

in recent years on all the major EU institutions. In the first half of 2009, the Czech presidency of the Council was almost derailed by Eurosceptic forces in the main ruling party and by parochial domestic rivalries, which brought about the fall of the incumbent government. In the 2009 European elections, strongly Eurosceptic parties attracted large sections of the electorate in some countries: roughly a third of voters in Austria and the Netherlands, a quarter in the UK (without including the Tories) and a fifth in France. Above all, turnout reached a historic low (43 per cent), which was interpreted as either indifference or hostility towards the EU among large numbers of voters. This seemed to affect the representativeness of the European Parliament (EP), precisely at a time when the German Constitutional Court, as discussed above, was questioning the ability of this institution to adequately represent voters (BVerfGE 2009:s.279). As far as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was concerned, it attracted intense criticism in 2008. Following several of its rulings involving internal market legislation, the ECJ was criticized by trade unions across the EU for undermining workers' and unions' rights. Furthermore, the authority of the ECJ was clearly contested in the German Constitutional Court's Lisbon ruling (see p.160). As regards the European Commission, the aftermath of the 2005 and 2008 referenda illustrated its difficulties in promoting the Union's general interest, in a context where any controversial proposal might fan Euroscepticism in the member states.

Furthermore, the two biggest achievements of the EU, the completion of the internal market and the eastern enlargement, have triggered backlash reactions in the last couple of years, which have been exacerbated by the financial and economic crisis that broke out in late 2008. The internal market, a core pillar of the EU, was threatened by protectionist tendencies, notably in France and the UK. While state aid to the automobile sector was made conditional upon the preservation of French jobs, British workers were demonstrating against the temporary transfer of Italian workers to plants in the UK. In parallel, surveys have highlighted the mixed feelings of public opinion towards the latest enlargements. While a large majority of citizens welcomed the resulting increased mobility within the enlarged EU, 56 per cent thought that enlargement had contributed to job losses in their country, and 50 per cent thought it had increased feelings of insecurity (FEB 257:23). Besides, xenophobic reactions against Romanian residents in Italy (in 2008) and Ireland (in 2009) have endangered the principle of the free movement of

persons in the EU. These reactions were reminiscent of French concerns over a potential 'invasion' of Polish service providers (the notorious 'Polish plumber') during the 2005 referendum campaign on the EU Constitutional Treaty.

Finally, the impact of the financial and economic crisis on the evolution of public support for continued integration is uncertain. For the time being, no uniform pattern has emerged. While the crisis seems to boost pro-European support in Sweden (to join the Eurozone) and in Iceland (for EU accession), public opinion in the UK seems to be evolving in an opposite direction. In the past, support for EC/EU membership declined after the two oil shocks of the 1970s and the economic recession of the early 1990s; today, there is uncertainty about the impact of prolonged economic recession on the evolution of support.

These different examples show that Euroscepticism is a generic and encompassing term, which applies to a large variety of actors and discourses.

Origins and definitions of the term

Euroscepticism is a rather recent term. It was not used during the first decades of European integration, when opponents of integration were referred to as nationalists, 'anti-marketeters' (for opponents to the common market in the UK) or simply as communists, Gaullists, etc. However, some of the core concepts of Eurosceptic discourse already existed, such as 'Eurocrat' – a term which appeared in French dictionaries in the mid-1960s (during the de Gaulle era) and which conveys the idea of a gap between European elites and the average citizen. Euroscepticism is a term that originated in a specific context, that of British public debate on the EC in the mid-1980s. First published in an article in *The Times* in 1985 (Harmsen and Spiering 2004), as the completion of the common market was about to become the top priority on the EC's agenda, it initially referred to the 'anti-marketeters', who at that time comprised most of the Labour party and a fringe of the Conservatives. It was popularized later by Margaret Thatcher's so-called 'Bruges speech', given in 1988 at the College of Europe. In this speech, which was to become a 'key building block in the development of British opposition to the European Union' (Usherwood 2004:5), Thatcher outlined the core tenets of her vision of the future of the EC. From the early 1990s on, as domestic debates on the EU

became increasingly polarized in the context of the Maastricht Treaty's ratification process, the term Euroscepticism expanded to continental Europe, where it became a 'catch-all' synonym for any form of opposition or reluctance towards the EU.

This reminder of the origin of the term highlights the first difficulty encountered when trying to define Euroscepticism: to what extent does it refer to a specifically British phenomenon? As explained later in the book, Euroscepticism has a specific meaning in the British context, where it refers to a form of cultural anti-Europeanism broader than 'EU-scepticism' (Harmsen and Spiering 2004). In fact, the meaning of Euroscepticism varies according to country context. While it always refers to some form of hostility towards the EU, this hostility does not necessarily apply to the same dimensions of European integration. For instance, Euroscepticism in Austria is driven, to a large extent, by negative perceptions of EU enlargement and opposition to Turkey's EU accession. In the UK, this dimension of Euroscepticism is not significant, as most Eurosceptic discourses express hostility towards a 'European super-state' and to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Similarly, Swedish public opinion displays a rather positive evaluation of the latest EU enlargements, compared with other older member states (FEB 257: 32–5), while being more reluctant towards political integration, notably in the field of foreign policy.

Second, the meaning of Euroscepticism also varies across time, as it evolves in parallel to the successive developments of the EU. Opposition to European integration in 1957 mainly implied opposition to the setting up of the common market; by contrast, opposition to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 amounted to hostility towards political integration (as embodied, for instance, by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)). In this respect, the notion of 'revisionists' can be used to refer to those Eurosceptics who oppose European integration as it evolved after the Maastricht Treaty (Flood and Usherwood 2007:6).

Third, Euroscepticism is a very plastic notion that originated in media discourse; like populism, it is compatible with any ideological position, from the extreme left to the extreme right. It is not an ideology: it does not express a single, stable set of ideas, putting forward a comprehensive worldview. Like populism, it also has a normative dimension, as it is often used in inter-party competition to disparage political competitors. Indeed, it is quite telling that even well-known Eurosceptics, such as Czech President Vaclav Klaus, do

not label themselves 'Eurosceptics' but rather 'Euro-critics' or 'Eurorealists' (as in the 2001 *Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism* presented by the Czech Civic Union (ODS), of which Klaus is a former leader). In this respect, the flurry of terms that have emerged in order to refer to different forms of Euroscepticism (Eurorejects, Europragmatists, Eurorealists, etc.) does not contribute to a clear understanding of the phenomenon.

Perhaps a useful starting point is the literal meaning of the term 'scepticism'. Historically, scepticism is a philosophy that developed in ancient Greece in the fourth century BC. Initially outlined by Pyrrhon, scepticism is a mindset: sceptics do not accept the validity of any belief or opinion *a priori*, without submitting it to a free and critical examination. The sceptic abstains from judgments and advocates distancing oneself from one's own opinions and beliefs. Scepticism developed in opposition to any form of dogma or theoretical thinking, to which sceptics opposed practical experience and common sense. In this respect, scepticism is a safeguard against intolerance and against the possible subversion of idealism into fanaticism. However, this mindset has its downsides. Indeed, sceptics have been accused of discrediting any form of universal truth or ethics, as their reliance on practical common sense has led them to emphasize the respect of local norms and traditions. The insistence of sceptics on respect for diversity against uniformity may lead to a form of moral relativism and conservatism.

If one retains this definition, Euroscepticism does not necessarily mean hostility towards European integration. Literally, Eurosceptics are those who submit the issue of European integration to a sceptical examination: support for European integration should not derive from any theoretical or normative belief (for instance, the belief that an ever closer union between the peoples of Europe is necessarily a good thing) but must be assessed on the basis of practical cost/gains analysis and according to its respect of national (political, cultural, normative) diversities. In this sense, the Eurosceptic opposes, to the 'dogma' of an ever closer union, a pragmatic stance, evaluating European integration on its merits.

However, in today's political and academic discourse, Euroscepticism has come to be equated with different forms of opposition to European integration. A seminal early definition proposed by Paul Taggart, and initially applied to Euroscepticism among political parties, equated Euroscepticism with 'contingent and conditional opposition to European integration as well as total

and unconditional opposition to it' (1998:364). This initial definition, which covered a broad range of attitudes towards the EU, was later broken down into two different forms of opposition by Taggart and Szcerbiak. Whereas 'hard Euroscepticism' refers to 'principled opposition to the EU and European integration' (as it is being articulated by those parties or actors advocating a withdrawal from the EU or opposing EU accession), 'soft Euroscepticism' expresses a 'qualified opposition' to the EU, reflecting dissatisfaction with EU policies or with the current EU trajectory perceived to be contrary to the national interest (Taggart and Szcerbiak 2002). Other typologies have been put forward, outlining different degrees of opposition to European integration, such as Kopecky and Mudde's (2002) distinction between Euroscepticism (expressing principled support for membership but dissatisfaction with the EU's current development) and Europhobia (expressing principled opposition and dissatisfaction), or Flood and Usherwood's six-point continuum of party positions, ranging from simple rejection of the EU to a maximalist position advocating a federal Europe (2007:6).

Before turning to the definition retained in this book, it is important to clarify, in Taggart and Szcerbiak's words, 'what Euroscepticism is not' (2003:12). The first question addressed by the two authors relates to dissatisfaction with one or several EU policies: can this be equated with Euroscepticism? To answer this question, they put forward a distinction between 'core' and 'peripheral' EU policies. For instance, while opposition to EMU or to major EU treaties can be equated with Euroscepticism, opposition to less central policies, such as the CFSP or the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), cannot. However, as the authors point out, the categorization of policies as core or peripheral depends on subjective perceptions. For instance, dissatisfaction with the CFP is widespread in the UK, while being a non-issue in other countries. Similarly, among French political elites, the CFSP is a core component of the traditional French understanding of the EU as a relevant power in international relations (the *Europe-puissance* concept). In a similar vein, as the authors point out, opposition to EU enlargement does not necessarily correlate with Eurosceptic orientations. While Euro-enthusiasts may oppose enlargement as a process that could dilute the EU and prevent institutional deepening, Eurosceptics may support it precisely for the same reasons. However, this is, again, a question of context and type of actor. While opposition to enlargement tends to be correlated with a more principled opposition to

further integration among national MPs (MNPs), it tends to be associated with pro-European positions (in the sense of institutional deepening) among Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) (Katz 2002:19). Consequently, in order to assess whether opposition to specific EU policies is an expression of a broader type of Euroscepticism, one has to analyze the actors' positions within their specific context.

The second question to be addressed is whether criticizing the EU 'for being insufficiently integrationist and/or undemocratic' is a form of Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szcerbiak 2003:15). As the two authors rightly point out, criticizing the EU for not being supranational or democratic enough cannot simply be equated with Euroscepticism. Indeed, to advocates of a federal Europe, the institutions of the European Economic Community (EEC) were not supranational enough and the European Communities, centred mainly on economic goals, did not live up to the plans of a political union. Eugen Kogon, a former anti-fascist and European federalist, expressed this disillusionment with the EEC when he wrote, in 1957, that the Rome treaties had little to do with the political unification of Europe (quoted in Loth 1989:602). More than thirty years later, federalist hopes were dashed again as the Maastricht Treaty set up the EU on the basis of a pillar structure, with reduced powers for supranational institutions in the second and third pillars. As a result, some advocates of a federal Europe, such as the Belgian Green Party, voted against the Maastricht Treaty (Taggart and Szcerbiak 2003:15, note 28). Similarly, one can criticize the EU for being insufficiently democratic because it is under-developed as a union of citizens. Typically, pro-Europeans who articulate this type of criticism call, for instance, for an extension of the powers of the EP as a way to democratize the EU. Such was the case for the British political scientist and former MEP David Marquand, author of the famous notion of the 'democratic deficit' (see Marquand 1979). Indeed, an intra-systemic criticism, what Flood and Usherwood call the 'reformist position' (2007:6), does not necessarily equate to Euroscepticism. What counts is how actors argue their position and which options they put forward in order to palliate the EU's shortcomings. Again, the issue of context is of crucial importance here. For instance, the notion of subsidiarity (which is now put forward as the panacea for the EU's alleged democratic shortcomings) does not have the same meaning in the 1984 Spinelli project for a European constitution, where it was a cornerstone of federal

Europe, as it does in the 2009 programme of the Bavarian Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU), where it is a code word for the repatriation of EU powers to states or regions. In a similar vein, references to 'freedom' in the British debate on the EU often denote a Eurosceptic position, as it stands for national independence against Brussels' authority.

Keeping these clarifications in mind, in the remainder of the book we will use the term 'hard Eurosceptic' (or 'anti-European') for those parties or actors who oppose EU membership as a principle. In contrast the generic term 'Eurosceptic' will be used for that broader range of groupings or individuals who accept the reality of EU membership, while expressing hostility or deep reluctance towards the 'basic political arrangements' (Easton 1975:437) underlying the EU political system, which they do not consider as fully legitimate, such as: the pooling of sovereignty; the delegation of state powers to supranational institutions; the primacy of EU law over national norms (including constitutions); and the underlying telos of an 'ever closer union' (as the first objective of the European Economic Community (EEC), mentioned in the preamble of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC)). Moreover, what Eurosceptic discourses often have in common is a non-acceptance of the *sui generis* character of the EU as a union 'of states and citizens' (which distinguishes the EU from interstate international organizations). Those who conceive of EU citizenship and a (hypothetical) post-national democracy as consubstantially illegitimate might be qualified as Eurosceptic. Finally, we qualify as Eurosceptic those parties (essentially from the radical right or radical left) who do not explicitly oppose EU membership, while nevertheless questioning, to varying degrees, the core values on which the Union is based (for instance, market economy, free competition and non-discrimination).

Objectives and thesis of the book

This book aims at providing the reader with an understanding of the dynamics underlying opposition to European integration. By doing so, it pursues a twofold objective. First, there is a need to clarify current debates on Euroscepticism and to debunk widespread, misleading and often normative assumptions about this phenomenon. Current developments in European integration have attracted a lot of political and media attention on Euroscepticism, often leading

to the diffusion of mistaken or un-nuanced views on the issue. Examples include the commonly held assumptions that there has been a general decline in public support for European integration since Maastricht, that Eurosceptics are necessarily 'losers' of the Europeanization and globalization processes, or that voters are more Eurosceptic than political elites. Thus, the book also aims at providing answers to simple questions, such as: Do latest EU referenda and declining turnout at European elections express voters' views on the EU or do they mainly express protest against governments? How can cross-country differences in levels of Euroscepticism be explained? Why are women more Eurosceptic than men? And so on.

Secondly, the study of Euroscepticism has generated a vast and rapidly expanding library of materials from such disciplines as political science, political sociology, history, media and communication studies, cultural studies, and translation studies, to name a few. This diversity of perspectives on Euroscepticism has shed light on the different facets of Euroscepticism. This book aims to be the first attempt to bring together and connect these different perspectives, in order to offer a comprehensive analysis of Euroscepticism, as it is being articulated by a variety of actors (political parties and voters, the media, national institutions, civil society organizations, etc.).

In this respect, I argue that Euroscepticism is too often viewed either as a marginal phenomenon articulated by non-mainstream actors (such as protest-based parties or the tabloid press) or as an irrational behaviour on the part of ignorant voters, who 'vote against Europe' in order to sanction national governments. Consequently, it is often analyzed exclusively as the expression of an 'elite/public' divide. By contrast, this book argues that public Euroscepticism is embedded in a much wider context, in which mainstream political elites, national institutions and domestic mass media act as filters of collective perceptions of 'Europe'. Indeed, successive chapters highlight the mainstream dimension of Euroscepticism, as it is articulated by government parties' leaderships, the quality press, and other entities.

Moreover, it argues that students of Euroscepticism must widen their perspective across time and space. From a chronological point of view, collective perceptions of the EU are influenced by different temporalities: that of accession processes but also countries' relationships with 'Europe' in the course of history. From a spatial point of view, perceptions of the EU are influenced not only by national

Conclusion

In analyzing developments in European governance, this chapter has shown how Euroscepticism, among other trends, has contributed to the decreasing centrality of key aspects of supranational decision-making, as it was understood in the foundational period of the EC. Moreover, it has highlighted the possible impact of Euroscepticism on processes of geographical spill-over and has shown how different expressions of Euroscepticism are intertwined with a more global competition between different views on international governance.

The impact of Eurosceptics, however, is by no means limited to attempts to block or paralyze the process of European integration. As the chapter argues, Eurosceptics have prompted attempts to make the EU more democratic and more efficient by exposing the limits of functional legitimacy and by questioning inefficient policy status quos. Furthermore, for scholars of democracy, the phenomenon of public Euroscepticism is also a warning. As analyzed later in the book, it is one of the many symptoms of the malaise of democracy and highlights how market integration processes at regional or global levels influence state/society relations and citizens' orientations towards institutions of representative democracy.

Chapter 2

Varieties of Euroscepticism

This chapter starts by outlining a broad historical overview of the emergence and evolution of Euroscepticism in the course of European integration, before putting forward a typology of different varieties of Euroscepticism, illustrating its changing nature over time.

Four different varieties of Euroscepticism are distinguished: utilitarian Euroscepticism, which expresses scepticism as to the gains derived from EU membership at individual or country level; political Euroscepticism, which illustrates concerns over the impact of European integration on national sovereignty and identity; value-based Euroscepticism, which denounces EU 'interference' in normative issues; and cultural anti-Europeanism, which is rooted in a broader hostility towards Europe as a continent and in distrust towards the societal models and institutions of European countries.

Euroscepticism across time: a historical overview

One can distinguish two stages in the development of Euroscepticism from the early days of European integration to the present day.

From the 1950s to the mid-1980s: the marginalization of Euroscepticism

To begin with, it should be noted that, contrary to widespread assumptions, Euroscepticism is first and foremost a phenomenon to be found among national political elites. In the early 1950s, political Euroscepticism – defined as opposition to the setting up of a supranational institutional system – was indeed a mainstream, if not predominant, view among western European political elites, even in continental Europe (see pp.102–3).

However, during the following decades (the 1960s and 1970s up until the mid-1980s), Euroscepticism was dampened by three

factors. First, the institutions of the EEC were less supranational than those of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which contributed to reducing opposition to supranationalism. Moreover, the authority of the European Commission was further circumscribed by President de Gaulle's nationalism during the so-called Empty Chair crisis of 1965. Second, this period was characterized by the absence of major institutional reforms, as integration progressed mainly through the less visible logic of the Europeanization of domestic law. Third, domestic party systems during that period were still relatively stable, as mainstream political parties were not challenged by 'new politics' parties articulating a Eurosceptic discourse.

The end of the 1980s: the real shift

The second period started after the signature of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. This period marked the beginning of the end of the hard-won, pro-integration consensus among national political elites. The SEA, which aimed at completing the common market by eliminating non-tariff barriers to free trade (thus creating the internal market), was indeed the last stage of the integration process which remained relatively consensual. At the same time, the SEA already entailed the seeds of future contestation: the extension of QMV in the Council of Ministers, the enlarged scope of the EEC's powers (in policy areas such as regional cohesion, health and safety at work, environmental protection, etc.) and the enhanced role for the Commission, implied by the highly ambitious goal of completing the common market. Soon after the signature of the SEA, a debate started emerging on the limits of European integration, as political elites divided over two core issues: the extent to which the internal market should be regulated (or remain a mere free-trade area with a common external tariff) and the transformation of the EEC into a political union. In that respect, Euroscepticism is first and foremost the consequence of a lack of consensus among elites on the goals of integration.

The famous 1988 Bruges speech by Margaret Thatcher was a landmark in that evolution. In this speech, the British Prime Minister clearly spelled out the concerns of those who did not want integration to go beyond the SEA, by rejecting any attempt at developing regulatory competences at EC level (beyond the area of competition policy) and by opposing any form of political union

implying, for instance, a common foreign and defence policy. A milestone in the re-emergence of Euroscepticism in public debate on integration, the Bruges speech crystallized trends going far beyond the UK, as concerns were raised elsewhere in Europe over the extension of the EEC's powers. Indeed, at the same time a contentious debate on that issue emerged at a regional level in Germany. From the second half of the 1980s on, the German *Länder*, wary of a possible erosion of federalism and of their exclusive powers, started contesting the legitimacy of the EC's powers in fields such as occupational education, audiovisual services, environment, health, state aid, etc. The *Länder* succeeded in getting the subsidiarity principle inserted into the Treaty Establishing the EEC (TEC), through the SEA, with reference to environmental policy. That the subsidiarity principle was meant above all to limit the scope of the EEC's power was made clear by a resolution of the German *Bundesrat* in 1986, which specified that subsidiarity should not be used as a way to extend the EEC's powers.

These divisions culminated in controversies surrounding the Maastricht Treaty (1991). Indeed, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty proved especially difficult, as the Danish and French referenda in 1992 illustrated (with 50.7 per cent of No votes in Denmark and a very narrow margin of 51 per cent in favour of the treaty in France). In the UK, ratification was only secured in July 1993, as only about a quarter of MPs in the House of Commons voted in favour of ratification. Although certainly not federalist in its essence, the Maastricht Treaty did entail several provisions that came to crystallize strong opposition at domestic level: the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (together with the contentious status of the European Central Bank (ECB)); a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA); and EU citizenship. This, together with the symbolic transformation into a European Union, was rejected by those who advocated, and continue to advocate, a 'revisionist' position, namely going back to the previous stage of integration embodied by the SEA. Today, in fact, many among the Eurosceptics have never accepted the reforms entailed in Maastricht that, in their view, changed the nature of European integration by transforming it into an explicitly political project. At the same time, nevertheless, the Maastricht Treaty itself illustrated the reservations of a majority of governments towards a possible extension of the EU's power, as it elevated subsidiarity as the overarching principle delimiting the

scope of the EU's competences. In that respect, the treaty itself was indicative of a mainstreaming of Eurosceptic discourses which, in the post-Maastricht era, started being articulated by traditionally pro-European actors – not the least of whom was former Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who, in the aftermath of the French referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, denounced what he saw as the 'regulation fury' (*Regulierungswut*) of the EC (*Le Monde* 1992). This mainstreaming of Euroscepticism was also facilitated by the emerging discourse on the democratic deficit of the EU, which made Euroscepticism intellectually acceptable. Finally, changes in the international context of European integration favoured the re-emergence of political Euroscepticism. The Cold War had been a decisive stimulus in favour of western European unification and had contributed to mute some of the Euroscepticism of national political elites, as the EEC was seen as a bulwark against communism. With the end of the Cold War, this rationale for closer integration disappeared. To some, like Margaret Thatcher, for instance, this was a key argument against the necessity of political integration.

Since Maastricht, two developments have exacerbated Eurosceptics' concerns. First, the treaties that followed entailed significant developments in policy areas tightly linked to national sovereignty: cooperation in internal affairs (police and justice) started being 'communautarized' with the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), while the CFSP created by the Maastricht Treaty was complemented by the setting up of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) with the Nice Treaty (2001). Second, the 'constitutionalization process' of the EU proved highly divisive, as member states deeply disagreed on the content of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (drafted in 2000) and on the EU Constitutional Treaty (drafted by a convention between 2002 and 2003) which, by applying state-like concepts (such as constitution, laws, minister) to the EU, exacerbated concerns over the alleged transformation of the EU into a 'European super-state'.

This political Euroscepticism, however, is only one of the different varieties of Euroscepticism, as the following sections show.

Utilitarian Euroscepticism

Utilitarian Euroscepticism refers to scepticism about the gains derived from integration, or its distributional impacts, be it at an individual or collective level. This form of Euroscepticism was not

very present between the 1960s and the late 1980s, as European integration coincided, on the whole, with a period of economic growth. From the beginning of the 1990s on, however, increasing utilitarian scepticism at the public opinion level was matched by a parallel development at the elite level, as governments explicitly articulated critical utilitarian assessments of the EU. This trend was compounded by two factors: EMU and EU enlargement to less developed countries. The costs of integration, calls for a re-nationalization of the EU's distributive policies, and backlashes of economic nationalism increasingly permeated domestic public debates as governing parties articulated a more blunt expression of national interests.

EMU: changing perceptions about mutual benefits

The aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty coincided with more negative assessments of benefits derived from EC/EU membership at the public opinion level (see p.174). Although certainly triggered by the economic recession of the early 1990s, this evolution was compounded, in the course of the 1990s, by the implementation of EMU. Indeed, in comparison to the EU distributive policies that already existed at the time of Maastricht (the CAP, social and regional cohesion), EMU changed cost/benefit evaluations both at individual and national levels. It contributed to changing perceptions about European integration as a mutually beneficial, win-win process.

With the need to meet the convergence criteria (including budgetary discipline, which is supervised by the European Commission), the EU became increasingly associated with public spending cutbacks. As Eichenberg and Dalton write, 'the Maastricht Treaty brought the EU into the area of *domestic redistribution*' (2007:132). As a consequence, the EU was increasingly associated with less protection in the eyes of many citizens, whereas member states remained the only providers of social welfare. Moreover, the introduction of the Euro contributed to more negative utilitarian appraisals of membership at the public opinion level, as it was associated with inflation. For example, before the 2005 Dutch referendum, more than 90 per cent of those polled thought that prices had gone up as a result of the introduction of the Euro (Aarts and van der Kolk 2006:244). Moreover, EMU clearly polarized domestic public debate on integration in some countries, while

antagonizing large segments of public opinion. This was the case in the 1990s for instance, in the UK, where debates on EMU during the 1991 general elections radicalized Euroscepticism among segments of the Conservative party, while roughly two-thirds of citizens were opposed to it (Alexandre-Collier 2000:136).

On a national level, EMU also contributed to changing perceptions about the 'winners' and 'losers' of integration, as some countries perceived themselves as being disadvantaged by EMU. This was most notably the case in Germany (at least for public opinion, which was strongly attached to the Deutsche Mark) but also, more recently, in the Netherlands. Indeed, during the campaign preceding the 2005 referendum, the widespread belief that the national currency (the guilder) had been undervalued during the shift to the Euro – and thus was 'sold' too cheaply – contributed to the idea that the country as a whole did not benefit largely from European integration (Aarts and van der Kolk 2006:244). The second impact of EMU on collective assessments of integration is linked to budgetary discipline, especially that deriving from the Stability and Growth Pact. According to the Pact, the Commission can recommend that the Council of Ministers give a warning (and possibly also financial sanctions) to a member state that does not respect the commonly agreed budgetary discipline. Even if only ministers can ultimately sanction another member state, the Commission's public warnings against national budgetary laxness have created an uproar in some member states. In 2001, for instance, the European Commission's criticism of Ireland's budgetary policy was harshly rebutted by then Finance Minister Charlie McCreevy (Kennedy and Sinnott 2007:67). Moreover, the inefficiency of the Stability and Growth Pact's sanctioning mechanism – especially the fact that large countries, like France and Germany, have not been sanctioned despite budgetary laxness – gave credence, especially in some smaller countries, to the idea that EMU implied an unequal distribution of efforts and costs among countries.

The costs of integration and calls for re-nationalization

Reforms conducted in order to respect the convergence criteria also exacerbated emerging debates on the costs of integration in some member states, especially among the strongest net contributors to the EU budget. Here, the 1984 quarrel over the EC budget, triggered by Margaret Thatcher, initiated a trend that would affect future

debates on the EU budget by legitimizing the discourse on the membership that every country was entitled to expect from EC – an emerging discussion in Germany, initiated in the first half of the 1980s, as Germany was increasingly portrayed as 'paymaster of the Community' in domestic public debate (Schild 2001:339). In the Netherlands, another big net contributor to the EU budget, debates on the costs of EU membership emerged in 1998–99, as the government announced that it hoped to secure a reduction of the Dutch contribution (Harmsen 2004:100). The same issue later became a cornerstone of public debate during the 2005 referendum.

These debates, which have to be analyzed in the context of EU enlargement, triggered calls for a re-nationalization of the EU's distributive policies. In the Netherlands, for instance, Frits Bolkestein (a leading figure of the liberal-conservative VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie – People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) who later became EU Commissioner), from the early 1990s on asked for a fundamental reform of the CAP and the structural funds, while opposing the social chapter of the treaty; mechanisms of redistribution, in his view, should be limited to the national level (quoted in Harmsen 2004:105). In Germany, calls for a re-nationalization of the structural funds, which were first articulated by regional politicians, have been taken over at national level by the two main parties, the Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU) and the Sozial-demokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), since the early 2000s (SPD 2001; CDU-CSU 2002).

Calls for a re-nationalization of the EU's distributive policies found much echo in the context of the 2004 enlargement. Indeed, at the turn of the twenty-first century, opposition to EU enlargement (and to the costs associated with it) was increasingly articulated by mainstream political parties, as was the case during the 2001 Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty, the Italian general elections that same year (as hostility to enlargement was articulated by Forza Italia) or in the Dutch general elections in 2002 (as some leaders from the liberal, governing party VVD questioned the economic benefits of enlargement (Van Ham 2002:3)). Other EU policies, which do not rely on a redistributive logic, continue to be perceived as entailing indirect and significant redistributive consequences at the expense of some member states. Such is the case with the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in the UK and the problem of quota-hopping by Spanish fishermen (who register their boats as

British in order to benefit from the fishing quotas allocated to the UK), at the expense of their British counterparts. The Factortame ruling of the ECJ (1991), which declared the national law that had been passed to prevent this practice as being incompatible with EU legislation, aroused Eurosceptic sentiments and prompted calls for a re-nationalization of the GPP in the UK.

Parallel to these developments, it became increasingly clear that market-making policies, such as competition, had far-reaching economic and political implications at the domestic level. Thus, the European Commission was increasingly confronted, in the course of the 1990s, with backlashes of economic nationalism, as governments tried to prevent the liberalizing impact of EU law on sensitive sectors, notably in the field of competition law and, especially, state aid. This issue became highly political in Germany, as the Commission started to scrutinize state aid to regional banks (*Landesbanken*), whose public service mission is to promote regional development but which, in practice, also compete with private banks (Smith 1999:40).

Bringing the national interest back in

In such a context, domestic public debates on integration became increasingly influenced by calls for a more explicit articulation of the 'national interest', notably in those founding countries of the EC where the pro-European consensus of political elites had been strong in previous decades. In the Netherlands, for instance, from the end of the 1990s on, mainstream politicians like Frits Bolkestein called for a reaffirmation of Dutch national interests in the EU (what he called a 'cultural break') (Harmsen 2004:107). In Italy, leaders of Forza Italia made similar statements (Leconte 2005:40).

Political Euroscepticism

Political Euroscepticism can be defined as principled opposition or defiance towards the setting up of a supranational institutional system, the delegation of powers to supranational institutions beyond a limited core of policies (internal market, competition policy) and to the principle of the pooling of sovereignties. As mentioned previously, this form of Euroscepticism underlay much of the opposition to the early stages of integration in the 1950s. However, from the mid-1960s until the end of the Eighties, it

remained confined to minority groups; integration in that period was perceived as being essentially legal and economic. At the turn of the 1990s, however, and especially with the Maastricht Treaty, political Euroscepticism gained ground for several reasons.

EU citizenship: the spectre of double allegiance

One of the most controversial provisions of the Maastricht Treaty was the creation of EU citizenship. It was indeed the cornerstone of much of the anti-Maastricht opposition, especially in Denmark, France and the UK (precisely those countries where, two decades earlier, elites had been most opposed to the direct elections of MEPs).

Although certainly not revolutionary, since some of the rights it entails existed before the Maastricht Treaty, EU citizenship awoke a deep-rooted distrust towards 'double allegiance', that is, a fear that EU citizenship might compete with national citizenship and that citizens might give precedence to the former over the latter in cases of conflict between the two (Weiler 1995:22). Here again, Margaret Thatcher was among those who most clearly spelled out this concern when she declared, during the ratification debate on the Maastricht Treaty in the House of Lords in June 1993, that 'If there is a citizenship, you would all owe a duty of allegiance to the new Union ... There would be a duty to uphold its laws. What will happen if the allegiance to the Union comes into conflict with allegiance to our own country? How would the European Court find then? The Maastricht Treaty gives this new European Union all the attributes of a sovereign state' (quoted in Koslowski 1999:166). In Denmark also, the alleged infringement of EU citizenship on national sovereignty and identity contributed to the failure of the first referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. This is why, in December 1992, the European Council, in order to pave the way for a second referendum in Denmark, 'took cognizance' of a Danish declaration stating that 'citizenship of the Union is a political and legal concept which is entirely different' from national citizenship and does not aim to create 'a citizenship of the Union in the sense of citizenship of a nation-state' (Council of the European Union 1992).

In France, the symbolic threat posed by EU citizenship was compounded by additional concerns linked to the right to vote and be elected in municipal elections granted to non-national, EU residents. Things were made more complex by the fact that members of

the upper house of the national parliament, the Senate, are elected by delegates of municipalities and by members of the lower house, the National Assembly. Consequently, non-French EU citizens, if elected mayors or deputy mayors, might have participated in the election of the members of one of the Parliament's two chambers. This led not only extreme right, but also mainstream politicians from the Gaullist party *Rassemblement pour la République (RPR)* (well-known figures such as Charles Pasqua and Alain Juppé, for instance), to reject EU citizenship as 'unacceptable' (quoted in Koslowski, 1999:167). Eventually, a bill excluding EU citizens from the functions of mayor and deputy mayor and from participation in senatorial elections was passed.

In 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty added a specification to provisions on EU citizenship, explicitly stating that 'citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship'. Moreover, during the 1997 IGC, audacious proposals aimed at extending EU citizenship rights, notably by the Austrian and Italian governments (such as a citizens' initiative and the 'right to receive an education taking account of the common heritage of European civilization') were rejected by other member states (Agence Europe 1986).

Against the flag: hostility to European identity and EU symbols

Underlying the hostility towards EU citizenship is indeed a deep reluctance towards concepts such as 'European identity' or European culture. The idea that European integration might imply the promotion of a shapeless and 'fake' European identity or culture underlies many Eurosceptic discourses. Here again, Margaret Thatcher's Euroscepticism clearly captured this feeling, as she declared in her 1988 Bruges speech: 'Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality' (1988:4). In this variant of Euroscepticism, European identity is often equated with a monstrous, shapeless mix where national identities get lost – a 'European conglomerate', in Thatcher's eyes, or 'a unitary, cultural and linguistic pulp that came out of Brussels bureaucrats' mincing machine', in those of former far-right leader Jörg Haider (quoted in Leconte 2003:157).

Indeed, since the second half of the 1980s, EC institutions have tried to promote a European cultural identity in order to boost popular support for integration and the common market. Parallel to this, efforts have been made to promote common EC/EU symbols aimed at fostering a common identity, such as the EU flag (which was hoisted for the first time as the Community flag in 1986), the European anthem (adopted in 1985), the European passport (introduced in 1985) and the selection of 9 May as commemoration day of the Schuman Declaration (since 1986). Such strategies aimed at coping with the deficit in common symbols that is often identified as one of the causes for the lack of public identification with the EU.

Nonetheless, these attempts have met with deep reluctance at member state level. As early as 1992, for instance, ministers of culture made it clear that EC actions in the sphere of culture should 'neither replace nor compete with' national and regional cultural policies (quoted in Pantel 1999:54). Reluctance towards EU action in the sphere of culture was also present during negotiations on the Amsterdam Treaty. An apparently minor change to Article 128 TEU specified that 'The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its actions under the provisions of this Treaty, in particular *in order to respect and promote the diversity of its cultures*' (emphasis added).

EU symbols have induced a similar opposition. The 1996 British debate on ID cards, as the British government decided to combine new British identity cards with the new European driver's licence, was illustrative of this, as it provoked a fierce debate about which symbols should appear on the cards. It had been preceded a few years earlier by a controversy over the 1985 European passport, which had encountered much hostility, not the least because of the strong symbolic value attached to this symbol of national identity in the UK (Smith 2004:53). Such debates are indicative of a larger debate on the compatibility between European and national identities. Other attempts at creating EU symbols have met strong resistance among the member states. For instance, the Commission's proposal to let athletes from all member states appear as one delegation during the opening ceremony of the Olympic games in Barcelona and Albertville was rejected by governments (Smith 2004:53). More recently, the institutionalization of the EU symbols (flag, anthem, motto, currency and commemoration day), which was operated by the EU Constitutional Treaty (Article I-8), had to be abandoned in the Lisbon Treaty because some governments opposed it.

Finally, some ECJ rulings on prosaic issues have affected symbols of national identity and/or culture. For instance, in a 1987 ruling (*Commission versus the Federal Republic of Germany*), the ECJ declared a German law defining requirements for beer purity as incompatible with EC legislation on the free movement of goods. Another well-known example is the 2002 ruling by an English court (applying EU law) on the application of the metric system by British shopkeepers, which gave rise to the 'metric martyrs' saga in the UK.

The 'democratic deficit': a Eurosceptic shift of a pro-European notion

Opposition to state-like symbols included in the Constitutional Treaty, not to mention the term 'constitution' itself, might also be seen as the superficial expression of a more meaningful debate about the implications of European integration for national democracy and about the democratic nature of the EU.

Like the now famous 'subsidiarity' concept, which had initially been referred to in a pro-European context (the 1984 EP's project for a Constitution for Europe), the 'democratic deficit' is a notion forged by a pro-European author. In 1979, David Marquand, writing in the context of the first direction election of MEPs, warned against the emergence of a possible 'democratic deficit', whose origin he saw in the difficulty of applying accountability to decisions made at EC level. To prevent such a scenario, he advocated an extension of QMV in the Council of Ministers (thus preventing national governments from hiding behind the unanimity rule), as well as legislative powers for the EP. Without such reforms, he argued, transferring more powers to the EC would lead to a deficit in accountability (Marquand 1979). This represented the pro-European side of the democratic deficit debate.

Nonetheless, during debates surrounding the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the 'democratic deficit' became a rallying cry for Eurosceptic discourses of various sorts. As Yves Mény writes:

We find a bit of everything in this mixed bag: academic 'learners' who subscribe to this analysis; judges, indeed supreme courts, such as the German Constitutional Court, searching in vain for a European 'demos'; British tabloids of the so-called gutter press but also reputable newspapers noted for their seriousness; Europeans convinced that they want more and more from

Europe; Eurosceptics overpleased with the argument and unhesitating (like some Gaullists) to be content with a skimpy democracy at home ... and, last but not least, numerous European parliamentarians wishing to reinforce rightful parliamentary powers. (2004:186)

Here again, the tone had already been set by Margaret Thatcher in 1988, as she declared: 'Working more closely does not require power to be centralised in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy ... We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels' (1988:5).

This rhetoric illustrated concrete fears dating back to the SEA negotiations, as the extension of QMV in the Council of Ministers implied increasing difficulties for national parliaments in their ability to scrutinize the European legislative process. Seeing themselves as the losers of European integration, to the benefit of the executives, many national parliaments asked for constitutional reforms between 1985 and 1990 in order to enhance their ability to keep track of the EC legislative process. Many of these measures were reinforced in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty (Judge 1995). However, in some countries, like the UK, legitimate concerns over the erosion of the national parliament's power merged with less justified criticism against EU-level unelected institutions (the Commission and the ECB) in the Eurosceptic discourse, as code words such as 'unelected bureaucracy', 'European super-state' and 'Brussels dictatorship' became core concepts of the Eurosceptic jargon (Teubert 2001).

Of all countries, it was probably in Germany that the debate about the consequences of European integration for national democracy was deepest. Indeed, it took on a constitutional dimension with the German Constitutional Court's 12 October 1993 judgment about the Maastricht Treaty. Whereas the Court estimated that the Maastricht Treaty was compatible with the Basic Law (a case which had been challenged by the plaintiffs on the grounds that EMU and CFSP were not compatible with the Basic Law), it nevertheless reserved its right to determine the limits of the primacy of EU law over national constitutional provisions in case of conflict between the two. In the Court's view, it was legitimate to do so as long as the EU was not a state meeting the standards of

national democracy, as there was neither an EU-level parliamentary democracy, nor an EU charter of fundamental rights. This judgment, which was welcomed by Eurosceptics across the EU, changed the scope of the democratic deficit discussion by launching a debate about the impact of European integration on national constitutions. In the German case, this issue added to concerns as to the possible erosion of federalism, as the latter has been seen as one of the fundamentals of democracy since 1949. As early as 1986, the debate in the German *Bundesrat* on the implications of the SEA for German federalism was indicative of concerns over the very principles underlying the national constitutional order, as was expressed by a Bavarian Minister: 'the *Länder* ... risk degenerat[ing] into mere administrative units depending upon Bonn and Brussels. This is our very constitutional order which is being questioned. The efforts to regulate more and more policy domains in a unified manner for the whole European Community fundamentally contradict the federal principle and the subsidiarity principle in the organisation of state and society. We are at a crossroads. Which path should the EC follow? Should it develop along a hierarchical, bureaucratic and centralist model or along a liberal, federalist model based on subsidiarity?' (quoted in Volmerange 1993:99).

The spill-over metaphor: an inescapable process?

As these concerns over the fundamentals of member states' constitutional orders illustrate, much of the democratic deficit discourse is rooted in the feeling that European integration is an inescapable process, potentially running out of the control of its constituent parts. This fear has been nurtured by the long-prevailing method of incremental integration in the absence of clarity over the EU's ultimate goals, by specific treaty provisions and by the communication style of EU institutions.

As early as 1965, French President Charles de Gaulle had provoked what became known as the Empty Chair crisis in order to contest the principle of an automatic extension of the scope of QMV voting, which was enshrined in the TEC. In a similar vein, the Maastricht provisions on EMU, which include a schedule in which the monetary union goes on automatically to the next stage, were criticized, notably by the British Parliament, on the grounds that this did not allow for an adequate oversight of the process by national legislators. In a similar vein, the silence of the treaties on the much-debated question of the

right to secession, i.e. whether a member state can legally leave the European Union, has long underlain Eurosceptic discourses (a claim that the Lisbon Treaty counters by providing a legal basis for a member state to leave the Union).

Moreover, the communication style of EU institutions has contributed to ingraining the perception that integration is an irreversible and inescapable process. For instance, analyses of the European Commission's communication documents during the Delors presidency have highlighted the neo-functional, spill-over-oriented and deductive style of the Commission's discourse. Based on precise deadlines, and on the 'motor' or 'engine' metaphor used to depict European integration, they seemed to try to convince European citizens of the ineluctable character of European integration, thus heightening concerns about the process possibly spiralling out of control.

Value-based Euroscepticism

Value-based Euroscepticism (Madeley and Sitter 2005:13) refers to the perception that EU institutions unduly interfere in matters where not only strongly held collective and societal preferences, but, more fundamentally, value systems, are at stake (for instance, issues such as abortion, divorce, minorities' rights, the balance between individual liberties and public order, and so on). This form of resentment towards the EU originates in the idea that, as the integration process spills over into new policy domains, the EU is exerting a growing and allegedly illegitimate influence on issues that are 'socially constructed and culturally bound' (Weiler 1995:7). These concerns are compounded by the extension of the scope of QMV, which awakens fears of being outvoted on highly symbolic and deeply polarizing normative issues. Although some of these issues do not belong to the scope of the EU's powers (such as abortion), the implementation of EU law, under the supervision of the ECJ, can indirectly impact them. Like other forms of Euroscepticism, value-based Euroscepticism was always present in debates on integration but has been gaining in relevance along with three developments.

Developments in normative integration

The first development relates to the completion of the internal market, as the case law of the ECJ has progressively clarified the

far-reaching consequences of the implementation of the four freedoms of circulation (goods, capital, workers and services) for a range of issues which, albeit not pertaining to the scope of the EU's powers, are affected by the principle of free circulation. A good example of this is the 1991 ECJ ruling in the *Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan and Others* case, in which the ECJ stated that an abortion performed according to the law of the member state in which it is performed constituted a service within the meaning of Article 50 of the TEC. This ruling triggered a vociferous debate in Ireland, as some saw it as an infringement of domestic legislation on abortion. Another striking example is that of the 1997 ECJ ruling on Swedish legislation on the sale of alcohol, as the ECJ stated that, although a state monopoly on the sale of alcohol could be justified to protect public health, the restriction of alcohol imports to a limited number of licenced importers violated the rules of the internal market.

Second, value-based Euroscepticism has gained ground following the mainstreaming of human rights in several EU policies. Significant legislative and policy innovations have occurred, especially since the mid-1990s, in a variety of policy areas that have strong implications in terms of ethics, including the fight against racism, anti-discrimination, the mainstreaming of human rights in Justice and Home Affairs. This evolution was reflected in the treaty itself (with Article 13 TEC on non-discrimination) and in ensuing secondary EU law (with directives aimed at combating different forms of discrimination). It has been embodied, notably, by the drafting of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, whose scope and legal status have been highly debated among governments. Among its most contested provisions, the Charter includes provisions on non-discrimination, social rights (which were the most contentious, notably the right to work) and minimum requirements in criminal law (concerning, for example, defendants' rights). Here again, some ECJ rulings clarifying the reach of EU legislation, notably on non-discrimination, have spurred criticism that the EU is overstepping the scope of its powers and unduly questioning long-established norms or *acquis*, which often have historical significance in national contexts. Examples include a 2000 ruling in which the ECJ declared that the prohibition on women serving in the German army from engaging in combat operations (a prohibition which was enshrined in the Basic Law) violated EU legislation on non-discrimination. This ruling was harshly criticized by the Bavarian CSU on the

grounds that 'this question ... is a political, societal choice which should be decided only by German constitutional organs entitled with democratic legitimacy. It is unacceptable that the EU takes this decision out of the hands of national organs.' In the eyes of the CSU, this represented a drift of the EU away from its original design: 'EU law is intruding more and more in lifestyle choices, thus affecting sectors that are not purely economic' (Bocklet 2000).

Third, developments in the fields of criminal and, to a lesser extent, civil justice cooperation have also contributed to value-based Euroscepticism. Here, the Amsterdam Treaty represents a watershed in three respects. First, it not only foresees closer cooperation in criminal matters, but also the harmonization of member states' criminal law, when necessary. Second, it endows the ECJ, for the first time, with interpretative powers in the field of cooperation in criminal matters. Third, it aims at enhancing the mutual recognition of judicial decisions. As Ingolf Pernice states, in view of future developments foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty on police cooperation and the setting up of a EU public prosecutor office: 'Since the Amsterdam Treaty the EU changes its face. It becomes a political union in a new sense ... Will this eventually lead to the loss of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force hereto enjoyed by the member states?' (2005:6). Such developments have come up against strong resistance at the domestic level. For instance, the reluctance of member states' governments to approximate legislations in criminal law, in the name of national sovereignty, has long impeded important legislative proposals, such as the Council framework decisions on combating racism and xenophobia and on the procedural rights of defendants in criminal proceedings.

Opposition to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

The adoption of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, especially, has been met with strong resistance at the domestic level, triggering reactions inside both governments and political parties.

To begin with, fierce opposition to the Charter (either by opposition parties, in the case of the UK, or by incumbent parties, in the Polish case) has prompted the British and Polish governments to negotiate a derogatory status regarding the Charter. A protocol agreed upon at the Brussels European Council of 21–22 June 2007, which was annexed to the Lisbon Treaty, states that neither the ECJ, nor national courts in the UK, will be able to declare 'national laws,

regulations or administrative provisions, practices or actions' as being incompatible with the Charter (Council of the European Union 2007:25). In the case of the Polish delegation, the centrality of normative concerns clearly appears in the unilateral declaration granted to the Polish government by the European Council, which states that 'the Charter does not affect the right of Member States to legislate in the spheres of public morality, family law as well as the protection of human dignity and respect for human physical and moral integrity' (p. 25). In a similar logic, following the 1991 disputed ECJ ruling related to abortion, the Irish government succeeded in getting a protocol annexed to the treaties (Protocol No. 7 to the TEU and TEC), stating that 'nothing [in the treaties] shall affect the application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3. of the Constitution of Ireland' (which acknowledges 'the right to life of the unborn').

At party level, both non-mainstream and mainstream political parties in several member states campaigned against the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, notably in opposition to the Charter. The core of the argument was that, by giving legally binding force to the Charter, whose implementation could be submitted to the jurisdiction of the ECJ, the Constitutional Treaty would allow the Union to challenge domestic legislation on family and matrimonial matters, sexual minorities' and immigrants' rights, and in criminal law. This gave rise to two sorts of value-based Euroseptic discourses. Among radical right-wing parties (such as the League of Polish Families, the Italian Northern League, and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)), the EU Charter was portrayed as entailing a risk of 'moral corruption' by allegedly empowering sexual or religious minorities. Among mainstream political parties, opposition to the Charter originated in two concerns: first, that social rights included in the Charter might harm the competitiveness of European companies; second, that provisions on non-discrimination and defendants' rights would threaten national self-determination in the fields of immigration and criminal justice, as was argued, for instance, by the British Conservatives.

Finally, value-based Eurosepticism is also present in some segments of public opinion, especially in countries where national legislation on such issues as abortion is rather restrictive. For instance, during the first Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty, the perception that EU law might affect domestic legislation on divorce and abortion in Ireland not only affected turnout by motivating

people (either pro- or anti-abortion) to turn out to vote, it also induced some voters, notably women, to vote against the treaty (Sinnott 2001:19).

Cultural anti-Europeanism

The last form of Eurosepticism originates in scepticism towards 'Europe' as a civilization, as a historical and cultural entity. Here, EU scepticism is rooted in a deeper, cultural scepticism towards Europe in a broader sense, which can be defined as 'anti-Europeanism'.

There are two variants of this form of scepticism. In the first variant, 'Europe', as such, does not exist. By trying to bring closer peoples that neither share a common history, nor a political culture, proponents of European integration wrongly presuppose that there is something called 'Europe'. In the absence of a shared ethnic identity between the peoples of Europe, integration beyond a mere free trade area does not make sense. In the second variant, 'Europe' – or rather continental Europe – is portrayed as an entity with homogeneous values, norms and preferences that are deemed incompatible with national preferences and traditions. From this perspective, European integration is but one expression of wider processes of Europeanization/homogenization/globalization that are to be rejected because they could prove corrosive to national values.

Scepticism towards Europe as a historical and cultural entity

A first variant of this anti-Europeanism consists in saying that 'Europe' as a concept lacks complete historical and/or cultural validity. Lacking a consensus as to its geographical limits, the meaning of 'Europe' has varied so much across time and space that one can question its validity. Moreover, Europe as a civilization, if it ever existed, has always been intermeshed with other civilizations and/or cultures, be they Arabic, Turkish or Asian. As a consequence, Europe does not have a common past, nor is a history of Europe conceivable.

This kind of scepticism, which has been called 'historiographic Eurosepticism' (Carbonell 1999:1), also leads to scepticism towards European integration as it materialized in the course of the 1950s, with the ECSC and later the EEC. Indeed, from that perspective,

'Europe' was nothing more than successive failed attempts at its unification and the then integration through the EEC would not escape that fate. A 1967 essay by a French journalist about the history of Europe clearly captures this argument by stating: 'The account of European history is easy to do: there was never something called Europe ... It is now up to the present bureaucratic Europe to try and do better than assemble bits of a continent ... Three thousand years have not been long enough to unify the continent. Secular and religious princes, conquerors and dreamers have failed. Bureaucracy can only sketch out caricatures of Europe' (Sédillot 1967, quoted in Carbonell 1999:15).

This argument about an inescapable diversity is often present in today's Eurosceptic discourses. It was articulated, for instance, by advocates of the Mediterranean Union Project, who rebutted the criticism the German government levelled at the project; the latter expressed concerns that it would split the EU. The strongly Eurosceptic French website Voxlatina was one of them, as it stated: 'By imposing her views of a downgraded Mediterranean project, the German Chancellor has shown an obsessive denial of reality, namely division ... Indeed, whether one likes it or not, Europe is (already) divided! Just as there are still two Germans cohabiting side by side despite reunification, divided by differences of mentality and economic development, there are at least two Europe(s). Everyone knows the dividing lines between those two Europe(s): the division, dating back two thousand years, between Romanic peoples and non-Romanic ones and, later, the division between Protestants and Catholics' (Mignot 2008).

In the eyes of some Eurosceptics, it is precisely this lack of shared history, together with the more general absence of a shared ethnic identity, that prevents the EU from becoming a democratic, political union.

Scepticism towards a European political identity

Indeed, scepticism towards Europe as a cultural entity underlies much of the scepticism and the hostility towards a possible European political identity. Much of this intellectual resistance towards the possibility of a democracy at a European level was fostered by two elements in the Maastricht period: the creation of an EU citizenship and the 12 October 1993 'Maastricht judgment' of the German Constitutional Court. This kind of scepticism has also been expressed in reaction to the writings of Jürgen Habermas, who,

as early as 1992, argued that the formation of a European political identity based on a European equivalent of 'constitutional patriotism' was both possible and desirable. Besides, Habermas argued, a democracy at a European level was conceivable if a European public sphere and a unified party system emerged (Habermas 1992). Since the Maastricht developments, this thesis has been contradicted by intellectuals and politicians on two grounds.

The first argument consists in saying that cultural homogeneity is a pre-condition for the emergence of a common political identity and a democracy at EU level. In the absence of a shared ethnic identity (embodied in history, mythology, language, religion, social traditions, etc.), such developments are not possible. Even the definition of shared fundamental rights can be a conflict-ridden process, as the understanding of those rights might vary from one country to another (for example, the right to free speech). Moreover, since elements of ethnicity are deemed necessary for the development of democracy, a democracy at the EU level is allegedly not conceivable. An offshoot of that argument is the so-called 'no-demos thesis', i.e. the idea that a European demos is not conceivable in the absence of a shared ethnic identity. This argument underlay the German Constitutional Court's judgment on Maastricht (see pp.155–6).

The second argument consists in saying that, as the emergence of democracy and the construction of the nation are tightly interlinked historically, they cannot be dissociated. Thus, legal or constitutional patriotism cannot take root in a non-national context. In France, for instance, this critique is articulated, often with strong Eurosceptic undertones, by republican, left-wing essayists and politicians such as Jean-Pierre Chevènement (for an overview of this literature, see Lacroix 2005). However, it is also articulated by right-wing, liberal politicians, for example the late Lord Dahrendorf, member of the British House of Lords. As he declared, 'Democracy is tightly linked to the nation-state. The nation-state is the only context in which representative, parliamentary democracy, based on debate, can work. Europe is not democratic. The European Parliament does not produce democracy. We have no European public sphere in which we can seriously debate in a democratic way' (quoted in Leconte 2003:455).

The rejection of wider processes of Europeanization

Cultural anti-Europeanism also expresses itself through the rejection of wider processes of Europeanization that are not linked

directly to the implementation of EU law but to broader, long-term sociological transformations affecting national societies. From this perspective, European integration is seen as one trend among others, which facilitates the circulation of debates, ideas, and practices across borders, thus fostering societal change. Increasingly, indeed, domestic public debates on issues such as welfare state reform or ethical issues such as euthanasia, stem cell research and drug policy are influenced by references to other national models and/or legislation, both within and outside the EU (for instance, Switzerland on the issue of euthanasia). Further on, the emergence of a deliberative space in the EU, for instance in the EP, enhances such a development. This was the case, for instance, for debates on reproductive rights (European Parliament 2002a) and discussions relating to the financing of stem cell research with EU funds in 2006.

These issues are not decided at an EU level but have been fiercely debated in the EP. This is why, to some Eurosceptics, European integration is seen as entailing a risk of degeneration (moral, cultural, political) of national societies, infusing them with corrosive values. This discourse partly overlaps the rhetoric articulated both by radical right- and left-wing parties, which presents Europeanization and European integration as forms of 'Americanization' and/or globalization. Similarly, in the eyes of Eurosceptics, the EU (and the ECJ) and the Council of Europe (and the European Court of Human Rights) both contribute to unwanted processes of Europeanization of national law and societies and are equally disliked as unwanted infringements of national sovereignty, notably on high-profile human rights issues. As one observer of British debate on European integration observed, 'These two Europe[s] have sometimes tended to become conflated in Eurosceptic discourse' (Drewry 2007:102), a phenomenon which is compounded by existing cooperation between the two organizations.

Distrust of European countries

A founding father of the Eurobarometer, Jacques-René Rabier, has emphasized the significance of mutual trust in the process of integration, as a form of social or 'horizontal' integration (Rabier 1977). This dimension of integration becomes increasingly relevant, for instance, with the creation of a European judicial area, which implies mutual trust in national judicial systems. Eurobarometer surveys investigating citizens' preferences indicate that there is relatively

widespread distrust of other countries' judicial systems among EU citizens, which might affect cooperation in civil justice in the EU (SEB 292:29). This distrust can be equated with another form of anti-Europeanism originating in the depreciation of other countries' institutions and political systems.

As we shall see in the next chapter, this type of anti-Europeanism is especially present in British Eurosceptic discourses, which are often underlain by deep mistrust towards continental European countries' welfare states and institutions. This type of anti-Europeanism is also widespread among Eurosceptics in the United States. In his study on Euroscepticism in the United States, for instance, Chamorel shows that Euroscepticism (defined as hostility towards the EU or its main policies) is rooted in a deeper hostility towards European politics, diplomacy, culture and economics (which he calls 'anti-Europeanism') (2006: 166–7). The idea that the EU is built on continental European values alien to US traditions permeates, for instance, the hostility of neo-conservatives towards the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is accused of 'greatly expanding the scope of state power' (McNamara 2006:5). Moreover, in the case of neo-conservatives, Euroscepticism is linked to the historical legacy of the 'Munich syndrome' (referring to European democracies' appeasement diplomacy towards Nazi Germany in the 1930s) (Vaisse 2004:453). This stereotypical view of Europe's alleged moral laxness and cowardice towards dictators resurfaced during the 2003 military intervention in Iraq, as this comment illustrates: 'Americans just don't trust Europe's political judgment. Appeasement is its second nature. Europeans have never met a leader, Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, Quaddafi, Khomeini, Saddam, they didn't think could be softened up by concessions' (Mead 2002).

This form of anti-Europeanism is not limited to English-speaking countries, however. It is also present in the discourse of Dutch soft Eurosceptics, like Frits Bolkestein, who argued that the '[Dutch] individualistic and open, democratised culture shares greater similarities with Canada than with Italy' (quoted in Harmsen 2004:10).

Ethnocentrism and xenophobia

In some cases, this type of anti-Europeanism amounts to sheer ethnocentrism, even xenophobia. This is the case, for example, in the strident Germanophobia (and Francophobia) underlying British

tabloids' Euroscepticism. In a similar vein, Germanophobia also underlay early French opposition to the ECSC and the European Defence Community (EDC), just as it underlies Euroscepticism among the French extreme right or among some left-wing 'national-Republican' intellectuals. Examples include, for instance, Emmanuel Todd, who equated Maastricht Yes voters with heirs to the Vichy regime, obsessed with the 'German model' (quoted in Lacroix 2005:5). In a more mundane way, issues such as foreign land ownership (which can no longer be restricted as a result of the implementation of EU law) have also crystallized fears about a possible 'invasion' by foreign EU citizens in some countries. Examples include the French referendum campaign on Maastricht, as extreme-right politicians warned against a possible 'British invasion' of southern France (quoted in Koslowski 1999:167).

This ethnocentric Euroscepticism is also expressed in the idea that European integration amounts to imposing a specific national 'counter-model' on other countries. A widespread version is expressed in the (wrong) belief that the convergence criteria of EMU were imposed by the German government on other member states. A more radical version is articulated, for instance, by those who predict that the EU will experience a 'Belgian scenario' of communitarian fragmentation and dissolution, as separate cultural entities are forced to unite under the motto of an 'ever closer union'. This thesis has been put forward in a book by a Belgian journalist who claims to explain how 'Belgian political attitudes have infected those of the EU' (Belien 2005). Lord Ralph Harris, a British Conservative politician, praised this 'penetrating historical analysis [that] warns that the EU is heading the way of Belgium – towards a corrupt, corporatist, coercive construct devoid of national consciousness or cohesion' (Belien 2005). This idea is also present in the discourse of radical right-wing politicians in Austria who refer to inter-community tensions in Belgium in order to disparage the idea of closer union among the peoples of the EU (Leconte 2003:388).

Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, Euroscepticism is a highly diverse, multifaceted phenomenon. Rather than one single Euroscepticism, there are indeed several forms, and although distinct, these varieties of Euroscepticism interact. At an individual level for instance, as we

shall see later (see pp.237–8), scepticism regarding the distributional impact of a specific EU policy or legislation can easily spill over into a more principled opposition to a further delegation of powers to the EU.

Nevertheless, the likelihood of dissatisfaction with specific EU policies transforming into principled opposition also depends on pre-existing perceptions of European integration. In that respect, this chapter has highlighted the fact that different varieties of Euroscepticism reflect reservations about integration that are more or less deeply ingrained. As has been argued elsewhere in the case of French anti-Americanism (Roger 2002), disapproval of specific policies is sometimes rooted in a broader cultural and/or ideological hostility towards the United States as a model of society. Similarly, EU scepticism is often rooted in deeply ingrained perceptions resulting from collective processes of socialization over the long term. Indeed, the possibility that Eurosceptic discourses might resonate with broader perceptions of Europe as 'the other' is influenced to a great extent by the country context, as the next chapter explains.

Chapter 3

A Geography of Euroscepticism

Initially created by advocates of European unification, with a clearly political objective (to foster the emergence of a European public opinion) (Baisnée 2007), Eurobarometer surveys try to measure levels of public Euroscepticism by assessing citizens' support for their country's EU membership (i.e. whether they see it as a good thing or not) and by inquiring into citizens' utilitarian evaluations of membership (i.e. whether they think their country has benefited from membership or not). The resulting countries' rankings in terms of levels of pro-Europeanism can in fact be misleading. First of all, they can easily foster stereotypical views of countries, by classifying them into simplistic categories (for instance, Europhile versus Eurosceptic countries). Moreover, high levels of support for EU membership can coincide with widespread hostility to further integration, as was illustrated during the 2005 and 2008 referenda in the Netherlands and Ireland. In that respect, Eurobarometer rankings can obscure the existence of relatively widespread Eurosceptic orientations in apparently Europhile countries. For instance, a recent survey showed that in Belgium, a Europhile country by all Eurobarometer standards, one-fifth of citizens thought that European integration had already gone too far (Abts *et al.* 2009:9). In Spain, the very high abstention rate in the 2005 referendum, 57.7 per cent (FEB168:6) and the widespread indifference towards the EU (in 2001, 59 per cent would feel indifferent if the EU was scrapped (EB 55:33)) nuance the perception of a largely Europhile country. This shows that levels of membership support alone do not give an accurate picture of where national public opinion stands on European integration. This chapter aims to shed some light on the complex set of factors underlying collective perceptions of European integration, while explaining why countries differ in this regard.

Cross-country differences in relation to Euroscepticism are twofold. First, countries differ in terms of levels of Euroscepticism,

be it party-based or popular Euroscepticism. Second, differences apply to predominant varieties of Euroscepticism. For instance, cultural anti-Europeanism is a key dimension of Euroscepticism in the UK. In a similar vein, it has been argued that countries like Denmark and France are especially prone to political Euroscepticism; since there is a strong overlap between state and nation in these countries, any step towards political integration at EU level tends to be perceived as a challenge to both state and nation (Hansen and Waever 2002). Value-based Euroscepticism is more likely to be relevant in countries where domestic legislation on ethical issues is either rather conservative (such as Ireland, Malta, and Poland) or rather permissive (such as the Netherlands). In both cases, European integration might be perceived as challenging collective preferences, either in a too liberal or in a too conservative direction.

The chapter starts by showing how the national context affects levels and forms of Euroscepticism. It then analyzes five types of variables accounting for these cross-country differences: the context, timetable and modalities of countries' accession processes to the EU; collective utilitarian assessments of countries' EU membership; the perceived fit or misfit between the EU and national institutions; references to 'Europe' in nation-building processes; and, finally, understandings of national identity. The chapter ends by showing how these variables can be transposed to the regional level of analysis, in order to explain cross-regional variations in levels of Euroscepticism within countries.

Different countries, different Euroscepticism(s)

Nationality is the most relevant factor influencing individuals' attitudes towards the EU, ahead of transnational factors such as level of education or occupation, according to several recent studies (Brinegar and Jolly 2005; Voessing 2005). For instance, the level of support for EU membership among Dutch workers is on average 20 percentage points higher than among their British counterparts. By the same token, Dutch and Irish manual workers display higher levels of EU support than executives in many countries, a fact which contradicts the core assumptions of the utilitarian theory (Brinegar and Jolly 2005). Leaving aside sociological factors, a British or an Austrian citizen, for instance, is twice as unlikely as an Irish or a Dutch one to be in favour of European integration (Baisnée *et al.* 2006:85).


Cross-country differences in membership support

To sketch a broad picture of cross-country variations, one can distinguish between three groups of countries on the basis of the Eurobarometer surveys, keeping in mind that these are ideal-typical categories. A first group of countries, including the Benelux countries, Spain and Ireland (and, more recently, Denmark, Poland and Romania), repeatedly displays the highest levels of membership support, with 60 to 80 per cent of citizens qualifying their country's EU membership as a good thing. A second group of countries at the opposite end of the pro-/anti-integration cleavage, comprising the UK, Austria and Hungary, recurrently appears as the most Eurosceptic, with less than 40 per cent of citizens evaluating EU membership positively. Other countries (Latvia and, to a lesser extent, Sweden and Finland) can, to some extent, be grouped together with this Eurosceptic group, as levels of membership approval in these countries often drop below 50 per cent. A third group, the intermediate category, is composed of countries such as Germany and France, where levels of support tend to vary around 50 per cent.

Certainly, this broad sketch implies neither that national attitudes to EU membership are homogeneous, nor that they are fixed. Indeed, some countries have experienced quite significant evolutions in public opinion trends over the long run (see Figure 3.1). In Denmark, for instance, public opinion since EC accession has evolved from being quite sceptical into being one of the most Europhile in the EU. Some countries, however, have experienced an opposite scenario. This was the case, for example, for Italian and, to a lesser extent, French public opinion. After experiencing a phenomenon of pro-European convergence with the most Europhile nations (the Benelux countries and Germany) in the 1970s and 1980s, public opinion in these countries turned less supportive of the EU, a phenomenon which was most striking in Italy (with barely 40 per cent of the public evaluating EU membership positively in the last couple of years).

However, for those countries located at each end of the pro-/anti-integration cleavage, the predominant scenario is that of relatively stable patterns of public opinion over the long term. As early as the late 1940s, for instance, public opinion in the Nordic countries (Norway and Sweden) was rather sceptical towards the idea of 'the United States of Europe', whereas such an idea was strongly supported by public opinion in the Benelux countries (Rabier 1989).

FIGURE 3.1 *Evolution of public support for EC/EU membership by country, 1957–2007*



Source: data from various issues of Eurobarometer.

In the same period, British public opinion was largely undecided in that respect. Whereas it had started to converge towards the pro-European orientations of continental countries in the course of the 1950s, it departed from the pattern of the six founding EEC countries by the beginning of the 1960s. Moreover, these cross-country differences also applied to attitudes towards political integration. For instance, opposition to the creation of a European army in 1948 was strongest in the UK, Sweden and Switzerland, where a majority of citizens opposed this scenario. Finally, levels of information about concrete developments in European integration clearly set the UK apart from other countries participating in those developments. In 1957, whereas two-thirds of EEC citizens knew about the creation of the common market, less than 40 per cent of British citizens were aware of it (Rabier 1989).

Policy-based Euroscepticism and cross-country differences

The influence of the country context on attitudes towards the EU is not limited to general perceptions about EU membership, however. It also applies to citizens' preferences as to the desired scope of the EU's power. For instance, citizens in the UK and Denmark seem to be the most willing to restrict the scope of the EU's power in general (Voessing 2005). Besides, the national variable also influences citizens' preferences as to the Europeanization of specific policies. Indeed, policy-specific Euroscepticism varies across countries. In the Nordic countries, much of the opposition to a further extension of the EU's power concerns welfare issues, environmental protection, defence and police cooperation, while much British Euroscepticism is focused on EMU (Lubbers and Scheepers 2005:228). These differences between countries are reflected in public opinion patterns. For example, public support for a common EU immigration policy ranges from 10 per cent in Finland to 70 per cent in the Netherlands, while opposition to it is strongest in the UK, Finland, Sweden and Austria (Luedtke 2005). The case of EMU also highlights these national patterns of support. In 2002, as the Euro was being introduced, German public opinion systematically displayed the most negative evaluation of the Euro, according to several indicators (FEB 139:59–60).

The country context mediating transnational variables

What is more, the country context also influences perceptions of integration indirectly, as it determines the respective relevance of specific, transnational factors in shaping individual perceptions of the EU. For instance, demographic factors, such as gender, are more or less influential in shaping an individual's views on the EU, depending on his/her nationality. Indeed, probably the most powerful transnational variable influencing individuals' opinions on the EU, namely attitudes towards minorities, still has a highly differentiated impact across countries, depending on the relevance of immigration issues in a given country (McLaren 2006). Finally, nationality also influences the parameters according to which individuals evaluate EU institutions. Depending on an individual's nationality, for instance, the input legitimacy of EU-level decision-making will be accorded more or less relevance in general evaluations of the EU.

Certainly, there are country-specific issues that come to crystallize Eurosceptic feelings: the issue of truck traffic in the Austrian Alps, concerns over EU legislation on state aid and its possible impact on the wine sector in Malta, and scepticism towards the common EU fishery policy in potential EU members such as Iceland and Norway, for instance. Beyond this diversity, however, there are similar types of variables that influence collective perceptions of the EU. These are indeed the consequence of different temporalities: the short-term time-span of accession processes and the long-term effects of century-old processes of nation-building and political socialization in a national context.

Accession processes and seniority as an EU member

To begin with, national perceptions of the EU are shaped by accession processes: the context in which a given country joins the EU, as well as the length and modalities of the accession process. Moreover, it has been argued that EU membership induces a process of socialization; citizens allegedly become more supportive of the EU as societies Europeanize.

Context of the accession process

The context in which a country joins the EU is especially relevant. In some cases, for instance, EC/EU accession has been closely connected with processes of democratic transition and/or consolidation, as was the case for Greece, Portugal and Spain. In the Spanish case, for instance, the link between EEC accession and democratic transition (which was definitively secured in 1981–82) explains the high level of support for EU membership in Spanish public opinion (Diez-Medrano 2003). Nonetheless, perceptions of a clear association between EU accession and democratic transition also depend on the timetable of accession. In cases where accession processes are especially lengthy, the perception of a link between the two processes can be eroded. Such an argument has been put forward in the case of the eastern and central European (ECE) countries that joined the EU in 2004. Certainly, their accession process did not last significantly longer than for southern countries: ten years for those that applied in 1994, which is comparable to the Spanish case. However, the lapse of time between the return to democracy and EU accession was significantly longer for the ECE