Volume 4 Issue 2 October 2009
hrss
hamburg review of social sciences
„Welcome Sceptics!“
A Pro-European Argument in Favour of Eurosceptics in the European Parliament.
Pieter de Wilde*
Abstract
Eurosceptic parties won a clear victory in the 2009 European Parliament elections.
Contrary to the negative reactions from some pro-European politicians and
political scientists, this essay argues that the electoral success of Eurosceptic parties
will neither endanger the process of European integration nor keep the European
Parliament from working in an efficient and effective manner. Ideally, debates
concerning European integration should be held during national elections.
However, since they rarely are, European parliament elections offer the next best
opportunity for such debates.
* Pieter de Wilde is a PhD Fellow at ARENA, Centre for European Studies, University of
Oslo.
hrss, Volume 4 (2009), pp. 59-73
www.hamburg-review.com
59
Volume 4 Issue 2 October 2009
Introduction
The European Parliament (EP) elections of June 2009 resulted in a clear victory
of Eurosceptical parties. In the United Kingdom, the UK Independence Party
surpassed Labour with 16,5% of the vote and the British National Party won two
seats as well. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders’ PVV came in second with nearly
17% of the vote. In Austria, three Eurosceptic parties – Martin, FPÖ, and BZÖ –
together gained nearly 35% of the vote. The Eurosceptics may not have won
equally spectacular victories in all Member States, but the overall result is clear.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the composition in party groups of the new European
Parliament after the June 2009 elections. One may understand the ECR,
EUL/NGL, EFD and almost all non-affiliated Members of the European Parliament
to fall under the general label of ‘Euroscepticism. Together, this amounts to
20% of all MEPs.
Reactions from pro-European politicians and political scientists have been
negative, as they argue this result endangers European integration and exacerbates
– or at least does not alleviate – the EU’s democratic deficit. This essay argues
that the electoral victory of the Eurosceptics and their increased presence in
the EP should be welcomed from a democratic, pro-European point of view. In
light of a strong Eurosceptic attitude among many EU citizens, pro-Europeans
now face a trade-off between a democratic Union that listens to the will of the
people on the one hand, and continuing to pool sovereignty in an ‘ever closer Union’
on the other hand. I argue pro-Europeans should choose – and are in fact already
pleading for – a democratic Union over a more centralised Union. That
means welcoming the representation of Eurosceptic sentiments in the European
Parliament.
hrss, Volume 4 (2009), pp. 59-73
www.hamburg-review.com
60
Volume 4 Issue 2 October 2009
Figure 1: Composition of the 7th European Parliament after the June
2009 Elections
Source: European Parliament
Three arguments by pro-Europeans and political scientists against Eurosceptics
in the European Parliament will be discussed, and proven wrong. As I will argue,
Eurosceptics in the European Parliament will not significantly hamper further integration,
they will not decrease the efficiency of the EP as a legislator, nor do
their campaigns of issues of formal integration during European elections mount
up to voter deception.
The exact same dynamics feared by pro-Europeans and political scientists may
in fact increase the stability and legitimacy of the European Union and thus function
to solidify European integration, rather than endanger it. I argue the effect of
the Eurosceptics’ victory is not negative for European integration, but the extent
to which it is positive remains to be seen. For the Eurosceptics to really contribute
to European integration, they must organise in the European Parliament and fully
engage pro-Europeans both in debate and in co-legislating. Eurosceptic citizens,
just like pro-Europeans, deserve equal and effective representation of their
opinions.
hrss, Volume 4 (2009), pp. 59-73
www.hamburg-review.com
61
Volume 4 Issue 2 October 2009
A good Europe is a democratic Europe
In order to make an assessment to what extent the Eurosceptic victory is positive
from a pro-European point of view, one has to clarify what the criteria are on
which this evaluation is made. A proper evaluation can only be made with principles
of democracy: government of the people, by the people, and for the people.
In fact, as will be discussed below, the three arguments made against Eurosceptic
presence in the EP also base themselves on these principles.
A first reason why principles of democracy are valid benchmarks is simply that
authoritarianism is not very popular in Europe. Although there may be some anti-democratic
pro-Europeanists, their number is presumably small. Many Member
States by now have a long democratic tradition which has become deeply ingrained
in their national culture. An authoritarian Europe going blatantly against
the will of EU citizens and willing to suppress any resistance would in all likelihood
evoke massive protest to the extent that the EU would seize to exist. Most
pro-Europeans and political scientists recognise this. If they argue for more integration,
they advocate a more or less federal Europe with such traditional features
of democracy as majority rule, protection of minority rights and separation
of power.
A second reason why principles of democracy are valid is that the EU is now in
such a state of development that it requires democracy in order to survive. It is
generally recognised that the EU has now evolved to such an extent, that it can be
seen as some kind of ‘polity’ or political system (Hix 2005). Decisions made within
EU framework cover a wide range of policy fields and have direct and significant
impact on the daily lives of EU citizens. Such far reaching powers require
some form of democracy in order to be legitimate and stable (Eriksen and Fossum
2004; Føllesdal and Hix 2006; Lord and Beetham 2001; Mair 2005, 2007).
Assuming that pro-Europeans care about the continued survival of the European
Union and the achievements in integration it represents, a true pro-European argument
must therefore not only be an argument for more centralisation, but also
an argument for a more democratic EU.
But what do such principles of democracy imply in practice? The concept of
democracy and its meaning in the context of the EU are hotly contested in scientific
debate (Føllesdal and Hix 2006; Lord and Beetham 2001; Majone 2002; Mohrss,
Volume 4 (2009), pp. 59-73
www.hamburg-review.com
62
Volume 4 Issue 2 October 2009
ravcsik 2006). Without denying the importance of such a scientific debate, this
essay will build on a very popular understanding of democracy, shortly summarised
in a famous statement my Abraham Lincoln: government of the people, by
the people, and for the people. If we consider the European Parliament a legitimate
part of EU democracy, this implies the following. First, there should be an
adequate representation of citizens’ opinions. Thus, all opinions in society should
also be represented by political parties in the European Parliament (Schmitt and
Thomassen 2000). Secondly, the European Parliament should have a real say
within the EU, or there wouldn’t be ‘government by the people’. Thirdly, the European
Parliament should work effectively and efficiently to supply the people
with good policies. The second principle will be left out of present discussion,
since the powers of the EP are not the issue here. The first and third principle,
however, are relevant and will be used to evaluate the presence of Eurosceptics in
the EP and the three arguments presented against it. I will show that all three arguments
presented by pro-Europeans and political scientists are based on keeping
the European Parliament effective, delivering the goods and making sure citizens’
opinions are heard where they matter.
Three arguments against Eurosceptics in the European Parliament
To see whether the victory of Eurosceptics presents a risk to everything proEuropeans
hold dear, we need to understand the arguments made by proEuropeans
and political scientists. They argue against Eurosceptics in the EP for
three reasons. First, Eurosceptics may endanger the project of European integration.
Second, they may endanger effective and efficient governance in the European
Union by hindering the workings of the EP. Thirdly, in terms of representation
of citizens’ opinions, the right place for Eurosceptics is not in the European
Parliament, but rather in the different national parliaments of EU Member
States.
In pro-European eyes, past achievements and future plans for European integration
are necessary for effective policy-making in the EU and ‘delivering the
goods’. In other words, they are necessary to provide ‘government for the people’,
reflected in our third democratic principle. Pro-Europeans argue that the victory
hrss, Volume 4 (2009), pp. 59-73
www.hamburg-review.com
63
Volume 4 Issue 2 October 2009
of Eurosceptic parties endangers the project of European integration. It will make
it harder to go through with planned steps, like closer cooperation in Justice and
Home Affairs and enlargement of the EU with countries such as Turkey and the
Ukraine. Even worse, some of the achievements already made may come in danger
if, for example, political pressure on the Euro increases as national governments
feel the heat of Eurosceptic pressure at home. In a doomsday scenario,
countries might even leave the European Union altogether resulting in the possible
collapse of the EU. Thus, the economic and functional benefits of cooperation
between the Member States are at stake.
Secondly, a large Eurosceptic presence in the European Parliament risks efficient
governance in the EU. As the European Parliament has an important say in
many EU policy fields, it is important that it functions efficiently and constructively
as a co-legislator. Again, this argument appeals to the third principle of
democracy: government for the people. If the only thing Eurosceptical parties do
is block decision-making, the entire legislative process within the EU may grind
to a halt. It seems realistic to assume that many of the new Eurosceptical Members
of the European Parliament (MEPs) will take such a role. For instance, Geert
Wilders has already promised that his party’s MEPs will not join any European
party group. The efficient working of the EP is dependent on such party groups
for efficient governance as they facilitate reaching majorities in parliament for
legislative proposals and amendments. There is thus a risk that the Eurosceptic
MEPs will not contribute to legislation, making the burden on the pro-European
MEPs heavier and making it more difficult to find necessary majorities.
Thirdly, the European parliament is not the right place for Eurosceptics. This
is an argument made primarily by political scientists from a representative point
of view (Kriesi 2007; Mair 2001). Peter Mair argues that the elections for the European
Parliament should be about traditional left-right economic issues. After
all, the European Parliament has significant influence in policy areas of distribution
and redistribution in the EU. On questions of formal integration – whether
the EU should have more or less powers, competencies in certain fields, enlargement
questions, and power distribution between the EU and the Member States –
the European Parliament has very little say. These questions are all dealt with in
intergovernmental fashion, by the national governments. From the point of view
of representation, citizens’ opinions should be represented at the level of governhrss,
Volume 4 (2009), pp. 59-73
www.hamburg-review.com
64
Volume 4 Issue 2 October 2009
ment where decisions about these issues are made. Otherwise, ‘government by
the people’ would be a mere farce. Since Eurosceptical parties represent citizens’
opinion on formal European integration, they should represent these citizens at
the national level in national parliaments in order to influence what national governments
decide in EU framework. In other words, Eurosceptics in the European
Parliament are in the wrong place. By campaigning on issues of formal integration
during European elections, these Eurosceptical parties are conveying the
message that citizens with negative opinions on formal integration should send
them to Brussels and Strasbourg to block further integration. This is in fact, unrealistic
given the lack of powers the EP has in such issues. Therefore, campaigning
on issues of formal integration during European elections amounts to voter
deception.
Eurosceptics do not harm the project of integration
If one understands the aim of integration to be as much centralisation or pooling
of sovereignty as possible, then the Eurosceptics’ victory may indeed be seen as
negative. Yet, since the European Parliament does not decide about the competencies
of the European Union and the Eurosceptics only have a minority in the
European Parliament, we should not overstate that danger. If, however, the proEuropeans
want a functioning, stable and legitimate European Union, then the
victory of Eurosceptics should be welcomed as furthering the project of integra-
tion.
Firstly, let’s keep in mind that only a small part of all Eurosceptics are completely
opposed to any form of integration or cooperation between European
countries whatsoever. Most Eurosceptics are actually in favour of quite advanced
forms of integration. Some of them, like the Dutch Socialist Party, may even combine
calls for ‘less Brussels’ with being in favour of close cooperation on policy
fields such as environmental policy and immigration policy (Van Kessel and
Crum 2009: 6). The wide diversity in ‘Euroscepticisms’ has led political scientists
to try and codify these forms into ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak and
Taggart 2008) or ‘Eurosceptics’, ‘Europragmatists’ and ‘Eurorejects’ (Kopecký
and Mudde 2002). Even if the wide variety of what we generally refer to as ‘Euhrss,
Volume 4 (2009), pp. 59-73
www.hamburg-review.com
65
Volume 4 Issue 2 October 2009
rosceptics’ would gain a majority of seats in the European Parliament and national
parliaments, it would be unlikely to see the complete end of European integration.
As such, there isn’t so much to fear from a pro-European point of view as is
often made out to be.
Aside from the dominant left-right dimension of politics structuring EP party
organisation, there is also a clear pro-anti European dimension relevant to understanding
party politics and voting behaviour in the European Parliament (Hix
and Lord 1997). Even though the European Parliament does not decide on further
integration, it does not hesitate to ventilate its collective opinion on such matters.
Also in areas in which it has little formal competencies like foreign policy or enlargement,
the EP often adopts resolutions. Furthermore, it actively campaigns
for increases in its own powers in informal dealings with Member State governments.
It would be welcome from a democratic point of view, and good for the legitimacy
of the European Parliament, if such opinions and dealings with Member
States reflect public opinion. If a more prominent presence of Eurosceptics in the
EP brings it closer to the average position of EU citizens on a relevant dimension
of conflict, this presence would make it a more representative body. If this would
make opinions adopted by the EP and its stance towards Member State governments
more in line with citizens’ wishes concerning further integration, this
would increase the legitimacy of the EP and, by proxy, of the European Union as a
whole. As a result, Eurosceptics in the EP might put a brake on further integration
in the short run, but at the same time increase the legitimacy of the European
Union and thereby its stability as a political system. In the long run, that
might create the basis for a more settled and durable European Union and perhaps
even for further steps in integration, if the collective will of its citizens allows
it.
The European Parliament will still be effective
Fears that the Eurosceptics in the European Parliament will harm the EP as an
efficient lawmaker are not that well grounded. First of all, although Eurosceptics
won a clear victory, there is still a large pro-European majority in the EP, located
in the traditional party federations. Even if Eurosceptic parties are unwilling to
hrss, Volume 4 (2009), pp. 59-73
www.hamburg-review.com
66
Volume 4 Issue 2 October 2009
contribute positively, there are still plenty of majorities possible to pass legislation.
In the past, there have often been supermajorities in EP voting. It is not necessarily
a problem if these majorities become smaller. With the loss of the socialdemocrats,
the European People’s Party (centre right) now has clear initiative.
They might shift coalitions, taking on board the social-democrats, the liberals, the
greens and/or other conservative parties depending on the particular piece of legislation
in question.
These traditional party federations have proven in the past to be relatively cohesive,
effective party federations (Hix et al. 2003; Hix et al. 2005; Thomassen et
al. 2004) and there is no reason to believe that they will not continue to be so facing
an increasingly Eurosceptic presence. In fact, the presence of Eurosceptic parties
and accompanying difficulties of forming majorities may even stimulate these
traditional parties to become even more cohesive.
Finally, the argument that the Eurosceptics harm the efficiency of the European
parliament is largely based on the presumption that they will not be able to
effectively organise themselves. This still remains to be seen, of course. Before the
last election, there hasn’t been very effective cooperation among Eurosceptics
outside of the far left. The Independence and Democracy Group was a very loosely
organised group of Eurosceptical parties. There is not much that brought these
parties together other than their shared Euroscepticism. For instance, this group
contained both the fiercely Catholic Polish League of Families, as well as the
combined Dutch orthodox Protestant Parties SGP and Christian Union. As a result
of the lack of common ideology, it hasn’t been a very cohesive party group.
Two new groups have been formed after the June 2009 elections. A conservative
Eurosceptic group called European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and
the even more Eurosceptical Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD). It is to be
regretted that many of the Eurosceptics are not part of either of these groups and
remain non-attached. It will be interesting to see whether the ECR and EFD are
willing and able to present coherent views and work together with each other and
non-affiliated MEPs to present a collective Eurosceptic opinion. Although the
past doesn’t provide much hope, effective party groups would give the Eurosceptics
more positions are chair persons for committees and rapporteurs for legislative
proposals, as well as a vehicle to coordinate voting behaviour. As the number
of Eurosceptic MEPs increases, their potential collective influence also grows.
hrss, Volume 4 (2009), pp. 59-73
www.hamburg-review.com
67
Volume 4 Issue 2 October 2009
Thus, the potential benefits for them of working together increase as they could
collectively have a real say. Inversely, the relative price for not working together
also increases. If they manage to organise, their voters’ preferences would be better
transmitted towards actual policy-formulation. With an eye on effective government
by the people – including Eurosceptic people - these parties should find
a way to combine forces, despite the large internal differences of opinion they
would have to bridge.
Debate about Europe must happen (somewhere)
As Peter Mair (2001) argues, citizens’ opinions should be heard and represented
at the level of government where decisions on these issues are made. We would
thus need campaigns on ‘Europe’ during national elections and Eurosceptical political
parties represented in national parliaments. In national parliaments, they
can then overlook their national government’s behaviour in intergovernmental
negotiations on the future of European integration. The European elections, on
the contrary, should be about left-right issues. Debating Europe in European elections
is in fact a form of voter deception. It appears as if citizens’ opinions are
represented, whereas in fact they are not because they are not translated towards
actual policy making. I present here two arguments why debating Europe during
European elections is not as bad as Mair makes it out to be.
First, as stated above, the European Parliament may not have formal powers
on integration issues, but still adopts resolutions about it and actively campaigns
for an increase of its own powers. This may still have impact on decisions made
by the European Council in informal ways. These resolutions and activities
should therefore reflect citizens’ opinions and a Eurosceptic presence in the European
Parliament is needed as many citizens are sceptical on these issues. As a
logical consequence, raising issues of formal integration in European elections is
also legitimate.
More importantly, debate about European integration must happen somewhere.
Only if we see the European and national channels of representation as
completely isolated, does Mair’s argument fly. In reality, however, both elections
are contested by the same parties in the same public spheres. These parties and
hrss, Volume 4 (2009), pp. 59-73
www.hamburg-review.com
68
Volume 4 Issue 2 October 2009
public spheres provide linkages between the two formal channels of representation,
ensuring that citizens’ opinions expressed in one of these channels are also
transmitted to the other.
The vast majority of political parties in Europe contest both national and European
elections. They attempt to represent the same set of policy preferences
and ideas at both levels. Thus, the manifesto and slogans they campaign on at national
level and the ones they campaign on at European level might not be exactly
the same, but they are at least compatible. Clear contradictions would be exploited
by competing political parties, creating the image of a confused, ambiguous,
or even deceiving party. Positions adopted during European election campaigns
are therefore structured by parties’ national manifestoes and in turn may
lead to changes therein. Positions on European integration advanced during European
elections may thus find their way to the national parliaments too. If these
campaigns result in victory, parties will likely defend these positions in the national
parliament as well. If they result in defeat, parties may reconsider their
general attitude towards European integration and their actions in national poli-
tics.
Aside from political parties, a second link between the European and national
channels of representation in the European Union is provided by the public
sphere(s). Through public debate – particularly in mass media – opinions on European
integration are not just uploaded and downloaded between citizens and
parties, they are also formed and changed as a result of the arguments brought to
bear (Eder 2007; Fossum and Schlesinger 2007; Trenz and Eder 2004). Since
public spheres in Europe are still largely national in scope, national debates about
European integration are clearly distinct (Diez Medrano 2003; Harmsen 2008;
Larsen 1999). These debates are held and shaped during peaks of political contestation
surrounding events concerning European integration, since this is how the
attention of mass media functions (Galtung and Ruge 1965). Through the discussion
they evoke, these events shape the way Europe is debated and understood by
establishing common themes and reference points. These themes and reference
points find their way both to public opinion and to political parties in national
and European parliaments.
If Europe cannot be debated during national elections because these are dominated
by other issues, than alternative ‘events’ are needed. Through party politihrss,
Volume 4 (2009), pp. 59-73
www.hamburg-review.com
69
Volume 4 Issue 2 October 2009
cal dynamics and the public sphere, events such as European elections function to
shape national politics. Debating Europe in European elections is therefore a
second best option, rather than voter deception.
Conclusion
If, as democratic pro-Europeans, we think a legitimate, stable Union in line with
the will of its citizens is more desirable than an authoritarian super state, the
presence of Eurosceptics in the EP should be welcomed. It is a victory of democracy
and a step towards closing the gap between Europe’s elites and its citizens.
Fears of pro-Europeans and political scientists are unwarranted. First, the Eurosceptics’
victory in the June 2009 European elections will not harm European integration.
The general label ‘Eurosceptics’ in fact covers a wide variety of political
parties, most of which are in favour of some form of cooperation among European
countries. Even if they were radically against any form of cooperation, they
are still only a minority and in the wrong place to affect integration considerably.
Secondly, it will not endanger the EP as an efficient legislator since well organised
pro-European parties still have a majority and may be inclined to work even more
efficiently now that their majority has become smaller. Finally, although representation
of citizens’ opinions about integration should ideally happen at national
level, having European elections about issues of formal integration is still a
second best option, not voter deception. Through the interlinkages provided by
political parties and the public sphere, these campaigns will also influence national
politicians and national parliaments, thus increasing the extent to which
citizens’ preferences are represented towards the European Union. As these three
negative arguments about the victory of the Eurosceptics have been refuted, we
can conclude that this Eurosceptic victory is not to be mourned or feared from a
democratic pro-European point of view.
In order for the election results to really work out positively, however, Eurosceptic
parties in the EP should organise and engage the pro-Europeans collectively.
They could give a European face to Euroscepticism if they manage to form a
coherent party group with more internal cohesion than the old Independence and
Democracy Group. Combined in such a new group, the Eurosceptics could activehrss,
Volume 4 (2009), pp. 59-73
www.hamburg-review.com
70
Volume 4 Issue 2 October 2009
ly engage in the activities of the European Parliament, claim committee chair positions,
questioning time and rapporteurships. Most importantly, they could publically
challenge the dealings of pro-Europeans in the European Parliament.
Through more public political conflict in the European Parliament, the boundaries,
meanings and reference points of European integration may be debated at a
European level. The victory of the Eurosceptics might hamper further integration
in the short run, but it could create a more stable and legitimate Union in the long
run. Something a true democratic pro-European should find hard to reject.
Acknowledgments
This essay presents personal views of the author. Many thanks to Kolja Raube and Erik
Ryen for helpful comments. Any faults remain the author’s.
References
Diez Medrano, Juan 2003. Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in
Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom, Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Eder, Klaus 2007. The Public Sphere and European Democracy: Mechanisms of
Democratisation in the Transnational Situation, in John Erik Fossum and
Philip Schlesinger (eds), The European Union and the Public Sphere. A
Communicative Space in the Making?, Abingdon: Routledge, 44-64.
Eriksen, Erik Oddvar / Fossum, John Erik 2004. Europe in Search of Legitimacy:
Strategies of Legitimation Assessed, International Political Science Review,
25:4, 435-459.
Føllesdal, Andreas / Hix, Simon 2006. Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the
EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik, Journal of Common Market
Studies, 44:3, 533-562.
Fossum, John Erik / Schlesinger, Philip 2007. The European Union and the
Public Sphere. A Communicative Space in the Making?, Abingdon: Routledge.
Galtung, Johan / Holmboe Ruge, Mari 1965. The Structure of Foreign News: The
Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian
hrss, Volume 4 (2009), pp. 59-73
www.hamburg-review.com
71
Volume 4 Issue 2 October 2009
Newspapers, Journal of Peace Research, 2:1, 64-91.
Harmsen, Robert 2008. The Evolution of Dutch European Discourse: Defining
the Limits of Europe, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 9:3, 316-
341.
Hix, Simon 2005. The Political System of the European Union, 2nd Edition. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hix, Simon / Kreppel Amie / Noury, Abdul G. 2003. The Party System in the
European Parliament: Collusive or Competitive?, Journal of Common Market
Studies, 41:2, 309-331.
Hix, Simon / Lord, Christopher James 1997. Political Parties in the European
Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
Hix, Simon / Noury, Abdul / Roland, Gérard 2005. Power to the Parties:
Cohesion and Competition in the European Parliament, 1979-2001, British
Journal of Political Science, 35:2, 209-234.
Kopecký, Petr / Mudde, Cas 2002. The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party
Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe, European Union
Politics, 3:3, 297-326.
Kriesi, Hanspeter 2007. The Role of European Integration in National Election
Campaigns, European Union Politics, 8:1, 83-108.
Larsen, Henrik 1999. British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s: A
Discourse Approach, European Journal of International Relations, 5:4, 451-
483.
Lord, Christopher / Beetham, David 2001. Legitimizing the EU: Is there a Postparliamentary
Basis for its Legitimation?, Journal of Common Market Studies,
39:3, 443-462.
Mair, Peter 2001. The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems, in
Simon Hix and Klaus H. Goetz eds., Europeanised Politics? European
Integration and National Political Systems, London: Frank Cass, 27-51.
Mair, Peter 2005. Popular Democracy and the European Union Polity, European
Governance Papers, /No. C-05-03, EUROGOV, www.connex-
network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-05-03.pfd.
Mair, Peter 2007. Political Opposition and the European Union, Government and
Opposition, 42:1, 1-17.
Majone, Giandomenico 2002. The European Commission: The Limits of
Centralization and the Perils of Parliamentarization, Governance: An
International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 15:3, 375-
392.
hrss, Volume 4 (2009), pp. 59-73
www.hamburg-review.com
72
Volume 4 Issue 2 October 2009
hrss, Volume 4 (2009), pp. 59-73
www.hamburg-review.com
73
Moravcsik, Andrew 2006. What Can We Learn from the Collapse of the European
Constitutional Project?, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 47:2, 219-241.
Schmitt, Hermann / Thomassen, Jacques J. A. 2000. Dynamic Representation:
The Case of European Integration, Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische
Sozialforschung - Working Papers, 2000/21,
Szczerbiak, Aleks / Taggart, Paul 2008. Introduction: Researching
Euroscepticism in European Party Systems: A Comparative and Theoretical
Research Agenda, in Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart eds., Opposing
Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism. Volume 2:
Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1-27.
Thomassen, Jacques J. A. / Noury, Abdul / Voeten, Erik 2004. Political
Competition in the European Parliament: Evidence from Roll Call and Survey
Analyses, in Gary Marks and Marco R. Steenbergen eds., European Integration
and Political Conflict, New York: Cambridge University Press, 141-164.
Trenz, Hans-Jörg / Eder, Klaus 2004. The Democratizing Dynamics of a
European Public Sphere: Towards a Theory of Democratic Functionalism,
European Journal of Social Theory, 7:1, 5-25.
Van Kessel, Stijn / Crum, Ben J. J. 2009. The European Parliament Elections in
the Netherlands, 4 June 2009, EPERN Election Reports, 2009/28, Sussex
University, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/1-4-2-2.html.
Copyright of Hamburg Review of Social Sciences is the property of Prof. Dr. Roland Verwiebe on behalf of
Hamburg Review of Social Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to
a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or
email articles for individual use.