

relationship between the number of parties in a system and its stability or consensual/conflictual character. The structure of electoral preferences and the rules for winning power may still encourage centripetal, as opposed to centrifugal, patterns of party competition. Likewise, there may be other factors apart from a multiplicity of parties that compel a consensual approach to party politics. Where, for example, a political system is multinational, acceptability of decisions and consent will often require the involvement of party politicians representing a wide cross-section of nationalities and not just simple majorities of the whole. Such approaches to party politics are said to be 'consociational'. The problems of anti-system parties and multinational politics probably constitute the two clearest structural differences between party politics at the EU and national levels. There is scarcely any national political arena in Western Europe in which the principal political parties still disagree about the basic shape of the political system itself. This can scarcely be said of the EU, even though the more 'sceptical' national parties claim to take issue only with certain methods of European integration, and not with the need for some kind of Union.

From what we have said so far, it is clear that the roles of political parties are complex and multifaceted, as well as open to being played in different ways by different political parties: parties shape the public's political preferences and they help construct its understanding of the political system, but they also respond to what the public wants; they govern, but they also exist to oppose, criticise and even protest. Yet underlying all of this is one defining feature that sets them off from all other organisations: they exist to influence the *overall* formation of policy in the *public* sphere. Were they only interested in particular policies, they would be no different from interest groups. Were their core goals concerned with following, rather than shaping, the general framework of rules and laws by which other, more particular, economic and social activities are governed, they would be no different from private organisations like companies. It is for this reason that parties are often characterised by some overall set of attitudes, or ideology, about the manner in which societies *ought* to be governed: about the proper purpose of government, the extent of its intervention in economy and society and its relationship with the nation and the international scene. In contemporary circumstances, these questions are unanswerable without raising issues of European integration.

A history of party politics in the EU

The early European Community was heavily influenced by postwar patterns of party politics. Many of the attitudes towards the postwar integration of Western Europe were formed within the political parties that emerged least discredited from the Second World War. Those that had been closest to resistance movements were often the most keen, though the far left cooled to integration as the formation of a European Community came to be associated with the Western side in the Cold War. Meanwhile Christian Democrats took up much of the running, as the cause of West European reconciliation came naturally to those who believed that the conflicts and divisions of the age of nationalism had disguised a deeper past, based on a single European civilisation of shared religious and social values. Robert Schuman of the French MRP, Konrad Adenauer of the German Christian Democrats and Alcide De Gasperi of the Italian Christian Democrats formed a bond of mutual understanding that provided an early suggestion that horizontal cross-national feelings of ideological affinity really could break through the vertical divisions of the nation state. The early record of the Social Democrats was more ambiguous. The leadership of the German SPD initially opposed the European Community on the grounds that it would complicate relationships with the East and thus prejudice the cause of national reunification. Although the French Socialists were largely supportive of integration in the 1950s, they were less relaxed than the MRP about a small Community of Six that excluded Britain and gave priority to Franco-German reconciliation. From the start, there was also a clear split on the centre left between those who believed that European integration would be essential to manage markets and complete the formation of national welfare states and those who thought that it would only interfere with this objective. Prominent in the latter camp was the British Labour Cabinet which made the fateful decision that Britain should not be a founder member of the European Community in 1950. Across the original Six, Liberals and Radicals were largely favourable, with economic liberals looking forward to trade liberalisation and radical liberals finding inspiration in an arrangement that could curb the power of the state to make war or dominate its own citizens. By contrast, West European Conservative parties were almost universally opposed to the formation of the European Community. It is no coincidence that the six countries that accepted a

supranational approach to European integration in the 1950s were all those where Christian Democrats, rather than Conservatives, formed the main party of government on the centre right and as soon as this situation was reversed in one key country – de Gaulle's Fifth French Republic – the Community found itself being pulled in a more intergovernmental direction. Even Churchill's enthusiastic support for European integration turned out on closer inspection to preclude the supranational option, at least for Britain itself.

Whether hostile or opposed, similarity of attitude towards European integration was in itself a justification for the party families of Western Europe to meet, exchange views and coordinate action. However, the formation of a definite set of transnational institutions with a potential to make important decisions about matters that the parties cared about added urgency to these practices. Several of the political families had long experimented with federations or international organisations of various kinds, so a basis for collaboration was already there. From 1948, the early meetings of the Council of Europe also required national parliamentary parties to send six-monthly delegations to Strasbourg and there were some moves to make this into a democratic forum, or even Constituent Assembly, for the continent as a whole. It was not, however, until the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the first meeting of its Assembly in 1953 that any attempt was made to experiment with transnational parliamentary groups. With the formation of the EPP, the PES and the ELDR, the High Authority of the ECSC became the first international body accountable to an Assembly whose deputies sat in transnational blocs.

With these faint stirrings of transnational party activity, early theorists, like Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg, invested much hope in political parties as potential 'carriers' of European integration. Working with a pluralist model of politics in which institutions and parties are always under pressure to adapt to the needs and demands of the different groups and sections of their societies, and predicting that the European Community would be able to deliver political benefits that were beyond the reach of the nation state, Haas and Lindberg argued that parties which failed to redirect some of their efforts to influencing the institutions of the EC on behalf of their voters would lose out in the competition for political support. What was interesting about this theory was that it suggested political parties would come under competitive pressure to adapt to the European political arena, regardless of whether they were hostile or enthusiastic

about integration (Haas, 1958; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1971). At first, it was predicted, attempts to influence the new Community might take the form of *ad hoc* alliances between various agglomerations of interests and parties from different countries. However, political socialisation – positive experience of consensus-building in EC institutions – would eventually blend with the search for competitive advantage to impel parties towards more permanent and integrated formations at the European level. Even in the short term, it was hoped that party politicians could provide a supplementary source of new initiatives and political entrepreneurship to a largely technocratic European Commission. Over a longer period it was anticipated that they might be capable of agreeing comprehensive programmes at the European level, and of offering alternative leaderships to people all of the Community's institutions. Such hopes were critical to the EC's political development, for, as we have seen, the classic route to democratisation and the widening of electoral choice in Western Europe was to rely on parties to present the voter with competing policies and teams for government.

Contrary to these early predictions, the development of party activities at the European level was, however, at best sluggish, at least until the end of the 1970s. The federations and the party groups appeared to be mired in a lowest common denominator character of decision-making, suggesting not only that they had little ability to make national parties do what they would not have done anyway, but, more damagingly, that they were not even very important as sites for learning and socialisation. In most national parties, liaison with the transnational federation was usually left to relatively marginal officials, or treated as an excuse for occasional political tourism. Meanwhile, the EP remained unelected before 1979, with the consequence that its party groups consisted of those who primarily saw themselves as national members of parliament, thrown together for just one week a month in Strasbourg. There was, therefore, little sense of the groups emerging as politicians specifically selected to specialise in EC affairs. The only developments that did occur in the groups were, arguably, retrograde. The Gaullists, who had originally been in the ELDR, left in 1965 to form a group all on their own. Although they were by instinct prickly defenders of national independence, this move showed a remarkably low tolerance of constraints on national freedom of action, given the powerlessness of the Assembly as it then was. It also suggested that early experiments in transnational party formation might relapse into the practice common to other interna-

national assemblies or representatives sitting in national party blocs. Nor did the first widening of the EC in 1973 hold out much hope that the party groups could be commensurately enlarged without experiencing problems of their own. The British and Danish Conservatives confirmed the trend set by the Gaullists towards greater fragmentation and lower levels of transnational party organisation, by forming a fifth group of their own, the European Democratic Group (EDG). Although the Labour Party did eventually enter the PES, it did not even take up its seats in the Assembly in the first two years of British membership, and, even then, it remained for years to come a powerful source of internal division in the wider group.

Ideological diversity and conflicts of national and partisan interest seem plausible explanations for this unimpressive record of transnational party development before 1979 (Pridham and Pridham, 1981). However, differences in the ideological roots and sociological bases of national parties are constant factors and they cannot readily explain why, after such a disappointing start between the 1950s and 1970s, both the federations and the groups should have become more active and integrated during the 1980s and 1990s. As will be shown in following chapters, the federations ceased to be confined to the faintly futile task of drafting European manifestos for elections that were largely fought on national lines. They increasingly developed an additional role as sites for consensus-building by means of party leaders' summits held immediately prior to meetings of heads of government in the European Council, which, arguably, constitute the most authoritative forum for settling the Union's agenda and wider issues of European integration (Hix, 1995a). Meanwhile, studies of the groups in the EP noted their growing cohesiveness, even though successive enlargements of the Union meant that there were more national parties that needed to be accommodated in group agreements, and increased parliamentary powers meant the groups had to make more contentious choices about the distribution resources and allocation of political values (Attina, 1990).

The development of transnational party activities was probably stimulated more by reforms to the institutions of the Union during the 1980s and 1990s than by changes in the character of political parties. The problem with early optimism about the prospects for transnational party development was that it had assumed institutional contexts that simply did not exist during the first thirty years of the EU. Conversely, a combination of a directly elected parliament (1979), its empowerment by the Single European Act (1986) and

Maastricht Treaties (1992), and the curtailment of the national veto on the Council has meant that parties that are good at organising themselves transnationally will receive certain pay-offs that may be denied to others. Yet, institutional change has so far been lopsided in the kind of transnational party activity that it has catalysed. The experience of 1979 to 1996 would seem to suggest that there is a threshold between elite and mass politics that parties are unable – or unwilling – to cross in the transnationalisation of their activities. From the public's point of view, the federations and the groups are invisible elements in the Union's political infrastructure. Even in the most recent European election in 1994, it was the familiar national parties that appeared on ballot sheets; there was negligible awareness or discussion of the transnational parliamentary groupings to which candidates would adhere if elected; and, although some of the manifesto commitments agreed in the federations did percolate into the debate, public understanding of both their provenance and significance was hazy.

Indeed, even the intensification of transnational party activity in the EU in the 1980s and 1990s did little to remove the national foundations of party politics. In many ways, it is national, rather than transnational, parties that function as the 'carriers of European integration'. The continued ability of national parties to monopolise the mass political arena while reserving European-level activities for elite contacts between senior party figures and MEPs can be seen as evidence of their remarkable capacity to ensure that the transnationalisation of party activity does little to diminish their own role. Likewise, it is hard to avoid the impression that national political parties are key influences in shaping the political culture of each country's membership of the EU. There are two reasons for this. First, public attitudes towards European integration seem to be less rigidly formed than on domestic issues and they are, consequently, more open to political leadership by domestic parties, who often dominate national debates and media. Second, it is political parties who recruit elites and shape their basic political assumptions. The prejudices for or against European integration that they transmit from one generation of political leaders to another may help explain the significant continuities of approach towards the politics of the EU that are to be found in certain member states.

Amongst changes at the level of national party politics in the 1980s and 1990s that have, arguably, affected the practice of transnational party collaboration are the following: first, the problems that global-

isation and the 'crisis of the welfare state' have presented for left-of-centre parties in particular, and the attendant search for 'solutions' at the European level (Delwit and De Waele, 1993); second, the presence of new cleavage structures and a consequent need to accommodate new arrivals on the political scene, such as the Greens; and, third, the degree of *Parteiverdrossenheit* or public disillusionment with political parties and party democracy. The latter compels political parties to consider whether European integration is a 'problem' or a 'solution' in terms of their own political credibility, and supporters of the EU to ponder the implications of building the Union around party politicians who are not as authoritative as they once were in the domestic arena.

Argument and organisation of the book

Before presenting our particular view of the significance of political parties in the EU, it is helpful to set out systematically the main views of those who are more sceptical about the relevance of party politics to the study of the EU. These might be summarised as follows:

- EU politics are about contending 'national interests' rather than party ideologies. Although each member state is riven by internal conflict about the positions that should be adopted at EU level, there are authoritative domestic institutions for determining the 'national line' (Moravcsik, 1993a). Such majoritarian procedures that exist in the EU are only artifices to facilitate *interstate* bargaining (for example, by speeding decision-making). Few claim that they produce or 'sanctify' party political majorities at the European level.
- In so far as the EU is a political system that has to respond to social forces and not just interstate bargaining, it is argued that it is not political parties but economic interests that are most influential with the Commission and the Council (Gaffney, 1996, p. 21). According to this point of view, economic interests have little difficulty in organising themselves for international political influence. Transnational settings may even make it easier for them to escape controls, play off competing authorities and dominate the weak and diffuse decision-making processes typical of multi-state political systems (Holland, 1980). Policy networking

approaches further emphasise the extent to which EU agencies – at a practical level of policy formulation and implementation – become highly dependent on the expertise and cooperation of the very private interests that they are supposed to regulate (Mazey and Richardson, 1993). By contrast, it is suggested that parties, like democracy itself, are essentially nation-bound institutions. They are inherently constrained in their ability to organise, aggregate and communicate across political frontiers.

The Union has only had very modest success in stimulating the development of its own political parties. The EU does not have pan-European parties that directly engage the electorate in a competition around alternative approaches to European integration or in the aggregation of votes; and although transnational party activities touch on many individual aspects of the EU's governance, these do not amount to a classic model of party government, for it would be a heroic leap to describe the federations and party groups as having *overall responsibility* for government and opposition in the Union, or as the main linking mechanisms between all branches and levels of government. In so far as the EU has a party politics, it borrows heavily from the efforts of national political parties. Even the federations and party groups – which come nearest to endowing the EU with a party system of its own – are more *transnational* than *supranational*. That is to say, they are not composed of individuals and local branches, but of preexisting national parties, many of which were fully developed before the foundation of the Union itself. This, inevitably, leads to a very different balance of power between the whole and the parts than anything to be found in a single-state political party, with neither the federations nor the groups being able to command the same levels of loyalty and authority over national parties as the latter, in turn, enjoy over their own membership. In addition, the cultural segmentation of the Union along national and linguistic lines carries over into even the most assiduously 'European' of the federations and party groups.

Most sceptically of all, it can even be argued that the only impact of European integration on party politics has been negative and that it has greatly contributed to a general decline in their importance in Western Europe. To a degree this argument overlaps with the foregoing observations that the EU has changed the focus of decision-making from the natural habitats of political parties – national parliaments and elections – to interstate

define a 'new politics' that was not related to either the left or the right (Offe, 1985). However, the main parties invariably demand that new movements also compete on the traditional political issues; which forces new issues to be amalgamated into the original left and right concepts, and new parties to be aligned on the left-right dimension. By the late 1980s, the majority of Green parties had thus taken up positions on the left on most political issues. This flexibility of the meanings of left and right has enabled them to persist as the dominant concepts in strategic behaviour between political parties.

However, there is one cleavage in EU politics that cannot be squeezed into the single left-right dimension: the division between interests that support European integration, and interests that are adamantly opposed. One reason for this un squeezability is that this is a new dimension and the traditional party families have not (yet) been able to take up stable positions on either side of the issue. However, a more fundamental reason for the stubbornness of the 'integration-sovereignty' cleavage is that it inherently undermines the cohesion of the main party families. The traditional parties distinguish between themselves in the domestic arena over the role of state authority in the making of social and economic policies, and not on the question of the institutional design of the emerging supranational political system in Europe. In other words, after a century of relatively stable democratic state structures in Europe, the main *familles spirituelles* represent ideologies about who gets what under a particular institutional structure. However, political interests about the question of European integration are more determined by national and cultural factors than by party affiliation. Consequently, whereas parties in different European states from the same party family tend to have similar views about the role of the state (the left-right question), they are likely to have different views as regards European integration.

The Christian Democrats and Conservatives are a partial exception to this rule. From the rebirth of Christian Democratic parties after the Second World War, they have been unanimously committed to the process of European integration. This is rooted in Catholic social doctrine, and the reluctance of the Church to treat the nation state as the 'natural' political structure. In contrast, most Conservative parties are more eager to protect the traditional state structures. Contemporary Conservatism contains a definite streak of 'national liberalism', which defends the right of each European nation to its own self-determination. This division is thus a throwback to the

earliest political juncture in the formation of the domestic European states: where Christians Democrats had an allegiance to a supranational institution; and Conservatives were wedded to state structures that were defined independently of Rome.

Similarly, two of the smaller party families directly contradict this rule: both of which are more coherent on the integration-sovereignty cleavage than on the left-right dimension. First, Regionalist parties inherently question the structure of the state in Europe since its establishment between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, and advocate European integration to facilitate the destruction of this organisation. Regionalist parties are thus unanimously pro-European, but come from many different positions on the left-right political spectrum. Second, a small number of movements have begun to emerge that directly derive from the European integration cleavage. In most cases these movements have not been formally established as political parties, and only come together as a single political force to fight in European elections. In domestic electoral competition, when politics returns to the classic Left-Right issues, these movements consequently disappear as the members rejoin the mainstream political families from whence they came. Like the Regionalists, these anti-European movements are thus coherently aligned on the integration-sovereignty dimension but are fragmented on left-right issues.

Overall, therefore, the strategic environment of party politics in the EU system has two fundamentally irreconcilable dimensions. First, the left-right dimension is an abstract summary of socioeconomic and political cleavages. Second, the integration-sovereignty dimension is a conflict about more or less European integration derived from deep social, cultural, national and territorial traditions. Party politics in the EU is conducted within this two-dimensional space. However, the main party families prefer to compete on the left-right dimension, to minimise internal conflicts between different member parties of the same party family.

Position and strength of the party families

The coherence of the European *familles spirituelles* in the EU political space is shown by the positions of the member parties of the party families on the two dimensions. On the first (left-right) dimension,

Starting with the first cleavage in modern European politics, in the EU states that were traditionally aligned with the Church of Rome during the Reformation and Counter-Reformation period (as in Germany and the Benelux states), Christian Democracy is the main political family on the right (see Irving, 1979; Hanley, 1994). In contrast, in the states with national Churches that were independent of Rome (as in Britain, Scandinavia and France), Conservatism is the dominant political force on the right (Layton-Henry, 1982; Girvin, 1988). The only exceptions to this rule are Spain, Portugal and Italy, where deep Christian Democratic traditions have declined since the 1970s, and where the contemporary forces on the right have taken more 'national' and/or 'secular' positions, which are similar to the Conservative or Liberal families.

On sociopolitical issues, such as divorce and abortion, Christian Democrats are usually to the right of the Conservatives. On economic issues, however, they are usually to the left of the Conservatives. Consequently, as economic issues are generally more salient than sociopolitical issues, the average position of the Christian Democrats is to the left (6.7) of the Conservatives (7.7), as Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show. The only real exceptions to this rule are the minor Scandinavian Christian Democratic parties. However, this is because Scandinavian Christian Democracy is inherently 'Christian fundamentalist', against the liberalism of the Scandinavian states, whereas the 'social Catholicism' of the continental Christian Democrats facilitates compromise with Liberal and Social Democratic parties. Nevertheless, on the left-right dimension, the Christian Democratic and Conservative families are both fairly coherent: with a low deviation from the mean (standard deviations of 0.8 and 0.4 respectively) and a small difference between the most centrist and most extreme parties (ranges of 2.7 and 1.1 respectively).

On the integration-sovereignty dimension, the 'supranational' origins of Christian Democracy, as opposed to the 'national' origins of Conservatism, are reflected in the opinions of the Christian Democrat and Conservative voters. The average difference between Christian Democrat voters in favour of EU integration and those opposed to EU integration is almost +75 per cent, whereas for the Conservatives it is only +54 per cent. On this dimension, however, the Conservatives are more internally divided than the Christian

the parties can be located from empirical data compiled from judgements by 'party systems experts' in each of the European states. In these judgements, each party is positioned on a scale from 1 (at the left end of the spectrum) to 10 (at the right end). The predominance of a single left-right dimension is confirmed in empirical research, regardless of whether expert judgements, voter orientations or content analysis is used (Castles and Mair, 1984; Budge, Robertson and Hearl, 1987; Lavet and Hunt, 1992; Huber and Inglehart, 1995). The data on the positions of the parties on the left-right dimension that are used here are taken from Huber and Inglehart (1995), except for Greece, which is taken from Mavgardatos (1984). However, no survey has been conducted by experts on the positions of parties on the second (European integration) dimension. Nevertheless, a reasonable indicator of the position of parties on the integration-sovereignty dimension of EU politics are the views of individuals who 'identify' with that party. Few works have exclusively addressed the question of party attitudes towards European integration. The exceptions are Morgan and Silvestri (1982); European Parliament (1988); Featherstone (1989); Haahr (1993); and Gaffney (1996). In the tables below, the figures for the positions of the parties on the second dimension hence refer to the number of people who identify with a particular party who think the EU is a 'good thing' minus the number of people who identify with the same party who think the EU is a 'bad thing'. On these two dimensions, the standard deviation of the parties (the average deviation from the mean position of each party family) and the range (the difference between the lowest and highest party positions in each party family) are indicators of the level of coherence of the party families on each of the dimensions.

Apart from the location of the party families in EU politics, the other main aspect of the EU party system is the relative strengths of the party families. In the tables below, the strength of each individual party is the average percentage of the electorate that voted for it in national elections between 1990 and 1994 and in the 1994 European election. The mean strength of a party family is the total number of European citizens that voted for the parties in that family in this period. This is calculated by weighting the individual party scores according to the size of the EU member state; for example, the German electorate comprises 22.1 per cent of the EU citizenry, the Luxembourg electorate is only 0.1 per cent; and the British electorate is 15.7 per cent.

TABLE 2.2
The Christian Democrats

Member state	Party name	Date established	Left/Right	Pro-/Anti-EU	% 90-94
AUSTRIA	Österreichische Volkspartei	1945 (1889)	6.3	-	39.8
BEL. Flem.	Christelijke Volkspartij	1968 (1884)	5.7	74	16.9
BEL. Flem.	Parti social-chrétien	1968 (1884)	6.0	64	7.5
DENMARK	Kristeligt Folkeparti	1970	6.2	-	1.7
FINLAND	Suomen Kristillinen Liitto	1958	8.5	-	3.1
FRANCE	Centre des démocrates-Sociaux	1976 (1945)	5.8	-	~5.0
GERMANY	Christlich Demokratische Union	1950 (1870)	6.4	60	33.9
IRELAND	Christlich Soziale Union	1946 (1870)	7.0	-	6.4
IRELAND	Fine Gael	1933 (1922)	7.0	68	24.4
ITALY	Partito popolare italiano	1994 (1919)	6.3	75	16.5
LUXEMB.	Parti chrétien social	1994 (1919)	-	-	2.3
NETHERL.	Christen Democratisch Appél	1914	7.1	95	31.5
NETHERL.	Christen Democratische Unie	1980 (1879)	6.3	88	26.5
PORTUGAL	Partido do Centro Democrático e Social	1974	8.4	66	8.5
SWEDEN	Kristdemokratiska Samhallspartiet	1964	7.0	-	7.1

Notes:

The dates in the fourth column refer to the establishment of the current organisation bearing the name of the party. The dates in parentheses refer to the establishment of the earliest incarnation of the current organisation.

All the parties in the table are members of the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD).

The parties marked with an asterisk are also members of the European People's Party (EPP) party federation. Most CDD MEPs sit in the Group of the EPP in the EP. The OVP, CDU, CSU, PPI and PCS are also members of the 'Conservative' European Democratic Union (EDU).

The data used here on the positions of the parties on the integration-sovereignty dimension are taken from *Eurobarometer*, No. 37c (1992). The data on party strengths are taken from the election reports in various editions of the *Journal of Electoral Studies*.

TABLE 2.3
The Conservatives

Member state	Party name	Date established	Left/Right	Pro-/Anti-EU	% 90-94
DENMARK	Det Konservative Folkeparti	1916 (1850)	7.6	70	16.9
FINLAND	Kansallinen Kokoomus	1918 (1894)	7.4	-	19.3
FRANCE	Rassemblement pour la République	1976 (1947)	7.9	54	~18.0
FRANCE	Parti républicain	1977 (1966)	7.2	-	~10.0
GREECE	Nea Dimokratia	1974 (1902)	8.3	57	39.6
ITALY	Forza Italia	1994	-	-	2.9
ITALY	Polotiki Anixi	1994 (1902)	-	-	19.2
SPAIN	Partido Popular	1989 (1910)	7.5	56	37.7
SPAIN	Moderata Samlingspartiet	1968 (1902)	8.3	-	21.9
UK	Conservative Party	1867 (1830)	7.7	34	34.4
	Mean:		7.7	54.2	18.9
	Standard Deviation:		0.4	11.6	
	Range:		1.1	36	

Notes:

All the parties in the table, except FI are members of the European Democratic Union (EDU). The parties marked with a single asterisk are also members of the European People's Party (EPP) party federation and sit in the Group of the EPP in the EP, and the parties marked with a double asterisk are not members of the EPP but sit in the EPP Group nonetheless. The RPR, FI, and PA sit in the 'Union for Europe' Group in the EP.

Democrats. The supporters of the Christian Democrats are strongly pro-EU integration in all EU states: where the German CDU voters are the least pro-European Christian Democrats. In contrast, the difference between British Conservative voters in favour of the EU and those opposed is only +34 per cent, whereas for the Danish Conservatives (and probably for the other Scandinavian Conservatives) this figure is +70 per cent. This difference was hence revealed in the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, where all Christian Democratic parties were unanimously in favour of the treaty, and there were deep divisions in many of the Conservative parties (particularly in the British CP and the French RPR). Consequently, although the religious cleavage that traditionally divided Conservatives and Christians in Europe may have almost disappeared since the 1960s, the difference between a fundamental allegiance to a European-wide entity and an allegiance to the nation state may prevent the two main political families of the Right from organising together at the European level.

Liberals

The ideology of Liberalism relates to personal social and political freedom as well as economic freedom (see Kirchner, 1988). On the issue of social and political freedom Liberal parties are hence usually to the left of Christian Democrats; whereas on the issue of economic freedom they are often to the right of Christian Democrats. Moreover, this duality of Liberal ideology has produced two main streams within the contemporary Liberal family: *Radical Liberals* emphasise social and political freedoms, whereas *Economic Liberals* emphasise economic freedom. Consequently, as Table 2.4 shows, the mean position of the Liberal family on the left-right dimension is 6.4, which is only slightly to the left of the Christian Democrats, and there is a high level of internal cohesion (with a standard deviation of 1.0 and a range of 3.5, from 4.8 to 8.3). However, the average left-right position of the twelve Liberal parties where the Radical stream is dominant is 5.5 (which is clearly to the left of the Christian Democrats) – marked with an 'R' in Table 2.4. This is thus in contrast to the average position of 7.1 for the eleven parties where the Economic stream predominates (which is between the Christian Democrats and the Conservatives) – marked with an 'E' in Table 2.4.

On the question of European integration, however, Liberal supporters are even more integrationist than the Christian Democrats:

with an average difference between 'support for' and 'opposition to' the EU of +75 per cent. On European issues, moreover, there is only a minor difference between the supporters of Radical Liberals (+71 per cent), and Economic Liberals (+78 per cent). Radical Liberals argue that greater social and political freedom is gained through the development of a larger sociopolitical unit in Europe. Economic Liberals, on the other hand, see European integration as the only way to deregulate the restricted national economies in Europe. However, as with the Christian Democrats and Conservatives, these pro-European views are not consistently held within the Liberal streams. Among the Radical Liberals, the Greek, Spanish and British parties are less Euro-enthusiast than Italian and German parties; and among the Economic Liberals, the Belgian Flemish party is not as pro-European as the Dutch and Danish parties. Nevertheless, all the Liberal parties supported the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.

Finally, a further complication in the position of the Liberal family in EU politics is the underlying 'agrarian' background of some of the parties who now claim to be Liberal. These parties are shown in Table 2.4 with an 'A'. As previously discussed, the Agrarians were a coherent party family based on a deep urban-rural cleavage in European politics. For a number of reasons, however, these parties have increasingly occupied the centre ground in the party systems where they are present: in Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden. The mean left-right position of these *Agrarian Liberal* parties is 6.8, which is very close to the Christian Democrats. However, the significance of these parties for the behaviour of the Liberal family in EU politics is that they have a very specific attitude towards European integration: related directly to the status of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) – which constitutes more than one-third of the EU budget. Agrarian parties are staunch defenders of the CAP, and are thus strongly in favour of the EU as it stands at present. However, if the CAP is radically reformed, through an opening up of the European agricultural market as a result of rulings by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) or EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, the Agrarian Liberals may begin to oppose the EU. In stark contrast, the rest of the Liberal family (and particularly the Economic Liberals) advocates the introduction of more free market measures into the CAP. This would thus undermine the coherence of the Liberals on the second dimension in EU politics.

TABLE 2.4
The Liberals

Member state	Party name	Date established	Left/Right	Pro-/Anti-EU	% 90-94
AUSTRIA	Liberales Forum ^R	1993	6.3	-	3.0
BEL. Flem.	Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten ^E	1993 (1846)	7.3	59	11.7
BEL. Francoph.	Parti réformateur libéral ^E	1979 (1846)	7.4	80	5.3
DENMARK	Det Radikale Venstre ^R	1870	8.1	78	17.4
	Venstre: Danmarks Liberale Parti ^A	1905 (1870)	5.7	80	6.0
FINLAND	Suomen Keskusta ^A	1906	7.0	-	24.8
	Suomen Maaseudun Puolue ^A	1959	7.0	-	4.8
FRANCE	Parti radical ^E	1901	6.7	-	≈2.0
	Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche ^R	1972 (1901)	4.8	-	≈6.0
GERMANY	Freie Demokratische Partei ^R	1948 (1861)	5.6	83	7.1
GREECE	Hellenic Liberal Party ^R	1982 (1910)	5.3	68	2.8
IRELAND	Fianna Fail ^A	1926 (1905)	6.8	74	37.1
	Progressive Democrats ^E	1985 (1905)	8.3	-	5.6
ITALY	Partito repubblicano italiano ^R	1895	5.6	79	2.0
	Radicali ^R	1962 (1955)	-	70	1.4
	Federazione dei liberali italiani ^E	1994 (1848)	7.3	77	1.2

Member state	Party name	Date established	Mean: Standard Deviation:	Range:	Mean: Standard Deviation:	Range:
LUXEMB.	Demokratesch Partei ^E	1945	8.3	78	8.3	78
NETHERL.	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie ^E	1948 (1885)	7.2	88	7.2	88
	Democraten '66 ^R	1966	4.8	88	4.8	88
PORTUGAL	Partido Social Democrata ^E	1974	6.4	79	6.4	79
SPAIN	Centro Democrático y Social ^R	1982 (1977)	5.4	46	5.4	46
	FORO ^E	1993	-	-	-	-
SWEDEN	Folkpartiet Liberalerna ^R	1934 (1900)	5.9	-	5.9	-
	Centerpartiet ^A	1921 (1913)	5.9	-	5.9	-
UK GB	Social and Liberal Democrats ^R	1988 (1839)	5.2	63	5.2	63
	Alliance Party of Northern Ireland ^R	1970	5.8	-	5.8	-
N. Ireland	APNI	1970	5.8	-	5.8	-
	SLD	1988 (1839)	5.2	63	5.2	63
	CP*	1921 (1913)	5.9	-	5.9	-
	FPL	1934 (1900)	5.9	-	5.9	-
	FORO ^E	1993	-	-	-	-
	CDS	1982 (1977)	5.4	46	5.4	46
	PSD	1974	6.4	79	6.4	79
	D'66	1966	4.8	88	4.8	88
	VVD	1948 (1885)	7.2	88	7.2	88
	DP	1945	8.3	78	8.3	78
	Mean: Standard Deviation:		6.4	75.1	6.4	75.1
	Range:		1.0	11.1	1.0	11.1
			3.5	42	3.5	42
			11.0	-	11.0	-

Note: All the parties in the table, except the CD, MRG, Rad. and FF, are members of the European Liberal, Democratic and Reform Party (ELDR) and sit in the Group of the ELDR in the EP. MRG and Rad. sit in the 'European Radical Alliance' Group in the EP and FF sits in the 'Union for Europe' Groups in the EP.

Like the Liberals, the Socialist party family exists in all the member states of the EU (Paterson and Thomas, 1986; Padgett and Paterson, 1991). Furthermore, like the three main party families of the centre right, the Socialist party family is fairly coherent on the left-right dimension. As Table 2.5 shows, the left-right mean position of the 19 EU Socialist parties is 4.3. There are some ideological differences within the Socialist family. For example, SAP is more 'pacifist' than the British LP, the PDS is more interventionist than PSOE, and the SPD prefers a coalition with a Liberal party whereas the PvdA, the SPÖ and the SP prefer coalitions with Christian Democrats. Nevertheless, all the parties in the Socialist family are moderately in favour of state intervention to correct 'market failures', and universally advocate a reduction of state interference in individual social and political relations (such as abortion rights, freedom of consciousness, and freedom of sexuality). Consequently, the Socialist family is highly cohesive on the left-right dimension: with a standard deviation of only 0.5 and a range of only 1.8 (3.5 to 5.3).

However, compared to the level of cohesion on the left-right dimension, on the question of European integration the Socialist family is historically divided. In the 1950s, the Socialist parties in the original six member states were less reluctant than the other main party families to approve the Paris and Rome Treaties. In the 1960s and most of the 1970s, the Socialist parties in Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway were officially opposed to their countries becoming members of the European Economic Community. Although all the European Socialists supported the Maastricht Treaty, the Socialist parties in Britain, Denmark, France and Greece suffered deep internal divisions when it came to ratifying the Treaty in the national parliaments. Finally, these internal divisions were repeated in Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway in the 1994 referendums on joining the EU and in the September 1995 Swedish elections to the EP. Overall, however, Socialist parties are generally in favour of European integration, but in some member states they are careful not to antagonise their supporters. As Table 2.5 shows, there is a vast difference between the high levels of support for the EU among Socialist voters in Ireland, Portugal and the Netherlands, and the low levels of support in Denmark, Britain, Greece, and even among the francophone Belgians.

TABLE 2.5
The Socialists

Member state	Party name	Date established	Left/Right Pro-/Anti-EU	% 90-94
AUSTRIA	Sozialistische Partei Österreichs	1889	4.8	31.4
BEL. Flem.	Socialistische Partij	1978 (1889)	4.0	11.5
DENMARK	Parti Socialiste	1978 (1889)	4.2	12.5
DENMARK	Socialdemokrater	1871	4.2	26.6
FINLAND	Sosiaalidemokraattinen Puolue	1899	4.4	22.1
FRANCE	Parti Socialiste	1969 (1905)	4.1	17.4
GERMANY	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	1891 (1863)	3.8	33.2
GREECE	Panhellinio Sosialistiko Kinema	1974 (1935)	4.6	41.0
IRELAND	Labour Party	1912	4.1	15.2
ITALY	Partito Democratico della Sinistra	1991 (1921)	3.5	19.8
ITALY	Partito Socialista Italiano	1892	5.0	5.6
LUXEMB.	Parti Ouvrier Socialiste Luxembourggeois	1947 (1892)	5.3	1.4
LUXEMB.	Parti Socialiste	1903	4.0	24.8
NETHERL.	Partij van de Arbeid	1946 (1894)	4.2	23.5
NETHERL.	Partido Socialista	1973 (1875)	4.9	32.0
SPAIN	Partido Socialista Obrero Español	1879	4.0	34.9
SWEDEN	Socialdemokratiska Arbetarpartii	1889	4.1	37.6
U.K. GB	Labour Party	1900	4.4	38.3
N. Ireland	Social Democrat and Labour Party	1970 (1949)	3.7	1.0
	Mean:		4.3	30.1
	Standard Deviation:		0.5	
	Range:		1.875	
			64.3	60

Note:

All the parties in the table, except the PSDI, are members of the Party of European Socialists (PES) and sit in the Group of the PES in the EP. The Italian PSDI was expelled from the PES in 1994 for its support of the Berlusconi government, but it still considers itself part of the Socialist family.

The Greens are the only other party family that exists in all the EU member states (see Müller-Rommel, 1989). The first formal political party in this tradition was the British Ecology Party, which was established in 1973. However, the German Die Grünen are usually treated as the 'mother of the Greens' because they were the first to achieve electoral success and have dominated the ideological debates in the Green movement. Green ideology mixes the original commitments to environmental protection and pacifism with a radical agenda for reforming the European economic and political system. Rather than justifying these positions in terms of economic interests, as most of the Radical Left parties do, the Greens are fundamentally 'post-materialist': arguing that society should move beyond the narrow aims of economic and political security. However, there is an ongoing debate as to whether the Greens should wholly reject the present system of representational politics (as advocated by the fundamentalists ('fundis')) or should compromise with the traditional parties to achieve incremental change (the position of the pragmatists ('realos')). In the 1990s, most Green parties have only been able to secure electoral success when adopting this later position. To be able to participate in the electoral process, however, the Greens have been forced to define their positions on the main issues dividing the other main party families (i.e., questions of economic policy) and thus to take up a position on the left-right spectrum. As Table 2.6 shows, in so doing the Greens have positioned themselves between the Socialist and Radical Left families (with an average of 3.2).

By defining their identity in left-right terms, however, the Greens are as incoherent as the other main party families when it comes to the question of European integration. In ideological terms, the Greens are torn between supporting European-level initiatives for environmental protection that cannot be implemented at the national level, and a deep scepticism of the 'democratic deficit' in EU decision-making. In 1992, however, all the Green parties either voted against or abstained in the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in the national parliaments; and the Green parties in Austria, Sweden and Finland opposed EU membership in the 1994 referendums. As Table 2.6 shows, the Green voters are also unevenly distributed between pro- and anti-EU positions. Nevertheless, on average the difference between Green voters 'in favour' and those 'opposed' is

TABLE 2.6

The Greens

Member state	Party name	Date established	Left/Right Pro-/Anti-EU	% 90-94
AUSTRIA	Die Grüne Alternativen	1986 (1982)	2.9	4.8
BEL. Flem.	Anders Gaan Leven (AGALEV)	1981	3.4	66
BEL. Francoph.	Ecolo	1978	3.5	62
DENMARK	De Grønne	1983	2.0	0.4
FINLAND	Vihreä-Demokraati	1982	4.0	6.8
FRANCE	Les Verts	1984 (1978)	4.4	5.2
GERMANY	Die Grünen	1979	2.9	1.4
GERMANY	Grüne Alternative	1991 (1978)	4.4	7.9
GREECE	Ecologistes Alternatives	1989	-	0.5
IRELAND	Camhiontas Glas	1981	-	4.7
ITALY	Federazione dei Verdi	1986	2.6	3.1
LUXEMB.	Déi Gréng Alternativ/Grei	1993 (1983)	2.3	9.8
NETHERL.	Green Links	1989	1.8	4.8
NETHERL.	De Groenen	1986	-	0.1
PORTUGAL	Os Verdes	1982	-	≈1.0
SPAIN	Los Verdes	1986	-	0.8
SPAIN	Miljøpartiet de Grøna	1981	4.3	3.3
U.K.	Green Party	1985 (1973)	-	2.4
			Mean:	4.6
			Standard Deviation:	10.3
			Range:	15

Note: All the parties in the table, except GE, are members of the European Federation of Green Parties (EFGP) and sit in the Green Group in the EP (if they have any MEPs).

over 65 per cent, which suggests that they are more pro-European than the 'materialist' supporters of the Socialist or Radical Socialist parties. This could mean that the anti-European positions of the Green party leaderships are unsustainable in the long term.

Radical Left

Turning to the first of the smaller party families that arose after the extension of the franchise in Europe, there is a group of parties in many EU member states to the left of the Socialists (Baumgarten, 1982). These parties, which are shown in Table 2.7, derive from two separate political traditions: the Communist parties that emerged around the time of the Russian Revolution; and the Independent Socialist parties that emerged in the late 1950s and 1960s against the so-called 'sell out' of the governing Socialist and Social Democratic parties. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, however, most European Communist parties dropped their commitment to a complete overthrow of capitalist and liberal democratic institutions (and many dropped the word Communist in their name). This consequently pushed the two traditions together, in a 'united front' to campaign for a democratisation of European political and economic institutions (see Bell in Gaffney, 1996). In contemporary EU politics, therefore, these parties are effectively a coherent *famille spirituelle*: with an average position on the left-right of 2.3, and a standard deviation of only 0.8.

This treatment of the Radical Left as a single party family in EU politics is further justified by the coherence of their positions towards European integration (see Fiesci, Shields and Woods in Gaffney, 1996). Almost all the parties in Table 2.7 are officially opposed to further European integration, and all except the Spanish IU voted against or abstained in the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. However, there are some radical differences in the opinions of the EU among the voters for these parties. As Table 2.7 shows, the average difference between Radical Left voters 'in favour of or 'opposed to' the EU is +34 per cent. Nevertheless, this figure masks striking differences. At one extreme, about 60 per cent more voters for the Greek SYN and Irish DL are in favour of the EU than are opposed; whereas, at the other extreme, 32 per cent more voters for the Danish SF are opposed to the EU than are in favour (hence a figure of -32).

The Radical Left

TABLE 2.7

Member state	Party name	Date established	Left/Right Pro-/Anti-EU	% 90-94
AUSTRIA	Kommunistische Partei Österreichs	1918	-	0.2
DENMARK	Socialistisk Folkeparti	1958	-32	8.5
FINLAND	Vasemmistiliitto	1990 (1918)	-	0.5
FRANCE	Parti Communiste Français	1920	19	10.1
GERMANY	Partei Demokratisch-Sozialistische Linke	1968	-	0.8
GREECE	Synaspismos tis Aristeras	1977 (1918)	68	3.8
IRELAND	Kommunistiko Komma Hellados	1918	33	5.3
ITALY	Rifondazione Comunista	1991 (1907)	54	3.2
LUXEMB.	Nouvelle Gauche	1990 (1921)	48	6.0
NETHERL.	Socialistische Partij	1957	-	2.6
PORTUGAL	Partido Comunista Portugues	1921	31	1.2
SPAIN	Izquierda Unida	1986 (1920)	54	11.6
SWEDEN	Vänsterpartiet	1990 (1917)	-	4.5
UK N. Ireland	Workers' Party	1970 (1921)	-	0.1
		Mean:	2.3	34.4
		Standard Deviation:	0.8	29.0
		Range:	2.6	100

Note: The nine parties in the table that have MEPs that are marked with an asterisk sit in the Confederal Group of the United European Left in the EP.

At the other end of the left-right dimension are the various parties that make up the Extreme Right in European politics (Georg-Betz, 1994). There are three main streams to this grouping. First, there are the *neo-fascist* organisations that advocate the economic and social policies of the Nazi and Fascist movements of the 1930s and 1940s (and often use the same symbols) – these are indicated with an ‘F’ in Table 2.8. Second, there are several overtly nationalist and *xenophobic* parties that either derive from monarchist traditions (such as AN or EPEN) or emerged as protest movements against immigration in the 1970s and 1980s, but actively deny any links to Fascism or Nazism – marked with an ‘X’ in the table. Third, in the 1980s several new Extreme Right parties emerged that combined nationalist ideology with a strong *anti-tax protest* against the modern welfare state – marked with an ‘A’ in the table. The Austrian FPÖ, which derives from a ‘national liberal’ tradition from the middle of the nineteenth century, does not easily fit this typology. However, it can be considered part of the Extreme Right family because in its present incarnation it combines nationalist/xenophobic and nationalist/anti-tax ideologies.

These parties can be treated as a single party family in EU politics for a number of reasons. First, they have a strongly coherent position on the left-right dimension: with an average of 9.3, and a standard deviation of only 0.4. On economic issues some Extreme Right parties are more free market than others. However, they have common policies on many sociopolitical issues: for example, they are all anti-immigration, anti-abortion, anti-homosexual rights, and anti-parliamentarian (preferring ‘strong presidentialism’). Second, moreover, despite some voters for these parties being relatively pro-European (such as the supporters of the VB), the parties of the Extreme Right are strongly opposed to European integration. All the parties of the Extreme Right opposed the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992; and the FPÖ and NYD campaigned against Austrian and Swedish membership of the EU in the 1994 referendums. There is a tension in Far Right ideology as regards European integration: between a preservation of national identities, and an emphasis on a deeper cultural commonality between ‘White Europeans’. However, the groups that advocate this second position (the neo-Fascists) are electorally and organisationally small. Consequently, the

The Extreme Right

TABLE 2.8

Member state	Party name	Date established	Left/Right	Pro-/Anti-EU	% 90-94
AUSTRIA	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs ^{X/A}	1955 (1885)	8.6	-	16.6
BEL. Flem.	Vlaams Blok ^X	1978	9.8	43	7.2
FRANCOPH.	Front National ^X	1985	-	-	2.1
DENMARK	Fremskridtspartiet ^A	1972	9.1	31	4.7
FRANCE	Front National ^X	1972	10.0	0	10.7
GERMANY	Republikaner ^X	1983	9.3	-43	3.1
	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands ^F	1964 (1920)	-	-	2.2
GREECE	Deutsche Volksumion ^F	1987	-	-	1.1
	Ethniki Politiki Enosis ^X	1977 (1946)	9.4	-	1.1
ITALY	Allianza Nazionale ^X	1994 (1946)	9.3	57	10.4
LUXEMB.	D’National Bewegong ^X	1988	-	-	0.3
NETHERL.	Centrum Democraten ^X	1980	9.5	-	1.1
PORTUGAL	Movimento Accao Nacional ^X	-	-	-	0.4
SPAIN	Fuerza Nueva ^A	1976 (1934)	-	-	1.1
SWEDEN	Ny Demokrati ^A	1990	9.1	-	6.7
U.K. GB	British National Party ^F	1982 (1967)	-	-	1.1
	National Front ^F	1967	-	-	1.1
	Mean: 9.3	Standard Deviation: 0.38	17.6	35.7	5.3
	Range: 1.4			100	

Note: The five parties in the table that have MEPs that are marked with an asterisk sit together as ‘non-attached members’ in the EP. See text for an explanation of X, A and F.

contemporary Extreme Right family is predominantly 'nationalist' in orientation and hence vehemently anti-European integration.

Regionalists

The first of the two political families that are less coherent on the left-right dimension than on the question of European integration are the Regionalists (Rokkan and Urwin, 1982; Rudolph and Thompson, 1989). The label 'Regionalists' encompasses a diverse mix of ethnic, linguistic, substate nationalist, autonomist, separatist, and irredentist groups. The single common strand between these groups, nonetheless, is that they advocate a reform of the territorial structure of the state in which they operate, which encompasses anything from decentralisation or devolution, to complete independence or accession to a different state. Most of these parties also support an eventual goal of a 'Europe of Regions', where the existing nation states are wholly replaced by a European-wide political system based on a mosaic of small territorial units. As Table 2.9 shows, therefore, the supporters of Regionalist parties are generally more pro-European integration than the supporters of any other party family.

By defining itself in terms of 'territorial politics' rather than on socioeconomic issues, however, the Regionalists are deeply divided on the left-right dimension (with a standard deviation of 2.2). Some parties, like the Spanish HB, the Irish SF or the Welsh PC, are at the extreme left of the spectrum (advocating public ownership of the industries in their region), whereas others are at the far Right of the spectrum (supporting anti-foreigner positions). The majority of Regionalist parties, however, contain left and right wings within a single party, and consequently adopt a centrist position in the party system (hence a mean of 5.4). This central position has allowed many of the larger Regionalist parties to coalesce in the national and European arenas with the mainstream party families. For example: Lega Nord has formed alliances with the PDS or Forza Italia in Italy, and with the Liberal group in the EP; the UDC, CDC and PNV have been aligned with PSOE in Spain, and with either the Christian Democrats or the Liberals in the EP; and the SNP and VU have coalesced with some of the parties in the Radical stream of the Liberals in the EP to form the Group of the European Radical Alliance. In general, therefore, if the main European party families all adopt pro-European positions, the Regionalist party family may find it difficult to define a common identity.

Anti-Europeans

Finally, the only other group of parties that define themselves more on the European integration dimension than on left-right issues are the Anti-Europeans. These groups do not strictly constitute a party family, as few of them have ongoing party organisations. However, they can be compared to the traditional party families because the electoral and organisational strength of all four parties in Table 2.10 is directly dependent on the salience of the new integration-sovereignty cleavage in EU politics.

Three of the Anti-European movements, the Danish FB and JB and the French MAE, only compete as political organisations during European elections. The Danish FB was the earliest anti-European party to be formed, in the 1972 Danish referendum on membership of the European Community. It was originally composed of many leading individuals from the Danish Progress Party (FRP), but was also allied with the Socialist People's Party (SF). During the 1992 and 1993 referendums on the Maastricht Treaty, however, the 'No' campaign split into two factions: a right-wing group based on the original FB, with many of the supporters of the FRP (and won 10.3 per cent in the 1994 European elections); and a left-wing group, the JB, with the supporters of the SF that refused to back the 'Danish compromise' of the December 1992 Edinburgh European Council (and won 15.2 per cent in the 1994 European elections).

The French MAE was also a side-product of the 'No' campaign in the 1992 French referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. The leaders of MAE – such as Philippe de Villiers, James Goldsmith and Charles de Gaulle (the grandson of the former French President) – were prominent figures in the French Gaullists (RPR). It was thus formed out of the right of French politics. MAE has only fought one election campaign, the 1994 European elections, and may not survive as a coherent movement. However, the level of support for the movement, 12.5 per cent, and the organisational resources of leading the Europe of Nations Group in the EP, suggest that it will at least live to fight the 1999 European elections. Moreover, the relative success of the 'No' campaigns (against the united opposition of the main political parties) in the 1994 referendums in Austria, Finland and Sweden suggests that similar parties to these Danish and French groups may emerge in future European elections in the new EU member states. This would further enhance the identity and strength of an Anti-European political family.

TABLE 2.10

The Anti-Europeans

Member state	Party name	Date established	% 89-94
DENMARK	Folkebevægelsen Mod EF	1972	14.6
	Junibeveægelsen	1993	7.6
FRANCE	Majorité pour l'Autre Europe	1992	6.2
NETHERL.	Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij/ Gereformerd Politiek Verband	1984 (1918)	7.2
	Reformatoirisch Politieke Federatie	RPF	
		Mean:	1.6

Note: The % votes for each party are the average results in the 1989 and 1994 European elections, not the averages for all elections between 1990 and 1994 (as in the other tables). All the parties in the table sit in the 'Europe of Nations' Group in the EP.

The other party included in Table 2.10 is fundamentally different to the movements that were directly spawned by the integration-sovereignty cleavage. The SGP, GPV and RPF are Protestant fundamentalist parties in the Netherlands, that originally date from 1918. However, since the 1984 European elections, they have deliberately campaigned against European integration; with European election manifestos entitled *For National Independence in the European Cooperation and Unity in Diversity*. Moreover, whereas in national elections (and in the 1979 European election) the two parties usually poll under 2 per cent, in the 1984, 1989 and 1994 European elections they have averaged 7 per cent. Finally, after the 1994 European elections, the SGP/GPV/RPF joined the Danish and French parties in a new Europe of Nations Group in the EP. The electoral support for these parties in European elections (which they fight as a 'united front'), and their legislative behaviour at the European level, is therefore based more on mobilisation around the integration-sovereignty cleavage in EU politics than their original position on the left-right dimension.

Consequently, the Anti-Europeans are fairly coherent on the integration-sovereignty dimension of the EU party system. Also in direct contrast to the traditional party families, and like the Regionalists, the Anti-Europeans are deeply divided on left-right issues. All these anti-European movements were initially led by politicians who broke away from right-wing parties (as in the FB and MAE), or were


right-wing parties that increasingly took an anti-European position (as with the SGP/GPV/RPF). However, when left-wing parties which were formally Euro-sceptic (as in the case of the Greens and Radical Left) turn to support European integration, many left-wing activists and voters may move to the anti-European movements. Strategic movements on the left towards pro-European positions may thus increase the support base of the Anti-European parties. However, this will inevitably undermine their internal cohesion. This was dramatically exposed in the Danish Anti-European movement. The leadership of the Danish Socialist People's Party changed its position between the two referendums on the Maastricht Treaty (from the 'No' to the 'Yes' campaign). Many party activists and voters consequently defected from the party in the second referendum and joined the FB. However, this influx of Left-oriented voters in the FB produced a new division in the Danish Anti-European movement, which eventually led to the establishment of a separate left/Anti-European party: the JB.

Shape of the EU party system

By way of a summary and conclusion, therefore, the shape of the EU party system is the strengths and positions of the party families in the two-dimensional space. The positions of the party families are summarised in Figure 2.1: the mean positions are shown by an 'X', and the ranges are shown by the ellipses. As the ellipses reveal, only two of the party families are more coherent on the integration-sovereignty dimension than on the left-right dimension: the Regionalists and the Anti-Europeans. These are thus the only families that can openly compete on European issues. The 'core' families of all the domestic European party systems, in contrast, are fairly coherent on the left-right dimension, but have wide ranges on the integration-sovereignty dimension. This consequently means that these families risk internal divisions if they are unable to couch EU issues in terms of the traditional left-right continuum.

However, the mean positions of the Socialists, Liberals, Christian Democrats and Conservatives in the early 1990s (shown by 'X' in Figure 2.1) suggest that this is exactly the strategy that these party families have attempted to pursue. In the 1990s, the mean positions of the core families are close together on the integration-sovereignty

FIGURE 2.1 Positions of the party families



Note: The mean position of each party family is shown by an X. The ellipses represent the ranges of the member parties of each party family.

dimension, in moderately pro-European positions, and are far apart on the left-right. This implies that they do not compete on EU issues. For example, whereas in the 1970s the majority of the Socialist parties were anti-European integration, in the 1990s they are universally moderately pro-European. This has thus narrowed the gap between the Socialists and the three right-wing families on European issues, which has enabled them to compete purely in left-right terms and to reduce the risk of internal divisions within their family.

Ironically, this convergence on pro-integration positions among the main party families, and subsequent concentration on left-right issues, is likely to undermine the two families that are primarily aligned on the integration-sovereignty dimension. First, the larger Regionalist parties will be inclined to join one or other of the main

blobs as the Regionalist family fragments on the left-right dimension. Second, as the Socialists, Greens and Radical Left become more pro-European, this will leave a space for the Anti-European family to expand. The price of this expansion, however, is likely to be the eventual division between left and right Anti-Europeans (as represented by the two ellipses in the figure).

The positions of the families in the policy space consequently suggest that there are three main political blocs in the EU party system: a left bloc and a centre-right bloc that are coherent on the left-right dimension; and a pro-Europe bloc that is coherent on the integration-sovereignty dimension and consequently cuts through the other two blocs. In addition, there are two openly anti-integration party families – the Extreme Right and the Anti-Europeans – and three party families that are ambivalent – the Radical Left, the Greens and the Conservatives. However, these families do not constitute a coherent ‘bloc’ against the pro-European families. The likely shape of party competition in the EU system is not only dependent upon the positions and existence of these blocs but also on their relative electoral strengths.

As Table 2.11 hence illustrates, between 1990 and 1994 the left and centre-right blocs were fairly evenly balanced (with between 40 and 46 per cent of the votes across the EU). However, whereas the Socialists were the largest party in the left bloc in every EU member state, the Liberals, Christian Democrats and Conservatives were each dominant in about a third of the national systems. Moreover, the four political families who are strongly in favour of European integration (the pro-Europe bloc) together constituted about 60 per cent of the vote. Nevertheless, half of this support came from the Socialist family, which easily splits into pro- and anti-European voters when the integration-sovereignty cleavage is manifest (as in European elections or referendums on the ratification of changes to the EU Treaty).

Overall, therefore, no single political bloc is dominant on either of the two main dimensions in the EU party system. This may mean that if a majority party-political coalition is constructed in the European arena it will reflect a balance of electoral opinion on both main issues in the EU. Another possibility, however, is that if both dimensions are salient in the EU party system, the political blocs (and some of the political families) may fragment into four distinct blocs: left-integration (Socialists and the left-wing Regionalists); left-sovereignty (Radical Left, Greens and the left-wing Anti-Europeans); right-integration (Liberals, Christian Democrats and the right-wing

Regionalists); and right-sovereignty (Conservatives, Extreme Right and the right-wing Anti-Europeans). Only if the core party families of the centre left and centre right refuse to compete on the integration-sovereignty dimension could this fragmentation be avoided.

In conclusion, therefore, the significance of the shape of the EU party system is that this particular set of positions and alliances structures the way parties relate to each other when pursuing their political goals in EU politics. The historical and ideological nature of the *familles spirituelles* suggests that this shape is relatively stable over time. For example, although Christian Democrats and Conservatives may cooperate at present in the EP, we cannot assume that this in perpetuity (unless one or other of the families completely dissolves). Similarly, the above findings suggest that opposition to European integration is not simply a passing fad. The question of more or less integration into a new European system is a manifest dimension of political conflict that seriously undermines the coherence of the traditional party families. This is fundamentally because the institution of the political party is deeply rooted in the establishment of democratic institutions at the level of the nation state. Moreover, with this framework to understand political interaction *between* parties on issues in EU politics (the strategic environment) we can now turn in the next chapter to political interaction *within* the party family organisations.

TABLE 2.11
Strengths of political blocs and party families

Country	PRO-EUROPE BLOC				CENTRE-RIGHT BLOC			
	Rad. LEFT	GREEN	SOC	REGS	LIBS	CHR. DEMS	CON	Ext. ANTI-EURO
AUSTRIA	2	4.8	31.4	3.0	39.8	16.7	95.9	95.9
BELGIUM	10.8	24.0	24.0	6.0	17.0	9.3	91.5	91.5
DENMARK	9.0	26.6	26.6	4	26.4	4.7	107.9 ¹	107.9 ¹
FINLAND	10.1	22.1	22.1	5.5	31	19.3	97.7	97.7
FRANCE	7.9	6.6	17.4	.3	8.0	10.7	90.1	90.1
GERMANY	3.8	7.9	33.2	7.1	40.3	3.4	95.7	95.7
GREECE	12.1	.5	41.0	2.8	42.5	.7	99.6	99.6
IRELAND	3.2	4.7	15.2	24.4	19.2	10.4	90.2	90.2
ITALY	6.0	3.1	26.8	8.4	18.8	19.2	97.3	97.3
LUXEMBURG	2.6	9.8	24.8	18.8	31.5	10.4	97.8	97.8
NETHERLANDS	1.2	4.9	23.5	26.5	31.5	1.1	96.9	96.9
PORTUGAL	9.0	1.0	32.0	42.2	8.5	4	93.1	93.1
SPAIN	11.6	.8	34.9	11.1	1.0	.1	97.2	97.2
SWEDEN	4.5	3.3	37.6	17.6	7.1	6.7	98.7	98.7
UK	1	2.4	39.3	6.4	17.1	2	99.9	99.9
Avg. Strength	5.2	4.6	30.1	3.8	11.0	5.0	96.1	96.1
	39.9%				45.8%			

Note: The total percentage for Denmark is over 100% because the average votes for the anti-EU parties are for the 1989 and 1994 European elections, whereas the average votes for the other parties are for all the national and European elections between 1989 and 1994. The numbers in bold are the strongest parties in the centre-right and centre-left blocs in each member state.