1
Same menu, seperate tables: The institutionalist turn in political
science and the study of European integration
MARK D. ASPINWALL1
& GERALD SCHNEIDER2
1University of Durham, UK; 2University of Konstanz, Germany
Abstract. Recent research on European integration has largely profited from the institutionalist
turn in political science. Theoretical progress has, however, been hampered by the
diverse understandings of this new research tradition. This paper tries to tackle the conceptual
diversity in a positive way. We first analyze the neo-institutionalist turn in political science
and European studies and then move on to a detailed analysis and comparison of the three
competing approaches – sociological, historical, and rational choice institutionalism. Next,
we will show that the main differences are as much epistemological as theoretical. A convergence
towards a unifying institutionalist approach can thus only be possible if some sort of a
methodological convergence takes place. We sketch how a synthesis between the competing
schools might appear.
‘In my country there is a belief . . . that the only thing separating us
from the animals is mindless superstitions and pointless rituals’.
Quoted from Latka, ‘Taxi’, in Tad Tuleja Curious Customs (New
York: Harmony Books), p. xii.
‘Love and War are the same thing, and strategems and policy
are as allowable in one as in the other’.
Miguel de Cervantes, Don Quixote (reprint, New York: Modern
Library, 1955, p. 580, quoted in Tim O’Brien 1995. In the Lake of
Woods. New York: Penguin, p. 193.)
We are all institutionalists now
A few years ago, the distinguished comparativist Gabriel A. Almond (1990)
complained about the state of the art in political science. His main assertion
was that epistemological and ideological differences prevent scholars
from engaging in a productive discussion beyond small sects of like-minded
people. We can now observe a similar development in studies on European
integration. Although ideological conflicts have waned even in academia
and although the distinction between ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ research
seems increasingly obsolete (King, Keohane & Verba 1994), sharp diviFirst
publ. in: European Journal of Political Research 38 (2000), 1, pp.1-36
Konstanzer Online-Publikations-System (KOPS)
URL: http://www.ub.uni-konstanz.de/kops/volltexte/2008/7130/
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-71301
2
sions still characterize the theoretical debate on regional collaboration. The
protraction of these disputes is all the more paradoxical since the contending
approaches share, at least at first sight, some common ground. The
most important sign of theoretical convergence is, of course, that almost
any Europeanist with a minimal level of self-respect flags herself as an
‘institutionalist’ at the moment.
The institutionalist turn in integration studies dates back at least to
Scharpf’s seminal articles (1985, 1988) on the joint-decision trap. His lament
that traditional approaches such as neofunctionalism have largely ignored the
impact of decisionmaking rules on the integration process coincided with
the publication of March & Olsen’s (1984) pioneering piece which heralded
the institutionalist turn in political science. In the meantime, institutionalist
analysis has been turned into the mainstream approach in political science.
Even though integration studies have always been rather slow in adapting to
conceptual changes, they too were finally reached by the disciplinary change
of tide. Since the early 1990s we have witnessed a proliferation of studies on
the relative power of institutional actors, examinations of the complexities of
bargaining between actors from different levels, and evaluations of the role
that norms and socialization play in the process of European integration.
Despite these impressive achievements almost no convergence towards a
common understanding of European institutions has occurred. On the contrary,
a considerable promiscuity characterizes the way in which researchers
deal with different facets of rule-based behavior. This partly reflects the
state of the art in the general discussion where no consensus definition of
institutions and their salient attributes has been reached. The conceptual indeterminacy
matters more, however, in the relatively volatile field of European
studies where only a gradual turn towards theoretically innovative and empirically
systematic research designs can be observed. Instead of offering
insights to other subdisciplines, integration research is still heavily dependent
upon imports from other disciplines.
We argue that epistemological rather than theoretical differences constitute
some of the most important divisions between the contending approaches.
This means that Europeanists assume to sit in different restaurants
and, more importantly, employ different utensils to attack what we consider
to be the same menu. While most sociological and historical institutionalism
is inductively searching for the patterns of European collaboration, rational
choice theorists aim at uncovering the rules of regional integration in a deductive
fashion. If they do not shy away from a systematic testing of their
theories, their empirical strategy often consists of quantitative evaluations
of basic propositions. The research design of the sociological and historical
3
institutional approaches, conversely, is often (but not always) limited to a case
study framework.
In addition, important ontological differences separate the institutionalist
traditions, and these are perhaps less reconcilable. To carry the metaphor a
little further, some Europeanists like to separate grappa and coffee, while
their counterparts prefer the Italian way of mixing them up. The fundamental
sources of human behavior from the rationalist perspective come from outside
the agent and her context. From the sociological and, to an extent, the historical
perspective, the agent and her context are co-determining; they evolve
simultaneously, and do not exist independently. These different ontologies
can, however, co-exist on the same menu because the restaurant’s etiquette
only insists upon a scientific approach from all diners. We explore these
differences in more detail below.
This article tries to live up to the daunting task of exploring these
differences and of finding some common ground between the different institutionalisms.
Neo-institutionalism is usually divided into two major variants
– rational choice and historical (Bulmer 1994; Shepsle 1989; Moe 1991; Norgaard
1996). However, we adopt the distinction by Hall & Taylor (1996) of
three institutionalisms – sociological, historical, and rationalist.1
The reason
is that there are important differences between the historical and sociological
approaches which we try to draw out and clarify in this paper. In addition,
there are important areas of agreement between all three approaches, so that
it is perhaps more appropriate to think of them not as discrete conceptual
categories but as points along a continuum, or as independent nodes with
areas of commonality.
The article is structured as follows: We first present a review of the contending
approaches and then move on to an evaluation of the most important
institutionalist research in European studies. The final section demonstrates
the potential for convergence.
An overview of the three contending approaches
The basic premise of neo-institutionalist analysis is that institutions affect
outcomes. Institutions contain the bias individual agents have built into
their society over time, which in turn leads to important distributional consequences.
They structure political actions and outcomes, rather than simply
mirroring social activity and rational competition among disaggregated units
(March & Olsen 1984; 1989; Thelen & Steinmo 1992; Lindberg & Campbell
1991).
This key postulate leaves a great many questions in its wake, however,
and one problem of the institutionalist turn in political science is the am-
4
biguity that characterizes the whole research program. Hans Keman (1997:
1) comes to a similar conclusion when he writes: ‘new institutionalism is
. . . characterized by a clear lack of conceptualization of what institutions are,
or how they can be defined’.
Rationalists on the one hand see institutions mainly as ‘long-lived equilibrium
patterns of rational behavior’ and thus realized outcomes in a strategic
game ‘that society plays’ (Calvert 1994: 218). At the other extreme, institutions
constitute human identity and behavior. From this perspective, ‘all
problems are common; all solutions socially constructed and reified; all expectations
common and publicly hegemonic’ (Berger & Luckmann, cited in
Jepperson 1991: 151). This sociological view often assumes that institutions
have cultural roots and in fact sees culture and institutions as somewhat
synonymous. In a review of the literature, Finnemore (1996: 333) states
that ‘the institutionalists’ structure is a cultural one; it is Western rationality
and individuality that creates states, markets, bureaucratic organizations’.
The competing definitions owe much to the legacies of Max Weber and
Emile Durkheim. In the former perspective, institutions shape behavior, but
ultimately they do not determine it. Durkheimian sociologists, conversely,
attribute the overriding influence to social structure. Although the new institutionalisms
link the two theoretical strands, sociological institutionalism is
much more influenced by the Durkheimian research tradition than is rational
choice.
These are two ends of the same spectrum, which varies according to the
extent to which institutions are internalized by agents and therefore the extent
to which they are susceptible to conscious manipulation. Moreover, the field
is characterized by pluralism not simply in what institutions are assumed
to do, but also in the definitions of institutions: Peter Hall (1986: 19), for
example, defines institutions as ‘the formal rules, compliance procedures,
and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals
in various units of the polity and economy’, Much broader, but still
quite commonsensical is Asbjorn Norgaard’s (1996: 39) recent statement that
they are ‘legal arrangements, routines, procedures, conventions, norms, and
organizational forms that shape and inform human interaction.’
This article is based on the understanding that institutions encompass
both formal and informal structures that influence human behavior. In the
European Union, voting or legislative procedures are in the former category.
The Council’s drive towards consensus solutions even in the event that qualified
majority decisions are possible is an example of an important informal
rule. Cultural practices and cognitive patterns also fall into this category.
The effects of institutions on human action can be either constraining
or empowering. One side of this dual role is accordingly that rules prevent
5
actions that might otherwise be pursued. National constitutions or deeply
entrenched social traditions might for instance hinder the development of
lasting transnational relations in the European arena. The other facet of rulebased
behavior is that institutions such as equal voting power enable actors
to undertake certain actions that might seem inconceivable in other circumstances.
For instance, to promote gender equality in reluctant member states,
the European Court of Justice referred to Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome
which obliges the introduction of measures guaranteeing ‘equal pay for equal
work’ (Pierson 1996). Moreover, shared cultural and cognitive-based understandings
may promote common action, whereas different understandings
may act as a constraint.
In the context of European collaboration, institutions can function as independent,
intervening or outcome variables. As independent variables, they
include bedrock values, ideas, and norms at the national, organizational,
or some other level. As intervening variables, they may comprise codified,
clearly-visible rules or they may be routines and standard practices which
are less visible but equally important determinants of social behavior. As
dependent variables, they include those equilibria and patterns of behavior
that characterize the process of European collaboration.
Since rules affect behavior at all levels of societal interaction, neoinstitutionalism
has no theoretical bias towards either ‘high’ or ‘low’ politics
or towards either vertical or horizontal forms of cooperation. In the reform
of the Structural Funds, institutions such as the division of power between
federal and regional actors or the dominant bargaining principles have for instance
proven to be important in the administration of funds (Payne, Mokken
& Stokman 1997). The checks and balances that have been established for the
interactions between the European Commission, the Council of Ministers,
the Court of Justice and the European Parliament consists of a myriad of
sometimes rather byzantine rules (Moser & Schneider 1997).
As we suggested earlier, there may be considerable convergence between
the ‘new institutionalisms’ in certain respects. For example, some historical
institutionalists share with rational choice institutionalists an emphasis on
actor intentionality in the short term (Pierson 1996). Other historical institutionalists
tend to emphasize the long-term consequences of institutions –
particularly their tendency to influence preferences (Bulmer, 1994) – and thus
share with sociological institutionalists a preoccupation with endogenized
behavior.
Nonetheless, no synthesizing approach is in sight. One of the most important
underlying differences between theorists concerns the time horizon.
Rational choice theorists tend to concentrate on short-term decisionmaking.
Sociological institutionalists concentrate on long-term institutional effects.
6
Likewise, historical institutionalists concentrate on the long term effects of
specific (possibly rational) decisions. Closely related to this (and indeed probably
co-varying with temporal differences) is the extent to which institutional
effects are ‘internalized’ by agents. From the rational choice perspective,
institutions are most often external to the agent – including voting procedures
and conflict resolution mechanisms – unless actors are engaged in the
conscious creation of rules. One basic distinction in the rationalist literature
is accordingly between games on rules and games within rules. From the
sociological perspective institutions are internalized – including identitive
institutions such as nationality or religion. It follows that these different emphases
will cause observers to stress alternative explanations for the logic
of action, the interpretation of rules, and the formation of preferences and
strategies.
The differences between the contending approaches become more obvious
if we analyze them in detail. Table 1 shows accordingly that all approaches
understand institutions as rules and norms.2
Our standards of assessment fall
basically into three categories. We first distinguish between the approaches of
the different institutionalist schools of thought, particularly with reference to
their scientific world-view; we then move on to their understanding of institutions
and the time frame which characterizes the typical research designs.
Finally, we highlight the ways in which the approaches deal with three general
problems: preference formation, the creation of institutions, and their
evolution. We illustrate the differences with examples from recent research.
Historical/sociological institutionalism
Theorists clearly distinguish historical and sociological institutionalism from
rational choice institutionalism (compare Norgaard 1996 and Moe 1991 to
Thelen & Steinmo 1992). Although there are significant differences between
them, they both accord institutions an important independent role, and view
humans as rooted in particular contexts; their menu of options and preferences
is limited by the repeated historical practice of interaction and by the social
setting in which they find themselves.
From both historical and sociological perspectives institutions provide an
environment in which political struggles are played out and which structure
the game by providing a set of rules. In fact, there is common ground with
the rational choice institutionalism in the most basic assumption, namely that
institutions influence individual action. Historical and sociological institutionalism
sees institutions as providing a political environment or cultural
context which alters the individual’s sense of what is in her best interests –
in other words, actors are conditioned by the accumulation of procedures,
rules, and norms over time. Identities, priorities, interpretations of reality are
7
Table 1. Main features of the three institutionalist approaches
Sociological Historical Rationalist
institutionalism institutionalism institutionalism
Scientific world view Holism, Modified egoism; Methodological
constructivism; agency constrained individualism;
group identity; or structured by optimizing and
shared past/common common agreement strategic behavior
experience
Typical research Case studies of Historical sociology, Casual illustrations
design cultural, cognitive case studies of hypotheses,
links. macroquantitative
tests
Time horizon Long term Long term Short term
Definition of Norms, rules, culture Informal and formal Rules, procedures
institutions rules
Role of institutions Major independent Intervening variable. Intervening variable.
for human action variable; cultural Grown constraint Situative constraint
constraint. and opportunity and opportunity
Preference formation Constitution of Endogenous. Exogeneous to the
actors through Creation of model or decisioninstitutions;
institutions affects theoretic explanation
endogeneous process preferences.
Creation of Evolutionary; Delegation; self- Distributional
institutions occasional abrupt maintaining and conflict, reduction of
changes caused by potentially expansive transaction costs or
new events or collective dilemma
reinterpretations. as driving force
Evolution of Cognitive/memory – Contingent processes Bargaining process,
institutions process of with path evolutionary
mythologizing dependency and selection
common events. unintended
consequences
all created by this context. In contrast to the rationalist, to whom institutions
represent a strategic operating environment, actors have less ability to set
priorities independent of the institutional context. In this view, human action
is more context-driven than goal-driven.
8
In sociological institutionalism and certain aspects of historical institutionalism,
agents form preferences endogenously, and these are to a certain
extent ‘path dependent’. Over time contexts may change, but since humans
are social animals their preferences and priorities change with them. A further
point of convergence is the scientific orientation of the two approaches, both
of which tend to be holistic. One consequence of this outlook is that the typical
research design of the two approaches is largely influenced by historical
sociology and other related approaches.
However, important differences exist between the historical and sociological
approaches as well: both Hall & Taylor (1996) and Finnemore (1996)
distinguish between the structural and constraining features of historical
institutionalism and the cognitive and culturally embedded features of sociological
institutionalism. As Thelen & Steinmo (1992: 8) put it, historical
institutionalists argue that ‘not just the strategies but also the goals actors
pursue are shaped by the institutional context’. They move beyond the institution
as a strategic environment within which actors pursue exogenously-given
interests, and define institutions as having a much more important role in
shaping political inputs as well as outcomes. The state is the most relevant
institutional environment here. ‘[T]he state is not only affected by society but
also affects it . . . processes internal to political institutions, although possibly
triggered by external events, affect the flow of history’ (March & Olsen 1989:
17–18; also, Skocpol 1985).
It is also possible to distinguish between historical institutionalists, namely
those whose research proceeds from an essentially rationalist perspective (but
concentrates on the ‘unintended consequences’ of rational decisions (Pierson
1996; Immergut 1992); and those whose work concentrates more on the long
term consequences of institutions for actors’ preferences and strategies (Armstrong
and Bulmer 1997). Much of the basis for these different approaches is
the extent to which institutional norms and constraints have been assimilated
by actors. To those in the former tradition, actors are still adjusting to the
obstacles in their path. To those in the latter tradition, actors have internalized
these institutional constraints.
From the sociological perspective, culture is extremely important because
it contains the bedrock cognitive similarities that cause people to share perceptions
of the world around them (Campbell et al. 1991). Although theorists
also denote formal organization and regimes as ‘carriers of institutionalization’
(Jepperson 1991: 150), culture is one of the most important driving
forces behind the institutionalization of human behavior. Legitimacy is also
a crucial concept in sociological institutionalism, because it helps to explain
similarities in organizational forms across spaces and in places where
9
functional demands had not warranted them. Pursuit of legitimacy leads to
patterned behavior.
Therefore, sociological institutionalism perceives institutions as major independent
variables. This becomes obvious in a statement by DiMaggio and
Powell (1991: 11): ‘Institutions do not just constrain options; they establish
the very criteria by which people discover their preferences’. Institutions are
constitutive, in that they comprise the criteria by which agents form their
identity. They develop a ‘corresponding canopy of legitimations, stretching
over it a protective cover of both cognitive and normative interpretation’
(Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 79). Thus, agents do not bounce between institutions
as they venture from one objective to another; agent and structure
are inextricably bound together – the actions of agents are impossible to comprehend
without reference to the cognitive, culturally-informed ‘institutions’
within which they exist. Culture and institutions therefore become virtually
synonymous under the sociological rubric. Unlike historical or rational choice
institutionalism there is no conception of institutional choice.
The relationship between agency and structure was taken a step further
by Giddens (1984, 1976), who theorized the mutually constitutive effects
of agency and structure and who viewed structural rules, defined by him as
internal to the actor, as both enabling and constraining (on structuration in
international relations, see Ruggie 1998). In his structuration approach agents
produce structure, in that they creatively employ social skills in everyday
situations, and also reproduce structure, thus enabling it to endure beyond
any individual’s lifetime. Structuration is important as a potential means of
bridging the gap between rational choice and constructivist approaches since
it recognises both the influence of agency and also the influence of structure.
In order to accomplish this, however, the deeply embedded social practices
which comprise structure must themselves become the object of analysis.
Culturally-based commonalities do not erase the potential for conflict –
far from it. But common interpretations of events, made possible by shared
cultural norms or some habitualized practice, reduce transaction costs and
lead to what Berger & Luckmann term an ‘economy of effort’ (1967: 71).
These boundaries may occur at the national, subnational, or organizational
level. Conversely, actors with similar interests who do not emerge from the
same cultural context find that there is a cross-cutting cleavage separating
them. This has occurred repeatedly in efforts to agree to common economic
policies in the EU – actors from some states or sectors consistently prefer a
liberal approach; actors from other states or sectors a protectionist approach.
The differences may be traced not simply to transient interests, but to longerterm
divergence in normative conceptions of capitalism.
10
To summarize, it is possible to distinguish between institutional structures
that are more explicit, intentional and recognised on the one hand; and
cultural features that are implicit, internalized, and potentially unrecognized
on the other. However, these approaches to institutions are not without their
critics. Koelbe (1995: 239), for example, criticizes the feedback conceptualization
of institutions and states: ‘Individuals are not helpless when it comes to
institutional choice, but historical institutionalists insist that institutions guide
their choices. In the end, it is unclear whether the intentions of individuals or
the constraints imposed by institutions shape outcomes’. In historical institutionalism,
structure may indeed be created by agents; but subsequently, like
Frankenstein’s monster, structure takes on a life of its own.
Moreover, it is very difficult to measure the effect of culturally-derived
institutions, because it is virtually impossible to surmise, except by counterfactuals,
what the event would have produced in the absence of these
institutions. Control groups do not exist. According to the very paradigm,
it is impossible to imagine individuals acting without reference to cultural
roots; to ascertain the effects of these roots becomes exceedingly difficult.
Finally, it is somewhat problematic to make a clear differentiation in practice
between the effects of culture and cognition and the effects of structure and
constraint.
Rational choice institutionalism
The rational choice version of institutionalism is not as coherent a research
program as is often thought. The most important differences are over
the creation and maintenance of rules where bargaining (Knight 1992) or
evolutionary selection (Axelrod 1984; Arthur 1994) become increasingly recognized
as the most important driving forces. This is also the case for those
transaction costs economists who originally saw political institutions as the
more or less automatic result of externality and public goods problems (North
1981; Williamson 1985).
Obviously, almost all adherents of this approach agree with the precepts
of methodological individualism. Accordingly, human action is considered to
be the cornerstone of any social scientific explanation. The rational choice
perspective originally derives from neo-classical economics and views humans
as utility-maximizers who are able to rank their priorities in accordance
with fixed, exogenous preference scales. This paradigm stresses individual
motivation through material gain, and even if theorists do not reject the social
qualities of human agents (Buchanan 1979), actors are conceived as more
independent of context.
During the past two decades, most rational choice work has been largely
influenced by non-cooperative game theory. This approach generally studies
11
how individuals make decisions if they know that the ultimate outcome is
also influenced by other actors. If rational choice approaches do not fall into
the trap of functionalist analysis and conceive of institutions as the answers
to some societal ‘need’, they pay attention to the potential for inefficient responses.
Second- or even third-best responses often flow from the gap that
lies between social and individual rationality. In general, rational choice institutionalism
sees politics as an arena in which individuals try to maximize
their personal gain. Since most decisions are affected by several individuals,
decision making has to be seen as an interdependent process. Since actors
might have incentives to cheat on other players, a society might end up with
institutions that are suboptimal from a collective viewpoint. The Prisoners’
Dilemma and other socially problematic game situations such as the Centipede
or the Chicken Game are some of the famous metaphors with which
rational choice researchers have analyzed the tension between individual and
social interests.
The rational choice approach has first and comfortably found its way into
international relations, where it assumes that actors behave in a strategic
manner, adapting their strategies and beliefs to the assumed actions of other
players. States desiring gains from cooperation, therefore, create and maintain
institutions to lower the transaction costs associated with inter-state activity,
such as incomplete contracting, imperfect information, and the inability to
monitor and enforce agreements. Cooperation, therefore, is instrumental, and
is not necessarily a socially-ingrained and habitual practice.
Rational choice institutionalism consequently sees institutions as providing
a context within which individual decisions are set, but places the
emphasis on ‘individual’ rather than ‘context’. They are, to quote Shepsle
(1989: 135), ‘equilibrium theories. They seek to explain characteristics of
social outcomes on the basis not only of agent preferences and optimizing
behavior, but also on the basis of institutional features’. Institutions provide
a set of formal rules and procedures, or informal practices, that structure
relationships. North (1981: 12) voiced this when he said that ‘something
more than an individualistic calculus of cost/benefit is needed in order to
account for change and stability’. Institutions were the missing element in
neoclassical economics. They ‘provide the framework within which human
beings interact. They establish the cooperative and competitive relationships
which constitute a society . . . ’ (North, 1981: 201).
Rational choice theorists generally start from preferences that are exogeneous
to their model. This general assumption is made because one element
has to be fixed in order to reach explanatory power. If a model allows every
variable to change, nothing can be explained. Preference change can thus
only be modeled if other factors are held constant. This is the analytic trick
12
behind Becker’s (1996) decision-theoretic extension of the basic economic
model with which he can rigorously account for socialization and addiction.
Becker’s model, however, has not yet been applied to institutional and
strategic questions.3
Rational choice generally uses, in comparison with the other approaches, a
more narrow definition of institutions. In the rationalist approach to European
integration, institutions are formal and informal rules that regulate and shape
human interactions. Although no rationalist work on the impact of organizational
culture has been undertaken, such applications are theoretically
feasible. This at least suggests the early contribution by Kreps (1990; originally
published in Japanese in 1984) who delineated the strategic role of trust
and other social norms. Rational choice reasoning also lends itself to the analysis
of how inefficient conventions and norms are selected and maintained.
David’s (1985; see also Arthur 1994) analysis of the impractical QWERTY
keyboard standard is the classic example that institutionalist reasoning has no
inherent bias in favor of either optimal or second-best solutions.
One important aspect of rational choice reasoning in contrast to the more
extreme versions of sociological institutionalism is that it does not assume
that institutions precede human action. In accordance with historical institutionalists,
rationalists perceive institutions mainly as an intervening rather
than an independent variable. However, we do not think that these differences
should necessarily impinge on the way in which institutionalist research is
carried out. The close comparison shows that the main differences are the
basic goals and scientific orientations that separate the three research traditions.
Historical and sociological institutionalism aim at ‘thick’ description,
at least in the field of European studies, though large quantitative studies of
the emergence of a homogenous world culture have also been undertaken.
On the other hand, rational choice approaches have an inbuilt bias towards
parsimonious explanation.
The other differences between the approaches are a consequence of this
basic epistemological division. For instance, divergent opinions on the feasibility
and desirability of endogenizing preference change are not one of
the major reasons why a theoretical convergence between the competing
institutionalisms seems unlikely. It is simply an effect of profoundly different
research designs. Historical and sociological institutionalist typically
describe how such changes take place. Rationalists, by contrast, put much
higher emphasis on the establishment of a causal mechanism under which
an endogenous change of taste becomes more likely. If they cannot come up
with a convincing model, the topic disappears from their research agenda.
All methodological approaches have distinct advantages and disadvantages.
The empirical/descriptive approaches are highly detailed, but tend not to
13
yield a discernible pattern upon which generalizations can be made, not least
because of the widespread habit to examine one case at a time. The deductive
modeling approaches are more explicit in their a priori expectations, but do
not always offer unambiguous and generalizable empirical support. Many
of these divergences are based on one fundamental ontological difference:
rational choice and certain historical institutionalists believe in the human as
a distinct, survival-conscious unit; sociological and some historical theorists
start from the holistic premise that humans are part of a whole and that they do
not exist in a meaningful way outside that whole. We will discuss shortly how
the basic differences become apparent in the theoretically guided research on
European integration.
Diverging views on institutionalism and European integration
Like the new institutionalism as a whole, there is no consensus on how to
think about the role of institutions in European integration. To illustrate this
diversity of views, we review some of the extant work in the field.
Rational choice
Rational choice research on the European Union builds on the noncooperative
assumption that actors in all relevant decision making arenas
behave strategically to reach their preferred outcome.4
Since the European
Union has gradually evolved into a complex power sharing system, most interactions
are affected by the way power is delegated from principals to agents
(Moser & Schneider 1997). Typical principals are voters who yield treaty
making power to their governments. Political executives are, conversely,
principals in their own right on whose orders supranational institutions act.
Delegating power is not trivial since agents often pursue their own goals,
profiting from their superior knowledge and experience. Rational choice
theorists have focused to a considerable extent on how agents exploit the uncertainty
stemming from the imperfect division of power between competing
European actors.
Most research has been particularly influenced by signaling games and
the spatial theory of voting.5
As is the case with other subfields, substantial
progress has mainly come from those scholars who actively engage in the task
of building their own models. Game theoretical concepts have, however, also
been a major source for the metaphorical analysis of the European Union.
‘Consumers’ of rational choice do, however, most often content themselves
with the import of some idea without developing them further (Schneider
1994).6
In other words, ‘soft’ applications of the rationalist paradigm often
14
suffer under the problem of coming up with hypotheses that seem plausible,
but cannot be traced back to a convincing deductive framework.
Theoretical advances have first and foremost been made in the analysis
of the ways in which institutional reforms such as the introduction of the
Single European Act or the Treaty on European Union have redistributed
decision making power among the competing actors. According to Steunenberg
(1994, similarly Crombez 1996), the introduction of the cooperation
procedure and the codecision procedure did not diminish the influence of the
European Commission in comparison with the European Parliament. This
view is partly challenged by Moser (1997a, b) who contends that codecision
can force the Commission to accept proposals by the European Parliament
which deviate from its own preference. In his evaluation of Tsebelis’s study
on the Parliament’s alleged conditional agenda setting power (1994/5), Moser
shows that the legislature can only exert an independent effect under the cooperation
procedure if the decision making context changes over time. Under
the codecision procedure, by contrast, the European Parliament has obtained
for the first time unconditional veto power (Schneider 1995). This gradual
strengthening will continue under the new codecision procedures since the
Council now definitively lost the possibility of returning to its initial proposal
after a failed compromise (Steunenberg 1998, see also Crombez 2000 and
Tsebelis & Garrett 2000).
The introduction of rules on the implementation of EU measures (the socalled
‘comitology’ procedures) has led, by contrast, to a strengthening of
the intergovernmentalist rather than the supranationalist actors. As Steunenberg,
Koboldt & Schmidtchen (1996, 1997) demonstrate, the Council has
obtained considerable ‘gatekeeping’ power on some supranational proposals.
Franchino (2000) demonstrates in a macro-quantitative study that strategic
considerations are highly important in this context. Another institution within
the European Union that has been studied by rationalists is the European
Court of Justice. Garrett (1992) offered a first strategic interpretation of ECJ
decision making. He conjectured that ‘. . . the actions of all courts are fundamentally
political in that they anticipate the possible reactions of other
political actors in order to avoid their interpretation’. Although he qualified
this interpretation, Garrett (1995) used an exchange with Mattli & Slaughter
(1995) to reiterate that the ECJ behaves in a strategic fashion and systematically
takes the possible reactions of the member states into account. Alter
(1998) as well as Mattli & Slaughter seem to agree with this.
The first generation of spatial models on decisionmaking in the European
Union has been largely devoted to the actors’ objective influence, without
systematically analyzing the very individual ways in which actors make use
of different institutional settings. In our view, this narrow focus is problematic
15
since it might nurture generalizations that are not well founded in the reality
of EU decision making. Especially models within the booming branch of spatial
games often do not capture the most important features of the empirical
situation under scrutiny.
The conflicting interpretations of the codecision procedure might serve as
an illustration why the empiricism typical of most non-rational choice institutionalists
should play a more prominent role in the process of EU theorizing.
Moser (1997) for instance demonstrates in contrast to Tsebelis (1997) that
the latest substantial institutional innovation empowered the legislature in
comparison with the Council of Ministers. As Kaiser’s (1996) empirical study
shows, this power shift is, however, not due to limitations on the Council’s
power to propose, as Moser’s interpretation of the Treaty on European Union
suggests. It seems largely to be a consequence of the costs that are involved
with the use of vetos and inflexible bargaining positions.7
This finding shows
that the strategic use of institutions rather than the power potential arising
from a legalist interpretation of the constitutional rules should be one of the
key topics in rationalist reasoning on EU institutions.
One exception to the formalistic trend is the two-level game literature
on European integration. Schneider & Cederman (1994) show how member
states use domestic institutions to strengthen their bargaining stance in the
negotiation rounds of the European Council. A possible threat involving a
formal rule is modeled in the referendum game where a laggard state can hint
at popular resistance towards further integration in order to obtain a less favorable
treaty.8
Hug’s (1997) discussion of the feasibility of direct democracy
at the level of the European Union reiterates this point and demonstrates that
the future development of the organization depends heavily on how future
procedures are designed. If referendums are binding, constituents at the domestic
level are more likely to go along with the opinion of their preferred
party than in a situation of a non-committing vote (Hug & Sciarini 2000).
However, rational choice research has not yet devoted sufficient attention
to the impact of informal institutions (Schmidt 2000). One example is the possibility
to employ a potential government crisis to bolster a threat in the realm
of the European Union (Schneider & Cederman 1994). Another example of
the considerable influence of informal rather than formal rules is seniority,
which influences not least the way in which the European Commission is
formed or how members of the European Parliament are selected (Schneider
1997b). Finally and probably most importantly, no rationalist work on the
impact of cultural factors on the integration process exists.
16
Historical/sociological
The historical and sociological institutionalist approaches take a different cut
on institutional dynamics and decisionmaking in the EU. In historical institutionalism
the focus is on the ways prior institutional commitments condition
further action, limit the scope of what is possible, and cause agents to redefine
their interests (Bulmer 1994; Pierson 1996). As Bulmer states, ‘political
struggles are mediated by prevailing institutional arrangements’ (1994: 355).
Institutional and policy change become ‘path dependent’ as actors define their
preferences endogenously, based upon what has occurred in the past. The image
is one of a ratchet, in which institutional arrangements are winched into
place slowly over time, thus constraining human behavior. History creates
context, which shapes choice.
Member state preferences are conditioned and shaped by what they have
already agreed to within Europe. Therefore, causality flows both ways – while
agents choose institutions, institutions then constrain agents. EU institutional
and policy development may ultimately follow one of any number of ‘paths’,
and historical institutionalism does not show favoritism for one path over
another. There is no reason why agents may not subsequently alter institutional
arrangements to better suit their needs, but extant research points to the
‘stickiness’ and longevity of prior structural arrangements.
This is illustrated in work by Pierson (1996). He argues that intergovernmentalism
neglects the evolution of cooperation over time and the importance
of past decisions on interstate negotiations. Gaps emerge in member state
control over institutional evolution, and these gaps are extremely difficult to
close. Using the development towards a European social policy as an illustration,
he shows the path-dependency of collaboration within the EU: ‘In a
number of instances, the short-term preoccupations of institutional designers
have led them to make decisions that undermined long-term member-state
control’. The ubiquity of unintended consequences, the autonomy of supranational
institutions, and the instability of policy preferences in member states
are further factors that have contributed to the inadvertent loss of control.
This work is about the autonomy of supranational institutions from member
state principals, and represents an implicit extension of the recent thinking
by comparativists about state autonomy from domestic social forces (Skocpol
1985). Pierson points out that member state power is increasingly constrained
by a ‘partial but nonetheless significant development of European-level social
policy’ (1996: 156).
Pierson’s essay is a response to the intergovernmentalist notion of state
choice, and he uses the language of choice in delineating initial institutional
arrangements. The implication is that member state preferences continue to
be defined externally to the integration process – in other words they are less
17
influenced by the development of EU institutions and policies than purely
non-rational choice theorists would have us believe. Although Pierson does
suggest that ‘altered circumstances’ (1996: 140) might force a change of
governmental policy preferences, he also places emphasis on the partisan
sources of preference. The inference is that exogenous preference formation –
member state governments seeking to maximize national benefits rather than
achieve a common solution in the ‘European interest’ – is still an important
source of motivation.9
Thus, as he acknowledges (1996: 131), his research
straddles the rationalist/non-rationalist divide.
Historical institutionalists differ over the role of culture in institutional
influence, however. Where Pierson or Immergut (1992) see constrained rational
actors, Armstrong & Bulmer (1997) give emphasis to the different
aspects of culture within European organizations such as the Commission.
Historical institutionalists also differ over the issue of power. Pierson’s discussion
of historical institutionalism at the EU level omits the profound
importance of structural bias, which is an important aspect of the historical
agenda (Hall & Taylor 1996: 940–1; Skocpol 1985; Armstrong & Bulmer
1997: 52). The structure of supranational institutions and policy competence
privileges certain types of policy over others, and by extension, certain actors
over others.
The normative aspect of new institutionalism is evident here: institutions
are not necessarily the product of neutral bargaining or efficient historical
evolution. They have ideas built into them, which then influence the chances
of agents. For example, the market orientation of European policy, and the
existence of producer and consumer (DGIV) directorates with shared competence
over policy marginalizes non-market interests. The dominant mode of
policymaking has been negative, reflecting both the ascendant normative bias
of liberalism and the structure of EU institutions, which privileged negative
over positive integration.10
Therefore, along these two dimensions at least – power and culture –
it is possible to distinguish among historical institutionalists working on
European-level politics. In general, those closest to the rationalist camp
discount culture and see institutions as power-neutral; those closest to the
sociological camp take culture into account and see the institutions as having
important implications for the power of social groups.
The agency role of EU actors is also crucial to an understanding of the
historical institutional basis of policymaking (among others, see Cram 1997;
Armstrong & Bulmer 1997; Pierson 1996; Burley & Mattli 1993). There is
much agreement that the European Commission and the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) have actively constructed a European competence in important
ways, through rulings, proposals, and alliances with actors at various levels
18
across the EU. This activism may be an unwelcome byproduct of principalagent
delegation, because as we stated earlier, agents sometimes have their
own agendas. In the case of the Commission, this activity is ongoing through
an identification of new issues, proposed solutions, and establishment of alliances.
Throughout its work, the Commission strives both to legitimize itself
and to create a demand for European level public goods that might not be created
by principals acting jointly. Again, the effect of this is (often very slowly)
to shift or create preferences, strategies, interests, and identities, which would
not have been the case without supranational agency activism.
Although Europeanists working from a historical institutionalist perspective
tend to focus on the EU level, there is a much larger comparativist
literature using the historical approach at the level of the nation state. Numerous
scholars have examined the unique economic and political traditions
which color state responses to social demands or external change (see the
contributors to Evans et al. 1985; Hall 1986; Schmidt 1995; Crouch 1993;
Katzenstein 1985; Putnam 1993). For example, the similarities in corporatist
arrangements among small European states distinguished their responses to
economic change from those of the large industrial states (Katzenstein 1985).
One of the shortcomings of historical institutionalism is its failure to integrate
the effects of institutions over time at these two levels. As it becomes increasingly
difficult to disentangle the mutual influences of the member state and
EU levels, historical institutionalist research should endeavor to examine the
interaction of institutions between the supranational and national polities.
In sum, historical institutionalism, while not a coherent body of thought,
stresses the role of prior commitments and institutional and policy stickiness
in the process of European integration. Historical institutionalism does not
predict movement toward or away from integration; rather it predicts that
agency rationality, strategic bargaining, and preference formation are conditioned
by institutional context. European integration is a cumulative process,
where prior decisions form a basis upon which new decisions are made. In the
view of some theorists, historical institutionalism also infers a relationship
between organizational culture and political outcomes (Armstrong & Bulmer
1997), and sees an important structural bias on the part of institutional design
(Hall and Taylor, 1996; Armstrong & Bulmer 1997), which privileges some
actors over others.
Sociological institutionalism has also contributed important insights to
European integration studies and there seems to have been a veritable explosion
in recent years in the number of scholars taking a broadly sociological
or constructivist approach to this subject (see Joergensen 1997; Wiener 1998;
Christiansen et al. 1999). This trend builds upon scholarship in international
19
relations which has sought to identify normative and cultural mechanisms
by which both state behavior and state identity are constrained or constructed,
and additionally how identity itself influences state interests and
practices, as well as international normative structures. The work in this area
has sought to counter the rationalist thread linking both neoliberal institutionalism
and neorealism (for an excellent overview, see Katzenstein 1996;
Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein, 1996; also, Wendt 1992, 1994; Ruggie
1998; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen 1995).
Sociological institutionalism in European studies has begun to make
inroads in the theoretical landscape once dominated by variants of intergovernmentalism
and supranationalism (for a review of the literature see Wind
1997: 24–32). Scholars have examined the enlargement of the EU and NATO
(Fierke & Wiener 1999), European citizenship (Wiener 1998), regionalism
and European integration (Christiansen 1997), and domestic-European relations
(Larsen 1997; Holm 1997; Laursen 1997) among others. This literature,
like the international relations scholarship before it, is concerned partly with
how state behavior is shaped or constrained in ways not captured by rationalist
theories and partly about how identity is constructed. Thomas Diez, for
example, drawing on Ole Wæver, asserts that ‘Europe has become a reference
point embedded in all national identity constructions’ (Diez 1999: 10).
Constructivists have taken the notions of history, institutions, norms,
ideas, and culture well beyond the point at which historical institutionalists
are willing to go, raising them to the level of independent variables and problematizing
a number of key concerns that rationalists take for granted. Some
of the institutionalist research that fits this general category has examined
the role of separate European state cultural traditions, which also produce
‘institutions’, though not necessarily in the sense intended by historical institutionalists.
The reason for this bias is that culture has been implicitly defined
as a state phenomenon, informing national actors in similar ways, though
insights from organizational culture may equally be applied to specific groups
or organizations.
Significantly, this research is at odds with the findings of sociological
institutionalists more generally, who focus on organizational isomorphism
as a response to the spread of western culture. The claim is that rational
instrumentality in terms of markets and bureaucracies has forced adaption
among organizations in otherwise very different contexts. It is the need for external
cultural legitimation, rather than finding the most functionally-efficient
response to local needs, that has forced adaptation (Meyer & Rowan 1991).
Thus, Finnemore (1996) points out that the sociological institutionalist literature
tends to focus on the homogenizing effects of an emergent ‘world
20
culture,’ (although she finds evidence of continuing contestation between
cultural norms and values; 1996: 341).
Europeanists might usefully adapt concepts from the sociological perspective
to explore how certain features of a ‘regional culture’ attract member
states – such as a European model of capitalism, social democracy, and (during
the Cold War) civilian power status. Some of these common cultural
features in Europe have roots extending well back in history – such as JudeoChristianity
and the Enlightenment – and contribute to what might be called
a Western civilizational character (as Turkey knows to its chagrin; on civilizational
conflict see Huntington 1993). It seems fairly clear that these features
of the EU have attracted new members, particularly from southern and eastern
Europe, who are eager to bolster their legitimacy as developed states of the
West. We could examine whether their choice has been governed more by this
need to belong or by the economic benefits they calculated would flow from
membership. Those interested in theorizing about the reasons for regional
integration often overlook the normative attraction of ‘Europe’ in the hurry to
provide functionalist explanations of institutional reform or common policies.
On the other hand we could turn this research question around and ask
instead, why has the EU itself tried to emulate states by developing statelike
features, such as citizenship? Organizational isomorphism has affected
the behavior of the EU as well as of European states, not least in order to
provide a gloss of legitimacy to supranational governance. At the same time,
the welter of criticism of the EU continues, based on the notion that it is
illegitimate when compared to the state. The contested terrain of legitimate
governance is apparent in the curious disjuncture between the British and
Italian views of EMU: the British see it as de-legitimizing, the Italians see it
as legitimizing.
Studies of European political economy have noted the enduring differences
between state traditions in Europe and the importance of them in
determining responses to change (see especially Crouch 1993; Crouch &
Streek 1997). The nature of domestic industrial relations arrangements, for
example, based upon distinct cultural traditions, separate modes of capitalism,
differential state-society relations, and so forth, have an important
impact upon how actors respond to a variety of external challenges, including
opportunities or demands for integration. Nationally-rooted cultural features
‘establish a system of common reference’ among actors, including their perceptions
of the outside world, and they also establish a common identity
rooted in both history and anticipated future (Zetterholm 1994: 4–5). This
differentiation acts as a cross-cutting influence to the system-wide influences
of social democracy, neo-liberalism, or some other motivating ideology.
21
For example, although firms across Europe are ostensibly organized to
maximize profits, in reality there are very different motivating principles depending
on the cultural landscape in which the firm is located. Where the state
reaches deep into society, owning monopoly enterprises and reproducing hierarchical
relationships, the reaction to change (or the possibility of change) is
likely to be far different than for liberal states. State ownership of monopolies
and protection of national firms tends to fossilize national policy communities
of bureaucrats, producers, and national parliaments in such a way that they
are resistant to change from both inside the state (consumer groups, new
producers, and ‘generalist’ ministries) and outside the state (foreign producers,
the EU, and other international organizations). Although liberalization
may be gaining credibility and legitimacy across western Europe (and firms
are therefore re-organizing to be able to face greater competition), distinct
national political-economic institutions and values that mitigate against full
liberalism continue to hold sway.
One interesting issue raised by the sociological institutionalist approach
is how these distinct national cultural settings change as liberalism and competitive
practices gain legitimacy more widely. Indeed, the contested nature
of legitimate practices in European capitalism means that sociological influences
act at cross-purposes. More than one ‘institutional environment’ is
acting upon agents and organizations, sending them conflicting signals about
legitimate behavior.
Therefore, from the sociological institutionalist perspective, integration
depends crucially on cultural and cognitive variation, and consequently the
impact of values, beliefs, and identities on actors’ responses to integrative
challenges. This variation may occur along professional lines, where groups
of professionals from different EU member states begin to respond in similar
ways to proposed or agreed policies; it may occur within organizations such
as the European Commission; it may occur along national lines, where firms
in an Anglo-American context have different views of markets than firms in
a Rhineland context (see Madsen 1994; Plaschke 1994; Streek 1997); it may
occur at the subnational level, where citizens in one part of a country may
have different views of the appropriate nature of state-society relations than
citizens in another part of the country (Putnam 1993).
The key underlying assumption is that cognitive boundaries add transaction
costs to cooperation, whether these links are founded in language, faith,
geography, ‘epistemic professionalism’, or some other bond which assigns
common meaning and value to human experience. Cultural persistence may
be the result of external pressure (functional need or the desire for rewards) or
internalization of norms. Alternatively, it may be caused by transmission of
‘an exterior and objective reality’ in which those cultural meanings that have
22
wide significance in society are ‘enculturated’ into succeeding generations
(Zucker 1991). These commonalities solidify over time, and so sociological
institutionalism shares with historical institutionalism this important focus
upon the temporal aspects of institutions. Moreover, as we move from historical
institutionalism to sociological institutionalism, we see a tendency
to assume that institutions become internalized and part of agent identity.
Institutions become increasingly important independent causes of outcomes
whether these are institutional design/change decisions or policy decisions.
Methodology and theory: A tentative research agenda
In this section we set out some of the methodological issues that must be
addressed when applying the new institutionalisms to European integration
studies. A tentative research agenda is also set out. We take as a starting
point the notion that all our new institutionalisms are part of the scientific
enterprise. Moreover, we follow King, Keohane, and Verba’s point that where
the objective is to gain knowledge through empirical research and the search
for patterns, rules of inference should be followed. ‘Inference, whether descriptive
or causal, qualitative or quantitative, is the ultimate goal of all social
science’ (1994: 6, 34). Our research, whether from the rational choice, historical,
or sociological perspectives, deals with uncertainty and tries to make
descriptive, explanatory, or causal inferences about the nature of European
integration.
This is perhaps the starting point for an understanding, if not reconciliation,
between the new institutionalisms. It follows from the point above that
it is the influence of institutions on outcomes that will be a principle area
of research. Institutions, conceived as those formal and informal mechanisms
that produce regular patterns of social behavior, act as both independent
and intervening variables in this research. The dependent variables include
such outcomes as common policies, reform of the supranational institutions,
enlargement, and many other practical questions facing the European Union.
Much has been made of the differences between the methodologies of the
different institutionalisms, especially qualitative versus quantitative research
and formal deductive theorizing versus inductive case-study oriented thick
description. These different approaches are often (though not of necessity)
associated with a particular type of institutional approach.
Rational choice institutionalism has largely focused on formal rules and
the actor’s potential influence within a particular strategic setting. Institutions
are like mazes or hurdles – something to be negotiated on the way to a prize
which everyone is seeking. The most important result is arguably the rigorous
demonstration that power in the European Union is shared in a complex
23
and often counterintuitive way between competing actors. The approach assumes
that actors understand the possibilities and limitations that the diverse
decision making rules have created. More particularly, rational choice institutionalism
suggests that actors adapt their behavior to these institutions and
use them strategically.
The methodology of rational choice institutionalism has mainly been deductive,
formal, and universalist. It has tended not to examine individual
cases, and this has led (as we stated earlier) to conflicting interpretations of
the same events, such as the influence of the codecision procedure. As Green
& Shapiro (1994) point out, a major weakness of rational choice theorizing
is this lack of empiricism. This is compounded by the occasional tendency
to engage in post-hoc theory adjustments when empirical data are found
to contradict the model and by the lack of attention to competing theories
(neither of these latter two tendencies are limited to rational choice theorists,
of course).
Historical institutionalism, by contrast, starts from the premise that human
decisions are much more sticky. They create a web of rules and patterns
of behavior which essentially ‘regularizes’ human conduct in such a way
that certain options, choices, or preferences are not entirely viable. However,
some aspects of historical institutionalism are closely related to rational
choice institutionalism. For example, many historical institutionalists would
not deny that agents intentionally create institutions to solve collective action
problems. Moreover, within certain constraints, historical institutionalists do
believe that agents behave rationally, order preferences (to the extent they are
able to) and act strategically to achieve beneficial outcomes. As institutions
become more familiar, or as social activity conforms to them, historical institutionalists
would predict that actors’ choices in terms of preferences and
strategies would narrow.
Finally, sociological institutionalism gives primacy to the ways human
behavior is conditioned at a deeper, cultural level. Institutions are not mazes
or hurdles, external to the actor; they are internal, subconcious, pre-rational.
Cognitive links created by common experience link humans together, which
lowers the transaction costs of determining how to act in particular situations.
These commonalities and understandings can only be created over time, and
thus sociological and certain historical institutionalist approaches are closely
related.
Certain elements of historical institutionalism are closely related to
sociological institutionalism, notwithstanding the assertion of differences
between the structural and constraining features of the former and the cognitive
and cultural features of the latter. For example, institutions such as
the state and its bureaucracy are historical artifacts – they structure and con-
24
strain social elements. Yet they are also endorsed and legitimized by cultural
attributes, and over time the state institutions help to reinforce culture and
condition responses to potential and real change. The interaction is twoway
– constraints and cognitive processes are intertwined. Over time the
mutual impact of culture and historical institutional evolution are impossible
to separate.
The methodology of historical and sociological institutionalism in
European integration studies has been empirical and case-study oriented.
Whether intentionally or not it has tended to follow the route of ‘analytical
induction and historically grounded comparisons’ (suggested by Evans et al.
1985: 348 with respect to the state). This has led to a rich collection of descriptive
analyses of events but with little theoretical generalization and even
less quantitative data manipulation. Conceivably, quantitative methods could
be applied to determinations of institutional influence but to date this has not
occurred in European studies.
Empirical case studies have the distinct advantage that they are descriptively
rich and quite precise in their explanation of unique events. However,
they suffer from the defect that the very detail may obscure the relative
importance of causal variables. Moreover, one-at-a-time case studies do not
permit valid generalizations as long as no causal model exists to assist in the
inevitable task of counterfactual reasoning.11
Researchers could potentially
overcome this by gathering a number of case studies together. The European
Union is a unique institution, but this uniqueness should not be an excuse
for a lack of theoretical sophistication and methodological rigor. On the contrary,
most institutionalist research questions on the European Union refer
to a selection of similar events and thus invite comparativist analysis either
across policy areas, across member states, or across time (see for example,
Hix 1998).
Consistent with the general discussion above, institutionalist contributions
to the study of the European Union diverge in at least two important ways
across the different theoretical approaches. First, the competing approaches
differ in the intensity with which they try to establish causal explanations of
the interrelationship between actors, context and rules. Sociological and historical
institutionalisms pay particular attention to the contexts which, in their
opinion, help to shape policy change, mediate between integrative actors, and
alter conditions in which integrative decisions are reached. In this paradigm
(particularly the sociological institutionalist one), structure is ontologically
prior to agency. In rationalist research, context matters less. Although different
environments present diverging incentive structures, individuals are still
conceived of as reacting basically in the same strategic fashion.
25
A second difference lies in the way the approaches deal with evidence.
While illustrations and casual stories are often considered as a sufficient base
to bolster a rationalist argument, historical and sociological institutionalist
explanations are much more driven by empirical findings. When rationalists
take the empirical task more seriously, they often employ ‘positivist’ theories
(for a convincing example, see Franchino 2000). On the other hand, while
many historical and sociological institutionalists assimilate quantitative or
qualitative evidence in a positivist manner, there is often a normative element
to theorizing which stresses that institutions produce outcomes of certain
types, due to the structural bias inherent in institutions.
What should we make of this methodological pluralism? One advantage
of formal modeling, whether it involves fully or only boundedly rational
actors, is that it forces precision into an argument. In other words, strategic
rationality, broadly conceived, uncovers some of the problems of inductive
reasoning. It lends precision to a theoretical argument and allows formal theorists
to challenge common sense interpretations. The necessary complement
to a convincing empirical strategy (Moravcsik 1997) is a model, rational
or non-rational, which establishes causal links between variables and from
which testable hypotheses are derived. While we agree with many rational
choice critics that only empirically grounded examinations allow us to move
further in the social sciences, we also believe that it is urgent to establish
a solid theoretical model before engaging in qualitative or quantitative
tests. Without a solid grounding of the basic hypotheses, any empirical work
remains incomplete and shaky.
Therefore we encourage those working in a historical and sociological
framework to raise their theoretical aspirations by working with models that
are as explicit and generalizable as possible, and they should endeavor to
generate as many observable implications as feasible in their empirical work.
Ideally, they should link a number of cases in a comparative framework,
testing an explicit model.
Analytical models are indispensable in the development of institutionalist
theories even if they are dealing with potentially unique constellations. Yet,
any model in an applied setting such as the EU decisionmaking arena should
be empirically informed and accompanied by a sound test. Without testing
and confirmation of hypotheses with empirical data, these hypotheses must
remain subject to question. Some work in non-rational choice institutionalism
leads us in this direction. We believe that this merger between theoretical
rigor and substantive tests of the deduced hypotheses is the main comparative
advantage of a revised institutionalism.
Finally, we believe that it is crucial that theorists take into account alternative
theoretical explanations to the puzzles they are addressing, and this
26
applies primarily to rational choice theorists, who would be forced to relax
their universality claims. As two well-known institutionalists put it,
It is not obvious that any one approach is superior to the others in capturing
the complexities of change. There are several stories to be told
and a necessary humility associated with the telling of any one of them.
(March & Olsen 1998: 21)
How should we treat these competing views of institutions? Is there something
wrong with theoretical and methodological pluralism? We believe in
accordance with Ostrom (1991), Norgaard (1996) and others that there is
some potential for theoretical convergence although we do not eschew pluralism
in either theory or methodology. First and foremost, the understanding
of institutions converges to some extent, with all approaches perceiving them
as both constraints and opportunities.
Second, no approach has an inherent bias towards certain levels of analysis.
While it is sometimes argued that rationalist institutionalists focus on
grand bargains in the European Council, such a theoretical focus is not a
necessity. On the contrary, recent institutionalist research points out that
power sharing is increasingly important despite the ultimate predominance
of intergovernmentalist institutions such as the European Council (Schneider
1995).
One possibility for theoretical convergence is the relaxation of the rationality
assumption in rational choice modeling. This is particularly the case with
evolutionary game theory which studies the emergence of behavioral patterns
among boundedly rational and habit driven actors (Weibüll 1995). Ostrom
similarly argues that rational decisionmaking occurs within a rule-bound context.
‘Rather than conceptualizing rule-governed choice as more important
than rational choice, a general approach would attempt to explain how both
rules and anticipated consequences affect behavior and outcomes’ (Ostrom
1991: 239). Norgaard takes this a step further and advocates an approach that
‘both appreciates that human beings are intentional and reflective irrespective
of context, and that people’s preferences are shaped by experiences and
thus by cultural legacies, and, indirectly, by the institutions constraining and
enabling social interaction’ (1996: 32). This ‘reasonable rationality’ relaxes
many assumptions about the materialist, welfare-optimizing nature of human
choice, but in doing so it risks tautology by labeling everything as rational.
Another possibility is to think more carefully about the temporal ‘level
of analysis’. Rational choice institutionalism’s focus is primarily upon short
time-horizon bargaining scenarios, even if these games may be iterated.
Historical and sociological institutionalism, by contrast, assume that the institutional
influences on actor behavior are the product of a long gestation
27
period. Since these institutionalists are pre-programmed to begin their analysis
from a structural perspective, they take a longer term view of institutions
by definition. Structure may constitute agents, but it often takes a long time
for structure to evolve. Yet if these theorists examine a one-off decisionmaking
scenario, they may find that actors behave rationally within the confines of
institutional context. In other words, against ‘the background of habitualized
activity opens up a foreground for deliberation and innovation’ (Berger &
Luckmann, 1967: 71).
Conversely, rational choice institutionalism may find that the long-term
consequences of repeated interactions are that some forms of behavior are
deemed legitimate in a bargaining context, while others are illegitimate. Unless
institutionalized practices are rejected, time tends to internalize their
effects so that agents have less propensity to reflect consciously on their
efficacy. Over time, institutions become less susceptible to agent calculation.
On the contrary, they are ‘internalized’ and ‘frozen’ into the decision-making
system, leading to habit-driven rather than self-reflective behavior (for norm
internalization, see Finnemore & Sikkink 1998).
Finally, agents may act differently depending on what is at stake. Plausibly,
as the perceived stakes rise, agents will becomes more ‘rationalist’ in
their actions as they carefully consider the costs and benefits, risks and opportunities
of certain outcomes. Likewise, in less costly, more mundane activity,
agents may be more likely to act on the basis of ‘appropriateness’ (March
& Olsen 1998) – that is, appropriateness defined as what is contextually
legitimate. In other words they may ask how they ‘should’ respond to the
situation.
Institutionalists of all stripes should begin to think more carefully about
ways to discern between the explanatory power of the institutionalisms,
adding to this first cut. For example, we may ask whether European integration
occurs because of a rational calculation of anticipated benefits by
member states, or because the norms embodied in the EU – such as peaceful
relations, democratic government, and ever closer union – now exert a supranational
legitimacy. Given the contested nature of European integration we
sometimes forget the norms that unify the states of Europe.
With these thoughts in mind, we offer a set a guiding questions that could
serve to channel future research in this area. First, what kind of institutions
matter in the context of European integration and how do they affect behavior
by agents at all levels of decision making? Second, under what circumstances
do certain institutions arise, and how much can we attribute in this emergence
to intentional behavior and the passage of time? Third, how are institutions
altered or maintained, and how do EU institutions affect institutions at other
levels and vice versa? Fourth, how do EU institutions impact on decision
28
making? Table 2 elaborates on this research framework and suggests possible
lines of inquiry generated from the foregoing discussions and extant research
on institutions.
Conclusion
This article has explored the common ground between the separate strands
of institutionalist thought, and has attempted to go beyond the tautological
assertions that relaxed rationality assumptions, be it in the form of ‘reasonable
rationality’ or ‘rule-bound rationality’ can reconcile the two schools.
We believe that the theoretical differences between the competing schools of
thought have been overstated. Epistemological divergences, by contrast, have
not yet played a major role in the debate.
We show how a certain degree of reconciliation based on a common research
agenda can be reached. The article particularly suggests that the ‘thick
description’ characterizing sociological and historical institutionalism is at
least partly compatible with rationalist thinking. Equally, large-n studies may
lead to the conclusion that preferences, strategies, or outcomes are contingent
upon historical or social processes. One possible means of accomplishing this
reconciliation is to examine through case study method an episode of institutional
change or policy formulation by attempting to control for the influence
of institutions on actor preferences and strategies. In other words, the study
could strive to postulate what actors’ preference and strategies would have
been in the absence of institutions, and compare this to the observed outcome.
A methodological convergence, however, will only become likely under
two conditions. First, applied rationalists have to give in to the historical
and sociological institutionalists demand for empirical precision. Without a
meaningful referent in reality, any hypothesis remains, to quote David Singer,
an ‘insight without evidence’. Second, non-rational choice research should
also acknowledge that models, be they rational or non-rational, are an indispensable
method to derive hypotheses. We believe that many case studies
could be improved if they are more theoretically guided and more consciously
seeking to detect those causal mechanisms that matter. From all perspectives,
the future of institutionalism in integration studies thus looks daunting. In
our view, the challenge that we have analyzed in this article is, however, also
exciting and promising.
29
Table 2. Current research practice (RP) and possible future research practice (FP)
Questions Rational choice Historical Sociological
What kind of RP: Mainly RP: All RP: Identity,
institutions formal decisionmaking shared experience
matter? institutions institutions at the and attached
FP: Widening of EU and national symbols, myths
focus to informal levels. etc.
rules and cultural FP: Role of culture FP: Organizational
practices rather than national
Relationship RP: Exploration of RP: Constraining RP: Nationallybetween
power potential effect of based
institutions and FP: Strategic use institutions. norms/values
strategies of institutions. FP: process of color responses
assimulating FP: Cross-cutting
institutions over influence of nontime.
national norms.
What causes RP: Reliance on RP: Functional RP: Linked to
institutions to selection models need, but habit, identity and
arise and change? or transaction convenience, common
cost arguments shortcuts also. interpretations.
FP: Institution FP: Role of actor FP: Role of
creation as a choice, agency external pressures
bargaining initiative. or shocks.
process
Role of RP: Actors are RP: Intentionality RP: Intentionality
intentionality fully rational crucial to creation largely absent.
FP: Extension to of institutions. FP: Process of
models with FP: How organizational
limited rational intentionality is adaptation to
actors modified by external forces.
institutional
history.
Role of history RP: History plays RP: Constraining, RP: Cognitive
only a role as it structuring role. links harden
affect short-term FP: Internalizing between episodes
interactions effect over long of externallyFP:
Modeling term. induced change.
specific FP: Effect of cross‘historical’
cutting
influences sociological
influences.
30
Acknowledgements
Previous versions of this paper have been presented at the 1997 research
session of the European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR), University
of Bergen, 18–21 September 1997, and the workshop on the ‘Rules of
Integration’, University of Konstanz, 6–8 October 1998 We would like to
thank the ECPR and Thyssen Foundation for their assistance and gratefully
acknowledge the traveling support and hospitality of the Department of Comparative
Politics at the University of Bergen. The article has greatly profited
from our discussions with different participants, including Simon Bulmer,
Jeff Checkel, Laura Cram, Johan P. Olsen and Susanne Schmidt. We would
also like to thank Thomas Plümper, George Tsebelis and two anonymous
reviewers for extensive comments. Our project represents not only a perhaps
futile attempt to find a synthesis between different research traditions
in European studies, but also a more personal effort by two scholars who
try to understand each other’s research. The article could thus not have been
written without a minimal level of tolerance. It might have helped that we
were both socialized in our colleague’s research tradition: ironically, both
of us decided against the cultural mainstream, with Aspinwall becoming
a historical/sociological institutionalist and Schneider a diehard rationalist.
Given our different understanding of the world, any remaining error should
be attributed to either bad habits or suboptimal choices.
Notes
1. We believe that the label ‘historical’ is a misnomer since every social phenomenon can be
attributed to the influence of history. As social scientists we should specifically delineate
between important and unimportant historical influences. We recognise, however, that
many social scientists use historical institutionalism as an independent category and we
follow this convention.
2. The following discussion extends the useful classification in Imbusch (1997).
3. Extending Becker’s framework to explicitly strategic situations is feasible. It should, however,
be kept in mind that adding complexities to an already complicated model yields a
considerable indeterminacy in the selection of the appropriate solution to a game.
4. This is the reason why rational choice institutionalism has also been labeled the theory of
strategic integration (Moser and Schneider 1997).
5. Rationalist studies on European integration have their predecessor in voting power studies
where the ex ante power of individual actors is assessed (e.g., Brams & Affuso 1976). As
Garrett & Tsebelis (1996) correctly point out, this kind of study largely focuses on individual
institutional actors, thereby missing the increasing tendency towards power sharing
and ignoring institutional complexities of decision making in the European Union. Some
recent work tries to account for institutional aspects. One problem with these revisions is
that they implicitly assume an unambiguous impact of institutions on the actors’ voting
31
power. As the spatial voting literature has repeatedly shown, such a uniformity is, however,
unrealistic if actors’ preferences are allowed to vary. Three proponents of the voting
power literature have recently shown that these problems cannot be solved through the
inclusion of ideological consideration since the voting power indices are highly sensitive
to small variations in the actors’ preferences (Lane, Berg & Maeland 1997). Only indices
that are based on spatial models are able to overcome this problem (see Steunenberg,
Schmidtchen & Koboldt 1999).
6. For a related point, see Snidal (1986).
7. Kaiser (1996) attributes Tsebelis’ (1997) interpretation that the European Parliament has
lost influence under codecision in comparision to cooperation to his failure to recognize
that the European Commission matters in the second reading and that, consequently, the
influence of the Parliament is more limited than he conjectures in his analysis of this
decision stage. Scully’s (1997) attack on Tsebelis’ interpretation raises similar points, but
is unfortunately hampered by severe misinterpretations of strategic reasoning (Tsebelis
and Garrett 1997).
8. Pahre (1997) similarly demonstrates that different forms of parliamentary involvement
can be used strategically and affect a country’s behavior at the international level.
9. This observation is, by the way, perfectly compatible with the rationalist literature on
two-level games.
10. This has also been pointed out by Scharpf (1988) who would not consider himself a
historical institutionalist.
11. The ‘method’ of counterfactual reasoning has recently been proposed as a means to overcome
the small n-problem that characterizes theoretical explorations of many interesting
social phenomena. It is often forgotten, however, that the number of cases can be raised
in most research designs.
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Address for correspondence: Dr. Mark D. Aspinwall, Department of Politics, University of
Durham, Durham DH1 3LZ, United Kingdom
Phone: +44 191 374-2810; Fax: +44 199 374-7630; E-mail: m.d.aspinwall@durham.ac.uk