Israeli Perspective on Space Security
28
Deganit Paikowsky, Isaac Ben-Israel, and Tal Azoulay
Contents
28.1 Introduction .............................................................................. 494
28.2 Israel’s Pragmatic Approach to Space .................................................. 494
28.3 Israel’s Space Program: Evolution and Overview ...................................... 495
28.4 Israel’s National Security Strategy and the Role of Its Space Program ............... 496
28.4.1 Israel’s Strategic Conception .................................................. 496
28.4.2 Quality Over Quantity ......................................................... 497
28.4.3 The Need for Self-Reliance in Space .......................................... 497
28.4.4 Strategic Depth ................................................................. 498
28.4.5 Improving Intelligence Capabilities for Near and Distant Arenas .. .. .. ... .. 498
28.4.6 Space, Military Doctrine, and Force Buildup ................................. 499
28.5 Space: An Opportunity and a Challenge ................................................ 500
28.5.1 A Growing Reliance on Space and the Sensitivity to
Space Sustainability ............................................................ 500
28.5.2 Support of the Global Trend to Secure the Space Environment ... ... .... ... 502
28.5.3 An Emerging Threat: Space and Cyberspace Security ....................... 503
28.6 Conclusions .............................................................................. 504
References ....................................................................................... 504
Abstract
Israel has a 30-year tradition of space activity developing, operating, and
launching satellites into space. As a small country, Israel enhances its power
through space in ways otherwise not possible. This opportunity is accompanied
by signiﬁcant challenges, especially in maintaining the qualitative gap
and preserving Israel’s position at the forefront of technology, as well as
securing the space environment. The signiﬁcance of space in Israel’s strategic
The views expressed are solely the authors’ and do not reﬂect an ofﬁcial policy or opinion of any
Israeli entity.
D. Paikowsky (*) • I. Ben-Israel • T. Azoulay
Yuval Neeman Workshop for Science, Technology and Security, Tel Aviv University,
Tel Aviv, Israel
e-mail: deganit.paik@gmail.com; itzik@post.tau.ac.il; tal.azoulay.ssp11@gmail.com
K.-U. Schrogl et al. (eds.), Handbook of Space Security,
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-2029-3_17,
# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015
493
conception shapes Israel’s perspective on space security. This chapter provides
a short overview of the Israeli space program, outlines Israel’s strategic
conception focusing on the role of its space program, analyzes Israel’s
approach to space security, and outlines current challenges and opportunities
space presents for Israel.
Presence in space essential to us. . .and I am convinced that
we must establish this as an objective to which we must
aspire. (Mofaz S (2003) Lecture at the conference, A new
security paradigm. Yuval Neeman Workshop for Science,
Technology and Security, Tel Aviv University)
Defense Minister, Major General (Res.) Shaul Mofaz 2003.
28.1 Introduction
In the early 1980s in order to fulﬁll acute security needs, Israel embarked on an
ambitious space program, which placed it among the group of states which are
capable of self production, maintenance, and control of satellites and launchers.
Having an indigenous national space, capability is part of Israel’s national security
strategy. As a traditional spacefaring nation and a sophisticated producer and user
of space technologies and applications, Israel attributes great importance to
securing the space environment for peaceful uses for all nations.
Looking back 30 years, the overall space activity of Israel is much broader
than national security activity. In the 1990s Israel commercialized its space activity.
It has a robust commercial space industry, alongside a strong scientiﬁc sector.
Nevertheless, this chapter analyzes Israel’s security needs and overall approach
to space security. Israel’s approach to space security may be described as
threefold: (1) developing and maintaining self-sufﬁciency in niche technologies
and applications important to Israel’s strategic needs, (2) protecting its systems and
capabilities, and (3) securing the space environment for all users.
The main body of the chapter is composed of ﬁve sections. The ﬁrst section
depicts the overall Israeli approach to space. The second section provides a short
overview of the Israeli space program. The third section outlines Israel’s strategic
conception focusing on the role of its space program. In the fourth section the
authors analyze Israel’s approach to space security. The ﬁfth section outlines
challenges and opportunities space presents for Israel.
28.2 Israel’s Pragmatic Approach to Space
Israel’s approach towards space and space security emerges primarily from its
position in the regional and global systems. As a small and threatened country,
Israel strives to secure and assure its national security, as well as achieve a lofty
position (especially in its region).
494 D. Paikowsky et al.
Israel’s need to relate to a broad circle of states which surround it, beyond its
immediate neighbors, and its national and security interests demand an orientation
towards space. As a small country, Israel suffers from an acute lack of resources. For
these reasons, the country manifests a pragmatic approach to space power, aimed to
satisfy national security needs. Generally, these consist of the capability to reach
distant threats from an intelligence and operational point of view. This mainly involves
early warning, intelligence, deterrence, and self-reliance in advanced technologies.
Israel seeks a presence in space and regional dominance in space in niche areas:
Earth observation (i.e., lightweight satellites, high resolution electro-optic, and
SAR), low-Earth orbit (LEO) launch capability, and communications. Israel does
not undertake to build all systems entirely on its own. It has, for example, no
navigation or weather systems and has no manned mission. However, Israel seeks
to cooperate with international partners on projects of this nature, as well as
scientiﬁc projects.
28.3 Israel’s Space Program: Evolution and Overview
In the last 30 years, Israel developed a highly advanced space industry and
indigenous infrastructure of space technology in two main niche areas: Earth
observation and communications, including the ground segment of communications
satellites.
The major impetus leading to the decision to embark on an independent
Israeli space program was the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, and the perceived
need to protect Israel, including through the need to verify Egypt’s compliance
with the treaty. The agreement, signed in 1979, did not neutralize Israel’s
concerns of hostile Egyptian aspirations. There was a clear need for intelligence
on what was happening in Egypt without violating its sovereignty. It was
determined that independent operation of a reconnaissance satellite would provide
the optimal solution to this operational problem. In 1981, the Israeli space
program was established out of a pragmatic approach aimed to satisfy national
security needs of early warning, deterrence, and self-reliance in advanced
technologies.
In 1988, the ﬁrst satellite – Ofeq-1 – was successfully launched. Two years
later, Israel launched Ofeq-2. In 1995, Ofeq-3, the ﬁrst operational electro-optic
reconnaissance satellite, was put in orbit. In the years that had come, Israel
successfully put in orbit several more Ofeq series satellite (5, 7, and 9). In 2008,
Israel launched TECSAR, a sophisticated lightweight synthetic-aperture radar
[SAR] satellite.
In the 1990s, besides its national space expertise, Israel developed commercial
satellites (Amos communication satellite series, EROS remote sensing
electro-optical series), subsystems, and other equipment. In the next few years,
Israel is expected to launch several more satellites of different payloads including
hyperspectral and a nanosatellite, which will be used to demonstrate new
technology capabilities.
28 Israeli Perspective on Space Security 495
28.4 Israel’s National Security Strategy and the Role of Its
Space Program
Israel has built its strength in space in accordance with priorities that correspond to
its national and security needs. Understanding Israel’s perception of space and of
space security demands an analysis of Israel’s strategic conception, especially in
relation to space.
28.4.1 Israel’s Strategic Conception
Israel has no ofﬁcial publication that presents its security doctrine and grand
strategy. The only ofﬁcially adopted document is an “Overview” written in
1953 by David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s ﬁrst Prime Minister (Ben-Gurion 1981;
Ben Israel 2001). Ben-Gurion’s report (originally 46 pages long) was submitted
to the government on October 18, 1953. In this overview, Ben-Gurion evaluates and
analyzes the geostrategic facts, challenges, and threats faced by the young State of
Israel, which was established 5 years earlier in 1948. Ben-Gurion also provides
principles of addressing these threats and challenges.
A fundamental part of Israel’s security doctrine is the concept that because
Israel’s independence was not recognized by its neighbors, the country might go
through many “rounds” of warfare, and cannot afford to lose even one. The doctrine
has always been based on three principles: deterrence, early warning, and decisive
victory.
The ﬁrst and foremost principle of Israel’s doctrine is to deter war, and if
deterrence fails, to bring the battle to a rapid and clear conclusion, by destroying
the attacking forces on the adversary’s territory. For this reason and due to the
overwhelming numerical and geographical inferiority of Israel, assuring early
warning intelligence is vital for Israel’s national security. Decisive victory is
necessary to keep wars brief and to develop aggregate deterrence over the course
of many “rounds” of conﬂict. In order to deter war or low-intensity conﬂicts, Israel
projects an image of a capable force that will retaliate disproportionately. This
strategic posture is often misunderstood, and Israeli military reaction is often
accused of applying “excess” force.
Although 60 years have passed, many of the threats and challenges described
and analyzed by Ben-Gurion, including some of the methods of mitigation,
remain relevant today. Nevertheless, over the years there were several attempts
to update the national security policy and formalize it. The most recent one took
place in 2004–2006 by a committee headed by Dan Meridor, appointed by then
PM Ariel Sharon and Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz. Given the rise of rocket and
terrorism threats in the last two decades, the Meridor committee suggested an
additional fourth dimension – “civilian defense.”
Under these conditions and principles, national space capabilities and infrastructure
for military and civilian applications are perceived as force multipliers
boosting Israel’s technological advantage, which allows it to enhance military
496 D. Paikowsky et al.
capabilities. These capabilities also contribute to a number of nonmilitary ﬁelds.
This, in turn, enables the country to increase its level of national security and
strengthen its status in the region. Hence, a strong state-of-the-art space program
is highly important to Israel’s national security. Nonetheless, as explained above,
Israel’s limited resources dictate that it must concentrate on those ﬁelds that are
critical.
The following statement by Major General (Ret.) David Ivry, former Air Force
Commander (1977–1982), provides valuable insight into the role of the Israeli
space program in Israel’s deterrence strategy:
The perception of one’s capabilities and one’s willingness to use those capabilities are
important components of deterrence. The perception of space capabilities is one of the
primary components in Israel’s future deterrence. Therefore, Ofeq 1, 2, and 3 contributed
far more than anyone estimated. Imaging resolution is not the strategic measurement.
Rather, the strategic measurement is the perception of capabilities that the State of
Israel displays. Not what we possess, but rather what the enemy estimates that we possess.
The gaps in capabilities and information, in the tactical ﬁeld, miniaturization ﬁeld,
and others are an immeasurably important component in the dimension of our strategic
deterrence.
The next section delves into the principles of Israel’s national security conception
and analyzes the role of space.
28.4.2 Quality Over Quantity
The basic principle of Israel’s national security concept is that Israel must balance
its numerical inferiority by creating and maintaining a qualitative edge in all
civilian and military realms: education provided to citizens, expertise of scientists,
the level of research and development, the quality of weapons systems, and strong
motivation among the military cadres. In particular, investments in science and
technology are central factors in the power equation between Israel and its
neighbors.
The “Quality over Quantity” concept has remained valid throughout the
years and is applied to all aspects of Israel’s security doctrine. So far, it has been
proven successful in countering conventional wars, terrorism, and low-intensity
conﬂicts. This concept also plays a role in the development of Israel’s space
capabilities.
28.4.3 The Need for Self-Reliance in Space
Israel is an isolated country which suffers severe security problems that are
intensiﬁed by a long history of wars, acts of terror, and atrocities that date long
before the state was established in 1948. Analyzing its problems, interests, and
objectives, Israeli decision-makers reached the conclusion that self-reliance, especially
in science and technology, is needed in order to achieve qualitative
28 Israeli Perspective on Space Security 497
superiority over its adversaries.1
The same rationale was applied in embarking on
a space program. Israeli decision-makers aspired to have the capability without
having to rely on other nations or consider potential pressure. Furthermore, the
internationally acknowledged norm in which having a national space capability is
a means, and a symbol of, power, had also played a role (at least partially), in
Israel’s decision to access and utilize space using its own launchers and satellites
(Paikowsky 2009b).
The following statement by IDF Colonel Eli Polak testiﬁes to the importance
of indigenous Israeli satellites: “Satellites” products enable a better understanding
of the intelligence picture, provide combat support, and aid decisionmaking
at high political level. It is not possible to describe a conﬂict scenario
today without Blue-and-White (i.e., 100 % Israeli) satellite intelligence
(Blizovsky 2009).
28.4.4 Strategic Depth
Israel’s narrow borders constitute a lack of strategic depth and have posed existential
threats which necessitated a search for solutions to avoid the elements of
strategic surprise and sudden attack. For these reasons, Israel’s security doctrine
demands advanced intelligence capabilities for early warning; as well as combat
capabilities for a rapid transfer of battle away from Israel’s population centers to
enemy territory. The orientation towards space assists Israel in coping with the
challenges presented by the lack of strategic depth.
The opportunity to observe enemy territory from space is a scientiﬁc and
technological solution to the military problem which Israel faces. Observation
from space enables Israel to cope with threats from Arab countries directly bordering
the country, as well as those that threaten Israel but are located farther away
geographically. At the 2010 Ilan Ramon Space Conference, the then IDF Air Force
Commander Major General Ido Nechushtan pointed out the advantage provided by
Israel’s space program regarding the lack of strategic depth, and said space is
a force multiplier that provides Israel with a strategic depth crucial to its national
security (Nechushtan 2010).
28.4.5 Improving Intelligence Capabilities for Near
and Distant Arenas
Satellite-derived intelligence information is considered to be a great equalizer in
strategic terms because it increases transparency among states and diminishes the
sense of uncertainty, thus reducing the risk of surprise. Use of satellites, therefore,
1
For more information on the history of the Israeli space program and the motivation of Israel to
embark on an indigenous capability, see Paikowsky (2009)
498 D. Paikowsky et al.
reduces the fear of surprise, increases the level of security, and permits the building
and preservation of relations based on trust (Shaﬁr 2004).
In this context, in recent years Israel has been witnessing a worrying expansion
of Iranian military activity. Iran has pushed forward with ballistic missile development,
space capabilities, and most notably a nuclear weapons program. Additionally,
Iran actively engages in ground-based satellite disruptions. Satellite imagery
and analysis have played an essential role in the international community’s awareness
and response regarding the above referenced Iranian programs. Despite
increasing international condemnation, these activities have continued and serve
to emphasize the importance of protecting space assets from attacks, as well as
making use of space assets to detect and deter attacks.
In Israel’s strategic thinking, the Israeli space program is recognized as
a critical component of its independent intelligence capability. The issue of Israel’s
self-sufﬁciency is a complex one. Israel is far from being totally self-reliant; it
depends on American political support in international forum and economic
aid. Nevertheless, in the ﬁeld of intelligence, Israel has a great deal of
autonomy and does not rely on foreign sources for supplying it with intelligence
technology.
Possession of independent intelligence capabilities has many implications for
Israel beyond the ﬁeld of intelligence. It enhances the power of the state and the
image of Israel in the eyes of its opponents as well as its allies, and increases its
ﬂexibility, both from the perspective of its ability to gather information and
the resulting autonomy in decision-making. Independent capabilities also permit
the country to conceal its areas of interest and to gather information unhindered. To
achieve this independence, Israel has been building its space program, especially
the capability to develop and launch satellites. The main rational for this undertaking
can be found, for example, in a parliament report published in March
2004. The members of the Steinitz Commission recommended intensifying the
development of an Israeli reconnaissance satellite system as infrastructure for long
distance Visint intelligence. “This system should be built in such a way that it has
the ability to respond to threats to the State of Israel in near and distant ‘tiers of
threat,’ and the capability to track down, identify and monitor technological,
industrial and military infrastructures” (Knesset Foreign Policy and Security
Subcommittee 2004).
28.4.6 Space, Military Doctrine, and Force Buildup
Having a presence in space is part of the fundamental components of the military
doctrine Israel adopted in the last two decades. This doctrine draws from the
American military doctrine known as Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA),
which was developed in the early 1990s. RMA has four facets: control of space,
dominant maneuver, information warfare, and precision strike. Space plays an important
role in each of these areas (Ben Israel 2004; Paikowsky 2005): intelligence,
deterrence, navigation and guidance, communications (shortening sensor-shooter
28 Israeli Perspective on Space Security 499
loops among the forces), command and control, meteorology, and media. Israel’s
space program plays an important role in the military doctrine, both in practice
and conceptually.
28.5 Space: An Opportunity and a Challenge
The description of a rational for Israel’s engagement in space activities
provided above reveals that Israel (which operates a successful space program
on a modest budget) views space as a signiﬁcant opportunity, especially as a force
multiplier projecting the quality of force over its quantity. In the era of the
information revolution and the expansion into space (which is an integral part
of this process), quantity and mass of ORBAT (order of battle) no longer play
such a big role. Israel, as a small country that exploits its features, opportunities,
and capabilities, can enhance its power through space in ways it otherwise
not possible.
This opportunity is accompanied by signiﬁcant challenges, especially in
maintaining the qualitative gap and preserving Israel’s position at the forefront of
technology. The signiﬁcance of space in Israel’s strategic conception shapes
Israel’s perspective on space security.
Israel perceives space as a global commons and therefore aspires to contribute
to a secure and sustainable space environment. Israel acknowledges the worldwide
use of space for supporting terrestrial military activity, as well as defending,
and deterring harmful actions, against space systems. Nevertheless, it seeks
greater international collaboration and cooperation, especially among democratic
spacefaring nations, in maintaining space as a peaceful environment for the beneﬁt
of all.
28.5.1 A Growing Reliance on Space and the Sensitivity to
Space Sustainability
The increasing reliance on space-based systems for day-to-day activities on Earth,
along with the global trend of a growing use of space for military activities,
increases the vulnerability of the space domain to hazards and harmful activities.
Space is becoming more congested and competitive. The growing number of space
security incidents has lead nations to ﬁnd methods of ensuring their access to space,
their freedom of action, as well as proper functioning of their assets there. For
example, a growing number of nations now seek to develop space situational
awareness (SSA) capabilities and debris removal (DR) capabilities. Improved
international SSA capabilities and DR capabilities may have a positive effect on
the sustainability of outer space because they would increase transparency. If
shared, these systems could also upgrade conﬁdence in the international community,
as they would enable better prediction, and prevention, of harmful interference
with space assets. Nevertheless, these new developing concepts could also be used
500 D. Paikowsky et al.
for negating the use of satellites. This could have dangerous implications for the
space environment.2
Many spacefaring nations are concerned with these trends,
including Israel. Similar to other spacefaring nations which use and appreciate
space, Israel too is gradually becoming more reliant on its space activity for day-today
life. But together with the reliance on space comes the sensitivity to its
sustainability and security.
Israel enjoys and suffers from a growing reliance on space systems for its critical
national infrastructure. For this reason, it is concerned about the growing global
trend of space militarization. Such threats, if realized, could lead to Israel losing its
current relative advantages in the realm of space. Therefore, Israel is looking for
ways to protect its satellites and achieve a sustainable space environment.
Due to the lack of ofﬁcially released statements and policy papers on this topic in
Israel, an important source of information on Israeli space policy is the various
conferences and academic events which take place each year. Presentations by high
ofﬁcials of the Israeli space community offer valuable insight into current trends in
Israeli space policy. The following statement was made by Commander of the
Israeli Air Force, Eliezer Shkedi, at the 2007 Ilan Ramon Annual Space Conference:
“the operational importance of space is increasing constantly. Why is this
ﬁeld critical? There exists a concern that others who recognize its importance will
try to attack space assets. We must consider defense measures, against physical
harm, jamming, blinding, or any other technique. One of the greatest surprises that
can happen in the modern world, in advanced countries with space assets, is
a situation in which a country is surprised to ﬁnd its space assets damaged. This
kind of damage can be caused by an enemy nation or a terrorist organization.
I suggest that none of us close our eyes, to understand that this is the reality
and to confront the situation with eyes wide open. This is a dream scenario for
countries that have been left behind by advanced technological capabilities”
(Shekedy 2007).
Shkedi’s statement is an example of the growing recognition in Israel of the
importance of a sustainable space environment and the need to protect space
systems. In his annual presentation at the 2008 Ilan Ramon Space Conference,
IAF Commander Shkedi addressed the Chinese ASAT test by saying that “We
cannot ignore this issue. The issue of dealing with the expanding space capabilities,
combined with the increasing dependence of the modern military on
space. . . in my estimation this issue is on ‘our table’ whether we like it or not.
To ignore the matter would be very much incorrect. As one who is concerned with
operational aspects, and we must be very concerned with operational aspects, we
must understand how to develop space assets and how to protect them so that they
will be operational when necessary. I say speciﬁcally “when necessary” because
apparently a limited conﬂict will present few threats to space capabilities. However,
I have no doubt that as the level of conﬂict rises, or if an enemy feels that the
threat to him is very high, one of the issues that he will ﬁnd himself confronted
2
For further discussion of this issue, please see Levi and Dekel (2011)
28 Israeli Perspective on Space Security 501
with will be whether or not to use, or to attempt to use, methods that oppose
land, sea, and air assets, and develop such capabilities against space assets.
Most likely space conﬂict will not be a burning issue in the next year. But looking
ﬁve years ahead, or 10 years ahead, I feel that it will be a very relevant issue.”
(Shekedy 2008).
28.5.2 Support of the Global Trend to Secure the Space
Environment
Besides the ASAT occurrences of the last few years, there have also been several
events of satellite jamming and interference.3
It is too early to determine whether
space weaponization is inevitable, and if the use of ASATs will be internationally
accepted as legitimate. Having ASAT technology be part of a country’s space
security capability can serve three goals. First, it allows a military to have the
capacity for aggressive action against an adversary; second, it provides a capability
to defend against hostile activities; third, it may be used for deterrence against
potential aggressive actions. The risk is that ASATs for aggressive actions will be
developed under the excuse of deterrence and defense reasons.
As long as this trend of a growing military use of space is followed by responsible
and cautious actors, it is not a cause for immediate alarm. If these technologies
proliferate and fall into the hands of irresponsible actors and rogue states,
space may evolve into a dangerously unpredictable arena. This process would
have signiﬁcant implications for the national security of all the “space club”
members,4
including Israel. For this reason, advocates of non-weaponization of
space often argue that declarations and actions to develop ASAT capabilities
increase the potential for a space arms race (Milowicki and Johnson-Freese 2008).
A different approach, based on the democratic peace theory, in which democracies
rarely go to war with one another, suggests that democratic nations involved in
space security actions and ASAT capability development will not act against one
another. For this reason, their aspirations and actions should not be perceived by
other democratic and responsible nations as threatening actions. Democratic
nations, such as Israel, should not be overly concerned by other democratic nations
developing such capabilities. It is in this context that Israel supports efforts of other
democratic and reliable allied countries to develop space security capabilities.5
3
An important example is the case of Iran’s satellite jamming activity against BBC broadcasts,
which was widely criticized and condemned by leading European Union countries and the
UN-ITU. Theodoulou M Tehran told to end satellite jamming. The National. http://www.
thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID¼/20100322/FOREIGN/703219849/1002/FOREIGN.
Accessed 22 March 2010.
4
For a deﬁnition and discussion of the nature of the space club, see Paikowsky (2009) and
Paikowsky (2009)
5
For a more detailed discussion, see Paikowsky and Ben-Israel (2011)
502 D. Paikowsky et al.
The democratic peace theory is based on the philosophical idea of Immanuel
Kant in his book Perpetual Peace (1795). In the discipline of international relations,
this idea has been examined since the 1960s and even empirically tested by several
scholars in the 1990s.
As a spacefaring nation that utilizes space assets on a daily basis in the defense
ﬁeld, and even more in the civilian and commercial ﬁelds, Israel is interested in
a space environment that is safe and secure, expects other countries to act responsibly
in space, and will act in cooperation to achieve this goal.
Recent years have seen a number of international initiatives and agreements
being advanced by countries interested in space sustainability. The European
Union proposed an Outer Space Code of Conduct.6
Russia and China have
suggested the draft treaty on prevention of placement of weapons in space
(PPWT).7
In 2008, the UN passed a series of guidelines for debris mitigation
(UN Debris Mitigation Guidelines). Years before these proposals, a resolution
calling for the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) has been
debated within the UN Conference on Disarmament. The United States and Israel
oppose PAROS.
The United States is concerned with the binding nature of such proposals. It is
especially concerned with the lack of transparency and enforcement that would
enable irresponsible countries and actors to take advantage of those abiding by the
treaties. This could result in responsible actors losing their relative advantage, their
freedom of action in space, and their ability to defend their space assets. Therefore,
the United States supports non-binding agreements which would serve as conﬁdence
building measures.
Israel favorably views these legally non-binding efforts towards space sustainability.
In Israel there is an understanding and belief in the need for international
cooperation to ensure that space remains accessible and sustainable for the future.
28.5.3 An Emerging Threat: Space and Cyberspace Security
The growing dependence of the global economy on space systems creates a common
concern regarding debris and other threats in the space environment which threaten
space systems. As part of this process, recognition is gradually increasing that
physical damage to satellites is not worthwhile and should be avoided because it
may damage other satellites indiscriminately. Additionally, the likelihood of soft
interference in the operation of space systems by jamming or cyber attacks is rising.
This was also recognized by many in Israel who perceive a direct link between cyber
threats (Levi and Dekel 2011; Levi and Dekel 2012) and assuring the security and
safety of space systems (Ben-Israel 2012).
6
For the updated version of the European initiative of the Outer Space Code of Conduct (2012)
7
For more information on the PPWT
28 Israeli Perspective on Space Security 503
28.6 Conclusions
Israel’s space program was launched in response to national security needs. Over
the years, with Israel’s development and evolution as a country, its needs and
capabilities have also evolved. Today, Israel has commercial, scientiﬁc, and
civilian space assets and is expanding its involvement in international space
cooperation. These developments, combined with increasing reliance on space for
day-to-day activities and the nation’s continuing security issues, make space
security a concern for Israel.
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