

Affect and Emotion

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- 31 Khong, *Analogies At War*, pp.110–11.
 32 *Ibid.*, p.134.
 33 *Ibid.*, p.10.
 34 *Ibid.*, pp.217–18.
 35 Houghton, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis*.
 36 The Entebbe raid was famous in the 1970s and has been depicted in movies a number of times, the most recent being *The Last King of Scotland*.
 37 Marijke Breuning, “The Role of Analogies and Abstract Reasoning in Decision-Making,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 47: 229–45, 2003.
 38 Donald Sylvan, Thomas Ostrom, and Katherine Gannon, “Case-Based, Model-Based, and Explanation-Based Styles of Reasoning in Foreign Policy,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 38: 61–90, 1994, p.88.
 39 Gick and Holyoak, “Schema Induction and Analogical Transfer,” p.32.

Suggested Further Reading

- Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies At War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
 Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
 Steven Pinker, *How The Mind Works* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).
 Yaacov Vertzberger, *The World In Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990).

It is clear that no account of the psychology of politics would be remotely complete without an account of the role that *emotion*—or “affect” as it is sometimes called—plays within it. Many phenomena in politics involve emotion and feelings rather than just the “cold” kind of information-processing we examined in the previous chapter; virtually all political concepts are charged with emotion, either positive or negative, something that many psychologists refer to as “hot cognitions.”³¹ Political stimuli often provoke strong emotions, feelings such as liking, dislike, happiness, sadness, anger, guilt, gratitude, disgust, revenge, joy, insecurity, fear, anxiety, and so on.

We do not look at politics neutrally, as some kind of super-advanced, artificially intelligent computer might. Very few people can look at a photograph of George W. Bush or Hillary Clinton, for instance, or a picture of an airplane slamming into the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, without *feeling* something. Few Americans can look at a picture of the late Osama Bin Laden and not feel anger, contempt, or some other negative emotion, just as many radical Islamists in the Middle East look at the same picture and feel pride, admiration, and other positive responses. And this phenomenon is not confined to politics, of course. As the psychologist Robert Zajonc notes:

one cannot be introduced to a person without experiencing some immediate feeling of attraction or repulsion and without gauging such feelings on the part of the other. We evaluate each other constantly, we evaluate each other's behavior, and we evaluate the motives and consequences of their behavior.

Setting aside social situations, moreover, “there are probably very few perceptions and cognitions in everyday life that do not have a significant affective component, that aren't hot, or in the very least tepid.”³²

Advocates of most cognitive perspectives tend to treat people as pure processors of information. This is not true of the cognitive consistency approach of Leon Festinger, in which the emotion of psychological discomfort (dissonance) motivates people to adapt their beliefs, but it is true of most applications of schema theory, for instance. As Yuen Foong Khong notes, "the information-processing theories of the 1970s and 1980s—including schema theory—consciously shied away from 'hot' cognitions, in part because cognitive psychology's model of the mind was informed by the computer analogy." For some years after cognitive concepts like schemas became popular, it was true to say that the topic of emotion in politics was somewhat neglected. As David Redlawsk has pointed out, rational choice theorists—supporters of the *Homo economicus* approach—have always given emotion short shrift, but advocates of the cognitive theories examined in Chapter 9 have traditionally downplayed this potent force as well:

Perhaps because accurately measuring emotional response to political stimuli is very difficult, even political psychologists not necessarily working in the rational choice tradition turned first to the tools of cognitive psychology to understand how people process political information. The cognitive revolution of the past decades led to a great deal of focus (much quite successful) on the cognitive underpinnings of political behavior. Yet a long line of psychological research . . . posits that cognition is not unbiased; that people have various cognitive and emotional motivations to see the world in particularistic ways. Yet somehow this recognition that emotions matter a lot did not find its way very far into political psychology. Instead a distinctly cognitive information processing approach developed that talked of "schemas" and "heuristics" and "rational" decision-making. But it did not talk much about motivation and emotion.⁵

While this was certainly true until fairly recently, it is fortunately no longer the case, especially in the field of mass political behavior. A flood of books about emotion and voting behavior has come onto the market in recent years, for instance, and the work of George Marcus and his colleagues has been especially important in this regard.⁶

Politics is as much about "feeling" as it is about "thinking."⁶ In order to understand political emotions better, though, it helps to categorize the different kinds of political feelings possible, and what we colloquially term "emotion" should really be distinguished in various ways.⁷ For one thing, feelings that are *object-specific* (in other words, that derive from a reaction to a specific thing or person) differ from those that are *diffuse* (that is, they are not associated with a specific person or thing). We can label this kind of emotional feeling "mood,"

former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, for instance, suffered from depression for most of his life, a condition he often referred to as his "black dog." One of the distinguishing features of such moods is that the sufferer is often unable to attribute the dark feelings that come with them to any specific object or cause.⁸ Alternatively, we have all had the experience of waking up in a "sunny" mood, and this too is non-specific in nature. "Emotional responses," on the other hand, may be as transitory and fleeting as this kind of good mood, but they are reactions provoked by a particular person or event, and we can thus attribute some sort of "cause" to them. Ronald Reagan once made a rather appropriate joke—at a time when the Cold War was still going on—about bombing the Soviet Union, for instance. Some reacted to this with anger, others with annoyance, and still others with laughter.

Some emotions differ from both moods and emotional responses in the sense that they are much more long-lasting than either of these. "Evaluations" refer to longer-term attitudes towards (for instance) a particular politician or party, attitudes which rarely change overnight. Both George W. Bush and Hillary Clinton inspire particularly strong affective evaluations among American voters, just as John Howard and Tony Blair did in Australia and Great Britain respectively. It is possible, of course, that we evaluate political leaders using solely "cold" cognitive processes such as schemas or the degree to which the values of a politician fit our own, but this is unlikely because all politicians appear to evoke emotional reactions in people (strong "like" or "dislike," or merely indifference).

Are Emotions "Irrational"?

For a long time, emotions have been treated as something visceral, something which comes "from the gut" rather than the mind. This mode of thinking has ancient roots. In the Western tradition of political thought, it is still very common to contrast "reason" with "emotion"; on the one hand stands ordered, rational reason (something to be aspired to and admired), on the other the full of irrational, emotional impulses (something to be avoided). This is implicit in Freud's distinction between the id and the superego, for instance. We are very much accustomed to thinking of emotion as something detrimental to informed, factually based decision-making.

This way of approaching the operations of the human mind is clearly present in popular culture and dates back hundreds if not thousands of years, right back to the ancient Greeks. Anyone who has ever watched an episode of *Star Trek* or one of its many movie spin-offs, for instance, knows that the relationship between Captain James Kirk and his assistant Mr. Spock turns on their different ways of approaching the worlds around them. While as a human being Kirk

is often passionate and emotional, he is just as often berated by Spock for departing from the dictates of pure reason. When Kirk is led to an emotional response, Spock frequently responds with the cold admonition “that is illogical, Captain.” Half-human and half-Vulcan, however, Spock himself constantly experiences an internal psychological struggle between his reasoning, logical Vulcan half and his emotional human half.

This approach may be seriously misleading, however, and there is a very different (and increasingly popular) view within political psychology that challenges the view that emotional processes are inherently irrational or noncognitive in nature.⁹ It is certainly true to say that hot cognitions often compete with cold ones. Anyone who has tried to lose weight knows that going on a diet is like warring with oneself, logic telling us that we should avoid purchasing chocolate bars and ice cream, appetite (or perhaps plain greed) dictating the opposite. As Steven Pinker points out, “mental life often feels like a parliament within. Thoughts and feelings vie for control as if each were an agent with strategies for taking over the whole person, you.”¹⁰ We are all familiar with the damage that unbridled emotion—especially highly negative affect states such as anger—can do. Nevertheless, emotions are *not necessarily* something which should be regarded as detrimental, he argues. Combining a modern cognitive approach with a Darwinian evolutionary approach, Pinker contends that we have emotions because they have proven useful in propagating the species. We feel love and solidarity with those closest to us, for instance, because we are motivated to ensure the survival of our own genes (a rather unromantic view, he concedes, but very few of us regard such love as “irrational”). Certain cultures are often regarded as more “emotional” than others—take for instance the common stereotype of the “hot-headed Latin” or the “unemotional German”—but Pinker argues that cultures vary only in the ways that their members *display* emotions, not in the extent that they *feel* them. We are all preprogrammed by evolution to feel essentially the same range of emotions, he contends. We do not all feel the same emotions in response to events—differing reactions across the globe to being presented with a picture of Bin Laden again provide a good example here—but we have all developed the same capacity to feel a very similar range of different emotions.

Emotional responses are probably also essential as *motivating* forces. Emotions help supply us with our goals and objectives in life. When somebody pursues a goal doggedly and takes pleasure in attaining it, we often say that he or she has a “passion” for it, a rather apt phrase. Using the example of Mr. Spock, Pinker notes that although Kirk’s right-hand man was supposedly emotionless,

he must have been driven by some motives and goals. Something must have kept Spock from spending his days calculating pi to a quadrillion digits

or memorizing the Manhattan telephone directory. Something must have impelled him to explore strange new worlds, to seek out new civilizations, and to boldly go where no man had been before. Presumably it was intellectual curiosity, a drive to set and solve problems, and solidarity with allies—emotions all. The emotions are mechanisms that set the brain’s highest level goals. Once triggered by a propitious moment, an emotion triggers the cascade of subgoals and sub-subgoals that we call thinking and acting. Because the goals and means are woven into a multiply nested control structure of subgoals within subgoals within subgoals, no sharp line divides thinking from feeling, nor does thinking inevitably precede feeling or vice versa.¹¹

Steven Pinker gives the example of fear, which is “triggered by a signal of impending harm like a predator, a cliff top, or a spoken threat. It lights up the short-term goal of fleeing, subduing, or deflecting the danger, and gives the goal high priority, which we experience as a sense of urgency.”¹² Artificial intelligence experts, he notes, also concede that creating a functioning robot would require us to program in something resembling emotions “merely for them to know at every moment what to do next.”¹³

A similar reason for not treating emotions as detrimental to cold reasoning processes is that they seem actively to aid in the formation of “good” decision-making, and may even be essential to it. In order to make sound, well-considered decisions, we first of all have to *care* about those decisions. This conclusion receives strong support in the work of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio and his colleagues. Damasio discovered that patients who have damage to their prefrontal cortex—the area of the brain that controls emotional responses—often make reckless decisions, even though they may otherwise have extensive intellectual capabilities.¹⁴ He argues that this stems from the absence of emotions (such as fear) that would prevent normal individuals from acting in ways damaging to their social and professional lives. Put simply, they make bad decisions because they no longer have the capacity to care one way or another. As political scientist Jonathan Mercer relates,

people without emotion may know they should be ethical, and may know they should be influenced by norms, and may know that they should not make disastrous financial decisions, but this knowledge is abstract and inert and does not weigh on their decisions. They do not care about themselves and others, and they neither try to avoid making mistakes nor are they capable of “learning” from their mistakes.¹⁵

Like Pinker and Damasio, Mercer sees emotion as *essential* to rationality, not a competitor with it.¹⁶

Whether emotions or cold cognitions “come first”—and thus whether a good theory of political reasoning ought to start with the material presented in this chapter or the previous one—is a debate almost as old as psychology itself. Yaacov Vertzberger is eclectic on this question, arguing that emotions “may cause cognition, or conversely cognition may cause emotions. They cause cognition where a prior experience triggers instant affective reactions before cold processes take place.”¹⁷ Robert Zajonc, on the other hand, was one of the first in recent times to argue that emotion may precede cold cognition, and many political psychologists now agree. Think for instance about what happens when you quite suddenly see someone standing directly in front of you or looking through a nearby window. If you weren’t aware at all that the person was there—we commonly say that he or she has “crept up on you”—you immediately feel surprise or alarm, to the point where some of us will even cry out or shout. We experience fear or astonishment almost immediately, before the conscious mind has processed what is happening. But then, if the person is a friend or someone we know well, we process that information, and may be embarrassed at our own reaction. This is a simple example of emotion coming before conscious cognition or processing of information.

Again, however, our next step is as always to ask what relevance this has for the study of politics. We can best do this by briefly discussing two popular approaches that argue for the primacy of affect; both take the position that one cannot possibly think without feeling, and that feeling often comes first.

Affective Intelligence Theory

Building on insights from neuroscience—a topic which will be covered in more detail in the next chapter—George Marcus and his colleagues explicitly reject the popular view that we must first “think” before we can “feel.”¹⁸ They distinguish between two systems which they term the *disposition* and *surveillance* systems. The first deals with information that is routine. It evaluates incoming information according to the emotions that a particular stimulus elicits: in particular, a stimulus may evoke enthusiasm or aversion. While the first mechanism deals with common or habitual ways of thinking, the second deals with stimuli that are novel and unexpected. The dominant emotion dealt with in this second system is anxiety. As Redlawsk puts it:

once aroused by something unexpected (read “dangerous”) the surveillance system heightens awareness and prepares us to respond by elevating “anxiety” levels. This process is not driven by cognitive processing of the environment but by an emotional response to an unexpected stimulus.

The result is that in this aroused state learning is enhanced, since one needs to understand the nature of whatever threat has been encountered and is thus motivated to find out more about the stimulus.¹⁹

We are alerted to attend much more closely to the stimulus and rely less on habitual thought. In this way, the surveillance system promotes more “reasoned” thought.

Motivated Reasoning Theory

Milton Lodge and Charles Taber have been pioneers in developing a slightly different approach to understanding how emotion affects politics.²⁰ Although they agree with Marcus and his colleagues that affect should be regarded as prior to cold cognition, they approach the topic a little differently. They assume three things: (1) all political stimuli are affectively charged (the “hot cognition” hypothesis); (2) people keep in their heads an online, constantly updated “running tally” which includes their feelings about these stimuli; and (3) how a person “feels” generally affects the reception of stimuli as well. “The clear expectation is that most, if not all, citizens will be *biased reasoners*, finding it nearly impossible to evaluate any new information in an evenhanded way,” Lodge and Taber say.²¹

These two perspectives may not be entirely complementary, as Redlawsk has suggested. In particular, they implicitly disagree about whether encountering a novel or unexpected situation is likely to lead to “better” decision-making. Under the Marcus model, evolutionary mechanisms have led to an ability to act instantaneously, before cold cognitive processes set in. This is expected to improve, not detract from, decision-making. In Lodge and Taber’s approach, on the other hand, affect *biases* the interpretation of new information. As Redlawsk notes, Lodge and his colleagues “find people are more likely to stick to their guns, to support their prior beliefs, and thus allow affect to interfere with updating [of newly encountered information].”²² Thus the first approach emphasizes the way that emotions help us learn, while the second stresses the ways in which emotions bias and distort that process.

How are Hot and Cold Cognition Linked?

Emotions have an “automatic” quality to them, and may sometimes reflect unconscious processes. As George Marcus puts it, “the idea that emotional processes occur outside of conscious awareness, which was initially treated with skepticism, is no longer much disputed.”²³ More work needs to be done on the ways that specific cognitive processes in politics interact with emotion, however.

Although “hot cognitions” are not the primary focus of *Khong’s Analogies At War*, he notes that analogical reasoning has an affective content as well as a purely cognitive one.²⁴

Thus, when [Secretary of State] Dean Rusk decided that the danger in Vietnam was analogous to that in Korea, the analogy might not only conjure up images of Chinese troops crossing the Yalu River, but also evoke negative feelings about inscrutable Chinese hordes.

He also felt “remorse about his failure to anticipate China’s intervention in the Korean War,” *Khong* points out.²⁵ We do not simply “match” the characteristics of a situation with a previous one in a detached way; frequently, we pick an analogy that has some strong emotional significance to us, as *Korea* did for both President Johnson and his secretary of state. Cognitive availability may thus be a function of hot processes as well as cold ones, but this has so far been a neglected area in political psychology.

Moreover, it is clear that emotions—especially fear—played a strong role in Johnson’s Vietnam decision-making. One well-known fear that he mentioned often to his subordinates was the prospect that he might inadvertently set off World War III by bringing China into the war. “In the dark at night, I would lay awake picturing my boys flying around North Vietnam, asking myself an endless series of questions,” Johnson told Doris Kearns Goodwin. “What if one of those targets you picked today triggers off Russia or China? What happens then?”²⁶ It is clear that this was based in part on the Korean analogy, but the comparison set off strong emotions in Johnson that inevitably affected policy-making. *Blema Steinberg’s* analysis of U.S. decision-making on Vietnam also suggests that the emotions of shame and humiliation were very much behind the reasoning of both LBJ and his successor Nixon:

Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon were two highly narcissistic individuals who suffered from painful feelings of shame and humiliation. It was these feelings, in the overall context of their narcissistic character structures, that played an important role in shaping their presidential decisions on Vietnam.²⁷

While not everyone would agree with her psychoanalytic characterization of the two men, it seems beyond doubt that these emotions (and others) had an impact. Another of Johnson’s well-documented fears was being “the first American president to lose a war.”

One useful way of linking work on emotion with “cold” approaches such as schema theory may be to regard emotion as a kind of “cognitive short cut,”

as Fiske and Pavelchak suggest.²⁸ They argue that when someone appears to be a typical member of some category—for instance, a “typical Democrat” or a “typical Republican”—we react affectively not to that person’s characteristics, but use our emotional reactions to the group category instead. Unless the person seems to be atypical in some noticeable way, we simply assign that person to the general category and ignore his or her particular characteristics. Cognitively this makes some sense, since as with other short cuts it puts less strain on our limited information-processing capabilities. Specific kinds of affect (happiness, sadness, anger, and so on) may also trigger particular information-processing styles.

This approach would seem to assume that affect is secondary, rather than primary, and this kind of approach has dominated the study of elite decision-making (including foreign policy decision-making). There is no reason, though, why the models developed by both the Marcus camp and the Lodge-Taber camp cannot be applied to international relations, just as they have become influential in approaching mass behavior. As Redlawsk notes:

Where “political behavior” is usually focused on the mass behavior of citizens—often in terms of voting—the political psychology of emotion is often developed at a more individual level of analysis and therefore is broadly applicable to situations in which individuals must process information about political conditions, whether we talk about citizens evaluating candidates, or elites addressing beliefs about war and peace.²⁹

The Negative Aspects of Emotion

While accepting that feeling is an integral part of human cognition, we should not of course lose sight of the fact that negative emotions clearly can have a damaging effect in politics and that emotion can contribute to highly irrational outcomes; emotion may be vital to human reasoning, but this does not mean that we will avoid all serious errors. We shall see many of these effects when we come to look at the negative aspects of nationalism and ethnic conflict, for instance, both of which are fuelled by powerful human emotions. Equally, some kinds of mood clearly damage the quality of decision-making. As Vertzberger notes, “depression produces rigid, narrowly focused information processing,” especially extreme and overgeneralized assessments of the situation.³⁰ During his last days in office, Lyndon Johnson was clearly in a deeply depressed state, and this may have contributed to his closed-mindedness and unwillingness to listen to advice that ran counter to his Vietnam policies. The same seems to have been true of Richard Nixon during the scandal of Watergate.³¹

There is a greater tendency in the psychological study of international relations and foreign policy to treat emotion as a negative force than there is in the study of mass behaviors such as voting and public opinion, and there is some justification for this: it is hard to see the emotions that fuel ethnic hatred, genocide, apartheid, terrorism, and war between states as positive forces in the world. Nevertheless, the positive role of emotion in decision-making is beginning to be appreciated within the international relations branch of political psychology as well. Jonathan Mercer's work on trust provides a leading example of this kind of approach, as does Ralph White's work on empathy. The work of both of these scholars will be discussed in Chapter 16, and it is also consistent with the hypothesis that emotions can have a predominantly "good" effect on decision-making.

Can Emotions Be Measured?

As we noted earlier, the topic of emotion has often been equally ignored by devotees of both *Homo economicus* and *Homo psychologicus*, by rational choice theorists and advocates of cognitive psychological applications alike. The tendency to set affect aside has in part been a result of the difficulty of measuring emotional responses themselves, though. Supposing, for instance, you have just given your spouse or significant other a sweater for his or her birthday. He or she takes it out of its wrapping, holds it up and exclaims "just what I always wanted!" How do you know whether he or she really likes it, however? Your loved one may actually be delighted by the gift, of course. Alternatively, he or she may be rather disappointed, thinking "this isn't really my style" or "I wanted a new car." He or she may actively *hate* the sweater, but just claimed to like it because when we love someone, we usually try at all costs not to hurt their feelings.

Despite the simplicity of this example, there are a large number of different emotions potentially floating about here: mutual love, dislike of the sweater, liking the sweater, disapproval of one's partner's taste in clothes, the desire not to hurt the other's feelings, greed, disappointment, empathy, and so on. Despite the fact that the two individuals communicating the emotions are intimate friends accustomed to reading one another's emotional responses, neither can be absolutely sure which of several emotions the other is experiencing. If reading emotions in individual cases is this difficult, how can psychologists possibly measure people's emotions in an accurate way?

Conclusion

The most common approach to measuring emotional response has been to simply ask people what they are feeling. Analysts of mass behaviors have long made use of questionnaires and surveys in which individuals are asked to self-report their feelings towards some political stimulus or other. We have also long had more scientific ways of measuring emotional response, such as examining a subject's heart rate and perspiration levels using the same technology as lie detectors (though these techniques are far less widely used in political psychology). There are some problems with both of these techniques, of course: people may not be willing or able to describe their emotions with precision, and the use of older technologies to tap emotional responses involves ethical as well as financial issues, as well as being rather imprecise and unsuitable for some purposes. As we shall see in the next chapter, developments in neuroscience—most notably in brain imaging techniques such as MRI and fMRI—have made it easier than before to measure *directly* the emotions that individuals are experiencing, however. Moreover, political psychologists have begun to work with neuroscientists at an interdisciplinary level to utilize such techniques in their work. While this work is very new indeed and the results of the few studies done so far are extremely preliminary, in the next chapter we will examine and assess some of the latest research that has been done in this area.

Notes

- 1 This phrase was introduced by Robert Abelson in the early 1960s, and has become common in the literature on affect. See Robert Abelson, "Computer Simulation of 'Hot Cognitions,'" in Silvan Tomkins and Samuel Messick (eds.), *Computer Simulation of Personality: Frontier of Psychological Theory* (New York: Wiley, 1963).
- 2 Robert Zajonc, "Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences," *American Psychologist*, 35: 151–75, 1980, p.153.
- 3 Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies At War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), p.225.
- 4 David Redlawsk, "Feeling Politics: New Research into Emotion and Politics," in Redlawsk (ed.), *Feeling Politics: Emotion in Political Information Processing* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p.2.
- 5 Apart from Redlawsk's edited volume, see for instance Russell Neuman, George Marcus, Michael MacKuen, and Ann Crigler (eds.), *The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Drew Westen, *The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007); Ted Brader, *Campaigning For Hearts and Minds: How Emotional Appeals in Political Ads Work* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006); George Marcus, *The Sentimental Citizen:*

- Emotion in Democratic Politics* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002); and George Marcus, Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen, *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
- 6 Redlawsk, "Feeling Politics," p.2.
 - 7 Victor Ottati and Robert Weyer, "Affect and Political Judgment," in Shanto Iyengar and William McGuire, *Explorations in Political Psychology* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993).
 - 8 With advances in neuroscience, it has become clear that depression is often the result of a deficiency of the chemical serotonin in the brain, something which is very often treated with a "synthetic serotonin re-uptake inhibitor" like Prozac and its many pharmacological cousins. This treatment was of course unavailable in Churchill's day.
 - 9 See for instance George Marcus, *The Sentimental Citizen*.
 - 10 Steven Pinker, *How The Mind Works* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), p.419.
 - 11 *Ibid.*, p.373. Spock's character is not necessarily contradictory, however, since as already noted one of his parents was human. While writing this book I was amazed to come across a whole book in my university library devoted solely to the psychology of *Star Trek*. See Robert Sekuler and Randolph Blake, *Star Trek on the Brain: Alien Minds, Human Minds* (New York: W. W. Freeman, 1998). The authors use examples from their book to teach neuroscience.
 - 12 Pinker, *How the Mind Works*, p.374.
 - 13 *Ibid.*, p.374.
 - 14 See Antonio Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: Putnam, 1994).
 - 15 Jonathan Mercer, "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics," *International Organization*, 59: 77-106, 2005, p.93.
 - 16 *Ibid.*, p.94.
 - 17 Yaacov Vertzberger, *The World In Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), p.176.
 - 18 Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen, *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*, p.9.
 - 19 Redlawsk, "Feeling Politics," p.4.
 - 20 Milton Lodge and Charles Taber, "Three Steps Toward a Theory of Motivated Political Reasoning," in Arthur Lupia, Matthew McCubbins, and Samuel Popkin (eds.), *Elements of Reason* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Lodge and Taber, "The Automaticity of Affect for Political Leaders: Groups, and Issues: An Experimental Test of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis," *Political Psychology*, 26: 455-82, 2005; Taber and Lodge, "Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs," *American Journal of Political Science*, 50: 755-69, 2006.
 - 21 Lodge and Taber, "Three Steps Toward a Theory of Motivated Political Reasoning," p.184.
 - 22 Redlawsk, "Feeling Politics," p.4.
 - 23 George Marcus, "Emotions in Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3: 221-50, 2000, p.231.
 - 24 Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies At War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp.225-26.

15 *Ibid.*, p.224.

16 Doris Kearns Goodwin, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), p.270.

17 Blema Steinberg, *Shame and Humiliation: Presidential Decision Making on Vietnam* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), p.7.

18 Susan Fiske and Mark Pavelchak, "Category-Based vs. Piecemeal-Based Affective Responses: Developments in Schema-Triggered Affect," in Richard Sorrentino and E. Tory Higgins (eds.), *Handbook of Motivation and Cognition* (New York: Guilford Press, 1986).

19 Redlawsk, "Feeling Politics," pp.5-6.

20 Vertzberger, *The World In Their Minds*, p.177.

21 *Ibid.*, p.177.

Suggested Further Reading

David Redlawsk (ed.), *Feeling Politics: Emotion in Political Information Processing* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

Russell Neuman, George Marcus, Michael MacKuen, and Ann Crigler (eds.), *The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).