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Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science
Edited by James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, Arthur Lupia
Book DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511921452
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Chapter
1 - Experimentation in Political Science pp. 3-12
Chapter DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511921452.001
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CHAPTER 1
Experimentation in Political Science
James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski,
and Arthur Lupia
In his 1909 American Political Science Association
presidential address, A. Lawrence
Lowell (1910) advised the fledgling discipline
against following the model of the natural
sciences: “We are limited by the impossibility
of experiment. Politics is an observational,
not an experimental science . . . ” (7).
The lopsided ratio of observational to experimental
studies in political science, over the
one hundred years since Lowell’s statement,
arguably affirms his assessment. The next
hundred years are likely to be different. The
number and influence of experimental studies
are growing rapidly as political scientists discover
ways of using experimental techniques
to illuminate political phenomena.
The growing interest in experimentation
reflects the increasing value that the discipline
places on causal inference and empirically
guided theoretical refinement. Experiments
facilitate causal inference through the
transparency and content of their procedures,
most notably the random assignment of observations
(a.k.a. subjects or experimental
Parts of this chapter come from Druckman et al. (2006).
participants) to treatment and control groups.
Experiments also guide theoretical development
by providing a means for pinpointing
the effects of institutional rules, preference
configurations, and other contextual
factors that might be difficult to assess using
other forms of inference. Most of all, experiments
guide theory by providing stubborn
facts – that is, reliable information about
cause and effect that inspires and constrains
theory.
Experiments bring new opportunities for
inference along with new methodological
challenges. The goal of the Cambridge Handbook
of Experimental Political Science is to help
scholars more effectively pursue experimental
opportunities while better understanding
the challenges. To accomplish this goal,
the Handbook offers a review of basic definitions
and concepts, compares experiments
with other forms of inference in political science,
reviews the contributions of experimental
research, and presents important methodological
issues. It is our hope that discussing
these topics in a single volume will help facilitate
the growth and development of experimentation
in political science.
3
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4 James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia
1. The Evolution and Influence of
Experiments in Political Science
Social scientists answer questions about
social phenomena by constructing theories,
deriving hypotheses, and evaluating these
hypotheses by empirical or conceptual means.
One way to evaluate hypotheses is to intervene
deliberately in the social process under
investigation. An important class of interventions
is experiments. An experiment is a
deliberate test of a causal proposition, typically
with random assignment to conditions.1
Investigators design experiments to evaluate
the causal impacts of potentially informative
explanatory variables.
Although scientists have conducted experiments
for hundreds of years, modern experimentation
made its debut in the 1920s and
1930s. It was then that, for the first time,
social scientists began to use random assignment
in order to allocate subjects to control
and treatment groups.2
One can find examples
of experiments in political science as early
as the 1940s and 1950s. The first experimental
paper in the American Political Science
Review (APSR) appeared in 1956 (Eldersveld
1956).3
In that study, the author randomly
assigned potential voters to a control group
that received no messages or to treatment
groups that received messages encouraging
them to vote via personal contact (which
included phone calls or personal visits) or via
a mailing. The study showed that more voters
in the personal contact treatment groups
turned out to vote than those in either the
control group or the mailing group; that is,
personal contact caused a relative increase in
turnout. A short time after Eldersveld’s study,
an active research program using experiments
to study international conflict reso-
1 This definition implicitly excludes so-called natural
experiments, where nature initiates a random process.
We discuss natural experiments in the next
chapter.
2 Brown and Melamed (1990) explain that “[r]andomization
procedures mark the dividing line between
classical and modern experimentation and are of great
practical benefit to the experimenter” (3).
3 Gosnell’s (1926) well-known voter mobilization field
study was not strictly an experiment because it did
not employ random assignment.
lution began (e.g., Mahoney and Druckman
1975; Guetzkow and Valadez 1981), and,
later, a periodic but now extinct journal, The
Experimental Study of Politics, began publication
(also see Brody and Brownstein 1975).
These examples are best seen as exceptions,
however. For much of the discipline’s
history, experiments remained on the periphery.
In his widely cited methodological paper
from 1971, Lijphart (1971) states, “The
experimental method is the most nearly ideal
method for scientific explanation, but unfortunately
it can only rarely be used in political
science because of practical and ethical
impediments” (684). In their oft-used methods
text, King, Keohane, and Verba (1994)
provide virtually no discussion of experimentation,
stating only that experiments are helpful
insofar as they “provide a useful model
for understanding certain aspects of nonexperimental
design” (125).
A major change in the status of experiments
in political science occurred during the
last decades of the twentieth century. Evidence
of the change is visible in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1 comes from a content analysis of
the discipline’s widely regarded flagship journal,
the APSR, and shows a sharp increase,
in recent years, in the number of articles
using a random assignment experiment. In
fact, more than half of the 71 experimental
articles that appeared in the APSR during
its first 103 years were published after 1992.
Other signs of the rise of experiments include
the many graduate programs now offering
courses on experimentation, National Science
Foundation support for experimental
infrastructure, and the proliferation of survey
experiments in both private and publicly
supported studies.4
Experimental approaches
4 The number of experiments has not only grown, but
experiments appear to be particularly influential in
shaping research agendas. Druckman et al. (2006)
compared the citation rates for experimental articles
published in the APSR (through 2005) with the rates
for 1) a random sample of approximately six nonexperimental
articles in every APSR volume where at
least one experimental article appeared, 2) that same
random sample narrowed to include only quantitative
articles, and 3) the same sample narrowed to two articles
on the same substantive topic that appeared in the
same year as the experimental article or in the year
before it appeared. They report that experimental
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Experimentation in Political Science 5
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Numberofarticles
Years
Figure 1.1. Experimental Articles in the American Political Science Review
have not been confined to single subfields or
approaches. Instead, political scientists have
employed experiments across fields and have
drawn on and developed a notable range
of experimental methods. These sources of
diversity make a unifying Handbook particularly
appealing for the purpose of facilitating
coordination and communication across varied
projects.
2. Diversity of Applications
Political scientists have implemented experiments
for various purposes to address a
multitude of issues. Roth (1995) identifies
three nonexclusive roles that experiments
can play, and a cursory review makes clear
that political scientists employ them in all
three ways. First, Roth describes “searching
for facts,” where the goal is to “isolate
the cause of some observed regularity,
by varying details of the way the experiments
were conducted. Such experiments are
part of the dialogue that experimenters carry
on with one another” (22). These types of
experiments often complement observational
research (e.g., work not employing random
assignment) by arbitrating between conflicting
results derived from observational data.
“Searching for facts” describes many experarticles
are cited significantly more often than each
of the comparison groups of articles (e.g., 47%, 74%,
and 26% more often, respectively).
imental studies that attempt to estimate the
magnitudes of causal parameters, such as the
influence of racial attitudes on policy preferences
(Gilens 1996) or the price elasticity of
demand for public and private goods (Green
1992).
A second role entails “speaking to theorists,”
where the goal is “to test the predictions
[or the assumptions] of well articulated
formal theories [or other types of theories].
. . . Such experiments are intended to
feed back into the theoretical literature – i.e.,
they are part of a dialogue between experimenters
and theorists” (Roth 1995, 22). The
many political science experiments that assess
the validity of claims made by formal modelers
epitomize this type of correspondence
(e.g., Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1992;
Morton 1993; Fr´echette, Kagel, and Lehrer
2003).5
The third usage is “whispering in
the ears of princes,” which facilitates “the
dialogue between experimenters and policymakers.
. . . [The] experimental environment
is designed to resemble closely, in certain
respects, the naturally occurring environment
that is the focus of interest for the policy purposes
at hand” (Roth 1995, 22). Cover and
Brumberg’s (1982) field experiment examining
the effects of mail from members of the
U.S. Congress on their constituents’ opinions
5 The theories need not be formal; for example, Lodge
and his colleagues have implemented a series of
experiments to test psychological theories of information
processing (e.g., Lodge et al. 1989; Lodge,
Steenbergen, and Brau 1995).
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6 James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia
exemplifies an experiment that whispers in
the ears of legislative “princes.”
Although political scientists might share
rationales for experimentation with other
scientists, their attention to focal aspects
of politically relevant contexts distinguishes
their efforts. This distinction parallels the use
of other modes of inference by political scientists.
As Druckman and Lupia (2006) argue,
“[c]ontext, not methodology, is what unites
our discipline. . . . Political science is united
by the desire to understand, explain, and predict
important aspects of contexts where individual
and collective actions are intimately
and continuously bound” (109). The environment
in which an experiment takes place
is thus of particular importance to political
scientists.
And, although it might surprise some,
political scientists have implemented experiments
in a wide range of contexts. Examples
can be found in every subfield. Applications
to American politics include not only
topics such as media effects (e.g., Iyengar
and Kinder 1987), mobilization (e.g., Gerber
and Green 2000), and voting (e.g., Lodge,
McGraw, and Stroh 1989), but also studies
of congressional and bureaucratic rules (e.g.,
Eavey and Miller 1984; Miller, Hammond,
and Kile 1996). The field of international
relations, in some ways, lays claim to one
of the longest ongoing experimental traditions
with its many studies of foreign policy
decision making (e.g., Geva and Mintz 1997)
and international negotiations (e.g., Druckman
1994). Related work in comparative politics
explores coalition bargaining (e.g., Riker
1967; Fr´echette et al. 2003) and electoral systems
(e.g., Morton and Williams 1999), and
recently, scholars have turned to experiments
to study democratization and development
(Wantchekon 2003), culture (Henrich et al.
2004), and identity (e.g., Sniderman, Hagendoorn,
and Prior 2004; Habyarimana et al.
2007). Political theory studies include explorations
into justice (Frohlich and Oppenheimer
1992) and deliberation (Simon and
Sulkin 2001).
Political scientists employ experiments
across subfields and for a range of purposes.
At the same time, many scholars remain
unaware of this range of activity, which limits
the extent to which experimental political scientists
have learned from one another. For
example, scholars studying coalition formation
and international negotiations experimentally
can benefit from talking to one
another, yet there is little sign of engagement
between the respective contributors to
these literatures. Similarly, there are few signs
of collaboration among experimental scholars
who study different kinds of decision making
(e.g., foreign policy decision making and voting
decisions). Of equal importance, scholars
within specific fields who have not used
experiments may be unaware of when and
how experiments can be effective. A goal of
this Handbook is to provide interested scholars
with an efficient and effective way to learn
about a broad range of experimental applications,
how these applications complement
and supplement nonexperimental work, and
the opportunities and challenges inherent in
each type of application.
3. Diversity of Experimental
Methods
The most apparent source of variation in
political science experiments is where they are
conducted. To date, most experiments have
been implemented in one of three contexts:
laboratories, surveys, and the field. These
types of experiments differ in terms of where
participants receive the stimuli (e.g., messages
encouraging them to vote), with that exposure
taking place, respectively, in a controlled setting;
in the course of a phone, in-person, or
web-based survey; or in a naturally occurring
setting such as the voter’s home (e.g., in the
course of everyday life, and often without the
participants’ knowledge).6
Each type of experiment presents methodological
challenges. For example, scholars
have long bemoaned the artificial settings
of campus-based laboratory experiments and
the widespread use of student-aged subjects.
Although experimentalists from other
6 In some cases, whether an experiment is one type or
another is ambiguous (e.g., a web survey administered
in a classroom); the distinctions can be amorphous.
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Experimentation in Political Science 7
disciplines have examined implications of
running experiments “on campus,” this literature
is not often cited by political scientists
(e.g., Dipboye and Flanagan 1979;
Kardes 1996; K¨uhberger 1998; Levitt and
List 2007). Some political scientists claim that
the problems of campus-based experiments
can be overcome by conducting experiments
on representative samples. This may be true;
however, the conditions under which such
changes produce more valid results have not
been broadly examined (see, e.g., Greenberg
1987).7
Survey experiments, although not relying
on campus-based “convenience samples,”
also raise questions about external validity.
Many survey experiments, for example,
expose subjects to phenomena they might
have also encountered prior to participating
in an experiment, which can complicate causal
inference (Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk
2007).
Field experiments are seen as a way to
overcome the artificiality of other types of
experiments. In the field, however, there can
be less control over what experimental stimuli
subjects observe. It may also be more difficult
to get people to participate due to an inability
to recruit subjects or to subjects’ unwillingness
to participate as instructed once they are
recruited.
Besides where they are conducted, another
source of diversity in political science experiments
is the extent to which they follow
experimental norms in neighboring disciplines,
such as psychology and economics.
This diversity is notable because psychological
and economic approaches to experimentation
differ from each other. For example,
where psychological experiments often
include some form of deception, economists
consider it taboo. Psychologists rarely pay
subjects for specific actions they undertake
during an experiment. Economists, in contrast,
often require such payments (Smith
1976). Indeed, the inaugural issue of Experi-
7 As Campbell (1969) states, “ . . . had we achieved one,
there would be no need to apologize for a successful
psychology of college sophomores, or even of Northwestern
University coeds, or of Wistar staring white
rats” (361).
mental Economics stated that submissions that
used deception or did not pay participants
for their actions would not be accepted for
publication.8
For psychologists and economists, differences
in experimental traditions reflect differences
in their dominant paradigms. Because
most political scientists seek first and foremost
to inform political science debates,
norms about what constitutes a valid experiment
in economics or psychology are not
always applicable. So, for any kind of experiment,
an important question to ask is: which
experimental method is appropriate?
The current debate about this question
focuses on more than the validity of the inferences
that different experimental approaches
can produce. Cost is also an issue. Survey
and field experiments, for example, can be
expensive. Some scholars question whether
the added cost of such endeavors (compared
to, say, campus-based laboratory experiments)
is justifiable. Such debates are leading
more scholars to evaluate the conditions
under which particular types of experiments
are cost effective. With the evolution of these
debates has come the question of whether
the immediate costs of fielding an experiment
are offset by what Green and Gerber (2002)
call the “downstream benefits of experimentation.”
Downstream benefits refer to subsequent
outcomes that are set in motion by
the original experimental intervention, such
as the transmission of effects from one person
to another or the formation of habits.
In some cases, the downstream benefits of
an experiment only become apparent decades
afterward.
In sum, the rise of an experimental political
science brings both new opportunities
for discovery and new questions about the
price of experimental knowledge. This Handbook
is organized to make the broad range
of research opportunities more apparent and
8 Of the laboratory experiments identified as appearing
in the APSR through 2005, half employed induced
value theory, such that participants received financial
rewards contingent on their performance in the
experiment. Thirty-one percent of laboratory experiments
used deception; no experiments used both
induced value and deception.
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8 James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia
to help scholars manage the challenges with
greater effectiveness and efficiency.
4. The Volume
In concluding his book on the ten most fascinating
experiments in the history of science,
Johnson (2008) explains that “I’ve barely
finished the book and already I’m secondguessing
myself” (158). We find ourselves in
an analogous situation. There are many exciting
kinds of experimental political science on
which we can focus. Although the Handbook’s
content does not cover all possible topics,
we made every effort to represent the broad
range of activities that contemporary experimental
political science entails. The content
of the Handbook is as follows.
We begin, in Part I, with a series of
chapters that provide an introduction to
experimental methods and concepts. These
chapters provide detailed discussion of what
constitutes an experiment, as well as the
key considerations underlying experimental
designs (i.e., internal and external validity,
student subjects, payment, and deception).
Although these chapters do not delve into the
details of precise designs and statistical analyses
(see, e.g., Keppel and Wickens 2004; Morton
and Williams 2010), their purpose is to
provide a sufficient base for reading the rest of
the Handbook. We asked the authors of these
chapters not only to review extant knowledge,
but also to present arguments that help place
the challenges of, and opportunities in, experimental
political science in a broader perspective.
For example, our chapters regard questions
about external validity (i.e., the extent
to which one can generalize experimental
findings) as encompassing much more than
whether a study employs a representative (or,
at least, nonstudent) sample. This approach
to the chapters yields important lessons about
when student-based samples, and other common
aspects of experimental designs, are and
are not problematic.9
9 Perhaps the most notable topic absent from our introductory
chapters is ethics and institutional review
boards. We do not include a chapter on ethics because
it is our sense that, to date, it has not surfaced as a
Part II contains four essays written by
prominent scholars who each played an important
role in the development of experimental
political science.10
These essays
provide important historical perspectives and
relevant biographic information on the development
of experimental research agendas.
The authors describe the questions they
hoped to resolve with experiments and why
they believe that their efforts succeeded and
failed as they did. These essays also document
the role experiments played in the evolution
of much broader fields of inquiry.
Parts III to VIII of the Handbook explore
the role of political science experiments
on a range of scholarly endeavors. The
chapters in these parts clarify how experiments
contribute to scientific and social
knowledge of many important kinds of
political phenomena. They describe cases
in which experiments complement nonexperimental
work, as well as cases where
experiments advance knowledge in ways that
nonexperimental work cannot. Each chapter
describes how to think about experimentation
on a particular topic and provides
advice about how to overcome practical (and,
when relevant, ethical) hurdles to design and
implementation.
In developing this part of the Handbook,
we attempted to include topics where experiments
have already played a notable role.
We devoted less space to “emerging” topics
in experimental political science that have
great potential to answer important questions
but are still in early stages of development.
Examples of such work include genetic and
neurobiological approaches (e.g., Fowler and
Schreiber 2008), nonverbal communication
(e.g., Bailenson et al. 2008), emotions (e.g.,
Druckman and McDermott 2008), cultural
norms (e.g., Henrich et al. 2004), corruption
major issue in political science experimentation. In
addition, more general relevant discussions are readily
available (e.g., Singer and Levine 2003; Hauck
2008). Also see Halpern (2004) on ethics in clinical
trials. Other methodological topics for which we do
not have chapters include Internet methodology and
quasi-experimental designs.
10 Of course, many others played critical roles in the
development of experimental political science, and
we take some comfort that most of these others have
contributed to other volume chapters.
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Experimentation in Political Science 9
(e.g., Ferraz and Finan 2008; Malesky and
Samphantharak 2008), ethnic identity (e.g.,
Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein 2002),
and elite responsiveness (e.g., Esterling,
Lazer, and Neblo 2009; Richardson and John
2009). Note that the Handbook is written in
such a way that any of the included chapters
can be read and used without having read the
chapters that precede them.
The final part of the book, Part IX, covers a
number of advanced methodological debates.
The chapters in this part address the challenges
of making causal inferences in complex
settings and over time. As with the preceding
methodological chapters, these chapters
do more than review basic issues; they also
develop arguments on how to recognize and
adapt to such challenges in future research.
The future of experimental political science
offers many new opportunities for creative
scholars. It also presents important challenges.
We hope that this Handbook makes the
challenges more manageable for you and the
opportunities easier to seize.
5. Conclusion
In many scientific disciplines, experimental
research is the focal form of scholarly activity.
In these fields of study, disciplinary norms
and great discoveries are indescribable without
reference to experimental methods. For
the most part, political science is not such a
science. Its norms and great discoveries often
come from scholars who integrate and blend
multiple methods. In a growing number of
topical areas, experiments are becoming an
increasingly common and important element
of a political scientist’s methodological tool
kit (see also Falk and Heckman 2009). Particularly
in recent years, there has been a massive
expansion in the number of political scientists
who see experiments as useful and, in some
cases, transformative.
Experiments appeal to our discipline
because of their potential to generate stark
and powerful empirical claims. Experiments
can expand our abilities to change how critical
target audiences think about important
phenomena. The experimental method produces
new inferential power by inducing
researchers to exercise control over the subjects
of study, to randomly assign subjects to
various conditions, and to carefully record
observations. Political scientists who learn
how to design and conduct experiments carefully
are often rewarded with a clearer view
of cause and effect.
Although political scientists disagree about
many methodological matters, perhaps there
is a consensus that political science best serves
the public when its findings give citizens and
policymakers a better understanding of their
shared environs. When such understandings
require stark and powerful claims about cause
and effect, the discipline should encourage
experimental methods. When designed in a
way that target audiences find relevant, experiments
can enlighten, inform, and transform
critical aspects of societal organization.
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