

# SOCIAL INCLUSION

•  
• Visegrad Fund  
•



Perspectives, Practices  
and Challenges within  
the Visegrad Region

people

SOLIDARITY

WORK

education

innovation

Minorities

Politics

action

PARTICIPATION

SPACE



**Social Inclusion:  
Perspectives, Practices and Challenges within  
the Visegrad Region**

**SOC607**

Literature Reader

Content

1. Theoretical Introduction – What is Social Inclusion?
2. Social Innovations as a Practical Inclusive Tool
3. Inclusive Workplace
4. Dynamics of Social Inclusion/Exclusion in Public Space
5. Inclusive Education
6. Political aspects of social inclusion – What are inclusive policies?
7. How to Write a Research Proposal?

# 1

## **Theoretical Introduction – What is Social Inclusion?**

# 1

1. Alexander, Jeffrey C. 1988. "Core Solidarity, Ethnic Outgroup and Social Differentiation." Pp. 78 - 106 in *Action and its Environments: Toward a New Synthesis*. New York: Columbia UP.
2. Allman, Dan. 2013. "The Sociology of Social Inclusion." *SAGE Open*. DOI: 10.1177/2158244012471957.
3. Collins, Hugh. 2003. "Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion." *The Modern Law Review* 66(1):16-43.
4. Levitas, Ruth. 2005. "Three Discourses of Social Exclusion." Pp. 7-28 in *The Inclusive Society?: Social Exclusion and New Labour*. 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
5. Levitas, Ruth. 2005. "Delivering Social Inclusion." Pp. 159-177 in *The Inclusive Society?: Social Exclusion and New Labour*. 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

### THREE

## Core Solidarity, Ethnic Outgroup, and Social Differentiation

Theorists of Western development have been hard put to account for the ethnic and racial conflicts that have created the recent wave of nationalist and separatist movements in industrial societies. For developing nations, such conflicts are to be expected; they are part of the "transition" period. But after industrial society is firmly established, it is believed such divisions will become residual, not systematic or indeed intensifying contradictions. (Marx 1848 [1955]; Tonnies 1887 [1957]; Weber 1904 [1958]; Durkheim 1893 [1947]).

This theoretical difficulty is fundamental; its roots lie in the complex history of Western development itself. Theories of nation building are products of Enlightenment thinking, generated by the twin revolutions of political nationalism and industrialism. As the analytic translation of these social developments, they have been rationalistic in the extreme, sharing a utilitarian distaste for the nonrational and normative and the illusion that a truly modern society will soon dispense with such concerns.

One antidote to this theoretical failing is increased sensitivity to secular myth and cultural patterns, phenomena with which theorists have been increasingly concerned (Geertz 1973a; Bellah 1970). But solidarity is the more crucial theoretical dimension for problems of emergent ethnicity and nationalist conflicts. The concept of solidarity refers to the subjective feelings of integration that individuals experience for members of their social groups. Given its phenomenological character, solidarity problems

I acknowledge the advice and helpful critical readings of a number of friends and colleagues: Jeffrey Prager, Seamus Thompson, Leo Kuper, Ivan Light, Dean R. Gerstein, and Ruth Bloch. I have also received invaluable aid from Maria Iosue, who was my research assistant for this project.

clearly diverge from those of economics and politics, which concern themselves, respectively, with scarcity and the self-conscious organization of goals. Yet solidarity also differs from problems of culture, which are oriented toward meaningful patterns relatively abstracted from specific time and space. Thus, although integrative exigencies are not generated by purely instrumental considerations, they are more concrete than "values." In contrast to values, social solidarity refers to the structure of actual social groups. Like religion, politics, and economics, solidarity constitutes an independent determinant of human societies and a fundamental point for sociological analysis (Shils 1975a; Parsons 1967a, 1971; Alexander 1978, 1983; cf. Nakane 1970, Light 1972).

*"Inclusion" and the Paradigm  
of Linear Evolution*

Solidarity becomes a fundamental factor because every nation must, after all, begin historically. Nations do not simply emerge out of thin air, for example, as universalistic, constitutional entities. They are founded by groups whose members share certain qualitatively distinct characteristics, traits around which they structure their solidarity. No matter what kind of future institutions this "core group" establishes, no matter what the eventual liberalism of its social and political order, residues of this core solidarity remain.

From the perspective of the integrative problem, national development can be viewed as a process of encountering and producing new solidary outgroups (cf. Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1975). With religious and economic rationalization, new sects and social classes are created. With territorial expansion and immigration, new ethnic groups are encountered (cf. E. Weber 1976). In response to these developments, pressures develop to expand the solidarity that binds the core group. In this way, nation building presents the problem of "inclusion" (Parsons 1967b, 1971).

I define inclusion as the process by which previously excluded groups gain solidarity in the "terminal" community of a society. Two points are crucial in this definition. First, inclusion refers to *felt* solidarity, not simply to behavioral participation. Pariah groups that fill crucial social roles—like Western Jews in the Middle Ages or Indians in post-Colonial

Uganda—are not “included.”\* Second, I am concerned here specifically with a society’s terminal community (Geerts 1973b). A dominant focus of the American tradition of race relations and ethnicity studies has focused almost exclusively on the primary group level, on whether individuals join the same clubs, make the same friends, and intermarry (Gordon 1964). While such questions are certainly significant, morally as well as intellectually, they cannot provide the only important focus for historical and comparative analysis. In defining the terminal community as the widest solidary group with which individuals feel significant integration, I am referring to those feelings that, extending beyond family and friends, create the boundaries of acknowledged “society.” Whether this terminal community is narrow and limiting or is expansive enough to encompass a range of particular groupings—this question is as ramifying an issue as the level of economic or political development or the nature of religious belief. Inclusion, then, refers to a change in solidary status. To the degree that individuals are felt to be full members of the terminal community they have to that degree been “included.”

Inclusion can be measured by the degree to which the terminal community has become more “civil” and less “primordial.” The latter refer to the given, seemingly natural ties that structure solidarity—race, territory, kinship, language, even religion (Geerts 1973b, Shils 1975b). To the degree that people share any one of these traits, they will feel direct, emotional bonds. Primordial ties are necessarily few. In aboriginal society, where the “world” ended at the farthest waterhole, sex, kinship, age, and territory presented the principal axes for solidary identification.

Civil ties, on the other hand, are more mediated and less emotional, more abstract and self-consciously constructed. Instead of referring to biological or geographic givens, they refer to ethical or moral qualities associated with “social” functions and institutions. The emergence of civil ties can be seen as a process of differentiation, one that parallels the movements toward economic, political, and religious differentiation that have been the traditional foci of modernization theory. Membership in the terminal community must, in the first place, be separated from mem-

\*At its extreme, such purely behavioral participation by outgroups forms the basis of “plural societies,” in the terminology developed by Kuper and Smith (1969; Kuper, 1978). In their terms, I am dealing in this essay with the causes and consequences of different degrees of pluralization in the industrial West, a subject to which plural societies theory has not yet devoted significant attention.

bership in particular kinship groups and, more generally, from biological criteria. This community solidarity must also be differentiated from status in the economic, political, and religious community.

The primordial-civil continuum, then, provides an independent criterion for evaluating the inclusion process. This standard has usually, however, been applied in an artificial, linear way even by those theorists who have taken the integrative problem seriously. From Hegel and Tocqueville to Parsons, the transition from primordial to civil solidarity has been envisioned as rigidly interlocked with political and economic transformation. The ideal-typical point of origin is the narrow moral basis of Banfield's "backward society," a self-contained village where identification scarcely extends beyond the family to the town, let alone to occupation, class, or even religious affiliation (Banfield 1959). This primordial community is then transformed in the course of modernization into Durkheim's organic solidarity, Parsons' societal community, or Tocqueville's mass democracy; given the expansive civil ties in the latter societies, individuals "rightly understand" their self-interest (Durkheim 1893 [1933]; Tocqueville 1835 [1945]; Parsons 1971).

To a significant degree, such a universalizing transformation in solidarity has, indeed, characterized the modernization process. In the Western Middle Ages, the Christian Church provided the only overarching integration that bound distinct villages and estates. It was, after all, the Papal bureaucracy that created the territorial jurisdictions of Gallia, Germania, Italia, and Anglia long before these abstract communities ever became concrete groupings (Coulton 1935:28-29). It did so, fundamentally, because Christian symbolism envisioned a civil solidarity that could transcend the primordial ties of blood (Weber 1904 [1958]). Similarly, alongside the officers of the Church, the King's henchmen were the only medieval figures whose consciousness extended beyond village and clan. To the degree the King and his staff succeeded in establishing national bureaucracies, they contributed enormously to the creation of a civil terminal community, despite the primordial qualities that remained powerfully associated with this national core group (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1939:8-21; cf. Eisenstadt 1963). Economic development also has been closely intertwined with the extension of civil ties, as Marx himself implicitly acknowledged when he praised capitalism for making "national one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness . . . more and more impossible" (Marx 1848 [1955]: 13; cf. Landes 1969:1-40).



Civil solidarity is, in fact, fundamentally linked to differentiation in these other structural dimensions. Only if religion is abstracted from the earthly realm and oriented toward a transcendent, impersonal divine source can "individualism" emerge, i.e., an accordance of status to the individual person regardless of social position (Little 1969, Walzer 1965). Only with political constitutionalism, which is closely related to such religious developments (Friedrichs 1964), can groups respond to injustice, not in terms of reasserting primordial unity, but in terms of defending their rights as members of the wider community (Bendix 1964 [1977]). Only with the functional, impersonal form of industrial organization can positions be awarded on the basis of efficiency rather than in terms of kinship, race, or geographical origins. Civil solidarity cannot, however, simply be considered the reflection of these other differentiations. Not only does it constitute an independent, nonresidual dimension with which these institutional developments interact. It occurs, in addition, through particular, concrete mechanisms that, in responding to these developments, create wider solidarity: through more efficient transportation and communication, increased geographical and cultural mobility, urbanization, secular education, mass and elite occupational mobility and intermarriage, and increasingly consensual civic ritualization (cf. E. Weber 1976; Goode 1963:28-80; Lipset and Bendix 1960; Shils and Young 1975 [1956]:135-52).\*

\*Although few of the treatments of these mechanisms sufficiently relate them to the distinctive problem of solidarity, the last mechanism I have cited, civic ritualization, is rarely given any attention at all. By civic ritual I refer to the affectively charged, rhetorically simplified occasions through which a society affirms the solidary bonds of its terminal community. Such consensual rituals, microcosms of which are repeated in local milieu, include everything from the funeral ceremonies of powerful leaders to the televised dramas of national political crises (see my discussion of Watergate in chapter 5) and the spectacles of national sport championships. One crucial symbolic element often invoked by these rituals is directly relevant to the crucial historical position of any society's core group, namely, the element of "national ancestors." Every system of national symbolism involves a myth of creation, and these narrative stories must be personified in terms of actual historical persons. These ancestors become an ascriptive "family" for the members of the terminal community, as, in America, George Washington is viewed as the "father" of the American nation. As the personification of the founding core group, ethnic composition of these symbolic national ancestors is crucial, and the solidary history of a nation can be traced in terms of shifts in their purported ethnicity. In the United States, for example, there has been a struggle over whether the black leader, Martin Luther King, will be accorded such symbolic founding status. The creation of a national holiday honoring his birthday may have resolved this in the affirmative, but it is still too early for a definitive answer.

But although these systemic linkages are certainly correct, there has been a strong tendency to conflate such abstract complementarity with empirical history. Theorists of solidarity have themselves been infected by Enlightenment rationalism. From the beginning of Western society, in fact, "progressive" thinking has confidently proclaimed purely civic solidarity to be the "future" of the human race, whether this future lay in the Athenian polis, Roman law, the universal brotherhood of Christianity, the social contract, the General Will, or in classless communism.\* But in historical reality differentiation is not a homogeneous process. It occurs in different spheres at different times, and these leads and lags have enormously complex repercussions on societal development (Smelser 1971, Vallier 1971, Eisenstadt 1973, E. Weber 1976). As an autonomous dimension, solidarity varies independently of developments in other spheres. As a result, civic integration is always unevenly attained. Indeed, the newly created, more expansive associations that result from differentiation will often themselves become, at some later point in time, narrowly focused solidarities that oppose any further development. This is as true for the transcendent religions and nationalist ideologies that have promoted symbolic and political differentiation as for the economic classes, like the bourgeoisie and proletariat, which after a triumphant expansion of cosmopolitanism have often become a source of conservative antagonism to the wider whole.

Most fundamentally, however, civil integration is uneven because every national society exhibits a historical core. While this founding group may create a highly differentiated, national political framework, it will also necessarily establish, at the same time, the preeminence of certain primordial qualities.† While members of noncore groups may be extended full legal rights and may even achieve high levels of actual institutional participation, their full membership in the solidarity of the national community may never be complete (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1975). This tension between core and civil solidarity must inform any theory of inclusion in industrial societies.

\*Even when anticivil developments are acknowledged, they tend to be treated as deviant eruptions from the purely civil mode, as in Nolte's penetrating analysis of Fascism as an "anti-transcendent" ideology or in Mosse's analysis of blood as the common denominator of German "Volk" culture (Nolte 1965, Mosse 1964).

†This general statement must be modified in applying this model to developing rather than to developed nations. Although every society does have a historical, solidary core, the artificiality of the creation of many postcolonial societies leaves several founding ethnic blocs in primordial competition rather than a single founding group.

*A Multidimensional Model: The Internal and  
External Axes of Inclusion*

My focus here is on the problem of ethnic, not class, inclusion. I define ethnicity as the real or perceived primordial qualities that accrue to a group by virtue of shared race, religion, or national origin, including in the latter category linguistic and other cultural attributes associated with a common territorial ancestry (cf. Schermerhorn 1970:12).

Inclusion of an ethnic outgroup depends on two factors: (1) the external, or environmental, factor, which refers to the structure of society that surrounds the core group; (2) the internal, or volitional, factor, which refers to the relationship between the primordial qualities of core group and outgroup. The external factor includes the economic, political, integrative, and religious systems of society; the more differentiated these systems are, the more inclusion becomes a legitimate possibility. In contrast to this external reference, the internal factor is more volitional: to the degree that primordial complementarity exists between core group and outgroup, members of the core group will tend to regard inclusion as a desirable possibility. Finally, although both internal and external factors can be measured behaviorally, their most significant impact is subjective and phenomenological. To the degree that the environment is differentiated and primordiality is complementary, the felt boundaries of the terminal community will become more expansive and civil.

While remaining systematic, this general model takes into account a wide range of factors. Each factor can be treated as independently variable, and by holding other factors constant, we can establish experimental control. Of course, such a general model cannot simply be tested; it must also be specified and elaborated. This can be accomplished by at least two different strategies.

Taking a purely analytic approach, we may trace the effects of varying each factor in turn. We can demonstrate, for example, that in terms of the external environment, differentiation in every social sphere—not simply changes in solidarity itself—has consequences for the structure of terminal integration. In South Africa, for example, while the divergence among primordial qualities remained fairly constant, more differentiated *economic development* ramified in ways that enlarged core and outgroup interaction and increased the pressures on the rigidly ascribed political order (cf. Kuper 1969). Similarly, while primordial anti-Semitism re-

remained unchanged and legal restrictions were unaltered, European mercantilism created important opportunities for the exercise of Jewish financial expertise, whose recognition eventually had wide-ranging repercussions. In nineteenth-century America, on the other hand, the black outgroup was not drawn first into qualitatively more differentiated economic production. While the primordial separation between black and Caucasian Americans remained constant, the Civil War initiated changes in the *legal system* that differentiated some (if not all) individual rights from racial qualities. As an example of variation in the *political environment*, we can refer to the processes often initiated by the construction of certain great empires. By differentiating overarching bureaucracies and impersonal rules, conquerors like Alexander and Napoleon opened up opportunities for excluded groups, like the Jews, in nations where the primordial distinctions between core group and outgroup, and other structural characteristics as well, had remained relatively unchanged.

Although the relative differentiation of religion constitutes another variable in the inclusion process, as I have indicated in the first section of this chapter and will illustrate further below, the contrast between Protestantism and Catholicism, both relatively transcendent religions, is instructive for the kinds of specifications that must be introduced in applying this model to the complexity of a concrete historical case. Whereas the greater symbolic abstraction and institutional differentiation of Protestantism, especially the Puritan variety, is generally more conducive to inclusion than Catholicism, in the exclusion produced by slavery the reverse has often been true, as the contrast between Anglo-Saxon and Iberian slave conditions has demonstrated (Elkins 1969). Indeed, in the particular conditions of slavery, two of the most traditionalistic aspects of Iberian Catholicism were particularly conducive to black inclusion: (1) its relative paternalism generated a greater concern for the well-being of outgroups than the more individualistic voluntary principle of Protestant societies did; (2) The Catholic fusion of church and state encouraged religious interference in the political and legal order to an extent unheard of in Anglo-Saxon societies.

These broad structural changes in "external environment" have affected solidarity through the kinds of specific integrating mechanisms I outlined above: through increased interaction as effected through geographic and economic mobility, increased economic and political participation, expanded education and communication, and intermarriage. Significant

numbers of American blacks, for example, later used their upgraded legal status to emigrate to urban areas, where the racially based qualifications for economic and political participation could not be so easily enforced. Small but influential segments of European Jewry (the *Schutzjuden*, or "Protected Jews") used the limited political immunity generated by their economic prowess to gain access to the secular, homogenizing culture of nineteenth-century Europe. By the same token, it was participation in South Africa's differentiated economic life that produced for the non-whites increased access to universalistic culture through education, and economic and geographical mobility through, in part, expanding urbanization (Doxey 1961:85-109; Van der Horst 1965; Van den Berghe 1965:86, 279-80). In fact, it was precisely to inhibit and control these mechanisms—to protect core group domination from the effects of societal differentiation—that Apartheid was first introduced by the Afrikaner Nationalist elite (Kuper 1960; Van den Berghe 1965; cf. Blumer 1965).

We may, on the other hand, hold environmental factors constant and trace the effects of variation in the internal factors. Probably the most significant illustration of variation in primordial complementarity and its relation to inclusion is the widespread phenomenon of finely graded color stratification (cf. Gergen 1968). In Mexico, where light Spanish or *criollo* complexion has traditionally defined the racial core, *mestizos*, or mixed bloods, are granted significantly more inclusion than the darker skinned Indians. This continuum from the light to dark color has created a finely graded series of "internal" opportunities for inclusion. The same kind of color gradation, from black to "colored" to white affects access to the internal environment in South Africa. The rule in both cases is based on the complementarity criterion: members of a solidary outgroup have access to the degree their racial traits are conceived as closer to those of the core group. Similar kinds of gradations could be established along the dimensions of religion and national origins, as I illustrate in part 3. Variation in these internal factors facilitates inclusion by affecting the kinds of structural mechanisms I have cited above. And the latter, of course, affect the way the complementarity criterion manifests itself in turn. Thus, while Peru exhibits the same grading of color, darker "mixed blood" has gained significantly less inclusion there than in Mexico. This variation can be explained by the interaction of color with the greater differentiation of Mexican social structure, produced by the contrast be-

tween Mexican and Peruvian colonial development and by the impact of the Mexican Revolution (Harris 1964:36-40).

Having outlined the major analytic features of this inclusion model, in the following I seek to demonstrate its applicability via a specific case study.<sup>1</sup>

*The Model Applied: The Uneven Inclusion of Europeans,  
Asians, and Africans in the United States*

In discussing the U.S. case, I compare inclusion for European and non-European immigrants and consider, within each category, the variation in both internal and external factors.

The social system that confronted mass European immigration after 1820 presented, by the standards of its time, an unusually "civil" structure. In large part, this depended on America's historical past, or perhaps the lack of one (Hartz 1955; Lipset 1965:1-233). Without an American feudalism, there existed no aristocracy that could monopolize economic, political, and intellectual prerogatives on a primordial basis. Similarly, without the legacy of Catholicism and an established Church, spiritual domination and monopolization were less viable possibilities (Bellah 1970:168-89).

As a result of this legacy, and other historically specific factors as well, institutional life in America was either unusually differentiated or, at least, open to becoming more so. Schumpeter's notion of an open class system applies more to the early American nation than to Europe, for while geographical and economic mobility did not eliminate the American class structure, they guaranteed that actual class membership fluctuated to a significant degree (Thernstrom 1974). Although America had an unusually weak national bureaucracy, the political system was differentiated in other important ways. The combination of strong constitutional principles and dearth of traditional elites generated early party conflict and encouraged the allocation of administrative offices by political "spoils" rather than according to the kind of implicit kinship criteria inherent in a more traditional status-based civil service. Wide distribution of property, plus populist opposition to stringent electoral qualifications, meant significant dispersion of the franchise. Finally, the diversity and decentralized character of Protestant churches in America encouraged the proliferation of

pietistic religious sects and voluntary denominationalism rather than religious establishment (Miller 1956:16-98, 141-52; 1967:90-120, 150-62; Mead 1963:12-37 and chapter 2, above). The transcendent, abstract quality of Anglo-American Protestantism also made it conducive to the secularization of intellectual and scientific discussion and to the emergence of public, nonreligious education.

This external situation must be balanced, however, against the internal one. Despite its relatively civil structure, this American nation had been founded by a strong, self-conscious primordial core. White in race, Anglo-Saxon and English-speaking in ethnicity, intensely Protestant in religious identity, this "WASP" core group sought to maintain a paradox that, though hypocritical, was rooted in the historical experience of the American nation. They asserted that American institutions, while differentiated and civil, were, at the same time, permeated by certain primordial qualities (Jordan 1968). And, indeed, although this was a basic factor in American race relations from the outset, until the 1820s and 1830s this anomaly was not severely tested within the white society. During the seventeenth century, European immigrants were almost entirely English, and though the sources of immigration varied more in the eighteenth century, the nation's English and Protestant primordial core could still conceivably be identified with the institutional structure of the nation (Hansen 1940; Handlin 1957:23-39).

Between 1820 and 1920, America experienced massive immigration from a wide variety of European nations. As the core group tried to defend its privileged position, this process produced waves of xenophobic sentiment and exclusionary movements (Higham 1969). Yet by the middle of the present century, these outgroups had achieved relatively successful inclusion (Glazer 1975:3-32), at least within the limits established by the necessarily historical roots of national identity (Gordon 1964; Glazer and Moynihan 1963).

In terms of the internal, volitional factor in inclusion, the points of conflict and accommodation in the immigration process must be assessed in terms of the congruence between primordial solidarities (Hansen 1940; cf. Schooler 1976). While the Caucasian homogeneity of outgroup and core group prevented racial conflict, significant polarization still occurred between the WASP core and non-English immigrants. The division was most intense, however, between core and Northern European immigrants,

on one side, and Southern European groups on the other (Handlin 1957:75, 85; Higham 1969). Southern Europeans, after all, differed more strikingly from the core in national culture and language. Although this national conflict was partly offset by the Christianity that most immigrants shared, antipathy between Catholic and Protestant made the religious variable another significant point of ethnic cleavage.

In the actual empirical process of inclusion, these points of internal cleavage and convergence were combined in a variety of ways (Parsons 1967b; Blauner 1972:56, 68). The Irish, for example, played an important bridging role, for while sharing certain vital cultural and linguistic traits with the English core, their Catholicism allowed them to interpenetrate on the religious dimension with the later, more intensely excluded Catholic group, the Italians (cf. Handlin 1951 [1973]:116-24). Similarly, although the Jews were disliked for specifically religious reasons, this tension was partially offset by racial and national convergence, particularly in the cases of Northern European Jews like the Germans. Between the Christian core group and Eastern European Jewish immigrants, in fact, German Jews often played a mediating role like that of the Irish Catholics to the Southern Europeans (Howe 1976).

After they had become naturalized citizens, and within the limitations established by their primordial divergence, these European immigrants took advantage of the openings presented by differentiation in the external environment to contest the privileged position of America's WASP core (Handlin 1951 [1973]). According to their respective origins and special skills, groups took different institutional paths toward inclusion. Catholics used American disestablishment to gain religious inclusion and legitimacy, and Catholicism gradually became transformed into one Christian denomination among many (Ahlstrom 1972:546-54, 825-41). In the big cities, Catholics used America's party structure and spoils system to build political power. Jews, on the other hand, parlayed their urban-economic background into skills that were needed in the industrializing economic system (Blauner 1972:62-63). Later, the Jewish emphasis on literacy—which in its similar Old Testament emphasis on the "word" partly neutralized the Protestant religious cleavage—helped Jews gain access to the intellectual and scientific products of America's secular culture.

The internal and external situation that confronted America's non-European immigrants—those from Africa and Asia—was strikingly differ-



ent.\* In terms of primordial qualities, the divergence was much more intense. Racial differences created an initial, highly flammable cleavage, one to which Protestant societies are particularly sensitized (Elkins 1969; Tannenbaum 1969; Bellah 1975:86-112). Asians and Africans were also distinguished more sharply in the religious dimension, for few shared the majority's commitment to Christianity. In fact, as "non-Christians," blacks were in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as often the butt of religious slurs as they were of racial epithets. Superimposed on these religious and racial dimensions was the sharp divergence between non-Europeans and the American core in terms of national origins, viz., longstanding American fantasies about "darkest Africa" and the "exotic Orient" (Light 1972; Blauner 1972:65).

Not only were national traditions and territory more disjunctive, but also there existed no common linguistic reference or (for Africans at least) urban tradition to bridge the gap (Blauner 1972:61; Handlin 1957:80-81). The WASP core group, and indeed, the new European immigrants themselves, reacted strongly against such primordial disparity: the history of mob violence against Chinese and blacks has no precedent in reactions against European immigrants.

Equally important in the fate of these immigrants, however, was the nature of the external environment they entered (cf. Blauner 1972). Entering as slaves in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, blacks were without legal right<sup>o</sup> Because their participation in American institutional life was at every point legally fused with the biological criteria of race, they faced a closed, not an open and differentiated, social system. Although the circumstances were much less severe for the Chinese immigrants who entered in mass in the 1850s, their common status as indentured labor sharply limited their mobility and competitiveness in the labor market (Bean 1968:163-65; Lyman 1970:64-77). This external inhibition exacerbated primordial antagonism, and the California state legislature passed a series of restrictive pieces of legislation that further closed various aspects of institutional life (Lyman 1970:95-97). Similarly, whereas the Japanese did not face any initial external barriers, the primordial reaction against the agricultural success of immigrant Japanese

\*A complete picture of the U.S. situation would have to include also the core group conquest of the native North American Indian civilization and the incorporation of the Mexican population of the Southwestern United States. Although I believe that these more explicitly colonial situations can be analyzed within the framework presented here, specific variations must be introduced. See the section that follows in the text.

farmers produced California's Alien Land Law, which fused farm ownership with naturalized citizenship, a status denied to all non-Caucasian, first-generation immigrants (Bean 1968:332-35; Modell 1970:106-10). This law partly undermined their agriculture production, forcing masses of Japanese into the cities (Light 1972:73-74). At one time or another, then, each non-European group faced a social environment that was "fused" to one degree or another. Simply in terms of external factors alone, therefore, non-European immigrants could not as easily transform their numbers into political power, their economic talents into skills and rewards, and their intellectual abilities into cultural accomplishments.

Uneven institutional differentiation and internal primordial divergence together generated massive barriers to African and Asian inclusion that protected not only the WASP core group but also the partially included European immigrants. To the degree that American blacks and Asians have moved toward inclusion, it is the result of accommodation on both these fronts. In terms of internal factors, widespread conversion not only to Christianity but also to "Americanism," the adoption of the English language, and the assumption of an urban life style have had significant impact, as have the changing religious sensitivities of the Christian majority and the continued secularization of American culture.

On the external side, institutional differentiation has opened up in different dimensions at different times. With the legal shift after the Civil War, economic and cultural facilities (Lieberson 1980:159-69) began to be available for some blacks, particularly for those who immigrated to Northern cities after the First World War. Only after further legal transformation in the 1950s and 1960s, however, has political power become fully accessible, a political leverage that in turn has provided greater cultural and economic participation. In the Asian case, discriminatory legislative enactments were gradually overturned in the courts and formally free access to societal resources was restored by the end of World War II. Two facts explain the remarkably greater rate of Asian inclusion as compared to black. First, their great "external" advantages allowed Chinese and Japanese immigrants to preserve, at least for several generations, the resilient extended-kinship network of traditional societies (Light 1972; cf. Eisenstadt 1954). Second, the core group's primordial antipathy was, in the end, less intense toward Asians (Lieberson 1980:366-67), whose racial contrast was less dramatic, traditional religion more literate, and national origins more urbanized and generally accessible.

*A Note on the Model's Application  
to the Colonial Situation*

Although I have developed this model specifically with reference to relatively modernized Western societies, I would like to comment briefly on its relevance to the colonial situation, both because the notion of "internal colonialism" has been recently applied to these Western societies (Blauner 1972; Hechter 1975; see note 1, below) and because colonial and post-colonial societies have themselves been so vitally affected by the modernization process.

As a form of ethnic domination that usually combines a highly fused external environment with vast primordial disparity, the prototypical colonial situation must be viewed as the polar opposite of solidary inclusion. For this reason, and because colonization has involved the initial and often continual application of force, there has been a strong tendency to perceive colonialization in a theoretically undifferentiated way, as initiating a system of total domination that can end only in secession and revolution. From the perspective developed here, this perception is in error: the colonial situation is subject to the same kind of analytic differentiation and internal variation as any other relationship between core group and subordinate outgroup. Indeed, every core group, whether in the West or in the third world, rests initially upon some form of colonialization. Early Parisians colonized the territorial communities that later composed France, much as later Frenchmen tried to incorporate, much less successfully, the North African Algerian community. Similarly, the difference is only one of degree between the aggressive nation building initially undertaken with the island, now called England, by the English core group; the subsequent domination by the English nation over its neighboring communities in the British Isles; and the later English colonization of the non-British empire.

Resolution of the colonial situation, then, varies according to the same analytic factors as the inclusion or exclusion of outgroups in Western societies does. Although the rigidity of later colonial situations has often produced radicalized nationalist movements for ethnic secession (see the section following), there have been alternative developments. The case of Great Britain is instructive in this regard (for background, see Beckett 1966, Bulpitt 1976, Hanham 1969, Hechter 1975, Mitchison 1970, Norman 1968, Philip 1975, Rose 1970, 1971).

Although Wales, Scotland, and Ireland were all incorporated involuntarily, the nature of the external political factor by which this colonization was accomplished was crucial for later events. The early military domination of Ireland by the still highly traditional English state was far harsher than the later incorporation of Wales and Scotland by an English state much more committed to bureaucratic and, in the case of Scotland, constitutional organization. This initial political variation created a crucial context for the critical primordial relation of religion, helping to determine the relative success of England's attempts to incorporate these colonies into Reformation Protestantism. Scotland and Wales were successfully "reformed"; Ireland was not. In combination with the territorial discontinuity of Ireland, this internal factor created the basis for the much more passionate primordial antipathy that developed between Ireland and England. It also prevented the kind of elite intermingling that helped to further mitigate primordial antagonism between England and the other colonies. On the basis of this primordial religious antagonism, the relatively undifferentiated condition of English church-state relations became crucial to Irish development, producing the fusion of economic, political, and religious position that was unknown to Wales and Scotland. This, in turn, set the stage for the harsh settlement communities that finally transformed the Irish-English relation into the kind of rigid and exploitative situation that is so close to the traditional "colonial" one. Finally, only in this multidimensional historical context can the divergent responses to English industrialization be properly understood. Whereas the vast differentiation of the English economy that occurred in the nineteenth century produced significant leverage for the Welsh and Scots, the Irish were unable to take advantage of this opportunity for inclusion to any comparable degree. Indeed, in Ireland, this industrialization actually helped to create the internal resources for national emancipation.

In such rigid colonial situations, if economic and cultural mobilization do not lead to successful secessionist movements (see below), they may trigger, instead, extraordinary efforts at core group protection. In South Africa, Apartheid was instituted only in 1948, after intensifying economic, political, and cultural modernization threatened to open up various spheres to African participation (Doxey 1961; Van der Horst 1965). In terms of the model proposed here, Apartheid represents an attempt to isolate the "mechanisms" of inclusion—urbanization, geographical and economic mobility, education, communication, intermarriage—from the

underlying processes of differentiation that produced them. Using formally legitimate coercion, Apartheid tries to link each of these mechanisms to the primordial dimension of race. It establishes racial "tracks" for job training, urbanization, education, intermarriage, sexual intercourse, spiritual action, public association, and communication (Kuper 1960). In this strategy of coping with increased differentiation through government-induced and government-legitimated racialism, the Apartheid strategy resembles the Nazi one. Just as Nazism went beyond the merely conservative antidemocratic regimes of an earlier Germany because the latter could no longer manage the strains of a rapidly and unevenly differentiating society, so Apartheid is the kind of radical, violent response to a challenge to core solidarity that occurs only in an industrial society undergoing rapid modernization. In both German Nazism and South African Apartheid, this more radical opposition to change was carried out by the more insecure older social groups, in Germany by segments of the lower middle class, in South Africa by the Afrikaner (not the British) Nationalist party.

If traditional colonization could create such different outcomes depending on the particular content of external and internal relationships, the fate of so-called "internal colonies" in contemporary industrial societies must surely be considered in an equally differentiated way. Only such a sensitivity to analytical variations, for example, can explain the kind of divergent experiences of the descendants of Mexicans, Africans, Indians, Japanese, and Chinese—all of whom have been considered colonized groups—in the United States today.

### *The Process of Inclusion and Ideological Strategies*

Structural dislocations, of course, do not directly imply social mobilization. However, with the single exception of diaspora communities, solitary exclusion will, eventually, provoke mobilization designed to equalize outgroup position vis-à-vis the core. The nature of these struggles and the kind of ideological strategies the outgroups assume will be related closely to the structural bases of their exclusion. Three ideal-typical strategies may be distinguished.

*Assimilative Movements and "Equal Opportunity."* Assimilation may be defined as the effort to achieve full institutional participation through identification with the primordial qualities of the core group. Significant movement in this antiethnic direction will be a viable strategy only under certain conditions. If inclusion is reasonably to be viewed simply as a matter of closing the "primordial gap," fairly substantial external opportunities must exist. Assimilation is not, of course, a rationally calculated strategy. It emerges rather from the experience of relative commonality and from certain levels of actual sociation in institutional life. In the American case, both Christian and Jewish European immigrants have followed this path, as, more recently, have Asian Americans. In Britain, though there have been strong assimilative tendencies within the Scots and Welsh, these have been intertwined, as we will see, with more primordially sensitive strategies.

The conflicts within assimilative groups are between "traditionalists," who wish to maintain strong ethnic identity and are usually regarded as politically conservative, and "modernists" who seek to adopt the dominant ethnic style and most often are viewed as politically progressive. As for conflicts between assimilationists and the host society, assimilating solidary outgroups produce significant independent social and political movements only in the first generation. After this initial wave, however, they often constitute important cultural forces and widely influential ethnic spokesmen. The self-conscious stratificational principle that such assimilative spokesmen adopt is "equal opportunity" rather than "equality of results." The assimilationists' drive for equality is expressed in the desire for "social rights" like public education. Yet they simultaneously embrace the ideal of individual liberty for every member of the society, justifying their demand for limited egalitarianism on the grounds that it is necessary to sustain the principle of individual, meritocratic competition. This commitment to liberty only reflects their structural experience: for assimilative groups, constitutional, individualizing freedoms have been an effective lever in the inclusion process (Raab 1972, Glazer 1975).

Even in the limiting case of maximal external opportunity and internal complementarity, however, it is unlikely that the primordial gap will ever be completely closed. The failure to do so cannot, moreover, be traced only to the core group's historical advantage. Highly assimilated outgroups themselves often seek to maintain vestiges of primordial definition—what Weber cynically labeled ersatz ethnicity and what contem-

porary Americans admiringly call "roots." Ethnic solidarity, after all, need not have a pejorative connotation; it can contribute to the construction of social identification as such. For this reason, the concept of civil society is a limiting case. Although an assimilating outgroup disproportionately identifies with a core group, the definition of core primordality may itself be subtly changed by the very process of assimilation (cf. Glazer 1975).

*Nationalist Movements and Ethnically Conscious Inclusion.* In groups that experience stronger primordial divergence and face more difficult structural barriers, assimilative strategies will not predominate. To be sure, assimilation will be one reaction to solidary exclusion, and as long as efforts at inclusion continue it will remain, if only unconsciously, a significant and important strategy in breaking down the barrier of primordial divergence. Yet where solidary groups face significantly fused external structures or possess certain primordial qualities—like race or an autonomous territorial area—that cannot easily be mitigated, they will remain primordially sensitive to a significant degree. When these groups become mobilized, the stratificational principle they advocate shifts from the "balanced" endorsement of equal opportunity to more group-oriented demands for preferential treatment. As equality of results becomes more significant, the individual rights of the dominant core receive increasingly less attention (Hentoff 1964, Prager 1978; Glazer 1975, ignores these basic distinctions in his conflation of the European and non-European aspects of U.S. inclusion). This shift reflects, of course, the *relative* failure of differentiated constitutional principles and civil rights in effecting outgroup inclusion. Such an ideological transition is reflected in the "affirmative action" demands of America's racial minorities and in the demands by groups like the Welsh and Catalonians for linguistic equality in their public education.

Contrary to the assimilationist tendency, these nationalist groups do form independent social movements. In terms of struggles for actual political power, however, they usually express themselves through institutionalized party structures and economic organizations and only sporadically create vehicles that compete for power with these dominant institutions. While primordially sensitive, these movements still seek equal institutional access. Moreover, though self-consciously committed to maintaining ethnic distinctiveness, they continue to undergo a gradual process of primordial homogenization. For example, while there is sig-

nificant support in Wales for linguistic autonomy—social-psychological studies indicate much higher rates of approval for Welsh over English accents (Bourhis et al. 1973)—the actual number of Welsh speakers has greatly declined in recent years. This would seem to have been the inevitable result of meeting the other major Welsh nationalist demands, which have urged inclusion in the English core institutions of culture and economic life (Thompson 1978). Such an unintended consequence will continue to be a source of tension in nationalist movements as long as the primordially sensitive group remains committed to inclusion rather than to secession. Whether these movements continue, indeed, to seek inclusion depends on the relative flexibility of the institutional environment. In the cases of American blacks, the British Scots and Welsh, and the Spanish Catalans, these environments either have continued to be sufficiently flexible or have recently become so. Insofar as they are not, secessionist movements develop (Shils 1975a). In the case of French-Canadian Quebecois, the issue remains unresolved; their situation indicates the independent impact that social mobilization has upon basic structural dislocation.

*Nationalist Movements and Ethnic Secession.* Whereas efforts at ethnically conscious inclusion are only rarely committed to independent party organization, secessionist movements create political organizations that subordinate not only traditional political disagreements within the out-group but also economic divisions.

Although the line should not be drawn too sharply, two general factors are crucial in facilitating this movement toward secession. The most basic is unusual rigidity, in terms either of internal primordiality or external environment. Among primordial qualities, independent territory seems to be the most significant factor, hence, the radical nationalism so often associated with the ideal-typical colonial case. Shared territory is an "intrinsic," quasi-permanent factor around which shifts in ethnic consciousness can ebb and flow. In points of high primordial consciousness, furthermore, it allows ethnicity to be connected to the political and economic interests of every sector of the excluded group. Territory has clearly been central, for example, in the most recent movement for Scottish secession from England, where the shifting economic opportunities of center and periphery have quickly become the focus of a new, more ethnically conscious political strategy (Thompson 1978). Such factors must



interact, in turn, with external circumstances. In Ireland, for example, the secessionist drive developed much earlier and more intensively because autonomous territory was combined with the kinds of highly rigid external factors described above.

The second crucial factor in moving ethnically conscious groups from inclusive to secessionist strategies is a more idiosyncratic one: the international climate. If secessionist nationalism appears to be "the order of the day" in the mid-twentieth century, and, more recently, in industrial countries, it establishes a normative reference that will inevitably affect perceptions of the actual situation. This "demonstration effect" (Bendix 1976) or cultural diffusion (Smith 1978) is as significant for twentieth-century nationalism as for nineteenth (Kohn 1962:61-126); the anti-colonial nationalism of the postwar world is as important for explaining the timing of the European secessionist movements of the 1960s and 1970s as the upsurge in Italian nationalism was for explaining the Irish "Home Rule" movement in the 1860s. The international context can also have highly important material effects, not just moral ones, when an outside power supplies arms or financial support to national insurgents.

As the analysis in this section begins to indicate, the relation between "structural" position—in an internal and external sense—and ideological outcome is mediated in any historical situation by a series of more specific intervening variables (see Smelser 1962). Thus, although the general relation obtains, any single outgroup in the course of its development will actually experience all three of these movements. American Judaism, for example, continues to have factions that advocate Zionist secession and ethnically conscious inclusion, as well as assimilation. Furthermore, the movement toward a "structurally appropriate" strategy is never chronologically linear. American black consciousness about primordality, for example, actually began to increase during the civil rights drives of the 1960s, when the assimilative standard of "equal opportunity" was dominant and when the legal and political orders were finally becoming differentiated from biological, particularistic standards. The particular time order of ideological strategies depends upon a series of such historically specific factors, and on this more specific level conflict itself becomes an independent variable. One also wants to consider the effects of the distinction between leadership and mass. Since strong and independent political leadership so often emerges only from middle, highly educated strata, certain initial advances toward inclusion—no matter how ulti-

mately ephemeral—will usually occur before secessionist movements can forcefully emerge.

A similar issue concerns the actual motivation of solidary outgroups themselves. Certainly, there are periods when excluded groups do not actively desire inclusion, and a few groups never want it. The degree to which an outgroup experiences the desire for inclusion relates, in part, to the same internal volitional factors that affect core group receptivity to the excluded party; it also depends upon the length of time of mutual exposure and on the degree to which the external environment of the interaction is differentiated. Where the primordial gap is extreme, the external environment rigid, and the period of mutual exposure relatively short, exclusion is less likely to produce demands for solidarity inclusion. Even in this case, however, instrumental self-interest will usually produce demands for equal treatment, if not solidarity, as a strategy to alleviate unsatisfactory external conditions.

### *Conclusion*

Given their rationalist bias, theories of nation building generally ignore the role of solidarity in societal development. Among those theorists who have discussed the integration problem, moreover, an evolutionary bias leads most to underestimate significantly the permanent importance of primordial definitions of the national community. In contrast to these prevailing perspectives, I have argued that because most nations are founded by solidary core groups, and because societal development after this founding is highly uneven, strains toward narrow and exclusive national solidarity remain at the center of even the most "civil" nation-state. Differences in national processes of ethnic inclusion—even in the industrial world—are enormous. To encompass the variation while retaining systematicity, I have proposed a multidimensional model. On the internal axis, inclusion varies according to the degree of primordial complementarity between core group and solidary outgroup. On the external axis, inclusion varies according to the degree of institutional differentiation in the host society. It is in response to variations in these structural conditions that ethnic outgroups develop different incorporative strategies—assimilation, ethnically conscious inclusion, and nationalist secession—as well as different stratificational principles to justify their demands.

Applying this general model primarily to special aspects of the inclusion

process in the United States, I have elaborated it in important ways. Yet this effort still represents only a first approximation; much further work remains before the model could truly become a theory of the middle range. For example, it would eventually have to be specified for different classes of empirical events. Thus, within the general external and internal constraints I have established, inclusion seems to vary systematically according to the different modes of outgroup contact: indentured servitude versus slavery, economic colonization versus military, colonization over groups within contiguous territories versus more territorially distinct occupation, and so forth.\* This variation in turn affects the kind of external variable that is most significant in any given situation, whether the state, the economy, religion, or law.† This factor weighting is undoubtedly also affected by the kinds of historically specific "differentiation combinations" encountered in particular national societies, i.e., which institutional sectors lead and which lag. Finally, different kinds of internal combinations might also be specified; for example, a white-Anglo Saxon Catholic core group will differ in predictable ways from the WASP and a white Catholic Southern European core from a Northern European one.

I hope it is clear, however, how such further conceptualization can fruitfully draw upon the hypotheses already set forth. At a minimum, the model proposed here demonstrates not only that fundamental cleavages in developed societies can be nonutilitarian in scope and proceed along nonlinear paths, but also that within a multidimensional framework such complex strains can be conceptualized in a systematic comparative and historical manner.

#### NOTES

1. In terms of contemporary sociological theory, then, the animus of this chapter is directed in several directions.

While in one sense further developing the functionalist approach to differentiation theory, I am arguing for a much more serious recognition of group interest, differential power, uneven development, and social conflict than has usually characterized this tradition. My "neofunctionalist" argument begins, for example, from the intersection between neo-Marxist and Shilsian center-periphery theory and one aspect of Parsons' system theory, modifying

\*For a discussion of independent political effects in the South African case, see Kuper 1965:42-56.

†These are the kinds of variables that Schermerhorn makes the central focus of his analysis, virtually to the exclusion of the factors I have discussed above.

the former and energizing the latter. I also distance myself from the conflation of ideology, model, and empirical explanation that often characterizes Parsons' work.

On the other hand, by stressing the necessity for analytic differentiation and multidimensional causality, I am arguing against Marxist and structuralist analyses, which even when they formally recognize the independence of ethnic phenomena—whose inequality they rightly insist upon—continually try to root it in "last instance" arguments. Thus, even in his sophisticated version of Marxist analysis, John Rex (1970) never accepts religion or ethnicity as truly independent variables, nor, more fundamentally, does he view the problem of solidarity as an independent dimension of social life. Concentrating mainly on the activities of labor and work, ethnic domination *per se* becomes for Rex an extrinsic variable.

Very much the same instrumental theoretical bias reduces the value of Lieberman's (1980) impressive empirical study. In his effort to explain the relative lack of success of postslavery blacks as compared with white immigrants in the United States after 1880, Lieberman tries to conceive of the "heritage of slavery" simply as a structural barrier, i.e., one that affects only the external conditions of the competition between the two groups. In this way, despite his occasional recognition of their importance (e.g., p. 366), the subjective perception of differences experienced by the groups themselves—and by the other ethnic communities involved—becomes a residual category.

I am suggesting a general process that occurs when racial and ethnic groups have an inherent conflict—and certainly competition for jobs, power, position, maintenance of different subcultural systems, and the like are such conflicts. Under the circumstances, there is a tendency for the competitors to focus on differences between themselves. The observers (in this case the sociologists) may then assume that those differences are the sources of conflict. In point of fact, the rhetoric involving such differences may indeed inflame them, but we can be reasonably certain that the conflict would have occurred in their absence. . . . Differences between blacks and whites [for example] enter into the rhetoric of race and ethnic relations, but they are ultimately secondary to the conflict for society's goodies. . . . Much of the antagonism toward blacks was based on racial features, but one should not interpret this as the ultimate cause. Rather the racial emphasis resulted from the use of the most obvious feature(s) of the group to support the intergroup conflict generated by a fear of blacks based on their threat as economic competitors. (pp. 382–83).

Without a multidimensional framework that takes cultural patterns as constraining structures in their own right—see my discussion of "structural analysis" in chapter 1, above—Lieberman is necessarily forced to conceive of subjective "discrimination" as an individualistic variable. Indeed, he links the use of discrimination not only to supposedly "psychological" studies of attitude formation but also to analyses that find inherent racial qualities of the victims themselves to be the cause for their oppression.

Finally, by stressing the strong possibility for social and cultural differentiation in Western societies and the distinction and relative autonomy of the external and internal axes of ethnic conflict, I argue against contemporary "internal colonialist" theory. This approach too often refers to domination in an undifferentiated and diffuse way and, conversely, underemphasizes the variations that characterize the histories of oppressed groups by virtue of their distinctive primordial relations to the core group and their different external environments.

For the relation between the present argument and plural society theory—which still remains relatively unsystematized—see p. 80n., above.

#### REFERENCES

- Ahlstrom, Sydney E. 1972. *A Religious History of the American People*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

- of Talcott Parsons: A Theoretical and Ideological Reinterpretation." *American Sociological Review* (April), 43:177-98.
- 1983. *The Modern Reconstruction of Classical Thought: Talcott Parsons*. Vol. 4 of *Theoretical Logic in Sociology*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Banfield, Edward C. 1959. *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. New York: Free Press.
- Bean, Walton. 1968. *California*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Beckett, J. C. 1966. *The Making of Modern Ireland 1603-1923*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Bellah, Robert N. 1970. *Beyond Belief*. Harper and Row.
- 1975. *The Broken Covenant*. New York: Seabury.
- Bendix, Reinhard. 1964 (1977). *Nation Building and Citizenship*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 1976. "The Mandate To Rule: An Introduction." *Social Forces* (December), 55(2):252-56.
- Blauner, Robert. 1972. *Racial Oppression in America*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Blumer, Herbert. 1965. "Industrialization and Race Relations." In Guy Hunter, ed., *Industrialization and Race Relations*, pp. 220-53. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bourhis, Richard Y., Howard Giles, and Henri Tajfel. 1973. "Language as a Determinant of Welsh Identity." *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 3(4):447-60.
- Bulpitt, Him. 1976. "The Making of the United Kingdom: Aspects of English Imperialism." P.S.A. Workgroup on United Kingdom Politics, University of Strathclyde (September).
- Coulton, C. G. 1935. "Nationalism in the Middle Ages." *The Cambridge Historical Journal* 5(1):15-40.
- Doxey, G. V. 1961. *The Industrial Colour Bar in South Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Durkheim, Emile. 1893 (1933). *The Division of Labor in Society*. New York: Free Press.
- Eisenstadt, S. N. 1954. *The Absorption of Immigrants*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- 1963. *The Political System of Empires*. New York: Free Press.
- 1973. *Tradition, Change, and Modernity*. New York: Wiley.
- Elkins, Stanley. 1969. "Slavery in Capitalist and Non-Capitalist Countries." In Laura Foner and Eugene D. Genovese, eds., *Slavery in the New World*, pp. 8-26. Englewood, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Friedrichs, Carl J. 1964. *Transcendent Justice: The Religious Dimension of Constitutionalism*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
- Geertz, Clifford. 1973a. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.
- 1973b. "The Integration Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Pol-

- itics in the New States." In Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, pp. 255-310.
- Gergen, Kenneth. 1968. "The Significance of Skin Color in Human Relations." In John Hope Franklin, ed., *Color and Race*, pp. 112-28. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Glazer, Nathan. 1975. *Affirmative Discrimination*. New York: Basic Books.
- Glazer, Nathan and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. 1963. *Beyond the Melting Pot*. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
- Goode, William J. 1963. *World Revolution and Family Patterns*. New York: Free Press.
- Gordon, Milton M. 1964. *Assimilation in American Life*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Handlin, Oscar. 1951 (1973). *The Uprooted*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- 1957. *Race and Nationality in American Life*. New York: Doubleday.
- Hanham, Harold J. 1969. *Scottish Nationalism*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Hansen, Marvin Lee. 1940. *The Immigrant in American History*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Harris, Marvin. 1964. *Patterns of Race in the Americas*. New York: Walker and Company.
- Hartz, Louis. 1955. *The Liberal Tradition in America*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich.
- Hechter, Michael. 1975. *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British Development, 1536-1966*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hentoff, Nat. 1964. "Reaching Equality by Special Treatment." *The New Equality*. New York: Viking.
- Higham, John. 1969. *Strangers in the Land*. New York: Atheneum.
- Howe, Irving. 1976. *World of Our Fathers*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich.
- Jordan, Winthrop D. 1968. *White Over Black*. Durham: University of North Carolina Press.
- Kohn, Hans. 1962. *The Age of Nationalism*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Kuper, Leo. 1960. "The Heightening of Racial Tension." *Race* (November), 2:24-32.
- 1965. *An African Bourgeoisie*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- 1969. "Political Change in White Settler Societies: The Possibility of Peaceful Democratization." In Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, eds., *Pluralism in Africa*, pp. 169-93. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- 1978. "The Theory of Plural Society: Race and Conquest." Unpublished manuscript.
- Kuper, Leo and M. G. Smith. 1969. *Pluralism in Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Landes, David. 1969. *The Unbound Prometheus*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Lieberson, Stanley. 1980. *A Piece of the Pie*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

- Light, Ivan. 1972. *Ethnic Enterprise in America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1965. *The First New Nation*. New York: Vintage.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan. 1967. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction." In Lipset and Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, pp. 1-64. New York: Free Press.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin and Reinhard Bendix. 1960. *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Little, David. 1969. *Religion, Order, and Law*. New York: Harper Torchbook.
- Lyman, Stanford M. 1970. "Strangers in the Cities: The Chinese on the Urban Frontier." In Charles Wollenberg, ed., *Ethnic Conflict in California History*, pp. 61-100. Los Angeles: Tinnon-Brown.
- Marx, Karl. 1848 (1955). *The Communist Manifesto*. Samuel Beer, ed. Northbrook, Ill.: AHM Publishing Corporation.
- Mead, Sidney E. 1963. *The Lively Experiment*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Miller, Perry. 1956. *Errand Into the Wilderness*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- 1967. *Nature's Nation*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Mitchison, Rosalind. 1970. *A History of Scotland*. London: Methuen.
- Modell, John. 1970. "Japanese-Americans: Some Costs of Group Achievement." In Charles Wollenberg, ed., *Ethnic Conflict in California History*, pp. 101-20. Los Angeles: Tinnon-Brown.
- Mosse, George L. 1964. *The Crisis of German Ideology*. New York: Grosset and Dunlap.
- Nakane, Chie. 1970. *Japanese Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Nolte, Ernst. 1965. *The Three Faces of Fascism*. New York: Mentor.
- Norman, E. R. 1968. *Anti-Catholicism in Victorian England*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Parsons, Talcott. 1967a. "On the Concept of Influence." In T. Parsons, ed., *Sociological Theory and Modern Society*, pp. 355-82. New York: Free Press.
- 1967b. "Full Citizenship for the Negro American?" In T. Parsons, ed., *Sociological Theory and Modern Society*, pp. 422-65. New York: Free Press.
- 1971. *The System of Modern Society*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Philip, Alan Butt. 1975. *The Welsh Question*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
- Prager, Jeffrey. 1978. "Equal Opportunity and Equal Protection: Ideas and Interpretation in Flux." Presentation to Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Association. San Francisco, California.
- Raab, Earl. 1972. "Quotas by Any Other Name." *Commentary* (January), pp. 41-45.
- Rex, John. 1970. *Race Relations in Sociological Theory*. New York: Schocken.
- Rokkan, Stein. 1975. "Dimensions of State Formation and National Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations within Europe." In Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe*, pp. 562-600. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

- Rose, Richard. 1970. "The United Kingdom as a Nation-State." Survey Research Center Occasional Paper No. 6, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.
- 1971. *Governing without Consensus*. London: Faber & Faber.
- Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1939. *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schermerhorn, R. A. 1970. *Comparative Ethnic Relations*. New York: Random House.
- Schooler, Carmi. 1976. "Serfdom's Legacy: An Ethnic Continuum." *American Journal of Sociology* 81(6):1265-86.
- Shils, Edward A. 1975a. "The Integration of Societies." In Shils, *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macro-Sociology*, pp. 48-90. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 1975b. "Primordial, Personal, Sacred, and Civil Ties." In Shils, *Center and Periphery*, pp. 111-26.
- Shils, Edward A. and Michael Young. 1975 (1956). "The Meaning of the Coronation." In Shils, *Center and Periphery*, pp. 135-52.
- Smelser, Neil J. 1962. *Theory of Collective Behavior*. New York: Free Press.
- 1971. "Stability, Instability, and the Analysis of Political Corruption." In Bernard Barber and Alex Inkeles, eds., *Stability and Social Change*, pp. 7-29. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Smith, Anthony. 1978. "The Diffusion of Nationalism: Some Historical and Sociological Perspectives." *British Journal of Sociology* 29(2): 234-48.
- Tannenbaum, Frank. 1969. "Slavery, the Negro, and Racial Prejudice." In Laura Foner and E. D. Genovese, eds., *Slavery in the New World*, pp. 3-7. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
- Thernstrom, Stephen. 1974. "Socialism and Social Mobility." In John H. M. Laslett and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Failure of a Dream?* pp. 509-27. New York: Doubleday.
- Thompson, Seamus. 1978. *Dual Incorporation in British Politics: A Theory of Class and Ethnic Mobilization*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of California at Los Angeles.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1835 (1945). *Democracy in America*, vol. 1. New York: Random House.
- Toennies, Ferdinand. 1887 (1957). *Community and Society*. East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University.
- Vallier, Ivan. 1971. "Empirical Comparison of Social Structure: Leads and Lags." In Vallier, ed., *Comparative Method in Sociology*, pp. 203-63. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Van den Berghe, Pierre L. 1965. *South Africa, A Study in Conflict*. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press.
- Van der Horst, Sheila T. 1965. "The Effects of Industrialization on Race Relations in South Africa." In Guy Hunter, ed., *Industrialization and Race Relations*, pp. 97-140. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Walzer, Michael. 1965. *The Revolution of the Saints*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.



Weber, Eugen. 1976. *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France: 1870-1914*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Weber, Max. 1904 (1958). "Class, Status, and Party." In Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Eber*, pp. 180-95. London: Oxford University Press.

— 1958. *The City*. New York: Free Press.

# The Sociology of Social Inclusion

SAGE Open  
January-March 2013: 1–16  
© The Author(s) 2012  
DOI: 10.1177/2158244012471957  
<http://sgo.sagepub.com>  


Dan Allman<sup>1</sup>

## Abstract

This article looks at social inclusion from a sociological perspective. It argues that sociology complements biological and other natural order explanations of social stratification. The article interrogates a variety of forms of social integration, including ostracism within 5th century B.C. Greece, 19th-century solidarism, and Goffman's mid-20th-century work on stigma. It does so to demonstrate how in each of these contexts, social inclusion and exclusion can function as apparatus that problematize people on the margins, and by extension, contribute to their governance and control. The article proposes that sociology provides a valuable orientation from which to consider social inclusion because it illuminates how social integration maintains and manages the ways in which people move about and through their socially stratified worlds.

## Keywords

social inclusion, social exclusion, social integration, social stratification, sociology

We live in the state and in society; we belong to a social circle which jostles against its members and is jostled by them; we feel the social pressure from all sides and we react against it with all our might; we experience a restraint to our free activities and we struggle to remove it; we require the services of other [people] which we cannot do without; we pursue our own interests and struggle for the interests of other social groups, which are also our interests. In short, we move in a world which we do not control, but which controls us, which is not directed toward us and adapted to us, but toward which we must direct and adapt ourselves.

Gumpłowicz, 1963, p. 6

This article considers the concept of social inclusion from the perspective of sociology. In doing so, it aims to complement the work of historians, economists, psychologists, and natural scientists to better understand the origins of the social inclusion concept. It argues that action and efforts to include or exclude individuals and social groups are fundamental to society as forces that govern through the oppressive or liberating effects such inclusionary or exclusionary actions promote.

As a discipline from which to consider the social inclusion and exclusion concepts, sociology offers an excellent vantage. Sociology is well oriented to consider facets of social equality and inequality, social integration and stratification, social mobility as it relates to social inclusion and exclusion, and the functional contributions of the periphery relative to the social core. Sociology provides a needed vantage from which to consider social inclusion as it lends itself to extension beyond economic or natural fitness.

In the social world, whether one is welcomed, represented, or provided for by the mainstream, or whether one is

ostracized, ignored, or bemired, the outcome is a collection of social practices. These social practices result from various degrees of intimacy and interactions between friends, strangers, families, colleagues, kinship groups, communities, cultures, and even whole societies—all of which lend themselves to sociological study.

This article begins with a consideration of exclusion and inclusion societies across time and place, including gated communities, closed institutions, and caste systems. The article delves into what is described as the natural order of social inclusion and exclusion. It explores some of the theories and findings that have come out of such an approach, including the evolutionary and sociobiological work in the area. To make its case for a sociology of social inclusion, the article then gazes back in time to three examples: ostracism in 5th-century Athens, solidarism in 19th century France, and contemporary considerations of stigma as influenced by the work of Goffman. Building on this, the article proposes that societies which emphasize differences in social integration are structured by architectures of inclusion that govern and manage how marginal women and men inhabit social space, while functioning to maintain many of the attributes of the status quo.

## Exclusion Hierarchies

More than 50 years ago, the anthropologist and sociologist David Pocock (1957) reflected that processes of inclusion and exclusion were features of all hierarchies. Pocock felt

---

<sup>1</sup>University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada

### Corresponding Author:

Dan Allman, University of Toronto, Dalla Lana School of Public Health, 155 College Street, Room 524, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M5T 3M7  
Email: [dan.allman@utoronto.ca](mailto:dan.allman@utoronto.ca)

that in general terms, the discussion of inclusion and exclusion fed into efforts to define what might be called a social ontology, or the way that the existence and social positioning of groups in a hierarchically structured society would be explained. Such a social ontology has been described by Sibley (1995) as a landscape of exclusion; a form of social and philosophical geography that melds ideology with place in an exercise of social, economic, and political power that invariably results in forms of oppression, and in many instances, exploitation (Towers, 2005). Fredericks (2010) suggested that belongingness as experienced in everyday relations constructs the kinds of sentiments on which societies of exclusion (and inclusion) are based. Referencing the work of De Certeau (1984), Fredericks makes the case for the importance of the everydayness of belonging and attachment, and the memory and tradition it reinforces as means of appropriation and territorialization.

One example of such a landscape of exclusion is a gated community (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2002). Grant and Rosen (2009) proposed these communities exist as exclusion societies. They cite Flusty's (2004) argument that the community gates that enclose act to protect those inside from unforeseen and largely unwanted encounters with otherness. Examples given range from urban gated communities where exclusion is legitimized as spatial inequity (Flusty, 2004) to the present security fences undulating across Israel, or separating the United States from Mexico (Kabachnik, 2010).

Herbert (2008) reflected on the ways in which urban spaces in the United States and elsewhere are turned into exclusion societies through the criminalization of public spaces outside the rarefied protected enclaves shielded within gates and walls. Focusing on the disorderly, Herbert describes this exclusion as a form of modern day prohibition that cedes out the homeless, the transient; and those who loiter, panhandle, and display public drunkenness (Douglas, 1966). Herbert found that these practices of creating exclusion societies are not new; that they have and continue to be used as justifications for forms of social cleansing (Cresswell, 2006; Dubber, 2005; Duncan, 1978; Spradley, 1970).

Essentially the physical embodiment of territorial actions, exclusion societies seek to separate and compound the favored from the disfavored, and the hygienic from the dirty (Douglas, 1966; Sibley, 1995). To do this, they collectively create spaces of inclusion and exclusion, even if not all parties cede to such collectivism.

Disability, like gated communities, is another example of the ways societies create cultural spaces structured by exclusion. Kitchin (1998) described the reproductive nature of disablist practices, as assemblies that seek to ensure disabled people are kept in certain places from where they come to understand when they may be out of place. For Kitchin, social relations between the disabled and the able-bodied function to keep disabled people in their place and to signal when they may be stepping beyond this space.

Prisons, like asylums and other places that remove individuals from broader social life are additional if somewhat more extreme forms of exclusion societies. These institutions enclose the daily lives of certain social actors from broader society, replacing wider interaction with complex subcultures (Baer, 2005).

An altogether different type of exclusion society is a caste system, which relies less on geographical separation and more on social distance. A notable example is the caste system of India (Nayar, 2007). At the root of India's exclusion society are the untouchable castes whose marginal social position is owed to their relationship to impurities associated with death and organic pollution (Deliege, 1992).

Berreman (1967, referencing Davis & Moore, 1945; Lenski, 1966; Mills, 1963; Tumin, 1953), held that caste systems—unlike gated communities, inner cities, orphanages, leper colonies, asylums, and prisons—are fundamentally structures through which power and privilege are allocated via interdependent social classifications ordered by stratified and ranked divisions of labor. Mencher (1974) referenced Leach (1960) in suggesting that India's caste classifications facilitate divisions of labor free of the competition and expectations of mobility inherent in other systems.

As exclusion societies, caste systems perpetuate themselves and the positions of privilege provided to those included within them. Yet they are different from other exclusion societies because across many noncaste landscapes of exclusion, mobility is conceivable and emulation of status is possible. However, in caste systems, place within the exclusion or inclusion hierarchy is ascribed at birth (Berreman, 1967, referencing Bailey, 1957; Sinha, 1959, 1962; Srinivas, 1956, 1966). Such exclusion by ascription has an economic dimension also through the way in which untouchables are "denied control of the means of production" (Deliege, 1992, p. 170, referencing Oommen, 1984). This results in forms of deprivation and poverty that enforce dependence, deference, and ultimately acceptance.

Exclusion societies are identifiable at different places in time, space, and geography. Such societies tend to be associated with differential access to social and economic well-being, and differential proximity to illness and disease. Inclusion societies, however, evolve from within such contexts. They are characterized by movements toward greater social justice, equality, and collectivism in response to the kinds of global oppressions exclusion societies embody and perpetuate.

## A Natural Order

Mechanisms of social inclusion and exclusion and the effects of these have been thoroughly investigated within the field of psychology and related disciplines. Work in this area has sought to better understand possible evolutionary origins of social inclusion and exclusion, and potential

sociobiological purposes to these different explanations of integration (Kurzban & Leary, 2001).

Eisenberger and Lieberman (2005) and MacDonald and Leary (2005) have approached inclusion and exclusion from a psychosocial and physiological perspective in which they consider how the impacts of these social practices share overlapping characteristics with our physical pain systems. Eisenberger and Lieberman reflected that our social interconnectivity is as fundamental as our most basic human needs for fire, sustenance, and shelter and that the absence of such connectivity is experienced, literally, as pain. They propose that the pain of social exclusion, separation, or rejection share many of the experiential attributes of forms of physical pain. Referencing Baumeister (2000), Eisenberger and Liberman described how across many centuries and cultures, various forms of storytelling and artistic expression reflect how the interruption, loss, or absence of social bonds can manifest as intense experiences of human pain and suffering. They point out that the pain and suffering associated with the loss of social bonds is recognized by many legal systems also.

To help explain the social, psychological, and physical pain experienced by exclusion, Eisenberger and Lieberman (2004) developed *pain overlap theory*. This theory holds that different kinds of pain utilize elements of shared processing systems. As reflected by MacDonald and Leary (2005), among our less developed ancestors, both physical and social pain were functional in that they steered kin and other social groups from environmental and other threats, reorienting them in the direction of helpful others. As such, the social pain of exclusion was seen to have evolved as a means of responding to danger.

In detailing their *sociometer theory*, Leary, Tambor, Terdal, and Downs, (1995) explained why inclusionary and integrational practices are so fundamentally important to social interactions and how we are designed to detect them. They note that many writers have suggested that the human need to seek inclusion and to avoid exclusion is essential, and furthermore, that as a developmental trait, this orientation likely can be traced to its survival benefit (Ainsworth, 1989; Barash, 1977; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Baumeister & Tice, 1990; Bowlby, 1969; Hogan, 1982; Hogan, Jones, & Cheek, 1985).

For Leary et al. (1995), an individual's sociometer is managed through self-esteem where social inclusion and exclusion are used as mechanisms to monitor the well-being of an individual or group's social relations. These authors use the sociometer to underscore pain overlap theory by suggesting that self-esteem is a kind of inclusion detector that meters changes in the inclusionary or exclusionary positioning of individuals. From this perspective, it would be this need for detection that ultimately drives individuals to maximize their quest for inclusion while minimizing the possibility of exclusion.

Along with the overlapping pain thesis and the sociometer/self-esteem thesis, Baumeister and Leary (1995) have

posited a *belongingness thesis*. This suggests the need to belong is a fundamental human motivation. Here, along with base needs like food and shelter (Bernstein, Sacco, Young, Hugenberg, & Cook, 2010), belongingness is held to be a foundational human need that results in a general pattern whereby social inclusion is used to reward, and social exclusion to punish. The outcome is a gauge that structures both social values and comportment (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).

Whereas a sociological perspective might suggest at the societal level that there exist a series of motivations to *design* inclusive frameworks for the betterment of social life, a natural order perspective would suggest that basic human survival and reproduction benefit from the evolution of cohesive group living; that to an extent, inclusion and exclusion as components of a behavioral repertoire may have helped to ensure evolutionary and reproductive fitness (Leary et al., 1995). This thinking suggests that such fitness at the level of kin networks or community groups may mirror existing physiological traits for responding to physical pain, to also structure responses to social pain. From this perspective, the exclusion/inclusion continuum exists alongside a biologically driven, psychological reaction that leads to the adoption of a generalized dislike of social exclusion and a favoring of the maintenance of adequate inclusion (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2005; MacDonald & Leary, 2005).

Such arguments present another perspective as to why different societies and social groupings across diverse historical periods and geographical locations develop intense drives to create and strengthen social institutions around various aspects of social integration and exclusion. Yet, as the examples of ostracism, solidarism, and stigmatism will reflect, any biological *push* with regards to social stratification is accompanied by a social world *pull*. The examples of ostracism, solidarism, and stigmatism will demonstrate how at different intervals in history, it is not necessarily biological forces but instead social architectures that become employed in the creation and continuance of inclusion societies.

## Ostracism

Acts and practices of including or excluding others as aspects of systems of stratification may be as old as much of humanity itself. Certainly, most societies display some degree of taboos and customs concerning forms of both social rejection and social acceptance (Douglas, 1966; Gruter & Masters, 1986; Lévi-Strauss, 1963; Radcliffe-Brown, 1952).

In institutional terms, a very early form of social exclusion is evident in the scholarship of the role of ostracism in Athens, Greece, during the 5th century B.C., when the provision of an official mechanism to institutionalize ostracism was enacted.

Although there is some debate within the works of Aristotle and Androtion as well as subsequent scholars about whether the law of ostracism originated with Cleisthenes

prior to the first official ostracism of Hipparchos, son of Charmos, in 488 B.C. (Kagan, 1961; Raubitschek, 1951; Robinson, 1939, 1945, 1946, 1952), there is consensus that the law appeared sometime in the 20 years surrounding the battle at Marathon. The law of ostracism was instituted as a means to protect young democratic institutions from the resurgence of tyranny (Raubitschek, 1951). It did so through the enactment of an *ostrakophoria* (Goligher, 1910, p. 558, referencing Carcopino, 1909; Reh binder, 1986, p. 323). Thus, ostracism was considered a democratic process in which those who were qualified to vote would “scratch onto a clay shard the name of a party leader to be banned (hence the name *ostrakismos* = shard judgment)” (Reh binder, 1986, p. 323).

As an initial incident in a series of expulsions driven by the desire for political control (Kagan, 1961), the very first political ostracism was followed by the successive exclusion of Magakles in 487-6, Xanthippos in 485-4, and Aristides in 483-2.

As institutionalized more than 25 centuries ago, ostracism was used almost exclusively as a political weapon against male generals (Raubitschek, 1951), as a means to mitigate the influence of political rivals (Kagan, 1961) and to police and control the well-being of the state. Reh binder (1986) suggested the main aim of ostracism was to “exclude the losing party leader from the state” as “early democracy could not integrate the continuous action of opposition parties into the political process” (p. 321). To address this and to solve party conflicts, a law of ostracism essentially functioned to banish the leader of the opposition.

Importantly, Athenian ostracism was levied against an already elite class who for tyrannical activities or suspicions of tyranny were considered political liabilities or dangers. These acts did not bring shame on the recipient, but rather were prestigious, even honorable—a status reflected in the convention for the ostracized individual to retain his property, and, after his return, to regain his elite personal and social status (Reh binder, 1986).

As Aristotle wrote in *Politics*:

Democratic states institute the rule of ostracism [because] such states are held to aim at equality above anything else; and with that aim in view they used to pass a sentence of ostracism on those whom they regarded as having too much influence owing to their wealth or the number of their connexions or any other form of political strength. (Barker, 1952, p. 135, referenced in Masters, 1986, p. 390)

Ostracism as it came to be enacted in Attic democracy was not an event applied lightly or arbitrarily. It required careful deliberation, a large quorum, and the immunity of an ostracized person’s family. In essence, ostracism acted like a safety valve that ensured a smoother, more peaceful, and less tumultuous running of the state (Kagan, 1961).

As instituted at the time, the law of ostracism was seen to be successful. It so weakened the ability of potentially disruptive subversive groups to wreak havoc on society and its political systems, that in the more than 90 years between 508 and 417 B.C., no more than 20 official ostracisms took place (Ostwald, 1955).

Given that modern industrial societies increasingly tend to frown on the kinds of excluding practices as reflected in the legal practice of ostracism (Reh binder, 1986), it can be challenging to acknowledge that ostracism exists in contemporary societies also, legally through, for example, formal punishments such as imprisonment, or racial prejudice, scapegoating, and xenophobia (Gruter & Masters, 1986). For Kort (1986), ostracism can be considered as coerced or involuntary exit of an individual or individuals from the society in which they live that manifests as a range of exclusions. Thus, a society demonstrating variation in ostracism practices reflects a society with solidaristic strategies for the exclusion of its members from participation and from occupying positions of respect (Kort, 1986, referencing Masters, 1986).

## Solidarism

To turn from the ostracism of 5th-century Athens to the solidarism of late-19th-century France, allows for the contrast of an early institutional approach to social exclusion with an equally enlightening historical era of inclusion.

The concept of solidarism evolved in the late-19th-century in France during a period of social, epistemological, and ontological change. It was an age when understandings of autonomy were being reconsidered by “scientism, political ideologies (especially Marxism) and the Roman Catholic Magister,” entities united in their intent to denounce an increasing vanity-like individualism (Vincent, 2001, p. 414).

Although, within this period, the idea of solidarity was not an established ethical reference, French Protestants united around this new form of solidarity known as solidarism. In doing so, the Protestants defined a path forward in their transformed identity as a social minority (Vincent, 2001).

For this underclass, being an excluded minority was not seen as a stance from which to claim social or human rights. Rather, exclusion was seen as igniting the kind of freedoms of thought and associations, which lent themselves to the reconciliation of identity-lending conceptualizations like justice and liberty (Vincent, 2001).

Although French Protestants were bound by religion, their move to solidarism is not seen as being directly related to religious teachings or directives. If anything, French Protestantism of this period was wary of “religious pietism and political liberalism and generally suspicious of any institutional expression of the desire for social justice” (Vincent, 2001, p. 415). As a result, they turned instead to groups not known as religious in connotation, such as trade associations, unions, and left-of-centre political parties.

It has been suggested that the story of solidarism is essentially the story of France's move to the welfare state. In opposing collectivism because it potentially threatened individual liberty, while promoting the empowerment of the working class, the new philosophy of solidarism countered the individualism of laissez-faire liberalism and social Darwinism. In time, solidarism would come to help to dismantle existing resistance to social reform and to usher in this new era of Welfarism (Sheradin, 2000).

Léon Bourgeois's book *Solidarité* (1998), which first appeared in 1896, is held to be a form of manifesto for the solidarism movement. In the decades prior to the First World War, the newly empowered French Radical Party were looking for a philosophy that would help them to maintain central power against the right-leaning individualists and the left-leaning collectivists (Hayward, 1961, 1963). In 1895-1896, during the short-lived Radical government of Bourgeois, he published a pamphlet titled *Solidarité* based on a series of his public letters that had appeared earlier. The main intent of this document was to advocate for a new approach, between "retreating laissez-faire liberalism and ascendant socialism." The aim of the particular piece of writing was to shine a light on "the duties that citizens owed to each other" (Koskeniemi, 2009, p. 285).

Bourgeois's *Solidarité* is seen as representing what has been described as a *belle époque* within the Third Republic (Hayward, 1963). Solidarism became the main social philosophy of his new radical party (Koskeniemi, 2009), orienting it and the nation toward what in time would become a new more inclusive state. As a new political and collective philosophy, solidarism was seen as reflective of a modernization of the revolutionary maxim: *liberty, equality, and fraternity*.

Notably, solidarism's narrative features the influences of democracy and humanism, through its belief in the development and contributions of every individual, and through its assertion of the inherent dignity of all of humanity (Sheradin, 2000).

Solidarism was committed to democracy, to the empowerment of the working class, and to 19th-century understandings of human reliance and interdependence (Sheradin, 2000). In being so committed, one can find a second meaning in this movement, one interwoven with concern over balancing self-interest with the era's philosophical humanistic ideals.

It is not surprising that among the principles of French solidarism was the belief that the liberty of human kind was not freedom absolute, but rather an understanding that free individuals were also in debt to society, to every other citizen, and to future generations (Koskeniemi, 2009).

In time, with the passing of World War I, the French Radical Party fell from favor as many of the working class shifted their allegiance to the Socialists following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 (Hayward, 1963). Ultimately, the harshness of World War I ended much of the utopian inclusivity inherent within the solidarist approach, and by

the 1920s, much of the impact and influence of solidarism had been depleted (Koskeniemi, 2009).

However, for the generation or two of those in France moved by the solidarist approach to social integration, one of the most persuasive elements of the philosophy and one that lent to its fashionableness was what Hayward (1961) described as an *open sesame* inclusive approach to mitigating the social conflicts of the era. The philosophy was meaningful to the time also because as an approach, it was not really radical at all. Rather, it melded elements of community, inclusivity, and social solidarity—all useful mechanisms to help the populace attain security against poverty, illness, unemployment, and war (Hayward, 1961).

The broad solidarism movement was oriented to the reconciliation of individual and social ethics with the belief that all citizens had the free will to interact and develop relationships with others (Vincent, 2001). Solidarism in essence acted as a shared and uniting philosophy—a precondition of the era's new approaches toward social contractuality (Foschi & Cicciola, 2006)

For Koskeniemi (2009), the influences of these preconditions would be felt at home and abroad, playing a defining role in solardistic evolutions throughout the Spanish Civil War, World War II, the beginning forays across the continent toward the establishment of the European Union (EU), and ultimately, as the sociological lens helps reveal, trickling through Goffman's 1950s work on stigma and France's 1970s social inclusion as promoted by René Lenoir.

## Stigmatism

Stigma and the act of stigmatizing is a common and recognizable form of social exclusion, yet, efforts to contend with some of the prejudices and discriminations recognized as components of stigmatization reflect forms of social inclusion.

Inherent within Goffman's (1963) work: *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, is a belief in the universality of stigma and social exclusion. Stigma as a process leads certain individuals to be "systematically excluded from particular sorts of social interactions because they possess a particular characteristic or are a member of a particular group" (Kurzban & Leary, 2001, p. 187). The concept embodies the functionality of "outsiderdom"; and the utility of why humans, as "an inherently social species with a strong need for social acceptance should be so inclined to reject members of its own kind" (Kurzban & Leary, 2001, p. 187). For Goffman and those influenced by him (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Elliott, Ziegler, Altman, & Scott, 1982; Jones et al., 1984; Kleinman et al, 1995; Schneider, 1988), stigmatization occurs when the evaluation of an individual results in that person being discredited (Kurzban & Leary, 2001).

As a sociologist, Goffman's approach was both dramaturgical and oriented toward a symbolic interactionist

perspective. His main interest was in the structure of social interactions and the rules that governed them (Goffman, 1967). For Goffman, social structures provided the context for interactions, as it was social structure that steadied and sustained social hierarchies (Scambler, 2009). Yet some have suggested that Goffman may not have sufficiently attended to political economy, or to elements considered traditionally beyond the foci of symbolic interactionists such as class, power, gender, and ethnicity (Scambler, 2006, 2009).

From a functional perspective, stigma in the natural world reflects certain biological elements. Kurzban and Leary (2001) suggested that this world is structured by a series of interconnected interactions that result in variable costs and benefits (see Whiten & Byrne, 1988, 1997). As reflected earlier, there is a universality to stigma in the sense that it has been observed in most human cultures and even in the animal kingdom (Behringer, Butler, & Shields, 2006; Buchman & Reiner, 2009; Dugatkin, FitzGerald, & Lavoie, 1994; Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2011). Examples of this near universality include territoriality in fish, birds, reptiles, and mammals, and cross-species status hierarchies and social ostracism.

Some like Kurzban and Leary (2001) sought to frame the exclusion of stigma from the perspective of biological determinism. That is, as psychological rather than social systems structured by natural selection to ease some of the challenges of sociality. The proposition is that these systems or exclusionary mechanisms often influence individuals to subconsciously exclude dangerous others from social structures and interactions (Archer, 1985). Thus, from this biologically deterministic perspective, stigma is not so much owing to the kind of negative evaluation as theorized by Goffman and colleagues, but rather to a form of protective disassociation.

Another deterministic approach to stigmatism has considered the exclusion of stigma from the perspective of disease, and specifically as a mechanism of disease avoidance. Here, the basic claim derives from several observations. First, that we tend to evaluate those who are infectious in the same way as we would evaluate other kinds of stigmatized individuals (Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, & Mentzer, 1979). Second, that the most severely stigmatized groups (i.e., those who are most avoided) are individuals who are evidently ill or who demonstrate characteristics of the ill or diseased (Oaten et al., 2011 referencing Bernstein, 1976; Heider, 1958; Kurzban, & Leary, 2001; Schaller, & Duncan, 2007). Leprosy and smallpox are but two examples. For these authors, envisioning stigma as disease-avoidance does not negate other processes that contribute to discriminatory or exclusionary behavior. Rather, it suggests that beneath or antecedent to other processes is an avoidance system that seeks to limit possible contact with infectiousness and disease (Oaten et al., 2011).

Parker and Aggleton (2003) reflected that often stigma goes undefined in academic scholarship or reverts to somewhat of a stereotypical, two-dimensional description of

exclusion. In a series of articles, these authors have argued for the development of a more nuanced conceptual framework that would go beyond the works of Goffman and of biological determinists (Parker, 2012, referencing also Parker & Aggleton, 2003, and Maluwa, Aggleton, & Parker, 2002), to think beyond evolutionary stigma or differentially valued stigma and more directly about stigma as a "social process fundamentally linked to power and domination" (Parker, 2012, pp. 165-166).

Parker (2012, referencing Stuber, Meyer, & Link, 2008) reflected that theory and research has tended to operationalize stigma either as discrimination (as in the work of Goffman, 1963) or as prejudice (as in the work of Allport, 1954). Subsequently, over the second half of the 20th century, the two foci evolved along parallel but distinctly separate directions, with the work on prejudice tending much more to tackle race, ethnicity, and associated social relations.

Yet as Parker (2012), Parker and Aggleton (2003), Link and Phelan (2001), and others have argued, discrimination and prejudice, as components or forms of stigma, share key relations with the production and reproduction of power relations.

It is arguably owing to this revisioning beyond dramaturgical performance and biological determinism that stigma can be envisioned as a somewhat supplanted component of the contemporary discourse of social exclusion and inclusion.

The suggestion that stigma is not (or not only) performed and not (or not only) determined but rather is culturally produced as a social, relational, and powerful artifact is a compelling argument (Buchman & Reiner, 2009). Equally compelling is Scambler's (2009) reflection that stigma can be a very convoluted social process, one for which sociology is well-oriented to imagine as a combination of experience, anticipation, and perception, of the harms of blame and devaluation; the fears and pain of rejection and exclusion; and the hopes and desires for acceptance and inclusion.

## Social Inclusion

How cultures and societies stratify and divide; how they account for customs around inclusion, exclusion, belonging, and togetherness; and how the processes that include and exclude are talked about, described, understood, and experienced, all provide some clues as to the role of social integration and stratification within a given society. Indeed, how stratification is conceived and discussed can obscure the very nature of the processes by which such divisions come to be. This is precisely why the discipline of sociology is so useful. Unlike natural order sciences, it does more than identify and posit explanations for social divisions. Sociology, in addition to this, can reflect also on the disciplinary discourses encircling discussions of these social partitions. For example, one of the means by which stratification is conceptualized and discussed could take as a

reflective example, the pre-World War II writings of Sorokin (1998), who in considering stratification differentiated between horizontal and vertical social mobility. Sorokin suggested that horizontal mobility related to changes in occupational position or role, but not to changes within a social hierarchy, whereas vertical mobility did describe changes within the social hierarchy. Sorokin summarized his theory by reflecting that within systems of vertical and horizontal mobility, there could be individual social infiltration as well as collective social movement. Furthermore, that although it was possible to identify forms of mobile and immobile societies within different geographical and historical contexts, it was rare for a society's strata to be closed absolutely, and rare for the vertical mobility of even the most mobile society to be completely free from obstacles.

As proposed by Sorokin, these types of social movements could often vary across time and space, yet even across time, trends—particularly as they might apply to vertical mobility—were unlikely to be writ in stone. Although autocratic societies might be less mobile than democratic societies, the rule was not fixed and could have exceptions (Sorokin, 1998).

While often used to describe low or zero labor market involvement (Foster, 2000), early definitions of social exclusion in time broadened to consider barriers to effective or full participation in society (Du Toit, 2004). These types of barriers were considered to contribute to progressive processes of marginalization that could lead to deprivation and disadvantage (Chakravarty & D'Ambrosio, 2006). As the exclusion concept took on currency, it began to reflect more than a simple material nature and to begin to encompass the experience of individuals or communities who were not benefitting or were unable to benefit relative to others in society (Davies, 2005; Levitas, 1998). In time, the concept would evolve to reflect lapses in social integration and social cohesion that plagued advanced capitalist societies (Chakravarty & D'Ambrosio, 2006). It would evolve also to refer to processes that prevent individuals or groups from full or partial participation in society, as well as the crippling and reifying inability to meaningful participation in economic, social, political, and cultural activities and life (de Haan & Maxwell, 1998; Duffy, 1995, 2001; Horsell, 2006)—a definitional approach that imbues exclusion in terms of neighborhood, individual, spatial, and group dimensions (Burchardt, Le Grand, & Piachaud, 1999, referenced in Percy-Smith, 2000).

March, Oviedo-Joekes, and Romero (2006) suggested that one of the elements that unify the divergent definitional approaches to social exclusion and inclusion is that social exclusion is a process as opposed to a static end state. Further, that inclusion, in addition to being a context-based social and historical product reflective of social and national history, tends to mirror also what Silver (1995) proposed were the very limits of the borders of belonging.

Despite attempts at globally applicable definitions of social exclusion and inclusion, it has been suggested that

there will always be patterns of border shaping that are particular to specific contexts. This is in part because the weight of inclusion versus exclusion is dependent on the particulars of any given society (de Haan & Maxwell, 1998; March et al., 2006; O'Brien, Wilkes, de Haan, & Maxwell, 1997). Such society-specific particulars might take the form of traditional and historic patterns of stratification, or be based on how individual groups and/or characteristics may be valued over others. Less clear, however, is which, if any, elements of a given society or social structure may mitigate the kinds of exclusion/inclusion dynamics that may be held aloft as representative of normative practice. For example, in some social contexts, patterns of inclusion and exclusion may reflect different stages of social and economic development. Alternately, these patterns may vary by type and/or political orientation of governments, or by the religious, ethnic, or cultural makeup of a given society.

Ultimately, however, the use of inclusion and exclusion concepts has evolved to the point where within a number of contexts, they are used as a descriptor for those who represent a particular kind of threat to social harmony (Silver & Miller, 2003). In sum, the terms *social inclusion* and *social exclusion* have been used throughout the social science and humanities literature in a number of different ways—to describe acts of social stratification across human and animal societies, as a principle to reflect the ordering that occurs within societies to determine social position, and as a narrative to explain and at times justify why one or more groups merit access to the core or the periphery, to the benefit or expense of others.

Initial discourses of social inclusion are widely attributed to having first appeared in France in the 1970s when the economically disadvantaged began to be described as *the excluded* (Silver, 1995). The preliminary uses of this new parlance appeared as a means to refer to a variety of disabled and destitute groups. The government of France was among the earliest adapters of exclusion terminology, and it is there that most often the concept is suggested to have found its contemporary meaning (Silver & Miller, 2003).

As a fully documented policy response, the concept of social inclusion to counteract social exclusion emerged toward the end of the 1980s, when the European Community (EC) first used the term social exclusion (Wilson, 2006). The appearance of the term social inclusion in the rhetoric of the EC was in itself a key point of departure, in that exclusion was suddenly held to be a reflection that “poverty was no longer the right word to use to describe the plight of those marginalized from mainstream society” (Williams & White, 2003, p. 91).

Ascertaining the contemporary use of the terms social inclusion and social exclusion involves a study of diffusion of, most importantly, the applications of René Lenoir, France's Secretary of State for Social Welfare in the Chirac government of the 1970s (Davies, 2005, citing Lenoir, 1974; Pierce, 1999; Silver, 1995).



## L'Inclusion Sociale

In 1965, a French social commentator, Jean Klanfer, published *L'Exclusion sociale: Étude de la marginalité dans les sociétés occidentales* [Social exclusion: The study of marginality in Western societies] (Béland, 2007). Described as an anthropology of poverty (Cl, 1968), Klanfer's work argued that society rewarded personal responsibility with inclusion and personal irresponsibility with exclusion. If the work of Bourgeois was a primary influence on the solidarism movement almost 100 years earlier, the writings of Klanfer would fuel the imagination of René Lenoir (1974), most notably in his book *Les exclus*.

In his political tome, Lenoir contended social exclusion was a result of France's postwar transition from a largely agricultural society to an urban one (Davies, 2005). While the belief was that these events could lead to poverty, Lenoir argued that they could lead to a brand of social polarization also, which challenged the *Liberté, Égalité, and Fraternité* ideals of the French Republican project.

Many have suggested that if there were a birth of the modern rhetoric of social inclusion, it would be here, in French thought that sought a means to reintegrate the large numbers of ex-industrial workers and a growing number of young people excluded from opportunities to join the labor force in the new economies of the 1970s and beyond.

According to Silver (1995) and Silver and Miller (2003), one of the reasons the inclusion and exclusion concepts resonated so strongly for the French was that in their society, the Anglo-Saxon idea of poverty was seen to essentially insult the equality of citizenry contained within the *Liberté* manifesto—an equality that, as reflected in France's late-20th-century welfare state, operationalized charity as basic social assistance in response to poverty, and as essentially a right of citizenry. Furthermore, what would come to be seen as an inclusive welfare state was held to be the most effective and civilized way to eliminate absolute material deprivation and the risks to well-being such deprivation could cause.

However, as the 1970s progressed, and as unemployment became endemic, the passage of time brought even greater numbers of those considered excluded, and with them ever-increasing reiterations of the new exclusion discourse (Silver, 1995). The result in France was a movement to protect *les exclus*. The movement was so strong that by 1998, the French posited legal codification to prevent and combat social *exclusions* (note the plural) as a means to foster universal access to fundamental human rights.

Within French Republican thought in particular, social exclusion was seen to reflect ruptures in solidarity and the social bond (*lien social*), something essentially tantamount to heresy within the French social contract. Heresy because the French social contract of the time was seen to hold (and some may argue continues to hold) reciprocity, both between the social obligations French citizens have for the French

state and the obligations that society has in return, to provide reasonable livelihoods for its members. Here, though, the accepted exceptions, as in many welfare regimes, were restricted to those who could not work due to older age, disability, or ill health, and did not extend to those whose deliberate actions and/or deliberate tendencies toward illicit pleasure, removed them from broader labor force opportunities or expectations.

In some respects, the mutuality and reciprocity evident in elements of French Republican thought reflected a social contract that favored the already-included in its definition of society. For the positioning of reciprocity within the social contract, such a context has implications for the creation of biases against the failings of the excluded. In particular, against those who vary from society's includable norms. In the place of any such consideration leading to action, appeared a sort of stoic romanticism. Thus, for the French, the excluded came to represent a martyred or punished sector of a society against whom the included had failed to live up to their side of the social contract.

As the concept of exclusion grew to gain broader credence beyond France, the EC and the subsequent EU, it increasingly incorporated target groups who were not simply poor or without sufficient resources. It incorporated those segregated also from the social core through attributes such as ethnicity or race, age, gender, and disability, and whose characteristics could contribute to justify the need for deliberate social inclusion programs (Omidvar & Richmond, 2003). That these attributes tended to be noncriminalized and relatively politically correct, as opposed to criminalized and/or contested, is a feature that should not be lost.

Even though the concepts of citizenship and social integration in the French tradition may present some challenges for Anglo-Saxon manners of thinking, this did not, according to Gore, Figueiredo, and Rodgers (1995), prevent the wider adoption of exclusion frameworks across Western Europe. These authors suggested that in appropriating the concept as integral to modern and meaningful social development, the EC was linking the concept of social exclusion more closely with evolving thoughts around the implications of unrealized social rights.

While EC and EU directives sought to carve out greater social inclusion, other countries, particularly Commonwealth countries—notably the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa—were beginning to roll out their own interpretations of this rhetoric.

In its initial contemporary use, the exclusion terminology adopted in France and subsequently diffused elsewhere, was meant to refer to those individuals who were considered to be on the margins of French society of the 1970s. That is, individuals considered society's social problems, who tended to share a particular social reality, a less than successful material existence compounded with real barriers in accessing benefits provided by the French welfare state (Daly, 2006).

So great were the social problems, that Lenoir, would suggest that a full 10% of the French population were *exclu*, or outcast. According to Davies (2005), “the novel characteristic of les exclus was not that they were poor (although most were), but that they were disconnected from mainstream society in ways that went beyond poverty” (p. 3). This disconnect, it was argued, was facilitated by their relative social positioning and by factors related to poor health and social, economic, and geographical isolation from active engagement in politics. From this perspective, to be socially excluded was paramount to being of the underclass; to be among those people who did not fit into the norms of industrial societies, who were not protected by social insurance and who were essentially considered social misfits. (Silver, 1995; Stegemen & Costongs, 2003). Beliefs about social conformity aside, Silver’s (1995) near definitive list of the socially excluded reads in some regards as a full 50% of the world’s population. In doing, so it lends credence to Labonte’s (2004) assertion that the socially excluded are liable to comprise everyone who is not middle-aged, middle class, and male.

It follows that just naming who is at risk of social exclusion, based on identity, vulnerability, membership, or biology will not suffice without some reflection as to who is naming the excluded, where those who label or define the excluded stand ontologically relative to their own or others’ exclusion, and what if any the influences of personal, political, stereotypical, or xenophobic biases may be. It is an element of the conceptualization of social inclusion and exclusion particularly well-suited to sociology’s contribution.

## A Sociological Lens

In many ways, despite the contribution of the psychological and life sciences, and even the contributions of social policy, the concepts of social inclusion and exclusion are profoundly sociological. This is because at the very root of both classic and contemporary sociological thinking are concerns with social stratification, social inequality, and social class—key concepts which the social inclusion literature repeatedly touches upon.

Witcher (2003, referencing Burchardt et al., 1999) reflected that social inclusion and exclusion were concepts that were often poorly defined or theorized. Daly (2006) has suggested that although there is nothing inherent in the inclusion and exclusion concepts that defy or negate theorization, in general, sociology’s attempts at their theorization could be inconsistent or facile.

Horsell (2006) referenced Crowther (2002) in suggesting that the contemporary interest in social exclusion and inclusion were reflective of similar attempts to conceptualize the dual influences of poverty and social deprivation. As such, these concepts signaled that somehow the cumulative impacts of poverty and social deprivation (or the cumulative

effects of social exclusion in the absence of social inclusion) could represent a threat to social order.

Horsell’s (2006) suggestion was that, in purely operational terms, the exclusion/inclusion paradigm acted to reinforce neoliberal ideas about social actors and agency as well as to harness principles of mutual obligation and active participation; that the discourse, broadly speaking, had both symbolic and physical dimensions. In its consideration of the ways in which contemporary social policy analysis treats social position as stratification, deprivation, and inequality, attempts to tease out the causes and consequences of social exclusion relative to inclusion could risk becoming muddled by mixing together attempts to better the lives and living conditions of people living below poverty lines, with the illusion that more were being done than might be. Horsell’s suggestion of illusion hinged on the reflection that those who may ultimately benefit from the application of such inclusion-speak when operationalized as policy could tend to be those who already enjoyed a number of inclusion’s benefits.

Levitas (1996, 1998) has reflected that the overall flavor of the social inclusion rhetoric is strongly Durkheimian. She has stressed that Durkheim and the exclusion/inclusion discursive continuum demonstrate a tendency to repress conflict as well as a tendency toward an approach to inclusion that subversively critiques capitalism in a way that would be lacking from a purely Durkheimian analysis.

Owing in part to this, Levitas (1998) labeled the rhetoric of social inclusion “a new Durkheimian hegemony” (p. 178), given that most contemporary views of inclusion correspond to scholarly interpretations of Durkheim’s sociology, including Durkheim’s emphasis on an alternative attempt to navigate an understanding of society between unacceptable free market capitalism and an unacceptable state socialism.

Such hegemony, according to Bowring (2000), leads us to think of elements of exclusion like deprivation and inequality as phenomena that occur at the very margins of society, and by extension, to ignore social structures that influence the included as well as the excluded. Bowring’s point was that the exclusion/inclusion rhetoric risks being somewhat of a red herring, because exclusion at the societal level could be indicative of systemic deprivation and not just a deprivation experienced or reported by those defined as socially excluded.

For Wilson (2006), it was important to recall that social integration per se was not a focus of Durkheim. For Durkheim, inequality and social stratification were natural results of society, components of a solidary system he divided into mechanical and organic: the former being a fountain of social cohesion and the latter a well of social inclusion. Together, they were envisioned as the kinds of dependencies that social actors within advanced societies share with one another. Wilson’s point was that although Durkheim associated increases in solidarity with social progress, he would not

necessarily associate the same solidarity with social inclusion, since in theory, advanced societies characterized by mutual dependence would exhibit the kinds of mutual and shared bonds that would defy the need for social inclusion in the first place.

The emphasis of these authors, and arguably of a Durkheimian perspective as applied to social inclusion also, is that new or reborn ways are not necessarily different ways. That despite its focus on the socially disenfranchised and their position relative to a status quo, there remains a hollow echo to the rhetoric around social inclusion. A void that is both redolent of discussion of the hollow state (Barnett, 1999; Davies, 2000; Della Sala, 1997; Holliday, 2000; London Edinburgh Weekend Return Group, 1980; Rhodes, 1994; Roberts & Devine, 2003; Skelcher, 2000), as well as a void that references one of Levitas's (2000) and Labonte's (2004) salient points: that it is one thing to promote an inclusionary utopia. However, in the event that such a utopian vision comes to pass, how likely is it that the result will be the kind of social world foreseen? In other words, even if a utopian ideal were within the reach of real-world, applied social policy, what are the odds, as Kenyon (2003) suggested, that attaining an inclusive society would result in the banishment of all inequality.

It was Young's (1999) argument, and Wilson's (2006) reiteration that although much of the West's social inclusion rhetoric may address many things, the root cause of social exclusion is not one of them. In this, the rhetoric fails because to address these causes would require acknowledgment that even within real-world inclusion societies, people frequently continue to experience poverty in a context that envelops them with messages of the meritocracy that surrounds them—a meritocracy that suggests that anyone with desire and ambition can succeed through acceptable behavior and hard work. For these authors, this represents a relative process of deprivation—one that includes an encounter with a form of culture shock where the culture in which the excluded experience their day-to-day existence actively reinforces the notion that they are receiving a much lower standard of living than others.

Here then, one could contend, is reflected the relative deprivation that leads to social exclusion “through a subjective experience of inequality and unfairness as materially deprived people seek to obtain the unobtainable” (Young, 1999, p. 401, cited in Wilson, 2006, p. 342). In a twist on the variations in social inclusion discourses presented earlier, this view holds that social exclusion morphs into “a cultural phenomenon arising from dialectic relationships between identity and social acceptance and the contradiction of a supposed meritocracy in which the poor lack the material means to meet the aspirations they are encouraged to embrace” (Wilson, 2006, p. 343). In other words, exclusion becomes social status contested between a hierarchical valuation of different kinds of social identities (socially hazardous vs. socially accepted) within a social world attempting to remedy

the inherent challenges embedded in an inequitable division of resources within an acquisitive, material world.

### **Residuous Exclusion**

In discussing the problematization of exclusion, the sociologist Nikolas Rose wrote that the mid-19th century wore the mantle of “a succession of figures that seem to condense in their person, their name, their image all that is disorder, danger, threat to civility, the vagrant, the pauper, the degenerate” (Rose, 1999, p. 254). As the 19th century gave way to the 20th, there appeared efforts to create universally shared forms of social citizenship. Yet even within this drive toward universality, there were those who were cast as uncludable, just as there are today. Within the new liberal thinking, universal citizenship did not emulate fully the fact that the notion of *universal* was still a somewhat relative concept and that a boundary between the includable and the excludable would not only continue to exist but would be reinforced also.

From this arose “notions such as ‘the residuum,’ ‘the unemployable’ and ‘the social problem group’” (Rose, 1999, p. 254), that is, states of embodied being, through social roles, social strata, and entire classes that would, in time, become integral to these new forms of liberal thinking. From such vantage, the rhetoric of exclusion/inclusion, and the array of notions and underlying beliefs about the utility of integration, would become parts of the organizing, and traceable mainstays of reform. From older, perhaps simpler conceptualizations of inequality were born new ways of understanding what Rose, citing Levitas (1996), described as a “two-thirds, one-third social order” where a seemingly continually widening gap between the included two thirds and the excluded one third would continue to unfurl (Rose, 1999, p. 258).

Rose (1999) differentiated the new excluded from previous form of unequals. Whereas minorities that arose from the welfare state had claims to unity and solidarity, the new excluded have few of these, and it is perhaps from this lack of unification that the new expertise underlying inclusion's emphasis is born. Challenged from forging identity and right of place based on shared exclusion, this new underclass is “like Marx's peasants, individualized like potatoes in a sack, incapable of forming themselves into a single class on the basis of a consciousness of their shared expropriation” (Rose, 1999, pp. 254-255).

In moving from a welfare to a postwelfare, advanced liberal order, social control is reconfigured into control that moves beyond repressing or containing individual pathology. It becomes both about knowledge and access to the production of knowledge. This is because—to paraphrase Marx—access to the production of knowledge provides for the definition of what is and is not includable (Rose, 1999, referencing Ericson & Haggerty, 1997). Thus, the new labor force of control is no longer one that is either purely reactive or purely punitive. Rather, it takes on a form of administrative function whereby it oversees the *marginalia* comprising the

bounds (and bonds) of inclusion and exclusion, of risk and safety and permissibility (Rose, 1999). It was Rose's vision that for the excluded underclass "a politics of conduct is today more salient than a politics of class" (Rose, 2000, p. 335, citing Mead, 1991, p. 4, and Procacci, 1999, p. 30).

Although Rose's discourse is compelling, one should consider also whether all of the excluded are created equal. Do they all share the same position within the underclass? For example, across the Western world, special interest groups have sprung up since the softening of the welfare state, groups which include not only those that are socially excluded—drug users, sexual deviants, the poorly socialized—but also the physically excluded such as those who are bodily or mentally challenged.

In order for the work of Rose and those who have influenced his arguments regarding the inclusion/exclusion divide to be applicable (these influences include the works of Foucault, 1979a, 1976/1979b, 1985, 1991; Mead, 1991; O'Malley, 1992, 1999, 2004; Valverde, 1998), the work will need, in part, to account for diversity and social stratification within the underclass—that is, to help shed light on how and why certain social hierarchies of the status quo become replicated within the margins, leading to some of the marginal experiencing, in a sense, double marginality. At the same time, even those who achieve core or nonperipheral social status risk facing constraining hierarchies and limits to social mobility that function to either deny or defy full integration.

Extrapolating from the work of Rose, the inclusion society would not be a utopian dream, but rather a development that to varying extents would further institutionalize themes of inclusion, permissible rights, and the breadth of acceptable conduct.

## Conclusion

This article has reflected on social inclusion from the vantage of sociology. It has reflected on exclusion and inclusion societies, across time and place and has demonstrated the importance of considering the physical world's exclusion and inclusion societies not only from a natural order perspective but from a social order perspective also.

Many of the considerations explored here have embodied measurable, objective approaches to the sociological conception and consideration of exclusion and inclusion. Du Toit (2004) has suggested current definitions, and their applications within individual country contexts allow social scientists and policy makers to present social exclusion as a single outcome of potentially multiple determinants of deprivation. Yet, this article has considered arguments that position inclusion and exclusion as much more than the fodder of contemporary policy. Indeed, it has demonstrated how human integration and expulsion are both highly historical and deeply sociological; that forms of social deprivation as well as social entitlement span many hundreds of years, if not the full course of human history itself.

For all that is known about social stratification, the tendency, particularly from the perspective of sociology, has been to consider inclusion and exclusion from an observational standpoint. This has occurred through policy analysis, historical analysis, and even consideration of some of the sociobiological correlates of inclusion and exclusion. What is less well known and less well developed are approaches for understanding the subjective experiences of social inclusion and social exclusion. For example, how exclusion and inclusion are experienced socially? How experiences of inclusion and exclusion are produced and reproduced socially? How different social labels impact the experience of inclusion and exclusion, and what the role of stigma may be?

For the reader, understanding the journey from social exclusion to social inclusion sociologically is an undertaking across potentially difficult terrain. Among other things, it requires a critical eye capable of accounting for individual and group participation and lack thereof (Daly, 2006).

And what of poverty? For some writers who have sought to unpack social inclusion and exclusion, these concepts are but alternate ways of recasting the notion of poverty. Others suggest economic poverty need be seen either as only one of an interrelated group of dimensions which work in tandem together to contribute to an individual's inability to successfully access the overall labor market. Such an approach would envision poverty as one factor in a multifaceted approach to understanding the experiences of society's lower strata (Sirovátka & Mare, 2006; Woodward & Kohli, 2001).

As prescribed approaches to policy and practice, efforts to contend with contemporary social exclusion often come to be framed by a rhetoric of reformation, imbued with different traditions in terms of how poverty is framed around either relational or distributional issues (Murie & Musterd, 2004, referencing van Kempen, 2002). It is a vantage that capitalizes on Marshall's (1963) model of postwar social rights, where, rather than focus on forms of postwar poverty, the focus on social exclusion is on redistribution, access, and participation (Murie & Musterd, 2004). Then and now, sociologically speaking, when poverty rather than social structure is held up as the cause and consequence of exclusion, such deprivation is presented as a failure of capabilities as opposed to a manner of being within a social structure or society.

Chakravarty and D'Ambrosio (2006) suggested that an emphasis on the shortfalls of economic thresholds as an explanation for exclusion is not the same as emphasizing structured inabilities to participate. This is because a focus on structural inabilities allows for a more complex, multidimensional understanding of the interplay, overlap, and social distance between money, work, and belonging. As a reconceptualization of social disadvantage, such a perspective provides an important framework for thinking out alternatives to the welfare state. It links poverty, productivity by means of employment and social integration that in turn emphasizes integration and insertion into a labor market, active and personalized participation, and a multicultural national citizenry (Gore et al.,

1995). It broadens also the notion of inclusion beyond biological or economic fitness alone.

In this regard, the suggestion that social inclusion exists not necessarily as a mechanism of sociobiological well-being only but more viscerally as a reflection of outcome of economic empowerment holds much in common with Richard Parker and Peter Aggleton's post-Goffman work on stigma. Although good arguments exist—and many have been presented here—about why integration and ostracism can be interpreted through both natural order and economic lenses, inclusion and exclusion do not represent free-floating views. Like stigma, inclusion and exclusion also exist at “the historically determined nexus between cultural formulations and systems of power and domination” (Parker, 2012, p. 166).

As systems of social power, these formations constitute architectures of inclusion; that is, means and ways that inclusion and exclusion are both enacted and talked about. Such architectures exist as literal and figurative coalitions of action, reaction, governance, control, and power which together comprise how a policy aim like social inclusion is wound, entwined, draped, and displayed for public rendering and consumption.

In what can be described as a political economy of inclusion, the hierarchies embedded in these architectures of inclusion not only ascribe value to who is to be considered includable but also reflect value structures that can lead to forms of ideologically based interpretations about whether inclusion is as good or better than exclusion (Rodgers, 1995) based on variation in social power, the ability to hold rights, and the representation or embodiment of hazard.

As with more traditional, physical forms of architecture, inclusion's architectures function to both limit and facilitate the movement and interaction of people through hierarchies of integration. Enclosed within these architectures are worlds of inclusion and exclusion that push and pull amid new forms of allowance, constraint, and conflict (Gumplowicz, 1963). Parallel yet interconnected worlds in which, are reflected, the socially excluded, reduced, and idealized as somewhat two-dimensional occupiers of social space (Spina, 2005).

Gillies (2005) reflected that societies have a tendency to normalize the sins of the included while penalizing the sins of the excluded. This suggests that even if discourses about social inclusion are effectively rendered as policy and translated into practice, the act of reevaluating the biases society's hold for marginal underclasses of excluded social actors may well remain. This is to say that were society able to find room within its social architectures for its marginal women and men (Park, 1928), the fact of their powerlessness coupled with their comportment could still relegate them to the periphery, occupying colonized spaces stratified on one side by accusations of nonnormative or deviant behavior and on another by power relations.

For the contemporary open thinker trying to grapple with social inclusion and exclusion as a set of potentially complex concepts between those who study and profess a natural, an

economic, or a social order, ideas about power would seem to be of particular importance—be it the power of the elite or the empowerment of those with special needs. Power seems to fuel the wheels of integration. Although power can be shown to have a decisive role in both the natural and the economic orders, it is in the arena of the social where it is perhaps best understood. One only need look at the history of philosophy and social theory for evidence of how power and proximity to it can enable or bar integration. Power allows proximity to the means of inclusion—essentially, to inclusion's apparatus.

Of course, simply thinking openly about social worlds as variations of inclusionary or exclusionary societies does not lead to societies that are more inclusive. It does, however, allow for a more open lens with which to consider the past as well with which to view the present.

### Author's Note

Portions of this article were written during visits to the University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria; the University of Pretoria and the University of the Western Cape, South Africa; and the University of Namibia.

### Acknowledgments

This work acknowledges the important contributions of Professors Lynn Jamieson, Angus Bancroft, Alex Robertson, Esther Breitenbach, and Anthony Coxon at the University of Edinburgh; Professors Ted Myers and Liviana Calzavara at the University of Toronto; and Professor Avril Taylor at the University of the West of Scotland. Thanks to Professor Donald Sacco for deftly ushering this manuscript through the review process at SAGE Open, and to the anonymous reviewers for their perceptive and very useful comments.

### Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

### Funding

The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article: The author received financial support from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) Funding Reference Number 68356.

### References

- Ainsworth, M. D. S. (1989). Attachments beyond infancy. *American Psychologist, 44*, 709-716.
- Allport, G. W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Archer, C. (1985). Social deviance. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (Vol. 2, 3rd ed., pp. 743-804). New York, NY: Random House.
- Baer, L. D. (2005). Visual imprints on the prison landscape: A study on the decorations in prison cells. *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, 96*, 209-217.

- Bailey, F. G. (1957). *Caste and the economic frontier*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- Barash, D. P. (1977). *Sociobiology and behavior*. New York, NY: Elsevier.
- Barker, E. (1952). *Aristotle: Politics*. London, England: Oxford University Press.
- Barnett, J. R. (1999). Hollowing out the state? Some observations on the restructuring of hospital services in New Zealand. *Area*, 31, 259-270.
- Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation. *Psychological Bulletin*, 117, 497-529.
- Baumeister, R. F., & Tice, D. M. (1990). Anxiety and social exclusion. *Journal of Social & Clinical Psychology*, 9, 165-195.
- Behringer, D. C., Butler, M. J., & Shields, J. D. (2006). Avoidance of disease by social lobsters. *Nature*, 441, 421.
- Béland, D. (2007). The social exclusion discourse: Ideas and policy change. *Policy & Politics*, 35, 123-139.
- Bernstein, M. J., Sacco, D. F., Young, S. G., Hugenberg, K., & Cook, E. (2010). Being "in" with the in-crowd: The effects of social exclusion and inclusion are enhanced by the perceived essentialism of ingroups and outgroups. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 36, 999-1009.
- Bernstein, N. R. (1976). *Emotional care of the facially burned and disfigured*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
- Berreman, G. D. (1967). Caste as social process. *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, 23, 351-370.
- Bourgeois, L. (1998). *Solidarité* [Solidarity]. Arras, France: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
- Bowlby, J. (1969). *Attachment and loss: Vol. 1: Attachment*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Bowring, F. (2000). Social exclusion: Limitations of the debate. *Critical Social Policy*, 20, 307-330.
- Buchman, D., & Reiner, P. B. (2009). Stigma and addiction: Being and becoming. *American Journal of Bioethics*, 9(9), 18-19.
- Burchardt, T., Le Grand, J., & Piachaud, D. (1999). Social exclusion in Britain 1991-1995. *Social Policy & Administration*, 33(3), 227-244.
- Carcopino, M. J. (1909). *Histoire de l'ostracisme athénien. Mélanges d'Histoire ancienne*. Paris, France: Alcan.
- Chakravarty, S. R., & D'Ambrosio, C. (2006). The measurement of social exclusion. *Review of Income and Wealth*, 52, 377-398.
- Cl, C. (1968). Review of L'exclusion sociale. Étude de la marginalité dans les sociétés occidentales by Jules Klanfer. *Population* (French ed.). 6, 1137-1138.
- Cresswell, T. (2006). *On the move: Mobility in the modern Western world*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Crocker, J., Major, B., & Steele, C. (1998). Social stigma. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (Vol. 2, 4th ed., pp. 504-553). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.
- Crowther, C. (2002). The politics and economics of disciplining an inclusive and exclusive society. *Social Policy Review*, 14, 199-225.
- Daly, M. (2006). *Social exclusion as concept and policy template in the European Union*. Belfast, UK: Queen's University.
- Davies, J. S. (2000). The hollowing-out of local democracy and the "fatal conceit" of governing without government. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 2, 414-428.
- Davies, J. S. (2005). The social exclusion debate: Strategies, controversies and dilemmas. *Policy Studies*, 26, 3-27.
- Davis, K., & Moore, W. E. (1945). Some principles of stratification. *American Sociological Review*, 10, 242-249.
- De Certeau, M. (1984). *The practice of everyday life*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- de Haan, A., & Maxwell S. (1998). Poverty and social exclusion in north and south. *IDS Bulletin*, 29(1), 1-9.
- Deliege, R. (1992). Replication and consensus: Untouchability, caste and ideology in India. *Man*, 27(1), 155-173.
- Della Sala, V. (1997). Hollowing out and hardening the state: European integration and the Italian economy. *West European Politics*, 20(1), 14-33.
- Douglas, M. (1966). *Purity and danger: An analysis of concept of pollution and taboo*. London, England: Routledge.
- Dubber, M. (2005). *The police power: Patriarchy and the foundations of American government*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Duffy, K. (1995). *Social exclusion and human dignity in Europe: Background report for the proposed initiative by the Council of Europe*. Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe.
- Duffy, K. (2001). Risk and opportunity: Lessons from the human dignity and social exclusion initiative for trends in social policy. *Canadian Journal of Law & Society/Revue Canadienne Droit et Societe*, 6(2), 17-41.
- Dugatkin, L. A., FitzGerald, G. J., & Lavoie, J. (1994). Juvenile three-spined sticklebacks avoid parasitized conspecifics. *Environmental Biology of Fishes*, 39, 215-218.
- Duncan, J. (1978). Men without property: The classification and use of urban space by tramps. *Antipode*, 10, 24-33.
- Du Toit, A. (2004). "Social exclusion" discourse and chronic poverty: A South African case study. *Development and Change*, 35, 987-1010.
- Eisenberger, N. I., & Lieberman, M. D. (2004). Why rejection hurts: The neurocognitive overlap between physical and social pain. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 8, 294-300.
- Eisenberger, N. I., & Lieberman, M. D. (2005). Why it hurts to be left out: The neurocognitive overlap between physical and social pain. In K. D. Williams, J. P. Forgas, & W. van Hippel (Eds.), *The social outcast: Ostracism, social exclusion, rejection, and bullying* (pp. 109-127). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Elliott, G. C., Ziegler, H. L., Altman, B. M., & Scott, D. R. (1982). Understanding stigma: Dimensions of deviance and coping. *Deviant Behavior*, 3, 275-300.
- Ericson, R., & Haggerty, K. (1997). *Policing the risk society*. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.
- Flusty, S. (2004). *De-Coca-colonization: Making the globe from the inside out*. London, England: Routledge.

- Foschi, R., & Cicciola, E. (2006). Politics and naturalism in the 20th century psychology of Alfred Binet. *History of Psychology, 9*, 267-289.
- Foster, J. (2000). Social exclusion, crime and drugs. *Drugs: Education, Prevention and Policy, 7*, 317-330.
- Foucault, M. (1979a). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison*. New York, NY: Vintage.
- Foucault, M. (1979b). *The history of sexuality: An introduction* (Vol. 1, R. Hurley, Trans.). London, England: Allen Lane. (Original work published 1976)
- Foucault, M. (1985). *The use of pleasure*. London, England: Penguin Viking.
- Foucault, M. (1991). Governmentality. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.), *The Foucault effect* (pp. 87-104). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Fredericks, B. (2010). What health services within rural communities tell us about Aboriginal people and Aboriginal health. *Rural Society, 20*, 10-20.
- Gillies, V. (2005). Meeting parents needs? Discourses of "support" and "inclusion" in family policy. *Critical Social Policy, 25*, 70-90.
- Goffman, E. (1963). *Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Goffman, E. (1967). *Interaction ritual: Essays on face-to-face behaviour*. New York, NY: Doubleday.
- Goligher, W. A. (1910). Review of *Mélanges d'Histoire ancienne*. *English Historical Review, 25*, 556-559.
- Gore, C., Figueiredo, J. B., & Rodgers, G. (1995). Introduction: Markets, citizenship and social exclusion. In G. Rodgers, C. Gore and J. B. Figueiredo (Eds.), *Social exclusion: Rhetoric, reality, responses* (pp. 1-42). Geneva, Switzerland: International Institute for Labour Studies, United Nations Development Programme.
- Grant, J. L., & Rosen, G. (2009). Armed compounds and broken arms: The cultural production of gated communities. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 99*, 575-589.
- Gruter, M., & Masters, R. D. (1986). Ostracism as a social and biological phenomenon: An introduction. *Ethology and Sociobiology, 7*, 149-158.
- Gumplowicz, L. (1963). *Outlines of sociology* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Paine-Whitman.
- Hayward, J. E. S. (1961). The official social philosophy of the French third republic: Léon Bourgeois and solidarism. *International Review of Social History, 6*(Pt. 1), 19-48.
- Hayward, J. E. S. (1963). Educational pressure groups and the indoctrination of the radical ideology of solidarism, 1895-1914. *International Review of Social History, 8*, 1-17.
- Heider, F. (1958). *The psychology of interpersonal relations*. New York, NY: John Wiley.
- Herbert, S. (2008). Contemporary geographies of exclusion I: Traversing skid road. *Progress in Human Geography, 32*, 659-666.
- Hogan, R. (1982). A socioanalytic theory of personality. In M. Page (Ed.), *Nebraska symposium on motivation* (pp. 55-89). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Hogan, R., Jones, W. H., & Cheek, J. M. (1985). Socioanalytic theory: An alternative to armadillo psychology. In B. R. Schlenker (Ed.), *The self and social life* (pp. 175-198). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Holliday, I. (2000). Is the British state hollowing out? *Political Quarterly, 71*, 167-177.
- Hook, D., & Vrdoljak, M. (2002). Gated communities, heterotopia and a "rights" of privilege: A "heterotopology" of the South African security-park. *Geoforum, 33*, 195-219.
- Horsell, C. (2006). Homelessness and social exclusion: A Foucauldian perspective for social workers. *Australian Social Work, 59*, 213-225.
- Jones, E. E., Farina, A., Hastorf, A. H., Markus, H., Miller, D. T., & Scott, R. A. (1984). *Social stigma: The psychology of marked relationships*. New York, NY: Freeman.
- Kabachnik, P. (2010). Place invaders: Constructing the nomadic threat in England. *Geographical Review, 100*, 90-108.
- Kagan, D. (1961). The origin and purposes of ostracism. *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 30*, 393-401.
- Kenyon, S. (2003). Understanding social exclusion and social inclusion. *Municipal Engineer, 156*, 97-104.
- Kitchin, R. (1998). "Out of place," "knowing one's place": Space, power and the exclusion of disabled people. *Disability & Society, 13*, 343-356.
- Klanfer, J. (1965). *L'Exclusion sociale: Étude de la marginalité dans les sociétés occidentales* [Social exclusion: The study of marginality in western societies]. Paris, France: Bureau de Recherches sociales.
- Kleinman, A., Wang, W. Z., Li, S. C., Cheng, X. M., Dai, X. Y., Li, K. T., & Kleinman, J. (1995). The social course of epilepsy: Chronic illness as social experience in interior China. *Social Science & Medicine, 40*, 1319-1330.
- Kort, F. (1986). The politics of ostracism. *Ethology and Sociobiology, 7*, 367-377.
- Koskenniemi, M. (2009). International law as sociology: French "solidarism" 1871-1950. In M. Koskenniemi (Ed.), *The gentle civilizer of nations: The rise and fall of international law 1870-1960* (pp. 266-352). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Kurzban, R., & Leary, M. (2001). Evolutionary origins of stigma: The functions of social exclusion. *Psychological Bulletin, 127*, 187-208.
- Labonte, R. (2004). Social inclusion/exclusion: Dancing the dialectic. *Health Promotion International, 19*, 115-121.
- Leach, E. R. (1960). Introduction. In E. R. Leach (Ed.), *Aspects of caste in South India, Ceylon, and Northwest Pakistan* (pp. 1-10). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Leary, M. R., Tambor, E. S., Terdal, S. K., & Downs, D. L. (1995). Self-esteem as an interpersonal monitor: The sociometer hypothesis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68*, 518-530.
- Lenoir, R. (1974). *Les exclus: Un Français sur dix* [The excluded: One Frenchman out of ten]. Paris, France: Le Seuil.

- Lenski, G. (1966). *Power and privilege: A theory of social stratification*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Lévi-Strauss, C. (1963). *Totemism*. Boston, MA: Beacon.
- Levitas, R. (1996). The concept of social exclusion and the new Durkheimian hegemony. *Critical Social Policy*, 16(1), 5-20.
- Levitas, R. (1998). *The inclusive society? Social exclusion and new labour*. London, England: Macmillan.
- Levitas, R. (2000). Discourses of risk and utopia. In B. Adam, U. Beck, & J. van Loon (Eds.), *The risk society and beyond: Critical issues for social theory* (pp. 198-209). London, England: SAGE.
- Link, B., & Phelan, J. (2001). Conceptualizing stigma. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 27, 363-385.
- London Edinburgh Weekend Return Group. (1980). *In and against the state*. London, England: Pluto.
- MacDonald, G., & Leary, M. R. (2005). Why does social exclusion hurt? The relationship between social and physical pain. *Psychological Bulletin*, 131, 202-223.
- Maluwa, M., Aggleton, P., & Parker, R. (2002). HIV and AIDS-related stigma, discrimination, and human rights. *Health and Human Rights*, 6, 1-18.
- March, J. C., Oviedo-Joekes, E., & Romero, M. (2006). Drugs and social exclusion in ten European cities. *European Addiction Research*, 12, 33-41.
- Marshall, T. H. (1963). *Citizenship and social class in sociology at the crossroads*. London, England: Heinemann.
- Masters, R. D. (1986). Ostracism, voice, and exit: The biology of social participation. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 7, 379-395.
- Mead, L. (1991). The new politics of the new poverty. *Public Interest*, 103, 3-20.
- Mencher, J. P. (1974). The caste system upside down, or the not-so-mysterious East. *Current Anthropology*, 15, 469-493.
- Mills, C. W. (1963). *The sociology of stratification*. In I. Horowitz (Ed.), *Power, politics and people: The collected essays of C. Wright Mills* (pp. 305-323). New York, NY: Ballantine.
- Murie, A., & Musterd, S. (2004). Social exclusion and opportunity structures in European cities and neighbourhoods. *Urban Studies*, 41, 1441-1459.
- Nayar, K. R. (2007). Social exclusion, caste & health: A review based on the social determinants framework. *Indian Journal of Medical Research*, 126, 355-363.
- Oaten, M., Stevenson, R. J., & Case, T. I. (2011). Disease avoidance as a functional basis for stigmatization. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society*, 366, 3433-3452.
- O'Brien, D., Wilkes, J., de Haan, A., & Maxwell, S. (1997). *Poverty and social exclusion in North and South* (IDS Working Paper No. 55). Institute of Development Studies and Poverty Research Unit, University of Sussex. Retrieved from <http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/Wp55.pdf>
- O'Malley, P. (1992). Risk, power and crime prevention. *Economy and Society*, 21, 252-275.
- O'Malley, P. (1999). Consuming risks: Harm minimization and the government of "drug-users." In R. Smandych (Ed.), *Governable places: Readings on governmentality and crime control* (pp. 191-214). Brookville, VT: Ashgate.
- O'Malley, P. (2004). The uncertain promise of risk. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 37, 323-343.
- Omidvar, R., & Richmond, T. (2003). *Immigrant settlement and social inclusion in Canada*. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: The Laidlaw Foundation. Retrieved from [http://www.laidlawfdn.org/sites/default/files/laidlaw\\_publications/working\\_papers\\_social\\_inclusion/wpsosi\\_2003\\_jan\\_immigrant-settlement.pdf](http://www.laidlawfdn.org/sites/default/files/laidlaw_publications/working_papers_social_inclusion/wpsosi_2003_jan_immigrant-settlement.pdf)
- Oommen, T. (1984). Sources of deprivation and styles of protest: The case of the Dalits in India. *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, 18, 45-61.
- Ostwald, M. (1955). The Athenian legislation against tyranny and subversion. *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, 86, 103-128.
- Park, R. E. (1928). Human migration and the marginal man. *American Journal of Sociology*, 33, 881-893.
- Parker, R. (2012). Stigma, prejudice and discrimination in global public health. *Cadernos de Saúde Pública*, 28, 164-169.
- Parker, R., & Aggleton, P. (2003). HIV and AIDS-related stigma and discrimination: A conceptual framework and implications for action. *Social Science & Medicine*, 57, 13-24.
- Percy-Smith, J. (2000). (Ed.), *Policy responses to social exclusion: Towards inclusion?* Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press.
- Pierce, R. (1999). *Social exclusion: A literature review*. York, UK: University of York.
- Pocock, D. F. (1957). Inclusion and exclusion: A process in the caste system of Gujarat. *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, 13, 19-31.
- Procacci, G. (1999). Poor citizens: Social citizenship and the crisis of welfare states. In S. Hänninen (Ed.), *Displacement of social policies* (pp. 7-30). Jyväskylä, Finland: University of Jyväskylä.
- Radcliffe-Brown, A. R. (1952). *Structure and function in primitive society: Essays and addresses*. London, England: Cohen & West.
- Raubitschek, A. E. (1951). The origin of ostracism. *American Journal of Archaeology*, 55, 221-229.
- Rehbinder, M. (1986). Refusal of social cooperation as a legal problem: On the legal institutions of ostracism and boycott. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 7, 321-327.
- Rhodes, R. A. W. (1994). The hollowing out of the state: The changing nature of the public service in Britain. *Political Quarterly Review*, 65, 137-151.
- Roberts, J. M., & Devine, F. (2003). The hollowing out of the welfare state and social capital. *Social Policy and Society*, 2, 309-318.
- Robinson, C. A., Jr. (1939). The struggle for power at Athens in the early fifth century. *American Journal of Philology*, 60, 232-237.
- Robinson, C. A., Jr. (1945). Athenian politics, 510-486 B.C. *American Journal of Philology*, 66, 243-245.
- Robinson, C. A., Jr. (1946). The date of Themistocles' ostracism. *American Journal of Philology*, 67, 265-266.
- Robinson, C. A., Jr. (1952). Cleisthenes and ostracism. *American Journal of Archaeology*, 56, 23-26.
- Rodgers, G. (1995). What is special about a "social exclusion" approach? In G. Rodgers, C. Gore, & J. B. Figueiredo (Eds.), *Social exclusion: Rhetoric, reality, responses* (pp. 43-56).



- Geneva, Switzerland: International Institute for Labour Studies, United Nations Development Programme.
- Rose, N. (1999). *Powers of freedom: Reframing political thought*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Rose, N. (2000). Government and control. *British Journal of Criminology*, 40, 321-339.
- Scambler, G. (2006). Sociology, social structure and health-related stigma. *Psychology, Health & Medicine*, 11, 288-295.
- Scambler, G. (2009). Health-related stigma. *Sociology of Health & Illness*, 31, 441-455.
- Schaller, M., & Duncan, L. A. (2007). The behavioral immune system: Its evolution and social-psychological implications. In J. Forgas, M. G. Haselton, & W. von Hippel (Eds.), *Evolution and the social mind: Evolutionary psychology and social cognition* (pp. 293-307). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
- Schneider, J. W. (1988). Disability as moral experience: Nepilepsy and self in routine relationships. *Journal of Social Issues*, 44, 63-78.
- Sheradin, K. A. (2000). *Reforming the republic: Solidarity and the making of the French welfare state, 1871-1914* (Doctoral thesis). Department of History, The College Arts and Sciences, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY.
- Sibley, D. (1995). *Geographies of exclusion: Society and difference in the West*. London, England: Routledge.
- Silver, H. (1995). Reconceptualizing social disadvantage: Three paradigms of social exclusion. In G. Rodgers, C. Gore, & J. B. Figueiredo (Eds.), *Social exclusion: Rhetoric, reality, responses* (pp. 57-80). Geneva, Switzerland: International Institute for Labour Studies, United Nations Development Programme.
- Silver, H., & Miller, S. M. (2003). Social exclusion: The European approach to social disadvantage. *Indicators*, 2(2), 1-17.
- Sinha, S. (1959). Bhumi-Kshatriya social movement in south Manbhum. *Bulletin of the Department of Anthropology (University of Calcutta)*, 8, 9-32.
- Sinha, S. (1962). State formation and Rajput myth in tribal central India. *Man in India*, 42, 35-80.
- Sirovátka, T., & Mare, P. (2006). Poverty, social exclusion and social policy in the Czech republic. *Social Policy & Administration*, 40, 288-303.
- Skelcher, C. (2000). Changing images of the state: Overloaded, hollowed-out, congested. *Public Policy and Administration*, 15(3), 3-19.
- Snyder, M. L., Kleck, R. E., Strenta, A., & Mentzer, S. J. (1979). Avoidance of the handicapped: An attributional ambiguity analysis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 37, 2297-2306.
- Sorokin, P. A. (1998). *Social and cultural mobility*. London, England: Routledge.
- Spina, F. A. (2005). *The faith of the outsider: Exclusion and inclusion in the biblical story*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
- Spradley, J. (1970). *You owe yourself a drunk: An ethnography of urban nomads*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.
- Srinivas, M. N. (1956). A note on Sanskritization and Westernization. *Far Eastern Quarterly*, 15, 481-496.
- Srinivas, M. N. (1966). *Social change in modern India*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Stegemen, I., & Costongs, C. (2003). *Health, poverty and social exclusion in Europe: Literature review on concepts, relations and solutions*. Brussels, Belgium: EuroHealthNet. Retrieved from [http://eurohealthnet.eu/sites/eurohealthnet.eu/files/publications/pu\\_5.pdf](http://eurohealthnet.eu/sites/eurohealthnet.eu/files/publications/pu_5.pdf)
- Stuber, J., Meyer, I., & Link, B. (2008). Stigma, prejudice, discrimination and health. *Social Science & Medicine*, 67, 351-357.
- Towers, G. (2005). West Virginia's lost youth: Appalachian stereotypes and residential preferences. *Journal of Geography*, 104(2), 74-84.
- Tumin, M. M. (1953). Some principles of stratification: A critical analysis. *American Sociological Review*, 18, 387-394.
- Valverde, M. (1998). *Diseases of the will: Alcohol and the dilemmas of freedom*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- van Kempen, E. (2002). "Poverty pockets" and social exclusion: On the role of place in shaping social inequality. In P. Marcuse & R. van Kempen (Eds.), *Of States and Cities* (pp. 240-257). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Vincent, G. (2001). The engagement of French Protestantism in solidarity. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 4, 401-421.
- Whiten, A., & Byrne, R. W. (1988). *Machiavellian intelligence: Social expertise and the evolution of intellect in monkeys, apes, and humans*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon.
- Whiten, A., & Byrne, R. W. (1997). *Machiavellian intelligence II: Extensions and evaluations*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Williams, C. C., & White, R. (2003). Conceptualising social inclusion: Some lessons for action. *Municipal Engineer*, 156, 91-95.
- Wilson, L. (2006). Developing a model for the measurement of social inclusion and social capital in regional Australia. *Social Indicators Research*, 75, 335-360.
- Witcher, S. (2003). *Reviewing the terms of inclusion: Transactional processes, currencies and context* (Case Paper 67). London, England: London School of Economics.
- Woodward, A., & Kohli, M. (2001). European societies: Inclusions/exclusions? In A. Woodward & M. Kohli (Eds.), *Inclusions and exclusions in European society* (pp. 1-17). London, England: Routledge.
- Young, J. (1999). Cannibalism and bulimia: Patterns of social control in late modernity. *Theoretical Criminology*, 3, 387-407.

## Bio

**Dan Allman's** work focuses on the social and structural production of risk and well-being, particularly for those considered marginal, vulnerable, or peripheral to a society's core. His interests include social stratification and equity, the sociology of health and medicine, and global health.

# Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion

*Hugh Collins\**

*Although laws against discrimination have conventionally been justified and articulated according to various conceptions of equality, tensions between different notions of equality undermine the coherence of these explanations. The aim of social inclusion is proposed as part of an alternative justification for discrimination laws. As well as exploring the meaning and implications of the policy of social inclusion for discrimination laws, the extent to which the law already embodies this idea is assessed with particular reference to the scope of anti-discrimination laws, proof of discrimination, justification defences, and positive discrimination. It is concluded that the goal of social inclusion has the potential to provide a vital ingredient in a more coherent, though not uncritical, account of the aims of anti-discrimination legislation.*

## The aim of equality

What is the general aim of anti-discrimination laws? At first sight, legislation in the European Union and the United States advances a conception of equality as its general aim. Indeed, anti-discrimination laws have often been dubbed 'equality laws'.<sup>1</sup> The central case of prohibited conduct is less favourable treatment of another person on grounds of (or because of) their race, sex, or one of the other protected group classifications.<sup>2</sup> This standard insists upon equal treatment to the extent that people should be assessed without regard to certain characteristics such as sex and race that have often been a source of disadvantage in the past. Equal treatment demands impartiality in the sense of forbidding criteria such as sex or race from providing grounds for differentiation.<sup>3</sup> Yet the aim of anti-discrimination laws cannot be reduced to equal treatment.

A closer inspection of the legislation reveals three kinds of deviations from a simple equal treatment principle. In some cases, different rather than the same treatment is required. In the case of discrimination against pregnant women, for instance, the law mandates different treatment of women rather than the same treatment as men.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, different treatment of disabled persons is required in many respects, in order to enable them to gain access to work and other opportunities.<sup>5</sup> In a second type of deviation, equal treatment is itself not

---

\* Law Department, London School of Economics. Thanks are owed to many who commented on earlier drafts of this essay, especially Oonagh Reitmann, Richard Nobles, and Nicola Lacey.

1 S. Fredman, 'Equality: A New Generation?' (2001) 30 ILJ 145; C. McCrudden, 'The Effectiveness of European Equality Law: National Mechanisms for Enforcing Gender Equality Law in the Light of European Requirements' (1993) 13 OJLS 320; B. Hepple, M. Coussey and T. Choudhury, *Equality: A New Framework*, Report of the Independent Review of the Enforcement of UK Anti-Discrimination Legislation (Oxford: Hart, 2000).

2 Eg EC Directive 2000/78, Art 2.2(a) Civil Rights Act 1964, Title VII, 42 USC s 2000e-2(a)(1).

3 I. M. Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) Chapter 4.

4 Eg EC Directive 92/85, OJL 348, 28.11.92; EC Directive 2002/73, OJL269, 5.10.2002.

5 Americans With Disabilities Act 1990, 42 USC s 1201, especially s 12112(b)(5)(A); EC Directive 2000/78, Art 5; Disability Discrimination Act 1996, especially s 6; the requirement for different treatment is considered below.

permitted, if it causes unjustifiable 'indirect discrimination' or 'disparate impact'.<sup>6</sup> Here formal equal treatment becomes unlawful where a rule or practice disproportionately operates to the disadvantage of one of the protected groups, and the rule or practice cannot be objectively justified. A third kind of deviation permits preferential treatment for protected groups in certain circumstances, in order to redress a prior history of disadvantage. The exact scope of permitted positive discrimination is deeply controversial, no doubt because it is perceived as conflicting sharply with the equal treatment principle.<sup>7</sup> These three deviations reveal that we cannot understand the aim of anti-discrimination laws by reference to a straightforward equal treatment principle. The question becomes how can we account for the law in a way that both recognises the force of the equal treatment principle and acknowledges its deficiencies as a complete explanation of the aims of the law?

Conventional accounts of the aim of anti-discrimination laws try to answer that question by using another conception of equality, one that furthers a substantive or distributive goal. Deviations from equal treatment are justified by reference to the pursuit of goals such as equality of results, equality of resources, or equality of opportunity. For example, it is argued that permitting claims for 'indirect discrimination' or 'disparate impact' serves the purpose of reducing institutional barriers to the achievement of a distributive goal such as more equality in results or fairer equality of opportunity.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, in European law the permitted scope for positive discrimination is determined in part by reference to a substantive conception of equality: 'With a view to ensuring full equality in practice, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting specific measures to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to [sex, race, etc.] ...'<sup>9</sup> Although the precise conception of substantive equality remains ambiguous in such formulations, it certainly seems possible to justify deviations from the equal treatment principle by reference to some distributive conception of equality. The problem for justifying the aims of anti-discrimination laws becomes rather to restrain or confine the force of a substantive conception of equality.

This problem arises because there is always a tension between the equal treatment principle and substantive conceptions of equality. Because equal treatment determines a procedure rather than an outcome, equal treatment can always be challenged as obstructing the achievement of a particular outcome. This tension is most obvious with respect to a strong egalitarian version of equality. If the aim of the legislation is perceived to be strict equality of outcomes, any rule or practice including equal treatment that prevents the achievement of an egalitarian

6 Eg EC Directive 2000/78, Art 2.2(6); Civil Rights Act 1964, Title VII, 42 USC s 2000e-2(a)(2) and (k).

7 M. B. Abram, 'Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers' (1986) 99 *Harvard Law Review* 1312. This conflict was the conceptual framework within which US constitutional law addressed the issue of reverse discrimination: *Regents of University of California v Bakke*, 438 US 265, 98 S Ct 2733 (1978) (Supreme Ct US).

8 C. McCrudden, 'Changing Notions of Discrimination' in S. Guest and A. Milne (eds), *Equality and Discrimination: Essays in Freedom and Justice ARSP Vol 21* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1985) 86; J. Gardner, 'Liberals and Unlawful Discrimination' (1989) 9 OJLS 1. The variety of possible distributive senses of equality found in the law is explored in S. Fredman, *Discrimination Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) Chapter 1; C. Barnard and B. Hepple, 'Substantive Equality' (2000) 59 CLJ 562.

9 Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000, OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, 16 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, article 7(1); see also on sex discrimination in particular Treaty Establishing the European Community Article 142(4).

outcome must be questioned. For example, if the egalitarian outcome is defined as an equal distribution of jobs between men and women, any rule or practice that obstructs that goal would have to be challenged, including an equal treatment principle that insists that men and women should be assessed on their merits, disregarding their sex. But the same problem arises in connection with any substantive conception of equality, including the apparently less ambitious goals of equality of opportunity and equality of resources. Whenever the legislation seeks a particular substantive outcome that concerns a distribution of advantages among social groups, a procedural rule that forbids consideration of membership of groups as a relevant criterion for decisions must obstruct the pursuit of that goal.

Courts have to resolve this tension between the equal treatment principle and substantive conceptions of equality in particular instances. The predominant method in Europe is to use a test of 'proportionality'.<sup>10</sup> In the United States, courts apply the equivalent test of 'strict scrutiny'.<sup>11</sup> The gist of these tests is that specific measures designed to achieve substantive equality must not be disproportionate violations of the equal treatment principle. Although this formulation provides a tool for judicial examination of the issue, it does not resolve the tension between the equal treatment principle and substantive conceptions of equality. The more a specific measure is likely to achieve the desired substantive equality, the greater will be the tension with the equal treatment principle, and the harder it will be to justify under the test of proportionality. A court has to produce fine distinctions between measures that represent only minor and necessary deviations from the equal treatment principle and measures that go too far in the pursuit of a desired egalitarian outcome. Wherever the line is drawn, a decision can always be criticised as displaying either a slavish adherence to the equal treatment principle or a dangerous sacrifice of the principle. The tension remains between, on the one hand, an aim of ensuring equal treatment for all citizens regardless of certain characteristics such as sex and race, and on the other hand, an aim of achieving a more equal distribution of welfare or resources among all citizens that may require in some instances different treatment on the grounds of those same characteristics.

Many possible routes have been proposed as providing a better reconciliation of the tension between the equal treatment principle and substantive conceptions of equality. Here I do not want to enter into the details of these proposals, except to draw out of them a sense of the strategic choices that can be made and lessons that may be learned from following various paths.

One route for resolving the tension is to seek a substantive conception of equality that is sufficiently limited that it rarely, if ever, clashes with the equal treatment principle. The idea of 'equality of opportunity' provides an example of this approach. Leaving aside the indeterminacy of this notion, the strategy of

10 *Abrahamsson & Anderson v Fogelqvist* C-407/98 [2000] ECR I-5539, [2002] ICR 932; *Application by Badeck*, C-158/97 [2000] ECR I-1875, [2000] IRLR 432; *Lommers v Minister Van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer En Visserij* C-476/99 [2002] IRLR 430; S. Fredman, *Discrimination Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 136–143. These cases discuss the application of the earlier Equal Treatment Directive 76/207 Art 2(4), which is limited to sex discrimination, and uses the slightly different wording of the concept of 'equal opportunity' rather 'equality in practice'. However, this provision has to be read in the context of EC Treaty Art 142(2), as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, that uses the formulation of 'full equality in practice', now implemented by EC Directive 2002/73, creating new Art 2(8).

11 'Strict scrutiny' requires that a discriminatory law or administrative act must further a compelling state interest by the most narrowly tailored means available: *Korematsu v United States* (1994) 323 US 214, 65 S Ct 193 (Supreme Ct US).

defining a goal that less frequently requires deviation from the equal treatment principle is plainly a step towards a better resolution of the problem. Nevertheless, this route can never be entirely successful. If the narrow distributive aim has any substantive content at all, it must at some point come into tension with a procedural rule that is blind to outcomes.

A second strategy consists in confining the strict application of the equal treatment principle to certain distributive allocations. For example, it might be proposed that equal treatment should be rigorously observed in hiring decisions, but with respect to training and other 'outreach' measures, equal treatment should be sacrificed in the pursuit of a substantive goal such as fair equality of opportunity. The problem that this strategy encounters is to explain the principle on which the division of distributive allocations should be drawn. In practice, the law does not seek to draw such a division, but rather applies the equal treatment principle across the board. The legal question remains whether the departure from equal treatment in the allocation of training and other benefits represents a disproportionate violation of the equal treatment principle. For example, legislation in the United Kingdom permits employers and training bodies to grant preferential access to training to a particular racial group, but only if there are either no members of the racial group doing the work for which training is supplied, or their proportion is comparatively small.<sup>12</sup> Similarly, in a case concerning an employer's child-care facility reserved exclusively for women employees, the European Court of Justice concluded that the employer's measure failed the test of proportionality, because it excluded male employees who take care of children by themselves.<sup>13</sup> The strategy of isolating some distributive decisions from the application of the equal treatment principle, though possible in theory, appears to be unacceptable in practice owing to the force of the equal treatment ideal.

A third strategy for resolving the tension tries to dispense with the equal treatment principle altogether by redefining it as 'equal worth', 'equal respect', or 'treatment as an equal'.<sup>14</sup> Under these formulations, different treatment in the pursuit of a distributive goal is unobjectionable provided that it does not involve disrespect for any group. Indeed, equal respect, particularly when formulated as a claim for recognition and empowerment of an identity,<sup>15</sup> may require different treatment, because respect (or recognition or cultural empowerment) may involve accepting and accommodating difference.<sup>16</sup> Although this strategy avoids the tension we have been considering, it achieves this result only by discarding the equal treatment principle. A white male at the receiving end of adverse treatment arising from an affirmative action quota can perhaps accept that his treatment may not involve bad motives or disrespect, but it certainly involves unequal treatment, partial treatment, or different treatment on the basis of gender or race. His right to be treated with respect and dignity may not have been infringed, but his other right to equal treatment has been plainly violated. Radical voices in favour of diversity may not be concerned about the abandonment of an equal treatment principle, because of its tendency to impose a hegemonic white, male,

12 Race Relations Act 1976 ss 37, 38.

13 *Lommers v Minster Van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij* C-476/99 [2002] IRLR 430.

14 R. Dworkin, *A Matter of Principle* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) 301; R. Kennedy, 'Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate' (1986) 99 *Harvard Law Review* 1327.

15 N. Fraser, *Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the 'Postsocialist' Condition* (New York: Routledge, 1997); D. Cooper, "'And You Can't Find Me Nowhere": Relocating Identity and Structure with Equality Jurisprudence' (2000) 27 *Journal of Law and Society* 249.

16 I. M. Young, above n 3, Chapter 6.

heterosexual norm. Yet anti-discrimination laws in their definitions of direct discrimination and the application of the test of proportionality in practice insist upon a process involving equal treatment, not merely equal respect. If we accept that an equal treatment principle will remain at the core of anti-discrimination laws, what we can draw out of this strategy is rather the recognition that as well as equal treatment, anti-discrimination laws may also seek to uphold a principle of equal respect. These two principles may produce a new tension when equal respect requires different treatment. I doubt whether this new tension could be adequately resolved without reference to a distributive goal that explains when equal respect should override equal treatment.

A final strategy for resolving the tension between the equal treatment principle and a substantive aim of equality that I want to highlight is one that diminishes the principle to an instrumental rule. This interpretation identifies a distributive goal as the dominant aim of the legislation, and regards equal treatment as a useful guide to how the aim of the law should be implemented, though whenever the substantive goal requires different treatment, the principle of equal treatment should be ignored. Again this strategy provides a route for resolving the tension, though it encounters considerable difficulty in explaining why the anti-discrimination laws as currently formulated seem to place equal treatment as a dominant principle. This strategy must also provide an intelligible and coherent account of the distributive goal to be attributed to the legislation, and it must have a plausible explanation of why the pursuit of this goal normally involves the procedural test of equal treatment.

From this perfunctory review of the strategic choices available to accounts of the aims of anti-discrimination laws, I draw a number of lessons. First, any plausible interpretation of the aims of these laws must award the equal treatment principle an important role. The second point is, however, that an explanation of why different treatment is sometimes required or permitted seems to necessitate the inclusion of a distributive aim for the legislation. It is the distributive aim that explains when and why deviations from equal treatment should be required or permitted. Thirdly, an additional principle of equal respect or equal worth probably should also be attributed to the legislation, but not to the exclusion of the equal treatment principle. Nor does this additional principle remove the need for attributing a distributive aim to the legislation. Fourthly, any distributive aim attributed to the legislation will have a trajectory that will eventually bring it into tension with the equal treatment principle. Although this tension can be reduced by diminishing the ambitions of the distributive goal, it never disappears entirely. The final lesson to be drawn is that it may be possible to define a distributive goal that entails the use of equal treatment as its operational principle, but which also sets limits to its operation by reference to the distributive goal. The two main difficulties confronting such an interpretation of the aims of the anti-discrimination legislation are to define an appropriate distributive goal and to explain why this goal requires considerable weight to be attached to the equal treatment principle.

All these considerations point towards a solution that attributes a weak egalitarian distributive goal to the legislation, such as equality of opportunity. Such a phrase both implies that equal treatment should be the normal practice, but also admits the possibility that to render opportunities equal in practice it may be necessary to afford unequal treatment in some instances. On closer inspection, however, such a solution proves painfully inadequate. We know that equal treatment will in practice not ensure equality of opportunity. Applying the standard of equal treatment to people who have been disadvantaged in acquiring

the types of skills, education, and experience that count as merit for the purpose of qualifying for jobs merely tends to confirm or reinforce the effects of disadvantage.<sup>17</sup> In pursuit of the goal of equality of opportunity, therefore, we need to intervene to give preferential treatment to disadvantaged groups. The problem is to know how far to take this intervention, because it is arguable that whenever inequalities in results can be discerned, there must be some inequality of opportunity that ought to be remedied. This problem is often addressed by refining the goal to be one of fair equality of opportunity, which of course merely restates the problem under the rubric of fairness. The question becomes when is it fair to treat people in exactly the same way, and when is it fair to treat them differently.

What interests me about this formulation of the possible distributive goal for anti-discrimination legislation is that it eschews any direct reference to conceptions of equality. Some notion of equality may form part of the idea of fairness, but that is not a necessary conclusion. This step opens up the possibility that the distributive aim of the legislation can be adequately described without reference to conceptions of equality. But if not some notion of substantive equality, what kind of distributive aim might be attributed to the legislation?

At this point in the argument, we may turn towards an examination of the explicit political justifications for the legislation that can be discovered in contemporary government documents. As we might expect, these documents include frequent references to various conceptions of equality, particularly equality of opportunity and equal worth. But there are also two other strands in the political justifications for the legislation. One stresses the economic benefits to be obtained by enabling all members of a nation's workforce to participate in the economy to the fullest extent of their potential. This argument comprises a standard justification put forward by governments for regulation of labour markets that the proposed regulation will improve the competitiveness of business.<sup>18</sup> A second strand of justification, however, should interest us more, because it is more directly aimed at explaining the aim of anti-discrimination laws. This element of the official discourse refers to the notion of social inclusion as a key justification for anti-discrimination laws.

## Social inclusion

'Discrimination usually amounts to exclusion in some form.'<sup>19</sup> No doubt we should be wary of attaching too much significance to political rhetoric. Some may be mere froth, and most may be deliberately ambiguous. But I think that the notion of social inclusion represents a significant shift in political thought, because it fits neatly into a general strategic need of 'Third Way' politics.<sup>20</sup> The Third Way

17 B. Hepple, 'Discrimination and Equality of Opportunity - Northern Irish Lessons' (1990) 10 OJLS 408; I. M. Young, above n 3, Chapter 7; B. Parekh, 'The Case for Positive Discrimination' in B. Hepple and E. Szyszczak (eds), *Discrimination: The Limits of Law* (London: Mansell, 1992) 272.

18 H. Collins, 'Regulating the Employment Relation for Competitiveness' (2001) 30 ILJ 17.

19 Department of Trade and Industry, *Towards Equality and Diversity: Implementing the Employment and Race Directives, Consultation Document* <http://www.dti.gov.uk/er> (2001) para 1.2.

20 For elucidation of the 'Third Way', see A. Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); A. Giddens, *The Third Way and its Critics* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000); and the essays collected in A. Giddens (ed), *The Global Third Way Debate* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001).

tries to distance itself from egalitarian ideals associated with traditional socialist movements, whilst promising more practical and effective measures towards a fairer society than those offered by traditional social democratic parties. The category of the socially excluded is more precise than those suffering from economic poverty. The group of the socially excluded is defined rather as people who are effectively prevented from participating in the benefits of citizenship or membership of society owing to a combination of barriers, of which poverty is merely one. Other barriers include poor educational opportunities, membership of a disfavoured racial minority, an inaccessible location, responsibility for family dependants, or, more commonly a combination of such factors.<sup>21</sup> By aiming to eradicate social exclusion, the centre-left political parties can steer a path between, on the one hand, promising strong egalitarian measures involving substantial tax and transfer measures, and, on the other, merely offering a protection of rights without any substantive commitments to distributive justice or a fairer society.

Although the phrase social exclusion spins continuously from the lips of politicians in Europe and has become a centrepiece of European Community Social Policy,<sup>22</sup> it is seldom defined. When clarification is given, there are certainly convenient ambiguities and puzzling divergences in meanings.<sup>23</sup> Yet the same might be said about the concept of equality, and that does not prevent us from taking the ideal of equality seriously. The problem is rather that the concept of social inclusion is less familiar than equality, so that its meanings and implications appear even murkier. It is not part of the familiar repertoire of liberal political theory or inscribed routinely in constitutions and declarations of rights. Sometimes appeals to the principle of social inclusion amount to no more than coded demands for equality of results or a more egalitarian society. Here I will concentrate, however, on the strands in this discourse that distinguish it from conceptions of equality including egalitarian notions of welfare.

Social inclusion is an aim or principle of justice. It is often mistaken for an egalitarian notion of distributive justice. This mistake is understandable, because the demands of social inclusion may require help to be given to the same groups such as the poor who are favoured by laws based upon egalitarian justifications. Social inclusion and egalitarian ideals share a concern about outcomes or distributive patterns. Yet there is also a fundamental difference. Social inclusion does not seek the same or broadly equivalent outcomes for citizens. It concentrates its attention not on relative disadvantage between groups, but rather on the absolute disadvantage of particular groups in society. The objective is not some notion of equality of welfare, but one of securing a minimum level of welfare for every citizen. Its typical targets are 'child poverty', 'unemployed youth', or 'racial minorities in deprived neighbourhoods', not a more general equalisation of welfare.

21 For a guide to the range of policy issues encapsulated in the idea of social inclusion: Social Exclusion Unit, Cabinet Office, *Preventing Social Exclusion*, (March 2001) <http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/seu/2001/pse/PSE%20HTML/default.htm>. For a global perspective on the origins and significance of the notion of social inclusion: G. Rodgers, C. Gore and J. B. Figueiredo (eds), *Social Exclusion: Rhetoric, Reality, Responses* (Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, International Labour Office, 1995).

22 Decision No 50/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 December 2001 establishing a programme of Community action to encourage cooperation between Member States to combat social exclusion, OJ L10, 12/01.2002 1.

23 R. Levitas, *The Inclusive Society? Social Exclusion and New Labour* (London: Macmillan, 1998); R. Lister, 'Strategies for Social Inclusion: promoting Social Cohesion or Social Justice?' in P. Askonas and A. Stewart (eds), *Social Inclusion: Possibilities and Tensions* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000) 37.



This difference from the ideal of equality of outcomes can lead another mistaken view that social inclusion must therefore be concerned with equality of resources. The idea of equality of resources is that individuals should be assured as far as possible an equal chance in society to achieve their goals or that there should be equality of opportunity. Without investigating further the controversial questions of what might be meant by 'resources' or 'opportunity' in those formulations, we can distinguish the aim of social inclusion on two grounds. First, social inclusion does not set itself the task of ensuring an equal distribution of resources or opportunities. The point is rather that because some groups have so few resources or opportunities, we should redress that position without undertaking a broader redistribution. Many advocates of the 'Third Way' support equality of opportunity in order to distance themselves from egalitarian goals and to stress their respect for individual autonomy.<sup>24</sup> Given their acceptance of the limited capacities of governments effectively to redistribute resources or opportunities in a market society, however, their ambitions for regulation seem to be confined in practice to helping those who are completely excluded. The second, fundamental, difference from equality of resources consists in the concern for social inclusion as an outcome. It is not enough under the aim of social inclusion to give a bigger share of resources or opportunities to disadvantaged groups, and leave them to choose whether to take up the possibilities they provide. Social inclusion is committed to the achievement of outcomes, not just life-chances. The significance of this point emerges more clearly if we consider the nature of the outcome to which social inclusion aspires.

The aim of social inclusion is a type of welfarism in the sense that the outcome sought is to improve the welfare of disadvantaged groups. Yet it is not the same as utilitarianism or the maximisation of welfare, for social inclusion gives priority to the welfare of the targeted groups, even if redistribution in their favour does not maximise utility.<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, we should distinguish the type of welfare sought by social inclusion from that used frequently in economics and policy sciences. The type of welfare required under the aim of social inclusion is not the satisfaction of preferences formed exogenously, to which the state adopts a neutral attitude. There is a perfectionist element in the idea of social inclusion, in that there is a conception of the essential elements of 'well-being'.<sup>26</sup> These essential elements of 'well-being' include material goods such as food and shelter, but also include opportunities to participate in meaningful ways in social life. These non-material goods include a fulfilling level of education, participation in politics,<sup>27</sup> cultural activities, and work. Individuals should be able to pursue their chosen goals in relation to these non-material goods in order to achieve a state of 'well-being'. Thus 'well-being' combines subjectivist and objectivist notions of welfare. 'Well-being' is objectivist to the extent that it identifies particular kinds of

24 A. Giddens (2000) above n 20, 85–89; R. Mullender, 'Theorizing the Third Way: Qualified Consequentialism, the Proportionality Principle, and the New Social Democracy' (2000) 27 *Journal of Law and Society* 493; H. Collins, 'Is There a Third Way in Labour Law?' in J. Conaghan, M. Fischl and K. Klare (eds), *Labour Law in An Era of Globalization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 449.

25 I am drawing here on the distinctions drawn between egalitarianism, welfarism, and a principle of priority (of which social inclusion is an example) by D. Parfitt, 'Equality or Priority?' in M. Clayton and A. Williams (eds), *The Idea of Equality* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000) 81.

26 This notion of welfare is used by, amongst others, J. Gray, 'Inclusion: A Radical Critique' in P. Askonas and A. Stewart (eds), above n 22, 19, 28; J. Raz, *The Morality of Freedom* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) Chapter 12; and, possibly, A. Giddens (2000) above n 20, 88.

27 I. M. Young, *Inclusion and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

activities such as work, education, politics, and culture as the most significant sites for the achievement of 'well-being'. But 'well-being' is also subjectivist because the individual is permitted a range of choices about goals in relation to these worthwhile activities.

Although no sharp line can be drawn that determines the minimum acceptable level for these material and non-material goods, social inclusion insists that wherever the line is drawn, everyone should be raised to that level. It is therefore not sufficient for governments to provide material resources in order to tackle social exclusion. Non-material goods such as work are, if comparisons can be made, more essential elements of 'well-being', and social inclusion demands that disadvantaged groups should receive those non-material goods. Access to non-material goods requires, first, that the social organisation of these activities permits everyone to enter them without insurmountable barriers, and secondly, that each person enjoys the ability to choose between a range of possible goals in relation to these activities.

This emphasis upon the distribution of non-material goods derives from the deepest ambition of the aim of social inclusion. Although we have observed that social inclusion shares with equality a concern with the distributive allocations to groups and individuals in a society, its more fundamental objective is the outcome of social cohesion. Social inclusion is a theory of how society can be integrated and harmonious. At its simplest, the theory is that if everyone participates fully in society, they are less likely to become alienated from the community and will conform to its social rules and laws. Social inclusion fosters social cohesion or, to use an older concept, solidarity. The outcome sought by policies of social inclusion is therefore not merely justice for individuals but also a stable social order.

The significance of the connection between social cohesion and social inclusion needs to be stressed. In contemporary liberal theories of justice, it is usually presented as sufficient to establish social order that we should establish a just or nearly just society.<sup>28</sup> If the conditions of justice are met, it is argued that we owe a moral or political duty to uphold those institutions and to obey the laws that express them. In practice, contemporary governments do not appear to place so much faith in a sense of moral duty. They recognise rather that social order is fragile and that they need to take measures to promote social cohesion. At times this recognition results in authoritarian regimes, which are indeed unacceptable and do not deserve moral support. But governments influenced by the 'Third Way' use more subtle methods to promote social cohesion, which, though not entirely free from coercion, avoid the excesses of authoritarian states. The aim of social inclusion is precisely to establish conditions and opportunities that induce all citizens to participate in society and to come to value its institutions and potentials. 'People who are economically disengaged often become more generally disengaged, reinforcing the democratic deficit'.<sup>29</sup>

This additional element of social cohesion explains in part the presence of the objectivist (or perfectionist) dimension of 'well-being', and it also accounts for the paternalist strand in government policies about social inclusion. Whereas the aim of equality of opportunity seeks to put people in a position in which they are able to participate in the economy and other aspects of social life, the aim of social

28 J. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) Chapter 6; R. Dworkin, *Law's Empire* (London: Fontana, 1986) 195–216.

29 Barbara Roche, Minister for Women, 'Equality in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century', speech to Institute of Public Policy Research 15<sup>th</sup> May 2002, <http://www.ippr.org/press/index>.

inclusion also seems to include an element that sometimes requires people to become included. There are no rights without responsibilities. With respect to work, for instance, social inclusion policies, though not forcing people to work, strenuously try with a mixture of carrots and sticks to drive people into work. The carrots are 'in-work' benefits and negative earned income tax,<sup>30</sup> which are designed to ensure that work provides more material benefits than welfare benefits; and the sticks are the removal of welfare benefits from those who do not co-operate in seeking to find employment.<sup>31</sup> These policies can be described as paternalist, because they assert, for instance, that work is good for the individual and society, and, even if you don't want to work, you should, if you possibly can.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, it is insisted that nearly everyone can work, provided that individuals receive appropriate training and education, and that employers dismantle unnecessary exclusionary rules. This coercive element distinguishes the principle of social inclusion from even the broadest versions of equality of opportunity, which leave individuals with the freedom and the responsibility to make their own life-choices, including indolence.<sup>33</sup>

It follows that there is a difference in scope between egalitarian welfarist policies and social inclusion. An egalitarian objective sets the outcomes that it wishes to achieve, but has little to say about the means that should be used. The method could be one of regulating both the institutions of government and the market. Alternatively, the method could be one of progressive taxation and welfare benefits, leaving untouched the institutions of civil society and the market. In contrast, social inclusion requires regulation of social institutions. Money is not an acceptable substitute for the non-material goods that form a core of 'well-being'. In the case of work, for instance, having a job differs from receiving the same amount of money in welfare benefits. A job provides the opportunity to acquire knowledge and skills, to participate in the workplace community, to achieve meaningful goals, to acquire status or identity in the community, and to form friendships. The policy of social inclusion wishes to distribute these non-material goods to all members of society. Work is not regarded as a means to an end of material wealth, but an end in itself, because it is a vital ingredient of 'well-being'. And the achievement of 'well-being' for all groups is an essential element in constructing a civil and safe community.

I will need to add further elements to this brief description of the aim of social inclusion as we consider its implications as a potential justification for the aims of anti-discrimination laws. What has not yet been mentioned, and which needs to be recognised at the outset, is that the theory of social inclusion, like all political theories, was not developed in a vacuum, but rather evolved in response to an analysis of contemporary social problems. It is a product of the politics of rich Western countries in the late twentieth century. In those countries, a majority of the population had enjoyed since 1945 an unprecedented continuous period of

---

30 Tax Credits Act 1999.

31 Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999; Social Security (Welfare to Work) Regulations 1998, 1998 SI 2231. On the 'New Deal', see P. Cressey, 'New Labour and Employment, Training and Employee Relations' in M. Powell (ed), *New Labour, New Welfare State?* (Bristol: Policy Press, 1999) 171, 177.

32 Department of Social Security, *New Ambitions for Our Country: A New Contract for Welfare*, Cm 3805 (1998).

33 This element of freedom and responsibility in liberal notions of equality is highlighted in R. Dworkin, 'Does Equality Matter?' in A. Giddens (ed), above n 19, 172, 177. For a critique of coercive (or communitarian) welfare to work programmes in the USA: A. L. Alstott, 'Work vs Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies' (1999) 108 *Yale L J* 967.

growing prosperity and had been able to afford the institutional arrangements of the Welfare State. But these arrangements seemed to be threatened by a minority who had not participated in that prosperity and who seemed unwilling to accept the norms of civil society. Although the material needs of this minority were usually met by the Welfare State, they did not participate in society, and indeed appeared alienated. There was a concern about the breakdown of social order in inner cities, and particularly about a pattern of young people never joining in the institutions of civil society - voting, working, marrying and forming families. Instead of the Welfare State providing a solution, it was diagnosed as a source of the problem.<sup>34</sup> It was argued that welfare dependency actually promoted the way of life that rejected the institutions of a liberal and civil society. Whereas equality had been the political ideal required to incorporate the working class into civil society, the idea of social inclusion was the political response to the need to integrate the non-working class.

Having described these elements of the aim of social inclusion, we can now consider whether this aim informs anti-discrimination laws. Recall that the reason why social inclusion interests us is that it may provide an answer to the question of when is it fair to insist upon equal treatment and when is it fair to deviate from that standard. I approach this task by identifying an architecture for anti-discrimination laws that seems to be implicit in the aim of social inclusion. My analysis highlights four pillars: how the social problem to be addressed by anti-discrimination laws is conceived within the policy of social inclusion; how social inclusion justifies deviation from the equal treatment principle; the methods of proof of unlawful discrimination; and the extent of the requirement for positive discrimination in the pursuit of social inclusion. This analysis enables us to identify the extent to which a social inclusion justification may explain the aims and the content of the current law, though it also provides a critical perspective on possible inadequacies in the legislation.

## Structural disadvantage

What is the problem that anti-discrimination laws address? The equal treatment principle defines the problem narrowly as direct discrimination, that is treating a person differently on the ground of sex, race, or some other suspect classification. But in so far as anti-discrimination laws deviate from that standard, it is clear that the social problem is regarded as one involving structural or systematic disadvantage for protected groups. The notion of structural disadvantage combines two elements: first, an appreciation that there are patterns of disadvantage or that there are groups that seem to be disproportionately and persistently in worse positions; and second, that there are certain permanent arrangements, practices, institutions, and social structures that produce this outcome. The way in which we define the nature and sources of structural disadvantage provides a framework for the ambit of anti-discrimination laws. To understand this framework, it is helpful to disentangle three elements of the problem of structural disadvantage: the composition of the disadvantaged groups, the nature of their disadvantage, and the nature of the structures that tend to produce that disadvantage.

---

<sup>34</sup> For a lively analysis of the problem: W. Hutton, *The State We're In* (London: Vintage, 1996) Chapter 7.

## Disadvantaged groups

Equality justifications for anti-discrimination laws lack a determinate view of how to constitute the groups for comparison. The principle that different groups should be treated equally (in otherwise similar circumstances) does not describe how these groups should be composed. Any group can claim that it is not being treated equally and demand that it should receive protection from the law. The groups might be comprised by reference to genetic endowments, socially constructed categories, legal classifications such as nationality, or some other criterion of classification. What is crucial is that the group is able to claim plausibly that membership of the group puts individuals at a disadvantage. One effect of the indeterminacy of protected groups under the equal treatment principle is that the province of anti-discrimination laws always remains contested.<sup>35</sup>

In contrast, social inclusion provides a more determinate criterion for the composition of protected groups. The question is whether the group is one that in practice has been disproportionately socially excluded compared to the population as a whole. Under this criterion, for instance, single parents become a group to be protected, because the lack of affordable and adequate child-care arrangements tends to exclude them from material and non-material benefits. The principle of equality neither rules out single parents as a group to be protected, nor does it require them to be constituted as a group for the purposes of discrimination law. On the criterion of social inclusion, however, sex is not so clearly a criterion for the composition of a protected group. Within the category of women, there are certainly groups of women that suffer from social exclusion, such as those who are pregnant or parents of young children. It may be argued, furthermore, that most women suffer from some comparative disadvantage during their lives, because the potential for pregnancy has an adverse effect on all women in the labour market, so that all women should be regarded as a protected class under the test of social exclusion. But the social inclusion criterion for disadvantaged groups seems unlikely to include men as a class, so that sex on its own as a source of group composition, as opposed to discrimination against women, would not qualify as a relevant criterion for the composition of a protected group. Similarly, if we consider age discrimination in employment, justifications for legal intervention based on equality certainly permit the inclusion of this category, but also lack any justification for confining it to particular age groups. In contrast, a justification based on social exclusion would notice the disproportionate levels of unemployment of older people, and, having determined when age becomes a serious disadvantage in the labour market, that is about the age of 55, would regulate against discrimination in hiring practices that exclude directly or indirectly workers aged 55 or above. A similar finding of disadvantage might also lead to protection of workers under the age of 22. Notice as well that social inclusion is not interested in whether the group is classified by unalterable genetics, socially constructed qualities, or legally imposed characteristics, factors which are sometimes used to determine the scope of discrimination laws under equality

---

35 S. Fredman, above n 10, 76–82. Fredman argues that equality must be underpinned by the idea of dignity to provide determinacy, following constitutional developments in this direction in South Africa and Canada (at 119–121). Gardner proposes alternatively a theory of autonomy as the basis for the identification of groups: J. Gardner, 'On the Ground of Her Sex(uality)' (1998) 18 OJLS 168, a review of, and supporting in this respect, R. Wintemute, *Sexual Orientation and Human Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

justifications. Nor is it interested in whether the group is regarded with disrespect. The composition of groups is determined by reference to the objective of social inclusion, which can draw upon any system of classification. Examples of this variety might include single parents (regardless of sex) or residents in particular postcodes that include high levels of minority ethnic exclusion.

Considering contemporary anti-discrimination legislation, there is certainly a pattern of the definition of protected groups that reflects an equality justification. Protection is usually afforded to both a group and its symmetrical opposite, thus upholding a principle of equal treatment. There are, however, some exceptions to this pattern, as in the case of disability,<sup>36</sup> married persons,<sup>37</sup> persons undergoing gender reassignment.<sup>38</sup> These exceptions are compatible with a social exclusion approach to the definition of protected groups.

### Nature of disadvantage

An equality justification is also indeterminate with respect to the character of problematic disadvantage. If the aim of the law is conceived more precisely as equality of opportunity, or of resources, or of welfare, that additional element provides a more determinate description of the nature of the required disadvantage, though the possible range of disadvantages to be considered remains broad. Disadvantages resulting from discrimination may occur in any walk of life. For the purposes of eliminating disadvantages that infringe some standard of equality, there is no reason to limit the potential scope of the disadvantages to be addressed, even in the dark corners of the private sphere.<sup>39</sup>

Yet when discrimination laws are enacted, they address particular targets such as employment, education, the provision of public services, and many other aspects of business and social associations. First among these targets is invariably access to employment, or, more precisely, the ability to earn a living through the provision of services to others. What accounts for this focus on work? The answer cannot be that discriminatory practices are more prevalent in employment than other social contexts. This hypothesis seems improbable. Considerations of efficiency propel employers to hire the most productive workers regardless of sex or race. Direct or intentional discrimination in hiring practices is not usually an objective of employers, because it is likely to be inefficient. Discrimination becomes efficient for employers only to the extent that, by using criteria of group membership as a proxy for a test for productivity of a job applicant, the employer saves on transaction costs (the costs of investigating the relative productivity of job applicants) to such an extent that the savings exceed the costs of mistaken job offers.<sup>40</sup> Discrimination seems much more likely to flourish when the economic consequences are insignificant, that is in daily social interactions.

---

36 Disability Discrimination Act 1995.

37 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s 3; but EC Directive 2002/73, new Art 2(1) implies a symmetrical approach for 'marital or family status.'

38 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s 2A (as amended by Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999, SI 1999/1102).

39 There are other reasons for confining the scope of discrimination laws in the private sphere: J. Gardner, 'Private Activities and Personal Autonomy: At the Margins of Anti-discrimination Law', in B. Hepple and E. Szyszczak (eds), above n 17, 148.

40 G. S. Becker, *The Economics of Discrimination* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); K. J. Arrow, 'Models of Job Discrimination' in A. Pascal (ed), *Racial Discrimination in Economic Life* (Lexington MA, Lexington Books, D C Heath, 1972).

The emphasis upon employment in discrimination laws is all the more striking when we appreciate that hiring decisions by private employers comprise one of the hardest targets for which to justify legal regulation. A justification for regulation is easier within subsisting contractual relations, for the implied obligations of the contract are likely to rule out most forms of discrimination. In employment contracts, discriminatory decisions probably amount to a breach of the implied obligation on the employer not to act in a way that destroys mutual trust and confidence (in the UK), or a violation of some other general private law principle such as performance in good faith in the USA, France, and Germany. In connection with hiring practices, however, a private employer can rely upon a right to freedom of association or freedom of contract to resist any legal regulation.<sup>41</sup> In other contexts, such as the distribution of educational opportunities by agencies of the state, this obstacle to regulation is absent. It may be possible to argue that the right to freedom of association does not include the right to discriminate in hiring decisions,<sup>42</sup> but employers will nevertheless assert that their freedom is being unjustifiably invaded in costly ways. To overcome that objection, it is necessary to have a powerful argument for justifying regulation of hiring practices, such as respect for the right to equal treatment or a compelling distributive objective.<sup>43</sup>

The reason why access to employment is the primary target of discrimination laws surely lies in the significance we attach to the distribution of jobs in society. The significance of employment is explained in part by its welfare effects. Since most of us depend upon employment as our principle source of wealth, the distribution of jobs by employers is a key distributive mechanism in society. If hiring practices in the labour market lead to unequal distributive outcomes, causing for example disproportionate levels of poverty among some minority groups, egalitarian arguments might lead us to conclude that regulating hiring practices should be the principal goal of discrimination laws. Yet this distributive argument lacks an explanation of why the egalitarian goal should not be achieved through taxation and welfare payments rather than through the regulation of hiring decisions. What is required in addition is an explanation why the distribution of the jobs themselves matters, not just the economic benefits flowing from them.

Earlier it was argued that the notion of social inclusion attaches considerable significance to possession of a job. The problem of social exclusion is that some groups in society are denied the opportunity to participate in the mechanisms offered by society through which they may establish meaning for their lives, the connections of a community, and a sense of self-respect. Work provides for most people one of the principal mechanisms for constructing meaning, community, and status. Redistributive welfare programmes, though important for the relief of economic hardship, cannot tackle except at the margins the problem of social exclusion. Social inclusion thus provides an argument for targeting access to employment as the primary concern of discrimination laws. It explains why access to jobs should be the principal target of discrimination laws. 'The best defence

---

41 R. A. Epstein, *Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

42 For example, it might be argued that in order to protect other values or rights, limits are placed on the discretion to select contractual partners.

43 Gardner explores this problem and also argues for quasi-public nature of employer's hiring decisions as an instrument of distribution in order to diminish the force of the claim of the employer's right to freedom of contract: J. Gardner, above n 8, 5–8.

against social exclusion is having a job, and the best way to get a job is to have a good education, with the right training and experience.<sup>44</sup> This argument suggests that in the selection of the nature of the disadvantages that should be addressed by discrimination laws, the notion of social inclusion has played a role as an underlying justification for legal regulation in determining the types of disadvantage that need to be addressed.

## Structures

Both formal and informal institutional arrangements of our society tend to maintain existing distributive patterns, even once direct discrimination is eliminated. For instance, the normal role of child care performed by women puts them at a competitive disadvantage in seeking better jobs, which are typically designed with hiring rules that favour work experience and set requirements of long hours of work. This combination of formal institutional rules (the terms of employment) and informal social norms (women taking primary responsibility for child care) results in a predictable pattern of exclusion of women from the better jobs, as evidenced in the continuing disparity between average rates of pay for men and women. In order to address this type of distributive pattern, discrimination laws were broadened to encompass the formal institutional rules, which, in combination with informal social norms, have a discriminatory effect. Through the tests of indirect discrimination or disparate impact, the law questions the validity of the institutional rules, though it leaves untouched and unquestioned the informal social norms.

Under the tests of indirect discrimination or disparate impact that the law uses to tackle structural disadvantage, those who want to benefit from discrimination laws have to rely upon stereotypes or social norms that they may wish to escape or reject.<sup>45</sup> For example, a requirement of full-time work may be more difficult for women to satisfy if they fulfil child-care responsibilities. In order to take advantage of a remedy for indirect discrimination, a woman has to demonstrate that the institutional rule has the effect of disproportionately excluding women from work, because they comply with the social norm of fulfilling child-care responsibilities. This reasoning is vulnerable to attack from those who wish to reject the social stereotype and argue instead that women are not necessarily the partner who should take child-care responsibility or that alternative methods of child-care are available. Thus in *Clymo v Wandsworth Borough Council*,<sup>46</sup> a rule against job sharing the post of librarian was held not to be discriminatory against women, because the claimant had had the choice to pay for full-time child-care. As soon as the court or tribunal denies or rejects the social stereotype – in this instance women typically stay at home to take care of young children – the legal challenge to institutional discrimination begins to fall apart. This paradoxical reliance of the law on indirect discrimination on the persistence of patterns of

44 Tony Blair, 'Foreword by the Prime Minister', Social Exclusion Unit, Office of the Prime Minister, *Bridging the Gap: New Opportunities for 16-18 Year Olds Not in Education, Employment or Training*, July 1999, Cm 4405, 6. The doctrine that 'the best safeguard against social exclusion is a job' is also at the core of European Community Policy: Decision No 50/2002/EC, above n 21, Recitals para 8. It should also be noted that access to education and training is always the second important target of discrimination legislation.

45 N. Lacey, *Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory* (Oxford: Hart, 1998) 22.

46 [1989] IRLR 241 EAT.



structural disadvantage that it may be attempting to redress seems to be determined by the underlying equality justification for the law. The ideal of equality respects the choices of individuals about how they should lead their lives, but says the law should insist upon equal respect for those choices.<sup>47</sup> Respect for those choices means that the law should not question social norms in so far as they are conventions and patterns produced by the choice of individuals.<sup>48</sup> Under this equality justification, the prohibition against institutional discrimination should concern only those rules that, though formally neutral, have in their application a disparate adverse impact on certain groups as a result of attributes of those groups which they have not chosen.

In contrast, owing to the paternalist and perfectionist element in the goal of social inclusion, choices made by excluded groups that have the effect of reinforcing their exclusion are not choices that the goal necessarily respects. The social norms and conventions are themselves a target for discrimination laws, if they have the effect that the groups who make such choices are thereby excluding themselves from employment. Social inclusion thus questions both the institutional rule and the social convention. In respect of the social convention that women tend to take care of children, social inclusion challenges this convention to the extent that it results in women becoming socially excluded. Because the composition of groups is determined by reference to the criterion of social exclusion, the argument becomes that parents with young children who do not work and are not supported financially by a partner in work should not be permitted to follow the social norm of taking responsibility for childcare to the extent of excluding themselves from the labour market.<sup>49</sup> Given the difficulty of finding affordable child-care, parents may need part-time jobs in order to achieve 'well-being', a need reflected in the new right to ask for changes in working time.<sup>50</sup> The problem with a hiring rule that precludes job sharing from this perspective is not that it discriminates indirectly between men and women, but that it obstructs people such as parents of young children who need job opportunities for part-time work from entering the labour market. For the purposes of indirect discrimination law, the implication of a social inclusion justification is that whether or not the individual could have chosen to comply with the formal rule by departing from social convention is irrelevant, because the aim is not equal or fair opportunity, but the elimination of rules that have an exclusionary effect. It should be sufficient to establish a claim for indirect discrimination to prove that an institutional practice has that effect. It is possible to detect such a change in the new test for indirect sex discrimination in employment. The amended Sex Discrimination Act 1975 section 1(2)(b) drops the former element that asked whether a disproportionate number of women cannot comply with the hiring rule, and asks merely whether the rule has a detrimental effect for a considerably larger proportion of women, thus avoiding the issue of choice and social convention.<sup>51</sup>

Drawing together these observations about structural disadvantage, social inclusion explains why access to employment is a primary target for the law, offers

47 R. Dworkin, above n 33.

48 S. Fredman, *Women and the Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 288–290.

49 In this vein the Employment Act 2002 s 49 (adding s 2AA to the Social Security Administration Act 1992) prescribes work-focussed interviews for non-working partners of claimants for social security benefits with a view to a reduction of the claimant's benefits for dependants.

50 Employment Act 2002 s 47.

51 Sex Discrimination (Indirect Discrimination and Burden of Proof) Regulations 2001, SI 2001 No 2260, implementing the 'Burden of Proof' Directive 97/80/EC.

a different and more determinate approach to defining the composition of disadvantaged groups, and offers an alternative to the current law's reliance upon social norms in establishing claims for indirect discrimination. Clearly the aim of social inclusion does not provide a satisfactory explanation of all aspects of the law addressing structural disadvantage, but it does help to account for certain features that are puzzling from the perspective of equality justifications.

## Proving discrimination

An equality principle in anti-discrimination laws invariably requires a comparative approach to proof. In relation to sex discrimination, for instance, the law of direct discrimination launches an enquiry as to whether the woman was treated less favourably than a man. The comparative approach initiates a search for a man or a member of the majority group in similar circumstances, a search that often proves fruitless unless one creates a hypothetical man. This legal construction is often difficult to build, because a member of the majority or privileged group is unlikely to have experienced structural disadvantages in a similar way, so that it is hard to envisage how members of this group could find themselves in sufficiently similar circumstances for a fair comparison to be made. The law of indirect discrimination offers a route around this problem, though it retains the comparative approach to proof. It permits women and minorities to challenge an employer's hiring rules on the ground that the rules have a disproportionate adverse impact on them.

In contrast, the goal of social inclusion does not depend upon a comparison with a man or some other privileged group. The policy of social inclusion asks for proof that the rule or practice tends to reinforce the exclusion of an individual member of an excluded group or most members of the excluded group. A comparison can supply evidence of exclusionary effect, but it is not essential to proof. For example, if the employer's rule forbids part-time work, this rule reinforces the exclusion of any groups such as single parents that may require part-time jobs. Even if it is demonstrated that other groups are similarly or equally adversely affected by the rule, the fact that this particular excluded group is disadvantaged by the requirement is sufficient to provide a basis for a challenge to the rule.

It is evident that the formulations in current legislation reflect a comparative approach to proof of discrimination that links them to a notion of equality. Although the comparative approach is not always required, as in the case of discrimination on grounds of pregnancy,<sup>52</sup> it is the dominant test. It is also worth noting that, although a notion of equality holds sway in relation to proof of discrimination, the precise conception of equality that should be applied is often subject to dispute. This dispute emerges in connection with statistical comparisons used to establish disparate impact or indirect discrimination. No doubt much of the difficulty here can be attributed to a combination of the lack of precise statistical information combined with the complexity of the test. This test requires a comparison between the ratios of the privileged group to the protected group in two statistical pools.<sup>53</sup> The equal treatment principle tends to confine the pools for

<sup>52</sup> *Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd* C-32/93 [1994] ICR 770, ECJ.

<sup>53</sup> The clearest judicial statement of the correct comparative method was given by Mustill LJ in *Jones v Chief Adjudication Officer* [1990] IRLR 533 CA 537. For an endorsement of the view that comparative proportions are the correct statistical comparison (though not rigorously followed in this case): *R v Secretary of State for Employment ex p Seymour-Smith & Perez* Case C-167/97 [1999] ECR I-623 ECJ para 59) and C. Barnard and B. Hepple, above n 8, 571.

statistical comparison, whereas a substantive equality of results principle points to the relevance of a broadly composed pool of comparison, usually consisting of the labour market as a whole. In the case of a hiring condition such as a particular educational qualification, for instance, the focus of the equal treatment principle is on whether the condition disproportionately adversely affected a protected group within the set of job applicants. The relevant statistical comparison under this approach is the proportions between privileged group and disadvantaged group in the pool of job applicants compared to the proportions in the pool of those employed. From the perspective of equality of results, however, the relevant statistical pool should be defined at least as those available in the labour market who could satisfy all the requirements for the job apart from the disputed educational qualification. It is the proportions between privileged and disadvantaged groups who can and who cannot satisfy the condition that serves as the comparison for establishing indirect discrimination. In respect of this difference between the relevant statistical pools, it is possible to detect a contrast between the courts in the USA, which favour the logic of equal treatment principle in the selection of statistical pools of comparison,<sup>54</sup> whereas UK courts have more commonly adopted the logic of equality of results.<sup>55</sup> This difference is obscured, however, by the common problem of the unavailability of the relevant statistics such as the racial composition of job applicants.

As a distributive principle concerned with results, the aim of social inclusion supports the logic of selecting the broader pool of statistical comparison. The aim of social inclusion is to eliminate exclusionary rules and practices regardless of whether they have in fact excluded job applicants in the past. Yet the statistical pool favoured by social inclusion differs slightly from the broadest pool favoured by the goal of equality of results. The social inclusion principle does not focus on the statistics for the labour market as a whole, unless the job concerned requires minimal skills, because its concern is with those who possess the skills to benefit from the job or those who could acquire them with training.

As well as supporting the use of broader statistical pools for comparison, the aim of social inclusion may throw light on two other problems that emerge in the comparative approach to proof. One difficulty concerns the interpretation of statistical differences. The test for discrimination in EC law is not one of statistical significance in a technical sense, but rather one that adopts a formula that there must be disadvantage to a 'substantially higher proportion' of the protected group.<sup>56</sup> The puzzle posed by that test is why it detracts from the commitment to equality, which should require merely a test of statistical significance. There may be pragmatic considerations at work here, such as the unreliability of the statistics themselves. But an additional explanation for this slight deviation from the equality standard may be that the legislation implicitly acknowledges that its distributive aim has to be more focussed on rules that have a considerable exclusionary effect, and has to refrain from assessments of the merits of every rule that produces results that deviate slightly from a normal distribution.

<sup>54</sup> *Hazlewood School District v United States* 433 US 299 (1977).

<sup>55</sup> *University of Manchester v Jones* [1993] ICR 474 CA; *Allonby v Accrington and Rossendale College* [2001] ICR 1189 CA.

<sup>56</sup> Art 2 Directive 97/80 OJ L14 20.1.1998 6. It is unclear whether this test survives after the new definitions of indirect discrimination in EC Directives 2000/78 and 2002/73, which use a new formula of 'particular disadvantage'.

A second problem that claims of indirect discrimination sometimes have to confront is the exclusionary effect of a combination of rules. For example, an employer may use two hiring conditions such as a formal educational qualification and a skill acquired through work experience. The approach to statistical comparison under the equality principle requires a comparison between the group in the labour market that can comply with all the requirements for the job and the group that can comply with those requirements except for the omission of a disputed criterion such as the formal educational qualification. The problem may arise that, although any one hiring condition may not create a substantial difference in the composition of the comparative pools, a combination of two or more may have a significant exclusionary effect. There is a danger that under the approach based on equality, an employer may be able to reject the inference of indirect discrimination by insisting that each hiring requirement should be viewed in isolation. The aim of social inclusion explains why this method of analysis is unsatisfactory. Social exclusion is often the product of a combination of factors, such as being a member of a minority group in a particular neighbourhood. A disadvantaged group is therefore often identified in theories of social exclusion by more than one criterion. The aim of social inclusion thus perhaps explains our intuition that the method of analysis that examines each hiring condition in isolation is unsatisfactory, because it does not appreciate the multi-faceted sources of disadvantage in many instances.<sup>57</sup>

## Direct discrimination and a justification defence

In pursuit of the goal of social inclusion, the elimination of a strict comparative approach to proof of discrimination necessitates the introduction of a justification defence for both direct and indirect discrimination. Under most current discrimination legislation, a general justification defence is restricted to indirect discrimination, though narrower defences such as a genuine occupational qualification are available in some instances of direct discrimination. The limited availability of a justification defence to direct discrimination seems to be mandated by the equal treatment principle. By requiring consistent treatment, the equal treatment principle creates a strong presumption against the possibility of justifying intentional discrimination. Any exceptions must be explained by reference to some other important right, such as respect for privacy, or an extremely tight requirement of necessity for job performance. In contrast, under the principle of social inclusion, justifications for hiring rules that directly discriminate can tolerate a broader range of considerations, provided that the justifications are compatible with the aim of social inclusion. It is helpful to examine one example of a justification defence to direct discrimination in greater depth, for it reveals how a discrimination law based upon social inclusion rather than equality approaches the task of defining discrimination.

The example is the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. Unlike most discrimination laws, the test for legal responsibility in this Act is not essentially a comparative criterion that contrasts the result of hiring decisions or rules between disabled persons and those in otherwise similar circumstances without a

---

<sup>57</sup> D. Ashiagbor, 'The Intersection of Gender and Race in the Labour Market: Lessons for Anti-Discrimination Law' in A. Morris and T. O'Donnell (eds), *Feminist Perspectives on Employment Law* (London: Cavendish, 1999) 139.

disability. For example, if an employer operates a hiring rule that recruits must receive a satisfactory medical report, and a disabled person receives an unfavourable report as result of the disability, the way in which the law analyses the case is to say that disability discrimination has occurred unless the employer can demonstrate that the hiring rule is justified.<sup>58</sup> It is irrelevant that the hiring rule applies equally to persons without a disability,<sup>59</sup> and it is not necessary to prove disparate impact. Once it is shown that the rule has excluded a disabled person, the question is not whether there was unequal treatment, but whether the rule is justified in the sense that the reason for the rule is both material to the circumstances of the particular case and substantial.<sup>60</sup>

This justification defence is further refined in section 5(2) of the Act, which holds the employer legally responsible for disability discrimination, if the employer cannot justify a failure to make reasonable adjustments to arrangements that place a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage. Equal treatment is not good enough. What the legislation requires is a duty to treat disabled persons differently, to make 'reasonable accommodations',<sup>61</sup> not to treat them equally.

Although the formal justification defence under the DDA appears to impose a low threshold,<sup>62</sup> the real substance of the justification issue is to be discovered in the question whether the employer has failed to make reasonable adjustment for the person's disability. What amounts to a reasonable adjustment is guided by the statute and an elaborate Code of Practice.<sup>63</sup> If an employer has complied with the Code and considered all the possible adjustments that might be made for the disabled person and only rejected those ones which it is reasonable to reject on grounds of excessive cost, impossibility, and perhaps safety,<sup>64</sup> the final question of whether in the particular circumstances of the case the hiring decision was justified seems likely to impose only a low additional hurdle for employers. The important question is whether all reasonable adjustments were considered, and here the tribunals encounter the acute difficulty of balancing the costs to the employer of assessing and making adjustments against the exclusionary effects of the hiring rules.

Under the policy of social inclusion it becomes possible, therefore, to recognise a broad justification defence to direct discrimination. The core element of this justification defence requires a demonstration that the objective of the rule serves the goal of social inclusion. The potential width of justifications can be illustrated by the facts and legal reasoning in *James v Eastleigh Borough Council*.<sup>65</sup> The Council operated a rule that persons of state pensionable age would be admitted for free to the Council's swimming pool. At that time the state pensionable age was 60 for women and 65 for men. The application of this rule entailed that Mr James, aged 61, paid the full charge whereas his wife of the same age entered the pool at the concessionary rate. If this rule is assessed exclusively from the perspective of a comparative equality principle, it seems to be an inescapable

58 *London Borough of Hammersmith & Fulham v Farnsworth* [2000] IRLR 691 EAT.

59 *Clark v TDG Ltd (t/a Novacold)* [1999] IRLR 318 CA.

60 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 s 5(3); see Arden LJ in *Post Office v Jones* [2001] ICR 805 817 CA.

61 This term is used in Article 5 of EC Directive 2000/78, above n 9, and The Americans with Disabilities Act 1990 s 102(b)(5)(A) 42 USC s 12,112(b)(5)(A).

62 See *Heinz v Kendrick* [2000] IRLR 141 EAT.

63 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 s 6; Code of Practice for the Elimination of Discrimination in the Field of Employment against Disabled Persons or Persons who have had a Disability (1996).

64 For a critique of such safety justifications: J. Davies and W. Davies, 'Reconciling Risk and the Employment of Disabled Persons in a Reformed Welfare State' (2000) 29 ILJ 347.

65 [1990] 2 AC 751 HL.

conclusion that there is a difference in treatment between the sexes. 'But for' Mr James' sex, he would have been entitled to the reduced charge. From the perspective of social inclusion, however, the analysis becomes more complex. We can understand the Council's policy as one aimed at a group, persons of state pensionable age, which finds it difficult to afford to take advantage of the facilities offered by the community. If the reason for this exclusion is the cost, a more inclusive outcome can be achieved by introducing a discriminatory charging rule in favour of that group. Although the rule about concessions incidentally violates a strict principle of equal treatment on the ground of sex, the principle of social inclusion provides a reason for dispensing with an equal treatment rule in this case, because equal treatment provides an inaccurate or off-target guide to the goal of achieving better social inclusion. Social inclusion permits unequal treatment if that measure favours an excluded group, and the excluded group can be defined by reference to the pattern of social exclusion - persons of state pensionable age. In short, the rule is not an unjustified rule from the perspective of social inclusion and therefore the Council should probably not be held to be in breach of the legal obligation. A majority of the Judicial Committee, however, upheld Mr James claim of sex discrimination, because the argument based on equal treatment was compelling. The temptation to introduce a qualification to the equal treatment principle for benign motives was resisted, no doubt in part because it afforded no criterion of what should count as a benign motive, and in part because the history of discrimination against women has been replete with men who acted with what they regarded as benign, chivalrous, and considerate motives.

## Positive action

Our earlier review of equality justifications for anti-discrimination laws noted the tension between any kind of different treatment based upon the characteristics of protected groups and the equal treatment principle. This tension has not entirely precluded some forms of positive action, but any measures have been subject to 'strict scrutiny' or a stringent test of 'proportionality'. In the United Kingdom, with the possible exception of Northern Ireland,<sup>66</sup> positive action with respect to the allocation of jobs by quotas or the like has been regarded as too great a violation of the equal treatment principle.<sup>67</sup> Our earlier theoretical discussion suggested that, in order to override the equal treatment principle and to justify different treatment, what is required is a compelling distributive justification. What kind of positive action does the distributive goal of social inclusion mandate?

66 Under The Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 SI 1998 No 3162 (NI 21), the Equality Commission in Northern Ireland is required to promote 'affirmative action' (article 7), which is defined as action designed to secure fair participation in employment by members of the Protestant and Roman Catholic Community (article 4). However, the mandatory orders that the Commission may direct towards employers are limited to measures to revise practices for the purpose of promoting equality of opportunity (Article 14). A. McColgan, *Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials* (Oxford: Hart, 2000) 517–518, 142–145.

67 The intricacies and perhaps inconsistencies of the US position are beyond the scope of this essay, though there is a similar pattern of a highly restrictive approach to affirmative action. Apart from court-ordered affirmative action programs as a remedy for past direct discrimination, strict scrutiny typically rules out affirmative action (*City of Richmond v JA Croson Co* 488 US 469 (1989), *Adarand Constructors Inc v Peña* 115 S Ct 2097 (1995)), though it may permit 'targets' but not 'quotas' in voluntary plans designed to redress patterns of disadvantage (*Johnson v Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, CA* 480 US 616 (1987)).

Positive discrimination for the purpose of social inclusion requires that employers should be sensitive to difference and make reasonable adjustments, in order to enable members of excluded groups to overcome obstructions to their obtaining work suitable for their skills and capability. This duty requires employers to consider amongst many things how the workplace is organised, how jobs are structured, and how the skills and capabilities of the workers could be improved, with a view to the reduction of barriers to employment for excluded groups. We have already considered an example of such a duty of positive discrimination in the duty to make reasonable accommodations under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995.<sup>68</sup>

Social inclusion does not, however, require the employer to adopt quotas to eliminate statistical discrimination, as might be required under a strong egalitarian approach. These quotas are unsatisfactory from the point of view of social inclusion, both because they ignore the question whether the individual worker can achieve 'well-being' from the job, and because they do not address the causes of social exclusion.<sup>69</sup> If the cause of social exclusion is that applicants from a particular excluded group lack the training to perform the job, the solution lies either in the provision of training or the reorganisation of work so that less training is required for some positions. If the cause of social exclusion is that the hours of work render it difficult for the excluded group to conform, the solution lies in a consideration of whether flexibility in hours could be introduced. This duty to make reasonable adjustments in hours of work might apply to our earlier example of job-sharing the position of librarian,<sup>70</sup> or to the case of a religious minority for whom work at a particular time is incompatible with required religious observances.<sup>71</sup>

Although at first sight this requirement for positive action mandated by the social inclusion principle appears to be at odds with current discrimination law that in general forbids different treatment, a closer inspection of the operation of the law of indirect discrimination reveals that it can approximate to the model suggested by the aim of social inclusion. In a claim for indirect discrimination, once the indirect discriminatory effect of a hiring rule is revealed by statistical evidence, the employer must justify the rule on business grounds to avoid a successful claim of discrimination. The justification standard currently used in cases of indirect sex discrimination is under EC law a test of proportionality,<sup>72</sup> which is similar to the 'business necessity' test used in the United States. Under other UK anti-discrimination laws, the test is perhaps slightly weaker: a requirement to balance objectively the discriminatory effect of the rule against

68 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 s 6(7) forbids more favourable treatment except in so far as different treatment is required under the duty of reasonable adjustment. See also Canadian Employment Equity Act 1995 s 2, which insists that 'equity' requires more than treating persons in the same way but 'requires special measures and the accommodation of differences.' This formula can justify quotas in order to breach social conventions that create barriers to employment: *Action Travail des Femmes v Canadian National Railway Co* [1987] 1 SCR 1114, 40 DLR (4<sup>th</sup>) 193 (S Ct Canada).

69 There are also reasons to be sceptical about the effectiveness of mandated affirmative action programmes in the light of the lack of compliance by employers with the 3% quota in the Disabled Persons (Employment) Act 1944; see B. Doyle, *New Directions Towards Disabled Workers' Rights* (London: Institute of Employment Rights, 1994) 10–11.

70 *Clymo v Wandsworth Borough Council* [1989] IRLR 241 EAT.

71 *Ahmad v Inner London Education Authority* [1978] QB 36 CA; *Ahmad v UK* (1982) 4 EHRR 126, EComHR. See also the American duty of reasonable accommodation of an employee's religious observance or practice in Civil Rights Act 1964 Title VII s 701(j) 42 USC s 2000e(j).

72 *Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz C-170/84* [1986] ECR 1607 ECJ; EC Directive 2000/78, Art 2(2)(b); 2002/73, new Art 2(2).

the reasonable needs of the party imposing the condition.<sup>73</sup> This justification defence requires the employer to discover and reveal the potential costs of eliminating the hiring rule in the same way that the duty of accommodation functions as an 'information-forcing rule'.<sup>74</sup> Then the court must balance those costs to the employer against the exclusionary impact of the rule.

As Jolls argues in the US context,<sup>75</sup> this process is closely analogous to the duty to make reasonable adjustment, provided that the courts do not permit a trivial cost to the employer to count as a sufficient justification. If the courts accept both that an employer may have to incur some costs to accommodate excluded groups and that those measures might involve reorganising the workplace, altering job content, and improving training opportunities, a justification defence to indirect discrimination presents a similar enquiry to that posed by the duty of reasonable adjustment.<sup>76</sup> For example, in *London Underground Ltd v Edwards (No 2)*,<sup>77</sup> where an employer introduced a new shift system that compelled a single parent eventually to resign, the court found that the shift system, though serving the employer's business needs, did not prevent the employer from accommodating the needs of single parents. As Morrison J observed in the Employment Appeal Tribunal, '[T]here was good evidence that London Underground could have made arrangements which would not have been damaging to their business plans but which would have accommodated the reasonable demands of their employees.' These similarities between a justification of indirect discrimination and the duty of reasonable adjustment appear more transparently under the EC test of proportionality. The key question under the test of proportionality is often whether the employer's rule is necessary in the sense no other rule with less adverse impact on the excluded group would satisfy the business needs of the employer.<sup>78</sup> Arguments about justification in indirect discrimination claims amount to more than an individualised claim for adjustment, because the employer is required to justify the adverse impact of the rule on an excluded class, not merely on a particular job applicant. The outcome of this legal process is in effect to require the employer to consider the possibility of affirmative action for a group, not in the sense of adopting quotas, but in the sense of adjustments to the business to enable members of the excluded group to obtain employment.

Although these examples reveal the close parallel in reasoning between the kind of positive action required by the principle of social inclusion and the operation of the employer's justification defence to claim of indirect discrimination, the match between the current law and the implications of the aim of social inclusion is not exact. The central difference concerns the potential width of justifications for indirectly discriminatory rules. Under the social inclusion principle, it should be

73 *Hampson v Department of Education and Science* [1989] ICR 179 CA. This test was approved and described as an application of the EC test of proportionality by Lord Nicholls in *Barry v Midland Bank plc* [199] ICR 859, HL 870, and by Sedley LJ in *Allonby v Accrington and Rossendale College* [2001] ICR 1189 CA 1200, though there seems to be a clear difference between a test of necessity and a mere balancing of interests.

74 P. S. Karlen and G. Rutherglen, 'Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation' (1996) 46 *Duke Law J* 1, 32.

75 C. Jolls, 'Antidiscrimination and Accommodation' (2001) 115 *Harv L Rev* 642.

76 S. Fredman, above n 10, 316–318.

77 [1997] IRLR 157 EAT; (affirmed [1999] ICR 494 CA); J. Conaghan, 'The Family-Friendly Workplace in Labour Law Discourse: Some Reflections on *London Underground Ltd v Edwards*' in H. Collins, P. Davies, R. Rideout (eds), *Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation* (London: Kluwer, 2000) 161.

78 This test of proportionality is also being applied under the Human Rights Act 1998, eg *Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2)* [2001] EWCA Civ 633, [2001] 3 WLR 42 CA.



possible to justify a rule with indirect discriminatory effects if the rule helps to reduce social exclusion. Thus the justification defence is not confined to business considerations such as cost, but can include the broader social objective of reducing social exclusion. For example, in Northern Ireland, where one effect of practices of religious discrimination has been a disproportionate level of unemployment among the Catholic community, the legislation provides a justification defence for hiring rules that give preference to unemployed persons, even though such rules almost certainly discriminate indirectly against the Protestant community.<sup>79</sup> This special provision is required because under the current anti-discrimination laws the employer can only justify indirectly discriminatory rules by reference to business considerations rather than broader social objectives.

As this last example reveals, not every legal expression of the duty of reasonable adjustment confers a broad discretion on the courts. In some instances the requirements of reasonable adjustment have been closely stipulated by Parliament. For instance, maternity and parental leave rights, which impose a cost on employers to adjust to the needs of new parents, have closely defined parameters and entitlements.<sup>80</sup> The further duty to accommodate parents' need for time off work to deal with family emergencies is more loosely defined by a standard of reasonableness.<sup>81</sup> These 'family-friendly' measures can be regarded as a determination of the requirement of reasonable adjustment for parents, with their underlying goal being in part the reduction of social exclusion.

## Priority not equality

The preceding sketch of the architecture of anti-discrimination laws based on a goal of social inclusion has emphasised four features. First, the primary target of social inclusion is the allocation of jobs to groups that suffer persistent disadvantage in the labour market. These groups can be identified by reference to one or more criteria, none of which need refer to unalterable or 'status' characteristics. Secondly, proof of discrimination should depend upon evidence of disadvantage combined with membership of one of the protected groups, without the further need to prove comparative greater disadvantage than other groups. Thirdly, anti-discrimination laws that pursue the goal of social inclusion should, however, permit a broad justification defence to both direct and indirect discrimination, though the justification must either rest upon the need to combat social exclusion or a claim that the discriminatory rule only excludes those people who could not take advantage of the employment opportunity. Finally, the goal of social inclusion mandates a form of positive action that can be described as a duty of reasonable adjustment.

My brief sketch of the features of anti-discrimination laws based upon a principle of social inclusion has not addressed many features of the current laws

79 Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 art 75, (SI 1998 No 3162 (NI 21)). A similar provision in art 73 provides a justification defence to rules that indirectly discriminate in selection for redundancy.

80 Employment Rights Act 1996, Part VIII (as amended by Employment Relations Act 1999 s7). Details are fixed by Maternity and Parental Leave, etc. Regulations 1999 SI 1999/3312. The current Employment Bill 2002 adds a tightly circumscribed right to paid paternity leave and improve maternity rights.

81 Employment Rights Act 1996, s 57A (as amended by Employment Relations Act 1999 s 8).

and proposals to amend them. The discussion could be extended in many directions with suggestive results. For instance, the most recent innovations in discrimination laws, which have been described as 'fourth generation duties',<sup>82</sup> impose positive duties on public sector bodies to take steps to improve equality.<sup>83</sup> The official justification for these positive duties is framed in terms of some notion of equality, such as fair equality of opportunity or more equal results. As Fredman argues, however, 'an important dimension of fourth generation equality laws is their potential to encourage participated groups in the decision-making process itself'.<sup>84</sup> There are many possible explanations for this emphasis upon participation by disadvantaged groups in determining the content of positive duties. A participatory process may contribute to democratic governance, a point stressed in European Union measures,<sup>85</sup> or it may help minorities to express how their 'difference' should be respected.<sup>86</sup> But ideas of equality do not seem to require such an emphasis on participation of minorities in the formulation of public policy. In contrast, the goal of social inclusion does emphasise the contribution of participation in public life as a contribution to 'well-being', so this element in the strategy of the development of positive duties fits into a social inclusion principle.

During the course of this analysis, we have compared the equality justifications for current anti-discrimination laws with the implications of the justification based upon social inclusion. In some respects, but by no means all, I have argued that the social inclusion justification provides a more coherent explanation of the legal framework. My argument is not that a social inclusion justification provides a complete interpretation of the current laws. Such a claim is implausible given the influential role that the notion of equality has played in the construction of the legislation. Where the potential influence of social inclusion can be detected is rather in accounts of when the law permits or requires different treatment rather than equal or the same treatment. In short, social inclusion provides a goal for the legislation that supplies a justification in particular instances for departures from the general rule of equal treatment.

Returning to our initial formulation of the problem of identifying the aims of anti-discrimination laws, social inclusion offers a distributive goal that answers the question when is it fair to require equal treatment and when is it fair to require different treatment. The answer is that deviations from equal treatment are required in order to achieve the distributive aim of social inclusion. This aim requires preference or priority to be given to members of a particular group, if the group can be classified as socially excluded. The preferential measures required are those that will contribute to the reduction of social exclusion.

The distributive aim of social inclusion avoids any direct connection with a distributive goal framed in terms of equality. It neither seeks equality of welfare nor equality of opportunity, though of course a successful policy of social inclusion would make a society more equal in both respects. The aim of social inclusion is rather to construct a conception of unfairness in results, and to suggest

---

82 B. Hepple, M. Coussey and T. Choudhury, above n 1, para 1.6.

83 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s 75 and Schedule 9; Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998, SI 1998 No 3162 (NI 21); Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000.

84 S. Fredman, above n 1, 164. A glimpse into the proposed methods of participation for the public sector is provided by the Department of Trade and Industry, *Equality Scheme: Section 75 Northern Ireland Act 1998* (January 2002), which envisages extensive consultation with large and small organisations, together with a range of measures designed to encourage participation.

85 Commission White Paper, *European Governance*, 25.7.2001, Com (2001) 428 final.

86 I. M. Young, above n 25, 184; A. Phillips, *The Politics of Presence* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); S. Fredman, above n 1, 153–156.

appropriate remedial strategies that involve giving priority or preference to excluded groups. But does this concern with priority rather than equality entail an abandonment of the equal treatment principle?

It is certainly compatible with the aim of social inclusion to argue that equal treatment should apply as the normal rule. Social exclusion is often the result of unequal treatment, so that a requirement of equal treatment often serves to address the problem. In the light of our earlier discussion, however, does this explanation of using equal treatment as a rule of thumb attribute sufficient weight to the principle in view of the force attached to it in anti-discrimination legislation? I doubt that this explanation of the role of the equal treatment principle could succeed, though my argument has never required that it should.

The reason for introducing the aim of social inclusion into the account of the aims of anti-discrimination legislation was to find a solution to the puzzle of why different treatment was sometimes required or permitted. My argument was that a notion of distributive justice was needed for such an account. Social inclusion provides such a theory of distributive justice, one which is not so ambitious as to cast doubt on maintaining equal treatment as the normal rule, but which also explains when and why deviations from the normal rule should be required or permitted. The continuing importance of the principle of equal treatment as an aim of the law is not abandoned as a result of recognising a distributive aim of social inclusion. Even so, we still require an explanation of why so much weight seems to be attached to the equal treatment principle, such that any deviation has to be carefully justified under tests of proportionality and the like.

My surmise is that equal treatment has been accorded such importance in anti-discrimination laws for two reasons. First, equal treatment is the normal rule required by the separate principle of respect for individual dignity or equal worth. We observed earlier that equal worth sometimes requires respect for difference, but we should not ignore how it also supports in most instances a requirement of equal treatment. This principle of equal respect is expressed by article 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: 'The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.' The independent value of respect for individual dignity thus strengthens the weight to be attached to the value of equal treatment.

A second reason why equal treatment has been given such a prominent role in the legislation is that the principle has provided a dominant constitutional principle within Western legal systems. A legal system, which has achieved autonomy from the political and economic systems, has its independent demands of fair process, of evidence and proof, of remedial devices, of legal justification, and, in general, of preservation of the integrity of its system.<sup>87</sup> The maxims of

87 This distinction between political goal and the operational requirements of the legal system uses the analytical framework of systems theory, as in G. Teubner, *Law as an Autopoietic System* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), though a similar distinction between general justifying aim and conditions of legal responsibility can be expressed through political philosophy, as in H. L. A. Hart, *Punishment and Responsibility* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968) Chapter 1. The terminology of 'integrity' derives, of course, from R. Dworkin, above n 26. My discussion focuses on the demand of integrity for equal respect, but the legal system imposes many other operational requirements on anti-discrimination laws, such as proof of 'detriment' as a condition for a claim, and a tendency to require the satisfaction of some criterion of 'fault' before compensation can be awarded.

'equal protection of the laws' or 'treat like cases alike' represent fundamental operational principles of these legal systems. The significance of this legal framework is that whenever political goals have to be incorporated into law, the legal system must accommodate them within its own operational principles. The political goal behind anti-discrimination legislation becomes translated in the operations of the legal system as a rule that like cases should be treated alike. In other words, the legal system has its own independent values or communication system, which place constraints on how political goals can be pursued through its mechanisms. Whatever the political aim behind anti-discrimination legislation, whether it comprises equality of results, equality of opportunity, or social inclusion, that aim has to be modified to comply with the principle of equal treatment in order for it to be accommodated with integrity within the legal system.

A combination of these two reasons probably explains sufficiently why the anti-discrimination legislation attaches such great weight to the principle of equal treatment. The significance attached to equal treatment by the principle of equal respect and the integrity of the legal system can provide an explanation for why the anti-discrimination laws depart from the architecture suggested by the distributive goal of social inclusion. For instance, it was noted earlier that aim of social inclusion does not explain why white males should receive legal protection against discrimination, assuming that they are not an excluded group. We can appreciate, however, that the symmetrical pattern of many discrimination laws responds to the requirements of the principle of equal worth and the demands of integrity of the legal system.

Returning, finally, to the question posed at the outset – what are the aims of anti-discrimination laws? – my argument suggests that as well as upholding the ideal of respect for the dignity of individuals or equal worth, the legislation also must be understood as pursuing a distributive aim in order to account for deviations from the equal treatment principle. I have argued, though certainly not conclusively, that this distributive aim or criterion of fairness may be discovered in the aim of social inclusion. Although the current law does not fit precisely with the principles suggested by the aim of social inclusion, the match is closer than might be initially supposed, and in several respects the aim of social inclusion explains features of the law that seem hard to account for by reference to other possible distributive aims such as equality of opportunity. In particular, the aim of social inclusion suggests a more determinate standard for the legitimacy of positive action than the tests of 'proportionality' or 'strict scrutiny'. It suggests that deviations from equal treatment should be permitted where the discriminatory measure is necessary to achieve the result of social inclusion for members of a group that are presently largely excluded.

Moreover, an appreciation of the aim of social inclusion may provide an insight into the reasons why we may have reservations about some aspects of the current law. For instance, remember *James v Eastleigh Borough Council*, the case concerning free entry to a swimming pool. Although the majority of the House of Lords regarded the problem as a simple case of direct discrimination, because 'but for' his sex Mr James would have had a free swim, the minority were surely correct to doubt whether the aim of the law included preventing the local authority from increasing access to its facilities for those who might otherwise be excluded. We do not know whether the concession based upon state pensionable age served the goal of reducing the exclusion of a group that was otherwise disproportionately excluded from this public facility. That question was left answered, because the

majority believed that ultimately the equal treatment principle provided an exclusionary rule that prevented any justification of direct discrimination. The aim of social inclusion explains why that question should have been relevant, and why a deviation from the equal treatment rule may have been justified in this instance. This exercise in examining the aims of the anti-discrimination laws in the light of the idea of social inclusion is not therefore merely an exercise in mapping, of interpretation, or of rationalisation, but it is also intended as a critical exploration of the assumptions and limitations of these laws.

# 1 Three Discourses of Social Exclusion

The term social exclusion is intrinsically problematic. It represents the primary significant division in society as one between an included majority and an excluded minority. This has implications for how both included and excluded groups are understood, and for the implicit model of society itself. Attention is drawn away from the inequalities and differences among the included. Notably, the very rich are discursively absorbed into the included majority, their power and privilege slipping out of focus if not wholly out of sight. At the same time, the poverty and disadvantage of the so-called excluded are discursively placed outside society. What results is an overly homogeneous and consensual image of society – a rosy view possible because the implicit model is one in which inequality and poverty are pathological and residual, rather than endemic. Exclusion appears as an essentially peripheral problem, existing at the boundary of society, rather than a feature of a society which characteristically delivers massive inequalities across the board and chronic deprivation for a large minority. The solution implied by a discourse of social exclusion is a minimalist one: a transition across the boundary to become an insider rather than an outsider in a society whose structural inequalities remain largely uninterrogated.

In practice, however, ‘social exclusion’ is embedded in different discourses which manifest these problems to varying extent. Three discourses are identified here: a redistributionist discourse (RED) developed in British critical social policy, whose prime concern is with poverty; a moral underclass discourse (MUD) which centres on the moral and behavioural delinquency of the excluded themselves; and a social integrationist discourse (SID) whose central focus is on paid work. They differ in how they characterize the boundary, and thus what defines people as insiders or outsiders, and how inclusion can be brought about. RED broadens out from its concern with poverty into a critique of inequality, and contrasts exclusion with a version of citizenship which calls for substantial redistribution of power and wealth. MUD is a gendered discourse with many forerunners, whose demons are criminally-inclined, unemployable young men and sexually and

socially irresponsible single mothers, for whom paid work is necessary as a means of social discipline, but whose (self-) exclusion, and thus potential inclusion, is moral and cultural. SID focuses more narrowly on unemployment and economic inactivity, pursuing social integration or social cohesion primarily through inclusion in paid work. The three discourses differ quite markedly in how they present the relationship between inclusion/exclusion and inequality, a theme which is central to the overall argument of this book.

The following discussion of RED, MUD, and SID also considers how the valorization of unpaid work plays through the different discourses. In October 1997 the Office of National Statistics (ONS) published the first estimates of the extent and value of unpaid work in the British economy. If a monetary value were put on such work, at 1995 values it would have been at least equivalent to £341 billion, or more than the whole UK manufacturing sector, and perhaps as much as £739 billion, 120 per cent of gross domestic product. Among the reasons for this statistical development was the insensitivity of conventional national accounts to the movement of activities between market and non-market sectors.<sup>1</sup> Yet despite this official endorsement, the dominant public and social-scientific understanding of 'work' remains paid work. Since the ONS figures confirmed that women do much more unpaid work than men, and that although men do more paid work, they also have more leisure, men's work is more acknowledged, as well as more highly rewarded, than women's work.<sup>2</sup> Following a well-established theme in feminist arguments, Miriam Glucksmann argues that work cannot be elided with those forms which happen to take place in a market setting: work refers to all 'activity necessary for the production and reproduction of economic relations and structures... irrespective of how and where it is carried out'. She describes the 'manner by which all the labour in a particular society is divided up and allocated to different structures, institutions and activities' as the total social organization of labour, and goes on to discuss historical changes in the gendered division of labour within and between household and market – shifts which the new satellite accounts are expressly developed to illuminate.<sup>3</sup> Both Glucksmann's perspective and the new official data raise another question. How is the recognition of not just the social but the economic value of currently unpaid work compatible with the distribution of the social product primarily through rewards for paid work? RED, MUD and SID have different capabilities for acknowledging, and thus for potentially addressing, this question.

## RED: SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND CRITICAL SOCIAL POLICY

In 1979 Peter Townsend published a major study of poverty, analysing survey data from 1968–9. His purpose was to redefine poverty as an objective condition of relative deprivation. Rather than defining poverty, as earlier studies and official policy had done, in terms of levels of income necessary for subsistence, Townsend argued that the crucial issue was whether people had sufficient resources to participate in the customary life of society and to fulfil what was expected of them as members of it:

Individuals, families and groups can be said to be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or at least are widely encouraged and approved, in the societies to which they belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs and activities.<sup>4</sup>

Expectations across society might differ in many respects, but Townsend claimed there was nevertheless ‘a loosely defined set of customs, material goods and social pleasures at any point in a nation’s history which can be said to represent general amenities, or to which all or most people in that society are agreed to be entitled. Those who have few of these amenities can be said to be deprived’. Inequality might affect the style in which people participated in some social practices – the lavishness of holidays, or celebrations of birthdays and religious festivals. Poverty and deprivation went beyond this. There was a level of resources below which, rather than just a reduction in the scale of participation, there was a sudden withdrawal from the community’s style of living: people ‘drop out or are excluded’.<sup>5</sup>

Townsend was not the first to argue that poverty was a multi-faceted process rather than simply a matter of low income. But his was a sustained argument which widened the perspective from income to resources, and from consumption to participation. The analysis embraced housing, health and environmental pollution. It revealed disability as a particular factor in producing exclusion. It addressed deprivation at work, including hours of work, job security, and the working environment, and looked at the relationship between work, welfare and fringe benefits. The solution proposed was explicitly and broadly redistributive. Townsend recommended a decreased reliance



on means-tested benefits, which he saw as a mechanism of social control as well as a rationing device: benefits should be paid as of right. He acknowledged a conflict between this approach and the principles and requirements of a capitalist market. Nevertheless, he argued that:

National action to remedy poverty – through incomes policy, full employment, less specialization of work roles, higher social security benefits, new forms of allowances and rate support grants and a more redistributive tax structure – is implied.<sup>6</sup>

*Poverty in the United Kingdom* also included a chapter on one-parent families. This was a relatively new category in social thought. Townsend noted that there was no such term before 1964, when ‘fatherless families’ were collectively identified, and no national collation of statistics until 1967; ‘motherless families’ were incorporated later. Consistent with later trends in social science towards deconstructing rather than constructing categories, Duncan and Edwards have argued that lone-parent families should not be treated as a single group.<sup>7</sup> But Townsend was concerned about unmarried and separated mothers being pressed into employment despite their entitlement to benefit, and also concerned that lone fathers would continue to be subjected to improper pressure. Fathers only acquired the right to claim benefits as lone parents in 1975. This was one of a number of changes – including linking pension upratings to the higher of earnings or prices – brought in by the Wilson government, with Barbara Castle as Minister for Health and Social Security. Townsend attributed the poverty of one-parent families to a number of factors: the low earning-power of women; the absence of public child care; the practical restrictions that caring for children places on lone parents; attitudes to unmarried parents; the social expectation that women should be the primary carers; and the lack of income rights for women caring for children within marriage or outside it. The restructuring of the benefit system should incorporate larger maintenance allowances for children, allowances for the care of children, and an allowance for the upkeep of the family home in recognition of the unpaid work involved – all paid as of right, rather than means-tested.<sup>8</sup> These recommendations went some way towards recognizing the unpaid work of parenting.

The whole thrust of Townsend’s argument was that poverty resulted in exclusion from social participation, but he did not use the term ‘social exclusion’. Reflecting on this in 1997, he said that he had resisted the term for some time because he saw discrimination and exclusion as ‘effects rather than causes’, as ‘by-products of... market

manufactured class'; too much emphasis on social exclusion diverted attention from deprivation. However, he said 'I was wrong... "social exclusion" directs attention to the marginalised and excluded and to the potential instruments of their exclusion'.<sup>9</sup> He argued once again for a redistributive strategy, not just through the tax and benefit systems and public services, but through the reduction of earnings differentials, a minimum wage, a minimum income for those unable to work, and financial recognition of unpaid work through at least a conditional participation income, if not an unconditional citizen's income.

The eighteen years between these statements were also the eighteen years of Conservative government, marked by dramatic increases in inequality, in unemployment, and in the numbers living in poverty, as well as more restrictive conditions for less generous social security benefits. The Tories had a redistributive strategy – but it was redistribution to the rich. Over this period, 'social exclusion' gained currency in critical social policy, especially in the discourse of the research and campaigning organization, Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG). CPAG marked the 1997 election with the publication of *Britain Divided: The growth of social exclusion in the 1980s and 1990s*.<sup>10</sup> Its three sections were subtitled 'creating poverty and social exclusion'; 'dimensions of poverty and social exclusion'; and 'combating poverty and social exclusion' – a formula which leaves open the relationship between the two terms. Walker, however, defined poverty in similar terms to Townsend: it is 'a lack of the material resources, especially income, necessary to participate in British society'. Social exclusion has a broader, more comprehensive, meaning: it 'refers to the dynamic process of being shut out, fully or partially, from any of the social, economic, political and cultural systems which determine the social integration of a person in society'.<sup>11</sup>

Contributors to the book were variously successful in maintaining this distinction. They emphasized that poverty does not necessarily lead to exclusion – a point made by Townsend in 1979, who noted that although poverty constituted a serious barrier to social participation, nevertheless stability of personal circumstances, length of residence, good health and frequent social contacts mitigated the effects of low material resources. The CPAG volume argued that social exclusion may be a cause, rather than just a result, of poverty. Homelessness, health, unemployment, food, utility disconnections were discussed, as well as (and in relation to) gender, ethnicity, the social security system and the overall distribution of income and wealth. The agenda was one

of radical redistribution – although Townsend was one of a minority, together with Lisa Harker, who mentioned unpaid work. Harker, both here and elsewhere, called for universal child benefit, plus a benefit supporting child rearing.<sup>12</sup> This would be payable in addition to social insurance benefits, and calculated on an individual rather than household basis – thus reducing the personal economic dependency of women on men.

A concept of exclusion which refers to being shut out fully *or partially* is thereby extended to incorporate inequality, and its converse necessarily implies much greater equality. *Britain Divided* concluded on a cautiously optimistic note about the prospects for a redistributive agenda under Labour, citing Gordon Brown's John Smith Memorial Lecture where he argued that equality must be restored to its proper place in the trinity of socialist values, alongside liberty and community, and insisted that Labour would tackle poverty and inequality. Given Brown's later redefinition of equality as equality of opportunity (see Chapter 7 below), the caution may have been more appropriate than the optimism. But in the years of Thatcherite domination, direct defence of equality was difficult. It was assaulted as an immoral, even totalitarian, imposition of uniformity, and a brake on economic growth. Increasingly, the idea of citizenship was deployed in defence of welfare rights and welfare provision. Thus Walker argued that 'social exclusion may... be seen as the denial (or non-realisation) of the civil, political and social rights of citizenship'.<sup>13</sup> Peter Golding argued that poverty led to a reduction in participation tantamount to partial citizenship, as low income families were excluded from new information technologies, entertainment and leisure pursuits, as well as from financial institutions and from political life.<sup>14</sup> Ruth Lister's *The Exclusive Society* was subtitled 'citizenship and the poor', and traced the development of the broadening view of social exclusion as the antithesis of citizenship.<sup>15</sup>

Citizenship is, of course, another word which can embrace many meanings, and whose inflection to the individual or the social may vary considerably. Goodin argues that citizenship is a more egalitarian concept than inclusion.<sup>16</sup> Whereas inclusion focuses on the division between insiders and outsiders, and does not address the relationship between boundary and centre, citizenship focuses on the characteristics which are shared. However, models of citizenship differ in their scope, and thus in what respect citizens are to be deemed equal. The version used as an antonym to social exclusion drew heavily on T. H. Marshall's model, set out in 1950, which incorporated civil, political

and social rights. Marshall too saw citizenship as implicitly egalitarian in relation to the rights and duties attaching to any particular definition. But he also argued that the twentieth century was characterized by the progressive extension of social rights: 'the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society'.<sup>17</sup> It was this emphasis on social citizenship rights, and the right to share *to the full* in the social heritage, which made this a useful language for egalitarians for it implied, as Marshall said, greater economic equality. On the other hand, he also observed that the move towards greater equality would be limited by the tension between the principle of social justice and the operation of the market. Moreover, citizenship could operate to legitimate inequalities, provided that they did not transgress equality of opportunity, did not cut too deep, and occurred 'within a population united in a single civilisation'.<sup>18</sup>

Marshall's framework was not adopted uncritically. He had addressed inequalities of class, but not those consequent on ethnicity and gender. Some argued that the concept of citizenship needed radical overhaul to avoid the problem of assimilating women to an essentially male model of the citizen.<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless, it formed the basis of an egalitarian, redistributive, broad understanding of social exclusion, inclusion and citizenship. Although social exclusion was, at the extreme, the product of poverty, citizenship was fundamentally affected by inequality. Lister's statement sums up the standpoint:

It is not possible to divorce the rights and responsibilities which are supposed to unite citizens from the inequalities of power and resources that divide them. These inequalities – particularly of class, race and gender – run like fault-lines through our society and shape the contours of citizenship in the civil, political and social spheres. Poverty spells exclusion from the full rights of citizenship in each of these spheres and undermines people's ability to fulfil the private and public obligations of citizenship.<sup>20</sup>

Between 1979 and 1997, the social-democratic redistributive agenda was recast in this new language of exclusion and citizenship. Social exclusion was more clearly understood as a dynamic process, and a multi-faceted one, than poverty had generally been, and questions of gender and ethnicity had much higher profile; not only poverty, but the whole gamut of social inequalities were brought into the frame. Used in this discourse, RED, social exclusion mobilizes more than the

concern with outcast poverty from which it started. It addresses the exclusionary processes in all areas of society which result in inequality itself. The characteristics of RED can be summarized as follows:

- It emphasizes poverty as a prime cause of social exclusion.
- It implies a reduction of poverty through increases in benefit levels.
- It is potentially able to valorize unpaid work.
- In positing citizenship as the obverse of exclusion, it goes beyond a minimalist model of inclusion.
- In addressing social, political and cultural, as well as economic, citizenship, it broadens out into a critique of inequality, which includes, but is not limited to, material inequality.
- It focuses on the processes which produce that inequality.
- It implies a radical reduction of inequalities, and a redistribution of resources and of power.

If Labour's understanding of social exclusion were consistent with RED, it would imply moving towards a more radically redistributive programme than that set out in the 1997 manifesto. However, other discourses, with different implications, are available.

#### MUD: THE UNDERCLASS AND THE CULTURE OF DEPENDENCY

The evolution of RED took place in a political context where social citizenship rights were under continued attack from the New Right. Unemployment and the numbers in poverty soared in the early 1980s to levels unprecedented in the post-war years, and social security spending rose with them. The government's response was to tighten eligibility for benefits and reduce their value, deny the existence of poverty, suppress and abolish some of the key indicators of its extent, and blame the poor for their own situation. References to the 'underclass' and to a 'culture of dependency' became embedded in a discourse concerned with social order and moral integration.

The New Right of the 1980s is now widely misunderstood as an exclusively neo-liberal project, aimed at the deregulation of the market and the reduction of state intervention. It was, however, made up of two apparently contradictory, but actually symbiotic, strands of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism. Neo-liberal economics underpinned widespread privatization, and justified growing inequalities in the

name of incentives. But neo-conservatism, which developed alongside neo-liberalism, was concerned with order rather than freedom, with family, nation and morality – and held no brief for a minimal state. This was not the last gasp of old conservatism struggling to survive. The ‘free’ economy needed a strong state to impose and uphold the conditions of its operations, especially in the restrictions on trade union resistance. The state also had to police the effects – most notably in the 1984–5 miners’ strike, protests over the poll tax, and urban unrest, but also on a more routine basis. The strong state in turn relied on the market – and especially the ever-present threat of unemployment – as a potent source of social discipline.<sup>21</sup>

This dual character of the New Right is important to understanding the political realignments of the 1990s. It is also fundamental to understanding the discourses about poverty which RED was intended to rebut. Those reliant on benefit were always separated into the deserving and the undeserving poor – those who really needed help and those who were scroungers exploiting an overgenerous and insufficiently-policed system. At least for the deserving poor, benefits were generally seen as good for the individual recipients, if expensive for society as a whole. Echoing arguments from the United States, this changed. Economic dependence on ‘welfare’ was construed as ‘dependency’, a pathological moral and psychological condition created by the benefit system itself – and fostered by the libertarianism of the 1960s – in which the state was seen as a universal provider, sapping personal initiative, independence and self-respect. Benefits were bad for, rather than good for, their recipients. If this was true of individuals, it was even more true of the poor collectively: welfare spending gave rise to a ‘culture of dependency’. This discourse inexorably took over the public domain. In a television documentary about poverty and unemployment, the political commentator John Cole described the ‘giro culture’ as ‘an endemic culture of no work and reliance on benefits’, characterized by a ‘downward spiral of idleness, crime and erosion of the work ethic’.<sup>22</sup> The focus had shifted from the structural basis of poverty to the moral and cultural character of the poor themselves.

The idea of an ‘underclass’ was central to this shift. Townsend had himself used the term without any critical connotation to refer to different groups of the excluded poor: the elderly, disabled, chronically sick, long-term unemployed and one-parent families.

A large, and proportionately increasing, section of the population are neither part of the paid workforce nor members of the households

of that workforce... The ways in which they have been denied access to paid employment, conceded incomes equivalent in value to bare subsistence, attracted specially defined low status as minority groups, and accommodated, as a result, within the social structure as a kind of modern 'underclass', need to be traced.<sup>23</sup>

This was a statement about the place of the poor in – and notably not outside – the overall social structure. It was free from claims about the lifestyles of the poor, and free from moral condemnation, except for the social processes which generated poverty.

In 1990, Frank Field's *Losing Out: The Emergence of Britain's Underclass* argued that the extension of citizenship rights heralded by Marshall had been reversed by the effects of Thatcherism, particularly by exclusion from work and increased reliance on means-tested benefits. Exclusion from citizenship was the mark of the underclass, which would not disappear without 'the implementation of a series of policies aimed at re-establishing full citizenship'.<sup>24</sup> He was critical of the growing tendency both to describe and to explain poverty in cultural terms and thus effectively blame the poor for their circumstances. He used an article by Ralf Dahrendorf as an example. Dahrendorf, like Field, had written about the underclass in terms of exclusion from citizenship: 'The existence of an underclass casts doubt on the social contract itself. It means that citizenship has become an exclusive rather than an inclusive status. Some are full citizens, some are not'.<sup>25</sup> But he also argued that the underclass was characterized by low educational attainment or functional illiteracy, that incomplete families were the norm rather than the exception, and that it was culturally distinct from the rest of society:

It includes a lifestyle of laid-back sloppiness, association in changing groups and gangs, congregation around discos or the like, hostility to middle-class society, particular habits of dress, hairstyle, often drugs or at least alcohol – a style, in other words which has little in common with the values of the work society around.<sup>26</sup>

Field was at pains to emphasize the structural, rather than cultural, factors leading to the growth of an underclass. Unlike Dahrendorf, he insisted that the underclass remained committed to work, this being the 'cornerstone value of the whole system'; it was 'important not to lose sight of the fact that the main aim of this... group is to win a place back in society by gaining a job'.<sup>27</sup> But he did not deny that they were

behaviourally distinct and a problem for the majority: 'the existence of an underclass tends to make our society a less civilised one in which to live', and 'it should come as little surprise that some of those who feel they have no stake in 'official' society should react in a way that demonstrates their exclusion'.<sup>28</sup> However, in discussing the characteristics of a system which tended to trap the poor on benefits, he did express concern about the moral consequences of benefit dependency and the erosion of initiative, and referred to the 'personal pathologies of many of the underclass, and the culture induced by poverty'.<sup>29</sup> Over the following years, Field moved to a much clearer view that state provision created dependency and eroded incentives to work and to save.<sup>30</sup>

The characterization of the underclass in cultural terms was consolidated by the intervention of the American commentator, Charles Murray. Murray's tract, *The Emerging British Underclass* was published both in the *Sunday Times*, which financed his visit to Britain in 1989, and by the right-wing think-tank, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA). He argued that an underclass had long existed in the United States, and was now developing in Britain. He described himself as 'a visitor from a plague area come to see if the disease is spreading'. He asked 'how contagious is the disease?'; 'is it going to spread indefinitely or is it self-containing?'. The 'disease' was cultural, spread by 'people... whose values are contaminating the life of entire neighbourhoods' – by rejecting both the work ethic and the family ethic which are central to the dominant culture.<sup>31</sup> Not all the poor were part of an underclass. Its existence could be diagnosed by three symptoms: 'illegitimacy, crime and drop-out from the labour force': and 'if illegitimate births are the leading indicator of an underclass and violent crime is a proxy measure of its development, the definitive proof that an underclass has arrived is that large numbers of young, healthy, low-income males choose not to take jobs'.<sup>32</sup>

These three factors, Murray argued, interact to produce pathological communities in which the socialization of children – especially boys – is inadequate: 'communities need families. Communities need fathers'.<sup>33</sup> Fathers are necessary as role models to civilize the young; but marriage and family responsibilities are necessary to civilize men, who are, without these constraints, driven to prove their masculinity in destructive ways. The benefit system feeds the growth of the underclass, by making it too easy for lone mothers to rear children, and removing the pressure on single mothers to marry. In a later account, Murray's emphasis shifted even further towards demonizing lone



parenthood, and he proposed decreasing economic support for lone mothers and their children, while increasing the stigma attaching to them.<sup>34</sup> The policy implications were not the extension of citizenship rights, but their greater conditionality, reduction or removal.

This is, of course, exactly what happened in the United States. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of August 1996 abolished Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), replacing it with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), in which there was no entitlement to benefits. It devolved welfare provision to individual states, but within a highly prescriptive framework underpinned by replacing federal matching funds with cash-limited block grants. Levels of grant would be cut if states failed to get people off welfare and into work: 25 per cent of all claimants should be in work by October 1997, and 50 per cent by 2002; for two-parent families, the targets were 75 per cent by 1997 and 90 per cent by 1999. For the first time since Roosevelt's New Deal, eligible claimants could be refused benefits if the cash ran out. A limit of five years was imposed on the total length of time a family could receive federal TANF funds. State plans were required to include a provision that if a family received benefit for more than two years, at least one adult in the family would have to participate in workfare-type activity. Discretion to waive this rule was permissible only where there were children under the age of one. States were required to refuse benefits to those refusing work or workfare programmes, and were to be penalized for not meeting target participation rates in work-related activities by TANF claimants. Teenage mothers would be ineligible for TANF unless attending school and living with their parents or guardians – thus seeking 'to discourage single parenthood and illegitimate births by denying entitlement to huge swathes of the US welfare system'.<sup>35</sup> Wisconsin was among the states which had pioneered experiments in workfare before the 1996 Act, under waiver of the federal rules. Over the ten years from 1987 to 1997, the number of claimants dropped by 60 per cent. In 1997, the Wisconsin Works or W-2 programme went state-wide. All claimants were now required to work – in unsubsidized or subsidized employment or in 'community service' jobs at below the minimum wage. Lone mothers were required to return to work when their youngest child was twelve weeks old. The Governor of Wisconsin, Tommy Thompson, who pioneered the reforms was questioned as to the morality and Christianity of a policy which separated very young babies from their mothers and led to an increased reliance on soup kitchens and emergency shelters. He replied that paying people not to

work, not to get married and to have more children was unchristian, and encouraged irresponsible behaviour.<sup>36</sup>

Murray's description of the underclass cast it in cultural and moral terms. In the United States, the so-called underclass is largely black, so the discourse has an additional racial element. This is not so immediately present in Britain, where commentators are often at pains to point out that the victim-villains are poorly qualified white working class young people. But like earlier accounts of dangerous classes lurking at the margins of society,<sup>37</sup> including Marx's lumpenproletariat, it is a very clearly gendered picture. The delinquency of young men is directly criminal and anti-social, accompanied by wilful idleness and drug abuse. Young women's delinquency manifests itself in their sexual and reproductive behaviour, the imputed irresponsibility of lone parenthood. The two are connected through the assumption that lone parenting is inadequate parenting, with both forms of delinquency attributed to a failure of socialization, especially into the work ethic and a belief in marriage.

By 1992, when John Westergaard took the underclass as the subject of his presidential address to the British Sociological Association, it was clear that there were three different meanings attaching to the term: outcast poverty; the moral turpitude of the poor; and a less specific, rhetorical usage which had become common in the media. Westergaard argued, as Stuart Hall had done five years earlier,<sup>38</sup> that the term underclass implied a dichotomous view of society, and served to obscure inequalities among the majority:

What the three have in common is, to start with, a postulate of the recent emergence of a significant minority of the population who are trapped, outside and below 'society at large' either by cultural depravity or economic deprivation, and an inference, whether expressed or implied, that the divide between this underclass and the great majority is increasingly *the* most salient and challenging line of division for the future, by contrast with the older divisions of class now said to be in eclipse.<sup>39</sup>

Westergaard went on to argue that this was exactly why the concept had such appeal. It allowed the recognition of the increasingly obvious persistence of poverty to co-exist with arguments or assumptions about the attrition of class divisions in society as a whole.

Critical social policy was more concerned to defend structural interpretations of poverty against cultural accounts which blamed the poor. The term 'underclass' became very unpopular because of its

association with Murray's rhetoric of moral inferiority and social contagion. Despite its capacity to capture the ways in which aspects of poverty compound one another, it was rejected on three grounds: its imprecision; the lack of empirical evidence supporting its cultural claims; and its punitive rather than supportive policy implications.<sup>40</sup> Its ambiguity meant that those who used it as a description of the monstrously divisive consequences for the poor of Thatcherite policies unwittingly opened the door to a quite different discourse about the potential consequences of the poor for the comfortable majority, where redistribution gave way to retribution. The idea of the dependency culture, for whose existence there was little evidence,<sup>41</sup> also facilitated this switch from structural to cultural interpretations. Its central tenet was that groups of people excluded from society as a whole, and especially when dependent on benefit, would develop a distinctive set of morally undesirable attitudes and behaviours, characterized by various forms of parasitism, crime and immorality. Lister argued that 'those who invoke the development of an 'underclass' to make the case for the restoration of full citizenship rights to the poor are playing with fire'.<sup>42</sup> The contested meaning of the underclass gave way to a strong preference for talking about social exclusion instead: thus in RED, social exclusion is used to actively refuse the moral agenda of the underclass debate.

This has had little impact on the popular usage of the term 'underclass', especially in the media, where it continues to carry both structural and cultural meanings. Adonis and Pollard defend its use. It 'captures the essence of the class predicament for many at the bottom: a complete absence of ladders, whether basic skills, role models, education or a culture of work'.<sup>43</sup> It is characterized by 'unemployment and unemployability' as well as single motherhood and educational failure. The cultural interpretation wins out: 'there is no question that upbringing plays a big and probably growing role in transferring poverty and social inadequacy from one generation to the next'.<sup>44</sup> But as social exclusion entered public political discourse, it did so in conjunction with references to the underclass – with Blair himself repeatedly referring to an underclass excluded from the mainstream. Social exclusion is also an ambiguous term, capable of carrying both structural and cultural meanings. Thus Duffy defines social exclusion as 'a broader concept than poverty, encompassing not only low material means but the inability to participate effectively in economic, social, political and cultural life, and in some characterisations, alienation and distance from the mainstream society'.<sup>45</sup> Where it is

used in conjunction with the underclass, social exclusion is at risk of co-optation into a highly problematic discourse, MUD, whose main characteristics are these:

- It presents the underclass or socially excluded as culturally distinct from the ‘mainstream’.
- It focuses on the behaviour of the poor rather than the structure of the whole society.
- It implies that benefits are bad, rather than good, for their recipients, and encourage ‘dependency’.
- Inequalities among the rest of society are ignored.
- It is a gendered discourse, about idle, criminal young men and single mothers.
- Unpaid work is not acknowledged.
- Although dependency on the state is regarded as a problem, personal economic dependency – especially of women and children on men – is not. Indeed, it is seen as a civilizing influence on men.

#### SID: SOCIAL EXCLUSION, SOCIAL INTEGRATION AND EUROPE

The increasing public reference in Britain to social exclusion was not only the result of resistance to the underclass discourse, but the growing importance of the European Union. The origins of the European-wide emphasis on social exclusion lay in France, where the opposite of exclusion was insertion. Silver argues that social exclusion has a specific meaning in the French republican tradition, within a paradigm rooted in both Durkheimian sociology and Catholicism, and concerned with moral integration.<sup>46</sup> Exclusion is understood as the breakdown of the structural, cultural and moral ties which bind the individual to society, and family instability is a key concern. French discourses of exclusion, themselves contested, broadened out to a consideration of groups marginalized economically, socially, culturally and, in the case of outer suburbs, spatially; and to the fields of education, employment, housing and health. Although insertion, as the obverse of exclusion, acquired a similarly wide brief, a key measure was the introduction in 1988 of a residual benefit, the RMI (*Revenu Minimum d’Insertion*), stressing the reciprocal nature of solidarity. Recipients of RMI were required to sign a ‘*contrat d’insertion*’ – in many cases focused on employment, but in some involving other forms

of social participation negotiated with social workers, and addressing aspects of ‘daily living, behaviour, and family relationships’.<sup>47</sup>

Silver sees moral integration as the distinctive characteristic of what she calls the ‘solidarity’ paradigm. Her reading of Durkheim, however, understates the extent to which he saw social integration as based in work (see Chapter 9). It also understates how far the moral integration of ‘solidarity’ is focused on work – with work itself perceived as having social as well as moral and economic functions. Conversely, she neglects the moral element in liberal underclass discourse (her ‘specialization’), seeing the main source of integration as based in exchange. Spicker argues that although the language surrounding the RMI is more communitarian, the effect is similar to US workfare programmes – and similarly individualizes the problem of unemployment.<sup>48</sup>

As a result of its origins within French social policy, the concept of social exclusion at European level became, as Room put it, a curious amalgam of a liberal, Anglo-Saxon concern with poverty and a more conservative, continental concern with moral integration and social order.<sup>49</sup> But to suggest that there is a single discourse of social exclusion in Europe would be misleading. The multi-lingual character of the Union necessarily implies a variety of discourses, which will not map precisely on to each other, even when translated from the same documents. However, the differences run deeper than this, leading to a series of overlapping national discourses of exclusion, rather than a pan-European consensus.<sup>50</sup> Discursive variation is accompanied by national policy differences, as discourses of exclusion are deployed within distinct political settings – although these national policies are increasingly oriented to and implicated in contested interpretations of a European framework.

This book is not a comparative study of discourses of exclusion or of social policy across Europe, but an examination of a single national case. Its focus is the different discourses around exclusion available to New Labour, and the uses made of them. However, among those resources are the concepts of exclusion embedded in the documents and policy instruments of the European Union itself. The discourse of key European policy papers – in their English versions – reveals a much narrower understanding of exclusion than that implied by Silver’s ‘solidarity’ model. This can be typified as a social integrationist discourse, SID, which stresses the integrative function of paid work. SID had a wider currency in British political discourse, and by using European documents as illustrative of it, I am not implying that this was the main source of the discourse, as will be clear from Chapters 3 and 4.

SID can be illustrated by the two European Commission White Papers on social and economic policy issued in 1994 – *European Social Policy and Growth, Competitiveness, Employment*<sup>51</sup> – which are widely supposed to epitomize the social, rather than purely economic, concerns of the Union. Despite the language of solidarity, these policy documents emphasize exclusion as exclusion from paid work rather than a broader view of exclusion from social participation, and prescribe integration through paid work. The terms cohesion, solidarity, integration and exclusion recur. The core concerns of both documents are economic efficiency and social cohesion: ‘we are faced with the immense responsibility... of finding a new synthesis of the aims pursued by society (work as a factor of social integration, equality of opportunity) and the requirements of the economy (competitiveness and job creation)’.<sup>52</sup> The economic discussion is couched in terms of efficiency, deregulation, and the need for economic growth, while the ‘social’ discourse counterposes solidarity, integration and cohesion to unemployment, poverty and social exclusion. Sometimes exclusion is identified with poverty: ‘with more than 52 million people in the Union living below the poverty line, social exclusion is an endemic phenomenon’;<sup>53</sup> while the need for economic and social cohesion calls for ‘solidarity... in the fight against social exclusion’, to combat the ‘poverty... which splits society in two’.<sup>54</sup> The processes of exclusion are described as ‘dynamic and multi-dimensional’, and linked ‘not only to unemployment and/or low incomes, but also to housing conditions, levels of education and opportunities, health, discrimination, citizenship and integration in the local community’.<sup>55</sup> Yet although this list might appear to echo the factors identified in RED, it is notable that the terms social exclusion and exclusion from paid work are used virtually interchangeably, while a similar elision occurs between ‘people’ and ‘workers’. A section headed ‘the free movement of persons’ goes on to discuss only the ‘free movement of workers’. ‘Promoting the Social Integration of Disabled People’ discusses only training and assistance to enter the labour market. On the ‘key issue of improved access to means of transport and public buildings’, the Commission will ‘press for the adoption of the proposed Directive on the travel conditions of *workers* with motor disabilities’ (emphasis added).<sup>56</sup>

Since *Growth, Competitiveness, Employment* starts from a concern with unemployment, its focus on paid work is unsurprising. Few, in any case, would dispute that unemployment is a contributory factor to social exclusion, and work a factor in social integration. This, however, is not the same as treating them as synonymous – a slippage which

makes difficult the exploration of their empirical connection. The assumption that social integration and participation in paid work are coterminous is particularly clear in a discussion of education and skills: ‘The basic skills which are essential for *integration into society and working life* include a mastery of basic knowledge (linguistic, scientific and other knowledge), and skills of a highly technical and social nature, that is the ability to develop and act in a complex and highly technological environment, characterized, in particular, by the importance of information technologies’ (emphasis added).<sup>57</sup> The emphasis on the importance of information technology skills is probably exaggerated even in terms of the skills needed for employment, but as a description of the skills needed for integration into society, it is an odd list. *Growth, Competitiveness, Employment* treats the absence of these skills as the cause of social exclusion – or what *European Social Policy* calls exclusion ‘from the cycle of opportunities’: ‘The failure of education... is an increasingly important and increasingly widespread factor of marginalisation and economic and social exclusion. In the Community, 25 to 30% of young people... leave the education system without the preparation they need to become properly integrated into working life’.<sup>58</sup>

Working life means paid employment. Unpaid work makes only a brief appearance in these documents, and then with a view to bringing it into the market sector to create more jobs. In ruling out *ab initio* the possibility of ‘a generalized reduction in working hours and job sharing’ as economically inefficient, the economic White Paper says we need to ‘think up new individual or collective needs which would provide new job opportunities’.<sup>59</sup> It proposes meeting old needs in new ways. ‘Women’s full integration in the labour market is expected to create jobs in the provision of services and goods not yet integrated into the market and currently being provided by either women’s unpaid labour or paid informal women’s labour’. Improving existing career opportunities for women will itself generate additional demand for child care. Where jobs are not created spontaneously, member states are exhorted to ‘encourage growth in the employment intensive area of the care sector and of the provision of household services’, and thus to ‘enhance the perceived value, and therefore encourage increased skills in such sectors’.<sup>60</sup> The assumptions about skill and value embedded here include the view that unpaid work is unskilled. Greater recognition of unpaid work other than through market mechanisms is ruled out. The extent of unpaid work, its necessity to the maintenance of social life and human relationships, and the limits

to potential marketization are underestimated, and the problems of low pay and gender segregation in the labour market ignored.<sup>61</sup>

In these documents, markets are not seen as benign. Markets have failings, produce unacceptable inequalities and embody short-termism, and thus require regulation, or at least management: 'only a properly managed interdependence can guarantee a positive outcome for everybody', and 'collective solidarity mechanisms' are essential to counter adverse effects.<sup>62</sup> This could be a prescription for a redistributive welfare state, which might therefore acknowledge and reward unpaid work, but it is not. The cost of welfare provision is seen as excessive: 'current levels of public expenditure, particularly in the social field, have become unsustainable and have used up resources which could have been channelled into productive investment'.<sup>63</sup> 'Solidarity' is a device for reducing the costs of social provision, not for redistribution. The forms of solidarity invoked are manifold: between those who have jobs and those who do not; between generations; between regions; between 'those who earn their income from work and those who earn their income from investments'; and between men and women, 'making it easier to reconcile family life and working life'. Notably, solidarity is not just a policy issue for member states, but a matter for individuals: it is 'the business of each citizen to practice "neighbourly solidarity"'.<sup>64</sup> Hutton described *Growth, Competitiveness, Employment* as the last gasp of social Europe before it was suffocated by the monetarist criteria agreed as the foundation of monetary union. But the tension between 'monetarist' and 'social' Europe, and the dominance of the former, are already apparent in the document itself. Further movement in that direction followed, as austerity measures were brought in by governments across Europe anxious to qualify for entry into the single currency – in many states provoking social unrest in response to cuts in welfare rights.

The emphasis on paid work is endemic in the financial and legal framework of the Union. As the term social exclusion gained currency in Europe, currency, in the form of European funding, attached to projects to combat it. But the rules governing the use of the Community's Structural Funds reinforce the understanding of social participation as labour market activity. The Social Fund, the main source of cash to combat exclusion, may only properly be used to fund measures directly related to the labour market, either through integration of marginal groups into it or through the promotion of equal opportunities. In practice, since funding goes to projects proposed by member states on the basis of additionality, many projects concerned with the



welfare of marginal groups which are ostensibly directed to improving their labour market integration appear to have a wider brief.

The legal definition of citizenship within Europe is also biased towards paid work. Louise Ackers argues that the general emphasis on ‘workers’ rather than ‘people’ in European law produces a stratified system of citizenship in Europe.<sup>65</sup> Although the Maastricht Treaty declares nationals of all member states to be European citizens with the right to move and reside freely within the Union, this right does not confer equal access to social rights and benefits in the country of residence. Whereas paid workers, self-employed people and those exercising their right to remain after ending paid employment have full social rights in their country of residence, members of their families have only derivative rights. This applies, of course, to women engaged in unpaid caring – for children or adults – who therefore do not have the same rights as paid workers. If family members and dependants can acquire social citizenship rights by proxy, non-employed persons not attached to a worker – students, disabled adults, retired people, for example – do not acquire them at all. Their right to move and reside freely within the Union is limited by the condition that they do not become a charge on the public purse of the host country. The essential point is that the emphasis on paid work as the primary means of social integration and the privileging of paid work over unpaid work has significant and gendered repercussions for citizenship status itself.

A discourse about social exclusion which focuses on integration through paid work tends to reduce the social to the economic, and simultaneously limits understanding of economic activity to market activity. If inclusion tends to shift the agenda away from equality, the focus on inclusion through paid work exacerbates this. SID thus has a number of features which distinguish it from RED and MUD:

- It narrows the definition of social exclusion/inclusion to participation in paid work.
- It squeezes out the question of why people who are not employed are consigned to poverty. Consequently, it does not, like RED, imply a reduction of poverty by an increase in benefit levels.
- It obscures the inequalities between paid workers.
- Since women are paid significantly less than men, and are far more likely to be in low-paid jobs, it obscures gender, as well as class, inequalities in the labour market.
- It erases from view the inequality between those owning the bulk of productive property and the working population.

- It is unable to address adequately the question of unpaid work in society.
- Because it ignores unpaid work and its gendered distribution, it implies an increase in women's total workload.
- It undermines the legitimacy of non-participation in paid work.

RED, SID and MUD are presented here as distinct discourses. They are, of course, ideal types. All of them posit paid work as a major factor in social integration; and all of them have a moral content. But they differ in what the excluded are seen as lacking. To oversimplify, in RED they have no money, in SID they have no work, in MUD they have no morals. In terms of Walker's broad definition of social exclusion as exclusion from social, economic, political or cultural systems, the discourses emphasize different elements – and posit different causal relationships between them. Thus both SID and MUD are narrower than RED, with SID reducing the social to the economic and substantially ignoring the political and cultural. MUD, on the other hand, emphasizes the cultural, with the economic deriving from this, while the social and political are sidelined. In reality, although there are examples which conform very closely to a particular model, much public discourse slides between them. That, indeed, is one of the reasons why a concept like social exclusion is so powerful. Not only does the multiplicity of meanings which attach to it give it wide acceptance, but it operates as a shifter between the different discourses. Like the 'underclass', 'social exclusion' can, almost unnoticed, mobilize a redistributive argument behind a cultural or integrationist one – or represent cultural or integrationist arguments as redistributive.

But there are also major differences between the discourses in their capacity to recognize, let alone valorize, unpaid work. Part of the point of Glucksmann's model of the total social organization of labour is that work, or economic activity, occurs not only within the market in the conventionally-defined economic sphere, but also outside it. To understand the shifting forms of work and the relationships within which they are embedded, the analysis cannot begin from a standpoint which privileges one particular form or site of work. Many of the problems with which politicians and policy makers now grapple can be seen in terms of the breakdown of a historical organization of labour in which men had primary responsibility for paid work and women primary responsibility for unpaid domestic work, albeit often combining this with some paid employment. SID barely acknowledges non-market work at all, or treats it as a residual form. The unpaid

work of child care, for example, is either to be drawn into the market, or squeezed into the spaces around paid employment. Unpaid work is addressed solely from the standpoint of the market. This is slightly less true of MUD, which, while deploying the idea of ‘dependency’ in its refusal to valorize unpaid work, simultaneously complains of the consequences of inadequate parenting. Yet this contradiction is itself masked by the fact that parenting is not understood as work. In general, the emphasis on paid work as a vehicle of inclusion, and the construction of exclusion as non-employment, inherently privileges market activity: it does not address either work, or social integration, in terms of the total social organization of labour.

In the following chapters, I shall argue that the developing discourse of New Labour shifted it significantly away from RED towards an inconsistent combination of SID and MUD. The impossibility of adequately acknowledging unpaid labour from this standpoint produces deep contradictions between different elements of policy, most especially between the rediscovery of community and the attempt to draw everyone into paid work through the New Deal or welfare to work programmes. This contradiction can be resolved only by a rightward shift to a reformulation of the Thatcherite free economy-strong state dyad in terms of community, or by a leftward shift towards a RED agenda. A central political question for Labour’s first term in office will be how it negotiates between the different available discourses of social exclusion, and how, especially through the Social Exclusion Unit, it translates them into policy. Their performance will be judged not only on whether they deliver ‘social inclusion’, but what kind of inclusion they deliver, for whom, and on what terms. The following chapters outline the emergence of the new political discourse, and their implications for delivering inclusion.

# 8 Delivering Social Inclusion

How far will Labour succeed in delivering social inclusion? Blair would prefer this question deferred for ten years, but at least a provisional assessment will be needed before the election in 2001 or 2002. As the policies are put in place, it is possible to ask what kind of inclusion Labour seeks to deliver, what the criteria of success would be, and how likely it is that the policies will achieve this. None of the discourses has a well-developed set of indicators of social exclusion, partly because the centrality of the term in British politics is so new – and partly because to clarify the definition would undermine the very flexibility of the concept which makes it politically useful. Because the meaning and imputed causes of exclusion differ in RED, SID and MUD, so too will some of the indicators of success in producing greater inclusion. The prospects for inclusion depend on which discourse you are situated in. Both provisional and later assessments can be made in Labour's own terms, and against other understandings of social exclusion and other criteria. Success in combating exclusion will be as contested as the concept itself. The most obvious critical yardsticks are those implied by RED, and the main part of this chapter considers the prospects for welfare to work and the Social Exclusion Unit from the different standpoints of RED, SID and MUD. Questions are also raised about the nature of the 'social' in social inclusion, and about unpaid work, transport, participation in common institutions and political inclusion – and the contradictions and tensions between aspects of inclusion.

## WELFARE TO WORK: THE VIEW FROM SID

There are aspects of both welfare to work and the remit of the Social Exclusion Unit which are consistent with RED, SID and MUD. The welfare to work programme has widespread support. For RED, involuntary unemployment is one important cause of poverty; for SID, work in itself delivers inclusion; for MUD, work is a moral necessity to counter dependence. In the broadest sense, all would interpret the programme as successful if it: reduces the number of people dependent on benefit; moves the people concerned into socially useful paid employment which delivers self-esteem, social relationships and a

reasonable standard of living; provides high quality, affordable care for their children; reduces poverty; reduces social security spending, thus releasing more money to be spent on health and education; and does so without coercion. Pigs might fly. The difference between the discourses lies in the priority given to these various aims.

From the perspective of SID, the most important indicators of success would be a rise in labour force participation rates, especially for the target groups of young people, lone parents and people with disabilities; and a drop in the number of workless households among those of working age. Falling registered unemployment is not an adequate measure of the success of the New Deal, since it excludes those forced off the register and a range of people deemed economically inactive. In 1997, the unemployment figures fell sharply, and there were no longer 250 000 young people eligible for the New Deal, but roughly half that number. This was partly due to the effect on the count of the Jobseeker's Allowance, but also to a real drop in youth unemployment. A rise in unemployment was forecast for 1998 as the New Deal came into effect. The test of rising participation rates avoids the measurement problems associated with unemployment, but it is complicated by how far any change can be attributed to the welfare to work programme itself. Evaluating changes against a background of changing economic conditions is not so easy.

There is a further complication to relying on unemployment rates as an indicator of exclusion. Unemployment rates are higher in France and Germany, and Labour, like the Conservatives, attributes Britain's lower recorded unemployment – and that in the USA – to the greater flexibility of the economy. But the USA has a much higher proportion of its male population in prison. If incarceration rates and unemployment rates are taken together, the difference between Europe and the United States lies principally in the proportion of young (predominantly black) men in jail.<sup>1</sup> While levels of imprisonment in Britain are not comparable with those in the US, they are high by European Standards. This has implications for benefit budgets. The proportion of GDP spent on social security in the UK, as in the USA, is relatively low compared to France and Germany, but the costs of social security payments for the unemployed must be balanced against the greater costs of incarceration. While unemployment is the key form of social exclusion for SID, the greater social exclusion of imprisonment is neglected.

Rising participation rates are more important to SID than the numbers passing through the programmes who find some form of

work. Before the pilot schemes for lone parents and their evaluation were completed, Harman vaunted their success in terms of the percentage of participants moving into employment. These early figures were disputed because they related to those taking up the offer of an interview, not those approached or eligible. It was also suggested that these were the very women who would have taken employment without help. Some of those moving into work under the New Deal would do so anyway. Simply looking at outcomes for participants in welfare to work ignores two further problems: substitution and churning. Participants may be given a competitive advantage, so that they get jobs at the expense of others in the labour market, for example privileging the young unemployed at the expense of older workers. This substitution effect is a particular problem with subsidised employment. As Hutton said, the programmes may also result in only temporary and short-term work placements, and a churning in and out of employment. Increased labour force participation rates indicate the success of the programmes over and above substitution, churning, or existing levels of movement into work.

The likely success of welfare to work in SID's terms is – and will remain – disputable. Its supply-side assumptions may undermine it. There is no consensus about how far unemployment is a problem of employability, and how far it is caused by a lack of demand for labour. Although the lead indicator for SID is labour market attachment, and this has priority over the quality and pay of jobs, SID differs from MUD on the issue of compulsion. The emphasis on the positive utility of work means compulsion should not be necessary; the emphasis on work as a route to self-esteem makes compulsion, especially in the shape of thinly-disguised workfare schemes, counter-productive. It is therefore important whether the New Deal results in people moving into real jobs, rather than being forced into make-work schemes for benefit, or even 'benefit plus'. The quality of the scheme, and therefore of the work, is not irrelevant.

Without investment to provide real jobs, improved training and skills may simply equip individuals for a competitive struggle for employment in which some must lose. The initial response of the private sector to pleas to provide opportunities for young people under the New Deal was disappointing, even with the subsidies offered. This is partly because employers do not want unwilling conscripts as workers, but it does not bode well for the expansion of jobs when the subsidies run out. One suggestion has been that local authorities might compensate for this shortfall. In a roundabout way, the local state

would thus become the employer of last resort, in a return to limited Keynesian demand management – a solution compatible with SID, but one which will cost money. But SID emphasizes carrots, not sticks. Within SID, the prime concern is not saving money: increased expenditure on in-work benefits, on child care, on training, and even on job creation might be wholly legitimate in promoting inclusion through work.

## WELFARE TO WORK: THE VIEW FROM MUD

From within MUD, the central criterion of success is the reduction in the numbers of people of working age wholly dependent on benefit. A drop in the number of workless households is important. Since the central element in MUD is the moral necessity of work, neither the level of pay nor the quality of the work is important. Coercion is legitimate – even justified as tough love. MUD may appear to be directed primarily at reducing public spending, but the discourse and the policies are ambiguous in this respect. Labour's welfare to work policies as originally floated in the Borrie report owed much to the Australian Working Nation programme,<sup>2</sup> and especially to the JET (Jobs, Education, Training) scheme for lone mothers. Both the rhetoric, in the use of the term welfare and the phrase New Deal, and the substantive policies, moved closer to an American model. In office, Labour showed increasing interest in Wisconsin Works or W-2, and in September 1997 Jean Rogers, the W-2 administrator, attended the post-election conference at the London School of Economics on 'How Labour can Deliver'. Experience in both Australia and Wisconsin showed that the provision of child care to enable lone parents to work is expensive. This is so even before posing serious questions about the quality of child care, whether parents or children suffer as a result, or the pay and conditions of the carers.

MUD has other features. Work is also a prophylactic against crime. For the young unemployed, it is a means of social discipline – or, as Labour put it, 'our policy against crime is jobs'. It is important both for workers and for their children, who need to be set an example, and to learn the work ethic – not at their parent's knee, but through separation from it. Those same children, especially in lone-parent families, are seen as in need of parental supervision to curb their criminal tendencies. This points either to an irresolvable contradiction between

welfare to work and the agenda of social order – or to Murray’s agenda, of attempting to make lone parenthood as difficult as possible to enforce moral conformity. Success, for MUD, would mean not just a decrease in benefit dependency, but a decrease in crime and in lone parenthood, all perceived as indissolubly linked.

## WELFARE TO WORK: THE VIEW FROM RED

For RED, the most pressing question is the effect on the lives of the excluded. The central indicator of success or failure in tackling social exclusion is the prevalence of poverty, and whether there is both absolute and relative improvement in the living standards of the poor. The availability of information to monitor these changes was undermined by changes to the statistical base during the Thatcher years; restoration and improvement is needed.<sup>3</sup> The question will not just be whether more people are in paid work, but whether those in and out of employment, above and below working age, are better or worse off.

The reduction of involuntary unemployment is one element in this. As for SID, the emphasis is on the benefits of paid work, financial and otherwise. The quality of work matters. Coercion is generally rejected because benefit penalties may be unjustly applied, and themselves cause greater poverty and exclusion – as well as potentially undermining the New Deal by turning it effectively into a workfare programme. Compulsion is viewed as unnecessary in almost all cases if there is reasonable, reasonably paid work available, and pointless or worse if there is not. RED, like SID, sees exclusion from paid work as a form of and a factor in social exclusion. But increased rates of labour market participation will be an indicator of success only if they result in a reduction in poverty. The level of the minimum wage is crucial to RED. And whatever the success of welfare to work, it will not improve the situation of those who remain dependent on benefits or state pensions. Moreover, because RED recognizes parenting as unpaid work, lone parents dependent on benefit are not viewed as not working. The implication is an increase in benefits to relieve poverty, rather than an across the board cut or the introduction of coercion into the New Deal to force them into paid employment. For RED, welfare to work can be at best a partial solution to the problem of social exclusion.



## DELIVERING SOCIAL INCLUSION: THE SOCIAL EXCLUSION UNIT

One of the first tasks set for the Unit in its first six months was the development of indicators of exclusion. In one sense, this will make assessment of the success of the Unit in the Government's own terms relatively straightforward. But as in the case of welfare to work, different indicators will be preferred or prioritized from the standpoint of the different discourses. Perri 6, writing for Demos, says social exclusion 'can best be measured by looking at how many people are cut off from work, learning and other forms of social participation' – the priorities of SID – and goes on to suggest as indicators measures of both the causal processes and the condition of social exclusion. The former include 'mobility, promotion and redundancy, social stratification and limited social mobility, educational failure or family breakdown'; the latter 'worklessness and unemployment, homelessness, lack of membership of voluntary organisations, denial of services, isolation or lack of effective social contacts, lack of a car or a telephone'.<sup>4</sup> It is notable that poverty does not appear as an indicator of either the cause or condition of exclusion.

For RED, income data is a proxy indicator, though not a measure, of the wider multi-faceted process of exclusion. Although poverty is a prime cause of social exclusion, the two are not synonymous. Improving the material living standards of the poor is a necessary but insufficient condition for combating exclusion. The Social Exclusion Unit also sees exclusion as a complex and multi-dimensional problem. Its concern with multiple deprivation, homelessness, joblessness, and the concentration of these in areas which also suffer from high levels of crime is not immediately different from RED, and the pursuit of a co-ordinated approach to these is wholly consistent with it. To some extent, the indicators will overlap. But whether the perceived causes and thus proposed solutions coincide is another matter. In MUD, if exclusion is the result of poverty, poverty itself is largely attributed to a failure of employability – which, given the responsibility of individuals for their own employability, is in large part a moral problem. If MUD says 'the poor are different from us', RED says 'yes; they have less money'. The obvious difference is that RED implies improved levels of benefits, while MUD does not. Government policy rules out additional expenditure in this form, so that for RED, as Lister said, the Social Exclusion Unit tackles exclusion with one hand tied behind its back.

In some instances, the relationship between the two approaches is as straightforward as Lister suggests. For example, the Unit is concerned about the exclusion of sectors of society from financial services. Residents in some areas may be unable to open bank accounts, obtain credit cards, or obtain credit because of their postcode. Poorer people pay more for credit – especially from loan sharks. Competitive strategies in the privatized utilities discriminate against poorer customers. Potential future work for the Unit includes looking at ‘options for improving access to services, public and private, for low income individuals or areas’. These issues may be addressed through pressure on utilities and financial institutions to alter their practice, and through encouraging credit unions – non profit-making self-help groups which foster saving and provide small loans. There is nothing here that would conflict with a RED agenda; Child Poverty Action Group has long documented the fact that the poor pay more for most goods and services. There is, simply, a gap: one aspect of financial exclusion is that the poor have less money, and inadequate income is an important factor in debt.

In other respects, the RED approach and that of the Social Exclusion Unit differ rather more. The range of goals may largely coincide, but the priority given to them is different; and since the perceived causes of exclusion are different, so too are the means of reaching those goals. If RED emphasizes social and economic inclusion, and understands poverty in material and structural terms, MUD emphasizes moral inclusion, and understands poverty as primarily cultural in origin. Explanations of poverty as a cultural problem lead all too easily into policies to control the poor. The more the thinking behind the Unit is consistent with MUD, the more the policies for achieving inclusion are likely to be ambiguous from the standpoint of RED.

The most obvious example of this is the focus on social order. In terms of its initial priorities, the reduction in crime and disorder particularly on the targeted estates would be a key indicator of the Social Exclusion Unit’s success – although the measurement of crime is fraught with difficulty, and the measurement of disorder even more so. When Jack Straw was asked by Jonathan Dimbleby on 28 September 1997 what changes would take place during Labour’s first term of office, he replied that communities would be safer – but that the Government also aimed to change the norms and values of a generation, and to establish that parenting is not a purely private matter in which next door neighbours have no say. Some of the policies for delivering these outcomes rely not only on repression, but forms of repression

which are themselves directly exclusionary – an increased use of exclusion orders against individuals, curfews which exclude young people from public spaces, and eviction orders. As the Social Exclusion Unit started work, it was reported that there were ‘nearly 10 000 people ... on the council’s exclusions list for anti-social behaviour’ in Manchester alone.<sup>5</sup> A general increase in the use of eviction orders is anticipated. It may even be necessary – but it is important to recognize that the inclusion of some is predicated on the further exclusion of others. If the control of crime and disorder leads to more prison sentences, this too represents an increase in social exclusion. The 1997 Crime and Disorder Bill makes provision for ‘anti-social behaviour orders’ which may be sought by local councils or by the police for any person aged ten or over who has acted ‘in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to two or more persons not of the same household as himself’. The orders may contain those prohibitions ‘necessary for protecting persons in the local government area from further anti-social acts by the defendant’. Breaches of the order carry penalties of up to five years imprisonment. The problem lies in the catch-all formula, which does not rest on any specific offence being committed – and does not even require that alarm and distress be reasonable responses to the behaviour in question.

The early priority given to tackling truancy is again ambiguous. Although the remit of the Social Exclusion Unit referred also to exclusions from school, it was truancy which Blair stressed at the Unit’s launch. In a police report to the Unit, children aged between 10 and 16 were said to be responsible for 40 per cent of all street robberies, 33 per cent of car thefts and 30 per cent of house break-ins in London, mostly during school hours. The link between truancy and crime seemed clear – although it does not follow that most children illicitly absent from school or even most persistent truants are engaged in crime, or that they should be publicly regarded as actual or potential offenders. Other research presented to the Unit referred to the low educational achievement of young offenders, and suggested that persistent truanting was the result of poor educational attainment (mainly by boys) rather than its primary cause. Again, an improvement in educational achievement, a reduction in persistent truanting, and a reduction in crime would all be regarded as good outcomes by RED, SID and MUD. But the connections posited between them, and the policies for addressing them differ. The link long made by RED between unemployment and crime, a social and structural problem, becomes in MUD a link between unemployability and crime, a problem

of individual behaviour. In MUD, 'tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime' points to truancy and poor parental supervision as the 'causes'; in RED, the emphasis is on poverty and its role in educational underachievement.

The danger is not just that one hand is tied behind the Unit's back, but that repression will substitute for inclusion. The attraction for MUD of focusing on truancy is that parental responsibility can be invoked as a solution. The Crime and Disorder Bill, consistent with pre-election policy, provides for the use of parenting orders. These would apply to the parents of convicted young offenders, and to the parents of children or young people subject to child safety orders, anti-social behaviour orders, or who do not regularly attend school. They may require parents to attend weekly counselling sessions for up to three months, and to comply with other specified requirements for up to a year. Jack Straw elaborated likely requirements as being home at specified times to supervise their child and accompanying that child to school. Breaches of the order will be punishable by a substantial fine. It is not clear whether the orders will be made against the parents severally or jointly, and who will be liable for the fine, especially where parents are not married and are thus not legally liable for each other's debts. The potential conflict between meeting the requirements of a parenting order and earning a living is implicit in the suggestion that the stipulations should 'as far as practicable' not interfere with times when the parent normally works. Where truancy is the problem, the children who cause most concern are those of secondary school age – the age group where there is growing pressure within New Labour that lone parents should be compelled to seek paid employment.

A suggestion that the Foyer movement be extended to single mothers is also ambiguous. Pioneered in France and developed in Britain since 1992, Foyers provide hostel accommodation for homeless young people, with help and advice to enable them to move into more permanent accommodation and training or work. They are entirely voluntary, although residents are required to keep house rules. Their encouragement by the Social Exclusion Unit would be appropriate from RED, SID and MUD – in RED's case, especially if supported by additional funds, and a benefit system which facilitated a move on from Foyer life. But the suggestion that 'young mothers would be encouraged to move into... hostels with their babies, and would get advice on training, access to creches and support workers, including health care visitors to monitor their children' does not seem quite in the Foyer spirit.<sup>6</sup> There may be some young women for whom such

facilities would be welcome and wholly appropriate, offering practical and social support not available elsewhere; some units already exist. As a policy for inclusion, it is double edged. Encouraging young single mothers into institutions – having reduced the benefits available to them – marks them out as a group, and is potentially exclusionary. And it rests on a presumption of moral exclusion. MUD sees single parenthood as a form of delinquency, and as a ‘parenting danger zone’ in need of early intervention. The provision of suitable services, including housing, in a non-institutional manner is not only more expensive, but offers less possibility of social control.

#### ‘SOCIAL’ INCLUSION

The wide brief of the Social Exclusion Unit makes its success more difficult to define than that of the welfare to work scheme. More, the potential breadth of the idea of social exclusion itself means that a very wide range of policies may bear on the delivery of inclusion. In RED, the question of social participation, not just participation in work, is central. Exclusion is exclusion from participation – in economic, political, social or cultural systems.

However the understanding of the ‘social’ in social inclusion is under-developed. Demos addresses this in terms of networks and social capital. Social capital refers to ‘the quality of contacts people have and networks they plug into, and the norms of trust, reciprocity and goodwill, sense of shared life across the classes, and capacities to organise that these ties afford’; or more simply to ‘those relationships which provide people with a sense of trust and community’.<sup>7</sup> The potential fruitfulness of this is undermined by the treatment of social networks as means to ends – either of work or of social control. Thus for individuals, network poverty means lack of access to the kinds of contacts helpful in finding employment.<sup>8</sup> For society, networks are important because ‘an organized citizenry can alleviate many social problems and ease the implementation of various kinds of public policy, for instance by using neighbourhood watch groups to minimise crime. As a result, nations as a whole lose a resource when the ties between individuals erode’.<sup>9</sup>

Discussions of social exclusion in contemporary political discourses do not collapse the social into the economic, although economic inclusion is paramount. There is recurrent reference in stakeholding and communitarian literature to the importance of intermediate

institutions and to civil society – those places where people live their lives beyond the workplace. But there is a disturbing tendency for civil society and the community to be reduced to an arena of unpaid work, a means of mopping up problems created by the market or a mediator of social discipline. Social inclusion, social networks, and sociability as ends in themselves scarcely figure: the meaning of the social needs clarification and elaboration.

The presumption shared by RED, SID and MUD is that inclusion in paid work leads to greater social inclusion – in the case of RED, provided that it also reduces poverty. There is little attention paid to the ways in which paid work may impede inclusion. Although Hutton indirectly acknowledges this where people work very long hours, and the problem of ‘juggling’ is a constant issue in relation to women’s employment, the downside of paid work is not thought of in terms of social exclusion. Yet not being able to collect young children from school affects participation in the social networks that develop around the school and in the neighbourhood as well as the relationship between parent and child. Paid work leaves less time for many other activities. The same may be true of unpaid work.

## UNPAID WORK

The contradiction between welfare to work and parenting in Labour’s policies can hardly be overstressed. It arises from thinking about parenting as a responsibility, rather than something which involves work which is currently unpaid. The unpaid work of parenting includes domestic labour as well as direct engagement with the child – engagement which takes place through daily practicalities and which can also be describe as emotional labour. Even if welfare to work for lone parents is a success, and they move voluntarily into employment, their children are adequately cared for, and they are materially better off, there is a hidden cost. It is a cost to women of a major increase in their total workload, not a cost to society of inadequate parenting. Looking at social production from the point of view of the total social organization of labour and acknowledging the prevalence of unpaid work calls into question how we understand the meaning of work itself and the justice of using the wage relation as a means of distributing the social product, as well as the reliance on paid work as a mechanism of social inclusion. Solutions to this are not obvious, and are limited by the structural dominance of the market.

One approach is to bring as much unpaid work as is possible into the market sector. This is the direction in which current policies point. However, even if all adults of working age are expected to be in paid work, and all children in collective day care, a great deal of unpaid work remains to be done – and is done chiefly by women. Its implication is an increase in women's overall workload.

A second approach would be to reward unpaid work directly, in proportion to its value. This, on the ONS figures, would imply a huge shift of resources from the market to the non-market sector. One common objection is the difficulty of evaluating how well unpaid work is carried out. While one can imagine that attempting to do this might be an attractive idea to Jack Straw, it is not necessary; most jobs in the market sector are not rewarded on the basis of performance related pay. A more intractable difficulty is the danger of ghettoizing women in domestic labour, the criticism levelled at the Wages for Housework Campaign in the 1970s. And a principled objection might be that distribution in relation to unpaid work, like distribution through the wage relation, rests on a redefinition of what constitutes a social contribution, not on a shift to distribution on the basis of need; it is in this sense less radical and less egalitarian than RED. It would also meet the same limits as RED. The redistribution of resources from market to non-market sector would, as Townsend said of radical redistribution through the benefits system, run up against the limits of what is possible in a system which depends fundamentally on distribution through the wage relation.

A third possibility would be a major redistribution of both paid and unpaid work. This would mean breaking down the gender inequalities in both forms of work. It would also require limitations on paid working time more draconian than anything likely to be contemplated by the European Union, but affording an acceptable standard of living on the basis of much shorter hours. Movements in this direction are possible, and favoured by the French. But significant changes which do not increase poverty and inequality would be possible only on the basis of a large reduction in wage differentials, and limited by the requirements of a capitalist economy.

## GETTING THERE

Participation in social life, whether that be paid work, voluntary work, family life, or the ragbag category leisure, depends on being able to get

to the sites of these activities. It requires mobility; it requires transport. The promised development of an integrated transport system is fundamental to the development of social inclusion. This is an issue for SID as well as RED, for transport problems affect employment prospects. For RED, it is a wider question: the social life of those without cars can be very limited. This is particularly true in rural areas, where in many cases public transport is almost or wholly non-existent. Such a system needs to be affordable – although affordability depends on income, so increasing the incomes of the poorest might be a useful contributory factor. It also needs to be accessible to disabled people, whose social exclusion is caused not only by lack of money, but by lack of transport and the general inaccessibility of public spaces. The response of the green pressure group SERA's response to the transport White Paper argues that an inclusive transport system would mean 'a rail system that is adequately staffed, affordable and fully accessible to all disabled people' and that 'all buses running on the streets of Britain are fully accessible to all the nation's citizens'.<sup>10</sup>

The promotion of an integrated transport system has a number of motivations. Reducing traffic congestion is partly about managing capitalism more efficiently; traffic jams cost firms money. It is partly environmentally driven, both in terms of the global need to reduce greenhouse emissions, and the local need to reduce asthma-inducing air pollution. Reducing car use, once a fringe concern, is now Government policy and has wide support. But this is not a straightforward matter. First, the projected need for new homes is likely to be met by increased building in rural areas. Many people want to move out of cities. The land available for building in cities is limited – although it could be substantially increased by reducing the amount of land used for parking. Some brownfield sites are heavily polluted, and decontamination makes them more expensive to develop than greenfield sites. Increased rural development means more car use, not less. Secondly, the exhortation to individuals to use their cars less must not be a way of subordinating their needs to industry's preference for a clear run. Switching freight to rail is part of the plan, and success in this is essential to an inclusive system. This is particularly important because most of the discussions of reduced car use focus on switching short journeys to walking or cycling, on the supposition that these are most amenable to modal change. But many short journeys are made to ferry children around or carry shopping. SERA concedes that 'the car can bring people into the mainstream of life who might otherwise feel excluded', notes its importance to 'mothers who have a thousand and



one things to do with...children', and says that the challenge is to make sure the right sort of journeys are made by car, 'for they add to, and don't detract from, social inclusion'.<sup>11</sup> This implicitly recognizes the third potential bar to and negative effect of changing public behaviour. Walking to and from a school a mile away with young children involves four miles and the best part of two hours a day. If the distances are greater, so is the time involved; if the children are at different schools, the logistics may be impossible – and certainly impossible to combine with getting to work. Many mothers already juggle with these difficulties. Reducing car use may mean an increase in women's unpaid work.

## COMMON INSTITUTIONS

Hutton's focus on the rich as well as the poor suggests that inclusion requires that people use the same services and institutions. Transport is one example. Others are health and education, where Hutton's concern was with the divide between public and private provision. There is a body of opinion that the combination of medical advances leading to new treatments, an ageing population and rising demands make some form of rationing in the National Health Service inevitable. Without greatly increased funding, the likely outcome of this is an increase in private health provision among those who can afford it. In both health and education there is talk of 'partnership' – the NHS buying treatments in private hospitals, private schools opening up their sports facilities to state school pupils. This will not address the fundamental inequality of provision. Short of making private health and education illegal, the only ways of radically reducing the possibility of a large and influential minority deserting collective provision are to provide public services which match those privately available, or to radically reduce the inequalities which make this desertion possible. The first route is enormously expensive, and New Labour has no intention of promoting inclusion by the second means.

In both school and university sectors of education, newly divisive policies are being pursued. The introduction of fees and the abolition of maintenance grants for higher education is likely to narrow rather than broaden access. The education action zones promised in the Education Bill in late 1997 pose a different kind of problem. The purpose of the zones, described by Government officials as 'the centrepiece of our modernisation agenda' is to improve educational

standards in the designated areas. Their connection to addressing social exclusion is clear. But schools in these zones will be able to employ ‘innovative methods’; they will not be bound by the requirements of the national curriculum, but be allowed to concentrate on core skills. They will also be exempt from national agreements on teachers’ pay and conditions, and be able to extend their working week, extending the school day and opening schools at weekends (compare Etzioni, Chapter 5). Management of the zones will be put out to tender, and while most are expected to be run by ‘partnerships’ of local authorities, community groups and businesses, zones may be imposed against local authority wishes and may be run solely by private businesses. This potentially places large parts of the education system in private hands, where the curriculum can be increasingly bent to the needs of industry rather than the wider needs of pupils. It also removes democratic accountability, and further undermines the role of local education authorities and local government – continuing, rather than reversing the trends of the last twenty years. The question of democratic accountability raises the issue of political inclusion.

## POLITICAL INCLUSION

One important wider aspect of inclusion is the question of political inclusion or inclusiveness. This addresses the structures and processes of political decision making, how these are conducted, and who is involved in them; social inclusion and exclusion more often refer to the experiences of citizens whose participation in normal social life, however this is understood, is facilitated or prevented. Social and political inclusion are doubly connected: political inclusiveness may be expected to deliver greater social inclusion; and among the aspects of social life in which participation is sought is the political process itself. From the perspective of RED, political inclusion is an aspect of social inclusion.

In one sense, the whole agenda of political reform, including policies for Scottish, Welsh and regional devolution could be presented as an attempt to bring government closer to the people. Whether they could or will deliver greater political inclusion is a large and important question, beyond the scope of this book. Inclusion would mean greater participation in processes broadly defined as political – and with the outcome of giving people greater real power over decisions affecting their lives. The reconstruction of local government would be an

important part of this. Some of the problems about the idea and reality of political inclusion can be illustrated by looking at the early stages of the Blair Government itself.

On election, Blair promised to govern inclusively. Most of Labour's references in the pre-election and immediate post-election period were to political inclusiveness; they were about consultation and 'dialogue', about political rather than social or economic inclusion, about process rather than outcome. Government should be democratic, open, accountable and responsive and should eschew sectarian exclusion, hierarchical exclusivity and adversarial style. Wider consultation and public involvement, as well as the devolution of decisions according to the principle of subsidiarity, should supplement elections. Such processes might include community forums, citizens' juries, public hearings, as well as referendums. The inclusion of those groups in society hitherto excluded from or under-represented in the political process should be increased in both formal and informal processes. The most frequently stated concern was the under-representation of women; less frequent, but regular, mention was also made of ethnic minorities and disabled people. The inclusive society would be one where everyone – or every significant group – has a voice, and where these voices are heard either through representation on the basis of identity – women speak for women, black people for black people – or indirectly through advocacy groups or voluntary associations. Inclusive government was signalled by the presence of women MPs and ministers, as well as those disabled, openly lesbian or gay, or from ethnic minorities.

Some of the problems deriving from constructing identities rather than collectivities as the proper basis of representation can be seen by looking at Labour's best case, women – which also illustrates that political inclusion may be necessary, but it is scarcely sufficient. There were more women elected to the 1997 Parliament, and more women in Blair's first Government, than ever before in Britain. This resulted from a policy of having all women short-lists for a proportion of parliamentary candidates – a policy dropped after it was challenged as illegal by two male party members. It may thus prove to be a fragile achievement. Blair's honouring of the long-standing promise of a Minister for Women with cabinet status did not inspire confidence. The job was given to Harriet Harman as an afterthought, in addition to the potentially conflicting brief of Secretary of State for Social Security. Then, in an attempt to patch up the damage, Joan Ruddock was asked to take on ministerial responsibility at a more junior level.

However, by this time, all the salaried ministerial positions had been distributed (including Mandelson's post of Minister without Portfolio) – so she acquired the work, the status, but not the pay. A Women's Unit was set up, part of its brief being to assess the impact on women of all policy proposals. It was given no spending budget, and some argued that to be effective, it would need to be based in the Treasury, with gender impact statements central to Treasury policy. Fears were expressed that the inclusion of women in the Blair Government meant a feminization of politics rather than an advance for feminism and the interests of women. Skjeie argues from the Norwegian experience that the political inclusion of women does not necessarily transform substantive outcomes.<sup>12</sup> Increased representation does give a higher profile to some issues – notably, and importantly, child care – but responses to these issues are routinely subordinated to conventional party political agendas. This is exactly what happened in the dispute over benefit cuts for lone parents – a dispute which also illustrated how the inclusion of women meant not only their co-option to, but their active role in legitimizing, policies damaging to women's interests.

Processes of informal inclusion and consultation are at least as significant as formal presence. Blair greatly increased the number of political advisers at Downing Street, many recruited from think-tanks like the IPPR and Demos; these advisers were unelected, unaccountable and overwhelmingly male. Appointments to the large number of task forces and review bodies set up after the election continued the co-option of unelected individuals to the policy-making process, particularly those from the business sector or 'community'. Political inclusion crossed party boundaries. David Mellor, a Conservative minister forced to resign after a sexual scandal, was asked to chair the Football Task Force. Alan Howarth, who defected to Labour from the Tories in 1996, was rewarded with a ministerial post at the Department for Education and Employment. Pre-election collaboration with the Liberal Democrats over plans for constitutional reform continued after the election with a cross-party Cabinet Committee – although in the week of the 1997 Liberal Democrat Conference, both Peter Mandelson and Alistair Darling warned that if the Liberal Democrats wanted co-operation between the parties to continue, they should stop criticizing the Government's economic policies.

Daniel argues that outside groups did gain greater access to ministers and civil servants – consistent with the new Clause IV commitment to working with voluntary organizations, consumer groups and

other representative bodies.<sup>13</sup> However, she said, this inclusion was ‘not about participatory democracy so much as about participation in the delivery of policy’, and that ‘those who confuse the two things are in for a disappointment’. Nowhere was this more apposite than in relation to the trade unions, who were repeatedly warned to expect no special treatment – ‘fairness not favours’. Unions constituted a sectional interest, while the business community, apparently, was not. They were not altogether excluded from participation in the task forces, but their representation was meagre. Trade union representatives were invited to Downing Street in the late summer of 1997 to discuss the manifesto commitment to union recognition, but not involved in wider policy questions. Blair spoke at the 1997 TUC Congress, which met under the slogan ‘Partners for Progress’, and made it clear that any political inclusion of the unions was conditional upon their conforming to the new ‘responsible’ unionism epitomized by John Monks, which would not challenge either the policies of government or the consensual image of the new Britain it sought to promote. Blair said he would ‘watch very carefully to see how the culture of modern trade unionism’ developed. He told the unions that there were more important battles than those over ‘labour law’, and that they should be concentrating on issues of skills, training, welfare to work, pensions and the reform of the National Health Service. He ordered them to modernize: ‘Modernise your political structures as we have done in the Labour Party. Influence with this government and with me is not determined by anything other than the persuasiveness of your arguments. The old ways – resolutionitis, the committee rooms, the fixing, the small groups trying to run the show have no future. New trade unionism – that is your aim. Partners for Progress. That is your slogan’. But there was no doubt who was the senior, and who the junior, partner. Appropriate behaviour for trade unions was to be defined by Blairite fiat, not by trade unionists themselves, and their inclusion dependent upon this effective co-option. And it is notable that the constituencies of legitimate identity eligible for inclusion did not include class: for this would be to import ‘old’ categories of conflict into the new era of partnership.

The central question is who, and whose interests, are represented at any level of government – and whose interests prevail. The general problem about the contemporary emphasis on dialogue and on ‘having a voice’, which in political and social theory is based on the ideas of Jurgen Habermas, is that it gives too little recognition to the structures of power within which that discussion takes place. Emergent decisions

take on the appearance of consensus, and political inclusion risks becoming political co-option. Moreover because there are presumed to be only differences of opinion, not conflicts of interest, dissenting voices outside the consensus are marginalized as trouble makers. Genuine political inclusiveness may be necessary to overcoming social exclusion, though it is certainly not sufficient. Rhetoric about inclusiveness, and even actual inclusion, in the processes of policy formation must be distinguished from the outcomes of these policies.

The dirigiste management of Blair's Government is easily understandable as repressing conflicts which might otherwise divide the Party within and beyond Parliament. What is less immediately obvious is that the underpinning model of society on which the third way is based is one in which conflicts of interest are suppressed. It is this which leads to the instability of the third way and its tendency to fall into authoritarianism. This model, with its consequences and limits, is the subject of the next chapter.

# Notes

## NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1. Andersen, Paul and Mann, Nyta (1997) *Safety First: The Making of New Labour*, London: Granta Books; Davies, A.J. (1996) *To Build a new Jerusalem: The British Labour Party from Kier Hardy to Tony Blair*, London: Abacus; Jones, Tudor (1996) *Remaking the Labour Party: From Gaitskell to Blair*, London: Routledge; Panitch, Leo and Leys, Colin (1997) *The End of Parliamentary Socialism: From New Left to New Labour*, London: Verso; Shaw, Eric (1994) *The Labour Party Since 1979*, London: Routledge.
2. Layard, Richard (1997) *What Labour Can Do*, London: Warner Books.
3. Silver, Hilary (1994) 'Social exclusion and social solidarity: three paradigms' *International Labour Review* Vol. 133, Nos. 5–6, pp. 531–78.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. Murgatroyd, Linda and Neuburger, Henry (1997) 'A Household Satellite Account for the UK' *Economic Trends* No. 527, October: 63–71; Waring, Marilyn (1988) *If Women Counted*, London: Macmillan.
2. These gender differences are almost certainly understated. The methodology does not allow people to record themselves as doing more than one thing at once. Respondents are expressly instructed that doing housework while caring for children should be recorded as housework *rather than* care of children. If this is extended to activities such as eating and leisure (which are not counted as unpaid work), the child care responsibilities of women will be seriously undercounted, and the differences between men and women reduced.
3. Glucksmann, Miriam (1995) 'Why "Work"? Gender and the "Total Social Organisation of Labour"' *Gender, Work and Organisation* Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 69, 67.
4. Townsend, Peter (1979) *Poverty in the United Kingdom*, Harmondsworth: Penguin p. 32.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 399, 249.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 564.
7. Duncan, Simon and Edwards, Rosalind (1997) *Single Mothers in an International Context: Mothers or Workers?* London: UCL Press.
8. Townsend's (1979) attitude to unpaid work, and to the position of women more generally, was not wholly consistent. In talking about levels of unemployment, he argued that the numbers would be far higher if the 'under-utilized productive capacity of non-employed women with or without dependants', together with other economically inactive groups were to be included. On the other hand, he was concerned that the shift from manufacturing to service industries would 'create a major new

- source of inequality and poverty in society' as older men were displaced from the labour market in favour of women. He predicted that 'a larger number of physically active middle-aged males will be pensioned off to facilitate occupational opportunity for women' p. 682.
9. Townsend, Peter (1997) 'Redistribution: The Strategic Alternative to Privatisation', in Alan Walker and Carol Walker, *Britain Divided: The growth of social exclusion in the 1980s and 1990s*, London: CPAG, p. 269.
  10. Walker, Alan and Walker, Carol, (eds) (1997) *Britain Divided: The growth of social exclusion in the 1980s and 1990s*, London: CPAG.
  11. *Ibid.*: 8.
  12. Harker, Lisa (1996) *A Secure Future? Social security and the family in a changing world*, London: CPAG; Harker, Lisa (1997) 'New Paths for Social Security' in Alan Walker and Carol Walker, *Britain Divided: The growth of social exclusion in the 1980s and 1990s*, London: CPAG.
  13. Walker, *op cit.*, p. 8.
  14. Golding, Peter (1986) *Excluding the Poor*, London: CPAG.
  15. Lister, Ruth (1990) *The Exclusive Society: Citizenship and the Poor*, London: CPAG.
  16. Goodin, Robert E. (1996) 'Inclusion and Exclusion', *European Journal of Sociology* Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 343–71.
  17. Marshall, T.H. (1950) 'Citizenship and Social Class' in T.H. Marshall and Tom Bottomore, *Citizenship and Social Class*, London: Pluto Press 1992, p. 8.
  18. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
  19. Pateman, Carole (1988) *The Sexual Contract*, Cambridge: Polity Press; Walby, Sylvia (1994) 'Is Citizenship Gendered?' *Sociology* Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 379–95.
  20. Lister, *op cit.*, p. 68.
  21. Hall, Stuart and Jacques, Martin (1983) *The Politics of Thatcherism*, London: Lawrence and Wishart; Levitas, Ruth (1986) (ed.) *The Ideology of the New Right*, Cambridge: Polity; Gamble, Andrew (1988) *The Free Economy and The Strong State*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
  22. *Cole on the Dole*, 19 February 1993.
  23. Townsend (1979) *op cit.*, p. 920.
  24. Field, Frank (1990) *Losing Out: The Emergence of Britain's Underclass*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, p. 101.
  25. Dahrendorf, Ralf (1987) 'The erosion of citizenship and its consequences for us all' *New Statesman*, 12 June, p. 13.
  26. *Ibid.*
  27. Field, *op cit.*, pp. 7, 107.
  28. *Ibid.*, pp. 155, 107.
  29. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
  30. Field, Frank (1995) *Making Welfare Work: Reconstructing Welfare for the Millennium*, London: Institute of Community Studies.
  31. Murray, Charles (1990) *The Emerging British Underclass*, London: IEA, p. 23.
  32. *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 17.
  33. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
  34. Murray, Charles (1994) *Underclass: The Crisis Deepens*, London: IEA.



35. Bewick, Tom (1997) 'The poverty of US welfare reform: lessons from California', *Working Brief* 87, August/September, pp. 21–7.
36. *Panorama*, 29 September 1997; Rogers, J. Jean (1997) 'Making welfare work', *New Statesman* 29 August, pp. 17–18.
37. Macnicol, John (1987) 'In pursuit of the Underclass', *Journal of Social Policy*, Vol. 16, pp. 293–318; Mann, Kirk (1992) *The Making of an English Underclass*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press; Morris, Lydia (1994) *Dangerous Classes: The Underclass and Social Citizenship*, London: Routledge.
38. *Thinking Aloud*, 12 November 1987, 'Is There a New Underclass in British Society?' Channel 4.
39. Westergaard, John (1992) 'About and Beyond the "Underclass"', *Sociology* Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 575–87.
40. Oppenheim, Carey (1993) *Poverty: The Facts*, London: CPAG.
41. Dean, Hartley and Taylor-Gooby, Peter (1992) *Dependency Culture: the explosion of a myth*, New York: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.
42. Lister *op cit.*, p. 26.
43. Adonis, Andrew and Pollard, Stephen (1997) *A Class Act: The Myth of Classless Society*, London: Hamish Hamilton, p. 16.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
45. Duffy, K. (1995) *Social Exclusion and Human Dignity in Europe*, Council of Europe.
46. Silver *op cit.*
47. Spicker, Paul (1997) 'Exclusion', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 35(1): 133–143; Evans, Martin, Paugam, Serge and Prellis, Joseph A. (1995) *Chunnel Vision: Poverty, social exclusion and the debate on social welfare in France and Britain*, STICERD working paper WSP/115, London: London School of Economics.
48. Spicker *op cit.*
49. Room, Graham (1995) (ed.) *Beyond the Threshold*, Bristol: Policy Press.
50. Sostris (1997) *Social Strategies in Risk Societies: Social Exclusion in Comparative Perspective*, Sostris Working Paper 1, London: University of East London.
51. EC (1994b) *European Social Policy: a way forward for the Union*, Brussels: European Commission; EC (1994a) *Growth, competitiveness, employment: the challenges and ways forward into the 21st century*, Brussels: European Commission.
52. EC (1994a) *op cit.*, p. 3.
53. EC (1994b) *op cit.*, p. 49.
54. EC (1994a) *op cit.*, pp. 15–16.
55. EC (1994b) *op cit.*, p. 49.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 35–6, 51–2.
57. EC (1994a) p. 136.
58. EC (1994b) *op cit.*, p. 49; EC (1994a) *op cit.*, p. 134.
59. EC (1994a) *op cit.*, pp. 9,11.
60. *Ibid.*, pp. 148–9.
61. Maier, Friederike (1994) *Equal Opportunities for Women and Men: Wage and Non-wage Labour Costs, Social Security and Public Funds to Combat Unemployment*, Brussels: European Commission; Rees, Teresa (1994)

*Equal Opportunities for Women and Men: Equality into Education and Training Policies*, Brussels: European Commission.

62. EC (1994a) *op cit.*, pp. 12, 15.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
64. *Ibid.*, pp. 15–16, 139.
65. Ackers, Louise (1998) *Shifting Spaces: Women, Citizenship and migration within the European Union*, Bristol: Policy Press.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. Thompson and du Gay (1997) 'Future imperfect' *Nexus*, Winter/Spring, pp. 8–9.
2. Twigg, Stephen *Fabian Review* Vol. 109, No. 2, p. 23.
3. Cohen, Nick (1997) 'Totally Wonkers', *Observer*, 9 March, p. 20.
4. *New Statesman* 15 January 1993, p. 5.
5. The membership of the Commission on Social Justice was: Sir Gordon Borrie, QC; Professor A.B. Atkinson, Oxford; Anita Bhalla, Asian Resource Centre, Birmingham; Professor John Gennard, Strathclyde University; The Very Reverend John Gladwin, Provost of Sheffield and Bishop-Elect of Guildford; Christopher Haskins, Chairman, Northern Foods plc; Patricia Hewitt; Dr Penelope Leach, Fellow, British Psychological Society; Professor Ruth Lister, Loughborough University; Professor David Marquand, University of Sheffield; Bert Massie, Director, Royal Association for Disability and Rehabilitation; Emma MacLennan, Vice-Chair, Low Pay Unit; Dr Eithne McLaughlin, Queens University, Belfast; Stephen Webb, Institute for Fiscal Studies; Margaret Wheeler, UNISON; Professor Bernard Williams, Oxford.
6. Beresford, Peter and Turner, Michael (1997) *It's Our Welfare*, Report of the Citizens' Commission on the future of the Welfare State, London: National Institute for Social Work.
7. Commission on Social Justice (CSJ) (1994) *Social Justice: Strategies for Social Renewal*, London: Vintage, p. 96 (emphasis added).
8. Townsend, Peter (1995) 'Persuasion and Conformity: An assessment of the Borrie report on Social Justice', *New Left Review* Vol. 213, pp. 137–50.
9. Milne, Kirsty (1995) 'Welfare Statement', *New Statesman and Society*, 27 January, p. 21.
10. CSJ *op cit.*, p. 95.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Andersen and Mann *op cit.*
13. This was part of the Australian 'Working Nation' initiative, which, like New Labour's New Deal, was introduced by a right-wing Labour administration. See Finn, Dan (1997) *Working Nation: Welfare Reform and the Australian Job Compact for the long term unemployed*, London: Unemployment Unit.
14. Showstack Sassoon, Anne (1996) 'Beyond pessimism of the intellect: Agendas for Social Justice and Change' in Mark Perryman (ed.) *The Blair Agenda*, London: Lawrence and Wishart, p. 159.

50. Mulgan (1997a) *op cit.*, p. 202.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 137.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 185.
53. Guy, Will (1996) 'Health for All' in Ruth Levitas and Will Guy (eds) *Interpreting Official Statistics* London: Routledge; Wilkinson, Richard (1997) *Unhealthy Societies: From Inequality to Wellbeing*, London: Routledge.
54. Blair, 2 June 1997, *op cit.*
55. *Ibid.*
56. Blair, 24 January 1997, 'The 21<sup>st</sup> Century Welfare State' Social and Economic Policy Conference, Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.
57. Blair, 2 June 1997, *op cit.*
58. Mandelson, *Observer* 17 August 1997.
59. Blair, 29 January 1996, *op cit.*
60. Harman, 13 November 1997, *op cit.*
61. Brown, 11 September 1997, *op cit.*
62. Mandelson, 14 August 1997, 'Labour's Next Steps: Tackling Social Exclusion', Fabian Society lecture.
63. Harman, 13 November 1997, *op cit.*
64. Plant, Raymond (1997b) 'The Labour Market, Citizenship and Social Exclusion', CASE Seminar, London School of Economics, 10 December.
65. Campbell, Bea (1993) *Goliath: Britain's Dangerous Places*, London: Methuen.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

1. Downes, David, *Guardian* 25 November 1997, 'Prison does wonders for the jobless figures'; Western, Bruce and Beckett, Katherine (1997) 'How unregulated in the U.S. Labour Market? The Penal System as a Labor Market Institution', paper presented to the American Sociological Association, Toronto.
2. Finn, Dan (1997) *Working Nation: Welfare Reform and the Australian Job Compact for the Long Term Unemployed*, London: Unemployment Unit.
3. Townsend, Peter (1996) 'The Struggle for Independent Statistics on Poverty' in Ruth Levitas and Will Guy (eds) *Interpreting Official Statistics*, London: Routledge.
4. Perri 6 (1997b) 'Social exclusion: time to be optimistic' in *The Wealth and Poverty of Networks: Tackling Social Exclusion*, Demos Collection 12, London: Demos, p. 3.
5. *Observer* 7 December 1997.
6. *Guardian* 30 December 1997.
7. Perri 6 (1997b) *op cit.*, p. 6; Schneider, Jo Anne (1997) 'Welfare-to-network' in *The Wealth and Poverty of Networks: Tackling Social Exclusion*, Demos Collection 12, London: Demos, p. 30.
8. Perri 6 (1997) *Escaping Poverty*, London: Demos.
9. Hall, Peter A. (1997) 'Social capital: a fragile asset' in *The Wealth and Poverty of Networks: Tackling Social Exclusion*, Demos Collection 12, London: Demos, p. 35.

10. Stewart, John (1997/8) 'And the SERA response', *New Ground* 53, p. 13.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Skjeie, Hege (1991) 'The Rhetoric of Difference: On Women's Inclusion into Political Elites', *Politics and Society* Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 133–63.
13. Daniel, Caroline (1997) 'May the taskforce be with you', *New Statesman* 1 August, p. 29.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER 9

1. Durkheim, E. (1964 [1893]) *The Division of Labour in Society*, New York: Free Press.
2. Gray (1997) *op cit.*, pp. 19–20.
3. Watts Miller, Willie (1996) *Durkheim, Morals and Modernity*, London: UCL Press, p. 246.
4. Soros, George *Guardian* 18 January 1997.
5. Durkheim, *op cit.*, p. 211.
6. Levitas, Ruth (1998) 'Will Hutton: Closet Durkheimian' in Paul Baguley and Jeff Hearn (eds) *Transforming Politics: Power and Resistance*, London: Macmillan.
7. Watts Miller *op cit.*, p. 4.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
9. Durkheim, cited in Giddens, Anthony (1986) (ed.) *Durkheim on Politics and the State*, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 8.
10. Stanley, John L. (ed.) (1976) *From Georges Sorel: Essays in Socialism and Philosophy*, Oxford University Press.
11. Durkheim, *op cit.*, p. 17.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
13. Durkheim, cited in Giddens, *op cit.*, p. 21.
14. Durkheim, *op cit.*, p. 242.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
16. Pahl, R.E. (1991), 'The Search for Social Cohesion: from Durkheim to the European Commission', *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 32, No. 2, p. 348.
17. Lehmann, Jennifer (1994) *Durkheim and Women*, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press.
18. Gilman, Charlotte Perkins (1966 [1898]) *Women and Economics*, New York: Harper Torchbooks.
19. Durkheim, cited in Watts Miller, *op cit.*, pp. 75–6.
20. Durkheim, Emile (1952 [1897]) *Suicide*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
21. Durkheim, cited in Giddens *op cit.*, p. 31.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 238.
23. Durkheim (1964) *op cit.*, pp. 377–8.
24. Durkheim, cited in Watts-Miller *op cit* p. 254.
25. Fenton, Steve (1984) *Durkheim and Modern Sociology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Giddens (1971) *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Giddens (1978)

# Select Bibliography

- Acheson, Donald (1998) *Independent Inquiry into Inequalities in Health*, London, The Stationery Office.
- Aldridge, Stephen (2001) *Social mobility: a discussion paper*, London: Performance and Innovation Unit.
- Aldridge, Stephen (2004) *Life Chances and Social Mobility: An overview of the evidence*, London: Prime Minister's Strategy Unit.
- Andersen, Paul and Mann, Nyta (1997) *Safety First: The Making of New Labour*, London: Granta Books.
- Barratt Brown, Michael and Coates, Ken (1996) *The Blair Revelation: Deliverance for Whom?* London: Spokesman.
- Beresford, Peter and Turner, Michael (1997) *It's Our Welfare*, Report of the Citizens' Commission on the future of the Welfare State, London: National Institute for Social Work.
- Blair, Tony (1994b) *Socialism*, Fabian Pamphlet 565, London: Fabian Society.
- Bradshaw, Jonathan and Peter Kemp, Sally Baldwin and Abigail Rowe (2004) *The Drivers of Social Exclusion: A Review of the Literature*, London: SEU/Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.
- Campbell, Bea (1993) *Goliath: Britain's Dangerous Places*, London: Methuen.
- Commission on Public Policy and British Business (CPPBB) (1997) *Promoting Prosperity: A Business Agenda for Britain*, London: Vintage.
- Commission on Social Justice (CSJ) (1994) *Social Justice: Strategies for Social Renewal*, London: Vintage.
- Commission on Taxation and Citizenship (2000) *Paying for Progress: A New Politics of Tax for Public Spending*, London: Fabian Society.
- Dahrendorf, Ralf *et al.* (1995) *Report on Wealth Creation and Social Cohesion in a Free Society*, London: Commission on Wealth Creation and Social Cohesion.
- Davies, A. J. (1996) *To Build a New Jerusalem: The British Labour Party from Kier Hardie to Tony Blair*, London: Abacus.
- Dean, Hartley and Taylor-Gooby, Peter (1992) *Dependency Culture: the explosion of a myth*, New York: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.
- Demos (1997) *The Wealth and Poverty of Networks: tackling social exclusion*, Demos Collection 12, London: Demos.
- Department of Health (1999) *Caring About Carers: a national strategy for carers*, London: The Stationery Office.
- Department of Social Security (1999) *Opportunity For All: Tackling Poverty and Social Exclusion* (OFA 1999), Cm 4445, London: The Stationery Office.
- Department of Social Security (2000) *Opportunity For All. One Year On: Making a Difference* (OFA 2000), Cm 4865 London: The Stationery Office.
- Department of Work and Pensions (2001) *Opportunity For All: Making a Difference. Third Annual Report* (OFA 2003) Cm 5260, London: The Stationery Office.
- Department of Work and Pensions (2002) *Opportunity For All: Fourth Annual Report* (OFA 2002) Cm 5598, London: The Stationery Office.

- Department of Work and Pensions (2003) *Opportunity For All: Fifth Annual Report* (OFA 2003) Cm 5956, London: The Stationery Office.
- Department of Work and Pensions (2004) *Opportunity For All: Sixth Annual Report* (OFA 2004) Cm 6234 London: The Stationery Office.
- Duncan, Simon and Edwards, Rosalind (1997) *Single Mothers in an International Context: Mothers or Workers?* London: UCL Press.
- Durkheim, Emile (1952 [1897]) *Suicide*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Durkheim, Emile (1964 [1893]) *The Division of Labour in Society*, New York: Free Press.
- Etzioni, Amitai (1994) *The Parenting Deficit*, London: Demos.
- Etzioni, Amitai (1995 [1993]) *The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda*, London: Fontana.
- Etzioni, Amitai (1997 [1996]) *The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society*, London: Profile Books.
- Fairclough, Norman (2000) *New Labour, New Language*, London: Routledge.
- Fenton, Steve (1984) *Durkheim and Modern Sociology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Field, Frank (1990) *Losing Out: The Emergence of Britain's Underclass*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Field, Frank (1995) *Making Welfare Work: Reconstructing Welfare for the Millennium*, London: Institute of Community Studies.
- Finlayson, Alan (2003) *Making Sense of New Labour*, London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Finn, Dan (1997) *Working Nation: Welfare Reform and the Australian Job Compact for the long term unemployed*, London: Unemployment Unit.
- Gamble, Andrew (1988) *The Free Economy and The Strong State*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Gane, Mike (1992) 'Durkheim: Woman as Outsider' in M. Gane (ed.) *The Radical Sociology of Durkheim and Mauss*, London: Routledge, pp. 85–134.
- Giddens, Anthony (1971) *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Giddens, Anthony (1978) *Emile Durkheim*, London: Fontana.
- Giddens, Anthony (ed.) (1986) *Durkheim on Politics and the State*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Gilman, Charlotte Perkins (1966 [1898]) *Women and Economics*, New York: Harper Torchbooks.
- Glucksmann, Miriam (1995) 'Why "Work"? Gender and the "Total Social Organization of Labour"', *Gender, Work and Organization*, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 63–75.
- Golding, Peter (1986) *Excluding the Poor*, London: CPAG.
- Goodin, Robert E. (1996) 'Inclusion and Exclusion', *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 343–71.
- Goodman, Alissa and Zoe Oldfoeld, (2004) *Permanent Differences? Income and Expenditure Inequality*, London: Institute of Fiscal Studies.
- Gordon, David, Laura Adelman, Karl Ashworth, Jonathan Bradshaw, Ruth Levitas, Sue Middleton, Christina Pantazis, Demi Patsios, Sarah Payne, Peter Townsend and Julie Williams (2000) *Poverty and Social Exclusion in Britain*, York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.

- Gray, John (1989) *Liberalisms: Essays in Political Philosophy*, London: Routledge.
- Gray, John (1992) *The Moral Foundations of Market Institutions*, London: IEA Health and Welfare Unit.
- Gray, John (1993a) *Beyond the New Right: Markets, government and the common environment*, London: Routledge.
- Gray, John (1993b) *Post-Liberalism: Studies in Political Thought*, New York: Routledge.
- Gray, John (1996) *After Social Democracy*, London: Demos.
- Gray, John (1997) *Endgames: Questions in Late Modern Political Thought*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Gray, John (1995) *Enlightenment's Wake: Politics and culture at the close of the modern age*, London: Routledge.
- Green Party (1993) *Manifesto for a Sustainable Society*, London: Green Party.
- Gregg, Paul and Wadsworth, Jonathan (1996) 'Feeling Insecure?', *Employment Audit*, 2, Autumn, pp. 17–26.
- GUMG (Glasgow University Media Group) (1976) *Bad News*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Gutmann, Amy (1988) *Democracy and the Welfare State*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Hall, Peter A. (1997) 'Social capital: a fragile asset' in *The wealth and poverty of networks: tackling social exclusion*, Demos Collection 12, London: Demos, pp. 35–7.
- Hall, Stuart (2003) 'New Labour's double-shuffle', *Soundings* 24.
- Hall, Stuart and Jacques, Martin (1983) *The Politics of Thatcherism*, London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Halpern, David, Clive Bates, Geoff Mulgan, Stephen Aldridge, Greg Beales and Adam Heathfield (2004) *Personal Responsibility and Changing Behaviour: the state of knowledge and its implications for public policy*, London: Cabinet Office.
- Halsey, A. H. and Young, Michael (1995) *Family and Community Socialism*, London: IPPR.
- Harker, Lisa (1996) *A Secure Future? Social security and the family in a changing world*, London: CPAG.
- Harker, Lisa (1997) 'New Paths for Social Security' in Alan Walker and Carol Walker, *Britain Divided: The growth of social exclusion in the 1980s and 1990s*, London: CPAG.
- Hills, John, Julian Le Grand and David Piachaud (eds) (2001) *Understanding Social Exclusion*, Oxford University Press.
- Howarth, Catherine, Peter Kenway, Guy Palmer and Cathy Street (1998) *Monitoring Poverty and Social Exclusion: Labour's Inheritance*, York: New Policy Institute/Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Hutton, Will (1995a) 'High Risk Strategy', *The Guardian*, 30 October, pp. 2–3.
- Hutton, Will (1995b) *The State We're In*, London: Jonathan Cape.
- Hutton, Will (1996a) *The State We're In*, London: Vintage.
- Hutton, Will (1996b) 'The Stakeholder Society' in Marquand and Seldon (1996) pp. 290–308.
- Hutton, Will (1996c) 'Left with no illusions', *Prospect*, March, pp. 46–50.
- Hutton, Will (1997a) 'Our Stake in Society', *The Observer*, 20 April, p. 29.

- Hutton, Will (1997b) 'An Overview of Stakeholding' in Kelly *et al.* (1997) pp. 3–9.
- Hutton, Will (1997c) *The State to Come*, London: Vintage.
- Jones, Nicholas (1997) *Campaign 1997*, London: Indigo.
- Jones, Tudor (1996) *Remaking the Labour Party: From Gaitskell to Blair*, London: Routledge.
- Kay, John (1993) *The Foundations of Corporate Success*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kay, John (1996a) 'The Good Market', *Prospect*, May, pp. 39–43.
- Kay, John (1996b) *The Business of Economics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kelly, Gavin, Kelly, Dominic and Gamble, Andrew, (1997) (eds) *Stakeholder Capitalism*, London: Macmillan.
- Labour Party (LP) (1992) *It's Time To Get Britain Working Again* (Election Manifesto).
- Labour Party (LP) (1995a) *Renewing Democracy, Rebuilding Communities*.
- Labour Party (LP) (1995b) *Safer Communities, safer Britain*.
- Labour Party (LP) (1995c) *A Quiet Life: Tough Action on Criminal Neighbours*.
- Labour Party (LP) (1995d) *Excellence for Everyone: Labour's crusade to raise standards*.
- Labour Party (LP) (1995e) *A New Economic Future for Britain: Economic and employment opportunities for all*.
- Labour Party (LP) (1996a) *Tackling Youth Crime: Reforming Youth Justice*.
- Labour Party (LP) (1996b) *Parenting*.
- Labour Party (LP) (1996c) *Lifelong Learning*.
- Labour Party (LP) (1996d) *Learn as You Earn: Labour's plans for a skills revolution*.
- Labour Party (LP) (1996e) *Aiming Higher*.
- Labour Party (LP) (1996f) *Labour and the Voluntary sector: Setting the Agenda for partnership in government*.
- Labour Party (LP) (1996g) *Strategy for Women*.
- Labour Party (LP) (1996h) *A Fresh Start for Britain: Labour's strategy for Britain in the modern world*.
- Labour Party (LP) (1996i) *Getting Welfare to Work: Opportunities for Lone Mothers*.
- Labour Party (LP) (1996j) *Building Prosperity: Flexibility, efficiency and fairness at work*.
- Labour Party (LP) (1996k) *Labour's New Deal for a Lost Generation*.
- Labour Party (LP) (1996m) *Protecting Our Communities: Labour's plans for tackling criminal, anti-social behaviour in neighbourhoods*.
- Labour Party (LP) (1996n) *New Labour, New Life for Britain* (draft manifesto).
- Labour Party (LP) (1997a) *Labour's Business Manifesto: Equipping Britain for the Future*.
- Labour Party (LP) (1997b) *Because Britain Deserves Better* (1997 Election manifesto).
- Labour Party (LP) (2001) *Ambitions for Britain* (2001 Election manifesto).
- Layard, Richard (1997) *What Labour Can Do*, London: Warner Books.
- Lehmann, Jennifer (1994) *Durkheim and Women*, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press.



- Levitas, Ruth (1986) (ed.) *The Ideology of the New Right*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Levitas, Ruth (1996a) 'Fiddling while Britain Burns: The 'measurement' of unemployment' in Ruth Levitas and Will Guy (eds) *Interpreting Official Statistics*, London: Routledge, pp. 45–65.
- Levitas, Ruth (1996b) 'The concept of social exclusion and the new Durkheimian hegemony', *Critical Social Policy* 46, Vol. 16, pp. 5–20.
- Levitas, Ruth (1998) 'Will Hutton: Closet Durkheimian' in Paul Bagguley and Jeff Hearn (eds) *Transforming Politics: Power and Resistance*, London: Macmillan.
- Levitas, Ruth (2004) 'Shuffling back to Equality?', *Soundings* 26 pp. 59–72.
- Levitas, Ruth (2004) 'The Concept and Measurement of Social Exclusion' in Christina Pantazis, David Gordon and Ruth Levitas (eds) *Poverty and Social Exclusion: The Millennium Survey*, Bristol: Policy Press.
- Lister, Ruth (1990) *The Exclusive Society: Citizenship and the Poor*, London: CPAG.
- Lloyd, John (1997a) 'A plan to abolish the underclass', *New Statesman*, 29 August, pp. 14–16.
- Lloyd, John (1997b) 'Interview: Clive Hollick', *New Statesman*, 24 January, pp. 18–19.
- Lockwood, David (1964) 'Social Integration and System Integration' in George K. Zollschan and W. Hirsch (eds), *Explorations in Social Change*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Lockwood, David (1992) *Solidarity and Schism*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Lukes, Stephen (1973) *Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work*, London: Allen Lane.
- Macmurray, John (1931) *Learning to Live*, London: BBC.
- Macmurray, John (1932) *Freedom in the Modern World*, London: Faber and Faber.
- Macmurray, John (1935a) *Reason and Emotion*, London: Faber and Faber.
- Macmurray, John (1935b) *Creative Society: A Study of the Relation of Christianity to Communism*, London: SCM Press.
- Macmurray, John (1957) *The Self as Agent*, London: Faber and Faber.
- Macmurray, John (1961) *Persons in Relation*, London: Faber and Faber.
- Macnicol, John (1987) 'In pursuit of the Underclass', *Journal of Social Policy*, Vol. 16, pp. 293–318.
- Mandelson, Peter and Liddle, Roger (1996) *The Blair Revolution: Can New Labour Deliver?* London: Faber and Faber.
- Mann, Kirk (1992) *The Making of an English Underclass*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- Marquand, David and Seldon, Anthony (1996) *The Ideas that Shaped Post-War Britain*, London: New Statesman/Fontana.
- Marshall, T. H. (1950) 'Citizenship and Social Class' in T. H. Marshall and Tom Bottomore, (1992) *Citizenship and Social Class*, London: Pluto Press.
- Maxwell, Dominic (2004) *Fair Dues: Towards a more progressive inheritance tax*, London: IPPR.
- Mitchell, R., Mary Shaw and Daniel Dorling (2000) *Inequalities in life and death: What if Britain were more equal?*, Bristol: Policy Press.
- Morris, Lydia (1994) *Dangerous Classes: The Underclass and Social Citizenship*, London: Routledge.

- Mulgan, Geoff (1997a) *Connexity: How to Live in a Connected World*, London: Chatto and Windus.
- Mulgan, Geoff (1997b) (ed.) *Life After Politics: New Thinking for the Twenty-first Century*, London: Fontana Press.
- Mulgan, Geoff (1997c) 'Think well-being, not welfare', *New Statesman*, 17 January, pp. 28–9.
- Mulhall, Stephen and Swift, Adam (1992) *Liberals and Communitarians*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Murray, Charles (1990) *The Emerging British Underclass*, London: IEA.
- Murray, Charles (1994) *Underclass: The Crisis Deepens*, London: IEA.
- Oppenheim, Carey (1993) *Poverty: The Facts*, London: CPAG.
- Pahl, R. E. (1991), 'The search for social cohesion: from Durkheim to the European Commission', *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 345–60.
- Panitch, Leo and Leys, Colin (1997) *The End of Parliamentary Socialism: From New Left to New Labour*, London: Verso.
- Pantazis, Christina, David Gordon and Ruth Levitas (eds) (2005) *Poverty and Social Exclusion: The Millennium Survey*, Bristol: Policy Press.
- Pateman, Carole (1988) *The Sexual Contract*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Paxton, Will and Dixon, Mike (2004) *The State of the Nation: An Audit of Injustice in the UK*, London: IPPR.
- Pearce, Frank (1989) *The Radical Durkheim*, London: Unwin Hyman.
- Plender, John (1997) *A Stake in the Future: The Stakeholding Solution*, London: Nicholas Brealey.
- Room, Graham (1995) (ed.) *Beyond the Threshold*, Bristol: Policy Press.
- Rowntree (1995) *Joseph Rowntree Foundation Inquiry into Income and Wealth*, 2 vols, York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Shaw, Eric (1994) *The Labour Party Since 1979*, London: Routledge.
- Shaw, Mary, Daniel Dorling, David Gordon and George Davey Smith (1999) *The widening gap: Health inequalities and policy in Britain*, Bristol: Policy Press.
- Showstack Sassoon, Anne (1996) 'Beyond pessimism of the intellect: Agendas for social Justice and Change' in Mark Perryman (ed.) *The Blair Agenda*, London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Silver, Hilary (1994) 'Social exclusion and social solidarity: three paradigms' *International Labour Review* Vol. 133(5–6), pp. 531–78.
- Skjeie, Hege (1991) 'The Rhetoric of Difference: On Women's Inclusion into Political Elites', *Politics and Society* Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 133–63.
- Social Exclusion Unit (1998) *Rough Sleeping*, London: SEU.
- Social Exclusion Unit (1998) *Truancy and Social Exclusion*, London: SEU.
- Social Exclusion Unit (1998) *Bringing Britain Together: a national strategy for neighbourhood renewal*, London: SEU.
- Social Exclusion Unit (1999) *Teenage Pregnancy*, London: SEU.
- Social Exclusion Unit (1999) *Bridging the Gap: new opportunities for 16–18 year olds not in education, employment or training*, London: SEU.
- Social Exclusion Unit (1999) *Review of the Social Exclusion Unit*, London: SEU.
- Social Exclusion Unit (2000) *Minority ethnic issues in social exclusion and neighbourhood renewal*, London: SEU.

- Social Exclusion Unit (2001) *A new commitment to neighbourhood renewal – national strategy action plan*, London: SEU.
- Social Exclusion Unit (2001) *National strategy for neighbourhood renewal – Policy Action Team audit*, London: SEU.
- Social Exclusion Unit (2001) *Preventing social exclusion*, London: SEU.
- Social Exclusion Unit (2002) *Making the connections: transport and social exclusion interim findings*, London: SEU.
- Social Exclusion Unit (2002) *Reducing re-offending by ex-prisoners*, London: SEU.
- Social Exclusion Unit (2002) *Young runaways*, London: SEU.
- Social Exclusion Unit (2003) *Making the connections: transport and social exclusion*, London: SEU.
- Social Exclusion Unit (2003) *A better education for children in care*, London: SEU.
- Social Exclusion Unit (2004) *Tackling Social Exclusion: Taking stock and looking to the future – emerging findings*, London: SEU.
- Social Exclusion Unit (2004) *Action on Debt: why it matters and what you can do*, London: SEU.
- Social Exclusion Unit (2004) *Mental Health and Social Exclusion*, London: SEU.
- Social Exclusion Unit (2004) *Breaking the Cycle: Taking stock of progress and priorities for the future*, London: SEU.
- Sostris (1997) *Social Strategies in Risk Societies: Social Exclusion in Comparative Perspective*, Sostris Working Paper 1, London: University of East London.
- Spicker, Paul (1997) 'Exclusion', *Journal of Common Market Studies* Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 133–43.
- Tony Atkinson, Bea Cantillon, Eric Marlier, and Brian Nolan (2002) *Social Indicators: The EU and Social Inclusion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Townsend, Peter (1979) *Poverty in the United Kingdom*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Townsend, Peter (1995) 'Persuasion and Conformity: An assessment of the Borrie report on Social Justice', *New Left Review* Vol. 213, pp. 137–50.
- Townsend, Peter (1996) 'The Struggle for Independent Statistics on Poverty' in Ruth Levitas and Will Guy (eds) *Interpreting Official Statistics*, London: Routledge.
- Toynbee, Polly (2003) *Hard Work: Life in Low Pay Britain*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Trades Union Congress (TUC) (1996) *Your Stake at Work: TUC Proposals for a Stakeholding Economy*, London: Trades Union Congress.
- UK National Plan on Social Inclusion 2001–3 (NAP 2001).
- UK National Plan on Social Inclusion 2003–5 (NAP 2003).
- Walker, Alan and Walker, Carol (1997) (ed.) *Britain Divided: The growth of social exclusion in the 1980s and 1990s*, London: CPAG.
- Waring, Marilyn (1988) *If Women Counted*, London: Macmillan.
- Watts Miller, Willie (1996) *Durkheim, Morals and Modernity*, London: UCL Press.
- Westergaard, John (1992) 'About and Beyond the "Underclass"', *Sociology* Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 575–87.

- Willetts, David (1996) *Blair's gurus*. London: Centre for Policy Studies.
- Willetts, David (1997) *Why Vote Conservative?* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Wright, Tony (1997) *Why Vote Labour?* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Young, Michael (2001) 'Down with Meritocracy', *The Guardian*, 29 June.
- Young, Michael (1958) *The Rise of the Meritocracy 1870–2033*, London: Thames and Hudson.

# 2

## **Social Innovations as a Practical Inclusive Tool**

# 2

1. European Union. 2014. "Social innovation, a new path." Pp. 11-56 in Social Innovation: a Decade of Changes. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.



# Social Innovation

A Decade of Changes

*A BEPA report*

*August 2014*

## Acknowledgements

This report owes much to the personal commitment, knowledge and thoughts of Agnès Hubert, Maria da Graça Carvalho and Pierre Goudin of the Bureau of European Policy Advisers, with the support and input of Baudouin Regout, under the supervision of Jean-Claude Thébault and Maria Angeles Benitez Salas.

A number of European Commission officials from various policy departments also contributed to this report, in particular all the members of the interservice group on social innovation.

BEPA would like to thank all the participating services for their very useful work and comments, especially reflected in part II of the report, namely DG AGRI, COMM, CONNECT, EAC, ECHO, EMPL, ENER, ENTR, HR, MARKET, MOVE, REGIO, RTD, SANCO and TAXUD.

Extracts from reports produced or commissioned by the European Commission have also been used in various chapters or sections of the report and are typically acknowledged in footnotes mentioning the relevant references and internet links.

BEPA would also like to thank Sid-Ahmed Talbi and Carmen Tresguerres for their help. Finally, we are very grateful to Aurélie Therace for her graphical and publishing support in producing the report.

### *Disclaimer*

The analysis contained in this report does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission.



## Table of contents

Acknowledgements .....	2
Introduction .....	8
PART I	
Social innovation, a new path .....	11
1. Social innovation as a driver for change.....	13
1.1. An evolving context.....	14
1.2. The social market economy concept .....	17
1.2.1. The origins of the concept.....	17
1.2.2. The social market economy in the European arena.....	18
1.2.3. A new strategy for the Single Market .....	18
1.3. Ecosystems for social innovation.....	20
1.3.1. An approach to the concept of ecosystem.....	20
1.3.2. Main components of an ecosystem for social innovation .....	21
1.3.3. Examples of ecosystems for social innovation.....	22
1.4. Measurement of social impact.....	23
1.4.1. Evidence-based policies.....	25
1.4.2. Funding/financing social innovation .....	26
1.4.3. Indicators for a socially innovative society .....	28
2. Leading by example: how public sector innovation supports social innovation.....	31
2.1. The Commission's commitment to supporting public sector innovation.....	31
2.2. Powering European public sector innovation: towards a new architecture .....	32
3. Achievements and lessons learned.....	35
3.1. Deepening our understanding and knowledge of social innovation .....	36
3.1.1. The Mapping study.....	36
3.1.2. Social innovation research in the European Union .....	37
3.2. Instruments to improve the ecosystem .....	37
3.2.1. The social economy.....	37
3.2.2. Microfinance.....	39
3.2.3. Incubation .....	41

3.2.4. Workplace innovation .....	41
3.2.5. Changes in governance .....	42
3.3. Specific examples of actions from the field.....	42
3.3.1. Social inclusion.....	43
3.3.2. Migration.....	43
3.3.3. Urban regeneration.....	44
3.3.4. Health and ageing.....	45
3.3.5. Social innovation and the environment.....	46
3.3.6. Regional strategies .....	47
3.3.7. Lessons learned from social innovation achievements .....	48
3.4. Social entrepreneurship to revive the social economy .....	49
4. Conclusion: scanning the future to shape the future .....	51
<i>Europe's Societal Challenges</i> .....	52
<i>So what future for Europe and which solutions?</i> .....	53
<i>What will social enterprise look like in Europe by 2020?</i> .....	54
<i>The way forward</i> .....	55
<i>Improve governance in relation to social innovation</i> .....	55
<i>Focus on knowledge</i> .....	56
<i>Support, encourage and improve the business environment</i> .....	56
 PART II	
Main developments in EU policies.....	57
Executive summary .....	58
1. The Dominant Policy Framework 2010-20: smart, sustainable and inclusive Growth.....	59
1.1. Europe 2020 flagship initiatives.....	60
1.1.1. A resource-efficient Europe .....	61
1.1.2. An industrial policy for the globalisation era .....	61
1.1.3. Digital Agenda for Europe .....	62
1.1.4. Innovation Union .....	63
1.1.5. Youth on the Move .....	64
1.1.6. The agenda for new skills and jobs.....	65
1.1.7. The European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion.....	66
1.2. Consolidating the Single Market: Single Market Acts and the Social Business Initiative .....	67

1.3. The environment and resource efficiency.....	69
<i>a. Making energy an integral part of governance and management</i> .....	69
<i>b. Empowering the consumer</i> .....	70
<i>c. The emergence of the energy-literate prosumer</i> .....	71
<i>d. Social lessons from Energy technology demonstration</i> .....	71
1.4. A new approach to social policy: the Social Investment Package (SIP).....	71
2. Main programmes, action plans and supporting schemes .....	75
2.1. European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) .....	76
2.1.1. European Social Fund.....	77
2.1.2. European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) .....	78
2.1.3. The European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) .....	79
2.2. Horizon 2020: coupling research to innovation .....	81
2.3. The Programme for Employment and Social Innovation EaSI (2014-20) to follow the PROGRESS programme .....	82
<i>a. Social innovation and social policy experimentation supported through the PROGRESS programme</i> .....	82
<i>b. Targeted support to social policy innovation projects through direct funding through the EaSI programme</i> .....	83
<i>c. The Programme for Employment and Social Innovation (EaSI)</i> .....	84
2.4. Other programmes and action plans .....	85
2.4.1 The COSME programme: the competitiveness of SMEs.....	85
2.4.2. Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs programme .....	85
2.4.3. The Erasmus+ programme for education, training, youth and sport (2014-20).....	86
2.4.4. The new Creative Europe Programme (2014-20) .....	87
2.4.5. Innovation for a Sustainable Future – The Eco-innovation Action Plan (EcoAP).....	87
3. Initiatives and instruments.....	89
3.1. Governance and coordination .....	89
3.1.1. Social innovation debate with policymakers .....	90
3.1.2. Powering public sector innovation.....	92
3.1.3. Policy guidance on social innovation.....	93
3.1.4. New practices for making policy .....	94
3.1.4.1. Expert groups and networks.....	95

3.1.4.2. European Innovation Partnerships .....	96
<i>a. The European Innovation Partnership on Active and Healthy Ageing (EIP-AHA).....</i>	<i>96</i>
<i>b. The European Innovation Partnership on Agricultural Productivity and Sustainability (EIP-AGRI).....</i>	<i>97</i>
<i>c. The European Innovation Partnership on Water.....</i>	<i>97</i>
<i>d. The European Innovation Partnership on Raw Materials .....</i>	<i>98</i>
<i>e. The European Innovation Partnership on Smart Cities.....</i>	<i>98</i>
3.1.4.3. The Open Innovation Strategy and Policy Group.....	98
3.1.4.4. Living Labs .....	99
3.1.4.5. Futurium.....	99
3.1.4.6. Participatory leadership in the European Commission .....	100
3.1.5. Create an optimised regulatory environment.....	100
3.1.5.1. Simplification of the European Cooperative Regulation.....	100
3.1.5.2. Proposal for a European Foundation.....	101
3.1.5.3. Study on the situation of Mutual Societies and their cross-border activities .....	102
3.1.5.4. European Statute for other forms of social enterprises such as non-profit enterprises .....	102
3.1.5.5. Reform of public procurement: enhancement of quality in the award process.....	103
3.1.5.6. Increasing and including new aid categories in the revision of the General Block Exemption Regulation for state aid.....	104
3.1.5.7. Employee financial participation.....	104
3.2. Financing capacities and facilities.....	105
3.2.1. The EaSI programme for social innovation.....	105
3.2.2. Access to venture capital – The European Venture Capital Funds .....	105
3.2.3. The European regulatory framework for social investment funds: the European Union Social Entrepreneurship Funds (EuSEF).....	105
3.2.4. The development of microcredit/microfinance.....	106
<i>a. European Progress Microfinance Facility .....</i>	<i>106</i>
<i>b. European Code of Good Conduct for Microcredit Provision.....</i>	<i>107</i>
3.2.5. Crowdfunding for social entrepreneurs.....	108
3.2.6. The EIF impact investing scheme .....	109
3.2.7. Dormant funds.....	109
3.2.8. Best practice sharing between Member States regarding the use of capital accumulated in social enterprises and in particular asset locks.....	109

3.3. Capacity building and recognition .....	110
3.3.1. Recognising social innovators.....	110
3.3.1.1. Mapping of the social enterprises sector, business models, economic weight, tax regimes, identification of best practices.....	110
3.3.1.2. Database of labels and certifications of social enterprises .....	110
3.3.1.3. Social innovation prizes .....	111
3.3.2. Networks.....	113
3.3.2.1. Networks of Incubators for Social Innovation .....	113
3.3.2.2. Social Innovation Europe (SIE) .....	113
3.3.2.3. The Collective Awareness Platforms initiative (CAPS).....	115
3.3.2.4. Digital Social Platforms .....	117
3.3.2.5. Workplace Innovation Network.....	118
3.3.2.6. Multi-stakeholder platform for corporate social responsibility .....	118
3.3.2.7. Policy innovation design .....	119
3.3.3. Empowering people .....	119
3.3.3.1. Skills, training and education.....	120
3.3.3.2. Europe for Citizens Programme .....	122
3.3.3.3. Network of twinned towns .....	123
3.3.3.4. Contribute to change - Young Women in Political Careers .....	123
3.3.3.5. Citizens' dialogues .....	124
3.3.3.6 Other activities.....	125
3.4. Research .....	125
3.4.1. 'Social Sciences and Humanities' and 'Science with and for Society' .....	126
3.4.2. Social innovation in other thematic areas of research .....	128
3.4.3. Digital social innovation.....	128
3.4.4. Pilot projects in the areas of e-Inclusion, e-Health, e-Government, e-Learning and mobility.....	129
3.4.5. Research on behaviour .....	131
 ANNEX I	
Examples of participatory projects convened by the European Commission.....	135
 ANNEX II	
A 'checklist' for citizens' deliberations.....	139

## Introduction

*In recent years, many initiatives and events have been carried out to develop pragmatic and participatory solutions to social and environmental problems that have been made more pressing by the crisis and have been addressed inadequately or not at all by either the market or the state.*

Converging analyses indicate that we are (or should be) on course for economic renewal and institutional change. A response based on another way to produce value, with less focus on financial profit and more on real demands or needs is indeed an attractive premise for reconsidering production and redistribution systems.

In this context, social innovations, which are emerging all over the world, are still small in scale, but they are being echoed by changes in thinking and are delivering more and more effective and relevant solutions. The notion has gained ground that social innovation is not only about responding to pressing social needs and addressing the societal challenges of climate change, ageing or poverty, but is also a mechanism for achieving systemic change. It is seen as a way of tackling the underlying causes of social problems rather than just alleviating the symptoms.

Some recent international reports have analysed and explained the emerging role of social innovation vis-à-vis economic and societal challenges from different angles:

- two successive OECD reports<sup>1</sup> have largely linked its emergence to rising inequalities. Furthermore, they argue that the crisis has revealed the weakness of the current economic system of redistribution;
- the 2013 International Labour Organisation report<sup>2</sup> notes that, in advanced economies, the challenge is to stimulate job creation while addressing macroeconomic imbalances; and
- taking a longer term perspective, the Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations has published a report<sup>3</sup> on successes and failures in addressing global challenges over recent decades. The report calls for a radical shake-up in politics and business to embed long-term thinking and provides practical recommendations for action in order to create a more resilient, inclusive and sustainable future.

The European Union itself has reacted promptly to this evolution. A number of policy measures, such as pilot programmes funded by the Structural Funds, have been initiated to empower various actors to address collaboratively the needs of their community.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Growing unequal?*, 2008; <http://www.oecd.org/social/soc/growingunequalincomedistributionandpovertyinoecdcountries.htm> and *Divided we stand*, 2011; <http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/dividedwestandwhyinequalitykeepsrising.htm>.

<sup>2</sup> *Repairing the economic and social fabric* (ILO, World of work report 2013).

<sup>3</sup> *Now for the Long Term*, 2013; [http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/commission/Oxford\\_Martin\\_Now\\_for\\_the\\_Long\\_Term.pdf](http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/commission/Oxford_Martin_Now_for_the_Long_Term.pdf).

<sup>4</sup> Local Employment Initiatives, EQUAL, LEADER, URBAN, ...; see in this respect the 25 year anniversary of AIEDL; <http://www.aeidl.eu/en.html>.

In 2009, the Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA) organised a workshop<sup>5</sup> with experts, civil society organisations, policymakers and social innovators. Following this workshop, President Barroso asked BEPA to investigate the definition and *raison d'être* of social innovation, document the Commission's involvement in this field, identify the barriers to its development and suggest avenues for improvement. At that time, research on this topic had been mainly empirical and the first BEPA report, published in 2010, leveraged examples from the field in order to illustrate the emergence of the social innovation movement and contribute a light conceptual framework with a broad definition of social innovations, which underlined its collaborative process and outcome-oriented nature.<sup>6</sup>

Within a few years, policy support for social innovation has moved towards the centre of the political agenda. Inside the European Commission, the number of services involved has grown and a 'social innovation' culture has spread in support of the Europe 2020 Strategy and its implementation.

Some of these services have developed strong legal and institutional mechanisms aimed primarily at supporting social innovation. This is the case for the internal market services, where the Social Business Initiative (SBI) is supported by a permanent stakeholders group (GECES) and a list of 11 actions to be followed up. This initiative has given birth to many projects and achievements, among which the 'Strasbourg event' of January 2014 (cf. Part I, § 3.4) was a hallmark.

In other policy areas, some services upgraded the policy relevance of social innovation:

- Transport and mobility are now viewed as areas of potential for innovation with a strong social impact. Indeed, these areas use new working methods (such as public taxis for people with disabilities, driven by pensioners) combined with technology (safety sensors in cars and smartphone-based urban transport planners) and social innovation to support the uptake of new services (shared electric vehicle fleets and development of new logistics services);
- At present, innovation in the humanitarian aid sector is almost exclusively focused on technological innovations. However, when looking at long-term risk and the development of prevention and risk reduction, the human factor in social innovation could be a strong lever. The European Commission's contribution to the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 will concentrate more on social innovation; and
- The improvement of knowledge on social innovation through research, platforms, hubs and networks of researchers and transformative tools to open policy perspectives is increasingly supported in various policy areas such as education and culture, health and consumption, communication or technology.

The services that have been most involved in this matter from the beginning (Employment and Social Affairs, Enterprise, Regional Policy, Agriculture, and Research and Innovation) have substantially increased their contributions.

Finally, even internally, the European Commission increasingly uses participatory training courses and events for human resources in a more socially innovative way.

---

<sup>5</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy\\_advisers/activities/conferences\\_workshops/socinnov\\_jan-2009\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/activities/conferences_workshops/socinnov_jan-2009_en.htm).


<sup>6</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/publications\\_pdf/social\\_innovation.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/publications_pdf/social_innovation.pdf).

All these developments – changes in the economic and social context, policy developments, particularly in the EU, in the social field, the development of new analytical frameworks – have led BEPA to update the initial report it produced in 2010 with the active participation of all Commission services, reflecting their increasing involvement in supporting social innovation.

The first part of the report discusses the general context in which these policies and programmes have emerged and the developments which they relied upon to grow. It focuses on relevant changes that have occurred – and are still ongoing – since the publication of the first BEPA report. The first part starts by presenting social innovation as a driver for change, before listing some main achievements and lessons learned from a variety of examples from the field. Finally, it suggests some recommendations for future policymakers.

The second part of the report presents factually, and as comprehensively as possible, the leading 2010-20 policy framework, the main programmes and supporting schemes and the initiatives and instruments established by the Commission to support social innovation, based on the contributions of participating services.





# PART I

Social innovation,  
a new path

*In 2009, when for the first time the European Commission organised a workshop on social innovation, it was an attempt to capture a subject that was becoming increasingly topical.*

*Since then, although most of the contextual elements contained in the first BEPA report have been retained and even expanded, some elements of the landscape have changed significantly. This part of the report intends to point out these changes. It first presents social innovation as a driver for change before focusing on the growing role of the public sector in overcoming the barriers to social innovation, developing some of the achievements made and lessons learned in recent years and concluding with some recommendations to pave the way forward.*

*The recent dynamic combination of interests, institutions and ideas for the promotion of social innovation has been embedded in wider **political, technological and economic changes** which have affected and will continue to affect the development of social innovation in the current decade.*

A significant change in the policy background has been the closer political attention paid to redefining the relationship between the social and the economic spheres.<sup>7</sup> The economic concepts of capital and investment have become social policy instruments and corporate social responsibility is shifting from being a matter of charity to one of inclusion. This change has been conceptually supported in particular by the revival at EU level of the concept of the social market economy, which has shaped the recent exercise to deepen the Single Market and, in so doing, has secured a place for social innovation at the core of EU policies.

The second change that we have identified as significant for the future is linked to the production of social innovations. Mobilising people and resources around a novel idea has never been easy (cf. Henri Dunant creating the Red Cross). This is only the first step of many.<sup>8</sup> Each step entails a process of co-creation which initiates the next one. Together with the search for a favourable economic, legal, social 'milieu' to generate co-creation, the concept of **ecosystems** has been borrowed from biology through management science to describe the environments where social innovations emerge, grow and thrive. We will explore how this concept can help to defragment mental 'silos', work across boundaries and facilitate the sharing of information and knowledge, and identify the role and interest of public authorities in enabling social innovation ecosystems.

The third change is related to measurement issues, which have become increasingly important as social innovation initiatives have mushroomed. Measuring social innovation should indeed help to achieve some crucial objectives, such as proving that it is an effective and sustainable way to respond to societal needs or showing that social and environmental value creation is central to the human and ecological sustainability of societies.

---

<sup>7</sup> *Social innovations, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, edited by T. J. Hamalainen and R. Heiskala, © Sitra, 2007.

<sup>8</sup> See the six different stages for the production of social innovation identified in the first BEPA report, p. 54, or Ten Practical Steps to Implement Social Innovation in the *Guide to Social Innovation*.

## 1.1. An evolving context

'We are at the dawn of something new' – emphatic rhetoric or a description of what was filling the room? This remark from the podium during the 'Social entrepreneurs have your say' event in January 2014 in Strasbourg illustrates the state of mind of the hundreds of 'core actors' from all over Europe who attended the meeting. They were not only describing their perceptions but expressing a wish to be part of this 'something new'.

From the stakeholders' workshop held in 2009 with the President of the Commission, developments in policymaking circles – inside and outside the European Commission – are palpable. As already explained in the first BEPA social innovation report, the growing interest in social innovation has come from the continuous and increased need of public authorities, civil society organisations, private corporations and individuals to respond to the new social risks with new and more effective approaches and shrinking budgets. The crisis has enhanced that process. The new participation and sharing ethos of the social networks generation, as well as the renewed necessity for Europe to develop its innovation capabilities and the mounting interest in quality of life, are boosting factors.

Since the beginning of the decade, three major developments have emerged.

- the *players* have evolved: social players have overcome their first negative reaction of seeing social innovation only as a partial privatisation of welfare, which is the state's responsibility. They have now become active participants in the development of social innovations at local, national and European levels.<sup>9</sup> In all Member States, representatives of the national and local authorities, social entrepreneurs and social economy organisations, the banking and finance sector and the academic and university sector play an active part in the consultative multi-stakeholders group set up by the Commission in 2012<sup>10</sup> and large groups of citizens all over the world are joining what has been called 'a social innovation movement'.<sup>11</sup> Traditional economic players have also radically changed their vision as the idea that social innovation is about bringing solutions to some of the complex problems of today is seen as necessary.<sup>12</sup> The financial world at large is also taking a strong interest in the sector by developing ethical investment products, including 'social and environmental impact financing';
- the *institutions* are also changing: public authorities, in particular in the social, health and education fields, are committed both to being innovative inside and promoting new forms of financing, partnerships and alliances outside in order to improve their services to users and involve stakeholders; and
- last but not least, *ideas*, the third corner of the action triangle, have also developed and spread. The amount of research, projects, experiments, debates, documents, books, events produced on social innovation since the beginning of the decade is impressive. A body of literature now exists to frame the various terminology sets in the social innovation galaxy, and new research continues to explore definitions but also

<sup>9</sup> See social platform position paper on social innovation [http://www.socialplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/20131203\\_SocialPlatform\\_PositionPaper\\_social\\_innovation.pdf](http://www.socialplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/20131203_SocialPlatform_PositionPaper_social_innovation.pdf).

<sup>10</sup> GECES [http://ec.europa.eu/internal\\_market/social\\_business/expert-group/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/social_business/expert-group/index_en.htm).

<sup>11</sup> Unger Mangabeiro, Harvard Law School; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9c3PppXk1w>.

<sup>12</sup> *The Solution Revolution: How business, government and social enterprises are teaming up to solve society's toughest problems*, William D. Eggers and Paul Macmillan (Harvard Business review press, 2013).

investment models, development and evaluation methodologies from an empirical as well as a conceptual perspective and the underpinnings of social innovation. EU funded research has played a crucial role in this field by funding comparative research on a large scale, encouraging both academic excellence and the practical application of results.

We undoubtedly know more now about this ‘volatile’ or ‘quasi’ concept<sup>13</sup> of social innovation, the governance structures and the role of public authorities, the capacity building, the financing capacities needed to allow social innovations to emerge, grow, scale up and spread. We know more about how social innovations are useful to local welfare systems and services and how they contribute to poverty reduction, combating inequalities and changing lifestyles. We also know more about their conditions for sustainability and the views of stakeholders. Empirical research has helped to identify where change is happening and needs to be encouraged. Conceptual research has achieved milestones in defining and framing what is really at stake. As argued by Geoff Mulgan,<sup>14</sup> *‘[s]ocial innovation is an asset to discover the future through action rather than believing it can be discovered solely through analysis’*.

Furthermore, the picture would not be complete if at this point we did not address the emergence of a phenomenon that significantly affects social innovation: the rise of a hyperconnected society.

The rise of the collaborative economy – from AirBnB (the social networking service for bed and breakfast) to car sharing or ‘Code4share’ to ‘Wikipedia’ – is indeed a characteristic of the recent period which goes beyond just inventing new business models. Digital social innovation is a new kind of innovation enabled by the network effect of the internet, which is leading to new models of collaborative production and content sharing which radically change the competition and supply and demand equations of traditional business models. On this issue, a study conducted by a consortium of partners<sup>15</sup> is currently building a map of digital social innovation actors and networks.

In this context, there are some challenges for the EU.

- First, in the reconfiguration of the economy which is currently taking place under the influence of network giants, how is Europe to take advantage of open and collaborative possibilities to tackle societal challenges? How is it to leverage the power of the large number of social networks of active citizens and communities who often operate under the radar?<sup>16</sup> The potential of using digital technologies to enable better and more social innovation to engage stakeholders, citizens, geeks and civil society communities in the innovation process cannot be neglected. Considering the distributed nature of digital social innovation and its openness to new players, research based on a bottom-up approach reveals new forms of social innovation and

<sup>13</sup> This term was coined by Jane Jenson in *Social innovation. Gadget, Concept or Mobilising Idea?*; www.cccq.umontreal.ca. It is defined as ‘a hybrid, making use of empirical analysis and thereby deploying scientific methods, but simultaneously having an indeterminate quality, making it adaptable to a variety of situations and flexible enough to follow the twists and turns of policy’. ‘It is more than a buzzword, it has a reputable intellectual basis but may be vulnerable to criticism on theoretical, analytical and empirical grounds’.

<sup>14</sup> Quoted in *The world in 2025, contributions of an expert group*, January 2009, p.69.

<sup>15</sup> Study on innovation in the Digital Agenda conducted by Nesta, Waag Society, ESADE, IRI and Future Everything; <http://digitalsocial.eu>.

<sup>16</sup> See study by IPTS; <http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu/publications/pub.cfm?id=4339>.

new organisational forms that can be encouraged, scaled up and incorporated into institutional frameworks; and

- secondly, how to set up the best institutional framework for harnessing the networked collective intelligence of people to tackle major social issues and produce recognised value for Europe in terms of community wellbeing, ecological footprint, and democratic legitimacy?<sup>17</sup>

### **A public private partnership on decentralised, open, privacy-aware architectures for the social good (including open data and public federated identity management)**

The internet ecosystem currently faces two major and urgent problems:

In 2011 the Commission launched an initiative to pool a range of European funds to promote evidence-based social innovation, initially concentrating on social assistance schemes. The Commission's initiative includes:

- a handful of non-European companies continue to consolidate their leading positions in data aggregation and capture collective intelligence via lock-ins, monopolistic behaviour and aggressive IP litigation. Most users have accepted their exploitative business models in exchange for free services. This deal not only undermines privacy and weakens data protection, but also commodifies knowledge, identity, and personal data. Unfortunately, most European ICT research is developed to fit into this centralised model, which only aggravates the situation; and
- the European Commission has been funding excellent basic research on the Internet of Things (IoT) and the Future Internet area. However, there is no strategic vision guiding EU research. Projects do not give rise to an alternative playing field since they promote the kind of short-term incremental developments that only reinforce the dominant positions mentioned above. While Europe has an unrivalled density of infrastructure and research potential, the lack of overall coherence in its vision contributes to the consolidation of non-European companies.

An alternative framework is needed to provide an open architecture for the integrated management of online identity, security, data, and collective governance, based on democratic and participatory processes. The only practical response is the development of distributed and decentralised solutions for future critical infrastructures in the three main areas set out below:

1. Distributed architectures: this includes the need for open data distributed repositories, distributed cloud, distributed search and distributed social networking. It can also include the development of new mobile platforms able to ensure some basic services at European level, on top of which a whole new open ecosystem of services and applications could flourish in a participatory innovation model based on open source and open hardware development;
2. Public federated identity management for the entire EU: weave identity management into the EU Digital Infrastructure by applying a federated model to the entire Union. The agency that public or private providers have controls which platforms it talks to and the platform determines which services, products or spin-offs are supported. The aim should be to turn the current passport into an open source mesh-networked device; and
3. New governance modalities for big data (main question around collective ownership of data, data portability and data as knowledge commons): the question is how to ensure user control over personal information in an ocean of commercially valuable big data. Citizens should be aware that technical solutions do not work by themselves, therefore legal and commercial solutions have to be based on technology and integrated with the appropriate policy framework. Defining sensible governance modalities for big data will require substantial collaboration between the public and private sectors, based on a multi-stakeholder model, in order to define the minimum level of sensible regulation allowing fair competition in the emerging areas of big data.

<sup>17</sup> For examples of the impact on democracy, see the 2013 World Forum *Rewiring democracy – connecting institutions and citizens in the digital age*. Further information is available at: <http://www.epsiplatform.eu/content/world-forum-democracy#sthash.iqvUpOPH.dpuf>.

To stimulate thought on this issue, Francesca Bria<sup>18</sup> has described how the EU could take advantage of the shift from closed innovation to collaborative, open innovation. Her contribution is summarised below.

## 1.2. The social market economy concept

### 1.2.1. The origins of the concept

The term ‘social market economy’ emerged in the post-World War II period, when Germany was looking for a new economic, political and social start. It is strongly associated with what has been coined the post-war ‘German economic miracle’. At the time, the idea was to find a renewed impetus for a laissez-faire market-based economy, rejecting the centrally planned and state-directed system of the previous period while ensuring a social and political consensus.

Men like Ludwig Erhard, Alfred Müller-Armack and some of their collaborators coined the term ‘social market economy’ as a new and comprehensive understanding of a free market and socially-orientated economic order. It became the hallmark of their political and social aspirations. It entailed two ideas: first, that a market economy was a better way to improve living standards; secondly, that the market order can serve the aims of social security and protection, as long as it is flanked by the right economic and social policies. In other words, market economics and social security do not exclude each other, but which comes first? Two different schools of thought gave a different meaning to this concept. On the one hand, the *Ordoliberalism* of Eucken, Rüstow and Böhm (also known as the Freiburg School, to which Hayek could be added) acknowledged that protection against poverty, unemployment, illness and old age are important as long as they ‘are not pursued in conflict with the rules of the market’. On the other hand, Müller-Armack (later secretary-of-state to Ludwig Erhard) and Wilhelm Röpke had stronger views on the primacy of social aims since they rooted this concept in Christian Democratic ethics.

For historic reasons, most people in Germany strongly supported the concept (and its somewhat contradictory interpretations) provided it was efficient. The social market economy was the conceptual framework for the ‘German economic miracle’ and deemed critical for ensuring economic ‘prosperity for all’ and social justice. As a result of growing inequalities and the perceived unfairness of the social protection system, however, some people started to question the efficiency of the iconic model. In 2008, for example, only 31 % of all Germans said they had a ‘good opinion’ of the social market economy, a figure that had risen to 38 % by the beginning of 2010. While it remains a rallying political concept, the social market economy and the best ways to balance in the future the ideals of freedom, social justice and economic growth are now being revisited.<sup>19</sup>

This short history of the term gives some idea of its heuristic but ambiguous meanings from its origins to the present. Today the term which ‘blended market capitalism, strong labour protection and union influence, and a generous welfare state’ does not

---

<sup>18</sup> Senior Project Lead, Innovation Lab, EU Project Coordinator D-CENT - DSI.

<sup>19</sup> cf. for instance: [http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/bst\\_engl/hs.xsl/269.htm](http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/bst_engl/hs.xsl/269.htm).

fit the current reforms of the welfare state but, as pointed out by *The Economist*,<sup>20</sup> the 'social market economy' broadly refers to the study of the different social institutions underpinning every market economy and it has been used to describe attempts to make capitalism more caring and to the use of market mechanisms to increase the efficiency of the social functions of the state.

### 1.2.2. The social market economy in the European arena

The four freedoms (free circulation of goods, services, capital and people) at the heart of the EU's Single Market are commonly seen as economic instruments to favour increased competition, specialisation and economies of scale, improve the efficiency of the allocation of resources and drive economic integration within the EU. The question is: should this driver be geared solely to economic growth or should it serve the goals of social as well as economic cohesion? On this issue, the debates of the European Convention for the Future of Europe (2003-05) were heated. The idea of a powerful Single Market underpinning international competitiveness and the creation of growth and jobs as the ultimate end of the European Union was rather dominant. After the crisis, the European social model and its aim of producing wellbeing for all is more often seen as an important goal of European integration. In contrast with the distinction which appears more obvious today, the term 'social market economy' in the text of the Constitution suited everyone and was embedded in the Treaty<sup>21</sup> as it seemed to opportunely reflect the views of liberals, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats.<sup>22</sup>

### 1.2.3. A new strategy for the Single Market

*'The crisis has induced some critical reconsideration of the functioning of markets. It has also enhanced concerns about the social dimension. The Treaty of Lisbon, soon to enter into force, makes it explicit for the first time ...that 'the Union [...] shall work [...] for a highly competitive social market economy. All this calls for a fresh look at how the market and the social dimensions of an integrated European economy can be mutually strengthened.'*

This excerpt from the mission letter from the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, inviting former Competition Commissioner, Mario Monti, to prepare a report setting out recommendations for an initiative to relaunch the Single Market clearly sets the new tone. The existing tensions between market integration and social objectives are more vividly exposed now that the Lisbon Treaty has formally introduced the objective of achieving a 'highly competitive social market economy'. 'If the market and the social components do not find an appropriate reconciliation, something has to give in. Following the crisis, with the declining appetite for the market and the increasing concern about inequalities, it is by no means clear that it would be the market, i.e. the

<sup>20</sup> <http://www.economist.com/economics-a-to-z/s#node-21529660>.

<sup>21</sup> Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union states: *'The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment'*.

<sup>22</sup> At the time, it was interpreted as a symbolic ideological gain for the European socialists (*The European Convention: bargaining in the Shadow of Rhetoric*, Paul Magnette and Kalypso Nicolaidis – published in: West European Politics, April 2004).



Single Market, to prevail.’ In his report,<sup>23</sup> Professor Monti clearly identified public services (or services of general economic interest) as being at the centre of social concerns. This was a window of opportunity to enable bottom-up creativity, particularly in the way services are delivered and matching the needs of users.

The Monti Report raised the need to reinforce the Single Market through a series of concrete measures. This was done in a two-stage approach in April 2011 and October 2012.<sup>24</sup> It is interesting to note that, whereas the initial impulse to reinforce the social content of the Single Market had come from a top-down initiative, the idea of developing ‘new emerging business models in which social, ethical or environmental objectives are pursued alongside financial profit’, submitted for consultation as part of a list of 12 possible initiatives to strengthen neglected aspects of the Single Market, was strongly supported by the public in the answers to this consultation.

This unanimity should not hide underlying ambiguities in overcoming corporatist approaches and acquired interests in the sphere of the social economy, and different understandings in Europe of what constitutes a social enterprise or business. As acknowledged in an OECD report on social entrepreneurship<sup>25</sup> ‘[e]ven if social entrepreneurship as an activity is developing quickly around the world and social innovations are appearing everywhere, these are both relatively recent fields of research and practice and the notions are still ill-defined. A term like social entrepreneurship tends to overlap with terms such as social economy, third sector, non-profit sector, social enterprise and social entrepreneur, some of which are also ill-defined and overlapping. Moreover, definitions are context-sensitive, in the sense that the geographical and cultural contexts matter’. For instance, traditions within Europe vary: the German approach differs from the Italian or British early development of cooperatives or from the successful concept in France of *économie sociale et solidaire*, to name just a few of the contexts where social entrepreneurship linked to social innovations is developing.

Conceptual clarity is needed but cannot be imposed in a top-down approach. It has to be worked out progressively by actors, who are now speaking to each other, taking the best from each tradition, while adapting to a new common post-crisis reality.

Following long discussions on definitions during the preparation of the text of the Social Business Initiative, it was finally agreed that rather than reduce a still-developing idea to an overly narrow definition, social entrepreneurship should be defined on the basis of three main characteristics:

- the social objective was the reason for developing innovative activities;
- profits were mainly invested in achieving this social objective; and
- the organisation and ownership used participatory principles aiming at social justice.

The actual development and content of the SBI are described in detail in the second part of this document. What must be stressed at this stage is that:

- social entrepreneurship should be placed in the main ‘engine room’ of European integration: the Single Market raised social innovation to a new level of recognition,

<sup>23</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti\\_report\\_final\\_10\\_05\\_2010\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf).

<sup>24</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/internal\\_market/smact/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/smact/index_en.htm).

<sup>25</sup> *SMEs, Entrepreneurship and Innovation*, contribution of Antonella Noya (OECD, 2010).

allowing major instruments such as public procurement directives or competition policy to engage with the development of this 'emerging' sector; and

- the way it has been developed has been participatory<sup>26</sup> and all-encompassing,<sup>27</sup> i.e. through a systemic change in approach rather than through incremental changes in the institutional infrastructure of the business world.

## 1.3. Ecosystems for social innovation

### 1.3.1. An approach to the concept of ecosystem

For some time now, management scholars have recognised the parallels between biological and economic systems. The concept of an ecosystem – which in biology refers to an environment where different, sometimes competing, species can complement each other – has been used in particular by Michael Porter,<sup>28</sup> who underlined that the traditional framework of industries made up of competitors, suppliers and customers does not pay enough attention to the many other actors and environments in an industry: the organisations making complementary products, the infrastructure on which the organisation depends, and the various institutions, people, and interest groups that affect the entire industry, including the end users or consumers.

An ecosystem's framework, in contrast, incorporates the broader environment within which organisations operate. It captures the elements of Porter's economic analysis, adds other potentially important actors, and incorporates the non-market forces.

This framework is particularly appropriate for the production of social innovation, as their promoters (social entrepreneurs, intrapreneurs, etc.) must leverage complex systems of interacting players in rapidly evolving political, economic, physical and cultural environments. Moreover, the more innovative the initiative, the more likely it is to come up against the aversion to change of those who have stakes in the system as it is.

Today, ecosystems for social innovation are seen as the way to create an innovation-friendly environment where social innovations can grow and to address not only the apparent cause but also the underlying problems. The shift from social innovation as a charitable solution to a problem that has an immediate but unsustainable impact (e.g. give food to the hungry) to the transformative ambition to create long-lasting changes to solve societal problems (e.g. homelessness, food disorders) that are engrained in behaviours and institutional and cultural context (laws, policies, social norms) has also been a reason to look for a 'friendly milieu' to organise interactions and respond to the needs of social innovations at every stage of their development. Thus, the term 'ecosystem' has spread within the social innovation community as a response to the different

<sup>26</sup> It started with a wide consultation and was shaped by three European Commissioners, i.e. the Commissioners responsible for the Single Market (M. Barnier), Employment and Social Affairs (L. Andor) and Enterprise (A. Tajani).

<sup>27</sup> The Social Business Initiative was launched with a Communication on corporate social responsibility and a revision of the Transparency Directive as a package to increase trust: 'Social business is a good example of an approach to business that is both responsible and contributes to growth and jobs. But we need to ensure all companies, not just social businesses, take their impact on wider society seriously: that's why I also want big multinationals [...] to be more open about what they are paying to governments across the world' (Michel Barnier).

<sup>28</sup> *The Competitive Advantage of Nations*, 1990.

needs to structure, experiment, nurture, network, support, scale up and transfer social innovations at the different stages of their development.

### 1.3.2. Main components of an ecosystem for social innovation

**Supportive policies, adequate governance, innovative finance, a variety of capacity building and recognition tools** such as incubators, hubs, forums, prizes and research in methodologies, **benchmarking and impact measurement** are the main components which, together, create the ‘natural environment’ for social innovation to flourish. While the movement and creative energy in the ecosystem comes from the actors and their connections, the administrative, economic and legal environment has to be enabling.

Where the priority objective is to solve a problem of a social or societal nature, people (in whatever capacity they act) have to pool their resources and work together. Often, a dominant administrative culture or conflicting objectives prevent this. The key to supportive governance is to identify those obstacles and create spaces for cooperation and for thinking outside the box. Promoting a culture of trust and learning from failures is also part of supportive governance. Governments have to set up enabling processes and institutions to encourage the creation of ecosystems which mobilise collective energy and initiative to develop, mostly small-scale but effective solutions to improve quality of life. Social entrepreneurship (or intrapreneurship), the main vector to channel action in this field is often small, can also be larger<sup>29</sup> and usually has a transformative agenda. The use of digital tools to reach their goals is already quite widespread amongst social innovators (e.g. Websourd<sup>30</sup> uses a call centre to translate job interviews, etc.). Increasingly, however, digital tools are also used as a core element to mobilise collective intelligence for the co-creation of public goods (e.g. Code for America,<sup>31</sup> Nudge,<sup>32</sup> etc.). This gives a radically new dimension to social innovations and the ecosystems which can allow them to grow. Communication technologies create very large and open spaces for the self-organisation and mobilisation of society which enlarge the scope of civil society mobilisation and generate new issues of control and trust (see the Digital Social Innovation project<sup>33</sup> and the Onlife Initiative for rethinking public spaces in the digital transition<sup>34</sup>).

Access to resources and/or funding is another crucial component, which has to be available in different forms at the right time. From access to public procurement or small experimental grants to investments in large projects likely to bring substantial social benefits in the medium to long term (e.g. investment in the social integration of prisoners to eventually reduce crime). As illustrated in the Malmö example mentioned below, this can even include regrouping investments to achieve the same social objective and involving stakeholders and end users can often double or treble the impact of budgets and or investments.

<sup>29</sup> cf. for example SOS (<http://www.groupe-sos.org>).

<sup>30</sup> <http://www.websourd.org/>; <http://www.websourd-entreprise.fr/>.

<sup>31</sup> <http://codeforamerica.org/>.

<sup>32</sup> R. Thaler & C. Sunstein, Yale University Press, 2009.

<sup>33</sup> <https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/socialinnovationeurope/directory/switzerland/event/digital-social-innovation-workshop>.

<sup>34</sup> <http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/onlife-initiative>.

Any collective endeavour where the mobilisation of energies is the main resource needs catalysing places and instruments where collective work is valued and recognised (or at least not penalised). Incubators to generate the birth and growth as well as tools to exchange, compare and value are other essential components of the social innovation ecosystem.

The fourth ingredient to create a fertile environment for initiating innovative practices of a disruptive nature is to develop evidence of a different nature that is likely to work and yield measurable results, but also to develop methodologies from empirical and theoretical observations to develop or scale up successful experiments. Thus, research is an essential component of the ecosystem.

*A striking example of the development above is the study entitled A map of social enterprises and their ecosystems in Europe.<sup>35</sup> The European Commission called for this study in April 2013 to establish for the first time an overview of national policies, schemes and actions aimed at promoting social enterprises and supporting the development of a conducive ecosystem where it exists as well as the current state and dynamics of social investments markets. This was only done for 11 Member States.<sup>36</sup>*

*It studies the following issues for these countries: the political and legal recognition of the concept of social enterprise; public support schemes; whether marks and labelling schemes are in use, the social investment markets. Finally, it assesses the opportunities and barriers for each country. This first exercise shows wide differences amongst Member States regarding the degree of maturity of the ecosystem. In countries with a long tradition of social economy like Italy and France, a variety of well-established tools have been developed while in newcomers like Latvia or Romania, the recognition and the private and public support systems for social business is still in its infancy but in great demand.*

*In itself, this study is a resource for policymakers, social entrepreneurs and stakeholders in social business in general as it provides timely information on when, where and how social entrepreneurs can find an understanding and friendly environment to initiate, develop and scale up social enterprises.*

### 1.3.3. Examples of ecosystems for social innovation

As mentioned above, the growing importance of social enterprises in the EU social innovation policy framework emphasises the importance of developing an enabling environment made of specific instruments, a more understanding environment and to develop innovative tools (e.g. European Partnerships) to stimulate interaction between actors in fertile ground. A large number of public or private actors at national and local level can take advantage of this new policy focus.

Two very different case studies can be mentioned to illustrate these issues:

- firstly, Oksigen<sup>37</sup> is a dynamic Belgian consortium established on the private initiative of likeminded individuals. It covers every stage of a social innovation's develop-

<sup>35</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/internal\\_market/social\\_business/docs/expert-group/20131128-sbi-sector-mapping-study\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/social_business/docs/expert-group/20131128-sbi-sector-mapping-study_en.pdf).

<sup>36</sup> Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Romania, Latvia, Poland, Italy, Spain, Ireland and Belgium.

<sup>37</sup> For more information, please refer to: <http://www.oksigen.eu/> and <http://www.i-propeller.com/>.

ment, including tutoring and mentoring, the search for diverse sources of financing, upscaling and transfer and integrates applied research. It offers a springboard for leveraging the effects of public and private programmes and funds aimed at developing effective solutions to new or unaddressed social or societal needs;

- secondly, a multicultural city like Malmö,<sup>38</sup> which is strategically putting in place an ambitious plan of ‘ecosystems’, is a good example of what can be done in this area. Local authorities together with welfare services and local economic actors have a vested interest in identifying more efficient solutions to address concrete social problems and improve the quality of life in their community. The idea is to fundamentally reassess all the direct and indirect social ‘costs’ and reallocate them in a dynamic and interactive process to benefit people in the community with a long-term impact. This cannot be done unless you create an ecosystem where administrations working in silos, economic actors willing to serve their community as well as their business interest and those citizens most concerned, are given a common framework where they can interact, design and implement.

## 1.4. Measurement of social impact

There are at least four reasons for tackling the challenge of measuring social innovation. First, there is a need to prove that social innovation is an effective and sustainable way to respond to societal needs (from this perspective, the belief that after the crisis, social innovation can play a pivotal role in serving as a competitive future advantage for European economies and societies has been underlined in many EU documents.<sup>39</sup> The *Guide to Social Innovation*, published in 2013, states in particular ‘Europe is ideally placed to take a lead and capture first-mover benefits when it comes to implementing social innovations by proactively and effectively trying to fully (and fairly) realise both economic and societal benefits’). Second, justifying the allocation of public money as well as attracting other sources of public and private financing requires a shared understanding of what the ‘positive and measurable social effects’<sup>40</sup> of social innovations are. Third, evidence-based policies require ex ante evidence of the expected impact of the actions involved. Finally, social innovations (seen as drivers in the current transition<sup>41</sup>) could open the way to developing a new competitive advantage for European economies, showing that social and environmental value creation is central to the human and ecological sustainability of societies.

The reasons why social innovations are difficult to measure are of course proportional to their scope (i.e. the smaller the objective, the easier the measurement). This difficulty is also explained by the fact that their success relies on factors which, by their nature, are difficult to quantify, at least in the short to medium term. Indeed, their success relies on how they have been able to act as drivers of social change,<sup>42</sup> to break with established

<sup>38</sup> [www.malmo.se/kommission](http://www.malmo.se/kommission).

<sup>39</sup> The Innovation Union flagship initiative introduced social innovation as a driver of a European innovation strategy and this idea has since guided developments in research and innovation policy, enterprise and industry in particular.

<sup>40</sup> This is the terminology used by EU institutions (Commission, Parliament, Economic and Social Committee) to frame the notion of social impact in the EuSEF (European Social Entrepreneurship Funds) and EaSI (European Programme for Employment and Social Innovation).

<sup>41</sup> See The EU's Fifth Project - *Transitional Governance in the Service of Sustainable Societies* <http://www.uclouvain.be/461789.html>.

<sup>42</sup> *Social innovations as drivers of social change*, J. Howaldt, R. Kopp & M. Schwarz, 2013.

approaches<sup>43</sup> and to engage a process of changing behaviours, ‘basic routines, resource and authority flows, or beliefs of the social system’ in which they occur.<sup>44</sup>

The benefits of overcoming the challenge of measuring social innovation will allow further developments in different aspects of social innovation at a crucial moment for the post-crisis economy.

Both micro-level measurement (how successfully a social enterprise is contributing to this goal) and macro-level measurement (social enterprises grow in an ecosystem composed of a favourable governance framework, capacity-building tools and learning processes) have become necessary.

Measures of the success/impact of social innovation is the increasingly shared idea that ‘economic outcomes have for a long time been the main indicator to measure the development of organisations and countries, but a more holistic perspective considering social, environmental and economic consequences must come to the fore to build a sustainable world’.<sup>45</sup> Awareness of this has increased in recent years since climate change and inequalities are on the rise. Even before widespread political attention was drawn to this agenda by the *Report on the Measurement of Economic and Social Progress*<sup>46</sup> (known as the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report), the Commission had already held a large forum on Beyond GDP<sup>47</sup> in 2007. This was followed by a Communication on *GDP and Beyond – Measuring progress in a changing world*,<sup>48</sup> highlighting the need for new instruments to monitor and measure environmental and social development and establishing a roadmap. A review of progress on GDP and beyond actions was published in 2013.<sup>49</sup> In addition, other actors have also taken steps to introduce new instruments, e.g. the OECD with its Better Life Index.<sup>50</sup> Many analysts around the world believe that it is necessary to measure wellbeing or quality of life in order to better respond to the needs of this century. As far as social innovation is concerned, this is likely to kick-start the systemic change mentioned *inter alia* in the first BEPA report, by bringing to the fore the value of non-tradeable goods and services that contribute to wellbeing.

Against this background, we examine below the need for social impact measurement and guidance on how it should be carried out in the specific context of:

- evidence-based policies; and
- funding/financing social innovation; and to
- follow progress so far in the area of indicators and social impact measurement.

<sup>43</sup> *Social Innovation: Blurring Boundaries to Reconfigure Markets*, A. Nicholls & A. Murdock; Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

<sup>44</sup> *Making a Difference - Strategies for Scaling Social Innovation for Greater Impact*, Frances Westley and Nino Antadze (presented at the Social Frontiers social innovation research conference, November 2013).

<sup>45</sup> EESC report on social impact measurement.

<sup>46</sup> [http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport\\_anglais.pdf](http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf).

<sup>47</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/environment/beyond\\_gdp/index\\_en.html](http://ec.europa.eu/environment/beyond_gdp/index_en.html).

<sup>48</sup> COM(2009) 433 final.

<sup>49</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/pdf/SWD\\_2013\\_303.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/pdf/SWD_2013_303.pdf).

<sup>50</sup> [www.betterlifeindex.org](http://www.betterlifeindex.org).

### 1.4.1. Evidence-based policies

Public policy development increasingly requires accountability as well as efficiency to ensure the best use of resources. While coarse assessments can in some cases be the way to approximate a cost benefit analysis due to urgent circumstances, scientifically based methods are increasingly used to compare (*ex ante*) the benefits that a community would derive from a specific measure or scheme to a comparable community which did not have this measure or scheme. The principle of social experimentation to test a policy intervention on a small population so as to evaluate its efficacy before deciding whether it should be scaled up is on the agenda of many policymakers wishing to design a potentially policy-relevant intervention as well as measure its actual efficacy.

Existing methods for assessing a project's chances of success and their different costs are detailed in a methodological guide for policymakers,<sup>51</sup> published by the Commission in September 2011 in order to assist policymakers in designing socially innovative projects. This guide sets out basic principles to follow in order to design a potentially policy-relevant intervention. It describes six commonly used methods of evaluation, which are compared from the point of view of the reliability of the results they deliver; and considers the costs associated with each method, and the complexity of implementing them in practice.

The 'gold standard' for these methods goes to randomised experiments. They draw from the principle of randomised controlled trial used in scientific experiment, and in particular clinical trials to test the efficacy or effectiveness of various types of medical interventions in a patient population. The use of randomised trials to test solutions was pioneered by Esther Duflo, professor at MIT and Director of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab,<sup>52</sup> which has now grown into a global network of professors who use randomised evaluations to answer critical policy questions in the fight against poverty. This network has conducted over 500 randomised evaluations in 57 countries. Some of the policy lessons have led to the scaling up of programmes which have improved the lives of millions of individuals. These include school-based deworming programmes as one of the most effective methods for improving school participation in developing countries or providing free access to chlorine dispensers at water sources to reduce the death of children under five.<sup>53</sup>

Nevertheless, randomised evaluations of social programmes take time and can be complex to implement.

Many authors in the open literature have discussed the benefits and limitations of randomised social experimentation as a tool for evaluating social programmes.<sup>54</sup> Other techniques also commonly used are referred to as non-experimental or quasi-experimental methods. They are usually less complex to implement than randomised evaluations, but the results they deliver are also less reliable. It appears that random assignment to the treatment and comparison groups is the best way to ensure that the comparison group is similar in every respect to the treatment group. Non-experimental

---

<sup>51</sup> Written by J-Pal Europe at the request of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion.

<sup>52</sup> <http://www.povertyactionlab.org/>.

<sup>53</sup> <http://www.povertyactionlab.org/scale-ups/chlorine-dispensers-safe-water>.

<sup>54</sup> See for example *Randomization and Social Policy Evaluation*, James Heckman, NBER Technical Working Paper No 107, July 1991.

methods must rely on an assumption to justify the claim that the comparison group they use is similar to the treatment group.

In order to test measures aimed at the development of new social practices and/or the reorganisation of existing ones in EU Member States, the PROGRESS programme (2008-12) allocated EUR 10 million to developing social policy experiments. Thirty-six projects focusing on the social and professional inclusion of vulnerable groups were financed. *Hope in stations: HOmeless PEople* in train stations was one of these projects. In the new programme for employment and social innovation, technical assistance for conducting randomised evaluations is made available to administrations undertaking social policy reforms.

Thus, the rapid development of this subject has proven its intrinsic interest. It is to be expected that the wide range of research projects and scientific publications on this topic will lead to enhanced cooperation on the quantification and measurement of social impact and on designing and assessing social policies.

#### 1.4.2. Funding/financing social innovation

A sound technique for measuring the impact of the social innovation is a prerequisite for funding/financing social innovation. The recent period has been characterised by the emergence of a wider diversity of funding sources for innovative ventures with a social objective from the public and private sectors. This proliferation of funding/financing mechanisms has led to the urgent need to further develop methods for measuring the social and economic benefits. Public bodies at every level have worked to increase the offer, from dedicated microfinance funds to public procurement,<sup>55</sup> but the financial and banking sector are taking a growing interest in 'impact finance' and the public at large responds, where legislation permits, to calls to 'crowdfund' social ventures. This is good news as one of the major barriers to the development of social innovation identified in the first BEPA report was access to finance, but also overdependence on grants from charities, foundations and public support, in particular when growth capital is needed to engage in long-term ventures.

This aspect has raised considerable attention, in particular at EU level, since the launch of the Social Business Initiative. The Commission's Communication on the Single Market Act II<sup>56</sup> highlighted the need to develop methods for measuring the social and economic benefits generated by social enterprises in the implementation of the EuSEF<sup>57</sup> and the programme for Employment and Social Innovation (EaSI).<sup>58</sup> In response, a subgroup of the Commission's consultative multi-stakeholder group on social enterprise (GECES)

<sup>55</sup> As illustrated in part 2 of this document.

<sup>56</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/internal\\_market/smact/docs/single-market-act2\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/smact/docs/single-market-act2_en.pdf).

<sup>57</sup> The Regulation on European social entrepreneurship funds (EuSEFs) was published in the Official Journal on 25 April 2013. Together with the Regulation on European venture capital funds (EuVECA) and the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), this Regulation aims to make it easier for AIFMD-exempt venture capitalists and social entrepreneurs to raise funds across Europe without the requirement to comply with the full AIFMD regime. The key elements of the Regulation provide for an EU brand for EuSEFs and the introduction of a European marketing passport. The range of eligible financing tools/investments under the EuSEF Regulation is wider than those available for venture capital funds under the EVCF Regulation.

<sup>58</sup> The third axis of this programme focuses on microfinance and social entrepreneurship with a fund of EUR 86 million over seven years to provide grants, investments and guarantees to social enterprises which can demonstrate that they have a 'measurable social impact'.



was tasked with providing the Commission with guidelines on how social enterprise can measure their social impact on the community.

The report adopted by the GECES in June 2014 makes a set of recommendations and defines areas where follow-up is required. It underlines the benefit that a standard for social impact measurement, ideally agreed worldwide, would have. However, it recognises that no single set of indicators can be devised in a ‘top-down fashion’ to measure social impact in all cases.

In order to meet the needs of social enterprises, funders and policymakers to achieve comparability in reporting and monitoring, to limit the costs of the assessment to the size and scope of the venture and to allow an approach that respects the diversity of social enterprises as well as the need to cope with change and improvement, the GECES advocates a process for social impact measurement.

This process involves five stages: 1) identify objectives; 2) identify stakeholders; 3) set relevant measurement; 4) measure, validate and value; 5) report, learn and improve. All stages should involve active stakeholder engagement. In particular, the number and range of indicators should be agreed between the social enterprise, beneficiaries or service users as well as investors, allowing for lighter and cheaper processes for small ventures. The dynamics of involving all stakeholders (from investors to service users) is designed to maintain the balance between the overriding need to deliver measurable social impact and the need for a profitable operation that can meet investor expectations.

The report also includes guidance on reporting standards for social impact measurement and indicators, and examples of case studies illustrating how measurement techniques are used. It represents a very rigorous, participatory and useful exercise to respond to the European Commission’s request. Its conclusions stress the need for further action, in particular in raising awareness and facilitating stakeholder engagement. This idea is reinforced by the opinion on social impact measurement of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC).<sup>59</sup>

According to the GECES subgroup, the areas where follow-up is required are:

- guidance to assist social enterprises, funders, fund managers and investors in all EU Member States in complying with the standards proposed;
- the establishment of a knowledge centre on social impact measurement for guidance, exchange of practice and monitoring;
- the development and consolidation of measurement frameworks with stakeholder participation;
- the development of reporting formats; and
- the development of a network or group of experts to act as a reference point for dissemination and development with respect to social impact measurement, integrating EuSEF and EaSI experience.

---

<sup>59</sup> <http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.int-opinions.29291>.

### 1.4.3. Indicators for a socially innovative society

In the wake of demands from stakeholders, the issue of social innovation and its economic, social (and environmental) impact and measurement have become significant priorities on the EU agenda. In EU policymaking, this has recently become apparent in initiatives like the Communication on the social dimension of the EMU,<sup>60</sup> which proposes social indicators and actions to complement economic reporting. This line of reasoning now appears in many EU documents where the measurement and monitoring of social added value, change and impact is a prerequisite for the implementation of directives and programmes. In line with the idea that we are still in a learning process, analysis and research is being conducted on the measurement of societal (social and environmental) value creation and the development of indicators.<sup>61</sup> On the latter issue, the 2013 report on Employment and Social Development in Europe highlights the need to adapt the way we measure economic and social progress in order to take proper account of inequalities.

In this context, the issue of measurement and financing has made tremendous advances in recent years. New tools are being tested, new sources of finance are appearing (EU funding possibilities, crowdfunding, more access to public procurement, etc.) and the question of social value creation is being widely discussed. However, it is still a work in progress which will continue to require considerable attention in the coming years.

This said, while there are currently no agreed macro or micro level measurement approaches that specifically focus on social innovation, the field of research is fed by indicators to measure innovation in public and private sector organisations (e.g. innovation union scoreboard, public sector innovation index, etc.) and indicators that focus on social normative or environmental dimensions which capture the social and wellbeing aspects (e.g. the European Statistical System (ESS) Sponsorship Group, the European System of Social Indicators, ESS/GESIS/Eurostat sustainable societies or the OECD Better Life Index).

In practice, there are some new and encouraging elements in recent developments.

- First, while the assessment exercises are still straitjacketed in 'one-size-fits-all' public spending control standards, social and environmental policies in particular are increasingly adopting scientifically based methods such as social experimentation to test (and prove) the effectiveness of innovations in their sector before they can be scaled up and replicated;
- Secondly, 'social impact measurement' is an issue, which has stirred up a lively debate in many circles and at many levels. At micro level, impact investing has been on the agenda of large private firms (JP Morgan and the GIIN<sup>62</sup>) for a few years now. The press has echoed more than usual to the financing of the social economy in general but also to associated financial innovations such as social impact bonds or crowdfunding. As explained in sub-section 1.4.2, several activities have been developed at European level. For example, the Social Business Initiative has launched

<sup>60</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/commission\\_2010-2014/president/news/archives/2013/10/pdf/20131002\\_1-emu\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/archives/2013/10/pdf/20131002_1-emu_en.pdf).

<sup>61</sup> EU research projects like e-Frame and BRAINPOoL are particularly relevant in this respect. The link with the role of social innovation in this agenda is made in TEPsIE and SIMPACT.

<sup>62</sup> In November 2010, JP Morgan collaborated with the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN) and the Rockefeller Foundation on one of the first significant (despite the small sample) pieces of research on investments intended to create a positive impact beyond financial returns. The study noted that the rigour of systems to track and manage social performance was the best guarantee against the risks to see exploitation of poor people for the sake of profit and system drifts.

the debate amongst national and local experts, civil society organisations<sup>63</sup> and the European institutions. Lately, the Group of European Experts (GECES) has contributed to the discussion about the different approaches to social impact measurement, which is an important step towards the establishment of shared standards; and

- Lastly, the European Commission has launched Horizon 2020, the largest research and innovation programme in the world, with a budget of EUR 80 billion. The programme will run from 2014 to 2020 and has an important social innovation component. It is to be expected that progress will be achieved in the different areas of social innovation, including the development of indicators for social innovation and techniques for social impact measurement.

---

<sup>63</sup> 3M Jonathan Bland, *Confrontations Europe*.



*Social innovation is a bottom-up process with little theoretical conceptualisation and support from methodological developments for the measurement of social impacts. The public sector plays a pivotal role in promoting and facilitating social innovation by providing a common conceptual framework for social innovation activities. Nevertheless the public sector needs to innovate itself in order to meet the increase in public demand and to promote and facilitate social innovation.*

There is an urgent need to power innovation within the public sector itself in order to unlock radical productivity improvements and efficiency gains, foster the creation of more public value and a better response to societal challenges. Public authorities need to promote effective instruments (legislation, removal of barriers, and public procurement) linked to social innovation.

This can only happen through a pervasive change of mind-set, with more experimentation, controlled risk taking, and an agile and personalised response to new constituent challenges. This will help unleash the potential of an innovative public sector that can enable social innovation to make the transition from a random, bottom-up approach to a systemic phenomenon.

## 2.1. The Commission's commitment to supporting public sector innovation

The European Commission has, for a long time, tried to develop new thinking to modernise European economies and their social model to meet societal expectations. Public sector innovation as a positive way to respond to budget constraints has indeed, for many years, been considered a policy lever to improve the quality and efficiency of pub-

lic services. For instance, the impact of new technologies researched and tested through large-scale pilot schemes on e-Government, e-Health, e-Inclusion, e-Participation and social experimentation schemes to improve social inclusion have been on the agenda for more than ten years. The same goes for social innovation schemes to empower people to improve the provision and delivery of services.

In 2012, the Group of Innovation Commissioners spurred renewed interest in this area, following the Innovation Union flagship initiative. It translated into concrete actions, including in particular the ones set out below.

- The inventory of the Commission's initiatives in public sector innovation is a first attempt to map the efforts made under different EU policy headings to support innovation in the public sector. It has so far resulted in a document focusing on processes and organisational changes in public sector organisations that contribute to increasing public welfare and quality of life (cf. 2.2 below).
- The Commission launched a pilot European Public Sector Innovation Scoreboard (EPSIS) with a view to improving its ability to benchmark the innovation performance of the public sector in Europe. The ultimate ambition was to capture and present public sector innovation in a similar way to the innovation performance rating of countries in the Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS)<sup>64</sup> and thereby encourage and facilitate innovation activity across the public sector. The 2013 pilot EPSIS<sup>65</sup> was the first EU-wide attempt to better understand and to analyse innovation in the public sector. It was developed based on the experience of earlier national and regional projects, tested widely and discussed with a number of key experts in relevant areas. The EPSIS shows that all EU Member States consider public sector innovation to be a national requirement and a means by which to drive continuous improvement in public service design and delivery. The Scoreboard also shows that Member States may be grouped into two categories: a small number of 'innovation leaders' and a larger number that may be designated as 'innovation followers'. 'Innovation leaders' are more concerned with finding radical new approaches to deliver public services whereas 'innovation followers' are still concerned with making fundamental reforms to public institutions.

## 2.2. Powering European public sector innovation: towards a new architecture

Under the responsibility of the Commissioner for Research and Innovation, a group of twelve experts was asked to analyse the role of the public sector, barriers to innovation and the current gaps in policies focused on innovation in the public sector. Their report *Powering European Public Sector Innovation: Towards a New Architecture*<sup>66</sup> suggests that public sector innovation today mostly happens through uncoordinated initiatives rather than as a result of deliberate, strategic efforts. The quest for more and better public sector innovation is hindered by several barriers, which fall into four major categories: weak

<sup>64</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/innovation-scoreboard/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/innovation-scoreboard/index_en.htm).

<sup>65</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/files/epsis-2013\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/files/epsis-2013_en.pdf).

<sup>66</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/psi\\_eg.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/psi_eg.pdf).

enabling factors or unfavourable framework conditions; lack of innovation leadership at all levels; limited knowledge and application of innovation processes and methods; and insufficiently precise and systematic use of measurement and data.

There are efforts underway to address these barriers, both in the European Union (e.g. Joinup,<sup>67</sup> the common portal for e-Government solutions) and globally (e.g. the OECD's Observatory of Public Sector Innovation<sup>68</sup>), and the expert group has reviewed an extensive amount of scientific literature and best practices. However, a paradigm shift is needed in order to embed and encourage an innovation culture within the public sector, which will also improve its absorptive capacity.

### ***A new innovation paradigm and design principles***

In its search for developing concrete recommendations to overcome the barriers to innovation, the expert group has recognised the following four design principles that should be at the heart of the public sector. These principles must be mainstreamed throughout the entire ecosystem of public sector actors for the greatest gains in quality, efficiency, fairness, transparency and accountability.

- Co-design and co-creation of innovative solutions (with other Member States, other parts of government, businesses, the third sector and citizens);
- Adopting new and collaborative service delivery models (across public, private and non-governmental actors, both within and across national borders);
- Embracing creative disruption from technology (the pervasive use of social media, mobility, big data, cloud computing packaged in new digital government offerings);
- Adopting an attitude of experimentation and entrepreneurship (government itself needs to become bolder and more entrepreneurial).

### ***Recommendations for new public sector innovation architecture in Europe***

The report identifies several actions that should be taken rapidly (either at EU level or in the Member States, depending on political and financial considerations). The recommendations may be divided into three groups.

- **Leading Innovation:** to establish a programme to empower and network innovative public leaders and to establish an EU Innovation Lab inside the European Commission to support and facilitate innovation in the work of the Commission Services.
- **Enabling Innovation:** to establish a network of Innovation Single Contact Points in all Member States; to establish an Accelerator for Digital Innovation and a Public Sector Angel Fund.
- **Informing Innovation:** to establish a Dynamic Innovation Toolbox targeted at public managers and to establish a European Citizens' Scoreboard for public services.

---

<sup>67</sup> <https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/>.

<sup>68</sup> <http://www.oecd.org/gov/public-innovation/observatory-public-sector-innovation.htm>.

BEPA held a high-level meeting on public sector innovation in July 2013.<sup>69</sup> The objective of this meeting was to discuss public sector innovation and the need for a more systemic approach in order to create a dynamic and open public sector. The major outcomes of the meeting may be grouped in the following areas:

#### ***Evidence-based methodologies for efficient policymaking***

- The need to test new policies and programmes: Innovative public programmes addressing important policy issues, which have a potential to be scaled up, should be 'tested' before they are implemented on a large scale. One should learn from the experiments, via rigorous evaluation.
- The need to use scientific methodologies to measure and quantify the social impact of policies and programmes: Learning about the impact of a policy is not straightforward. J-Pal,<sup>70</sup> the poverty action Lab created by Esther Duflo, has developed a scientific methodology based on a randomised control trials approach, which allows meaningful comparisons.

#### ***Innovation strategies in the public sector***

- The need to highlight innovation pockets at different levels of public administration: copying successful innovations is often the most effective way to innovate and the best ideas are not necessarily the newest. The European Public Sector Innovation Scoreboard can help to understand who is doing better and how we can improve.
- The need for the public sector to invest in innovation: based on collaborative approaches to driving change and to governance.
- The need to foster innovation led by example: the European Commission can provide support by promoting systematic collaboration and rigorous evaluation of the policies adopted, applying the scientific method to the public sector and using sophisticated tools to analyse complex interacting systems.

---

<sup>69</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/expertise/seminars/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/expertise/seminars/index_en.htm); <http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/conferences/note-psi-reportweb.pdf>.

<sup>70</sup> <http://www.povertyactionlab.org/about-j-pal>.



*Providing an overall evaluation of social innovations in Europe – including EU policies and their impact on societal challenges – is almost impossible considering the large amount of new and interactive initiatives, but also the broad goals of EU programmes that integrate social innovation. However, while the overall picture is sometimes difficult to capture at a glance, the drive behind social innovation has become firmer and instruments are better defined. This is no mean feat and the attention and budget allocated to promoting social innovation are higher than ever. The backdrop to this firmer drive is the need to improve knowledge of how and where social innovations emerge, scale up and duplicate, and how effective they are in addressing current societal challenges not only for, but also with citizens.*

A set of specific examples are taken from the Guide to Social Innovation, published by DG Regional and Urban Policy and DG Employment, Social Affairs in February 2013.<sup>71</sup> Some of them show how support under the Structural Funds will increasingly be sought for the development of instruments to encourage a participatory approach to the resolution of social problems. Others develop thematic issues to deal with the major challenges that migration and ageing; environmental trends; IT solutions to inclusion; urban regeneration and housing; health and wellbeing; and the development of ethical goods and services pose at local level and which many cities or local communities need to address.

While a number of the issues mentioned here would have found their place in other parts of this document, examples of practical developments mainly supported by the EU Structural Funds are meant to emulate new ideas and entrepreneurship.

---

<sup>71</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/sources/docgener/presenta/social\\_innovation/social\\_innovation\\_2013.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/presenta/social_innovation/social_innovation_2013.pdf).

## 3.1. Deepening our understanding and knowledge of social innovation

The two major sources of new knowledge developed during the last period are, on the one hand, a factual Europe-wide study on A Map of Social Enterprises and their Eco-systems in Europe, which was launched by the European Commission's Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion in April 2013<sup>72</sup> and, on the other hand, the large body of research funded by the FP5, FP6 and FP7 Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities Programme on issues related to social innovation, including in the areas of theory building and conceptualisation, local welfare systems and services, poverty reduction, combating inequalities, and changing lifestyles.

### 3.1.1. The Mapping study

It is composed of five main tasks which are briefly described as follows:

**Task 1: Identification of social enterprises** – to develop an operational definition that can be used to identify, measure and map social enterprise across Europe and thus provide the basis for carrying out the remaining research tasks;

**Task 2: Measurement, characterisation and mapping of social enterprise** – to collect (through primary and secondary research) and analyse data on the scale, characteristics and patterns of development of social enterprise in each country studied;

**Task 3: Legal and standards mapping** – to map (a) legal 'labels' and frameworks designed exclusively for social enterprises where these exist; (b) corporate law aspects of the three legal forms most commonly used by social enterprises in each country studied; (c) legal and regulatory barriers to creation and growth of social enterprise; and (d) marks, labels and certification systems designed for social enterprises;

**Task 4: Mapping of public policies and social investment markets** – to provide an overview of national policies, schemes and actions aimed at promoting social entrepreneurs and social enterprises and supporting the development of a conducive ecosystem (where these exist); and, the current state and dynamics of social investment markets in Europe; and

**Task 5: Developing recommendations for EU action** – to develop recommendations for future research and policy action to support the growth of social enterprise in Europe.

This is the very first time that researchers have carried out such a systematic and broad overview of existing traditions and legal, public policy and investment conditions for the development of social enterprises.

---

<sup>72</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/internal\\_market/social\\_business/docs/expert-group/20131128-sbi-sector-mapping-study\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/social_business/docs/expert-group/20131128-sbi-sector-mapping-study_en.pdf).

### 3.1.2. Social innovation research in the European Union

The EU Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities Programme is the second main source of new knowledge from the last period. However, in view of increasing demand from policymakers and practitioners alike for social innovations and the emerging possibilities for new research avenues on social innovation, including in Horizon 2020, a policy review commissioned by the European Commission's DG Research and Innovation from experts in the field<sup>73</sup> has produced a systematic overview of research findings from 17 European projects in the area of social innovation. The review<sup>74</sup> focuses on how these projects address social innovation in terms of theory, methodology, policy areas, actors, and level of analysis in order to bring the results to the attention of policymakers, wider groups of stakeholders and the broader public in a comprehensive way.

The point that comes to the fore is that this report is a stocktaking exercise, undertaken with a view to fostering the engagement of the European research community in a continuous exchange of ideas and best practices for analysing social innovation and in the promotion of networking among researchers.

The report ends by identifying five research fields that did not draw much attention in the projects reviewed and that are areas for further development (social innovation to overcome the inequalities of health and re-pattern the social determinants of health; social innovation in rural areas and societies; social innovation in the financial sector; social innovation and the private sector; and social innovation for managing diversity).

## 3.2. Instruments to improve the ecosystem

As well established by now, research in social innovation is – by nature – mainly empirical and its primary field of development is the local level, where stakeholders can more easily be mobilised on concrete issues. In order to scan the scope of empirical developments and draw lessons on how social innovations contribute to reform local welfare systems, this part of the report addresses some patterns of innovatory social projects and networks to fight social inequalities and stimulate social cohesion at local level.

### 3.2.1. The social economy

According to the EU Social Business Initiative, the social economy employs over 11 million people in the EU, accounting for 6 % of total employment. It covers bodies with a specific legal status (cooperatives, foundations, associations, mutual societies).

The social economy can clearly play a role in regional development. For instance, the Emilia Romagna region has published a study on the importance of the social economy

<sup>73</sup> Jane Jenson and Dennis Harrison in *Social innovation research in the European Union – Approaches, findings and future directions - Policy Review* [http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/social\\_innovation.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/social_innovation.pdf).

<sup>74</sup> Its first results were presented and discussed at the conference *Approaches to Research on Social Innovation: Learning from One Another for the Future*, which was organised by the FP7 project WILCO jointly with the European Commission's DG Research and Innovation on February 2013.

for territorial and social cohesion. Its main conclusions are that public policies are the fruit of the combined contribution of public authorities and social economy organisations in the provision of public utility services, in which the joint participation of both players is an essential requirement to ensure quality; and that public-private partnership is a tool to deliver more effective and efficient primary social services, which have so far been historically provided by the welfare state. At the same time, it helps identify and deliver services in new and additional fields. In so doing, new forms of cooperation are established with civil society and stakeholders.

The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) supports the development of social enterprises as it does for other types of businesses. Financial support can be delivered directly to individual companies, through social enterprise intermediaries, such as social enterprise or cooperative development agencies, and through financial institutions. There are increasing numbers of financial institutions that specialise in investing in social enterprises and many of the new ethical banks specialise in this type of investment.

The European Social Fund (ESF) also supports social enterprises. Firstly, it can strengthen administrative capacities and support structures which promote social enterprises. This can be carried out in particular through education and training, for example, through the integration of social entrepreneurship in the curricula of specific vocations, or the provision of training improving the business skills of social entrepreneurs. Networking and the development of partnerships, as well as the setting up of business development services for social enterprises can be supported too. Secondly, the ESF can mobilise extra funds targeted at the development of the social economy and the promotion of social entrepreneurship and easily accessible for social enterprises.

The social economy has different traditions in different parts and Member States of Europe. Some countries, like France, have a strong tradition of 'économie sociale et solidaire'. They are gearing up with social innovation in its 'newer' meaning and initiatives are sprouting, often linked with the Structural Funds. For example, *Avise*<sup>75</sup> has launched a call for proposals with the aim to accelerate social innovation in the social economy, and thus help to find new answers to unmet needs in fields like employment, housing, ageing, childcare, etc.

Market access for social enterprises is still restricted (even if the provisions of the new directives on public procurement<sup>76</sup> adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in early 2014 will noticeably improve the context). Sometimes they are unable to compete for public tenders against other small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) because of interpretations of national rules. Member States and Managing Authorities and other public contracting bodies can use the purchasing power of large and small ERDF projects to stimulate social innovation in employment and inclusion of marginalised groups. The example below from the City of Nantes illustrates how a procurement framework has opened a space for social enterprises to work directly with the private sector in helping disadvantaged people into employment. Similar examples exist in other parts of the EU.

---

<sup>75</sup> <http://www.avise.org/>.

<sup>76</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014L0024>; <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0025>; <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0023>.

### Using public procurement in an innovative way: The City of Nantes

The medium-sized city of Nantes (285 000 people) in north-west France has been known for nearly 15 years as a leading innovator in using social clauses in public procurement to provide entry level jobs for the long-term unemployed.

France revised its public procurement rules in 2006 allowing the condition that part of the work must be delivered by a specific target group with a need for professional insertion. Nantes Metropole and surrounding suburban administrations awarded contracts using this clause. Work has included swimming pools, roads, bus routes, and a media centre. The types of trades comprise mason assistants, carpenters, painters, building workers, pavers, green space maintenance staff, plumbers, metal workers, plasterboard, and external cleaners.

The city has also encouraged the development of support structures for individuals. The 'Entreprise d'insertion' trains and prepares them to get jobs that open up in the private sector. In 2008:

- 183 contract operations contained a social clause;
- 483 beneficiaries were able to work under an employment contract;
- 345 000 hours dedicated to insertion (about 200 full-time equivalent jobs), a further 92 000 hours of work for disadvantaged people were produced benefiting 266 employees;
- 133 enterprises were mobilised through these works;
- 75 % of beneficiaries were accompanied by a local insertion company (a type of training and employment social enterprise).

The Nantes example illustrates how public works contracts can deliver a double benefit: the work that needs to be done, such as a road, as well as jobs for excluded people.

### 3.2.2. Microfinance

Whereas microcredit refers specifically to one type of microfinance – the act of providing loans for business start-up and growth – microfinance is a broader concept in which a range of products are developed to increase financial inclusion. These products may include savings, financial education and literacy, personal loans and insurance.

Microfinance was slow to take off in Europe. ADIE<sup>77</sup> in France was one of the first to start up in the late 80s (it is now one of largest with around 20 000 borrowers in 2010). There are now over 100 microfinance institutions of which around 80 are members of the European Microfinance Network (EMN), which is supported with EU funds under the PROGRESS initiative.

Although there are variations, in all EU Member States over 95 % of all businesses are micro businesses employing less than ten people. They form the bottom of the enterprise pyramid and are the seeds from which most SMEs and even large companies grow. Microenterprises in Europe employ around one-third of private sector employees and produce about 20 % of output.

As mentioned in another part of this survey, the EU funds and instruments for supporting microfinance are:

<sup>77</sup> <http://www.adie.org/>.

- JASMINE, which provides technical assistance for microfinance organisations that are close to becoming banks or have high levels of financial sustainability (JASMINE is a joint initiative of the Commission, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and European Investment Fund (it is financed out of the ERDF);
- The ERDF, which provides support for setting up and growing microfinance;
- The EU PROGRESS Microfinance facility – a fund managed by the European Investment Fund with a total fund of EUR 160 million. It invests in microcredit providers, which may be banks or NGOs. It does this either by issuing guarantees, thereby sharing the providers' potential risk of loss, or by providing funding to increase microcredit lending;
- The ESF mostly provides flanking measures for business start-up and business support. Over EUR 2 billion have been allocated to ESF business support measures in the current period. Part goes to micro-businesses – especially at the start-up stage. The German Gründer coaching programme<sup>78</sup> is a good example of a national coaching scheme for start-ups that is co-financed by the ESF.

In 2011, a European Code of Good Conduct for Microcredit Provision<sup>79</sup> was developed in partnership with the microfinance sector.

There are also many microfinance organisations in Europe and elsewhere that have developed innovative approaches to lending to specific groups. The Microcredit Foundation Horizonti<sup>80</sup> in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, for example, has developed an innovative good practice 'Housing Microfinance for Roma and marginalised people'. The initiative started in 2007 with the aim of providing affordable housing to the Roma community.

### **The Kiút Programme, self-employment and microcredit for Roma in Hungary**

Kiút aims to support Roma to work in the formal economy by starting up a business. The microcredit programme provides assistance by lending start-up money for small businesses to generate enough revenue to service the loan and to produce additional income for Roma families.

The clients receive continuous administrative, financial and business advice and assistance. An explicit and important aim of the programme is to encourage the participation of women (with a set target of 50 % female members in each group).

<sup>78</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/nrp2014\\_germany\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/nrp2014_germany_en.pdf).

<sup>79</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/the\\_funds/instruments/jasmine\\_cgc\\_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/the_funds/instruments/jasmine_cgc_en.cfm).

<sup>80</sup> <http://www.microfinancefocus.com/microcredit-fdtn-horizonti-receives-2011-european-best-practices-award/>.

### 3.2.3. Incubation

The world of social innovation has a number of incubators and centres which are crucial for testing new ideas and bringing together partnerships.

#### **A Social Innovation Park in the Basque country**

Denokinn brings together social enterprises, public authorities and the private sector to scale up successful innovations after they have been piloted. They have launched the first social innovation park in Europe near Bilbao.

Denokinn received EUR 300 000 from the social experimentation part of the EU Progress Fund to develop a social inclusion dimension to their Hiriko electric car concept. The result was a plan to adopt a decentralised assembly in which the cars could be put together in work inclusion social enterprises by those excluded from the labour market.

The Hiriko car was launched by President Barroso on 27 January 2012. He said 'Hiriko is European social innovation at its best ... Firstly, it is a successful example of how to give a new lease of life to traditional industrial sectors by contributing to address major modern societal challenges, in that specific case, urban mobility and pollution. Secondly, it is a great combination of new business types of cooperation and employment opportunities with a strong social dimension. Thirdly, it is an excellent illustration of the finest use that can be made of European social funds'.

### 3.2.4. Workplace innovation

Workplace innovation focuses on how to improve aspects of work organisation and introduce modern management techniques that involve workers. Workplaces with flatter hierarchies and the possibility for workers to contribute are more creative and ultimately more productive and open to addressing both social and technological challenges. Workplace innovation concerns not only the private sector but also large parts of the social economy such as charities and foundations as well as the public sector. Celebrated examples include Google, which allows employees to spend 20 % of their time on their own projects, and IKEA, which practises stand-up round-table meetings among other innovative practices allowing employees to tackle problems as they arise with minimum management interference.

In the Netherlands and Belgium, workplace innovation is called 'Social Innovation' and has been supported for over a decade by the Structural Funds. The approach as such is strongest in northern Europe, especially Scandinavia.

The ERDF's business support measures can be used to finance such innovations helping both management and employees to explore more productive ways of working.

#### **Results-based entrepreneurship in the Netherlands**

Results-based entrepreneurship (RBE) aims at stimulating technological and social innovation within SMEs. Advisers work with management and staff combining strategic advice with social innovation (improving communication, raising personnel involvement, etc.) and so stimulating technological innovation. The improved teamwork promotes a collective ambition for the company's success encouraging new ideas, products and services.

Business support is given through Social Innovation vouchers. Firms can use these vouchers to hire an expert to help them implement the method. The voucher covers 50 % of the cost up to a maximum of EUR 20 000. The minimum voucher is EUR 3 000 (with a grant of EUR 1 500). By buying a voucher, a company receives double the amount of support that it would obtain if it bought the same consultancy on the open market. As companies contribute to the cost, the scheme ensures their support and commitment.

### 3.2.5. Changes in governance

Governance is one of the key issues when it comes to social innovation. Among the many experiments in this field, the latest include the one led by Santa Casa da Misericórdia (SCM),<sup>81</sup> in Lisbon (Portugal).

#### **The Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa (SCML) and the Banco de Inovação Social (BIS)**

The SCML is one of the oldest and most important private charities in Portugal. It was founded in 1498 as the first coherent social care system in Lisbon. In the 18th century, the Queen granted the SCML the right to run the first lottery in Portugal. Since the state granted the concession for lotteries in Portugal to the SCML, which uses its proceeds to finance the SCML's activities, the concession and activity is highly regulated.

The BIS, which also means 'twice' in Portuguese, is an informal, collaborative, and open platform, not an official institution. It seeks to use social innovation as a tool to introduce systemic change in society at all levels: institutions, economy, education, culture.

Portugal has to restore economic growth, employment, and make long-term structural reforms at all levels, but especially at institutional and economic levels (public sector, public services, competition, etc.).

To help address this challenge, and even though its action is limited to Lisbon, the SCML opens up to the world, collects best practices and collaborates with other institutions in the country and abroad to introduce change.

The SCML started its BIS programme about a year ago by inviting 26 other institutions to contribute their assets (knowledge, experience, funds, people, etc.) to the BIS project and bring social innovation to Portugal. The first institutions to be invited were the government itself, municipalities, universities, etc. to address all kinds of societal needs in Portugal.

These new forms of governance (collaborative, informal platforms or programmes) are believed to be the best way to foster social innovation. By bringing people and institutions together and work collaboratively, it will show people in Portugal how to govern in a different way.

To support and promote creativity, a call for ideas has been launched, where ideas can be debated. Many people have already sent ideas to address social needs. Social experimentation was also implemented (a current example is the United at Work project, an innovative way to address senior and junior unemployment through intergenerational entrepreneurship). The BIS also promotes social business by bringing together people who have interests in sustainable business. There is also an ongoing workstream on education, in schools, and a creativity competition was held in about 250 schools.

A social investment fund is being launched, which is necessary and the main current concern for the BIS. A key obstacle is the lack of Portuguese legislation in this area so far, in spite of the EU initiative.

## 3.3. Specific examples of actions from the field

In this section of the report, real life examples of projects financed by the European Structural Funds are tabled, showing how local initiatives, all of which are different and almost unique, are able to rely on EU funding to develop and achieve their goals.

<sup>81</sup> <http://www.scml.pt/>.



### 3.3.1. Social inclusion

Large sections of the European population are excluded from the benefits of economic and social progress. The different forms of disadvantage related to educational attainment, gender, age, physical status or ethnic background have been exacerbated by the crisis. Among them, blindness is a disability subject to specific constraints, as explained in the example below.

#### **I-Cane: Mobility solutions for blind and visually impaired people for global use**

Today Europe counts approximately 13 million blind and visual impaired people, who rely on 'old fashioned' aids, e.g. the white cane and guide dogs. The traditional solutions do not offer navigation outside the memory constrained zone. This enforces the social and economic isolation of this fast growing population of which the majority is over 50 years of age.

Developing high-tech solutions for a group of people with both limited financial means and also working with a user volume considerably lower than the requirements of high volume electronics manufacturers is not an easy market choice, it needed a particular approach. In 2004 the I-Cane foundation was initiated. Through this foundation funds were raised from charities and the public sector (province of Limburg NL and the EU ERDF fund) to execute a feasibility study and to deliver the proof of principle demonstration. In 2008 I-Cane succeeded in navigating a blind person on an unfamiliar route without hitting obstacles. In this demonstration invented by I-Cane, tactile human-machine interface also demonstrated its value since test persons were still able to listen to the environment parallel to receiving instructions via their fingers, a unique human-machine interface.

From 2008 the social enterprise I-Cane Social Technology BV continued the work of the I-Cane foundation. A development time of 5-8 years must be expected for mobility tools for disabled people but is unattractive for those who seek a quick return on investment. Via support from the Social Economy network in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, the funds were raised to meet the matching requirements of EU ERDF (OP Zuid) and national grant arrangements.

Today this combination of public and private funding has resulted in an Euregion based platform of SMEs, with European-wide knowledge institutes (such as the University of Delft, RWTH, Fraunhofer IPT, IMEC, TNO, ESA/Estec) and end cross-border user organisations, led by I-Cane Social Technology BV and the I-Cane Foundation. In 2012 the first large-scale tests with I-Cane systems started, followed by a market introduction in 2013.

The I-Cane case demonstrates the combination of funding, close user interaction and cooperation between social enterprises and knowledge institutes can deliver world-class break-out solutions.

### 3.3.2. Migration

In recent years, population movements, especially immigration from non-European areas, have become a more sensitive issue in the EU. Beyond the economic impact this may have, the immigration that European countries have to cope with creates many social issues. Due to their complexity, the human dimension which is still theirs, and their local specificity, some of these situations have to be handled through practices that often involve social innovation.

#### **Public sector innovation – immigration policy in Portugal**

Towards the end of the 20th century Portugal's immigrant population doubled within a few years, and most of the new arrivals were not Portuguese speakers and had no historical links with this country. For the first time, public administration experienced considerable difficulty in communicating with the immigrant population and understanding their needs. At the same time, large migrant populations had to cope with the challenge of social integration in an unknown linguistic, cultural and bureaucratic setting.

This major shift catalysed the Portuguese one-stop-shop approach in immigration policy and the National Immigrant Support Centres (CNAI) were opened to the public in 2004. The centres responded to a number of challenges identified by migrant clients by providing various immigration-related services in one space, applying an identical working philosophy, and working in cooperation. Indeed, participation is the core of innovation at the CNAIs in addition to the integrated service delivery. The implementation of the one-stop-shop approach was based on the incorporation of intercultural mediators in public administration service provision, who play a central role in service provision because of cultural and linguistic proximity to the service-users and facilitate interaction between state services and the immigrant population by forming an integral part of the procedures of Office of the High Commissioner for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue (ACIDI). Intercultural mediators usually come from immigrant communities themselves and speak fluent Portuguese as well as at least one other language. Following training and an exam, they are employed by certified immigrant associations, which receive grants from ACIDI. The certified associations participate in the definition of immigration policy, immigration regulation processes and consultative councils. ACIDI invests in the empowerment of immigrant leaders through training for immigrant association leaders, in partnership with universities. The mediators also play a fundamental role as integration outreach workers. Because they are immigrants themselves and normally reside in migrant neighbourhoods, they disseminate information about the rights and duties of immigrants in Portugal even outside the one-stop-shop building, reaching places and persons that the public administration would never reach if it never left its headquarters and operated exclusively through public servants.

### 3.3.3. Urban regeneration

Most cities in Europe have poor communities living in difficult environments. Over the past 20 years, the ERDF has financed integrated approaches to urban regeneration linking economic, social and environmental aspects. In the 1990s, the Community-led Economic Development priorities in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods of the UK were at the forefront. In the 2000s, Germany was a leading practitioner.

#### **The State of North Rhine-Westphalia 'Socially Integrative City' programme: supporting neighbourhood renewal**

Since 1999, the government of North Rhine Westphalia has been developing integrated policies to support 80 neighbourhood regeneration programmes in cities within its State. An Integrated Local Action Plan (LAP) outlines how the development, reorganisation and upgrading of an area is to take place. The approach is decentralised with clear responsibilities for each level.

- 55 Municipalities are responsible for the preparation and implementation of the LAP, applying for funding and ensuring the neighbourhood plan meets the needs of the city as a whole.
- The district governments (regional administration units of the federal State level of NRW) advise the municipalities on funding matters and authorise payments.
- The federal State ministry for urban development arranges and controls the programme and commissions evaluations.
- The EU provides funding through the ESF and ERDF operational programmes.

In addition, there are private housing and retail companies involved as well as foundations, welfare organisations and other stakeholders.

The neighbourhood management offices work on a wide range of tasks which include stimulating networking; promoting a changed image of the neighbourhood; supporting bargaining processes; setting up communication structures; informing the population and administration; organising offers of cultural activities; promoting the local economy; forming a link between the neighbourhood, city and other levels of decision-making; and developing projects.

A disposition fund (form of participatory budgeting) made up of 5 euro contributions per inhabitant finances small-scale projects decided by a local citizens' body. These projects have an immediate impact such as neighbourhood parties, tree-planting in a school yard and outings for children whose parents cannot normally afford them.

### 3.3.4. Health and ageing

The European Commission has identified active and healthy ageing as a major societal challenge common to all European countries, and an area which presents considerable potential for Europe to lead the world in providing innovative responses to this challenge.

The Innovation Union strategy addresses the health and ageing issue by aiming to enhance European competitiveness and tackle societal challenges through research and innovation.

One way to achieve this is through Innovation Partnerships, fostering an integrated approach. Their unique strength is that they will address weaknesses in the European research and innovation system (notably, under-investment, conditions which are not sufficiently innovation-friendly, and fragmentation and duplication), which considerably complicate the discovery or exploitation of knowledge and, in many cases, ultimately prevent the entry of innovations into the market place.

The European Innovation Partnership on Active and Healthy Ageing pursues a triple win for Europe:

1. enabling EU citizens to lead healthy, active and independent lives while ageing;
2. improving the sustainability and efficiency of social and health care systems;
3. boosting and improving the competitiveness of the markets for innovative products and services, responding to the ageing challenge at both EU and global level, thus creating new opportunities for businesses.

This is to be realised in the three areas of prevention and health promotion, care and cure, and active and the independent living of elderly people. The overarching target of this partnership will be to increase the average healthy lifespan by two years by 2020.

The ERDF is another answer to the challenge of active and healthy ageing, as illustrated by Finland, which has used this fund to co-finance a living lab focused on health and welfare services.

#### **The Living Lab on Wellbeing Services and Technology, a social innovation that produces user-driven innovations**

This Living Lab was a finalist of the RegioStars 2013 competition. It is an innovation platform that enables a new way of producing services for elderly people in a functional Public-Private-People partnership. Users participate actively in product development, service design and usability testing processes. The testing of welfare services and technologies takes place in real life contexts, in elderly people's homes and service homes.

The new collaborative structure consists of different stakeholders such as municipalities, suppliers, citizens, the third sector, universities, regional developers, specialists, financiers and regional, national and international networks. The created concept has increased trust between the actors.

The Living Lab Testing Process is a systematic and concrete tool, which contributes to the development of user-driven innovations and enhances cooperation between municipalities and business. The new cooperation Model improves business opportunities for companies and attracts new companies to the area. It enhances innovation and economic development strategies in a concrete way.

### 3.3.5. Social innovation and the environment

Social innovation can tackle environmental challenges<sup>82</sup> and is proving popular in this domain. There are a number of environmental drivers that are already instigating social innovations such as waste issues, transport and pollution problems, as well as declines in biodiversity and degradation of ecosystem services, for example, flood protection through wetlands. Although these drivers are environmental, they have social repercussions, such as health problems caused by air pollution, resource depletion due to inefficient waste disposal, exacerbation of flooding from damage to natural defences and food insecurity and agricultural issues exacerbated by poor soil quality or lack of pollination. In other words, societal and environmental issues are often interlinked and mutual solutions are possible. Some examples of forms of environmental social innovation include wood recycling social enterprises, organic gardening cooperatives, low-impact housing developments, farmers' markets, car-sharing schemes, renewable energy cooperatives and community composting schemes.<sup>83</sup>

In some sectors social innovation can shape technology, as evidenced by the grass-roots entrepreneurs and do-it-yourself builders of wind turbines and solar collectors in Denmark and Austria respectively.<sup>84</sup> These socially innovative groups instigated the commercial development of these technologies and continue to influence their design as they become more mainstream.

The application of local knowledge via community and social action can create adaptive and flexible solutions that are appropriate to solving environmental problems. The SPREAD Sustainable Lifestyles 2050 project<sup>85</sup> was a European social platform that invited a range of stakeholders to participate in the development of a vision for sustainable lifestyles by 2050. In its research it identified social innovators as one of the gatekeepers that can enable the shift towards more sustainable lifestyles. It proposed that the intentional and voluntary effort of social innovations to change lifestyles is an indispensable bottom-up driver for change, as they often champion new and promising behaviour. As such, it suggested that social innovations should be given the opportunity to test small-scale initiatives, which could be scaled up into large-scale sustainable solutions and participate in planning and decision-making.

The SPREAD project also highlighted the important role of social innovation and the supportive function of policy. It used scenarios and backcasting to outline a number of policy implications and recommendations on facilitating social innovation in this area. More generally the report suggested the need for an open transparent governance system with local participation to create ownership of decisions and ensure implementation.

#### **Policy implications and recommendations on supporting social innovation to achieve sustainable living from the SPREAD project**

- Using effective policy instruments, which could include regulation, economic incentives and public participation.
- Acknowledging that one size will not fit all. Instead, allowing for combinations or hybrid models and accepting provisions for dynamic structures that allow for change in order to fit the diversity of contexts across Europe.

<sup>82</sup> cf. <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/research/newsalert/pdf/IR10.pdf>.

<sup>83</sup> cf. Seyfang & Smith, 2007.

<sup>84</sup> cf. Ornetzeder & Rohrer, 2013.

<sup>85</sup> <http://www.sustainable-lifestyles.eu/publications/publications.html>.

- Up-scaling promising practices like Transition Towns, cycling cities, local currency systems, car sharing, and neighbourhood gardening. Providing institutional support to those initiatives, as well as to social entrepreneurs.
- Facilitating breakthrough and creative thinking by establishing free thinking ‘designLabs’ which are physical and intellectual spaces that encourage and facilitate cooperation and the co-creation of meaningful and innovative solutions to complex problems.
- Providing opportunities for societal actors, businesses and policymakers to leave their own ‘comfort zone’ and experiment and test new solutions in collaborative, open-sourced platforms.
- Creating partnerships with other sectors, such as the health sector, to change environments into those facilitating more active and healthy lifestyles.

Finally, one of the inputs of the SPREAD project was to underline that social innovation can complement technological innovation and policymaking to achieve systemic, long-lasting changes in lifestyles and society to tackle environmental issues. When citizens and communities instigate change themselves and develop the innovation, it is more likely to be successful and endure.

### 3.3.6. Regional strategies

Regional strategies that incorporate social innovation are only beginning to emerge. Many French regions already integrate social innovation in some form in their strategies for innovation and economic development, as a recent survey from Avise and the ARF<sup>86</sup> shows. Most of them consider social innovation to be linked to the social economy and/or work organisation, but it also combines various forms of incubation, co-creation with citizens, initiatives in the health and care sector.

#### **Basque Country: Social innovation linked to the regional innovation strategy**

The Basque Country is a good example of how a region can use a wide range of approaches to achieve social innovation. Innobasque is a non-profit private company created in 2007 to coordinate and promote innovation across the Basque Country. It acts as a regional innovation partnership. The Board brings together 57 leading actors from the region. It includes the rectors of the three universities, the chief executive of the cooperative group Mondragon, representatives from three ministries as well as chief executives from leading enterprises in the region.

Innobasque works at the policy level on many aspects of technological innovation but also brings in the general public through reflection groups and workshops such as its world café events, which focus on ways to promote societal transformations. The OECD has described Innobasque as leading work on social innovation and fostering collaborative action and joint research in the region. It is also exploring strategies to support the creation of new social firms (work integration social enterprises).

Examples of the achievements of this public-private partnership include:

- Lifelong learning via a participatory process with citizens.
- Social contract for housing: participatory process with public and private agents defining housing policy for the next 15 years.
- City XXI: Engagement on how a 21<sup>st</sup> century city could be developed, its urban planning and its values.
- Ageing and new in-house services to help people to live in at home as they get older with a good quality of life and services.
- Social contract for immigration involving all organisations and institutions to achieve a social contract for coexistence.

<sup>86</sup> Association des Régions de France (<http://www.arf.asso.fr/>).

### 3.3.7. Lessons learned from social innovation achievements

The abovementioned examples illustrate how social innovation works and succeeds in various areas in different European countries. What further lessons can we draw? The answer could be summarised in an important contribution aimed at understanding how social innovations grow at local level and how they contribute to changing local welfare systems. These issues are illustrated by 77 case studies in a 400-page e-book on Social Innovations for social cohesion: Transnational patterns and approaches from 20 European cities, developed as part of the WILCO project.<sup>87</sup>

#### Summary of the main findings of the WILCO project

##### Innovations in services to address users

The majority of the social innovations identified in the survey as important and promising are service innovations. The main differences between the service innovations analysed in the WILCO project and services established in the post-war welfare traditions or the more recent managerial culture of public and private services are the following:

- investing in capabilities rather than spotting deficits;
- preference for open approaches, avoiding targeting with stigmatising effects;
- service offers that connect otherwise separated forms of support and access, allowing for personalised bundles of support;
- creating flexible forms of ad hoc support;
- developing offers that meet newly emerging risks, beyond fixed social and participation rights and entitlements; and
- working through 'social contracts' with individuals and groups.

##### Innovations in modes of working and financing

While this is in itself banal, it represents quite a challenge when it comes to disentangling what is 'innovative' about a project and development and what is just an effect of the deconstruction of or regression in existing welfare models and regulations. The kinds of arrangement for cooperation in social innovations are much more diversified than in the public or business sector, including not only various forms of casual paid cooperation but also many forms of voluntary and civic contributions, ranging from short-term activism to regular unpaid volunteering with a long-term perspective, and from 'hands-on' volunteer work to constant inputs by civic engagement in a board. Therefore, from what is reported on the various social innovations, one gets the impression that working fields are taking shape here that are innovative in two respects. First, they are innovative because they balance very different arrangements for networking, paid work, volunteering and civic engagement. And secondly, it is at least remarkably new to see how much the demarcation lines between those who operate inside the organisation and those that get addressed as co-producers are often blurred (e.g. innovations in housing and neighbourhood revitalisation).

##### Innovations concerning the entity of (local) welfare systems

One of the aims offset by the EU authorities for the WILCO project was to look at the possible contributions of social innovations to changes and developments in local welfare systems. Speaking about a welfare system usually means including, besides the local welfare state/the municipality, the welfare-related roles and responsibilities of the third sector, the market sector and the community and family sphere. The cases of social innovations studied bear testimony to the mutual relations that exist between all of these four components of a (local) welfare system.

In conclusion, one of the central messages of these case studies on local social innovations is that they are the opposite of quick-fix solutions; using their full potential requires nothing less than a combination of 'the deep strategies of chess masters with the quick tactics of acrobats'. The lifecycles of social innovations (processes of emergence, stabilisation and scaling up) are very conditional and are not available simply at the press of a button.

<sup>87</sup> <http://www.wilcoproject.eu>.

## 3.4. Social entrepreneurship to revive the social economy

Beyond the priority measures in its short-term action plan, the Social Business Initiative (SBI) has engendered powerful and sustained momentum for social entrepreneurship.

One of the most iconic stages of this phenomenon was an unprecedented event held jointly by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), the European Commission and the city of Strasbourg<sup>88</sup> on 16 and 17 January 2014. More than 2000 social entrepreneurs and supporters representing the rich diversity of the social economy came together to affirm that social enterprises must play a bigger role in the future of Europe and to identify new ways of boosting the sector. They called for new, innovative funding sources, business support, networking, and clearer EU-wide regulations.

The event concluded with the Strasbourg Declaration, a milestone that covered a wide range of areas where social entrepreneurs want to see further changes:

### **'A call to action to realise the potential of social enterprise**

Governments and public bodies have started to recognise the power of social entrepreneurship. Steps are being taken in many Member States and regions to encourage the growth of social enterprises. At EU level, the SBI has made a positive start in promoting eco-systems for social enterprises but we must not lose momentum. Therefore,

1. The EU must follow through on all the actions in the SBI. It should develop a second phase of the SBI that broadens its scope, deepens its partnership with Member States, regional and local authorities, civil society organisations and key players in the ecosystem.
2. The European Economic and Social Committee, the next European Commission (with a dedicated inter-service structure) and the next European Parliament must take full ownership and deliver on the actions suggested in Strasbourg.
3. There must be a stronger engagement at EU, national, regional and local levels with the social enterprise community in the co-creation of new policies to support social enterprise, suited to the local context.
4. The Commission must ensure that its commitment to create an ecosystem for social enterprise is mainstreamed in its policies.
5. In partnership with the social enterprise sector, Member States, regional and local authorities must fully support the growth of social enterprises and help them build capacity. For example through legal frameworks, access to finance, business start-up and development support, training and education and public procurement.
6. The European institutions and Member States should reinforce the role of social enterprises in structural reforms to exit the crisis, notably where the social economy is less developed.
7. The Commission, the Member States and regions must boost cooperation between social enterprises across borders and boundaries, to share knowledge and practices. Similarly, all public authorities should cooperate better between themselves and enhance their capacity to support social enterprise growth.
8. Public and private players must develop a full range of suitable financial instruments and intermediaries that support social enterprises throughout their lifecycle.
9. Social enterprise still needs further research and national statistical collection for a better understanding, recognition and visibility of the sector, both among policymakers and the general public.
10. In this new Europe, all players need to look at growth and value creation from a wider perspective, by including social indicators and demonstrating positive social impact when reporting social and economic progress.

<sup>88</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/internal\\_market/conferences/2014/0116-social-entrepreneurs/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/conferences/2014/0116-social-entrepreneurs/index_en.htm).

The EESC was committed to the organisation of the Strasbourg event and is actively involved in social entrepreneurship through a substantial number of opinions and the Social Enterprise Project. Pursuing its interest, it has launched Make it happen, a new project designed to keep the Strasbourg Declaration alive by promoting policy directions and concrete actions to be forwarded to the new Commission and Parliament in Autumn 2014. Nine EESC members are directly involved in Make it happen through actions that involve strengthened cooperation with social enterprise supporters, the participation of the project group members in European events, and the consultation and involvement of various social economy stakeholders and supporters of social enterprise.

To further unlock the potential of this sector, the EESC has called for a more supportive environment for social enterprises and for their better integration into all EU policies. It believes that partnerships with regional and local authorities, as well as social entrepreneurs themselves, will play an important role.

The main actions points guiding the Social Enterprise Project are therefore as follows:

1. Co-creation of new policies to support social enterprise
2. Partnership to support social enterprises
3. Development of a second phase of the SBI.

Following an ongoing local strategy, the Social Enterprise Project is also taking part in local events spread around Europe to conduct fact-findings missions, collect best practices and investigate policy ideas and recommendations for the EU institutions.



*'Europe has a head-start. It is ideally placed to take a lead and capture first-mover benefits when it comes to implementing social innovations by pro-actively and effectively trying to fully (and fairly) realise both economic and societal benefits. With its strong legacy in social democracy, solidarity, civic participation, justice and fairness, Europe arguably constitutes especially fertile grounds when it comes to sustainably enabling and growing social innovation.'*<sup>89</sup>

Not only does the EU undoubtedly offer fertile ground for social innovation but, as a good gardener, it has taken good care of it, by nurturing it adequately. In 2010, in the first BEPA report, barriers and challenges to social innovation were identified according to the scope and level of ambition of the innovations: responding to social demands, societal challenges or engaging systemic change. Going systematically through the barriers identified then, it seems that a large number of them have either been or are being addressed effectively through EU policies. Milestones have been reached for instance with respect to the availability of funding for social entrepreneurs (e.g. EuSEF, EaSI, public procurement, crowdfunding). Progress is being made through innovative financial schemes, the interest of a large community of financial actors and a wide-ranging and active debate (within GECES, G8, etc.) on the establishment of a methodology to measure the impact of social enterprises on the creation of socio-economic benefits and their benefit for the community; the development of hubs is securing seed funding to promote and test pilot cases; networks of hubs should facilitate the building of ecosystems and the harnessing of contributions to expansion capital from a variety of sources. The Social Business Initiative has also addressed the question of the status of social enterprises (mapping) and the idea that innovations have 'social' roots is progressing among mainstream innovation corporations and public and private stakeholders. This was particularly clear during the annual EU Innovation Convention 2014.<sup>90</sup>

As a result, the EU landscape for social innovation is less fragmented today; it is generally more visible and the programmes, initiatives and instruments created recently have considerably contributed to setting up aspects of a European-wide ecosystem.

---

<sup>89</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/sources/docgener/presenta/social\\_innovation/social\\_innovation\\_2013.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/presenta/social_innovation/social_innovation_2013.pdf).

<sup>90</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/ic2014/index\\_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/ic2014/index_en.cfm).

Nevertheless, as underlined by the OECD, EU policy could gain in coherence: One example lies in the fact that one of the most powerful instruments to address issues related to social innovation, the ERDF and territorial and cohesion policy, makes no direct reference to it. Also, Social entrepreneurs and actors of social innovation who gathered in Strasbourg saw this event as a beginning and not an end. Michel Barnier, the Commissioner responsible for the Single Market, confirmed that this should become a regular event.

Moreover, prospective studies recently published on the future of Europe in the medium term are proving to be valuable lessons on the path that lies ahead for Europe to take full advantage of its actions to promote social innovation.

### *Europe's Societal Challenges*

A major source of inspiration comes from the report prepared by RAND Europe entitled *Europe's Societal Challenges*,<sup>91</sup> and commissioned by ESPAS.<sup>92</sup> It acknowledges the many challenges facing the EU and suggests ways to mitigate current downward trends.

According to the report, the world in 2030 could be characterised by the following significant changes.

#### **Regarding demographic change**

- The world's population will be more urbanised: for the first time in history, more than 50 % of the population will live in urban zones. Specifically, about 80 % of European society will live in cities, which will become increasingly important actors.
- We will also observe further ageing of the world's population. This trend is already apparent in Europe and it will be the region with the highest average age globally. European population ageing will have direct consequences for the working population and social welfare systems, health services and pensions in terms of demand and expenditure.

#### **Regarding immigration patterns**

- Immigration patterns will change, becoming more inter-regional (south-south rather than south-north). However, Europe will continue to be a destination region for its neighbouring regions.

#### **Regarding the growing middle class and the empowerment of individuals**

- The growing middle class will be a structural change in the world to come. The global middle class will increase from 1.8 billion in 2009 to 5 billion in 2030.
- Gender equality and the empowerment of women will improve as a result of more egalitarian access to education and the role of technology. Greater access to further education is likely to drive and be influenced by increased individual empowerment. This in turn may generate greater support for increasing gender equality and the empowerment of women.
- Poverty will fall globally and so will inequalities and access to wealth among states. However, there is a risk that inequalities among citizens/individuals will increase in terms of revenue, especially in Europe and the United States.
- The internet divide will persist within and between countries – in terms of access to networks and the internet. This means that technological development could potentially accelerate socio-economic inequalities between individuals/countries, since it essentially benefits the highly qualified, the connected and those in the higher income groups.

<sup>91</sup> <http://europa.eu/espas/pdf/espas-report-societal-trends.pdf>.

<sup>92</sup> European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (<http://europa.eu/espas/>).

#### Regarding the rise in inequality leading to vulnerability

- Across the spectrum of expected problems is a surge in inequality. While inequalities between European countries are decreasing, within countries they are rising.
- Earnings/gains from productivity growth tend to be heavily concentrated among high-income workers. At the same time, projections suggest a considerable surplus of low-skilled workers, which could lead to long-term and permanent joblessness among young people without secondary training and older workers who cannot retrain to meet requirements for new skills. As a consequence of this skills mismatch, income inequality is projected to expand.

#### Regarding quick technological development

- The development of new technologies will continue right through to 2030. Innovation will continue to depend on R&D investment, which should continue to increase in advanced economies and to further develop in China. In Europe, however, R&D expenses will decrease notably because of the increase in China, even if the 2020 objectives are met.
- In order to stimulate innovation, more than one source of funding is needed: education, cooperation among universities, business, and financial institutions organised around innovation ecosystems will be important.
- Innovation will also depend on the social and political organisation of society: democracy and open societies seem to favour innovation. There seems to be a circular relationship here, since innovation (particularly the development of technology) will also change the way citizens are organised.

These scenarios, should they materialise, would be accompanied by an undoubted political impact, which may be presented as a complex picture of paradoxes:

- In an increasingly complex world, there is an increasing loss of confidence in the institutions and an increasing aversion to risk. This could translate into a crisis of political action linked to the lack of understanding of global complexities among citizens.
- A steady fall in confidence in public action and in political engagement – be it at national or EU level – which could, once again, be exacerbated by the role of technology and access to unverified information.
- The advance of technology leads to a plethora of actors, just as much as it does to new ways of relating to each other (as groups or as citizens), individualistic tendencies (countering the formation of groups) and the radicalisation of society.
- Arguably, the pressures described above will call for substantial efforts in the field of social innovation. Yet, innovation may be slowed down by a culture of risk aversion.
- The interaction of the widening skills gap, digital divide and unequal benefits of technological innovations could lead to a vicious cycle for vulnerable groups, such as young people, the older poor, low-skilled workers, migrants and their children.

#### *So what future for Europe and which solutions?*

RAND Europe suggests four very interesting routes to explore:

- Preparing a new growth paradigm, focused on the wellbeing of citizens while offering opportunities for business to thrive: Europe's economy is expected to continue its decline, and policymakers should focus on a 'new growth paradigm' centred on society, not growth. Instead of focusing efforts on creating wealth, European nations are advised to prioritise the health of societies. The successor of the current Europe

2020 Strategy should aim to invest in human capital and avoid sluggish productivity growth, achieved at the expense of social inclusion, public health, education and skills, security or freedom. This will include improving the innovative capacity of SMEs; bridging the digital divide between Member States; matching migrant skills to the labour market, as well as those of the young unemployed.

- Investing in citizens, including protecting the most vulnerable: Aside from fixing the economy, the report argues that the real challenge for European policymakers will be to break the trend of rising poverty risks, increasing income inequality and long-term unemployment without relying on economic growth as a panacea. Investing in health and education, preferably as early as possible (e.g. through early childhood education and care interventions) will help reduce costs in the long term, avoid exclusion, and equip citizens with the skills that are in demand in the labour market. There is also a need to bridge the gender gap and address inequalities in access to technology.
- Adapting public sector and government institutions to the 21<sup>st</sup> century: This includes mitigating increasing pressure on the affordability of welfare states, particularly health and pensions.
- Bringing citizens back into the European project: A serious and long-term effort is required from the EU institutions and its Member States to support the development of a European identity from the earliest age – a sense of belonging that would reinforce a sense of solidarity and loyalty to democratic ideals. Several EU policies that deal with employment, education, health and technological development could be used for this purpose. Similarly, more transparency in decision-making processes and structural/institutional reforms that recognise the emergence of new actors/stakeholders on the scene (NGOs, civil society, business associations, etc.) and new forms of communication will be necessary.

#### *What will social enterprise look like in Europe by 2020?*

The second of the aforementioned studies is the British Council's 'think piece',<sup>93</sup> commissioned to contribute to the previously mentioned Strasbourg event. It provides a basis for discussing what will shape social innovation and the growth of social enterprises in the near future.

*How will social enterprise respond to economic conditions, social and environmental challenges, government policies, technology and investment over the next years? Social enterprises are on the rise throughout the EU, with governments and investors increasingly recognising the sector as a valid alternative to both private and public sector business.*

*By 2020, associations and charities will be part of the 'social enterprise spectrum', generating most of their income through trading activities. Enterprises from the private sector will have to demonstrate their credentials, and could be better at this than traditional social enterprises. Public, private and social economy organisations will be **encouraged** by investors, funders, and governments **to produce social value results in the long***

<sup>93</sup> cf. Mark Richardson, Richard Catherall – *What will social enterprise look like in Europe by 2020?* – British Council, January 2014.  
[http://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/britishcouncil.uk2/files/what\\_will\\_social\\_enterprise\\_look\\_like\\_in\\_europe\\_by\\_2020\\_0.pdf](http://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/britishcouncil.uk2/files/what_will_social_enterprise_look_like_in_europe_by_2020_0.pdf).

*term. As a consequence, **social impact** measurement and comparison (covering economic, environmental and social issues) **will become mainstream** in the social economy.*

***From grants to investment:** one of the most important drivers will be the **development of the social finance sector**. The traditional model of foundations will become outdated since more and more enterprises will try to **maximise their social impact while delivering a financial return**. Hybrid models of social investment (Social Investment Bonds, Social Impact Bonds) will emphasise new tools ('investment readiness', 'impact reporting') with two consequences: pressure on investors to consider social impact in investments and growing involvement of social enterprises on financial services delivery. **But the context will also be constraining: new national and EU funding priorities could exclude innovative social investments**; innovative social enterprises will have to make an international impact thanks to social franchising.*

*Complex networks: social enterprises will be more concerned with the importance of their impact (through changing government practices and business, through developing effective solutions that work). This consciousness will result in highly networked micro-social enterprises. Social entrepreneurs will be connected with micro-social structures and work with public, charitable, academic and profit-oriented sectors. Thus, this collaborative approach (crowdsourcing, funding, etc.) will be an interesting **alternative to traditional political investment**. Indeed, **effective social enterprises will be considered as models and will spread more rapidly** than classical mechanisms (e.g., social franchising). And European funding will encourage this kind of collaboration across international boundaries.*

#### *The way forward*

The European Union is at a decisive moment in its history in terms of the policies it intends to take tomorrow and the future it wants to design. With reference to social innovation, we are not yet in midstream. Over the past five years, we have seen how awareness has grown; how experiments have developed and how policies have begun to assist and foster this trend. With regard to the outcomes, expectations that have emerged and changes that could occur in Europe in the coming years, we need to measure the distance still to go to achieve the major challenge of social innovation and move beyond the expanding myriad of small initiatives and projects with limited results – as successful as they are – to achieve a real systemic change that puts social innovation at the heart of all processes and policies.

From where we stand today, building on the gains that have already been made and in addition to the abovementioned suggestions from RAND Europe, we believe that the following three key areas for reflection, exploration and action should be prioritised and explored.

#### *Improve governance in relation to social innovation*

In this field, the levers for improvement and action mainly concern the following three areas: globally speaking, a wider, more permanent support for the role of the public sector (at European, national, regional and local level) in terms of innovation, especially social innovation; fostering the link between social innovation and the private sector, in particular by improving framework conditions to enable the development of enduring partnerships; making corporate social responsibility a systematic and essential element of analysis and operating mode of all businesses.

Clearly, to reach these goals, the European Commission should keep improving synergies between its different services.

#### *Focus on knowledge*

Improvements in recent years to impact measurement and mapping have demonstrated their value. Today we should continue in this direction and further enrich knowledge in these two areas of research. Other hitherto unexplored areas deserve to be investigated, especially the interactions between social innovation and health. Research on social innovation must continue to move forward, in order to test new models, focus on best practices or favour bottom-up approaches. Finally, the growing role of information and communication technologies (ICT) in social innovation should be better incorporated in the way we understand and treat this topic.

#### *Support, encourage and improve the business environment*

The Single Market Act (I & II) and the Social Business Initiative have already made many improvements for European businesses that want to promote or participate in social innovation. All possibilities for going further in this direction should be explored and exploited: improve regulations in this field, mainly with regard to accessing finance; encouraging partnerships to support social innovation; using public procurements as a genuine social policy instrument; and developing a second phase of the Social Business Initiative.

Ultimately, the addition of these initiatives, the effect of these policies and the gradual (possibly irreversible) evolution in the way we look at social innovation could lead to side effects of unexpected magnitude.

- What is at stake is the ongoing struggle against inequality. We see that it continues to rise and tomorrow it may be even more central to the issues that European policies will have to face and fight.
- What is also at stake is the emergence of a different conception of the economy, a shared economy that is not focused exclusively on growth.
- Finally, empowering the citizen remains at the very heart of social innovation issues. This fundamental issue cannot be ignored by European policies.

# 3

## **Inclusive Workplace**

# 3

1. Blanchard, Kenneth H. 2010. "The power of vision." Pp. 17-30 in *Leading at a Higher Level: Blanchard on How to Be a High-performing Leader*. Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall.
2. Heinemeier Hansson, David and Jason Fried. 2010. "Chapter 1." Pp. 12-19 in *ReWork: Change the Way You Work Forever*. Vermilion.
3. Ligeti, George. 2012. "Chapter 1 omg!" Pp. 16-33 in *OMG! Not Training Again*. HumanRobot, Budapest.



## Chapter 2

# THE POWER OF VISION

---

Jesse Stoner, Ken Blanchard,  
and Drea Zigarmi

**W**hen leaders who are leading at a higher level understand the role of the triple bottom line as the right target—to be the provider of choice, employer of choice, and investment of choice—they are ready to focus everyone’s energy on a compelling vision.

### *The Importance of Vision*

Why is it so important for leaders to have clear vision? Because

---

*Leadership is about going somewhere.  
If you and your people don't know  
where you are going,  
your leadership doesn't matter.*

---

*Leading at a Higher Level*

Alice learned this lesson in *Alice in Wonderland* when she was searching for a way out of Wonderland and came to a fork in the road. “Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?” she asked the Cheshire Cat. “That depends a good deal on where you want to go,” the cat responded. Alice replied that she really did not much care. The smiling cat told her in no uncertain terms: “Then it doesn’t matter which way you go.”

Jesse Stoner conducted an extensive study that demonstrated the powerful impact of vision and leadership on organizational performance.<sup>1</sup> She collected information from the team members of more than 500 leaders. The results were striking. Leaders who demonstrated strong visionary leadership had the highest-performing teams. Leaders with good management skills but without vision had average team performance. Leaders who were identified as weak in vision and management skills had poor-performing teams.

The biggest impediment blocking most managers from being great leaders is the lack of a clear vision for them to serve. In fewer than 10 percent of the organizations we have visited were members clear about the vision. This lack of shared vision causes people to become inundated with multiple priorities, duplication of efforts, false starts, and wasted energy—none of which supports the triple bottom line.

A vision builds trust, collaboration, interdependence, motivation, and mutual responsibility for success. Vision helps people make smart choices, because their decisions are being made with the end result in mind. As goals are accomplished, the answer to “What next?” becomes clear. Vision allows us to act from a proactive stance, moving toward what we want rather than reactively away from what we don’t want. Vision empowers and excites us to reach for what we truly desire. As the late management guru Peter Drucker said, “The best way to predict your future is to create it.”

## *The Power of Vision*

### *Effective Versus Ineffective Vision Statements*

A lot of organizations already have vision statements, but most of them seem irrelevant when you look at the organization and where it's going. The purpose of a vision statement is to create an aligned organization where everyone is working together toward the same desired ends.

---

*The vision provides guidance for daily decisions  
so that people are aiming at the right target,  
not working at cross-purposes.*

---

How do you know if your vision statement works? Here's the test: Is it hidden in a forgotten file or framed on a wall solely for decoration? If so, it's not working. Is it actively used to guide everyday decision making? If the answer is yes, your vision statement is working.

### *Creating a Vision That Really Works*

Why don't more leaders have a vision? We believe it's a lack of knowledge. Many leaders—such as former president George H. W. Bush—say they just don't get the “vision thing.” They acknowledge that vision is desirable, but they're unsure how to create it. To these leaders, vision seems elusive—something that is magically bestowed only on the fortunate few. Intrigued by the possibility of making vision accessible for all leaders, Jesse Stoner teamed up with Drea Zigarmi to identify the key elements of a compelling vision—one that would inspire people and provide direction. In “From Vision to Reality,” Jesse and Drea identified three key elements of a compelling vision:<sup>2</sup>

- **Significant purpose:** What business are you in?
- **A picture of the future:** What will the future look like if you are successful?

## *Leading at a Higher Level*

- **Clear values:** What guides your behavior and decisions on a daily basis?

A vision must include all three elements to be inspiring and enduring. Let's explore these elements with some real-world examples.

### *Significant Purpose*

The first element of a compelling vision is a significant purpose. This higher purpose is your organization's reason for existence. It answers the question "Why?" rather than just explaining what you do. It clarifies, from your customers' viewpoint, what business you are *really* in.

CNN is in the "hard spot news-breaking business." Their customers are busy people who need breaking news on demand. Their business is to provide hard news as it unfolds—not to provide entertainment. According to CNN, the typical family today is too busy to sit in front of the television at 7 p.m. Dad has a second job, Mom is working late, and the kids are involved in activities. Therefore, CNN's purpose is to provide news 24 hours a day. This helps CNN employees answer the questions "What are my priorities?" and "Where should I focus my energy?"

Walt Disney started his theme parks with a clear purpose. He said, "We're in the happiness business." That is very different from being in the theme park business. Clear purpose drives everything the cast members (employees) do with their guests (customers). Being in the happiness business helps cast members understand their primary role in the company.

A wonderful organization in Orlando, Florida, called Give Kids the World, is an implementation operation for the Make-A-Wish Foundation. Dying children who always wanted to go to Disney World, SeaWorld, or other attractions in Orlando can get a chance through Give Kids the World. Over the years, the organization has brought more than 50,000 families to Orlando for a week at no cost to them. The organization thinks having a sick child is a family issue; therefore, the whole family goes to Orlando.

## *The Power of Vision*

When you ask the employees what business they are in, they tell you they're in the memory business—they want to create memories for these kids and their families.

On a visit to Give Kids the World, one of our colleagues passed a man who was cutting the grass. Curious about how widely understood the organization's mission was, our colleague asked the man, "What business are you in here at Give Kids the World?"

The man smiled and said, "We make memories."

"How do *you* make memories?" our associate asked. "You just cut the grass."

The man said, "I certainly don't make memories by continuing to cut the grass if a family comes by. You can always tell who the sick kid is, so I ask that youngster whether he or she or a brother or sister wants to help me with my chores."

Isn't that a wonderful attitude? It keeps him focused on servicing the folks who come to Give Kids the World.

---

*Great organizations have a deep and noble sense of purpose—a significant purpose—that inspires excitement and commitment.*

---

When work is meaningful and connected to what we truly desire, we can unleash a productive and creative power we never imagined. But purpose alone is not enough, because it does not tell you where you're going.

## *A Picture of the Future*

The second element of a compelling vision is a picture of the future. This picture of the end result should not be abstract. It should be a mental image you can actually see. The power of imagery has been described by many sports psychologists, including Charles Garfield in *Peak Performance: Mental Training Techniques of the World's Greatest Athletes*. Numerous studies have

*Leading at a Higher Level*

demonstrated that not only does mental imagery enhance performance, but it enhances intrinsic motivation as well.<sup>3</sup>

CNN's picture of the future is not something vague like being the premier network news station or being "number one." It's a picture you can actually create a mental image of: "To be viewed in every nation on the planet in English and in the language of that region."

Walt Disney's picture of the future was expressed in the charge he gave every cast member: "Keep the same smile on people's faces when they leave the park as when they entered." Disney didn't care whether a guest was in the park two hours or ten hours. He just wanted to keep them smiling. After all, they were in the happiness business. Your picture should focus on the end result, not the process of getting there.

At Give Kids the World, their picture of the future is that in the last week of the lives of youngsters who have been there, they will still be laughing and talking to their families about their time in Orlando.

Some people mistakenly use the Apollo Moon Project as an example of a vision. It is a wonderful example of the power of creating a picture of the future, but it's not an example of a vision. In 1961, when President John F. Kennedy articulated a picture of the future—to place a man on the moon by the end of the 1960s and bring him home safely—the United States had not even invented the technology to accomplish it. To achieve that goal, NASA overcame seemingly insurmountable obstacles, demonstrating the power of articulating a picture of the future. However, once the goal was achieved, NASA never re-created its spectacular achievement, because it was not linked to a significant purpose. There was nothing to answer the question "Why?" Was the purpose to "beat the Russians" or to "begin the Space Defense Initiative" or—in the spirit of *Star Trek*—"to boldly go where no one has gone before"? Because there was no clear purpose, there was no way to guide decision making going forward

## *The Power of Vision*

and answer the question “What next?” The second element—a picture of the future—is powerful, but it alone does not create an enduring vision.

### *Clear Values*

The third element of a compelling vision is having clear values. High performing organizations have clear values. Values define leadership and how employees act on a day-to-day basis while doing their work.

Values provide guidelines for how you should proceed as you pursue your purpose and picture of the future. They answer the questions “What do I want to live by?” and “How?” They need to be clearly described so that you know exactly what behaviors demonstrate that the value is being lived. Values need to be consistently acted on, or they are only good intentions. They need to resonate with the personal values of the members of the organization so that people truly choose to live by them.

The values need to support the organization’s purpose. Because CNN is in the journalism business, not the entertainment business, its values are “to provide accurate, responsible journalism and to be responsive to the news needs of people around the world.” These values help reporters and producers make on-the-spot decisions about news coverage and would be quite different if CNN were in the entertainment business.

Robert Johnson founded Johnson & Johnson for the purpose of alleviating pain and disease. The company’s purpose and values, reflected in its credo, continue to guide the company. Using its values to guide its decision making, Johnson & Johnson quickly recalled all Tylenol capsules throughout the United States during a 1982 tampering incident that was localized in the Chicago area. The immediate cost was substantial, but not knowing the extent of the tampering, the company didn’t want to risk anyone’s safety. In the end, Johnson & Johnson’s triple bottom line was served, demonstrated by the company’s long-term gains in reputation and profitability.

*Leading at a Higher Level*

Most organizations that do have values either have too many values or have not rank-ordered them.<sup>4</sup> Research done by Ken Blanchard and Michael O'Connor shows that people can't focus on more than three or four values that really impact behavior. They also found that values must be rank-ordered to be effective. Why? Because life is about value conflicts. When these conflicts arise, people need to know which value they should focus on.

The Disney theme parks have four rank-ordered values: safety, courtesy, the show, and efficiency. Why is safety the highest-ranked value? Walt Disney knew that if guests were carried out of one of his parks on a stretcher, they would not have the same smiles on their faces leaving the park as they had when they entered.

The second-ranked value, courtesy, is all about the friendly attitude you expect at a Disney park. Why is it important to know that it's the number-two value? Suppose one of the Disney cast members is answering a guest question in a friendly, courteous manner, and he hears a scream that's not coming from a roller coaster. If that cast member wants to act according to the park's rank-ordered values, he will excuse himself as quickly and politely as possible and race toward the scream. Why? Because the number-one value just called. If the values were not rank-ordered and the cast member was enjoying the interaction with the guest, he might say, "They're always yelling in the park," and not move in the direction of the scream. Later somebody could come to that cast member and say, "You were the closest to the scream. Why didn't you move?" The response could be, "I was dealing with our courtesy value." Life is a series of value conflicts. There will be times when you can't act on two values at the same time.

For a vision to endure, you need all three elements—a significant purpose, a picture of the future, and clear values—to guide behavior on a day-by-day basis. Martin Luther King, Jr. outlined his vision in his "I Have a Dream" speech. By describing a world where his children "will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character," he created powerful and specific images arising from the values of brotherhood, respect,



## *The Power of Vision*

and freedom for all—values that resonate with the founding values of the United States. King’s vision continues to mobilize and guide people beyond his lifetime because it illuminates a significant purpose, provides a picture of the future, and describes values that resonate with people’s hopes and dreams.

### *A Compelling Vision Creates a Culture of Greatness*

A compelling vision creates a strong culture in which the energy of everyone in the organization is aligned. This results in trust, customer satisfaction, an energized and committed workforce, and profitability. Conversely, when an organization does not live up to its stated values, employee and customer trust and commitment erode, negatively impacting all aspects of the bottom line. For example, Ford lost credibility and market share when its stated value—“Quality Is Job One”—was tested by its hesitation to take responsibility in the recall of the defective Firestone tires on its Explorer sport utility vehicle in 2000.<sup>5</sup>

### *Vision Is the Place to Start*

Research clearly demonstrates the extraordinary impact of a shared vision, or core ideology, on long-term financial performance. The cumulative stock returns of the HPOs researched by Collins and Porras were six times greater than the “successful” companies they examined and 15 times greater than the general market over a 50-year period of time!<sup>6</sup> For this reason, vision is the place to start if you want to improve your organization’s HPO SCORES and hit the target.

Research has demonstrated time and again that an essential characteristic of great leaders is their ability to mobilize people around a shared vision.<sup>7</sup>

If it’s not in service of a shared vision, leadership can become self-serving. Leaders begin to think their people are there to serve them, instead of the customer. Organizations can become

*Leading at a Higher Level*

self-serving bureaucracies where leaders focus their energies on recognition, power, and status, rather than the organization's larger purpose and goals. The results of this type of behavior have been all too evident recently at Enron, WorldCom, and others.

Once the leader has clarified and shared the vision, he can focus on serving and being responsive to the needs of the people, understanding that the role of leadership is to remove barriers and help people achieve the vision. The greatest leaders mobilize others by coalescing people around a shared vision. Sometimes leaders don't get it at first, but the great ones eventually do.

Louis Gerstner, Jr. is a perfect example. When Gerstner took the helm of IBM in 1993—amidst turmoil and instability as the company's annual net losses reached a record \$8 billion—he was quoted as saying, "The last thing IBM needs is a vision." A lot of people asked us what we thought about that statement. Our reply was, "It depends on how he defines vision. If he means a 'pie-in-the-sky' dream, he's absolutely right. The ship is sinking. But if all he's doing is plugging the holes, the ship isn't going anywhere." We were amused to read an article in *The New York Times*<sup>8</sup> two years later. In that article, Gerstner conceded that IBM had lost the war for the desktop operating system, acknowledging that the acquisition of Lotus signified that the company had failed to plan properly for its future. He admitted that he and his management team now "spent a lot of time thinking ahead." Once Gerstner understood the importance of vision, an incredible turnaround occurred. It became clear that the company's source of strength would be in integrated solutions and resisted pressures to split the company. In 1995, delivering the keynote address at the computer industry trade show, Gerstner articulated IBM's new vision—that network computing would drive the next phase of industry growth and would be the company's overarching strategy. That year, IBM began a series of acquisitions that positioned services to become the company's fastest-growing segment, with growth at more than 20 percent per year. This extraordinary turnaround demonstrated that the *most important thing* IBM needed was a vision—a shared vision.

## *The Power of Vision*

If an organization's vision is compelling, the triple bottom line is served. Success goes way beyond mere financial rewards. Vision generates tremendous energy, excitement, and passion, because people feel they are making a difference. They know what they are doing and why. There is a strong sense of trust and respect. Managers don't try to control, but rather let others assume responsibility, because people know they are part of an aligned whole. People assume responsibility for their own actions. They take charge of their future, rather than passively waiting for it to happen. There is room for creativity and risk taking. People can make their contributions in their own way, and those differences are respected, because people know they are in the same boat—all part of a larger whole going "full steam ahead!"

### *Vision Can Exist Anywhere in an Organization*

You don't have to wait for an organizational vision to begin. Vision is the responsibility of every leader at every level of the organization. It's possible for leaders of departments or teams to create shared visions for their departments even when the rest of the organization doesn't have one. Consider our work helping a tax department in a Fortune 500 company. The leader of the department stated:

"We began to understand our own and each others' hopes and dreams and discovered how close they were. We found ways to work together more effectively and began to enjoy work a lot more. We discovered what business we were really in: 'Providing financial information to help leaders make good business decisions.' As a result, we began to partner more effectively with business leaders. Our department gained more credibility in the company, and other departments began asking us what we had done to make such a turnaround. They became interested in creating a vision for their own department. It was contagious."

Too often, leaders complain that they can't have a vision because the larger organization doesn't have one. Again, it's not

## *Leading at a Higher Level*

necessary to wait. The power of vision will work for you and your team, regardless of your level in the organization.

### *Make Your Vision a Reality*

In their book *Full Steam Ahead! Unleash the Power of Vision in Your Company and Your Life*, Ken Blanchard and Jesse Stoner define vision as “knowing who you are, where you’re going, and what will guide your journey.”<sup>9</sup> *Knowing who you are* means having a significant purpose. *Where you’re going* means having a picture of the future. *What will guide your journey* are clear values. However, vision alone is not enough. For a leader to ensure that the vision becomes a reality—a shared vision that mobilizes people—Ken and Jesse identify three important guidelines that people must follow: How the vision is created, how it’s communicated, and how it’s lived.

#### *How It’s Created*

The process of creating the vision is as important as what the vision says. Instead of simply taking the top management to a retreat to put the vision together and then announcing it to others, encourage dialogue about the vision. While the initial responsibility for drafting an organizational vision rests with the top management, the organization needs to put in place mechanisms to give others an opportunity to help shape the vision—to put their thumbprint on it.

For a departmental or team vision, it’s possible to craft the vision as a team. Although the leader must have a sense of where he’s going, it’s important that he trusts and utilizes the knowledge and skills of the people on the team to get the best vision.

Regardless of how you initially draft the vision, it’s important that you get input from those it affects before you finalize it. Ask people these questions: “Would you like to work for an organization that has this vision? Can you see where you fit in the vision? Does it help you set priorities? Does it provide guidelines for making decisions? Is it exciting and motivating? Have we left anything

## *The Power of Vision*

out? Should we delete anything?” Involving people will deepen their understanding and commitment and create a better vision.

### *How It's Communicated*

Creating a vision—for your organization or department, for your work, and for your life—is a journey, not a one-time activity.

In some organizations, a vision statement may be found framed on the wall, but it provides no guidance or, worse, has nothing to do with the reality of how things actually are. This turns people off. Visioning is an ongoing process; you need to keep it alive. It's important to keep talking about the vision and referring to it as much as possible. Max DePree, the legendary former chairman of Herman Miller and author of *Leadership Is an Art*, said that in his visionary role, he had to be like a third-grade teacher. He had to keep on saying it over and over and over until people got it right, right, right! The more you focus on your vision, the clearer it will become, and the more deeply you will understand it. In fact, aspects of what you thought was the vision may change over time, but its essence will remain.

### *How It's Lived*

The moment you identify your vision, you need to behave as if it were happening right now. Your actions need to be congruent with your vision. As others see you living the vision, they will believe you are serious, and this will help deepen their understanding and commitment. Two strategies will support your efforts to live your vision:

- **Always focus on your vision.** Your vision should be the foundation for your organization. If an obstacle or unforeseen event throws you off-course, you may have to change your short-term goals, but your vision should be long-lasting. Change is bound to happen. Unforeseen events are bound to occur. Find a way to reframe what is happening as a challenge or opportunity on the road to living your vision.

## *Leading at a Higher Level*

- **Show the courage of commitment.** True commitment begins when you take action. There will be fears; feel them and move ahead. It takes courage to create a vision, and it takes courage to act on it. In the words of Goethe, “Whatever you can do, or dream you can, begin it. Boldness has genius, power, and magic in it.”

## *Vision and Leadership*

Vision always comes back to leadership. People look to their formal leaders for vision and direction. While leaders should involve people in shaping direction, the ultimate responsibility for ensuring and maintaining a vision remains with the leaders and cannot be delegated to others. Creating a vision is not an activity that can be checked off a list. It’s one of the most critical ongoing roles of a successful leader. It means the difference between high and average performance, whether it’s an entire organization, a department, or a team.

Once a vision is agreed upon, it is up to the leader to ensure that people respond to the vision. The leader’s job is to support people in accomplishing the vision by removing barriers; by ensuring that policies, practices, and systems make it easier for them to act on the vision; and by holding themselves, their peers, and their people accountable for acting consistently with the vision. This way people serve the vision, not the leader.

Vision calls an organization to be truly great, not merely to beat the competition and get big numbers. A magnificent vision articulates people’s hopes and dreams, touches their hearts and spirits, and helps them see how they can contribute. It aims everyone in the right direction.




Visit [www.LeadingAtAHigherLevel.com](http://www.LeadingAtAHigherLevel.com) to access the free virtual conference titled *Set Your Sights on the Right Target and Vision*. Use the password “Target” for your FREE access.

*Leading at a Higher Level*

*Chapter 2*

- 1 Jesse Stoner, *Visionary Leadership, Management, and High Performing Work Units* (doctoral dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1988).
- 2 Jesse Stoner and Drea Zigarmi, "From Vision to Reality" (Escondido, CA: The Ken Blanchard Companies, 1993). The elements of a compelling vision were also described by Stoner in "Realizing Your Vision" (Provo, UT: *Executive Excellence*, 1990)
- 3 Charles Garfield and Hal Bennett, *Peak Performance: Mental Training Techniques of the World's Greatest Athletes* (New York: Warner Books, 1989).
- 4 Ken Blanchard and Michael O'Connor, *Managing by Values* (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 1997).
- 5 Ford Motor Company documents indicate that company officials had data that Firestone tires installed on Explorer sport-utility vehicles had little or no margin for safety in top-speed driving at the tire pressures that Ford recommended. The papers were part of a collection of documents that Congressional investigators released before the third round of Congressional hearings investigating Ford's and Bridgestone/Firestone Inc.'s handling of tire failures.
- 6 Jim Collins and Jerry Porras, *Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies* (New York: HarperCollins, 1994).
- 7 Research studies described in *Leaders: The Strategies for Taking Charge* by Warren Bennis, 1985, and *The Leadership Challenge* by Kouzes and Posner, among others.
- 8 *New York Times*, August 2, 1995.
- 9 Ken Blanchard and Jesse Stoner, *Full Steam Ahead: Unleash the Power of Vision in Your Company and Your Life* (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2003).

# CHAPTER TAKEDOWNS



## Ignore the real world

“That would never work in the real world.” You hear it all the time when you tell people about a fresh idea.

This real world sounds like an awfully depressing place to live. It’s a place where new ideas, unfamiliar approaches, and foreign concepts *always* lose. The only things that win are what people already know and do, even if those things are flawed and inefficient.

Scratch the surface and you’ll find these “real world” inhabitants are filled with pessimism and despair. They expect fresh concepts to fail. They assume society isn’t ready for or capable of change.

Even worse, they want to drag others down into their tomb. If you’re hopeful and ambitious, they’ll try to convince you your ideas are impossible. They’ll say you’re wasting your time.



Don't believe them. That world may be real for them, but it doesn't mean you have to live in it.

We know because our company fails the real-world test in all kinds of ways. In the real world, you can't have more than a dozen employees spread out in eight different cities on two continents. In the real world, you can't attract millions of customers without any salespeople or advertising. In the real world, you can't reveal your formula for success to the rest of the world. But we've done all those things and prospered.

The real world isn't a place, it's an excuse. It's a justification for not trying. It has nothing to do with you.



## Learning from mistakes is overrated

In the business world, failure has become an expected rite of passage. You hear all the time how nine out of ten new businesses fail. You hear that your business's chances are slim to none. You hear that failure builds character. People advise, "Fail early and fail often."

With so much failure in the air, you can't help but breathe it in. Don't inhale. Don't get fooled by the stats. Other people's failures are just that: *other* people's failures.

If other people can't market their product, it has nothing to do with you. If other people can't build a team, it has nothing to do with you. If other people can't price their services properly, it has nothing to do with you. If other people can't earn more than they spend ... well, you get it.


Another common misconception: You need to learn from your mistakes. What do you really learn from mistakes? You might learn what *not* to do again, but how valuable is that? You still don't know what you *should* do next.

Contrast that with learning from your successes. Success gives you real ammunition. When something succeeds, you know what worked—and you can do it again. And the next time, you'll probably do it even better.

Failure is not a prerequisite for success. A Harvard Business School study found already-successful entrepreneurs are far more likely to succeed again (the success rate for their future companies is 34 percent). But entrepreneurs whose companies failed the first time had almost the same follow-on success rate as people starting a company for the first time: just 23 percent. People who failed before have the same amount of success as people who have never tried at all.\* Success is the experience that actually counts.

That shouldn't be a surprise: It's exactly how nature works. Evolution doesn't linger on past failures, it's always building upon what worked. So should you.

**PLANNING  
IS GUESSING**



## **Planning is guessing**

Unless you're a fortune-teller, long-term business planning is a fantasy. There are just too many factors that are out of your hands: market conditions, competitors, customers, the economy, etc. Writing a plan makes you feel in control of things you can't actually control.

Why don't we just call plans what they really are: guesses. Start referring to your business plans as business guesses, your financial plans as financial guesses, and your strategic plans

as strategic guesses. Now you can stop worrying about them as much. They just aren't worth the stress.

When you turn guesses into plans, you enter a danger zone. Plans let the past drive the future. They put blinders on you. "This is where we're going because, well, that's where we said we were going." And that's the problem: Plans are inconsistent with improvisation.

And you have to be able to improvise. You have to be able to pick up opportunities that come along. Sometimes you need to say, "We're going in a new direction because that's what makes sense *today*."


The timing of long-range plans is screwed up too. You have the most information when you're doing something, not *before* you've done it. Yet when do you write a plan? Usually it's before you've even begun. That's the worst time to make a big decision.

Now this isn't to say you shouldn't think about the future or contemplate how you might attack upcoming obstacles. That's a worthwhile exercise. Just don't feel you need to write it down or obsess about it. If you write a big plan, you'll most likely never look at it anyway. Plans more than a few pages long just wind up as fossils in your file cabinet.

Give up on the guesswork. Decide what you're going to do this week, not this year. Figure out the next most important thing and do that. Make decisions right before you do something, not far in advance.

It's OK to wing it. Just get on the plane and go. You can pick up a nicer shirt, shaving cream, and a toothbrush once you get there.

Working without a plan may seem scary. But blindly following a plan that has no relationship with reality is even scarier.



## Why grow?

People ask, "How big is your company?" It's small talk, but they're not looking for a small answer. The bigger the number, the more impressive, professional, and powerful you sound. "Wow, nice!" they'll say if you have a hundred-plus employees. If you're small, you'll get an "Oh ... that's nice." The former is meant as a compliment; the latter is said just to be polite.

Why is that? What is it about growth and business? Why is expansion always the goal? What's the attraction of big besides ego? (You'll need a better answer than "economies of scale.") What's wrong with finding the right size and staying there?

Do we look at Harvard or Oxford and say, "If they'd only expand and branch out and hire thousands more professors and go global and open other campuses all over the world ... *then* they'd be great schools." Of course not. That's not how we measure the value of these institutions. So why is it the way we measure businesses?

Maybe the right size for your company is five people. Maybe it's forty. Maybe it's two hundred. Or maybe it's just you and a laptop. Don't make assumptions about how big you should be ahead of time. Grow slow and see what feels right—premature hiring is the death of many companies. And avoid huge growth spurts too—they can cause you to skip right

over your appropriate size.

Small is not just a stepping-stone. Small is a great destination in itself.

Have you ever noticed that while small businesses wish they were bigger, big businesses dream about being more agile and flexible? And remember, once you get big, it's really hard to shrink without firing people, damaging morale, and changing the entire way you do business.

Ramping up doesn't have to be your goal. And we're not talking just about the number of employees you have either. It's also true for expenses, rent, IT infrastructure, furniture, etc. These things don't just happen to you. You decide whether or not to take them on. And if you do take them on, you'll be taking on new headaches, too. Lock in lots of expenses and you force yourself into building a complex business—one that's a lot more difficult and stressful to run.

Don't be insecure about aiming to be a small business. Anyone who runs a business that's sustainable and profitable, whether it's big or small, should be proud.



## Workaholism

Our culture celebrates the idea of the workaholic. We hear about people burning the midnight oil. They pull all-nighters and sleep at the office. It's considered a badge of honor to kill yourself over a project. No amount of work is too much work.

Not only is this workaholism unnecessary, it's stupid. Working more doesn't mean you care more or get more done. It just means you work more.

Workaholics wind up creating more problems than they solve. First off, working like that just isn't sustainable over time. When the burnout crash comes—and it will—it'll hit that much harder.

Workaholics miss the point, too. They try to fix problems by throwing sheer hours at them. They try to make up for intellectual laziness with brute force. This results in inelegant solutions.

They even create crises. They don't look for ways to be more efficient because they actually *like* working overtime. They enjoy feeling like heroes. They create problems (often unwittingly) just so they can get off on working more.

Workaholics make the people who don't stay late feel inadequate for “merely” working reasonable hours. That leads to guilt and poor morale all around. Plus, it leads to an ass-in-seat mentality—people stay late out of obligation, even if they aren't really being productive.

If all you do is work, you're unlikely to have sound judgments. Your values and decision making wind up skewed. You stop being able to decide what's worth extra effort and what's not. And you wind up just plain tired. No one makes sharp decisions when tired.

In the end, workaholics don't actually accomplish more than nonworkaholics. They may claim to be perfectionists, but that just means they're wasting time fixating on inconsequential details instead of moving on to the next task.

Workaholics aren't heroes. They don't save the day, they just use it up. The real hero is already home because she figured out a faster way to get things done.

BE

a



STARTER!

## Enough with “entrepreneurs”

Let’s retire the term *entrepreneur*. It’s outdated and loaded with baggage. It smells like a members-only club. Everyone should be encouraged to start his own business, not just some rare breed that self-identifies as entrepreneurs.

There’s a new group of people out there starting businesses. They’re turning profits yet never think of themselves as entrepreneurs. A lot of them don’t even think of themselves as business owners. They are just doing what they love on their own terms and getting paid for it.

So let’s replace the fancy-sounding word with something a bit more down-to-earth. Instead of entrepreneurs, let’s just call them starters. Anyone who creates a new business is a starter. You don’t need an MBA, a certificate, a fancy suit, a briefcase, or an above-average tolerance for risk. You just need an idea, a touch of confidence, and a push to get started.

---


\*Leslie Berlin, “Try, Try Again, or Maybe Not,” *New York Times*, Mar. 21, 2009.

# chapter 1 omg!

## **Team: brrrr!**

Why is the word "team" being used so often in the corporate world, or in the world of work at all? Teams compete in sports and in games. Companies, local government departments, or NGOs have rather built little communities and teams do not exist in civilian life at all.

Well, to be precise they do, but only in our heads. This is what makes playing in "teams" reality and this is the line along which people will identify with either the blue or red team (telecommunications company, TV channel, food chainstore). This is the phenomenon the business world has learned to exploit so well. If, let's say, we consider ourselves part of the Monkey Informatics team, then we will get into battle against Donkey Software with much greater vehemence and determination on the battlefield of business. Once we have established team consciousness among the






team members, then they can work 18 instead of 8 hours a day, and are prepared to commit smaller or greater infringements or acts of immorality to the detriment of the other company, motivated purely by a desire to "win".

To win the "competition". But what competition? Is it really a competition? Is there a start and a finish line? Is there a moment when somebody blows the whistle to signal the end of the match and we know whether it's the Monkeys or the Donkeys who have won? In reality the winners are the owners, who take their winnings home at the end of the year in the shape of dividends. They, more often than not, have a share in the Monkey and Donkey company alike.

Training is often used to build a team. This is even though real team building should not be achieved at a place distant from work and not with the involvement of an outside figure, but rather during normal business hours at work.


Team is not built by the training session or the trainer, but by the leader and the



community itself. Team is built on an average busy Thursday, or in the evening when the server suddenly breaks down, but the assignment must be completed by morning the next day the latest. And there is a leader and all the staff members are ready to join hands and without concern for themselves or for the others, they overcome the situation and tackle the problem. They do it for each other. Not out of fear of the upcoming deadline, and not for praise or money; but simply for each other. Now, that is team building. All the rest is maraschino cherry on top of the cake.

If a set of people does not evolve into a real community (all right, let's call it a "team") sooner or later, it is probably due to poor organisational climate. Company culture is shaped and developed by the management.

**humanrobot:** Is it not food for thought when advisers - for very high hourly rates - have no alternative but to advise the top management of a company of about ten thousand employees that they should - at least once a week - have lunch together with the workers in the company canteen?




## Road to training

All training must serve the improvement of the organisation. Training programmes range on a very wide scale, but if training is not part of a consciously thought-out and implemented building/development process, then training has very little to add.

Where do things go astray? Some training sessions just don't work; that's happened to me, too. Also there are bad trainers. But the seed of poor training is always sown during the preliminary ordering phase. This may be a realistic threat when


1. the expectations and responsibilities of the parties are not clarified,
2. training is wanted because there's some money left at the end of the year, or when there is not enough money and the client is seeking to get a bit of a facelift rather than root-level improvement,
3. client has some hidden objective or expectation of training,



4. the to-be participants do not have the faintest clue of what their boss has got in store for them.

**When the expectations and responsibilities of the parties are not clarified:** the client cannot clearly express what he wants to achieve through training; the developers – in the hope of financial and professional gains – are willing to go into any length to please the client and they do not squeeze out all the required information; the participants only spring to attention when they learn that participation is compulsory; the venue used only provides what is customary but fails in giving custom-tailored services.

**When training is wanted because there's some money left at the end of the year:** "It doesn't matter what it is..., just do something!", goes the task description. Now, it is up to the trainer to decide if he will take on an assignment like that in exchange for pocket money or the survival of his enterprise, or - on the grounds of protecting his own or the client's business interests - tactfully refuses suggesting that they should be reconsidering



the proposal at the beginning of next year in view of the long-term objectives.


**When there is not enough money, but the client is seeking to get a bit of a facelift treatment instead of real improvement:**

although people ought to be paid higher or more staff is needed because of increased workload, the company is unable or unwilling to spend more. Well, why don't we just give them a slap on the shoulder? Instead of sending them off for two days to a wellness hotel, the management gets them two trainers to do something with the overworked and underpaid staff.

**When the client has some hidden objective or expectation of the training:**


there was one school principal who wanted training from me because he feared that the mayor would not make him school principal when his mandate was over unless he had his teachers' support. He thought training would be a form of reward to his staff.

**When the to-be participants do not have the faintest clue of what their boss has got in store for them:** I have been witness to a




development programme - which, by the way, required many days of preparation - in which participants begged the trainer like school children not to make them do anything.

What it all boils down to is that the decision-maker (leader number one or the HR manager) decides that the organisation needs developing or, alternatively, staff members or teams need skills development or improvement in specific special areas of expertise. Or that development is needed across the entire organisation as they want to introduce an entirely new organisational culture. Of course, culture will not change overnight during training; the most a trainer can do is make people aware of the realisations that are already there lurking inside people's heads.



Most of the time, this is not recognised by the participants. Only felt or sensed.

**humanrobot:** "Hi there, we've got a little money left over in our budget, which we must either pay the government in taxes or alternatively, we can buy a research project. Could you not do some management programme on the pretext of research for us? You know, the bosses go down to the country each year. Now, this we could link this to a management training programme, a little bit of wine tasting and mini golf at the end", goes the typical rhetoric of the company HR.




## What is training definitely not about?

Training - and I must stress this again - is a means of organisation development. If it is wanted by a small market enterprise, the final and sole objective might just be to improve profitability. Nothing else. After all, the company was originally set up to make profit. What else? Of course, the other question is the price the company is paying to achieve the expected return.

Training is not a form of reward. Going sailing or spending one week in Barcelona (often coined incentive training) by the top management is more like a company holiday rather than organisation development. It may well be that the participants will have a good time and can unwind, they may also inevitably get to know each other better; even more so, loyalty to the generous boss will increase, after all, this great guy/girl is paying for the bill. Yet I insist that this has nothing to contribute to company development.


Training is not a form of punishment. "I am here because they put my name on the list,






just now when I have a deadline to meet tomorrow." Too many of my training sessions start out like this. In a better scenario, participants and I reward the sincerity of the comment with roaring laughter. Things are not going right? Well, just enrol them in some effectiveness-booster training. That'll make a difference. Is the staff overconfident? We'll send them off to an overnight survival course. But why?

Training is not the place for the trainer to hold theatrical shows. The trainer is a facilitator who is tasked with eliciting the thoughts and feelings that are already there inside the participants. The trainer is there to encourage people to say certain things, look at various life situations from different angles, express different problems and find the solutions if solutions can in fact be identified. During all this, it is not the task of nor the time for the trainer to make himself popular or likeable. Of course, there are times during training when the trainer is acting, as may be the case with short theoretical type presentations. There are moments when theatrical skills are called for, when the trainer




is driven by empathy. Nonetheless, all these moments must be used to serve the purpose of development and not the acceptance of the trainer, or the satisfaction of the trainer's personal desire to be in the centre of attention.

Training is not designed to pave the way for an unpleasant discussion. "People will feel better and it will be easier for them to take the pill", said one potential client; eventually, I declined the offer. The act of announcing any unpleasant news is an organisation development tool itself: having an open and clear approach, the honest exploration of the troubles and their causes, the ability to identify with the people concerned by the management is the best possible developmental tool that cannot be matched by even the best of trainers.




**humanrobot:** "Unfortunately, as it turned out, I could not attend the event; I had a foreign delegation to meet", says one director as he invites me for coffee behind the imitation leather padded door of his office. "Nevertheless, I would love you to tell me a few words about the people, who was the best of them all, perhaps the most cooperative and who impeded progress most. You know, I need this info to deal with these people in my everyday work." You would have to be a real tacky diplomat to get out of a tight situation like this one. After all, the client is your client even if he had failed to turn up at the training. He will issue you with your performance certificate, he will pay you, and it is up to him whether you will use this as a reference work, or quietly conceal that you have ever been near the place.



## The selling phase

It is always difficult to sell. Especially if you are selling a service, which most people believe they have some understanding of. Now organisation development is just such a service. I tend to feel I am really screwed when I find that my client has some vague knowledge of the subject and they keep wanting to convert the little they know into loose change. (This kind of work presents a real challenge because on the one hand I can utilise the eagerness of my partner but at the same time use a bit of tactfulness and diplomacy to keep my fingers on the steering wheel.

Let's call this group of people sciolists. They will show off their patchwork knowledge already during initial consultation. A typical example for this when they want to show off before their superiors or employees. Or they may want to get a training product from you that they may have heard of before and have grown to like it for some reason, and are most certainly not willing to hear the sad news from



you that this is exactly what they do not actually need.

There is, however, a group of clients that are either highly educated or totally ignorant on the subject. This latter group, recognising their ignorance, are excellent partners hence I put them in the same category with the educated ones. These clients


- 1.** do not see their roles in a relationship of subordination / domination, but focus on identifying shared goals,

- 2.** are ready and willing to learn and understand the entire training process, and

- 3.** are happy to share information - which we, service providers, can also learn a lot from and can offer them custom-tailored programmes,

- 4.** do not disguise problematic organisational components or shun their own responsibility.

Many service providers are irritated if the client wants to be part of the process in a creative way. However this is normally for the better since the client




1. will identify with the project if personally involved,

2. will find participation rewarding and realise their own responsibilities,

3. will be of assistance to you since they will most certainly know more about their organisation than you.

All you have to realise and consequently indicate to them is the border line between their and your responsibility.

**humanrobot:** We were holding a training session for the teaching staff of a vocational school in a small town. The programme was a great success mostly because the weaving and wood-carving teachers were open to the development methodologies we applied, which - by the way - were very detached from their everyday reality. They were able to laugh at themselves and could even tell us what they believed in, and the things they would not like to make changes to because they were convinced they had been doing well. When we finished, there was an Angel of Silence. Then suddenly, appearing seemingly from nowhere, the school principal asked a young lady teacher to hand out photocopies of a story and asked the teachers to read it and "nod one by one if you think you have understood it".




## Boxing and whitewater rafting

An organisation developer company was launching a new business branch and ran boxing training for the managers. According to the concept underlying the programme, world one has to learn to give and take punches in the business. Does it not occur to you that such a programme might , in fact, be organised for the sole reason to make the organisation developer stand out from the rest. At all costs?


The question is: why is any knowledge of boxing required to sell an IT system, build a residential estate, or introduce a new brand of swimming suits? Many think that the business world is like a boxing ring into which one only steps if armed from head to toe.

Whitewater rafting Some like it. And some loathe it. Our likes and dislikes and the way we relate to extreme sports vary, and rightly so. What may seem extreme sport to one person may be daily routine for he other.

Some of the feelings experienced in training courses, the thoughts and arguments of others,




and the mutually worked out solutions may be carried over into the realm of everyday reality. This is the real meaning and purpose of training. There is, however, a limit beyond which scaring or frightening people is expressly hazardous. And also unethical. Just because someone, having a helmet on his head, detests getting into an incessantly swaying rubber dinghy with three other people from the controlling department, it does not mean that they cannot be excellent payroll accountants who never make a mistake in thirty years, especially not at the cost of the company. It is not freezing to death in the icy waters and rolling over rocks that grinds you into a team - this is so even if the water, the boat and progress are fantastic metaphors in the various areas of business.





**humanrobot:** I've often had participants shyly eyeing the noses of their shoes and coming up to me directly before the training was about to begin to ask me about the type of activities they will be expected to perform. After a significant number of similar cases that showed the same pattern, I came to the realisation that people were worried that they would be subjected to humiliating exercises. In these cases it transpired that the manager responsible for organising the training failed to inform the participants on what they were to expect. In one development programme, an excessively obese lady came up to me, her neck badly covered with moles, and she asked me on a soft tone full of concern what type of activities we would be playing during the day. She told me how much she feared to make any physical contact with anyone because she had the belief that no-one would feel comfortable touching her under any circumstance. She also shared with me some of her former bad experiences. It transpired that a few years before the lady had looked perfectly average; she was a mother and a wife, but recently she had been diagnosed with a tumour, which produced the above symptoms. There were no activities on the cards that involved the touching of each other on this training session.



# 4

## **Dynamics of Social Inclusion/Exclusion in Public Space**

# 4

1. Kennett, Patricia. 1999. "Homelessness, citizenship and social exclusion." Pp. 37 – 60 in *Homelessness: exploring the new terrain*, edited by Patricia Kennett and Alex Marsh, Bristol: The Policy Press.
2. Mathieson, Jane, Jennie Popay, Etheline Enoch, Sarah Escorel, Mario Hernandez, Heidi Johnston, and Laetitia Rispel. 2008. "The meanings of social exclusion." Pp. 11-38 in *Social Exclusion. Meaning, measurement and experience and links to health inequalities. A review of literature*. WHO Social Exclusion Knowledge Network Background Paper 1. (Available on-line at: [http://www.who.int/social\\_determinants/media/sekn\\_meaning\\_measurement\\_experience\\_2008.pdf.pdf](http://www.who.int/social_determinants/media/sekn_meaning_measurement_experience_2008.pdf.pdf)).

## **Homelessness, citizenship and social exclusion**

*Patricia Kennett*

This chapter considers the relationship between homelessness and the concepts of citizenship and social exclusion. The connections are complex and numerous while at the same time nebulous and changing. The meanings of the concepts themselves represent 'contested terrain'. This chapter will argue, however, that this conceptual framework contributes to an understanding of the multiple connections between the ensembles of social rights, institutional and policy arrangements within and through which homelessness has been understood and through which the boundaries of citizenship and social exclusion have been drawn. The discussion will be located in the context of the contemporary 'entrepreneurial' city.

This chapter will begin with a brief discussion of the concepts of citizenship and social exclusion (for fuller discussions see Turner, 1993; Room, 1995; Bulmer and Rees, 1996; Jordan, 1996; Levitas, 1998; Lister, 1998). Developments in the post-war period will then be explored to establish the institutional, ideological and discursive context through which homelessness was constructed and the boundaries of citizenship and inclusionary and exclusionary criteria were established. The chapter will then consider the emergence of the new homelessness within an alternative policy discourse. Particularly from the early 1980s, this discourse was accompanied by the renegotiation of the content and meaning of citizenship rights. The chapter will argue that the current model of social integration and citizenship seems to be one in which there has been a re-evaluation of the notion of civil rights and an increasing emphasis on the 'privatised' citizen (Lister, 1990), active in the workfare state of the stakeholder society.

## Citizenship and social exclusion

The concept of citizenship has a long history but is most commonly associated with the work of T.H. Marshall (1950) for whom citizenship is based upon rights and entitlements. His central theme was that the rights of citizenship involve national constitutional rights such as civil and political rights, as well as embracing social rights, each of which is closely associated with social and political institutions. The hallmark of advanced industrial democracies is the eventual institutionalisation of all three types of rights and, in particular, social citizenship. For Marshall, the citizenship rights that accrue to members of a political community integrate previously unintegrated segments of the population and serve to mitigate some of the inequalities of class, thus altering the pattern of social inequality. Marshall discusses 'class fusion' which he refers to as the "general enrichment of the concrete substance of civilised life, a general reduction of risk and insecurity, and equalisation between the more or less fortunate at all levels" (Marshall, 1950, p 6). This leads "... towards a fuller measure of equality, an enrichment of the stuff of which the status is made and an increase in the number of those on whom the status is bestowed" (p 29). Marshall's thesis has been criticised for its evolutionary and Anglocentric nature (Giddens, 1982; Mann, 1987), as well as its emphasis on class. As Marsh (1998) points out, general accounts of citizenship often render other social divisions in society, such as gender and ethnicity, invisible. Marshall (1950) also fails to recognise the contingency, flexibility and fragility of the social contract between the state and the individual and that the attainment of citizenship rights and the opportunity to exercise such rights is a process of constant struggle and negotiation. The progression from civil to political and social rights is not the smooth, inevitable process Marshall suggests, but has always been dependent on political struggles between social movements, groups and classes. Retrogression and the erosion of the rights of particular groups are an ever-present possibility.

Byrne (1997) describes the term social exclusion as "currently the most fashionable term" (p 28) for describing social divisions in European capitalist societies. It has been the catalyst for extensive debate regarding the nature of social differentiation (for example, Rodgers, et al, 1995; Room, 1995; Jordan, 1996) and is now widely utilised both in national and international policy arenas (for example, European Commission, 1994; Social Exclusion Unit, 1998). Saraceno (1997) argues that the reconstruction of debates from poverty to social exclusion has involved "an actual conceptual shift, and a change in perspective; from a static to

a dynamic approach, as well as from a distributional to a relational focus” (p 177). Lee and Murie (1997) point out that the term social exclusion is more explicitly concerned with the social rights of citizenship and the ability to exercise such rights, particularly in relation to accessing services such as housing, employment and healthcare. And, according to Abrahamson (1997) “the element that distinguishes social exclusion from poverty and makes it, perhaps, more potent, is ... the affiliation with the issue of citizenship rights” (p 148). So while Room (1991) had defined social exclusion in relation to social rights and the inability of ‘citizens’ to secure these social rights, for Tricard social exclusion refers to:

**... processes and situations by which persons or groups tend to be separated or held at a distance from ordinary social exchange or positions which promote or allow integration or ‘insertion’ – that is, from participation in institutions or from access to rights, services or resources which imply full membership of society. (Tricard, 1991, p 2)**

The relational dynamics between housing and social exclusion have recently been explored by Lee and Murie (1997) who seek to show “the way in which the housing system forms part of the process through which poverty and deprivation arises and is experienced” (p 4). Somerville (1998), in applying the theory of social exclusion to housing processes, explores the themes of housing production, housing tenure, residential segregation, mobility and processes associated with homelessness and leaving home. He seeks to show “how housing processes cut across the different social levels (labour process, social reproduction and ideology), how they reflect prevailing patterns of social exclusion, and how they can mitigate or reinforce those patterns” (p 761). Anderson (1999), however, argues that debates linking housing and social exclusion have tended to “neglect a significant group of people who have *no* accommodation, or have shelter which is much less secure than council housing – single homeless people” (p 157). Yet, Pleace (1998) argues that the concept of social exclusion offers the opportunity to reconceptualise single homelessness and rough sleeping. He states that “‘homelessness’ does not actually exist as a discrete social problem” (p 50). Single homelessness is best seen as an outcome of processes of social exclusion, particularly “the inability of a section of the socially excluded population to get access to welfare services and social housing” (p 50). He sees the recent policy initiatives around resettlement and inclusion for single homeless people

(for example, the Rough Sleepers Initiative) as a “development of the relationship between the understanding of single homelessness and the concept of ‘social exclusion’” (p 51).

This chapter will argue, however, that while recent policy initiatives have indeed brought the issues of rough sleeping and single homelessness back onto the agenda it has been in the context of the promotion of a ‘productivist’ rather than a redistributive social policy agenda, emphasising the active rather than the passive citizen, with labour market insertion the key to inclusion (Levitas, 1998). These themes are encapsulated in the 1994 White Paper of the European Union, *European social policy – A way forward for the Union*:

**... it is clear that there needs to be a move away from more passive income maintenance measures towards active labour market measures designed to ensure the economic and social integration of all people. This means giving a top priority to employment, securing new links between employment and social policies by developing a ‘trampoline’ safety net, and recognising that those who are not in the labour market also have a useful role to play in society.... (European Commission, 1994, p 34-5)**

As Esping-Andersen (1996) argues, “the idea is to redirect social policy from its current bias in favour of passive income maintenance towards active labour market programmes that ‘put people back to work’, help households harmonise work and family obligations, and train the population in the kinds of skills that post-industrial society demands” (p 3). The promotion of the active citizen is now said to be an essential element of the enterprise culture and the entrepreneurial, competitive city. It signifies the emergence of an alternative mode of integration to that maintained and supported through the post-war era of Keynesian welfare capitalism. The dimensions of citizenship, social exclusion and homelessness during this period will now be explored to highlight the contingent and temporally specific nature of citizenship, social rights and integration.

## **Homelessness: a thing of the past**

A mode of integration in any phase of capitalist development emerges through the relationship between the state, the family, the individual and the institutional framework. Its sustainability depends on its resonance

with broader public and ontological narratives, that is, narratives which are attached to cultural and institutional formations larger than the single individual, and “personal narratives rooted in experience” (Sommers, 1994, p 619). The narratives encapsulated within the institutions of the post-war welfare state provide an insight into the nature of the webs of relationality within a mode of inclusion and their cultural and temporal specificity. The economic and political context was the promotion of Keynesian welfare capitalism organised around mass production and mass consumption of capital goods, within a largely national context. The welfare consensus emphasised an explicit commitment to state intervention through universal access to direct public provision of welfare benefits. It accepted an extended role for the state in economic and social policy and implicitly guaranteed social rights of citizenship for the whole population as a right. The discourse was that the state would ensure all citizens enjoyed a certain minimum standard of life and economic security as a matter of right. The mass consuming, mass producing, wage-earning society of the Fordist era was supported by a mode of integration encompassing a commitment to Keynesian capitalism, universal citizenship and collectively minimised individual risk, in that the state was seen as the primary guarantor against the vagaries and uncertainties of everyday life. Radical class struggle faded from political discourse and, according to Bowles and Gintis, “the language of liberal democracy, the lexicon of rights, was ... installed as the nearly universal means of political discourse” (Bowles and Gintis, 1982, p 64). The boundaries of social rights, however, were constructed within a specific narrative and that narrative reflected the privileged status of the white, male working class and the “partial citizenship” of women and black men (Kennett, 1998). While the Fordist welfare state linked the interests of capital and labour in a programme of full employment and social welfare it also involved the interplay of forms of social power other than class, such as racism and patriarchy (Williams, 1994). Thus the welfare settlement of the post-war period was a product of the “interrelation between capitalism, patriarchy and imperialism” (Williams, 1994, p 61).

In Britain the ethos of egalitarianism prevailed and the trends were towards decreasing social inequality and the gradual inclusion of previously excluded or marginal populations. On the new housing estates the move was to a more fragmented, home-centred culture as rising working-class living standards started to establish themselves. This was a period in which growing middle-class affluence enabled the further development of home-owning suburbia, while the ‘estate’ provided mass housing for



the 'respectable' working class. The Fordist regime could be characterised in terms of housing as a social right, universalism of subsidies and tax breaks and as an era of mass suburbanisation and direct state housing provision (Florida and Feldman, 1988). Personal disposable incomes rose, the rate of inflation was modest, the scale of unemployment was low and the majority of the population were well-housed. However, for the poor to be incorporated into the home ideal they had to meet certain criteria relating to personal decency and the acceptance of established behavioural norms. Issues relating to class, race, gender and sexuality were major considerations in how home was defined and who was able to gain access. Women and people from ethnic minorities were unlikely to have equal access to the capital through which the suburban home ideal could be achieved, and were likely to be denied access to local authority waiting lists (Rex and Moore, 1967; Castles and Kosack, 1973; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Henderson and Karn, 1987; Smith, 1989).

Nevertheless, the provision of state housing served to justify the institutions of the Keynesian welfare state and support the hegemony of the post-war settlement at the micro level. In Britain in 1960 7.5 million people were living in poverty (Coates and Silburn, 1970) and there were 2,558 households (10,270 by 1976) in temporary accommodation (Burke, 1981). Yet for the majority of individuals the ideological commitment to equality and welfarism was compatible with the 'lived' experience at the micro level. As Byrne points out:

**... in the Fordist era, good council housing was the locale in space of an employed working class and movement into it from poor council housing and out of it to the cheaper end of the owner-occupied system was simply an incremental matter. (Byrne, 1997, p 33)**

The prevailing ideology was one in which income and housing need had been met and poverty and homelessness involved a small number of people on the margins of society. The homeless population, under the 1948 National Assistance Act, was to be the object of welfare services rather than housing departments. This served to construct and maintain the undeserving status of the homeless and reinforce the individual, pathological model of homelessness. The way in which the homelessness problem was constructed, "which stressed the deviant characteristics of homeless individuals rather than issues such as housing shortage" (Neale, 1997, p 37), contributed to a policy agenda which served to render the

homeless population 'invisible' and perpetuate the logic of the public narrative that this was an era in which poverty and homelessness were a thing of the past.

### **Redrawing the boundaries of citizenship: risk, insecurity and the active citizen**

The last 25 years have been a period of substantial flux and change during which the landscape of capitalism has been reshaped: economic, political, social and cultural activities are said to have created a new set of conditions from the past. According to Jessop selective narratives of past events generate distinctive accounts of current economic, social and political problems, from which emerge "a limited but widely accepted set of diagnoses and prescriptions for the economic and political difficulties now confronting nations, regions, and cities and their populations" (Jessop, 1996, p 3). The redrawing of the boundaries of citizenship can be seen in this context. Allen argues that "discourses of citizenship are shaped not only by the material and political realities which they (selectively) reflect, but also by the way they seek to provide justificatory explanations for, and principles to guide, the social activities which organise that reality" (1998).

As economic conditions deteriorated during the mid-1970s, the post-war consensus began to crumble. The institutional arrangements of the post-war period which had supported specific configurations of citizenship were increasingly perceived as barriers and impediments to the deploying of new methods of production and consumption. In Britain, the erosion of the post-war consensus occurred in the context of rampant inflation in the wake of the oil crisis, and involved the acceptance by the 1976 Labour government of the International Monetary Fund's prescription of income restraint, cuts in social expenditure and, ultimately, the abandonment of Keynesian policy. By the 1980s a major structural reform of the welfare state was underway linked to an alternative economic doctrine, philosophical tradition and an anti-collectivist orthodoxy. Economic individualism and supply-side economics, as advocated by Hayek and Friedman, provided the framework for the policy formulations of monetarism, and the rhetoric for the devaluation of the welfare state portraying it as a barrier to economic recovery and the road to 'serfdom' and economic ruin. Writers such as Nozick (1974) influenced the notions of the minimal state and the atomistic individualism. The critique and devaluation of state intervention incorporated all three elements as

governments sought to reintroduce market processes into the welfare state and public sector. Connotations of a bloated, self-interested and inefficient bureaucracy were introduced and supported by ‘public choice’ theorists (Niskanen, 1971, 1973) with recommendations for the reduction in the size and power of government agencies and the introduction of competition and market forces into welfare provision. By the end of the 1980s there was an explicit policy emphasis on market-based approaches to the delivery of services, the role of local authorities became more focused on that of enabler rather than provider, and the ‘desirability’ and increased role for voluntary and private agencies in social policy was enhanced. As Dean argues, “the burden of welfare provision was shifted from the state to the informal, voluntary and commercial sectors and the character of welfare transactions became, if not literally private, more akin to contractual relations in the marketplace” (Dean, 1999, p 218).

These developments were accompanied by the erosion of the relative predictability and certainty of the mass producing, mass consuming Fordist era of welfare capitalism, and a change in the balance of class relations reflecting the changing relative status of different groups and their relationship with the state. The Fordist industrial order of stability in which the life cycle of the “working-class [male] masses was predictable and, mobility wise, generally flat” (Esping-Andersen, 1993, p 227) has come to an end. The decline of Fordism has been accompanied by the rise in both professional and lower-end service occupations, changes in class composition and a recrystallisation of class forces, resulting in a declining overall standard of living for large sections of the population and a reduction in the number and quality of employment opportunities. As discussed in the last chapter, the stable, predictable patterns of the conventional Fordist life cycle, underpinned by the institutions of the welfare state, have given way to greater variety and less predictability. Thus, in contrast to the post-war period, there seems to be increasing insecurity not only in the labour market but in many aspects of day-to-day life. Changes in the structure of employment combined with the reorientation of the welfare state are said to have created an arena of risk, insecurity and uncertainty for the majority of the population, not just the poor (Forrest and Kennett, 1997), in contrast to the previous mode of inclusion.

According to Beck (1992) insecurity has emerged in the context of the increasing individualisation and autonomisation of contemporary society, and Giddens (1991, 1992, 1994) argues that in this era of reflexive modernity “the concept of risk becomes fundamental to the way both lay actors and technical specialists organise the social world” (Giddens,

1991, p 3). Within this risk culture individuals are constantly required to assess their risk status and make decisions regarding potential risk “through contact with expert knowledge ...” (Giddens, 1991, p 5). Life-style choice, life-planning and the reflexivity of the self are central to the construction of an individual’s identity in this risk environment and, in turn, are linked to the notion of ontological (or emotional) security (Giddens, 1991). Increasingly, the social relations of everyday life have come to be associated with complexity and uncertainty, independence and individualism. The ‘collective management’ of uncertainty during the post-war period has given way to what Marris refers to as “the competitive management of uncertainty” (Marris, 1996, p 14) where strategies for containing uncertainty and risks must be developed individually. Thus, there has been a transfer of risk from the state and the employer to the family and the individual and a redrawing of the boundaries of citizenship (Kennett, 1998). This reorientation is an indication that the nature and significance of the social relations of welfare change over time as does the relationship between the individual and the state. This relationship is encapsulated in the institutions and ideology of the welfare state through which the inclusionary/exclusionary boundaries of citizenship are articulated and perpetuated.

This restructuring of relations between state and civil society and the establishment of new forms of intervention were most evident during the Conservative era in Britain when there was the most profound shift towards ‘welfare pluralism’ (Dean, 1999). However, following their election in May 1997, the Blair government has pursued similar strategies indicating according to Marquand (1998) that New Labour “has turned its back on Keynes and Beveridge” (quoted in Dean, 1999, p 221). According to Dean (1999) “New Labour has combined the economic liberalism of the Thatcher/Reagan orthodoxy, with something approaching socially conservative Christian democracy” (p 221). Key policies of New Labour have been Welfare-to-Work and the New Deal. Initially introduced to overcome the problem of unemployment among young people the scope of the New Deal has been extended to include, for example, lone parents and those over 25. According to King and Wickham-Jones:

**The policy recast in fundamental fashion Labour’s strategy to tackle poverty: previously, Labour administrations and social democratic thinkers had placed much weight on amelioration of general destitution through State-directed public spending programmes. New Labour, by contrast, emphasised paid work,**

**seemingly to the exclusion of other approaches. (King and Wickham-Jones, 1999, p 271)**

They go on to point out that in contrast to the commitment to universal and unconditional social rights which was central to Marshall's conception of citizenship and to the Labour Party's welfare agenda between 1945 and 1992, conditionality, compulsion and coercion appear to be the hallmarks of the policies of the Blair administration. Sanctions and penalties, such as loss of benefit, will fall on those who either refuse to participate or who are unable to finish the New Deal programmes. The implications of this move towards conditional citizenship are as yet unclear. King and Wickham-Jones (1999) point out the uncertainty in calculating the numbers denied benefit because of Welfare-to-Work. The most recent figure they cite is that of "1,352 individuals who had lost benefit because of their failure to participate" (p 279). Dean (1999) argues that in the context of conditional citizenship one outcome might be that "more citizens will defect from their contract with the State, in the sense that they will 'disappear' into the shadowy world of the informal economy. If welfare reform does not work with the grain of everyday survival strategies the result may be more not less social exclusion" (p 232). And similarly, the emphasis on labour market insertion as the means to social inclusion fails to take account of the nature and content of employment and the fact that low pay and casualisation characterise large sectors of the labour market today.

Drawing on the work of Jessop (1994) Dean argues that "the space between the individual and the State is itself 'hollowed out' as it is subordinated to economic forces and made increasingly conditional on the citizen's individual 'stake' in the economy as a paid worker" (p 225). While recognising the importance of the political and cultural dimensions to inclusion and exclusion Madanipour argues that:

**... the main form of inclusion is access to resources, which is normally secured through employment.... Marginalization and long-term exclusion from the labour market lead to an absence of opportunity for production and consumption, which can in turn lead to acute forms of social exclusion. (Madanipour, 1998, p 77)**

However, participation in the labour market does not necessarily guarantee inclusion, particularly because of inadequate access to resources and the

nature of employment available. For example, a recent study on the distribution of poor households within the countries of the European Union indicated that 35% of poor households were classified as working poor (EAPN, 1997). As Levitas (1998) argues, labour market insertion as the key to inclusion serves only to obscure the differential access to resources which exists *within* the working population not just between those within the labour market and those outside. This approach obscures the complex interplay of processes which structure opportunities particularly in relation to gender and ethnicity (issues discussed further in Chapters Five and Six of this volume) and which enable people to access and maintain a reasonable standard of life. Evidence suggests that the restructuring of capitalism combined with a renegotiation of the context of citizenship rights has been accompanied by a shift towards increasing inequality, social exclusion and homelessness, particularly among young people, women and people from ethnic minorities who are increasingly likely to enter into the sphere of the state and be reliant on more basic and coercive forms of social assistance.

### **Homelessness and the entrepreneurial city**

Homelessness is not a new or transient phenomenon, but recently has emerged as a problem affecting different kinds of areas from inner cities to rural areas, and has involved a widening spectrum of the population. A recent *Survey of English Housing* (1995/96) reported on people's experiences of homelessness. Six per cent of respondents reported that they had some experience of homelessness in the last 10 years. Of those aged 16-24 20% said that they had been homeless during the same time period and among lone parents with dependent children the figure was 29% (Green et al, 1997). Although the number of statutory homeless has continued to drop from its peak of 178,867 households in 1991, in 1996 it still represented 131,139 households in Great Britain, higher than any year before 1989 (Wilcox, 1997). Nor is homelessness among single women the 'hidden' homelessness of the past. More women can be seen sleeping rough and, particularly among younger women, there is likely to be greater use made of night shelters, with a rise of 70% in 1995 of women under 21 years old using winter shelters.

Hopper (1991) recognises novel elements of the phenomenon in terms of the scale, the heterogeneity of the homeless population in terms of gender, race and age, and the episodic nature of homelessness. While for Marcuse contemporary homelessness is distinguishable as:

**... large-scale, permanent and independent of the short-term business cycle, a combination never before existing in an advanced industrial society. It represents the inability of the market and the unwillingness of the state to care for the most basic needs of a significant segment of the population ... and their consequent complete exclusion from or suppression in the spatial fabric of a technologically and economically advanced city. It may thus fairly be called 'advanced homelessness'. (Marcuse, 1993, p 359)**

As alternative narratives have converged and combined in the contemporary city, so “economic, political and cultural spaces have been opened up, resulting in a restructuring of relations of inclusion and exclusion, of centrality and marginality” (Mommas, 1996, p 196). For Jessop the “intersection of these diverse economic, political and socio-cultural narratives” (Jessop, 1996, p 4) has crystallised in the context of the ‘entrepreneurial’ city where the processes through which homelessness occurs and the policy context in which it is maintained are most stark. The rhetoric of competitiveness, partnership and cohesion has dominated the discourse at both national and European Union levels. According to Oatley (1998) urban policy in Britain “has shifted from a welfare approach dominated by social expenditure to support deprived groups in depressed areas (1969–1979) to entrepreneurialism aimed at generating wealth and stimulating economic development” (p 203). Oatley lists a range of initiatives introduced during the 1990s, from City Challenge in 1991 to the Single Regeneration Budget which has become the central plank in the government’s regeneration policy, which he claims marked “a paradigm shift”. According to Oatley “These initiatives radically altered the way in which policies aimed at tackling problems or urban decline and social disadvantage were formulated, funded and administered” (1998, p x). While there is nothing new about characterising the city as the site of entrepreneurialism, what has been radically altered is the intensification of competition between urban regions for resources, jobs and capital and the policy agenda which has accompanied this intensification. With the growing importance of international competition in the global marketplace, which had played a fairly minor role in the Fordist 1950s and 1960s, major cities act as centres of economic, social, cultural and structural change as the arena is created in which cities promote innovation and entrepreneurialism in order to secure competitive advantage. The ‘managerialism’ of the 1960s has given way to what Harvey (1989) refers to as ‘entrepreneurial’ urban governance, thus facilitating the

transformation from the rigidity of Fordist production systems supported by Keynesian state welfarism, to a more geographically diverse and flexible form of accumulation. For Harvey, the basis of this new urban entrepreneurialism:

**... rests ... on a public private partnership focussing on investment and economic development with the speculative construction of place rather than the amelioration of conditions within a particular territory as its immediate (though by no means exclusive) political and economic goal. (Harvey, 1989, p 16)**

In both social and urban policy the emphasis is on reducing public services and stressing the role of agencies alternative to local government, and the need for a mix of private, not-for-profit and voluntary inputs. As larger cities endeavour to become transnationally important financial and control centres, urban initiatives concentrate on establishing special corporations for economic promotion in close cooperation with the private sector, thus incorporating elements of deregulation, privatisation and public-private partnership (Fainstein, 1991; Krätke and Schmoll, 1991). So while in the 1960s urban problems of poverty and inner-city decay were met by welfare initiatives and redevelopment, more recently the emphasis has been on growth based on market-oriented solutions and 'wealth creation,' with the consequences that:

**... the inner city ... becomes a microcosm for growth strategies based on financial services and property development, on deregulation and on polarised labour markets characterised by divergent skills and growing social inequality. (Hill, 1994, p 166)**

The affluent consumer and powerful corporations have become the object of urban policy and have, according to Harvey (1989), been subsidised at the expense of local collective consumption for the working class and the poor. The 'public interest' has become subsumed under private interests (Marcuse, 1993), increasing social division as well as reinforcing spatial divisions of consumption. The refurbishment of urban space and emphasis on cultural renewal facilitates gentrification processes and the promotion of consumption palaces, festivals and other leisure and cultural facilities as civic boosterism and place identity have become the "favoured remedies for ailing urban economies" (Harvey, 1989, p 28). As Griffiths (1998) argues "Entrepreneurialism is founded on speculation and risk-taking;



competition by its very nature, throws up winners and losers” (p 43). For the displaced and the poor the ‘image of affluence’ is likely to offer, at best, the opportunity of low paid, insecure employment and, at worst, the prospect of locating a pitch from which to panhandle for a few hours (see Winchester and White, 1988) before returning to the excluded space of the “multiply divided city” (Marcuse, 1993). Zero tolerance and coercion have become the response to destitution and poverty. Prestigious office locations install deterrents such as sprinkler systems to prevent the homeless from sleeping in their doorways, at the same time as major companies enter into a range of partnerships with voluntary organisations in the spirit of “new philanthropy” (*Housing*, 1991) for the young homeless.

Carlen argues that “at the end of the twentieth century in England the management of homelessness is not merely about housing scarcity but has also become a site of struggle over social change” (Carlen, 1996, p 10). Agencies seeking to work with the homeless have themselves become embedded in the entrepreneurialism of the city. With the emphasis on civic boosterism, according to Ruddick (1996), through their involvement with local growth coalitions in the spirit of public-private partnerships, service providers have, to some extent, become the intermediary in the production of a new social urban space in that they “manage the tensions between the visible impoverishment and global cities” (Ruddick, 1996, p 185).

Hopper (1991), Marcuse (1993) and Carlen (1996) have all pointed to the changing role of government and the nature of the homelessness industry who construct and manage the problem within the narratives of the entrepreneurial city. For Carlen “agency-maintained homelessness” occurs through:

**... the bureaucratic or professional procedures for the governance of homelessness which *deter* people from defining themselves as homeless; deny that homelessness claims are justifiable under the legislation; or *discipline* the officially-defined homeless into rapidly withdrawing their claims to homeless status. (Carlen, 1996, p 59)**

As well as the practices engaged in by local authorities, she highlights the “quality assurance” and “exclusionary categorisation and referral procedures” (p 59) utilised by hostel staff in the selection and management of hostel populations. Hopper (1991) argues that agencies providing services are in fact powerful interest groups in themselves and they

manipulate definitions of the problem and change their policies in ways that are most consistent with their continued existence. In Britain, as the providing state has become the enabling state, so attempts have been made to introduce market-based approaches to the delivery of local services. Thus local authorities have developed a strategic role to facilitate services and provision for the homeless through housing associations and non-profit organisations by distributing funds for which organisations have to compete. As service providers “they are the intermediaries through which flow the resources of relief to the homeless, and the people who outline how we should respond to this social phenomena” (Robertson, 1991, p 142). The ‘professional’ providers, through the bureaucratic process of fund-getting, supply information that appeals to the funding source, encouraging the development of specialised programmes which catalogue the homeless according to a range of individual vulnerabilities. The ‘homeless problem’ thus becomes defined not in terms of structural causes, but as merely an aggregate of social ‘characteristics’ symptomatic of underlying causes. The homeless population is thus reclassified as provision fragments and funding focuses on the pathological and individual characteristics of the homeless (that is, alcoholic, mentally ill) to which specialised professional skills are matched to specialised populations. It is the perceived need which becomes the social problem to which specialised caretakers can respond. Not only do these developments influence the labelling and stigma attached to being homeless, but also affect how the homeless person perceives themselves. In order to negotiate the burgeoning networks of agencies the homeless person must (re)classify her/himself into an appropriate category of perceived need.

These processes are particularly apparent in one major government initiative to combat homelessness which has been the Rough Sleepers Initiative (RSI). First initiated in London it is credited with reducing the numbers of central London rough sleepers from 1,000–2,000 in 1990 to around 270 in May 1995. (DoE, 1995). This was accompanied by the Department of Health’s Homeless Mentally Ill Initiative (HMII). The government committed £96m for the first phase of the RSI (1990–93) to organise direct access accommodation, advice, outreach work and some permanent housing association lettings. However, the 1995 Consultation Paper reported that:

**... people continue to sleep out at several main sites, for example, the Strand and the Bullring at Waterloo. Their evident plight is distressing not only for them but also for those who live, work**

**and visit the centre of the capital, and it is frustrating for those who seek to promote London as a world-class centre for business and tourism. (DoE, 1995, p 4)**

The initiative was extended for a further period and a greater emphasis was placed on “those sleeping rough or *with a clear history of sleeping rough*” (DoE, 1995, p 7; emphasis original). By March 1996 £182m had been spent on the initiative.

In 1995 the RSI model was extended outside London and local authorities were required to “quantify the extent of rough sleeping in their area, and if it existed, to examine its causes” (DoE, 1996, p 21). Only Bristol was able to ‘prove’ and document to the satisfaction of the DoE that rough sleeping was a significant problem and they were awarded £7.5m in 1996. More recently the RSI has been extended to Brighton, following their successful bid for capital and revenue funding. It could be argued that the distribution of funds has been based on a local authority’s expertise in formulating a bid rather than real need. In addition, this major focus on RSI has contributed to the perception of homelessness as rooflessness and funding has not been directed towards those people living in insecure and inappropriate condition. The emphasis on ‘rough sleepers’ has been perpetuated by the Social Exclusion Unit, and the Unit has set itself the target of reducing rough sleepers by two thirds by 2002 (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998). However, according to the Homeless Network:

**... it is our contention that without either a continuing supply of new accommodation, or a significant reduction in the flow of newly homeless people into London, we are likely to see the numbers of street homeless people increase sharply over the next 18 months. (quoted in Social Exclusion Unit, 1998, p 12)**

A recent report has indicated that while for many homeless people (636 or 13%) the resettlement process had had ‘positive outcomes’ in that the individuals involved were in non-RSI housing (Dane, 1998), for others (787 or 16%) the tenancy was considered to have been unsuccessful with the vast majority ending in abandonment. As one ex-tenant states “When I left I’d just had enough. It was just a big relief to walk out that door”. For another:

**“... it was like living a shell hermit-like existence. I was lonely, didn’t have the money to travel into the East End I knew, couldn’t**

**live on my benefits. My referral agency stopped visiting me after six months and my housing association wasn't interested. I knew after six weeks that there was no future in that place for me". (quoted in Dane, 1998, p 15)**

Clearly, there could be a number of explanations for these developments. They could be seen as the result of ineffective allocation, management and monitoring strategies adopted by the agencies involved. They could be seen as an example of the contradictions between the images and aspirations of the homeless themselves, and the political and policy narratives instituted by governments, for example, the assertion that "a place in a hostel has to be the start of a process that leads back to the things most of us take for granted" (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998, p 2). They could also be seen as an example of a policy agenda in which the diverse needs, expectations and aspirations of homeless people are subordinated to or subsumed within a strategy of stimulating wealth creation and enhancing competition.

## **Conclusion**

In the context of growing inequality and insecurity, labour market participation has become the panacea for an inclusive society. While the rhetoric of social exclusion has permeated the policy discourse it is not the comprehensive and dynamic approach offered by Berghman (1995), which looks beyond the experiences of work and income which has been adopted. It is a more narrowly applied definition which is encapsulated in the emerging model of citizenship and welfare. There has been a changing balance between rights and responsibilities and between the state and civil society. Work appears to be replacing welfare while social rights focus on contractual relations and coercion.

The policy responses to increasingly visible destitution and homelessness in British cities are an indication of the changes mentioned above. The Social Exclusion Unit has shown little concern with tackling the multifarious processes through which people find themselves homeless. Instead, as cities seek to compete in the international arena, the image of people sleeping in the streets contradicts and undermines the strategies of competitiveness, partnership and cohesion. Thus, it is those sleeping rough who have become the object of a narrowly defined set of policy solutions aimed mainly at restoring legitimacy in the entrepreneurial city. The definition of inclusion perpetuated by the government combined

with the reformulation of welfare and citizenship rights will do little to stem the flow of homeless people, nor to support and maintain those attempting to reconstruct a life off the street. This unidimensional construction of social rights and emphasis on entrepreneurialism and competitiveness may benefit some. However, it is unlikely to be a context for developing a policy and institutional framework through which homeless people can achieve forms of social inclusion which are both appropriate and sustainable. As Power et al (1999) argue, factors perpetuating the homeless life-style might begin with lack of accommodation but there are other interrelated and complex factors, such as marginalisation, insecurity, identification, vulnerability, lack of choice, isolation and lack of income/employment. The narrow interpretation of social exclusion evident in current policy does not connect with the multidimensional nature of contemporary homelessness, nor utilise the existing social networks and (limited) resources which exist among the homeless themselves. Within the current mode of integration there is little likelihood of addressing the homelessness issue and it would appear that at the end of the 20th century the most extreme manifestations of social exclusion – homelessness – will continue to be a feature of British cities.

## References

- Abrahamson, P. (1997) 'Combating poverty and social exclusion in Europe', in W. Beck, L. van der Maesen and A. Walker, *The social quality of Europe*, Bristol: The Policy Press, pp 145-76.
- Allen, J. (1998) 'Europe of the neighbourhoods: class, citizenship and welfare regimes', in A. Madanipour, G. Gars and J. Allen (eds) *Social exclusion in European cities*, London: Jessica King Publishers, pp 25-51.
- Anderson, I. (1999) 'Social housing or social exclusion', in S. Hutson and D. Clapham (eds) *Homelessness: Public policies and private troubles*, London: Cassell, pp 153-73.
- Bagguley, P. (1991) 'Post-Fordism and enterprise culture: flexibility, autonomy and changes in economic organisation', in R. Keat and N. Abercrombie (eds) *Enterprise culture*, London: Routledge.
- Beck, U. (1992) *Risk society: Towards a new modernity*, London: Sage Publications.

- Berghman, J. (1995) 'Social exclusion in Europe: policy context and analytical framework' in G. Room (ed) *Beyond the threshold: The measurement and analysis of social exclusion*, Bristol: The Policy Press, pp 10-28.
- Bowles, A. and Gintis, H. (1982) 'The crisis of liberal democratic capitalism: the case of the United States', *Politics and Society*, vol 1, no 1, pp 51-93.
- Bulmer, M. and Rees, A. (eds) (1996) *Citizenship today: The contemporary relevance of T.H. Marshall*, London: UCL Press.
- Burke, G. (1981) *Housing and social justice*, Harlow: Longman Group Ltd.
- Byrne, D. (1997) 'Social exclusion and capitalism', *Critical Social Policy*, vol 17, no 1, pp 27-51.
- Callinicos, A. (1992) *Against postmodernism: A Marxist critique*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Carlen, P. (1996) *Jigsaw: A political criminology of youth homelessness*, Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Castles, S. and Kosack, G. (1973) *Immigrant workers and class structure in Western Europe*, London: Harper and Row.
- Coates, K. and Silburn, R. (1970) *Poverty and the forgotten Englishman*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- Dane, K. (1998) *Making it last: Report into tenancy outcomes for rough sleepers*, London: Housing Services Agency.
- Dean, H. (1999) 'Citizenship', in M. Powell (ed) *New Labour, new welfare state?: The third way in British Social Policy*, Bristol: The Policy Press, pp 213-34.
- DoE (Department of the Environment) (1995) 'Rough Sleepers Initiative: future plans', Consultation Paper linked to the Housing White Paper, *Our future homes*, London: DoE.
- DoE (1996) 'Rough Sleepers Initiative: the next challenge', Strategy Paper linked to the Consultation Paper 'Rough Sleepers Initiative: future plans', London: DoE.
- Esping-Andersen (1993) *Changing classes, stratification and mobility in post-industrial societies*, London: Sage Publications.

- Esping-Andersen, G. (1996) *Welfare states in transition: National adaptations in global economies*, London: Sage Publications.
- EAPN (European Anti-Poverty Network) News (1997) No 49, June-July, Brussels.
- European Commission (1994) *European social policy – A way forward for the Union: A White Paper*, European Communities, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications available at <http://www.eurotext.ulst.ac.uk/policy/social/general/espwptoc.html> #x (1:10:98@ 14:20:06)
- Fainstein, S. (1991) 'Promoting economic development', *Urban Planning in the United States and Great Planning American Planning Association Journal*, vol 57, no 1, pp 22-33.
- Florida, R.L. and Feldman, M.M.A. (1988) 'Housing in US Fordism', *Policy & Politics*, vol 12, no 2, pp 187-209.
- Forrest, R. and Kennett, P. (1997) 'Risk, residence and the post-Fordist city', *American Behavioural Scientist*, vol 41, no 3, pp 342-59.
- Forrest, R. and Kennett, P. (1998) 'Re-reading the city: deregulation and neighbourhood change', *Space and Polity*, vol 2, no 1, pp 71-83.
- Giddens, A. (ed) (1982) *Profiles and critiques in social theory*, London: Macmillan.
- Giddens, A. (1991) *Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Giddens, A. (1992) *The transformation of intimacy: Sexuality, love and eroticism in modern society*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Giddens, A. (1994) *Beyond Left and Right: The future of radical politics*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Green, H., Keacon, K., Iles, N. and Down, D. (1997) *Housing in England 1995/96. A report of the 1995/1996 Survey of English Housing*, London: ONS.
- Griffiths, R. (1998) 'Making sameness: place marketing and the new urban entrepreneurialism', in N. Oatley (ed) *Cities, economic competition and urban policy*, London: Paul Chapman Publishing, pp 41-57.

- Harvey, D. (1989) 'From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation in urban governance in late capitalism', Paper presented to the Vega Symposium, Stockholm, July.
- Henderson, J. and Karn, V. (1987) *Race, class and state housing: Inequality and the allocation of public housing in Britain*, Aldershot: Gower.
- Hill, D.M. (1994) *Citizens and cities*, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Hopper, K. (1991) 'Symptoms, survival and the redefinition of public space: a feasibility study of homeless people at a metropolitan airport', *Urban Anthropology*, vol 20, no 2, pp 155-75.
- Housing* (1991) 'Doing business with the homeless', May, pp 29-30.
- Jessop, B. (1994) 'The transition to post-Fordism and the Schumpeterian workfare state', in R. Burrows and B. Loader (eds) *Towards a post-Fordist welfare state*, London: Routledge, pp 13-37.
- Jessop, B. (1996) 'The entrepreneurial city: re-imagining localities, re-designing economic governance, or re-structuring capital?', Paper presented at Urban Change and Conflict Conference, Glasgow, January.
- Jordan, B. (1996) *A theory of poverty and social exclusion*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Kennett, P. (1994) 'Exclusion, post-Fordism and the "new Europe"', in P. Brown and R. Crompton (eds) *The new Europe: Economic restructuring and social exclusion*, London: UCL Press, pp 14-32.
- Kennett, P. (1998) 'Differentiated citizenship and housing experience in Britain, Germany and Australia', in A. Marsh and D. Mullins (eds) *Housing and public policy: Citizenship, choice and control*, Buckingham: Open University Press, pp 30-56.
- King, D. and Wickham-Jones, M. (1999) 'Bridging the Atlantic: the Democratic (Party) origins of Welfare to Work', in M. Powell (ed) *New Labour, new welfare state?: The 'third way' in british social policy*, Bristol: The Policy Press, pp 257-80.
- Krätke, S. and Schmoll, F. (1991) 'The local state and social restructuring', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, vol 15, no 4, pp 542-52.



- Lee, P. and Murie, A. (1997) *Poverty, housing tenure and social exclusion*, Bristol: The Policy Press.
- Levitas, R. (1998) *The inclusive society? Social exclusion and New Labour*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Lister, R. (1990) *The exclusive society: Citizenship and the poor*, London: Child Poverty Action Group.
- Lister, R. (1998) *Citizenship: Feminist perspective*, Basingstoke: Macmillan
- Madanipour, A. (1998) 'Social exclusion and space', in A. Madanipour, G. Cars and J. Allen (eds) *Social exclusion in European cities*, London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, pp 75-89.
- Mann, M. (1987) 'Ruling class strategies and citizenship', *Sociology*, vol 21, no 3, pp 339-54.
- Marcuse, P. (1993) 'What's so new about divided cities?', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Studies*, vol 17, no 3, pp 355-65.
- Marquand, D. (1998) 'What lies at the heart of the people's project', *The Guardian*, 20 May.
- Marris, P. (1996) *The politics of uncertainty*, London: Routledge.
- Marsh, A. (1998) 'Processes of change in housing and public policy', in A. Marsh and D. Mullins (eds) *Housing and public policy: Citizenship, choice and control*, Buckingham: Open University Press, pp 1-29.
- Marshall, T.H. (1950) *Citizenship and social class*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mommas, H. (1996) 'Modernity, postmodernity and the crisis of social modernization: a case study in urban fragmentation', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, vol 20, no 2, pp 196-216.
- Neale, J. (1997) 'Theorising homelessness: contemporary sociological and feminist perspectives', in R. Burrows, N. Pleace and D. Quilgars (eds) *Homelessness and social policy*, London: Routledge, pp 35-49.
- Niskanen, W.A. (1971) *Bureaucracy and representative government*, Aldine: Atherton.
- Niskanen, W.A. (1973) *Bureaucracy: Servant or master? Lessons from America*, London: Institute of Economic Affairs.

- Nozick, R. (1974) *Anarchy, state and utopia*, New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Oatley, N. (ed) (1998) *Cities, economic competition and urban policy*, London: Paul Chapman Publishing.
- Pleace, N. (1998) 'Single homelessness as social exclusion: the unique and the extreme', *Social Policy and Administration*, vol 32, no 1, pp 46-59.
- Power, R., French, R., Connelly, J., George, S., Hawes, D., Hinton, T., Klee, H., Robinson, D., Senior, J., Timms, P. and Warner, D. (1999) *Promoting the health of homeless people*, London: Health Education Authority.
- Rex, J. and Moore, R. (1967) *Race, community and conflict*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rex, J. and Tomlinson, S. (1979) *Colonial immigrants in a British city: A class analysis*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Robertson, M.O. (1991) 'Interpreting homelessness: the influence of professional and non-professional service providers', *Urban Anthropology*, vol 20, no 2, pp 141-53.
- Rodgers, G., Gore, C. and Figueiredo, J. (1995) *Social exclusion: Rhetoric, reality, responses*, Geneva: ILO.
- Room, G. (1991) *National policies to combat social exclusion*, First Annual Report of the EC Observatory on Policies to Combat Social Exclusion, Brussels: European Commission.
- Room, G. (ed) (1995) *Beyond the threshold: The measurement and analysis of social exclusion*, Bristol: The Policy Press.
- Ruddick, S. (1996) *Young and homeless in Hollywood: Mapping social identities*, New York, NY: Routledge.
- Saraceno, C. (1997) 'The importance of the concept of social exclusion', in W. Beck, L. van der Maesen and A. Walker (eds) *The social quality of Europe*, Bristol: The Policy Press, pp 177-85.
- Smith, S.J. (1989) *The politics of 'race' and residence*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Social Exclusion Unit (1998) *Rough sleeping*, London: Social Exclusion Unit.
- Somerville, P. (1998) 'Explanations of social exclusion: where does housing fit in?', *Housing Studies*, vol 13, no 6, pp 761-80.

- Sommers, M.R. (1994) 'The narrative constitution of identity: a relational and network approach', *Theory and Ethics*, vol 23, no 5, pp 605-49.
- Tricard, J.P. (1991) 'Note de problematique: working papers of the Social Exclusion Observatory, EC Commission', in D. Robbins (1992) *Social exclusion 1990-1992: The United Kingdom EC Observatory on policies to combat social exclusion*, European Economic Interest Group, Lille: Animationa and Research, pp 1-6.
- Turner, B. (ed) (1993) *Citizenship and social theory*, London: Sage Publications.
- Twine, F. (1994) *Citizenship and social rights*, London: Sage Publications.
- Wilcox, S. (1997) *Housing finance review 1997/1998*, York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Williams, F. (1994) 'Social relations, welfare and the post-Fordism debate', in B. Loader and R. Burrows (eds) *Towards a post-Fordist welfare state?*, London: Routledge, pp 49-73.
- Winchester, H.P.M. and White, P.E. (1988) 'The location of marginalised groups in the inner city', *Environment and Planning D, Society and Space*, vol 6, no 1, pp 37-54.

### 3. The meanings of social exclusion

“Exclusion” is not a concept rooted in the social sciences, but an empty box given by the French state to the social sciences in the late 1980s as a subject to study... The empty box has since been filled with a huge number of pages, treatises and pictures, in varying degrees academic, popular, original and valuable’. (Murard, 2002:41)

Given its origins and rapid spread across nation states and global regions, it is perhaps inevitable that the phrase ‘social exclusion’ is used in different ways at different times reflecting different institutional, political, historical and geographic contexts. In this section we describe some of the meanings attaching to the concept of social exclusion and consider the relationship between these meanings and policy and actions aimed at addressing social exclusion.

#### 3.1 Constituent elements of the concept of social exclusion

Definitions of ‘social exclusion’ variously emphasise:

- The *groups* at risk of being excluded: for example, Lenoir (1974) quoted in Silver (1994:532) wrote: ‘the excluded made up one-tenth of the French population: the mentally and the physically handicapped, suicidal people, aged invalids, abused children, drug addicts, delinquents, single parents, multi-problem households, marginal, asocial persons, and other social misfits’
- What people are *excluded from*: for example, Silver (1994: 541) notes that: ‘the literature says people may be excluded from: a livelihood; secure, permanent employment; earnings; property, credit or land; housing; the minimal or prevailing consumption level; education, skills and cultural capital; the benefits provided by the welfare state; citizenship and equality before the law; participation in the democratic process; public goods; the nation or the dominant race; the family and sociability; humane treatment, respect, personal fulfilment, understanding’
- The *problems* associated with social exclusion: for example, England’s Social Exclusion Unit (SEU’s) defined social exclusion as: ‘a shorthand for what can happen when people or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health and family breakdown’(SEU, 1997)
- The *processes* driving exclusion and the *levels* at which they operate: for example, Estivill (2003:19) argues that: ‘Social exclusion must ... be understood as an accumulation of confluent processes with successive ruptures arising from the heart of the economy, politics and society, which gradually distances and places persons, groups, communities and territories in a position of

inferiority in relation to centres of power, resources and prevailing values'

- The *agents* and *actors* involved: for example, Mike Rann, Prime Minister of South Australia commented that: 'social exclusion is created by harsh and unjust economic conditions compounded by difficult social environments and made worse by insensitive government policies and government neglect...' (South Australian Labor Party, 2002).

Importantly, the differing emphasis on one or more of these facets of 'exclusion' has different implications for policy/action to address exclusion. A selection of definitions of social exclusion is provided in Appendix 1. These definitions are drawn from academic literature, reports from governmental and intergovernmental agencies; and from the ILO country case studies. Whilst not exhaustive they do illustrate both recurring elements and subtle differences in the ways in which social exclusion is defined.

Much of the 'common ground' apparent across these definitions can be attributed to Graham Room (1992, 1995), who was instrumental in establishing social exclusion as a multidimensional, dynamic and relational concept. These three constituent elements deliver insights into the nature, consequences and implications of unequal power relationships, and point to the important conceptual contribution that 'social exclusion' can make to understanding and addressing social and health inequalities.

*Multidimensional:* Room's conceptual shift from poverty, as primarily concerned with income and expenditure, to social exclusion, which he argues implies multidimensional disadvantage, has since been expanded upon in the literature. Definitions now typically refer variously to different dimensions (social, economic, cultural, political) and different levels (micro e.g. individual, household; meso e.g. neighbourhoods; and macro e.g. nation state and global regions) along which a social exclusion/inclusion continuum is seen to operate.

The consensus that social exclusion is a multidimensional phenomenon is present both in the English and the Spanish literature. García Roca (1998) for example, identifies three dimensions to social exclusion: a structural or economic dimension referring to a lack of material resources associated with exclusion from the labour market; a contextual or social dimension, expressed in a lack of integration into family life and the community; and a subjective or personal dimension expressed in an erosion of self worth and increased sense of anomie. Kronauer (1998) argues that the concept of social exclusion derived from France needs to be combined with elements of the concept of the "underclass" as used in the United States of America (USA) and the UK (Murray,1990), to differentiate it from poverty. According to Kronauer, social exclusion arises when a marginal economic position and social isolation combine. In this context he argues social exclusion is a product of people's relationships with: the labour market, consumption, institutions, social relationships, culture and geographical space. Other relevant arguments have been developed by

Gaviria, Laparra and Aguilar (1995), Minujin (1998), Cabrera (2000) and Velásquez (2001), based on Tezanos (1999).

*Dynamic:* This refers to the changing and interactive nature of social exclusion along different dimensions and at different levels over time. Some, including Room (1995) and Barnes (2005), contend that persistence over time is an integral aspect of social exclusion, while others (Levitas et al., 2007) have argued that judgements about the importance of persistence are neither theoretically nor empirically based. Most definitions recognise that the experience of social exclusion is unequally distributed across socio-economic and ethnic groups and that it is not a static state experienced by the same social groups at all times in all places. The experience and consequences of stigmatising conditions such as HIV/AIDS, for example, differ profoundly between South Africa and the USA and between ethnic groups in the USA. Additionally, rapid structural transformations and in particular the impact of globalisation are altering the contours of exclusion and inclusion within and between nation states and global regions.

In elaborating on the dynamics of social exclusion Castel (1997) argues that the causal relationship between poverty and disadvantage and wider inequalities must be recognised: the linkage between the experience of those at the margins of society and the fundamental working of societies. To do this, he suggests, 'exclusion' should be replaced by 'disaffiliation' because "Exclusion is immobile. It designates a state or, rather, privation states [...] To speak of disaffiliation, on the other hand, is not to confirm a rupture, but to delay a journey. The concept belongs to the same semantic field as dissociation, disqualification or social invalidation. Disaffiliated, dissociated, invalidated, disqualified, with relationship to what? This is in fact the problem. [...] To look for the relationships between the situation in which one is and that from which one comes, not to autonomise the extreme situations but to link what happens in the peripheries and what arrives to the centre' (Castel, 1997:16-17). It is apparent that Castel's argument refers not only to the dynamism of the social exclusion concept but also to its relationality.

*Relational:* This refers to the critical conceptual shift from the focus on distributional outcomes within a poverty discourse (i.e. the lack of resources at the disposal of individuals, households and/or wider social groups) to a focus on social relationships. However, there are two linked but importantly different strands to this argument.

One focuses on the idea that social exclusion involves the rupture of relationships between people and the society in which they live. This is vividly described by Room who notes that the concept is referring to:

"people who are suffering such a degree of multidimensional disadvantage, of such duration, and reinforced by such material and cultural degradation of the neighbourhoods in which they live that their relational links with the wider society are ruptured to a degree irreversible. This is the core of the concept (..) inadequate social

participation, lack of social protection, lack of social integration and lack of power."

In his writing on social exclusion and capability deprivation Amartya Sen adopts a related perspective arguing that social exclusion focuses attention on to the disadvantages arising from being excluded from shared opportunities enjoyed by others. Looking back to classical Greece, Sen (2000:4) writes: 'In this Aristotelian perspective, an impoverished life is one without freedom to undertake important activities that a person has reason to choose'. He draws parallels with the eighteenth century writings of Adam Smith, according to whom: "the (in)ability to appear in public without shame" is an important deprivation in itself. Indeed, for Sen, (2000:8):

'the real importance of the idea of social exclusion lies in emphasizing the role of relational features in the deprivation of capability and thus in the experience of poverty'.

A second interpretation of a relational perspective on social exclusion is that it focuses attention on inequalities as the product of social relationships that are defined historically by normative systems that assign social identities and associated power and status to different individuals, groups, classes, and even States. As in Norbert Elías' famous study in the 1960s of the English town given the pseudonym 'Winston Parva', "the exclusion and the stigmatization of those excluded turned out to be powerful weapons that were used by the old-established residents to keep their identity, to reaffirm their superiority, to maintain the outsiders firmly in their place" (Elías, 1998, [1993]:86). This approach to a relational perspective on exclusion demands a group, rather than an individual, analysis, that recognizes human interdependence as its foundation. In Michael Mann's analysis (1986:2), it is to understand the place that human groups occupy in "social power networks".

The exercise of power (economic, political, ideological or military) by human groups in social networks is unequal and it is from here that hierarchies are derived (Mann, 1986: 4). From this relational perspective, social reality viewed through the lens of social exclusion is the product of an unequal balance of power between social groups, nation states and global regions which contributes to an unequal distribution of goods and services. For these writers, without the two ingredients of redistribution and recognition it is not possible to overcome exclusion (Fraser, 1997:18). For this reason, a relational perspective implies an emancipatory dimension (involving new less hierarchical social systems), a political dimension (involving new political actors) and an institutional dimension (involving new public administrations and materiality of the state) (Fleury, 1998: 13-14).

There are other important differences in the way social exclusion is conceptualised. For example, it can be understood as a phenomenon operating in a *continuum* across society, or as affecting a *segment* of the population placed outside mainstream society. Similarly, it may be conceptualised as a *process* - a way of explaining power relationships

underlying and producing inequalities - or as a *state*, a way of describing the most disadvantaged people or social groups, who are assumed to be 'excluded' from social systems and relationships. In most definitions this 'state' is seen to be associated with (extreme) poverty.

There is also a distinction between schools of thought that emphasise *lack of participation* of individuals in society in general and labour markets in particular and those that identify social exclusion as a *lack of access to rights* as a citizen and/or member of particular group, community, society or country (Curran et al., 2007). The participation approach underpins much of the European writing on exclusion/inclusion, whereas the rights-based approach is more strongly associated with the development literature (Gore & Figueiredo, 1997). Curran et al. also suggest that the rights-based approach may be particularly relevant in the context of mental health.

However, Curran et al. (2007:295) have suggested that 'in the face of globalisation and greater international labour mobility, the rights-based and participation approaches become increasingly difficult to separate' (2007:295). The definition offered by Levitas et al. (2007:25) illustrates how both approaches can be integrated: 'Social exclusion is a complex and multi-dimensional process. It involves the lack or denial of resources, rights, goods and services, and the inability to participate in the normal relationships and activities, available to the majority of people in a society, whether in economic, social, cultural or political arenas. It affects both the quality of life of individuals and the equity and cohesion of society as a whole'.

Burchardt et al.'s (1999) definition emphasises participation: 'an individual is socially excluded if he or she does not participate in key activities of the society in which he or she lives'. This type of definition implies that social exclusion is relative, applicable to individuals living in a particular society. It leaves open question of who should decide which activities may be regarded as 'key'. This is not only an empirical question, implying the existence of a measurable inclusion/exclusion threshold according to the degree of participation in a particular activity, but also a normative one, involving the choice of key activities (or dimensions of participation necessary for inclusion) at a specified time and place.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is a strong advocate of a human rights-based approach to address social exclusion. At a recent virtual round table facilitated by the UNDP (UNDP, 2007a), it was argued that translating social exclusion as the UN non discrimination clause enables the concept to be grounded in international law applicable to the majority of states, and allows the necessary relationships between 'duty bearers' and 'claim holders' to be cultivated. From this perspective, social exclusion is understood to involve discrimination on the basis of social attributes and social identity. Marshall (1964) identified three stages in the development of rights: civil rights, political rights, and social rights. Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, a series of legally binding international treaties have established human rights standards which signatories have obligations to respect, protect and fulfil.



Civil rights include the rights to life, liberty and personal security; the right to equality before the law; the right to protection from arbitrary arrest; and the right to religious freedom. Political rights include free speech, expression, assembly and association, and political participation and vote. Economic and social rights include the rights to a family, to education, to health and wellbeing, to social security, to work and fair remuneration, to form trade unions, and to leisure time. Cultural rights include the right to benefits of culture, to the ownership of indigenous lands, rituals and shared practices, and the right to speak one's language and to 'mother tongue' education. Todd Landman (2006), in work commissioned by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), argues that social exclusion is a form of rights violation if systematic disproportionality of treatment of people across social, economic and political spheres can be demonstrated. He further argues that human rights deficits can increase people's vulnerability to exclusion.

Another key conceptual issue in the literature on social exclusion is that of *agency*. This is usually understood as a question of "who is doing the excluding?" (Atkinson, 1998) and is highly contested in the literature with attention having been directed at the causal role of 'agents' ranging from globalisation, multi-nationals and international agencies such as the World Bank and IMF, through nation states and their institutions, to excluded individuals/groups themselves. There appears to have been relatively little empirical research on the potential for agency amongst groups most severely affected by exclusionary processes. However, there is a rich literature from civil society and other sources demonstrating that rather than passive victims such groups can actively mould and/or resist exclusionary processes and their social, economic and health consequences. Importantly, this literature also gives more emphasis to the role of public services in addressing social exclusion and to issues of social justice and social solidarity than is apparent in much of the academic literature (Popay *et al.* 2008).

### **3.2 Making sense of diverse definitions of social exclusion**

The discussion so far suggests that whilst it is possible to identify common constituent elements in the meanings attaching to the concept of social exclusion there are also important differences in emphasis and tone. Frameworks developed by Hilary Silver (1994), Ruth Levitas (1998; 2005) and Jo Beall (2002) have made important contributions to understanding the ideological and political roots of these differences and illuminating the implications for policy/action to address social exclusion.

#### **Hilary Silver's paradigms of social exclusion**

Silver argues that social exclusion is 'polysemic, i.e. it has multiple meanings and therefore requires extensive semantic definition' (1994: 536). She identifies three paradigms in which she argues the different meanings and usages of the term social exclusion are embedded. She borrowed Kuhn's definition of a paradigm as 'a constellation of beliefs,

values, techniques and so on shared by the members of a given community' (Kuhn, 1970:175). According to Kuhn (1970:7) such paradigms 'specify not only what sorts of entities the universe does contain but also, by implication, those that it does not'. As Silver notes:

'Each paradigm attributes exclusion to a different cause and is grounded in a different political philosophy: Republicanism, liberalism and social democracy. Each provides an explanation of multiple forms of social disadvantage – economic, social, political and cultural – and thus encompasses theories of citizenship and racial-ethnic inequality as well as poverty and long-term unemployment' (Silver 1994: 539).

The *Solidarity paradigm* is embedded in French Republican political ideology, and views exclusion as the breakdown of a social bond between the individual and society that is cultural and moral, rather than economic. It draws on Durkheimian social theory: 'like deviance or anomie, exclusion both threatens and reinforces social cohesion' (Silver 1994:542). More recent uses incorporate multicultural notions of how the basis of solidarity is reconfigured.

The *Specialization paradigm* typifies Anglo-American liberal thought about exclusion. It perceives social actors primarily as individuals, who are able to move freely across boundaries of horizontal social differentiation and economic divisions of labour. This paradigm holds that exclusion is a form of discrimination. The roots of exclusion are to be found in unenforced rights and market failures. The specialization paradigm emphasises the individual and micro-sociological causes of economic exclusion; however, social liberals are also cognisant of the effects of structural change. According to Silver (1994:560): 'The split between supply-side and demand-side theories parallels the division between classical and social liberalism... In contrast to supply-side theoreticians who attribute poverty or unemployment to individual failings, most sociologists now accept that the new poverty and long-term unemployment have demand-side or structural causes'.

The *Monopoly paradigm*, influential on the European Left, sees exclusion as the result of the formation of group monopolies, restricting access of outsiders to resources. 'Drawing heavily on Weber, and, to a lesser extent, Marx, it views the social order as coercive, imposed through a set of hierarchical power relations. In this social democratic or conflict theory, exclusion arises from the interplay of class, status and political power and serves the political interests of the included... Exclusion is combated through citizenship, and the extension of equal membership and full participation in the community to outsiders' (Silver 1994: 543). In this paradigm, theories of labour market segmentation epitomise the link between social closure and economic exclusion.

Importantly, the focus in Silver's analysis is on the role of political ideology in generating different understandings of the nature and causes of social exclusion, and by implication different approaches to

policy/action to address social exclusion. However, there are limitations to this typology. Each of Silver's paradigms presents exclusion as based in social relationships between two groups: the included and the excluded. Whilst drawing attention to the 'actors' and 'forces' driving exclusionary processes this dichotomous approach fails to take account of the social gradients in access to resources and power evident in all societies. The paradigms also fail to account for the differential emphasis placed in different definitions on the potential for agency by people experiencing exclusionary processes. Finally, and importantly from the perspective of this paper, Silver's paradigms are shaped around advanced Western democracies. Their applicability in the global context remains therefore to be demonstrated, although in later writings, Silver extended the analysis to the Americas (2004, 2005).

### **Ruth Levitas' discourses of social exclusion**

Silver is primarily concerned to illuminate the political ideologies underpinning different definitions of social exclusion. Whilst she raises questions about the significance for policy of these differences she does not consider these in detail. In contrast, Ruth Levitas (2005) is primarily concerned to illuminate how ideological underpinnings for concepts of social exclusion change over time and how these are translated into different policies/action. Her focus is the UK and her work is based on an analysis of political discourse over the past two decades or more. As she notes: 'a discourse constitutes ways of acting in the world, as well as a description of it. It both opens up and closes down possibility for action' (Levitas: 2005:3). Levitas identifies three different social exclusion discourses in the UK. These are described briefly below.

The *redistributionist discourse (RED)*, emphasises poverty as a prime cause of social exclusion. It posits citizenship as the obverse of exclusion: 'poverty spells exclusion from the full rights of citizenship... and undermines people's ability to fulfil the private and public obligations of citizenship' (Lister,1990:68). RED addresses social, political, cultural and economic citizenship, broadening out into a critique of inequality (Levitas, 2005:14).

The *moral underclass discourse (MUD)* emphasises cultural rather than material explanations of poverty, resonating with the work of Charles Murray (1990), whereby the excluded are to blame for their fate. It focuses on the behaviour of the poor and implies welfare benefits are bad as they undermine people's ability to be self sufficient creating dependency. It is a strongly gendered discourse. (Levitas 2005:21).

The *social integrationist discourse (SID)* sees social inclusion and exclusion primarily in terms of labour market attachment. It obscures inequalities between paid workers, particularly gender inequalities (Levitas,2005:26).

Levitas argues that RED, SID and MUD are:

'... ways of thinking about exclusion that imply different strategies for its abolition. In RED, the assumption is that the resources available in cash or kind to the poor need to be increased both relatively and absolutely, implying both improved levels of income maintenance and better access to public and private services. In SID, the solution is increased labour market participation, for paid work is claimed to deliver inclusion both directly and indirectly through the income it provides. In MUD, the emphasis is on changing behaviour through a mix of sticks and carrots – manipulation of welfare benefits, sanctions for non-compliance and intensive social work with individuals' (Levitas,2005:x).

Her analysis is strongly informed by a socialist feminist perspective. In particular she points to the contradictions inherent in policies that valorise unpaid work (e.g. promote good quality parenting as a mechanism to address anti-social behaviour) whilst at the same time linking income maintenance entitlement to formal employment.

Although Levitas's framework focuses on contemporary Britain and is particularly applicable to states with established welfare systems, it has a broader relevance highlighting key issues concerning the nature of public policy responses to multiple social disadvantages. In the context of the UK, for example, she argues that policies to address social exclusion have moved from a concern with distributional equality to focus on ways of:

'lifting the poor over the boundary of a minimum standard – or to be more accurate, inducing those who are sufficiently sound in wind and limb to jump over it – while leaving untouched the overall pattern of inequality, especially the rich' (Levitas, 2005:156).

In a similar vein, Veit-Wilson (1998), differentiates between 'weak and 'strong' political discourses of social exclusion in Europe, noting that power relationships are absent from the 'weak' version:

'In the weak version of this discourse, the solutions lie in altering these excluded people's handicapping characteristics and enhancing their integration into dominant society. Stronger forms of this discourse also emphasise the role of those who are doing the excluding and therefore aim at solutions which reduce the powers of exclusion" (Veit-Wilson, 1998: 45).

### **Jo Beall's approaches to social exclusion**

Jo Beall (2002) has identified three approaches to social exclusion which are described below.

The *neo-liberal* approach views social exclusion as 'an unfortunate but inevitable side effect of global economic realignment' (Beall, 2002:43). As a consequence of the emergence of free trade and a single global market,

workers are now excluded from the benefits of trade barriers and social and employment protection.

A second approach argues that 'social exclusion represents little more than an unhelpful *re-labelling of poverty* or acts to distract attention from inequality generated by the workings of the economic system' (Beall, 2002:44) (emphasis added).

The third, *transformationalist*, approach focuses attention on social relations embedded in formal and informal institutions, and 'signals the use of the social exclusion framework to analyze international processes and institutional relationships associated with rapid social and economic global change and local impacts and responses' (Beall, 2002:44).

Of these three approaches, the neo-liberal and re-labelling of poverty approaches conceptualise social exclusion as a 'state' whereas the transformational approach focuses attention on exclusionary processes. This latter approach is concerned with social interactions and power relationships at different levels – from global to local – and recognises the social, political and cultural, as well as the economic, dimensions of power.

### **3. 4 Key points: the meanings of social exclusion**

The concept of 'social exclusion' is contested, and has multiple meanings. These meanings are being continually redefined over time and have different policy implications.

The term 'social exclusion' has been used to describe: groups at risk of exclusion; what people are excluded from; the states associated with exclusion; the processes involved and levels at which they operate; and the actors involved.

There is some consensus that 'social exclusion' is: (a) *multidimensional*, encompassing social, political, cultural and economic dimensions, and operating at different social levels; (b) *dynamic*, impacting in different ways to differing degrees at different social levels over time; and (c) *relational*. A relational perspective has two dimensions. On the one hand, it focuses on exclusion as the rupture of relationships between people and the society resulting in a lack of social participation, social protection, social integration and power. Alternatively, a relational perspective points to exclusion as the product of unequal social relationships characterised by differential power i.e. the product of the way societies are organised.

Definitions also differ in other fundamental respects. 'Social exclusion' has been conceptualised as a *continuum* across society, or as affecting a *segment* of the population outside mainstream social systems and relationships. Similarly, social exclusion may be defined as the *processes embedded in* unequal power relationships that create inequalities or as a *state* of multiple disadvantage. There is also a distinction between schools of thought that emphasise *lack of participation* of individuals in society and those that identify social exclusion as a *lack of access to citizenship rights* for members of particular group, community, society or country.

In terms of who or what is driving exclusion, attention has been directed at the causal role of diverse 'agents' ranging from globalisation to excluded individuals/groups themselves. Although there has been little research on the agency of groups most affected by exclusionary forces there is ample evidence from other sources that they are rarely passive victims.

Silver (1994), Levitas (1998; 2005) and Beall (2002) have made important contributions to our understanding of the ideological and political roots of different definitions and illuminated the implications for policy/action to address 'social exclusion'. While many definitions of 'social exclusion' incorporate apparently contradictory connotations, the labelling approach distinguishing 'the excluded' from the rest of society, dominates attempts to operationalise and measure 'social exclusion' and policy/action to address it.

#### **4. Exclusionary Processes**

'The concept [social exclusion] takes us beyond mere descriptions of deprivation, and focuses attention on social relations and the processes and institutions that underlie and are part and parcel of deprivation' (de Haan, 2001:26).

The previous section explored some of the differences - often implicit - underlying definitions and descriptions of 'social exclusion'. A key theme has been the distinction between social exclusion conceptualised as a 'state', a 'process', or both. As de Haan notes, conceptualised in relational and process terms, social exclusion can help increase understanding of the causes and consequences of deprivation and inequalities. In this section, we focus on some of these exclusionary processes. As Sen (2000) has noted a distinction can be drawn between active exclusionary processes that are the direct and intended result of policy or discriminatory action including, for example, withholding political, economic and social rights from migrant groups or deliberate discrimination on the basis of gender, caste or age; and passive exclusionary processes, which in contrast, arise indirectly, for example when fiscal or trade policies result in an economic downturn leading to increased unemployment. Whether active or passive, exclusionary processes operate at many levels - in households, villages and cities, nation states and global regions - and encompass, for example: institutionalised and informal racism, discrimination and xenophobia; deeply rooted social structures such as patriarchy; political ideologies such as neo-liberalism and the policies that flow from these; and the workings of global, national and local economies. Climate change is creating new powerful exclusionary processes and these will increase in the future whilst conflict, fuelled by competition over land and resources, by hatred and greed has long been a powerful exclusionary force and continues to be so. In a review of this nature we cannot cover the full range of exclusionary processes nor do justice to their complexity instead we have sought to illustrate the complexity, pervasiveness and scale of the processes involved. We focus on the economic, social, political and cultural domains, in particular: the exclusionary processes accompanying globalisation; the potentially exclusionary impacts of public policy; and the stigmatising and exclusionary impacts of certain cultural and symbolic processes. This section ends with a discussion of the distinctive contribution of the social exclusion relational 'lens'.

##### **4.1 Economic transformation and globalisation**

The concept of social exclusion emerged from the 1970s onwards during a period of rapid social and economic transformation at national, regional and global levels. As Silver (1994) and others have highlighted these transformations created what were perceived to be new social problems that challenged the assumptions underpinning Western welfare state provision concerning the operation of labour markets, the potential for full

employment, the relationship between paid and unpaid work and the nature of citizenship and entitlement<sup>1</sup>.

The economic crisis of the 1970s triggered a rise in the power and influence of neo-liberal ideologies and policies including: industrial restructuring, the opening up of labour markets, moves to reduce workers protection and the retreat of state provided welfare. Production was relocated and decentralised often moving to low wage economies, capital investment in new technologies contributed to growing unemployment in the older established industrial heartlands of Western Europe, North America and Australia, differentially affecting already disadvantaged groups and whole geographic areas. These trends were reinforced by the progressive growth of the tertiary sector of the economy from the 1960s, especially of the financial sector. As the financial sector became more global the monetary sovereignty of the nation state was undermined. These dynamics in the financial sector added to the pressure for greater labour flexibility, expressed in higher unemployment, more precarious employment and loss of the old mechanisms of social protection for many workers (Salama, 2006:64-72; Castel, 2004:75-86).

The nature and impact of globalisation and employment conditions around the world are considered in detail in the final reports of two other WHO Knowledge Networks (Benach, *et al.*,2007; Labonte, *et al.*,2007), including the dramatic impacts of these changes on the distribution of income and wealth and social relationships. Organised labour organisations and informal networks of solidarity have been undermined, individuals, households and entire communities have been put under extreme social and economic pressure, working conditions have deteriorated for millions of people, poverty increased and income inequalities widened. It was in this context that 'social exclusion' was seen to provide greater explanatory power than the concept of poverty: not only does it move beyond the economic domain to highlight the multi-dimensionality of inequalities, but it also illuminates causal processes. Some commentators went further arguing that the concept of social exclusion opened up new ways of investigating and understanding global exclusionary processes. Beall (2002:50) for example, suggests that it provides:

'a way of understanding the relational and institutional dynamics that serve to include some and keep others out in a connected but polarized global economic context. As such, it is an analytical construct compatible with the study of global economic processes and the poverty and inequality to which they increasingly give rise'.

As Castells (1998:162) has noted: 'globalization proceeds selectively, including and excluding segments of economies and societies in and out of networks of information, wealth and power that characterize the new dominant systems'. And whilst the economic and social impact of these transformational forces may have been felt initially in high income

---

<sup>1</sup> Feminist writers, amongst others had, of course, challenged the assumptions underpinning western welfare states before these macro economic and social changes became prominent.



countries, they have been both global and local in their reach. For example, Beall (2002), using examples from the cities of Faisalabad and Johannesburg, highlights the ways in which exclusionary processes associated with globalization graft themselves onto local dynamics of social exclusion. At the same time it is not just segments of societies that are subject to exclusionary processes but whole nations and regions of the world notably for example Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

Some writers, such as Amartya Sen, caution against a wholesale condemnation of globalisation arguing that it can be both a threat and an opportunity. For example, the positive impact on women's lives of paid employment in the garment industry in Bangladesh despite poor working conditions is described in the final report of the SEKN (Popay, et. al. 2008). For Sen, it is not globalization and markets per se that are problematic. Indeed, in a sense Sen sees markets as value-free, representing the 'basic arrangement through which people can interact with each other, and undertake mutually advantageous activities' (2000: 28). Rather, Sen argues, it is the malfunctioning of markets and the lack of adequate governance of globalizing forces that are the root of the problem. The role of public policy in this regard is considered next.

#### **4.2 Public policy and exclusionary processes**

For many writers, broadly positioned on the 'democratic left', exclusionary processes are not simply an unintended consequence of the economic restructuring that has taken place in the past 40 years: rather they are a necessary condition for it in a situation where, as David Byrne has argued (1999:128) 'post-industrial capitalism [is] founded around a flexible labour market and ... a systematic constraining of the organizational powers of workers as collective actors'. For Byrne, 'the excluded' are a reserve army of labour, moving in and out of employment at the bottom end of the labour market, mobilised or demobilised according to fluctuations in the economy. These writers point to the exclusionary processes associated with economic and social policies enacted by many Western states. For example, Navarro and colleagues (Navarro and Shi, 2001; Navarro et al., 2006) have analysed the relationship between political commitment to redistributive policies in high income capitalist countries and levels of income and social and health inequalities, arguing that where this commitment is weakest, in liberal democracies such as the USA, Canada and the UK, income and health inequalities are greatest. Similarly, Townsend (1997) has argued that the principle causes of increased levels of relative poverty in Britain from the 1980s onwards are deregulation; privatisation; unemployment; reduction in public spending; restructured taxes; and the centralising of political control.

The dominance of the international financial sector led to economic and political pressure on many low income countries to repay the debt accumulated in the post-war period. Multilateral banks pressed for structural adjustment policies in the 1980s, which became known in the 1990s as "the Washington Consensus". These 'adjustments' included opening up economies to international competition, increasing labour

flexibility, restricting public social expenditure and the introduction of new 'pro-market' forms of social protection for the poor underpinned by neo-liberal theories (Stewart, 1998: 38-42; Salama, 1999). These involved a shift away from the public funding and provision of essential services (e.g. healthcare) to a focus on subsidising demand for services from private sector providers (Hernández et al., 2002:323-333) and an increasing reliance on conditional cash and/or service transfers primarily to the poor (Popay et al., 2008; Hernández, 2003:352-358; Rodríguez, 2007). However, many commentators argue that these selective programmes have not had the impacts anticipated by their proponents. Instead, it is argued, they have increased social inequalities creating new forms of 'social exclusion'. These critics maintain that social protection systems that are conditional upon people's capacity to pay rather than their citizenship status (as in universal systems) will inevitably be exclusionary as well as being expensive to administer and difficult to target effectively (Hernández, 2002; Lauthier, 2005; Le Bonniec, 2005; Rodríguez, 2005; Mkandawire, 2005; Townsend, 2007).

An alternative view, from the radical left, is that the link between the right to an income and the obligation to earn or use it in ways consistent with the economic and cultural hegemony of capitalism should be broken (Bowring, 2000, in Davies, 2005:5). Bowring argued that redistributionist scholars, by emphasising participation in work, income and commodity relations, implicitly equate exclusion with normative deviation and inclusion with conformity to social convention. He also argued for the assertion of the existence of new, non-commodified, needs, which cannot be satisfied by capitalism and which prefigure a different kind of society (2000:309). Moreover, for Bowring (2000:314) 'assuming people are ashamed of poverty is... a scandalous attribution to make'; and many people living on substandard incomes are reluctant to describe themselves as such. )

#### **4. 3 Discrimination, stigma and human rights**

The discussion so far has highlighted exclusionary processes embedded in economic, political and social relationships operating within and between nation states. However, as Estivill (2003) has argued, these processes are overlain and reinforced by cultural and symbolic processes which differentiate and stigmatise particular groups, nations and global regions. Estivill (2003:45) describes three stages in the development of these dominant social values and attitudes. Dominant institutions start by applying negative labels and attributes to define and classify those who do not conform to dominant social 'rules'. The victorious 'social mindset' then uses its categorization to legitimize differences in the treatment of others. The third stage is characterised by strong repression and stigmatisation. This description resonates with Durkheim's (1895) analysis of deviance:

'Imagine a society of saints, a perfect cloister of exemplary individuals. Crimes (or deviance) properly so called, will there be unknown; but faults that appear venial to the layman will create

there the same scandal that the ordinary offence does in ordinary consciousnesses. If, then, this society has the power to judge and punish, it will define these acts as criminal (or deviant) and will treat them as such.'

Public attitudes towards the poor in Britain illustrate the exclusionary potential of these processes. For example, research by Gough and Eisenschitz (2006) suggest that these attitudes are at best indifferent, at worst, hostile, in a context of socio-spatial separation of the poor from the better off. They argued that this hostility is shaped, among others, by popular culture and political ideology propagated by the mass media, competition for jobs and other resources, and fear of poverty. A Fabian Society Report on child poverty (2006) reinforces this picture arguing that there would be little public support for a more progressive tax regime in the UK. However, a more nuanced picture emerges from the Joseph Rowntree Foundation's 2007 report on public attitudes to income inequality, with a majority of people thinking that the gap between high and low incomes is too great although this does not translate directly or simplistically into support for more redistributive policies.

Whilst Durkheim's theories are deterministic – leaving little space for agency on the part of disadvantaged people – more recent theorists have acknowledged that people are not necessarily passive victims. For example, Estivill (2003:14) argues that in the face of powerful exclusionary processes individuals and/or groups 'either try to find a way out through their own networks of relations or, if they so decide, they can fight against the circumstances of their exclusion and criticize society for its lack of recognition'. However, as Gough and Eisenschitz (2006:131) point out: 'In an individualistic society, it is natural to blame social failure on oneself' (Gough and Eisenschitz, 2006:131). They suggest that prevailing negative attitudes can increase the sense of powerlessness felt by people living in poverty and undermine their capacity for collective action. In addition to the lack of realistic opportunities for advancement, the ability of disadvantaged groups to improve their circumstances is further compromised by the social specificity of what Bourdieu (1986) has called 'cultural capital': a composite of social behaviours, accent, physical demeanour, cultural tastes and attitudes acquired in childhood. While higher-class cultural capital is regarded as universal, lower-class capital has limited socio-spatial recognition. Gough and Eisenschitz (2006: 111) contend that despite the mass media, the class gap in cultural capital in the UK is probably not narrowing, and that everyday behaviours still stigmatise and exclude the poor.

Negative social values and attitudes towards the poor and poverty in high income countries also create downward pressure on the level of aid monies going to low income countries. For example, a household survey of public attitudes towards poverty in developing countries commissioned in 2006 by DFID in the UK echoed, at a global level, negative and paternalistic perceptions of recipients of aid (Lader, 2007). On the positive side, over four fifths of respondents were concerned about poverty in developing countries, and 53% thought the UK government's commitment to poverty reduction in developing countries was too little. However, two

fifths of respondents agreed with the statement: 'some people have said that most aid to developing (poor) countries is wasted', generally blaming developing countries themselves for wasting aid, through corruption (76%) and inefficiency (46%). The most popular policy to help countries with corrupt governments was putting strict conditions on how the money was spent.

The impact of cultural and symbolic exclusionary processes is not confined to attitudes towards the poor. Operating through formal legalised and institutionalised systems as well as informally, these processes devalue and undermine the cultures and voices of indigenous peoples around the globe. They are contributing to the displacement of millions, rendering many stateless and condemning them to live in extreme poverty and constant fear with limited if any rights (Popay et al., 2008). Economic, cultural and symbolic exclusionary processes are together fuelling an unprecedented growth in the numbers of people without citizenship. These include refugees in countries with no asylum legislation; the displaced; failures in the birth registration system; and illegal immigrants. 'Non-citizens' implicitly do not exist in the eyes of social institutions and are not in a position to make claims to human rights, social protection or public services. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that at the end of 2005, the number of people with 'official' refugee status or protected or assisted by the UNHCR because they were at risk stood at 21 million. A year later this had increased by 56% to 32.9 million (UNHCR, 2007).

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has made a major contribution to understanding the nature of exclusionary processes in both developed and less economically developed countries (LEDCs) drawing particular attention to the significance of fundamental civil and political rights (Figueiredo and Gore, 1997). In many countries of the South, particularly those still struggling to free themselves from the negative legacies of their colonial past, political exclusion remains a powerful constraint on people's participation in formal institutions. Importantly, the contours of political exclusion are frequently mapped onto and reinforce patterns of cultural discrimination and stigmatisation.

#### ***4. 4 Social exclusion and other relational concepts***

Social exclusion is one of a number of relational 'lens' used by social scientists to make sense of patterns of social differentiation and inequalities. Notable others include gender, social class, religion, caste and ethnicity and all are complex and contested. Arguably, at the very least there are important overlaps between the social realities these concepts seek to describe; the particular contribution of social exclusion may be to focus attention on to the interaction and impact of multiple exclusionary processes.

Participants at a recent Round Table on social exclusion (UNDP, 2007a), mostly drawn from the UNDP and other UN agencies, highlighted the unequal power relationships underlying poverty, and the experiences of

exclusion of non-citizens, migrant workers and indigenous groups (for example the Janajati in Nepal and the Roma in Eastern Europe) and of stigmatised groups (for example the Dalits in India and Burakumin in Japan). They acknowledged that the concept of 'social inclusion' may be double-edged for ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities and indigenous peoples, with the potential for states to adopt policies of forcible displacement or assimilation that eradicate cultural differences. Minority groups often seek recognition of equal rights, including recognition of diversity<sup>2</sup>. Women and children were identified as being particularly vulnerable to exclusion, due to their weak economic and political power and lack of status in their communities, violence against women, increased HIV/AIDS vulnerability, and their exposure to ritual exclusion (eg women who refuse genital mutilation or rites of widowhood in the Cameroun).

The UNDP round table participants identified failure on the part of states to address exclusion based on caste, ethnicity, gender and geography as one of the causes of conflict. Examples of groups resisting discrimination by violent action include the Maoist people in Nepal, conflict in Sudan, and action by militant youths in the Niger delta, where the poorest and most excluded indigenous groups have had no share in the benefits of natural resources exploited by oil companies and the state (Mathieson et al. 2008). An estimated three-quarters of the world's conflicts have an ethnic or religious dimension, most often linked to exclusion from economic or political opportunities and/or suppression of cultural identity.

The insistence by some commentators to distinguish between causal processes underpinning different axes of social differentiation is linked in part to the earlier discussion of the diverse meanings attaching to social exclusion. Beall (2002), for example, adopting a definition reflecting the European origins of the concept, argues that experiences under apartheid in South Africa are best understood as racial oppression, exploitation and denial of citizenship rights rather than social exclusion. In contrast, she suggests, social exclusion is primarily speaking to class based divisions driven by economic processes and labour market dynamics and hence is more relevant to understanding the genesis of inequalities in post-apartheid urban South Africa where:

'... new forms of capitalist production and changes in employment in Johannesburg, associated with the rise in importance of the service sector, have begun to erode the entrenched correspondence between racial and class divisions that characterized racial economic development and employment patterns during much of the apartheid era. The new socially excluded residents of Johannesburg are not only those who are black but also white who

---

<sup>2</sup> Following many years of lobbying by indigenous and non-indigenous people, on 13 September 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which although non-binding, sets out the individual and collective rights of indigenous peoples and prohibits discrimination.

are superfluous to the requirements of the global economy and Johannesburg's place in it' (2002:49).

Concerns about the relationship between different dimensions of social differentiation and inequality and the relative salience of different causal processes are important. The concept of social exclusion has considerable analytical potential to enhance understanding and inform policy/action. It focuses attention simultaneously on the complex causal processes driving poverty and disadvantage and on the multidimensional nature of the experience or outcome of these processes. However, the insights provided by the social exclusion 'lens' cannot replace those provided by the lens of gender, ethnicity, caste, age, disability and so on. Only taken singly and in combination will the understanding provided by these concepts make the maximum contribution to achieving more equitable and cohesive societies and global systems.

#### **4.6 Key points: the processes of exclusion**

A relational approach to defining social exclusion that focuses on multidimensional, dynamic, processes embedded in unequal power relationships has 'investigative advantage' in understanding the causes and consequences of poverty and deprivation.

These processes operate and interact across economic, social, political and cultural dimensions, through social relations within and between individuals, communities, institutions, nation states and global regions. A focus on exclusionary processes can:

- Highlight the impacts of economic and social transformation driven by relational and institutional power differentials;
- Reveal linkages between processes associated with globalisation and local exclusionary dynamics;
- Illuminate the active and passive exclusionary processes arising from public policy;
- Expose the role of cultural and symbolic processes as drivers of exclusion stigmatising the poor and other population groups, restricting human, civil, political and cultural rights and constraining capacity for collective action.

In theory the concept of social exclusion has considerable analytical potential. It can focus attention onto the interaction between multiple exclusionary processes operating across systems of social stratification associated with gender, ethnicity, caste, religion, social class etc. However, insights provided by the social exclusion 'lens' are complementary to these other relational lens rather than providing an alternative way of conceptualising these.

## **5. Alternative and parallel discourses**

'...the concept of social exclusion as it originated in Western Europe, seems to have played a role in the re-opening of old debates and discussions... under new terminology' (Saith, 2001:10)

### **5.1 Which alternative discourses?**

As Saith highlights, debates surrounding the concept of social exclusion have echoes in and to some extent have replaced older debates. In the previous section important overlaps with debates about the nature and causes of inequalities associated with major axes of social differentiation notably gender, race/ethnicity, caste, age and ability/disability, were discussed. It was noted that the particular feature of the social exclusion lens is that it focuses attention on the role played by relationships between individuals, groups and whole nations, and particularly differential power embedded in these relationships, in the generation of poverty and inequality. In addition to overlaps with other relational concepts there are therefore important links with more proximal concepts – concepts which may have greater policy/action salience than social exclusion in some parts of the world. Poverty is clearly the most obvious alternative concept from this perspective but there are others: basic needs, sustainable development, social cohesion, social capital, etc. We have chosen to focus here on just two alternative discourses – poverty and social capital - partly because they are the most proximal to social exclusion but also because these discourses and their relationship to social exclusion are arguably the most contentious.

### **5.2 Poverty, vulnerability, capability and human development**

The concept of poverty is fast evolving, and when broadened to incorporate notions of relativity, vulnerability and capability deprivation, it tends to dovetail with thinking about social exclusion. Notwithstanding this common ground, most commentators would argue that the concepts of poverty and social exclusion are not synonymous.

Poverty was long conceptualised in absolute terms typically in terms of a minimum consumption basket to meet an individual's basic needs (Rowntree, 1901). It has more recently been redefined in relative terms, placing emphasis on the distribution of income and wealth in a society. There has been a corresponding move from defining an absolute poverty line - denoting a minimum standard of living that is similar in any country at any time - to a relative poverty line, set for example as a proportion of the national average income at a point in time.

Peter Townsend's landmark work in the UK was instrumental in this re-conceptualisation of poverty, establishing a set of resources, in the form of goods and services, governing standards of living, and moving towards a multidimensional, relative, definition of poverty. He also includes social participation – another relational concept - as a resource necessary to avoid poverty and its consequences.

'Individuals... can be said to be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they belong' (Townsend, 1979:31).

This relative concept of poverty is now prevalent in many countries in South and North America, Western Europe and Australasia. In the UK it was recently reiterated by the newspaper columnist Polly Toynbee: 'To be poor is to fall too far behind what most ordinary people have in your own society' (Toynbee, 2006). And it has gained credence to the right of the political spectrum in the UK: whereas in the past Conservative administrations have tended to dismiss relative poverty as reflecting no more than unavoidable, almost natural, inequalities in society (Beresford et al., 1999), in 2006 the Conservative Party leader David Cameron was quoted as saying: "Even if we are not destitute, we still experience poverty if we cannot afford things that society regards as essential" (Cameron, 2006). Measures of poverty in the UK, the EU and many other countries are consistent with this conceptualisation (for example, in the UK, poverty is assessed against low-income thresholds linked to contemporary median incomes).

As noted in earlier sections whilst some Northern Hemisphere commentators have voiced a concern at the way in which the discourse of social exclusion is decentring poverty discourses, others have focused on the additional benefits of the exclusion 'lens'. From an Anglo-Saxon poverty tradition, Matt Barnes (2005:15) has attempted to draw distinctions between poverty, deprivation and social exclusion. In his schema, and in contrast to poverty and deprivation, the concept of social exclusion 'evokes a multi-dimensional notion of participation in society, involving a combination of physical, material, relational and societal needs, over a period of time' (Barnes, 2005:16). This approach echoes Estivill's suggestion (2003:21) that: 'if poverty is a photograph, exclusion is a film'.

**Table 1: Comparison of poverty, deprivation and social exclusion**

<b>Poverty</b>	<b>Deprivation</b>	<b>Social exclusion</b>
One-dimensional	Multi-dimensional	Multi-dimensional
Physical needs	Physical needs Material needs	Physical needs Material needs Societal participation
Distributional	Distributional	Distributional Relational
Static	Static	Dynamic
Individual Household	Individual Household	Individual Household Community

Source: Barnes (2005)



However, whilst social exclusion has become the dominant inequality discourse in Europe and Latin America this is not necessarily the case around the globe. In other regions, notably South East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa the discourse of poverty, defined in both absolute and relative terms and extending to include notions of vulnerability, basic needs, capabilities, resource enhancement and sustainable human development and have greater policy/action relevance and salience. This is discussed in other SEKN documents and the SEKN's final report (Popay, et al. 2008; Rispel et al. 2007; Johnston et al. 2008).

Not-with-standing the pioneering work of scholars such as Peter Townsend, euro-centric approaches to defining and measuring poverty and deprivation have been criticised from a development perspective for placing too much emphasis on income disadvantage. For example, Robert Chambers (1997) on the basis of participatory research with people experiencing poverty and disadvantage in Africa, Asia and Latin America, emphasises the notion of *vulnerability*, which he defines as exposure to risk and shocks, and *defencelessness*, or the lack of means to cope without damaging loss. As Chambers (1997:45) argues:

'Deprivation as poor people perceive it has many dimensions, including not only lack of income and wealth, but also social inferiority, physical weakness, disability and sickness, vulnerability, physical and social isolation, powerlessness and humiliation ... In practice, much of this wide spectrum of deprivation and ill-being is covered by the common use of the word poverty... [However] poverty is then defined as low income, or often as low consumption, which is more easily and reliably measured. Surveys are carried out and poverty lines constructed. This limits much of the analysis of poverty to the one dimension that has been measured'.

Castel also focuses on the notion of 'vulnerability' pointing to need for a better understanding of the trajectory of groups and individuals along a 'continuum of vulnerable situations' (Castel, 1998: 129). In Castel's formulation vulnerability is not understood as an individual weakness, but as a range of situations that human groups share but the resources and capabilities to avoid or escape them is unequally distributed. Minujin similarly proposes a *continuum* from inclusion to exclusion characterised by increasing vulnerability (Minujin, 1998: 176-187).

Of particular relevance at a global level is the notion of *human development*: the process of enlarging people's choice by expanding human capabilities and functioning. This understanding of the common global development challenge regardless of GDP has been promoted by the UNDP, inspired by Amartya Sen's work on *capabilities*:

'At all levels of development the three essential capabilities for human development are for people to lead long and healthy lives, to be knowledgeable and to have a decent standard of living. If these basic capabilities are not achieved, many choices are simply

not available and many opportunities remain inaccessible. But the realm of human development goes further: essential areas of choice, highly valued by people, range from political, economic and social opportunities for being creative and productive to enjoying self-respect, empowerment and a sense of belonging to a community' (UNDP, 2007b).

The UNDP's first Human Development Report published in 1990 introduced the Human Development Index (HDI) which incorporates Sen's three 'essential' capabilities. Since then three other indices have been developed, including a Human Poverty Index (HPI). These are described in section 6.6 below.

In contrast to the UNDP's broad conceptualisation of poverty as deprivation in elements essential for human life, the World Bank uses a reductionist monetary figure of \$US 1 a day to define absolute poverty. This measure is now widely adopted by international agencies although it fails to take account of social needs and local complexity. Indeed, the first of the eight Millennium Development targets is to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than \$US 1 a day, using a 1993 measure of purchasing power parity (PPP) to adjust for differences in prices between countries. In developing countries, measures of poverty generally reflect an absolute approach relying on calculation of the costs of a 'basket' of basic needs.

### **5.3 Social exclusion and social capital**

Social capital, like social exclusion, is a contested concept which has received much attention in recent years. It has been described as a relational concept, concerned with 'identifying the nature and extent of social relationships' (Szreter and Woolcock, 2004:650). Whereas the conceptual literature linking social exclusion to health is limited, social capital has been widely theorised as a mediating link between socio-economic inequality and health, building on Richard Wilkinson's influential book, *Unhealthy Societies* (1996). There has also been extensive empirical research in this area, the interpretation of which is a subject of ongoing debate (see section 8 of this paper).

Robert Putnam, one of the key advocates of the concept, defines social capital as: 'features of social organisation such as networks, norms and trust' (Putnam, 1993). Types of networks range from the informal (family, friends, neighbours) to the formal (sports clubs, civic associations); norms are 'those unstated rules or standards that often govern actions during informal or spontaneous social relations' (Hean et al., 2004); and trust has been defined as 'belief in the goodwill and benign intent of others' (Kawachi et al, 1997).

Putnam (1993, 2000) sees social capital as the social infrastructure ('wires') that enables individuals to gain access to resources. Viewed at a relational level, social capital is thus for Putnam the property of individuals, but only by virtue of group/community membership. In

contrast, network scholars, notably James Coleman (1988), argue that social capital refers to the resources that flow through networks (for example, material resources, willingness of network members to offer assistance, information): i.e. the electricity rather than the wires themselves.

Bourdieu (1986) a French socialist and sociologist writing from a radically different theoretical and political position to Putnam, also defines social capital in terms of networks but emphasises their role in the constitution and maintenance of hierarchical class relations and social and economic inequalities. This is part of his account of different forms of capital (economic, cultural, social and symbolic) and their interrelationships. According to Virginia Morrow (2002:11), 'Bourdieu is primarily concerned with how economic capital underpins these other forms, how forms of capital interact with wider structures to reproduce social inequalities, and how the day-to-day activities of social actors draw upon and reproduce structural features of wider social systems'.

Much of the empirical research on social capital has been underpinned by the Putnam approach to understanding the concept. In this context, the unit of analysis to which the concept can be applied is contentious. While some neo-classical economists see social capital as the property of individuals, others, including the neo-conservative Francis Fukuyama (1995) see it as a characteristic of spatially defined communities ranging from villages to entire societies. It has been suggested that communities possessing high levels of social capital may obtain benefits including faster economic development, better government and improved health. However, most commentators recognise that social capital can be associated with either good or bad outcomes: the purposes for which resources are used being analytically and practically distinct from how they are obtained. Thus high levels of social capital may be associated with criminal and 'terrorist' activity, corruption and nepotism and/or social control, blocking the access of 'out-groups' to 'community' resources.

Conventionally, within the Putnamesque approach, two types of social capital have been identified: 'bonding' social capital, referring to relations between members of a group or network who share a common identity; and 'bridging' social capital, which transcends these divides (for example, of age, ethnicity, class), through participation in associational activity. More recently, a third dimension, 'linking' social capital, has been introduced, defined by Szreter and Woolcock (2004:655) as 'norms of respect and networks of trusting relationships between people who are interacting across explicit, formal or institutionalized power or authority gradients in society'. Linking social capital, according to Szreter and Woolcock (2004:656), is: 'particularly relevant for the effective implementation of measures to assist the ill, poor, and the 'socially excluded'. For example, they argue that without relationships of trust and respect between those involved in delivering public services and 'the poor', these measures are unlikely to succeed. Szreter and Woolcock conclude that a three-dimensional conceptualisation of social capital:

'places great emphasis on both the quality and quantity of relationships between all citizens. It also places emphasis on whether or not these relationships are founded on mutual respect between people, differentiated either horizontally by their varying social identities or vertically by their access to different levels of power and authority' (Szreter and Woolcock, 2004:663).

It has been argued that much empirical research on social capital has suffered from a lack of theoretical clarity (Hean et al., 2004) and attempts at measurement reflect the conceptual debates described above. Criticisms include: a preponderance of indicators that reflect the same 'elasticity' with which the term 'social capital' is used in different disciplines and approaches; a lack of clarity about the choice of unit of analysis or level for measurement (e.g. individual, aggregate, or community); over-reliance on self-reports; a large number of potentially omitted variables; and problems with the transferability and appropriateness of survey instruments to different geographic contexts and disciplinary realms. Blaxter argues that these problems have implications for the study of the putative relationship between social capital and health because:

'...there is a tendency to define as social capital whatever social indicators best predict health status. This becomes tautologous: social capital promotes good health, but is at the same time defined by those things known to be health promoting' (Blaxter, 2004:15).

In part because of these measurement difficulties, there are conflicting views on the relationship between social capital and health outcomes. For example, whilst Szreter and Woolcock, (2004:65) claim that the 'specific research connecting social capital to health outcomes via a social support mechanism is vast', Muntaner (2004:765), argues that 'the health effects of social capital cannot be taken for granted and in spite of some promising findings, the burden of proof is still on the 'social capital' hypothesis'. Morgan and Swann (2004:190), in the conclusion of their secondary analysis of surveys relating to social capital and health conclude that 'the positive relationships that have been found are only true for some indicators of social capital and vary according to the health outcome of interest. Moreover, while some independent effects have been found, social capital has less power to predict health than other more familiar indicators of socio-economic status'.

Swann and Morgan (2002:6) have also reviewed qualitative research on social capital to 'look beneath the surface at the hard-to-measure processes and actions of people's relationships to others, at community structures, and the 'life' of communities and networks'. This review identified a number of barriers to the acquisition and utilisation of 'social capital', including differential power and the experience of disempowerment, social identity, rights and aspects of place. Attempts have also been made to observe community relationships and norms directly.

At a general level, the utility of the Putnam approach to defining the concept of social capital has been criticised because of its foundation in the liberal traditions of utilitarianism and individualism (Skocpol, 1996; Hernández et al., 2001). From this perspective it is the notion of 'capital' available for individual roots - with its root in economics - that is the problem, notwithstanding the focus on personal relationships and voluntary association. These commentators challenge the assumption that "values" related to mutual trust and reciprocity will generate individual wealth and make for successful societies and criticise attempts to create hierarchies of societies based on the level of social capital (Inglehart, 1997). These approaches, it is argued, fail to recognise that conflict and power relationships do not necessarily lead to social failure and that voluntary relationships and the action of voluntary associations are not necessarily freely chosen but may result from potentially invisible pressure from states and institutions (Hernández et al., 2001:21-23).

Recent approaches to using the concept of social capital in research and policy has also been criticised for distracting from more pressing economic and political issues. For example, Muntaner (2004:677) has argued that: 'the political use of social capital outside public health leans towards tolerance for social inequality and against egalitarian social change'. He adds that an emphasis on the measurement of 'social capital', to the detriment of data reflecting political and economic processes, can lead to 'pseudo explanations' where:

'Crime, isolation, drug use, broken windows, sexually transmitted diseases and other diseases are seen as the outcome of some intrinsic deficiency of the community' (Muntaner, 2004: 678).

There are then major controversies surrounding the value of social capital as a conceptual lens through which to understand the nature and consequences of social relationships at micro, meso and macro levels within societies - controversies that mirror those surrounding the concept of 'social exclusion'. A pre-requisite for any analysis of the relationship between these two concepts is clarity of theoretical and ideological position and definition. Thus, for example, Putnam sees social capital as associated with social benefits or social problems - and hence as potentially a focus of social policy. Bourdieu on the other hand uses the concept as part of his social theory of inequality and does not develop it as a single cause of social ills or argue that policy should seek to impact on it specifically as distinct from social inequalities in general. Putnam's neo-Durkheimian perspective on social capital aligns itself most obviously with Levitas' SID discourse, and Silver's 'solidarity' paradigm, described in section 3. Bourdieu's analysis is closer to radical redistributionist interpretations of social exclusion, drawing on conflict theory, as exemplified by Silver's 'monopoly' paradigm and Beall's transformationalist approach. A three-dimensional conceptualisation of social capital goes some way towards exploring links between micro- and macro-sociological phenomena, but falls short of the 'integrated analysis of institutions' that Sen (2000) sees as essential to a relational approach to social exclusion; neither does it take full account of the dynamic structural aspects of global exclusionary processes. In summary, as

Levitas cautions (2006:136): 'the conceptual background and political implications of 'exclusion from social relations' and 'social capital' are not the same', and care should be taken to avoid defining, measuring, and interpreting them interchangeably.

### 5.3 Key points: alternative and parallel discourses

This section has considered concepts that may act as alternatives to social exclusion as 'lens' through which to understand and act on social inequalities. Poverty and social capital have been selected for attention here as the most proximal concepts and arguably the most contentious. There are other concepts which might have been considered including, for example, human rights, basic needs and sustainable development.

The conceptualisation and measurement of poverty and related notions of vulnerability and capability deprivation, have become increasingly sophisticated in recent decades. It is now widely accepted that poverty is relative (defined in terms of a particular spatial, cultural and temporal context) and multi-dimensional, encompassing lack of social as well as material resources. However, in contrast to the notion of 'social exclusion', contemporary measures of poverty tend to be restricted to distributional (rather than relational) resources, and to focus on the individual and household levels.

Whilst poverty continues to dominate the policy agenda in many low income countries/regions, eurocentric conceptual approaches have been challenged, in particular through Chambers' work on *vulnerability* and Sen's work on *capabilities*. In response to such critiques, since 1990, the UNDP has produced the *Human Development Index*, a composite measure of life expectancy, educational attainment and income, and more recently, a Human Poverty Index which adopts a relative rather than absolute approach. In contrast, the World Bank promotes an absolute measure of poverty and continues to set the extreme poverty line at \$US1/day. Despite criticisms that this level is now out of step with increases in commodity prices/costs of living and should be increased to \$2 per day at a minimum, it is still widely adopted by policy makers focused on international poverty reduction targets e.g. Millennium Development Goals.

*Social capital* is a relational concept which, like social exclusion, has received much attention in recent years and is highly contested. Leading theories differ as to the nature, role and benefits of social capital. The operationalisation and measurement of social capital reflects these controversies including: a lack of theoretical and definitional clarity; contested choices of indicators and levels of measurement; reliance on self-reports; and limited transferability.

In contrast to social exclusion, the relationship between social capital (defined in terms of relationships of trust and reciprocity) and population health/health inequalities has been widely theorised and is the subject of extensive empirical study. Research linking social capital to health outcomes is controversial whilst qualitative research has highlighted

barriers to the acquisition of social capital in disadvantaged communities. More generally, the concept within the Putnamesque approach is criticised as emanating from the liberal traditions of utilitarianism and individualism, and for distracting attention for the political and economic causes of inequalities.

A pre-requisite for any analysis of the relationship between 'social exclusion' 'poverty' and/or 'social capital' is clarity of ideological and theoretical position and definition. Care should be taken to avoid defining, measuring, and interpreting these concepts interchangeably.

## References

- Almeida-Filho, N. & Silvapaim, J. (1999). La crisis de la salud pública y el movimiento de la salud colectiva en Latinoamérica. *Cuadernos Médico Sociales* (Rosario), (75): 5-30.
- Appasamy, P., Guhan, S., Hema, R. et al. (1996). *Social exclusion from a welfare rights perspective in India*. International Institute of Labour Studies and United Nations Development Programme, Research Series 106, Geneva: ILO publications
- Arsenic Policy Support Unit (APSU) (2006). *Social Aspects of Access to Healthcare for Arsenicosis Patients*. Arsenic Policy Support Unit. Dhaka, Bangladesh.
- Atkinson, A.B. (1998). Social Exclusion, poverty and unemployment, in Atkinson, A.B. & Hills, J. (eds). *Exclusion, Employment and Opportunity*. CASE paper 4. London: London School of Economics
- Barnes, M. (2005). *Social Exclusion in Great Britain. An empirical investigation and comparison with the EU*. Aldershot: Ashgate
- Barry, B. (2002). Social exclusion, social isolation, and the distribution of income. In Hills, J., Le Grand, J., & Piachaud, D. (eds.) *Understanding social exclusion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Beall, J. Globalization and social exclusion in cities: framing the debate with lessons from Africa and Asia (2002). *Environment & Urbanization* 14(1): 41-51
- Benach, J., Muntaner, C., & Santana, V. (2007). *Employment Conditions and Health Equity. Final Report to the WHO Commission on the Social Determinants of Health from the Employment Conditions Knowledge Network* (ENCONET).
- Beresford, P., Green, D., Lister, R., & Woodard, K. (1999). *Poverty first hand: poor people speak for themselves*. London: CPAG
- Blane, D. (2000). The life course, the social gradient, and health. In Marmot, M. & Wilkinson, R.G. (eds.) *Social determinants of health*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Blaxter, M. (2004). Questions and their meanings in social capital surveys. In Morgan, A. & Swann, C. (eds.) *Social capital for health: issues of definition, measurement and links to health*. London: Health Development Agency
- Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In Richardson, J.G. (eds). *Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education*. New York: Greenwood Press



- Bowring, F. (2000). Social exclusion: limits of the debate. *Critical Social Policy*, 20, 307-30
- Breihl, J. (2003). *Epidemiología Crítica. Ciencia emancipadora e intercultural*. Buenos Aires: Universidad Nacional de Lanús; Lugar Editorial.
- Brunner, E., & Marmot, M. (2000). Social organisation, stress and health. In Marmot, M. & Wilkinson, R.G. (eds.) *Social determinants of health*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Burchardt, T., Le Grand, J., & Piachaud, C. (1999). Social exclusion in Britain 1991-1995. *Social Policy and Administration*. 33/3: 227-44
- Burchardt, T., Le Grand, J., & Piachaud, C. (2002). Degrees of exclusion: developing a dynamic, multidimensional measure, in Hills J, Le Grand J, Piachaud D. 2002. *Understanding social exclusion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Burchardt, T., & Vizard, P. (2007). *Definition of equality and framework for measurement: Final Recommendations of the Equalities Review Steering Group on Measurement*. CASE paper 120. London: LSE
- Byrne, D. (1999) *Social Exclusion*. Buckingham: Open University Press
- Cabrera, P. (2000). Introducción: exclusión, desviación, pobreza. En: Tezanos, F., Cabrera, P. *Miradas en el encuentro. Acortando distancias, construyendo realidades*, Madrid: RAIS:17-21
- Cameron, D. (2006). Quoted by Thompson I. in 'Is Poly Toynbee really the new guru?' The Guardian, 25/11/2006
- Castel, R. (1997) [1995]. *Las metamorfosis de la cuestión social. Una crónica del salariado*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Castel, R. (1998). La lógica de la exclusión. In Bustelo, E. & Minujin, A. (eds.) *Todos entran. Propuesta para sociedades incluyentes*. Bogotá: UNICEF, Santillana: 119-160.
- Castel, R. (2004). *La inseguridad social. ¿Qué es estar protegido?* Buenos Aires: Manantial.
- Castells, M. (1998). *The end of the millennium*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Chamberlayne, P., Rustin, M., & Wengraf, T. eds. (2002). *Biography and social exclusion in Europe. Experiences and life journeys*. Bristol: Policy Press
- Chambers, R. (1997). *Whose reality counts? Putting the first last*. London: ITDG publishing
- Coleman, J. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. *American journal of sociology*. 94:S95-S120

- Commission on Social Determinants of Health (CSDH) (2006). *A conceptual framework for action on the social determinants of health. Discussion paper for the Commission on Social Determinants of Health. Draft.* Geneva: WHO
- Council of Europe (1998). *Fighting social exclusion and strengthening social cohesion in Europe.* Recommendation 1355, Parliamentary Assembly debate on 28 January 1998
- Crawhall, N. (2006). IPACC secretariat mission to Niger report. In *Report on West African regional conference of indigenous peoples of the Sahara and Sahel.* Agadez, Niger, 20-25 February 2006, available: [www.ipacc.org.za](http://www.ipacc.org.za)
- Curran, C., Burchardt, T., Knapp, M., McDaid, D. & Bingley, L. (2007). Challenges in multidisciplinary systematic reviewing: a study on social exclusion and mental health policy. *Social policy and administration* 41 (3): 289-312
- Dahlgren, G. & Whitehead, M. (1993) *Tackling inequalities in health: what can we learn from what has been tried? Working paper prepared for the King's Fund International Seminar on Tackling Inequalities in Health, September 1993, Ditchley Park, Oxfordshire.* London: King's Fund
- Dahlgren, G. & Whitehead, M. (2006). *Levelling up (part 2): a discussion paper on European strategies for tackling social inequities in health.* Copenhagen: WHO regional office for Europe (Studies on social and economic determinants of population health, No.3).
- Davies, J.S. (2005). The social exclusion debate: strategies, controversies and dilemmas. *Policy studies* 26(1) 3-27
- Department of Social Security (DSS) (1999). *Opportunity for All: tackling poverty and social exclusion.* London: The Stationery Office
- Department for International Development (DFID) (2005). *Reducing poverty by tackling social exclusion. A policy paper.*
- Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) (2003). *United Kingdom National Action Plan on Social Inclusion 2003-05: the annexes.* London: Department for Work and Pensions  
<http://www.dwp.gov.uk/publications/dwp/2003/nap/>
- Dunn, S. (1999). *Creating accepting communities. Report of the MIND inquiry into social exclusion and mental health problems.* London: MIND publications
- Durkheim, E. (1895). *The rules of the sociological method*
- Elias, N. (1998) [1993]. Ensayo teórico sobre las relaciones entre establecidos y marginados. In Elias, N. *La civilización de los padres y otros ensayos.*

Compilación, presentación y traducción de Vera Weiler. Bogotá: Norma, Editorial Universidad Nacional: 79-138.

Esping-Andersen, G. (2000). *Fundamentos sociales de las economías postindustriales*. Barcelona: Ariel.

Estivill, J. (2003). *Concepts and strategies for combating social exclusion: an overview*. Geneva: International Labour Organisation

European Council (2000). *Fight against poverty and social exclusion – Definition of appropriate objectives*. Brussels, 30 November 2000  
[http://ec.europa.eu/employment\\_social/social\\_inclusion/objectives\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_inclusion/objectives_en.htm)

European Commission (2006). *Portfolio of overarching indicators and streamlined social inclusion, pensions and health portfolios*. Brussels

Fabian Society (2006). *Narrowing the gap. The final report of the Fabian Commission on life chances and child poverty*. London: Fabian Society

Figueroa, A., Altamirano, T., & Sulmont, D. (1996). *Social exclusion and inequality in Peru*. International Institute of Labour Studies and United Nations Development Programme, Research series 104, Geneva: ILO publications

Fleury, S. (1998). Política social, exclusión y equidad en América Latina. *Nueva Sociedad*, N° 156, Julio-Agosto: 1-25 (pdf version).

Fraser, N. (1997). Redistribución y reconocimiento. En: Fraser, N. *Iustitia Interrupta. Reflexiones críticas desde la posición 'postsocialista'*. Bogotá: Siglo del Hombre, Universidad de los Andes: 15-54.

Fraser, N. (2003). Redistribución, reconocimiento y exclusión social. In Departamento Administrativo de Bienestar Social (DABS) & Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Relaciones Internacionales, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana (eds.) *Inclusión social y nuevas ciudadanía. Condiciones para la convivencia y seguridad democráticas. Seminario Internacional. Memorias*. Bogotá: DABS, PUJ: 55-69.

Fukuyama, F. (1995). *Trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosperity*. New York: Free Press

García Roca, J (1998). *Exclusión social y contracultura de la solidaridad. Prácticas, discursos y narraciones*. Madrid: HOAC.

Gaviria, M., Laparra, M., and Aguilar, M. (1995). Aproximación teórica al concepto de exclusión. En: Álvarez-Uría, F. y otros. *Desigualdad y pobreza, hoy*. Madrid: Talasa: 133-200.

GES (Gabinet d'Estudis Socials) (1995). *Informe sobre a pobreza en Galicia*. Santiago de Compostela, Xunta de Galicia

- Gordon, D., Adelman, L., Ashworth, K., Bradshaw, J., Levitas, R., Middleton, S., Pantazis, C., Patsios, D., Payne, S., Townsend, P., & Williams, J. (2000). *Poverty and Social Exclusion in Britain*. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2000
- Gore, C. and Figueiredo, J.B. (eds.) (1997). *Social exclusion and anti-poverty policy: a debate*. International Institute for Labour Studies Research and United Nations Development Programme, research series 110. Geneva: International Labour Organisation publications
- Gough, J. & Eisenschitz A, with McCulloch A. (2006). *Spaces of social exclusion*. London: Routledge
- Graham, H. (2004). *Health inequalities: concepts, frameworks and policy*. Health Development Agency briefing paper. London: Health Development Agency
- de Haan, A. (2001). *Social Exclusion: enriching the understanding of deprivation*. World Development Report Forum on 'Inclusion, Justice and Poverty Reduction'.
- Hassan, M.M., Atkins, P.J., & Dunn, C.E. (2005). Social implications of arsenic poisoning in Bangladesh. *Soc Sci Med*. 61:2201-11
- Hean, S., Cowley, S., Forbes, A. & Griffiths, P. (2004). Theoretical development and social capital measurement. In Morgan, A. & Swann, C. *Social capital for health: issues of definition, measurement and links to health*. London: Health Development Agency
- Hernández, M. (2002). Reforma sanitaria, equidad y derecho a la salud en Colombia. *Cadernos de Saúde Pública*, 18 (4), Jul-Ago: 991-1001.
- Hernández, M. (2003). Neoliberalismo en salud: desarrollos, supuestos y alternativas. In Restrepo, D.I. (Ed) *La falacia neoliberal. Crítica y alternativas*. Bogotá: Vicerrectoría Académica y Sede Bogotá, Universidad Nacional de Colombia: 347-361
- Hernández, M., Obregón, D., Miranda, N. et al. (2002). *La Organización Panamericana de la Salud y el Estado colombiano: cien años de historia, 1902-2002*. Bogotá: OPS/OMS.
- Hernández, M., Ochoa, D., & Novoa, E. (2001). Del capital social a la construcción de lo público. *Trans, Revista de la Sede Bogotá*, N° 1: 10-41.
- Hills J, Le Grand J, Piachaud D. (2002). *Understanding social exclusion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- International Institute for Labour Studies (IILS) (1998). Annex I: issues for discussion. In: Figueiredo, J.B. & de Haan, A. eds. *Social exclusion: an ILO perspective*. International Institute for Labour Studies Research series 111. Geneva: International Labour Organisation
- Johnston, H. (2008). *Disentangling inequities in Bangladesh: A social exclusion and health analysis*. SEKN Background Paper 11, Dhaka, Bangladesh
- Juliano, D. (2001). Género y exclusión. In Valencia, A. (ed) *Exclusión social y construcción de lo público en Colombia*. Bogotá: Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Colombiana (CEREC), Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad del Valle: 27-50.
- Karikalan, I. (2002). Oorakali. In Basu, T. (eds) *Translating caste. Stories, essays, criticism*. New Delhi: Katha
- Kawachi, I., Kennedy, B.P., Lochner, K., & Prothrow-Smith, D. (1997). Social capital, income inequality and mortality. *American Journal of Public Health*. 87:1491-8
- Klein, N. (2001). The Unknown Icon. *The Guardian Weekend*, March 3 2001
- Krieger, N. (2003). Theories for social epidemiology in the twenty-first century. In Hofrichter, R. (ed.) *Health and social justice. Politics, ideology, and inequity in the distribution of disease. A public health reader*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
- Kronauer, M. (1998). Social exclusion and underclass – new concepts for the analysis of poverty. Pp 51-75. In Hans-Jurgen, A. (ed) *Empirical poverty research in a comparative perspective*. Ashgate: Aldershot
- Kuhn, T. (1970). *The structure of scientific revolutions. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Labonte, R., Blouin, C., Chopra, M., Lee, K., Packer, C., Rowson, M., Schrecker, T., & Woodward, D. (2007). *Towards Health-Equitable Globalisation: Rights, Regulations and Redistribution. Final Report of the Globalisation Knowledge Network to the WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health*.
- Lader, D. (2007). *Public attitudes towards development. Knowledge and attitudes concerning poverty in developing countries, 2006. A report on research using the Office for National Statistics Omnibus Survey produced by the Office for National Statistics on behalf of the Department for International Development*. London: Office for National Statistics
- Landman, T. (2006). *Human rights and social exclusion indicators: concepts, best practices, and methods for implementation*. University of Essex: Department of Government Human Rights Centre
- Lauthier, B. (2005). Una protección social mutualista y universal: condición para la eficacia de la lucha contra la pobreza. In Salama, P., Marques-Pereira,

J., Lauthier, B., Le Bonniec, Y., Rodríguez, O., Giraldo, C. *Sistemas de protección social: entre la volatilidad económica y la vulnerabilidad social*. Colección estudios sobre protección social, tomo 1. Bogotá: Centro de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo (CID), Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de Colombia: 95-154.

Le Bonniec, Y. (2005). Colombia: una apuesta aún incierta. In Salama, P., Marques-Pereira, J., Lauthier, B., Le Bonniec, Y., Rodríguez, O., Giraldo, C. *Sistemas de protección social: entre la volatilidad económica y la vulnerabilidad social*. Colección estudios sobre protección social, tomo 1. Bogotá: Centro de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo (CID), Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de Colombia: 158-176.

Lenoir, R. (1974). *Les exclus: un Français sur dix*. Paris: Le Seuil

Levitas, R. (1998). *The inclusive society? Social exclusion and new labour*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

Levitas, R. (2005). *The inclusive society? Social exclusion and new labour. Second edition*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

Levitas R. (2006). The concept and measurement of social exclusion. In Pantazis C, Gordon D & Levitas R (eds.) *Poverty and social exclusion in Britain. The millennium survey*. Bristol: Policy Press

Levitas, R., Pantazis, C., Fahmy, E., Gordon, D., Lloyd, E. & Patsios, D. (2007). *The multi-dimensional analysis of social exclusion*. Bristol Institute for Public Affairs, University of Bristol

Lister, R. (1990). *The exclusive society: citizenship and the poor*. London: CPAG

Mabbett, D. (2004). *Learning by numbers: the role of indicators in the social inclusion process*. Paper for the ESPAnet conference, Oxford, 9-11 September 2004

Madanipour, A. et al. (eds.) (1998). *Social exclusion in European cities. Processes, experiences and responses*. London: Jessica Kingsley

Mann, M. (1986). *The Sources of Social Power. Vol. I: A history of power from the beginning to A.D. 1760*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marmot, M. & Wilkinson, R.G. (eds.) (2006). *Social determinants of health. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Marshall, T.H. (1964). *Class, citizenship and social development*. New York: Doubleday.

Mathieson, J. Alhacen, A (Aghirin'man, Arlit) (2007). *Social exclusion in north Niger: A case study*. SEKN Background Paper 5, Lancaster, UK

McLean, C., Campbell, C., & Cornish, F. (2003). African-Caribbean interactions with mental health services in the UK: experiences and expectations of

exclusion as (re)productive of health inequalities. *Soc Sci Med* 56: 657-669

Miliband, D. (2006). *Social exclusion: the next steps forward*. Wetherby: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Publications.

Minujin, A. (1998). Vulnerabilidad y exclusión en América Latina. En: Bustelo, E., Minujin, A. (Editores) *Todos entran. Propuesta para sociedades incluyentes*. Bogotá: UNICEF, Santillana: 161-205.

Mkandawire, T. (2005). *Targeting and Universalism in Poverty Reduction*. Social Policy and Development Social Program Paper Number 23, Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Organización Panamericana de la Salud (OPS) (2003). *Exclusión en salud en países de América Latina y el Caribe*. Serie N° 1. Extensión de la Protección Social en Salud. Washington: OPS/OMS, Agencia Sueca para el Desarrollo Internacional (ASDI).

Morgan, A. & Swann, S. (2004). Where next for social capital research? In Morgan, A., & Swann, C. (eds.) *Social capital for health: issues of definition, measurement and links to health*. London: Health Development Agency

Morrow, V. (2002). Children's experiences of 'community': implications of social capital discourses. In Swann, C. & Morgan, A. (eds.) *Social capital for health: insights from qualitative research*. London: Health Development Agency

Muntaner, C. (2004). Commentary: social capital, social class and the slow progress of psychosocial epidemiology. *International Journal of Epidemiology*. 33:674-80

Murard, N. (2002). Guilty victims: social exclusion in contemporary France. In Chamberlayne, P., Rustin, M., & Wengraf, T. (eds.) *Biography and social exclusion in Europe. Experiences and life journeys*. Bristol: Policy Press

Murray, C. (1990). *The emerging British underclass*. London: Institute of Economic Affairs Health and Welfare Unit

Navarro, V. & Shi, L. (2001). The political context of social inequalities and health. *Int Journal of Health Services*. 31(1) 1-21

Navarro, V. (eds.) (2002) *The political economy of social inequalities. Consequences for health and the quality of life*. Baywood: Amityville

Navarro, V., Muntaner, C., Borrell, C., et al. (2006). Politics and health outcomes. *Lancet* 368:1033-7

- Organisation for Economic Cooperation and development (OECD) (1997). *Societal cohesion and a globalizing economy*. Washington DC: OECD, March 1997
- Palmer, G., MacInnes, T., & Kenway, P. (2006). *Monitoring poverty and social exclusion in the UK 2006*. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation [www.poverty.org.uk](http://www.poverty.org.uk), published by the New Policy Institute on behalf of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation
- Pantazis, C., Gordon, D., & Levitas, R. (eds.) (2006). *Poverty and social exclusion in Britain. The millennium survey*. Bristol: Policy Press
- Parr, H., Phil, C., & Burns, N. (2004). Social geographies of rural mental health: experiencing inclusions and exclusions. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 29 (4) 401-19
- Paugam, S. (1995). The spiral of precariousness: a multidimensional approach to the process of social disqualification in France. In Room, G. (ed.) *Beyond the threshold. The measurement and analysis of social exclusion*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Payne, S. (2006). Mental health, poverty and social exclusion. In Pantazis, C., Gordon, D. & Levitas, R. (eds.) Bristol: Policy Press
- Pierson, J. (2002). *Tackling Social Exclusion*. London: Routledge
- Popay, J., Williams, G. Thomas, C. and Gatrell, A. (1998). Theorising inequalities in health: The place of lay knowledge, *Sociology of Health and Illness* 20 (5), 619-644
- Popay, J., Escorel, S., Hernandez, M., Johnston, H., Mathieson, J., and Rispel, L. on behalf of the WHO Social Exclusion Knowledge Network (2008) *Understanding and tackling social exclusion; Final Report of the Social Exclusion Knowledge Network of the Commission on Social Determinants of Health*. Geneva with web link
- Prigogine, I. & Stengers, I. (1985). *Order out of chaos*. London: Flamingo
- Putnam, R. (1993). *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press
- Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling Alone. The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon and Schuster
- Rispel, L. Molomo, B. Dumela, S. (2007). *South African Case Study on Social Exclusion*. SEKN Background Paper 3, Johannesburg, South Africa
- Rodríguez, O. (2005). Avatares de la reforma del sistema de seguridad social, Ley 100 de 1993. En: Salama, P., Marques-Pereira, J., Lauthier, B., Le Bonniec, Y., Rodríguez, O., Giraldo, C. *Sistemas de protección social: entre la volatilidad económica y la vulnerabilidad social*. Colección estudios sobre protección social, tomo 1. Bogotá: Centro de Investigaciones para el



Desarrollo (CID), Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de Colombia: 177-231.

- Rodríguez, O. (2007).s *Las transformaciones teóricas y políticas del Banco Mundial: la antesala al Manejo Social del Riesgo*. Bogotá. Documento elaborado para el grupo Colombia del Nodo Regional Conjunto para América Latina de la Red de Conocimiento sobre Exclusión Social, Comisión de Determinantes Sociales de la Salud, Organización Mundial de la Salud (inédito).
- Room, G. et al. (1992). *Observatory on national policies to combat social exclusion. Second annual report*. Brussels: Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Industrial Relations, Commission of the European Communities
- Room, G. (1995). Poverty and social exclusion: the new European agenda for policy and research. In Room, G. (ed.) *Beyond the threshold. The measurement and analysis of social exclusion*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Rosanvallon, P. (1995). *La nueva cuestión social. Repensar el Estado providencia*. Buenos Aires: Manantial.
- Rowntree, S. (1901). *Poverty: a study of town life*. London: Longmans Green
- Saith, R. (2001). *Social exclusion; the concept and application to developing countries*. Working paper number 72. Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford
- Salama, P. (1999). *Riqueza y pobreza en América Latina. La fragilidad de las nuevas políticas económicas*. México: Universidad de Guadalajara, Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Salama, P. (2006). De la flexibilidad a la cohesión social, pasando por las finanzas. In Le Bonniec, Y., Rodríguez, O. (eds) *Crecimiento, equidad y ciudadanía. Hacia un nuevo sistema de protección social*. Colección Estudios sobre Protección Social, tomo 2. Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, Departamento Administrativo de Bienestar Social
- Schrecker, T. (2006). Personal communication
- Scokpol, T. (1996). Unravelling from above. *The American Prospect*, N° 25. En: <http://www.prospect.org/cgi-bin/printable.cgi>
- Sen, A. (2000). Social Exclusion: concept, application and scrutiny. Social Development papers 1. Asian Development Bank
- Seoane, J. (Comp.) (2004). *Movimientos sociales y conflicto en América Latina*. Buenos Aires: Agencia Sueca de Desarrollo Internacional (ASDI), Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO).

- Shaw, M., Dorling, D., & Davey Smith, G. (2006). Poverty, social exclusion, and minorities. In Marmot, M. & Wilkinson, R.G. (eds.) *Social determinants of health. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Silver, H. (1994). Social exclusion and social solidarity: three paradigms. *International Labour Review*. 133:531-78
- Silver, H. (2004). European Policies to Promote the Social Inclusion of Disadvantaged Groups: Lessons for Latin America. Pp. 135-76. In Buvinic, M. & Mazza J. (eds) *Social Inclusion: Latin America's Development Challenge*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, Inter-American Development Bank
- Silver, H. (2005). From Poverty to Social Exclusion: Lessons from Europe. Pp. 57-70. In Hartman, C. (eds.) *Poverty and Race in America: The Emerging Agendas*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books
- Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) (1997). *Social Exclusion Unit: Purpose, work priorities and working methods*. London: The Stationery Office
- South Australian Labor Party (2002). *Labor's social inclusion initiative: Labor's plans for government*.
- Spano, A. (2002). Female identities in late modernity. In Chamberlayne, P., Rustin, M., & Wengraf, T. (eds.) *Biography and social exclusion in Europe. Experiences and life journeys*. Bristol: Policy Press
- Stewart, F. (1998) La insuficiencia crónica del ajuste. In Bustelo, E. & Minujin, A. (eds) *Todos entran. Propuesta para sociedades incluyentes*. Bogotá: UNICEF, Santillana: 25-65.
- Swann, C. & Morgan, A. (2002). Introduction: Social capital for health: insights from qualitative research. In Swann, C. & Morgan, A. (eds) *Social capital for health: insights from qualitative research*. London: Health Development Agency
- Szreter S and Woolcock M (2004). Health by association: social capital, social theory and the political economy of public health. *International Journal of Epidemiology*. 33:650-67
- Tezanos, F. (1999). Tendencias de dualización y exclusión social en las sociedades tecnológicas avanzadas. Un marco para el análisis. En: Tezanos, F. (Editor) *Tendencias en desigualdad y exclusión social*. Madrid: Sistema.
- Townsend, P. (1979). *Poverty in the United Kingdom*. Harmondsworth: Penguin
- Townsend P. (1997). Redistribution: the strategic alternative to privatisation. In Walker, A. & Walker, C. (eds.) *Britain divided. The growth of social exclusion in the 1980s and 1990s*. London: CPAG

- Townsend, P. (2007) *The Right to Social Security and National Development: Lessons for OECD experience for low income countries*; Issues in Social Protection, Discussion Paper 18, International Labour Office
- Toynbee, P. (2006). *The Guardian*, 23 November 2006
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2007a). *Summary of the virtual round table on social exclusion*  
[www.hdr.undp.org/docs/nhdr/consolidated\\_replies/161.pdf](http://www.hdr.undp.org/docs/nhdr/consolidated_replies/161.pdf), accessed 3.10.07
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2007b). *Human Development Reports. Glossary of terms*. Available at:  
<http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/glossary/>
- United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) (2007). *2006 global trends: refugees, asylum-seekers, returnees, internally displaced and stateless persons*. Geneva: UNHCR
- Valencia, A (2001). Exclusión social y construcción de lo público en Colombia. In Valencia, A. (ed.) *Exclusión social y construcción de lo público en Colombia*. Bogotá: Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Colombiana (CEREC), Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad del Valle: 11-25.
- Veit-Wilson, J. (1998). *Setting adequacy standards*. Bristol: Policy Press
- Velásquez, F. (2001). Exclusión social y gestión urbana: a propósito de Cali. En: Valencia, A. (Editor) *Exclusión social y construcción de lo público en Colombia*. Bogotá: Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Colombiana (CEREC), Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad del Valle: 97-156.
- Watkins, K. (2006). *Human Development Report 2006. Beyond scarcity: power, poverty and the global water crisis*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan  
Available: <http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/indicators/>
- Watkins, K. (2007). *Human Development Report 2007/2008. Fighting climate change: human solidarity in a divided world*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan  
Available: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/>
- Wilkinson, R. (1996). *Unhealthy Societies: the afflictions of Inequality*. London: Routledge
- Wilkinson R.G., and Pickett, K.E. (2006). Income inequality and population health: a review and explanation of the evidence. *Social Science and Medicine* 62 1768-84
- Wolfensohn, J.D. (1997). *The challenge of inclusion*. Annual meetings address. Hongkong, 23 September 1997

**5**

## **Inclusive Education**

# 5

1. Clough, Peter, and Jenny. Corbett. 2000. "Routes to Inclusion: Introduction." Pp. 3-33 in *Theories of Inclusive Education: A Students' Guide*. London: Paul Chapman publishing.
2. European Agency for Special Needs and Inclusive Education. 2014. "Inclusive Education Benefits All." Pp. 11-15 in *Five Key Messages for Inclusive Education: Putting Theory into Practice*. Odense: European Agency for Special Needs and Inclusive Education.

# Introduction

---

## 'If only we had known then . . .'

PC: In 1978 I was working in a Special School, a school for kids with EBD . . . no, the point is that this was called a school for 'Maladjusted' kids. Can you imagine that now? I mean, this is only 20 years ago, and kids were called 'Educationally Sub-Normal' or – what? – 'Delicate', do you remember that . . . ?

Paul: . . . the categories . . .

PC: . . . 11? 12?

Felicity: When I teach this now – Warnock and the '81 Act, the whole history of how we got to where we are today – it's difficult to convey how actually radical, how really radical it was at the time . . .

Jane: Did it feel radical to us then? I don't remember feeling it then, but looking back, looking back's much clearer.

(MEd seminar, Sheffield, September 1998)

## *London, 1978*

The government commission chaired by Baroness Mary Warnock reported to the government on the findings of its official enquiry into special education (DES, 1978). It was wrong, said the report, to identify children by means of their 'handicap', and then to send them to schools organized to deal with just such 'categories'. Rather, the report went on, we should identify their *educational* difficulties and provide accordingly. And so the term *special educational needs* (SEN) entered UK legislation, its classrooms and – importantly – teachers' thinking. Strange to think that it was only in the last 20 or so years of the twentieth century that we began to speak of special educational needs. Until then the official terms included such as 'maladjusted' and 'sub-normal'. Warnock's committee started to change things.

Perhaps as many as one-fifth of the school population – said the report – might have a *Learning Difficulty* at some point, and for some variable time, in their school careers. Some of these difficulties would be so distinct

that the law would require an official *Statement* of the need they represented and – more importantly – a detailed prospectus of how these needs would be met. Thus a further term entered the jargon of educational difficulty and so the IEP – the *Individualized Education Plan* – became part of teachers' vocabulary. Many of Warnock's recommendations became law in the UK through the enactment of the Education Act 1981, and this legislation – together with Warnock's report – provide an essential hinge for this book.

### *Sheffield, 2000*

I choose the Warnock Report as my starting point in this overview of developments towards inclusion because it *was* evolutionary, but also has a peculiar contemporaneity for this book. For at the end of 1999, Mary Warnock announced: 'If only we had known then . . . The *statement* has been a disastrous mistake.' Reflecting on the effects of the committee's work, Warnock said:

looking back on the days of the committee, when everyone felt that a new world was opening for disadvantaged children, the most strikingly absurd fact is that the committee was forbidden to count social deprivation as in any way contributing to educational needs . . . The very idea of such a separation now seems preposterous.

(Warnock, 1999)

Of course, Warnock is herself a scholar – a philosopher at that – and might quite properly come to see earlier work as incomplete, or needing refinement. But, *disastrous? preposterous?* If Warnock is right in her assessment (admission even) – that the commission was wrong – then how ever should we justify the many thousands of experiences (of *statementing* and beyond) that characterize special education policy during the last 20 years?

That specific question is raised here to illustrate and emphasize two key points which are illustrated in this book: first, that

consensual ideas about who or what is 'special' change, sometimes rapidly; all such definitions belong to particular historical moments and are reflected in contemporary policies;

and, second, that:

individuals' ideas may change – sometimes radically – over the course of a career, and are in a dynamic relationship with policy contexts; this is to say that they may directly *influence*, as well as be *influenced by*, the development of policy.

### *Constructing difference and difficulty*

This was the first time in her short career that Steven's reception class teacher had had a child with a statement in her class. She was conscious that by choosing the inclusive option Steven's parents had accepted that he needed to interact with his peer group and not become, once more, dependent upon adults. She was reassured by the head that it was not a scenario of 'success or failure' and was given support to evaluate her own practice in a way which led her to believe that her established skills of providing a well structured and stimulating learning environment for all children were particularly relevant for Steven. She realised that it was her duty to attend not only to what was 'special' about Steven but also to what was 'ordinary' and that there was no mystique to analysing tasks. She was already doing this and making them accessible to all children, including children with learning difficulties.

(Herbert, 1998, p. 103)

Teachers, head teachers, parents make decisions about children and their difficulties, and behind every decision made in response to an instance of educational difficulty, there lie traditions of practice that more or less evidently affect outcomes. The decisions made by parents and teachers in the case discussed above by Herbert pointed to an outcome of *inclusive* practice. How an individual teacher, a department, a school, a local education authority (LEA) or service *constructs* both a problem and its solution is determined by their characteristic habits of interpretation. In the example above, Herbert draws attention to the transferable skills of a teacher of 5-year-olds to 'analyse skills' and present learning situations to children in ways which fit their own individual needs. It goes without saying that other interpretations may well be made, dependent upon experience and upon cultural determinants.

The sum of these various constructions of learning difficulty makes for a community with often diverse views on what 'special educational needs' are, and on how they should be met. Not all these views are made explicit as statements. They are more likely to be *inferred* from particular organizational structures: *this* LEA has closed nearly all its special schools, while *that* one is actually still building them; *this* school has a clear practice of withdrawal, while that one has subject-based learning-resource teams – of which the head teacher is a key member – and so on. But in each case these responses to educational difficulty express, if only implicitly, particular constructions of educational need.

This section of the book centres on the following questions:

- Where do the various 'constructions' of difficulty come from?
- How are they evidenced?
- How are they communicated?
- How are they challenged?
- How do they change?



We are all in some ways involved in this process of influencing and being influenced by people and events, which is a process of making history. Academic study in this area ought to start from a point of discovering and articulating *our own place* within the weave of ideas that make up policy and its realization in people's lives.

Most important of all, within the context of this book, is the question:

*Who changes constructions of educational need, of difference and of difficulty?*

The brief biographies in Section 2 will provide some insights into the life experiences, theories and practices of those who work as academics in the field of special educational need and inclusive education. But before glimpsing those more personal perspectives we need to be clear about terminology.

### *Exploring perspectives on inclusion*

The term 'inclusive education' has itself come to mean many different things which can in itself create confusion for students in this area. It is in fact a contestable term used to different effect by politicians, bureaucrats and academics. 'Inclusion' is not a single *movement*; it is made up of many strong currents of belief, many different local struggles and a myriad forms of practice. As bold moral and political rhetoric – the stuff of banners – the urge to inclusion is easily expressed in Western countries.

However, the notion of an inclusive society is at the same time difficult to contest in moral terms. As a basic tenet of belief, should not everybody have the same rights of access to education? Of course. But after the bold print of the banners, when decisions have to be made about how more precisely to spend public monies, general ideas of inclusion become entangled and infected with specific individual interests. It is often at this stage that what was intended to be a uniform platform may disintegrate into more fragmented demands for 'positive' discrimination – that is, for *unequal* treatment in respect of this or that group. The argument for absolute inclusion has yet to be won, let alone realized in practice.

It is at this point that the *process* of generating inclusive educational practices reaches to the heart of policy-making. What is established as policy must be concordant with what actually happens in schools, and in the lives of pupils. In this respect Len Barton has argued a major role for inclusive practices in education in order to realize wider changes in society:

Inclusion is a process. Inclusive education is not merely about providing access into mainstream school for pupils who have previously been excluded. It is not about closing down an unacceptable system of segregated provision and dumping those pupils in an unchanged mainstream system. Existing school systems – in terms of physical factors, curriculum aspects, teaching expectations and styles, leadership roles – will have to change. This is because inclusive education is about the participation of all children and young people and the removal of all forms of exclusionary practice.

(Barton, 1998, p. 85)

This emphasis on inclusion as a process – rather than a specific ideology or set of practices – is reflected in the shape and character of this present book, in which is assembled a great range of perspectives. The concern here is not to make judgements as to which approach may be morally superior or preferable, but rather to show how different ways of seeing ‘the broad picture’ will influence the detail of practice and provision. Not only are interpretations of what inclusion means contentious, but there are also diverse and conflicting debates in which these different approaches are seen as detrimental to the effective development of this area.

### **Theories of Inclusive Education: some key perspectives**

The organization of this book as a whole is based on the identification of a number of writers whose texts have been – in different ways, and at different times – significant in the development of inclusive educational practices. I have chosen to look at these writers and their work in relation to five ‘key perspectives’, a loose framework for analysis developed from a reading of the ‘Special’, ‘Integrative’ and ‘Inclusive’ literature, and – importantly – from other influences which might hitherto have been regarded as ‘mainstream’ developments.

This framework of perspectives is like a map of territory partly charted and partly known only as we travel through it. The history of 50 years ago is obviously easier to write than the history which is being made in this moment. In constructing this map I have drawn on existing analyses – for example of the ‘Individual’ and ‘Social’ models of disability (Oliver, 1988) which are broadly recognisable. Analysis of more recent developments, however, is much more speculative and will, undoubtedly, be challenged and revised.

Of course this is not the *only* way to analyse the development of such ideas. Lipsky and Gartner (1997), for example, describe the ‘evolution of ideas’ in the USA in terms of three ‘eras’:

- the era of institutions
- the era of deinstitutionalization

- the era of community membership.

In their review of the US literature they consider a series of 'Focal questions' in relation to each of the 'eras' they have identified. Their book *Inclusion and School Reform: Transforming America's Classrooms* (Lipsky and Gartner, 1997) discusses many of the issues raised in our book here, but the framework for analysis is different, thus illuminating different cultural perspectives on the evolution of inclusive ideas.

For the purposes of our book, the review of literature leads to the identification of five major perspectives (Figure 1.1). These perspectives are never wholly exclusive of each other, nor are they strictly chronologically sequential. The construction of the model in this way is intended to demonstrate three things:

- the historical influences which shape current views and practices
- the heterogeneity of inclusive ideology
- the ways in which researchers' ideas change and develop over a lifetime.

The presentation of these five perspectives in the sequence shown in Figure 1.1 conveys a particular view of the historical development of ideas and of practice. Of course, in practice nothing is so neat; ideas and

#### **The psycho-medical legacy**

This is understood as the system of broadly medicalized ideas which essentially saw the *individual* as being somehow 'in deficit' and in turn assumed a need for a 'special' education for those individuals.

#### **The sociological response**

This position broadly represents the critique of the 'psycho-medical legacy', and draws attention to a *social construction* of special educational needs.

#### **Curricular approaches**

Such approaches emphasize the role of the *curriculum* in both meeting – and, for some writers, effectively *creating* – learning difficulties.

#### **School improvement strategies**

This movement emphasizes the importance of systemic organization in pursuit of truly *comprehensive* schooling.


#### **Disability studies critique**

These perspectives, often from 'outside' education, elaborate an overtly political response to the exclusionary effects of the psycho-medical model.

**Figure 1.1** Five key perspectives on educational inclusion

practices sometimes converge, and at other times practices remain as the legacy of earlier conceptions and positions. I do not want to suggest that these positions are mutually exclusive; indeed, although there is something distinct about each of them, you will see that each one 'maps on to' the others in certain respects.

So the suggestion of a simple, linear development from one position to the next is to oversimplify the case. Rather, I want to show how there is always a dynamic relationship between the various perspectives. It would therefore be more realistic to consider the five as occupying – at times – the same ground but with different (sometimes *competing*) emphases and popularity. We might represent this development with the conceptualization in Figure 1.2.



**Figure 1.2** A historical interpretation of the development and interaction of ideologies leading to present thinking in inclusive education

*Note:* It must be emphasized that the five key influences as I discuss them in this section are all ever present, but certain perspectives have their 'moment' and Figure 1.2 sketches the 'arrival' of those moments within each perspective.

## Routes and perspectives

*Ann C:* I think that those of us in special, in Special Schools that is, we saw 'Preventing Classroom Failure'- that objectives approach as a lifeline at the time . . .

*PC:* Oh there's no doubt. Suddenly here was something with structure that you could actually . . .

*Trevor B:* You could actually use positively. I mean, there just was no such thing as the curriculum as we'd understand it now, we were all just . . . just doing our best, certainly, but flying without charts, I think.

*PC:* And the Ainscow stuff provided some of those charts? It did, it really did . . .

(Teacher INSET course, Sheffield, November 1999)

This book is prompted by our own experiences. I have worked through some 30 years of changing policies and practices in schools, and have seen at first hand how different periods were conditioned by different approaches – each with its own terminology and ways of doing things; each with its 'gurus' and key texts. One of the first conversations with Jenny Corbett – similar to the one above – was about how we had both come gratefully to seize on some of the objectives-driven materials which emerged in the late 1970s. From the vantage point of 2000 – with its different priorities and policies – such behaviourist work seems quaint at best. However, in the 1970s curriculum guidance in any institutional form of Special Education was scarce, and such highly programmatic schemes as *Preventing Classroom Failure* (Ainscow and Twedde, 1979) were a potentially rich resource in the curricular wasteland of Special Education. At this time, there was talk of how the school curriculum in general was a 'secret garden', to which only teachers held the key; and Phillip Williams commented that if indeed the ordinary curriculum had been a secret garden, then in Special Education that garden had been not only secret, 'but neglected, too' (Williams, 1985, p. vii).

In working some of the Routes to Inclusion in this section, I want to indicate the impossibility of thinking about inclusion without acknowledgement of the exclusive practices from which it is emerging. Raising the idea of a 'legacy' in this context emphasizes how there are certain ways of looking at learning difficulty which are inevitably handed down. Many of these have been shaped by traditions of medical and psychological practice going back 100 years and more. Some of these traditions are still felt in the structure and culture of our institutions, for example in the language that we use and the attitudes to difference that it reflects (Corbett, 1996). Other traditions emanate from a religious – if not biblical – view of difference and *de/formity* as ills to be cured. The 'legacy', therefore, of the medical model of disability is one which constructs disability as a problem to be solved or contained with procedures tried

and tested much as medical remedies; a parallel structure exists in the 'psycho-medical' response to learning difficulties.

### *The psycho-medical legacy*

When we hear talk of the 'psychological' or 'medical' model, the terms suggest both a conformity of definition and an easily identifiable use and practice. But in reality there is no such orthodoxy in either term, and they have little meaning unless understood alongside the 'social' (or other) model which provides a critique of them.

It is important to understand, though, that while the terms may not have a distinct *conceptual* identity, their use does strongly imply an *operational* meaning. To talk of a 'medical' model in the context of learning difficulties is to point to practices which call on pathology (that is, a science of *disease*). Figure 1.3 points up some of the features of a medical practice.

It is a truism that 'special' education owes its origins – and, its critics would say, its shortcomings – to the development of a *pathology of difference*, first through medical, then, later, through psychological enquiry.

It is, after all, less than 40 years since clinic-based assessments were prevalent; typically, those involving school doctors, psychiatrists and, to a lesser extent, educational psychologists. Assessment was mostly carried out in one session, when normative testing – particularly full-scale intelligence tests – would be accompanied by 'projective' testing of personality. The chief purpose of this testing was simple: it was to determine whether the child required transfer to a special school of a particular category.

In the early 1970s there was a significant expansion in the training and deployment of psychologists, and a complementary shift of focus from clinic to school, where 'remedial' services practised degrees of 'withdrawal' from the classroom for additional help with basic skills. Educational psychologists started to rely less on 'global' scores of IQ, and rather on specific sub-tests of the Weschler Intelligence Scales, the Illinois

#### The 'medical model'

*focuses on*  
sickness

aetiology of the problem  
subject-specific pathology  
specific treatment  
reactive measures

*rather than*  
health

experience of the individual  
environmental factors  
holistic support  
preventative measures (etc.)

Source: adapted from Bailey, 1998, p. 49

Figure 1.3 Some characteristics of the 'medical model'

Test of Psycholinguistic Abilities, or the Frostig Test of Visual Perception. As Williams (1990) points out, results of such batteries of testing were 'related to educational programmes designed to "strengthen" the cognitive or perceptual deficits assumed to underpin the particular subtests' (*ibid.*, p. 1026).

But this sort of assumption of a direct link between the 'training up' of individual deficit and consequent educational progress was not borne out in evidence as Ysseldyke (1987), among others, pointed out. For all this, such moves nevertheless represented an important shift in the development of educational assessment as importantly linked with intervention strategy. Some of Wedell's work, for example, during this period exemplifies a use of quasi-experimental hypothesis-testing leading to systematic intervention (Wedell, 1970).

But at the heart of these approaches was a view of the individual child as somehow deficient. Now although this deficit could be located and described by psychometric testing, its identification was made almost exclusively 'within' the child and not in the context of instruction. No connection is implied between the nature and presentation of a given task, on the one hand, and the child's performance of it, on the other. Today this seems an obvious shortcoming. But in the context of the 1960s (and to some extent 1970s) there was little or no apparent recognition of this in practice, for the curriculum was not as it is understood today. Nor were processes of learning articulated in the ways in which they have been in the later years of the twentieth century.

Before the term 'integration' was introduced formally in the 1978 Warnock Report and the subsequent legislation of 1981, some positive examples of integrative if not inclusive practices were developing. These could often be found within hospital settings and in the work of educational psychologists. Both Klaus Wedell and Peter Mittler, for example, might be seen to be exploring, in their separate and different ways, the routes to integration in their work of the late 1950s and early 1960s, long before the term 'special educational needs' was conceived.

In his work in Bristol, Wedell was encouraging hearing-impaired children from a segregated unit to join in mainstream classroom activities. Of this work, Wedell said (some 40 or so years later):

I wasn't thinking of being inclusive. It was just that that was what I felt education was about then. One of the things I have always been concerned about is that *kids themselves should as far as possible be able to decide*. Later on we saw some videos of kids with severe physical disabilities who were integrated. Some of the kids that were integrated were marvellously sociable and the teachers were marvellous and the kids were marvellous but [the school] couldn't provide the physio[therapist]. If you saw the video . . . the kids were actually becoming less dependent but I also had to ask myself 'Who's being God, in making decisions for these kids? What is most important for them for the future?' They are going to be marvellously adjusted kids.

(Wedell, in interview, 1998, emphasis added)

Here Wedell is reflecting the perennial dilemma in inclusive practices. There are bound to be some elements of a specialist programme which have to be sacrificed. Who decides on such priorities? Wedell suggested 'the kids', which is very much in tune with the 1990s rhetoric of emancipation and empowerment.

Peter Mittler, similarly, was working to integrate children with autistic spectrum disorders from a hospital setting into mainstream primary schools in the early 1960s. Almost 40 years later, he reflected that 'I thought that everyone was doing it, then I realised that it was extremely rare' (Mittler, in interview, 1998).

Both these major influences on special education practices in the UK and beyond claim that they were already thinking *towards* if not *of* inclusion before the term was coined. Although they both acknowledge that it was largely paediatricians who played a key role in their development during the 1960s, in keeping with the dominance of the medical model of disability at that stage, they both became concerned with including young people with disabilities as a matter of course. Mittler, for example, suggested that although he was trained as a psychologist in 'gradualism' – that is, step-by-step rehabilitation of people out of long-stay hospitals into the community – he came to realize, chiefly from US research, that it was more positive and effective to make bold rather than tentative moves forward. In developing 'less faith in the gradualist model', he has come to feel that one of the greatest barriers to inclusion is our underestimation of the potential abilities of those we label as having SEN; by extrapolation, therefore, the very existence of the special educational needs co-ordinator (SENCO) in UK schools is itself anti-inclusive.

Wedell was innovative in understanding in the late 1960s and early 1970s that the child-deficit model was reaching the end of its usefulness, and that it was more practically useful in developing new approaches to observe children in real school settings than in hospitals. Of course, such practice sometimes entailed the loss of apparently valuable resources; Wedell tells of his team's early access to

a marvellous chromium-plated child-study centre. It was beautiful, all purpose-designed. We had moved from a lovely old country house to the centre. It had been designed with one-way vision screens and so on, and I used to do the most fantastically detailed within-child assessment. There was hardly a thing that if you wanted to know about this kid, about his disabilities, that I couldn't tell you about . . . And then when I took over the Ed. Psych. [educational psychology – EP] training course at Birmingham and saw changes occurring, to my great sadness I said, 'We are being absolutely ridiculous. We've been totally sort of swept along by the excitement of having this lovely centre. We are not going to work here; we are not going to have this [sort of] training of EPs.' We moved into schools. But it was a terrible shame.

(Wedell, in interview, 1998)

Examples such as these may suggest something of a pioneering spirit on



the part of figures who have later come to be viewed by some as traditional, reactionary and above all perpetuating of a segregated special education. It is important for those examining the development of thinking and ideologies to acknowledge the ways in which key theorists were moving ahead within their *own* time, later to be overtaken by more radical new thinking.

For example, it is not always remembered that before the Education Act 1971, a large number of young people with learning disabilities were legally regarded as ineducable. It is important, therefore, to acknowledge that there were some practices which by today's definitions might be described as broadly inclusive in that they were insisting on the 'educable' status of a group previously denied access to educational provision.

The enduring role of educational psychology in the determination of the developing fields of special, integrative and inclusive education is beyond question. Sheila Wolfendale and Brahm Norwich are educational psychologists who trained in the traditions of Wedell and Mittler, and who have made significant contributions not only to the development of inclusive education, but simultaneously helped redefine and diversify the very nature as well as role of educational psychology in developing practices of working with teachers in the field. Sheila Wolfendale, for example, has strongly influenced the early years support offered by Educational Psychologists in her *All About Me* project (Wolfendale, 1987), while Brahm Norwich has worked on research development in 'cluster' mainstream schools, where teachers have provided peer support in developing their responsiveness to a diverse range of learners and their needs (Norwich, 1993).

What such researchers emphasize is that, although educational psychology generally had a central role in the development of special (segregative) education, there have been many forms of educational psychology, not all of which conform to a stereotype of exclusive practice. There is finally no single, enduring version which – transcendently, as it were – pervades the history of inclusive education. Rather, the nature and occupation of educational psychology itself has changed, perhaps reflexively with its involvement with special, integrative and inclusive educational expressions of policy.

On this note Brahm Norwich provides a useful reminder that there has emerged a range of psychologies. He highlights the importance of being alert to: 'the tensions within either psychology or medical models (biomedical versus social medical models)'. He calls for more interdisciplinary thinking to include: 'ecological (bio-psycho-social models) or interdisciplinary models which assume interconnections between different levels of analysis' (Norwich, personal communication, 31 March 2000).

### *The sociological response*

*PC:* I have my doubts, still. I mean it's one thing to have the insight, but quite another to be able to do something about it . . .

*Jim W:* Say more . . . more about insight . . . Doesn't insight lead to change?

*PC:* What I'm saying – what lots of people have said – is that a social critique of special education is . . . what? Well it might be quite right and all that but what difference does it make actually in the classroom, actually to the 30 kids you've got there and you've got to teach? I hear teachers on courses say that, and I think: hmm, yes, well . . . maybe this sort of [sociological] critique is actually disabling to teachers . . .

*JW:* I think you . . . I think you're missing the point of critique . . . It's not about the here-and-now-immediate, but the structures behind which make the here and now so awful . . . it's about vision, too.

(Inclusive Education Research Centre seminar, Sheffield, January 1999)

If the psychomedical perspective saw special educational need as arising from children's own characteristics, by contrast the sociological response sees them as the outcome of social processes. In the previous section we identified some of the contributions of educational psychology to the development of inclusive practices. This section now explores the contribution that a sociological critique has provided, in which the whole rationale for special education, and the professional roles associated with it, were challenged as symptomatic of oppressive processes.

Sally Tomlinson and Len Barton together wrote and edited a number of books which were very influential in developing the sociology of education, and in challenging the segregated special education sector. Both these sociologists located special educational needs in a much broader context than was customary in the work of educational psychologists, and introduced an explicitly political dimension. In 1984, they characterized special education as:

now a more important mechanism than it has ever been for differentiating between children, and allocating some to a lifestyle that – if not as stigmatised as in the past – will almost certainly be characterised by dependence and powerlessness. In addition, the economic recession in these societies has brought into sharper focus a perennial question in special education – 'How much should be spent on groups who may not be economically profitable or useful in the society?'

(Barton and Tomlinson, 1984, p. 87)

Within the terms of a critique like this it is possible to see the 1981 Education Act, for example, with its structures for formal assessment and statementing, as a clear means of both delimiting public expenditure and maintaining the status quo. The key movement in conceptual focus for this development, then, lies in a concentration on social disadvantage rather than individual deficit. As Barton says of this conceptualization: 'for me

inclusive education is not an end in itself, it is a means to an end, and that end is creating an inclusive society . . . This is well beyond an issue of disablement; it is about the removal of all forms of oppression . . .' (Barton, in interview, 1998).

Sally Tomlinson's 1982 study of the way in which pupils were selected for inclusion in the special schools of the day described as for 'Educationally Sub-Normal (Moderate)' learners, was particularly concerned to illustrate how social class chiefly, as well as ethnicity and gender, were important factors in the process of stigmatization of 'Sub-Normality'.

Tomlinson was one of a number of sociologists who were not primarily interested in special education as a substantive concern, but rather as a location for the exploration of the structures and cultures of difference. Tomlinson's work on special education, then, needs to be seen in the context of a broader concern of sociologists with a platform of issues of inequality and disadvantage, and with the crucial role of the institution in reproducing difference.

Similarly, Bob Lingard – an Australian who has been influential in developing policy in the *Disadvantaged Schools Programme* in Queensland – saw inclusion as about much more than a narrow conception of special educational needs and disability. Lingard says: 'I come out of an interest in kids from poor families and how schooling could be much more inclusive there, and I've been heavily involved with gender issues both at school level and in the development of [government] policy' (Lingard, in interview, 1999).

At the heart of the sociological response are the ideas of the 'vested interests' of professionals and of the institutional 'reproduction' of disadvantage. One of the distinctions to be made between the psychomedical and the sociological approach is in terms of their identification of whose interests are served by a 'special' education. Various sociological commentators started to challenge the previously taken-for-granted assumption that special schools existed benignly, genuine in their concern to serve the interests of children with marked learning difficulties. Critics of segregated systems instead identified other beneficiaries: Tomlinson (1982), for example, was among the first to see the advantages of this system for the medical and psychological professionals with a 'vested interest' in maintaining their own status and power. She argued that: 'the answer to the question "what is" an ESN(M) child or a maladjusted child will depend more on the values, beliefs and interests of those making the judgment than on any qualities intrinsic to the child' (Tomlinson, 1982, p. 66).

Similarly, Tom Skrtic's (1991) work echoed and reinforced an earlier argument made by Tony Dessent (1983) that:

Whatever else education involves it is first and foremost an administrative and organisational system whereby one group of professionals are invested with responsibility for handicapped and 'difficult-to-teach' children. At the same time other groups are absolved from such responsibility. Special education has come to be described and justified . . . in terms of its small teaching groups, special curricula, expertise and methods, but its historical roots lie in the need to remove the responsibility for teaching children with special needs from class teachers in normal schools.

(Dessent, 1983, p. 90)

Much of the work touched upon here is in the form of analysis, critique or 'deconstruction', particularly of what is seen or assumed to 'lie behind' special education. That is to say that some have sought to respond to the medico-psychological legacy by asking some of the very questions about the construction of difficulty posed earlier, and in so doing to seek to find what is hidden, disguised perhaps by systems, structures and a language inherited from earlier psychologically biased trends.

There is no doubt that such broad sociological and political perspectives presented a powerful and provocative challenge to the dominant psychological approaches. Critics, however, might say that they were limited in that the insights they generated related to an analysis of schools and society which offered no practical advice to teachers in classrooms. In the next subsection I shall sketch how these needs of teachers were partially met through what I call here 'curricular approaches'.

### *Curricular approaches*

*Kathy T:* You could say that [the emphasis on curriculum] really got a boost with the 1981 Act, with its IEPs [Individualized Educational Programmes].

*PC:* And the focus on educational needs rather than handicaps.

*KT:* But it was coming, it had to come, I mean the curriculum revolution of the 70s, all the Stenhouse stuff, it didn't touch well it didn't really touch special education at all.

*PC:* That's right and in fact special ed. curricula were so distinct, so separate because they were all about objectives.

*KT:* I wonder whether . . . I wonder: have we come full circle now, with the National Curriculum and all the specification of the Literacy Hour and so on? Back to objectives in the name of 'Curriculum for All'?

*PC:* Interesting, isn't it, that 'Curriculum for All' was the title of the OU [Open University] books of the 80s, the general title?

*KT:* . . . but very different from David Blunkett's 'Excellence for All'.

(Conference workshop, Nottingham, May 1999)

In the last section I outlined the sociological critique of 'special' forms of education. At the same time as this critique was gathering momentum (in the 1960s and 1970s), there was a related and parallel development of curriculum and teaching approaches which helped to foster a more

inclusive school and college culture.

What I am here calling 'a curricular approach' in fact comprises a very broad range of interventions through the curriculum. A highly specific and individual task-analysis programme may be seen as an intervention at the level of curriculum; or else the radical revision of the whole school day can equally be seen as a function of curriculum planning. The point is that each of these interventions depends on different conceptions of curriculum itself. This is partly because, during the period we are considering, the very notion of 'curriculum' was contested and developed. We shall see, then, that curricular approaches to learning difficulties have themselves developed in keeping with the mainstream development of curriculum, and curriculum studies.

In broad historical terms, there has been a change of conception from *curriculum as syllabus* to *curriculum as cultural scheme*. The whole history of inclusive education in schools and colleges might be plotted in terms of this shift. The shift effectively encapsulates what is meant by inclusion, for if inclusion is essentially about maximizing participation in community and culture, then in schools the medium for this is the curriculum.

I mentioned earlier the 'curricular wasteland' of special education, characterized by Phillip Williams as a garden 'not only secret, but neglected, too' (Williams, 1985, p. vii). Broadly speaking, 'special' curricula up to the era of the Warnock Report were importantly conditioned by two seminal books – *The Backward Child* (Burt, 1937) and *Backwardness in the Basic Subjects* (Schonell, 1942). Burt had identified the 'innately dull' as distinct from those whose 'backwardness was accidental or acquired' (Burt, 1937, p. 606). For these pupils, 'Individual attention . . . should result in progress being so speeded up that all who are not dull as well as backward should, after one or two terms, be fit for retransference to the ordinary class' (*ibid.*).

Such a view crystallizes an approach which, for the next 40 or so years, saw the child as needing to be rehabilitated to fit the given curriculum, rather than the curriculum in any way adapted to meet the child's needs. Schonell (1942) went on to confirm and refine Burt's distinction, introducing the notion of 'improvable scholastic deficiency (which) . . . may characterise dull, normal or supernormal pupils' (*ibid.*, p. 61). And in terms of actual teaching responses, since 'typically such deficiency was confined to a single school subject', 'treatment for the condition was through individual or small group short coaching sessions arranged at frequent intervals rather than in full-time backward classes' (Golby and Gulliver, 1985, p. 139, emphasis added). In their critical discussion of these years,

Golby and Gulliver go on to say that such ideas

were offered to the world at the very time when those educational notions which culminated in the 1944 Act were being formed. An idea of retardation which was based on psychometrics fitted well with education which would be given in accordance with 'the age, ability and aptitude of the pupil.' It buttressed the idea that ability was measurable, that children could therefore be grouped and taught in homogenous units, and that the curriculum for each of these units was distinct . . . Burt and Schonell's focus upon reading and number confirmed teachers in the epistemic divisions which were still believed to be necessary.

(Ibid.)

Golby and Gulliver conclude:

Thus, when in the late 1940s the first remedial centres were set up, they were received with open arms by teachers . . . [This development] however, diverted attention from the 'normal' curriculum itself. *So long as remedial provision was made – an ambulance service in a system which was prone to accident – the curriculum could remain a static entity.*

(Ibid., emphasis added)

I have quoted at some length from Golby and Gulliver's paper because it points up richly the conception of curriculum as essentially a form of treatment that lay so deeply at the heart of 'special' and 'remedial' education. It was a conception which was to endure for many years and which powerfully maintained and reinforced the separateness of mainstream and 'special' provision.

Arguably, the first really noticeable development of curriculum in special education came with the use of objectives in meeting learning difficulties. Generally speaking, the use of objectives – and particularly behavioural objectives – in the UK followed their burgeoning use in the USA in the 1950s. One of the earliest and most important influences on UK developments was the Hester Adrian Research Centre at Manchester University – importantly under Peter Mittler's guidance – and projects such as the Education of the Developmentally Young (EDY) (McBrien, 1981) which the centre set up. However, perhaps the best known of these behavioural objective approaches to teachers in special education, is that articulated in Mel Ainscow and Dave Tweddle's (1979) Coventry-based *Preventing Classroom Failure: an objectives approach*. Parallel approaches are present in the Special Needs Action Plan (SNAP) (Ainscow and Muncey, 1981) and programmes like DataPac (Akerman *et al.*, 1984). What is chiefly characteristic of these approaches is an 'assess: teach: assess again' approach. Reason, Farrell and Mittler (1990) comment that such

assessments assume that the curriculum can be drawn up as a hierarchy of target skills and knowledges to be mastered. At the top of the hierarchy is the basic subject area . . . which has targets . . . Each of these targets is broken down into teaching aims . . . and these are further divided into pupil objectives which

state what pupils have to do to demonstrate that they have mastered the teaching objective.

(*Ibid.*, p. 1026)

Three final quotations here will serve to point up the orthodoxy which an objectives approach to learning difficulties came to have during this period. In 1978 the Warnock Report actually defined the curriculum in terms of 'four interrelated elements', which are '(1) setting of objectives; (2) choice of materials and experiences; (3) choice of teaching and learning methods to attain the objectives; and (4) appraisal of appropriateness of the objectives and the effectiveness of the means of achieving them' (DES, 1978, p. 206).

In the same period, Ainscow and Tweddle (1979) spoke of the assumption in their work 'that they are special schools because sophisticated teaching methods and techniques are used in them . . . In fact, [the behavioural objectives approach] is the kind of system which should be operated in a special school or unit if it is "special" in more than name only' (*ibid.*, p. 105).

Finally Mittler (1981), in a prospectus written in the same period, titled 'Teacher Training for the 21st Century', listed the skills and knowledges that special educators would need, which included 'proficiency in the specification of behavioural objectives, goal setting, task analysis, programme writing' (*ibid.*, p. 10).

In terms of the historical development of inclusive education, such a view of the role of objectives in curricula may now seem naive. There is also no doubt that this view of the 'special' curriculum as not much more than a set of teaching plans helped maintain its separateness from 'regular', mainstream systems. However, it is also possible to see in these activities two important contributions to

- the beginnings of a direct connection of assessment with curriculum, and a reflexive relationship between them in the teach/assess/teach cycle
- the emerging recognition that educational difficulties are not exclusively something 'within' the learner, but are importantly related to instructional conditions.

### *Curricula for all?*

These insights, however, are still far removed from a radically different strand of curricular approaches. This is a strand which owes its development more to social movements than to psychological constructs. It is also a strand which is far more explicit about the comprehensive

school values which drive it. As Alan Dyson says of this 'route to inclusion', it is a

tradition which derives from post-war egalitarianism and is closely related to the comprehensive movement. I'm not certain that this is the same as [the sociological critique of] Tomlinson and others. A number of commentators, however (Tony Booth principally) relate their vision of inclusion (however labelled) to comprehensive education. My own focus likewise has been less to do with disability *per se* than with issues of disadvantage and marginalisation affecting a large minority in the education system.

(Dyson, personal communication, 2000)

If, during this period of the 1970s, the curriculum of 'special' education can be characterized in terms of objectives, curriculum in the mainstream was occupied with radically different issues and practices. In contrast with what could be seen as the *contraction* of curricular thinking in 'special' education, mainstream development was rich with expansion. Fresh insights into the nature and process of learning:

- threw into question notions of 'innate' or 'static' ability
- challenged assumptions about the nature and acquisition of literacy
- began to point up the vital role of learners themselves in the 'construction' of knowledge
- indicated new ways of grouping knowledges which broke with some of the traditional subject boundaries
- suggested changes to pedagogic organization which had traditionally grouped learners by ability.

These, and other, features of the period found their expression in emerging programmes such as the Schools Council Humanities Curriculum Project aimed at 'average and below average' pupils, and which were built around interactive methods like small-group discussion. Most importantly, however, all such developments must be seen as expressions of the major ideological shift during this period from elitism to equality of opportunity, and thus from the categorical sorting out of children at age 11 to the espousal of a comprehensive education system. Such a system depends reflexively on the principle of a common curriculum.

It is arguably the curriculum which always stood – secure as a Berlin Wall – between mainstream and segregated special provision; it was the possibility of mediating that curriculum, and the means of its delivery, which enabled 'integrative' education; and it is still the curriculum on which the success of any truly inclusive initiative rests.



Many of the important foundations for inclusive practices, then, are to be seen as arising from a strong ideological commitment to comprehensive schooling, and a form of curriculum which would truly realize it. Arguably one of the most important contributions made during the 1980s and 1990s was that of the Special Education team at the Open University. Recruited initially to develop SEN courses within the Psychology Section of the School of Education, the team early developed a radical and characteristic conception of inclusive education which was essentially continuous with comprehensive ideology. The team significantly relocated itself within the Curriculum Studies Section, and rapidly developed courses which turned their backs on traditional, psychologically led enquiry. These courses owed their character rather to the ideas of Lawrence Stenhouse (1975) and the Centre for Action Research in Education (CARE) at the University of East Anglia, with their emphasis on teacher- and action-research. They arguably represent the first major operational expression of inclusive schooling in UK university departments of education.

Pre-eminent in their widespread audience and effect is the suite of books developed by the OU team, chiefly Tony Booth, Patricia Potts and Will Swann, with titles (from as early as 1983) such as *Integrating Special Education* (Booth and Potts, 1983) and the series *Curricula for All* (1987) which comprised three books whose titles say a great deal about the ideological as well as pedagogical programmes which they propose:

- *Preventing Difficulties in Learning* (Booth, Potts and Swann, 1987)
- *Producing and Reducing Disaffection* (Booth and Coulby, 1987)
- *Including Pupils with Disabilities* (Booth and Swann, 1987).

Similarly oriented, the latest series of readers (to support Course E829: Developing Inclusive Curricula) is called *Equality and Diversity in Education*.

But there is more to the generic OU approach than an ideological commitment to comprehensive community schooling. For the very nature and structure of the teaching materials themselves represent a quite particular, and no less ideological, commitment to a conception of learning which questioned *what* students were required to study and *how* evidence was presented and evaluated, and to *what* ends. Answers to these questions were framed in a mode of critical enquiry which owed much more to mainstream curriculum studies than to any tradition of a 'special' education. Tony Booth reflects on the development of the 'shape' of the team's first course, E241: Special Needs – Education 'around three questions:

- What's going on [in Special Education]?
- How do we make sense of 'what's going on'?
- What *should* go on?'

He then goes on to relate a particular ideological commitment to an equally particular conception of enquiry:

I was reading stuff about life history at the time. And I was very occupied with – and still am – the question: How d’you – anyone – learn from [your] experience? How can students learn from experience? The task was – and is – to develop studies that don’t depart from your own experience . . . [I was impressed by] the whole freeing up of method that was exercised by CARE, the liberation of method was so refreshing . . . which I linked up with the philosopher of science Feyerabend’s *Against Method* and it was that liberalising of method that was terribly influential; but not just the liberation of method, but of epistemology, of the whole epistemological foundation of methods of enquiry. That was the other side to the development of E241 – the use of case study [methods] – [we] battled hard for acceptance of them as a legitimate approach to study . . . so for students to get a book which was almost entirely case studies of people’s experience, that felt like a big breakthrough.

(Booth, in interview, 2000)

Booth’s point, of course, is that this shift from predominantly quantitative to qualitative methods was of particular significance in an area (of ‘special’ education) which had for so long been dominated by psychometric and generally positivist approaches.

The Open University initiatives were supported and reflected by related work elsewhere which problematized the role of the curriculum, and schools themselves, as creative of difficulties. Among others, key publication of this time and tone include:

- Paul Widlake’s (1984) *Beyond the Sabre-Toothed Curriculum*, an eloquent attack on the moribund curriculum of ‘remedial’ education
- Hazel Bines’s (1986) *Redefining Remedial Education*, which articulated a new, supportive role for teachers in providing access to the curriculum for all
- John Sayer’s (1987) *Secondary Schools for All?* which carefully laid out strategies for making the school a ‘resource for the community’ where ‘special needs can be met *only* within the context of the whole school’
- Tony Dessent’s (1987) *Making the Ordinary School Special*, a template for the development of continuous, comprehensive, community education.

It is worth noting in concluding this section that the conceptions of curriculum to be found in the above derive from the territory of inclusive, mainstream practices, and were nowhere to be found in the parallel literature of ‘special’ education. Thus, for example, Wilfred Brennan’s book *Curriculum for Special Needs* was published at roughly the same time as most of the above (1985) but carries no reference whatever to the work and ideology of people like Stenhouse (1975) or Carr and Kemmis (1982).

What I have called curricular approaches to inclusion, however varied, have as their central identity the understanding that what we ask an individual to do – how we ask it and when – will directly determine his or her success as it is experienced by them, and as it is defined by their community. If this is a rather obvious truism, then it is one which has often been overlooked by curriculum policy-makers. And it is the one which – arguably more than any other educational structure – has maintained a disconnected ‘special’ and ‘mainstream’ structure.

In the conclusion to *Theorising Special Education*, Catherine Clark, Alan Dyson and Alan Millward ask whether it is ‘time to move on’. This call follows their

contention that it is now time to ‘reconnect’ special education. We are advocating a theoretical position which emphasises the connection between special education and fundamental educational issues. That position calls for an analysis of special education from a perspective that is broader than the concerns of special education, that is historical and that is situated in the complexities of particular structures and practices at particular times and places. [Such a position promises to move] on beyond the repetitive and sterile arguments within which [special education] has latterly become trapped. (Clark, Dyson and Millward, 1998, pp. 172–3)

In the next section I shall sketch a key emerging position in the development of inclusive education which operates precisely from a reconnection of ‘special’ with ‘fundamental educational issues’, and continues the identification of inclusion with comprehensive ideals.

### *School improvement strategies*

*Barbara N:* we’ve been talking about this [effective school movement] as though it’s one thing, but it really isn’t so, is it?

*PC:* . . . important differences between school improvement like for position in the league tables, number of A–Cs and all that, and school improvement for the good of all . . . the IQEA [Improving the Quality of Education for All] stuff and other . . .

*DJC:* Yes when we talk about the effective school you’ve got to ask ‘Effective at what? Or for who?’

*PC:* Or . . . what would an ‘effective’, a truly effective Comprehensive school look like? . . . Roy Hattersley gave a talk here last year and he said one of the things he said was ‘There’s no such thing as a Failing Comprehensive, and do you know why? Because there’s still no such thing as a Comprehensive’.

(Teacher INSET workshop, Sheffield, February 2000)

In 1991, Mel Ainscow edited and published a collection of papers called

*Effective Schools for All*. Based substantially on the International Special Education Conference of the previous year, the book brings together what – in the usual context of ‘special’ education – is at first sight an unusual confection of writers. But the significance of the inclusion of ‘mainstream’ commentators such as Neville Bennett and David Reynolds is found easily in the book’s explicit attachment to school improvement (as the primary means of realizing inclusion). Describing his own professional development, Ainscow cites David Hopkins, Lawrence Stenhouse, Rob Walker and John Elliott – among others – from ‘the action research movement’, writers ‘who argue for cooperative inquiry’; and ‘evaluators who base their work on the notion of naturalistic inquiry’ (Ainscow, 1991, p. 12). From these and other influences, Ainscow identifies six common strands to characterize a prospectus for his emerging work:

- 1 Forms of inquiry are used that encourage teachers to examine particular events or processes as a whole and in their natural settings.
- 2 The design of the inquiry is seen as being emergent; that is to say, the directions and forms of an investigation are decided upon as information is collected.
- 3 The teacher is seen as the primary ‘instrument’ for gathering information, using natural methods of information-gathering such as observation and discussion.
- 4 Wherever possible inquiry is seen as a collaborative process involving colleagues and pupils.
- 5 Through processes of data analysis and interpretation, theories emerge from information that is collected. This is usually referred to as ‘grounded theory’ in that it is seen as being grounded in the data.
- 6 Accounts are usually presented as case studies with, where possible, some attempts to suggest tentative applications of the findings to other settings.

(Ainscow, 1991, p. 13)

The connection with the writers, ideas and concepts of the previous section – on curricular approaches – will be obvious. What is novel, however, is the explicit bringing together of such methodologies both with notions of learning difficulty and with the mainstream policy concerns of the 1990s. Above all, what Ainscow is working out here – and through subsequent work such as *Improving the Quality of Education for All* (Hopkins, West and Ainscow, 1996) – is a *vision of inclusive education as simply given with effective comprehensive schooling*.

It is really only during the last decade that ‘school effectiveness’ as a ‘movement’ or ‘school’ of thought became part of the educational currency. It is all the more difficult to trace the connections I identify here because, as Booth (1998) reminds us, it is necessary to step outside the special and inclusive literature, in order to learn from ‘mainstream’ ideas. When he calls for the ‘removal of boundaries’ (*ibid.*, p. 88), he does so in order to incite an interconnectivity between researchers, disciplines and ideas. If

A central premise of Lawrence Stenhouse's work was that: 'Curriculum development involves bringing practice in classrooms and teaching plans closer together through an evaluation by teachers' (Stenhouse, 1975, p.77). Such work brought the notion of teachers exploring and developing their own curricula to the fore, and represented a 'devolution of power' (McNiff 1988) of curriculum evaluation. Action research, curriculum research and development and teacher research were tools and processes which, in the hands of creative teachers, forced the differentiation of curriculum materials and the evolution of curriculum 'entitlement'. Essentially, this set of approaches could be characterized as focusing on schools and curricula as directly related to – and sometimes productive of – learning difficulties. In a strong sense, notions of inclusive education are vitally related to these conceptions of the curriculum, extending as they do to include school and college ethos, institutional culture, and the ways in which behaviour management is maintained and monitored; and, of course, the role of pedagogy in creating inclusion and exclusion.

we pursue the notion of the disconnected nature of various educational research strands, we can find an example in the separately developed themes of special and inclusive education and 'school effectiveness'. The relatively recent development of school effectiveness in relation to the field of SEN is evidenced by the writers in Clark, Dyson and Millward (1998) who comprehensively discuss key theories and recent thinking in SEN and inclusive education. Is it significant that while some attention is given within the text to the concept of school effectiveness, there is no reference to the term in the index of the book (which normally conveys both its architecture and major political concerns)? In parallel, in *The Intelligent School* MacGilchrist, Myers and Reed (1997) report school effectiveness developments, and cite examples of practice within the sphere of special education. But they, too, omit terms such as 'SEN' or 'inclusion' from their index. This may seem a small point, but it underscores Booth's call to look outside a narrow field of enquiry. There is much to be gained in the development of educational thinking by going beyond one's front door, and 'taking cuttings' from other people's gardens. I give the disconnection some space here, because I want to emphasize yet again how difficult it can be, when studying aspects of special and inclusive education, to trace connections of new thinking and practice.

*Disability studies critique*

CT: It's ironic really – people talk to me about the 'struggle' for disability rights, but what do they know?

PC: About living with the fight for. . .

CT: About living it? Not theorizing it – living it!

PC: There's the point about the whole context in which we think about education – when we're thinking about disability . . .

SM: No, you see, it's the isolation of disability that's the problem – and so is the isolation of education a problem . . .

CT: Oliver is right when he talks about the connection between health, housing . . .

SM: Yes and care, support – work with families . . .

PC: And the stuff about the connections between educational and social policy.  
(PhD student supervision session, Sheffield, March 2000)

As with the previous perspectives, there are clearly a number of differing accounts which might be seen to make up a broadly homogenous critique. You will see from Colin Barnes's and Mike Oliver's different accounts (in Section 2) that there is no single orthodoxy to what I have for ease of reference here called the 'disability studies critique'. What I wish to show, however, is something of the vital and conditioning influence which a number of scholars have brought to debates around inclusion from *outside* education – as it were – and which has directly affected the development of schools' policies.

Disability studies is of course an almost entirely separate discipline from educational studies, and as such its contribution to debates on inclusive education are unique. This is an important point, for the disability studies movement cannot therefore be said to hold a *curricular* brief as such. For this very reason – that is, its 'outsideness' from education – its contribution to educational debate may be arguable, with both strengths and weaknesses. One of these strengths, though, is the way that it can relate specific issues of social inclusion, and inclusion in employment and housing, to educational inclusion within a 'big picture'.

One of the earliest and most influential expositions of the disability studies critique in the UK is to be found in Mike Oliver's paper 'The social and political context of educational policy: the case of special needs' published in 1988. In it, Oliver shows how 'Educational policy has not developed separately from other initiatives in the area of health, housing, social security, family support and so on [and that] much can be learnt from studying the relationships between educational and social policy' (Oliver, 1988, p. 13). Oliver characterizes these social policies in terms of four ideologies. Respectively, these are expressed: as humanitarian response, as social investment, as the outcome of conflict between competing groups and as social control. Oliver's main argument is that

initially, disability was perceived as an individual problem; it then came to be seen as a social construction and, finally, it is beginning to be perceived as a social creation . . . [and] largely due to the growing power of disabled people, the definition of disability as a social creation is now gradually being accepted as the most appropriate one.

(*Ibid.*)

Although theorists like Oliver are concerned with issues of the creation of disability, special education has only been a small and incidental element of their critiques. Oliver, in particular, applied a Marxist analysis to his discussions on social and economic developments. His interpretation of progress remains significantly different from that often presented by those offering either a psychology or curricular approach, which have tended to suggest that there are areas of development and positive achievement despite obstacles. Oliver's evaluations, on the other hand, tend to the pessimistic. Interviewed in 1998, Oliver commented:

maybe there are marginally a few more children with physical impairments in ordinary education . . . and a few less with educational and behavioural problems in ordinary schools, but at the end of the day that is only at the margins and the power structures remain virtually unchallenged and untouched, and I think there are obviously a number of barriers: there are political barriers, economic barriers . . . there are professional barriers. Teachers still do not concede, and even the most enlightened and 'right-on' teachers who would have no trouble in recognising oppression on the basis of class or race or gender, would still be happy to say 'I am not taking a blind child', or 'I am not taking a deaf child into my class, and that is not a political issue, that is a resource issue' . . . and I think those kinds of oppressive attitudes have changed remarkably little over the last 20 years or so.

Oliver concluded his 1988 paper with a quotation from John Fish's 1985 paper, 'Community, co-operation, co-partnership'. Actually, in Fish's paper there comes together – though surely not to everybody's satisfaction – a credo which seems to reflect equally on insight from disability critique and from a curricular understanding of learning difficulties. Fish says:

- (i) Although disabilities and difficulties may be different, and their nature, effects and the needs which result from them should be studied, the handicaps which stem from them have many common characteristics.
- (ii) Handicaps are determined by society through its laws, norms and institutions and not by disabilities.
- (iii) Handicapping effects result from the nature of the situations met by individuals with disabilities and difficulties in education, social circumstances and employment.
- (iv) The degree to which situations are handicapping is determined by the community, its attitudes and its provision for individuals who form part of it.

(Fish, 1985b, p. 5)

I think it very significant that Oliver openly endorses John Fish's credo. These principles, Oliver (1988, p. 29) says, 'clearly represent a significant shift' from the individual and social constructionist definitions and practices given with the Warnock era and culture. However, it seems clear that Oliver's injunction (of 1988) remains unrealized in the year 2000: 'The development of a pedagogic practice based upon the definition of special educational needs as a social creation is . . . an urgent and essential task over the next few years' (Oliver, 1988, p. 29).

### Conclusion: powerful coalitions?

By looking 'back' through the disability studies critique at the influences of the psycho-medical model, the sociological response, curricular approaches and school improvement measures, is it possible to look *forward* to the emergence of a more homogeneous response to inclusive schooling with individual learners rights to inclusive education – as well as needs for individually appropriate education – at centre stage? More specifically, I wonder, is there some recent convergence of thinking about inclusion, about what it is – or should be – and about how it will be best achieved? Perhaps this is just a hunch of mine which comes from spending time researching this book, and talking with the people who appear in Section 2. Perhaps also it is a hope. In any event, what I think there is evidence of is a convergence of energies of different sorts in the project of inclusion. Let me give two examples of this:

- 1 The project shared by Jennifer Evans, Alan Dyson and Klaus Wedell, which is reported in *Collaboration for Effectiveness: Empowering Schools to be Inclusive*. Here there is a combination of differing backgrounds, perspectives and talents which perhaps ten years ago could not have been imagined.
- 2 The *Index for Inclusion* (Booth *et al.*, 1999), published by the Centre for Studies in Inclusive Education (CSIE), and the outcome of a particularly fruitful collaboration between two very different researchers, Tony Booth and Mel Ainscow as well as the CSIE.

I suggest that these developments among others reflect something of a trend. Taken generally they represent some powerful emerging coalitions in inclusive research and development in at least three ways:

- 1 *Epistemic*: by which I mean the attempts to bring together different forms, or disciplines, of knowledge, such as psychology and sociology. It should be clear from my earlier discussion that this particular combination of studies is particularly significant given the history of special and inclusive education;
- 2 *Methodological*: by which I mean the bringing together and justification of a mix of research methods, styles and ideologies, to some extent



reflecting the epistemic synergies (mentioned above).

- 3 *Institutional*: by which I wish to point up the increase in collaboration not only between individuals, but also necessarily between the institutions for whom they work (and this, of course, includes organizations such as the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and local education authorities. (I should also suggest that there is some perceptible increase not only in inter-institutional work, but also in *intra*-institutional collaboration in the name of inclusion: there are now quite a number of university departments of education in the UK with 'dedicated' and substantial research and teaching centres in inclusive education, as well as those in social studies departments, for example).

Perhaps the most salient example of a current 'powerful coalition' is to be found in the shared work of three very different individuals, with very different backgrounds and from very different institutions. Mel Ainscow, Tony Booth and Alan Dyson first published work some years ago and have gone on to collaborate quite prolifically. You will see from Section 2 how different are the 'routes to inclusion' which each has taken. Yet they appear currently to evidence a collaboration of which one can truly use the (often clichéd) notion of 'synergy'. However it is evaluated, the effect of three key figures in inclusive education working in concert, bringing to this particular work their years of scholarship, is an example of the complex weave over time of differing trends and practices.

For me, they also exemplify a form of curricular approach which might be summarized in this way:

[If] . . . curriculum is placed at the centre of 'special needs' enquiry, then special needs provision will necessarily move nearer to the centre of curriculum issues, no longer marginalized but the very touchstone and proving point of coherent, sensitive and moral curriculum planning for all. [On] . . . the part of teacher and researcher alike, this curricular approach will call for:

- a. The framing of problems in the *whole* context in which they are noticed; such a frame will recognise the relevance of the aims and organisational structures of the *particular* institutions quite as much as the needs, motivations and intentions of all the individuals under study.
- b. A theoretical framework which is capable of taking account of such complex interrelations by drawing on a *variety* of sociological, psychological and other theories rather than exclusively relying on any one of them.
- c. A systematic recognition of the *experience* of participants – teachers, pupils and parents – in order better to understand and interpret teaching and research situations.
- d. The empirical monitoring and documentation of learning events by both teachers and researchers leading to critical self-evaluation and appropriate revision of methodologies.

### *The (almost) final word: Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme*

In conversation with a philosopher, the main character in Molière's play *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme* – Monsieur Jourdain – is surprised and delighted to be told that he has been speaking prose all his life without knowing it! This was the image and structure that Klaus Wedell chose to use when we interviewed him in 1999; he referred to his own position as

a *bourgeois gentilhomme* situation . . . where what's-his-name, I've forgotten his name says, 'I didn't realize that I was talking [prose] all the time' . . . I started being an educational psychologist in 1964 . . . in Bristol . . . [and] I became concerned about children who weren't developing language and who were deaf and we hadn't got any provision for them and we said 'Well . . . what are we going to do with them?' and the natural thing was to set up a unit in a nursery school, and we purposely chose a room that had a door into the main room and the door was left open at certain parts of the day and progressively the kids would, move towards the door, stand by the door, stand outside the door and I wasn't thinking of . . . being inclusive I was just . . . that was what I felt education was about then. So in a sense, that is why I am saying 'I didn't realize that I was talking 'prose' all the time'.

What is Wedell claiming here? That he was 'talking *inclusion* all the time', whatever it was actually called at the time? That the move to *integrate* was – for its time – an essentially *inclusive* thrust? Peter Mittler could be seen to be making a similar claim about his early work to include children with autistic spectrum disorders, reflecting that 'I thought that everyone was doing it, then I realised that it was extremely rare' (see p. 13, this chapter).

If this is so, then perhaps you could equally argue that an inclusive drive is to be found in the 1944 Education Act (which 'included' pupils previously outwith the educational system) or – surely? – the 1870 Act, marking the beginnings of mass popular education. Perhaps the metaphor of 'casting the net ever wider' describes this general move. And is 'inclusion' therefore not a recent phenomenon but rather an evolving set of ideas immanent in the historical development of educational institutions?

How do you set about deciding the answers to these questions? Is this 'revisionism'? And who says so? Who has 'the final word'? I hope that some questions will be answered through the Profiles and Reflections of Section 2. But of course, the *final* word will be yours: it is for you to decide how these claims and my views fit with your other reading and your own thoughts, experiences and analyses. To help you start to do this, I have appended a Workshop Exercise to this section. I hope that this throws some light on your own 'route to inclusion': travel hopefully!

## **Appendix: reviewing the journey**

This workshop exercise has been constructed as a tool to help you reflect back upon what you have read, and on your other reading of literature in the field in order to construct your own map of the routes to inclusion. You may wish to complete the table provided as part of your own private study, or within your own student group. If you do the latter you will, no doubt, find that you engage in much critical discussion and questioning. Section 1 has suggested five major routes in the development of inclusive ideology and practice. Before you leave this section and move on to engage with the finer details of some of the people who have contributed to the construction of this map, you may wish to review the journey so far. In Section 1 you have explored with me some of the territories of inclusive education, tracing five major routes identified as:

- 1 the psycho-medical legacy.
- 2 the sociological response.
- 3 curricular approaches.
- 4 school improvement strategies.
- 5 disability studies critique.

Clearly there has been no neat progression from one idea to another and as Figure 1.2 illustrates (p. 9), one influential 'school' may continue to contribute to thinking and practice while newer, perhaps more popular, approaches begin to dominate. It is the case that all five of the major routes to inclusion that I have discussed here impact upon the way we now see inclusion – both in society and in educational practice.

Table 1.4 begins to extract some of the ideas included in this section in order to summarize the key strands within each 'route'. Looking at the table you will see that some summary points for the psycho-medical model have been inserted. Using the material available throughout Section 1, add the summary points for the other 'routes'. There may well be some cells which cannot be completed; for example, if there were no specific legislative contexts to speak of, that cell would remain blank.

Table 1.4 The five major routes in the development of inclusive ideology and practice: a summary

	<i>The psycho-medical legacy</i>	<i>The sociological response</i>	<i>Curricular approaches</i>	<i>Effective schooling</i>	<i>Disability critique</i>
Form of knowledge/epistemology/discipline	Positivist Natural sciences Psychology				
Key concepts	Deficit				
Source of difficulty/problem viewed as	Individual pathology				
Locus of intervention	Individual 'treatment'				
School setting implied	Segregated/special school				
Dominant period of influence	?				
Significant legislation and policy contexts	1944 Education Act				
Dominant research methodology	Quantitative Measurement				
Other?					



## INCLUSIVE EDUCATION BENEFITS ALL

### Introduction

There is increasing recognition across Europe, and more widely at international level, that moving towards inclusive policy and practice in education is an imperative. The *Council conclusions on the social dimension of education and training* state that: 'Creating the conditions required for the successful inclusion of pupils with special needs in mainstream settings benefits all learners' (Council of the European Union, 2010, p. 5).

The Commission of the European Communities' Green Paper on Migration and Mobility underlines that:

*Schools must play a leading role in creating an inclusive society, as they represent the main opportunity for young people of migrant and host communities to get to know and respect each other ... linguistic and cultural diversity may bring an invaluable resource to schools* (Commission of the European Communities, 2008, p. 1).

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (2009) clearly indicates that inclusive education is a question of equity and is therefore a quality issue impacting upon all learners. Three propositions regarding inclusive education are highlighted: inclusion and quality are reciprocal; access and quality are linked and are mutually reinforcing; and quality and equity are central to ensuring inclusive education.

A number of Agency projects have also focussed on this issue. The report on the Agency's *Raising Achievement for All Learners (RA4AL)* conference (European Agency, 2012c) highlights that issues surrounding the definition of inclusion have become increasingly important, but that there appears to be growing agreement on the need for a rights-based approach to develop greater equity and social justice and to support the development of a non-discriminatory society. The debate about inclusion has, therefore, broadened from one that used to focus on relocating children described as having special educational needs into mainstream schools, to one that seeks to provide high-quality education – and consequent benefits – for all learners.

As more countries move to a wider definition of inclusive education, diversity is recognised as 'natural' in any group of learners and inclusive education can be seen as a means of raising achievement through the presence (access to education), participation (quality of the learning experience) and achievement (learning processes and outcomes) of **all** learners.



Agency work on *Key Principles for Promoting Quality in Inclusive Education* (European Agency, 2009b) reinforces the importance of learner-centred/personalised learning approaches, teacher assessment that supports learning, and collaborative work with parents and families – these are, however, key to improving the quality of education for all learners.

### **Inclusive education as an approach to raise achievement for all learners**

Wilkinson and Pickett note that ‘greater equality, as well as improving the wellbeing of the whole population, is also the key to national standards of achievement’ (2010, p. 29). They stress that if:

*a country wants higher average levels of educational achievement among its school children, it must address the underlying inequality which creates a steeper social gradient in educational achievement (ibid., p. 30).*

Challenging the idea that including all learners may somehow be detrimental to high achievement, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2011) shows that improving the lowest performing students does not have to be at the expense of higher performers. The findings of the UNESCO report *Learning Divides* (Willms, 2006) also provide evidence that strong school performance and equity can go hand-in-hand and that countries with the highest levels of performance tend to be those that are successfully raising the achievement of all learners (European Agency, 2012d).

According to the Agency’s *RA4AL* report,

*Farrell and colleagues (2007) ... found a small body of research to suggest that placing learners with SEN in mainstream schools has no major adverse consequences for all children’s academic achievement, behaviour and attitudes. A systematic review of the literature commissioned by the Evidence for Policy and Practice Initiative (EPPI) (Kalambouka et al., 2005) also found that, in general, there are no adverse effects on learners without SEN when learners with special needs are included in mainstream schools (European Agency, 2012d, p. 8).*

Several studies outline the benefits of inclusion for learners without disabilities. These benefits include:

*increased appreciation and acceptance of individual differences and diversity, respect for all people, preparation for adult life in an inclusive society and opportunities to master activities by practising and teaching others. Such effects are also documented in recent research, for example Bennett and Gallagher (2012) (European Agency, 2012d, p. 8).*



*The positive impact of inclusive placements on learners with disabilities is noted by research such as MacArthur et al. (2005) and de Graaf et al. (2011). This includes improved social relationships and networks, peer role models, increased achievement, higher expectations, increased collaboration among school staff and improved integration of families into the community (European Agency, 2012d, p. 8).*

Further benefits may include access to wider curriculum opportunities and recognition and accreditation of achievement.

*Consideration should be given to improving the organisation of ‘spaces’ for learning and providing more opportunities for learners to discover talents in a range of areas beyond academic learning (ibid., p. 25).*

Research by Chapman et al. (2011) focussed specifically on:

*leadership that promotes achievement for learners with SEN/disability and suggested that the presence of a diverse student population can, under the right organisational conditions, stimulate collaborative arrangements and encourage innovative ways of teaching hard to reach groups (European Agency, 2012d, p. 21).*

### **‘What is good for pupils with SEN is good for all pupils’**

This statement made in the Agency publication *Inclusive Education and Classroom Practice* (European Agency, 2003, p. 33) has, since that time, been frequently reiterated in Agency work.

For example, the same study highlighted that:

*peer tutoring or co-operative learning is effective in both cognitive and affective (social-emotional) areas of pupils’ learning and development. Pupils that help each other, especially within a system of flexible and well-considered pupil grouping, profit from learning together (ibid., p. 23).*

In Agency work on inclusive practice in secondary schools in 2005, it was stressed that:

*All students – including students with SEN – demonstrate improvements in their learning with systematic monitoring, assessment, planning and evaluation of their work (European Agency, 2005, p. 8)*

and that:

*All students benefit from co-operative learning: the student who explains to the other student retains information better and for longer and the needs of the student who is learning are better addressed by a peer whose level of understanding is only slightly higher than his or her own level (ibid., pp. 18–19).*



The *RA4AL* report states that:

*a system that allows learners to progress towards common goals, but through different routes, using different styles of learning and assessment, should be more inclusive and raise the achievement of all learners* (European Agency, 2012d, p. 25).

Agency work on *Assessment in Inclusive Settings* also notes the need to involve all learners and parents/families in both the learning and the assessment process (Watkins, 2007).

The same report points out that the process of differentiation needs careful consideration. Although it may also be associated with individualisation and personalisation and seen as a way to meet more specific individual or group needs, it often remains teacher-centred rather than learner-led. Personalisation needs to start with the needs and interests of all learners.

In the Agency's more recent *i-access* project, it is noted that the benefits of assistive technology or 'enabling technology' often prove useful for a large variety of users. 'Accessibility benefits users with disabilities and/or special educational needs and may often benefit all users' (European Agency, 2012e, p. 22).

The views of young people with and without disabilities expressed in the *Young Views on Inclusive Education* publication provide a clear summary of the benefits of inclusive education for all learners. As one young learner said: 'Inclusive education is for all children. Normal schools should be near their homes. This experience promotes meeting people from the neighbourhood' (European Agency, 2012a, p. 11). Others added: 'Students with and without special needs can learn from each other and exchange their knowledge', 'It is good for us – good for them. It is important to recognise the benefits to everyone in the class' and 'Inclusive education helps mainstream children to become more tolerant, with more open minds' (ibid., p. 22).

### **Monitoring progress**

As inclusive education has broadened to consider quality education for all learners, it is necessary to find new ways to monitor progress. It is suggested in Agency work on indicators and the *MIPIE* report (2011a) that, at school level, data collection could consider the factors that impact upon the quality of schools' admission strategies, such as: non-discriminatory admission rules and policies; policies and strategies developed to support learners in disclosing their needs; the existence of a clear policy statement against bullying; implementation of existing codes of practice on inclusive education; staff training sessions on admission issues and on creating a welcoming school climate; working respectfully and collaboratively with learners





---

and families; strategies to help learners and families to participate actively in the school community and classroom; and the availability of information, counselling and advice strategies and their impact on learners.

In conclusion, the broader inclusion debate now seeks to provide high-quality education – and benefits – for all learners. Strong school performance and equity can go hand-in-hand.

The education system is complex and fragmented and, at present, lacks coherent thinking about inclusive education. In general, there is little support for principals and leaders who may be trying to bring about change in isolated situations. Diversity is increasing across the system, but the traditions of the past restrict action. Schools' capability must be developed through context awareness, correspondence (between legislation and policy/practice), conceptual clarity and a continuum of support – for all stakeholders – that encourages schools to be proactive rather than reactive. Getting to know all learners and intervening early will develop quality support for all learners that it is seen as part of regular education.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bennett, S. and Gallagher, T.L., 2012. *The Delivery of Education Services for Students who have an Intellectual Disability in the Province of Ontario*. Toronto: Community Living Ontario
- Chapman, C., Ainscow, M., Miles, S. and West, M., 2011. *Leadership that promotes the achievement of students with special educational needs and disabilities*. Nottingham: National College for School Leadership
- Commission of the European Communities, 2008. *Green Paper – Migration & mobility: challenges and opportunities for EU education systems*. {SEC(2008) 2173} /\* COM/2008/0423 final \*/ Brussels: Commission of the European Communities
- Council of the European Union, 2010. *Council conclusions on the social dimension of education and training. 3013th EDUCATION, YOUTH AND CULTURE Council meeting Brussels, 11 May 2010*.  
[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/en/educ/114374.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/educ/114374.pdf) (Last accessed July 2014)
- European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 1999. *Financing of Special Needs Education – A seventeen-country Study of the Relationship between Financing of Special Needs Education and Inclusion*. Middelfart, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education
- European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2002a. *Transition from School to Employment. Key Principles and Recommendations for Policy Makers*. Middelfart, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education. [http://www.european-agency.org/sites/default/files/transition\\_transition\\_entext.pdf](http://www.european-agency.org/sites/default/files/transition_transition_entext.pdf) (Last accessed July 2014)
- European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2002b. *Transition from School to Employment. Main problems, issues and options faced by students with special educational needs in 16 European countries. Summary Report*. Middelfart, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education. [http://www.european-agency.org/sites/default/files/transition-from-school-to-employment\\_Transition-en.pdf](http://www.european-agency.org/sites/default/files/transition-from-school-to-employment_Transition-en.pdf) (Last accessed July 2014)
- European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2003. *Inclusive Education and Classroom Practice. Summary Report*. Odense, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education. <http://www.european-agency.org/publications/ereports/inclusive-education-and-classroom-practices/iecp-en.pdf> (Last accessed July 2014)



European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2005. *Inclusive Education and Classroom Practice in Secondary Education. Summary Report*. Odense, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education. [http://www.european-agency.org/publications/ereports/inclusive-education-and-classroom-practice-in-secondary-education/iecp\\_secondary\\_en.pdf](http://www.european-agency.org/publications/ereports/inclusive-education-and-classroom-practice-in-secondary-education/iecp_secondary_en.pdf) (Last accessed July 2014)

European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2006. *Individual Transition Plans: Supporting the Move from School to Employment*. Odense, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education. [http://www.european-agency.org/publications/ereports/individual-transition-plans-supporting-the-move-from-school-to-employment/itp\\_en.pdf](http://www.european-agency.org/publications/ereports/individual-transition-plans-supporting-the-move-from-school-to-employment/itp_en.pdf) (Last accessed July 2014)

European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2009a. *Multicultural Diversity and Special Needs Education*. Odense, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education. <http://www.european-agency.org/publications/ereports/multicultural-diversity-and-special-needs-education/multicultural-diversity-and-special-needs-education> (Last accessed July 2014)

European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2009b. *Key Principles for Promoting Quality in Inclusive Education – Recommendations for Policy Makers*. Odense, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education. <http://www.european-agency.org/publications/ereports/key-principles-for-promoting-quality-in-inclusive-education/key-principles-EN.pdf> (Last accessed July 2014)

European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2010. *Early Childhood Intervention – Progress and Developments 2005–2010*. Odense, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education. <http://www.european-agency.org/publications/ereports/early-childhood-intervention-progress-and-developments/EI-report-EN.pdf> (Last accessed July 2014)

European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2011a. *Mapping the Implementation of Policy for Inclusive Education: An exploration of challenges and opportunities for developing indicators*. Odense, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education. <http://www.european-agency.org/agency-projects/mapping-the-implementation-of-policy-for-inclusive-education> (Last accessed July 2014)

European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2011b. *Teacher Education for Inclusion Across Europe – Challenges and Opportunities*. Odense,



Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education.  
<http://www.european-agency.org/publications/ereports/te4i-challenges-and-opportunities/te4i-challenges-and-opportunities> (Last accessed July 2014)

European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2011c. *Key Principles for Promoting Quality in Inclusive Education – Recommendations for Practice*. Odense, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education.  
<http://www.european-agency.org/publications/ereports/key-principles-for-promoting-quality-in-inclusive-education-1/Key-Principles-2011-EN.pdf> (Last accessed July 2014)

European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2011d. *Participation in Inclusive Education – A Framework for Developing Indicators*. Odense, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education.  
<http://www.european-agency.org/publications/ereports/participation-in-inclusive-education-a-framework-for-developing-indicators/Participation-in-Inclusive-Education.pdf> (Last accessed July 2014)

European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2012a. *Young Views on Inclusive Education*. Odense, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education.  
<http://www.european-agency.org/publications/ereports/young-views-on-inclusive-education/YoungViews-2012EN.pdf> (Last accessed July 2014)

European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2012b. *Profile of Inclusive Teachers*. Odense, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education.  
<http://www.european-agency.org/agency-projects/Teacher-Education-for-Inclusion/Profile-of-Inclusive-Teachers.pdf> (Last accessed July 2014)

European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2012c. *Raising Achievement for All Learners – Quality in Inclusive Education. Report on the conference held in Odense, Denmark on 13<sup>th</sup>–15<sup>th</sup> June 2012*. Odense, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education.  
<http://www.european-agency.org/sites/default/files/RA4AL-conference-report.pdf> (Last accessed July 2014)

European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2012d. *Raising Achievement for All Learners – Quality in Inclusive Education*. Odense, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education.  
<http://www.european-agency.org/publications/ereports/ra4al-synthesis-report/RA4AL-synthesis-report.pdf> (Last accessed July 2014)

European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2012e. *Promoting Accessible Information for Lifelong Learning: Recommendations and findings of the i-access project*. Odense, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special



Needs Education. <http://www.european-agency.org/publications/ereports/i-access/i-access-report.pdf> (Last accessed July 2014)

European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2012f. *Vocational Education and Training: Policy and Practice in the field of Special Needs Education – Literature Review*. Odense, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education. <http://www.european-agency.org/agency-projects/vocational-education-and-training/vet-files/VET-LiteratureReview.pdf> (Last accessed July 2014)

European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2012g. *Teacher Education for Inclusion: Project Recommendations linked to Sources of Evidence*. Odense, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education. <http://www.european-agency.org/agency-projects/Teacher-Education-for-Inclusion/sources-of-evidence.pdf> (Last accessed July 2014)

European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2013. *European and International Policy Supporting ICT for Inclusion*. Odense, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education. [http://www.european-agency.org/sites/default/files/european-and-international-policy-supporting-ict-for-inclusion\\_policy-supporting-ict-for-inclusion.pdf](http://www.european-agency.org/sites/default/files/european-and-international-policy-supporting-ict-for-inclusion_policy-supporting-ict-for-inclusion.pdf) (Last accessed July 2014)

European Agency for Special Needs and Inclusive Education, 2014. *Vocational Education and Training – Summary of Country Information*. Odense, Denmark: European Agency for Special Needs and Inclusive Education. <http://www.european-agency.org/sites/default/files/VET Summary of Country information 2014.pdf> (Last accessed July 2014)

Farrell, P., Dyson, A.S., Polat, F., Hutcheson, G. and Gallannaugh, F., 2007. 'SEN inclusion and pupil achievement in English schools' *Journal of Research in Special Educational Needs*, 7(3), 172–178

Frilseth, L., 2012. *The Norwegian Model for Education for All in Upper Secondary School*. Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training. <http://www.european-agency.org/agency-projects/ra4al/ra4al-seminar-pdf/Norway-L-Frilseth.pdf> (Last accessed July 2014)

Fullan, M., 2011. *Change Leader: Learning to do what matters most*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass

de Graaf, G., van Hove, G. and Haveman, M., 2011. 'More academics in regular schools? The effect of regular versus special school placement on academic skills in Dutch primary school students with Down syndrome' *Journal of International Disability Research*, December 2011, 57(1), 21–38. doi: 10.1111/j.1365-2788.2011.01512.x



- Hargreaves, A. and Shirley, D., 2009. *The Fourth Way – The inspiring future for educational change*. Joint publication with Ontario Principals' Council and National Staff Development Council. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press
- Kalambouka, A., Farrell, P., Dyson, A. and Kaplan, I., 2005. *The impact of population inclusivity in schools on student outcomes*. Research Evidence in Education Library. London: EPPI-Centre, Social Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London
- Kyriazopoulou, M. and Weber, H. (editors), 2009. *Development of a set of indicators – for inclusive education in Europe*. Odense, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education. <http://www.european-agency.org/publications/ereports/development-of-a-set-of-indicators-for-inclusive-education-in-europe/Indicators-EN-with-cover.pdf> (Last accessed July 2014)
- MacArthur, J., 2009. *Learning Better Together: Working towards inclusive education in New Zealand schools*. Wellington: IHC
- MacArthur, J., Kelly, B., Sharp, S. & Gaffney, M., 2005. *Participation or exclusion? Disabled children's experiences of life at school*. A paper presented at the Children's Issues Conference, Dunedin, New Zealand, July 2005
- Menter, I., Hulme, M., Elliott, D. and Lewin, J., 2010. *Literature Review on Teacher Education in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Scottish Government Social Research. Edinburgh: Scottish Government
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011. *PISA in Focus. Improving Performance: Leading from the Bottom*. 2011/2 (March). Paris: OECD
- Redley, M., 2009. 'Understanding the social exclusion and stalled welfare of citizens with learning disabilities' *Disability & Society*, 24(4), 489–501
- UNESCO Institute for Information Technologies in Education and European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2011. *ICTs in Education for People with Disabilities: Review of innovative practice*. Moscow: UNESCO Institute for Information Technologies in Education. <http://www.european-agency.org/publications/ereports/ICTs-in-Education-for-People-With-Disabilities/Review-of-Innovative-Practice> (Last accessed July 2014)
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2009. *Policy Guidelines on Inclusion in Education*. Paris: UNESCO
- United Nations, 2006. *Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities*. New York: United Nations
- Watkins, A. (editor), 2007. *Assessment in Inclusive Settings: Key Issues for Policy and Practice*. Odense, Denmark: European Agency for Development in Special Needs



---

Education. <http://www.european-agency.org/publications/ereports/assessment-in-inclusive-settings-key-issues-for-policy-and-practice/assessment-in-inclusive-settings-key-issues-for-policy-and-practice> (Last accessed July 2014)

Wilkinson, R. and Pickett, K., 2010. *The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone*. London: Penguin

Willms, J.D., 2006. *Learning divides: Ten policy questions about the performance and equity of schools and schooling systems*. Montreal: UNESCO Institute for Statistics

World Health Organization/World Bank, 2011. *World Report on Disability*. Geneva: WHO Press. [http://www.who.int/disabilities/world\\_report/2011/en/index.html](http://www.who.int/disabilities/world_report/2011/en/index.html) (Last accessed July 2014)

# 6

## **Political Aspects of Social Inclusion – What Are Inclusive Policies?**



# 6

1. Etzioni, Amitai. 2001. *The Third Way to a Good Society*. Center for Communitarian Policy Studies of The George Washington University, Washington, DC.
2. Bates, Peter and Fabian A. Davis. 2004. "Social Capital, Social Inclusion and Services for People with Learning Disabilities." *Disability and Society* 19 (3): 195-207.

# THE THIRD WAY TO A GOOD SOCIETY<sup>1</sup>

Amitai Etzioni\*

## *Abstract*

*The Third Way debate has, so far, not been very successful. While governments across the world search for a new political synthesis, the theoretical debate has offered little to those interested in a new framework for progressive politics. This essay presents an account of what the Third Way really means, and roots it in a communitarian vision of the good society. It argues that such societies achieve a dynamic balance between state, market and community, and blends theoretical discussion with the practical implications of such an approach. At the core of the analysis is the idea that the Third Way is an ethical position that seeks to treat people as ends in themselves. While flexibility and pragmatism are important to the new politics, they should be understood as components of a broader framework, in which social progress is measured by more than the accumulation of material goods. How do we manage devolution successfully? What approach should government take to inequality? What is the proper relationship between rights and responsibilities? The essay illuminates these and other issues, and calls for a broad-ranging moral dialogue to address them.*

## **The Good Society: First Principles**

### The Vision

We need a clearer vision of where the Third Way is taking us. While debates on improvements to public programs or legal structures fascinate some, most people are not interested in technocratic details. They yearn for a vision of where we are headed, one that provides a way of assessing past accomplishments and plans for the future. Such a vision inspires and compels; it lends meaning to our endeavors and sacrifices, to our lives.

We aspire to a society that is not merely civil but is also good. A good society is one in which people treat one another as ends in themselves and not merely as instruments; as whole persons rather than as fragments; as members of a community, bonded by ties of affection and commitment, rather than only as employees, traders, consumers or even as fellow citizens. In the terms of the philosopher Martin Buber, a good society nourishes 'I-Thou' relations, although it recognizes the inevitable and significant role of 'I-It' relations.

Some core values of a good society can be directly derived from its definition. Child abuse, spousal abuse, violent crime in general and of course civil and international war offend the basic principle of treating people as ends. Hence, our love of peace. Furthermore, we hold that violating individual autonomy, unless there are strong compelling public needs, is incompatible with treating people as ends. This is the ultimate foundation of our commitment to liberty.

---

\* Amitai Etzioni is University Professor and Director of the Center for Communitarian Policy Studies of The George Washington University, Washington, DC.

When we find value in creating or appreciating art, music and other expressions of culture, or engage in learning for its own sake, we typically are in the realm of ends. In contrast, when we trade in these items we are in the instrumental realm, which is quite legitimate, as long as it does not intrude on, let alone dominate, that of ends.

When we bond with family, friends or community members we live up to the basic principle of the good society. The values of love, loyalty, caring and community all find their roots here. In contrast, when we 'network' – bonding for a utilitarian purpose rather for its own sake – we abandon this realm.

The relationship of the basic principle to social justice is a complex one. The priority of treating people as ends requires more than equality of opportunity but less than equality of outcomes; it denotes a rich basic minimum for all. Still other values arise more indirectly, we shall see, out of moral dialogues. These seek to limit conflict and cultural wars and put a premium on reaching shared understandings – a major attribute of good societies.

The ethical tenet that people are to be treated as purposes rather than only as means is commonly recognized. Less widely accepted is the significant sociological observation that it is in communities, not in the realm of the state nor the market, that this tenet is best institutionalized.

Equally pivotal is the recognition that only in a society where no one is excluded, and all are treated with equal respect, are all people accorded the status of being ends in themselves and allowed to reach their full human potential. Furthermore, the core communitarian idea – that we have inalienable individual rights *and* social responsibilities for each other – is based on the same basic principle: we are both *entitled* to be treated as ends in ourselves and are *required* to treat others and our communities in this way.

The good society is one that balances three often partially incompatible elements: the state, the market, and the community. This is the underlying logic of the statements above. The good society does not seek to obliterate these segments but to keep them properly nourished – and contained.

Similarly, much has been made already of the fact that the Third Way (neue Mitte, centrist approach, communitarian thinking) does not view the government as the problem or as the solution but as one partner of the good society. Nor does it see the market as a source of all that is good or evil but as a powerful economic engine that must be accorded sufficient space to do its work while also guarded properly.

Different Third Way societies still struggle with finding the proper point of balance. The continental societies still have a long way to go toward curtailing the state and allowing the market to function properly. The United States may well have overshot the point of balance by according the market too much space. The United Kingdom and Holland might be drawing closer to the point of balance. Germany and above all France are still reliant on the big state. However, the third partner of the good society – the community – has not been given its proper share of the social division of labor in all Third Way societies.

The vision of a good society is a tableau on which we project our aspirations, not a full checklist of all that deserves our dedication. And the vision is often reformulated as the world around us changes, and as we change. Moreover, it points to different steps that different societies best undertake, depending on their place on the Third Way. But the ultimate vision is one and the same.

The good society is an ideal. While we may never quite reach it, it guides our endeavors, and we measure our progress by it.

## 2 The Third Way

*The Third Way is a road that leads us toward the good society.* However, it should be acknowledged at the outset that the Third Way is indeed fuzzy at the edges, not fully etched. As *The Economist* (1998) wrote about the Third Way: 'Trying to pin down an exact meaning is like wrestling an inflatable man. If you get a grip on one limb, all the hot air rushes to another.' Professor Steven Teles (n.d.) of Brandeis University has called the Third Way 'a masterwork of ambiguity'. But this is one of the main virtues of this approach: it points to the directions that we ought to follow, but is neither doctrinaire nor an ideological rigid system.

The Third Way is not American, British or the property of any other nation or region or culture. Among its numerous origins are the Old and the New Testament; the teachings of the Ancient Greeks; Asian, Muslim and Jewish conceptions of harmony and responsibility for others than self; Fabian thinking; Catholic social thought; and much else.<sup>2</sup>

The Third Way has often been depicted in *negative* terms, in terms of that which it is not. It is correctly stated as neither a road paved by statist socialism nor one underpinned by the neoliberalism of the free market. It tilts neither to the right nor to the left. (In the US – which has had no significant socialist tradition – the Third Way runs between a New Deal conception of big state, which administers large-scale social programs and extensively regulates the economy, and a libertarian or laissez faire unfettered market.<sup>3</sup>)

Here, an attempt is made to furnish it with a positive and normative characterization as a public philosophy that both provides principles and points to public policy implications. Above all, we suggest changes people will have to introduce into their own ways of conduct and their institutions.

Is there one Third Way or multiple Third Ways? While some societies drive more in the left lane (France, Italy) and some more in the right (the United States), the road they all travel is fully distinct from the one charted by totalitarian and libertarian approaches. Moreover, while the various Third Way societies differ in their specific synthesis of the ways of the state and the market, they are pulling closer to one another.

Much has been written about the need to find a way that will allow European economies to compete globally but not become Americanized; to enhance economic flexibility and productivity but not yield all to the service of mammon; to develop a new European social model. Much of what follows addresses these questions by focusing on two key issues: the role of community on the Third Way and the need to set clear limits on how far one ought to tilt in the American direction.

## 2 The Roles of the Community

### 2. The Neglected Partner

#### *Communities defined*

Communities are the main social entities that nourish ends-based (I-Thou) relationships, while the market is the realm of means-based (I-It) relationships. The state-citizen relationship also tends to the instrumental. True, some people bond at work, and some barter in communities, but by and large without communities a deficit in ends-based relationships is sure to be pronounced. As John Gray (1996: 16) put it: 'The flourishing of individuals presupposes strong and deep forms of common life.' In short, communities are a major component of good societies.

The concept of community is often said to be vague and elusive. This charge is also made against other widely used concepts such as class, elites and even rationality. Communities, in my understanding, are based on two foundations, both of which reinforce I-Thou relationships. First, communities provide bonds of affection that turn groups of people into social entities resembling extended families. Second, they transmit a shared moral culture (a set of shared social meanings and values, which characterize that which the community considers virtuous versus unacceptable behavior) from generation to generation, as well as reformulating this moral framework day by day. These traits define and differentiate communities.

While in earlier eras, and to some extent today, communities were largely residential (membership was geographically defined, as in villages), this is now often not the case. Contemporary communities evolve among members of one profession working for the same institution (for example, the physicians of a given hospital or the faculty of a college); members of an ethnic or racial group even if dispersed among others (a Jewish community or one of Bangladeshi immigrants in east London); people who share a sexual orientation; or intellectuals of the same political or cultural feather. Some communities are quite large, and in part imagined; for instance, many gay men visiting another part of the country know socially some people who live there and feel close to others they meet there for the first time.

Groups that merely share a specific interest – to prevent the internet from being taxed or to reduce the costs of postage – are solely an interest group or lobby. They lack the affective bonds and shared culture that make communities into places that truly involve people rather than focusing on a narrow facet of their lives.

Critics correctly point out that communities are not necessarily places of brotherly and sisterly love; they may be oppressive, intolerant, nasty. This is largely true of communities in earlier eras. In democratic societies, people often choose which communities to join and participate in, making communities as a rule less overpowering. While even contemporary communities are far from perfect, the same obviously holds for the state and the market. We must stop comparing existing social entities to some visionary utopia and ask instead how they can be improved. And we must recognize that each of the three partners is better (not necessarily good) at some tasks than the others. Communities are often overlooked as a very important social factor even by Third Way advocates, who tend to focus on seeking the proper balance between the state and the market.<sup>4</sup> In a well balanced society all three complement and contain one another.

### *The relative advantage of communities*

The special capacity of communities to move us toward the good society is highlighted by the finding that people who live in communities live longer, healthier and more content lives than people who are bereft of such membership. They are likely to have significantly fewer psychosomatic illnesses and mental health problems than those who live in isolation. And, with their craving for sociality well sated, community members are much less likely to join violent gangs, religious cults or militias.

The fact that social isolation is dangerous for mental health was highlighted in 1955 during the first mission to establish a US base in Antarctica, where isolation provoked paranoid psychosis (Stuster 1996: 8). Since then, numerous studies have shown that isolation significantly increases various psychological health risks.<sup>5</sup> In their classic study of New Yorkers lonely in high-rise apartments, *Mental Health in the Metropolis*, Leo Srole and his associates (1962) found that 60 percent of the residents had sub-clinical psychiatric conditions and 20 percent were judged psychologically impaired. Numerous studies have demonstrated that, after work-related stress, the most important social factor in mental health is marital, familial and friendship relationships (Walz 1994: 56-57). Elderly people who live alone, have no friends, or have poor relationships with their children are 60 percent more likely to develop dementia than those whose social contacts are more satisfying, according to a study published by the medical journal *The Lancet* (Fratiglioni 2000).

Communities, data shows, can play a major role in providing preventive and acute care, reducing the need for publicly funded social services as divergent as child care, grief counselling and professional drug and alcohol abuse treatment, as well as assisting in curtailing juvenile delinquency.

The strongest evidence for these statements is found in religious communities that meet my definition of shared affective bonds and a moral culture. Practically all kinds of anti-social behavior are relatively low among Mormon communities in Utah, Orthodox Jewish communities in New York, and Black Muslim groups. They are also lower, on average, in villages and small-town America as compared to large cities, where communities are less prevalent.

There are scores of studies similar to the ones summarized here that highlight communities' important role. Patrols of volunteers, called Orange Hats, chased drug dealers out of their neighborhood in Washington, DC. In the process, members of the community also became closer to one another.

In 1988, Wellsburg, West Virginia, had a particularly high incidence of heart disease – 29 percent above the national average. By 1996, the community's cardiovascular health profile was among the best in the state, according to a study conducted by Mary Lou Hurley and Lisa Schiff. The improvement reflected community organized walks, healthy potluck suppers and numerous classes in aerobics and ways to reduce cholesterol, blood pressure and stress. A screening of 182 community members found that they had maintained their weight loss and most of the reduction in cholesterol and blood pressure. According to the researchers, 'the average wellness score ... topped the 1988 baseline by 12 percent and the average fitness score by 42 percent' (Hurley & Schiff 1996).

In the county of Tillamook, Oregon, diverse community groups, including religious and liberal ones, decided to collaborate on the problem of teenage pregnancy, leading to a decrease from twenty-four pregnancies per thousand girls age ten to seventeen in 1990 to seven per thousand in 1994 (Luke & Neville 1998).

These are but a few illustrative findings. Aside from significantly reducing public costs, communal provisions such as these are often much more individually tailored than public programs and can be made much less alienating than government action.

*Ergo, next*

For all these reasons, cultivating communities where they exist, and helping them form where they have been lost, is essential for future provision of much social good; it should be a major priority for future progress along the Third Way.

In the next years communities should be increasingly relied upon to shoulder a greater share of those social missions that must be undertaken, because – to reiterate – communities can do so at a much lower public cost and with greater humanity than either the state or the market. In effect, *communities may well be the most important new source of social services in the foreseeable future, as the ability to increase taxes to pay for social services is nearly exhausted, and the total costs will continue to rise at rates higher than inflation.*<sup>6</sup>

Seeking much greater reliance on communities is not an attempt to replace the welfare state. On the contrary, by reducing the burden on the welfare state, communities help sustain it.

Existing public policies and procedures should be reviewed regularly to ensure that the renewal and maintenance of existing communities is not inadvertently undermined (for example, by preempting their natural roles) and that these policies and procedures opportune community development on a local, regional and societal level.

To foster communities the prime minister may call on all ministers to provide him annually with reports on steps to involve communities more in their work; community ‘audits’ could further assess where there is room for greater community involvement; and statistics ought to be published regularly about progress in the needed direction. However, experience shows that such measures are much more effective if they are represented, symbolically and in practice, by high profile institutions. This strongly suggests that one should create a special division within a suitable ministry (for example, the Home Office or the Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions) or better yet, create a new ministry dedicated to community development. While critics are likely to complain about centralism, forming some kind of permanent taskforce for community development in a government department would further reinforce this important mission.

Much has been made in recent years about the new ways through which the state might project itself. It has been said it should be an ‘enabler’ and a ‘catalyst’ rather than itself directing and financing social programs. This postmodern management is said to be flat rather than hierarchical; based on networking rather than directive; serving public goals indirectly via the market. A good part of this is true, and needs no repeating here. Some of it is over-hyped; the management style most suited for social work may not be the same for building a destroyer and so on. Above all, Third Way management styles must be tailored not merely to take into account various combinations of the state and the market but also to involve communities.

## 2.2 Mutuality and Voluntary Associations

A good society relies even more on mutuality than on voluntarism. Mutuality is a form of community relationship in which people help each other rather than merely helping those in need.<sup>7</sup> The Neighborhood Watch scheme and anti-crime patrols (by community volunteers) such as in Balsall Heath in Birmingham, where crime was reduced by six citizen teams regularly patrolling the streets (Leadbeater 1997), are examples of mutuality. So are consumer and producer cooperatives, like Local Food Buying Groups and mutual saving associations such as credit unions (Leadbeater & Martin 1998). Fostering Tenant Management Associations in council estates rather than relying mainly on government or profit-making management is another case in point.

Mutuality-based associations have always existed and have been on the rise in recent years. Still, they need to be much expanded, encouraged, and refurbished with the needed resources in order to carry more of the social burdens in the years to come.

Mutuality is commonly and naturally practiced among family members, friends, neighbours, colleagues and members of voluntary associations. It can be an important source of child care (such as in parent cooperatives, where parents provide a few hours of service each week, thereby reducing public costs and providing natural staff accountability); sick care (for instance, when people are discharged 'early' from hospitals to be helped by kin and other community members); grief support; and much else.

Mutual-help groups (oddly often called self-help groups) can play a major role coping with cancer, contagious diseases, alcoholism, obesity and the like (probably the best known is the highly successful Alcoholics Anonymous – Wuthnow 1994: 71). They are a vastly underused resource. In the new century, public services, especially the National Health Service and welfare agencies, should greatly increase efforts highlighting the value of such groups, as well as help prime them and provide resources. It must, however, ensure that its role in initiating and conducting these groups does not sap these groups' natural communal flows or stunt their development.

Mutuality is undermined when treated like an economic exchange of services. (Undermining occurs, for example, when governments pay friends to be friends as some countries do to ensure that someone visits and informally assists those discharged from hospitals.) Mutuality is based on an open-ended moral commitment. In mutual relationships, people do not keep books on each other but have a generalized expectation that the other will do his or her turn if and when a need arises. Public policies and arrangements that attempt to organize mutuality as if it were an exchange will tend to undermine this moral foundation. Examples of such policies are 'time banks', in which hours spent baby sitting, for example, are recorded and the same amount of hours in voluntary service are expected in return, or establishing programs like used clothing exchanges, in which the amount of clothes one contributes determines the amount one receives from the exchange. Much looser, more informal 'arrangements' – of the kind that prevail among people who 'exchange' gifts – are preferred. At the same time, posting on a website or other public place the time contributions various members of a community have made, as one does for financial donations, may help foster such contributions.

To favor mutuality is not to make light of voluntarism. Indeed, it should be further encouraged. A good start in this direction are Chancellor Gordon Brown's policies encouraging a spirit of voluntarism and civic patriotism. His measures include matching



people who want to offer their time and money through voluntary work with charitable and voluntary organizations seeking volunteers, via a dedicated website.

The importance of voluntarism for community building, civic spirit and democratic government has been set out many times and requires no repetition. It should be noted, however, that several Third Way societies, especially on the continent, still have a long way to go before voluntarism is properly developed and can assume its share of the social business that must be conducted.

Voluntarism is best carried out, whenever possible, in the service learning mode. *Service learning* is a form of voluntarism in which those who serve do not maintain they are acting purely through altruism but instead acknowledge that they themselves benefit educationally and socially from their experience. It is especially compatible with the ideal of treating people as ends, although all forms of voluntarism are preferable to pure means-based relationships.

The question often arises: who will be able to provide more time for mutuality and voluntarism, given that more and more women, who used to be a major source of both, are now in paid employment? One answer may well be senior citizens. They are a rapidly growing class; live longer and healthier lives than their predecessors; consume a growing proportion of the societal resources; and would greatly benefit from staying involved in pro-social roles. Without their contribution, societies may well not be able to attend to a large and growing portion of its social business.

While each member of every community ought to be both required and expected to make contributions to the common good above and beyond that of their own community (for instance, by paying taxes due in full), they should be allowed, indeed encouraged, to provide 'extras' for their own community. Hence, it is crucial for communities to be free to levy some form of fees, dues or taxes above those levied by the state. Parents should be welcomed when they contribute services, money and assets to their children's schools rather than be expected to put their resources into an anonymous pot from which all schools may draw. Ethically, it is too heroic to expect that people will be willing to do for one and all as much as they are willing to do for their own communities. And limiting contributions to universal pots is incompatible with a society that views communities as essential, constitutive social entities.

At the same time communities should be encouraged to care about the fate of other communities; for example, better-off communities should be expected to help those less endowed. To the extent they assist their sister communities, the affluent ones could be celebrated and given tax benefits. Special levies could be dedicated to specific projects, making them more readily accepted than increases in general taxes.

Much more realistic and valuable programs are regional ones, in which communities help one another with arrangements that vary from rapid transit system to coordinating police efforts, from building highways and bridges to sharing an airport. These sharing arrangements are often quite properly touted as enhancing efficiency (indeed many would not be possible without regional collaboration). However, they often – although by no means always – do serve as somewhat indirect forms of reallocation of resources, as the better-off communities pick up a larger share of the costs than the other ones, or the less endowed ones reap a disproportionate part of the benefits generated.

## 2.3 Pro-community Public Policies

Community renewal can be enhanced by providing occasions for social gatherings (for example, opening schools for community meetings; fostering neighborhood street festivals). Temporary organizers can be assigned to an area to initiate group formations. And community renewal benefits from improving the physical conditions, safety, and accessibility of public spaces. (For a compelling example, see the discussion of schools as community hubs in Bentley 1998 and Jupp 1999.)

Renewal is also fostered by inviting groups of people sharing the use of a property, area or public service to participate in decision-making regarding its use. Examples include citizens setting the hours a park is open, who may use it (children *and* dogs?) and for what purposes (public assembly or communing with nature?). More support must be given to groups of citizens like those who set park opening times and bylaws in the Phoenix Community Park near Charing Cross Road in central London (Warpole & Greenhalgh 1997). Calling on such groups to assume some responsibility for maintaining shared facilities can further enhance bonds among the members. Major benefits can be achieved if people are helped to form shopping coops, mutual saving and loan associations, and other forms of economic organization that parallel and hence enforce communal bonds.

For communities to flourish, public policies must take into account that often communities' boundaries do not conform to administrative ones. These boundaries should be tailored to the communities' lines rather than attempt to make communities adhere to a preset administrative geography.

In addition, public policies need to be tailored to smaller social units than are often encompassed in one administrative district, because communities are often smaller. This applies to policies such as the New Deal for Communities, aimed at smaller neighbourhoods of 2-5,000 people, and the National Strategy for Neighborhood Renewal. The reorganization of core social policy programs around smaller neighbourhood units is an ongoing priority. Increased devolution allows more citizens to participate in their own government, become more politically engaged, and increase their civic skill and effect. For instance, neighborhood officers entrusted with patrolling local areas for deteriorating facilities, environmental problems and social conflicts can be helpful especially if elected rather than appointed, and if their priorities are set either solely by the affected communities or at least in close consultation with them.

Policy-makers should take into account that communities need not be residential or include members who live next to one another. Communities can form around institutions (universities, hospitals) or professions (longshoremen, accountants). They are often ethnically based and can even form in cyberspace (virtual communities). Best results are achieved when communities that already share social bonds are further reinforced by providing them with access to a shared online 'wired' space.

Thriving communities often need core institutions such as local schools, courthouses, post offices and downtown shopping areas. Under some conditions, such as when an area has been largely depopulated, it might make sense to yield to considerations of economic and administrative efficiency and consolidate or 'regionalize' such institutions or allow downtown shopping to be replaced by supermalls. However, such economic and administrative efficiencies should never be considered the only relevant considerations. To put it differently, a Third Way society gives much weight to social costs that include costs resulting from the loss of

community when its core institutions are shut down. Only when non-social considerations clearly outweigh social ones should core institutions, the mainstays of community, be closed.

## 2.4 Community Safety

Policies that seek to sustain or renew communities must take into account that communities are formed and reinforced largely in public spaces rather than in the privacy of one's home. To the extent that these spaces are unsafe or depleted, communities are diminished. Therefore, communities should take special care to maintain public playgrounds, sidewalks, pedestrian walkways, parks and plazas. For non-residential communities this might entail providing meeting spaces in, for instance, public schools or libraries; setting aside segments of public parks for picnics; and providing group-based transportation, such as vans that bring senior citizens or handicapped people to day centers.

Public safety and community welfare benefit from the introduction of 'thick' community policing that entails much more than merely getting cops out of their cars to walk the beat. This involves the community in setting priorities for the police and in overseeing their conduct. And it requires involving the police in conflict resolution and in the protection of the overall quality of life.<sup>8</sup>

All future building, street, neighborhood and town planning should provide for enhanced public safety and community building. Among the numerous possibilities are wider sidewalks, porches that abut sidewalks, gates that block traffic but not pedestrians and much more. (The British experiment in modern tower-block building during the 1970's which decimated communities that had existed in many working class neighborhoods parallels similar calamitous projects in the United States.)

Currently in the UK there is no duty to inform local residents about repeat sexual offenders released into a community. When pedophiles, who have a very high recidivism rate, are released from jail and move into a neighbourhood, there should be a duty to inform communities. At the same time, communities should be warned against harassing these offenders. (While such a combination may sound utopian, it has been approximated in the US state of Washington.)

Criminals who have paid their dues to society, served their sentences and led a legitimate life without any new arrests for ten years should have their rights fully restored and their records sequestered. Such records would be reopened before sentencing only if they have been reconvicted. In this way a good society can foster repentance, leading to full restoration of former criminals to membership in the community.

Restorative justice, especially for non-violent first-time offenders, serves the same purpose. This practice requires offenders to meet with their victims in the presence of third parties from the community. In the process, offenders learn about the victims' suffering, express their regrets, and make amends. The goal is to mix punishment with rehabilitation, and to keep these offenders as integrated members of the community (Clear & Karp 1999).

### 3 Moral Culture and its Institutions

#### 3. The Power of the Moral Culture of Communities

The primary social role of communities is often seen to be its fostering of interpersonal bonding, rather than its provision of moral culture. However, both have an important role in nourishing I-Thou relationships and in undertaking important social functions. While community bonding satisfies a profound human need, *moral culture can serve to enhance social order significantly while reducing the need for state intervention in social behavior*. One should not allow legitimate ambivalence about the moral voices of communities (which will be addressed shortly) to overwhelm their tremendous potential contributions to good forms of social order.

There are clearly some forms of behavior that a good society considers anathema and must seek to curb (such as damaging the environment, domestic violence, neglect of children, selling liquor and cigarettes to minors). The moral culture of the community helps to define such behaviors. Most importantly, the community's ability to draw on subtle and informal processes of social regulation, such as approbation and censure, is much more compatible with ends-based relations than relying on the coercive powers of the state.

Extensive studies have demonstrated that these processes play a major role in curbing drug abuse, preventing petty crime and violation of the environment, and much else (Luke & Neville 1998). Aside from curbing anti-social behavior, the moral culture of communities can also foster good conduct, including attending to one's children and elders, paying taxes, volunteering and many other pro-social activities (Sampson 1997).

While one should not exaggerate the role that community forms of social regulation play in reducing serious crime, the considerable success of those already implemented shows both the value of mobilizing communities on the side of social order and one way these reductions can be achieved much more extensively than has been done so far.

One of the main virtues of drawing on the informal regulation of communities to foster pro-social behavior is that few if any public costs are exacted, and such processes are much more sensitive to subtle individual differences than official programs.<sup>9</sup>

Third Way governments do best when they resist the rush to legislate good behavior. When there is a valid need to modify behavior, the state should realize that relying on informal community-based processes is preferable to relying on the law.<sup>10</sup>

Third Way governments should realize that legislation often numbs the moral conscience. When legislation is introduced in places where a moral culture *does* exist, the result frequently will be to diminish the moral voices of the community. For example, if the government were to rule that alcoholics attend AA meetings or face jail sentences, such meetings would be far less effective than those in which attendees participate because of their own inner motivations and the encouragement of those close to them.

We have also learned from attempts to suppress divorce, abortions and consumption of alcohol by law that such policies tend to backfire and should be avoided, whether or not one opposes these behaviors. One should have faith in faith; the shortest line to pro-social conduct, whatever one considers such conduct to be, entails convincing people of the merits of the moral claims we lay on them. The law best

follows new shared moral understandings rather than trying to lead them. The American Prohibition is a telling case study of what happens when this point is ignored.

This is not to suggest that there is no room for legislation concerning moral and social issues. However, it is far better for informal social processes to underpin pro-social behavior than for the police, courts, and inspectors to do so. And laws that supplement and help sustain moral cultures will be more effective and humane than those that try to take the lead.

The difference between ‘naked’ laws (not preceded or backed by moral commitments) and ‘well-covered’ ones has major implications for public leaders and politicians. Leaders have two rather distinct roles. One, often underscored, is to prepare legislation and build support for it among the legislators. The other rather different and less well understood role is to build up and change the moral culture. They best combine both attributes and lead with moral persuasion before they call on the legislature. Such leaders can carry their society much further along the Third Way.

### 3.2 Limiting the Power of Communities

While the moral cultures of communities are a major wellspring for constructing a good society, community-based morality itself needs to be scrutinized by members as well as outside observers. One method is to assess the community’s moral culture by drawing on shared societal values as enshrined in the basic laws or the constitution of the state. Communities must be contained and balanced, just like all the other elements that make for a good society.<sup>11</sup>

While one may differ about specifics, in principle no community can be fully relied upon to determine that which is right and wrong. For example, should immigrant communities be allowed to arrange marriages even if there is a large age difference between the couple and consent is doubtful? Should female circumcision or child labor be tolerated? These are not questions over which communities should have the final say, as they concern basic human rights.

Communities in earlier ages, and even some in contemporary free societies, have oppressed individuals and minorities. It is the role of the state to protect the rights of all members in all communities as well as those of outsiders present within the communities’ confines. Thus, no community should be allowed to violate the right to free speech, assembly and so on of anyone – whether they are members, visitors, passers-by or otherwise. Any notion that communities can be relied upon as the sole or final arbitrator of morality falls apart with the simple observation that a community may reach 100 percent consensus in discriminating against some people on the basis of race. This vision of contained yet thriving communities is not farfetched. Numerous communities exist within democratic societies that abide by their constitutions or basic laws. The rules that contain communities may be further extended or curtailed as constitutions are modified, but the basic principle is the same: *unfettered communities are no better than unfettered markets or states*. A good society achieves a balance through mutual containment of its core elements; the community is not exempted. However, the fact that communities can get out of hand should not be used as an argument against communities per se. Like medicine, food and drink, if taken in good measure communities are essential elements of the good life; if taken to excess, they can destroy it.

### 3.3 Rights and Responsibilities

Some people champion individual and human rights and civil liberties as an unbounded principle, to which exceptions are to be tolerated only under very special conditions; others demand that people live up to their duties (whether prescribed by state or church), with very little concern for their rights. At the core of the Third Way ought to be the recognition that a good society combines respect for individual rights and fulfillment of basic human needs with the expectation that members live up to their responsibilities to themselves, their family and friends, and to the community at large.

One of the greatest achievements of the communitarian approach has been curbing the language of rights that has turned every want and interest into a legal entitlement, fostering unnecessary litigiousness.<sup>12</sup> While this is largely an American malaise, in the UK compensation claims have risen exponentially in the past ten years. In the US 'rights talk', which fosters a disregard of social responsibility, was dominant in the 1980's, in the days of rampant individualism. Today, it has been largely replaced by a wide recognition that both individual rights and social responsibilities must be respected (Giddens 1998; Etzioni 1993).

What exactly is meant by 'rights *and* responsibilities'? Basic individual rights are inalienable, just as one's social obligations cannot be denied. However, it is a grave moral error to argue that there are 'no rights without responsibilities' or vice versa.<sup>13</sup> Thus, people who evade taxes, neglect their children or fail to live up to their social responsibilities in some other way are still entitled to a fair trial, free speech, and other basic rights. The number of basic rights we should have may be debated, but those that are legitimate are not conditional. Hence, policies that deny criminals the right to vote while in jail (as holds in both the UK and the US), some even after they have served their term (as is the case in many states in the US), should be modified. Following the same principle, nobody should be denied the basic necessities of life even if they have not lived up to their responsibilities, such as to find work. Society can show its disapproval and punish irresponsible individuals without disenfranchising them or condemning them to abject poverty.

As a corollary, a person whose rights have been curbed – perhaps a person has been denied the right to vote because of a registration foul-up or jail sentence, or has been silenced through a meritless libel suit – is still not exempt from attending to his or her children, not littering and other social responsibilities.

In short, while rights and responsibilities are complementary and necessitate one another, each has its own moral standing and is part and parcel of ends-based relationships. A good society does not deny persons their basic rights even if they do not live up to their responsibilities, just as it does not exempt from responsibility those whose rights have not been fully honored.

#### *Responsibility from all, for all*

Responsibilities *from all* means that a good person, a member of a good society, contributes to the common good. No one is exempt, although of course people will vary greatly in the contributions they can make. In considering this matter, consider a paraplegic who has lost the use of his limbs. He is permanently institutionalized. He uses a small stick in his mouth to turn pages of a book. Should we provide him with a nurse's aide to turn the pages or expect him to take that much responsibility for his own well-being? In order to serve both the person's dignity and the expectation that

everyone will do as much for the common good as they can, we would expect him to turn the pages himself, assuming he can do so without undue effort. If assuming responsibility to the best of one's abilities applies under these circumstances, surely no one is exempt from contributing to the common good in line with his or her ability.

Accordingly, high school students should be encouraged to do community service as part of their civic practice, perhaps as 'millennium volunteers' (Briscoe 1995). Senior citizens should be expected to help each other, members of their families and their community. Those who receive welfare and cannot find gainful work should hold community jobs. People with contagious diseases should be expected to take special pain not to spread it to others and so on.

The reference here is not primarily to legal commitments, enforced by courts and by the police, but to moral obligations.<sup>14</sup> And discharging one's responsibility should not be considered a sacrifice or a punishment but an ennobling activity, something a good person does. Indeed, high school students can gain deep satisfaction from working in soup kitchens, as senior citizens can by voluntarily running social centers for other seniors, and so on.

Responsibility for all is to be paralleled by responsibility *for all*. Responsibility for all means that everybody is to be treated with the respect due to all human beings. This means first of all social inclusion. Communities can play an especially important role in ensuring that everyone is included and treated with the full respect entitled to them by the mere fact of their humanity, as an end in themselves.<sup>15</sup> An obvious example is that discrimination based on race, ethnicity, gender, sexual preference, religious background or disability should be the focus of moral dissuasion and legally banned. Discrimination not only offends our elementary sense of justice – it is incompatible with treating people as ends in themselves.

Responsibility for all also means ensuring that everyone has access to the basic necessities of life. Voluntary associations, extended families, friends, mutual saving associations and religious charity can help to provide some of these, but cannot take on the final responsibility to ensure that all will be attended to. It is the responsibility of the state to ensure that such provisions are available to all.

One of the core implications of treating every human being as an end means that all deserve a *rich basic minimum standard of living*, irrespective of their conduct. These are things which are everyone's due. They deserve at least food, shelter, clothing and elementary health care. People who act in anti-social ways or do not discharge their social responsibilities – whether because of their genes, parents, 'the system', poor upbringing, or character failing – are not to be denied the elementary life necessities we provide to inmates, prisoners of war and pets.

No one's basic humanity and membership in the community should be denied. *It follows that no one should be completely cut off welfare* or dumped into the streets even if they refuse to work, attend classes or do community service. The provisions to such idle or selfish people (who are a minority of benefits recipients) may be reduced and not include cash beyond some small amount, but the state's duty in a good society is to ensure that no one goes hungry, homeless, unclothed or sick and unattended. They may well deserve much more, and what is 'enough' – for instance in terms of health care – might be rather difficult to define.<sup>16</sup>

Similarly, there is considerable room for debate over what such a *rich basic minimum* entails (Nathanson 1998), that understanding is sure to differ with the economic conditions of the society, the age of those affected and their health status, and

the community's specific moral shared understanding. But these deliberations ought to be about how extensive the provision of these basic goods should be – not whether they should be provided at all.

Providing a basic minimum to people will not kill the motivation to work for most, as long as work is available and they are able. Though some will abuse the system, a good society should consider this a small price to pay for affirming the basic humanity of everyone. Putting mental patients, alcoholics, mothers with children or anyone else onto the streets, cutting off all benefits to them, is simply not compatible with treating all people as ends in themselves.

During the 1990's, welfare systems, which badly needed to be reformed, were restructured. However, here we see a clear case of over-correction, arguably the most extreme of many that took place in recent years. The reform entailed cutting off some people in toto – not lowering benefits but terminating them – and terminating not merely cash support but also housing allowances, food stamps and health insurance for children. Over the next years, these reforms need to be re-reformed if we are to cease this violation of this basic tenet of a good society. There is much room for deliberation concerning what exactly society owes each person and at what levels benefits will cut into motivation to work and to refrain from anti-social behavior. For instance, furnishing cash would not necessarily be a part of such a state (or even charity) provided package. To ensure that community jobs keep people above the poverty line of the kind already discussed, their income from wages publicly provided *and* from other kinds of benefits – whether in kind or in cash – should be high enough to meet the 'minimum' test.

In many areas there is a complex and tense relationship between rights and responsibilities. In these situations it is a grave mistake to presume that either rights or responsibilities are dominant. Rights and responsibilities should be treated as two cardinal moral claims. In the best of all worlds, both can be fully honored. In reality, policies cannot often maximize both. But no *a priori* assumption should be made that priority will be given to one rather than the other.<sup>17</sup>

All policies that impinge on the balance between individual rights and social responsibilities should be reviewed and adjusted accordingly. The right to privacy, for example, is to be respected, but it should not take priority over protection of life and limb. For instance, mandatory drug testing of school bus drivers, train engineers, and air traffic controllers is legitimate because in these cases, the violation of privacy is small whereas the danger to those they are entrusted with is considerable. At the same time, the ban on the violation of the privacy of medical records by employers – records that concern the most intimate parts of our life and whose violation yields at best minimal social benefits – should be upheld and fully enforced.

A balanced society approaches the tension between individual rights and social responsibilities along these lines and adjusts its policies accordingly. In some areas it might enhance the reach of rights (for instance in the protection of personal information) while in others the claim of social responsibilities (for instance, keeping DNA profiles of all criminals), without such a combined approach being inconsistent. The same holds for increasing freedom of information, subjecting the police to race relations laws and the armed forces to human rights, as defined by the European Court of Human Rights on the one hand, while also enabling police to intercept and decode email messages on the other. Along the same line, drug dealers in prisons should be stopped and routine testing of inmates should be introduced.



### 3.4 Moral Dialogues: Changing Moral Cultures

Debates about our moral culture are often unnecessarily polarized. We are not limited to either adhering to traditional, conservative mores (for example, traditional two-parent families, with mothers at home) or treating all behaviors as if they had equal legitimacy (two parents, single parents, gay marriages, sequential monogamies, polygamy). We can express a preference for peer marriages (in which fathers and mothers have the same rights and the same responsibilities) over other forms of family without condemning the latter. There are social and moral options between rigidly sticking to tradition (as parts of the religious right demand) and a cultural-moral free-for-all (as some on the left have, in effect, advocated in the past).

While initially the moral culture of a given community or group of communities is handed down from generation to generation, this culture need not be fixed or 'traditional'. On the contrary, moral culture is continually recast to reflect new social needs, demands, insights and, above all, moral claims. This occurs through a process of special importance to those seeking a good society: moral dialogue. Moral dialogues are 'give and take' discussions that engage values rather than merely interests or wants. They involve more than facts and reasons; they engage our beliefs. They are composed of the many hours spent over meals, in pubs, while commuting, at work and in the media discussing moral issues.

Local communities, whole national societies, and even international communities engage in extensive dialogues about acute moral issues, such as our duty to the environment, women's rights and sexual discrimination, and specific questions such as gay marriages, putting children on trial as adults, the death penalty, cruelty to animals and testing a whole village's DNA in order to catch a criminal.

Usually only one or two topics are the subject of intensive moral dialogue at any one time. Practically anyone can try to initiate a moral dialogue, from the prime minister to a local poet, from a media personality to a group of protesters. However, it is ultimately the public at large that decides which it will engage in. Despite claims to the contrary, the media – which serves as an important venue for moral dialogues – controls neither the agenda nor the outcome, although of course it influences both. This is because the media itself is not of one mind, and because the public is much less susceptible to brainwashing than is often assumed.<sup>18</sup>

Moral dialogues are largely about values. They are not dialogues among experts but among citizens. Moral dialogues often draw on factual and logical arguments, but they are mainly ethical, rather than empirical, in nature. Recall, for instance, the arguments that have taken place over bombing Serbia during the Kosovo war, releasing Pinochet or allowing gay marriage.

When a community is engaged in a moral dialogue, the discussion often seems disorderly, meandering and endless. However, it frequently does lead to a genuine recasting of that community's voluntary moral culture, that which the community condones or censures.

Most importantly, *through the process of moral dialogue people often modify their conduct, feelings and beliefs*. For example, in the 1950s most communities had no sense of a moral obligation toward the environment. A profound moral dialogue that developed in the 1960s and 1970s led not merely to a shared moral sense of our duty to Mother Earth (although communities continue to differ on what exactly that entails) but also to a fair measure of changed behavior, such as voluntary recycling and

conservation of energy. In short, *if a community needs to change its social policies in a significant way, such changes are best preceded (as far as public policies are concerned) and largely generated (as far as changes in personal and social conduct are concerned) by moral dialogue.*

Moral dialogues can follow what sociologists call 'moral panic' but these two should not be conflated. Panic alarms people and can lead them to embrace dubious policies. In contrast, moral dialogues lead them to reexamine their beliefs, world views and prejudices, and to recast them.

One of the great weaknesses of some of the Third Way governments is their tendency to take shortcuts, often skirting or short-changing the need for moral dialogue. For instance, the release of a Third Way framework document in Germany in mid-1998 by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was not preceded by a dialogue with the members of the Social Democratic Party or even its leadership, not to mention the German public at large. In contrast, changing Clause IV of the Labour party platform followed 'the widest consultation exercise ever undertaken by a British political party... Tens of thousands took part, almost half the party participated' (Blair 1997: 51).

Currently moral dialogues are badly needed on issues such as limiting the centrifugal effects of devolution, deeper involvement in the European Union, the implications of continued immigration and the effects of growing multiculturalism on the core values of the society. The rise of right-wing parties in Austria, Switzerland, Germany and France, and the romanticisation of Communist regimes in eastern Germany, are in part driven by lack of sufficient dialogue on these matters.

Another topic that calls for a moral dialogue is in the area of international humanitarian efforts. What are the limits and scope of foreign aid? When should economic sanctions be applied? When is the exercise of force justified? When is it appropriate to cancel the debt of developing nations? Should we put pressure on other countries to change their moral cultures in matters ranging from child labor to female circumcision?

While there are no guaranteed ways to trigger moral dialogues or ensure their development, devices such as extensive public hearings by Parliamentary committees and inquiries by citizen commissions may initiate dialogue. The latter have no official standing and may be established by a think tank, foundation or some other civic body. They are composed of the representatives of major segments of society affected by the issues under study, conduct public hearings and publish recommendations based on the dialogue they trigger. Such devices must be used much more extensively if more people are to become further engaged by the moral and political issues at the heart of the Third Way.

Many groups that are strongly committed to specific values tend to demand that public leaders push their agenda through, engineering public support if it does not exist. The power of leadership in a democratic society is, thankfully, much more limited. Political leadership in free societies must judiciously choose occasions on which major changes are sought, with new coalitions built and political capital put at risk, rather than vainly tilting with the wind.

Such willingness to assume risk at select points was evident when Old Labour transformed into New Labour, when the old opposition between left and right was leapfrogged on the road to a Third Way. It is evident in the continued recasting of the welfare state, and in guiding countries from an industrial to a knowledge-based economy. It will be called upon again to face the next major challenges of the Third

Way: curbing inequality; balancing devolution with building a community of communities; and defining the place of the national community within the European one, among others.

Involving the public more in dialogues about major policy change, especially those concerning moral and social issues, makes it more difficult to govern. Such dialogues are time-consuming and do not necessarily conclude as government may wish. But it is doubtful that it would be possible to achieve profound and lasting social change without such dialogues. To put it more starkly: a government can make incremental changes year on year without profoundly engaging the public – or it can truly lead in new directions. This can only be done if the public has been engaged and won over – often causing significant changes in the direction government was seeking to move. After all, democracy entails much more than a solid majority in the parliament.

### 3.5 Family: The Need for a Definitive New Look

Throughout history, in all societies, families have been entrusted with initiating character formation, introducing younger generations to the moral culture of the community, preparing them to be good people.

Before one can settle any of the numerous specific issues that arise from the transition from traditional forms of families to ‘postmodern’ ones, we require a more conclusive examination of the evidence about the effects of highly divergent social arrangements. To proceed, the government should convene a ‘science court’, an inquiry composed of expert social scientists.<sup>19</sup> The court would hold public hearings, interrogating scientific witnesses and representatives of the various bodies of thought on the subject. The court might require additional analysis of existing data or the generation of new data, to provide a strong and shared body of relevant evidence. In this way it should be able to reach solid credible conclusions about critical issues that arise concerning our ability to replace the two parent family, and help move to settle the public dialogue on these issues. Clearly it makes a great deal of difference for the moral culture and for public policy whether children suffer greatly or actually benefit, as some maintain, from new forms of family arrangements and the institutionalization of children. The science court should focus on children of young age, especially from birth until five, the years in which many believe the foundations of character are formed.

The science court should investigate not merely whether the absence of a second partner is harmful, but also the implications of a growing ‘children deficit’. There is evidence that the birth rate in several developed societies is falling below the population replacement level, with numerous ill consequences for society.<sup>20</sup> To put it more sharply, if we once held that the first social duty of the family is the moral education of children, we may now wish to amend this to say that duty calls for having children at all.<sup>21</sup> Millions see children as a burden, interfering with their careers and lifestyle. This is just another disconcerting reflection of the pressures of globalism and radical individualism.

The introduction of several new family policies might best be delayed until the work of the science court is completed. This holds, for instance, for legal authorization of new forms of marriage (Wilkinson 1999), such as time-limited commitments, giving full legal endorsement to household partnerships, and introducing covenant marriages.<sup>22</sup>

There are those who ask: Why do we have to rule which form of marriage we ought to favor rather than let each person make her or his own choices? Firstly, as long as marriage remains a state sanctioned and enforced institution, we must decide what

amounts to a marriage. The same is true for the question of who is entitled to benefits available to those who are married. Even if all state involvement was abolished, the science court would still be needed to help focus the moral debate, which reshapes voluntary moral culture. If one form or another of marriage and family were to prove harmful to children, we still should not necessarily ban it, but families and communities ought at least to know about it.

Some key matters, though, require no study or inquiry. There should be no return to 'traditional' forms of family, in which women were treated as second class citizens. This would violate the principle of treating all as ends (Wilkinson 1999). Fathers and mothers should have the same rights and responsibilities. Fathers obviously can look after children and women work outside of the household. A substantive step in the right direction will be made when laws that allow mothers of newborn children to take paid leave and have their jobs held for them for a given number of years are also fully applied to fathers.

There is no one correct way to balance work and family; each person and couple must work this out. It is, however, in the interest of a good society to encourage and enable parents to spend more time with their children.

### 3.6 Schools as Places of Character Formation

Much has been written about making schools into more effective tools for the competitive information economy, and on the need to improve academic skills and knowledge of graduates. However, we have also known since Aristotle about the importance of character development. In our society, schools are the places in which the character of young people is developed. They are the place where young people learn, or at least ought to, how to control their impulses and develop empathy, essential for treating one another as ends rather than only as instruments. They are the place where young people should learn how to deal civilly with one another and to resolve conflicts peacefully. Most importantly, in schools young people learn that treating others only as instruments is profoundly unethical, and that they have responsibilities for one another, their family and the community.

A good society requires good people; it cannot allow for character education to be driven out by academics. The direct experiences and narratives offered by schools are more important for character formation than lectures on ethics or civics. Community service, peer mentoring and other ways of taking responsibility, role playing and participation in mock governments are all vastly superior forms of civic education than formal and abstract lectures about democratic government.

To ensure that this core education principle will be heeded, an annual assessment should be made in all schools of the educational (as distinct from teaching) messages they impart, and of their approach to character formation. If these are defective, schools should be helped by personnel especially dedicated to this issue to restructure their approach.

Educational, family and welfare policies are often developed in isolation from one another and, most of all, from work practices. But if people are to be treated as ends, they cannot be viewed as fragments, as students *or* parents *or* workers. Each individual must be treated as a whole. This, in turn, requires a much better dovetailing of different policies. For example, school days end before most parents finish work. Unsurprisingly,

a high level of juvenile crime occurs between 3 and 6 PM. Gaps like these must be bridged with policies that treat the many aspects of society as segments of one whole.

### **The Other Partners: State and Market**

The good society is a partnership of three sectors: government, private sector, and community. Each one reflects and serves a distinct facet of our humanity. Only by serving all three, rather than fragmenting them or setting one against the other, can we achieve a society that encompasses the whole person, essential for their being treated as ends in themselves.

While these partners may differ in terms of their respective roles, and these may change with social conditions, in a good society the three sectors seek to cooperate with one another. Each is part of the solution; none is blamed as the source of the problem. They are complementary rather than antagonistic. Most importantly, each partner helps contain the others, to ensure one will not usurp the missions best accomplished by the others. Maintaining this three-way balance is at the heart of the good society.

#### **4. The State**

The Third Way approach maintains that sweeping and detailed control of the economy and society by the state is incompatible with a good society, as is an unfettered market. It also follows that while the state can and should be slimmed down, there are many tasks that are its legitimate domain.

- The main responsibility for public safety should rest with the state. Therefore, to the extent that the society draws on private policing (such as hired guards) and profit-making prisons, their conduct should be closely regulated. At the same time, the state's function in this arena should be contained by the community. For instance, civil review boards can help ensure that the police do not brutalize citizens. Another form of containment is scrutiny by a free press.
- Citizens should not be armed in a good society, and police arms should be minimal. The state should ensure the continued disarmament of the population. To the extent that a civil militia is needed, as the Swiss for instance hold, arms are best deposited in public armories. Holding a gun up to a person is about as far as one can get from treating people as ends.
- A major goal for the next decade should be significantly increasing *certitude* (sometimes referred to as 'celerity') that those who violate the law will be caught, those caught will be convicted and those convicted will serve their term. An increase in certitude would allow a reduction in the length of prison time and the harshness of the term (for example, less solitary confinement and less reliance on high security prisons) while at the same time enhancing public safety. The result is a more humane treatment of criminals and greater possibility of their rehabilitation, in line with our criteria for the good society, as well as significantly lower public costs (after a transition period).<sup>23</sup>

Punishing those who violate the law is unavoidable in an orderly and just society. Increased certitude combined with shorter sentences will ensure punishment and curtail the inhuman and costly treatment that often ensues when people are incarcerated. Hopefully such an approach would also deter criminals more effectively.

The state should be responsible for public health, that is, for health matters that are in the interest of the community above and beyond that of individual patients, for example: containing communicable diseases, ensuring the safety of drugs and foods, and undertaking some forms of preventive health such as mandatory vaccinations and water fluoridation.

Illness and the resulting dependency not only exact increasingly large public costs, but are also incompatible with people achieving their full potential. Preventive care is the best antidote. Specific goals for preventive care should be set for each decade, including contributions expected from citizens, for instance, by increasing the amount of exercise they take. *Decreasing the rate of smoking, especially among teenagers, is the single most important preventive goal for the next ten years.* While figures differ, the importance of preventive care is highlighted by the finding that in a given period in the United States changes in lifestyle added 11.5 years to life expectation while improvements in medical services added only 0.5 years.

A good society should view the market as akin to nuclear energy: it can provide an enormous and growing bounty of products and services, and help to serve the common good, including culture and arts, science and education, public health and welfare. However, it must be watched over carefully. If excessively restricted the market cannot perform well. At the same time, a good society assumes that if the market is not properly contained, it may dehumanize people and wreak havoc on local communities, families and social relations. Indeed, unfettered markets can undo I-Thou relations and allow I-It ones to dominate.

The Third Way does not lead to a free market any more than it favors football without rules or referees. The market has always operated within a social context, which has included a fabric of social values, laws, and regulatory mechanisms. The role of the government is not to abolish these but to adapt them to changing conditions, especially to the cyber-age.

The main question Third Way societies struggle with is when to allow market forces a free rein and when to put up containing walls. (An obvious example of an area the market must be kept from penetrating is the distribution of transplantable human organs.) There are significant differences among Third Way societies on this viewpoint, which reflects how much progress they have made on this journey, especially between societies that have been Thatcherized (mainly the US and the UK) and those that have not travelled far down this road. However, all *Third Way societies should be much clearer about the areas into which market forces must be prevented from intruding. This is essential if the proper balance between the instrumental realm and that of ends is to be achieved and sustained.*

Third Way societies are currently making numerous incremental changes that favor market forces. These include greater flexibility in work rules, lower personal, capital gains and corporate tax rates, lower benefits, higher co-insurance charges, further privatization, enabling firms to issue shares to their workers, enabling workers to purchase shares tax free, reforms of insolvency and much else.

Such changes will remain unnecessarily threatening and unprincipled as long as it is not clearly indicated which social boundaries will not be breached. Especially significant on this matter is the question of whether people can reliably assume that whatever the changes in economic policy, they will still have secure safety nets protecting their basic health insurance, retirement income and basic

subsistence. Can people take for granted that even if these nets were set at lower levels, no one would be allowed to fall through them? Will work be available for all those who seek it or are pressured to find employment? Will the income from work be sufficient to keep people out of poverty? Will training be available for those made redundant by technologically driven changes? While details can be debated, *people in a good society are accorded a basic sense of economic security.*

Markets cannot be free from public oversight and regulation. To a limited extent one can and should rely on the market to self-regulate (for instance, industries agreeing not to target young children in their advertising), and communities can play a containing role. For example, many consumer groups play an important role as unofficial ‘watchdogs’ of corporate behavior. But the main responsibility for containing the market – experience shows – must rest with the state. To ensure that state regulations do not become excessive, they should remain in effect only if examinations show that they do not unnecessarily restrain the market or that they cannot be replaced by better regulations or other ways of achieving the same social purposes.

The notion that cyberspace can be a new utopian world, free from state controls, in which people govern themselves, is without reality or justice. Cyberspace has long since turned from a virtual village into a metropolis in which people do need protection. As the proportion of transactions conducted in cyberspace continues to increase, so must public oversight. Prescription drugs sold on the internet cannot be free from the protections that customers require off-line. Taxes cannot be avoided. Messages transmitted by drug lords, pedophiles and terrorists cannot be exempt from the reach of the law. Libel on the internet is not different from any other.

Some controls can be exerted by parents and educators. Others can rely on self-regulation and transparency (for example, the posting of privacy policies and the use of trustmarks). However, increasingly the virtual world will become like the rest of the world, and will need the same careful balance of freedom and public scrutiny.

While the basic need for containing cyberspace’s economic and technological forces is the same as in other markets, the tools may well be different. Because cyberspace knows no national borders, development of worldwide agreements and enforcement must be achieved as rapidly as possible.

Ensuring basic access for all is another role for the state, so that cyberspace does not become another arena for social exclusion. This will be especially important as more education and voting takes place in virtual formats.

Given the close association between work and a sense of self-worth, which is a vital foundation of ends-based relationships, public policy should aim *both to hold inflation at bay and also to stimulate the economy*, enabling higher growth in general and low unemployment especially. Given recent evidence that higher growth and lower unemployment than previously considered possible can be achieved without rekindling serious inflation, and given the inhumanity of joblessness even in a state with broad welfare provisions – public policy should tilt more toward growth and less toward inflation fighting. An annual growth rate above 3 percent and an unemployment rate below 5 percent should be considered realistic targets.

Expanding available work through the market until unemployment is low is the most desirable outcome. However, to the extent that this is impractical, policies which distribute available work are preferable to those that protect job privileges but keep unemployment high (for instance, by curbing part-time work). Surely it is better for all who seek and are able to work to be employed than for some to have high salaries and benefits well protected, only to be highly taxed in order to pay unemployment benefits to those who are kept out of the labor market. The Dutch approach to employment is closer to an ends-respecting model than that of several other Third Way countries (Hemerijck & Visser 2001).

As a last resort, community jobs should be available for all those who cannot find gainful work in the marketplace or public sector.<sup>24</sup> These could include environmental improvements and teaching aides, as well as other work that would not be carried out if it had to be paid for. Thus, community jobs would not compete with other forms of job creation or with those who hold low-paying jobs. The state should be attentive to environmental needs and coordinate those activities needed to shore up the environment, but it should not shoulder them all.<sup>25</sup> To some extent environmental protection can be reconciled with market interests, and become a source of new jobs and technological innovation. At the same time, the state in a good society recognizes our duty to pass on the environment to our children in good or better condition than we inherited it, and that such a social commitment entails some net public costs.

These costs can be reduced as people increasingly recognize that protecting the environment is a part of everyone's social moral responsibilities, an important source of community jobs and a place for volunteering.<sup>26</sup>

To help sustain the three-way partnership, the state fosters communities where they exist and helps prime their development where they have failed. It is careful not to contribute to their ossification and decay by preempting their role. Hence, as a rule the state should not be the first source of social services. Small loans, child care, sick care, counseling and much else is best provided in the first instance by members of the immediate and extended family, local and other communities, voluntary associations, workplaces and others. When the state becomes the first or sole source of these services, it undermines, demoralizes and bureaucratizes relationships that are at the core of communal life.

In order to encourage communities' role in social services, all state agencies should have *citizen participation advisory boards*. Their task would be to find ways for citizens to participate as volunteers in delivering some services currently carried by the state. They should also play a role in providing timely, relevant and informed feedback on the performance of service providers.

The state should foster economic and social entrepreneurship, and therefore not impose taxes or regulations which disable the economic engines of innovation and change. At the same time, *taxes should not disadvantage those who labor in favor of those who invest*. If taxes are withheld at source, they should be withheld from both workers and investors. (Because of the dangers of capital flight, to proceed may well require carrying this measure out on the level of the EU, or most likely the OECD.)



## 4.2 The Private Sector

'We are not against market-based economy but market-based society.' Lionel Jospin, Prime Minister of France.

Third Way societies recognize that the market is the best engine for production of goods and services, of work and thus jobs, of economic progress. Moreover, the private sector may foster innovation that adapts the economy to changing conditions and opportunities.

While much attention is properly paid to social problems created by market forces – factory closures, loss of job security, overwork in some industries and idleness in others – such problems should not blind us to the basic merit of strong economic growth. So, for example, rising international trade raises a host of problems concerning labor and environmental standards, but we should also recognize that trade, in the long run, benefits most societies and most members of society.

Those who lose their jobs as a result should be helped by the community and the state. Policies such as the United States Trade Adjustment Assistance (providing targeted support for those dislocated by economic change) should be increased, allowing redundant workers to be retrained and, if necessary, resettled, or given community jobs.<sup>27</sup>

Some claim that most social standards must be suspended for a nation to be able to compete in the global economy. While some adaptations are necessary, each should be critically examined. It is empirically incorrect and morally false to assume that a society cannot respond to the negative effects of globalization, or that, if it could respond, the loss of economic efficiency would *a priori* not be worth paying.

It is equally important to recognize that globalization calls for the development of national, regional and global social and political institutions. As corporations and internet businesses increasingly become cross-national and global forces, so balancing groups – from labor unions to environmentalists – must link arms across national lines, and regulatory and other public institutions must be regional and global in scope. Limits on violations of the environment, land mines, trade in ivory and much else are preliminary and rather weak examples, but they point to what must be done.

## 4.3 The Art of Combinations

The tendency to view the state and the market as opposites, at least as alternative approaches to social issues, conceals the fact that some of the best and most important work of a society that aspires to be good is conducted either by the third sector or by hybrids. These are various amalgams in which elements of two or even three sectors are combined. Examples follow. Their purpose is to urge much greater attention to these neither private nor public nor communal bodies. Assuming a systematic examination of their qualities and limitations would show that in many areas these are superior to pure sector types, many more missions should be entrusted to these hybrids.

Examples include:

- Religious institutions and voluntary associations that provide social services, but are financed in part by the government.
- Privately run or not-for-profit cultural institutions, such as universities, museums and theatres, whose initial capital costs or start-up funds are provided by the state.

These institutions may continue to rely on some partial government subsidies but should draw the majority of their operating funds from their gift shops, restaurants, entrance ticket-sales and so on.

- State vouchers that allow people to purchase community services or market products, for instance, housing allowances and pre-school child care.
- Public corporations, such as the Public Broadcast Corporation (which provides for public TV) and the National Public Radio (NPR). These public media outlets are especially important in an age of increasingly commercial forms of communication.

There is much more scope for combinations in matters concerning utilities (especially water), public services (transportation), and many others. Let us swear off the simplistic market-or-government dichotomy.

#### 4.4 The Knowledge Society and Curtailing Scarcity

Much has been stated, correctly, about the importance of fostering the transition to a knowledge-based economy. Such a transformation – which entails prioritizing investment in people (via education and lifelong learning) as well as technology – is said to be essential for prosperity. It could also be a good way to reduce menial labor and increase the number of jobs that are stimulating, family-friendly and compatible with the needs of the environment. However, *surprisingly little attention has been paid to an attribute of a knowledge-based economy that by itself justifies heavy investment in it: its potential to reduce scarcity and enhance social justice.*

Knowledge as a resource differs greatly from those relied upon in industrial societies – capital goods, from steel to petrol – in that it can be *shared and consumed* many times over. Thus, if a factory uses a ton of steel, this steel is no longer available to any other user and, as a result, issues of resource allocation and scarcity arise. However, when a person puts a design on the internet – for a better mousetrap, car, home, software program or whatever – millions can use it and the originator still has the original.<sup>28</sup> Similarly, many thousands of people can download a piece of music, poetry or film and it can still be consumed again. While not all knowledge is or can be shared in this manner, a growing number of new ‘goods’ are being shared on the internet in this way.

Of course, there are tricky problems that must be worked out concerning intellectual property and patent rights. However, one should not overlook that there are very large bodies of knowledge that can be shared legally in this almost miraculous new way – including numerous books, music, and art for which the copyright has expired and that are in the public domain. The same should hold for most information produced by the government, from national statistics to text of parliamentary debates.

The more people satisfy their wants by drawing on free knowledge, say by reading downloaded files, playing chess on the internet or joining virtual self-help groups, the scarcer scarcity becomes and the smaller the I-It sector a society must bear. Scarcity will never be eliminated. However, the more people (once their basic material wants are sated) draw on open sources of knowledge (including culture), the more ends-based their relations can become.

Last but not least, there is a profound connection between fostering the knowledge-based economy and enhancing social justice. Most earlier theories of justice are based on the idea of transferring large amounts of resources from the haves to the have-nots.

This raises obvious political difficulties. However, to the extent that those whose basic needs are met draw their additional satisfaction from non-scarce resources, the door opens to a whole new world, in which those better off may well be less opposed to the transfer of material goods to those less endowed. And those who have less could benefit from non-scarce knowledge resources, once the community and state ensure that they have the basic skills and resources needed to access the new world of knowledge.

This may seem far-fetched, visionary and utopian. Yet while such a world may be far in our future, its harbingers are all around us. The more we foster a transition to a knowledge-based economy and basic access for all, the closer we come to living in a society that is driven less by scarcity – and is more equitable as a result.

#### 4.5 Limiting Corruption

Few issues concerning the proper balance between market and state are more important than preventing those with economic power from also concentrating political power. In numerous free societies there is a growing stream of private monies into public hands – either in the old-fashioned form of personal bribery and favors, or in the modern form of special interests ‘contributing’ funds to political parties, legislators or government officials in exchange for special treatment at the public’s cost. Few things are more corrosive for the Third Way than the corruption of public institutions. Such double-fisted concentration of power violates a profound precept of a truly democratic society, whereby all members are equal citizens, whatever their wealth differences.

Trust is a key element of ends-based relationships; while general social trust among the general public has been diminishing, trust in public leaders and institutions is particularly vulnerable. The American public has become rather cynical of a political system in which limiting the role of private monies in public life is almost impossible. European societies must pay more attention to this matter than they have hitherto. While the problem may well be less severe in the UK than in many other societies, the best time to lock the barn is before the horse is stolen. Several new laws and regulations in the UK seek to curb the corruption of politics – these include banning foreign funding and paid questions, declaring all interests in a public register, and publicizing donations to political parties over £ 2,000. It remains to be seen whether these will suffice to protect public life from private monies.<sup>29</sup>

### 5 Sustaining the Community of Communities

#### 5.1 Devolution Coupled with Nation Building

The Labour government has lived up to its promise of devolution. However, the process has revealed a slew of new issues to be addressed. One concerns ways to devolve further ‘down’, bringing power closer to the people, to the level of communities rather than regions such as Scotland and Wales, or even cities as large as London. If devolution is extended downward, citizens will have more opportunities to participate in their own government, and are more likely to become politically engaged.

A more urgent challenge is learning to devolve power while reinforcing the loyalties and bonds that maintain a national society. The mere mention of Scottish independence, and the intense squabbles between regions over variation in central government funding, are indications that this issue requires urgent attention.

A strong economy, reallocation of wealth, sound environmental programs and respect for basic laws can only be advanced if smaller communities are parts of more encompassing ones. England or Scotland alone could not achieve the kind of international leadership and economic power Britain currently provides. In the current environment, nations cannot avoid fragmentation without active leadership and concrete society-building measures.

The quest for such measures is, for the most part, yet to be undertaken. Forming nationwide work groups, projects and programs that cut across regional borders – for example, economic development programs encompassing northeast England and southern Scotland – might serve this end. Changing the National Curriculum to include more historical material focusing on the achievements of the union and less on civil wars might help. Honoring those who foster unity rather than separateness would be useful. But these alone will not suffice. Much new thinking is still required on this issue.

The vision of society as a community of communities applies to geographic, racial and ethnic communities alike. A good society thrives on a diversity of cultures that enriches people's lives through the arts, music, dance, social contact, cuisine and much more. But such a multicultural society cannot flourish without a shared framework, which itself will evolve over time. Its elements include commitment to a democratic way of life, to basic laws or the constitution, to mutual respect and, above all, to the responsibility to treat all others as ends in themselves. Diversity should not become the opposite of unity, but should exist *within* unity.

Sustaining a given community of communities does not contradict the gradual development of more encompassing communities, such as the European Union or, eventually, a world community. These too will be composed of networks of communities rather than hundreds of millions of individuals, or even hundreds of fragmented social entities. It is foolish to believe that the collapse of nations does not matter because the fragments may then join the larger European community in what Philip Dodd (1995) refers to as 'the Euro-federalist solution to the present battle over Britain'. Such notions are unduly optimistic about the pace and scope of Europe's development as a true community. They disregard the fact that more encompassing communities are not composed of numerous small fragments: they are an additional layer of community, rather than one that preempts the others.

Finally, deeper involvement in the EU is best preceded by extensive moral dialogues, not merely one referendum about the euro. While there seems to be considerable support for joining a European community, below the surface there are strong euro-sceptical sentiments that must be taken seriously.

## 5.2 Limiting Inequality

Society cannot sustain itself as a community of communities if disparities in well-being and wealth between elites and the rest of society are too great. While we may debate exactly what social justice entails, there is little doubt what community requires. If some members of a community become further removed from the daily living conditions of most other members – leading lives of hyper-affluence in gated communities, with chauffeured limousines, servants and personal trainers – they lose contact with the rest of the community. Such isolation not only frays social bonds and insulates privileged people from the moral cultures of the community, but also blinds

them to the realities of their fellow citizens' lives. This in turn may cause them to favor unrealistic policies ('let them eat cake'), which further undermines the community's trust in them.

To prevent this problem it has been suggested that the state should provide equality of outcomes. However, during the twentieth century we have learned that this treatment goes against the grain of a free society. As a result, even command and control societies have been unable truly to implement this approach. We also learned that, when it is approximated, it undermines creativity, excellence and motivation to work, and is unfair to those who do apply themselves. Furthermore, the resulting labor costs are so high as to render a society uncompetitive in the global economy.

Equality of opportunity has been extolled as a substitute. However, to ensure equality of opportunity for all, everyone must have a similar starting point. *These can be provided only if all are accorded certain basics*, which we have already established is a core part of treating all as ends and not merely as means.

Additional policies to curb inequality further can be made to work at both ends of the scale. Special education efforts to bring children from disadvantaged backgrounds up to par, such as Surestart (in the UK) and Head Start (in the US), and training workers released from obsolescent industries for new jobs, are examples of programs providing a measure of equality of outcome to make equality of opportunity possible. However, the results often reveal themselves very slowly. Hence in the shorter run greater effects will be achieved by raising tax credits and the minimum wage and by creating initiatives that encourage sharing of resources between communities.

Raising the minimum wage invites the criticism that people will be priced out of the jobs market. However, if the level of minimum wage is tied to what people need to provide for their basic needs, it is the moral obligation of a good society to provide for this standard of living. The only alternative to a proper minimum wage would be welfare payments – which tend to be degrading, develop dependency and are politically more unattractive than minimum wage. However, it does not follow that the minimum wage should automatically be tied to a *relative* poverty line – one that rises as quickly as other wages in society. A rich basic minimum is defined in absolute terms, not as a statistical artifact.

For a long time it has been known that the poor will be with us, even if they work, as long as they have no assets. People who own assets, especially a place of residence (whether a house or an apartment), are more likely to 'buy' into a society, to feel and be part of the community and to be an active member of it. *One major way to advance home ownership is through schemes that allow those on low incomes to obtain mortgages*, as provided in the United States by federally chartered corporations such as Fannie Mae. More should be done on this front.

We suggest that this might be achieved by following the same model used in the Earned Income Tax Credit in the US and the Working Families Tax Credit in the UK: *providing low income people with earned interest on mortgages*. Those whose income is below a certain level may earn, say, two dollars for every dollar they set aside to provide them with the seed money for buying a home. Alternatively, 'sweat' equity might be used as the future owners' contribution, for instance if they work on their housing sites. While raising the income and ownership of the poor might ensure that everybody can afford the basic minimum essential to the core principle of a good society, such measures will not suffice for the purposes of community building. Other

measures that prevent ever higher levels of inequality should be undertaken if wealthier people are not to become too distanced from the rest of society.

Such measures may include maintaining progressive taxation from most if not all sources, increasing inheritance tax and ensuring that tax on capital is paid as it is on labor. Given that such measures cannot be adopted if they seriously endanger the competitive status of a country, they would be difficult to implement solely at the national level. A number of inequality curbing measures may well require co-introduction or harmonization at least within the EU and preferably with the OECD countries; better yet (in the long term) worldwide.

Ultimately this matter, as with many others, will not be properly addressed until there is a sea change in the moral culture of society and the purposes that animate it. Major reallocation of wealth cannot be forced by a democratic society, and vigorous attempts to impose it will cause a flight of wealth and damage the economy in other ways. In contrast, history from early Christianity to Fabian socialism teaches us that people who share progressive values will be inclined to share some of their wealth voluntarily. A good society seeks to promote such values through a grand moral dialogue rather than by dictates.

## **6 The Next Grand Dialogue: A Moderate Return of Counterculture?**

The good society understands that ever-increasing levels of material goods are not a reliable source of human well-being and contentment, let alone of a morally sound society. It recognizes that the pursuit of well-being through ever higher levels of consumption is Sisyphean. This is not an argument in favor of poverty and self-denial. However, extensive data shows that, once basic material needs are well sated and securely provided for, additional income does not add to happiness (Myers 2000). The evidence shows that profound contentment is found in nourishing ends-based relationships, in bonding with others, in community building and public service, and in cultural and spiritual pursuits. Capitalism never aspired to address the needs of the whole person; at best it treats a person as an economic entity. Statist socialism subjugated rather than inspired people. It is left to good societies to fill the void.

The most profound problems that plague modern societies will be fully addressed only when those whose basic needs have been met shift their priorities up Maslow's scale of human needs. That is, only after they accord a higher priority to gaining and giving affection, cultivating culture, becoming involved in community service and seeking spiritual fulfillment. Such a shift in priorities is also required before we can truly come into harmony with the environment, as these higher priorities replace material consumption. Such a new set of priorities may also be the only conditions under which those who are well endowed would be willing to support serious reallocation of wealth and power, as their personal fortunes would no longer be based on amassing ever larger amounts of consumer goods.<sup>30</sup> In addition, transitioning to a knowledge-based economy would free millions of people (one hopes all of them, gradually) to relate to each other as members of families and communities, thus laying the social foundations for a society in which ends-based relationships dominate while instrumental ones are well contained.

The upward shift in priorities, a return to a sort of moderate counterculture, a turn to voluntary simplicity – these require a grand dialogue about our personal and shared

goals. Intellectuals and the media can help launch such a dialogue and model the new forms of behavior. Public leaders can nurse the recognition of these values, by moderating consumption at public events and ceremonies, and by celebrating those whose achievements are compatible with the good society rather than with a merely affluent one. But ultimately, such a shift lies in changes in the hearts and minds, in the values and conduct, of us all. We shall not travel far toward a good society unless such a dialogue is launched and advanced to a positive conclusion.

## Noten

1. This essay grew out of a discussion between Geoff Mulgan and myself. I am indebted to Tom Bentley for numerous and detailed suggestions and queries. I also benefitted greatly from comments by Steven Lukes, John Gray, Martin Albrow and Robin Niblett for comments on a previous draft. I was helped much by editorial assistance by Natalie Klein, Jennifer Ambrosino, and Rachel Mears and by research assistance by Matthew Horne and Jason Marsh. A rather different version of this essay is published in the United States under the title *Next: The Road to the Good Society*, New York: Basic Books, 2000.
2. E. Frazer, Official Fellow, Tutor, and Lecturer in Politics at the University of Oxford, has written that 'Tony Blair's communitarianism was influenced by the philosophy of John MacMurray.' Frazer 1999: 25.
3. On this point see Chait 1998: 19.
4. According full attention to the importance of communities is what is most lacking on the Third Way, which otherwise retraces quite closely new communitarian thinking. On communitarianism see Etzioni 1993; Etzioni 1996; Tam 1998; Gray 1996; Giddens 1998; Selznick 1992; The Communitarian Network Website.
5. See for instance Altman 1973; Barabaz 1984; Johnson 1976; Harrison et al. 1991.
6. The reason for this is that social services are labor intensive, and labor costs rise more rapidly than capital costs because labor flows are not nearly as fluid and global as capital flows. Ergo, workers in one country have a greater ability to gain or maintain higher wages and benefits than those in another country. In contrast, banks and other financial institutions cannot charge significantly higher interest rates than similar institutions in other countries. For instance, the differences in yield that American and European banks provide are minuscule compared to the differences in salaries and benefits their workers earn. Given that general inflation rates reflect both labor and capital costs, and given that one component B capital B is lower than the average, it is a mathematical certainty that the other B labor B will be higher.
7. For discussion of this concept, see Leadbeater & Christie 1999 as well as Leadbeater 1997. See also Etzioni 1993.
8. For more discussion see Leadbeater 1996.
9. For background discussions see Jupp 1999; Gray 1996; Hargreaves & Christie 1998; Hargreaves & Christie 1999; Kruger 1998; Mulgan et al. 1997.
10. To the extent that the Blair government is increasingly seen as a 'nanny state' that nags the public and tries to establish moral codes from above, a clarification of the government position on this issue seems to be called for.
11. The values enshrined in the laws of the state in turn may be assessed by drawing on still more encompassing laws, such as those of the EU and the UN. For more discussion see Etzioni 1996: Chapter 8.
12. As the UK moves closer to having a written constitution, or as it adopts EU codes, the American malaise of litigiousness may become more common on these shores. At the same time it is not at all obvious that written constitutions are superior to basic laws, common law and strong democratic traditions.
13. While I generally agree with Anthony Giddens, we differ on this point. He writes, 'Government has a whole cluster of responsibilities for its citizens and others, including the protection of the vulnerable. Old-style democracy, however, was inclined to treat rights as unconditional claims. With expanding individualism should come an extension of individual obligations... As an ethical principle, "no rights without responsibilities" must apply not only to welfare recipients, but to everyone.'
14. To keep this crucial point in mind, one may refer to 'voluntary moral culture' as distinct from the coercive one, found in Afghanistan and Iran in an extreme form and, in more moderate ways, in many non-free societies.
15. 'Inclusion refers in its broadest sense to citizenship, to the civil and political rights and obligations that all members of a society should have, not just formally, but as a reality of their lives' (Giddens 1998: 102-103). As Philip Selznick put it, 'All persons have the same intrinsic worth... Everyone who is a person is equally an object of moral concern. This is the essence of justice.' Selznick adds that the most important threat to social justice is social subordination. Hence social power should be 'dispersed and balanced' but not wiped out. See Selznick n.d.: 63.
16. In the United States, the state of Oregon contributed to the dialogue on appropriate health care provisions. In its health care plan, the state ranked 688 medical procedures according to their costs and benefits; ultimately, it was decided that the first 568 services listed would be covered by the Oregon Medicaid program. Whether or not this was the right cutoff point cannot be determined without a detailed examination of the plan. The case shows, however, that the discussion of what must be included can be made in rather specific terms rather than as an abstract moral principle (Houston Chronicle News Service 1993).
17. The conditions under which 'trade offs' may occur is discussed at length in Etzioni 1999. Briefly, a trade off should be considered only if there is a major social problem, for instance the rapid spread of HIV, if there are no effective treatments that do not entail trade offs, and if the intrusions proffered are as minimal as possible.
18. The problems that arise from the increased commercialization of the media and the concentration of ownership deserve a separate treatment. Suffice it to say here that publicly owned and operated media should be cherished and support for it expanded, best by granting them large endowments.
19. For further discussion of 'science courts', see Smith II 1999. See also Mazur 1993.
20. These can be ameliorated to some extent by high levels of immigration, but that would pose a host of challenges all by itself, by

deepening the tensions raised by multiculturalism.

21. One must, of course, stress that no stigma should be attached to families that cannot have children or see themselves as psychologically ill qualified to bring them up.
22. The latter provides couples with the opportunity to bind themselves voluntarily to higher level of commitment by agreeing to participate in premarital counseling, counseling while married if one spouse requests it, and delaying divorce for two years if one partner files for it, except in cases where a crime has been committed. See, for example, Etzioni & Rubin 1997.
23. This approach deserves some elaboration. People who are inclined to commit crimes are deterred by two factors that relate to one another as two variables in a mathematical formula: size of penalty ( $P_e$ ) multiplied by the probability of being caught and punished ( $P_r$ ) equals public safety. That is, a higher level of public safety can be achieved by increasing either variable. Given that  $P_r$  costs much less than  $P_e$  in human social and economic terms, increasing  $P_r$  is obviously preferable. Moreover, given that data show that increases in  $P_r$  are much more effective than in  $P_e$ , these facts alone provide a compelling reason for trying to increase  $P_r$  rather than  $P_e$  in the next years (Grogger 1991, see especially page 304).
24. This is of course much less of an issue when unemployment is low. However, having community jobs as an integral part of the program is important even if these jobs become a major factor only in other situations.
25. I draw here on Mulgan et al. 1997: 19.
26. See the community recycling initiatives described in Murray 1999.
27. To what extent the European Structural Fund covers this matter remains to be established.
28. Some minimal use of traditional resources are involved, such as charges for connecting to the internet, but the costs for these are trivial.
29. Among the matters that may need more attention are the ways candidates get around expenditure limits by not reporting certain costs, under-reporting expenses (such as travel expenses for the candidate and his family), and by stocking up on electioneering supplies well before the election. See Klein 1999.
30. For additional discussion, see Etzioni 1998.



## Literatuur

- Altman, I. 1973  
'An Ecological Approach to the Functioning of Socially Isolated Groups', in: J.E. Rasmussen (ed.), *Man in Isolation and Confinement*, Chicago: Aldine, 241-270.
- Anderson, B. 1991  
*Imagined Communities*, London: Verso.
- Anderson, V. 1991  
*Alternative Economic Indicators*, London: Routledge.
- Atkinson, D. 1994  
*The Common Sense of Community*, London: Demos.
- Barabaz, A.F. 1984  
'Antarctic Isolation and Imaginative Involvement: Preliminary Findings', *International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis* 32, 296-300.
- Barber, B. 1998  
*A Place For Us: How to Make Society Civil and Democracy Strong*, New York: Hill & Wang.
- Bellah, R.N. et al. 1991  
*The Good Society*, New York: Knopf.
- Bentley, T. 1998  
*Learning Beyond the Classroom*, London: Routledge.
- Blair, T. 1997  
*New Britain*, Boulder: Westview Press.
- Blair, T. 1998  
*The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century*, London: Fabian Society.
- Blair, T. & G. Schröder 1999  
*Europe: The Third Way/Die neue Mitte*, London: Labour Party and SPD.
- Boswell, J. 1994  
*Community and the Economy: The Theory of Public Co-operation*, London: Routledge.
- Briscoe, I. 1995  
*In Whose Service: Making Community Service Work for the Unemployed*, London: Demos.
- Butcher, H. et al. (eds.) 1993  
*Community and Public Policy*, London: Pluto Press.
- Chait, J. 1998  
'The Slippery Center', *The New Republic*, November 16, 19.
- Clarke, R. (ed.) 1990  
*Enterprising Neighbours: The Development of the Community Association Movement in Britain*, London: NFCO.
- Clear, T.R. & D.R. Karp 1999  
*The Community Justice Ideal*, Boulder: Westview Press.
- Coenen, H. & P. Leisink 1993  
*Work and Citizenship in the New Europe*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
- Commission on Global Governance 1995  
*Our Global Neighbourhood*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Communitarian Network Website, The  
<<http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps>>.
- Culpitt, I. 1992  
*Welfare and Citizenship*, London: Sage.
- Demaine, J. & H. Entwistle (eds.) 1996  
*Beyond Communitarianism: Citizenship, Politics and Education*, London: Macmillan.
- Dodd, P. 1995  
*The Battle Over Britain*, London: Demos.
- Donnison, D. 1991  
*A Radical Agenda: After the New Right and the Old Left*, London: Rivers Oram Press.
- Economist, The* 1998  
'Goldilocks Politics', *The Economist*, December 19.
- Elshtain, J.B. 1989  
*Democracy on Trial*, New York: Basic Books.
- Etzioni, A. 1993  
*The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda*, New York: Crown.
- Etzioni, A. 1996  
*The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society*, New York: Basic Books.
- Etzioni, A. 1998  
'Voluntary Simplicity: Characterization, Select Psychological Implications, and Societal Consequences', *Journal of Economic Psychology* 19-5, 619-644.
- Etzioni, A. 1999  
*The Limits of Privacy*, New York: Basic Books.
- Etzioni, A. 2001  
*Next: The Road to the Good Society*, New York: Basics Books.
- Etzioni, A. & P. Rubin 1997  
*Opportuning Virtue: Lessons of the Louisiana Covenant Marriage Law*, Washington, DC: The Communitarian Network.
- Fratiglioni, L. et al. 2000  
'Influence of Social Networks on Occurrence of Dementia', *The Lancet* 355-9212, April 15, 1315.
- Frazer, E. 1999  
*The Problems of Communitarian Politics: Unity and Conflict*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Giddens, A. 1994  
*Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Giddens, A. 1998  
*The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Goodhart, D. 1994  
*The Reshaping of the German Social Market*, London: IPPR.

- Gray, J. 1996  
*After Social Democracy: Politics, Capitalism and the Common Life*, London: Demos.
- Grogger, J. 1991  
 'Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment', *Economic Inquiry* 29, 297-309.
- Hall, J.A. (ed.), 1995  
*Civil Society*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hargreaves, I. & I. Christie 1998  
*Tomorrow's Politics*, London: Demos.
- Hargreaves, I. & I. Christie 1999  
*To Our Mutual Advantage*, London: Demos.
- Harrison, A.A. et al. 1991  
*From Antarctica to Outer Space: Life in Isolation and Confinement*, New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Hemerijck, A. & J. Visser 2001  
 'The Dutch Model: An Obvious Candidate for the "Third Way"?' *The European Journal of Sociology* 42-1, 221-242.
- Hockey, L. 1997  
*Partners in Learning: Ten Community Based Case Studies*, London: LGMB.
- Houston Chronicle News Service 1993  
 'OK Expected for Oregon Health Plan', *The Houston Chronicle*, March 18, A5.
- Hurley, M.L. & L. Schiff 1996  
 'This Town Made Wellness a Way of Life', *Business and Health* 14-12, 39-43.
- Joas, H. 1994  
 'Communitarianism in Germany', *The Responsive Community* 5-1, 24-29.
- Johnson, R. 1976  
*Culture and Crisis in Confinement*, Lexington: Lexington Books.
- Jupp, B. 1999  
*Living Together: Community Life on Mixed Tenure Estates*, London: Demos.
- Klein, L. 1999  
 'On the Brink of Reform: Political Party Funding in Britain', *Case Western Reserve Journal of Law* 31-1, 1-46.
- Koryushkin, A. & G. Meyer (eds.) 1999  
*Communitarianism, Liberalism, and the Quest for Democracy in Post-Communist Societies*, St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University Press.
- Kruger, D. 1998  
*Access Denied?*, London: Demos.
- Leadbeater, C. 1996  
*The Self-Policing Society*, London: Demos.
- Leadbeater, C. 1997  
*Civic Spirit: The Big Idea for a New Political Era*, London: Demos.
- Leadbeater, C. & S. Martin 1998  
*The Employee Mutual*, London: Demos.
- Leadbeater, C. & I. Christie 1999  
*To Our Mutual Advantage*, London: Demos.

- Luke, J.S & K. R. Neville 1998  
 'Curbing Teen Pregnancy: A Divided Community Acts Together', *The Responsive Community* 8-3, 62-72.
- Mazur, A. 1993  
 'The Science Court: Reminiscence and Retrospective', *Risk* 4-1, 161.
- Miller, D. 1990  
*Market, State and Community*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Miller, D. 1995  
*On Nationality*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Mulgan, G. 1997  
*Connexity: How to Live in a Connected World*, Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
- Mulgan, G. et al. 1997  
*The British Spring: A Manifesto for the Election After Next*, London: Demos.
- Murray, R. 1999  
*Creating Wealth*, London: Demos.
- Myers, D.G. 2000  
*The American Paradox: Spiritual Hunger in an Age of Plenty*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Nathanson, S. 1998  
*Economic Justice*, New York: Prentice Hall Academic.
- Oldfield, A. 1990  
*Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World*, London: Routledge.
- Putnam, R.D. 2000  
*Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Sampson, R. 1997  
 'Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy', *Science* 277, August 14, 918-924.
- Selznick, Ph. 1992  
*The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Selznick, Ph. n.d.  
 'Social Justice: A Communitarian Perspective', manuscript.
- Smith II, G.P. 1999  
 'Judicial Decision Making in the Age of Biotechnology', *Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy* 13, 93.
- Srole, L. et al. 1962  
*Mental Health in the Metropolis: The Midtown Manhattan Study*, New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Stuster, J. 1996  
*Bold Endeavors: Lessons from Polar and Space Exploration*, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
- Tam, H.B. 1998  
*Communitarianism: A New Agenda for Politics and Citizenship*, New York: New York University Press.

- Teles, S.M. n.d.  
'An Apologia for the Third Way', paper presented at a recent American Political Science Association convention.
- Walz, M. 1994  
*Social Isolation and Social Mediators of the Stress of Illness*, Hamburg: Lit Verlag.
- Warpole, K. & L. Greenhalgh 1997  
*Park Life*, London: Demos.
- Wilkinson, H. 1997  
'No Turning Back', in: G. Mulgan (ed.), *Life After Politics: New Thinking for the Twenty-first Century*, London: Fontana Press.
- Wilkinson, H. 1999  
*The Proposal: Giving Marriage Back to the People*, London: Demos.
- Wuthnow, R. 1994  
*Sharing the Journey: Support Groups and America's New Quest for Community*, New York: Free Press.

# Social capital, social inclusion and services for people with learning disabilities

Peter Bates<sup>a\*</sup> and Fabian A. Davis<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup>*National Development Team, Ipswich, UK;* <sup>b</sup>*Bromley Mental Health Services, Oxleas NHS Trust, Chislehurst, Kent, UK*

Both social capital and social inclusion have emerged as significant concepts for human services in the last decade and yet their inter-relationship remains largely unexplored. This article argues that, whilst they are similar in their vision for a healthy society, they adopt sufficiently different perspectives to stimulate and challenge each other. This can be well illustrated by reference to services for people with a learning disability. Commissioners and providers of learning disability services are encouraged through this article to harness both concepts in order to assist in the process of modernizing services and increasing life opportunities for the people they support. It is argued that it is not possible to understand the full consequences of adopting either theoretical position without an adequate understanding of the other. Examples are given of the implications of this for advocacy services, day opportunities, rural communities, transition and staff training.

## Introduction

The concept of social capital (Putnam, 2000) has become popular just as the English White Paper 'Valuing People' (Department of Health, 2001b) has required learning disability services to work towards social inclusion. This article points a spotlight on useful insights in both social capital and social inclusion approaches that may help in the development of learning disability services, and notes some of the hazards of an unthinking adoption of either of these frameworks in isolation from the other.

## Social capital: investment in human society

Mrs Rose has decided to re-open the old school in our village as a community centre. She sent round a questionnaire asking each household how they could contribute their time and skills. She had 94 responses—more than the number of households in the village. As she says, 'I don't know why I'm doing this. I'm nearly 80 and I won't live to see this place open. But there's such a lot of talent in this community and somebody's got to get people together.' I always had the capacity to get involved, but I'm only using my capacity because Mrs Rose asked. (Ritchie, 2001)

Robert Putnam (2000) calls buildings, plant and equipment physical capital; people,

---

\*Corresponding author: National Development Team, Unit 10, Hill View Business Park, Old Ipswich Road, Claydon, Ipswich IP6 0AJ, UK. Email: pbates@ndt.org.uk

skills, knowledge and experience human capital; and social networks and norms of trust and reciprocity social capital. This distinction was taken up Prime Minister Tony Blair when he said that ‘in the future, we need to invest in social capital as surely as we invest in skills and buildings’ (Corrigan & Miller, 1999).

Putnam (2000) goes on to observe that the term ‘social capital’ has been coined at least six times during the twentieth century, while Schuller (2000) has suggested that its roots lie in a variety of intellectual traditions, including Alexis de Tocqueville (1835) on voluntary associations, Elizabeth Bott (1957) on social networks, John Dewey (1929) on shared concerns, Jurgen Habermas (1984) on trust, Amitai Etzioni (1996) on communitarianism and Albert Bandura (1977) on self-efficacy.

Despite this rich intellectual heritage, the notion of social capital remains fluid and lacks a precise definition, so, for example, Grootaert (2001) offers a list of 50 indicators that have been used in empirical studies, while the Social Action Research Project (Health Development Agency, 1999) baseline study used the following six components as a working definition:

- Participation in the local community: do you think of yourself as part of the local area? Are you an active member of a local group? Have you participated in voluntary or religious activities?
- Reciprocity: have you done or received a favour from someone living nearby? Do local people look after each other? Who would you turn to for advice or to share some good news?
- Feelings of trust and safety: in your own home or going out at night. Have you been a victim of crime? Can people round here be trusted?
- Social connections: have you chatted with family, friends or neighbours recently? Do you have close friends round here? How many people did you talk to yesterday? Do you go outside this area to visit your friends?
- Citizen power: have you formally complained about a local service? Have you joined a committee to fight for a local cause?
- Community perception: do you pick up other people’s rubbish? Do you enjoy living here? Are there enough community facilities and public transport?

### **Social inclusion**

Social inclusion is another fluid term with a variety of meanings (Bates, 2002a). For the purposes of this article, social inclusion means ensuring that people with learning disabilities have full and fair access to activities, social roles and relationships directly alongside non-disabled citizens. Over the past 30 years an informal network of writers (Wolfensberger, 1972; O’Brien, 1987; Falvey *et al.*, 1994; Rusch & Hughes, 1989) have shown how support can be provided so that people with disabilities can be employed rather than attend a sheltered workshop, live in their own home rather than in a hostel, and participate in friendships and community life with a diverse array of citizens, rather than conducting their whole lives within segregated disability services.

Since New Labour established the Social Exclusion Unit in 1997 (Social

Exclusion Unit, 1998), the notion of social exclusion has also been used to embrace poverty, unemployment and threats to community safety, along with poor access to healthcare and decent housing.

### **Recent policy convergence**

We would argue that social capital is an idea whose time has come. It has been enthusiastically adopted by the World Bank, American, European and UK governments, and has permeated the areas of health, education, community care, community regeneration and employment (Mitchell & Harrison, 2001).

Increasing social capital is expected to generate improvements in all the above areas because it is argued that increased civic participation will invigorate government, information flowing through informal networks can enhance job prospects, supportive friendships buffer against distress and illness, reciprocal relationships create a culture where learning and contribution flourishes, and heightened trust leads to a reduction in crime. As such, social capital theory should be of interest to Local Strategic Partnerships, Learning Disability Partnership Boards, Health Improvement Programmes, Community Safety Partnerships, and a host of other initiatives that directly or indirectly impact the lives of people with learning disabilities.

The 2001 White Paper 'Valuing People' (Department of Health, 2001b) introduces person-centred planning (O'Brien, 1987) as a driver to promote service change. The White Paper assumes that the majority of people with a learning disability will want to move towards an independent life in the community, leading to the demise of segregated services. A major part of this change is to be day service modernization by 2006 and the promotion of social inclusion will be an essential component of this change (Love *et al.*, 2002). As a result, many services are looking towards social inclusion advocates and social 'capitalists' for a comprehensive and detailed conceptual framework within which to plan and manage such major change.

Thus, developments in learning disability provision, social inclusion and social capital all meet in the growing policy emphasis upon citizenship, so that 'the world disabled people will occupy will extend way beyond their specialist services' (Simons, 1998).

### **Contrasting social inclusion and social capital**

The introduction above has hinted at some significant challenges to learning disability services that emerge from singular analyses of the implications of adopting either a social capital or social inclusion perspective. The Health Development Agency's framework for social capital is now used to look at some of these areas and to explore implications where the two theories need to be considered in tandem. Real examples from services for people with learning disabilities are used to illustrate the synergy or divergences between the two theoretical discourses.



*Participation in the local community*

Those people who have been deliberately segregated in prisons, long-stay hospitals and other institutions are rarely mentioned in social capital thinking, while social inclusion advocates strongly assert that society should find ways of bringing this group back home (Mansell, 1993). A brief glance at policy documents such as *Valuing People* would suggest that services should promote inclusion, but despite this, current service arrangements often segregate learning disabled people, particularly those with the least natural ability to articulate their interests.

However, bringing people back home demands more than relocating their beds—relationships have to change as well. In both social capital and inclusion thinking, service users are recognized as citizens, and the traditional focus on the relationship between worker and service user is replaced by an emphasis upon the reciprocal relationship between citizen and community:

Two women with learning disabilities wanted to take up yoga. No local groups existed, so the worker found a tutor and a community hall, and put adverts around the neighbourhood. A mixed group of citizens joined and everyone welcomed each other—including the people with learning disabilities. Nine years later the group is still running—long after the worker moved to another job. (Christine Burke, personal communication)

This paradigm shift is also enacted as people are supported to take up open employment and to participate in community Timebanks (Reed & Boyle, 2002) and local exchange trading schemes (Seyfang, 2001). Advocates of social inclusion have rightly highlighted the importance of waged employment as a route to income, status and relationships, while social capitalists point the spotlight on informal roles and relationships. In addition to the opportunity to earn a wage, people with learning disabilities may participate in the community via education, volunteering or leisure pursuits.

Mainstream learning providers have a renewed focus upon developing citizens' social and civic skills, and this may lead to a renaissance of non-vocational training to counter the recent emphasis upon developing only those skills that directly contribute to the economy. Such a shift in emphasis would have a disproportionately beneficial effect upon people with learning disabilities.

Similarly, a social capital perspective highlights the benefits of volunteering. For many years, services have arranged a few opportunities for people with learning disabilities to become volunteers in the community. Each placement must find a path between employment (volunteering as work simulation in order to attain vocational experience and skills) and community participation (volunteering as a means to harness altruistic endeavour and build affiliation and membership). Social capitalists helpfully wrest volunteering back from a single-minded attempt to use volunteering solely as work preparation and remind us that volunteering builds community, trust and reciprocity. Care is needed to ensure that volunteering opportunities are safe, rewarding, and respectful and contribute to the formation of social capital (Bates, 2002b):

The VALUES project based at Leicester Volunteer Centre supports people with

learning disabilities to contribute their time and skills to the local community. Individuals make a difference in the museum, charity shops, environmental projects, and lunch clubs—all sorts of places.

### *Reciprocity*

The way in which people with learning disabilities are perceived by others can be even more important to their capacity to contribute to the development of social capital and their own social inclusion than their disability. For example, if members of the public label people with learning disabilities as fraudulent, attention seeking, disinterested in civic affairs or unable to make a positive contribution to the community, this will limit their potential for reciprocal relationships with non-disabled community members. While it can be hard to identify the unique contribution that a particular person enjoys making and for which they will be genuinely appreciated, without opportunity this may never be discovered at all.

The two theoretical positions bring complimentary insights to the topic of reciprocity. Putnam (2000) makes a distinction between bonding and bridging relationships in which bonding relationships form between people who share a common bond, while bridging relationships bring diverse people together.

Respectful bonding relationships between people with learning disabilities are important, of course, but social inclusion theorists envisage a society in which bridging relationships span all the structural divisions in society (Amado, 1993). An included life with an ordinary home, job and leisure pursuits (rather than segregated in residential units, day centres and 'group trips') is a prerequisite for building these socially inclusive bridging relationships. Social inclusion theorists argue that society should nurture relationships between people with a learning difficulty and those without (e.g. Amado, 1993) and assert that everyone can feel at home in mainstream society, while social capital theorists do not make this explicit. Any service would be limited by adopting a social capital analysis alone as this could lead to a diminished vision that confined bonding relationships to those between peers in a day centre and bridging relationships to those that formed between centres, such as at the Special Olympics.

Bridging social capital provides what Granovetter (1973) referred to as weak ties—a valuable source of information and contacts that can help people with everything from job-finding to problem solving. Similarly, while Putnam rather derides 'mail-order' membership, belonging to an association that collects subscriptions and provides publicity can contribute to a sense of identity and provide material for conversation with others. Social capital reminds us of the importance of nurturing these connections with 'insignificant others' alongside more intimate connections:

#### *Building sustainable relationships*

Seventeen people with learning disabilities have fenced 144 gardens on the Oakwood Estate in Bridgend. As well as forming a tight-knit team, they have gained work experience and qualifications in amenity horticulture by linking with the local college. One group member said 'my self esteem has improved, I feel physically fitter and I feel

being part of the group is helpful for character building.’ Using locally grown renewable timber, the fencing has created ‘defensible spaces’ as a means of reducing crime and nuisance. Stolen cars used to be driven on the lawns between the houses, but now that the gardens are in place there is no room. They say that it is all about creating sustainable projects and sustainable relationships. The people with learning disabilities feel safe and welcome on the estate. Local residents hold the project in very high esteem and they advocate for and defend its members if the need arises. Local children have joined in with painting the fences during school holidays, leading to a reduction in vandalism. One tenant said, ‘We find that friends and neighbours are far more willing to pull together and to help each other, and are once more gaining pride and enjoyment in our community’.

### *Feelings of trust and safety*

Putnam’s position moves us from the privacy of a friendship into the public arena by including the concept of ‘thin trust’ in his description of social capital. Thin trust is present when strangers view each other as potential friends and absent when they regard each other as potential enemies. Campbell’s team (1999) failed to find much thin trust in an English housing estate, and the MENCAP (1999) inquiry into bullying showed just how reasonable it is for many people with learning disability to avoid public spaces and public transport, especially the school run.

Unfortunately, inclusion advocates tend to ignore the shameful reality of bullying, oppression and discrimination that is a daily experience for many people with learning disabilities (MENCAP, 1999). It is curious to note that *Valuing People* is silent on the matter of bullying, while the Department of Health does require mental health services to address it (Department of Health, 2001a). It is here that social capitalists have the advantage, since their goal of increasing thin trust precisely attends to this agenda.

We all have to run the gauntlet of meeting strangers from time to time and negotiate our way through thin trust in order to locate the new friends and colleagues with whom we might enjoy thick trust, but there are extra challenges for visible minorities, and this includes some people with learning disabilities.

Social capitalists task us with addressing these problems by challenging media stereotypes, providing learning disabilities equality training, and actively promoting positive relationships between people with and without disabilities. While social capitalists are developing instruments to measure these things, they have no guidance to offer on which tools are needed to make these changes, so we must look for advice to inclusion advocates, as well as media studies, community development, health promotion and students of the social psychology of stigma.

Inclusion advocates who wish to build links with community development workers may find that social capital is the linking concept that will bring them together.

Any examination of trust and safety quickly moves into a consideration of structural inequalities. Despite this, few inclusion advocates or social capitalists have given much attention to the way in which structural inequalities around race or gender impact upon the lives of people with learning disabilities. Social capital can systematically oppress women (Riddell *et al.*, 2001), people from black and ethnic

minority communities (Campbell & MacLean, 2002), people with disabilities, and, as Putnam notes, terrorist groups are strong on bonding relationships. Campbell (2000) sums all this up as ‘antisocial capital’, although it is likely that many groups have a mixture of benevolent and toxic effects, and few, if any, are unambiguously virtuous or destructive.

Staff will need to respond to these complexities at a number of levels. First, a focus on leisure and voluntary participation in the community will require services to offer support in the evenings and weekends in ordinary community locations away from learning disability premises, and so working arrangements will need to support these activities. Secondly, staff will need to respond imaginatively to bullying, thin trust and structural inequality.

### *Social connections*

Both social inclusion and social capital theorists invite us to think about people with learning disabilities as citizens who are able to make a contribution to the whole community. This clashes with the current reality, where perhaps only a third of the people utilizing learning disability services have even one non-disabled friend (Robertson *et al.*, 2001). Friendships between people with learning disabilities and non-disabled people must overcome some difficulties, especially where there are inequities in communication skills, disposable income and freedom of choice (Zetlin & Murtaugh, 1988), but can be very rewarding for participants (Newton *et al.*, 1995). Indeed, we think that people with learning disabilities may well have the potential to make an above-average contribution to the community.

Inclusion advocates have been eager to support people with learning disabilities to take up positive social roles, such as householder, employee or student. While lip service has been paid to participation as well as presence in the community, social capitalists insist that attention is given to the quality of social relationships in these settings. Simply achieving the status of a student does not build social capital if there are few opportunities for networking and relationship building. Bridging relationships with non-disabled students are not enhanced if the student is attending a special class, at a special time and taking lunch in a special, segregated cafeteria. Just as important is the support that is made available, for co-location alone does not guarantee the development of friendships. So, for example, poorly skilled job-coaches may unwittingly detach learning disabled workers from their non-disabled work colleagues in order to provide intensive task training.

There are also particular challenges that arise from taking a focus on informal and unregulated relationships. A learning disabled customer is legally entitled to fair and equal service from the bar staff, but the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 does not govern the behaviour of other drinkers in the public house. This means that a host of awkward, unfriendly or downright hostile responses may be more in evidence in unregulated social relationships—exactly in those areas that are well covered by social capitalists.

A second reason why discrimination may be amplified in unregulated relationships revolves around the practical transaction with the bar staff. This is governed by

clear rules for the encounter (placing an order, pulling the pint, paying for the drink), while the informal connections with other drinkers in the pub are less defined and, consequently, more difficult to negotiate. Similarly, in the workplace, practical tasks may enable people with learning disabilities to demonstrate their abilities at work and so allow social interaction to grow as their competence is recognized, whilst equal opportunities policies constrain potentially negative responses of colleagues. In contrast, unregulated places that are about talking and little else may provide few opportunities for this kind of broader relationship to emerge and so people who don't seem to fit in may be more comprehensively ostracized. One person said, 'I have a job, but no-one wants to go out with me in the evenings'. Social capitalists demand that these challenges are addressed.

An analysis of social capital through the life-course reveals how there are particular rites of passage when capital accrues or is lost. A move into residential care, perhaps on the death of a parent, can wipe out stocks of social capital—especially if it involves relocation into a different neighbourhood (Riddell *et al.*, 2001). Indeed, entry into any care system may burn-off social connections, trust and reciprocity. Staff need to be aware that addressing these issues can be just as important as the selection of appropriate accommodation, medication or counselling.

### *Citizen power*

Both social inclusion and social capital theories offer a familiar challenge in this domain—that of increasing service user participation and advocacy.

Traditional services have been characterized by 'vertical' relationships in which staff hold power over service users, while social capitalists and service user advocates seek 'horizontal' relationships (Riddell *et al.*, 1999).

There are a number of potential pit falls to watch out for here. As a social capital perspective gains ground, there are the ever-present dangers to be avoided, including:

- preferring 'white' social capital over culturally diverse manifestations of relationships, trust and civic participation;
- adding informal community connections to the list of things that it is acceptable to 'prescribe' for people using services;
- reproducing traditional power relationships of control and containment within new community locations;
- that individuals who do not engage may be blamed for their situation.

From our experience these problems can come about because both social capital and inclusion theorists risk unduly focusing on 'slotting in', rather than transforming society. From this standpoint, society is perceived as fundamentally just and stable, so that learning disability services simply need to locate a menu of vacant slots and help the person to decide what they would like to do, learn the correct behaviour and then engage in the social opportunity of their choice. Bourdieu (1983) challenges this perception by reminding us how the 'old boy' networks use social capital to

maintain their power and control, and advises us that this kind of social capital should be dismantled and replaced by more equitable relationships.

Paradoxically and despite the above we suggest that it is also vital to take an optimistic overview of communities. Reviews of supported employment (Riddell *et al.*, 1997) and volunteering (Bates, 2001b) note that expansion of the service is restricted, not by a shortage of 'hosts' willing to offer opportunities to people with learning disabilities, but by a shortage of state funding and therefore support staff. By extension we may assume that there will be plenty of informal social settings that would welcome people with learning disabilities, so long as we could arrange adequate support.

A further example of the synergy possible by taking a dual perspective involves advocacy services. These have devoted much time to supporting people with learning disabilities to engage in formal decision-making processes. Service users have learnt how committees work, how records are kept and distributed, as well as the subtler tasks of lobbying and negotiating with senior managers. Meanwhile, social capitalists have observed that, while the general membership of civic and community associations have been falling, there has been an even faster decline in the number of people willing to take office in these associations. In addition, recent urban regeneration and service improvement strategies have emphasized the value of public consultation and involvement, and sought new methods of reaching traditionally excluded groups. This means that market expansion and labour shortages in these community and civic associations neatly coincides with a new generation of skilled and experienced people who happen to also have a learning difficulty.

Advocacy groups that have traditionally focused on long-term bonding in order to reform the learning disability service could build bridging relationships with local community organizations and campaigns. Some people with learning disabilities might eventually leave the advocacy group in order to join other advocates for the local community improvements that most interest them as citizens.

While there is general approval for specific social roles, such as that of employee or student, taking an active part in civic, political or informal associations does not earn universal praise. Staff operate within a contemporary society that appears to place great store on garden redesign, for example, but which ridicules train spotting. This might result in staff feeling comfortable about arranging a taxi for the learning disabled person who wants to attend the agricultural college, but the same worker may be less willing to arrange transport to a meeting of the local branch of railway enthusiasts!

Separating out one's rights as a citizen from one's rights as an employee or for that matter as a service user, can lead to contradictory allegiances for staff. A person's interests or eagerness to write to the newspapers about litter may embarrass the day service staff member or spill over into unwelcome publicity for an employer. Despite this, social capitalists demand that we support people with learning disabilities who wish to vote, contribute to public discussions or agitate for social change.

In addition, those who provide formal or informal civic education should be equally interested in the parallel questions, 'How do I contribute to my community?' and 'How can I transform my community?' Paulo Freire (1972) and other educators

of the liberation school have shown how the task of transforming society can be attempted through alliances between disabled and non-disabled people; that is, through the development of bridging social capital.

### *Community perception*

In a recent training seminar, one day-centre worker described his own leisure time as occupied entirely with solitary visits to the off-licence and watching TV game shows, and therefore he did not see why isolation was a problem for disabled people. We do not know if staff in learning disability services engage in community life to a greater or lesser extent than the average, but it is likely that the personal attitudes of staff will have a real impact on the lives of service users. This is illustrated by a Department of Health study where inappropriate staff attitudes and behaviour was the most frequently cited barrier to access by disabled people (Disability Matters Limited & NHS Executive, 1999).

This suggests that there is some danger of staff defining service users' lives by their own personal choice of lifestyle, either by assuming that people with learning disabilities will not be interested in community engagement or by evangelically promoting their own personal interests.

Staff in learning disability services may also favour urban settings, as they appear to offer more venues to people who use services, despite the high transport costs of bringing everyone into a single point. Small, rural communities have fewer events and buildings, but arguably more networks and informal opportunities to connect. When there are more bridging relationships between groups in small communities, positive or negative reputations can also spread quickly, and create or deny a new resident a chance of a fresh start in a new social setting. This means that workers engaged in community relocation should recognize informal networks as sources of social capital and develop strategies in supporting service users to navigate them successfully.

Staff and other allies therefore have a two-fold task: to recognize the unique individuality of the learning disabled person and to similarly recognize the unique attributes of the many available communities to which that person might contribute. Such creative and individualized responses defy simple categorizations and press us to create systems that promote artistry, rather than the regimented production of standardized care packages. Since people with learning disabilities are likely to want and need unique arrangements, there is a danger that the introduction of standard monitoring systems will close down their leisure options to those listed on monitoring forms, whilst treating the richness of local human communities as no more than an arrangement of blank, featureless buildings and facilities.

## **Discussion**

Attention to social capital is welcome as long as this emphasis does not eclipse other important goals in the minds of service developers. For example, Wilkinson (1996) asserts that income inequality is a fundamental cause of health inequality and that

social capital plays no more than a mediating role in this relationship, while Putnam (2000) sees social capital as the primary factor. We would argue therefore that working on social capital must not become a cheap alternative to reducing income inequality and must not divert us from the task of developing services that provide for basic human dignity (Morgan, 2001).

As long as many learning disabled people lack a decent home, satisfactory income, good health, meaningful employment, and freedom from discrimination and abuse they are unlikely to view or be viewed as an asset to their neighbourhoods. The complimentary relationship between social inclusion and social capital reminds us that promoting social capital as a human service aim is a legitimate and long-term solution to the isolation and segregation of many devalued groups. However, it is not a panacea and needs bolstering with other approaches.

Social capitalists collect a diverse array of data from whole populations, as illustrated by the range of issues under discussion. As there are a host of comparative indicators already in use with the general population, some of these might also be suitable for collecting aggregate data about people with learning disabilities and comparing findings with the general population in order to discover the size of the 'inclusion gap' (Love *et al.*, 2002). However, population-level data is a poor source of guidance for what to offer to named individuals, and so care is needed in interpreting these findings:

Sue lives in a suburb and works long hours in the city. She leaves early each morning and gets home late at night. Almost every weekend she travels to visit friends in other parts of the country. As a result, she does not know her neighbours. Despite her house being often empty, she is safe from burglary as many of her neighbours are unemployed and they maintain a vigorous neighbourhood watch group.

Social inclusion theorists would look at Sue's connections with her neighbours, while social capitalists look at the whole street and recognize that she benefits from the social capital built up by her neighbours.

At the individual level, those staff who work on developing social capital therefore also need to be skilled in recognizing other factors and have access to the expertise of social inclusion advocates in how to choose, get and keep a home, a job and a social life. Managers should be aware of the tension and difference in priorities that each theoretical position taken on its own could have on resource allocation, and strike an appropriate balance that supports people who use services and simultaneously invests in the whole community. Service designers need to strike a balance between attempting to develop new 'social capital or inclusion projects', and the subtler task of threading the approach through existing services.

## **Conclusion**

If interpreted with care, the concept of social capital provides a helpful additional perspective to learning disability services that are striving to promote social inclusion. The relationship is reciprocal, however, as inclusion advocates working with learning disabled people have insights and experience that will support the pro-



motion of social capital for the whole community, as well as service users. Finally, many of the issues that have been highlighted in this article apply equally to many other groups who are at risk of exclusion. There is room for further dialogue.

## References

- Amado, A.N. (Ed.) (1993) *Friendships and community connections between people with and without developmental disabilities* (Baltimore, Paul H Brookes).
- Bandura, A. (1977) *A social learning theory* (New Jersey, Prentice Hall).
- Bates, P. (Ed.) (2002a) *Working for inclusion* (London, Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health).
- Bates, P. (2002b) *A real asset: a manual for supported volunteering* (Manchester: National Development Team).
- Bott, E. (1957) *Family and social network* (London, Tavistock).
- Bourdieu, P. (1983) The forms of capital, in: A. H. Halsey, H. Lauder, P. Brown & A. Stuart Wells (Eds) *Education: culture, economy, society* (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
- Campbell, C. (2000) Social capital and health: contextualizing health promotion within local community networks, in: S. Baron, J. Field & T. Schuller (Eds) *Social capital: critical perspectives* (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
- Campbell, C. & MacLean, C. (2002) Ethnic identities, social capital and health inequalities: factors shaping African-Caribbean participation in local community networks, *Social Science and Medicine*, 55(4), 643–657.
- Campbell, C., Wood, R. & Kelly, M. (1999) *Social capital and health* (London, Health Education Authority).
- Corrigan, P. & Miller, C. (1999) *Social capital: the basic building block of social cohesion—management briefing*, August 1999 (London, Office for Public Management).
- Department of Health (2001a) *Making it happen: a guide to delivering mental health promotion, implementation plan for Standard One of the National Service Framework for Mental Health* (London, Department of Health).
- Department of Health (2001b) *Valuing people: a new strategy for learning disability for the 21st century*, Department of Health Cmd 5806 (London, DoH).
- De Tocqueville, A. (1835) *Democracy in America*, Volume 1. Available online at: [http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/toc\\_indx.html](http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/toc_indx.html) (accessed 16 July 2003).
- Dewey, J. (1929/1958) *Experience and nature* (New York, Dover).
- Disability Matters Limited and NHS Executive (1999) *Working in partnership to implement Section 21 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 across the NHS*. Available online at: [www.doh.gov.uk/pub/docs/doh/section21dda.pdf](http://www.doh.gov.uk/pub/docs/doh/section21dda.pdf) (accessed 16 July 2003).
- Etzioni, A. (1996) *The new golden rule: community and morality in a democratic society* (New York, Basic Books).
- Falvey, M., Forest, M., Pearpoint, J. & Rosenberg, R. (1994) *All my life's a circle: using the tools: circles, MAPS and PATH* (Toronto, Inclusion Press).
- Freire, P. (1972) *Pedagogy of the oppressed* (Harmondsworth, Penguin).
- Granovetter, M.S. (1973) The strength of weak ties, *American Journal of Sociology*, 78, 1360–1380.
- Grootaert, C. (2001) Social capital the missing link? in: P. Dekker & E. M. Uslaner (Eds) *Social capital and participation in everyday life* (London, Routledge).
- Habermas, J. (1984) *The theory of communicative action: reason and the rationalization of society* (Boston, Beacon Press).
- Health Development Agency (1999) *Social Action Research Project*. Available online at: [www.had-online.org.uk/html/resources/websites.html](http://www.had-online.org.uk/html/resources/websites.html) (accessed 16 July 2003).

- Love, W., Bates, P. & Whitehead, S. (2002) *Day Service Modernization Toolkit Part 1* (Bristol, Valuing People Support Team). Available online at: <http://www.valuingpeople.gov.uk/documents/DayService1.pdf> (accessed 18 March 2004).
- Mansell, J. (Chair) (1993) *Services for people with learning disabilities and challenging behaviour or mental health needs* (London, Department of Health. HMSO).
- MENCAP (1999) *Living in fear* (London, MENCAP).
- Mitchell, D. & Harrison, M. (2001) Studying employment initiatives for people with mental health problems in developing countries: a research agenda, *Research and Development in Primary Care*, 2, 107.
- Morgan, A. (2001) *Overview and progress report on the Health Development Agency's programme of research on social capital and health* (London, Health Development Agency).
- Newton, J., Olson, D. & Horner, R. (1995) Factors contributing to the stability of social relationships between individuals with mental retardation and other community members, *Mental Retardation*, 33, 383–393.
- O'Brien, J. (1987) A guide to lifestyle planning: using the activities catalog to integrate services and natural support systems, in: B. Wilcox & G. T. Bellamy (Eds) *A comprehensive guide to the activities catalog: an alternative curriculum for youth and adults with severe disabilities* (Baltimore, Paul H Brookes).
- Putnam, R.D. (2000) *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community* (New York, Simon Schuster).
- Reed, Z. & Boyle, D. (2002) Growing strong communities, in: P. Bates (Ed.) *Working for inclusion* (London, Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health).
- Riddell, S., Baron, S., Stalker, K. & Wilkinson, H. (1997) The concept of the learning society for adults with learning disabilities: human and social capital perspectives, *Journal of Education Policy*, 12(6), 473–483.
- Riddell, S., Baron, S. & Wilson, A. (1999) Social capital and people with learning difficulties, *Studies in the Education of Adults*, 31(1), 49–65.
- Riddell, S., Wilson, A. & Baron, S. (2001) Gender, social capital and lifelong learning for people with learning difficulties, *International Studies in Sociology of Education*, 11(1), 3–23.
- Ritchie, P. (2001) *The future's purple*, paper given at the SHS conference, Edinburgh 24–25 May.
- Robertson, J., Emerson, E., Gregory, N., Hatton, C., Kessissoglou, S., Hallam, A. & Linehan, C. (2001) Social networks of people with intellectual disabilities in residential settings, *Mental Retardation*, 39, 201–214.
- Rusch, F.R. & Hughes, C. (1989) Overview of supported employment, *Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis*, 22(4), 351–363.
- Schuller, T. (2000) *Exploiting social capital: learning about learning*, inaugural lecture at Birkbeck College, 9 February 2000.
- Seyfang, G. (2001) Spending time, building communities: evaluating time banks and mutual volunteering as a tool for tackling social exclusion, *Voluntary Action: The Journal of the Institute of Volunteering Research*, 4(1), 29–48.
- Simons, K. (1998) *Home, work and inclusion: the social policy implications of supported living and employment for people with learning disabilities* (York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation).
- Social Exclusion Unit (1998) *Bringing Britain together: a national strategy for neighbourhood renewal*, Cmd 4045 (London, Stationery Office).
- Wilkinson, R.G. (1996) *Unhealthy societies: the afflictions of inequality* (London, Routledge).
- Wolfensberger, W. (1972) *Normalization: the principle of normalisation in human services* (Toronto, National Institute on Mental Retardation).
- Zetlin, A.G. & Murtaugh, M. (1988) Friendship patterns of mildly learning handicapped and nonhandicapped high school students, *American Journal on Mental Retardation*, 92, 447–454.



**7**

## **How to Write a Research Proposal?**

# 7

1. Esterberg, Kristin G. 2002. "Strategies for beginning research." Pp. 25-41 in *Qualitative Methods in Social Research*. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
2. Henn, Matt, Mark Weinstein, and Nick Foard. 2006. "Designing a Research Proposal." Pp. 249-272 in *A Short Introduction to Social Research*. London: SAGE Publications.

# 2

## Strategies for Beginning Research

### GETTING STARTED: WHERE TO BEGIN?

Getting started is often one of the hardest tasks for beginning researchers. How do you know if you have a good idea for a research project? How can you tell if the research project is doable? Just as important, how can you tell if the research is worth doing? Even experienced researchers sometimes have trouble finding a topic, beginning a new research project, figuring out how to start, choosing a research strategy, or developing a general research plan.

The first step in any research project is deciding on a general topic and then refining the topic. Suppose you are interested in homelessness or in students' alcohol use. Homelessness in general would be far too big a topic—even for someone doing a Ph.D. dissertation—so you would have to find a way to make your research more manageable. You could focus on just one aspect of homelessness, such as the experiences of workers in homeless shelters or the effects of homelessness on children. To narrow down the topic of student alcohol use, you could focus on the role of alcohol at student parties or the effects of alcohol consumption on academic achievement. You also need to think about the different approaches you could take to your research, as reflected in the paradigms discussed in Chapter 1. But what do you do if you don't know what general topic interests you? How do you begin then?

## GENERATING IDEAS

How do you generate useful, interesting ideas? It's hard to give sound advice on finding good research topics, for several reasons. One problem is that we don't usually think about where good ideas come from. They seem somehow serendipitous, a stroke of magnificent luck. Suppose you are walking down the street and suddenly notice that most of the streetlights are out on one block but functioning on the next. You also notice that the trash seems to be picked up on that block but not on the first one. This leads you to wonder about how different neighborhoods gain access to city services. Or suppose you read an article in the newspaper or see a program on TV that sparks your curiosity about how homeless people survive in the winter in cold climates. Or maybe you have a long-standing interest in sports or young children, and so research ideas seem to come naturally. These are all legitimate ways to identify a research topic. If you don't have any interests at all, you'll find it difficult to find an interesting research topic. But most of us are interested in at least *something*.

Often, qualitative researchers begin where they are. That is, they look at their own lives to see if they can find anything interesting to study, an unusual angle or puzzling event or phenomenon. Then they try to refine the topic into a more manageable—and researchable—form.

For example, Carol Freedman, a graduate student raising a young child, needed to do a research project for a course on research methods. She had been participating in a mothers' group, and so she decided to study it. The project eventually became her master's thesis, titled "Setting Stay-at-Home Standards: An Ethnographic Study of the Southland Mothers Association" (Freedman 1997).

Elliot Liebow wrote in the preface to his book *Tell Them Who I Am* that he had been diagnosed with cancer and had a limited life expectancy, so he decided to volunteer at a soup kitchen. As he put it, "I did not want to spend my last months on the 12th floor of a government office building, so at 58 I retired on disability from my job of 20-some years as an anthropologist with the National Institute of Mental Health" (1993, p. viii). Because he felt pretty good for a lot longer than he expected, he started volunteering at a homeless shelter as well. He became interested in the lives of the women at the shelter, so he began taking field notes and thinking about the shelters as a site in which to do research. Ultimately, he did an in-depth study of the lives of homeless women.

Other researchers, too, have written about how they developed their research interests. Lynn Davidman (1999) wrote about the experience of losing her mother to cancer when she was 13 and how that shaped her

decision to study what she calls “motherloss.” The point is, if you look around at your own environment, you may find the beginnings of a research topic.\*

But should you stop there? What would happen if researchers began only with their own experiences and never considered others’ perspectives? In framing research questions, it’s important to remember that how people select research problems is not a neutral process. Rather, research questions always reflect *someone’s* interests and priorities—either the researcher’s or, if the researcher is getting funding from someone else, the people who are doing the funding. While this is not necessarily a bad thing, you do need to think about the variety of perspectives that different people bring to research projects.

Consider the following example: City officials in a midwestern city became concerned with drug use in a poor section of town. That section contained a low-income public housing complex, populated mainly by poor women and their children, that was in bad condition, with leaky roofs, dilapidated interiors, and crumbling steps. City officials convened a series of meetings at the housing complex to try to deal with the problem. A number of people attended the meetings, including the managers of the housing complex, members of an antidrug task force, various government officials, the police, a legal aid attorney, residents of the housing complex, and a few university researchers.

Over the course of the meetings, it became clear that the women who lived in the complex didn’t see drugs as a major problem in their community. The main problem, from their perspective, was the dilapidated condition of the buildings they lived in. They also felt harassed by the complex security guards, most of whom were off-duty police officers. But the managers of the complex didn’t see things in the same way at all. They felt that if the women could just “pull themselves up by their own bootstraps” and get jobs (or husbands with jobs), they would pay more rent and the buildings would soon be fixed. They felt the security guards were needed to protect the buildings and that if the women hadn’t broken any laws then they had nothing to fear from the police. The legal aid attorney had yet another interpretation of the problem—as a civil rights violation. Finally, one graduate student researcher who was studying the meetings interpreted the dynamics between management, police, government officials, and the tenants in terms of state attempts to control poor women (Masuda 1998).

---

\*If you’re interested in learning more about how researchers come up with their topics, you might want to read some of the stories in *Qualitative Sociology as Everyday Life*, edited by Barry Glassner and Rosanna Hertz.



So whose interpretation of the situation was correct? What was the “real” problem? Was it drugs? Dilapidated housing? Police harassment? Social control? It depends on whose perspective you take. This is what I mean when I say that problems are never neutral. A problem is always a problem *for* someone. Sociologists sometimes refer to this as the “definition of the situation.” In any social setting, people make assumptions about what they think is happening and how to interpret the actors and events. Researchers are also involved in a process of social interaction. They, too, make assumptions about what they think is happening and define the situation in diverse ways. How researchers choose to frame their research questions reflects their sense of what “the” problem is. What if you were going to research this situation? Whose perspective would you take into account? Why?

## DECIDING WHAT TO RESEARCH

When you are first deciding what to research, you need to ask yourself a number of questions. First, what do you already know about the topic? And if you don’t know very much, how can you get more information? Going to the library or searching the Internet are good ways to learn more about a topic (and we’ll discuss these further later in the chapter), but they’re not the only ways. You can also talk to other people, such as a professor or another student, who have an interest in the topic. You can visit places to get more information. For example, if you are interested in homeless people, you might volunteer at a shelter or visit the site.

A second question you need to consider is, How do you feel about your potential topic? Do you have very strong feelings about it? If so, your feelings might lead you to focus on one particular area and avoid others or blind you to other perspectives. You may be too biased to do a good job or to understand others’ points of view. It’s important to remain open to a variety of perspectives.

Being a member of the group you are studying can be both positive and negative. People often have strong feelings about the people and groups they are involved with. If you are studying a familiar group, you’ll need to be especially careful to remain open-minded. For example, imagine that you are a member of a campus sorority or fraternity. You know that students who aren’t involved in these groups often have negative opinions about them, and you want to do research to try to counter these stereotypes. Your involvement helps you gain access to members, and that is certainly positive. But you are so invested in showing the positive side that you aren’t able

to see any other points of view. In this case, being a member might hinder your ability to do good research.

As you develop your research project, you need to keep an open mind about the people and events in your research setting and to remain open to multiple definitions of the situation. If you close yourself off to alternative explanations too soon, you may miss important insights into your research setting.

### **How Do You Turn a Topic into a Question?**

Once you've settled on a general topic, it's time to turn it into a research question. In qualitative research, your research question may shift once you begin your investigation. In fact, many scholars argue that a good qualitative researcher must have the ability to remain open to what the field setting or research site has to offer. They believe that the most important thing is simply to go out into the field to see what is out there. I argue that an initial focus is important. Even though your research question may change—and sometimes dramatically—once you begin work, you still need to start somewhere. Otherwise, you may have difficulty figuring out how to begin your research. As your research progresses, however, you need to keep an open mind to other questions that may arise in the course of your research—questions that may be even more important than the ones you initially devised.

As a first step, try brainstorming a list of questions about your topic. Then you can evaluate whether the questions can be answered using the resources you have at hand. Let's say you're interested in the general topic of abortion, but you're not sure how to narrow your topic down. Try asking some questions:

- ◆ What is the experience of abortion like for women?
- ◆ How do activists on both sides of the debate think about abortion? What do they think women's roles should be?
- ◆ How do abortion clinic staff deal with the threats of violence? Does it change the way they think about their work?
- ◆ How have media portrayals of abortion changed over time?

Notice how these questions are all answerable, at some level, with reference to the empirical world (the world of the senses). You could ask women who have had abortions what their experience is like; you could observe the staff in a clinic; you could examine news accounts of abortion to see how they have changed.

Compare those questions with, say, the following:

- ◆ Is abortion a good or a bad thing?
- ◆ Should women be able to choose to have an abortion?

These kinds of questions really can't be answered with reference to the empirical world. While they may be important *ethical* questions, they aren't amenable to social research. Thus, you need to consider whether the research questions you propose can be answered with reference to the "real" world.

You also need to ask yourself what your own assumptions about abortion and the women who have them are. If you have had an abortion yourself or know someone who has had one, that will certainly shape your thinking about the topic. If you have strong feelings pro or con, those will influence your initial question as well. You need to consider whether your own investments in the issue will allow you to investigate it with an open mind.

### **Is the Topic Interesting?**

Next, you need to consider whether your research question is interesting. A good qualitative researcher can make just about any topic interesting. But if you are bored by or indifferent to your project, you probably ought to choose another one. Doing qualitative research can take a long time, and completing a research project—even one that you are interested in—can be difficult. It's tough to keep going when you're bored by your topic. Sometimes, beginning researchers pick questions because they think they will be easy or because their professor or adviser suggested the topic. These are poor reasons to choose a topic, unless, of course, you already have an interest in the topic. No research project is truly easy, and even the easiest research becomes difficult when you don't want to do it.

### **Whose Perspective Should You Take?**

Once you've settled on a tentative research question, you need to think about how you will begin to approach it. At this stage, consider how taking different perspectives will lead you to embark on very different research projects. If your topic is homelessness, for example, you will find yourself moving down a very different path if you decide to study workers in homeless shelters than if you decide to study homeless people themselves. Simi-

larly, you will find yourself doing a very different research project if you choose to conduct your research in a small shelter that houses homeless women and their families rather than a large shelter that provides temporary housing for single men. Try to list as many perspectives as you can before you settle on a tentative focus. But even then, it's important to keep a questioning attitude. And as you continue with your work, you should remain open to as many perspectives as possible.

You also need to consider how different paradigms might shape different approaches to your research. Although you do not need to settle on a paradigm at this early stage, it's helpful to think about how these choices will affect your research. With a social constructionist approach, for example, you would want to pay close attention to how individuals define and create social reality. With a critical approach, you would want to frame your research so that it would be useful in creating social change.

Let's consider the example of education in preschools and kindergartens. A feminist researcher might focus on gender relations in the classroom—perhaps on how boys and girls interact and how gender is produced through that interaction (see, for example, Thorne 1993). A social constructionist might focus on interaction as well. But this researcher might be more interested in exploring how children come to define the classroom as a “school” and how they learn the expectations for behaving in that setting (see, for example, Corsaro and Molinari 2000). A postmodernist might focus on the multiple and fragmented realities within and around the school setting: the realities of children, teachers, administrators, and others. This researcher might explore children's cartoons, commercial culture, and other texts that shape children's realities. A positivist might begin with a theory about education—for example, that children who attend preschool adjust better to kindergarten than those who do not—and focus the research on that question.

### **Is the Research Feasible?**

Once you've settled on a tentative question, you need to ask whether you can actually do the research. For example, if you are interested in studying people in homeless shelters, you need to get permission from the shelter staff (probably the director) and from the residents themselves. Some groups are relatively easy to gain access to (such as other students); others are relatively difficult (such as people who are involved in illegal activities, like drug smugglers). You may also need to gain permission from an institutional review board at your school, which scrutinizes projects for ethical problems.

Once you've determined that you can gain access to the group you are interested in studying, you need to think about what other resources you will need. First, consider *time*. Doing qualitative research can take a great deal of time. If you are trying to study a group to which it may be difficult to gain access or that may be hostile to researchers, be sure you have enough time to develop the kinds of relationships you will need to do the research. For example, suppose you are interested in illegal drug use, as anthropologist Steven Koester is (Koester 1994). Specifically, you are interested in how HIV might be transmitted among street people who inject drugs. It will take a long time before they trust you enough to confide in you, so you need to consider whether you have enough time to gain trust.

Another important resource is *money*. Doing qualitative research can cost money. If you are going to do the research full-time, you still need to support yourself. If you are going to interview people, you need to purchase or have access to a reliable tape recorder and audiotapes. You also might have to hire someone to transcribe interview tapes, unless you plan to do it yourself. You may have to travel somewhere else to get to your research population or to find documents in an archive. You may need to purchase films or other texts to analyze. And there may be other costs as well.

The question of feasibility can be particularly difficult if you are trying to conduct a research project over the course of a semester. You may have great ideas for research projects, but the projects are too ambitious to be carried out over 14 or so weeks. Once you finally gain access to your research population or data, it is the end of the semester and time to wrap things up. Thus, you may find it easier to begin with a setting that you already know or can gain access to. But this means you'll have to be especially careful about the preconceptions and biases you bring to your work.

### Is the Research Worth Doing?

A final issue is whether you *should* do a particular project. Just because you are interested and have the resources you need, it doesn't mean you should actually do the research. The key issue is whether the research has any potential uses or benefits. Will your research make a contribution, either to individuals or to a larger group or to our general knowledge base? Does it have the capacity to harm anyone—either yourself or the research participants? Before you begin any research project, you need to consider the potential benefits and risks. (These ethical issues will be considered in detail in Chapter 3.)

Again, let's say you are interested in researching people in homeless shelters. You think the study might have potential benefits because people

might be more sympathetic to the problems of the homeless if they understood what their lives were like. They might be more interested in building affordable housing or having the government spend more money on subsidized homes. While the research might not have an immediate positive impact on the participants' themselves, you think that in the long run your work might help debunk stereotypes about homeless people.

## DEVELOPING A RESEARCH STRATEGY

Once you've chosen a topic and framed a research question, you need to develop a research strategy. Specifically, you need to address these questions:

- ◆ How will you gather the data?
- ◆ What kind of population or setting will you study?
- ◆ Will you use in-depth interviews, or do an observational study, or work with "texts" (which can include things like books and magazines but also media such as TV shows, movies, and songs)?
- ◆ How will you begin to analyze and make sense of the data you have collected?

Different research traditions suggest somewhat different strategies. We'll consider these next.

### Different Traditions, Different Starting Points

Depending on which research tradition you choose, you will begin your research from very different starting points. Before you get too far in your work, then, you need to consider which tradition(s) makes the most sense to you. According to the positivist paradigm, which we discussed in Chapter 1, the goal of social research is theory testing. Thus, in this tradition, you need to settle on a theory *before* you begin your research. Researchers who work within this tradition usually spend much time researching what others have found about their topic. They then develop *hypotheses*, or statements that can be tested, based on these theories, which often are framed in causal language: "x causes (or affects) y" or "The more of x, the less of y." Then they develop a research design that they can use to test their hypotheses. They use the results of their empirical tests to determine whether their theory is useful.

Let's say you're interested in rational choice theory (Friedman and Hechter 1988), which states that people act according to their best interests. Specifically, you're interested in applying rational choice theory to divorce. You think that, if people feel they will get more out of divorcing than staying in a marriage, they will choose to divorce. You're aware that raising children after a divorce can be hard, so you think that people with children have less to gain from a divorce than those without. Your hypothesis might be this: Couples who have children are less likely to divorce than couples who have no children. You could test this by comparing the divorce rate of couples who have children with that of couples who do not.

Qualitative researchers rarely work within this positivist tradition. That is, they are much less likely to test hypotheses than are quantitative researchers and are much more likely to work within one of the other traditions discussed in Chapter 1. Instead of *beginning* with a theory, qualitative researchers are more likely to begin with an examination of the empirical world. In the naturalistic and constructionist traditions, researchers immerse themselves in the social worlds of their research subjects. Only when they have been in a setting for a long time do they begin to develop theories. Some call this a *grounded theory* perspective (Charmaz 2000; Strauss and Corbin 1998), in which the aim is to develop theory grounded in the empirical world. If you choose this approach, your first step is to decide on a field setting or site for your research. At this stage, although you should do a library search to determine if others have studied the same kinds of sites, you should not try to develop testable hypotheses. Rather, you should focus on how you might gain access to the site and begin building relationships with the people there.

Researchers working within a critical research tradition might decide to do *action research*, in which the objective is to produce some kind of social change. For example, you might work with a coalition that seeks to end homelessness in your community. In this case, you first need to identify the stakeholders—the people who have a stake in eliminating homelessness. Obviously, people without homes do, but who else? Shelter workers? Community agencies? Neighborhood residents? You also need to identify who has the power to effect change and what the people you are working with think needs researching. For example, they might believe that the research should focus on the cost of housing in the community and on people's wages. In action research, rather than begin with a theory, you need to begin with a clear statement of the needs and priorities of the group.

While the discussion of research paradigms in Chapter 1 may have seemed abstract, the choice of a paradigm has real-life implications. The

choices you eventually make will determine whether you turn first to the published research, or to the empirical world. In research that draws on the positivist tradition, you need to have well-developed hypotheses before you begin your research. In research that draws on the naturalistic or constructionist traditions, you need to frame a general research question and choose a site for your research. In research that draws on postmodernist traditions, you might focus on texts. In this approach, although it's a good idea to read at least some of the published literature before you begin (and many researchers, myself included, would insist that you do so), you don't begin with already formed hypotheses. Instead, you develop your theory and an increasingly refined research question as you conduct the research.

### Types of Research Strategies

Once you have settled on a research question and research tradition, you need to decide how you will collect your data. Specifically, you need to address these issues:

- ◆ What research strategy will you use?
- ◆ What population or site will you study?
- ◆ What texts will you choose?
- ◆ What will your evidence consist of? Transcripts of interviews? Observational notes? Archival materials, like letters or diaries or an organization's records? Songs or videotapes of TV programs?
- ◆ How will you spend your time? Listening and talking to people? Observing? Going through published materials? Watching audio-tapes?

You can choose from several general research strategies. Which one you settle on depends on your research question, the research tradition you see yourself as working in, and your own individual preferences.

**Observational Studies** In the naturalistic or constructionist traditions, you might conduct an *observational study*, in which you gather data by observing interaction in a particular site (such as a street corner or homeless shelter). Observational studies are useful when you want to understand how people behave in a particular setting or when you want an in-depth understanding of a particular culture or group. In an observational study, you might choose



to participate. For example, you might volunteer at a homeless shelter, as Elliot Liebow, whom we discussed in Chapter 1, did. Or you might choose simply to observe in a public place (such as a shopping mall or a public park), without participating.

**Interviews** Many qualitative researchers choose to conduct formal in-depth *interviews* with people. These can be relatively structured or unstructured. Interviews are good research techniques when you want to know what people think or feel about something. Researchers often combine observational techniques with either formal or informal interviews. In formal interviews, the researcher sets a particular time and place for an interview. Informal interviews tend to arise spontaneously in the course of observation. For example, you might decide to formally interview people who volunteer in a homeless shelter in order to understand their experiences, as well as to observe and informally interview shelter residents.

**Unobtrusive Measures** Not all research involves talking with or observing people. *Unobtrusive research* involves examining human traces, or evidence of human activity. For example, if you want to know which magazines in the library are most popular, you might study which ones seem to have thumbed pages or seem to have been heavily perused. A number of researchers have studied public graffiti. Caroline Cole (1991), for example, analyzed the writing on walls in women's bathrooms, arguing that the graffiti there served as an alternative means of communication. Jeff Ferrell (1995) analyzed hip-hop graffiti in Denver, Colorado, combining participant observation of graffiti writers with visits to graffiti sites in other cities. He argues that hip-hop graffiti reflects young people's efforts to resist social control.

Sometimes, researchers study "texts" such as newspapers, books, organizational records, TV shows, and court transcripts. For example, Sharon Hays wanted to investigate what she called the "cultural contradictions of motherhood" (1996). To do so, she analyzed child-rearing manuals to identify the kinds of social norms for mothering contained in them and conducted in-depth interviews with mothers of small children to determine how they actually viewed their mothering.

**Triangulation** Each research strategy has particular strengths and weaknesses. For example, in-depth interviews can provide insight into people's thoughts and feelings, but people's behaviors don't always match their words. Analysis of texts can tell you about social ideals for behavior, but the

texts can't tell you how people actually respond to them. For this reason, researchers often use two or more research strategies. This is called *triangulation*. Because different data collection strategies have different strengths and weaknesses, research designs that include multiple research strategies tend to be the strongest ones.

## READING THE LITERATURE

Whichever research tradition and strategy you choose, you should visit the library early in the process of designing your research. Although some naturalistic researchers caution against becoming too wedded to a particular theory or viewpoint before immersing yourself in your field setting, I think this concern is a little overstated. By knowing what other researchers have already said about your topic, you are in a better position to come up with a well-thought-out research plan. And at some point during the research process, you will still need to conduct a literature review to help you place your own research in context.

I recommend that you begin any research project by simply browsing. Look through the journals and books that seem most interesting to you, or browse through the databases available at your library. I usually skim through the abstract or the introduction quickly to see if I might want to read the whole article or book. Then I go through those readings that seem most useful in more detail. I recommend looking at as wide a variety of sources as you can. As you do so, be sure to take good notes (including accurate citations) so that you can locate the sources again as needed. There's nothing more frustrating than knowing that you had the perfect source but being unable to use it because you can't find it again.

Every library is different. Some have subscriptions to many journals and excellent on-line searching capabilities; others don't. Each library has its own special way of providing access to the materials. Some libraries have on-line search services, like EBSCOhost or Infotrac, which will deliver whole articles to you on-line. Others have a large selection of books and journals in print that you can browse through. Your librarian or professor will be the best person to help you search in your own library.

Most libraries will have access to Sociological Abstracts, either in print or on-line. One of the most important databases for sociologists, Sociological Abstracts summarizes the articles in the most important journals that sociologists publish in. By searching this index, you should be able to get a good idea of what others have said about your topic. Depending on your

field and topic, you may also want to search databases such as Psychological Abstracts, ERIC, or Criminal Justice Abstracts. Again, I strongly recommend that you check with your professor or librarian to see what resources on your campus might be helpful for you.

Although this book can't help you search your specific library, it can give you some general tips on conducting a useful library search:

1. Try a number of different terms for the same thing. Different databases will often use somewhat different key words, and the same database may yield very different articles if you use just slightly different search terms.
2. If the term you've searched yields too many citations to look through, try narrowing it down. For example, I recently used the on-line version of Sociological Abstracts to search the term "working women." When I did so, I received 3669 "hits"—clearly, too many to look through. When I narrowed the topic to "working women and sexual harassment," I received 49 citations—still a lot to look through, but a much more manageable number.
3. Try a number of different sources, including the book catalogue, the journals (also called serials), and the Internet. Different sources will tend to give you very different kinds of results.
4. Once you've found a useful article or book, see if you can track down some of the sources the author used. They are often helpful.
5. Ask a librarian for help, especially if you're finding very little information about what you think should be a popular topic. But be sure you've already thought about some potential angles for your project. The librarian can't create a research topic for you, but she or he can help you find the right resources, given a specific topic.

## EVALUATING WEB SITES

The Internet can provide a wealth of material for research projects. You can get information from a variety of government and private sources, as well as research reports, book reviews, and other useful texts. Many government agencies have Web sites, including the Census Bureau, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the FBI. However, the Internet can also lead you astray. A friend of mine says that the World Wide Web is like a huge catalogue—everyone wants to sell you something. Thus, you need to evaluate Web sites

carefully before relying on them in your research. Here are a few questions to ask in judging the usefulness of various sites:

- ◆ Who sponsored the site? Is it maintained by a commercial enterprise or individuals who stand to gain something? Does it contain advertising? Is it maintained by a government agency or university or research institution? Or is it maintained by an individual? If so, what qualifications does the person have? Is she or he an expert in the field, or someone who is mainly trying to express a personal point of view?
- ◆ Does the site seem obviously biased? Does it use obviously inflammatory language? Is it published by a political or social organization with a particular agenda? Does it have a mission statement or statement of purpose anywhere on the site? What kinds of sites is it linked to?
- ◆ How often is the site updated? If it was published several years ago and hasn't been updated since, it probably is not a particularly reliable source.

As you continue to develop and refine your research project, you will probably need to return to the library a number of times. As your research changes, so will the literature that you find useful. But these tips at least will get you started.

## THE RESEARCH PROCESS IN REVIEW

Developing a good research project is an ongoing process. There are a number of steps you need to take when embarking on a research project. Although the steps are listed in one order here, you will probably find that you need to go back and forth between the steps as your research unfolds. You should also realize that your project may shift its focus as you learn more and gather more evidence about your topic. At each of these stages, try to remain open to alternative paths.

1. Choose a general topic and try to refine it into a research question.
2. Evaluate whether your topic is interesting, feasible, and worth doing—and ethical. Chapter 3 discusses ethical issues that may arise in research.

3. Develop a research strategy. Decide on the kinds of data you will collect, and think about how you will try to analyze or make sense of them. Make sure that the strategy is consistent with the research question you pose and the research tradition you are working within.
4. Begin your search of the literature. Although you will probably need to return to the literature at other stages in the research process, you should begin with a good sense of what others who have studied the same topic have found.
5. Begin collecting and organizing your data. Chapters 4–7 examine different methods of collecting data, including observation, interviews, textual analysis, and action research.
6. Begin analyzing (or interpreting) your data. Although qualitative researchers usually move back and forth between analyzing and collecting data, it is sometimes helpful to think of the two as separate steps, at least initially. Chapters 8 and 9 discuss strategies for interpreting data.
7. Write up your research. In qualitative research, it can sometimes seem as if you are writing all the time. Certainly, the process of organizing data entails writing, as does interpretation. Qualitative researchers present their work in many venues: as journal articles or books, as presentations at professional conferences, at training sessions or in-service meetings for professionals, and as presentations for community groups. Chapter 10 focuses on strategies for writing up your research and presenting it to a larger community.

## QUESTION FOR THOUGHT

---

Now is the time to consider where *you* stand in relation to your research question. Think back to the research traditions, or paradigms, outlined in Chapter 1. Which one(s) seem most convincing to you? Do you think researchers should take a critical position? Or does a more traditional orientation appeal to you? What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches? What personal insights do you have into your proposed research topic? What kinds of special knowledge might you have by virtue of your own life experiences? How might these insights shape the kinds of research you might do?

## EXERCISES

1. As you go about your daily routine, try to pay particular attention to your surroundings. See if you can develop at least two research questions sparked by what you encounter in your daily life.
2. Evaluate one of your research questions in terms of whether it is interesting, feasible, and worth doing. Consider what kinds of resources you would need to complete the research.
3. Think of a general research topic that you might find interesting. Can you come up with three or four different perspectives on it? Try refining the topic into several different research questions.
4. Go to the library to see what information you can find about the research questions you developed. Locate at least five books or journal articles that you think might be useful.
5. Search the Internet to find at least two different Web sites of interest to you. Evaluate each Web site you've chosen in terms of its potential usefulness or bias.
6. Use several different research strategies to locate information about your topic. Try several different search engines on the Internet, such as Yahoo or Excite, and several academic databases, such as the card catalogue and Sociological Abstracts. (Check with your professor or librarian about the best methods for searching on your campus.) What different kinds of materials do you find using each strategy?

## SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

- Creswell, John W. *Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994. A good introduction to research design, especially for those interested in comparing qualitative and quantitative approaches.
- Glassner, Barry, and Rosanna Hertz (eds.). *Qualitative Sociology as Everyday Life*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999. A collection of essays by qualitative scholars that examine the linkages between sociological research and everyday life.
- Lareau, Annette, and Jeffrey Shultz (eds.). *Journeys Through Ethnography: Realistic Accounts of Fieldwork*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. A collection of researchers' accounts of doing qualitative research.
- LeCompte, Margaret D., and Jean J. Schensul. *Designing and Conducting Ethnographic Research*. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 1999. Part of the Ethnographer's Toolkit, a seven-book guide to conducting ethnographic research.

## References

- Acker, Joan; Kate Barry; and Joke Esseveld. 1996. "Objectivity and Truth: Problems in Doing Feminist Research." Pp. 60–87 in *Feminism and Social Change: Bridging Theory and Practice*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Adler, Patricia A. 1985. *Wheeling and Dealing*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Adler, Patricia A., and Peter Adler. 1991. "Stability and Flexibility: Maintaining Relations within Organized and Unorganized Groups." Pp. 173–183 in *Experiencing Fieldwork: An Inside View of Qualitative Research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Adler, Patricia A., and Peter Adler. 1994. "Social Reproduction and the Corporate Other: The Institutionalization of Afterschool Activities." *Sociological Quarterly* 35:309–328.
- Alinsky, Saul David. 1971. *Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals*. New York: Random House.
- Altheide, David L., and R. Sam Michalowski. 1999. "Fear in the News: A Discourse of Control." *The Sociological Quarterly* 40:475–503.
- American Sociological Association. 1997. *Style Guide*, 2nd ed. Washington, DC: American Sociological Association.
- Anderson, Kathryn; Susan Armitage; Dana Jack; and Judith Wittner. 1990. "Beginning Where We Are: Feminist Methodology in Oral History." Pp. 94–112 in *Feminist Research Methods: Exemplary Readings in the Social Sciences*, edited by Joyce McCarl Nielsen. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Atkinson, Paul, and Martyn Hammersley. 1998. "Ethnography and Participant Observation." Pp. 110–136 in *Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry*, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Babbie, Earl. 1990. *Survey Research Methods*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Barthel, Diane. 1988. *Putting on Appearances: Gender and Advertising*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

- Becker, Bettina. 1999. "Narratives of Pain in Later Life and Conventions of Storytelling." *Journal of Aging Studies* 13:73-87.
- Becker, Howard S. 1963. *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*. New York: Free Press.
- Becker, Howard S. 1986. *Writing for Social Scientists: How to Start and Finish Your Thesis, Book, or Article*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Becker, Howard S. 1998. *Tricks of the Trade: How to Think About Your Research While You're Doing It*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Becker, Howard; Blanche Geer; Everett Hughes; and Anselm Strauss. 1977 [1961]. *Boys in White: Student Culture in Medical School*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- Belgrave, Linda Liska, and Kenneth J. Smith. "Negotiated Validity in Collaborative Ethnography." *Qualitative Inquiry* 1:69-87.
- Berg, Bruce L. 2001. *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
- Berns, Nancy. 1999. "'My Problem and How I Solved It': Domestic Violence in Women's Magazines." *The Sociological Quarterly* 40:85-108.
- Biernacki, Patrick, and Dan Waldorf. 1981. "Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques of Chain Referral Sampling." *Sociological Methods and Research* 10:141-163.
- Binik, Yitzchak M.; Kenneth Mah; and Sara Kiesler. 1999. "Ethical Issues in Conducting Sex Research on the Internet." *Journal of Sex Research* 36:82-91.
- Blee, Kathleen. 1996. "Becoming a Racist: Women in Contemporary Ku Klux Klan and Neo-Nazi Groups." *Gender & Society* 10: 680-703.
- Blumer, Herbert. 1969. *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Britton, Dana M. 1999. "Cat Fights and Gang Fights: Preference for Work in a Male-Dominated Organization." *Sociological Quarterly* 40:455-474.
- Brown, L. David. 1993. "Social Change Through Collective Reflection with Asian Nongovernmental Development Organizations." *Human Relations* 46:249-274.
- Burawoy, Michael, et al. 1991. *Ethnography Unbound*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cancian, Francesca. 1996. "Participatory Research and Alternative Strategies for Activist Sociology." Pp. 187-205 in *Feminism and Social Change: Bridging Theory and Practice*, edited by Heidi Gottfried. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Cannon, Lynne Weber; Elizabeth Higginbotham; and Marianne L.A. Leung. 1991. "Race and Class Bias in Qualitative Research on Women." Pp. 107-118 in *Beyond Methodology: Feminist Scholarship as Lived Research*, edited by Mary Margaret Fonow and Judith A. Cook. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Caplan, Arthur L. 1992. "When Evil Intrudes." *Hastings Center Report* 22:29-32.



- Chapkis, Wendy. 1997. *Live Sex Acts: Women Performing Erotic Labor*. New York: Routledge.
- Charmaz, Kathy. 2000. "Grounded Theory: Objectivist and Constructivist Methods." Pp. 509–536 in *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 2nd ed., edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Chataway, Cynthia. 1997. "An Examination of the Constraints on Mutual Inquiry in a Participatory Action Research Project." *Journal of Social Issues* 53:747–765.
- Clark, Roger; Rachel Lennon; and Leanna Morris. 1993. "Of Caldecotts and Kings: Gendered Images in Recent American Children's Books by Black and Non-Black Illustrators." *Gender & Society* 7:227–245.
- Coffey, Amanda, and Paul Atkinson. 1996. *Making Sense of Qualitative Data: Complementary Research Strategies*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Cole, Caroline. 1991. "Oh Wise Women of the Stalls." *Discourse and Society* 2:401–411.
- Collins, Patricia Hill. 1990. *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment*. New York: Routledge.
- Corsaro, William A., and Luisa Molinari. 2000. "Priming Events and Italian Children's Transition from Preschool to Elementary School: Representations and Actions." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 63:16–33.
- Coy, Patrick G. 1999. "Participant Observation, Shared Risks, and the Search for the Research Self Amidst Political Violence." Paper presented at the American Sociological Association annual meeting, Chicago.
- Davidman, Lynn. 1999. "The Personal, the Sociological, and the Intersection of the Two." Pp. 70–87 in *Qualitative Sociology as Everyday Life*, edited by Barry Glassner and Rosanna Hertz. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Deegan, Mary Jo. 1991. *Women in Sociology: A Bio-Bibliographical Sourcebook*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Denzin, Norman. 1989. *The Research Act*, 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Denzin, Norman. 1999. "Performing Montana." Pp. 147–158 in *Qualitative Sociology as Everyday Life*, edited by Barry Glassner and Rosanna Hertz. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Denzin, Norman. 2000. "The Practices and Politics of Interpretation." Pp. 897–922 in *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 2nd ed., edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Denzin, Norman K., and Yvonna S. Lincoln. 1998. "Introduction: Entering the Field of Qualitative Research." Pp. 1–34 in *The Landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues*, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Denzin, Norman K., and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.). 2000. *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Deutsch, Francine M. 1999. *Halving It All: How Equally Shared Parenting Works*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- DeVault, Marjorie L. 1999. *Liberating Method: Feminism and Social Research*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Dickson, Geraldine. 2000. "Aboriginal Grandmothers' Experience with Health Promotion and Participatory Action Research." *Qualitative Health Research* 10:188-214.
- Dodson, Lisa. 1998. *Don't Call Us Out of Name: The Untold Lives of Women and Girls in Poor America*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Dohan, Daniel, and Martin Sanchez-Jankowski. 1998. "Using Computers to Analyze Ethnographic Field Data: Theoretical and Practical Considerations." *Annual Review of Sociology* 24:477-491.
- Donnelly, David F., and Kristina Ross. "The Internet: Historical Media Research on the Virtual Archives." *Historical Journal of Film, Radio & Television* 17:129-137.
- Ellingson, Laura. 1998. "'Then You Know How I Feel': Empathy, Identification, and Reflexivity in Fieldwork." *Qualitative Inquiry* 4:492-513.
- Ellis, Carolyn. 1998. "'I Hate My Voice': Coming to Terms with Minor Bodily Stigmas." *Sociological Quarterly* 39:517-537.
- Ellis, Carolyn. 1999. "Heartful Autoethnography." *Qualitative Health Research* 9:669-684.
- Ellis, Carolyn, and Arthur P. Bochner. 2000. "Autoethnography, Personal Narrative, Reflexivity: Researcher as Subject." Pp. 733-768 in *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 2nd ed., edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Elsinger, Heidi. 1998. "Images of Women in *Sports Illustrated* and *Sports Illustrated for Kids*." Unpublished senior thesis, University of Massachusetts-Lowell.
- Emerson, Robert M.; Rachel I. Fretz; and Linda L. Shaw. 1995. *Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Esterberg, Kristin. 1997. *Lesbian and Bisexual Identities: Constructing Communities, Constructing Selves*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Ferrell, Jeff. 1995. "Urban Graffiti: Crime, Control, and Resistance." *Youth & Society* 27:73-93.
- Fine, Michelle; Lois Weis; Susan Weseen; and Loonmun Wong. 2000. "For Whom? Qualitative Research, Representations, and Social Responsibilities." Pp. 107-131 in *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 2nd ed., edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Finlay, William, and James E. Coverdill. 1999. "The Search Game: Organizational Conflicts and the Use of Headhunters." *Sociological Quarterly* 40: 11-30.
- Fleitas, Joan. 1998. "Spinning Tales from the World Wide Web: Qualitative Research in an Electronic Environment." *Qualitative Health Research* 8: 283-293.
- Fontana, Andrea, and James H. Frey. 1998. "Interviewing: The Art of Science." Pp. 47-78 in *Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials*, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

- Franzosi, Roberto. 1990a. "Strategies for the Prevention, Detection, and Correction of Measurement Error in Data Collected from Textual Sources." *Sociological Methods and Research* 18:442-472.
- Franzosi, Roberto. 1990b. "Computer-Assisted Coding of Textual Data: An Application to Semantic Grammars." *Sociological Methods and Research* 19:225-257.
- Franzosi, Roberto. 1998. "Narrative Analysis—Or Why (and How) Sociologists Should Be Interested in Narrative." *Annual Review of Sociology* 24:517-554.
- Freedman, Carol. 1997. "Setting Stay-at-Home Standards: An Ethnographic Study of the Southland Mothers Association." Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Missouri-Kansas City.
- Freire, Paulo. 1970. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. New York: Seabury Press.
- Friedman, Debra, and Michael Hechter. 1988. "The Contribution of Rational Choice Theory to Macrosociological Research." *Sociological Theory* 6: 201-218.
- Gamson, Joshua. 1998. *Freaks Talk Back: Tabloid Talk Shows and Sexual Non-conformity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gans, Herbert J. 1962. *The Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life of Italian-Americans*. New York: Free Press.
- Gans, Herbert J. 1999. "Participant Observation in the Era of 'Ethnography.'" *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 28:540-548.
- Ganz, Marshall. 2000. "Resources and Resourcefulness: Strategic Capacity in the Unionization of California Agriculture, 1959-1966." *American Journal of Sociology* 105:1003-1062.
- Garber, Marjorie. 1995. *Vice Versa: Bisexuality and the Eroticism of Everyday Life*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Gaventa, John. 1991. "Carrying On . . ." *Social Policy* 21(3):68-70.
- Gee, James. 1991. "A Linguistic Approach to Narrative." *Journal of Narrative and Life History* 1:15-39.
- Geertz, Clifford. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.
- Gergen, Kenneth J. 1991. *The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary Life*. Basic Books.
- Gergen, Mary M., and Kenneth J. Gergen. 2000. "Qualitative Inquiry: Tensions and Transformations." Pp. 1025-1046 in *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 2nd ed., edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Gibson-Graham, J.K. 1994. "'Stuffed If I Know!': Reflections on Post-modern Feminist Social Research." *Gender Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography* 1:205-224.
- Glassie, Henry. 1991. "Studying Material Culture Today." Pp. 253-266 in *Living in a Material World: Canadian and American Approaches to Material Culture*, edited by Gerald Pocius. St. John's, Newfoundland: Institute of Social and Economic Research.

- Glassner, Barry, and Rosanna Hertz (eds.). 1999. *Qualitative Sociology as Everyday Life*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Goffman, Erving. 1976. *Gender Advertisements*. London: Macmillan.
- Gordon, Linda. 1988. *Heroes of Their Own Lives: The Politics and History of Family Violence*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Gottlieb, Alma, and Philip Graham. 1993. *Parallel Worlds: An Anthropologist and a Writer Encounter Africa*. New York: Crown, 1993.
- Greenwood, Davydd J.; William Foote Whyte; and Ira Harkavy. 1993. "Participatory Action Research as a Process and as a Goal." *Human Relations* 46:179-193.
- Greer, Colin. 1991. "A Culture of Politics." *Social Policy* 21(3):53-57.
- Groger, Lisa; Pamela Mayberry; and Jane Straker. 1999. "What We Didn't Learn Because of Who Would Not Talk to Us." *Qualitative Health Research* 9:829-836.
- Gubrium, Jaber F., and James A. Holstein. 1997. *The New Language of Qualitative Method*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gubrium, Jaber F., and James A. Holstein. 1998. "Narrative Practice and the Coherence of Personal Stories." *Sociological Quarterly* 39:163-187.
- Harding, Sandra. 1986. *The Science Question in Feminism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Harding, Sandra. 1987. "Introduction: Is There a Feminist Method?" Pp. 1-14 in *Feminism & Methodology*, edited by Sandra Harding. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Hartsock, Nancy. 1987. "The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism." Pp. 157-180 in *Feminism & Methodology*, edited by Sandra Harding. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Hays, Sharon. 1996. *The Cultural Contradictions of Motherhood*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Hodder, Ian. 1989. "Post-modernism, Post-structuralism and Post-processual Archaeology." Pp. 64-78 in *The Meanings of Things: Material Culture and Symbolic Expression*, edited by Ian Hodder. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Hodder, Ian. 1998. "The Interpretation of Documents and Material Culture." Pp. 110-129 in *Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials*, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Holstein, James A., and Jaber F. Gubrium. 1995. *The Active Interview*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Hondagneu-Sotelo, Pierrette. 1996. "Immigrant Women and Paid Domestic Work: Research, Theory, and Activism." Pp. 105-122 in *Feminism and Social Change: Bridging Theory and Practice*, edited by Heidi Gottfried. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Huberman, A. Michael, and Matthew B. Miles. 1998. "Data Management and Analysis Methods." Pp. 179-210 in *Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials*, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

- Humphreys, Laud. 1970. *Tearoom Trade: Impersonal Sex in Public Places*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Ignacio, Emily Noelle. 2000. "Ain't I a Filipino (Woman)?" An Analysis of Authorship/Authority Through the Construction of 'Filipina' on the Net." *Sociological Quarterly* 41:551-572.
- Janesick, Valerie. 1998. *"Stretching" Exercises for Qualitative Researchers*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Janis, Irving. 1982. *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Jayaratne, Toby Epstein, and Abigail J. Stewart. 1991. "Quantitative and Qualitative Methods in the Social Sciences: Current Feminist Issues and Practical Strategies." Pp. 85-106 in *Beyond Methodology: Feminist Scholarship as Lived Research*, edited by Mary Margaret Fonow and Judith A. Cook. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Karp, David A. 1999. "Social Science, Progress, and the Ethnographer's Craft." *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 28:597-609.
- Katz, Jack. 1996. "Families and Funny Mirrors: A Study of the Social Construction and Personal Embodiment of Humor." *American Journal of Sociology* 101:1194-1237.
- Kendall, Lori. 2000. "'OH NO! I'M A NERD!' Hegemonic Masculinity on an Online Forum." *Gender & Society* 14:256-274.
- Keough, Noel; Emman Carmona; and Linda Grandinetti. 1995. "Tales from the Sari-Sari: In Search of Bigfoot." *Convergence* 28(4):5-16.
- Kincheloe, Joe L., and Peter L. McLaren. 1998. "Rethinking Critical Theory and Qualitative Research." Pp. 260-299 in *The Landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues*, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Kleinman, Sherryl. 1991. "Field-Workers' Feelings: What We Feel, Who We Are, How We Analyze." Pp. 184-195 in *Experiencing Fieldwork: An Inside View of Qualitative Research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Koester, Stephen. 1994. "Copping, Running, and Paraphernalia Laws: Contextual Variables and Needle Risk Behavior Among Injection Drug Users in Denver." *Human Organization* 53:287-295.
- Kondo, Dorinne K. 1990. *Crafting Selves: Power, Gender, and Discourses of Identity in a Japanese Workplace*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kotamraju, Nalini P. 1999. "The Birth of Web Site Design Skills: Making the Present History." *American Behavioral Scientist* 43:464-475.
- Krieger, Susan. 1983. *The Mirror Dance: Identity in a Women's Community*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Krieger, Susan. 1991. *Social Science and the Self: Personal Essays on an Art Form*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Johnson, Timothy P.; Michael Fendrich; Chitra Shaligram; Anthony Garcy; and Samuel Gillespie. 2000. "An Evaluation of the Effects of Interviewer Characteristics in an RDD Telephone Survey of Drug Use." *Journal of Drug Issues* 30:77-102.

- Labov, William. 1978. "Crossing the Gulf Between Sociology and Linguistics." *American Sociologist* 13:93-103.
- Lamott, Anne. 1995. *Bird by Bird: Some Instructions on Writing and Life*. New York: Anchor.
- Lareau, Annette, and Jeffrey Schultz (eds.). 1996. *Journeys Through Ethnography: Realistic Accounts of Fieldwork*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- LaRossa, Ralph; Charles Jaret; Malati Gadgil; and G. Robert Wynn. 2000. "The Changing Culture of Fatherhood in Comic-Strip Families: A Six-Decade Analysis." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 62:375-388.
- Laslett, Barbara, and Barrie Thorne. 1997. *Feminist Sociology: Life Histories of a Movement*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Leblanc, Lauraine. 2000. *Pretty in Punk: Girls' Gender Resistance in a Boys' Subculture*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- LeCompte, Margaret D., and Jean J. Schensul. 1999a. *Designing and Conducting Ethnographic Research*. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
- LeCompte, Margaret D., and Jean J. Schensul. 1999b. *Analyzing and Interpreting Ethnographic Data*. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
- Lee, Raymond M. 2000. *Unobtrusive Methods in Social Research*. Buckingham, England: Open University Press.
- Lempert, Lora Bex. 1994. "A Narrative Analysis of Abuse." *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 22:411-441.
- Lerner, Jennifer E., and Linda Kalof. 1999. "The Animal Text: Message and Meaning in Television Advertisements." *The Sociological Quarterly* 40: 565-586.
- Liebow, Elliot. 1967. *Tally's Corner: A Study of Negro Streetcorner Men*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Liebow, Elliot. 1993. *Tell Them Who I Am: The Lives of Homeless Women*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Lincoln, Yvonna S., and Norman K. Denzin. 2000. "The Seventh Moment: Out of the Past." Pp. 1047-1065 in *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 2nd ed., edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Lincoln, Yvonna S., and Egon Guba. 1985. *Naturalistic Inquiry*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Lincoln, Yvonna S., and Egon Guba. 2000. "Paradigmatic Controversies, Contradictions, and Emerging Confluences." Pp. 163-188 in *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 2nd ed., edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Lofland, John, and Lyn H. Lofland. 1984. *Analyzing Social Settings*, 2nd ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Lofland, John, and Lyn Lofland. 1995. *Analyzing Social Settings*, 3rd ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Lofland, Lyn. 1985. *A World of Strangers: Order and Action in Urban Public Space*. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.

- Lykes, M. Brinton. 1997. "Activist Participatory Research Among the Maya of Guatemala: Constructing Meanings from Situated Language." *Journal of Social Issues* 53:725-747.
- Macdonald, Keith, and Colin Tipton. 1993. "Using Documents." Pp. 187-200 in *Researching Social Life*, edited by Nigel Gilbert. London: Sage.
- MacDougall, Colin, and Frances Baum. 1997. "The Devil's Advocate: A Strategy to Avoid Groupthink and Stimulate Discussion in Focus Groups." *Qualitative Health Research* 7:532-540.
- Madriz, Esther I. 1998. "Using Focus Groups with Lower Socioeconomic Status Latina Women." *Qualitative Inquiry* 4:114-129.
- Madriz, Esther. 2000. "Focus Groups in Feminist Research." Pp. 835-850 in *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 2nd ed., edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Manning, Peter K., and Betsy Cullum-Swan. 1998. "Narrative, Content, and Semiotic Analysis." Pp. 246-273 in *Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials*, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Marcenko, Maureen O., and Linda Samost. 1999. "Living with HIV/AIDS: The Voices of HIV-Positive Mothers." *Social Work* 44:36-45.
- Marcus, George. 1998. "What Comes (Just) After 'Post'? The Case of Ethnography." Pp. 383-406 in *The Landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues*, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Masuda, Kazuyo. 1998. "Cockroaches and Cops: Women Struggling in an Urban Section 8 Housing Complex." Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Missouri-Kansas City.
- McAdams, Dan P. 1993. *The Stories We Live By: Personal Myths and the Making of the Self*. New York: Guilford Press.
- McNeil, Larry B. 1995. "The Soft Arts of Organizing." *Social Policy* 26:16-22.
- McNicoll, Paule. 1999. "Issues in Teaching Participatory Action Research." *Journal of Social Work Education* 35:51-62.
- Miles, Matthew B., and A. Michael Huberman. 1994. *Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Milgram, Stanley. 1974. *Obedience to Authority*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Miller, Neil. 1995. *Out of the Past: Gay and Lesbian History from 1869 to the Present*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Mishler, Elliot G. 1991. "Representing Discourse: The Rhetoric of Transcription." *Journal of Narrative and Life History* 1:255-280.
- Mitchell, Richard G., Jr. 1991. "Secrecy and Disclosure in Fieldwork." Pp. 97-108 in *Experiencing Fieldwork: An Inside View of Qualitative Research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Mitchell, Richard G. 1993. *Secrecy and Fieldwork*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Moen, Phyllis. 1989. *Working Parents: Transformations in Gender Roles and Public Policies in Sweden*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

- Montell, Frances. 1999. "Focus Group Interviews: A New Feminist Method." *NWSA Journal* 11:44-71.
- Montini, Theresa. 1996. "Gender and Emotion in the Advocacy for Breast Cancer Informed Consent Legislation." *Gender & Society* 10:9-23.
- Morgan, David L. 1988. *Focus Groups as Qualitative Research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Morgan, David L. 1995. "Why Things (Sometimes) Go Wrong in Focus Groups." *Qualitative Health Research* 5:516-524.
- Morgan, David L. 1996. "Focus Groups." *Annual Review of Sociology* 22: 129-153.
- Morse, Janice M. 1998. "The Contracted Relationship: Ensuring Protection of Anonymity and Confidentiality." *Qualitative Health Research* 8:301-304.
- Morse, Janice M. 1998. "Designing Funded Qualitative Research." Pp. 56-85 in *Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry*, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Naples, Nancy A., with Emily Clark. 1996. "Feminist Participatory Research and Empowerment: Going Public as Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse." Pp. 160-183 in *Feminism and Social Change: Bridging Theory and Practice*, edited by Heidi Gottfried. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Neuman, W. Lawrence. 1994. *Social Research Methods*, 2nd ed. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
- Neutens, James J., and Laura Rubinson. 1997. *Research Techniques for the Health Sciences*, 2nd ed. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
- Nielsen, Joyce McCarl. 1990. *Feminist Research Methods: Exemplary Readings in the Social Sciences*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Oakley, Ann. 1981. "Interviewing Women: A Contradiction in Terms." Pp. 30-61 in *Doing Feminist Research*, edited by Helen Roberts. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Park, Robert E. *On Social Control and Collective Behavior*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.
- Patton, Michael Quinn. 1990. *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*, 2nd ed. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Plummer, Ken. 1995. *Telling Sexual Stories*. London: Routledge.
- Plummer, Ken. 1999. "The 'Ethnographic Society' at Century's End." *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 28:641-649.
- Posavac, Emil J., and Raymond G. Carey. 1997. *Program Evaluation: Methods and Case Studies*, 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Presser, Stanley, and Linda Stinson. 1998. "Data Collection Mode and Social Desirability Bias in Self-Reported Religious Attendance." *American Sociological Review* 63:137-145.
- Punch, Maurice. 1998. "Politics and Ethics in Qualitative Research." Pp. 156-184 in *The Landscape of Qualitative Research*, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.



- Ragin, Charles C. 1994. *Constructing Social Research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
- Rathje, William. 1992. "How Much Alcohol Do We Drink? It's a Question . . . So to Speak." *Garbage* 4(1):18-19.
- Rathje, William. 1993. "Less Fat? Aw, Baloney." *Garbage* 5(4):22-23.
- Rathje, William, and Cullen Murphy. 1992. "Garbage Demographics." *American Demographics* 14:50-55.
- Reinharz, Shulamit. 1992. *Feminist Methods in Social Research*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Richards, Thomas J., and Lyn Richards. 1998. "Using Computers in Qualitative Research." Pp. 211-245 in *Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials*, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Richardson, James T. 1991. "Experiencing Research on New Religions and Cults: Practical and Ethical Considerations." Pp. 62-71 in *Experiencing Fieldwork: An Inside View of Qualitative Research*, edited by William B. Shaffir and Robert A. Stebbins. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Richardson, Laurel. 1992. "The Consequences of Poetic Representation: Writing the Other, Rewriting the Self." Pp. 125-140 in *Investigating Subjectivity: Research on Lived Experience*, edited by C. Ellis and M. G. Flaherty. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Richardson, Laurel. 2000. "Writing: A Method of Inquiry." Pp. 923-948 in *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 2nd ed., edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Riessman, Catherine Kohler. 1993. *Narrative Analysis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Ronai, Carol R. 1992. "The Reflexive Self Through Narrative: A Night in the Life of an Erotic Dancer/Researcher." Pp. 102-124 of *Investigating Subjectivity: Research on Lived Experience*, edited by C. Ellis and M. G. Flaherty. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Rosie, Anthony. 1993. "'He's a Liar, I'm Afraid': Truth and Lies in a Narrative Account." *Sociology* 27:144-152.
- Rutter, Jason, and Greg Smith. 1999. "Presence and Absence in Virtual Ethnography." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Chicago.
- Ryan, Gery, and Thomas Weisner. 1996. "Analyzing Words in Brief Descriptions: Fathers and Mothers Describe Their Children." *Cultural Anthropology Methods* 8(3):13-16.
- Sacks, Harvey. 1974. "On the Analysability of Stories by Children." Pp. 216-232 of *Ethnomethodology*, edited by Roy Turner. Baltimore: Penguin Education.
- Sanders, Clinton R. 1989. "Organizational Constraints on Tattoo Images: A Sociological Analysis of Artistic Style." Pp. 232-241 in *The Meanings of Things: Material Culture and Symbolic Expression*, edited by Ian Hodder. London: Unwin Hyman.

- Scarce, Rik. 1995. "Scholarly Ethics and Courtroom Antics: Where Researchers Stand in the Eyes of the Law." *American Sociologist* 95: 87-113.
- Schegloff, Emmanuel. 1997. "'Narrative Analysis': Thirty Years Later." *Journal of Narrative and Life History* 7:97-106.
- Schegloff, Emmanuel, and Harvey Sacks. 1974. "Opening Up Closings." Pp. 233-264 in *Ethnomethodology*, edited by Roy Turner. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books.
- Schensul, Stephen L.; Jean J. Schensul; and Margaret D. LeCompte. 1999. *Essential Ethnographic Methods: Observations, Interviews, and Questionnaires*. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
- Schiffman, Josepha. 1991. "'Fight the Power': Two Groups Mobilize for Peace." Pp. 58-79 in *Ethnography Unbound: Power and Resistance in the Modern Metropolis*, by Michael Burawoy et al. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Seidman, Irving. 1998. *Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and the Social Sciences*, 2nd ed. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Shaffir, William. 1991. "Managing a Convincing Self-Presentation: Some Personal Reflections on Entering the Field." Pp. 72-81 in *Experiencing Fieldwork: An Inside View of Qualitative Research*, edited by William B. Shaffir and Robert A. Stebbins. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Shaffir, William, and Robert Stebbins. 1991. *Experiencing Fieldwork: An Inside View of Qualitative Research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Shuster, Evelyne. 1998. "The Nuremberg Code: Hippocratic Ethics and Human Rights." *Lancet* 351:974-978.
- Sia, Ah-hiok. 2000. *A Study of International Students' Networks*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri-Kansas City.
- Small, Stephen A. 1995. "Action-Oriented Research: Models and Methods." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 57:941-956.
- Smith, Dorothy. 1987. "Women's Perspective as a Radical Critique of Sociology." Pp. 84-96 in *Feminism and Methodology*, edited by Sandra Harding. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Smith, Louis M. 1998. "Biographical Method." Pp. 184-224 in *Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry*, edited by Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Smith, Phil. 1999. "Food Truck's Party Hat." *Qualitative Inquiry* 5:244-261.
- Sociology Writing Group. 1991. *A Guide to Writing Sociology Papers*, 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Sohrabi, Nader. "Historicizing Revolutions: Constitutional Revolutions in the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and Russia, 1905-1908." *American Journal of Sociology* 100:1383-1447.
- Stacey, Judith. 1991. *Brave New Families: Stories of Domestic Upheaval in Late Twentieth Century America*. New York: Basic Books.
- Stacey, Judith. 1996. "Can There Be a Feminist Ethnography?" Pp. 88-101 in *Feminism and Social Change: Bridging Theory and Practice*, edited by Heidi Gottfried. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

- Stack, Carol. 1974. *All Our Kin: Strategies for Survival in a Black Community*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Stack, Carol. 1996. "Writing Ethnography: Feminist Critical Practice." Pp. 96–106 in *Feminist Dilemmas in Fieldwork*, edited by Diane L. Wolf. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Steinberg, Ronnie J. 1996. "Advocacy Research for Feminist Policy Objectives: Experiences with Comparable Worth." Pp. 225–255 in *Feminism and Social Change: Bridging Theory and Practice*, edited by Heidi Gottfried. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Stoecker, Randy. 1999. "Are Academics Irrelevant? Roles for Scholars in Participatory Research." *American Behavioral Scientist* 42:840–844.
- Strauss, Anselm, and Juliet Corbin. 1990. *Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Strauss, Anselm, and Juliet Corbin. 1998. "Grounded Theory Methodology: An Overview." Pp. 158–183 in *Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry*, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Stringer, Ernest T. 1996. *Action Research: A Handbook for Practitioners*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Tewksbury, Richard, and Patricia Gagne. 1997. "Assumed and Presumed Identities: Problems of Self-Presentation in Field Research." *Sociological Spectrum* 17:127–156.
- Theophano, Janet, and Karen Curtis. 1996. "Reflections on a Tale Told Twice." Pp. 151–176 in *Journeys Through Ethnography: Realistic Accounts of Fieldwork*, edited by Annette Lareau and Jeffrey Schultz. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Thompson, Sharon. 1995. *Going All the Way: Teenage Girls' Tales of Sex, Romance, and Pregnancy*. New York: Hill & Wang.
- Thorne, Barrie. 1993. *Gender Play: Girls and Boys in School*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Tuchman, Gaye. 1998. "Historical Social Science: Methodologies, Methods, and Meanings." Pp. 225–260 in *Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry*, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Viditch, Arthur J., and Stanford M. Lyman. 2000. "Qualitative Methods: Their History in Sociology and Anthropology." Pp. 37–84 in *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 2nd ed., edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Walters, Ian. 1997. "Vietnam Zippos." *Journal of Material Culture* 2:61–75.
- Walzer, Susan. 1998. *Thinking About the Baby: Gender and Transitions into Parenthood*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Webb, Eugene J.; Donald T. Campbell; Richard Schwartz; Lee Sechrest; and Janet Belew Grove. 1981. *Nonreactive Measures in the Social Sciences*, 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Werner, Oswald, and Mark G. Schoepfle. 1987. *Systematic Fieldwork: Ethnographic Analysis and Data Management*, Volume 2. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

- Whittier, Nancy. 1995. *Feminist Generations: The Persistence of the Radical Women's Movement*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Whyte, William Foote. 1943. *Street Corner Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Whyte, William Foote. 1991. "The Social Sciences in the University." *American Behavioral Scientist* 34:618-634.
- Whyte, William Foote. 1995. "Learning from the Mondragon Cooperative Experience." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 30:58-68.
- Whyte, William Foote. 1996. "Qualitative Sociology and Deconstructionism." *Qualitative Inquiry* 2:220-226.
- Whyte, William Foote. 1999. "The Mondragon Cooperatives in 1976 and 1998." *Industrial & Labor Relations Review* 52:478-481.
- Whyte, William Foote. 1993. *Street Corner Society*, 4th ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Wolcott, Harry F. 1990. *Writing Up Qualitative Research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Wolcott, Harry F. 1999. *Ethnography: A Way of Seeing*. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
- Wolf, Daniel R. 1991. "High-Risk Methodology: Reflections on Leaving an Outlaw Society." Pp. 211-223 in *Experiencing Fieldwork: An Inside View of Qualitative Research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Wolf, Diane L. (ed.). 1996. *Feminist Dilemmas in Fieldwork*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Zavella, Patricia. 1987. *Women's Work and Chicano Families: Cannery Workers of the Santa Clara Valley*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Zavella, Patricia. 1996. "Feminist Insider Dilemmas: Constructing Ethnic Identity with Chicana Informants." Pp. 138-159 in *Feminist Dilemmas in Fieldwork*, edited by Diane L. Wolf. Boulder, CO: Westview.

# 10

## Designing a Research Proposal

- ✓ To examine the role of the proposal within research
- ✓ To inform readers of the criteria by which successful proposals are judged
- ✓ To examine an example of a successful research proposal
- ✓ To identify distinctions between quantitative and qualitative proposals
- ✓ To provide a framework structure for a research proposal

- **Introduction**
- **What is a research proposal?**
- **The reviewers' assessment criteria**
- **Quantitative and qualitative research proposals**
- **Is there a formula for writing successful research proposals?**
- **Outline of the proposed research**
- **Summary**
- **Recommended reading**

### Introduction

All researchers should be able to prepare a proposal for a research topic to a professional standard. Being able to produce such a proposal is an important skill. Intending doctoral students are required to prepare such a proposal when applying for studentships and seeking formal registration for their project. Such requirements are also common on many university Masters courses.

Outside of the academic arena, there are also many organisations that provide funding for social research. Where this is the case, how do you convince a funding body that may be assessing a large number of competing proposals that your research is worthy of support in preference to the others that it will look at? You may have a great idea that immediately captures the imagination, but are you capable of transforming this idea into a feasible project?

The research proposal is the means by which we are able to demonstrate that we are able to do this. As such, it allows us to spell out what exactly is the research problem that we are intending to investigate, why this is worthy of investigation, and how we intend to carry out the research. In putting such a proposal together we shall not only need to demonstrate our knowledge of the area in which we are interested, but also be required to show that we have the necessary methodological competence and sensitivity to carry out the research.

This chapter covers the essential ground in constructing a high-quality research proposal. Specifically, it considers:

- What is a research proposal?
- What is the value of a research proposal?
- What should be included in a good research proposal?
- How should a research proposal be structured?
- By what standards are research proposals assessed?

## **What is a research proposal?**

The research proposal is an application that is prepared by a research student, university academic, or professional researcher for support prior to embarking upon a research study.

At one level, the objectives of a research proposal may be seen as providing a statement about the purposes of the research, how it is to be carried out, the resource implications of the proposed investigation, as well as the timescale for completion. At another level, however, the research proposal is an argument. Through the document, you are presenting a case, in which the intention is to convince others of the general merits and feasibility of the proposed study.

The research proposal should therefore aim to convey three key aspects of an intended research project:

1. its objectives and scholarly significance;
2. your technical qualifications; and
3. the level of funding required.

### *The objectives and scholarly significance of the proposed study*

The general research issues to be examined, together with the methodological strategy to be pursued, need to be carefully explained to the reviewer. Each must also be fully justified.

The proposal, then, should communicate your specific intentions. This involves a clear overview of the purpose of the proposed study and of its importance,

together with a step-by-step plan for conducting it. The research problem(s) needs to be identified, questions or hypotheses should be stated, and key terms defined. You must specify and justify which target group is to be included in the sample, together with the research design to be adopted, the research instrument(s) to be used, the procedures to be followed, and the methods of analysis to be used.

All of these aspects of the project should be covered, and at least a partial review of previous related literature must be included. This will enable you to 'ground' your project theoretically – to make explicit links between this and existing ideas and debates that are taking place within the wider academic or policy community. The literature review will also enable you to demonstrate the suitability of your proposed research strategy. Your case will be strengthened if you: (a) reference the type of methods used by other authors in the past to conduct similar studies; (b) are then able to demonstrate from this that you have appraised the effectiveness of these approaches in generating data to examine the issues at hand, and therefore justified your own choice of research strategy.

### *The technical qualifications of the researcher*

This will need to be stated, whether you are a student intending to commence with a Masters or doctoral research programme, or a project leader applying for funding support. Your experience and level of expertise should be carefully set out, in terms of both your knowledge of the subject area and your methodological 'qualifications' and skills. (Note that when applying for funding, it should not be assumed that by 'experience', precedence is inevitably given to those who are well published with a long history of research in the field, over new and aspiring researchers. As we shall see, an application is judged on the basis of the applicant's track record to date, which will be measured against the particular stage reached in her or his academic career.)

### *The level of funding required*

It goes without saying that all review committees will need to be convinced that the intended project provides 'value for money'. This, as we shall see, does not necessarily mean that cheapest is always best. Instead, it requires that the researcher provides evidence that she or he has carefully costed the proposed project, and that the level of funding sought is warranted, given both the aims and objectives of the study and the methods to be used to implement it.

If yours is a proposed Masters dissertation or doctoral thesis, and you are not applying directly for financial support, you will nonetheless need to convince the course team that you have access to sufficient resources to complete your study.

## **The reviewers' assessment criteria**

The essential criteria for assessment of the research proposal will be broadly the same, regardless of which body the prospective researcher is targeting. This will be the case, whether or not you are applying for funding from an external agency or a university research committee, or to a postgraduate course team in order to receive its approval to proceed with a postgraduate dissertation. The proposal should contain sufficient information to persuade both specialist and non-specialist members of the review committee that the proposed activity is sound and worthy of support under their criteria for the selection of projects.

### **Activity 10.1 Review Committee's judgement of a research proposal**

---

What do you think the research review committee will consider most important in assessing a research proposal? Make a list of the areas that you think members of such a committee would focus upon when considering a research proposal.

*But what are the key criteria that such bodies use to assess a research proposal?*

The criteria most typically used by review committees to measure the potential of your research proposal can be listed as:

- Track record
- Originality
- Feasibility
- Clarity
- Outputs

### **Activity 10.2 Review committee assessment criteria**

---

Consider the assessment criteria listed above. Which do you think the research review committee will consider most important in assessing a research proposal? How would you rank them in terms of their priority for such a committee? For each, write short notes explaining why you think it is a low- or high-level criterion for review committees.



## *Clarity*

The assessors will be scrutinising a research proposal to ensure that there is an internal coherence to the project:

- Is it clearly thought through in terms of what you have set out to do?
- Is there a clear identification of the research problem that you intend to investigate?

It will be anticipated – indeed expected – by the review committee that the research proposal will not be deficient in these areas. Therefore, clarity is a low-level criterion. Very few research proposals would be expected to fail because they lacked internal coherence.

## *Feasibility*

Can you achieve what you initially set out to do in your proposal (within your budget and your estimated timescale, and using your initial research strategy)?

You should think through your research plans carefully, and try to anticipate all possible issues and detours that you may encounter during your study. But the review committee will be sufficiently experienced in these matters to appreciate that research programmes cannot be precisely mapped out, particularly for emergent qualitative research studies. Certainly, the notion of ‘delivery within budget’ is a red herring.

And there will be issues that arise during the course of your study which may impact upon your initial methodological strategy – issues that you could not realistically have predicted at the outset. Perhaps these will be in terms of access difficulties encountered, or sickness of a key ‘gatekeeper’, or ethical matters that arise additional to those discussed in your research design.

Feasibility is an important issue, and the review committee will use this as one of the criteria upon which they will assess your research proposal. However, risk will take precedence over predictability. Producing a book on time is of course important, but the review committee will ask the question, ‘will the book be read by 5, or 500, or 5,000 people?’ before they ask, ‘will the applicant meet his/her deadline?’ Similarly, If you can demonstrate that your research is innovative, then your proposal is likely to be considered very seriously by the review committee. The exciting, yet expensive, research idea has a greater likelihood of approval than a proposal that is considerably cheaper, but is nonetheless not as inspiring.

Feasibility is an important criterion therefore – more so than clarity – but it is nonetheless a relatively low-level one.

## *Track record*

Understandably, if your research proposal is to be assessed competitively against those submitted by other candidates, the review committee will take into account

the track records of each applicant. But an established track record by itself is certainly no guarantee of success. And review committees will be realistic enough to appreciate that a 'new' researcher can only develop a good track record if bodies like their own provide the researcher with the support to embark upon a research career.

Furthermore, such committees will have different expectations of 'new' and more 'long-standing' applicants. Indeed, a good track record can be achieved even at a relatively early stage for researchers. The expectations held by assessors of what counts as a good track record is relative to the stage of a research career achieved by a particular applicant. New and aspiring researchers should therefore pitch their application for research support appropriately. Typically, the route to be taken is a 'staged' one. It involves the aspiring student applying initially for a university postgraduate course. Paid academic research posts, or practitioner research posts, are likely to follow only after qualification. Such a trajectory may be a long and arduous one, but achieving a good track record comes only with talent and hard work.

## *Outputs*

This is a very important criterion, more so than those already mentioned. The review committee will be particularly interested in supporting project proposals that have the potential for achieving publication, or which may have 'utility' for the wider policy community.

Extract 10.1 provides an example taken from a (successful) research proposal – the *Youth and Politics* project (Henn and Weinstein 2000) – that was awarded a research grant from an external research-funding agency (the Economic and Social Research Council). Here, the applicants were required to demonstrate the relevance of the research for different user groups.

Notice that there are very explicit statements from the funding agency concerning its expectations about:

- the usefulness of the proposed research for this community;
- that there is evidence that such organisations and individuals have had some input into the design of the research;
- that the research is of sufficient interest to practitioners that they may have provided tangible support to the project (perhaps in terms of part-funding or a letter of support).

You may not have been able to achieve this level of external support, but it will significantly add to the robustness and credibility of your research proposal if you can demonstrate that it has importance to the wider practitioner or policy-making communities. This will be the case regardless of whether or not you are applying for external funding for research, or you are preparing a research proposal for a thesis.

**EXTRACT 10.1 Youth and Politics project (Henn and Weinstein 2000)**

**Relevance to 'user' groups**

*Please explain below the likely contribution to policy or practice; details of consultation with user groups (such as public, private and voluntary sector practitioners and policy makers) in the development of the research and proposed collaboration/communication with such groups during the research should be included. Details of any potential co-funding or support in kind should also be included here. **Do not** exceed one side.*

1. The proposed research will be of value to policy users and to the wider political community. In previous research, we have dealt with a number of agencies and organisations that have links to youth, including amongst others, the Institute for Citizenship, the Citizenship Team at the Department for Education and Employment, the National Union of Students, various trades unions (notably the GMB), and the party youth sections. Meetings will be held to further progress these links through the research, in terms of: the design of the research and the survey questionnaire; testing out the plausibility and utility of the research findings; the dissemination of the findings through presentations at the end of the research. Together, these organisations will be able to provide invaluable advice and support to the project.
2. Non-technical summaries and briefing papers shall be disseminated to various policy users and other interested groups, including those mentioned in 1. above, but also others such as the British Youth Council, the Young Fabians, as well as all members of the Crick Commission, and think-tanks.
3. Academics will be consulted during the design stage of the research – particularly in terms of discussion of theoretical issues in the development of the questionnaire.
4. Research results will be communicated to the academic community via conferences (the annual meetings of the UK Political Studies Association and the British Sociological Association) and academic journals (papers will be submitted to the 'British Journal of Political Science', and 'Sociology' in the first instance).
5. Earlier research that we have conducted has already been widely disseminated through the national and local media. It is anticipated that the proposed research will lead to similar levels of media exposure, and press releases will be produced for this purpose.

### *Originality*

Members of a review committee who are charged with the task of reviewing your research proposal will recognise that the project's perceived contribution to the

external users, or its potential for publication in an academic journal, or to gain a good pass on a Masters course, will be largely dependent upon its originality. The potential to generate new knowledge is the key to a good research proposal. If you can convince the review committee that you have met this criterion, then and only then will they assess your proposal on the basis of the other criteria mentioned above. By the same token, if you fail to convince these assessors that you have an original idea that you intend to investigate through your proposed project, then the reviewers are unlikely to consider your application further.

But different types of reviewer will have different yardsticks against which to measure 'originality':

1. External funding agencies (higher education funding councils like the ESRC, charitable funding bodies like the Nuffield Foundation) – will assess originality in terms of an expected significant contribution to knowledge likely to follow from the proposed research.
2. Ph.D. review committees – will look for indications that the intended study programme has a significant potential for publication.
3. Masters supervisors – will be concerned that the dissertation proposal will lead to an authentic and independent research project.

So, how will you discover your 'big idea'?

It is likely to develop organically from your own research interests. Most importantly, you must read widely – adopting too narrow a focus in your reading may limit your ability to discover your research question. You must look consciously for it. This will by necessity involve you in one or more of the following:

- Developing an awareness (through reviewing the literature and/or attending conferences) of the research which is currently being developed in your field. As you do so, search for an idea which you consider to be significant by its omission from your field. Try to identify what is conventionally referred to as a research gap in your chosen area.
- Challenging current thinking in your field (to do this requires you to be aware of the key issues and debates in your subject area first of all).
- Applying an existing idea to a new field or a different academic or policy context. This may not involve you in developing a 'new' idea as such, but the way in which you use that existing idea will be innovative. It therefore has the potential to make an original contribution to knowledge. An example might involve you examining a marketing technique that is used widely within the general field of business studies, and researching the extent of its usage by political parties in their campaigning. Through your research, you may gain a greater understanding of the development of modern electioneering methods.

The research proposal is therefore an important document. As such, it will take significant time, effort, and patience to get it right. It will also likely involve the

preparation of several drafts, as well as feedback from colleagues in the field, before it is ready for submission. But such preparation has some important potential benefits for the project. Submitting the research proposal enables an expert review committee to evaluate the merits of your research plans, and in so doing – especially where they may offer suggestions for revision – provides important ‘expert’ insight into how to improve the study.

## **Quantitative and qualitative research proposals**

Prior to the drafting of a research proposal, the nature of the research design to be selected should be set out. Whether one is intending to adopt a broadly qualitative research design, or a strategy that is largely quantitative in nature, is likely to affect the shape and format of the research proposal. Of course, those charged with reviewing proposals would have very clear expectations that certain content will be included in the proposal, regardless of the intended research strategy. However, some elements of a quantitative research proposal will not be included in a qualitative research proposal, and vice versa. Furthermore, quantitative research proposals are likely to be more uniform than those designed for broadly qualitative-based studies. As K.P. Punch (1998, pp.269–70) notes:

It is easier in many respects to suggest proposal guidelines for a quantitative study, since there is greater variety in qualitative studies, and many qualitative studies will be unfolding rather than prestructured. An emerging study cannot be as specific in the proposal about its research questions, or about details of the design. When this is the case, the point needs to be made in the proposal.

In the remainder of this chapter, the core elements of a research proposal will be reviewed. Where appropriate, the specific aspects that are necessary for drafting either a qualitative or a quantitative proposal will be noted.

## **Is there a formula for writing successful research proposals?**

A research proposal, then, is a written plan for a study. It spells out in detail what the researcher intends to do. It permits others to learn about the intended research, and to offer suggestions for improving the study. It helps the researcher to clarify what needs to be done, and aims to avoid unintentional pitfalls or unknown problems.

Before examining what a research proposal might look like, it is important to be aware that what will be suggested in the remainder of this chapter is intended to serve as a general framework, not a definitive set of instructions. The only general rule that must always be adhered to is that the research proposal should be both

succinct and complete. Other than that, each university research committee or external funding agency will have its own expectations about the actual format of the research proposal, and some will be more explicit than others in this respect. Research proposals often vary significantly in terms of length. In some cases, application forms that prescribe precisely what is wanted will need to be completed. In others, the researcher will have more latitude to decide upon the format of the proposal.

However, the onus will be on the researcher to 'bend' to meet the requirements of the university review committee or external funding agency.

## **Outline of the proposed research**

In the absence of any forms or guidelines, there are general themes that you might use to structure your own research proposal, whether this is for a postgraduate dissertation, or an application for external research funding. However, what follows are 'elements' of a proposal – you do not need to have each as a particular heading.

### *Title page*

This should include each of the following: your name, the title of the proposed project, any collaborating agencies which have been involved in the preparation of the proposal, the date of submission, and, if applicable, the funding agency to which you are applying for support.

### *Abstract*

The abstract is a brief synopsis of the planned research investigation. It appears at the front of the proposal, but it is usually the last element to be written. It should include two key areas – the major objectives of the proposed study, and the procedures and general methodological strategy that are to be used in order to meet these objectives. The abstract should be approximately one page or less in length.

The abstract is an important strategic element of the proposal, and therefore should be afforded considerable attention in the drafting of your proposal. It serves three key interlinked purposes:

- The reviewer usually reads it before the full proposal to gain a perspective of the study and of its expected significance.
- The reviewer uses it as a reference to the nature of the study if the project comes up for discussion.

- It will sometimes be the only part of the proposal that is read when making preliminary selections of applicant proposals.

Read through Extract 10.2. As you do so, look carefully at the two aspects of an abstract outlined above, and note how they are covered.

**EXTRACT 10.2 Abstract: *Youth and Politics* project (Henn and Weinstein 2000)**

Conventional wisdom holds that young people in Britain are alienated from the political process. Moreover, some have suggested that there is an 'historic political disconnection' of youth from formal party politics, with this group more likely to participate in new politics formations. Paradoxically, there is a recognition that formalised youth activities are a potentially significant aspect of party development. They serve the purposes of recruiting the future political elite, raising political awareness among young people, and widening the pool of party activists. The aim of this project is to reveal the level of engagement that young people have with party politics in Britain. Specifically, the research will examine whether there is a crisis of democratic legitimacy in terms of the attitudes of young people toward party politics. It will also investigate differences in this respect, along socio-demographic and spatial lines. Importantly, regional analysis will enable an examination of the efficacy of new political institutions in Wales, Scotland and London for strengthening levels of young people's political engagement. Quantitative data will be collected by means of a national postal survey of young people. This will be the first British nation-wide study to focus exclusively on first-time voters with only limited experience of formal politics.

**Activity 10.3**

Think about a research project that you intend to conduct. Write an abstract of between 200 and 250 words, setting out (a) the general issues and debates/or policy field that you intend to engage with through your study, (b) your specific aims and objectives, and (c) the research strategy that you propose to follow to meet these objectives.

*Research problem to be investigated*

There are usually four areas to be addressed in this section of the research proposal: the purpose of the proposed study, a justification for the project, the specific research

questions that you intend to explore, and a definition of the key terms and concepts that you will examine. However, you will write only one section. This must contain all of these four aspects; you will not deal with each under a separate heading.

### *Purpose of the study*

This section expects you to state succinctly what the research proposes to investigate. The purpose should be a concise statement, providing a framework to which details are added later. Generally speaking, any study should seek to clarify some aspect of the field of interest that is considered important, thereby contributing both to the overall knowledge in the field and to current practice.

### *Justification for the study*

The researcher must make clear why this particular study is important to investigate. You must present an argument for the work of the study.

As an example, you might be interested in the general field of organisation studies. If you intend to study a particular method through which a local authority deals with harassment at work, you need to make a case that such a study is important, and that people are or should be concerned with it. Perhaps it is particularly prevalent in a particular department compared to the overall situation within the local authority. You might indicate that previous studies have identified a pattern of harassment that is linked to poor morale within the workplace, increased incidences of people suffering from occupational stress, and high levels of absenteeism. Or perhaps, where the issue is not checked, it may lead to poor industrial relations. The net result either way may lead to an erosion of quality within the particular department, and a decline in public confidence in the service.

Alternatively, you may be interested in conducting a research study which aims to evaluate the effectiveness of 'care in the community' solutions for mental health patients. Existing research may indicate that since the introduction of the current arrangements, there has been a marked increase in the general suicide rate amongst this group, or perhaps an expansion in the rate of homelessness among people with severe learning difficulties.

You must also make clear why you have chosen to investigate the particular method adopted by organisations to tackle such problems. In many such proposals, there is the implication that current methods are not adequate to tackle the problem seriously.

Coley and Scheinberg (1990, p.41) have developed a useful framework for conceptualising issues for research that helps to justify how research may reveal interesting new insights into the problem. The framework may not, in its entirety, be appropriate for all styles of research, but the general method they adopt is a useful way of beginning to think about how you may structure the 'case' for your proposed study:

People with 'A' characteristics and background live in 'B' conditions/environments and have 'C' problems/needs that are caused by 'D'.



People are blocked from solving these problems because of 'E'. This problem is related to other problems 'F', and have 'G' short- and long-term impact if not addressed.

The impact of their needs/problems on the community is 'H'. Others have addressed their needs/problems by doing 'I', the result of their interventions have been 'J'.

The most promising strategy for intervention now is 'K'.

Key questions to ask yourself at this point are:

- Have I identified the specific research problem that I wish to investigate?
- Have I indicated what I intend to do about this problem?
- Have I put forward an argument as to why this problem is worthy of investigation?

### *The research questions*

The particular research questions that you intend to examine should be stated next. These are usually, but not always, a more specific form of the problem in question form. For quantitative researchers, research hypotheses will be set out at this stage for reasons of clarity and as a research strategy. If a researcher has a hypothesis in mind, it should be stated as clearly and as concisely as possible. It is unnecessarily frustrating for a reader to have to infer what a study's hypothesis or hypotheses might be. Examples of the research questions that were to be pursued in the *Youth and Politics* project noted in Extracts 10.1 and 10.2 are included in Extract 10.3.

For qualitative researchers, especially those adopting an emergent research design, the actual research questions and hypotheses will not become clear until the research has begun. Typically, these begin to take shape in the course of data collection and analysis. As K.P. Punch (1998, p.270) notes:

If a tightly structured qualitative study is planned, the proposal can proceed along similar lines to the quantitative proposal. If a more emergent study is planned, where focus and structure will develop as the study proceeds, this point should be made clearly (in the research proposal). In the former case, there will be general and specific questions. In the latter case, there will only be general orienting and guiding research questions.

Key questions to ask yourself at this point are:

- Have I asked the specific research questions that I wish to explore through my research?
- Do I have any hypotheses in mind? If so, have I expressed them clearly and appropriately?
- Do I intend to investigate a relationship between different phenomena or variables? If so, have I indicated the variables that I think may be related?

**EXTRACT 10.3 Key research questions: *Youth and Politics* project  
(Henn and Weinstein 2000)**

- Popular understanding of parties.
- Are young people indifferent, or even hostile to political parties?
- What, if anything, do they like about them?
- Do their attitudes towards parties significantly differ from those of other sections of the population (such as their parents' generation)?
- Is there evidence to suggest that young people are now more disaffected from parties than at any time since the introduction of universal suffrage?
- And is there a case for arguing that young people, given their particular socialisation and formal educational experiences, might actually be more predisposed to party appeals?

**Activity 10.4**

Write down a list of five key questions that you aim to research in your project. As you do, make brief notes to remind yourself why you are asking these questions - what do you aim to achieve in doing so?

***Definitions of key terms and concepts***

All key terms should be defined. In a quantitative hypothesis-testing study, these are primarily the terms that describe the variables of the study. Your task is to make your definitions as clear as possible. If previous definitions found in the literature are clear to all, that is well and good. Often, however, they need to be modified to fit your proposed study. It is often helpful to formulate *operational definitions* as a way of clarifying terms or phrases. While it is probably impossible to eliminate all ambiguity from definitions, the clearer the terms used in a study are – to both you and others – the fewer difficulties will be encountered in subsequent planning and conducting of the study.

For instance, if you are conducting a study which involves researching harassment at work, you will want to examine different aspects and dimensions of this key concept. One of these may be violence, and you should carefully define this by taking account of the different forms of violence – physical, verbal, and emotional. Now review the section on operationalising concepts in Chapter 3.

In an emergent qualitative-based research study, however, the key concepts that you intend to engage with in your research will not all be clear to you at the outset of your research. The key issues, their dimensions, and how you intend to define

them will only become clear in the course of the actual empirical investigation. Where this is so, you should state this clearly within your proposal.

A key question to ask yourself at this point is:

- Have I defined all key terms clearly and (if possible) operationally?

### *Review of the literature*

In a research proposal, the literature review is a partial summary of previous work related to the focus of the study. You will need to demonstrate to a review committee that you are familiar with the major trends in previous research as well as opinions on the topic, and that you understand their relevance to your planned study. The major weakness of many literature reviews is that they cite references without indicating their relevance or implications for the planned study.

You need to review the literature comprehensively prior to the development of your research proposal – in order for instance to identify a research gap that will serve as a stimulus for your study. However, the space available for you to develop this in your research proposal will be limited. You will therefore need to be concise and succinct in your review.

Cormack (1984) provides a useful overview of the three key uses of a literature review. It will:

- provide you with a wide range of documentary information on facts, opinions, and comments concerning the topic to be investigated;
- help you to discover whether the topic has already been studied, and, if so, to what extent your work will be affected;
- help you to decide which research techniques will be most appropriate for your study.

In the early stages, the literature review will consume much of your time and energies. However, it should be regarded as a continuous process, with new information added as the project proceeds.

You should take a structured approach to your literature search. Ask yourself, what information are you after? If you are going to use word searches on CD-ROMs or the Internet, you should list all the possible keywords and synonyms that you consider to be relevant to your research question(s). You should also be clear about which timescale you intend to cover in your project (only articles since 1991?), and what the geographic boundaries are that you intend to work within (Australian but not Canadian studies?). Finally, you should be flexible about the range of material that you consider for your literature review – especially if your initial searching fails to uncover a sufficient body of literature for your study. For instance, you may consider studies that investigate the sources and impact of occupational stress in the teaching and nursing professions, and how these experiences apply to the fire

service in terms of the implications for safety. Or perhaps in a project focusing on youth engagement with politics, you might find it valuable to consider studies that examine the political participation of ethnic minority groups. For more information about consulting the literature, see Chapter 9.

Key questions to ask yourself at this point are:

- Have I surveyed and described relevant studies that are related to my research problem?
- Have I surveyed existing expert opinion on the problem?
- Have I summarised the existing state of opinion and research on the problem?

### *Methodology to be used for conducting the research*

The methodology section should include a discussion of your intended research design, the sample you will examine, the instruments to be used to conduct the investigation, procedural detail for collecting your empirical evidence, and the data analysis technique(s) to be used.

### *Research design*

The particular research design to be used should be identified, as well as how it applies to the present study. You therefore need to ensure that your choice of approach is *justified* in this section (see Extract 10.4). Typically, the basic design is fairly clear cut, and fits one of the following models:

- Survey research
- Historical research
- Experimental research
- Observational/ethnographic research
- Documentary research

However, you may want to use a variety of approaches. Combining methods and strategies may help to add depth to your study, as well as enable you to identify whether your approach is valid and reliable. See Chapter 3 for a discussion of this mixed method research design.

Emergent qualitative research designs may involve you in approaching your methods more flexibly during the course of the study. As K.P. Punch (1998, p.273) explains, when opting for such a research design: 'There is a need to explain the flexibility the study requires and why, and how decisions will be made as the study unfolds'.

Nonetheless, you should be as explicit as you can be in your proposal about the general research design that you intend to use, and provide as much material about your plans as you are able.

**EXTRACT 10.4 *Youth and Politics* research proposal  
(Henn and Weinstein 2000)**

As you read through this extract, notice how the two methods are justified with respect to the project aims and objectives.

***Focus on attainers***

As a methodological innovation, we will focus exclusively on ‘attainers’ – young people eligible to vote for the first time when the 2001 electoral register comes into force. As far as we are aware, the proposed study would be the first of its kind to focus solely on attainers. Our intention in limiting our study to this age group is twofold. Firstly, in research terms, attainers are a relatively unique target group. Most social and political surveys that examine the views of young people tend to combine their views with older youths. Hence, attainers will typically be analysed as part of an 18–24 (or 18–25) year old group (see, for instance Parry et al. 1992) or included in studies of students (e.g., Denver and Hands 1990), often alongside respondents with an increasingly mature age profile as Higher Education is opened up to new entrants. Secondly, they will have had minimal formal experience of participating in politics in terms of voting, with the possible exception of the 2001 local elections. They are, therefore, relatively inexperienced politically in comparison to older people and are therefore less likely than their older contemporaries to have formed deep-seated views about politics, parties and politicians. As a consequence, attainers provide a fascinating target group for study in terms of their perceptions of political institutions and actors in Britain. The study will form the baseline for understanding future developments in youth attitudes of, and orientation towards, British political parties as these attainers gain experience of engaging with politics. There is potential therefore to track attitudes over time for comparative purposes.

**Activity 10.5**

Decide what is to be the research design for your intended study.  
State clearly why you have chosen that particular approach in terms of the aims and objectives you set out for your project in Activity 10.4.

***Sample***

In your proposal, you should indicate in considerable detail how you will include participants – the sample – for investigation in your study. You should indicate

what the size of the sample will be, how members will be selected, and what claims you may legitimately make about the representativeness of your sample. For a quantitative research study, you should aim, if at all possible, to adopt a random sampling technique, or, if this is unrealistic, a quota sampling method should be used in an attempt to maximise representativeness.

However, for small-scale projects of the type likely to be undertaken by postgraduate students where your study will be subject to various resource constraints, it may be legitimate to use other less rigorous sampling methods such as the convenience sample. It is more important to complete a project with an unrepresentative sample than abandon the study because it fails to achieve a sample that is representative of your target group. If a convenience sample must be used, relevant demographics (gender, ethnicity, occupation, age, housing, and any other relevant characteristics) of the sample should be described. The legitimate population to which the results of the study may be generalised should be indicated.

For emergent qualitative research designs, you are likely to use theoretical sampling to select your research participants. Where this is the case, you are much more likely to include respondents whose presence is designed to maximise theoretical development than to achieve representativeness. Your reasons for choosing this sampling strategy should be indicated (and justified) within this section of the research proposal, together with an acknowledgement that: (a) the sample has been chosen to generate insights (as opposed to definitive conclusions) about your research area; and (b) the results will be indicative, rather than representative, of the views of the wider population. For a further discussion of this point, see the section on case selection from Chapter 3.

Key questions to ask yourself at this point are:

- Have I described my sampling plan?
- Have I described the relevant characteristics of my sample in detail?
- If you are using a predominantly quantitative research design, have I identified the population to which the results of the study may legitimately be generalised?
- If you are using a predominantly qualitative research design, have I demonstrated that my selection of cases is reasonably typical of what might be expected if I had conducted my research elsewhere?

### *Instruments to be used*

Whenever possible, existing research instruments should be used in your study, since construction of even the most straightforward test or questionnaire (or selection of questions) is often very time consuming and difficult. Furthermore, doing so will enable you to make comparisons between your findings and the results from the earlier study from which the research instrument was borrowed.

However, you cannot justify using an existing research instrument if it is not appropriate for your purpose, even though it may be more convenient. You will therefore need to assess whether existing instruments are suited to your needs.

In the event that appropriate instruments are not available, the procedures to be followed in developing your own research instruments to be used in the study should be described with attention to how validity and reliability will be enhanced. It will be important to indicate within your proposal that you intend to build a *pilot stage* (Extract 10.5) into your project, or, if the research instrument has already been tested for these purposes, include a version within the appendices. For example, if you are conducting a survey, you should include a specimen questionnaire or some questions that you consider to be good illustrations of what you will ask. For a more qualitative research design, you might include an observation schedule, or a topic guide for in-depth interviews.

**EXTRACT 10.5 Pilot stage: *Youth and Politics* research proposal (Henn and Weinstein 2000)**

As you read through the following extract, you will notice how a pilot study has already been conducted to examine both what sorts of question areas will likely need to be explored for the qualitative part of the project, and how the quantitative aspect will take advantage of an existing research instrument.

**Pilot research**

A qualitative-based pilot study, using focus groups, has already been completed by the research team in preparation for this full project (Henn, Weinstein and Wring 1999). This preliminary research was designed to help establish which questions should be asked, as well as their structure. We will also hold meetings with various party youth activists and youth organisers, interested user groups, and academics in order to further our understanding of which questions to include in the questionnaire. In addition, the proposed survey will include questions that appear on other national political opinion studies to enable comparative work with other age groups (including amongst others, the British Social Attitudes surveys, the British Election Studies surveys, and the British Election Panel surveys). Considerable attention will be paid to the design and layout of the questionnaire to ensure an attractive presentation of the postal survey. This will draw on previous experience of conducting postal surveys of this particular target group (Wring, Henn and Weinstein 1999; Henn, Weinstein and Wring 2000). A pilot study will be conducted in the Nottingham area in order to test the efficacy of the questions to be used in the postal survey.

Key questions to ask yourself at this point are:

- Have I described the instrument(s) to be used?
- Have I indicated their relevance to the present study?

- Have I stated how I will check the reliability and validity of my data collection instruments?
- Have I built a 'piloting the instrument' stage into the research design?

### *Procedures and data collection*

Outline your proposed method(s) of research. This should be presented in sufficient detail for the reader to know whether the project is realistic, feasible, and worthwhile. You will need to describe how you intend to access your target group, and contact your research participants. Is your target group one that is typically difficult to involve in research studies of your kind? If so, what steps will you take to maximise your response rate, and minimise bias? What method of data collection will you use? For instance, if your proposed study involves the use of a questionnaire, you should indicate whether you intend to use a self-completion version, or implement it in a face-to-face situation, or via the telephone.

It is important to make your procedures of data collection clear so that if another researcher wants to repeat the study in exactly the same way as the original, you have made your procedures as clear as possible so they can be replicated. Certain procedures may change from those previewed in the proposal as the study is carried out, but a proposal should always aim to have this level of clarity as its goal. Explain why you think this is the best method for investigating the research problem.

A key question to ask yourself at this point is:

- Have I fully described the procedures to be followed in the study – what will be done, where, when, and how?

### *Data analysis*

The researcher should indicate how the data to be collected will be organised, interpreted, and analysed. You should explain which statistical procedures and tests you intend to use for quantitative-based studies, and why you are choosing to do so. Similarly, if you intend to conduct a qualitative research study, then you should indicate the methods of analysis you will use to analyse the data. Perhaps you intend to quantify the results obtained from your unstructured interviews? If your project is more emergent in nature, you may be proposing to adopt a grounded theory approach.

### *Ethical considerations*

The review committee will have been alerted to any potential or any actual ethical problems likely to arise from your proposed study while reading the methodology section. The proposal may be reviewed by a committee whose primary objective is to assess the scientific methods of a study, but they will also be aware of ethical issues.

It is important that you anticipate gaining written consent from adults or parents or guardians when members of your target group cannot themselves give



approval. Ethical matters may also be relevant to protecting these research participants from any negative consequences of your study. However, you will also need to demonstrate to the review committee that you have taken adequate steps to ensure that both yourself and others associated with your intended project are protected from harm, particularly if the research situation is one that has the potential to place people in positions of danger.

At some point in the proposal it is necessary to indicate clearly what you regard as the major ethical issues of the project, and to state clearly how these will be handled. Alternatively you may state that the proposal raises no ethical issues. In order to complete this section effectively and convincingly, you should pay close attention to the ethical guidelines that are set out in the codes of conduct that many academic and professional organisations have developed. For a full discussion of ethics, see Chapter 4.

### *Timescale*

The amount of time you need to devote to the study should be set out in the proposal. It may be that this is a proposal for a full-time commitment or for only a few hours in a week. But whichever is the case, the research proposal must specify the amount of time involved (Extract 10.6). The review committee will need to know how long the project will take when considering whether to fund it, or, if yours is a proposal for a Masters dissertation, whether the project can be finished within your deadline.

#### **EXTRACT 10.6 Timetable for the *Youth and Politics* project**

Completion of all preparation and design work (3 months); commencement of survey data collection phase of study (3 months); completion of survey data collection phase of study (6 months); commencement of analysis phase of study (6 months); completion of analysis phase of study (14 months); commencement of writing up of the research (12 months); completion of preparation of any new datasets for archiving (14 months); completion of writing up (18 months).

### *Facilities and resources*

Describing particular forms of expertise or backup facilities can strengthen a proposal. Good computer and library facilities fall into this category. Where established networks are integral to a project, or co-operation has been obtained from particular agencies or institutions, some indication of this, like a letter of agreement, may be included as a helpful appendix.

### ***Budget***

Preparing a research budget is as much a skill as preparing other parts of the proposal. Part of the skill lies in locating other people who know the price of all appropriate commodities: staff time, tape-recorders, photocopying, travel costs, and so on. Preparing a budget means translating the timescale and plan of work into financial terms.

In preparing a budget, use a checklist to include main headings such as:

- Research salaries
- Data collection costs (purchase of equipment and other materials, printing, travelling expenses)
- Stationery and postage
- Data analysis expenses

### ***Pre-submission***

It is likely that a research proposal will go through many drafts. Indeed, there would be major cause for concern if it did not. There are a number of things to be achieved in reviewing a proposal – not least considering its physical presentation. Legibility, lucidity, and clarity of presentation are all important. While readers of a proposal will not be evaluating its presentation, the relatively small amount of time it takes to ensure a layout that is easily followed will be time well spent.

Check carefully that the proposal meets all of the criteria set by the review committee.

Perhaps most importantly, ask colleagues to read and comment upon your proposal, and take any criticisms that they may have of it seriously. As Hessler (1992, p.287) states:

We assume too much, taking for granted the nuances and assumptions of our research, which is tough on readers who do not share this knowledge ... take nothing for granted. If in doubt, spell it out, even to the point of repeating yourself. Redundancy is not the worst sin in grant writing.

### **SUMMARY**

This chapter has reviewed the process of constructing a research proposal, setting out the main points that need to be considered in producing a professional and convincing document. As we have seen, in any proposal it is of paramount importance that the research that is envisaged is clearly articulated and is of value to the body looking to support the research.

In assessing your proposal, a reviewer will also be looking to see that your proposed study is a feasible one. As well as capturing a reviewer's imagination with the subject of your research, you will have to satisfy the reviewer that you are in a position to carry the research out to a high standard. Having a bright idea

is the starting point from which you have to construct a compelling case that your research is not only interesting, but also capable of execution.

In this respect the reviewer will be looking for you to demonstrate your methodological proficiency and sensitivity. For example, have you adequately addressed the complexities of the sampling strategy that will need to be adopted and are you fully aware of any potential issues that may preclude you obtaining access to your intended research participants?

As we have seen, there are different audiences for different sorts of research proposals. If your research is intended to be carried out as part of a Masters course at a university, you may be primarily focused on persuading your tutors that you have located your research in a particular body of specialist literature. On the other hand, if you are applying for funding from an external agency that places a high premium on policy-oriented research then you will need to convince the reviewing panel that your research not only is of academic interest, but also has wider societal value.

Of course, all reviewers will have their own set of criteria by which they will judge the proposals that come before them. Unfortunately, there is no easily applied formula that can be applied to all research proposals that can guarantee success. However, the more consideration that you have been able to give to the research you plan to carry out, reflecting on the outline elements that have been covered in this chapter, the more likely it is that you will have produced a proposal that stands up to keen scrutiny.

## RECOMMENDED READING

Blaikie, N. 2000. *Designing Social Research*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Brewer, E.W., Achilles, C.M. and Fuhrman, J.R. 1993. *Finding Funding: Grant Writing for the Financially Challenged Educator*. London: Sage.

Bryman, A. 2001. *Social Research Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Coley, S.M. and Scheinberg, C.A. 1990. *Proposal Writing*. London: Sage.

Hart, C. 2001. *Doing a Literature Search: A Comprehensive Guide for the Social Sciences*. London: Sage.

Henn, M. and Weinstein, M. 2000. *First-Time Voters' Attitudes towards Party Politics in Britain* [online]. Economic and Social Research Council. Available at

<[http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme\\_social/Peoples\\_perceptions\\_social\\_capital.pdf](http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_social/Peoples_perceptions_social_capital.pdf)> (Accessed 9 January 2004).

Punch, K.P. 1998. *Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches*. London: Sage.

Punch, K.P. 2000. *Developing Effective Research Proposals*. London: Sage.

# Bibliography

- Adler, P. 1985. *Wheeling and Dealing*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Aldridge, A. and Levine, K. 2001. *Surveying the Social World: Principles and Practice in Survey Research*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Allport, G. 1942. *The Use of Documents in Psychological Science*. New York: Social Science Council.
- Arber, S. 1993. Designing Samples. In: N. Gilbert (ed.), *Researching Social Life*. London: Sage. pp.68–92.
- Arksey, H. and Knight, P. 1999. *Interviewing for Social Scientists*. London: Sage.
- Asch, S.E. 1965. Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments. In: H. Proshansky and B. Seidenberg (eds), *Basic Studies in Social Psychology*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. pp.393–410.
- Barker, E. 1984. *The Making of a Moonie. Brainwashing or Choice*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Barnes, J. 1979. *Who Should Know What? Social Science, Privacy and Ethics*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Barthes, R. 1967. *Elements of Semiology*, trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Bechhofer, F. 1974. Current Approaches to Empirical Research: Some Central Ideas. In: R.G. Burgess (ed.), *Field Research: A Sourcebook and Field Manual*. London: Allen and Unwin. p.211.
- Becker, H. 1967. Whose Side Are We on? *Social Problems*, 14, pp.239–47.
- Becker, H. 1974. Photography and Sociology. *Studies in the Anthropology of Visual Communication*, 1, pp.3–26.
- Becker, H.S. and Geer, B. 1960. Participant Observation: The Analysis of Qualitative Field Data. In: R.G. Burgess (ed.), *Field Research: A Sourcebook and Field Manual*. London: Allen and Unwin. p.239.
- Behling, J.H. 1984. *Guidelines for Preparing the Research Proposal*. Lanham, MD: University of Maryland Press.
- Benn, T. 1988. *Out of the Wilderness: Diaries 1963–67*. London: Arrow Books.
- Berg, B. 1998. *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
- Berger, A.A.S. 1993. *Improving Writing Skills: Memos, Letters, Reports and Proposals*. London: Sage.
- Berger, R. 1990. Nazi Science: The Dachau Hypothermia Experiments. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 332 (20), pp.1435–40.
- Bernard, B. 1999. *Century*. London: Phaidon Press.
- Bernard, H.R. 1994. *Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. London: Sage.
- Bilton, T. et al., 1987. *Introductory Sociology*. London: Macmillan.

## Bibliography

- Bingham, N. 2003. Writing Reflexively. In: M. Pryke, G. Rose and S. Whatmore (eds), *Using Social Theory: Thinking Through Research*. London: Sage.
- Blaikie, N. 2000. *Designing Social Research*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Brewer, E.W., Achilles, C.M. and Fuhrman, J.R. (eds) 1993. *Finding Funding: Grant Writing for the Financially Challenged Educator*. London: Sage.
- Brewer, J. and Hunter, A. 1989. *Multimethod Research: A Synthesis of Styles*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Brooks, N. 1989. Writing a Grant Application. In: G. Perry and F.N. Watts (eds), *Behavioural and Mental Health Research: A Handbook of Skills and Methods*. Hove, Sussex: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Brunskell, H. 1998. Feminist Methodology. In: C. Seale (ed.), *Researching Society and Culture*. London: Sage. pp.37–47.
- Bryman, A. 1988. *Quantity and Quality in Social Research*. London: Sage.
- Bryman, A. 1989. *Research Methods and Organisation Studies*. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Bryman, A. 1990. *Analysing Quantitative Data for Social Scientists*. London: Routledge.
- Bryman, A. 2001. *Social Research Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bulmer, M. (ed.) 1982. *Social Research Ethics*. London: Macmillan.
- Bulmer, M. 1984. Why Don't Sociologists Make More Use of Official Statistics? In: M. Bulmer (ed.), *Sociological Research Methods*. London: Macmillan. pp.131–52.
- Burgess, R.G. 1982. *Field Research: A Sourcebook and Field Manual*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Burgess, R.G. 1984. *In the Field: An Introduction to Field Research*. London: Routledge.
- Butler, D. 1994. *The Opinion Polls and the 1992 General Election*. London: Market Research Society.
- Cain, M. 1990. Realist Philosophy and Standpoint Epistemologies or Feminist Criminology as a Successor Science. In: L. Gelsthorpe and A. Morris (eds), *Feminist Perspectives in Criminology*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. pp.124–40.
- Campbell, D. 1995. PC Condon Fuels Race-Crime Furore. *Guardian*, 8 July, p.5.
- Cassell, J. 1982. Harms, Benefits, Wrongs, and Rights in Fieldwork. In: J. Sieber (ed.), *The Ethics of Social Research: Fieldwork, Regulation, and Publication*. New York: Springer. pp.7–31.
- Cavendish, R. 1982. *Women on the Line*. London: Routledge.
- Coghlan, D. and Brannick, T. 2001. *Doing Action Research in Your Own Organisation*. London: Sage.
- Coley, S.M. and Scheinberg, C.A. 1990. *Proposal Writing*. London: Sage.
- Comte, A. 1974. The Essential Comte: Selected from 'Cours de philosophie positive' by Auguste Comte . . . , ed. and with an introduction by Stanislaw Andreski, trans. and annot. Margaret Clarke. London: Croom Helm.
- Corbin, J. and Strauss, A. 1990. *Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques*. London: Sage.
- Cormack, D.F.S. 1984. *The Research Process in Nursing*. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific.
- Corrigan, P. 1979. *Schooling the Smash Street Kids*. London: Macmillan.
- Coulthard, M., Walker, A. and Morgan, A. 2002. People's Perceptions of Their Neighbourhood and Community Involvement [online]. London: The Stationery Office. Available at <<http://www.gsr.ntu.ac.uk/esrcyouth.htm>> (Accessed 28 February 2005).
- Coxon, A. 1988. Towards a Sociology of AIDS. *Social Studies Review*, January, pp.84–7.
- Crewe, I. 1983. *Surveys of British Elections: Problems of Design, Response and Bias*. Colchester: University of Essex.
- Crossman, R. 1975. *The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1: Minister of Housing 1964–1966*. London: Hamilton.
- Crotty, M. 1998. *The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process*. London: Sage.

- Crow, I. 2000. The Power of Research. In: D. Burton (ed.), *Research Training for Social Scientists*. London: Sage. pp.68–80.
- Cuba, L. and Cocking, J. 1997. *How to Write About the Social Sciences*. Harlow: Longman.
- Day, A. 1996. *How to Get Work Published in Journals*. Aldershot: Gower.
- De Saussure, F. 1983. *Course in General Linguistics*, trans. and annot. Roy Harris. London: Duckworth.
- De Vaus, D. 1985. *Surveys in Social Research*. London: UCL Press.
- De Vaus, D.A. 1996. *Surveys in Social Research*, 2nd edn. London: UCL Press.
- Denscombe, M. 2003. *The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Research Projects*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Denscombe, M. and Aubrook, L. 1992. It's Just Another Piece of Schoolwork: The Ethics of Questionnaire Research on Pupils in Schools. *British Educational Research Journal*, 18, pp.113–31.
- Denzin, N. 1989. *The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods*, 3rd edn. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. 1998a. *Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. 1998b. *Strategies of Qualitative Enquiry*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. 1998c. *The Landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Dey, I. 1993. *Qualitative Data Analysis: A User-Friendly Guide for Social Scientists*. London: Routledge.
- Diener, E. and Crandall, R. 1978. *Ethics in Social and Behavioural Research*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Douglas, J. 1976. *Investigative Social Research: Individual and Team Research*. London: Sage.
- Drew, C.J. 1980. *Introduction to Designing and Conducting Research*. St Louis, MO: C.B. Mosby.
- Erikson, K. 1967. A Comment on Disguised Observation in Sociology. *Social Problems*, 12, pp.336–73.
- ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council). 1995. *Writing for Business*. Swindon: ESRC.
- Eysenck, H. 1971. *Race, Intelligence and Education*. London: MT Smith.
- Fay, B. 1993. The Elements of Critical Social Science. In: M. Hammersley (ed.), *Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice*. London: Sage. pp.33–6.
- Festinger, L., Riecken, H. and Schachter, S. 1956. *When Prophecy Fails*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Fetterman, D. 1989. *Ethnography: Step by Step*. London: Sage.
- Fielding, F. and Gilbert, N. 2000. *Understanding Social Statistics*. London: Sage.
- Fielding, N. 1981. *The National Front*. London: Routledge.
- Fielding, N. 1993a. Ethnography. In: N. Gilbert (ed.), *Researching Social Life*. London: Sage. pp.154–71.
- Fielding, N. 1993b. Qualitative Interviewing. In: N. Gilbert (ed.), *Researching Social Life*. London: Sage. pp.135–53.
- Fielding, J. and Gilbert, N. 2000. *Understanding Social Statistics*. London: Sage.
- Finch, J. 1993. It's Great to Have Someone to Talk to: Ethics and Politics of Interviewing Women. In: M. Hammersley (ed.), *Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice*. London: Sage. pp.166–80.
- Fletcher, D.E. 1997. Organisational Networking and Strategic Change in a Small Family Business. Unpublished doctoral thesis, Nottingham Polytechnic.
- Foucault, M. (ed.) 1980. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*. New York: Pantheon.
- Fowler, F. 1993. *Survey Research Methods*. London: Routledge. pp.54–68.
- Frankfort-Nachmias, C. and Nachmias, D. 1996. *Research Methods in the Social Sciences*, 5th edn. New York: St Martin's Press.
- Gelsthorpe, L. 1992. Response to Martyn Hammersley's Paper 'On Feminist Methodology'. *Sociology*, 26 (2), pp.213–18.

## Bibliography

- Gilbert, N. 2001. Writing About Social Research. In: N. Gilbert (ed.), *Researching Social Life*, 2nd edn. London: Sage.
- Gill, J. and Johnson, P. 1997. *Research Methods for Managers*. London: Paul Chapman.
- Gillespie, T. 1994. Feminist Research: Reclaiming Objectivity. *Research, Policy and Planning*, 12 (2), pp.23–5.
- Glaser, B. and Strauss, A. 1967. *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*. New York: Aldine.
- Goldthorpe, J., Lockwood, D., Bechhofer, F. and Platt, J. 1969. *The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Gorden, R. 1980. *Interviewing: Strategy, Techniques and Practice*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey.
- Government Statisticians' Collective, 1993. How Official Statistics Are Produced: Views from the Inside. In: M. Hammersley (ed.), *Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice*. London: Sage. pp.146–65.
- Graziano, A. and Raulin, M. 1997. *Research Methods: A Process of Inquiry*, 3rd edn. New York: Addison-Wesley.
- Guba, E. and Lincoln, Y. (eds) 1989. *Fourth Generation Evaluation*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Hakim, C. 1982. *Secondary Analysis in Social Research: A Guide to Data Sources and Methods with Examples*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Hakim, C. 1987. *Research Design: Strategies and Choices in the Design of Social Research*. London: Routledge.
- Hakim, C. 1993. Research Analysis of Administrative Records. In: M. Hammersley (ed.), *Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice*. London: Sage. pp.131–45.
- Hammersley, M. 1992a. On Feminist Methodology. *Sociology*, 26 (2), pp.187–206.
- Hammersley, M. 1992b. *What's Wrong With Ethnography?* London: Routledge.
- Hammersley, M. 1993a. What is Social Research? In: M. Hammersley (ed.), *Principles of Social and Educational Research: Block 1*. Milton Keynes: The Open University.
- Hammersley, M. (ed.) 1993b. *Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice*. London: Sage.
- Hammersley, M. 1995. *The Politics of Social Research*. London: Sage.
- Hammersley, M. 1997. A Reply to Humphries. *Sociological Research Online*, [online], 2 (4). Available at  
<<http://www.socresonline.org.uk/2/4/6.html>> (Accessed 20 June 2001).
- Hammersley, M. and Atkinson, P. 1995. *Ethnography: Principles in Practice*, 2nd edn. London: Routledge.
- Hammersley, M. and Gomm, R. 1997. Bias in Social Research. *Sociological Research Online*, [online], 2 (1). Available at  
<<http://www.socresonline.org.uk/2/1/2.html>> (Accessed 20 June 2001).
- Hamner, J. and Hearn, J. 1993. Gendered Research and Researching Gender: Women, Men and Violence. British Sociological Association Annual Conference, 'Research Imaginations'. University of Sussex, 5–8 April.
- Hanfling, O. 1981. *Logical Positivism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Harari, H., Harari, O. and White, R.V. 1985. The Reaction to Rape by American Bystanders. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 125, pp.653–8.
- Haraway, D. 1991. *Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*. London: Free Association.
- Harding, S. 1987. Is there a Feminist Methodology? In: S. Harding (ed.), *Feminism and Methodology*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. pp.1–14.
- Hart, C. 2001. *Doing a Literature Search: A Comprehensive Guide for the Social Sciences*. London: Sage.
- Henn, M. 1998. *Opinion Polls and Volatile Electorates: Problems and Issues in Polling Volatile Electorates*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Henn, M. and Weinstein, M. 2000. *First-Time Voters' Attitudes Towards Party Politics in Britain* [online]. Economic and Social Research Council. Available at



- <[http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme\\_social/Peoples\\_perceptions\\_social\\_capital.pdf](http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_social/Peoples_perceptions_social_capital.pdf)> (Accessed 9 January 2004).
- Henn, M., Weinstein, M. and Wring, D. 1999. *Young People and Citizenship: A Study of Opinion in Nottinghamshire*. Nottingham: Nottinghamshire County Council.
- Henn, M., Weinstein, M. and Wring, M. 2002. A Generation Apart? Youth and Political Participation in Britain. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 4 (2), pp.167–92.
- Henn, M., Young, M. and Hill, N. 1997. Labour Renewal Under Blair? A Local Membership Study. In: J. Stanyer and G. Stoker (eds), *Contemporary Political Studies*. Belfast: Political Studies Association. pp.495–509.
- Henwood, K. and Pidgeon, N. 1995. Remaking the Link: Qualitative Research and Feminist Standpoint Theory. *Feminism and Psychology*, 5 (1), pp.7–30.
- Henwood, K.L. and Pidgeon, N.F. 1993. Qualitative Research and Psychological Theorizing. In: M. Hammersley (ed.), *Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice*. London: Sage. pp.14–32.
- Hessler, R.M. 1992. *Social Research Methods*. St Paul, MN: West.
- Hoinville, G. and Jowell, R. 1978. *Survey Research Practice*. London: Heinemann.
- Holdaway, S. 1982. 'An Inside Job': A Case Study of Covert Research on the Police. In: M. Bulmer (ed.), *Social Research Ethics*. London: Macmillan. pp.59–79.
- Homan, R. 1991. *The Ethics of Social Research*. London: Longman. pp.41–68.
- Hood, S., Mayall, B. and Oliver, S. (eds) 1999. *Critical Issues in Social Research: Power and Prejudice*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Howard, K. and Sharpe, J.A. 1983. *The Management of a Student Project*. Aldershot: Gower.
- Humphreys, L. 1970. *Tearoom Trade: Impersonal Sex in Public Places*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Humphries, B. 1997. From Critical Thought to Emancipatory Action: Contradictory Research Goals? *Sociological Research Online*, [online], 2 (1). Available at <<http://www.socresonline.org.uk/2/1/3.html>> (Accessed 20 June 2001).
- Humphries, B. 1998. The Baby and the Bath Water: Hammersely, Cealey Harrison and Hood-Williams and the Emancipatory Research Debate. *Sociological Research Online*, [online], 3 (1). Available at <<http://www.socresonline.org.uk/3/1/9.html>> (Accessed 20 June 2001).
- Irvine, J., Miles, I. and Evans, J. (eds) 1979. *Demystifying Social Statistics*. London: Pluto Press.
- Jayaratne, T. 1993. The Value of Quantitative Methodology for Feminist Research. In: M. Hammersley (ed.), *Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice*. London: Sage. pp.109–23.
- Jones, J. 1995. *Understanding Psychological Science*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Jones, P. 1993. *Studying Society: Sociological Theories and Research Practices*. London: Collins Educational.
- Jupp, V. and Norris, C. 1993. Traditions in Documentary Analysis. In: M. Hammersley (ed.), *Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice*. London: Sage. pp.37–51.
- Kane, E. 1990. *Doing Your Own Research: Basic Descriptive Research in the Social Sciences and Humanities*. London: Boyars.
- Katz, J. 1972. *Experimentation with Human Beings*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Kelly, L., Burton, S. and Regal, L. 1994. Researching Women's Lives or Studying Women's Oppression? Reflections on what Constitutes Feminist Research. In: M. Maynard and J. Purvis (eds), *Researching Women's Lives from a Feminist Perspective*. London: Taylor & Francis, 1994, pp.27–48.
- Kelman, H. 1972. The Rights of the Subjects in Social Research: An Analysis in Terms of Relative Power and Legitimacy. *American Sociologist*, 27, pp.989–1015.
- Kirk, J. and Miller, M.L. 1986. *Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research*. London: Sage.
- Kolakowski, L. 1993. An Overview of Positivism. In: M. Hammersley (ed.), *Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice*. London: Sage. pp.1–8.
- Krathwohl, D.R. 1988. *How to Prepare a Research Project: Guidelines for Funding and Dissertations in the Social and Behavioural Sciences*. New York: Syracuse University Press.

## Bibliography

- Krueger, R.A. 1994. *Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Kuhn, T. 1970. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kuzwayo, E. 1985. *Call Me Woman*. London: Women's Press.
- Lasswell, H. 1942. Communications Research and Politics. In: D. Waples (ed.), *Print, Radio and Film in a Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Laurie, H. and Sullivan, O. 1990. Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Data in the Longitudinal Study of Household Allocations. *Sociological Review*, 1 (39), pp.113–30.
- Leedy, P.D. 1989. *Practical Research: Planning and Design*. London: Macmillan.
- Levitas, R. and Guy, W. 1996. *Interpreting Official Statistics*. London: Routledge.
- Locke, L.F., Spirduso, W.W. and Wilverman, S.J. 1993. *Proposals That Work: A Guide for Planning Dissertations and Grant Proposals*. London: Sage.
- Lofland, J. and Lofland, L. 1995. *Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis*, 3rd edn. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Macdonald, K. and Tipton, C. 1993. Using Documents. In: N. Gilbert (ed.), *Researching Social Life*. London: Sage. pp.187–200.
- Mann, C. and Stewart, F. 2000. *Internet Communication and Qualitative Research: A Handbook for Researching Online*. London: Sage.
- Market Research Society, 1992. *Report of The Market Research Society Inquiry Into the 1992 General Election*. London: Market Research Society.
- Marsh, C. 1979. Problems With Surveys: Method or Epistemology? *Sociology*, 13 (2), pp.293–305.
- Marsh, C. 1982. *The Survey Method: The Contribution of Surveys to Sociological Explanation*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Mason, J. 1996. *Qualitative Interviewing*. London: Sage.
- May, T. 2001. *Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process*, 3rd edn. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Mayhew, H. 1861–1862. *London Labour and the London Poor: A Cyclopaedia of the Conditions and Earnings of those that will work, those that cannot work, and those that will not work*, 4 vols. London: Griffin Bohn.
- Maynard, M. 1994. Methods, Practice and Epistemology: The Debate about Feminism and Research. In: M. Maynard and J. Purvis (eds), *Researching Women's Lives from a Feminist Perspective*. London: Taylor & Francis. pp.10–26.
- Maynard, M. 1998. Feminists' Knowledge and Knowledge of Feminisms: Epistemology, Theory, Methodology and Method. In: T. May and M. Williams, (eds), *Knowing the Social World*. Buckingham: Open University Press. pp.120–37.
- McRobbie, A. 1991. *Feminism and Youth Culture: From Jackie to Just Seventeen*. London: Macmillan.
- Mies, M. 1993. Towards a Methodology for Feminist Research. In: M. Hammersley (ed.), *Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice*. London. pp.64–82.
- Miles, I. and Irvine, J. 1979. The Critique of Official Statistics. In: J. Irvine, I. Miles, and J. Evans (eds), *Demystifying Social Statistics*. London: Pluto Press. pp.113–29.
- Milgram, S. 1963. Behavioural Study of Obedience. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 6, pp.371–8.
- Millen, D. 1997. Some Methodological and Epistemological Issues Raised by Doing Feminist Research on Non-Feminists. *Sociological Research Online*, [online], 2 (3). Available at <<http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/2/3/3/html>> (Accessed 18 May 1999).
- Miller, D.C. 1991. *Handbook of Research Design and Social Measurement*. London: Sage.
- Mishler, E. 1986. *Research Interviewing*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Moon, N. 1997. The Opinion Polls Since 1992 – Lessons Learned and Changes Made. *Social Research Association News*, May, pp.5–6.

- Morgan, D.L. and Kreuger, R.A. 1998. *The Focus Group Kit Vols 1–6*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Moser, C. and Kalton, G. 1971. *Survey Methods in Social Investigation*. London: Heinemann.
- Moxley, J. 1992. *Publish, Don't Perish: The Scholar's Guide to Academic Writing and Publishing*. London: Greenwood Press.
- Neuman, W. 2000. *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, 4th edn. London: Allyn and Bacon. pp.75–82.
- Newell, R. 1993. Questionnaires. In: N. Gilber (ed.), *Researching Social Life*. London: Sage.
- Oakley, A. 1981. Interviewing Women: A Contradiction in Terms. In: H. Roberts, (ed.), *Doing Feminist Research*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. pp.30–61.
- Oakley, A. 1999. People's Ways of Knowing: Gender and Methodology. In: S. Hood, B. Mayall and S. Oliver (eds), *Critical issues in Social Research: Power and Prejudice*. Buckingham: Open University Press, pp.154–70.
- Oakley, A. and Oakley, A. 1979. Sexism in Official Statistics. In: J. Irvine, I. Miles and J. Evans (eds), *Demystifying Social Statistics*. London: Pluto Press. pp.172–189.
- O'Connell Davidson, J. and Layder, D. 1994. *Methods: Sex and Madness*. London: Routledge.
- Office for National Statistics, 1999. Publications. *Office for National Statistics*, [online]. Available at <[http://www.ons.gov.uk/pns\\_f.htm](http://www.ons.gov.uk/pns_f.htm)> (Accessed 2 March 2000).
- O'Muircheartaigh, C. 1997. Election 97: A Triumph for the Pollsters? *Research, Market Research Society*, June, pp.14–22.
- Oppenheim, A. 1993. *Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude Measurement*, 2nd edn. Aldershot: Gower.
- Patrick, J. 1973. *A Glasgow Gang Observed*. London: Eyre-Methuen.
- Patton, M. 1987. *How to Use Qualitative Methods in Evaluation*. London: Sage. pp.70–107.
- Pawson, R. 1989. *A Measure for Measures: A Manifesto for Empirical Sociology*. London: Routledge.
- Peräkylä, A. 1997. Reliability and Validity in Research Based on Tapes and Transcripts. In: D. Silverman (ed.), *Qualitative Research: Theory, Method & Practice*. London. pp.201–20.
- Piliavin, I.M., Rodin, J. and Piliavin, A. 1969. Good Samaritanism: An Underground Phenomenon. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 13, pp.289–99.
- Platt, J. 1981. Evidence and Proof in Documentary Research and Some Specific Problems of Documentary Research. *Sociological Review*, 29 (1), pp.31–52.
- Popper, K. 1959. *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. London: Hutchinson.
- Popper, K. 1972. *Objective Knowledge*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Powdermaker, H. 1966. *Stranger and Friend: The Way of an Anthropologist*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Punch, K.P. 1998. *Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches*. London: Sage.
- Punch, K.P. 2000. *Developing Effective Research Proposals*. London: Sage.
- Punch, M. 1993. Observation and the Police: The Research Experience. In: M. Hammersley (ed.), *Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice*. London: Sage. pp.181–99.
- Punch, M. 1986. *The Politics and Ethics of Fieldwork*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Punch, M. 1998. Politics and Ethics in Qualitative Research. In: N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln (eds), *The Landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues*. London: Sage. pp.156–84.
- Ramazanoglu, C. 1992. On Feminist Methodology: Male Reason Versus Female Empowerment. *Sociology*, 26 (2), pp.213–18.
- Reinharz, S. 1983. Experiential Analysis: A Contribution to Feminist Research. In G. Bowles and R. Duelli Klein (eds), *Theories of Women's Studies*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. pp.162–192.
- Reinharz, S. 1992. *Feminist Methods in Social Research*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Reiss, A. 1971. *The Police and Public*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Roberts, H. (ed.) 1990. *Doing Feminist Research*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

## Bibliography

- Roethlisberger, F.J. and Dickson, W.J. 1939. *Management and the Worker*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Romm, N. 1997. Becoming More Accountable: A Comment on Hammersley and Gomm. *Sociological Research Online*, 2 (1), [online], 2 (3). Available at <<http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/2/3/2/html>> (Accessed 18 May 1999).
- Roy, D. 1952. Quota Restriction and Goldbricking in a Machine Shop. *American Journal of Sociology*, 67 (2), pp.427–42.
- Ruebhausen, M. and Brim, O. 1966. Privacy and Behaviour in Research. *American Psychologist*, 21, p.432.
- Sacks, H. 1995. *Lectures on Conversation*, ed. E.A. Schegloff with an introduction by G. Jefferson. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Salkind, N. 2003. *Statistics for People Who (Think They) Hate Statistics*. London: Sage.
- Sapsford, R. 1993. Problems, Cases and the Logic of Research Studies. In: M. Hammersley (ed.), *Principles of Social and Educational Research*. Milton Keynes: The Open University.
- Sapsford, R. 1999. *Survey Research*. London: Sage.
- Schofield, J.W. 1993. Increasing the Generalisability of Qualitative Research. In: M. Hammersley (ed.), *Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice*. London: Sage. pp.200–25.
- Schofield, W. 1993. Sample Surveys. In: M. Hammersley (ed.), *Principles of Social and Educational Research: Block 2*. Milton Keynes: The Open University. pp.75–108.
- Schumacher, D. 1992. *Get Funded!: A Practical Guide for Scholars Seeking Research Support from Business*. London: Sage.
- Schutt, R. 1999. *Investigating the Social World*. London: Sage.
- Schwartz, M. 1964. The Mental Hospital: The Researched Person in the Disturbed World. In: A. Vidich, J. Benson and M. Stein (eds), *Reflections on Community Studies*. New York: Harper and Row. pp.85–117.
- Seale, C. 1998. *Researching Society and Culture*. London: Sage.
- Seeman, M. 1972. On the Meaning of Alienation. In: C. Frankfort-Nachmias and D. Nachmias, *Research Methods in the Social Sciences*. London: Arnold, 1996, pp.32–3.
- Sieber, J. 1992. *Planning Ethically Responsible Research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Silverman, D. 1993. *Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction*. London: Sage.
- Silverman, D. 1998. *Harvey Sacks: Social Science and Conversation Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Silverman, D. 1997. *Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice*. London: Sage.
- Silverman, D. 2000. *Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook*. London: Sage.
- Silverman, D. 2001 *Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction*, 2nd edn. London: Sage.
- Slattery, M. 1986. *Official Statistics*. London: Tavistock.
- Smart, C. 1984. *The Ties That Bind: Law, Marriage, and the Reproduction of Patriarchal Relations*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- SRA (Social Research Association), 2003. *Ethical Guidelines*. London: Social Research Association.
- Stanley, L. and Wise, S. 1983. *Breaking Out: Feminist Consciousness and Feminist Research*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Stavenhagen, R. 1993. Decolonializing Applied Social Sciences. In: M. Hammersley (ed.), *Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice*. London: Sage. pp.52–63.
- Strange, V., Oakley, A. and Forrest, S. 2003. Mixed-sex or Single-sex Sex Education: How Would Young People Like Their Sex Education and Why? *Gender & Education*, 15 (2), pp.201–14.
- Strauss, A. and Corbin, J. 1998. *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory*, 2nd edn. London: Sage.

- Thatcher, M. 1993. *The Downing Street Years*. London: HarperCollins.
- Thomas, W. and Znaniecki, F. 1918–1920. *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Thompson, H. 1967. *Hell's Angels*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Tonkiss, F. 1998. The History of the Social Survey. In: C. Seale (ed.), *Researching Society and Culture*. London: Sage. pp.58–71.
- Townend, D. 2000. How Does Substantive Law Currently Regulate Social Science Research? In: D. Burton (ed.), *Research Training for Social Scientists*. London: Sage. pp.113–21.
- Trotsky, L. 1975. *My Life: An Attempt at an Autobiography*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Van Maanen, J. 1979. On Watching the Watchers. In: P. Manning and J. Van Maanen (eds), *Policing: A View from the Street*. Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear. pp.309–49.
- Von Wright, G.H. 1993. Two Traditions. In: M. Hammersley (ed.), *Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice*. London: Sage. pp.9–13.
- Ward Schofield, J. 1993. Increasing the Generalizability of Qualitative Research. In: M. Hammersley (ed.), *Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice*. London: Sage. pp.200–25.
- Warren, C. 1981. *Gender Issues in Field Research*. London: Sage.
- Warwick, D. 1983. The Politics and Ethics of Field Research. In: M. Bulmer and D. Warwick (eds), *Social Research in Developing Countries: Surveys and Censuses in the Third World*. Chichester: Wiley. pp.315–30.
- Waterhouse, R. 1994. Census Figures Are Abandoned After Two Million Are Missed. *Guardian*, 23 December, p.1.
- Webb, E.J., Campbell, D.T., Schwartz, R.D. and Sechrest, L. 1984. The Use of Archival Sources in Social Research. In: M. Bulmer (ed.), *Sociological Research Methods*. London: Macmillan. pp.113–30.
- Weber, M. 1949. *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*. New York: Free Press.
- Weinstein, M. 2005. A Comparative Analysis of Youth Activism in Mainstream Political Parties and New Social Movements in Britain. Unpublished PhD thesis, Nottingham Trent University.
- Wetherell, M., Taylor, S. and Yates, S. (eds) 2001a. *Discourse as Data: A Guide for Analysis*. London: Sage.
- Wetherell, M., Taylor, S. and Yates, S. (eds) 2001b. *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader*. London: Sage.
- Willis, P. 1977. *Learning to Labour*. Farnborough: Saxon House.
- Wright Mills, C. 1959. The Sociological Imagination. In: R.G. Burgess, *Field Research: A Sourcebook and Field Manual*. London: Allen and Unwin. p.209.
- Yablonsky, L. 1968. *The Hippy Trip*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Zimbardo, P. 1973. On the Ethics of Intervention in Human Psychological Research. *Cognition*, 2, pp.243–56.

**Social Inclusion: Perspectives, Practices and Challenges within the Visegrad Region**  
**SOC607**

Course Reader  
2016

Text selection by Mgr. Elena Gallová Kriglerová; Doc. Ing. Anna Kadeřábková; Mgr. Lenka Kissová; George Ligeti, Ph.D., Csc.; Marcjanna Nózka, Ph.D.; Mgr. Ivana Rapošová; PhDr. Michal Vašečka, Ph.D.

Reader editors Lenka Kissová, Ivana Rapošová  
Layout by Peter Kotvan  
Cover page by Michal Kotvan

Please, note that this reader is a study material compiled exclusively for the course *Social Inclusion: Perspectives, Practices and Challenges within the Visegrad Region*. We would like to kindly ask you not to share and circulate it.