Social Inclusion:
Perspectives, Practices and Challenges within
the Visegrad Region
SOC607
Literature Reader
Content
1. Theoretical Introduction – What is Social Inclusion?
2. Social Innovations as a Practical Inclusive Tool
3. Inclusive Workplace
4. Dynamics of Social Inclusion/Exclusion in Public Space
5. Inclusive Education
6. Political aspects of social inclusion – What are inclusive policies?
7. How to Write a Research Proposal?
1
Theoretical Introduction –
What is Social Inclusion?
1
1. Alexander, Jeffrey C. 1988. "Core Solidarity, Ethnic Outgroup and Social
Differentiation." Pp. 78 - 106 in Action and its Environments: Toward a New Synthesis.
New York: Columbia UP.
2. Allman, Dan. 2013. "The Sociology of Social Inclusion." SAGE Open. DOI:
10.1177/2158244012471957.
3. Collins, Hugh. 2003. "Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion." The Modern
Law Review 66(1):16-43.
4. Levitas, Ruth. 2005. "Three Discourses of Social Exclusion." Pp. 7-28 in The
Inclusive Society?: Social Exclusion and New Labour. 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
5. Levitas, Ruth. 2005. "Delivering Social Inclusion." Pp. 159-177 in The Inclusive
Society?: Social Exclusion and New Labour. 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
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January-March 2013: 1­–16
© The Author(s) 2012
DOI: 10.1177/2158244012471957
http://sgo.sagepub.com
We live in the state and in society; we belong to a
social circle which jostles against its members and is
jostled by them; we feel the social pressure from all
sides and we react against it with all our might; we
experience a restraint to our free activities and we
struggle to remove it; we require the services of other
[people] which we cannot do without; we pursue our
own interests and struggle for the interests of other
social groups, which are also our interests. In short, we
move in a world which we do not control, but which
controls us, which is not directed toward us and
adapted to us, but toward which we must direct and
adapt ourselves.
Gumplowicz, 1963, p. 6
This article considers the concept of social inclusion from
the perspective of sociology. In doing so, it aims to complement
the work of historians, economists, psychologists, and
natural scientists to better understand the origins of the social
inclusion concept. It argues that action and efforts to include or
exclude individuals and social groups are fundamental to society
as forces that govern through the oppressive or liberating
effects such inclusionary or exclusionary actions promote.
As a discipline from which to consider the social inclusion
and exclusion concepts, sociology offers an excellent
vantage. Sociology is well oriented to consider facets of
social equality and inequality, social integration and stratification,
social mobility as it relates to social inclusion and
exclusion, and the functional contributions of the periphery
relative to the social core. Sociology provides a needed vantage
from which to consider social inclusion as it lends itself
to extension beyond economic or natural fitness.
In the social world, whether one is welcomed, represented,
or provided for by the mainstream, or whether one is
ostracized, ignored, or bemired, the outcome is a collection
of social practices. These social practices result from various
degrees of intimacy and interactions between friends, strangers,
families, colleagues, kinship groups, communities, cultures,
and even whole societies—all of which lend themselves
to sociological study.
This article begins with a consideration of exclusion and
inclusion societies across time and place, including gated communities,
closed institutions, and caste systems. The article
delves into what is described as the natural order of social
inclusion and exclusion. It explores some of the theories and
findings that have come out of such an approach, including the
evolutionary and sociobiological work in the area. To make its
case for a sociology of social inclusion, the article then gazes
back in time to three examples: ostracism in 5th-century
Athens, solidarism in 19th century France, and contemporary
considerations of stigma as influenced by the work of Goffman.
Building on this, the article proposes that societies which
emphasize differences in social integration are structured by
architectures of inclusion that govern and manage how marginal
women and men inhabit social space, while functioning
to maintain many of the attributes of the status quo.
Exclusion Hierarchies
More than 50 years ago, the anthropologist and sociologist
David Pocock (1957) reflected that processes of inclusion
and exclusion were features of all hierarchies. Pocock felt
471957SGOXXX10.1177/21
58244012471957SAGE OpenAllman
2012
1
University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Corresponding Author:
Dan Allman, University of Toronto, Dalla Lana School of Public Health, 155
College Street, Room 524,Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M5T 3M7
Email: dan.allman@utoronto.ca
The Sociology of Social Inclusion
Dan Allman1
Abstract
This article looks at social inclusion from a sociological perspective.It argues that sociology complements biological and other
natural order explanations of social stratification.The article interrogates a variety of forms of social integration, including
ostracism within 5th century B.C. Greece, 19th-century solidarism, and Goffman’s mid-20th-century work on stigma. It does
so to demonstrate how in each of these contexts, social inclusion and exclusion can function as apparati that problematize
people on the margins, and by extension, contribute to their governance and control.The article proposes that sociology
provides a valuable orientation from which to consider social inclusion because it illuminates how social integration maintains
and manages the ways in which people move about and through their socially stratified worlds.
Keywords
social inclusion, social exclusion, social integration, social stratification, sociology
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that in general terms, the discussion of inclusion and exclusion
fed into efforts to define what might be called a social
ontology, or the way that the existence and social positioning
of groups in a hierarchically structured society would be
explained. Such a social ontology has been described by
Sibley (1995) as a landscape of exclusion; a form of social
and philosophical geography that melds ideology with place
in an exercise of social, economic, and political power that
invariably results in forms of oppression, and in many
instances, exploitation (Towers, 2005). Fredericks (2010)
suggested that belongingness as experienced in everyday
relations constructs the kinds of sentiments on which societies
of exclusion (and inclusion) are based. Referencing the
work of De Certeau (1984), Fredericks makes the case for the
importance of the everydayness of belonging and attachment,
and the memory and tradition it reinforces as means of appropriation
and territorialization.
One example of such a landscape of exclusion is a gated
community (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2002). Grant and Rosen
(2009) proposed these communities exist as exclusion societies.
They cite Flusty’s (2004) argument that the community
gates that enclose act to protect those inside from unforeseen
and largely unwanted encounters with otherness. Examples
given range from urban gated communities where exclusion
is legitimized as spatial inequity (Flusty, 2004) to the present
security fences undulating across Israel, or separating the
United States from Mexico (Kabachnik, 2010).
Herbert (2008) reflected on the ways in which urban
spaces in the United States and elsewhere are turned into
exclusion societies through the criminalization of public
spaces outside the rarefied protected enclaves shielded
within gates and walls. Focusing on the disorderly, Herbert
describes this exclusion as a form of modern day prohibition
that cedes out the homeless, the transient; and those who loiter,
panhandle, and display public drunkenness (Douglas,
1966). Herbert found that these practices of creating exclusion
societies are not new; that they have and continue to be
used as justifications for forms of social cleansing (Cresswell,
2006; Dubber, 2005; Duncan, 1978; Spradley, 1970).
Essentially the physical embodiment of territorial actions,
exclusion societies seek to separate and compound the
favored from the disfavored, and the hygienic from the dirty
(Douglas, 1966; Sibley, 1995). To do this, they collectively
create spaces of inclusion and exclusion, even if not all parties
cede to such collectivism.
Disability, like gated communities, is another example of
the ways societies create cultural spaces structured by exclusion.
Kitchin (1998) described the reproductive nature of
disablist practices, as assemblies that seek to ensure disabled
people are kept in certain places from where they come to
understand when they may be out of place. For Kitchin,
social relations between the disabled and the able-bodied
function to keep disabled people in their place and to signal
when they may be stepping beyond this space.
Prisons, like asylums and other places that remove individuals
from broader social life are additional if somewhat
more extreme forms of exclusion societies. These institutions
enclose the daily lives of certain social actors from
broader society, replacing wider interaction with complex
subcultures (Baer, 2005).
An altogether different type of exclusion society is a caste
system, which relies less on geographical separation and
more on social distance. A notable example is the caste system
of India (Nayar, 2007). At the root of India’s exclusion
society are the untouchable castes whose marginal social
position is owed to their relationship to impurities associated
with death and organic pollution (Deliege, 1992).
Berreman (1967, referencing Davis & Moore, 1945;
Lenski, 1966; Mills, 1963; Tumin, 1953), held that caste systems—unlike
gated communities, inner cities, orphanages,
leper colonies, asylums, and prisons—are fundamentally
structures through which power and privilege are allocated via
interdependent social classifications ordered by stratified and
ranked divisions of labor. Mencher (1974) referenced Leach
(1960) in suggesting that India’s caste classifications facilitate
divisions of labor free of the competition and expectations of
mobility inherent in other systems.
As exclusion societies, caste systems perpetuate themselves
and the positions of privilege provided to those
included within them. Yet they are different from other exclusion
societies because across many noncaste landscapes of
exclusion, mobility is conceivable and emulation of status is
possible. However, in caste systems, place within the exclusion
or inclusion hierarchy is ascribed at birth (Berreman,
1967, referencing Bailey, 1957; Sinha, 1959, 1962; Srinivas,
1956, 1966). Such exclusion by ascription has an economic
dimension also through the way in which untouchables are
“denied control of the means of production” (Deliege, 1992,
p. 170, referencing Oommen, 1984). This results in forms of
deprivation and poverty that enforce dependence, deference,
and ultimately acceptance.
Exclusion societies are identifiable at different places
in time, space, and geography. Such societies tend to be
associated with differential access to social and economic
well-being, and differential proximity to illness and disease.
Inclusion societies, however, evolve from within
such contexts. They are characterized by movements
toward greater social justice, equality, and collectivism
in response to the kinds of global oppressions exclusion
societies embody and perpetuate.
A Natural Order
Mechanisms of social inclusion and exclusion and the
effects of these have been thoroughly investigated within
the field of psychology and related disciplines. Work in this
area has sought to better understand possible evolutionary
origins of social inclusion and exclusion, and potential
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sociobiological purposes to these different explanations of
integration (Kurzban & Leary, 2001).
Eisenberger and Lieberman (2005) and MacDonald and
Leary (2005) have approached inclusion and exclusion from
a psychosocial and physiological perspective in which they
consider how the impacts of these social practices share overlapping
characteristics with our physical pain systems.
Eisenberger and Lieberman reflected that our social interconnectivity
is as fundamental as our most basic human needs for
fire, sustenance, and shelter and that the absence of such connectivity
is experienced, literally, as pain. They propose that
the pain of social exclusion, separation, or rejection share
many of the experiential attributes of forms of physical pain.
Referencing Baumeister (2000), Eisenberger and Liberman
described how across many centuries and cultures, various
forms of storytelling and artistic expression reflect how the
interruption, loss, or absence of social bonds can manifest as
intense experiences of human pain and suffering. They point
out that the pain and suffering associated with the loss of
social bonds is recognized by many legal systems also.
To help explain the social, psychological, and physical
pain experienced by exclusion, Eisenberger and Lieberman
(2004) developed pain overlap theory. This theory holds that
different kinds of pain utilize elements of shared processing
systems. As reflected by MacDonald and Leary (2005),
among our less developed ancestors, both physical and social
pain were functional in that they steered kin and other social
groups from environmental and other threats, reorienting
them in the direction of helpful others. As such, the social
pain of exclusion was seen to have evolved as a means of
responding to danger.
In detailing their sociometer theory, Leary, Tambor,
Terdal, and Downs, (1995) explained why inclusionary and
integrational practices are so fundamentally important to
social interactions and how we are designed to detect them.
They note that many writers have suggested that the human
need to seek inclusion and to avoid exclusion is essential,
and furthermore, that as a developmental trait, this orientation
likely can be traced to its survival benefit (Ainsworth,
1989; Barash, 1977; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Baumeister
& Tice, 1990; Bowlby, 1969; Hogan, 1982; Hogan, Jones, &
Cheek, 1985).
For Leary et al. (1995), an individual’s sociometer is
managed through self-esteem where social inclusion and
exclusion are used as mechanisms to monitor the well-being
of an individual or group’s social relations. These authors
use the sociometer to underscore pain overlap theory by
suggesting that self-esteem is a kind of inclusion detector
that meters changes in the inclusionary or exclusionary
positioning of individuals. From this perspective, it would
be this need for detection that ultimately drives individuals
to maximize their quest for inclusion while minimizing the
possibility of exclusion.
Along with the overlapping pain thesis and the sociometer/self-esteem
thesis, Baumeister and Leary (1995) have
posited a belongingness thesis. This suggests the need to
belong is a fundamental human motivation. Here, along
with base needs like food and shelter (Bernstein, Sacco,
Young, Hugenberg, & Cook, 2010), belongingness is held
to be a foundational human need that results in a general
pattern whereby social inclusion is used to reward, and
social exclusion to punish. The outcome is a gauge that
structures both social values and comportment (Baumeister
& Leary, 1995).
Whereas a sociological perspective might suggest at the
societal level that there exist a series of motivations to design
inclusive frameworks for the betterment of social life, a natural
order perspective would suggest that basic human survival
and reproduction benefit from the evolution of cohesive
group living; that to an extent, inclusion and exclusion as
components of a behavioral repertoire may have helped to
ensure evolutionary and reproductive fitness (Leary et al.,
1995). This thinking suggests that such fitness at the level of
kin networks or community groups may mirror existing physiological
traits for responding to physical pain, to also structure
responses to social pain. From this perspective, the
exclusion/inclusion continuum exists alongside a biologically
driven, psychological reaction that leads to the adoption of a
generalized dislike of social exclusion and a favoring of the
maintenanceofadequateinclusion(Eisenberger&Lieberman,
2005; MacDonald & Leary, 2005).
Such arguments present another perspective as to why different
societies and social groupings across diverse historical
periods and geographical locations develop intense drives to
create and strengthen social institutions around various
aspects of social integration and exclusion. Yet, as the examples
of ostracism, solidarism, and stigmatism will reflect, any
biological push with regards to social stratification is accompanied
by a social world pull. The examples of ostracism,
solidarism, and stigmatism will demonstrate how at different
intervals in history, it is not necessarily biological forces but
instead social architectures that become employed in the creation
and continuance of inclusion societies.
Ostracism
Acts and practices of including or excluding others as aspects
of systems of stratification may be as old as much of humanity
itself. Certainly, most societies display some degree of
taboos and customs concerning forms of both social rejection
and social acceptance (Douglas, 1966, Gruter & Masters,
1986; Lévi-Strauss, 1963; Radcliffe-Brown, 1952).
In institutional terms, a very early form of social
exclusion is evident in the scholarship of the role of ostracism
in Athens, Greece, during the 5th century b.c., when
the provision of an official mechanism to institutionalize
ostracism was enacted.
Although there is some debate within the works of
Aristotle and Androtion as well as subsequent scholars about
whether the law of ostracism originated with Cleisthenes
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prior to the first official ostracism of Hipparchos, son of
Charmos, in 488 b.c. (Kagan, 1961; Raubitschek, 1951;
Robinson, 1939, 1945, 1946, 1952), there is consensus that
the law appeared sometime in the 20 years surrounding the
battle at Marathon. The law of ostracism was instituted as a
means to protect young democratic institutions from the
resurgence of tyranny (Raubitschek, 1951). It did so
through the enactment of an ostrakophoria (Goligher,
1910, p. 558, referencing Carcopino, 1909; Rehbinder,
1986, p. 323). Thus, ostracism was considered a democratic
process in which those who were qualified to vote would
“scratch onto a clay shard the name of a party leader to be
banned (hence the name ostrakismos = shard judgment)”
(Rehbinder, 1986, p. 323).
As an initial incident in a series of expulsions driven by
the desire for political control (Kagan, 1961), the very first
political ostracism was followed by the successive exclusion
of Magakles in 487-6, Xanthippos in 485-4, andAristeides in
483-2.
As institutionalized more than 25 centuries ago, ostracism
was used almost exclusively as a political weapon against
male generals (Raubitschek, 1951), as a means to mitigate the
influence of political rivals (Kagan, 1961) and to police and
control the well-being of the state. Rehbinder (1986) suggested
the main aim of ostracism was to “exclude the losing
party leader from the state” as “early democracy could not
integrate the continuous action of opposition parties into the
political process” (p. 321). To address this and to solve party
conflicts, a law of ostracism essentially functioned to banish
the leader of the opposition.
Importantly, Athenian ostracism was levied against an
already elite class who for tyrannical activities or suspicions
of tyranny were considered political liabilities or dangers.
These acts did not bring shame on the recipient, but rather
were prestigious, even honorable—a status reflected in the
convention for the ostracized individual to retain his property,
and, after his return, to regain his elite personal and
social status (Rehbinder, 1986).
As Aristotle wrote in Politics:
Democratic states institute the rule of ostracism
[because] such states are held to aim at equality above
anything else; and with that aim in view they used to
pass a sentence of ostracism on those whom they
regarded as having too much influence owing to their
wealth or the number of their connexions or any other
form of political strength. (Barker, 1952, p. 135, referenced
in Masters, 1986, p. 390)
Ostracism as it came to be enacted in Attic democracy
was not an event applied lightly or arbitrarily. It required
careful deliberation, a large quorum, and the immunity of
an ostracized person’s family. In essence, ostracism acted
like a safety valve that ensured a smoother, more peaceful,
and less tumultuous running of the state (Kagan, 1961).
As instituted at the time, the law of ostracism was seen to
be successful. It so weakened the ability of potentially disruptive
subversive groups to wreak havoc on society and its
political systems, that in the more than 90 years between 508
and 417 b.c., no more than 20 official ostracisms took place
(Ostwald, 1955).
Given that modern industrial societies increasingly tend to
frown on the kinds of excluding practices as reflected in the
legal practice of ostracism (Rehbinder, 1986), it can be challenging
to acknowledge that ostracism exists in contemporary
societies also, legally through, for example, formal
punishments such as imprisonment, or racial prejudice,
scapegoating, and xenophobia (Gruter & Masters, 1986). For
Kort (1986), ostracism can be considered as coerced or involuntary
exit of an individual or individuals from the society in
which they live that manifests as a range of exclusions. Thus,
a society demonstrating variation in ostracism practices
reflects a society with solidaristic strategies for the exclusion
of its members from participation and from occupying positions
of respect (Kort, 1986, referencing Masters, 1986).
Solidarism
To turn from the ostracism of 5th-century Athens to the
solidarism of late-19th-century France, allows for the contrast
of an early institutional approach to social exclusion
with an equally enlightening historical era of inclusion.
The concept of solidarism evolved in the late-19th-century
in France during a period of social, epistemological, and
ontological change. It was an age when understandings of
autonomy were being reconsidered by “scientism, political
ideologies (especially Marxism) and the Roman Catholic
Magister,” entities united in their intent to denounce an
increasing vanity-like individualism (Vincent, 2001, p. 414).
Although, within this period, the idea of solidarity was
not an established ethical reference, French Protestants
united around this new form of solidarity known as solidarism.
In doing so, the Protestants defined a path forward in
their transformed identity as a social minority (Vincent,
2001).
For this underclass, being an excluded minority was not
seen as a stance from which to claim social or human rights.
Rather, exclusion was seen as igniting the kind of freedoms
of thought and associations, which lent themselves to the
reconciliation of identity-lending conceptualizations like
justice and liberty (Vincent, 2001).
Although French Protestants were bound by religion,
their move to solidarism is not seen as being directly related
to religious teachings or directives. If anything, French
Protestantism of this period was wary of “religious pietism
and political liberalism and generally suspicious of any institutional
expression of the desire for social justice” (Vincent,
2001, p. 415). As a result, they turned instead to groups not
known as religious in connotation, such as trade associations,
unions, and left-of-centre political parties.
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It has been suggested that the story of solidarism is essentially
the story of France’s move to the welfare state. In
opposing collectivism because it potentially threatened individual
liberty, while promoting the empowerment of the
working class, the new philosophy of solidarism countered
the individualism of laissez-faire liberalism and social
Darwinism. In time, solidarism would come to help to dismantle
existing resistance to social reform and to usher in
this new era of Welfarism (Sheradin, 2000).
Léon Bourgeois’s book Solidarité (1998), which first
appeared in 1896, is held to be a form of manifesto for the solidarism
movement. In the decades prior to the First World War,
the newly empowered French Radical Party were looking for
a philosophy that would help them to maintain central power
against the right-leaning individualists and the left-leaning
collectivists (Hayward, 1961, 1963). In 1895-1896, during the
short-lived Radical government of Bourgeois, he published a
pamphlet titled Solidarité based on a series of his public letters
that had appeared earlier. The main intent of this document
was to advocate for a new approach, between “retreating laissez-faire
liberalism and ascendant socialism.” The aim of the
particular piece of writing was to shine a light on “the duties
that citizens owed to each other” (Koskenniemi, 2009, p. 285).
Bourgeois’s Solidarité is seen as representing what has
been described as a belle époque within the Third Republic
(Hayward, 1963). Solidarism became the main social
philosophy of his new radical party (Koskenniemi, 2009),
orienting it and the nation toward what in time would
become a new more inclusive state. As a new political and
collective philosophy, solidarism was seen as reflective of a
modernization of the revolutionary maxim: liberty, equality,
and fraternity.
Notably, solidarism’s narrative features the influences of
democracy and humanism, through its belief in the development
and contributions of every individual, and through its
assertion of the inherent dignity of all of humanity (Sheradin,
2000).
Solidarism was committed to democracy, to the empowerment
of the working class, and to 19th-century understandings
of human reliance and interdependence (Sheradin, 2000). In
being so committed, one can find a second meaning in this
movement, one interwoven with concern over balancing selfinterest
with the era’s philosophical humanistic ideals.
It is not surprising that among the principles of French
solidarism was the belief that the liberty of human kind was
not freedom absolute, but rather an understanding that free
individuals were also in debt to society, to every other citizen,
and to future generations (Koskenniemi, 2009).
In time, with the passing of World War I, the French
Radical Party fell from favor as many of the working class
shifted their allegiance to the Socialists following the
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 (Hayward, 1963). Ultimately,
the harshness of World War I ended much of the utopian
inclusivity inherent within the solidarist approach, and by
the 1920s, much of the impact and influence of solidarism
had been depleted (Koskenniemi, 2009).
However, for the generation or two of those in France
moved by the solidarist approach to social integration, one of
the most persuasive elements of the philosophy and one that
lent to its fashionableness was what Hayward (1961)
described as an open sesame inclusive approach to mitigating
the social conflicts of the era. The philosophy was meaningful
to the time also because as an approach, it was not really
radical at all. Rather, it melded elements of community, inclusivity,
and social solidarity—all useful mechanisms to help
the populace attain security against poverty, illness, unemployment,
and war (Hayward, 1961).
The broad solidarism movement was oriented to the reconciliation
of individual and social ethics with the belief that
all citizens had the free will to interact and develop relationships
with others (Vincent, 2001). Solidarism in essence acted
as a shared and uniting philosophy—a precondition of the
era’s new approaches toward social contractuality (Foschi &
Cicciola, 2006)
For Koskenniemi (2009), the influences of these preconditions
would be felt at home and abroad, playing a defining
role in solardistic evolutions throughout the Spanish Civil
War, World War II, the beginning forays across the continent
toward the establishment of the European Union (EU), and
ultimately, as the sociological lens helps reveal, trickling
through Goffman’s 1950s work on stigma and France’s
1970s social inclusion as promoted by René Lenoir.
Stigmatism
Stigma and the act of stigmatizing is a common and recognizable
form of social exclusion, yet, efforts to contend with
some of the prejudices and discriminations recognized as
components of stigmatization reflect forms of social inclu-
sion.
Inherent within Goffman’s (1963) work: Stigma: Notes on
the Management of Spoiled Identity, is a belief in the universality
of stigma and social exclusion. Stigma as a process
leads certain individuals to be “systematically excluded from
particular sorts of social interactions because they possess a
particular characteristic or are a member of a particular
group” (Kurzban & Leary, 2001, p. 187). The concept embodies
the functionality of “outsiderderness”; and the utility of
why humans, as “an inherently social species with a strong
need for social acceptance should be so inclined to reject
members of its own kind” (Kurzban & Leary, 2001, p. 187).
For Goffman and those influenced by him (Crocker, Major, &
Steele, 1998; Elliott, Ziegler, Altman, & Scott, 1982; Jones
et al., 1984; Kleinman et al, 1995; Schneider, 1988), stigmatization
occurs when the evaluation of an individual results in
that person being discredited (Kurzban & Leary, 2001).
As a sociologist, Goffman’s approach was both dramaturgical
and oriented toward a symbolic interactionist
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perspective. His main interest was in the structure of social
interactions and the rules that governed them (Goffman,
1967). For Goffman, social structures provided the context
for interactions, as it was social structure that steadied and
sustained social hierarchies (Scambler, 2009). Yet some have
suggested that Goffman may not have sufficiently attended
to political economy, or to elements considered traditionally
beyond the foci of symbolic interactionists such as class,
power, gender, and ethnicity (Scambler, 2006, 2009).
From a functional perspective, stigma in the natural
world reflects certain biological elements. Kurzban and
Leary (2001) suggested that this world is structured by a
series of interconnected interactions that result in variable
costs and benefits (see Whiten & Byrne, 1988, 1997). As
reflected earlier, there is a universality to stigma in the sense
that it has been observed in most human cultures and even
in the animal kingdom (Behringer, Butler, & Shields, 2006;
Buchman & Reiner, 2009; Dugatkin, FitzGerald, & Lavoie,
1994; Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2011). Examples of this
near universality include territoriality in fish, birds, reptiles,
and mammals, and cross-species status hierarchies and
social ostracism.
Some like Kurzban and Leary (2001) sought to frame the
exclusion of stigma from the perspective of biological determinism.
That is, as psychological rather than social systems
structured by natural selection to ease some of the challenges
of sociality. The proposition is that these systems or
exclusionary mechanisms often influence individuals to
subconsciously exclude dangerous others from social structures
and interactions (Archer, 1985). Thus, from this biologically
deterministic perspective, stigma is not so much
owing to the kind of negative evaluation as theorized by
Goffman and colleagues, but rather to a form of protective
disassociation.
Another deterministic approach to stigmatism has considered
the exclusion of stigma from the perspective of disease,
and specifically as a mechanism of disease avoidance. Here,
the basic claim derives from several observations. First, that
we tend to evaluate those who are infectious in the same way
as we would evaluate other kinds of stigmatized individuals
(Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, & Mentzer, 1979). Second, that the
most severely stigmatized groups (i.e., those who are most
avoided) are individuals who are evidently ill or who demonstrate
characteristics of the ill or diseased (Oaten et al., 2011
referencing Bernstein, 1976; Heider, 1958; Kurzban, &
Leary, 2001; Schaller, & Duncan, 2007). Leprosy and smallpox
are but two examples. For these authors, envisioning
stigma as disease-avoidance does not negate other processes
that contribute to discriminatory or exclusionary behavior.
Rather, it suggests that beneath or antecedent to other
processes is an avoidance system that seeks to limit possible
contact with infectiousness and disease (Oaten et al., 2011).
Parker and Aggleton (2003) reflected that often stigma
goes undefined in academic scholarship or reverts to somewhat
of a stereotypical, two-dimensional description of
exclusion. In a series of articles, these authors have argued
for the development of a more nuanced conceptual framework
that would go beyond the works of Goffman and of
biological determinists (Parker, 2012, referencing also
Parker & Aggleton, 2003, and Maluwa, Aggleton, & Parker,
2002), to think beyond evolutionary stigma or differentially
valued stigma and more directly about stigma as a “social
process fundamentally linked to power and domination”
(Parker, 2012, pp. 165-166).
Parker (2012, referencing Stuber, Meyer, & Link, 2008)
reflected that theory and research has tended to operationalize
stigma either as discrimination (as in the work of Goffman,
1963) or as prejudice (as in the work of Allport, 1954).
Subsequently, over the second half of the 20th century, the two
foci evolved along parallel but distinctly separate directions,
with the work on prejudice tending much more to tackle race,
ethnicity, and associated social relations.
Yet as Parker (2012), Parker and Aggleton (2003), Link
and Phelan (2001), and others have argued, discrimination
and prejudice, as components or forms of stigma, share key
relations with the production and reproduction of power
relations.
It is arguably owing to this revisioning beyond dramaturgical
performance and biological determinism that stigma
can be envisioned as a somewhat supplanted component of
the contemporary discourse of social exclusion and
inclusion.
The suggestion that stigma is not (or not only) performed
and not (or not only) determined but rather is culturally produced
as a social, relational, and powerful artifact is a compelling
argument (Buchman & Reiner, 2009). Equally
compelling is Scambler’s (2009) reflection that stigma can
be a very convoluted social process, one for which sociology
is well-oriented to imagine as a combination of experience,
anticipation, and perception, of the harms of blame and
devaluation; the fears and pain of rejection and exclusion;
and the hopes and desires for acceptance and inclusion.
Social Inclusion
How cultures and societies stratify and divide; how they
account for customs around inclusion, exclusion, belonging,
and togetherness; and how the processes that include
and exclude are talked about, described, understood, and
experienced, all provide some clues as to the role of social
integration and stratification within a given society. Indeed,
how stratification is conceived and discussed can obscure
the very nature of the processes by which such divisions
come to be. This is precisely why the discipline of sociology
is so useful. Unlike natural order sciences, it does more
than identify and posit explanations for social divisions.
Sociology, in addition to this, can reflect also on the disciplinary
discourses encircling discussions of these social
partitions. For example, one of the means by which stratification
is conceptualized and discussed could take as a
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reflective example, the pre–World War II writings of
Sorokin (1998), who in considering stratification differentiated
between horizontal and vertical social mobility. Sorokin
suggested that horizontal mobility related to changes in occupational
position or role, but not to changes within a social
hierarchy, whereas vertical mobility did describe changes
within the social hierarchy. Sorokin summarized his theory
by reflecting that within systems of vertical and horizontal
mobility, there could be individual social infiltration as well
as collective social movement. Furthermore, that although it
was possible to identify forms of mobile and immobile societies
within different geographical and historical contexts, it
was rare for a society’s strata to be closed absolutely, and rare
for the vertical mobility of even the most mobile society to
be completely free from obstacles.
As proposed by Sorokin, these types of social movements
could often vary across time and space, yet even across time,
trends—particularly as they might apply to vertical mobility—were
unlikely to be writ in stone. Although autocratic
societies might be less mobile than democratic societies, the
rule was not fixed and could have exceptions (Sorokin,
1998).
While often used to describe low or zero labor market
involvement (Foster, 2000), early definitions of social exclusion
in time broadened to consider barriers to effective or full
participation in society (Du Toit, 2004). These types of barriers
were considered to contribute to progressive processes of
marginalization that could lead to deprivation and disadvantage
(Chakravarty & D’Ambrosio, 2006). As the exclusion
concept took on currency, it began to reflect more than a
simple material nature and to begin to encompass the experience
of individuals or communities who were not benefitting
or were unable to benefit relative to others in society (Davies,
2005; Levitas, 1998). In time, the concept would evolve to
reflect lapses in social integration and social cohesion that
plagued advanced capitalist societies (Chakravarty &
D’Ambrosio, 2006). It would evolve also to refer to processes
that prevent individuals or groups from full or partial participation
in society, as well as the crippling and reifying inability
to meaningful participation in economic, social, political,
and cultural activities and life (de Haan & Maxwell, 1998;
Duffy, 1995, 2001; Horsell, 2006)—a definitional approach
that imbues exclusion in terms of neighborhood, individual,
spatial, and group dimensions (Burchardt, Le Grand, &
Piachaud, 1999, referenced in Percy-Smith, 2000).
March, Oviedo-Joekes, and Romero (2006) suggested that
one of the elements that unify the divergent definitional
approaches to social exclusion and inclusion is that social
exclusion is a process as opposed to a static end state. Further,
that inclusion, in addition to being a context-based social and
historical product reflective of social and national history,
tends to mirror also what Silver (1995) proposed were the
very limits of the borders of belonging.
Despite attempts at globally applicable definitions of
social exclusion and inclusion, it has been suggested that
there will always be patterns of border shaping that are particular
to specific contexts. This is in part because the weight
of inclusion versus exclusion is dependent on the particulars
of any given society (de Haan & Maxwell, 1998; March
et al., 2006; O’Brien, Wilkes, de Haan, & Maxwell, 1997).
Such society-specific particulars might take the form of traditional
and historic patterns of stratification, or be based on
how individual groups and/or characteristics may be valued
over others. Less clear, however, is which, if any, elements of
a given society or social structure may mitigate the kinds of
exclusion/inclusion dynamics that may be held aloft as representative
of normative practice. For example, in some
social contexts, patterns of inclusion and exclusion may
reflect different stages of social and economic development.
Alternately, these patterns may vary by type and/or political
orientation of governments, or by the religious, ethnic, or
cultural makeup of a given society.
Ultimately, however, the use of inclusion and exclusion
concepts has evolved to the point where within a number of
contexts, they are used as a descriptor for those who represent
a particular kind of threat to social harmony (Silver &
Miller, 2003). In sum, the terms social inclusion and social
exclusion have been used throughout the social science and
humanities literature in a number of different ways—to
describe acts of social stratification across human and animal
societies, as a principle to reflect the ordering that occurs
within societies to determine social position, and as a narrative
to explain and at times justify why one or more groups
merit access to the core or the periphery, to the benefit or
expense of others.
Initial discourses of social inclusion are widely attributed
to having first appeared in France in the 1970s when the economically
disadvantaged began to be described as the
excluded (Silver, 1995). The preliminary uses of this new
parlance appeared as a means to refer to a variety of disabled
and destitute groups. The government of France was among
the earliest adapters of exclusion terminology, and it is there
that most often the concept is suggested to have found its
contemporary meaning (Silver & Miller, 2003).
As a fully documented policy response, the concept of
social inclusion to counteract social exclusion emerged
toward the end of the 1980s, when the European Community
(EC) first used the term social exclusion (Wilson, 2006). The
appearance of the term social inclusion in the rhetoric of the
EC was in itself a key point of departure, in that exclusion
was suddenly held to be a reflection that “poverty was no
longer the right word to use to describe the plight of those
marginalized from mainstream society” (Williams & White,
2003, p. 91).
Ascertaining the contemporary use of the terms social
inclusion and social exclusion involves a study of diffusion
of, most importantly, the applications of René Lenoir,
France’s Secretary of State for Social Welfare in the Chirac
government of the 1970s (Davies, 2005, citing Lenoir, 1974;
Pierce, 1999; Silver, 1995).
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L’Inclusion Sociale
In 1965, a French social commentator, Jean Klanfer, published
L’Exclusion sociale: Étude de la marginalité dans les
sociétés occidentales [Social exclusion: The study of marginality
in Western societies] (Béland, 2007). Described as
an anthropology of poverty (Cl, 1968), Klanfer’s work
argued that society rewarded personal responsibility with
inclusion and personal irresponsibility with exclusion. If the
work of Bourgeois was a primary influence on the soldarism
movement almost 100 years earlier, the writings of Klanfer
would fuel the imagination of René Lenoir (1974), most
notably in his book Les exclus.
In his political tome, Lenoir contended social exclusion
was a result of France’s postwar transition from a largely
agricultural society to an urban one (Davies, 2005). While
the belief was that these events could lead to poverty, Lenoir
argued that they could lead to a brand of social polarization
also, which challenged the Liberté, Egalité, and Fraternité
ideals of the French Republican project.
Many have suggested that if there were a birth of the
modern rhetoric of social inclusion, it would be here, in
French thought that sought a means to reintegrate the large
numbers of ex-industrial workers and a growing number of
young people excluded from opportunities to join the labor
force in the new economies of the 1970s and beyond.
According to Silver (1995) and Silver and Miller (2003),
one of the reasons the inclusion and exclusion concepts resonated
so strongly for the French was that in their society, the
Anglo-Saxon idea of poverty was seen to essentially insult
the equality of citizenry contained within the Liberté manifesto—an
equality that, as reflected in France’s late-20thcentury
welfare state, operationalized charity as basic social
assistance in response to poverty, and as essentially a right of
citizenry. Furthermore, what would come to be seen as an
inclusive welfare state was held to be the most effective and
civilized way to eliminate absolute material deprivation and
the risks to well-being such deprivation could cause.
However, as the 1970s progressed, and as unemployment
became endemic, the passage of time brought even greater
numbers of those considered excluded, and with them everincreasing
reiterations of the new exclusion discourse (Silver,
1995). The result in France was a movement to protect les
exclus. The movement was so strong that by 1998, the French
posited legal codification to prevent and combat social exclusions
(note the plural) as a means to foster universal access
to fundamental human rights.
Within French Republican thought in particular, social
exclusion was seen to reflect ruptures in solidarity and the
social bond (lien social), something essentially tantamount
to heresy within the French social contract. Heresy because
the French social contract of the time was seen to hold (and
some may argue continues to hold) reciprocity, both between
the social obligations French citizens have for the French
state and the obligations that society has in return, to provide
reasonable livelihoods for its members. Here, though, the
accepted exceptions, as in many welfare regimes, were
restricted to those who could not work due to older age, disability,
or ill health, and did not extend to those whose deliberate
actions and/or deliberate tendencies toward illicit
pleasure, removed them from broader labor force opportunities
or expectations.
In some respects, the mutuality and reciprocity evident in
elements of French Republican thought reflected a social
contract that favored the already-included in its definition of
society. For the positioning of reciprocity within the social
contract, such a context has implications for the creation of
biases against the failings of the excluded. In particular,
against those who vary from society’s includable norms. In
the place of any such consideration leading to action,
appeared a sort of stoic romanticism. Thus, for the French,
the excluded came to represent a martyred or punished sector
of a society against whom the included had failed to live up
to their side of the social contract.
As the concept of exclusion grew to gain broader credence
beyond France, the EC and the subsequent EU, it increasingly
incorporated target groups who were not simply poor or without
sufficient resources. It incorporated those segregated also
from the social core through attributes such as ethnicity or
race, age, gender, and disability, and whose characteristics
could contribute to justify the need for deliberate social inclusion
programs (Omidvar & Richmond, 2003). That these
attributes tended to be noncriminalized and relatively politically
correct, as opposed to criminalized and/or contested, is
a feature that should not be lost.
Even though the concepts of citizenship and social integration
in the French tradition may present some challenges
for Anglo-Saxon manners of thinking, this did not, according
to Gore, Figueiredo, and Rodgers (1995), prevent the wider
adoption of exclusion frameworks across Western Europe.
These authors suggested that in appropriating the concept as
integral to modern and meaningful social development, the
EC was linking the concept of social exclusion more closely
with evolving thoughts around the implications of unrealized
social rights.
While EC and EU directives sought to carve out greater
social inclusion, other countries, particularly Commonwealth
countries—notably the United Kingdom, Australia, New
Zealand, Canada, and South Africa—were beginning to roll
out their own interpretations of this rhetoric.
In its initial contemporary use, the exclusion terminology
adopted in France and subsequently diffused elsewhere, was
meant to refer to those individuals who were considered to be
on the margins of French society of the 1970s. That is, individuals
considered society’s social problems, who tended to
share a particular social reality, a less than successful material
existence compounded with real barriers in accessing benefits
provided by the French welfare state (Daly, 2006).
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So great were the social problems, that Lenoir, would
suggest that a full 10% of the French population were exclu,
or outcast. According to Davies (2005), “the novel characteristic
of les exclus was not that they were poor (although
most were), but that they were disconnected from mainstream
society in ways that went beyond poverty”
(p. 3). This disconnect, it was argued, was facilitated by
their relative social positioning and by factors related to
poor health and social, economic, and geographical isolation
from active engagement in politics. From this perspective,
to be socially excluded was paramount to being of the
underclass; to be among those people who did not fit into
the norms of industrial societies, who were not protected by
social insurance and who were essentially considered social
misfits. (Silver, 1995; Stegemen & Costongs, 2003). Beliefs
about social conformity aside, Silver’s (1995) near definitive
list of the socially excluded reads in some regards as a
full 50% of the world’s population. In doing, so it lends credence
to Labonte’s (2004) assertion that the socially
excluded are liable to comprise everyone who is not middleaged,
middle class, and male.
It follows that just naming who is at risk of social exclusion,
based on identity, vulnerability, membership, or biology
will not suffice without some reflection as to who is naming
the excluded, where those who label or define the excluded
stand ontologically relative to their own or others’ exclusion,
and what if any the influences of personal, political, stereotypical,
or xenophobic biases may be. It is an element of the
conceptualization of social inclusion and exclusion particularly
well-suited to sociology’s contribution.
A Sociological Lens
In many ways, despite the contribution of the psychological
and life sciences, and even the contributions of social policy,
the concepts of social inclusion and exclusion are profoundingly
sociological. This is because at the very root of both
classic and contemporary sociological thinking are concerns
with social stratification, social inequality, and social class—
key concepts which the social inclusion literature repeatedly
touches upon.
Witcher (2003, referencing Burchardt et al., 1999)
reflected that social inclusion and exclusion were concepts
that were often poorly defined or theorized. Daly (2006) has
suggested that although there is nothing inherent in the inclusion
and exclusion concepts that defy or negate theorization,
in general, sociology’s attempts at their theorization could be
inconsistent or facile.
Horsell (2006) referenced Crowther (2002) in suggesting
that the contemporary interest in social exclusion and inclusion
were reflective of similar attempts to conceptualize the
dual influences of poverty and social deprivation. As such,
these concepts signaled that somehow the cumulative
impacts of poverty and social deprivation (or the cumulative
effects of social exclusion in the absence of social inclusion)
could represent a threat to social order.
Horsell’s (2006) suggestion was that, in purely operational
terms, the exclusion/inclusion paradigm acted to
reinforce neoliberal ideas about social actors and agency
as well as to harness principles of mutual obligation and
active participation; that the discourse, broadly speaking,
had both symbolic and physical dimensions. In its consideration
of the ways in which contemporary social policy
analysis treats social position as stratification, deprivation,
and inequality, attempts to tease out the causes and consequences
of social exclusion relative to inclusion could risk
becoming muddled by mixing together attempts to better
the lives and living conditions of people living below poverty
lines, with the illusion that more were being done than
might be. Horsell’s suggestion of illusion hinged on the
reflection that those who may ultimately benefit from the
application of such inclusion-speak when operationalized
as policy could tend to be those who already enjoyed a
number of inclusion’s benefits.
Levitas (1996, 1998) has reflected that the overall flavor
of the social inclusion rhetoric is strongly Durkheimian.
She has stressed that Durkheim and the exclusion/inclusion
discursive continuum demonstrate a tendency to repress
conflict as well as a tendency toward an approach to inclusion
that subversively critiques capitalism in a way that
would be lacking from a purely Durkheimian analysis.
Owing in part to this, Levitas (1998) labeled the rhetoric
of social inclusion “a new Durkheimian hegemony” (p. 178),
given that most contemporary views of inclusion correspond
to scholarly interpretations of Durkheim’s sociology, including
Durkheim’s emphasis on an alternative attempt to navigate
an understanding of society between unacceptable free
market capitalism and an unacceptable state socialism.
Such hegemony, according to Bowring (2000), leads us to
think of elements of exclusion like deprivation and inequality
as phenomena that occur at the very margins of society,
and by extension, to ignore social structures that influence
the included as well as the excluded. Bowring’s point was
that the exclusion/inclusion rhetoric risks being somewhat of
a red herring, because exclusion at the societal level could be
indicative of systemic deprivation and not just a deprivation
experienced or reported by those defined as socially
excluded.
For Wilson (2006), it was important to recall that social
integration per se was not a focus of Durkheim. For
Durkheim, inequality and social stratification were natural
results of society, components of a solidary system he divided
into mechanical and organic: the former being a fountain of
social cohesion and the latter a well of social inclusion.
Together, they were envisioned as the kinds of dependencies
that social actors within advanced societies share with one
another. Wilson’s point was that although Durkheim associated
increases in solidarity with social progress, he would not
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necessarily associate the same solidarity with social inclusion,
since in theory, advanced societies characterized by
mutual dependence would exhibit the kinds of mutual and
shared bonds that would defy the need for social inclusion in
the first place.
The emphasis of these authors, and arguably of a
Durkheimian perspective as applied to social inclusion also,
is that new or reborn ways are not necessarily different ways.
That despite its focus on the socially disenfranchised and
their position relative to a status quo, there remains a hollow
echo to the rhetoric around social inclusion. A void that is
both redolent of discussion of the hollow state (Barnett, 1999;
Davies, 2000; Della Sala, 1997; Holliday, 2000; London
Edinburgh Weekend Return Group, 1980; Rhodes, 1994;
Roberts & Devine, 2003; Skelcher, 2000), as well as a void
that references one of Levitas’s (2000) and Labonte’s (2004)
salient points: that it is one thing to promote an inclusionary
utopia. However, in the event that such a utopian vision
comes to pass, how likely is it that the result will be the kind
of social world foreseen? In other words, even if a utopian
ideal were within the reach of real-world, applied social policy,
what are the odds, as Kenyon (2003) suggested, that
attaining an inclusive society would result in the banishment
of all inequality.
It was Young’s (1999) argument, and Wilson’s (2006)
reiteration that although much of the West’s social inclusion
rhetoric may address many things, the root cause of social
exclusion is not one of them. In this, the rhetoric fails because
to address these causes would require acknowledgment that
even within real-world inclusion societies, people frequently
continue to experience poverty in a context that envelops
them with messages of the meritocracy that surrounds
them—a meritocracy that suggests that anyone with desire
and ambition can succeed through acceptable behavior and
hard work. For these authors, this represents a relative process
of deprivation—one that includes an encounter with a
form of culture shock where the culture in which the excluded
experience their day-to-day existence actively reinforces the
notion that they are receiving a much lower standard of living
than others.
Here then, one could contend, is reflected the relative
deprivation that leads to social exclusion “through a subjective
experience of inequality and unfairness as materially
deprived people seek to obtain the unobtainable” (Young,
1999, p. 401, cited in Wilson, 2006, p. 342). In a twist on the
variations in social inclusion discourses presented earlier,
this view holds that social exclusion morphs into “a cultural
phenomenon arising from dialectic relationships between
identity and social acceptance and the contradiction of a supposed
meritocracy in which the poor lack the material means
to meet the aspirations they are encouraged to embrace”
(Wilson, 2006, p. 343). In other words, exclusion becomes
social status contested between a hierarchical valuation of
different kinds of social identities (socially hazardous vs.
socially accepted) within a social world attempting to remedy
the inherent challenges embedded in an inequitable division
of resources within an acquisitive, material world.
Residuus Exclusion
In discussing the problematization of exclusion, the sociologist
Nikolas Rose wrote that the mid-19th century wore the
mantle of “a succession of figures that seem to condense in
their person, their name, their image all that is disorder, danger,
threat to civility, the vagrant, the pauper, the degenerate”
(Rose, 1999, p. 254). As the 19th century gave way to the
20th, there appeared efforts to create universally shared forms
of social citizenship. Yet even within this drive toward universality,
there were those who were cast as unincludable, just as
there are today. Within the new liberal thinking, universal
citizenship did not emulate fully the fact that the notion of
universal was still a somewhat relative concept and that a
boundary between the includable and the excludable would
not only continue to exist but would be reinforced also.
From this arose “notions such as ‘the residuum,’ ‘the
unemployable’ and ‘the social problem group’” (Rose, 1999,
p. 254), that is, states of embodied being, through social roles,
social strata, and entire classes that would, in time, become
integral to these new forms of liberal thinking. From such
vantage, the rhetoric of exclusion/inclusion, and the array of
notions and underlying beliefs about the utility of integration,
would become parts of the organizing, and traceable mainstays
of reform. From older, perhaps simpler conceptualizations
of inequality were born new ways of understanding
what Rose, citing Levitas (1996), described as a “two-thirds,
one-third social order” where a seemingly continually widening
gap between the included two thirds and the excluded one
third would continue to unfurl (Rose, 1999, p. 258).
Rose (1999) differentiated the new excluded from previous
form of unequals. Whereas minorities that arose from
the welfare state had claims to unity and solidarity, the new
excluded have few of these, and it is perhaps from this lack
of unification that the new expertise underlying inclusion’s
emphasis is born. Challenged from forging identity and
right of place based on shared exclusion, this new underclass
is “like Marx’s peasants, individualized like potatoes
in a sack, incapable of forming themselves into a single
class on the basis of a consciousness of their shared expropriation”
(Rose, 1999, pp. 254-255).
In moving from a welfare to a postwelfare, advanced liberal
order, social control is reconfigured into control that
moves beyond repressing or containing individual pathology.
It becomes both about knowledge and access to the production
of knowledge. This is because—to paraphrase Marx—
access to the production of knowledge provides for the
definition of what is and is not includable (Rose, 1999, referencing
Ericson & Haggerty, 1997). Thus, the new labor force
of control is no longer one that is either purely reactive or
purely punitive. Rather, it takes on a form of administrative
function whereby it oversees the marginalia comprising the
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bounds (and bonds) of inclusion and exclusion, of risk and
safety and permissibility (Rose, 1999). It was Rose’s vision
that for the excluded underclass “a politics of conduct is today
more salient than a politics of class” (Rose, 2000, p. 335, citing
Mead, 1991, p. 4, and Procacci, 1999, p. 30).
Although Rose’s discourse is compelling, one should
consider also whether all of the excluded are created equal.
Do they all share the same position within the underclass?
For example, across the Western world, special interest
groups have sprung up since the softening of the welfare
state, groups which include not only those that are socially
excluded—drug users, sexual deviants, the poorly socialized—but
also the physically excluded such as those who are
bodily or mentally challenged.
In order for the work of Rose and those who have influenced
his arguments regarding the inclusion/exclusion divide
to be applicable (these influences include the works of
Foucault, 1979a, 1976/1979b, 1985, 1991; Mead, 1991;
O’Malley, 1992, 1999, 2004; Valverde, 1998), the work will
need, in part, to account for diversity and social stratification
within the underclass—that is, to help shed light on how and
why certain social hierarchies of the status quo become replicated
within the margins, leading to some of the marginal
experiencing, in a sense, double marginality. At the same
time, even those who achieve core or nonperipheral social
status risk facing constraining hierarchies and limits to social
mobility that function to either deny or defy full integration.
Extrapolating from the work of Rose, the inclusion society
would not be a utopian dream, but rather a development
that to varying extents would further institutionalize themes
of inclusion, permissible rights, and the breadth of acceptable
conduct.
Conclusion
This article has reflected on social inclusion from the vantage
of sociology. It has reflected on exclusion and inclusion
societies, across time and place and has demonstrated the
importance of considering the physical world’s exclusion
and inclusion societies not only from a natural order perspective
but from a social order perspective also.
Many of the considerations explored here have embodied
measurable, objective approaches to the sociological conception
and consideration of exclusion and inclusion. Du
Toit (2004) has suggested current definitions, and their
applications within individual country contexts allow social
scientists and policy makers to present social exclusion as a
single outcome of potentially multiple determinants of deprivation.
Yet, this article has considered arguments that position
inclusion and exclusion as much more than the fodder of
contemporary policy. Indeed, it has demonstrated how
human integration and expulsion are both highly historical
and deeply sociological; that forms of social deprivation as
well as social entitlement span many hundreds of years, if
not the full course of human history itself.
For all that is known about social stratification, the tendency,
particularly from the perspective of sociology, has
been to consider inclusion and exclusion from an observational
standpoint. This has occurred through policy analysis,
historical analysis, and even consideration of some of the
sociobiological correlates of inclusion and exclusion. What is
less well known and less well developed are approaches for
understanding the subjective experiences of social inclusion
and social exclusion. For example, how exclusion and inclusion
are experienced socially? How experiences of inclusion
and exclusion are produced and reproduced socially? How
different social labels impact the experience of inclusion and
exclusion, and what the role of stigma may be?
For the reader, understanding the journey from social
exclusion to social inclusion sociologically is an undertaking
across potentially difficult terrain. Among other things, it
requires a critical eye capable of accounting for individual
and group participation and lack thereof (Daly, 2006).
And what of poverty? For some writers who have sought to
unpack social inclusion and exclusion, these concepts are but
alternate ways of recasting the notion of poverty. Others suggest
economic poverty need be seen either as only one of an
interrelated group of dimensions which work in tandem
together to contribute to an individual’s inability to successfully
access the overall labor market. Such an approach would
envision poverty as one factor in a multifaceted approach to
understanding the experiences of society’s lower strata
(Sirovátka & Mare, 2006; Woodward & Kohli, 2001).
As prescribed approaches to policy and practice, efforts to
contend with contemporary social exclusion often come to be
framed by a rhetoric of reformation, imbued with different
traditions in terms of how poverty is framed around either
relational or distributional issues (Murie & Musterd, 2004,
referencing van Kempen, 2002). It is a vantage that capitalizes
on Marshall’s (1963) model of postwar social rights,
where, rather than focus on forms of postwar poverty, the
focus on social exclusion is on redistribution, access, and participation
(Murie & Musterd, 2004). Then and now, sociologically
speaking, when poverty rather than social structure
is held up as the cause and consequence of exclusion, such
deprivation is presented as a failure of capabilities as opposed
to a manner of being within a social structure or society.
Chakravarty and D’Ambrosio (2006) suggested that an
emphasis on the shortfalls of economic thresholds as an explanation
for exclusion is not the same as emphasizing structured
inabilities to participate. This is because a focus on structural
inabilities allows for a more complex, multidimensional
understanding of the interplay, overlap, and social distance
between money, work, and belonging. As a reconceptualization
of social disadvantage, such a perspective provides an
important framework for thinking out alternatives to the welfare
state. It links poverty, productivity by means of employment
and social integration that in turn emphasizes integration
and insertion into a labor market, active and personalized participation,
and a multicultural national citizenry (Gore et al.,
by guest on September 19, 2016Downloaded from
12		 SAGE Open
1995). It broadens also the notion of inclusion beyond biological
or economic fitness alone.
In this regard, the suggestion that social inclusion exists not
necessarily as a mechanism of sociobiological well-being only
but more viscerally as a reflection of outcome of economic
empowerment holds much in common with Richard Parker
and PeterAggleton’s post-Goffman work on stigma.Although
good arguments exist—and many have been presented here—
about why integration and ostracism can be interpreted
through both natural order and economic lenses, inclusion and
exclusion do not represent free-floating views. Like stigma,
inclusion and exclusion also exist at “the historically determined
nexus between cultural formulations and systems of
power and domination” (Parker, 2012, p. 166).
As systems of social power, these formations constitute
architectures of inclusion; that is, means and ways that inclusion
and exclusion are both enacted and talked about. Such
architectures exist as literal and figurative coalitions of
action, reaction, governance, control, and power which
together comprise how a policy aim like social inclusion is
wound, entwined, draped, and displayed for public rendering
and consumption.
In what can be described as a political economy of inclusion,
the hierarchies embedded in these architectures of
inclusion not only ascribe value to who is to be considered
includable but also reflect value structures that can lead to
forms of ideologically based interpretations about whether
inclusion is as good or better than exclusion (Rodgers, 1995)
based on variation in social power, the ability to hold rights,
and the representation or embodiment of hazard.
As with more traditional, physical forms of architecture,
inclusion’s architectures function to both limit and facilitate
the movement and interaction of people through hierarchies
of integration. Enclosed within these architectures are worlds
of inclusion and exclusion that push and pull amid new forms
of allowance, constraint, and conflict (Gumplowicz, 1963).
Parallel yet interconnected worlds in which, are reflected,
the socially excluded, reduced, and idealized as somewhat
two-dimensional occupiers of social space (Spina, 2005).
Gillies (2005) reflected that societies have a tendency to
normalize the sins of the included while penalizing the sins
of the excluded. This suggests that even if discourses about
social inclusion are effectively rendered as policy and translated
into practice, the act of revaluating the biases society’s
hold for marginal underclasses of excluded social actors
may well remain. This is to say that were society able to find
room within its social architectures for its marginal women
and men (Park, 1928), the fact of their powerlessness coupled
with their comportment could still relegate them to the
periphery, occupying colonized spaces stratified on one side
by accusations of nonnormative or deviant behavior and on
another by power relations.
For the contemporary open thinker trying to grapple with
social inclusion and exclusion as a set of potentially complex
concepts between those who study and profess a natural, an
economic, or a social order, ideas about power would seem to
be of particular importance—be it the power of the elite or the
empowerment of those with special needs. Power seems to
fuel the wheels of integration. Although power can be shown
to have a decisive role in both the natural and the economic
orders, it is in the arena of the social where it is perhaps best
understood. One only need look at the history of philosophy
and social theory for evidence of how power and proximity to
it can enable or bar integration. Power allows proximity to the
means of inclusion—essentially, to inclusion’s apparati.
Of course, simply thinking openly about social worlds as
variations of inclusionary or exclusionary societies does not
lead to societies that are more inclusive. It does, however,
allow for a more open lens with which to consider the past as
well with which to view the present.
Author’s Note
Portions of this article were written during visits to the University
of Port Harcourt, Nigeria; the University of Pretoria and the
University of the Western Cape, South Africa; and the University
of Namibia.
Acknowledgments
This work acknowledges the important contributions of Professors
Lynn Jamieson, Angus Bancroft, Alex Robertson, Esther
Breitenbach, and Anthony Coxon at the University of Edinburgh;
Professors Ted Myers and Liviana Calzavara at the University of
Toronto; and Professor Avril Taylor at the University of the West of
Scotland. Thanks to Professor Donald Sacco for deftly ushering
this manuscript through the review process at SAGE Open, and to
the anonymous reviewers for their perceptive and very useful
comments.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for
the research and/or authorship of this article: The author received
financial support from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research
(CIHR) Funding Reference Number 68356.
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Bio
Dan Allman’s work focuses on the social and structural production
of risk and well-being, particularly for those considered marginal,
vulnerable, or peripheral to a society’s core. His interests include
social stratification and equity, the sociology of health and medicine,
and global health.
by guest on September 19, 2016Downloaded from
HughCollins*
Althoughlawsagainstdiscriminationhaveconventionallybeenjustifiedand
articulatedaccordingtovariousconceptionsofequality,tensionsbetweendifferent
notionsofequalityunderminethecoherenceoftheseexplanations.Theaimof
socialinclusionisproposedaspartofanalternativejustificationfordiscrimination
laws.As wellas exploringthemeaningandimplicationsofthepolicyofsocial
inclusionfordiscriminationlaws,theextenttowhichthelawalreadyembodiesthis
ideaisassessedwithparticularreferencetothescopeofanti-discriminationlaws,
proofofdiscrimination,justificationdefences,andpositivediscrimination.It is
concludedthatthegoalofsocialinclusionhasthepotentialtoprovidea vital
ingredientina morecoherent,thoughnotuncritical,accountoftheaimsofanti-
discriminationlegislation.
The aimofequality
Whatisthegeneralaimofanti-disonminationlaws?Atfirstsight,legislationin
theEuropeanUnionandtheUnitedStatesadvancesa conceptionofequalityas
itsgeneralaim.Indeedeanti-discriminationlawshaveoftenbeendubbed'equality
laws'.lThecentralcaseofprohibitedconductis lessfavourabletreatmentof
anotherpersonongroundsofsorbecauseof)theirrace,sex,oroneoftheother
protectedgroupclassifications.Thisstandardinsistsuponequaltreatmenttothe
extentthatpeopleshouldbeassessedwithoutregardtocertaincfiaracteristicssuch
as sexandracethathaveoftenbeena sourceofdisadvantageinthepast.Equal
treatmentdemandsimpartialityinthesenseofforbiddingcriteriasuchas sexor
racefromprovidinggroundsfordifferentiation.3Yettheaimofanti-discrimina-
tionlawscannotbereducedtoequaltreatment.
A closerinspectionofthelegislationrevealsthreekindsofdeviationsfroma
simpleequaltreatmentprinciple.In somecases,differentratherthanthesame
treatmentisrequired.Inthecaseofdiscriminationagainstpregnantwomen,for
instance,thelawmandatesdifferenttreatmentofwomenratherthanthesame
treatmentasmen.4Similarly,differenttreatmentofdisabledpersonsisrequiredin
manyrespects,in orderto enablethemto gainaccessto workand other
opportunities.5In a secondtypeof deviation,equal treatmentis itselfnot
* Law Department,LondonSchoolofEconomics.Thanksareowedtomanywhocommentedon
carlicrdraftsofthisessay,especiallyOonaghReitmannRichardNobles,and Nicola Lacey.
1 S. Fredman,'Equality:A NewGeneration?'(2001)30ILJ145-C. McCrudden,'TheEffectiveness
ofEuropeanEqualityLaw: NationalMechanismsforEnforcingGenderEqualityLaw in the
LightofEuropeanRequirements'(1993)13OJLS320;B.Hepple,M. CousseyandT. Choudhury,
Eqnality:A NewFramework,ReportoftheIndependentReviewoftheEnforcementofUK Anti-
DiscriminationLegislation(Oxford:Hart,2000).
2 Eg EC Directive2000/78,Art2.2(a) CivilRightsAct1964,TitleVII, 42 USC s 2000e-2(a)(1).
3 I. M. Young,J"sticeandthePolitzesofDifference(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1990)
Chapter4
4 Eg EC Directive92/85,OJL348,28.11.92;EC Directive2002/73,OJL269,5.10.2002.
S AmericansWithDisabilitiesAct1990,42 USC s 1201,especiallys 12112(b)(5)(A)-EC Directive
2000/78,Art5; DisabilityDiscriminationAct 1996,especiallys 6-therequirementfordifferent
treatmentis consideredbelow.
16 g TheModernLawReviewLimited2003.PublishedbyBlackwellPublishingLtd.,
9600GarsingtonRoad,OxfordOX42DQ,UK and350MainStreet,Malden,MA02148,USA.
Discrimination,EqualityandSocialInclusion
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January2003] Discrimination,EqualityandSocialInclusion
permitted,ifitcausesunjustifiable'indirectdiscrimination'or--'disparateimpact'.6
Here formalequal treatmentbecomesunlawfulwherea ruleor practice
disproportionatelyoperatestothedisadvantageofoneoftheprotectedgroups,
andtheruleorpracticecannotbeobjectivelyjustified.A thirdkindofdeviation
permitspreferentialtreatmentforprotectedgroupsincertaincircumstances,in
ordertoredressa priorhistoryofdisadvantage.Theexactscopeofpermitted
positivediscriminationisdeeplycontroversial,nodoubtbecauseitisperceivedas
conflictingsharplywiththeequaltreatmentprinciple.7Thesethreedeviations
revealthatwecannotunderstandtheaimofanti-discriminationlawsbyreference
toa straightforwardequaltreatmentprinciple.Thequestionbecomeshowcanwe
accountforthelawina waythatbothrecognisestheforceoftheequaltreatment
principleandacknowledgesitsdeficienciesas a completeexplanationoftheaims
ofthelaw?
Conventionalaccountsoftheaimofanti-discriminationlawstrytoanswerthat
questionbyusinganotherconceptionofequality,onethatfurthersa substantive
ordistributivegoal.Deviationsfromequaltreatmentarejustifiedbyreferenceto
thepursuitofgoalssuchasequalityofresults,equalityofresources,orequalityof
opportunity.For example,it is arguedthatpermittingclaimsfor'indirect
discrimination'or'disparateimpact'servesthepurposeofreducinginstitutional
barrierstotheachievementofa distributivegoalsuchasmoreequalityinresults
orfairerequalityofopportunity.8Similarly,inEuropeanlawthepermittedscope
forpositivediscriminationis determinedinpartbyreferencetoa substantive
conceptionofequality:'Witha viewto ensuringfullequalityinpractice,the
principleofequaltreatmentshallnotpreventanyMemberStatefrommaintaining
oradoptingspecificmeasurestopreventorcompensatefordisadvantageslinked
to[sex,race,etc.]...'9 Althoughthepreciseconceptionofsubstantiveequality
remainsambiguousinsuchformulations,itcertainlyseemspossibletojustify
deviationsfromtheequaltreatmentprinciplebyreferencetosomedistributive
conceptionofequality.Theproblemforjustifyingtheaimsofanti-discrimination
lawsbecomesrathertorestrainorconfinetheforceofa substantiveconceptionof
equality.
Thisproblemarisesbecausethereis alwaysa tensionbetweentheequal
treatmentprincipleand substantiveconceptionsof equality.Becauseequal
treatmentdeterminesa procedureratherthananoutcome,equaltreatmentcan
alwaysbechallengedasobstructingtheachievementofa particularoutcome.This
tensionismostobviouswithrespecttoa strongegalitarianversionofequality.If
theaimofthelegislationisperceivedtobestrictequalityofoutcomes,anyruleor
practiceincludingequaltreatmentthatpreventstheachievementofanegalitarian
6 EgECDirective2000/78,Art2.2(6);CivilRightsAct1964,TitleVII,42USCs2000e-2(a)(2)and
(k).
7 M. B. Abram,'AffirmativeAction:FairShakersandSocialEngineers'(1986)99HarvardLaw
Review1312.ThisconflictwastheconceptualframeworkwithinwhichUS constitutionallaw
addressedtheissueofreversediscrimination:RegentsofUniversityofCaliforniav Bakke,438US
265,98S Ct2733(1978)(SupremeCtUS).
8 C. McCrudden,'ChangingNotionsofDiscrimination'inS. GuestandA.Milne(eds),Equality
andDiscrimination:EssaysinFreedomandJusticeARSPVol21(Stuttgart:FranzSteiner,1985)
86;J.Gardner,'LiberalsandUnlawfulDiscrimination'(1989)9 OJLS1.Thevarietyofpossible
distributivesensesofequalityfoundinthelawisexploredinS. Fredman,Discrim1nationLaw
(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2002)Chapter1;C. BarnardandB. Hepple,'Substantive
Equality'(2000)59CLJ562.
9 Directive2000/78/ECof27 November2000,OJL 303,2.12.2000,16establishinga general
frameworkforequaltreatmentinemploymentandoccupation,article7(1),seealsoon sex
discriminationinparticularTreatyEstablishingtheEuropeanCommunityArticle142(4).
17t The ModernLaw ReviewLimited2003
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TheModernLaw Review [Vol.66
outcomemustbequestioned.Forexample,iftheegalitarianoutcomeisdefinedas
anequaldistributionofjobsbetweenmenandwomen,anyruleorpracticethat
obstructsthatgoalwouldhavetobechallenged,includingan equaltreatment
principlethatinsiststhatmenandwomenshouldbe assessedon theirmerits,
disregardingtheirsex.Butthesameproblemarisesin connectionwithany
substantiveconceptionofequality,includingtheapparentlylessambitiousgoals
ofequalityofopportunityandequalityofresources.Wheneverthelegislation
seeksa particularsubstantiveoutcomethatconcernsa distributionofadvantages
amongsocialgroups,a proceduralrulethatforbidsconsiderationofmembership
ofgroupsas a relevantcriterionfordecisionsmustobstructthepursuitofthat
goal.
Courtshavetoresolvethistensionbetweentheequaltreatmentprincipleand
substantiveconceptionsofequalityin particularinstances.The predominant
methodinEuropeis tousea testof'proportionality'.10In theUnitedStates,
courtsapplytheequivalenttestof'strictscrutiny'.11Thegistofthesetestsisthat
specificmeasuresdesignedto achievesubstantiveequalitymustnot be
disproportionateviolationsof theequal treatmentprinciple.Althoughthis
formulationprovidesa toolforjudicialexaminationoftheissue,itdoesnot
resolvethetensionbetweentheequal treatmentprincipleand substantive
conceptionsofequality.Themorea sI3ecificmeasureis likelyto achievethe
desiredsubstantiveequality,thegreaterwillbe thetensionwiththeequal
treatmentprinciple,and theharderit willbe to justifyunderthetestof
proportionality.A courthastoproducefinedistinctionsbetweenmeasuresthat
representonlyminorandnecessarydeviationsfromtheequaltreatmentprinciple
andmeasuresthatgo toofarinthepursuitofa desiredegalitarianoutcome.
Whereverthelineisdrawn,a decisioncanalwaysbecriticisedasdisplayingeither
a slavishadherencetotheequaltreatmentprincipleora dangeroussacrificeofthe
principle.Thetensionremainsbetween,ontheonehand,anaimofensuringequal
treatmentforallcitizensregardlessofcertaincharacteristicssuchassexandrace,
andontheotherhand,anaimofachievinga moreequaldistributionofwelfareor
resourcesamongallcitizensthatmayrequireinsomeinstancesdifferenttreatment
onthegroundsofthosesamecharacteristics.
Manypossiblerouteshavebeenproposedasprovidinga betterreconciliationof
thetensionbetweentheequaltreatmentprincipleandsubstantiveconceptionsof
equality.HereI donotwanttoenterintothedetailsoftheseproposals,exceptto
drawoutofthema senseofthestrategicchoicesthatcanbemadeandlessonsthat
maybelearnedfromfollowingvariouspaths.
Onerouteforresolvingthetensionis to seeka substantiveconceptionof
equalitythatis sufficientlylimitedthatitrarely,ifever,clasheswiththeequal
treatmentprinciple.Theideaof'equalityofopportunity'providesanexampleof
thisapproach.Leavingasidetheindeterminacyofthisnotion,thestrategyof
10Abrahamsson& AndersonvFogelqvistC- 407/98[2000]ECR 1-5539,[2002]ICR 932;Application
byBadeck,C-158/97[2000]ECR I-1875,[2000]IRLR 432;Lommersv MinisterVanLandbouw,
NatuurbeheerEn VisserijC-476/99[2002]IRLR 430;S. Fredman,DiscriminationLaw (Oxford:
OxfordUniversityPress,2002)136 143.ThesecasesdiscusstheapplicationoftheearlierEqual
TreatmentDirective76/207Art2(4),whichislimitedtosexdiscrimination,andusestheslightly
differentwordingoftheconceptof'equalopportunity'rather'equalityinpractice'.However,this
provisionhas to be readinthecontextofEC TreatyArt142(2),as amendedbytheTreatyof
Amsterdam,thatusestheformulationof 'fullequalityin practice',nowimplementedby EC
Directive2002/73,creatingnewArt2(8).
11 'Strictscrutiny'requiresthata discriminatorylaworadministrativeactmustfurthera compelling
stateinterestbythemostnarrowlytailoredmeansavailable:Korematsuv UnitedStates(l994)323
US 214,65 S Ct 193(SupremeCt US).
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January2003] Discrimination,EqualityandSocialInclusion
defininga goalthatlessfrequentlyrequiresdeviationfromtheequaltreatment
principleisplainlya steptowardsa betterresolutionoftheproblem.Nevertheless,
thisroutecanneverbeentirelysuccessful.Ifthenarrowdistributiveaimhasany
substantivecontentat all,it mustat somepointcomeintotensionwitha
proceduralrulethatisblindtooutcomes.
A secondstrategyconsistsin confiningthestrictapplicationof theequal
treatmentprincipletocertaindistributiveallocations.Forexample,itmightbe
proposedthatequaltreatmentshouldberigorouslyobservedinhiringdecisions,
butwithrespecttotrainingandother'outreach'measures,equaltreatmentshould
besacrificedinthepursuitofa substantivegoalsuchasfairequalityofopportunity.
Theproblemthatthisstrategyencountersistoexplaintheprincipleonwhichthe
divisionofdistributiveallocationsshouldbedrawn.Inpractice,thelawdoesnot
seektodrawsucha division,butratherappliestheequaltreatmentprincipleacross
theboard.Thelegalquestionremainswhetherthedeparturefromequaltreatment
in theallocationof trainingand otherbenefitsrepresentsa disproportionate
violationoftheequaltreatmentprinciple.Forexample,legislationintheUnited
Kingdompermitsemployersandtrainingbodiesto grantpreferentialaccessto
trainingtoa particularracialgroup,butonlyifthereareeithernomembersofthe
racialgroupdoingtheworkforwhichtrainingissupplied,ortheirproportionis
comparativelysmall.l2Similarly,in a caseconcerningan employer'schild-care
facilityreservedexclusivelyforwomenemployees,theEuropeanCourtofJustice
concludedthattheemployer'smeasurefailedthetestofproportionality,becauseit
excludedmaleemployeeswhotakecareofchildrenbythemselves.l3Thestrategyof
isolatingsomedistnbutivedecisionsfromtheapplicationoftheequaltreatment
pnnciple,thoughpossibleintheory,appearstobeunacceptableinpracticeowingto
theforceoftheequaltreatmentideal.
A thirdstrategyforresolvingthetensiontriesto dispensewiththeequal
treatmentprinciplealtogetherbyredefiningitas 'equalworth','equalrespect',or
'treatmentas an equal'.l4Undertheseformulations,differenttreatmentinthe
pursuitofa distributivegoalisunobjectionableprovidedthatitdoesnotinvolve
disrespectforanygroup.Indeed,equalrespect,particularlzwhenformulatedasa
claimforrecognitionandempowermentofan identity,lmayrequiredifferent
treatment,becauserespect(orrecognitionorculturalempowerment)mayinvolve
acceptingand accommodatingdifference.l6Althoughthisstrategyavoidsthe
tensionwehavebeenconsidering,itachievesthisresultonlybydiscardingthe
equaltreatmentprinciple.A whitemaleatthereceivingendofadversetreatment
arisingfroman affirmativeactionquotacanperhapsacceptthathistreatment
maynotinvolvebad motivesor disrespect,butit certainlyinvolvesunequal
treatment,partialtreatment,ordifferenttreatmentonthebasisofgenderorrace.
Hisrighttobetreatedwithrespectanddignitymaynothavebeeninfringed,but
hisotherrighttoequaltreatmenthasbeenplainlyviolated.Radicalvoicesin
favourofdiversitymaynotbeconcernedabouttheabandonmentofan equal
treatmentprinciple,becauseofitstendencytoimposea hegemonicwhite,male,
12 Race RelationsAct1976ss 37,38.
13 Lommersv MinsterVanLandbouw,Natuurbeheeren VisserijC-476/99[2002]IRLR 430.
14 R. Dworkin,A MatterofPrinciple(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1986)301;R. Kennedy,'Persuasion
andDistrust:A CommentontheAffirmativeActionDebate'(1986)99HarvardLawReview1327.
15 N. Fraser,JusticeInterruptus:CrticalReflectionson the'Postsocialist'Condition(New York:
Routledge,1997);D. Cooper,"'And You Can't FindMe Nowhere":RelocatingIdentityand
StructurewithEqualityJurisprudence'(2000)27 JournalofLaw andSociety249.
16 I. M. Young,aboven 3,Chapter6.
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TheModernLaw Review [Vol.66
heterosexualnorm.Yet anti-discriminationlawsin theirdefinitionsofdirect
discriminationandtheapplicationofthetestofproportionalityinpracticeinsist
upona processinvolvingequaltreatment,notmerelyequalrespect.Ifweaccept
thatanequaltreatmentprinciplewillremainatthecoreofanti-discrimination
laws,whatwecandrawoutofthisstrategyisrathertherecognitionthataswellas
equaltreatment,anti-discriminationlawsmayalsoseektoupholda principleof
equalrespect.Thesetwoprinciplesmayproducea newtensionwhenequalrespect
requiresdifferenttreatment.I doubtwhetherthisnewtensioncouldbeadequately
resolvedwithoutreferencetoa distributivegoalthatexplainswhenequalrespect
shouldoverrideequaltreatment.
A finalstrategyforresolvingthetensionbetweentheequaltreatmentprinciple
anda substantiveaimofequalitythatI wanttohighlightisonethatdiminishes
theprincipletoaninstrumentalrule.Thisinterpretationidentifiesa distributive
goalas thedominantaimofthelegislation,andregardsequaltreatmentas a
usefulguidetohowtheaimofthelawshouldbeimplemented,thoughwhenever
thesubstantivegoalrequiresdifferenttreatment,theprincipleofequaltreatment
shouldbeignored.Againthisstrategyprovidesa routeforresolvingthetension,
thoughit encountersconsiderabledifficultyin explainingwhythe antidiscriminationlawsas
currentlyformulatedseemtoplaceequaltreatmentas a
dominantprinciple.Thisstrategymustalsoprovideanintelligibleandcoherent
accountofthedistributivegoaltobeattributedtothelegislation,anditmusthave
a plausibleexplanationofwhythepursuitofthisgoalnormallyinvolvesthe
proceduraltestofequaltreatment.
Fromthisperfunctoryreviewofthestrategicchoicesavailabletoaccountsofthe
aimsofanti-discriminationlaws,I drawa numberoflessons.First,anyplausible
interpretationoftheaimsoftheselawsmustawardtheequaltreatmentprinciple
an importantrole.Thesecondpointis,however,thatan explanationofwhy
differenttreatmentis sometimesrequiredorpermittedseemstonecessitatethe
inclusionofa distributiveaimforthelegislation.Itis thedistributiveaimthat
explainswhenandwhydeviationsfromequaltreatmentshouldbe requiredor
permitted.Thirdly,an additionalprincipleof equal respector equal worth
probablyshouldalsobeattributedtothelegislation,butnottotheexclusionofthe
equaltreatmentprinciple.Nordoesthisadditionalprincipleremovetheneedfor
attributinga distributiveaimto thelegislation.Fourthly,anydistributiveaim
attributedtothelegislationwillhavea trajectorythatwilleventuallybringitinto
tensionwiththeequaltreatmentprinciple.Althoughthistensioncanbereducedby
diminishingtheambitionsofthedistributivegoal,itneverdisappearsentirely.The
finallessontobedrawnisthatitmaybepossibletodefinea distributivegoalthat
entailstheuseofequaltreatmentas itsoperationalprinciple,butwhichalsosets
limitstoitsoperationbyreferencetothedistributivegoal.Thetwomaindifficulties
confrontingsuchaninterpretationoftheaimsoftheanti-discriminationlegislation
aretodefineanappropriatedistributivegoalandtoexplainwhythisgoalrequires
considerableweighttobeattachedtotheequaltreatmentprinciple.
All theseconsiderationspointtowardsa solutionthatattributesa weak
egalitariandistributivegoaltothelegislation,suchas equalityofopportunity.
Sucha phrasebothimpliesthatequaltreatmentshouldbethenormalpractice,
butalsoadmitsthepossibilitythattorenderopportunitiesequalinpracticeitmay
benecessarytoaffordunequaltreatmentinsomeinstances.Oncloserinspection,
however,sucha solutionprovespainfullyinadequate.We knowthatequal
treatmentwillin practicenotensureequalityof opportunity.Applyingthe
standardofequaltreatmenttopeoplewhohavebeendisadvantagedinacquiring
20 t The ModernLaw ReviewLimited2003
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January2003] Discrimination,EqualityandSocialInclusion
thetypesofskills,education,andexperiencethatcountasmeritforthepurposeof
qualifyingforjobs merelytendsto confirmor reinforcethe effectsof
disadvantage.l7In pursuitofthegoalofequalityofopportunity,therefore,we
needto interveneto glvepreferentialtreatmentto disadvantagedgroups.The
problemistoknowhowfartotakethisintervention,becauseitisarguablethat
wheneverinequalitiesinresultscanbediscerned,theremustbesomeinequalityof
opportunitythatoughtto be remedied.Thisproblemis oftenaddressedby
refiningthegoaltobeoneoffairequalityofopportunity,whichofcoursemerely
restatestheproblemundertherubricoffairness.Thequestionbecomeswhenisit
fairtotreatpeopleinexactlythesameway,andwhenis itfairtotreatthem
differently.
Whatinterestsmeaboutthisformulatiollofthepossibledistributivegoalfor
anti-discriminationlegislationis thatit eschewsany directreferenceto
conceptionsofequality.Somenotionofequalitymayformpartoftheideaof
fairness,butthatisnota necessaryconclusion.Thisstepopensupthepossibility
thatthedistributiveaimofthelegislationcanbeadequatelydescribedwithout
referenceto conceptionsof equality.Butifnotsomenotionof substantive
equality,whatkindofdistributiveaimmightbeattributedtothelegislation?
Atthispointintheargument,wemayturntowardsan examinationofthe
explicitpoliticaljustificationsforthelegislationthatcan be discoveredin
contemporarygovernmentdocuments.As we mightexpect,thesedocuments
includefrequentreferencesto variousconceptionsof equality,particularly
equalityofopportunityandequalworth.Buttherearealsotwootherstrands
inthepoliticaljustificationsfortheleglslation.Onestressestheeconomicbenefits
tobeobtainedbyenablingallmembersofa nation'sworkforcetoparticipatein
theeconomytothefullestextentoftheirpotential.Thisargumentcomprisesa
standardjustificationputforwardby governmentsforregulationof labour
marketsthattheproposedregulationwillimprovethecompetitivenessof
business.l8A secondstrandofjustification,however,shouldinterestus more,
becauseitismoredirectlyaimedatexplainingtheaimofanti-discriminationlaws.
Thiselementoftheofficialdiscoursereferstothenotionofsocialinclusionas a
keyjustificationforanti-discriminationlawsB
Socialinclusion
'Discriminationusuallyamountsto exclusionin someform.'l9No doubtwe
shouldbewaryofattachingtoomuchsignificancetopoliticalrhetoric.Somemay
be merefroth,andmostmay& deliberatelyambiguous.ButI thinkthatthe
notionofsocialinclusionrepresentsa significantshiftinpoliticalthought,because
itfitsneatlyintoa generalstrategicneedof'ThirdWay'politics.20TheThirdWay
17 B. Hepple,'Discr}minationand Equalityof Opportunity- NorthernIrishLessons'(1990) 10
OJLS408-I. M. Young,aboven 3,Chapter7-B. Parekh,'TheCase forPositiveDiscrimination'
inB. HeppleandE. Szyszczak(eds),Discrimination:TheLimitsofLaw(London:Mansell,1992)
272.
I8 tI. Co}Rins,'RegulatingtheEmploymentRelationforCompetitiveness'(2001)30 ILJ 17.
19 DepartmentoiCTradeand Industry,TowardsEqualityandDiversity:ImplementingtheEmploymentandRace
Directives,ConsultationDocumenthttp://www.dti.gov.uk/er(2001)para 1.2.
20 For elucidationof the'ThirdWay',see A. Giddens,The ThirdWay:TheRenewalofSocial
Democracy(Cambndge:PolityPress, 1998),A. Giddens,The ThirdWay and its Critics
(Cambndge:Polity,2); and theessayscollectedin A. Giddens(ed), TheGlobalThirdWay
Debate(Cambridge:PolityPress,2001).
t The MosiernLaw ReviewLiIIiited3 2
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TheModernLaw Review [Vol.66
triestodistanceitselffromegalitarianidealsassociatedwithtraditionalsocialist
movements,whilstpromisingmorepracticalandeffectivemeasurestowardsa
fairersocietythanthoseofferedbytraditionalsocialdemocraticparties.The
categoryof thesociallyexcludedis moreprecisethanthosesufferingfrom
economicpoverty.Thegroupofthesociallyexcludedisdefinedratheras people
whoareeffectivelypreventedfromparticipatinginthebenefitsofcitizenshipor
membershipofsocietyowingtoa combinationofbarriers,ofwhichpovertyis
merelyone.Otherbarriersincludepooreducationalopportunities,membershipof
a disfavouredracialminority,aninaccessiblelocation,responsibilityforfamily
dependants,or,morecommonlya combinationofsuchfactors.2lByaimingto
eradicatesocialexclusion,thecentre-leftpoliticalpartiescansteera pathbetween,
ontheonehand,promisingstrongegalitarianmeasuresinvolvingsubstantialtax
andtransfermeasures,and,ontheother,merelyofferinga protectionofrights
withoutanysubstantivecommitmentstodistributivejusticeora fairersociety.
Althoughthephrasesocialexclusionspinscontinuouslyfromthelipsof
politlciansin Europeandhasbecomea centrepieceofEuropeanCommunity
SocialPolicy,22itisseldomdefined.Whenclarificationisgiven,therearecertainly
convenientambiguitiesandpuzzlingdivergencesin meanings.23Yet thesame
mightbesaidabouttheconceptofequality,andthatdoesnotpreventusfrom
takingtheidealofequalityseriously.Theproblemisratherthattheconceptof
socialinclusionislessfamiliarthanequality,sothatitsmeaningsandimplications
appearevenmurkier.Itis notpartofthefamiliarrepertoireofliberalpolitical
theoryor inscribedroutinelyin constitutionsand declarationsof rights.
Sometimesappealstotheprincipleofsocialinclusionamounttonomorethan
codeddemandsforequalityofresultsora moreegalitariansociety.HereI will
concentrate,however,on thestrandsinthisdiscoursethatdistinguishitfrom
conceptionsofequalityincludingegalitariannotionsofwelfare.
Socialinclusionis an aimorprincipleofjustice.It is oftenmistakenforan
egalitariannotionofdistributivejustice.Thismistakeisunderstandable,because
thedemandsofsocialinclusionmayrequirehelptobegiventothesamegroups
suchas thepoorwhoarefavouredbylawsbaseduponegalitarianjustifications.
Socialinclusionand egalitarianidealssharea concernaboutoutcomesor
distributivepatterns.Yetthereisalsoa fundamentaldifference.Socialinclusion
does not seek the same or broadlyequivalentoutcomesforcitizens.It
concentratesitsattentionnotonrelativedisadvantagebetweengroups,butrather
ontheabsolutedisadvantageofparticulargroupsinsociety.Theobjectiveisnot
somenotionofequalityofwelfare,butoneofsecuringa minimumlevelofwelfare
foreverycitizen.Itstypicaltargetsare'childpoverty','unemployedyouth',or
'racialminoritiesindeprivedneighbourhoods',nota moregeneralequalisationof
welfare.
21 Fora guidetotherangeofpolicyissuesencapsulatedintheideaofsocialinclusion:Social
ExclusionUnit,CabinetO5ce,PreventingSocialExclusion,(March2001)http:l/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uklseul20011pselPSE%20HTMLldefault.htm.Fora
globalperspectiveontheorigins
andsignificanceofthenotionofsocialinclusion:G.Rodgers,C.GoreandJ.B.Figueiredo(eds),
Social Exclusion:Rhetoric,Reality,Responses(Geneva:InternationalInstituteforLabour
Studies,InternationalLabourOfEce,1995).
22 DecisionNo 50/2002/ECoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof7 December2001
establishinga programmeofCammunityactionto encouragecooperationbetweenMember
StatestocombatsocialexclusioneOJL10,12/Q1.20021.
23 R.Levitas,TheInclusiveSociety?SocialExclusionandNewLabour(London:MacmiHan,1998)R.
Lister,'StrategiesforSocialInclusion:promotingSocialCohesionor SocialJustice?'in
P. AskonasandA. Stewart(eds),Social Inclusion:Possibilitiesand Tensions(Basingstoke:
Macmillan,2000)37.
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January2003] Discrimination,EqualityandSocialInclusion
Thisdifferencefromtheidealofequalityofoutcomescanleadanothermistaken
viewthatsocialinclusionmustthereforebeconcernedwithequalityofresources.
Theideaofequalityofresourcesisthatindividualsshouldbeassuredas faras
possibleanequalchanceinsocietytoachievetheirgoalsorthatthereshouldbe
equalityofopportunity.Withoutinvestigatingfurtherthecontroversialquestions
ofwhatmightbemeantby'resources'or'opportunity'inthoseformulations,we
candistinguishtheaimofsocialinclusionontwogrounds.First,socialinclusion
doesnotsetitselfthetaskofensuringan equaldistnbutionofresourcesor
opportunities.Thepointisratherthatbecausesomegroupshavesofewresources
oropportunities,weshouldredressthatpositionwithoutundertakinga broader
redistribution.Many advocatesof the 'ThirdWay' supportequalityof
opportunityinordertodistancethemselvesfromegalitariangoalsandtostress
theirrespectforindividualautonomy.24Giventheiracceptanceofthelimited
capacitiesofgovernmentseffectivelytoredistributeresourcesoropportunitiesina
marketsociety,however,theirambitionsforregulationseemtobeconfinedin
practicetohelpingthosewhoarecompletelyexcluded.Thesecond,fundamental,
differencefromequalityofresourcesconsistsintheconcernforsocialinclusionas
an outcome.Itisnotenoughundertheaimofsocialinclusiontogivea bigger
shareofresourcesoropportunitiestodisadvantagedgroups,andleavethemto
choosewhetherto takeup thepossibilitiestheyprovide.Socialinclusionis
committedtotheachievementofoutcomes,notjustlife-chances.Thesignificance
ofthispointemergesmoreclearlyifweconsiderthenatureoftheoutcometo
whichsocialinclusionaspires.
Theaimofsocialinclusionisa typeofwelfarisminthesensethattheoutcome
soughtistoimprovethewelfareofdisadvantagedgroups.Yetitisnotthesameas
utilitarianismorthemaximisationofwelfare,forsocialinclusiongivespriorityto
thewelfareofthetargetedgroups,evenifredistributionintheirfavourdoesnot
maximiseutility.25Furthermore,weshoulddistinguishthetypeofwelfaresought
bysocialinclusionfromthatusedfrequentlyineconomicsandpolicysciences.
The typeof welfarerequiredundertheaim of socialinclusionis notthe
satisfactionofpreferencesformedexogenously,towhichthestateadoptsa neutral
attitude.Thereis a perfectionistelementintheideaofsocialinclusion,inthat
thereis a conceptionoftheessentialelementsof'well-being'.26Theseessential
elementsof'well-being'includematerialgoodssuchasfoodandshelter,butalso
includeopportunitiestoparticipateinmeaningfulwaysinsociallife.Thesenonmaterialgoodsincludea
fulfillinglevelofeducation,participationinpolitics,27
culturalactivities,andwork.Individualsshouldbe abletopursuetheirchosen
goalsinrelationtothesenon-matenalgoodsinordertoachievea stateof'well-
being'.Thus'well-being'combinessubjectivistandobjectivistnotionsofwelfare.
'Well-being'is objectivistto theextentthatit identifiesparticularkindsof
24 A. Giddens(2000) above n 20, 85-89; R. Mullender,'TheorizingtheThirdWay: Qualified
Consequentialism,theProportionalityPrinciple,and theNew Social Democracy'(2000) 27
Journalof Law and Society493; H. Collins,'Is Therea ThirdWay in Labour Law?' in
J.Conaghan,M. Fischland K. Klare (eds),LabourLaw inAnEra ofGlobalization(Oxford:
OxfordUniversityPress,2002)449.
25 I amdrawinghereonthedistinctionsdrawnbetweenegalitarianism,welfarism,anda principleof
priority(of whichsocial inclusionis an example)by D. Parfitt,'Equalityor Priority?'in
M. ClaytonandA. Williams(eds),TheIdea ofEquality(Basingstoke:Macmillan,2000)81.
26 Thisnotionofwelfareis usedby,amongstothers,J.Gray,'Inclusion:A RadicalCritique'in
P. AskonasandA. Stewart(eds),aboven 22, 19,28;J.Raz, TheMoralityofFreedom(Oxford:
ClarendonPress,1986)Chapter12;and,possibly,A. Giddens(2000)aboven 20,88.
27 I. M. Young,InclusionandDemocracy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2000).
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TheModernLaw Review [Vol.66
activitiessuchaswork,education,politics,andcultureasthemostsignificantsites
fortheachievementof'well-being'.But'well-being'isalsosubjectivistbecausethe
individualis permitteda rangeof choicesaboutgoalsin relationto these
worthwhileactivities.
Althoughnosharplinecanbedrawnthatdeterminestheminimumacceptable
levelforthesematerialand non-materialgoods,socialinclusioninsiststhat
whereverthelineisdrawn,everyoneshouldberaisedtothatlevel.Itistherefore
notsufficientforgovernmentstoprovidematerialresourcesinordertotackle
socialexclusion.Non-materialgoodssuchas workare,ifcomparisonscanbe
made,moreessentialelementsof'well-being',andsocialinclusiondemandsthat
disadvantagedgroupsshouldreceivethosenon-materialgoods.Accesstononmaterialgoodsrequires,first,thatthesocialorganisationof
theseactivities
permitseveryonetoenterthemwithoutinsurmountablebarriers,andsecondly,
thateachpersonenjoystheabilitytochoosebetweena rangeofpossiblegoalsin
relationtotheseactivities.
Thisemphasisuponthedistributionofnon-materialgoodsderivesfromthe
deepestambitionoftheaimofsocialinclusion.Althoughwehaveobservedthat
socialinclusionshareswithequalitya concernwiththedistributiveallocationsto
groupsandindividualsina society,itsmorefundamentalobjectiveistheoutcome
ofsocialcohesion.Socialinclusionisa theoryofhowsocietycanbeintegrated
andharmonious.Atitssimplest,thetheoryisthatifeveryoneparticipatesfullyin
society,theyarelesslikelyto becomealienatedfromthecommunityandwill
conformtoitssocialrulesandlaws.Socialinclusionfosterssocialcohesionor,to
useanolderconcept,solidarity.Theoutcomesoughtbypoliciesofsocialinclusion
isthereforenotmerelyjusticeforindividualsbutalsoa stablesocialorder.
Thesignificanceoftheconnectionbetweensocialcohesionandsocialinclusion
needsto be stressed.In contemporaryliberaltheoriesofjustice,itis usually
presentedas sufficienttoestablishsocialorderthatweshouldestablisha justor
nearlyjustsociety.28Iftheconditionsofjusticearemet,itisarguedthatweowea
moralorpoliticaldutytoupholdthoseinstitutionsandtoobeythelawsthat
expressthem.Inpractice,contemporarygovernmentsdo notappeartoplaceso
muchfaithina senseofmoralduty.Theyrecogniseratherthatsocialorderis
fragileandthattheyneedtotakemeasurestopromotesocialcohesion.Attimes
thisrecognitionresultsinauthoritarianregimes,whichareindeedunacceptable
anddonotdeservemoralsupport.Butgovernmentsinfluencedbythe'ThirdWay'
usemoresubtlemethodstopromotesocialcohesion,which,thoughnotentirely
freefromcoercion,avoidtheexcessesofauthoritarianstates.Theaimofsocial
inclusionis preciselyto establishconditionsandopportunitiesthatinduceall
citizensto participatein societyand to cometo valueitsinstitutionsand
potentials.'Peoplewhoareeconomicallydisengagedoftenbecomemoregenerally
disengaged,reinforcingthedemocraticdeficit'.9
Thisadditionalelementofsocialcohesionexplainsinpartthepresenceofthe
objectivist(orperfectionist)dimensionof'well-being',anditalsoaccountsforthe
paternaliststrandingovernmentpoliciesaboutsocialinclusion.Whereastheaim
ofequalityofopportunityseekstoputpeopleina positioninwhichtheyareable
toparticipateintheeconomyandotheraspectsofsociallife,theaimofsocial
28 J.Rawls,A TheoryofJustice(Oxford-OxfordUniversityPress,1971)Chapter6; R. Dworkin,
Law'sEmpire(London:Fontana,1986)195-216.
29 BarbaraRoche,MinisterforWomen,'Equalityinthe21StCentury',speechtoInstituteofPublic
PolicyResearch15thMay2002,http:/www.ippr.org/press/index.
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January2003] Discrimination,EqualityaS-SocialInclusion
inclusionalso seemsto includean elementthatsometimesrequirespeopleto
becomeincluded.Thereareno rightswithoutresponsibilities.Withrespectto
work,forinstance,socialinclusionpolicies,thoughnotforcingpeopletowork,
strenuouslytrywitha mixtureofcarrotsandstickstodrivepeopleintowork.The
carrotsare 'in-work'benefitsand negativeearnedincometax,30whichare
designedto ensurethatworkprovidesmorematerialbenefitsthanwelfare
benefits;andthesticksaretheremovalofwelfarebenefitsfromthosewhodonot
co-operateinseekingtofindemployment.3lThesepoliciescanbedescribedas
paternalist,becausetheyassert,forinstance,thatworkisgoodfortheindividual
andsociety,and,evenifyoudon'twanttowork,youshould,ifyoupossibly
can.32Moreover,it is insistedthatnearlyeveryonecan work,providedthat
individualsreceiveappropriatetrainingand education,and thatemployers
dismantleunnecessaryexclusionaryrules.Thiscoerciveelementdistinguishesthe
principleof socialinclusionfromeventhebroadestversionsof equalityof
opportunity,whichleaveindividualswiththefreedomandtheresponsibilityto
maketheirownlife-choices,includingindolence.33
Itfollowsthatthereisa differenceinscopebetweenegalitarianwelfaristpolicies
andsocialinclusion.Anegalitarianobjectivesetstheoutcomesthatitwishesto
achieve,buthaslittletosayaboutthemeansthatshouldbeused.Themethod
couldbeoneofregulatingboththeinstitutionsofgovernmentandthemarket.
Alternatively,themethodcouldbe one of progressivetaxationand welfare
benefits,leavinguntouchedtheinstitutionsofcivilsocietyandthemarket.In
contrast,socialinclusionrequiresregulationofsocialinstitutions.Moneyisnotan
acceptablesubstituteforthenon-materialgoodsthatforma coreof'well-being'.
In thecaseofwork,forinstance,havinga job differsfromreceivingthesame
amountofmoneyinwelfarebenefits.Ajobprovidestheopportunitytoacquire
knowledgeand skills?to participatein theworkplacecommunity,to achieve
meaningfulgoals,toacquirestatusoridentityinthecommunity,andtoform
friendships.Thepolicyofsocialinclusionwishestodistributethesenon-material
goodstoallmembersofsociety.Workisnotregardedas a meanstoanendof
materialwealth,butanendinitself,becauseitisa vitalingredientof'well-being'.
Andtheachievementof'well-being'forall groupsis an essentialelementin
constructinga civilandsafecommunity.
I willneedtoaddfurtherelementstothisbriefdescriptionoftheaimofsocial
inclusionasweconsideritsimplicationsasa potentialjustificationfortheaimsof
anti-discriminationlaws.Whathasnotyetbeenmentioned,andwhichneedstobe
recognisedat theoutset,is thatthetheoryofsocialinclusion,likeallpolitical
theories,wasnotdevelopedina vacuum,butratherevolvedinresponsetoan
analysisofcontemporarysocialproblems.Itisa productofthepoliticsofrich
Westerncountriesinthelatetwentiethcentury.Inthosecountries,a majorityof
thepopulationhadenjoyedsince1945an unprecedentedcontinuousperiodof
30 Tax CreditsAct1999.
31 WelfareReformand PensionsAct 1999;Social Security(Welfareto Work)Regulations1998,
1998SI 2231.On the'NewDeal', seeP. Cressey,'NewLabourandEmployment,Trainingand
EmployeeRelations'inM. Powell(ed),NewLabour,NewWelfareState?(Bristol:PolicyPress,
1999)171,177.
32 DepartmentofSocialSecurity,NewAmbitionsforOurCountry:A NewContractforWelfare,Cm
3805(1998).
33 This elementof freedomand responsibilityin liberalnotionsof equalityis highlightedin
R. Dworkin,'Does EqualityMatter?'inA. Giddens(ed),aboven 19,172,177.Fora critiqueof
coercive(orcommunitarian)welfaretoworkprogrammesintheUSA: A. L. Alstott,'Workvs
Freedom:A LiberalChallengeto EmploymentSubsidies'(1999)108Yale L J967.
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TheModernLaw Review [Vol. 66
growingprosperityandhadbeenabletoaffordtheinstitutionalarrangementsof
theWelfareState.Butthesearrangementsseemedtobethreatenedbya minority
whohadnotparticipatedinthatprosperityandwhoseemedunwillingtoaccept
thenormsofcivilsociety.Althoughthematerialneedsofthisminoritywere
usuallymetbytheWelfareState?theydidnotparticipateinsociety,andindeed
appearedalienated.Therewasa concernaboutthebreakdownofsocialorderin
innercities,andparticularlyabouta patternofyoungpeopleneverjoininginthe
institutionsofcivilsociety- voting,working,marryingandformingfamilies.
InsteadoftheWelfareStateprovidinga solution,itwasdiagnosedasa sourceof
theproblem.34Itwasarguedthatwelfaredependencyactuallypromotedtheway
oflifethatrejectedtheinstitutionsofa liberalandcivilsociety.Whereasequality
hadbeenthepoliticalidealrequiredtoincorporatetheworkingclassintocivil
society,theideaofsocialinclusionwasthepoliticalresponseto theneedto
integratethenon-workingclass.
Havingdescribedtheseelementsoftheaimofsocialinclusion,wecannow
considerwhetherthisaiminformsanti-discriminationlaws.Recallthatthereason
whysocialinclusioninterestsusisthatitmayprovideananswertothequestionof
whenisitfairtoinsistuponequaltreatmentandwhenisitfairtodeviatefrom
thatstandard.I approachthistaskbyidentifyingan architectureforanti-
discriminationlawsthatseemstobeimplicitintheaimofsocialinclusion.My
analysishighlightsfourpillars:howthesocialproblemtobeaddressedbyanti-
discriminationlawsisconceivedwithinthepolicyofsocialinclusion;howsocial
inclusionjustifiesdeviationfromtheequaltreatmentprinciple;themethodsof
proofofunlawfuldiscrimination;andtheextentoftherequirementforpositive
discriminationin thepursuitof socialinclusion.Thisanalysisenablesus to
identifytheextenttowhicha socialinclusionjustificationmayexplaintheaims
andthecontentofthecurrentlaw,thoughitalsoprovidesa criticalperspectiveon
possibleinadequaciesinthelegislation.
Structuraldisadvantage
Whatistheproblemthatanti-discriminationlawsaddress?Theequaltreatment
principledefinestheproblemnarrowlyas directdiscrimination,thatistreatinga
persondifferentlyonthegroundofsex,race,orsomeothersuspectclassification.
Butinsofarasanti-discriminationlawsdeviatefromthatstandard,itisclearthat
the socialproblemis regardedas one involvingstructuralor systematic
disadvantageforprotectedgroups.The notionof structuraldisadvantage
combinestwo elements:first,an appreciationthatthereare patternsof
disadvantageorthattherearegroupsthatseemto be disproportionatelyand
persistentlyin worsepositions;andsecond,thattherearecertainpellllanent
arrangements,practices,institutions,and socialstructuresthatproducethis
outcome.The wayin whichwe definethenatureand sourcesof structural
disadvantageprovidesa frameworkfortheambitofanti-discriminationlaws.To
understandthisframework,itis helpfulto disentanglethreeelementsofthe
problemofstructuraldisadvantage:thecompositionofthedisadvantagedgroups,
thenatureoftheirdisadvantage,andthenatureofthestructuresthattendto
producethatdisadvantage.
34 For a livelyanalysisoftheproblem:W. Hutton,TheState We'reIn (London:Vintage,1996)
Chapter7.
26
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January2003J Discrimination,EqualityandSocialInclusion
Disadvantagedgroups
Equalityjustificationsforanti-discriminationlawslacka determinateviewofhow
to constitutethegroupsforcomparison.Theprinciplethatdifferentgroups
shouldbetreatedequally(inotherwisesimilarcircumstances)doesnotdescribe
howthesegroupsshouldbecomposed.Anygroupcanclaimthatitisnotbeing
treatedequallyanddemandthatitshouldreceiveprotectionfromthelaw.The
groupsmightbe comprisedby referenceto geneticendowments,socially
constructedcategories,legalclassificationssuchas nationality,or someother
criterionofclassification.Whatis crucialis thatthegroupis ableto claim
plausiblythatmembershipofthegroupputsindividualsata disadvantage.One
effectof theindeterminacyof protectedgroupsundertheequal treatment
principleis thatthe provinceof anti-discriminationlaws alwaysremains
contested.35
In contrast,socialinclusionprovidesa moredeterniinatecriterionforthe
compositionofprotectedgroups.Thequestioniswhetherthegroupisonethatin
practicehasbeendisproportionatelysociallyexcludedcomparedtothepopulation
asa whole.Underthiscriterion,forinstance,singleparentsbecomea grouptobe
protected,becausethelackofaffordableandadequatechild-carearrangements
tendstoexcludethemfrommaterialandnon-materialbenefits.Theprincipleof
equalityneitherrulesoutsingleparentsas a grouptobeprotected,nordoesit
requirethemtobeconstitutedasa groupforthepurposesofdiscriminationlaw.
Onthecriterionofsocialinclusion,however,sexisnotsoclearlya criterionfor
thecompositionofa protectedgroup.Withinthecategoryofwomen,thereare
certainlygroupsofwomenthatsufferfromsocialexclusion,suchasthosewhoare
pregnantorparentsofyoungchildren.Itmaybeargued,furthermore,thatmost
womensufferfromsomecomparativedisadvantageduringtheirlives,becausethe
potentialforpregnancyhasanadverseeffectonallwomeninthelabourmarket,
sothatallwomenshouldberegardedasa protectedclassunderthetestofsocial
exclusion.Butthesocialinclusioncriterionfordisadvantagedgroupsseems
unlikelytoincludemenas a class,so thatsexonitsownas a sourceofgroup
composition,asopposedtodiscriminationagainstwomen,wouldnotqualifyasa
relevantcriterionforthecompositionofa protectedgroup.Similarly,ifwe
consideragediscriminationinemployment,justificationsforlegalintervention
basedonequalitycertainlypermittheinclusionofthiscategory,butalsolackany
justificationforconfiningittoparticularagegroups.Incontrast,a justification
basedonsocialexclusionwouldnoticethedisproportionatelevelsofunemploymentof
olderpeople,and,havingdeterminedwhenage becomesa serious
disadvantageinthelabourmarket,thatis abouttheageof55,wouldregulate
againstdiscriminationin hiringpracticesthatexcludedirectlyor indirectly
workersaged55orabove.A similarfindingofdisadvantagemightalsoleadto
protectionofworkersundertheageof22.Noticeas wellthatsocialinclusionis
notinterestedinwhetherthegroupisclassifiedbyunalterablegenetics,socially
constructedqualities,or legallyimposedcharacteristics,factorswhichare
sometimesusedto determinethescopeofdiscriminationlawsunderequality
35 S. Fredman,aboven 10,76-82.Fredmanarguesthatequalitymustbeunderpinnedbytheideaof
dignitytoprovidedeterminacy,followingconstitutionaldevelopmentsinthisdirectioninSouth
Africaand Canada (at 119-121).Gardnerproposesalternativelya theoryofautonomyas the
basisfortheidentificationofgroups:J.Gardner,'On theGroundofHerSex(uality)'(1998) 18
OJLS 168,a reviewof,and supportingin thisrespect,R. Wintemute,SexualOrientationand
HumanRights(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1995).
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[Vol. 66TheModernLaw Review
justifications.Norisitinterestedinwhetherthegroupisregardedwithdisrespect.
Thecompositionofgroupsisdeterminedbyreferencetotheobjectiveofsocial
inclusion,whichcandrawuponanysystemofclassification.Examplesofthis
varietymightincludesingleparents(regardlessofsex)orresidentsinparticular
postcodesthatincludehighlevelsofminorityethnicexclusion.
Consideringcontemporaryanti-discriminationlegislation,thereis certainlya
patternofthedefinitionofprotectedgroupsthatreflectsanequalityjustification.
Protectionisusuallyaffordedtobotha groupanditssymmetricalopposite,thus
upholdinga principleofequaltreatment.Thereare,however,someexceptionsto
thispattern,as inthecaseofdisability,36marriedpersons,37personsundergoing
genderreassignment.38Theseexceptionsarecompatiblewitha socialexclusion
approachtothedefinitionofprotectedgroups.
Natureofdisadvantage
Anequalityjustificationis alsoindeterminatewithrespectto thecharacterof
problematicdisadvantage.Iftheaimofthelawis conceivedmorepreciselyas
equalityofopportunity,orofresources,orofwelfare,thatadditionalelement
providesa moredeterminatedescriptionof the natureof the required
disadvantage,thoughthepossiblerangeof disadvantagesto be considered
remainsbroad.Disadvantagesresultingfromdiscriminationmayoccurinany
walkoflife.Forthepurposesofeliminatingdisadvantagesthatinfringesome
standardof equality,thereis no reasonto limitthepotentialscopeof the
disadvantagestobeaddressed,eveninthedarkcornersoftheprivatesphere.39
Yetwhendiscriminationlawsareenacted,theyaddressparticulartargetssuch
as employment,education,theprovisionofpublicservices,andmanyother
aspectsofbusinessandsocialassociations.Firstamongthesetargetsisinvariably
accesstoemployment,or,moreprecisely,theabilitytoearna livingthroughthe
provisionofservicestoothers.Whataccountsforthisfocusonwork?Theanswer
cannotbethatdiscriminatorypracticesaremoreprevalentinemploymentthan
othersocialcontexts.Thishypothesisseemsimprobable.Considerationsof
efficiencypropelemployerstohirethemostproductiveworkersregardlessofsex
orrace.Directorintentionaldiscriminationinhiringpracticesisnotusuallyan
objectiveof employers,becauseit is likelyto be inefficient.Discrimination
becomesefficientforemployersonlytotheextentthat,byusingcriteriaofgroup
membershipasa proxyfora testforproductivityofajobapplicant,theemployer
savesontransactioncosts(thecostsofinvestigatingtherelativeproductivityof
jobapglicants)tosuchanextentthatthesavingsexceedthecostsofmistakenjob
offers.° Discriminationseemsmuchmorelikelytoflourishwhentheeconomic
consequencesareinsignificant,thatisindailysocialinteractions.
36 DisabilityDiscriminationAct1995.
37 SexDiscriminationAct1975s 3; butEC Directive2002/73,newArt2(1) impliesa symmetrical
approachfor'martialorfamilystatus.'
38 SexDiscriminationAct 1975s 2A (as amendedbySex Discrimination(GenderReassignment)
Regulations1999,SI 1999/1102.
39 Thereare otherreasonsforconfiningthescopeof discriminationlawsin theprivatesphere:
J.Gardner,'PrivateActivitiesand PersonalAutonomy:AttheMarginsofAnti-discrimination
Law',inB. HeppleandE. Szyszczak(eds),aboven 17,148.
40 G. S. Becker,TheEconomicsofDiscrimination(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1957);
K. J.Arrow,'ModelsofJobDiscrimination'inA. Pascal(ed),RacialDiscriminationinEconomic
Life(LexingtonMA, LexingtonBooks,D C FIeath,1972).
28
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January2003] Discrimination,EqualityandSocialInclusion
Theemphasisuponemploymentindiscriminationlawsisallthemorestriking
whenweappreciatethathiringdecisionsbyprivateemployerscompriseoneofthe
hardesttargetsforwhichtojustifylegalregulation.Ajustificationforregulationis
easierwithinsubsistingcontractualrelations,fortheimpliedobligationsofthe
contractarelikelyto ruleoutmostformsofdiscrimination.In employment
contracts,discriminatorydecisionsprobablyamounttoa breachoftheimplied
obligationontheemployernottoactina waythatdestroysmutualtrustand
confidence(intheUK),ora violationofsomeothergeneralprivatelawprinciple
suchas performancein goodfaithin theUSA, France,and Germany.In
connectionwithhiringpractices,however,a privateemployercanrelyupona
rightto freedomof associationor freedomof contractto resistanylegal
regulation.4lIn othercontexts,such as the distributionof educational
opportunitiesbyagenciesofthestate,thisobstacleto regulationis absent.It
maybepossibletoarguethattherighttofreedomofassociationdoesnotinclude
therightto discriminateinhiringdecisions,42butemployerswillnevertheless
assertthattheirfreedomis beingunjustifiablyinvadedin costlyways.To
overcomethatobjection,itisnecessarytohavea powerfulargumentforjustifying
regulationofhiringpractices,suchasrespectfortherighttoequaltreatmentora
compellingdistributiveobjective.43
Thereasonwhyaccesstoemploymentistheprimarytargetofdiscrimination
lawssurelyliesinthesignificanceweattachtothedistributionofjobsinsociety.
Thesignificanceofemploymentisexplainedinpartbyitswelfareeffects.Since
mostofus dependuponemploymentas ourprinciplesourceofwealth,the
distributionofjobsbyemployersis a keydistributivemechanisminsociety.If
hiringpracticesin thelabourmarketleadto unequaldistributiveoutcomes,
causingforexampledisproportionatelevelsofpovertyamongsomeminority
groups,egalitarianargumentsmightleadus toconcludethatregulatinghiring
practicesshouldbetheprincipalgoalofdiscriminationlaws.Yetthisdistributive
argumentlacksanexplanationofwhytheegalitariangoalshouldnotbeachieved
throughtaxationandwelfarepaymentsratherthanthroughtheregulationof
hiringdecisions.Whatis requiredin additionis an explanationwhythe
distributionofthejobsthemselvesmatters,notjusttheeconomicbenefitsflowing
fromthem.
Earlieritwasarguedthatthenotionofsocialinclusionattachesconsiderable
significancetopossessionofa job.Theproblemofsocialexclusionisthatsome
groupsinsocietyaredeniedtheopportunitytoparticipateinthemechanisms
offeredbysocietythroughwhichtheymayestablishmeaningfortheirlives,the
connectionsofa community,anda senseofself-respect.Workprovidesformost
peopleoneoftheprincipalmechanismsforconstructingmeaning,community,
andstatus.Redistributivewelfareprogrammes,thoughimportantforthereliefof
economichardship,cannottackleexceptat themarginstheproblemofsocial
exclusion.Socialinclusionthusprovidesan argumentfortargetingaccessto
employmentastheprimaryconcernofdiscriminationlaws.Itexplainswhyaccess
tojobsshouldbetheprincipaltargetofdiscriminationlaws.'Thebestdefence
41 R. A. Epstein,ForbiddenGrounds:The Case AgainstEmploymentDiscriminationLaws
(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress,1992).
42 Forexample,itmightbearguedthatinordertoprotectothervaluesorrights,limitsareplacedon
thediscret10ntoselectcontractualpartners.
43 Gardnerexploresthisproblemand also arguesforquasi-publicnatureof employer'shiring
decisionsas an instrumentof distributionin orderto diminishtheforceof theclaimof the
employer'srightto freedomofcontract:J.Gardner,aboven 8, 5-8.
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TheModernLaw Review [Vol. 66
againstsocialexclusionishavingajob,andthebestwa; togeta jobistohavea
goodeducation,withtherighttrainingandexperience.'Thisargumentsuggests
thatintheselectionofthenatureofthedisadvantagesthatshouldbeaddressedby
discriminationlaws,thenotionof socialinclusionhas playeda roleas an
underlyingjustificationfor legal regulationin determiningthe typesof
disadvantagethatneedtobeaddressed.
Structures
Bothformaland informalinstitutionalarrangementsof oursocietytendto
maintainexistingdistributivepatterns,even once directdiscriminationis
eliminated.Forinstance,thenormalroleofchildcareperformedbywomen
putsthemata competitivedisadvantageinseekingbetterjobs,whicharetypically
designedwithhiringrulesthatfavourworkexperienceandsetrequirementsof
longhoursofwork.Thiscombinationofformalinstitutionalrules(thetermsof
employment)andinformalsocialnorms(womentakingprimaryresponsibilityfor
childcare)resultsina predictablepatternofexclusionofwomenfromthebetter
jobs,asevidencedinthecontinuingdisparitybetweenaverageratesofpayformen
andwomen.Inordertoaddressthistypeofdistributivepattern,discrimination
lawswerebroadenedto encompasstheformalinstitutionalrules,which,in
combinationwithinformalsocialnorms,havea discriminatoryeffect.Through
thetestsofindirectdiscriminationordisparateimpact,thelawquestionsthe
validityoftheinstitutionalrules,thoughitleavesuntouchedandunquestionedthe
informalsocialnorms.
Underthetestsofindirectdiscriminationordisparateimpactthatthelawuses
totacklestructuraldisadvantage,thosewhowanttobenefitfromdiscrimination
lawshavetorelyuponstereotypesorsocialnormsthattheymaywishtoescapeor
reject.45Forexample,a requirementoffull-timeworkmaybemoredifficultfor
womento satisfyif theyfulfilchild-careresponsibilities.In orderto take
advantageofa remedyforindirectdiscrimination,a womanhastodemonstrate
thattheinstitutionalrulehastheeffectofdisproportionatelyexcludingwomen
fromwork,becausetheycomplywiththesocialnormoffulfillingchild-care
responsibilities.Thisreasoningis vulnerabletoattackfromthosewhowishto
rejectthesocialstereotypeandargueinsteadthatwomenarenotnecessarilythe
partnerwhoshouldtakechild-careresponsibilityorthatalternativemethodsof
child-careareavailable.ThusinClymov WandsworthBoroughCouncil,46 a rule
againstjobsharingthepostoflibrarianwasheldnottobediscriminatoryagainst
women,becausetheclaimanthadhadthechoicetopayforfull-timechild-care.As
soonas thecourtor tribunaldeniesor rejectsthesocialstereotype- in this
instancewomentypicallystayathometotakecareofyoungchildren- thelegal
challengeto institutionaldiscriminationbeginsto fallapart.Thisparadoxical
relianceofthelawonindirectdiscriminationonthepersistenceofpatternsof
44 Tony Blair,'Forewordby thePrimeMinister',Social ExclusionUnit,Officeof thePrime
Minister,BridgingtheGap.NewOpportunitiesfor16-18YearOldsNotinEducationJEmployment
orTraining,July1999,Cm4405,6.Thedoctrinethat'thebestsafeguardagainstsocialexclusionis
a job' isalsoat thecoreofEuropeanCommunityPolicy:DecisionNo 50/2002/EC,aboven21,
Recitalspara8. Itshouldalsobenotedthataccesstoeducationandtrainingisalwaysthesecond
importanttargetofdiscriminationlegislation.
45 N. Lacey,UnspeakableSubjects.FeministEssaysinLegalandSocialTheory(Oxford:Hart,1998)
46 [1989]IRLR 241EAT.
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January2003] DiscriminationsEqualityandSocialInclusion
structuraldisadvantagethatit maybe attemptingto redressseemsto be
determinedbytheunderlyingequalityjustificationforthelaw.Theidealof
equalityrespectsthechoicesofindividualsabouthowtheyshouldleadtheirlives,
butsaysthelawshouldinsistuponequalrespectforthosechoices.47Respectfor
thosechoicesmeansthatthelawshouldnotquestionsocialnormsinsofarasthey
areconventionsandpatternsproducedbythechoiceofindividuals.48Underthis
equalityjustification,theprohibitionagainstinstitutionaldiscriminationshould
concernonlythoserulesthat,thoughformallyneutral,haveintheirapplicationa
disparateadverseimpactoncertaingroupsasa resultofattributesofthosegroups
whichtheyhavenotchosen.
In contrast,owingtothepaternalistandperfectionistelementinthegoalof
socialinclusion,choicesmadeby excludedgroupsthathavetheeffectof
reinforcingtheirexclusionarenotchoicesthatthegoalnecessarilyrespects.The
socialnormsandconventionsarethemselvesa targetfordiscriminationlaws,if
theyhavetheeffectthatthegroupswhomakesuchchoicesaretherebyexcluding
themselvesfromemployment.Socialinclusionthusquestionsboththeinstitutionalruleandthesocialconvention.In
respectofthesocialconventionthat
womentendtotakecareofchildren,socialinclusionchallengesthisconventionto
theextentthatit resultsin womenbecomingsociallyexcluded.Becausethe
compositionof groupsis determinedbyreferenceto thecriterionof social
exclusion,theargumentbecomesthatparentswithyoungchildrenwhodo not
workandarenotsupportedfinanciallybya partnerin workshouldnotbe
permittedtofollowthesocialnormoftakingresponsibilityforchildcaretothe
extentofexcludingthemselvesfromthelabourmarket.49Giventhedifficultyof
findingaffordablechild-care,parentsmayneedpart-timejobsinordertoachieve
'well-being',a needreflectedinthenewrighttoaskforchangesinworkingtime.50
Theproblemwitha hiringrulethatprecludesjobsharingfromthisperspectiveis
notthatitdiscriminatesindirectlybetweenmenandwomen,butthatitobstructs
peoplesuchasparentsofyoungchildrenwhoneedjobopportunitiesforpart-time
workfromenteringthelabourmarket.Forthepurposesofindirectdiscrimination
law,theimplicationofa socialinclusionjustificationisthatwhetherornotthe
individualcouldhavechosentocomplywiththeformalrulebydepartingfrom
socialconventionisirrelevant,becausetheaimisnotequalorfairopportunity,
buttheeliminationofrulesthathaveanexclusionaryeffect.Itshouldbesufficient
to establisha claimforindirectdiscriminationto provethatan institutional
practicehasthateffect.Itispossibletodetectsucha changeinthenewtestfor
indirectsexdiscriminationinemployment.TheamendedSexDiscriminationAct
1975sectionl(2)(b)dropstheformerelementthataskedwhethera dispropor-
tionatenumberofwomencannotcomplywiththehiringrule,andasksmerely
whethertherulehasa detrimentaleffectfora considerablylargerproportionof
women,thusavoidingtheissueofchoiceandsocialconvention.5l
Drawingtogethertheseobservationsaboutstructuraldisadvantage,social
inclusionexplainswhyaccesstoemploymentisa primarytargetforthelaw,offers
47 R.Dworkin,aboven33.
48 S. Fredman,WomenandtheLaw (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1997)288-290.
49 InthisveintheEmploymentAct2002s49(addings 2AAtotheSocialSecurityAdministration
Act1992)prescribeswork-focussedinterviewsfornon-workingpartnersofclaimantsforsocial
securitybenefitswitha viewtoa reductionoftheclaimant'sbenefitsfordependants.
50 EmploymentAct2002s47.
51 SexDiscrimination(IndirectDiscriminationandBurdenofProof)Regulations2001,SI 2001No
2260,implementingthe'BurdenofProof'Directive97/80/EC.
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TheModernLaw Review [Vol.66
a differentand moredeterminateapproachto definingthecompositionof
disadvantagedgroups,andoffersanalternativetothecurrentlaw'srelianceupon
socialnormsinestablishingclaimsforindirectdiscrimination.Clearlytheaimof
socialinclusiondoesnotprovidea satisfactoryexplanationofallaspectsofthe
lawaddressingstructuraldisadvantage,butitdoeshelptoaccountforcertain
featuresthatarepuzzlingfromtheperspectiveofequalityjustifications.
Provingdiscrimination
Anequalityprincipleinanti-discriminationlawsinvariablyrequiresa compara-
tiveapproachtoproof.Inrelationtosexdiscrimination,forinstance,thelawof
directdiscriminationlaunchesanenquiryas towhetherthewomanwastreated
lessfavourablythana man.Thecomparativeapproachinitiatesa searchfora
manora memberofthemajoritygroupinsimilarcircumstances,a searchthat
oftenprovesfruitlessunlessone createsa hypotheticalman. This legal
constructionis oftendifficultto build,becausea memberofthemajorityor
privilegedgroupis unlikelyto haveexperiencedstructuraldisadvantagesin a
similarway,sothatitishardtoenvisagehowmembersofthisgroupcouldfind
themselvesinsufficientlysimilarcircumstancesfora faircomparisontobemade.
Thelawofindirectdiscriminationoffersa routearoundthisproblem,thoughit
retainsthecomparativeapproachtoproof.Itpermitswomenandminoritiesto
challengean employer'shiringruleson thegroundthattheruleshavea
disproportionateadverseimpactonthem.
Incontrast,thegoalofsocialinclusiondoesnotdependupona comparisonwith
a manorsomeotherprivilegedgroup.Thepolicyofsocialinclusionasksforproof
thattheruleorpracticetendstoreinforcetheexclusionofanindividualmemberof
an excludedgroupormostmembersoftheexcludedgroup.A comparisoncan
supplyevidenceofexclusionaryeffect,butitisnotessentialtoproof.Forexample,
iftheemployer'sruleforbidspart-timework,thisrulereinforcestheexclusionof
anygroupssuchas singleparentsthatmayrequirepart-timejobs.Evenifitis
demonstratedthatothergroupsaresimilarlyorequallyadverselyaffectedbythe
rule,thefactthatthisparticularexcludedgroupis disadvantagedby the
requirementissufficienttoprovidea basisfora challengetotherule.
Itisevidentthattheformulationsincurrentlegislationreflecta comparative
approachto proofofdiscriminationthatlinksthemto a notionofequality.
Althoughthecomparativeapproachis notalwaysrequired,as inthecaseof
discriminationongroundsofpregnancy,S2itisthedominanttest.Itisalsoworth
notingthat,althougha notionofequalityholdsswayinrelationtoproofof
discrimination,thepreciseconceptionofequalitythatshouldbeappliedisoften
subjecttodispute.Thisdisputeemergesinconnectionwithstatisticalcomparisons
usedtoestablishdisparateimpactorindirectdiscrimination.No doubtmuchof
thedifficultyherecan be attributedto a combinationofthelackofprecise
statisticalinformationcombinedwiththecomplexityofthetest.Thistestrequires
a comparisonbetweentheratiosoftheprivilegedgrouptotheprotectedgroupin
twostatisticalpools.53 Theequaltreatmentprincipletendstoconfinethepoolsfor
52 Webbv EMO AirCargo(UK) LtdC-32/93[1994] ICR 770, ECJ.
53 The clearestjudicialstatementofthecorrectcomparativemethodwas givenbyMustillLJin
Jonesv ChiefAdjudicationOfficer[1990]IRLR 533 CA 537. Foranendorsementoftheviewthat
comparativeproportionsarethecorrectstatisticalcomparison(thoughnotrigorouslyfollowedin
thiscase): R v SecretaryofStateforEmploymentexp Seymour-Smith& PerezCase C-167/97
[1999] ECR 1-623ECJ para59)andC. BarnardandB. Hepple,aboven 8, 571.
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January2003] Discrimination,EqualityandSocialInclusion
statisticalcomparison,whereasa substantiveequalityofresultsprinciplepointsto
therelevanceofa broadlycomposedpoolofcomparison,usuallyconsistingofthe
labourmarketas a whole.Inthecaseofa hiringconditionsuchas a particular
educationalqualification,forinstance,thefocusoftheequaltreatmentprincipleis
onwhethertheconditiondisproportionatelyadverselyaffecteda protectedgroup
withinthesetofjob applicants.Therelevantstatisticalcomparisonunderthis
approachistheproportionsbetweenprivilegedgroupanddisadvantagedgroupin
thepoolofjob applicantscomparedto theproportionsin thepoolofthose
employed.Fromtheperspectiveofequalityofresults,however,therelevant
statisticalpoolshouldbedefinedatleastas thoseavailableinthelabourmarket
whocouldsatisfyall therequirementsforthejob apartfromthedisputed
educationalqualification.Itistheproportionsbetweenprivilegedanddisadvantagedgroupswhocanandwhocannotsatisfytheconditionthatservesas
the
comparisonforestablishingindirectdiscrimination.In respectofthisdifference
betweentherelevantstatisticalpools,itispossibletodetecta contrastbetweenthe
courtsintheUSA,whichfavourthelogicofequaltreatmentprincipleinthe
selectionofstatisticalpoolsofcomparison,54whereasUK courtshavemore
commonlyadoptedtheloglcofequalityofresults.55Thisdifferenceisobscured,
however,bythecommonproblemoftheunavailabilityoftherelevantstatistics
suchas theracialcompositionofjob applicants.
As a distributiveprincipleconcernedwithresults,theaimofsocialinclusion
supportsthelogicofselectingthebroaderpoolofstatisticalcomparison.Theaim
ofsocialinclusionis toeliminateexclusionaryrulesandpracticesregardlessof
whethertheyhaveinfactexcludedjob applicantsinthepast.Yetthestatistical
poolfavouredbysocialinclusiondiffersslightlyfromthebroadestpoolfavoured
bythegoalofequalityofresults.Thesocialinclusionprincipledoesnotfocuson
thestatisticsforthelabourmarketas a whole,unlessthejobconcernedrequires
minimalskills,becauseitsconcerniswiththosewhopossesstheskillstobenefit
fromthejob orthosewhocouldacquirethemwithtraining.
Aswellas supportingtheuseofbroaderstatisticalpoolsforcomparison,the
aimofsocialinclusionmaythrowlightontwootherproblemsthatemergein
thecomparativeapproachto proof.Onedifficultyconcernstheinterpretation
ofstatisticaldifferences.Thetestfordiscriminationin EC lawis notoneof
statisticalsignificanceina technicalsense,butratheronethatadoptsa formula
thattheremustbe disadvantageto a 'substantiallyhigherproportion'ofthe
protectedgroup.56Thepuzzleposedbythattestis whyitdetractsfromthe
commitmentto equality,whichshouldrequiremerelya testof statistical
significance.Theremaybe pragmaticconsiderationsatworkhere,suchas the
unreliabilityof thestatisticsthemselves.But an additionalexplanationfor
thisslightdeviationfromtheequalitystandardmaybe thatthelegislation
implicitlyacknowledgesthatitsdistributiveaimhastobemorefocussedonrules
thathavea considerableexclusionaryeffect,andhastorefrainfromassessments
ofthemeritsofeveryrulethatproducesresultsthatdeviateslightlyfroma normal
distribution.
54 HazlewoodSchoolDistrictv UnitedStates433US 299(1977).
55 UniversityofManchestervJones[1993]ICR 474CA; AllonbyvAccringtonandRossendaleCollege
[2001]ICR 1189CA.
56 Art2 Directive97/80OJL14 20.1.19986. It is unclearwhetherthistestsurvivesafterthenew
definitionsofindirectdiscriminationin EC Directives2000/78and 2002/73,whichuse a new
formulaof'particulardisadvantage'.
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TheModernLaw Review [Vol.66
A secondproblemthatclaimsofindirectdiscriminationsometimeshaveto
confrontis theexclusionaryeffectofa combinationofrules.Forexample,an
employermayusetwohiringconditionssuchasa formaleducationalqualification
and a skillacquiredthroughworkexperience.The approachto statistical
comparisonundertheequalityprinciplerequiresa comparisonbetweenthegroup
inthelabourmarketthatcancomplywithalltherequirementsforthejobandthe
groupthatcancomplywiththoserequirementsexceptfortheomissionofa
disputedcriterionsuchastheformaleducationalqualification.Theproblemmay
arisethat,althoughanyone hiringconditionmaynotcreatea substantial
differenceinthecompositionofthecomparativepools,a combinationoftwoor
moremayhavea significantexclusionaryeffect.Thereisa dangerthatunderthe
approachbasedonequality,anemployermaybeabletorejecttheinferenceof
indirectdiscriminationbyinsistingthateachhiringrequirementshouldbeviewed
inisolation.Theaimofsocialinclusionexplainswhythismethodofanalysisis
unsatisfactory.Socialexclusionisoftentheproductofa combinationoffactors,
suchas beinga memberofa minoritygroupina particularneighbourhood.A
disadvantagedgroupisthereforeoftenidentifiedintheoriesofsocialexclusionby
morethanonecriterion.Theaimofsocialinclusionthusperhapsexplainsour
intuitionthatthemethodofanalysisthatexamineseachhiringconditionin
isolationisunsatisfactory,becauseitdoesnotappreczatethemulti-facetedsources
ofdisadvantageinmanyinstances.57
Directdiscriminationanda justificationdefence
Inpursuitofthegoalofsocialinclusion,theeliminationofa strictcomparative
approachtoproofofdiscriminationnecessitatestheintroductionofajustification
defenceforbothdirectand indirectdiscrimination.Undermostcurrent
discriminationlegislation,a generaljustificationdefenceis restrictedtoindirect
discrimination,thoughnarrowerdefencessuchas a genuineoccupational
qualificationareavailableinsomeinstancesofdirectdiscrimination.Thelimited
availabilityof a justificationdefenceto directdiscriminationseemsto be
mandatedbytheequaltreatmentprinciple.Byrequiringconsistenttreatment,
theequaltreatmentprinciplecreatesa strongpresumptionagainstthepossibility
ofjustifyingintentionaldiscrimination.Anyexceptionsmustbe explainedby
referenceto someotherimportantright,suchas respectforprivacy,or an
extremelytightrequirementofnecessityforjob performance.Incontrast,under
theprincipleof socialinclusion,justificationsforhiringrulesthatdirectly
discriminatecantoleratea broaderrangeofconsiderations,providedthatthe
justificationsarecompatiblewiththeaimofsocialinclusion.It is helpfulto
examineoneexampleofa justificationdefencetodirectdiscriminationingreater
depth,foritrevealshowa discriminationlawbaseduponsocialinclusionrather
thanequalityapproachesthetaskofdefiningdiscrimination.
The exampleis the DisabilityDiscriminationAct 1995. Unlikemost
discriminationlaws,thetestforlegalresponsibilityinthisActisnotessentially
a comparativecriterionthatcontraststheresultofhiringdecisionsor rules
betweendisabledpersonsandthoseinotherwisesimilarcircumstanceswithouta
57 D. Ashiagbor,'TheIntersectionofGenderand Race intheLabourMarket:LessonsforAntiDiscriminationLaw'
inA. MorrisandT. O'Donnel(eds),FeministPerspectivesonEmployment
Law (London:Cavendish,1999)139.
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January2003] Discrimination,EqualityandSocialInclusion
disability.Forexample,ifanemployeroperatesa hiringrulethatrecruitsmust
receivea satisfactorymedic'alreport,and a disabledpersonreceivesan
unfavourablereportas resultofthedisability,thewayinwhichthelawanalyses
thecaseistosaythatdisabilitydiscriminationhasoccurredunlesstheemployer
candemonstratethatthehiringruleisjustified.58Itisirrelevantthatthehiring
ruleappliesequallytopersonswithouta disability,59anditisnotnecessaryto
provedisparateimpact.Onceitis shownthattherulehasexcludeda disabled
person,thequestionisnotwhethertherewasunequaltreatment,butwhetherthe
ruleisjustifiedinthesensethatthereasonfortheruleis bothmaterialtothe
circumstancesoftheparticularcaseandsubstantial.60
Thisjustificationdefenceisfurtherrefinedinsection5(2)oftheAct,whichholds
theemployerlegallyresponsiblefordisabilitydiscrimination,iftheemployer
cannotjustifya failuretomakereasonableadjustmentstoarrangementsthatplace
a disabledpersonat a substantialdisadvantage.Equaltreatmentis notgood
enough.Whatthelegislationrequiresis a dutXto treatdisabledpersons
differently,tomake'reasonableaccommodations',nottotreatthemequally.
AlthouttheformaljustificationdefenceundertheDDA appearstoimposea low
threshold,2 therealsubstanceofthejustificationissueis tobediscoveredinthe
questionwhethertheemployerhasfailedtomakereasonableadjustmentforthe
person'sdisability.Whatamountsto a reasonableadjustmentis guidedby
thestatuteandanelaborateCodeofPractice.63Ifanemployerhascompliedwith
theCodeandconsideredallthepossibleadjustmentsthatmightbemadeforthe
disabledpersonandonlyrejectedthoseoneswhichitis reasonabletorejecton
groundsofexcessivecost,impossibility,andperhapssafety,64thefinalquestionof
whetherintheparticularcircumstancesofthecasethehiringdecisionwasjustified
seemslikelytoimposeonlya lowadditionalhurdleforemployers.Theimportant
questioniswhetherallreasonableadjustmentswereconsidered,andherethetribunals
encountertheacutedifEcultyofbalancingthecoststotheemployerofassessingand
makingadjustmentsagainsttheexclusionaryeffectsofthehiringrules.
Underthepolicyofsocialinclusionitbecomespossible,therefore,torecognisea
broadjustificationdefenceto directdiscrimination.Thecoreelementofthis
justificationdefencerequiresa demonstrationthattheobjectiveoftheruleserves
thegoalofsocialinclusion.Thepotentialwidthofjustificationscanbeillustrated
bythefactsandlegalreasoninginJamesv EastleighBoroughCouncil.65The
Counciloperateda rulethatpersonsofstatepensionableagewouldbeadmitted
forfreetotheCouncil'sswimmingpool.Atthattimethestatepensionableage
was60 forwomenand65 formen.Theapplicationofthisruleentailedthat
MrJames,aged61,paidthefullchargewhereashiswifeofthesameageentered
thepoolat theconcessionaryrate.Ifthisruleis assessedexclusivelyfromthe
perspectiveofa comparativeequalityprinciple,itseemsto be an inescapable
58 LondonBoroughofHammersmith& Fulhamv Farnsworth[2000]IRLR 691EAT.
59 Clarkv TDG Ltd (t/aNovacold)[1999]IRLR 318CA.
60 DisabilityDiscrlminationAct1995s 5(3);seeArdenLJinPostOfficevJones[2001]ICR 805817
61 Thistermis usedin Article5 of EC Directive2000/78,above n 9, and The Americanswith
DisabilitiesAct1990s 102(b)(5)(A)42 USC s 12,112(b)(5)(A).
62 See Heinzv Kendrick[2000]IRLR 141EAT.
63 DisabilityDiscriminationAct1995s 6; Code ofPracticefortheEliminationofDiscriminationin
theFieldofEmploymentagainstDisabledPersonsorPersonswhohavehada Disability(1996).
64 For a critiqueofsuchsafetyjustifications:J.DaviesandW. Davies,'ReconcilingRiskandthe
EmploymentofDisabledPersonsina ReformedWelfareState'(2000)29 ILJ347.
65 [1990]2 AC 751HL.
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TheModernLaw Review [Vol.66
conclusionthatthereis a differenceintreatmentbetweenthesexes.'Butfor'
MrJames'sex,hewouldhavebeenentitledtothereducedcharge.Fromthepers-
pectiveofsocialinclusion,however,theanalysisbecomesmorecomplex.Wecan
understandtheCouncil'spolicyas one aimedat a group,personsof state
pensionableage,whichfindsitdifficulttoaffordtotakeadvantageofthefacilities
offeredbythecommunity.Ifthereasonforthisexclusionis thecost,a more
inclusiveoutcomecanbeachievedbyintroducinga discriminatorychargingrulein
favourofthatgroup.Althoughtheruleaboutconcessionsincidentallyviolatesa
strictprincipleofequaltreatmentonthegroundofsex,theprincipleofsocial
inclusionprovidesa reasonfordispensingwithanequaltreatmentruleinthiscase,
becauseequaltreatmentprovidesaninaccurateoroff-targetguidetothegoalof
achievingbettersocialinclusion.Socialinclusionperinitsunequaltreatmentifthat
measurefavoursan excludedgroup,andtheexcludedgroupcanbedefinedby
referencetothepatternofsocialexclusion-personsofstatepensionableage.In
short,theruleisnotanunjustifiedrulefromtheperspectiveofsocialinclusionand
thereforetheCouncilshouldprobablynotbeheldtobeinbreachofthelegal
obligation.A majorityoftheJudicialCommittee,however,upheldMrJames
claimofsexdiscrimination,becausetheargumentbasedonequaltreatmentwas
compelling.Thetemptationtointroducea qualificationtotheequaltreatment
principleforbenignmotiveswasresisted,nodoubtinpartbecauseitaffordedno
criterionofwhatshouldcountasa benignmotive,andinpartbecausethehistory
ofdiscriminationagainstwomenhasbeenrepletewithmenwhoactedwithwhat
theyregardedas benign,chivalrous,andconsideratemotives.
Positiveaction
Ourearlierreviewofequalityjustificationsforanti-discriminationlawsnotedthe
tensionbetweenanykindofdifferenttreatmentbaseduponthecharacteristicsof
protectedgroupsandtheequaltreatmentprinciple.Thistensionhasnotentirely
precludedsomeformsofpositiveaction,butanymeasureshavebeensubjectto
'strictscrutiny'ora stringenttestof'proportionality'.In theUnitedKingdom,
withthepossibleexceptionofNorthernIreland,66positiveactionwithrespectto
theallocationofjobs byquotasorthelikehasbeenregardedas toogreata
violationoftheequaltreatmentprinciple.67Ourearliertheoreticaldiscussion
suggestedthat,inordertooverridetheequaltreatmentprincipleandtojustify
differenttreatment,whatis requiredis a compellingdistributivejustification.
Whatkindof positiveactiondoes thedistributivegoal of socialinclusion
mandate?
66 UnderTheFairEmploymentandTreatment(NorthernIreland)Order1998SI 1998No 3162(NI
21), theEqualityCommissionin NorthernIrelandis requiredto promote'affirmativeaction'
(article7), whichis definedas actiondesignedto securefairparticipationin employmentby
membersoftheProtestantandRomanCatholicCommunity(article4). However,themandatory
ordersthattheCommissionmaydirecttowardsemployersare limitedto measuresto revise
practicesforthepurposeof promotingequalityof opportunity(Article14). A. McColgan,
DiscriminationLaw: Text,CasesandMaterials(Oxford:Hart,2000)517-518,142-145.
67 TheintricaciesandperhapsinconsistenciesoftheUS positionarebeyondthescopeofthisessay
thoughthereisa similarpatternofa highlyrestrictiveapproachtoaffirmativeaction.Apartfrom
court-orderedaffirmativeactionprogramsas a remedyforpast directdiscrimination,strict
scrutinytypicallyrulesoutaffirmativeaction(CityofRichmondv JACrosonCo 488 US 469
(1989),AdarandConstructorsIncvPena115S Ct2097(1995)),thoughitmaypermit'targets'but
not 'quotas' in voluntaryplans designedto redresspatternsof disadvantage(Johnsonv
TransportationAgencyofSantaClaraCounty,CA 480 US 616(1987)).
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January20033 Discrimination,EqualityandSocialInclusion
Positivediscriminationforthepurposeof socialinclusionrequiresthat
employersshouldbesensitivetodifferenceandmakereasonableadjustments,in
ordertoenablemembersofexcludedgroupstoovercomeobstructionstotheir
obtainingworksuitablefortheirskillsand capability.This dutyrequires
employerstoconsideramongstmanythingshowtheworkplaceisorganised,how
jobsarestructured,andhowtheskillsandcapabilitiesoftheworkerscouldbe
improved,witha viewtothereductionofbarrierstoemploymentforexcluded
groups.We havealreadyconsideredan exampleof sucha dutyofpositive
discriminationin thedutyto makereasonableaccommodationsunderthe
DisabilityDiscriminationAct1995.68
Socialinclusiondoesnot,however,requiretheemployertoadoptquotasto
eliminatestatisticaldiscrimination,asmightberequiredundera strongegalitarian
approach.Thesequotasareunsatisfactoryfromthepointofviewof social
inclusion,bothbecausetheyignorethequestionwhethertheindividualworker
canachieve'well-being'fromthejob,andbecausetheydonotaddressthecauses
ofsocialexclusion.69Ifthecauseofsocialexclusionis thatapplicantsfroma
particularexcludedgrouplackthetrainingtoperformthejob,thesolutionlies
eitherin theprovisionoftrainingor thereorganisationofworkso thatless
trainingisrequiredforsomepositions.Ifthecauseofsocialexclusionisthatthe
hoursofworkrenderitdifficultfortheexcludedgrouptoconform,thesolution
liesina considerationofwhetherflexibilityinhourscouldbeintroduced.This
dutytomakereasonableadjustmentsinhoursofworkmightapplytoourearlier
exampleofjob-sharingthepositionoflibrarian,70ortothecaseofa religious
minorityforwhomworkat a particulartimeis incompatiblewithrequired
religiousobservances.7l
Althoughat firstsightthisrequirementforpositiveactionmandatedbythe
socialinclusionprincipleappearstobeatoddswithcurrentdiscriminationlaw
thatingeneralforbidsdifferenttreatment,a closerinspectionoftheoperationof
thelawofindirectdiscriminationrevealsthatitcanapproximatetothemodel
suggestedbytheaimofsocialinclusion.In a claimforindirectdiscrimination,
oncetheindirectdiscriminatoryeffectofa hiringruleis revealedbystatistical
evidence,theemployermustjustifytheruleon businessgroundsto avoida
successfulclaimofdiscrimination.Thejustificationstandardcurrentlyusedin
casesofindirectsexdiscriminationisunderEC lawa testofproportionality,72
whichissimilartothe'businessnecessity'testusedintheUnitedStates.Under
otherUK anti-discriminationlaws,thetestis perhapsslightlyweaker:a
requirementtobalanceobjectivelythediscriminatoryeffectoftheruleagainst
68 DisabilityDiscriminationAct 1995s 6(7) forbidsmorefavourabletreatmentexceptinso faras
differenttreatmentis requiredunderthedutyof reasonableadjustment.See also Canadian
EmploymentEquityAct1995s2,whichinsiststhat'equity'requiresmorethantreatingpersonsin
thesamewaybut'requiresspecialmeasuresandtheaccommodationofdifferences.'Thisformula
canjustifyquotasinordertobreachsocialconventionsthatcreatebarrierstoemployment:Action
TravaildesFemmesv CanadianNationalRailwayCo [1987]1 SCR 1114,40 DLR (4th)193(S Ct
Canada).
69 Thereare also reasonsto be scepticalabouttheeffectivenessof mandatedaffirmativeaction
programmesin thelightof thelack of complianceby employerswiththe3% quota in the
Disabled Persons(Employment)Act 1944;see B. Doyle, New DirectionsTowardsDisabled
Workers'Rights(London:InstituteofEmploymentRights,1994)1S11.
70 Clymov WandsworthBoroughCouncil[1989]IRLR 241EAT.
71 Ahmadv InnerLondonEducationAuthority[1978]QB 36CA; Ahmadv UK (1982)4 EHRR 126,
EComHR. SeealsotheAmencandutyofreasonableaccommodationofan employee'sreligious
observanceorpracticeinCivilRightsAct1964TitleVII s 701(j)42 USC s 2000e(j).
72 Bilka-KaufhausGmbHv WebervonHartzC-170/84[1986]ECR 1607ECJ;EC Directive2000/78,
Art2(2)(b);2002/73,newArt2(2).
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TheModernLaw Review [Vol.66
thereasonableneedsofthepartyimposingthecondition.73Thisjustification
defencerequirestheemployerto discoverand revealthepotentialcostsof
eliminatingthehiringrulein thesamewaythatthedutyofaccommodation
functionsas an 'inforination-forcingrule'.74Thenthecourtmustbalancethose
coststotheemployeragainsttheexclusionaryimpactoftherule.
AsJollsarguesintheUS context,75thisprocessiscloselyanalogoustotheduty
tomakereasonableadjustment,providedthatthecourtsdonotperinita trivial
costtotheemployertocountasa sufficientjustification.Ifthecourtsacceptboth
thatanemployermayhavetoincursomecoststoaccommodateexcludedgroups
andthatthosemeasuresmightinvolvereorganisingtheworkplace,alteringjob
content,andimprovingtrainingopportunities,a justificationdefencetoindirect
discriminationpresentsa similarenquirytothatposedbythedutyofreasonable
adjustment.76Forexample,in LondonUndergroundLtdv Edwards(No 2),77
whereanemployerintroduceda newshiftsystemthatcompelleda singleparent
eventuallytoresign,thecourtfoundthattheshiftsystem,thoughservingthe
employer'sbusinessneeds,didnotpreventtheemployerfromaccommodatingthe
needsofsingleparents.As MorrisonJobservedin theEmploymentAppeal
Tribunal,'[T]herewasgoodevidencethatLondonUndergroundcouldhavemade
arrangementswhichwouldnothavebeendamagingtotheirbusinessplansbut
whichwouldhaveaccommodatedthereasonabledemandsoftheiremployees.'
Thesesimilaritiesbetweenajustificationofindirectdiscriminationandthedutyof
reasonableadjustmentappearmoretransparentlyunderthe EC testof
proportionality.The keyquestionunderthetestofproportionalityis often
whethertheemployer'sruleisnecessaryinthesensenootherrulewithlessadverse
impactontheexcludedgroupwouldsatisfythebusinessneedsoftheemployer.78
Argumentsaboutjustificationinindirectdiscriminationclaimsamounttomore
thananindividualisedclaimforadjustment,becausetheemployerisrequiredto
justifytheadverseimpactoftheruleon an excludedclass,notmerelyon a
particularjob applicant.Theoutcomeofthislegalprocessisineffecttorequire
theemployertoconsiderthepossibilityofaffirmativeactionfora group,notin
thesenseofadoptingquotas,butinthesenseofadjustmentstothebusinessto
enablemembersoftheexcludedgrouptoobtainemployment.
Althoughtheseexamplesrevealthecloseparallelinreasoningbetweenthekind
ofpositiveactionrequiredbytheprincipleofsocialinclusionandtheoperationof
theemployer'sjustificationdefencetoclaimofindirectdiscrimination,thematch
betweenthecurrentlawandtheimplicationsoftheaimofsocialinclusionisnot
exact.Thecentraldifferenceconcernsthepotentialwidthofjustificationsfor
indirectlydiscriminatoryrules.Underthesocialinclusionprinciple,itshouldbe
73 HampsonvDepartmentofEducationandScience[1989]ICR 179CA. Thistestwasapprovedand
describedas anapplicationoftheEC testofproportionalitybyLordNichollsinBarryv Midland
Bankplc[199]ICR 859,HL 870,andbySedleyLJinAllonbyvAccringtonandRossendaleCollege
[2001]ICR 1189CA 1200,thoughthereseemstobea cleardifferencebetweena testofnecessity
anda merebalancingofinterests.
74 P. S. KarlenandG. Rutherglen,'Disabilities,Discrimination,andReasonableAccommodation'
(1996)46 DukeLaw J 1,32.
75 C. Jolls,'AntidiscriminationandAccommodation'(2001)115HarvL Rev642.
76 S. Fredman,aboven 10,316-318.
77 [1997]IRLR 157 EAT; (affirmed[1999]ICR 494 CA); J. Conaghan,'The Family-Friendly
WorkplaceinLabourLaw Discourse:SomeReflectionsonLondonUndergroundLtdv Edwards'
inH. Collins,P. Davies,R. Rideout(eds),LegalRegulationoftheEmploymentRelation(London:
Kluwer,2000)161.
78 ThistestofproportionalityisalsobeingappliedundertheHumanRightsAct1998,eg Wilsonv
FirstCountyTrustLtdfNo2) [2001]EWCA Civ633,[2001]3 WLR 42 CA.
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January2003] Discrimination,EqualityandSocialInclusion
possibletojustifya rulewithindirectdiscriminatoryeffectsiftherulehelpsto
reducesocialexclusion.Thusthejustificationdefenceisnotconfinedtobusiness
considerationssuchas cost,butcan includethebroadersocialobjectiveof
reducingsocialexclusion.Forexample,inNorthernIreland,whereoneeffect
of practicesof religiousdiscriminationhas beena disproportionatelevelof
unemploymentamongthe Catholiccommunity,the legislationprovidesa
justificationdefenceforhiringrulesthatgivepreferencetounemployedpersons,
eventhoughsuchrulesalmostcertainlydiscriminateindirectlyagainstthe
Protestantcommunity.79Thisspecialprovisionis requiredbecauseunderthe
currentanti-discriminationlaws the employercan onlyjustifyindirectly
discriminatoryrulesbyreferencetobusinessconsiderationsratherthanbroader
socialobjectives.
Asthislastexamplereveals,noteverylegalexpressionofthedutyofreasonable
adjustmentconfersa broaddiscretionon thecourts.In someinstancesthe
requirementsofreasonableadjustmenthavebeencloselystipulatedbyParliament.
For instance,maternityand parentalleaverights,whichimposea coston
employerstoadjusttotheneedsofnewparents,havecloselydefinedparameters
andentitlements.80Thefurtherdutytoaccommodateparents'needfortimeoff
worktodealwithfamilyemergenciesis morelooselydefinedbya standardof
reasonableness.81These 'family-friendly'measurescan be regardedas a
deterininationoftherequirementofreasonableadjustmentforparents,with
theirunderlyinggoalbeinginpartthereductionofsocialexclusion.
Prioritynotequality
Theprecedingsketchofthearchitectureofanti-discriminationlawsbasedona
goalofsocialinclusionhasemphasisedfourfeatures.First,theprimarytargetof
socialinclusionis the allocationof jobs to groupsthatsufferpersistent
disadvantageinthelabourmarket.Thesegroupscanbeidentifiedbyreference
to one or morecriteria,noneofwhichneedreferto unalterableor 'status'
characteristics.Secondly,proofofdiscriminationshoulddependuponevidenceof
disadvantagecombinedwithmembershipofoneoftheprotectedgroups,without
thefurtherneedtoprovecomparativegreaterdisadvantagethanothergroups.
Thirdly,anti-discriminationlawsthatpursuethegoalofsocialinclusionshould,
however,permita broadjustificationdefenceto bothdirectand indirect
discrimination,thoughthejustificationmusteitherrestupontheneedtocombat
socialexclusionora claimthatthediscriminatoryruleonlyexcludesthosepeople
whocouldnottakeadvantageoftheemploymentopportunity.Finally,thegoalof
socialinclusionmandatesa formofpositiveactionthatcanbedescribedasa duty
ofreasonableadjustment.
My briefsketchof thefeaturesof anti-discriminationlawsbasedupona
principleofsocialinclusionhasnotaddressedmanyfeaturesofthecurrentlaws
79 Fair Employmentand Treatment(NorthernIreland)Order1998art 75, (SI 1998No 3162
(NI 21)). A similarprovisionin art73 providesa justificationdefenceto rulesthatindirectly
discriminateinselectionforredundancy.
80 EmploymentRightsAct 1996,PartVIII (as amendedbyEmploymentRelationsAct 1999s7).
Detailsare fixedby Maternityand ParentalLeave,etc.Regulations1999SI 1999/3312.The
currentEmploymentBill2002 adds a tightlycircumscribedrightto paid paternityleaveand
improvematernityrights.
81 EmploymentRightsAct1996,s 57A(as amendedbyEmploymentRelationsActl999s 8).
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TheModernLaw Review [Vol.66
and proposalsto amendthem.The discussioncouldbe extendedin many
directionswithsuggestiveresults.Forinstance,themostrecentinnovationsin
discriminationlaws,whichhavebeendescribedas 'fourthgenerationduties'82
imposepositivedutiesonpublicsectorbodiestotakestepstoimproveequality.83
Theofficialjustificationforthesepositivedutiesisframedintermsofsomenotion
ofequality,suchasfairequalityofopportunityormoreequalresults.AsFredman
argues,however,'animportantdimensionoffourthgenerationequalitylawsis
theirpotentialtoencourageparticipatedgroupsinthedecision-makingprocess
itself'.84Therearemanypossibleexplanationsforthisemphasisuponparticipa-
tionbydisadvantagedgroupsindeterminingthecontentofpositiveduties.A
participatoryprocessmaycontributetodemocraticgovernance,a pointstressed
inEuropeanUnionmeasures,85oritmayhelpminoritiestoexpresshowtheir
'difference'shouldberespected.86Butideasofequalitydo notseemtorequire
suchan emphasison participationofminoritiesin theformulationofpublic
policy.Incontrast,thegoalofsocialinclusiondoesemphasisethecontributionof
participationinpubliclifeasa contributionto'well-being',sothiselementinthe
strategyofthedevelopmentofpositivedutiesfitsintoa socialinclusionprinciple.
Duringthecourseofthisanalysis,wehavecomparedtheequalityjustifications
forcurrentanti-discriminationlawswiththeimplicationsofthejustificationbased
uponsocialinclusion.Insomerespects,butbynomeansall,I havearguedthat
thesocialinclusionjustificationprovidesa morecoherentexplanationofthelegal
framework.Myargumentis notthata socialinclusionjustificationprovidesa
completeinterpretationofthecurrentlaws.Sucha claimisimplausiblegiventhe
influentialrolethatthenotionofequalityhasplayedintheconstructionofthe
legislation.Wherethepotentialinfluenceofsocialinclusioncanbe detectedis
ratherinaccountsofwhenthelawpermitsorrequiresdifferenttreatmentrather
thanequalorthesametreatment.Inshort,socialinclusionprovidesa goalforthe
legislationthatsuppliesa justificationinparticularinstancesfordeparturesfrom
thegeneralruleofequaltreatment.
Returningtoourinitialformulationoftheproblemofidentifyingtheaimsof
anti-discriminationlaws,socialinclusionoffersa distributivegoalthatanswersthe
questionwhenisitfairtorequireequaltreatmentandwhenisitfairtorequire
differenttreatment.The answeris thatdeviationsfromequaltreatmentare
requiredinorderto achievethedistributiveaimofsocialinclusion.Thisaim
requirespreferenceorprioritytobegiventomembersofa particulargroup,ifthe
groupcanbeclassifiedassociallyexcluded.Thepreferentialmeasuresrequiredare
thosethatwillcontributetothereductionofsocialexclusion.
Thedistributiveaimofsocialinclusionavoidsanydirectconnectionwitha
distributivegoalframedintermsofequality.Itneitherseeksequalityofwelfare
norequalityof opportunity,thoughof coursea successfulpolicyof social
inclusionwouldmakea societymoreequalinbothrespects.Theaimofsocial
inclusionisrathertoconstructa conceptionofunfairnessinresults,andtosuggest
82 B. Hepple,M. CousseyandT. Choudhury,aboven 1,para 1.6.
83 NorthernIrelandAct 1998,s 75 and Schedule9, Fair Employmentand Treatment(Northern
Ireland)Order1998,SI 1998No 3162(NI 21); Race Relations(Amendment)Act2000.
84 S. Fredman,aboven 1,164.A glimpseintotheproposedmethodsofparticipationforthepublic
sectoris providedby theDepartmentof Trade and Industry,EqualityScheme:Section75
NorthernIrelandAct1998(January2002),whichenvisagesextensiveconsultationwithlargeand
smallorganisations,togetherwitha rangeofmeasuresdesignedtoencourageparticipation.
85 CommissionWhitePaper,EuropeanGovernance,25.7.2001,Com(2001)428final.
86 I. M. Young,aboven 25, 184;A. Phillips,ThePoliticsofPresence(Oxford:ClarendonPress,
1995);S. Fredman,aboven 1,153-156.
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Discrimination,EqualityandSocialInclusionJanuary2003]
appropriateremedialstrategiesthatinvolvegivingpriorityor preferenceto
excludedgroups.Butdoesthisconcernwithpriorityratherthanequalityentailan
abandonmentoftheequaltreatmentprinciple?
Itiscertainlycompatiblewiththeaimofsocialinclusiontoarguethatequal
treatmentshouldapplyas thenormalrule.Socialexclusionisoftentheresultof
unequaltreatment,so thata requirementofequaltreatmentoftenservesto
addresstheproblem.In thelightofourearlierdiscussion,however,doesthis
explanationofusingequaltreatmentasa ruleofthumbattributesufficientweight
to theprinciplein viewof theforceattachedto it in anti-discrimination
legislation?I doubtthatthisexplanationoftheroleoftheequaltreatment
principlecouldsucceed,thoughmyargumenthasneverrequiredthatitshould.
Thereasonforintroducingtheaimofsocialinclusionintotheaccountofthe
aimsofanti-discriminationlegislationwastofinda solutiontothepuzzleofwhy
differenttreatmentwassometimesrequiredorpermitted.Myargumentwasthata
notionofdistributivejusticewasneededforsuchan account.Socialinclusion
providessucha theoryofdistributivejustice,onewhichisnotsoambitiousasto
castdoubtonmaintainingequaltreatmentas thenormalrule,butwhichalso
explainswhenandwhydeviationsfromthenormalruleshouldberequiredor
permitted.Thecontinuingimportanceoftheprincipleofequaltreatmentas an
aimofthelawisnotabandonedas a resultofrecognisinga distributiveaimof
socialinclusion.Evenso,westillrequireanexplanationofwhysomuchweight
seemstobeattachedtotheequaltreatmentprinciple,suchthatanydeviationhas
tobecarefullyjustifiedundertestsofproportionalityandthelike.
Mysurmiseisthatequaltreatmenthasbeenaccordedsuchimportanceinantidiscriminationlawsfortworeasons.First,equaltreatmentis
thenormalrule
requiredbytheseparateprincipleofrespectforindividualdignityorequalworth.
Weobservedearlierthatequalworthsometimesrequiresrespectfordifference,
butweshouldnotignorehowitalsosupportsinmostinstancesa requirementof
equaltreatment.Thisprincipleofequalrespectisexpressedbyarticle14ofthe
EuropeanConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamental
Freedoms:'TheenjoymentoftherightsandfreedomssetforthinthisConvention
shallbesecuredwithoutdiscriminationonanygroundsuchas sex,race,colour,
language,religion,politicalorotheropinion,nationalorsocialorigin,association
witha nationalminority,property,birthorotherstatus.'Theindependentvalue
ofrespectforindividualdignitythusstrengthenstheweighttobeattachedtothe
valueofequaltreatment.
A secondreasonwhyequaltreatmenthasbeengivensucha prominentrolein
thelegislationis thattheprinciplehas provideda dominantconstitutional
principlewithinWesternlegalsystems.A legalsystem,whichhas achieved
autonomyfromthepoliticalandeconomicsystems,hasitsindependentdemands
offairprocess,ofevidenceandproof,ofremedialdevices,oflegaljustification
and,ingeneral,ofpreservationoftheintegrityofitssystem.87Themaximsof
87 Thisdistinctionbetweenpoliticalgoalandtheoperationalrequirementsofthelegalsystemuses
theanalyticalframeworkof systemstheory,as in G. Teubner,Law as an AutopofeticSystem
(Oxford:Blackwell,1993),thougha similardistinctionbetweengeneraljustifyingaim and
conditionsoflegalresponsibilitycan-beexpressedthroughpoliticalphilosophy,as inH. L. A.
Hart,Punishmentand Responsibility(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1968)Chapter1. The
terminologyof'integrity'derives,ofcourse,fromR. Dworkin,aboven26.Mydiscussionfocuses
onthedemandofintegrityforequalrespect,butthelegalsystemimposesmanyotheroperational
requirementsonanti-discriminationlaws,suchas proofof'detriment'as a conditionfora claim
anda tendencytorequirethesatisfactionofsomecriterionof'fault'beforecompensationcanbe
awarded.
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TheModernLaw Review [Vol.66
'equalprotectionofthelaws'or 'treatlikecasesalike'representfundamental
operationalprinciplesof theselegalsystems.The significanceof thislegal
frameworkis thatwheneverpoliticalgoalshaveto be incorporatedintolaw,
thelegalsystemmustaccommodatethemwithinitsownoperationalprinciples.
Thepoliticalgoalbehindanti-discriminationlegislationbecomestranslatedinthe
operationsofthelegalsystemas a rulethatlikecasesshouldbetreatedalike.In
otherwords,thelegalsystemhasitsownindependentvaluesorcommunication
system,whichplaceconstraintsonhowpoliticalgoalscanbepursuedthroughits
mechanisms.Whateverthepoliticalaimbehindanti-discriminationlegislation,
whetherit comprisesequalityof results,equalityof opportunity,or social
inclusion,thataimhasto be modifiedto complywiththeprincipleofequal
treatmentin orderforit to be accommodatedwithintegritywithinthelegal
system.
Acombinationofthesetworeasonsprobablyexplainssufficientlywhytheantidiscriminationlegislationattachessuchgreatweightto
theprincipleofequal
treatment.Thesignificanceattachedtoequaltreatmentbytheprincipleofequal
respectandtheintegrityofthelegalsystemcanprovideanexplanationforwhy
theanti-discriminationlawsdepartfromthearchitecturesuggestedby the
distributivegoalofsocialinclusion.Forinstance,itwasnotedearlierthataimof
socialinclusiondoesnotexplainwhywhitemalesshouldreceivelegalprotection
againstdiscrimination,assumingthattheyarenotan excludedgroup.Wecan
appreciate,however,thatthesymmetricalpatternofmanydiscriminationlaws
respondstotherequirementsoftheprincipleofequalworthandthedemandsof
integrityofthelegalsystem.
Returning,finally,tothequestionposedattheoutset- whataretheaimsof
anti-discriminationlaws?- myargumentsuggeststhatas wellas upholdingthe
idealofrespectforthedignityofindividualsorequalworth,thelegislationalso
mustbe understoodas pursuinga distributiveaimin orderto accountfor
deviationsfromtheequaltreatmentprinciple.I haveargued,thoughcertainlynot
conclusively,thatthisdistributiveaimorcriterionoffairnessmaybediscoveredin
theaimofsocialinclusion.Althoughthecurrentlawdoesnotfitpreciselywiththe
principlessuggestedbytheaimofsocialinclusion,thematchiscloserthanmight
beinitiallysupposed,andinseveralrespectstheaimofsocialinclusionexplains
featuresofthelawthatseemhardtoaccountforbyreferencetootherpossible
distributiveaimssuchas equalityofopportunity.Inparticular,theaimofsocial
inclusionsuggestsa moredeterminatestandardforthelegitimacyofpositive
actionthanthetestsof'proportionality'or 'strictscrutiny'.It suggeststhat
deviationsfromequaltreatmerstshouldbe permittedwherethediscriminatory
measureis necessarytoachievetheresultofsocialinclusionformembersofa
groupthatarepresentlylargelyexcluded.
Moreover,anappreciationoftheaimofsocialinclusionmayprovideaninsight
intothereasonswhywemayhavereservationsaboutsomeaspectsofthecurrent
law. For instance,rememberJamesv EastleighBoroughCouncil,thecase
concerningfreeentrytoa swimmingpool.AlthoughthemajorityoftheHouseof
Lordsregardedtheproblemasa simplecaseofdirectdiscrimination,because'but
for'hissexMrJameswouldhavehada freeswim,theminorityweresurelycorrect
todoubtwhethertheaimofthelawincludedpreventingthelocalauthorityfrom
increasingaccesstoitsfacilitiesforthosewhomightotherwisebeexcluded.Wedo
notknowwhethertheconcessionbaseduponstatepensionableageservedthegoal
of reducingtheexclusionof a groupthatwas otherwisedisproportionately
excludedfromthispublicfacility.Thatquestionwasleftanswered,becausethe
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January2003] Discrimination,EqualityandSocialInclusion
majoritybelievedthatultimatelytheequal treatmentprincipleprovidedan
exclusionaryrulethatpreventedanyjustificationofdirectdiscrimination.Theaim
ofsocialinclusionexplainswhythatquestionshouldhavebeenrelevant,andwhy
a deviationfromtheequaltreatmentrulemayhavebeenjustifiedinthisinstance.
Thisexerciseinexaminingtheaimsoftheanti-discriminationlawsinthelightof
theideaofsocialinclusionis notthereforemerelyan exerciseinmapping,of
interpretation,orofrationalisation,butitisalsointendedasa criticalexploration
oftheassumptionsandlimitationsoftheselaws.
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1 Three Discourses of Social
Exclusion
The term social exclusion is intrinsically problematic. It represents the
primary significant division in society as one between an included
majority and an excluded minority. This has implications for how both
included and excluded groups are understood, and for the implicit
model of society itself. Attention is drawn away from the inequalities
and differences among the included. Notably, the very rich are discursively
absorbed into the included majority, their power and privilege
slipping out of focus if not wholly out of sight. At the same time,
the poverty and disadvantage of the so-called excluded are discursively
placed outside society. What results is an overly homogeneous and
consensual image of society ± a rosy view possible because the implicit
model is one in which inequality and poverty are pathological and
residual, rather than endemic. Exclusion appears as an essentially
peripheral problem, existing at the boundary of society, rather than a
feature of a society which characteristically delivers massive inequalities
across the board and chronic deprivation for a large minority. The
solution implied by a discourse of social exclusion is a minimalist one:
a transition across the boundary to become an insider rather than an
outsider in a society whose structural inequalities remain largely
uninterrogated.
In practice, however, `social exclusion' is embedded in different
discourses which manifest these problems to varying extent. Three
discourses are identified here: a redistributionist discourse (RED)
developed in British critical social policy, whose prime concern is with
poverty; a moral underclass discourse (MUD) which centres on the
moral and behavioural delinquency of the excluded themselves; and a
social integrationist discourse (SID) whose central focus is on paid
work. They differ in how they characterize the boundary, and thus
what defines people as insiders or outsiders, and how inclusion can be
brought about. RED broadens out from its concern with poverty into a
critique of inequality, and contrasts exclusion with a version of citizenship
which calls for substantial redistribution of power and wealth.
MUD is a gendered discourse with many forerunners, whose demons
are criminally-inclined, unemployable young men and sexually and
7
R. Levitas, The Inclusive Society?
© Ruth Levitas 2005
socially irresponsible single mothers, for whom paid work is necessary
as a means of social discipline, but whose (self-) exclusion, and thus
potential inclusion, is moral and cultural. SID focuses more narrowly
on unemployment and economic inactivity, pursuing social integration
or social cohesion primarily through inclusion in paid work. The three
discourses differ quite markedly in how they present the relationship
between inclusion/exclusion and inequality, a theme which is central to
the overall argument of this book.
The following discussion of RED, MUD, and SID also considers
how the valorization of unpaid work plays through the different discourses.
In October 1997 the Office of National Statistics (ONS)
published the first estimates of the extent and value of unpaid work in
the British economy. If a monetary value were put on such work, at
1995 values it would have been at least equivalent to £341 billion, or
more than the whole UK manufacturing sector, and perhaps as much
as £739 billion, 120 per cent of gross domestic product. Among the
reasons for this statistical development was the insensitivity of conventional
national accounts to the movement of activities between
market and non-market sectors.1
Yet despite this official endorsement,
the dominant public and social-scientific understanding of `work'
remains paid work. Since the ONS figures confirmed that women do
much more unpaid work than men, and that although men do more
paid work, they also have more leisure, men's work is more acknowledged,
as well as more highly rewarded, than women's work.2
Following
a well-established theme in feminist arguments, Miriam
Glucksmann argues that work cannot be elided with those forms which
happen to take place in a market setting: work refers to all `activity
necessary for the production and reproduction of economic relations
and structures . . . irrespective of how and where it is carried out'. She
describes the `manner by which all the labour in a particular society is
divided up and allocated to different structures, institutions and
activities' as the total social organization of labour, and goes on to
discuss historical changes in the gendered division of labour within and
between household and market ± shifts which the new satellite
accounts are expressly developed to illuminate.3
Both Glucksmann's
perspective and the new official data raise another question. How is
the recognition of not just the social but the economic value of currently
unpaid work compatible with the distribution of the social
product primarily through rewards for paid work? RED, MUD and
SID have different capabilities for acknowledging, and thus for
potentially addressing, this question.
The Inclusive Society8
RED: SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND CRITICAL SOCIAL POLICY
In 1979 Peter Townsend published a major study of poverty, analysing
survey data from 1968±9. His purpose was to redefine poverty as an
objective condition of relative deprivation. Rather than defining poverty,
as earlier studies and official policy had done, in terms of levels of
income necessary for subsistence, Townsend argued that the crucial
issue was whether people had sufficient resources to participate in the
customary life of society and to fulfil what was expected of them as
members of it:
Individuals, families and groups can be said to be in poverty when
they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the
activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are
customary, or at least are widely encouraged and approved, in the
societies to which they belong. Their resources are so seriously
below those commanded by the average individual or family that
they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs
and activities.4
Expectations across society might differ in many respects, but Townsend
claimed there was neverthless `a loosely defined set of customs,
material goods and social pleasures at any point in a nation's history
which can be said to represent general amenities, or to which all or
most people in that society are agreed to be entitled. Those who have
few of these amenities can be said to be deprived'. Inequality might
affect the style in which people participated in some social practices ±
the lavishness of holidays, or celebrations of birthdays and religious
festivals. Poverty and deprivation went beyond this. There was a level
of resources below which, rather than just a reduction in the scale of
participation, there was a sudden withdrawal from the community's
style of living: people `drop out or are excluded'.5
Townsend was not the first to argue that poverty was a multi-faceted
process rather than simply a matter of low income. But his was a
sustained argument which widened the perspective from income to
resources, and from consumption to participation. The analysis
embraced housing, health and environmental pollution. It revealed
disability as a particular factor in producing exclusion. It addressed
deprivation at work, including hours of work, job security, and the
working environment, and looked at the relationship between work,
welfare and fringe benefits. The solution proposed was explicitly and
broadly redistributive. Townsend recommended a decreased reliance
Three Discourses of Social Exclusion 9
on means-tested benefits, which he saw as a mechanism of social
control as well as a rationing device: benefits should be paid as of right.
He acknowledged a conflict between this approach and the principles
and requirements of a capitalist market. Nevertheless, he argued that:
National action to remedy poverty ± through incomes policy, full
employment, less specialization of work roles, higher social security
benefits, new forms of allowances and rate support grants and a
more redistributive tax structure ± is implied.6
Poverty in the United Kingdom also included a chapter on one-parent
families. This was a relatively new category in social thought. Townsend
noted that there was no such term before 1964, when `fatherless
families' were collectively identified, and no national collation of statistics
until 1967; `motherless families' were incorporated later. Consistent
with later trends in social science towards deconstructing rather
than constructing categories, Duncan and Edwards have argued that
lone-parent families should not be treated as a single group.7
But
Townsend was concerned about unmarried and separated mothers
being pressed into employment despite their entitlement to benefit,
and also concerned that lone fathers would continue to be subjected to
improper pressure. Fathers only acquired the right to claim benefits as
lone parents in 1975. This was one of a number of changes ± including
linking pension upratings to the higher of earnings or prices ± brought
in by the Wilson government, with Barbara Castle as Minister for
Health and Social Security. Townsend attributed the poverty of oneparent
families to a number of factors: the low earning-power of
women; the absence of public child care; the practical restrictions that
caring for children places on lone parents; attitudes to unmarried
parents; the social expectation that women should be the primary
carers; and the lack of income rights for women caring for children
within marriage or outside it. The restructuring of the benefit system
should incorporate larger maintenance allowances for children,
allowances for the care of children, and an allowance for the upkeep of
the family home in recognition of the unpaid work involved ± all paid
as of right, rather than means-tested.8
These recommendations went
some way towards recognizing the unpaid work of parenting.
The whole thrust of Townsend's argument was that poverty resulted
in exclusion from social participation, but he did not use the term
`social exclusion'. Reflecting on this in 1997, he said that he had
resisted the term for some time because he saw discrimination and
exclusion as `effects rather than causes', as `by-products of . . . market
The Inclusive Society10
manufactured class'; too much emphasis on social exclusion diverted
attention from deprivation. However, he said `I was wrong. . . . ``social
exclusion'' directs attention to the marginalised and excluded and to
the potential instruments of their exclusion'.9
He argued once again
for a redistributive strategy, not just through the tax and benefit systems
and public services, but through the reduction of earnings differentials,
a minimum wage, a minimum income for those unable to
work, and financial recognition of unpaid work through at least a
conditional participation income, if not an unconditional citizen's
income.
The eighteen years between these statements were also the eighteen
years of Conservative government, marked by dramatic increases in
inequality, in unemployment, and in the numbers living in poverty, as
well as more restrictive conditions for less generous social security
benefits. The Tories had a redistributive strategy ± but it was redistribution
to the rich. Over this period, `social exclusion' gained currency
in critical social policy, especially in the discourse of the research
and campaigning organization, Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG).
CPAG marked the 1997 election with the publication of Britain
Divided: The growth of social exclusion in the 1980s and 1990s.10
Its
three sections were subtitled `creating poverty and social exclusion';
`dimensions of poverty and social exclusion'; and `combating poverty
and social exclusion' ± a formula which leaves open the relationship
between the two terms. Walker, however, defined poverty in similar
terms to Townsend: it is `a lack of the material resources, especially
income, necessary to participate in British society'. Social exclusion
has a broader, more comprehensive, meaning: it `refers to the dynamic
process of being shut out, fully or partially, from any of the social,
economic, political and cultural systems which determine the social
integration of a person in society'.11
Contributors to the book were variously successful in maintaining
this distinction. They emphasized that poverty does not necessarily
lead to exclusion ± a point made by Townsend in 1979, who noted that
although poverty constituted a serious barrier to social participation,
nevertheless stability of personal circumstances, length of residence,
good health and frequent social contacts mitigated the effects of low
material resources. The CPAG volume argued that social exclusion
may be a cause, rather than just a result, of poverty. Homelessness,
health, unemployment, food, utility disconnections were discussed, as
well as (and in relation to) gender, ethnicity, the social security system
and the overall distribution of income and wealth. The agenda was one
Three Discourses of Social Exclusion 11
of radical redistribution ± although Townsend was one of a minority,
together with Lisa Harker, who mentioned unpaid work. Harker, both
here and elsewhere, called for universal child benefit, plus a benefit
supporting child rearing.12
This would be payable in addition to social
insurance benefits, and calculated on an individual rather than
household basis ± thus reducing the personal economic dependency of
women on men.
A concept of exclusion which refers to being shut out fully or partially
is thereby extended to incorporate inequality, and its converse
necessarily implies much greater equality. Britain Divided concluded
on a cautiously optimistic note about the prospects for a redistributive
agenda under Labour, citing Gordon Brown's John Smith Memorial
Lecture where he argued that equality must be restored to its proper
place in the trinity of socialist values, alongside liberty and community,
and insisted that Labour would tackle poverty and inequality. Given
Brown's later redefinition of equality as equality of opportunity (see
Chapter 7 below), the caution may have been more appropriate than
the optimism. But in the years of Thatcherite domination, direct
defence of equality was difficult. It was assaulted as an immoral, even
totalitarian, imposition of uniformity, and a brake on economic
growth. Increasingly, the idea of citizenship was deployed in defence
of welfare rights and welfare provision. Thus Walker argued that
`social exclusion may . . . be seen as the denial (or non-realisation) of
the civil, political and social rights of citizenship'.13
Peter Golding
argued that poverty led to a reduction in participation tantamount to
partial citizenship, as low income families were excluded from new
information technologies, entertainment and leisure pursuits, as well
as from financial institutions and from political life.14
Ruth Lister's
The Exclusive Society was subtitled `citizenship and the poor', and
traced the development of the broadening view of social exclusion as
the antithesis of citizenship.15
Citizenship is, of course, another word which can embrace many
meanings, and whose inflection to the individual or the social may vary
considerably. Goodin argues that citizenship is a more egalitarian
concept than inclusion.16
Whereas inclusion focuses on the division
between insiders and outsiders, and does not address the relationship
between boundary and centre, citizenship focuses on the characteristics
which are shared. However, models of citizenship differ in their
scope, and thus in what respect citizens are to be deemed equal. The
version used as an antonym to social exclusion drew heavily on T. H.
Marshall's model, set out in 1950, which incorporated civil, political
The Inclusive Society12
and social rights. Marshall too saw citizenship as implicitly egalitarian
in relation to the rights and duties attaching to any particular definition.
But he also argued that the twentieth century was characterized
by the progressive extension of social rights: `the whole range from the
right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to
share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised
being according to the standards prevailing in the society'.17
It was this
emphasis on social citizenship rights, and the right to share to the full
in the social heritage, which made this a useful language for egalitarians
for it implied, as Marshall said, greater economic equality. On the
other hand, he also observed that the move towards greater equality
would be limited by the tension between the principle of social justice
and the operation of the market. Moreover, citizenship could operate
to legitimate inequalities, provided that they did not transgress
equality of opportunity, did not cut too deep, and occurred `within a
population united in a single civilisation'.18
Marshall's framework was not adopted uncritically. He had
addressed inequalities of class, but not those consequent on ethnicity
and gender. Some argued that the concept of citizenship needed
radical overhaul to avoid the problem of assimilating women to an
essentially male model of the citizen.19
Nevertheless, it formed the
basis of an egalitarian, redistributive, broad understanding of social
exclusion, inclusion and citizenship. Although social exclusion was, at
the extreme, the product of poverty, citizenship was fundamentally
affected by inequality. Lister's statement sums up the standpoint:
It is not possible to divorce the rights and responsibilities which are
supposed to unite citizens from the inequalities of power and
resources that divide them. These inequalities ± particularly of class,
race and gender ± run like fault-lines through our society and shape
the contours of citizenship in the civil, political and social spheres.
Poverty spells exclusion from the full rights of citizenship in each of
these spheres and undermines people's ability to fulfil the private
and public obligations of citizenship.20
Between 1979 and 1997, the social-democratic redistributive agenda
was recast in this new language of exclusion and citizenship. Social
exclusion was more clearly understood as a dynamic process, and a
multi-faceted one, than poverty had generally been, and questions of
gender and ethnicity had much higher profile; not only poverty, but
the whole gamut of social inequalities were brought into the frame.
Used in this discourse, RED, social exclusion mobilizes more than the
Three Discourses of Social Exclusion 13
concern with outcast poverty from which it started. It addresses the
exclusionary processes in all areas of society which result in inequality
itself. The characteristics of RED can be summarized as follows:
. It emphasizes poverty as a prime cause of social exclusion.
. It implies a reduction of poverty through increases in benefit levels.
. It is potentially able to valorize unpaid work.
. In positing citizenship as the obverse of exclusion, it goes beyond a
minimalist model of inclusion.
. In addressing social, political and cultural, as well as economic,
citizenship, it broadens out into a critique of inequality, which
includes, but is not limited to, material inequality.
. It focuses on the processes which produce that inequality.
. It implies a radical reduction of inequalities, and a redistribution of
resources and of power.
If Labour's understanding of social exclusion were consistent with
RED, it would imply moving towards a more radically redistributive
programme than that set out in the 1997 manifesto. However, other
discourses, with different implications, are available.
MUD: THE UNDERCLASS AND THE CULTURE OF
DEPENDENCY
The evolution of RED took place in a political context where social
citizenship rights were under continued attack from the New Right.
Unemployment and the numbers in poverty soared in the early 1980s
to levels unprecedented in the post-war years, and social security
spending rose with them. The government's response was to tighten
eligibility for benefits and reduce their value, deny the existence of
poverty, suppress and abolish some of the key indicators of its extent,
and blame the poor for their own situation. References to the
`underclass' and to a `culture of dependency' became embedded in a
discourse concerned with social order and moral integration.
The New Right of the 1980s is now widely misunderstood as an
exclusively neo-liberal project, aimed at the deregulation of the market
and the reduction of state intervention. It was, however, made up of
two apparently contradictory, but actually symbiotic, strands of neoliberalism
and neo-conservatism. Neo-liberal economics underpinned
widespread privatization, and justified growing inequalities in the
The Inclusive Society14
name of incentives. But neo-conservatism, which developed alongside
neo-liberalism, was concerned with order rather than freedom, with
family, nation and morality ± and held no brief for a minimal state.
This was not the last gasp of old conservatism struggling to survive.
The `free' economy needed a strong state to impose and uphold the
conditions of its operations, especially in the restrictions on trade
union resistance. The state also had to police the effects ± most
notably in the 1984±5 miners' strike, protests over the poll tax, and
urban unrest, but also on a more routine basis. The strong state in turn
relied on the market ± and especially the ever-present threat of
unemployment ± as a potent source of social discipline.21
This dual character of the New Right is important to understanding
the political realignments of the 1990s. It is also fundamental to
understanding the discourses about poverty which RED was intended
to rebut. Those reliant on benefit were always separated into the
deserving and the undeserving poor ± those who really needed help
and those who were scroungers exploiting an overgenerous and insufficiently-policed
system. At least for the deserving poor, benefits were
generally seen as good for the individual recipients, if expensive for
society as a whole. Echoing arguments from the United States, this
changed. Economic dependence on `welfare' was construed as
`dependency', a pathological moral and psychological condition created
by the benefit system itself ± and fostered by the libertarianism of the
1960s ± in which the state was seen as a universal provider, sapping
personal initiative, independence and self-respect. Benefits were bad
for, rather than good for, their recipients. If this was true of individuals,
it was even more true of the poor collectively: welfare spending gave
rise to a `culture of dependency'. This discourse inexorably took over
the public domain. In a television documentary about poverty and
unemployment, the political commentator John Cole described the
`giro culture' as `an endemic culture of no work and reliance on benefits',
characterized by a `downward spiral of idleness, crime and erosion
of the work ethic'.22
The focus had shifted from the structural basis of
poverty to the moral and cultural character of the poor themselves.
The idea of an `underclass' was central to this shift. Townsend had
himself used the term without any critical connotation to refer to different
groups of the excluded poor: the elderly, disabled, chronically
sick, long-term unemployed and one-parent families.
A large, and proportionately increasing, section of the population
are neither part of the paid workforce nor members of the households
Three Discourses of Social Exclusion 15
of that workforce . . . The ways in which they have been denied
access to paid employment, conceded incomes equivalent in value to
bare subsistence, attracted specially defined low status as minority
groups, and accommodated, as a result, within the social structure as
a kind of modern `underclass', need to be traced.23
This was a statement about the place of the poor in ± and notably not
outside ± the overall social structure. It was free from claims about the
lifestyles of the poor, and free from moral condemnation, except for
the social processes which generated poverty.
In 1990, Frank Field's Losing Out: The Emergence of Britain's
Underclass argued that the extension of citizenship rights heralded by
Marshall had been reversed by the effects of Thatcherism, particularly
by exclusion from work and increased reliance on means-tested benefits.
Exclusion from citizenship was the mark of the underclass, which
would not disappear without `the implementation of a series of policies
aimed at re-establishing full citizenship'.24
He was critical of the
growing tendency both to describe and to explain poverty in cultural
terms and thus effectively blame the poor for their circumstances. He
used an article by Ralf Dahrendorf as an example. Dahrendorf, like
Field, had written about the underclass in terms of exclusion from
citizenship: `The existence of an underclass casts doubt on the social
contract itself. It means that citizenship has become an exclusive
rather than an inclusive status. Some are full citizens, some are not'.25
But he also argued that the underclass was characterized by low educational
attainment or functional illiteracy, that incomplete families
were the norm rather than the exception, and that it was culturally
distinct from the rest of society:
It includes a lifestyle of laid-back sloppiness, association in changing
groups and gangs, congregation around discos or the like, hostility
to middle-class society, particular habits of dress, hairstyle, often
drugs or at least alcohol ± a style, in other words which has little in
common with the values of the work society around.26
Field was at pains to emphasize the structural, rather than cultural,
factors leading to the growth of an underclass. Unlike Dahrendorf, he
insisted that the underclass remained committed to work, this being
the `cornerstone value of the whole system'; it was `important not to
lose sight of the fact that the main aim of this . . . group is to win a place
back in society by gaining a job'.27
But he did not deny that they were
The Inclusive Society16
behaviourally distinct and a problem for the majority: `the existence of
an underclass tends to make our society a less civilised one in which to
live', and `it should come as little surprise that some of those who feel
they have no stake in `official' society should react in a way that
demonstrates their exclusion'.28
However, in discussing the characteristics
of a system which tended to trap the poor on benefits, he did
express concern about the moral consequences of benefit dependency
and the erosion of initiative, and referred to the `personal pathologies
of many of the underclass, and the culture induced by poverty'.29
Over
the following years, Field moved to a much clearer view that state
provision created dependency and eroded incentives to work and to
save.30
The characterization of the underclass in cultural terms was consolidated
by the intervention of the American commentator, Charles
Murray. Murray's tract, The Emerging British Underclass was published
both in the Sunday Times, which financed his visit to Britain in 1989,
and by the right-wing think-tank, the Institute of Economic Affairs
(IEA). He argued that an underclass had long existed in the United
States, and was now developing in Britain. He described himself as `a
visitor from a plague area come to see if the disease is spreading'. He
asked `how contagious is the disease?'; `is it going to spread
indefinitely or is it self-containing?'. The `disease' was cultural, spread
by `people . . . whose values are contaminating the life of entire neighbourhoods'
± by rejecting both the work ethic and the family ethic
which are central to the dominant culture.31
Not all the poor were part
of an underclass. Its existence could be diagnosed by three symptoms:
`illegitimacy, crime and drop-out from the labour force': and `if illegitimate
births are the leading indicator of an underclass and violent
crime is a proxy measure of its development, the definitive proof that
an underclass has arrived is that large numbers of young, healthy, lowincome
males choose not to take jobs'.32
These three factors, Murray argued, interact to produce pathological
communities in which the socialization of children ± especially
boys ± is inadequate: `communities need families. Communities need
fathers'.33
Fathers are necessary as role models to civilize the young;
but marriage and family responsibilities are necessary to civilize men,
who are, without these constraints, driven to prove their masculinity in
destructive ways. The benefit system feeds the growth of the underclass,
by making it too easy for lone mothers to rear children, and
removing the pressure on single mothers to marry. In a later account,
Murray's emphasis shifted even further towards demonizing lone
Three Discourses of Social Exclusion 17
parenthood, and he proposed decreasing economic support for lone
mothers and their children, while increasing the stigma attaching to
them.34
The policy implications were not the extension of citizenship
rights, but their greater conditionality, reduction or removal.
This is, of course, exactly what happened in the United States. The
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
August 1996 abolished Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), replacing it with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF), in which there was no entitlement to benefits. It devolved
welfare provision to individual states, but within a highly prescriptive
framework underpinned by replacing federal matching funds with
cash-limited block grants. Levels of grant would be cut if states failed
to get people off welfare and into work: 25 per cent of all claimants
should be in work by October 1997, and 50 per cent by 2002; for twoparent
families, the targets were 75 per cent by 1997 and 90 per cent by
1999. For the first time since Roosevelt's New Deal, eligible claimants
could be refused benefits if the cash ran out. A limit of five years was
imposed on the total length of time a family could receive federal
TANF funds. State plans were required to include a provision that if a
family received benefit for more than two years, at least one adult in
the family would have to participate in workfare-type activity. Discretion
to waive this rule was permissible only where there were children
under the age of one. States were required to refuse benefits to those
refusing work or workfare programmes, and were to be penalized for
not meeting target participation rates in work-related activities by
TANF claimants. Teenage mothers would be ineligible for TANF
unless attending school and living with their parents or guardians ±
thus seeking `to discourage single parenthood and illegitimate births
by denying entitlement to huge swathes of the US welfare system'.35
Wisconsin was among the states which had pioneered experiments in
workfare before the 1996 Act, under waiver of the federal rules. Over
the ten years from 1987 to 1997, the number of claimants dropped by
60 per cent. In 1997, the Wisconsin Works or W±2 programme went
state-wide. All claimants were now required to work ± in unsubsidized
or subsidized employment or in `community service' jobs at below the
minimum wage. Lone mothers were required to return to work when
their youngest child was twelve weeks old. The Governor of Wisconsin,
Tommy Thompson, who pioneered the reforms was questioned as to
the morality and Christianity of a policy which separated very young
babies from their mothers and led to an increased reliance on soup
kitchens and emergency shelters. He replied that paying people not to
The Inclusive Society18
work, not to get married and to have more children was unchristian,
and encouraged irresponsible behaviour.36
Murray's description of the underclass cast it in cultural and moral
terms. In the United States, the so-called underclass is largely black,
so the discourse has an additional racial element. This is not so
immediately present in Britain, where commentators are often at pains
to point out that the victim-villains are poorly qualified white working
class young people. But like earlier accounts of dangerous classes
lurking at the margins of society,37
including Marx's lumpenproletariat,
it is a very clearly gendered picture. The delinquency of young men
is directly criminal and anti-social, accompanied by wilful idleness and
drug abuse. Young women's delinquency manifests itself in their sexual
and reproductive behaviour, the imputed irresponsibility of lone
parenthood. The two are connected through the assumption that lone
parenting is inadequate parenting, with both forms of delinquency
attributed to a failure of socialization, especially into the work ethic
and a belief in marriage.
By 1992, when John Westergaard took the underclass as the subject
of his presidential address to the British Sociological Association, it
was clear that there were three different meanings attaching to the
term: outcast poverty; the moral turpitude of the poor; and a less
specific, rhetorical usage which had become common in the media.
Westergaard argued, as Stuart Hall had done five years earlier,38
that
the term underclass implied a dichotomous view of society, and served
to obscure inequalities among the majority:
What the three have in common is, to start with, a postulate of the
recent emergence of a significant minority of the population who
are trapped, outside and below `society at large' either by cultural
depravity or economic deprivation, and an inference, whether
expressed or implied, that the divide between this underclass and
the great majority is increasingly the most salient and challenging
line of division for the future, by contrast with the older divisions of
class now said to be in eclipse.39
Westergaard went on to argue that this was exactly why the concept
had such appeal. It allowed the recognition of the increasingly obvious
persistence of poverty to co-exist with arguments or assumptions about
the attrition of class divisions in society as a whole.
Critical social policy was more concerned to defend structural
interpretations of poverty against cultural accounts which blamed the
poor. The term `underclass' became very unpopular because of its
Three Discourses of Social Exclusion 19
association with Murray's rhetoric of moral inferiority and social
contagion. Despite its capacity to capture the ways in which aspects of
poverty compound one another, it was rejected on three grounds: its
imprecision; the lack of empirical evidence supporting its cultural
claims; and its punitive rather than supportive policy implications.40
Its
ambiguity meant that those who used it as a description of the monstrously
divisive consequences for the poor of Thatcherite policies
unwittingly opened the door to a quite different discourse about the
potential consequences of the poor for the comfortable majority,
where redistribution gave way to retribution. The idea of the
dependency culture, for whose existence there was little evidence,41
also facilitated this switch from structural to cultural interpretations.
Its central tenet was that groups of people excluded from society as a
whole, and especially when dependent on benefit, would develop a
distinctive set of morally undesirable attitudes and behaviours, characterized
by various forms of parasitism, crime and immorality. Lister
argued that `those who invoke the development of an `underclass' to
make the case for the restoration of full citizenship rights to the poor
are playing with fire'.42
The contested meaning of the underclass gave
way to a strong preference for talking about social exclusion instead:
thus in RED, social exclusion is used to actively refuse the moral
agenda of the underclass debate.
This has had little impact on the popular usage of the term
`underclass', especially in the media, where it continues to carry both
structural and cultural meanings. Adonis and Pollard defend its use. It
`captures the essence of the class predicament for many at the bottom:
a complete absence of ladders, whether basic skills, role models,
education or a culture of work'.43
It is characterized by `unemployment
and unemployability' as well as single motherhood and educational
failure. The cultural interpretation wins out: `there is no
question that upbringing plays a big and probably growing role in
transferring poverty and social inadequacy from one generation to the
next'.44
But as social exclusion entered public political discourse, it did
so in conjunction with references to the underclass ± with Blair himself
repeatedly referring to an underclass excluded from the mainstream.
Social exclusion is also an ambiguous term, capable of carrying both
structural and cultural meanings. Thus Duffy defines social exclusion
as `a broader concept than poverty, encompassing not only low material
means but the inability to participate effectively in economic,
social, political and cultural life, and in some characterisations,
alienation and distance from the mainstream society'.45
Where it is
The Inclusive Society20
used in conjunction with the underclass, social exclusion is at risk of
co-option into a highly problematic discourse, MUD, whose main
characteristics are these:
. It presents the underclass or socially excluded as culturally distinct
from the `mainstream'.
. It focuses on the behaviour of the poor rather than the structure of
the whole society.
. It implies that benefits are bad, rather than good, for their
recipients, and encourage `dependency'.
. Inequalities among the rest of society are ignored.
. It is a gendered discourse, about idle, criminal young men and
single mothers.
. Unpaid work is not acknowledged.
. Although dependency on the state is regarded as a problem, personal
economic dependency ± especially of women and children on
men ± is not. Indeed, it is seen as a civilizing influence on men.
SID: SOCIAL EXCLUSION, SOCIAL INTEGRATION AND
EUROPE
The increasing public reference in Britain to social exclusion was not
only the result of resistance to the underclass discourse, but the
growing importance of the European Union. The origins of the European-wide
emphasis on social exclusion lay in France, where the
opposite of exclusion was insertion. Silver argues that social exclusion
has a specific meaning in the French republican tradition, within a
paradigm rooted in both Durkheimian sociology and Catholicism, and
concerned with moral integration.46
Exclusion is understood as the
breakdown of the structural, cultural and moral ties which bind the
individual to society, and family instability is a key concern. French
discourses of exclusion, themselves contested, broadened out to a
consideration of groups marginalized economically, socially, culturally
and, in the case of outer suburbs, spatially; and to the fields of education,
employment, housing and health. Although insertion, as the
obverse of exclusion, acquired a similarly wide brief, a key measure
was the introduction in 1988 of a residual benefit, the RMI (Revenu
Minimum d'Insertion), stressing the reciprocal nature of solidarity.
Recipients of RMI were required to sign a `contrat d'insertion' ± in
many cases focused on employment, but in some involving other forms
Three Discourses of Social Exclusion 21
of social participation negotiated with social workers, and addressing
aspects of `daily living, behaviour, and family relationships'.47
Silver sees moral integration as the distinctive characteristic of what
she calls the `solidarity' paradigm. Her reading of Durkheim, however,
understates the extent to which he saw social integration as based in
work (see Chapter 9). It also understates how far the moral integration
of `solidarity' is focused on work ± with work itself perceived as having
social as well as moral and economic functions. Conversely, she neglects
the moral element in liberal underclass discourse (her `specialization'),
seeing the main source of integration as based in exchange. Spicker
argues that although the language surrounding the RMI is more
communitarian, the effect is similar to US workfare programmes ± and
similarly individualizes the problem of unemployment.48
As a result of its origins within French social policy, the concept of
social exclusion at European level became, as Room put it, a curious
amalgam of a liberal, Anglo-Saxon concern with poverty and a more
conservative, continental concern with moral integration and social
order.49
But to suggest that there is a single discourse of social exclusion
in Europe would be misleading. The multi-lingual character of the
Union necessarily implies a variety of discourses, which will not map
precisely on to each other, even when translated from the same
documents. However, the differences run deeper than this, leading to
a series of overlapping national discourses of exclusion, rather than a
pan-European consensus.50
Discursive variation is accompanied by
national policy differences, as discourses of exclusion are deployed
within distinct political settings ± although these national policies are
increasingly oriented to and implicated in contested interpretations of
a European framework.
This book is not a comparative study of discourses of exclusion or of
social policy across Europe, but an examination of a single national
case. Its focus is the different discourses around exclusion available to
New Labour, and the uses made of them. However, among those
resources are the concepts of exclusion embedded in the documents
and policy instruments of the European Union itself. The discourse of
key European policy papers ± in their English versions ± reveals a much
narrower understanding of exclusion than that implied by Silver's
`solidarity' model. This can be typified as a social integrationist discourse,
SID, which stresses the integrative function of paid work. SID
had a wider currency in British political discourse, and by using European
documents as illustrative of it, I am not implying that this was the
main source of the discourse, as will be clear from Chapters 3 and 4.
The Inclusive Society22
SID can be illustrated by the two European Commission White
Papers on social and economic policy issued in 1994 ± European Social
Policy and Growth, Competitiveness, Employment 51
± which are widely
supposed to epitomize the social, rather than purely economic, concerns
of the Union. Despite the language of solidarity, these policy
documents emphasize exclusion as exclusion from paid work rather
than a broader view of exclusion from social participation, and prescribe
integration through paid work. The terms cohesion, solidarity,
integration and exclusion recur. The core concerns of both documents
are economic efficiency and social cohesion: `we are faced with the
immense responsibility . . . of finding a new synthesis of the aims pursued
by society (work as a factor of social integration, equality of
opportunity) and the requirements of the economy (competitiveness
and job creation)'.52
The economic discussion is couched in terms of
efficiency, deregulation, and the need for economic growth, while the
`social' discourse counterposes solidarity, integration and cohesion to
unemployment, poverty and social exclusion. Sometimes exclusion is
identified with poverty: `with more than 52 million people in the
Union living below the poverty line, social exclusion is an endemic
phenomenon';53
while the need for economic and social cohesion calls
for `solidarity . . . in the fight against social exclusion', to combat the
`poverty . . . which splits society in two'.54
The processes of exclusion
are described as `dynamic and multi-dimensional', and linked `not only
to unemployment and/or low incomes, but also to housing conditions,
levels of education and opportunities, health, discrimination, citizenship
and integration in the local community'.55
Yet although this list
might appear to echo the factors identified in RED, it is notable that
the terms social exclusion and exclusion from paid work are used virtually
interchangeably, while a similar elision occurs between `people'
and `workers'. A section headed `the free movement of persons' goes
on to discuss only the `free movement of workers'. `Promoting the
Social Integration of Disabled People' discusses only training and
assistance to enter the labour market. On the `key issue of improved
access to means of transport and public buildings', the Commission
will `press for the adoption of the proposed Directive on the travel
conditions of workers with motor disabilities' (emphasis added).56
Since Growth, Competitiveness, Employment starts from a concern
with unemployment, its focus on paid work is unsurprising. Few, in any
case, would dispute that unemployment is a contributory factor to
social exclusion, and work a factor in social integration. This, however,
is not the same as treating them as synonymous ± a slippage which
Three Discourses of Social Exclusion 23
makes difficult the exploration of their empirical connection. The
assumption that social integration and participation in paid work are
coterminous is particularly clear in a discussion of education and skills:
`The basic skills which are essential for integration into society and
working life include a mastery of basic knowledge (linguistic, scientific
and other knowledge), and skills of a highly technical and social nature,
that is the ability to develop and act in a complex and highly
technological environment, characterized, in particular, by the
importance of information technologies' (emphasis added).57
The
emphasis on the importance of information technology skills is probably
exaggerated even in terms of the skills needed for employment,
but as a description of the skills needed for integration into society, it
is an odd list. Growth, Competitiveness, Employment treats the absence
of these skills as the cause of social exclusion ± or what European
Social Policy calls exclusion `from the cycle of opportunities': `The
failure of education . . . is an increasingly important and increasingly
widespread factor of marginalisation and economic and social exclusion.
In the Community, 25 to 30% of young people . . . leave the
education system without the preparation they need to become properly
integrated into working life'.58
Working life means paid employment. Unpaid work makes only a
brief appearance in these documents, and then with a view to bringing
it into the market sector to create more jobs. In ruling out ab initio the
possibility of `a generalized reduction in working hours and job sharing'
as economically inefficient, the economic White Paper says we
need to `think up new individual or collective needs which would
provide new job opportunities'.59
It proposes meeting old needs in new
ways. `Women's full integration in the labour market is expected to
create jobs in the provision of services and goods not yet integrated
into the market and currently being provided by either women's
unpaid labour or paid informal women's labour'. Improving existing
career opportunities for women will itself generate additional demand
for child care. Where jobs are not created spontaneously, member
states are exhorted to `encourage growth in the employment intensive
area of the care sector and of the provision of household services', and
thus to `enhance the perceived value, and therefore encourage
increased skills in such sectors'.60
The assumptions about skill and
value embedded here include the view that unpaid work is unskilled.
Greater recognition of unpaid work other than through market
mechanisms is ruled out. The extent of unpaid work, its necessity to
the maintenance of social life and human relationships, and the limits
The Inclusive Society24
to potential marketization are underestimated, and the problems of
low pay and gender segregation in the labour market ignored.61
In these documents, markets are not seen as benign. Markets have
failings, produce unacceptable inequalities and embody short-termism,
and thus require regulation, or at least management: `only a
properly managed interdependence can guarantee a positive outcome
for everybody', and `collective solidarity mechanisms' are essential to
counter adverse effects.62
This could be a prescription for a redistributive
welfare state, which might therefore acknowledge and reward
unpaid work, but it is not. The cost of welfare provision is seen as
excessive: `current levels of public expenditure, particularly in the
social field, have become unsustainable and have used up resources
which could have been channelled into productive investment'.63
`Solidarity' is a device for reducing the costs of social provision, not for
redistribution. The forms of solidarity invoked are manifold: between
those who have jobs and those who do not; between generations;
between regions; between `those who earn their income from work and
those who earn their income from investments'; and between men and
women, `making it easier to reconcile family life and working life'.
Notably, solidarity is not just a policy issue for member states, but a
matter for individuals: it is `the business of each citizen to practice
``neighbourly solidarity'' '.64
Hutton described Growth, Competitiveness,
Employment as the last gasp of social Europe before it was suffocated
by the monetarist criteria agreed as the foundation of
monetary union. But the tension between `monetarist' and `social'
Europe, and the dominance of the former, are already apparent in the
document itself. Further movement in that direction followed, as
austerity measures were brought in by governments across Europe
anxious to qualify for entry into the single currency ± in many states
provoking social unrest in response to cuts in welfare rights.
The emphasis on paid work is endemic in the financial and legal
framework of the Union. As the term social exclusion gained currency
in Europe, currency, in the form of European funding, attached to
projects to combat it. But the rules governing the use of the Community's
Structural Funds reinforce the understanding of social participation
as labour market activity. The Social Fund, the main source of
cash to combat exclusion, may only properly be used to fund measures
directly related to the labour market, either through integration of
marginal groups into it or through the promotion of equal opportunities.
In practice, since funding goes to projects proposed by member
states on the basis of additionality, many projects concerned with the
Three Discourses of Social Exclusion 25
welfare of marginal groups which are ostensibly directed to improving
their labour market integration appear to have a wider brief.
The legal definition of citizenship within Europe is also biased
towards paid work. Louise Ackers argues that the general emphasis on
`workers' rather than `people' in European law produces a stratified
system of citizenship in Europe.65
Although the Maastricht Treaty
declares nationals of all member states to be European citizens with the
right to move and reside freely within the Union, this right does not
confer equal access to social rights and benefits in the country of
residence. Whereas paid workers, self-employed people and those
exercizing their right to remain after ending paid employment have full
social rights in their country of residence, members of their families
have only derivative rights. This applies, of course, to women engaged
in unpaid caring ± for children or adults ± who therefore do not have the
same rights as paid workers. If family members and dependants can
acquire social citizenship rights by proxy, non-employed persons not
attached to a worker ± students, disabled adults, retired people, for
example ± do not acquire them at all. Their right to move and reside
freely within the Union is limited by the condition that they do not
become a charge on the public purse of the host country. The essential
point is that the emphasis on paid work as the primary means of social
integration and the privileging of paid work over unpaid work has
significant and gendered repercussions for citizenship status itself.
A discourse about social exclusion which focuses on integration
through paid work tends to reduce the social to the economic, and
simultaneously limits understanding of economic activity to market
activity. If inclusion tends to shift the agenda away from equality, the
focus on inclusion through paid work exacerbates this. SID thus has a
number of features which distinguish it from RED and MUD:
. It narrows the definition of social exclusion/inclusion to participation
in paid work.
. It squeezes out the question of why people who are not employed
are consigned to poverty. Consequently, it does not, like RED,
imply a reduction of poverty by an increase in benefit levels.
. It obscures the inequalities between paid workers.
. Since women are paid significantly less than men, and are far more
likely to be in low-paid jobs, it obscures gender, as well as class,
inequalities in the labour market.
. It erases from view the inequality between those owning the bulk of
productive property and the working population.
The Inclusive Society26
. It is unable to address adequately the question of unpaid work in
society.
. Because it ignores unpaid work and its gendered distribution, it
implies an increase in women's total workload.
. It undermines the legitimacy of non-participation in paid work.
RED, SID and MUD are presented here as distinct discourses. They
are, of course, ideal types. All of them posit paid work as a major
factor in social integration; and all of them have a moral content. But
they differ in what the excluded are seen as lacking. To oversimplify, in
RED they have no money, in SID they have no work, in MUD they
have no morals. In terms of Walker's broad definition of social exclusion
as exclusion from social, economic, political or cultural systems,
the discourses emphasize different elements ± and posit different
causal relationships between them. Thus both SID and MUD are
narrower than RED, with SID reducing the social to the economic and
substantially ignoring the political and cultural. MUD, on the other
hand, emphasizes the cultural, with the economic deriving from this,
while the social and political are sidelined. In reality, although there
are examples which conform very closely to a particular model, much
public discourse slides between them. That, indeed, is one of the
reasons why a concept like social exclusion is so powerful. Not only
does the multiplicity of meanings which attach to it give it wide
acceptance, but it operates as a shifter between the different discourses.
Like the `underclass', `social exclusion' can, almost unnoticed, mobilize
a redistributive argument behind a cultural or integrationist one ± or
represent cultural or integrationist arguments as redistributive.
But there are also major differences between the discourses in their
capacity to recognize, let alone valorize, unpaid work. Part of the point
of Glucksmann's model of the total social organization of labour is
that work, or economic activity, occurs not only within the market in
the conventionally-defined economic sphere, but also outside it. To
understand the shifting forms of work and the relationships within
which they are embedded, the analysis cannot begin from a standpoint
which privileges one particular form or site of work. Many of the
problems with which politicians and policy makers now grapple can be
seen in terms of the breakdown of a historical organization of labour
in which men had primary responsibility for paid work and women
primary responsibility for unpaid domestic work, albeit often combining
this with some paid employment. SID barely acknowledges
non-market work at all, or treats it as a residual form. The unpaid
Three Discourses of Social Exclusion 27
work of child care, for example, is either to be drawn into the market,
or squeezed into the spaces around paid employment. Unpaid work is
addressed solely from the standpoint of the market. This is slightly less
true of MUD, which, while deploying the idea of `dependency' in its
refusal to valorize unpaid work, simultaneously complains of the
consequences of inadequate parenting. Yet this contradiction is itself
masked by the fact that parenting is not understood as work. In general,
the emphasis on paid work as a vehicle of inclusion, and the
construction of exclusion as non-employment, inherently privileges
market activity: it does not address either work, or social integration,
in terms of the total social organization of labour.
In the following chapters, I shall argue that the developing discourse
of New Labour shifted it significantly away from RED towards an
inconsistent combination of SID and MUD. The impossibility of adequately
acknowledging unpaid labour from this standpoint produces
deep contradictions between different elements of policy, most especially
between the rediscovery of community and the attempt to draw
everyone into paid work through the New Deal or welfare to work
programmes. This contradiction can be resolved only by a rightward
shift to a reformulation of the Thatcherite free economy-strong state
dyad in terms of community, or by a leftward shift towards a RED
agenda. A central political question for Labour's first term in office
will be how it negotiates between the different available discourses of
social exclusion, and how, especially through the Social Exclusion
Unit, it translates them into policy. Their performance will be judged
not only on whether they deliver `social inclusion', but what kind of
inclusion they deliver, for whom, and on what terms. The following
chapters outline the emergence of the new political discourse, and
their implications for delivering inclusion.
The Inclusive Society28
8 Delivering Social Inclusion
How far will Labour succeed in delivering social inclusion? Blair
would prefer this question deferred for ten years, but at least a provisional
assessment will be needed before the election in 2001 or 2002.
As the policies are put in place, it is possible to ask what kind of inclusion
Labour seeks to deliver, what the criteria of success would be,
and how likely it is that the policies will achieve this. None of the
discourses has a well-developed set of indicators of social exclusion,
partly because the centrality of the term in British politics is so new ±
and partly because to clarify the definition would undermine the very
flexibility of the concept which makes it politically useful. Because the
meaning and imputed causes of exclusion differ in RED, SID and
MUD, so too will some of the indicators of success in producing
greater inclusion. The prospects for inclusion depend on which discourse
you are situated in. Both provisional and later assessments can
be made in Labour's own terms, and against other understandings of
social exclusion and other criteria. Success in combating exclusion will
be as contested as the concept itself. The most obvious critical yardsticks
are those implied by RED, and the main part of this chapter
considers the prospects for welfare to work and the Social Exclusion
Unit from the different standpoints of RED, SID and MUD. Questions
are also raised about the nature of the `social' in social inclusion,
and about unpaid work, transport, participation in common institutions
and political inclusion ± and the contradictions and tensions
between aspects of inclusion.
WELFARE TO WORK: THE VIEW FROM SID
There are aspects of both welfare to work and the remit of the Social
Exclusion Unit which are consistent with RED, SID and MUD. The
welfare to work programme has widespread support. For RED, involuntary
unemployment is one important cause of poverty; for SID,
work in itself delivers inclusion; for MUD, work is a moral necessity to
counter dependence. In the broadest sense, all would interpret the
programme as successful if it: reduces the number of people dependent
on benefit; moves the people concerned into socially useful paid
employment which delivers self-esteem, social relationships and a
159
R. Levitas, The Inclusive Society?
© Ruth Levitas 2005
reasonable standard of living; provides high quality, affordable care for
their children; reduces poverty; reduces social security spending, thus
releasing more money to be spent on health and education; and does
so without coercion. Pigs might fly. The difference between the discourses
lies in the priority given to these various aims.
From the perspective of SID, the most important indicators of
success would be a rise in labour force participation rates, especially
for the target groups of young people, lone parents and people with
disabilities; and a drop in the number of workless households among
those of working age. Falling registered unemployment is not an
adequate measure of the success of the New Deal, since it excludes
those forced off the register and a range of people deemed economically
inactive. In 1997, the unemployment figures fell sharply, and
there were no longer 250 000 young people eligible for the New Deal,
but roughly half that number. This was partly due to the effect on the
count of the Jobseeker's Allowance, but also to a real drop in youth
unemployment. A rise in unemployment was forecast for 1998 as the
New Deal came into effect. The test of rising participation rates avoids
the measurement problems associated with unemployment, but it is
complicated by how far any change can be attributed to the welfare to
work programme itself. Evaluating changes against a background of
changing economic conditions is not so easy.
There is a further complication to relying on unemployment rates as
an indicator of exclusion. Unemployment rates are higher in France
and Germany, and Labour, like the Conservatives, attributes Britain's
lower recorded unemployment ± and that in the USA ± to the greater
flexibility of the economy. But the USA has a much higher proportion
of its male population in prison. If incarceration rates and unemployment
rates are taken together, the difference between Europe
and the United States lies principally in the proportion of young
(predominantly black) men in jail.1
While levels of imprisonment in
Britain are not comparable with those in the US, they are high by
European Standards. This has implications for benefit budgets. The
proportion of GDP spent on social security in the UK, as in the USA,
is relatively low compared to France and Germany, but the costs of
social security payments for the unemployed must be balanced against
the greater costs of incarceration. While unemployment is the key
form of social exclusion for SID, the greater social exclusion of
imprisonment is neglected.
Rising participation rates are more important to SID than the
numbers passing through the programmes who find some form of
The Inclusive Society160
work. Before the pilot schemes for lone parents and their evaluation
were completed, Harman vaunted their success in terms of the percentage
of participants moving into employment. These early figures
were disputed because they related to those taking up the offer of an
interview, not those approached or eligible. It was also suggested that
these were the very women who would have taken employment without
help. Some of those moving into work under the New Deal would
do so anyway. Simply looking at outcomes for participants in welfare
to work ignores two further problems: substitution and churning.
Participants may be given a competitive advantage, so that they get
jobs at the expense of others in the labour market, for example privileging
the young unemployed at the expense of older workers. This
substitution effect is a particular problem with subsidised employment.
As Hutton said, the programmes may also result in only temporary and
short-term work placements, and a churning in and out of employment.
Increased labour force participation rates indicate the success of
the programmes over and above substitution, churning, or existing
levels of movement into work.
The likely success of welfare to work in SID's terms is ± and will
remain ± disputable. Its supply-side assumptions may undermine it.
There is no consensus about how far unemployment is a problem of
employability, and how far it is caused by a lack of demand for labour.
Although the lead indicator for SID is labour market attachment, and
this has priority over the quality and pay of jobs, SID differs from
MUD on the issue of compulsion. The emphasis on the positive utility
of work means compulsion should not be necessary; the emphasis on
work as a route to self-esteem makes compulsion, especially in the
shape of thinly-disguised workfare schemes, counter-productive. It is
therefore important whether the New Deal results in people moving
into real jobs, rather than being forced into make-work schemes for
benefit, or even `benefit plus'. The quality of the scheme, and therefore
of the work, is not irrelevant.
Without investment to provide real jobs, improved training and
skills may simply equip individuals for a competitive struggle for
employment in which some must lose. The initial response of the
private sector to pleas to provide opportunities for young people
under the New Deal was disappointing, even with the subsidies offered.
This is partly because employers do not want unwilling conscripts as
workers, but it does not bode well for the expansion of jobs when the
subsidies run out. One suggestion has been that local authorities might
compensate for this shortfall. In a roundabout way, the local state
Delivering Social Inclusion 161
would thus become the employer of last resort, in a return to limited
Keynesian demand management ± a solution compatible with SID, but
one which will cost money. But SID emphasizes carrots, not sticks.
Within SID, the prime concern is not saving money: increased expenditure
on in-work benefits, on child care, on training, and even on
job creation might be wholly legitimate in promoting inclusion through
work.
WELFARE TO WORK: THE VIEW FROM MUD
From within MUD, the central criterion of success is the reduction
in the numbers of people of working age wholly dependent on benefit.
A drop in the number of workless households is important. Since
the central element in MUD is the moral necessity of work, neither
the level of pay nor the quality of the work is important. Coercion is
legitimate ± even justified as tough love. MUD may appear to be
directed primarily at reducing public spending, but the discourse and
the policies are ambiguous in this respect. Labour's welfare to work
policies as originally floated in the Borrie report owed much to the
Australian Working Nation programme,2
and especially to the JET
(Jobs, Education, Training) scheme for lone mothers. Both the
rhetoric, in the use of the term welfare and the phrase New Deal, and
the substantive policies, moved closer to an American model. In office,
Labour showed increasing interest in Wisconsin Works or W±2, and in
September 1997 Jean Rogers, the W±2 administrator, attended the
post-election conference at the London School of Economics on `How
Labour can Deliver'. Experience in both Australia and Wisconsin
showed that the provision of child care to enable lone parents to work
is expensive. This is so even before posing serious questions about the
quality of child care, whether parents or children suffer as a result, or
the pay and conditions of the carers.
MUD has other features. Work is also a prophylactic against crime.
For the young unemployed, it is a means of social discipline ± or, as
Labour put it, `our policy against crime is jobs'. It is important both for
workers and for their children, who need to be set an example, and to
learn the work ethic ± not at their parent's knee, but through separation
from it. Those same children, especially in lone-parent families,
are seen as in need of parental supervision to curb their criminal
tendencies. This points either to an irresolvable contradiction between
The Inclusive Society162
welfare to work and the agenda of social order ± or to Murray's
agenda, of attempting to make lone parenthood as difficult as possible
to enforce moral conformity. Success, for MUD, would mean not just
a decrease in benefit dependency, but a decrease in crime and in lone
parenthood, all perceived as indissolubly linked.
WELFARE TO WORK: THE VIEW FROM RED
For RED, the most pressing question is the effect on the lives of the
excluded. The central indicator of success or failure in tackling social
exclusion is the prevalence of poverty, and whether there is both
absolute and relative improvement in the living standards of the poor.
The availability of information to monitor these changes was undermined
by changes to the statistical base during the Thatcher years;
restoration and improvement is needed.3
The question will not just be
whether more people are in paid work, but whether those in and out
of employment, above and below working age, are better or worse
off.
The reduction of involuntary unemployment is one element in this.
As for SID, the emphasis is on the benefits of paid work, financial and
otherwise. The quality of work matters. Coercion is generally rejected
because benefit penalties may be unjustly applied, and themselves
cause greater poverty and exclusion ± as well as potentially undermining
the New Deal by turning it effectively into a workfare programme.
Compulsion is viewed as unnecessary in almost all cases if
there is reasonable, reasonably paid work available, and pointless or
worse if there is not. RED, like SID, sees exclusion from paid work as
a form of and a factor in social exclusion. But increased rates of labour
market participation will be an indicator of success only if they result
in a reduction in poverty. The level of the minimum wage is crucial to
RED. And whatever the success of welfare to work, it will not improve
the situation of those who remain dependent on benefits or state
pensions. Moreover, because RED recognizes parenting as unpaid
work, lone parents dependent on benefit are not viewed as not working.
The implication is an increase in benefits to relieve poverty, rather
than an across the board cut or the introduction of coercion into the
New Deal to force them into paid employment. For RED, welfare to
work can be at best a partial solution to the problem of social exclu-
sion.
Delivering Social Inclusion 163
DELIVERING SOCIAL INCLUSION: THE SOCIAL
EXCLUSION UNIT
One of the first tasks set for the Unit in its first six months was the
development of indicators of exclusion. In one sense, this will make
assessment of the success of the Unit in the Government's own terms
relatively straightforward. But as in the case of welfare to work, different
indicators will be preferred or prioritized from the standpoint of
the different discourses. Perri 6, writing for Demos, says social exclusion
`can best be measured by looking at how many people are cut
off from work, learning and other forms of social participation' ±
the priorities of SID ± and goes on to suggest as indicators measures
of both the causal processes and the condition of social exclusion.
The former include `mobility, promotion and redundancy, social stratification
and limited social mobility, educational failure or family
breakdown'; the latter `worklessness and unemployment, homelessness,
lack of membership of voluntary organisations, denial of
services, isolation or lack of effective social contacts, lack of a car or a
telephone'.4
It is notable that poverty does not appear as an indicator
of either the cause or condition of exclusion.
For RED, income data is a proxy indicator, though not a measure,
of the wider multi-faceted process of exclusion. Although poverty is a
prime cause of social exclusion, the two are not synonymous. Improving
the material living standards of the poor is a necessary but
insufficient condition for combating exclusion. The Social Exclusion
Unit also sees exclusion as a complex and multi-dimensional problem.
Its concern with multiple deprivation, homelessness, joblessness, and
the concentration of these in areas which also suffer from high levels
of crime is not immediately different from RED, and the pursuit of a
co-ordinated approach to these is wholly consistent with it. To some
extent, the indicators will overlap. But whether the perceived causes
and thus proposed solutions coincide is another matter. In MUD, if
exclusion is the result of poverty, poverty itself is largely attributed to a
failure of employability ± which, given the responsibility of individuals
for their own employability, is in large part a moral problem. If MUD
says `the poor are different from us', RED says `yes; they have less
money'. The obvious difference is that RED implies improved levels
of benefits, while MUD does not. Government policy rules out additional
expenditure in this form, so that for RED, as Lister said, the
Social Exclusion Unit tackles exclusion with one hand tied behind its
back.
The Inclusive Society164
In some instances, the relationship between the two approaches is as
straightforward as Lister suggests. For example, the Unit is concerned
about the exclusion of sectors of society from financial services. Residents
in some areas may be unable to open bank accounts, obtain
credit cards, or obtain credit because of their postcode. Poorer people
pay more for credit ± especially from loan sharks. Competitive strategies
in the privatized utilities discriminate against poorer customers.
Potential future work for the Unit includes looking at `options for
improving access to services, public and private, for low income individuals
or areas'. These issues may be addressed through pressure
on utilities and financial institutions to alter their practice, and
through encouraging credit unions ± non profit-making self-help
groups which foster saving and provide small loans. There is nothing
here that would conflict with a RED agenda; Child Poverty Action
Group has long documented the fact that the poor pay more for most
goods and services. There is, simply, a gap: one aspect of financial
exclusion is that the poor have less money, and inadequate income is
an important factor in debt.
In other respects, the RED approach and that of the Social Exclusion
Unit differ rather more. The range of goals may largely coincide,
but the priority given to them is different; and since the perceived
causes of exclusion are different, so too are the means of reaching
those goals. If RED emphasizes social and economic inclusion, and
understands poverty in material and structural terms, MUD emphasizes
moral inclusion, and understands poverty as primarily cultural in
origin. Explanations of poverty as a cultural problem lead all too easily
into policies to control the poor. The more the thinking behind the
Unit is consistent with MUD, the more the policies for achieving inclusion
are likely to be ambiguous from the standpoint of RED.
The most obvious example of this is the focus on social order. In
terms of its initial priorities, the reduction in crime and disorder particularly
on the targeted estates would be a key indicator of the Social
Exclusion Unit's success ± although the measurement of crime is
fraught with difficulty, and the measurement of disorder even more so.
When Jack Straw was asked by Jonathan Dimbleby on 28 September
1997 what changes would take place during Labour's first term of
office, he replied that communities would be safer ± but that the Government
also aimed to change the norms and values of a generation,
and to establish that parenting is not a purely private matter in which
next door neighbours have no say. Some of the policies for delivering
these outcomes rely not only on repression, but forms of repression
Delivering Social Inclusion 165
which are themselves directly exclusionary ± an increased use of
exclusion orders against individuals, curfews which exclude young
people from public spaces, and eviction orders. As the Social Exclusion
Unit started work, it was reported that there were `nearly 10 000
people . . . on the council's exclusions list for anti-social behaviour' in
Manchester alone.5
A general increase in the use of eviction orders is
anticipated. It may even be necessary ± but it is important to recognize
that the inclusion of some is predicated on the further exclusion of
others. If the control of crime and disorder leads to more prison sentences,
this too represents an increase in social exclusion. The 1997
Crime and Disorder Bill makes provision for `anti-social behaviour
orders' which may be sought by local councils or by the police for any
person aged ten or over who has acted `in a manner that caused or was
likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to two or more persons
not of the same household as himself'. The orders may contain those
prohibitions `necessary for protecting persons in the local government
area from further anti-social acts by the defendant'. Breaches of the
order carry penalties of up to five years imprisonment. The problem
lies in the catch-all formula, which does not rest on any specific offence
being committed ± and does not even require that alarm and
distress be reasonable responses to the behaviour in question.
The early priority given to tackling truancy is again ambiguous.
Although the remit of the Social Exclusion Unit referred also to
exclusions from school, it was truancy which Blair stressed at the Unit's
launch. In a police report to the Unit, children aged between 10 and 16
were said to be responsible for 40 per cent of all street robberies, 33
per cent of car thefts and 30 per cent of house break-ins in London,
mostly during school hours. The link between truancy and crime
seemed clear ± although it does not follow that most children illicitly
absent from school or even most persistent truants are engaged in
crime, or that they should be publicly regarded as actual or potential
offenders. Other research presented to the Unit referred to the low
educational achievement of young offenders, and suggested that persistent
truanting was the result of poor educational attainment (mainly
by boys) rather than its primary cause. Again, an improvement in
educational achievement, a reduction in persistent truanting, and a
reduction in crime would all be regarded as good outcomes by RED,
SID and MUD. But the connections posited between them, and the
policies for addressing them differ. The link long made by RED
between unemployment and crime, a social and structural problem,
becomes in MUD a link between unemployability and crime, a problem
The Inclusive Society166
of individual behaviour. In MUD, `tough on crime, tough on the
causes of crime' points to truancy and poor parental supervision as the
`causes'; in RED, the emphasis is on poverty and its role in educational
underachievement.
The danger is not just that one hand is tied behind the Unit's back,
but that repression will substitute for inclusion. The attraction for
MUD of focusing on truancy is that parental responsibility can be
invoked as a solution. The Crime and Disorder Bill, consistent with
pre-election policy, provides for the use of parenting orders. These
would apply to the parents of convicted young offenders, and to the
parents of children or young people subject to child safety orders, antisocial
behaviour orders, or who do not regularly attend school. They
may require parents to attend weekly counselling sessions for up to
three months, and to comply with other specified requirements for up
to a year. Jack Straw elaborated likely requirements as being home at
specified times to supervise their child and accompanying that child to
school. Breaches of the order will be punishable by a substantial fine.
It is not clear whether the orders will be made against the parents
severally or jointly, and who will be liable for the fine, especially where
parents are not married and are thus not legally liable for each other's
debts. The potential conflict between meeting the requirements of a
parenting order and earning a living is implicit in the suggestion that
the stipulations should `as far as practicable' not interfere with times
when the parent normally works. Where truanting is the problem, the
children who cause most concern are those of secondary school age ±
the age group where there is growing pressure within New Labour that
lone parents should be compelled to seek paid employment.
A suggestion that the Foyer movement be extended to single
mothers is also ambiguous. Pioneered in France and developed in
Britain since 1992, Foyers provide hostel accommodation for homeless
young people, with help and advice to enable them to move into more
permanent accommodation and training or work. They are entirely
voluntary, although residents are required to keep house rules. Their
encouragement by the Social Exclusion Unit would be appropriate
from RED, SID and MUD ± in RED's case, especially if supported by
additional funds, and a benefit system which facilitated a move on
from Foyer life. But the suggestion that `young mothers would be
encouraged to move into . . . hostels with their babies, and would get
advice on training, access to creches and support workers, including
health care visitors to monitor their children' does not seem quite in
the Foyer spirit.6
There may be some young women for whom such
Delivering Social Inclusion 167
facilities would be welcome and wholly appropriate, offering practical
and social support not available elsewhere; some units already exist.
As a policy for inclusion, it is double edged. Encouraging young single
mothers into institutions ± having reduced the benefits available to
them ± marks them out as a group, and is potentially exclusionary.
And it rests on a presumption of moral exclusion. MUD sees single
parenthood as a form of delinquency, and as a `parenting danger zone'
in need of early intervention. The provision of suitable services,
including housing, in a non-institutional manner is not only more
expensive, but offers less possibility of social control.
`SOCIAL' INCLUSION
The wide brief of the Social Exclusion Unit makes its success more
difficult to define than that of the welfare to work scheme. More, the
potential breadth of the idea of social exclusion itself means that a very
wide range of policies may bear on the delivery of inclusion. In RED,
the question of social participation, not just participation in work, is
central. Exclusion is exclusion from participation ± in economic, political,
social or cultural systems.
However the understanding of the `social' in social inclusion is
under-developed. Demos addresses this in terms of networks and
social capital. Social capital refers to `the quality of contacts people
have and networks they plug into, and the norms of trust, reciprocity
and goodwill, sense of shared life across the classes, and capacities to
organise that these ties afford'; or more simply to `those relationships
which provide people with a sense of trust and community'.7
The
potential fruitfulness of this is undermined by the treatment of social
networks as means to ends ± either of work or of social control. Thus
for individuals, network poverty means lack of access to the kinds of
contacts helpful in finding employment.8
For society, networks are
important because `an organized citizenry can alleviate many social
problems and ease the implementation of various kinds of public
policy, for instance by using neighbourhood watch groups to minimise
crime. As a result, nations as a whole lose a resource when the ties
between individuals erode'.9
Discussions of social exclusion in contemporary political discourses
do not collapse the social into the economic, although economic
inclusion is paramount. There is recurrent reference in stakeholding
and communitarian literature to the importance of intermediate
The Inclusive Society168
institutions and to civil society ± those places where people live their
lives beyond the workplace. But there is a disturbing tendency for civil
society and the community to be reduced to an arena of unpaid work,
a means of mopping up problems created by the market or a mediator
of social discipline. Social inclusion, social networks, and sociability as
ends in themselves scarcely figure: the meaning of the social needs
clarification and elaboration.
The presumption shared by RED, SID and MUD is that inclusion in
paid work leads to greater social inclusion ± in the case of RED,
provided that it also reduces poverty. There is little attention paid to
the ways in which paid work may impede inclusion. Although Hutton
indirectly acknowledges this where people work very long hours, and
the problem of `juggling' is a constant issue in relation to women's
employment, the downside of paid work is not thought of in terms of
social exclusion. Yet not being able to collect young children from
school affects participation in the social networks that develop around
the school and in the neighbourhood as well as the relationship
between parent and child. Paid work leaves less time for many other
activities. The same may be true of unpaid work.
UNPAID WORK
The contradiction between welfare to work and parenting in Labour's
policies can hardly be overstressed. It arises from thinking about parenting
as a responsibility, rather than something which involves work
which is currently unpaid. The unpaid work of parenting includes
domestic labour as well as direct engagement with the child ± engagement
which takes place through daily practicalities and which can also
be describe as emotional labour. Even if welfare to work for lone
parents is a success, and they move voluntarily into employment, their
children are adequately cared for, and they are materially better off,
there is a hidden cost. It is a cost to women of a major increase in their
total workload, not a cost to society of inadequate parenting. Looking
at social production from the point of view of the total social organization
of labour and acknowledging the prevalence of unpaid work
calls into question how we understand the meaning of work itself and
the justice of using the wage relation as a means of distributing the
social product, as well as the reliance on paid work as a mechanism of
social inclusion. Solutions to this are not obvious, and are limited by
the structural dominance of the market.
Delivering Social Inclusion 169
One approach is to bring as much unpaid work as is possible into the
market sector. This is the direction in which current policies point.
However, even if all adults of working age are expected to be in
paid work, and all children in collective day care, a great deal of
unpaid work remains to be done ± and is done chiefly by women. Its
implication is an increase in women's overall workload.
A second approach would be to reward unpaid work directly, in
proportion to its value. This, on the ONS figures, would imply a huge
shift of resources from the market to the non-market sector. One
common objection is the difficulty of evaluating how well unpaid work
is carried out. While one can imagine that attempting to do this might
be an attractive idea to Jack Straw, it is not necessary; most jobs in the
market sector are not rewarded on the basis of performance related
pay. A more intractable difficulty is the danger of ghettoizing women
in domestic labour, the criticism levelled at the Wages for Housework
Campaign in the 1970s. And a principled objection might be that
distribution in relation to unpaid work, like distribution through the
wage relation, rests on a redefinition of what constitutes a social contribution,
not on a shift to distribution on the basis of need; it is in this
sense less radical and less egalitarian that RED. It would also meet the
same limits as RED. The redistribution of resources from market to
non-market sector would, as Townsend said of radical redistribution
through the benefits system, run up against the limits of what is possible
in a system which depends fundamentally on distribution through
the wage relation.
A third possibility would be a major redistribution of both paid and
unpaid work. This would mean breaking down the gender inequalities
in both forms of work. It would also require limitations on paid working
time more draconian than anything likely to be contemplated by
the European Union, but affording an acceptable standard of living on
the basis of much shorter hours. Movements in this direction are
possible, and favoured by the French. But significant changes which do
not increase poverty and inequality would be possible only on the basis
of a large reduction in wage differentials, and limited by the requirements
of a capitalist economy.
GETTING THERE
Participation in social life, whether that be paid work, voluntary work,
family life, or the ragbag category leisure, depends on being able to get
The Inclusive Society170
to the sites of these activities. It requires mobility; it requires transport.
The promised development of an integrated transport system is fundamental
to the development of social inclusion. This is an issue for SID
as well as RED, for transport problems affect employment prospects.
For RED, it is a wider question: the social life of those without cars
can be very limited. This is particularly true in rural areas, where in
many cases public transport is almost or wholly non-existent. Such a
system needs to be affordable ± although affordability depends on
income, so increasing the incomes of the poorest might be a useful
contributory factor. It also needs to be accessible to disabled people,
whose social exclusion is caused not only by lack of money, but by lack
of transport and the general inaccessibility of public spaces. The
response of the green pressure group SERA's response to the transport
White Paper argues that an inclusive transport system would mean `a
rail system that is adequately staffed, affordable and fully accessible to
all disabled people' and that `all buses running on the streets of Britain
are fully accessible to all the nation's citizens'.10
The promotion of an integrated transport system has a number of
motivations. Reducing traffic congestion is partly about managing
capitalism more efficiently; traffic jams cost firms money. It is partly
environmentally driven, both in terms of the global need to reduce
greenhouse emissions, and the local need to reduce asthma-inducing
air pollution. Reducing car use, once a fringe concern, is now Government
policy and has wide support. But this is not a straightforward
matter. First, the projected need for new homes is likely to be met by
increased building in rural areas. Many people want to move out of
cities. The land available for building in cities is limited ± although it
could be substantially increased by reducing the amount of land used
for parking. Some brownfield sites are heavily polluted, and decontamination
makes them more expensive to develop than greenfield sites.
Increased rural development means more car use, not less. Secondly,
the exhortation to individuals to use their cars less must not be a way
of subordinating their needs to industry's preference for a clear run.
Switching freight to rail is part of the plan, and success in this is
essential to an inclusive system. This is particularly important because
most of the discussions of reduced car use focus on switching short
journeys to walking or cycling, on the supposition that these are most
amenable to modal change. But many short journeys are made to ferry
children around or carry shopping. SERA concedes that `the car can
bring people into the mainstream of life who might otherwise feel
excluded', notes its importance to `mothers who have a thousand and
Delivering Social Inclusion 171
one things to do with . . . children', and says that the challenge is to
make sure the right sort of journeys are made by car, `for they add to,
and don't detract from, social inclusion'.11
This implicitly recognizes
the third potential bar to and negative effect of changing public
behaviour. Walking to and from a school a mile away with young
children involves four miles and the best part of two hours a day. If the
distances are greater, so is the time involved; if the children are at
different schools, the logistics may be impossible ± and certainly
impossible to combine with getting to work. Many mothers already
juggle with these difficulties. Reducing car use may mean an increase
in women's unpaid work.
COMMON INSTITUTIONS
Hutton's focus on the rich as well as the poor suggests that inclusion
requires that people use the same services and institutions. Transport
is one example. Others are health and education, where Hutton's
concern was with the divide between public and private provision.
There is a body of opinion that the combination of medical advances
leading to new treatments, an ageing population and rising demands
make some form of rationing in the National Health Service inevitable.
Without greatly increased funding, the likely outcome of this is
an increase in private health provision among those who can afford
it. In both health and education there is talk of `partnership' ± the
NHS buying treatments in private hospitals, private schools opening
up their sports facilities to state school pupils. This will not address the
fundamental inequality of provision. Short of making private health
and education illegal, the only ways of radically reducing the possibility
of a large and influential minority deserting collective provision are to
provide public services which match those privately available, or to
radically reduce the inequalities which make this desertion possible.
The first route is enormously expensive, and New Labour has no
intention of promoting inclusion by the second means.
In both school and university sectors of education, newly divisive
policies are being pursued. The introduction of fees and the abolition
of maintenance grants for higher education is likely to narrow rather
than broaden access. The education action zones promised in the
Education Bill in late 1997 pose a different kind of problem. The
purpose of the zones, described by Government officials as `the
centrepiece of our modernisation agenda' is to improve educational
The Inclusive Society172
standards in the designated areas. Their connection to addressing
social exclusion is clear. But schools in these zones will be able to employ
`innovative methods'; they will be not be bound by the requirements of
the national curriculum, but be allowed to concentrate on core skills.
They will also be exempt from national agreements on teachers' pay
and conditions, and be able to extend their working week, extending
the school day and opening schools at weekends (compare Etzioni,
Chapter 5). Management of the zones will be put out to tender, and
while most are expected to be run by `partnerships' of local authorities,
community groups and businesses, zones may be imposed against local
authority wishes and may be run solely by private businesses. This
potentially places large parts of the education system in private hands,
where the curriculum can be increasingly bent to the needs of industry
rather than the wider needs of pupils. It also removes democratic
accountability, and further undermines the role of local education
authorities and local government ± continuing, rather than reversing
the trends of the last twenty years. The question of democratic
accountability raises the issue of political inclusion.
POLITICAL INCLUSION
One important wider aspect of inclusion is the question of political
inclusion or inclusiveness. This addresses the structures and processes
of political decision making, how these are conducted, and who is
involved in them; social inclusion and exclusion more often refer to the
experiences of citizens whose participation in normal social life, however
this is understood, is facilitated or prevented. Social and political
inclusion are doubly connected: political inclusiveness may be expected
to deliver greater social inclusion; and among the aspects of
social life in which participation is sought is the political process itself.
From the perspective of RED, political inclusion is an aspect of social
inclusion.
In one sense, the whole agenda of political reform, including
policies for Scottish, Welsh and regional devolution could be presented
as an attempt to bring government closer to the people. Whether they
could or will deliver greater political inclusion is a large and important
question, beyond the scope of this book. Inclusion would mean greater
participation in processes broadly defined as political ± and with the
outcome of giving people greater real power over decisions affecting
their lives. The reconstruction of local government would be an
Delivering Social Inclusion 173
important part of this. Some of the problems about the idea and reality
of political inclusion can be illustrated by looking at the early stages of
the Blair Government itself.
On election, Blair promised to govern inclusively. Most of Labour's
references in the pre-election and immediate post-election period
were to political inclusiveness; they were about consultation and `dialogue',
about political rather than social or economic inclusion, about
process rather than outcome. Government should be democratic,
open, accountable and responsive and should eschew sectarian exclusion,
hierarchical exclusivity and adversarial style. Wider consultation
and public involvement, as well as the devolution of decisions
according to the principle of subsidiarity, should supplement elections.
Such processes might include community forums, citizens' juries,
public hearings, as well as referendums. The inclusion of those groups
in society hitherto excluded from or under-represented in the political
process should be increased in both formal and informal processes.
The most frequently stated concern was the under-representation of
women; less frequent, but regular, mention was also made of ethnic
minorities and disabled people. The inclusive society would be one
where everyone ± or every significant group ± has a voice, and where
these voices are heard either through representation on the basis of
identity ± women speak for women, black people for black people ± or
indirectly through advocacy groups or voluntary associations. Inclusive
government was signalled by the presence of women MPs and ministers,
as well as those disabled, openly lesbian or gay, or from ethnic
minorities.
Some of the problems deriving from constructing identities rather
than collectivities as the proper basis of representation can be seen by
looking at Labour's best case, women ± which also illustrates that
political inclusion may be necessary, but it is scarcely sufficient. There
were more women elected to the 1997 Parliament, and more women in
Blair's first Government, than ever before in Britain. This resulted
from a policy of having all women short-lists for a proportion of parliamentary
candidates ± a policy dropped after it was challenged as
illegal by two male party members. It may thus prove to be a fragile
achievement. Blair's honouring of the long-standing promise of a
Minister for Women with cabinet status did not inspire confidence.
The job was given to Harriet Harman as an afterthought, in addition
to the potentially conflicting brief of Secretary of State for Social
Security. Then, in an attempt to patch up the damage, Joan Ruddock
was asked to take on ministerial responsibility at a more junior level.
The Inclusive Society174
However, by this time, all the salaried ministerial positions had been
distributed (including Mandelson's post of Minister without Portfolio)
± so she acquired the work, the status, but not the pay. A Women's
Unit was set up, part of its brief being to assess the impact on women
of all policy proposals. It was given no spending budget, and some
argued that to be effective, it would need to be based in the Treasury,
with gender impact statements central to Treasury policy. Fears were
expressed that the inclusion of women in the Blair Government meant
a feminization of politics rather than an advance for feminism and the
interests of women. Skjeie argues from the Norwegian experience that
the political inclusion of women does not necessarily transform substantive
outcomes.12
Increased representation does give a higher
profile to some issues ± notably, and importantly, child care ± but
responses to these issues are routinely subordinated to conventional
party political agendas. This is exactly what happened in the dispute
over benefit cuts for lone parents ± a dispute which also illustrated
how the inclusion of women meant not only their co-option to,
but their active role in legitimizing, policies damaging to women's
interests.
Processes of informal inclusion and consultation are at least as
significant as formal presence. Blair greatly increased the number
of political advisers at Downing Street, many recruited from thinktanks
like the IPPR and Demos; these advisers were unelected,
unaccountable and overwhelmingly male. Appointments to the large
number of task forces and review bodies set up after the election
continued the co-option of unelected individuals to the policy-making
process, particularly those from the business sector or `community'.
Political inclusion crossed party boundaries. David Mellor, a Conservative
minister forced to resign after a sexual scandal, was asked to
chair the Football Task Force. Alan Howarth, who defected to Labour
from the Tories in 1996, was rewarded with a ministerial post at the
Department for Education and Employment. Pre-election collaboration
with the Liberal Democrats over plans for constitutional reform
continued after the election with a cross-party Cabinet Committee ±
although in the week of the 1997 Liberal Democrat Conference, both
Peter Mandelson and Alistair Darling warned that if the Liberal
Democrats wanted co-operation between the parties to continue, they
should stop criticizing the Government's economic policies.
Daniel argues that outside groups did gain greater access to ministers
and civil servants ± consistent with the new Clause IV commitment
to working with voluntary organizations, consumer groups and
Delivering Social Inclusion 175
other representative bodies.13
However, she said, this inclusion was
`not about participatory democracy so much as about participation in
the delivery of policy', and that `those who confuse the two things are
in for a disappointment'. Nowhere was this more apposite than in
relation to the trade unions, who were repeatedly warned to expect no
special treatment ± `fairness not favours'. Unions constituted a sectional
interest, while the business community, apparently, was not. They
were not altogether excluded from participation in the task forces,
but their representation was meagre. Trade union representatives were
invited to Downing Street in the late summer of 1997 to discuss the
manifesto commitment to union recognition, but not involved in wider
policy questions. Blair spoke at the 1997 TUC Congress, which met
under the slogan `Partners for Progress', and made it clear that any
political inclusion of the unions was conditional upon their conforming
to the new `responsible' unionism epitomized by John Monks, which
would not challenge either the policies of government or the consensual
image of the new Britain it sought to promote. Blair said he
would `watch very carefully to see how the culture of modern trade
unionism' developed. He told the unions that there were more
important battles than those over `labour law', and that they should be
concentrating on issues of skills, training, welfare to work, pensions
and the reform of the National Health Service. He ordered them to
modernize: `Modernise your political structures as we have done in
the Labour Party. Influence with this government and with me is not
determined by anything other than the persuasiveness of your arguments.
The old ways ± resolutionitis, the committee rooms, the fixing,
the small groups trying to run the show have no future. New trade
unionism ± that is your aim. Partners for Progress. That is your slogan'.
But there was no doubt who was the senior, and who the junior,
partner. Appropriate behaviour for trade unions was to be defined by
Blairite fiat, not by trade unionists themselves, and their inclusion
dependent upon this effective co-option. And it is notable that the
constituencies of legitimate identity eligible for inclusion did not
include class: for this would be to import `old' categories of conflict
into the new era of partnership.
The central question is who, and whose interests, are represented at
any level of government ± and whose interests prevail. The general
problem about the contemporary emphasis on dialogue and on `having
a voice', which in political and social theory is based on the ideas of
Jurgen Habermas, is that it gives too little recognition to the structures
of power within which that discussion takes place. Emergent decisions
The Inclusive Society176
take on the appearance of consensus, and political inclusion risks
becoming political co-option. Moreover because there are presumed
to be only differences of opinion, not conflicts of interest, dissenting
voices outside the consensus are marginalized as trouble makers.
Genuine political inclusiveness may be necessary to overcoming social
exclusion, though it is certainly not sufficient. Rhetoric about inclusiveness,
and even actual inclusion, in the processes of policy formation
must be distinguished from the outcomes of these policies.
The dirigiste management of Blair’s Government is easily understandable
as repressing conflicts which might otherwise divide the
Party within and beyond Parliament. What is less immediately obvious
is that the underpinning model of society on which the third way is
based is one in which conflicts of interest are suppressed. It is this
which leads to the instability of the third way and its tendency to fall
into authoritarianism. This model, with its consequences and limits, is
the subject of the next chapter.
Delivering Social Inclusion 177
Notes
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION
1. Andersen, Paul and Mann, Nyta (1997) Safety First: The Making of New
Labour, London: Granta Books; Davies, A.J. (1996) To Build a new
Jerusalem: The British Labour Party from Kier Hardy to Tony Blair, London:
Abacus; Jones, Tudor (1996) Remaking the Labour Party: From
Gaitskell to Blair, London: Routledge; Panitch, Leo and Leys, Colin
(1997) The End of Parliamentary Socialism: From New Left to New
Labour, London: Verso; Shaw, Eric (1994) The Labour Party Since 1979,
London: Routledge.
2. Layard, Richard (1997) What Labour Can Do, London: Warner Books.
3. Silver, Hilary (1994) ‘Social exclusion and social solidarity: three paradigms’
International Labour Review Vol. 133, Nos. 5–6, pp. 531–78.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
1. Murgatroyd, Linda and Neuburger, Henry (1997) ‘A Household Satellite
Account for the UK’ Economic Trends No. 527, October: 63–71; Waring,
Marilyn (1988) If Women Counted, London: Macmillan.
2. These gender differences are almost certainly understated. The methodology
does not allow people to record themselves as doing more than
one thing at once. Respondents are expressly instructed that doing
housework while caring for children should be recorded as housework
rather than care of children. If this is extended to activities such as eating
and leisure (which are not counted as unpaid work), the child care
responsibilities of women will be seriously undercounted, and the differences
between men and women reduced.
3. Glucksmann, Miriam (1995) ‘Why ‘‘Work’’? Gender and the ‘‘Total
Social Organisation of Labour’’ ’ Gender, Work and Organisation Vol. 2,
No. 2, p. 69, 67.
4. Townsend, Peter (1979) Poverty in the United Kingdom, Harmondsworth:
Penguin p. 32.
5. Ibid., pp. 399, 249.
6. Ibid., p. 564.
7. Duncan, Simon and Edwards, Rosalind (1997) Single Mothers in an
International Context: Mothers or Workers? London: UCL Press.
8. Townsend’s (1979) attitude to unpaid work, and to the position of women
more generally, was not wholly consistent. In talking about levels of
unemployment, he argued that the numbers would be far higher if the
‘under-utilized productive capacity of non-employed women with or
without dependants’, together with other economically inactive groups
were to be included. On the other hand, he was concerned that the shift
from manufacturing to service industries would ‘create a major new
237
source of inequality and poverty in society’ as older men were displaced
from the labour market in favour of women. He predicted that ‘a larger
number of physically active middle-aged males will be pensioned off to
facilitate occupational opportunity for women’ p. 682.
9. Townsend, Peter (1997) ‘Redistribution: The Strategic Alternative to
Privatisation’, in Alan Walker and Carol Walker, Britain Divided: The
growth of social exclusion in the 1980s and 1990s, London: CPAG, p. 269.
10. Walker, Alan and Walker, Carol, (eds) (1997) Britain Divided: The
growth of social exclusion in the 1980s and 1990s, London: CPAG.
11. Ibid: 8.
12. Harker, Lisa (1996) A Secure Future? Social security and the family in a
changing world, London: CPAG; Harker, Lisa (1997) ‘New Paths for
Social Security’ in Alan Walker and Carol Walker, Britain Divided: The
growth of social exclusion in the 1980s and 1990s, London: CPAG.
13. Walker, op cit., p. 8.
14. Golding, Peter (1986) Excluding the Poor, London: CPAG.
15. Lister, Ruth (1990) The Exclusive Society: Citizenship and the Poor,
London: CPAG.
16. Goodin, Robert E. (1996) ‘Inclusion and Exclusion’, European Journal
of Sociology Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 343–71.
17. Marshall, T.H. (1950) ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ in T.H. Marshall
and Tom Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class, London: Pluto Press
1992, p. 8.
18. Ibid., p. 44.
19. Pateman, Carole (1988) The Sexual Contract, Cambridge: Polity Press;
Walby, Sylvia (1994) ‘Is Citizenship Gendered?’ Sociology Vol. 28, No.
2, pp. 379–95.
20. Lister, op cit., p. 68.
21. Hall, Stuart and Jacques, Martin (1983) The Politics of Thatcherism,
London: Lawrence and Wishart; Levitas, Ruth (1986) (ed.) The Ideology
of the New Right, Cambridge: Polity; Gamble, Andrew (1988) The Free
Economy and The Strong State, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
22. Cole on the Dole, 19 February 1993.
23. Townsend (1979) op cit., p. 920.
24. Field, Frank (1990) Losing Out: The Emergence of Britain’s Underclass,
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, p. 101.
25. Dahrendorf, Ralf (1987) ‘The erosion of citizenship and its consequences
for us all’ New Statesman, 12 June, p. 13.
26. Ibid.
27. Field, op cit., pp. 7, 107.
28. Ibid., pp. 155, 107.
29. Ibid., p. 8.
30. Field, Frank (1995) Making Welfare Work: Reconstructing Welfare for the
Millennium, London: Institute of Community Studies.
31. Murray, Charles (1990) The Emerging British Underclass, London: IEA,
p. 23.
32. Ibid., pp. 4, 17.
33. Ibid., p. 7.
34. Murray, Charles (1994) Underclass: The Crisis Deepens, London: IEA.
Notes238
35. Bewick, Tom (1997) ‘The poverty of US welfare reform: lessons from
California’, Working Brief 87, August/September, pp. 21–7.
36. Panorama, 29 September 1997; Rogers, J. Jean (1997) ‘Making welfare
work’, New Statesman 29 August, pp. 17–18.
37. Macnicol, John (1987) ‘In pursuit of the Underclass’, Journal of Social
Policy, Vol. 16, pp. 293–318; Mann, Kirk (1992) The Making of an
English Underclass, Milton Keynes: Open University Press; Morris,
Lydia (1994) Dangerous Classes: The Underclass and Social Citizenship,
London: Routledge.
38. Thinking Aloud, 12 November 1987, ‘Is There a New Underclass in
British Society?’ Channel 4.
39. Westergaard, John (1992) ‘About and Beyond the ‘‘Underclass’’ ’,
Sociology Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 575–87.
40. Oppenheim, Carey (1993) Poverty: The Facts, London: CPAG.
41. Dean, Hartley and Taylor-Gooby, Peter (1992) Dependency Culture: the
explosion of a myth, New York: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.
42. Lister op cit., p. 26.
43. Adonis, Andrew and Pollard, Stephen (1997) A Class Act: The Myth of
Classless Society, London: Hamish Hamilton, p. 16.
44. Ibid., p. 13.
45. Duffy, K. (1995) Social Exclusion and Human Dignity in Europe, Council
of Europe.
46. Silver op cit.
47. Spicker, Paul (1997) ‘Exclusion’, Journal of Common Market Studies
35(1): 133–143; Evans, Martin, Paugam, Serge and Prelis, Joseph
A. (1995) Chunnel Vision: Poverty, social exclusion and the debate on
social welfare in France and Britain, STICERD working paper WSP/115,
London: London School of Economics.
48. Spicker op cit.
49. Room, Graham (1995) (ed.) Beyond the Threshold, Bristol: Policy Press.
50. Sostris (1997) Social Strategies in Risk Societies: Social Exclusion in
Comparative Perspective, Sostris Working Paper 1, London: University
of East London.
51. EC (1994b) European Social Policy: a way forward for the Union, Brussels:
European Commission; EC (1994a) Growth, competitiveness,
employment: the challenges and ways forward into the 21st century,
Brussels: European Commission.
52. EC (1994a) op cit., p. 3.
53. EC (1994b) op cit., p. 49.
54. EC (1994a) op cit., pp. 15–16.
55. EC (1994b) op cit., p. 49.
56. Ibid., pp. 35–6, 51–2.
57. EC (1994a) p. 136.
58. EC (1994b) op cit., p. 49; EC (1994a) op cit., p. 134.
59. EC (1994a) op cit., pp. 9,11.
60. Ibid., pp. 148–9.
61. Maier, Friederike (1994) Equal Opportunities for Women and Men: Wage
and Non-wage Labour Costs, Social Security and Public Funds to Combat
Unemployment, Brussels: European Commission; Rees, Teresa (1994)
Notes 239
Equal Opportunities for Women and Men: Equality into Education and
Training Policies, Brussels: European Commission.
62. EC (1994a) op cit., pp. 12, 15.
63. Ibid., p. 54.
64. Ibid., pp. 15–16, 139.
65. Ackers, Louise (1998) Shifting Spaces: Women, Citizenship and migration
within the European Union, Bristol: Policy Press.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
1. Thompson and du Gay (1997) ‘Future imperfect’ Nexus, Winter/Spring,
pp. 8–9.
2. Twigg, Stephen Fabian Review Vol. 109, No. 2, p. 23.
3. Cohen, Nick (1997) ‘Totally Wonkers’, Observer, 9 March, p. 20.
4. New Statesman 15 January 1993, p. 5.
5. The membership of the Commission on Social Justice was: Sir Gordon
Borrie, QC; Professor A.B. Atkinson, Oxford; Anita Bhalla, Asian
Resource Centre, Birmingham; Professor John Gennard, Strathclyde
University; The Very Reverend John Gladwin, Provost of Sheffield and
Bishop-Elect of Guildford; Christopher Haskins, Chairman, Northern
Foods plc; Patricia Hewitt; Dr Penelope Leach, Fellow, British Psychological
Society; Professor Ruth Lister, Loughborough University;
Professor David Marquand, University of Sheffield; Bert Massie,
Director, Royal Association for Disability and Rehabilitation; Emma
MacLennan, Vice-Chair, Low Pay Unit; Dr Eithne McLaughlin,
Queens University, Belfast; Stephen Webb, Institute for Fiscal Studies;
Margaret Wheeler, UNISON; Professor Bernard Williams, Oxford.
6. Beresford, Peter and Turner, Michael (1997) It’s Our Welfare, Report of
the Citizens’ Commission on the future of the Welfare State, London:
National Institute for Social Work.
7. Commission on Social Justice (CSJ) (1994) Social Justice: Strategies for
Social Renewal, London: Vintage, p. 96 (emphasis added).
8. Townsend, Peter (1995) ‘Persuasion and Conformity: An assessment of
the Borrie report on Social Justice’, New Left Review Vol. 213, pp. 137–50.
9. Milne, Kirsty (1995) ‘Welfare Statement’, New Statesman and Society, 27
January, p. 21.
10. CSJ op cit., p. 95.
11. Ibid.
12. Andersen and Mann op cit.
13. This was part of the Australian ‘Working Nation’ initiative, which, like
New Labour’s New Deal, was introduced by a right-wing Labour
administration. See Finn, Dan (1997) Working Nation: Welfare Reform
and the Australian Job Compact for the long term unemployed, London:
Unemployment Unit.
14. Showstack Sassoon, Anne (1996) ‘Beyond pessimism of the intellect:
Agendas for Social Justice and Change’ in Mark Perryman (ed.) The
Blair Agenda, London: Lawrence and Wishart, p. 159.
Notes240
50. Mulgan (1997a) op cit., p. 202.
51. Ibid., p. 137.
52. Ibid., p. 185.
53. Guy, Will (1996) ‘Health for All’ in Ruth Levitas and Will Guy (eds)
Interpreting Official Statistics London: Routledge; Wilkinson, Richard
(1997) Unhealthy Societies: From Inequality to Wellbeing, London: Rout-
ledge.
54. Blair, 2 June 1997, op cit.
55. Ibid.
56. Blair, 24 January 1997, ‘The 21st
Century Welfare State’ Social and
Economic Policy Conference, Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.
57. Blair, 2 June 1997, op cit.
58. Mandelson, Observer 17 August 1997.
59. Blair, 29 January 1996, op cit.
60. Harman, 13 November 1997, op cit.
61. Brown, 11 September 1997, op cit.
62. Mandelson, 14 August 1997, ‘Labour’s Next Steps: Tackling Social
Exclusion’, Fabian Society lecture.
63. Harman, 13 November 1997, op cit.
64. Plant, Raymond (1997b) ‘The Labour Market, Citizenship and Social
Exclusion’, CASE Seminar, London School of Economics, 10 December.
65. Campbell, Bea (1993) Goliath: Britain’s Dangerous Places, London:
Methuen.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 8
1. Downes, David, Guardian 25 November 1997, ‘Prison does wonders for
the jobless figures’; Western, Bruce and Beckett, Katherine (1997) ‘How
unregulated in the U.S. Labour Market? The Penal System as a Labor
Market Institution’, paper presented to the American Sociological
Association, Toronto.
2. Finn, Dan (1997) Working Nation: Welfare Reform and the Australian Job
Compact for the Long Term Unemployed, London: Unemployment Unit.
3. Townsend, Peter (1996) ‘The Struggle for Independent Statistics on
Poverty’ in Ruth Levitas and Will Guy (eds) Interpreting Official Statistics,
London: Routledge.
4. Perri 6 (1997b) ‘Social exclusion: time to be optimistic’ in The Wealth and
Poverty of Networks: Tackling Social Exclusion, Demos Collection 12,
London: Demos, p. 3.
5. Observer 7 December 1997.
6. Guardian 30 December 1997.
7. Perri 6 (1997b) op cit., p. 6; Schneider, Jo Anne (1997) ‘Welfare-tonetwork’
in The Wealth and Poverty of Networks: Tackling Social Exclusion,
Demos Collection 12, London: Demos, p. 30.
8. Perri 6 (1997) Escaping Poverty, London: Demos.
9. Hall, Peter A. (1997) ‘Social capital: a fragile asset’ in The Wealth and
Poverty of Networks: Tackling Social Exclusion, Demos Collection 12,
London: Demos, p. 35.
Notes 253
10. Stewart, John (1997/8) ‘And the SERA response’, New Ground 53, p. 13.
11. Ibid.
12. Skjeie, Hege (1991) ‘The Rhetoric of Difference: On Women’s Inclusion
into Political Elites’, Politics and Society Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 133–63.
13. Daniel, Caroline (1997) ‘May the taskforce be with you’, New Statesman
1 August, p. 29.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 9
1. Durkheim, E. (1964 [1893]) The Division of Labour in Society, New
York: Free Press.
2. Gray (1997) op cit., pp. 19–20.
3. Watts Miller, Willie (1996) Durkheim, Morals and Modernity, London:
UCL Press, p. 246.
4. Soros, George Guardian 18 January 1997.
5. Durkheim, op cit., p. 211.
6. Levitas, Ruth (1998) ‘Will Hutton: Closet Durkheimian’ in Paul Bagguley
and Jeff Hearn (eds) Transforming Politics: Power and Resistance,
London: Macmillan.
7. Watts Miller op cit., p. 4.
8. Ibid., p. 90.
9. Durkheim, cited in Giddens, Anthony (1986) (ed.) Durkheim on Politics
and the State, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 8.
10. Stanley, John L. (ed.) (1976) From Georges Sorel: Essays in Socialism
and Philosophy, Oxford University Press.
11. Durkheim, op cit., p. 17.
12. Ibid., p. 16.
13. Durkheim, cited in Giddens, op cit., p. 21.
14. Durkheim, op cit., p. 242.
15. Ibid., p. 2.
16. Pahl, R.E. (1991), ‘The Search for Social Cohesion: from Durkheim to
the European Commission’, European Journal of Sociology, Vol. 32,
No. 2, p. 348.
17. Lehmann, Jennifer (1994) Durkheim and Women, Nebraska: University
of Nebraska Press.
18. Gilman, Charlotte Perkins (1966 [1898]) Women and Economics, New
York: Harper Torchbooks.
19. Durkheim, cited in Watts Miller, op cit., pp. 75–6.
20. Durkheim, Emile (1952 [1897]) Suicide, London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul.
21. Durkheim, cited in Giddens op cit., p. 31.
22. Ibid., p. 238.
23. Durkheim (1964) op cit., pp. 377–8.
24. Durkheim, cited in Watts-Miller op cit p. 254.
25. Fenton, Steve (1984) Durkheim and Modern Sociology, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; Giddens (1971) Capitalism and Modern
Social Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Giddens (1978)
Notes254
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A BEPA report
August 2014
Acknowledgements
This report owes much to the personal commitment, knowledge and thoughts of Agnès
Hubert, Maria da Graça Carvalho and Pierre Goudin of the Bureau of European Policy
Advisers, with the support and input of Baudouin Regout, under the supervision of JeanClaude
Thébault and Maria Angeles Benitez Salas.
A number of European Commission officials from various policy departments also contributed
to this report, in particular all the members of the interservice group on social
innovation.
BEPA would like to thank all the participating services for their very useful work and
comments, especially reflected in part II of the report, namely DG AGRI, COMM, CONNECT,
EAC, ECHO, EMPL, ENER, ENTR, HR, MARKT, MOVE, REGIO, RTD, SANCO and TAXUD.
Extracts from reports produced or commissioned by the European Commission have
also been used in various chapters or sections of the report and are typically acknowledged
in footnotes mentioning the relevant references and internet links.
BEPA would also like to thank Sid-Ahmed Talbi and Carmen Tresguerres for their help.
Finally, we are very grateful to Aurélie Therace for her graphical and publishing support
in producing the report.
Disclaimer
The analysis contained in this report does not necessarily reflect the views of the European
Commission.
Table of contents
Acknowledgements...........................................................................................................................2
Introduction...........................................................................................................................................8
PART I
Social innovation, a new path..................................................................................................11
1. Social innovation as a driver for change..........................................................13
1.1. An evolving context.......................................................................................................14
1.2. The social market economy concept .................................................................17
1.2.1. The origins of the concept........................................................................................17
1.2.2. The social market economy in the European arena...................................18
1.2.3. A new strategy for the Single Market ...............................................................18
1.3. Ecosystems for social innovation..........................................................................20
1.3.1. An approach to the concept of ecosystem......................................................20
1.3.2. Main components of an ecosystem for social innovation......................21
1.3.3. Examples of ecosystems for social innovation.............................................22
1.4. Measurement of social impact...............................................................................23
1.4.1. Evidence-based policies.............................................................................................25
1.4.2. Funding/financing social innovation....................................................................26
1.4.3. Indicators for a socially innovative society.....................................................28
2. Leading by example: how public sector innovation supports
social innovation............................................................................................................31
2.1. The Commission’s commitment to supporting public
sector innovation............................................................................................................31
2.2. Powering European public sector innovation: towards a new
architecture.......................................................................................................................32
3. Achievements and lessons learned.....................................................................35
3.1. Deepening our understanding and knowledge of social
innovation .........................................................................................................................36
3.1.1. The Mapping study........................................................................................................36
3.1.2. Social innovation research in the European Union.....................................37
3.2. Instruments to improve the ecosystem............................................................37
3.2.1. The social economy......................................................................................................37
3.2.2. Microfinance......................................................................................................................39
3.2.3. Incubation..........................................................................................................................41
4 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
3.2.4. Workplace innovation..................................................................................................41
3.2.5. Changes in governance..............................................................................................42
3.3. Specific examples of actions from the field...................................................42
3.3.1. Social inclusion................................................................................................................43
3.3.2. Migration............................................................................................................................43
3.3.3. Urban regeneration.......................................................................................................44
3.3.4. Health and ageing.........................................................................................................45
3.3.5. Social innovation and the environment.............................................................46
3.3.6. Regional strategies.......................................................................................................47
3.3.7. Lessons learned from social innovation achievements...........................48
3.4. Social entrepreneurship to revive the social economy.............................49
4. Conclusion: scanning the future to shape the future................................51
Europe’s Societal Challenges...................................................................................52
So what future for Europe and which solutions? .........................................53
What will social enterprise look like in Europe by 2020?.........................54
The way forward.............................................................................................................55
Improve governance in relation to social innovation..................................55
Focus on knowledge.....................................................................................................56
Support, encourage and improve the business environment.................56
PART II
Main developments in EU policies.........................................................................................57
Executive summary.......................................................................................................................58
1. The Dominant Policy Framework 2010-20: smart, sustainable
and inclusive Growth...................................................................................................59
1.1. Europe 2020 flagship initiatives............................................................................60
1.1.1. A resource-efficient Europe......................................................................................61
1.1.2. An industrial policy for the globalisation era.................................................61
1.1.3. Digital Agenda for Europe .......................................................................................62
1.1.4. Innovation Union............................................................................................................63
1.1.5. Youth on the Move........................................................................................................64
1.1.6. The agenda for new skills and jobs.....................................................................65
1.1.7. The European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion.............66
1.2. Consolidating the Single Market: Single Market Acts
and the Social Business Initiative .......................................................................67
5T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
1.3. The environment and resource efficiency.........................................................69
a. Making energy an integral part of governance
and management...................................................................................................69
b. Empowering the consumer................................................................................70
c. The emergence of the energy-literate prosumer..................................71
d. Social lessons from Energy technology demonstration....................71
1.4. A new approach to social policy: the Social Investment
Package (SIP)....................................................................................................................71
2. Main programmes, action plans and supporting schemes.....................75
2.1. European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF).....................................76
2.1.1. European Social Fund..................................................................................................77
2.1.2. European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).............................................78
2.1.3. The European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)......79
2.2. Horizon 2020: coupling research to innovation............................................81
2.3. The Programme for Employment and Social Innovation EaSI
(2014-20) to follow the PROGRESS programme.........................................82
a. Social innovation and social policy experimentation
supported through the PROGRESS programme.....................................82
b. Targeted support to social policy innovation projects through
direct funding through the EaSI programme...........................................83
c. The Programme for Employment and Social
Innovation (EaSI)......................................................................................................84
2.4. Other programmes and action plans ................................................................85
2.4.1 The COSME programme: the competitiveness of SMEs............................85
2.4.2. Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs programme ...........................................85
2.4.3. The Erasmus+ programme for education,
training, youth and sport (2014-20)..................................................................86
2.4.4. The new Creative Europe Programme (2014-20) .....................................87
2.4.5. Innovation for a Sustainable Future – The Eco-innovation
Action Plan (EcoAP)......................................................................................................87
3. Initiatives and instruments.......................................................................................89
3.1. Governance and coordination.................................................................................89
3.1.1. Social innovation debate with policymakers..................................................90
3.1.2. Powering public sector innovation........................................................................92
3.1.3. Policy guidance on social innovation..................................................................93
3.1.4. New practices for making policy...........................................................................94
3.1.4.1. Expert groups and networks....................................................................................95
6 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
3.1.4.2. European Innovation Partnerships.......................................................................96
a. The European Innovation Partnership on Active and Healthy
Ageing (EIP-AHA).....................................................................................................96
b. The European Innovation Partnership on Agricultural
Productivity and Sustainability (EIP-AGRI)................................................97
c. The European Innovation Partnership on Water.....................................97
d. The European Innovation Partnership on Raw Materials .................98
e. The European Innovation Partnership on Smart Cities.......................98
3.1.4.3. The Open Innovation Strategy and Policy Group.........................................98
3.1.4.4. Living Labs........................................................................................................................99
3.1.4.5. Futurium.............................................................................................................................99
3.1.4.6. Participatory leadership in the European Commission ........................100
3.1.5. Create an optimised regulatory environment.............................................100
3.1.5.1. Simplification of the European Cooperative Regulation.......................100
3.1.5.2. Proposal for a European Foundation...............................................................101
3.1.5.3. Study on the situation of Mutual Societies and their
cross-border activities.............................................................................................102
3.1.5.4. European Statute for other forms of social enterprises
such as non-profit enterprises............................................................................102
3.1.5.5. Reform of public procurement: enhancement of quality in
the award process......................................................................................................103
3.1.5.6. Increasing and including new aid categories in the revision
of the General Block Exemption Regulation for state aid....................104
3.1.5.7. Employee financial participation........................................................................104
3.2. Financing capacities and facilities.....................................................................105
3.2.1. The EaSI programme for social innovation..................................................105
3.2.2. Access to venture capital – The European Venture
Capital Funds............................................................................................................... 105
3.2.3. The European regulatory framework for social investment funds:
the European Union Social Entrepreneurship Funds (EuSEF)............ 105
3.2.4. The development of microcredit/microfinance...........................................106
a. European Progress Microfinance Facility.................................................106
b. European Code of Good Conduct for Microcredit Provision...........107
3.2.5. Crowdfunding for social entrepreneurs..........................................................108
3.2.6. The EIF impact investing scheme .....................................................................109
3.2.7. Dormant funds.............................................................................................................109
3.2.8. Best practice sharing between Member States regarding
the use of capital accumulated in social enterprises
and in particular asset locks................................................................................ 109
7T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
3.3. Capacity building and recognition.....................................................................110
3.3.1. Recognising social innovators..............................................................................110
3.3.1.1. Mapping of the social enterprises sector, business models,
economic weight, tax regimes, identification of best practices........110
3.3.1.2. Database of labels and certifications of social enterprises...............110
3.3.1.3. Social innovation prizes..........................................................................................111
3.3.2. Networks..........................................................................................................................113
3.3.2.1. Networks of Incubators for Social Innovation............................................113
3.3.2.2. Social Innovation Europe (SIE)............................................................................113
3.3.2.3. The Collective Awareness Platforms initiative (CAPS)...........................115
3.3.2.4. Digital Social Platforms..........................................................................................117
3.3.2.5. Workplace Innovation Network...........................................................................118
3.3.2.6. Multi-stakeholder platform for corporate social responsibility........118
3.3.2.7. Policy innovation design.........................................................................................119
3.3.3. Empowering people...................................................................................................119
3.3.3.1. Skills, training and education...............................................................................120
3.3.3.2. Europe for Citizens Programme.........................................................................122
3.3.3.3. Network of twinned towns ...................................................................................123
3.3.3.4. Contribute to change - Young Women in Political Careers.................123
3.3.3.5. Citizens’ dialogues.....................................................................................................124
3.3.3.6 Other activities..............................................................................................................125
3.4. Research..........................................................................................................................125
3.4.1. ‘Social Sciences and Humanities’ and ‘Science with
and for Society’........................................................................................................... 126
3.4.2. Social innovation in other thematic areas of research ........................128
3.4.3. Digital social innovation..........................................................................................128
3.4.4. Pilot projects in the areas of e-Inclusion, e-Health,
e-Government, e-Learning and mobility....................................................... 129
3.4.5. Research on behaviour ...........................................................................................131
ANNEX I
Examples of participatory projects convened
by the European Commission�����������������������������������������������������������������������������135
ANNEX II
A ‘checklist’ for citizens’ deliberations�����������������������������������������������������������139
8 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
Introduction
In recent years, many initiatives and events have been carried out to develop
pragmatic and participatory solutions to social and environmental
problems that have been made more pressing by the crisis and have been
addressed inadequately or not at all by either the market or the state.
Converging analyses indicate that we are (or should be) on course for economic renewal
and institutional change. A response based on another way to produce value, with less
focus on financial profit and more on real demands or needs is indeed an attractive
premise for reconsidering production and redistribution systems.
In this context, social innovations, which are emerging all over the world, are still small
in scale, but they are being echoed by changes in thinking and are delivering more and
more effective and relevant solutions. The notion has gained ground that social innovation
is not only about responding to pressing social needs and addressing the societal
challenges of climate change, ageing or poverty, but is also a mechanism for achieving
systemic change. It is seen as a way of tackling the underlying causes of social problems
rather than just alleviating the symptoms.
Some recent international reports have analysed and explained the emerging role of
social innovation vis-à-vis economic and societal challenges from different angles:
yy two successive OECD reports1
have largely linked its emergence to rising inequalities.
Furthermore, they argue that the crisis has revealed the weakness of the current
economic system of redistribution;
yy the 2013 International Labour Organisation report2
notes that, in advanced economies,
the challenge is to stimulate job creation while addressing macroeconomic
imbalances; and
yy taking a longer term perspective, the Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations
has published a report3
on successes and failures in addressing global challenges
over recent decades. The report calls for a radical shake-up in politics and
business to embed long-term thinking and provides practical recommendations for
action in order to create a more resilient, inclusive and sustainable future.
The European Union itself has reacted promptly to this evolution. A number of policy
measures, such as pilot programmes funded by the Structural Funds, have been initiated
to empower various actors to address collaboratively the needs of their community.4
1	Growing unequal?, 2008;
http://www.oecd.org/social/soc/growingunequalincomedistributionandpovertyinoecdcountries.htm
and Divided we stand, 2011; http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/dividedwestandwhyinequalitykeepsrising.htm.
2	Repairing the economic and social fabric (ILO, World of work report 2013).
3	Now for the Long Term, 2013;
http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/commission/Oxford_Martin_Now_for_the_Long_Term.pdf.
4	Local Employment Initiatives, EQUAL, LEADER, URBAN, …; see in this respect the 25 year anniversary of AIEDL;
http://www.aeidl.eu/en.html.
9P A R T I – S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N , A N E W P A T H
In 2009, the Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA) organised a workshop5
with
experts, civil society organisations, policymakers and social innovators. Following this
workshop, President Barroso asked BEPA to investigate the definition and raison d’être
of social innovation, document the Commission’s involvement in this field, identify the
barriers to its development and suggest avenues for improvement. At that time, research
on this topic had been mainly empirical and the first BEPA report, published
in 2010, leveraged examples from the field in order to illustrate the emergence of
the social innovation movement and contribute a light conceptual framework with a
broad definition of social innovations, which underlined its collaborative process and
outcome-oriented nature.6
Within a few years, policy support for social innovation has moved towards the centre of
the political agenda. Inside the European Commission, the number of services involved
has grown and a ‘social innovation’ culture has spread in support of the Europe 2020
Strategy and its implementation.
Some of these services have developed strong legal and institutional mechanisms aimed
primarily at supporting social innovation. This is the case for the internal market services,
where the Social Business Initiative (SBI) is supported by a permanent stakeholders
group (GECES) and a list of 11 actions to be followed up. This initiative has given birth to
many projects and achievements, among which the ‘Strasbourg event’ of January 2014
(cf. Part I, § 3.4) was a hallmark.
In other policy areas, some services upgraded the policy relevance of social innovation:
yy Transport and mobility are now viewed as areas of potential for innovation with a
strong social impact. Indeed, these areas use new working methods (such as public
taxis for people with disabilities, driven by pensioners) combined with technology
(safety sensors in cars and smartphone-based urban transport planners) and social
innovation to support the uptake of new services (shared electric vehicle fleets and
development of new logistics services);
yy At present, innovation in the humanitarian aid sector is almost exclusively focused
on technological innovations. However, when looking at long-term risk and the development
of prevention and risk reduction, the human factor in social innovation
could be a strong lever. The European Commission’s contribution to the World Humanitarian
Summit in 2016 will concentrate more on social innovation; and
yy The improvement of knowledge on social innovation through research, platforms,
hubs and networks of researchers and transformative tools to open policy perspectives
is increasingly supported in various policy areas such as education and culture,
health and consumption, communication or technology.
The services that have been most involved in this matter from the beginning (Employment
and Social Affairs, Enterprise, Regional Policy, Agriculture, and Research and Innovation)
have substantially increased their contributions.
Finally, even internally, the European Commission increasingly uses participatory training
courses and events for human resources in a more socially innovative way.
5	http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/activities/conferences_workshops/socinnov_jan-2009_en.htm.
6	http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/publications_pdf/social_innovation.pdf.
10 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
All these developments – changes in the economic and social context, policy developments,
particularly in the EU, in the social field, the development of new analytical
frameworks – have led BEPA to update the initial report it produced in 2010 with the
active participation of all Commission services, reflecting their increasing involvement in
supporting social innovation.
The first part of the report discusses the general context in which these policies and
programmes have emerged and the developments which they relied upon to grow. It
focuses on relevant changes that have occurred – and are still ongoing – since the publication
of the first BEPA report. The first part starts by presenting social innovation as
a driver for change, before listing some main achievements and lessons learned from a
variety of examples from the field. Finally, it suggests some recommendations for future
policymakers.
The second part of the report presents factually, and as comprehensively as possible,
the leading 2010-20 policy framework, the main programmes and supporting schemes
and the initiatives and instruments established by the Commission to support social
innovation, based on the contributions of participating services.
PART I
Social innovation,
a new path
12 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
In 2009, when for the first time the European Commission organised a
workshop on social innovation, it was an attempt to capture a subject that
was becoming increasingly topical.
Since then, although most of the contextual elements contained in the
first BEPA report have been retained and even expanded, some elements
of the landscape have changed significantly. This part of the report intends
to point out these changes. It first presents social innovation as a
driver for change before focusing on the growing role of the public sector
in overcoming the barriers to social innovation, developing some of the
achievements made and lessons learned in recent years and concluding
with some recommendations to pave the way forward.
1. Social innovation as
a driver for change
The recent dynamic combination of interests, institutions and ideas for
the promotion of social innovation has been embedded in wider political,
technological and economic changes which have affected and will continue
to affect the development of social innovation in the current decade.
A significant change in the policy background has been the closer political attention
paid to redefining the relationship between the social and the economic spheres.7
The
economic concepts of capital and investment have become social policy instruments
and corporate social responsibility is shifting from being a matter of charity to one of
inclusion. This change has been conceptually supported in particular by the revival at EU
level of the concept of the social market economy, which has shaped the recent exercise
to deepen the Single Market and, in so doing, has secured a place for social innovation
at the core of EU policies.
The second change that we have identified as significant for the future is linked to the
production of social innovations. Mobilising people and resources around a novel idea
has never been easy (cf. Henri Dunant creating the Red Cross). This is only the first
step of many.8
Each step entails a process of co-creation which initiates the next one.
Together with the search for a favourable economic, legal, social ‘milieu’ to generate
co-creation, the concept of ecosystems has been borrowed from biology through management
science to describe the environments where social innovations emerge, grow
and thrive. We will explore how this concept can help to defragment mental ‘silos’, work
across boundaries and facilitate the sharing of information and knowledge, and identify
the role and interest of public authorities in enabling social innovation ecosystems.
The third change is related to measurement issues, which have become increasingly
important as social innovation initiatives have mushroomed. Measuring social innovation
should indeed help to achieve some crucial objectives, such as proving that it is an
effective and sustainable way to respond to societal needs or showing that social and
environmental value creation is central to the human and ecological sustainability of
societies.
7	Social innovations, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, edited by T. J. Hamalainen and R.
Heiskala, © Sitra, 2007.
8	See the six different stages for the production of social innovation identified in the first BEPA report, p. 54, or
Ten Practical Steps to Implement Social Innovation in the Guide to Social Innovation.
14 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
1.1. An evolving context
‘We are at the dawn of something new’ – emphatic rhetoric or a description of what
was filling the room? This remark from the podium during the ‘Social entrepreneurs
have your say’ event in January 2014 in Strasbourg illustrates the state of mind of the
hundreds of ‘core actors’ from all over Europe who attended the meeting. They were
not only describing their perceptions but expressing a wish to be part of this ‘something
new’.
From the stakeholders’ workshop held in 2009 with the President of the Commission,
developments in policymaking circles – inside and outside the European Commission –
are palpable. As already explained in the first BEPA social innovation report, the growing
interest in social innovation has come from the continuous and increased need of public
authorities, civil society organisations, private corporations and individuals to respond
to the new social risks with new and more effective approaches and shrinking budgets.
The crisis has enhanced that process. The new participation and sharing ethos of the
social networks generation, as well as the renewed necessity for Europe to develop its
innovation capabilities and the mounting interest in quality of life, are boosting factors.
Since the beginning of the decade, three major developments have emerged.
yy the players have evolved: social players have overcome their first negative reaction
of seeing social innovation only as a partial privatisation of welfare, which is the
state’s responsibility. They have now become active participants in the development
of social innovations at local, national and European levels.9
In all Member States,
representatives of the national and local authorities, social entrepreneurs and social
economy organisations, the banking and finance sector and the academic and university
sector play an active part in the consultative multi-stakeholders group set
up by the Commission in 201210
and large groups of citizens all over the world are
joining what has been called ‘a social innovation movement’.11
Traditional economic
players have also radically changed their vision as the idea that social innovation is
about bringing solutions to some of the complex problems of today is seen as nec-
essary.12
The financial world at large is also taking a strong interest in the sector by
developing ethical investment products, including ‘social and environmental impact
financing’;
yy the institutions are also changing: public authorities, in particular in the social, health
and education fields, are committed both to being innovative inside and promoting
new forms of financing, partnerships and alliances outside in order to improve their
services to users and involve stakeholders; and
yy last but not least, ideas, the third corner of the action triangle, have also developed
and spread. The amount of research, projects, experiments, debates, documents,
books, events produced on social innovation since the beginning of the decade is impressive.
A body of literature now exists to frame the various terminology sets in the
social innovation galaxy, and new research continues to explore definitions but also
9	See social platform position paper on social innovation http://www.socialplatform.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/02/20131203_SocialPlatform_PositionPaper_social_innovation.pdf.
10	GECES http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/social_business/expert-group/index_en.htm.
11	Unger Mangabeiro, Harvard Law School; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9c3PppXk1w.
12	The Solution Revolution: How business, government and social enterprises are teaming up to solve society’s
toughest problems, William D. Eggers and Paul Macmillan (Harvard Business review press, 2013).
15P A R T I – S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N , A N E W P A T H
investment models, development and evaluation methodologies from an empirical
as well as a conceptual perspective and the underpinnings of social innovation.
EU funded research has played a crucial role in this field by funding comparative
research on a large scale, encouraging both academic excellence and the practical
application of results.
We undoubtedly know more now about this ‘volatile’ or ‘quasi’ concept13
of social innovation,
the governance structures and the role of public authorities, the capacity building,
the financing capacities needed to allow social innovations to emerge, grow, scale
up and spread. We know more about how social innovations are useful to local welfare
systems and services and how they contribute to poverty reduction, combating inequalities
and changing lifestyles. We also know more about their conditions for sustainability
and the views of stakeholders. Empirical research has helped to identify where change
is happening and needs to be encouraged. Conceptual research has achieved milestones
in defining and framing what is really at stake. As argued by Geoff Mulgan,14
‘[s]ocial
innovation is an asset to discover the future through action rather than believing it can
be discovered solely through analysis’.
Furthermore, the picture would not be complete if at this point we did not address the
emergence of a phenomenon that significantly affects social innovation: the rise of a
hyperconnected society.
The rise of the collaborative economy – from AirBnB (the social networking service for
bed and breakfast) to car sharing or ‘Code4share’ to ‘Wikipedia’ – is indeed a characteristic
of the recent period which goes beyond just inventing new business models.
Digital social innovation is a new kind of innovation enabled by the network effect of the
internet, which is leading to new models of collaborative production and content sharing
which radically change the competition and supply and demand equations of traditional
business models. On this issue, a study conducted by a consortium of partners15
is currently
building a map of digital social innovation actors and networks.
In this context, there are some challenges for the EU.
yy First, in the reconfiguration of the economy which is currently taking place under
the influence of network giants, how is Europe to take advantage of open and collaborative
possibilities to tackle societal challenges? How is it to leverage the power
of the large number of social networks of active citizens and communities who often
operate under the radar?16
The potential of using digital technologies to enable
better and more social innovation to engage stakeholders, citizens, geeks and civil
society communities in the innovation process cannot be neglected. Considering the
distributed nature of digital social innovation and its openness to new players, research
based on a bottom-up approach reveals new forms of social innovation and
13	This term was coined by Jane Jenson in Social innovation. Gadget, Concept or Mobilising Idea?; www.cccg.
umontreal.ca. It is defined as ‘a hybrid, making use of empirical analysis and thereby deploying scientific
methods, but simultaneously having an indeterminate quality, making it adaptable to a variety of situations
and flexible enough to follow the twists and turns of policy’. ‘It is more than a buzzword, it has a reputable
intellectual basis but may be vulnerable to criticism on theoretical, analytical and empirical grounds’.
14	Quoted in The world in 2025, contributions of an expert group, January 2009, p.69.
15	Study on innovation in the Digital Agenda conducted by Nesta, Waag Society, ESADE, IRI and Future
Everything; http://digitalsocial.eu.
16	See study by IPTS; http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu/publications/pub.cfm?id=4339.
16 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
new organisational forms that can be encouraged, scaled up and incorporated into
institutional frameworks; and
yy secondly, how to set up the best institutional framework for harnessing the networked
collective intelligence of people to tackle major social issues and produce recognised
value for Europe in terms of community wellbeing, ecological footprint, and democratic
legitimacy?17
17	For examples of the impact on democracy, see the 2013 World Forum Rewiring democracy – connecting
institutions and citizens in the digital age. Further information is available at: http://www.epsiplatform.eu/
content/world-forum-democracy#sthash.iqvUpOPH.dpuf.
A public private partnership on decentralised, open, privacy-aware architectures for
the social good (including open data and public federated identity management)
The internet ecosystem currently faces two major and urgent problems:
In 2011 the Commission launched an initiative to pool a range of European funds to promote
evidence-based social innovation, initially concentrating on social assistance schemes. the Commission’s
initiative includes:
•	 a handful of non-European companies continue to consolidate their leading positions in data aggregation and
capture collective intelligence via lock-ins, monopolistic behaviour and aggressive IP litigation. Most users have
accepted their exploitative business models in exchange for free services. This deal not only undermines privacy
and weakens data protection, but also commodifies knowledge, identity, and personal data. Unfortunately, most
European ICT research is developed to fit into this centralised model, which only aggravates the situation; and
•	 the European Commission has been funding excellent basic research on the Internet of Things (IoT) and the
Future Internet area. However, there is no strategic vision guiding EU research. Projects do not give rise to an
alternative playing field since they promote the kind of short-term incremental developments that only reinforce
the dominant positions mentioned above. While Europe has an unrivalled density of infrastructure and research
potential, the lack of overall coherence in its vision contributes to the consolidation of non-European companies.
An alternative framework is needed to provide an open architecture for the integrated management of online identity,
security, data, and collective governance, based on democratic and participatory processes. The only practical
response is the development of distributed and decentralised solutions for future critical infrastructures in the three
main areas set out below:
1.	 Distributed architectures: this includes the need for open data distributed repositories, distributed cloud, distributed
search and distributed social networking. It can also include the development of new mobile platforms able to
ensure some basic services at European level, on top of which a whole new open ecosystem of services and applications
could flourish in a participatory innovation model based on open source and open hardware development;
2.	 Public federated identity management for the entire EU: weave identity management into the EU Digital Infrastructure
by applying a federated model to the entire Union. The agency that public or private providers
have controls which platforms it talks to and the platform determines which services, products or spin-offs are
supported. The aim should be to turn the current passport into an open source mesh-networked device; and
3.	 New governance modalities for big data (main question around collective ownership of data, data portability
and data as knowledge commons): the question is how to ensure user control over personal information in
an ocean of commercially valuable big data. Citizens should be aware that technical solutions do not work by
themselves, therefore legal and commercial solutions have to be based on technology and integrated with the
appropriate policy framework. Defining sensible governance modalities for big data will require substantial
collaboration between the public and private sectors, based on a multi-stakeholder model, in order to define
the minimum level of sensible regulation allowing fair competition in the emerging areas of big data.
17P A R T I – S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N , A N E W P A T H
To stimulate thought on this issue, Francesca Bria18
has described how the EU could
take advantage of the shift from closed innovation to collaborative, open innovation. Her
contribution is summarised below.
1.2. The social market economy
concept
1.2.1. The origins of the concept
The term ‘social market economy’ emerged in the post-World War II period, when Germany
was looking for a new economic, political and social start. It is strongly associated
with what has been coined the post-war ‘German economic miracle’. At the time, the
idea was to find a renewed impetus for a laissez-faire market-based economy, rejecting
the centrally planned and state-directed system of the previous period while ensuring a
social and political consensus.
Men like Ludwig Erhard, Alfred Müller-Armack and some of their collaborators coined
the term ‘social market economy’ as a new and comprehensive understanding of a free
market and socially-orientated economic order. It became the hallmark of their political
and social aspirations. It entailed two ideas: first, that a market economy was a better
way to improve living standards; secondly, that the market order can serve the aims of
social security and protection, as long as it is flanked by the right economic and social
policies. In other words, market economics and social security do not exclude each other,
but which comes first? Two different schools of thought gave a different meaning to this
concept. On the one hand, the Ordoliberalism of Eucken, Rüstow and Böhm (also known
as the Freiburg School, to which Hayek could be added) acknowledged that protection
against poverty, unemployment, illness and old age are important as long as they ‘are
not pursued in conflict with the rules of the market’. On the other hand, Müller-Armack
(later secretary-of-state to Ludwig Erhard) and Wilhelm Röpke had stronger views on
the primacy of social aims since they rooted this concept in Christian Democratic ethics.
For historic reasons, most people in Germany strongly supported the concept (and its
somewhat contradictory interpretations) provided it was efficient. The social market
economy was the conceptual framework for the ‘German economic miracle’ and deemed
critical for ensuring economic ‘prosperity for all’ and social justice. As a result of growing
inequalities and the perceived unfairness of the social protection system, however, some
people started to question the efficiency of the iconic model. In 2008, for example, only
31 % of all Germans said they had a ‘good opinion’ of the social market economy, a
figure that had risen to 38 % by the beginning of 2010. While it remains a rallying political
concept, the social market economy and the best ways to balance in the future the
ideals of freedom, social justice and economic growth are now being revisited.19
This short history of the term gives some idea of its heuristic but ambiguous meanings
from its origins to the present. Today the term which ‘blended market capitalism,
strong labour protection and union influence, and a generous welfare state’ does not
18	Senior Project Lead, Innovation Lab, EU Project Coordinator D-CENT - DSI.
19	cf. for instance: http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/bst_engl/hs.xsl/269.htm.
18 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
fit the current reforms of the welfare state but, as pointed out by The Economist,20
the
‘social market economy’ broadly refers to the study of the different social institutions
underpinning every market economy and it has been used to describe attempts to make
capitalism more caring and to the use of market mechanisms to increase the efficiency
of the social functions of the state.
1.2.2. The social market economy in the European arena
The four freedoms (free circulation of goods, services, capital and people) at the heart of
the EU’s Single Market are commonly seen as economic instruments to favour increased
competition, specialisation and economies of scale, improve the efficiency of the allocation
of resources and drive economic integration within the EU. The question is: should
this driver be geared solely to economic growth or should it serve the goals of social
as well as economic cohesion? On this issue, the debates of the European Convention
for the Future of Europe (2003-05) were heated. The idea of a powerful Single Market
underpinning international competitiveness and the creation of growth and jobs as the
ultimate end of the European Union was rather dominant. After the crisis, the European
social model and its aim of producing wellbeing for all is more often seen as an important
goal of European integration. In contrast with the distinction which appears more
obvious today, the term ‘social market economy’ in the text of the Constitution suited
everyone and was embedded in the Treaty21
as it seemed to opportunely reflect the
views of liberals, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats.22
1.2.3. A new strategy for the Single Market
‘The crisis has induced some critical reconsideration of the functioning of markets. It
has also enhanced concerns about the social dimension. The Treaty of Lisbon, soon to
enter into force, makes it explicit for the first time …that ‘the Union [...] shall work [...] for
a highly competitive social market economy. All this calls for a fresh look at how the
market and the social dimensions of an integrated European economy can be mutually
strengthened.’
This excerpt from the mission letter from the President of the European Commission,
José Manuel Barroso, inviting former Competition Commissioner, Mario Monti, to prepare
a report setting out recommendations for an initiative to relaunch the Single Market
clearly sets the new tone. The existing tensions between market integration and social
objectives are more vividly exposed now that the Lisbon Treaty has formally introduced
the objective of achieving a ‘highly competitive social market economy’. ‘If the market
and the social components do not find an appropriate reconciliation, something has to
give in. Following the crisis, with the declining appetite for the market and the increasing
concern about inequalities, it is by no means clear that it would be the market, i.e. the
20	http://www.economist.com/economics-a-to-z/s#node-21529660.
21	Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union states: ‘The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work
for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly
competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment’.
22	At the time, it was interpreted as a symbolic ideological gain for the European socialists (The European
Convention: bargaining in the Shadow of Rhetoric, Paul Magnette and Kalypso Nicolaidis – published in: West
European Politics, April 2004).
19P A R T I – S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N , A N E W P A T H
Single Market, to prevail.’ In his report,23
Professor Monti clearly identified public services
(or services of general economic interest) as being at the centre of social concerns.
This was a window of opportunity to enable bottom-up creativity, particularly in the way
services are delivered and matching the needs of users.
The Monti Report raised the need to reinforce the Single Market through a series of
concrete measures. This was done in a two-stage approach in April 2011 and October
2012.24
It is interesting to note that, whereas the initial impulse to reinforce the social
content of the Single Market had come from a top-down initiative, the idea of developing
‘new emerging business models in which social, ethical or environmental objectives
are pursued alongside financial profit’, submitted for consultation as part of a list of
12 possible initiatives to strengthen neglected aspects of the Single Market, was strongly
supported by the public in the answers to this consultation.
This unanimity should not hide underlying ambiguities in overcoming corporatist approaches
and acquired interests in the sphere of the social economy, and different understandings
in Europe of what constitutes a social enterprise or business. As acknowledged
in an OECD report on social entrepreneurship25
‘[e]ven if social entrepreneurship
as an activity is developing quickly around the world and social innovations are appearing
everywhere, these are both relatively recent fields of research and practice and the
notions are still ill-defined. A term like social entrepreneurship tends to overlap with
terms such as social economy, third sector, non-profit sector, social enterprise and social
entrepreneur, some of which are also ill‑defined and overlapping. Moreover, definitions
are context‑sensitive, in the sense that the geographical and cultural contexts matter’.
For instance, traditions within Europe vary: the German approach differs from the Italian
or British early development of cooperatives or from the successful concept in France of
économie sociale et solidaire, to name just a few of the contexts where social entrepreneurship
linked to social innovations is developing.
Conceptual clarity is needed but cannot be imposed in a top-down approach. It has to be
worked out progressively by actors, who are now speaking to each other, taking the best
from each tradition, while adapting to a new common post-crisis reality.
Following long discussions on definitions during the preparation of the text of the Social
Business Initiative, it was finally agreed that rather than reduce a still‑developing idea
to an overly narrow definition, social entrepreneurship should be defined on the basis of
three main characteristics:
yy the social objective was the reason for developing innovative activities;
yy profits were mainly invested in achieving this social objective; and
yy the organisation and ownership used participatory principles aiming at social justice.
The actual development and content of the SBI are described in detail in the second part
of this document. What must be stressed at this stage is that:
yy social entrepreneurship should be placed in the main ‘engine room’ of European
integration: the Single Market raised social innovation to a new level of recognition,
23	http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf.
24	http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/smact/index_en.htm.
25	SMEs, Entrepreneurship and Innovation, contribution of Antonella Noya (OECD, 2010).
20 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
allowing major instruments such as public procurement directives or competition
policy to engage with the development of this ‘emerging’ sector; and
yy the way it has been developed has been participatory26
and all‑encompassing,27
i.e. through a systemic change in approach rather than through incremental changes
in the institutional infrastructure of the business world.
1.3. Ecosystems for social innovation
1.3.1. An approach to the concept of ecosystem
For some time now, management scholars have recognised the parallels between biological
and economic systems. The concept of an ecosystem – which in biology refers to
an environment where different, sometimes competing, species can complement each
other – has been used in particular by Michael Porter,28
who underlined that the traditional
framework of industries made up of competitors, suppliers and customers does
not pay enough attention to the many other actors and environments in an industry: the
organisations making complementary products, the infrastructure on which the organisation
depends, and the various institutions, people, and interest groups that affect the
entire industry, including the end users or consumers.
An ecosystem’s framework, in contrast, incorporates the broader environment within
which organisations operate. It captures the elements of Porter’s economic analysis,
adds other potentially important actors, and incorporates the non-market forces.
This framework is particularly appropriate for the production of social innovation, as
their promoters (social entrepreneurs, intrapreneurs, etc.) must leverage complex systems
of interacting players in rapidly evolving political, economic, physical and cultural
environments. Moreover, the more innovative the initiative, the more likely it is to come
up against the aversion to change of those who have stakes in the system as it is.
Today, ecosystems for social innovation are seen as the way to create an innovation-friendly
environment where social innovations can grow and to address not only
the apparent cause but also the underlying problems. The shift from social innovation as
a charitable solution to a problem that has an immediate but unsustainable impact (e.g.
give food to the hungry) to the transformative ambition to create long-lasting changes
to solve societal problems (e.g. homelessness, food disorders) that are engrained in
behaviours and institutional and cultural context (laws, policies, social norms) has also
been a reason to look for a ‘friendly milieu’ to organise interactions and respond to the
needs of social innovations at every stage of their development. Thus, the term ‘ecosystem’
has spread within the social innovation community as a response to the different
26	It started with a wide consultation and was shaped by three European Commissioners, i.e. the Commissioners
responsible for the Single Market (M. Barnier), Employment and Social Affairs (L. Andor) and Enterprise (A.
Tajani).
27	The Social Business Initiative was launched with a Communication on corporate social responsibility and a
revision of the Transparency Directive as a package to increase trust: ‘Social business is a good example of
an approach to business that is both responsible and contributes to growth and jobs. But we need to ensure
all companies, not just social businesses, take their impact on wider society seriously: that's why I also want
big multinationals [….] to be more open about what they are paying to governments across the world’ (Michel
Barnier).
28	The Competitive Advantage of Nations, 1990.
21P A R T I – S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N , A N E W P A T H
needs to structure, experiment, nurture, network, support, scale up and transfer social
innovations at the different stages of their development.
1.3.2. Main components of an ecosystem for social innovation
Supportive policies, adequate governance, innovative finance, a variety of capacity
building and recognition tools such as incubators, hubs, forums, prizes and research
in methodologies, benchmarking and impact measurement are the main components
which, together, create the ‘natural environment’ for social innovation to flourish. While
the movement and creative energy in the ecosystem comes from the actors and their
connections, the administrative, economic and legal environment has to be enabling.
Where the priority objective is to solve a problem of a social or societal nature, people
(in whatever capacity they act) have to pool their resources and work together. Often,
a dominant administrative culture or conflicting objectives prevent this. The key to supportive
governance is to identify those obstacles and create spaces for cooperation and
for thinking outside the box. Promoting a culture of trust and learning from failures is
also part of supportive governance. Governments have to set up enabling processes and
institutions to encourage the creation of ecosystems which mobilise collective energy
and initiative to develop, mostly small-scale but effective solutions to improve quality
of life. Social entrepreneurship (or intrapreneurship), the main vector to channel action
in this field is often small, can also be larger29
and usually has a transformative agenda.
The use of digital tools to reach their goals is already quite widespread amongst
social innovators (e.g. Websourd30
uses a call centre to translate job interviews, etc.).
Increasingly, however, digital tools are also used as a core element to mobilise collective
intelligence for the co-creation of public goods (e.g. Code for America,31
Nudge,32
etc.).
This gives a radically new dimension to social innovations and the ecosystems which
can allow them to grow. Communication technologies create very large and open spaces
for the self-organisation and mobilisation of society which enlarge the scope of civil
society mobilisation and generate new issues of control and trust (see the Digital Social
Innovation project33
and the Onlife Initiative for rethinking public spaces in the digital
transition34
).
Access to resources and/or funding is another crucial component, which has to be available
in different forms at the right time. From access to public procurement or small
experimental grants to investments in large projects likely to bring substantial social
benefits in the medium to long term (e.g. investment in the social integration of prisoners
to eventually reduce crime). As illustrated in the Malmö example mentioned below,
this can even include regrouping investments to achieve the same social objective and
involving stakeholders and end users can often double or treble the impact of budgets
and or investments.
29	cf. for example SOS (http://www.groupe-sos.org).
30	http://www.websourd.org/; http://www.websourd-entreprise.fr/.
31	http://codeforamerica.org/.
32	R. Thaler & C. Sunstein, Yale University Press, 2009.
33	https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/socialinnovationeurope/directory/switzerland/event/digital-social-innovation-
workshop.
34	http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/onlife-initiative.
22 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
Any collective endeavour where the mobilisation of energies is the main resource needs
catalysing places and instruments where collective work is valued and recognised (or
at least not penalised). Incubators to generate the birth and growth as well as tools to
exchange, compare and value are other essential components of the social innovation
ecosystem.
The fourth ingredient to create a fertile environment for initiating innovative practices
of a disruptive nature is to develop evidence of a different nature that is likely to work
and yield measurable results, but also to develop methodologies from empirical and
theoretical observations to develop or scale up successful experiments. Thus, research
is an essential component of the ecosystem.
A striking example of the development above is the study entitled A map of social enterprises
and their ecosystems in Europe.35
The European Commission called for this study
in April 2013 to establish for the first time an overview of national policies, schemes
and actions aimed at promoting social enterprises and supporting the development of a
conducive ecosystem where it exists as well as the current state and dynamics of social
investments markets. This was only done for 11 Member States.36
It studies the following issues for these countries: the political and legal recognition of
the concept of social enterprise; public support schemes; whether marks and labelling
schemes are in use, the social investment markets. Finally, it assesses the opportunities
and barriers for each country. This first exercise shows wide differences amongst Member
States regarding the degree of maturity of the ecosystem. In countries with a long tradition
of social economy like Italy and France, a variety of well-established tools have been
developed while in newcomers like Latvia or Romania, the recognition and the private and
public support systems for social business is still in its infancy but in great demand.
In itself, this study is a resource for policymakers, social entrepreneurs and stakeholders
in social business in general as it provides timely information on when, where and how
social entrepreneurs can find an understanding and friendly environment to initiate, develop
and scale up social enterprises.
1.3.3. Examples of ecosystems for social innovation
As mentioned above, the growing importance of social enterprises in the EU social innovation
policy framework emphasises the importance of developing an enabling environment
made of specific instruments, a more understanding environment and to develop
innovative tools (e.g. European Partnerships) to stimulate interaction between actors in
fertile ground. A large number of public or private actors at national and local level can
take advantage of this new policy focus.
Two very different case studies can be mentioned to illustrate these issues:
yy firstly, Oksigen37
is a dynamic Belgian consortium established on the private initiative
of likeminded individuals. It covers every stage of a social innovation’s develop-
35	http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/social_business/docs/expert-group/20131128-sbi-sector-mapping-study_
en.pdf.
36	Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Romania, Latvia, Poland, Italy, Spain, Ireland and Belgium.
37	For more information, please refer to: http://www.oksigen.eu/ and http://www.i-propeller.com/.
23P A R T I – S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N , A N E W P A T H
ment, including tutoring and mentoring, the search for diverse sources of financing,
upscaling and transfer and integrates applied research. It offers a springboard for
leveraging the effects of public and private programmes and funds aimed at developing
effective solutions to new or unaddressed social or societal needs;
yy secondly, a multicultural city like Malmö,38
which is strategically putting in place
an ambitious plan of ‘ecosystems’, is a good example of what can be done in this
area. Local authorities together with welfare services and local economic actors
have a vested interest in identifying more efficient solutions to address concrete
social problems and improve the quality of life in their community. The idea is to
fundamentally reassess all the direct and indirect social ‘costs’ and reallocate them
in a dynamic and interactive process to benefit people in the community with a longterm
impact. This cannot be done unless you create an ecosystem where administrations
working in silos, economic actors willing to serve their community as well
as their business interest and those citizens most concerned, are given a common
framework where they can interact, design and implement.
1.4. Measurement of social impact
There are at least four reasons for tackling the challenge of measuring social innovation.
First, there is a need to prove that social innovation is an effective and sustainable way
to respond to societal needs (from this perspective, the belief that after the crisis, social
innovation can play a pivotal role in serving as a competitive future advantage for European
economies and societies has been underlined in many EU documents.39
The Guide to
Social Innovation, published in 2013, states in particular ‘Europe is ideally placed to take
a lead and capture first-mover benefits when it comes to implementing social innovations
by proactively and effectively trying to fully (and fairly) realise both economic and societal
benefits’). Second, justifying the allocation of public money as well as attracting other
sources of public and private financing requires a shared understanding of what the ‘positive
and measurable social effects’40
of social innovations are. Third, evidence-based policies
require ex ante evidence of the expected impact of the actions involved. Finally, social
innovations (seen as drivers in the current transition41
) could open the way to developing
a new competitive advantage for European economies, showing that social and environmental
value creation is central to the human and ecological sustainability of societies.
The reasons why social innovations are difficult to measure are of course proportional to
their scope (i.e. the smaller the objective, the easier the measurement). This difficulty is
also explained by the fact that their success relies on factors which, by their nature, are
difficult to quantify, at least in the short to medium term. Indeed, their success relies on
how they have been able to act as drivers of social change,42
to break with established
38	www.malmo.se/kommission.
39	The Innovation Union flagship initiative introduced social innovation as a driver of a European innovation
strategy and this idea has since guided developments in research and innovation policy, enterprise and
industry in particular.
40	This is the terminology used by EU institutions (Commission, Parliament, Economic and Social Committee) to
frame the notion of social impact in the EuSEF (European Social Entrepreneurship Funds) and EaSI (European
Programme for Employment and Social Innovation).
41	See The EU's Fifth Project - Transitional Governance in the Service of Sustainable Societies
http://www.uclouvain.be/461789.html.
42	Social innovations as drivers of social change, J. Howaldt, R. Kopp & M. Schwarz, 2013.
24 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
approaches43
and to engage a process of changing behaviours, ‘basic routines, resource
and authority flows, or beliefs of the social system’ in which they occur.44
The benefits of overcoming the challenge of measuring social innovation will allow further
developments in different aspects of social innovation at a crucial moment for the
post-crisis economy.
Both micro-level measurement (how successfully a social enterprise is contributing to
this goal) and macro-level measurement (social enterprises grow in an ecosystem composed
of a favourable governance framework, capacity-building tools and learning processes)
have become necessary.
Measures of the success/impact of social innovation is the increasingly shared idea
that ‘economic outcomes have for a long time been the main indicator to measure the
development of organisations and countries, but a more holistic perspective considering
social, environmental and economic consequences must come to the fore to build a sustainable
world’.45
Awareness of this has increased in recent years since climate change
and inequalities are on the rise. Even before widespread political attention was drawn
to this agenda by the Report on the Measurement of Economic and Social Progress46
(known as the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report), the Commission had already held a large
forum on Beyond GDP47
in 2007. This was followed by a Communication on GDP and
Beyond – Measuring progress in a changing world,48
highlighting the need for new instruments
to monitor and measure environmental and social development and establishing
a roadmap. A review of progress on GDP and beyond actions was published in 2013.49
In
addition, other actors have also taken steps to introduce new instruments, e.g. the OECD
with its Better Life Index.50
Many analysts around the world believe that it is necessary
to measure wellbeing or quality of life in order to better respond to the needs of this
century. As far as social innovation is concerned, this is likely to kick-start the systemic
change mentioned inter alia in the first BEPA report, by bringing to the fore the value of
non-tradeable goods and services that contribute to wellbeing.
Against this background, we examine below the need for social impact measurement
and guidance on how it should be carried out in the specific context of:
yy evidence-based policies; and
yy funding/financing social innovation; and to
yy follow progress so far in the area of indicators and social impact measurement.
43	Social Innovation: Blurring Boundaries to Reconfigure Markets, A. Nicholls & A. Murdock; Palgrave Macmillan,
2011.
44	Making a Difference - Strategies for Scaling Social Innovation for Greater Impact, Frances Westley and Nino
Antadze (presented at the Social Frontiers social innovation research conference, November 2013).
45	EESC report on social impact measurement.
46	http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf.
47	http://ec.europa.eu/environment/beyond_gdp/index_en.html.
48	COM(2009) 433 final.
49	http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/pdf/SWD_2013_303.pdf.
50	www.betterlifeindex.org. .
25P A R T I – S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N , A N E W P A T H
1.4.1. Evidence-based policies
Public policy development increasingly requires accountability as well as efficiency to
ensure the best use of resources. While coarse assessments can in some cases be the
way to approximate a cost benefit analysis due to urgent circumstances, scientifically
based methods are increasingly used to compare (ex ante) the benefits that a community
would derive from a specific measure or scheme to a comparable community which
did not have this measure or scheme. The principle of social experimentation to test a
policy intervention on a small population so as to evaluate its efficacy before deciding
whether it should be scaled up is on the agenda of many policymakers wishing to design
a potentially policy-relevant intervention as well as measure its actual efficacy.
Existing methods for assessing a project’s chances of success and their different costs
are detailed in a methodological guide for policymakers,51
published by the Commission
in September 2011 in order to assist policymakers in designing socially innovative projects.
This guide sets out basic principles to follow in order to design a potentially policy-relevant
intervention. It describes six commonly used methods of evaluation, which
are compared from the point of view of the reliability of the results they deliver; and
considers the costs associated with each method, and the complexity of implementing
them in practice.
The ‘gold standard’ for these methods goes to randomised experiments. They draw
from the principle of randomised controlled trial used in scientific experiment, and in
particular clinical trials to test the efficacy or effectiveness of various types of medical
interventions in a patient population. The use of randomised trials to test solutions
was pioneered by Esther Duflo, professor at MIT and Director of the Abdul Latif Jameel
Poverty Action Lab,52
which has now grown into a global network of professors who use
randomised evaluations to answer critical policy questions in the fight against poverty.
This network has conducted over 500 randomised evaluations in 57 countries. Some
of the policy lessons have led to the scaling up of programmes which have improved
the lives of millions of individuals. These include school-based deworming programmes
as one of the most effective methods for improving school participation in developing
countries or providing free access to chlorine dispensers at water sources to reduce the
death of children under five.53
Nevertheless, randomised evaluations of social programmes take time and can be complex
to implement.
Many authors in the open literature have discussed the benefits and limitations of randomised
social experimentation as a tool for evaluating social programmes.54
Other
techniques also commonly used are referred to as non-experimental or quasi-experimental
methods. They are usually less complex to implement than randomised evaluations,
but the results they deliver are also less reliable. It appears that random assignment
to the treatment and comparison groups is the best way to ensure that the
comparison group is similar in every respect to the treatment group. Non-experimental
51	Written by J-Pal Europe at the request of
the European Commission's Directorate-General for Employment,
Social Affairs and Inclusion.
52	http://www.povertyactionlab.org/.
53	http://www.povertyactionlab.org/scale-ups/chlorine-dispensers-safe-water.
54	See for example Randomization and Social Policy Evaluation, James Heckman, NBER Technical Working Paper
No 107, July 1991.
26 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
methods must rely on an assumption to justify the claim that the comparison group
they use is similar to the treatment group.
In order to test measures aimed at the development of new social practices and/or
the reorganisation of existing ones in EU Member States, the PROGRESS programme
(2008-12) allocated EUR 10 million to developing social policy experiments. Thirty-six
projects focusing on the social and professional inclusion of vulnerable groups were
financed. Hope in stations: HOmeless PEople in train stations was one of these projects.
In the new programme for employment and social innovation, technical assistance for
conducting randomised evaluations is made available to administrations undertaking
social policy reforms.
Thus, the rapid development of this subject has proven its intrinsic interest. It is to be
expected that the wide range of research projects and scientific publications on this
topic will lead to enhanced cooperation on the quantification and measurement of social
impact and on designing and assessing social policies.
1.4.2. Funding/financing social innovation
A sound technique for measuring the impact of the social innovation is a prerequisite
for funding/financing social innovation. The recent period has been characterised by the
emergence of a wider diversity of funding sources for innovative ventures with a social
objective from the public and private sectors. This proliferation of funding/financing
mechanisms has led to the urgent need to further develop methods for measuring the
social and economic benefits. Public bodies at every level have worked to increase the
offer, from dedicated microfinance funds to public procurement,55
but the financial and
banking sector are taking a growing interest in ‘impact finance’ and the public at large
responds, where legislation permits, to calls to ‘crowdfund’ social ventures. This is good
news as one of the major barriers to the development of social innovation identified in
the first BEPA report was access to finance, but also overdependence on grants from
charities, foundations and public support, in particular when growth capital is needed to
engage in long-term ventures.
This aspect has raised considerable attention, in particular at EU level, since the launch
of the Social Business Initiative. The Commission’s Communication on the Single Market
Act II56
highlighted the need to develop methods for measuring the social and economic
benefits generated by social enterprises in the implementation of the EuSEF57
and the
programme for Employment and Social Innovation (EaSI).58
In response, a subgroup
of the Commission’s consultative multi-stakeholder group on social enterprise (GECES)
55	As illustrated in part 2 of this document.
56	http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/smact/docs/single-market-act2_en.pdf.
57	The Regulation on European social entrepreneurship funds (EuSEFs) was published in the Official Journal on
25 April 2013. Together with the Regulation on European venture capital funds (EuVECA) and the Alternative
Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), this Regulation aims to make it easier for AIFMD-exempt
venture capitalists and social entrepreneurs to raise funds across Europe without the requirement to comply
with the full AIFMD regime.  The key elements of the Regulation provide for an EU brand for EuSEFs and the
introduction of a European marketing passport.  The range of eligible financing tools/investments under the
EuSEF Regulation is wider than those available for venture capital funds under the EVCF Regulation.
58	The third axis of this programme focuses on microfinance and social entrepreneurship with a fund of EUR
86 million over seven years to provide grants, investments and guarantees to social enterprises which can
demonstrate that they have a ‘measurable social impact’.
27P A R T I – S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N , A N E W P A T H
was tasked with providing the Commission with guidelines on how social enterprise can
measure their social impact on the community.
The report adopted by the GECES in June 2014 makes a set of recommendations and
defines areas where follow-up is required. It underlines the benefit that a standard for
social impact measurement, ideally agreed worldwide, would have. However, it recognises
that no single set of indicators can be devised in a ‘top-down fashion’ to measure
social impact in all cases.
In order to meet the needs of social enterprises, funders and policymakers to achieve
comparability in reporting and monitoring, to limit the costs of the assessment to the
size and scope of the venture and to allow an approach that respects the diversity of
social enterprises as well as the need to cope with change and improvement, the GECES
advocates a process for social impact measurement.
This process involves five stages: 1) identify objectives; 2) identify stakeholders; 3) set
relevant measurement; 4) measure, validate and value; 5) report, learn and improve.
All stages should involve active stakeholder engagement. In particular, the number and
range of indicators should be agreed between the social enterprise, beneficiaries or
service users as well as investors, allowing for lighter and cheaper processes for small
ventures. The dynamics of involving all stakeholders (from investors to service users)
is designed to maintain the balance between the overriding need to deliver measurable
social impact and the need for a profitable operation that can meet investor expecta-
tions.
The report also includes guidance on reporting standards for social impact measurement
and indicators, and examples of case studies illustrating how measurement techniques
are used. It represents a very rigorous, participatory and useful exercise to respond to
the European Commission’s request. Its conclusions stress the need for further action,
in particular in raising awareness and facilitating stakeholder engagement. This idea is
reinforced by the opinion on social impact measurement of the European Economic and
Social Committee (EESC).59
According to the GECES subgroup, the areas where follow-up is required are:
yy guidance to assist social enterprises, funders, fund managers and investors in all EU
Member States in complying with the standards proposed;
yy the establishment of a knowledge centre on social impact measurement for guidance,
exchange of practice and monitoring;
yy the development and consolidation of measurement frameworks with stakeholder
participation;
yy the development of reporting formats; and
yy the development of a network or group of experts to act as a reference point for
dissemination and development with respect to social impact measurement, integrating
EuSEF and EaSI experience.
59	http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.int-opinions.29291.
28 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
1.4.3. Indicators for a socially innovative society
In the wake of demands from stakeholders, the issue of social innovation and its economic,
social (and environmental) impact and measurement have become significant priorities
on the EU agenda. In EU policymaking, this has recently become apparent in initiatives like
the Communication on the social dimension of the EMU,60
which proposes social indicators
and actions to complement economic reporting. This line of reasoning now appears
in many EU documents where the measurement and monitoring of social added value,
change and impact is a prerequisite for the implementation of directives and programmes.
In line with the idea that we are still in a learning process, analysis and research is being
conducted on the measurement of societal (social and environmental) value creation and
the development of indicators.61
On the latter issue, the 2013 report on Employment and
Social Development in Europe highlights the need to adapt the way we measure economic
and social progress in order to take proper account of inequalities.
In this context, the issue of measurement and financing has made tremendous advances
in recent years. New tools are being tested, new sources of finance are appearing (EU
funding possibilities, crowdfunding, more access to public procurement, etc.) and the question
of social value creation is being widely discussed. However, it is still a work in progress
which will continue to require considerable attention in the coming years.
This said, while there are currently no agreed macro or micro level measurement approaches
that specifically focus on social innovation, the field of research is fed by indicators
to measure innovation in public and private sector organisations (e.g. innovation
union scoreboard, public sector innovation index, etc.) and indicators that focus on social
normative or environmental dimensions which capture the social and wellbeing aspects
(e.g. the European Statistical System (ESS) Sponsorship Group, the European System of
Social Indicators, ESS/GESIS/Eurostat sustainable societies or the OECD Better Life Index).
In practice, there are some new and encouraging elements in recent developments.
yy First, while the assessment exercises are still straitjacketed in ‘one-size-fits-all’ public
spending control standards, social and environmental policies in particular are
increasingly adopting scientifically based methods such as social experimentation
to test (and prove) the effectiveness of innovations in their sector before they can
be scaled up and replicated;
yy Secondly, ‘social impact measurement’ is an issue, which has stirred up a lively debate
in many circles and at many levels. At micro level, impact investing has been
on the agenda of large private firms (JP Morgan and the GIIN62
) for a few years
now. The press has echoed more than usual to the financing of the social economy
in general but also to associated financial innovations such as social impact bonds
or crowdfunding. As explained in sub-section 1.4.2, several activities have been developed
at European level. For example, the Social Business Initiative has launched
60	http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/archives/2013/10/pdf/20131002_1-emu_en.pdf.
61	EU research projects like e-Frame and BRAINPOoL are particularly relevant in this respect. The link with the
role of social innovation in this agenda is made in TEPSIE and SIMPACT.
62	In November 2010, JP Morgan collaborated with the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN) and the
Rockefeller Foundation on one of the first significant (despite the small sample) pieces of research on
investments intended to create a positive impact beyond financial returns. The study noted that the rigour of
systems to track and manage social performance was the best guarantee against the risks to see exploitation
of poor people for the sake of profit and system drifts.
29P A R T I – S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N , A N E W P A T H
the debate amongst national and local experts, civil society organisations63
and the
European institutions. Lately, the Group of European Experts (GECES) has contributed
to the discussion about the different approaches to social impact measurement,
which is an important step towards the establishment of shared standards; and
yy Lastly, the European Commission has launched Horizon 2020, the largest research and
innovation programme in the world, with a budget of EUR 80 billion. The programme
will run from 2014 to 2020 and has an important social innovation component. It is to
be expected that progress will be achieved in the different areas of social innovation,
including the development of indicators for social innovation and techniques for social
impact measurement.
63	3M Jonathan Bland, Confrontations Europe.
2. Leading by example:
how public sector
innovation supports
social innovation
Social innovation is a bottom-up process with little theoretical conceptualisation
and support from methodological developments for the
measurement of social impacts. The public sector plays a pivotal role in
promoting and facilitating social innovation by providing a common conceptual
framework for social innovation activities. Nevertheless the public
sector needs to innovate itself in order to meet the increase in public demand
and to promote and facilitate social innovation.
There is an urgent need to power innovation within the public sector itself in order to unlock
radical productivity improvements and efficiency gains, foster the creation of more
public value and a better response to societal challenges. Public authorities need to
promote effective instruments (legislation, removal of barriers, and public procurement)
linked to social innovation.
This can only happen through a pervasive change of mind-set, with more experimentation,
controlled risk taking, and an agile and personalised response to new constituent
challenges. This will help unleash the potential of an innovative public sector that can
enable social innovation to make the transition from a random, bottom-up approach to
a systemic phenomenon.
2.1. The Commission’s commitment to
supporting public sector innovation
The European Commission has, for a long time, tried to develop new thinking to modernise
European economies and their social model to meet societal expectations. Public
sector innovation as a positive way to respond to budget constraints has indeed, for
many years, been considered a policy lever to improve the quality and efficiency of pub-
32 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
lic services. For instance, the impact of new technologies researched and tested through
large-scale pilot schemes on e-Government, e-Health, e-Inclusion, e-Participation and
social experimentation schemes to improve social inclusion have been on the agenda for
more than ten years. The same goes for social innovation schemes to empower people
to improve the provision and delivery of services.
In 2012, the Group of Innovation Commissioners spurred renewed interest in this area,
following the Innovation Union flagship initiative. It translated into concrete actions, including
in particular the ones set out below.
yy The inventory of the Commission’s initiatives in public sector innovation is a first
attempt to map the efforts made under different EU policy headings to support
innovation in the public sector. It has so far resulted in a document focusing on processes
and organisational changes in public sector organisations that contribute to
increasing public welfare and quality of life (cf. 2.2 below).
yy The Commission launched a pilot European Public Sector Innovation Scoreboard (EPSIS)
with a view to improving its ability to benchmark the innovation performance
of the public sector in Europe. The ultimate ambition was to capture and present
public sector innovation in a similar way to the innovation performance rating of
countries in the Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS)64
and thereby encourage and
facilitate innovation activity across the public sector. The 2013 pilot EPSIS65
was the
first EU-wide attempt to better understand and to analyse innovation in the public
sector. It was developed based on the experience of earlier national and regional
projects, tested widely and discussed with a number of key experts in relevant areas.
The EPSIS shows that all EU Member States consider public sector innovation to be
a national requirement and a means by which to drive continuous improvement in
public service design and delivery. The Scoreboard also shows that Member States
may be grouped into two categories: a small number of ‘innovation leaders’ and a
larger number that may be designated as ‘innovation followers’. ‘Innovation leaders’
are more concerned with finding radical new approaches to deliver public services
whereas ‘innovation followers’ are still concerned with making fundamental reforms
to public institutions.
2.2. Powering European public sector
innovation: towards a new
architecture
Under the responsibility of the Commissioner for Research and Innovation, a group of
twelve experts was asked to analyse the role of the public sector, barriers to innovation
and the current gaps in policies focused on innovation in the public sector. Their report
Powering European Public Sector Innovation: Towards a New Architecture66
suggests that
public sector innovation today mostly happens through uncoordinated initiatives rather
than as a result of deliberate, strategic efforts. The quest for more and better public sector
innovation is hindered by several barriers, which fall into four major categories: weak
64	http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/innovation-scoreboard/index_en.htm.
65	http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/files/epsis-2013_en.pdf.
66	http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/psi_eg.pdf.
33P A R T I – S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N , A N E W P A T H
enabling factors or unfavourable framework conditions; lack of innovation leadership at
all levels; limited knowledge and application of innovation processes and methods; and
insufficiently precise and systematic use of measurement and data.
There are efforts underway to address these barriers, both in the European Union (e.g.
Joinup,67
the common portal for e-Government solutions) and globally (e.g. the OECD’s
Observatory of Public Sector Innovation68
), and the expert group has reviewed an extensive
amount of scientific literature and best practices. However, a paradigm shift is
needed in order to embed and encourage an innovation culture within the public sector,
which will also improve its absorptive capacity.
A new innovation paradigm and design principles
In its search for developing concrete recommendations to overcome the barriers to innovation,
the expert group has recognised the following four design principles that should
be at the heart of the public sector. These principles must be mainstreamed throughout
the entire ecosystem of public sector actors for the greatest gains in quality, efficiency,
fairness, transparency and accountability.
yy Co-design and co-creation of innovative solutions (with other Member States, other
parts of government, businesses, the third sector and citizens);
yy Adopting new and collaborative service delivery models (across public, private and
non-governmental actors, both within and across national borders);
yy Embracing creative disruption from technology (the pervasive use of social media,
mobility, big data, cloud computing packaged in new digital government offerings);
yy Adopting an attitude of experimentation and entrepreneurship (government itself
needs to become bolder and more entrepreneurial).
Recommendations for new public sector innovation architecture in Europe
The report identifies several actions that should be taken rapidly (either at EU level or in
the Member States, depending on political and financial considerations). The recommendations
may be divided into three groups.
yy Leading Innovation: to establish a programme to empower and network innovative
public leaders and to establish an EU Innovation Lab inside the European Commission
to support and facilitate innovation in the work of the Commission Services.
yy Enabling Innovation: to establish a network of Innovation Single Contact Points in all
Member States; to establish an Accelerator for Digital Innovation and a Public Sector
Angel Fund.
yy Informing Innovation: to establish a Dynamic Innovation Toolbox targeted at public
managers and to establish a European Citizens’ Scoreboard for public services.
67	https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/.
68	http://www.oecd.org/gov/public-innovation/observatory-public-sector-innovation.htm.
34 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
BEPA held a high-level meeting on public sector innovation in July 2013.69
The objective
of this meeting was to discuss public sector innovation and the need for a more systemic
approach in order to create a dynamic and open public sector. The major outcomes of
the meeting may be grouped in the following areas:
Evidence-based methodologies for efficient policymaking
yy The need to test new policies and programmes: Innovative public programmes addressing
important policy issues, which have a potential to be scaled up, should be
‘tested’ before they are implemented on a large scale. One should learn from the
experiments, via rigorous evaluation.
yy The need to use scientific methodologies to measure and quantify the social impact
of policies and programmes: Learning about the impact of a policy is not straightforward.
J-Pal,70
the poverty action Lab created by Esther Duflo, has developed a
scientific methodology based on a randomised control trials approach, which allows
meaningful comparisons.
Innovation strategies in the public sector
yy The need to highlight innovation pockets at different levels of public administration:
copying successful innovations is often the most effective way to innovate and the
best ideas are not necessarily the newest. The European Public Sector Innovation
Scoreboard can help to understand who is doing better and how we can improve.
yy The need for the public sector to invest in innovation: based on collaborative approaches
to driving change and to governance.
yy The need to foster innovation led by example: the European Commission can provide
support by promoting systematic collaboration and rigorous evaluation of the policies
adopted, applying the scientific method to the public sector and using sophisticated
tools to analyse complex interacting systems.
69	http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/expertise/seminars/index_en.htm; http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/conferences/note-psi-
reportweb.pdf.
70	http://www.povertyactionlab.org/about-j-pal.
3. Achievements and
lessons learned
Providing an overall evaluation of social innovations in Europe – including
EU policies and their impact on societal challenges – is almost impossible
considering the large amount of new and interactive initiatives, but
also the broad goals of EU programmes that integrate social innovation.
However, while the overall picture is sometimes difficult to capture at a
glance, the drive behind social innovation has become firmer and instruments
are better defined. This is no mean feat and the attention and
budget allocated to promoting social innovation are higher than ever. The
backdrop to this firmer drive is the need to improve knowledge of how
and where social innovations emerge, scale up and duplicate, and how
effective they are in addressing current societal challenges not only for,
but also with citizens.
A set of specific examples are taken from the Guide to Social Innovation, published by
DG Regional and Urban Policy and DG Employment, Social Affairs in February 2013.71
Some of them show how support under the Structural Funds will increasingly be sought
for the development of instruments to encourage a participatory approach to the resolution
of social problems. Others develop thematic issues to deal with the major challenges
that migration and ageing; environmental trends; IT solutions to inclusion; urban
regeneration and housing; health and wellbeing; and the development of ethical goods
and services pose at local level and which many cities or local communities need to
address.
While a number of the issues mentioned here would have found their place in other
parts of this document, examples of practical developments mainly supported by the EU
Structural Funds are meant to emulate new ideas and entrepreneurship.
71	http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/presenta/social_innovation/social_innovation_2013.pdf.
36 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
3.1. Deepening our understanding and
knowledge of social innovation
The two major sources of new knowledge developed during the last period are, on the
one hand, a factual Europe-wide study on A Map of Social Enterprises and their Eco-systems
in Europe, which was launched by the European Commission’s Directorate-General
for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion in April 201372
and, on the other hand, the
large body of research funded by the FP5, FP6 and FP7 Socio-economic Sciences and
Humanities Programme on issues related to social innovation, including in the areas
of theory building and conceptualisation, local welfare systems and services, poverty
reduction, combating inequalities, and changing lifestyles.
3.1.1. The Mapping study
It is composed of five main tasks which are briefly described as follows:
Task 1: Identification of social enterprises – to develop an operational definition that
can be used to identify, measure and map social enterprise across Europe and thus provide
the basis for carrying out the remaining research tasks;
Task 2: Measurement, characterisation and mapping of social enterprise – to collect
(through primary and secondary research) and analyse data on the scale, characteristics
and patterns of development of social enterprise in each country studied;
Task 3: Legal and standards mapping – to map (a) legal ‘labels’ and frameworks designed
exclusively for social enterprises where these exist; (b) corporate law aspects of
the three legal forms most commonly used by social enterprises in each country studied;
(c) legal and regulatory barriers to creation and growth of social enterprise; and (d)
marks, labels and certification systems designed for social enterprises;
Task 4: Mapping of public policies and social investment markets – to provide an
overview of national policies, schemes and actions aimed at promoting social entrepreneurs
and social enterprises and supporting the development of a conducive ecosystem
(where these exist); and, the current state and dynamics of social investment markets
in Europe; and
Task 5: Developing recommendations for EU action – to develop recommendations for
future research and policy action to support the growth of social enterprise in Europe.
This is the very first time that researchers have carried out such a systematic and broad
overview of existing traditions and legal, public policy and investment conditions for the
development of social enterprises.
72	http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/social_business/docs/expert-group/20131128-sbi-sector-mapping-study_
en.pdf.
37P A R T I – S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N , A N E W P A T H
3.1.2. Social innovation research in the European Union
The EU Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities Programme is the second main source
of new knowledge from the last period. However, in view of increasing demand from
policymakers and practitioners alike for social innovations and the emerging possibilities
for new research avenues on social innovation, including in Horizon 2020, a policy
review commissioned by the European Commission’s DG Research and Innovation from
experts in the field73
has produced a systematic overview of research findings from 17
European projects in the area of social innovation. The review74
focuses on how these
projects address social innovation in terms of theory, methodology, policy areas, actors,
and level of analysis in order to bring the results to the attention of policymakers, wider
groups of stakeholders and the broader public in a comprehensive way.
The point that comes to the fore is that this report is a stocktaking exercise, undertaken
with a view to fostering the engagement of the European research community in a continuous
exchange of ideas and best practices for analysing social innovation and in the
promotion of networking among researchers.
The report ends by identifying five research fields that did not draw much attention in
the projects reviewed and that are areas for further development (social innovation to
overcome the inequalities of health and re-pattern the social determinants of health;
social innovation in rural areas and societies; social innovation in the financial sector;
social innovation and the private sector; and social innovation for managing diversity).
3.2. Instruments to improve the
ecosystem
As well established by now, research in social innovation is – by nature – mainly empirical
and its primary field of development is the local level, where stakeholders can more
easily be mobilised on concrete issues. In order to scan the scope of empirical developments
and draw lessons on how social innovations contribute to reform local welfare
systems, this part of the report addresses some patterns of innovatory social projects
and networks to fight social inequalities and stimulate social cohesion at local level.
3.2.1. The social economy
According to the EU Social Business Initiative, the social economy employs over 11 million
people in the EU, accounting for 6 % of total employment. It covers bodies with a
specific legal status (cooperatives, foundations, associations, mutual societies).
The social economy can clearly play a role in regional development. For instance, the
Emilia Romagna region has published a study on the importance of the social economy
73	Jane Jenson and Dennis Harrisson in Social innovation research in the European Union – Approaches, findings
and future directions - Policy Review http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/social_innovation.pdf.
74	Its first results were presented and discussed at the conference Approaches to Research on Social Innovation:
Learning from One Another for the Future, which was organised by the FP7 project WILCO jointly with the
European Commission’s DG Research and Innovation on February 2013.
38 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
for territorial and social cohesion. Its main conclusions are that public policies are the
fruit of the combined contribution of public authorities and social economy organisations
in the provision of public utility services, in which the joint participation of both
players is an essential requirement to ensure quality; and that public-private partnership
is a tool to deliver more effective and efficient primary social services, which have so far
been historically provided by the welfare state. At the same time, it helps identify and
deliver services in new and additional fields. In so doing, new forms of cooperation are
established with civil society and stakeholders.
The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) supports the development of social
enterprises as it does for other types of businesses. Financial support can be delivered
directly to individual companies, through social enterprise intermediaries, such as social
enterprise or cooperative development agencies, and through financial institutions.
There are increasing numbers of financial institutions that specialise in investing in social
enterprises and many of the new ethical banks specialise in this type of investment.
The European Social Fund (ESF) also supports social enterprises. Firstly, it can strengthen
administrative capacities and support structures which promote social enterprises. This
can be carried out in particular through education and training, for example, through
the integration of social entrepreneurship in the curricula of specific vocations, or the
provision of training improving the business skills of social entrepreneurs. Networking
and the development of partnerships, as well as the setting up of business development
services for social enterprises can be supported too. Secondly, the ESF can mobilise extra
funds targeted at the development of the social economy and the promotion of social
entrepreneurship and easily accessible for social enterprises.
The social economy has different traditions in different parts and Member States of
Europe. Some countries, like France, have a strong tradition of ‘économie sociale et solidaire’.
They are gearing up with social innovation in its ‘newer’ meaning and initiatives
are sprouting, often linked with the Structural Funds. For example, Avise75
has launched
a call for proposals with the aim to accelerate social innovation in the social economy,
and thus help to find new answers to unmet needs in fields like employment, housing,
ageing, childcare, etc.
Market access for social enterprises is still restricted (even if the provisions of the new
directives on public procurement76
adopted by the European Parliament and the Council
in early 2014 will noticeably improve the context). Sometimes they are unable to
compete for public tenders against other small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
because of interpretations of national rules. Member States and Managing Authorities
and other public contracting bodies can use the purchasing power of large and small
ERDF projects to stimulate social innovation in employment and inclusion of marginalised
groups. The example below from the City of Nantes illustrates how a procurement
framework has opened a space for social enterprises to work directly with the private
sector in helping disadvantaged people into employment. Similar examples exist in other
parts of the EU.
75	http://www.avise.org/.
76	http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014L0024; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0025; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0023.
39P A R T I – S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N , A N E W P A T H
The Nantes example illustrates how public works contracts can deliver a double benefit: the work that
needs to be done, such as a road, as well as jobs for excluded people.
3.2.2. Microfinance
Whereas microcredit refers specifically to one type of microfinance – the act of providing
loans for business start-up and growth – microfinance is a broader concept in which
a range of products are developed to increase financial inclusion. These products may
include savings, financial education and literacy, personal loans and insurance.
Microfinance was slow to take off in Europe. ADIE77
in France was one of the first to
start up in the late 80s (it is now one of largest with around 20 000 borrowers in 2010).
There are now over 100 microfinance institutions of which around 80 are members of
the European Microfinance Network (EMN), which is supported with EU funds under the
PROGRESS initiative.
Although there are variations, in all EU Member States over 95 % of all businesses are
micro businesses employing less than ten people. They form the bottom of the enterprise
pyramid and are the seeds from which most SMEs and even large companies grow.
Microenterprises in Europe employ around one-third of private sector employees and
produce about 20 % of output.
As mentioned in another part of this survey, the EU funds and instruments for supporting
microfinance are:
77	http://www.adie.org/.
Using public procurement in an innovative way: The City of Nantes
The medium-sized city of Nantes (285 000 people) in north-west France has been known for nearly 15 years
as a leading innovator in using social clauses in public procurement to provide entry level jobs for the long-term
unemployed.
France revised its public procurement rules in 2006 allowing the condition that part of the work must be delivered
by a specific target group with a need for professional insertion. Nantes Metropole and surrounding suburban
administrations awarded contracts using this clause. Work has included swimming pools, roads, bus routes, and a
media centre. The types of trades comprise mason assistants, carpenters, painters, building workers, pavers, green
space maintenance staff, plumbers, metal workers, plasterboard, and external cleaners.
The city has also encouraged the development of support structures for individuals. The ‘Entreprise d’insertion’
trains and prepares them to get jobs that open up in the private sector. In 2008:
•	 183 contract operations contained a social clause;
•	 483 beneficiaries were able to work under an employment contract;
•	 345 000 hours dedicated to insertion (about 200 full-time equivalent jobs), a further 92 000 hours of work for
disadvantaged people were produced benefiting266 employees;
•	 133 enterprises were mobilised through these works;
•	 75 % of beneficiaries were accompanied by a local insertion company (a type of training and employment social
enterprise).
40 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
yy JASMINE, which provides technical assistance for microfinance organisations that
are close to becoming banks or have high levels of financial sustainability (JASMINE
is a joint initiative of the Commission, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and European
Investment Fund (it is financed out of the ERDF);
yy The ERDF, which provides support for setting up and growing microfinance;
yy The EU PROGRESS Microfinance facility – a fund managed by the European Investment
Fund with a total fund of EUR 160 million. It invests in microcredit providers,
which may be banks or NGOs. It does this either by issuing guarantees, thereby
sharing the providers’ potential risk of loss, or by providing funding to increase microcredit
lending;
yy The ESF mostly provides flanking measures for business start-up and business support.
Over EUR 2 billion have been allocated to ESF business support measures in
the current period. Part goes to micro-businesses – especially at the start-up stage.
The German Gründer coaching programme78
is a good example of a national coaching
scheme for start-ups that is co-financed by the ESF.
In 2011, a European Code of Good Conduct for Microcredit Provision79
was developed in
partnership with the microfinance sector.
There are also many microfinance organisations in Europe and elsewhere that have developed
innovative approaches to lending to specific groups. The Microcredit Foundation
Horizonti80
in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, for example, has developed
an innovative good practice ‘Housing Microfinance for Roma and marginalised people’.
The initiative started in 2007 with the aim of providing affordable housing to the Roma
community.
78	http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/nrp2014_germany_en.pdf.
79	http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/instruments/jasmine_cgc_en.cfm.
80	http://www.microfinancefocus.com/microcredit-fdtn-horizonti-receives-2011-european-best-practices-award/.
The Kiút Programme, self-employment and microcredit for Roma in Hungary
Kiút aims to support Roma to work in the formal economy by starting up a business. The microcredit programme
provides assistance by lending start-up money for small businesses to generate enough revenue to service the loan
and to produce additional income for Roma families.
The clients receive continuous administrative, financial and business advice and assistance. An explicit and important
aim of the programme is to encourage the participation of women (with a set target of 50 % female members in
each group).
41P A R T I – S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N , A N E W P A T H
3.2.3. Incubation
The world of social innovation has a number of incubators and centres which are crucial
for testing new ideas and bringing together partnerships.
3.2.4. Workplace innovation
Workplace innovation focuses on how to improve aspects of work organisation and introduce
modern management techniques that involve workers. Workplaces with flatter
hierarchies and the possibility for workers to contribute are more creative and ultimately
more productive and open to addressing both social and technological challenges. Workplace
innovation concerns not only the private sector but also large parts of the social
economy such as charities and foundations as well as the public sector. Celebrated
examples include Google, which allows employees to spend 20 % of their time on their
own projects, and IKEA, which practises stand-up round-table meetings among other
innovative practices allowing employees to tackle problems as they arise with minimum
management interference.
In the Netherlands and Belgium, workplace innovation is called ‘Social Innovation’ and
has been supported for over a decade by the Structural Funds. The approach as such is
strongest in northern Europe, especially Scandinavia.
The ERDF’s business support measures can be used to finance such innovations helping
both management and employees to explore more productive ways of working.
A Social Innovation Park in the Basque country
Denokinn brings together social enterprises, public authorities and the private sector to scale up successful
innovations after they have been piloted. They have launched the first social innovation park in Europe near Bilbao.
Denokinn received EUR 300 000 from the social experimentation part of the EU Progress Fund to develop a social
inclusion dimension to their Hiriko electric car concept. The result was a plan to adopt a decentralised assembly in
which the cars could be put together in work inclusion social enterprises by those excluded from the labour market.
The Hiriko car was launched by President Barroso on 27 January 2012. He said ‘Hiriko is European social innovation at its
best … Firstly, it is a successful example of how to give a new lease of life to traditional industrial sectors by contributing
to address major modern societal challenges, in that specific case, urban mobility and pollution. Secondly, it is a great
combination of new business types of cooperation and employment opportunities with a strong social dimension. Thirdly,
it is an excellent illustration of the finest use that can be made of European social funds’.
Results-based entrepreneurship in the Netherlands
Results-based entrepreneurship (RBE) aims at stimulating technological and social innovation within SMEs.
Advisers work with management and staff combining strategic advice with social innovation (improving
communication, raising personnel involvement, etc.) and so stimulating technological innovation. The improved
teamwork promotes a collective ambition for the company’s success encouraging new ideas, products and
services.
Business support is given through Social Innovation vouchers. Firms can use these vouchers to hire an expert to help
them implement the method. The voucher covers 50 % of the cost up to a maximum of EUR 20 000. The minimum
voucher is EUR 3 000 (with a grant of EUR 1 500). By buying a voucher, a company receives double the amount of
support that it would obtain if it bought the same consultancy on the open market. As companies contribute to the
cost, the scheme ensures their support and commitment.
42 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
3.2.5. Changes in governance
Governance is one of the key issues when it comes to social innovation. Among the
many experiments in this field, the latest include the one led by Santa Casa da Misericordia
(SCM),81
in Lisbon (Portugal).
3.3. Specific examples of actions from
the field
In this section of the report, real life examples of projects financed by the European
Structural Funds are tabled, showing how local initiatives, all of which are different and
almost unique, are able to rely on EU funding to develop and achieve their goals.
81	http://www.scml.pt/.
The Santa Casa da Misericordia de Lisboa (SCML) and the Banco de Inovação Social (BIS)
The SCML is one of the oldest and most important private charities in Portugal. It was founded in
1498 as the first coherent social care system in Lisbon. In the 18th century, the Queen granted the SCML the right
to run the first lottery in Portugal. Since the state granted the concession for lotteries in Portugal to the SCML, which
uses its proceeds to finance the SCML’s activities, the concession and activity is highly regulated.
The BIS, which also means ‘twice’ in Portuguese, is an informal, collaborative, and open platform, not an official
institution. It seeks to use social innovation as a tool to introduce systemic change in society at all levels: institutions,
economy, education, culture.
Portugal has to restore economic growth, employment, and make long-term structural reforms at all levels, but
especially at institutional and economic levels (public sector, public services, competition, etc.).
To help address this challenge, and even though its action is limited to Lisbon, the SCML opens up to the world,
collects best practices and collaborates with other institutions in the country and abroad to introduce change.
The SCML started its BIS programme about a year ago by inviting 26 other institutions to contribute their assets
(knowledge, experience, funds, people, etc.) to the BIS project and bring social innovation to Portugal. The first
institutions to be invited were the government itself, municipalities, universities, etc. to address all kinds of societal
needs in Portugal.
These new forms of governance (collaborative, informal platforms or programmes) are believed to be the best way
to foster social innovation. By bringing people and institutions together and work collaboratively, it will show people
in Portugal how to govern in a different way.
To support and promote creativity, a call for ideas has been launched, where ideas can be debated. Many people
have already sent ideas to address social needs. Social experimentation was also implemented (a current example is
the United at Work project, an innovative way to address senior and junior unemployment through intergenerational
entrepreneurship). TheBISalsopromotessocialbusinessbybringingtogetherpeoplewhohaveinterestsinsustainable
business. There is also an ongoing workstream on education, in schools, and a creativity competition was held in about
250 schools.
A social investment fund is being launched, which is necessary and the main current concern for the BIS. A key
obstacle is the lack of Portuguese legislation in this area so far, in spite of the EU initiative.
43P A R T I – S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N , A N E W P A T H
3.3.1. Social inclusion
Large sections of the European population are excluded from the benefits of economic
and social progress. The different forms of disadvantage related to educational attainment,
gender, age, physical status or ethnic background have been exacerbated by the
crisis. Among them, blindness is a disability subject to specific constraints, as explained
in the example below.
3.3.2. Migration
In recent years, population movements, especially immigration from non-European areas,
have become a more sensitive issue in the EU. Beyond the economic impact this may
have, the immigration that European countries have to cope with creates many social
issues. Due to their complexity, the human dimension which is still theirs, and their local
specificity, some of these situations have to be handled through practices that often
involve social innovation.
I-Cane: Mobility solutions for blind and visually impaired people for global use
Today Europe counts approximately 13 million blind and visual impaired people, who rely on ‘old fashioned’ aids,
e.g. the white cane and guide dogs. The traditional solutions do not offer navigation outside the memory constrained
zone. This enforces the social and economic isolation of this fast growing population of which the majority is over
50 years of age.
Developing high-tech solutions for a group of people with both limited financial means and also working with a user
volume considerably lower than the requirements of high volume electronics manufacturers is not an easy market
choice, it needed a particular approach. In 2004 the I-Cane foundation was initiated. Through this foundation
funds were raised from charities and the public sector (province of Limburg NL and the EU ERDF fund) to execute
a feasibility study and to deliver the proof of principle demonstration. In 2008 I-Cane succeeded in navigating a
blind person on an unfamiliar route without hitting obstacles. In this demonstration invented by I-Cane, tactile
human-machine interface also demonstrated its value since test persons were still able to listen to the environment
parallel to receiving instructions via their fingers, a unique human-machine interface.
From 2008 the social enterprise I-Cane Social Technology BV continued the work of the I-Cane foundation. A
development time of 5-8 years must be expected for mobility tools for disabled people but is unattractive for those
who seek a quick return on investment. Via support from the Social Economy network in the Netherlands, Belgium
and Germany, the funds were raised to meet the matching requirements of EU ERDF (OP Zuid) and national grant
arrangements.
Today this combination of public and private funding has resulted in an Euregion based platform of SMEs, with
European-wide knowledge institutes (such as the University of Delft, RWTH, Fraunhofer IPT, IMEC, TNO, ESA/Estec)
and end cross-border user organisations, led by I-Cane Social Technology BV and the I-Cane Foundation. In 2012
the first large-scale tests with I-Cane systems started, followed by a market introduction in 2013.
The I-Cane case demonstrates the combination of funding, close user interaction and cooperation between social
enterprises and knowledge institutes can deliver world-class break-out solutions.
Public sector innovation – immigration policy in Portugal
Towards the end of the 20th century Portugal’s immigrant population doubled within a few years, and most of
the new arrivals were not Portuguese speakers and had no historical links with this country. For the first time,
public administration experienced considerable difficulty in communicating with the immigrant population and
understanding their needs. At the same time, large migrant populations had to cope with the challenge of social
integration in an unknown linguistic, cultural and bureaucratic setting.
44 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
3.3.3. Urban regeneration
Most cities in Europe have poor communities living in difficult environments. Over the
past 20 years, the ERDF has financed integrated approaches to urban regeneration linking
economic, social and environmental aspects. In the 1990s, the Community-led Economic
Development priorities in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods of the UK were at
the forefront. In the 2000s, Germany was a leading practitioner.
This major shift catalysed the Portuguese one-stop-shop approach in immigration policy and the National Immigrant
Support Centres (CNAI) were opened to the public in 2004. The centres responded to a number of challenges identified
by migrant clients by providing various immigration-related services in one space, applying an identical working
philosophy, and working in cooperation. Indeed, participation is the core of innovation at the CNAIs in addition to
the integrated service delivery. The implementation of the one-stop-shop approach was based on the incorporation
of intercultural mediators in public administration service provision, who play a central role in service provision
because of cultural and linguistic proximity to the service-users and facilitate interaction between state services
and the immigrant population by forming an integral part of the procedures of Office of the High Commissioner for
Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue (ACIDI). Intercultural mediators usually come from immigrant communities
themselves and speak fluent Portuguese as well as at least one other language. Following training and an exam,
they are employed by certified immigrant associations, which receive grants from ACIDI. The certified associations
participate in the definition of immigration policy, immigration regulation processes and consultative councils.
ACIDI invests in the empowerment of immigrant leaders through training for immigrant association leaders, in
partnership with universities. The mediators also play a fundamental role as integration outreach workers. Because
they are immigrants themselves and normally reside in migrant neighbourhoods, they disseminate information
about the rights and duties of immigrants in Portugal even outside the one-stop-shop building, reaching places and
persons that the public administration would never reach if it never left its headquarters and operated exclusively
through public servants.
The State of North Rhine-Westphalia ‘Socially Integrative City’ programme: supporting
neighbourhood renewal
Since 1999, the government of North Rhine Westphalia has been developing integrated policies to support 80
neighbourhood regeneration programmes in cities within its State. An Integrated Local Action Plan (LAP) outlines
how the development, reorganisation and upgrading of an area is to take place. The approach is decentralised with
clear responsibilities for each level.
•	 55 Municipalities are responsible for the preparation and implementation of the LAP, applying for funding and
ensuring the neighbourhood plan meets the needs of the city as a whole.
•	 The district governments (regional administration units of the federal State level of NRW) advise the
municipalities on funding matters and authorise payments.
•	 The federal State ministry for urban development arranges and controls the programme and commissions
evaluations.
•	 The EU provides funding through the ESF and ERDF operational programmes.
In addition, there are private housing and retail companies involved as well as foundations, welfare organisations
and other stakeholders.
The neighbourhood management offices work on a wide range of tasks which include stimulating networking;
promoting a changed image of the neighbourhood; supporting bargaining processes; setting up communication
structures; informing the population and administration; organising offers of cultural activities; promoting the local
economy; forming a link between the neighbourhood, city and other levels of decision-making; and developing
projects.
A disposition fund (form of participatory budgeting) made up of 5 euro contributions per inhabitant finances smallscale
projects decided by a local citizens’ body. These projects have an immediate impact such as neighbourhood
parties, tree-planting in a school yard and outings for children whose parents cannot normally afford them.
45P A R T I – S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N , A N E W P A T H
3.3.4. Health and ageing
The European Commission has identified active and healthy ageing as a major societal
challenge common to all European countries, and an area which presents considerable
potential for Europe to lead the world in providing innovative responses to this challenge.
The Innovation Union strategy addresses the health and ageing issue by aiming to enhance
European competitiveness and tackle societal challenges through research and
innovation.
One way to achieve this is through Innovation Partnerships, fostering an integrated approach.
Their unique strength is that they will address weaknesses in the European
research and innovation system (notably, under-investment, conditions which are not
sufficiently innovation-friendly, and fragmentation and duplication), which considerably
complicate the discovery or exploitation of knowledge and, in many cases, ultimately
prevent the entry of innovations into the market place.
The European Innovation Partnership on Active and Healthy Ageing pursues a triple win
for Europe:
1.	 enabling EU citizens to lead healthy, active and independent lives while ageing;
2.	 improving the sustainability and efficiency of social and health care systems;
3.	 boosting and improving the competitiveness of the markets for innovative products
and services, responding to the ageing challenge at both EU and global level, thus
creating new opportunities for businesses.
This is to be realised in the three areas of prevention and health promotion, care and
cure, and active and the independent living of elderly people. The overarching target of
this partnership will be to increase the average healthy lifespan by two years by 2020.
The ERDF is another answer to the challenge of active and healthy ageing, as illustrated
by Finland, which has used this fund to co-finance a living lab focused on health and
welfare services.
The Living Lab Testing Process is a systematic and concrete tool, which contributes to
the development of user-driven innovations and enhances cooperation between municipalities
and business. The new cooperation Model improves business opportunities for
companies and attracts new companies to the area. It enhances innovation and economic
development strategies in a concrete way.
The Living Lab on Wellbeing Services and Technology, a social innovation that produces
user-driven innovations
This Living Lab was a finalist of the RegioStars 2013 competition. It is an innovation platform that enables a new
way of producing services for elderly people in a functional Public-Private-People partnership. Users participate
actively in product development, service design and usability testing processes. The testing of welfare services and
technologies takes place in real life contexts, in elderly people’s homes and service homes.
The new collaborative structure consists of different stakeholders such as municipalities, suppliers, citizens, the third
sector, universities, regional developers, specialists, financiers and regional, national and international networks.
The created concept has increased trust between the actors.
46 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
3.3.5. Social innovation and the environment
Social innovation can tackle environmental challenges82
and is proving popular in this
domain. There are a number of environmental drivers that are already instigating social
innovations such as waste issues, transport and pollution problems, as well as declines
in biodiversity and degradation of ecosystem services, for example, flood protection
through wetlands. Although these drivers are environmental, they have social repercussions,
such as health problems caused by air pollution, resource depletion due to
inefficient waste disposal, exacerbation of flooding from damage to natural defences
and food insecurity and agricultural issues exacerbated by poor soil quality or lack of
pollination. In other words, societal and environmental issues are often interlinked and
mutual solutions are possible. Some examples of forms of environmental social innovation
include wood recycling social enterprises, organic gardening cooperatives, low-impact
housing developments, farmers’ markets, car-sharing schemes, renewable energy
cooperatives and community composting schemes.83
In some sectors social innovation can shape technology, as evidenced by the grassroots
entrepreneurs and do-it-yourself builders of wind turbines and solar collectors
in Denmark and Austria respectively.84
These socially innovative groups instigated the
commercial development of these technologies and continue to influence their design as
they become more mainstream.
The application of local knowledge via community and social action can create adaptive
and flexible solutions that are appropriate to solving environmental problems. The
SPREAD Sustainable Lifestyles 2050 project85
was a European social platform that invited
a range of stakeholders to participate in the development of a vision for sustainable
lifestyles by 2050. In its research it identified social innovators as one of the
gatekeepers that can enable the shift towards more sustainable lifestyles. It proposed
that the intentional and voluntary effort of social innovations to change lifestyles is an
indispensable bottom-up driver for change, as they often champion new and promising
behaviour. As such, it suggested that social innovations should be given the opportunity
to test small-scale initiatives, which could be scaled up into large-scale sustainable
solutions and participate in planning and decision-making.
The SPREAD project also highlighted the important role of social innovation and the supportive
function of policy. It used scenarios and backcasting to outline a number of policy
implications and recommendations on facilitating social innovation in this area. More
generally the report suggested the need for an open transparent governance system
with local participation to create ownership of decisions and ensure implementation.
82	cf. http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/research/newsalert/pdf/IR10.pdf.
83	cf. Seyfang & Smith, 2007.
84	cf. Ornetzeder & Rohracher, 2013.
85	http://www.sustainable-lifestyles.eu/publications/publications.html.
Policy implications and recommendations on supporting social innovation to achieve
sustainable living from the SPREAD project
•	 Using effective policy instruments, which could include regulation, economic incentives and public participation.
•	 Acknowledging that one size will not fit all. Instead, allowing for combinations or hybrid models and accepting
provisions for dynamic structures that allow for change in order to fit the diversity of contexts across Europe.
47P A R T I – S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N , A N E W P A T H
Finally, one of the inputs of the SPREAD project was to underline that social innovation can
complement technological innovation and policymaking to achieve systemic, long-lasting
changes in lifestyles and society to tackle environmental issues. When citizens and communities
instigate change themselves and develop the innovation, it is more likely to be
successful and endure.
3.3.6. Regional strategies
Regional strategies that incorporate social innovation are only beginning to emerge.
Many French regions already integrate social innovation in some form in their strategies
for innovation and economic development, as a recent survey from Avise and the ARF86
shows. Most of them consider social innovation to be linked to the social economy and/
or work organisation, but it also combines various forms of incubation, co-creation with
citizens, initiatives in the health and care sector.
86	Association des Régions de France (http://www.arf.asso.fr/).
Basque Country: Social innovation linked to the regional innovation strategy
The Basque Country is a good example of how a region can use a wide range of approaches to achieve social
innovation. Innobasque is a non-profit private company created in 2007 to coordinate and promote innovation across
the Basque Country. It acts as a regional innovation partnership. The Board brings together 57 leading actors from
the region. It includes the rectors of the three universities, the chief executive of the cooperative group Mondragon,
representatives from three ministries as well as chief executives from leading enterprises in the region.
Innobasque works at the policy level on many aspects of technological innovation but also brings in the general public
through reflection groups and workshops such as its world café events, which focus on ways to promote societal
transformations. The OECD has described Innobasque as leading work on social innovation and fostering collaborative
action and joint research in the region. It is also exploring strategies to support the creation of new social firms (work
integration social enterprises).
Examples of the achievements of this public-private partnership include:
•	 Lifelong learning via a participatory process with citizens.
•	 Social contract for housing: participatory process with public and private agents defining housing policy for the
next 15 years.
•	 City XXI: Engagement on how a 21st
century city could be developed, its urban planning and its values.
•	 Ageing and new in-house services to help people to live in at home as they get older with a good quality of life
and services.
•	 Social contract for immigration involving all organisations and institutions to achieve a social contract for coexistence.
•	 Up-scaling promising practices like Transition Towns, cycling cities, local currency systems, car sharing, and
neighbourhood gardening. Providing institutional support to those initiatives, as well as to social entrepreneurs.
•	 Facilitating breakthrough and creative thinking by establishing free thinking ‘designLabs’ which are physical and
intellectual spaces that encourage and facilitate cooperation and the co-creation of meaningful and innovative
solutions to complex problems.
•	 Providing opportunities for societal actors, businesses and policymakers to leave their own ‘comfort zone’ and
experiment and test new solutions in collaborative, open-sourced platforms.
•	 Creating partnerships with other sectors, such as the health sector, to change environments into those facilitating
more active and healthy lifestyles.
48 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
3.3.7. Lessons learned from social innovation achievements
The abovementioned examples illustrate how social innovation works and succeeds in various
areas in different European countries. What further lessons can we draw? The answer
could be summarised in an important contribution aimed at understanding how social
innovations grow at local level and how they contribute to changing local welfare systems.
These issues are illustrated by 77 case studies in a 400-page e-book on Social Innovations
for social cohesion: Transnational patterns and approaches from 20 European cities, developed
as part of the WILCO project.87
87	http://www.wilcoproject.eu.
Summary of the main findings of the WILCO project
Innovations in services to address users
The majority of the social innovations identified in the survey as important and promising are service innovations. The
main differences between the service innovations analysed in the WILCO project and services established in the post-war
welfare traditions or the more recent managerial culture of public and private services are the following:
•	 investing in capabilities rather than spotting deficits;
•	 preference for open approaches, avoiding targeting with stigmatising effects;
•	 service offers that connect otherwise separated forms of support and access, allowing for personalised bundles
of support;
•	 creating flexible forms of ad hoc support;
•	 developing offers that meet newly emerging risks, beyond fixed social and participation rights and entitlements;
and
•	 working through ‘social contracts’ with individuals and groups.
Innovations in modes of working and financing
While this is in itself banal, it represents quite a challenge when it comes to disentangling what is ‘innovative’ about a
project and development and what is just an effect of the deconstruction of or regression in existing welfare models
and regulations. The kinds of arrangement for cooperation in social innovations are much more diversified than in the
public or business sector, including not only various forms of casual paid cooperation but also many forms of voluntary
and civic contributions, ranging from short-term activism to regular unpaid volunteering with a long-term perspective,
and from ‘hands-on’ volunteer work to constant inputs by civic engagement in a board. Therefore, from what is reported
on the various social innovations, one gets the impression that working fields are taking shape here that are innovative
in two respects. First, they are innovative because they balance very different arrangements for networking, paid work,
volunteering and civic engagement. And secondly, it is at least remarkably new to see how much the demarcation lines
between those who operate inside the organisation and those that get addressed as co-producers are often blurred (e.g.
innovations in housing and neighbourhood revitalisation).
Innovations concerning the entity of (local) welfare systems
One of the aims offset by the EU authorities for the WILCO project was to look at the possible contributions of social
innovations to changes and developments in local welfare systems. Speaking about a welfare system usually means
including, besides the local welfare state/the municipality, the welfare-related roles and responsibilities of the third
sector, the market sector and the community and family sphere. The cases of social innovations studied bear testimony
to the mutual relations that exist between all of these four components of a (local) welfare system.
In conclusion, one of the central messages of these case studies on local social innovations is that they are the opposite of
quick-fix solutions; using their full potential requires nothing less than a combination of ‘the deep strategies of chess masters
with the quick tactics of acrobats’. The lifecycles of social innovations (processes of emergence, stabilisation and scaling up)
are very conditional and are not available simply at the press of a button.
49P A R T I – S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N , A N E W P A T H
3.4. Social entrepreneurship to revive
the social economy
Beyond the priority measures in its short-term action plan, the Social Business Initiative
(SBI) has engendered powerful and sustained momentum for social entrepreneurship.
One of the most iconic stages of this phenomenon was an unprecedented event held
jointly by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), the European Commission
and the city of Strasbourg88
on 16 and 17 January 2014. More than 2000 social entrepreneurs
and supporters representing the rich diversity of the social economy came
together to affirm that social enterprises must play a bigger role in the future of Europe
and to identify new ways of boosting the sector. They called for new, innovative funding
sources, business support, networking, and clearer EU-wide regulations.
The event concluded with the Strasbourg Declaration, a milestone that covered a wide
range of areas where social entrepreneurs want to see further changes:
88	http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/conferences/2014/0116-social-entrepreneurs/index_en.htm.
‘A call to action to realise the potential of social enterprise
Governments and public bodies have started to recognise the power of social entrepreneurship. Steps are being
taken in many Member States and regions to encourage the growth of social enterprises.  At EU level, the SBI has
made a positive start in promoting eco-systems for social enterprises but we must not lose momentum. Therefore,
1. The EU must follow through on all the actions in the SBI. It should develop a second phase of the SBI that broadens
its scope, deepens its partnership with Member States, regional and local authorities, civil society organisations and
key players in the ecosystem.
2. The European Economic and Social Committee, the next European Commission (with a dedicated inter-service
structure) and the next European Parliament must take full ownership and deliver on the actions suggested in
Strasbourg.
3. There must be a stronger engagement at EU, national, regional and local levels with the social enterprise
community in the co-creation of new policies to support social enterprise, suited to the local context.
4. The Commission must ensure that its commitment to create an ecosystem for social enterprise is mainstreamed
in its policies.
5. In partnership with the social enterprise sector, Member States, regional and local authorities must fully support
the growth of social enterprises and help them build capacity. For example through legal frameworks, access to
finance, business start-up and development support, training and education and public procurement.
6. The European institutions and Member States should reinforce the role of social enterprises in structural reforms
to exit the crisis, notably where the social economy is less developed.
7. The Commission, the Member States and regions must boost cooperation between social enterprises across
borders and boundaries, to share knowledge and practices. Similarly, all public authorities should cooperate better
between themselves and enhance their capacity to support social enterprise growth.
8. Public and private players must develop a full range of suitable financial instruments and intermediaries that
support social enterprises throughout their lifecycle.
9. Social enterprise still needs further research and national statistical collection for a better understanding,
recognition and visibility of the sector, both among policymakers and the general public.
10. In this new Europe, all players need to look at growth and value creation from a wider perspective, by including
social indicators and demonstrating positive social impact when reporting social and economic progress.
50 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
The EESC was committed to the organisation of the Strasbourg event and is actively
involved in social entrepreneurship through a substantial number of opinions and the
Social Enterprise Project. Pursuing its interest, it has launched Make it happen, a new
project designed to keep the Strasbourg Declaration alive by promoting policy directions
and concrete actions to be forwarded to the new Commission and Parliament in Autumn
2014. Nine EESC members are directly involved in Make it happen through actions that
involve strengthened cooperation with social enterprise supporters, the participation of
the project group members in European events, and the consultation and involvement of
various social economy stakeholders and supporters of social enterprise.
To further unlock the potential of this sector, the EESC has called for a more supportive
environment for social enterprises and for their better integration into all EU policies. It
believes that partnerships with regional and local authorities, as well as social entrepreneurs
themselves, will play an important role.
The main actions points guiding the Social Enterprise Project are therefore as follows:
1.	 Co-creation of new policies to support social enterprise
2.	 Partnership to support social enterprises
3.	 Development of a second phase of the SBI.
Following an ongoing local strategy, the Social Enterprise Project is also taking part in local
events spread around Europe to conduct fact-findings missions, collect best practices
and investigate policy ideas and recommendations for the EU institutions.
4. Conclusion: scanning
the future to shape
the future
‘Europe has a head-start. It is ideally placed to take a lead and capture
first-mover benefits when it comes to implementing social innovations by
pro-actively and effectively trying to fully (and fairly) realise both economic
and societal benefits. With its strong legacy in social democracy,
solidarity, civic participation, justice and fairness, Europe arguably constitutes
especially fertile grounds when it comes to sustainably enabling
and growing social innovation.’89
Not only does the EU undoubtedly offer fertile ground for social innovation but, as a
good gardener, it has taken good care of it, by nurturing it adequately. In 2010, in the
first BEPA report, barriers and challenges to social innovation were identified according
to the scope and level of ambition of the innovations: responding to social demands,
societal challenges or engaging systemic change. Going systematically through the barriers
identified then, it seems that a large number of them have either been or are being
addressed effectively through EU policies. Milestones have been reached for instance
with respect to the availability of funding for social entrepreneurs (e.g. EuSEF, EaSI,
public procurement, crowdfunding). Progress is being made through innovative financial
schemes, the interest of a large community of financial actors and a wide-ranging
and active debate (within GECES, G8, etc.) on the establishment of a methodology to
measure the impact of social enterprises on the creation of socio-economic benefits and
their benefit for the community; the development of hubs is securing seed funding to
promote and test pilot cases; networks of hubs should facilitate the building of ecosystems
and the harnessing of contributions to expansion capital from a variety of sources.
The Social Business Initiative has also addressed the question of the status of social
enterprises (mapping) and the idea that innovations have ‘social’ roots is progressing
among mainstream innovation corporations and public and private stakeholders. This
was particularly clear during the annual EU Innovation Convention 2014.90
As a result, the EU landscape for social innovation is less fragmented today; it is generally
more visible and the programmes, initiatives and instruments created recently have
considerably contributed to setting up aspects of a European-wide ecosystem.
89	http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/presenta/social_innovation/social_innovation_2013.pdf.
90	http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/ic2014/index_en.cfm.
52 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
Nevertheless, as underlined by the OECD, EU policy could gain in coherence: One example
lies in the fact that one of the most powerful instruments to address issues related to
social innovation, the ERDF and territorial and cohesion policy, makes no direct reference
to it. Also, Social entrepreneurs and actors of social innovation who gathered in Strasbourg
saw this event as a beginning and not an end. Michel Barnier, the Commissioner
responsible for the Single Market, confirmed that this should become a regular event.
Moreover, prospective studies recently published on the future of Europe in the medium
term are proving to be valuable lessons on the path that lies ahead for Europe to take
full advantage of its actions to promote social innovation.
Europe’s Societal Challenges
A major source of inspiration comes from the report prepared by RAND Europe entitled
Europe’s Societal Challenges,91
and commissioned by ESPAS.92
It acknowledges the
many challenges facing the EU and suggests ways to mitigate current downward trends.
According to the report, the world in 2030 could be characterised by the following significant
changes.
91	http://europa.eu/espas/pdf/espas-report-societal-trends.pdf.
92	European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (http://europa.eu/espas/).
Regarding demographic change
•	 The world’s population will be more urbanised: for the first time in history, more than 50 % of the population will
live in urban zones. Specifically, about 80 % of European society will live in cities, which will become increasingly
important actors.
•	 We will also observe further ageing of the world’s population. This trend is already apparent in Europe and it will be
the region with the highest average age globally. European population ageing will have direct consequences for the
working population and social welfare systems, health services and pensions in terms of demand and expenditure.
Regarding immigration patterns
•	 Immigration patterns will change, becoming more inter-regional (south-south rather than south-north). However,
Europe will continue to be a destination region for its neighbouring regions.
Regarding the growing middle class and the empowerment of individuals
•	 The growing middle class will be a structural change in the world to come. The global middle class will increase
from 1.8 billion in 2009 to 5 billion in 2030.
•	 Gender equality and the empowerment of women will improve as a result of more egalitarian access to education
and the role of technology. Greater access to further education is likely to drive and be influenced by increased
individual empowerment. This in turn may generate greater support for increasing gender equality and the empowerment
of women.
•	 Poverty will fall globally and so will inequalities and access to wealth among states. However, there is a risk
that inequalities among citizens/individuals will increase in terms of revenue, especially in Europe and the
United States.
•	 The internet divide will persist within and between countries – in terms of access to networks and the internet.
This means that technological development could potentially accelerate socio-economic inequalities between
individuals/countries, since it essentially benefits the highly qualified, the connected and those in the higher
income groups.
53P A R T I – S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N , A N E W P A T H
These scenarios, should they materialise, would be accompanied by an undoubted political
impact, which may be presented as a complex picture of paradoxes:
yy In an increasingly complex world, there is an increasing loss of confidence in the institutions
and an increasing aversion to risk. This could translate into a crisis of political
action linked to the lack of understanding of global complexities among citizens.
yy A steady fall in confidence in public action and in political engagement ­­– be it at
national or EU level – which could, once again, be exacerbated by the role of technology
and access to unverified information.
yy The advance of technology leads to a plethora of actors, just as much as it does to
new ways of relating to each other (as groups or as citizens), individualistic tendencies
(countering the formation of groups) and the radicalisation of society.
yy Arguably, the pressures described above will call for substantial efforts in the field of
social innovation. Yet, innovation may be slowed down by a culture of risk aversion.
yy The interaction of the widening skills gap, digital divide and unequal benefits of
technological innovations could lead to a vicious cycle for vulnerable groups, such as
young people, the older poor, low-skilled workers, migrants and their children.
So what future for Europe and which solutions?
RAND Europe suggests four very interesting routes to explore:
yy Preparing a new growth paradigm, focused on the wellbeing of citizens while offering
opportunities for business to thrive: Europe’s economy is expected to continue
its decline, and policymakers should focus on a ‘new growth paradigm’ centred on
society, not growth. Instead of focusing efforts on creating wealth, European nations
are advised to prioritise the health of societies. The successor of the current Europe
Regarding the rise in inequality leading to vulnerability
•	 Across the spectrum of expected problems is a surge in inequality. While inequalities between European countries
are decreasing, within countries they are rising.
•	 Earnings/gains from productivity growth tend to be heavily concentrated among high-income workers. At the
same time, projections suggest a considerable surplus of low-skilled workers, which could lead to long-term and
permanent joblessness among young people without secondary training and older workers who cannot retrain
to meet requirements for new skills. As a consequence of this skills mismatch, income inequality is projected to
expand.
Regarding quick technological development
•	 The development of new technologies will continue right through to 2030. Innovation will continue to depend on
R&D investment, which should continue to increase in advanced economies and to further develop in China. In
Europe, however, R&D expenses will decrease notably because of the increase in China, even if the 2020 objectives
are met.
•	 In order to stimulate innovation, more than one source of funding is needed: education, cooperation among universities,
business, and financial institutions organised around innovation ecosystems will be important.
•	 Innovation will also depend on the social and political organisation of society: democracy and open societies seem
to favour innovation. There seems to be a circular relationship here, since innovation (particularly the development
of technology) will also change the way citizens are organised.
54 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
2020 Strategy should aim to invest in human capital and avoid sluggish productivity
growth, achieved at the expense of social inclusion, public health, education
and skills, security or freedom. This will include improving the innovative capacity of
SMEs; bridging the digital divide between Member States; matching migrant skills to
the labour market, as well as those of the young unemployed.
yy Investing in citizens, including protecting the most vulnerable: Aside from fixing the
economy, the report argues that the real challenge for European policymakers will
be to break the trend of rising poverty risks, increasing income inequality and longterm
unemployment without relying on economic growth as a panacea. Investing in
health and education, preferably as early as possible (e.g. through early childhood
education and care interventions) will help reduce costs in the long term, avoid exclusion,
and equip citizens with the skills that are in demand in the labour market.
There is also a need to bridge the gender gap and address inequalities in access to
technology.
yy Adapting public sector and government institutions to the 21st
century: This includes
mitigating increasing pressure on the affordability of welfare states, particularly
health and pensions.
yy Bringing citizens back into the European project: A serious and long-term effort is
required from the EU institutions and its Member States to support the development
of a European identity from the earliest age – a sense of belonging that would
reinforce a sense of solidarity and loyalty to democratic ideals. Several EU policies
that deal with employment, education, health and technological development could
be used for this purpose. Similarly, more transparency in decision-making processes
and structural/institutional reforms that recognise the emergence of new actors/
stakeholders on the scene (NGOs, civil society, business associations, etc.) and new
forms of communication will be necessary.
What will social enterprise look like in Europe by 2020?
The second of the aforementioned studies is the British Council’s ‘think piece’,93
commissioned
to contribute to the previously mentioned Strasbourg event. It provides a basis
for discussing what will shape social innovation and the growth of social enterprises in
the near future.
How will social enterprise respond to economic conditions, social and environmental
challenges, government policies, technology and investment over the next years? Social
enterprises are on the rise throughout the EU, with governments and investors increasingly
recognising the sector as a valid alternative to both private and public sector busi-
ness.
By 2020, associations and charities will be part of the ‘social enterprise spectrum’, generating
most of their income through trading activities. Enterprises from the private sector
will have to demonstrate their credentials, and could be better at this than traditional
social enterprises. Public, private and social economy organisations will be encouraged
by investors, funders, and governments to produce social value results in the long
93	cf. Mark Richardson, Richard Catherall ­– What will social enterprise look like in Europe by 2020? ­– British
Council, January 2014.
http://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/britishcouncil.uk2/files/what_will_social_enterprise_look_like_in_europe_
by_2020_0.pdf.
55P A R T I – S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N , A N E W P A T H
term. As a consequence, social impact measurement and comparison (covering economic,
environmental and social issues) will become mainstream in the social economy.
From grants to investment: one of the most important drivers will be the development
of the social finance sector. The traditional model of foundations will become outdated
since more and more enterprises will try to maximise their social impact while
delivering a financial return. Hybrid models of social investment (Social Investment
Bonds, Social Impact Bonds) will emphasise new tools (‘investment readiness’, ‘impact
reporting’) with two consequences: pressure on investors to consider social impact in
investments and growing involvement of social enterprises on financial services delivery.
But the context will also be constraining: new national and EU funding priorities could
exclude innovative social investments; innovative social enterprises will have to make
an international impact thanks to social franchising.
Complex networks: social enterprises will be more concerned with the importance of
their impact (through changing government practices and business, through developing
effective solutions that work). This consciousness will result in highly networked micro-social
enterprises. Social entrepreneurs will be connected with micro-social structures
and work with public, charitable, academic and profit-oriented sectors. Thus, this
collaborative approach (crowdsourcing, funding, etc.) will be an interesting alternative
to traditional political investment. Indeed, effective social enterprises will be considered
as models and will spread more rapidly than classical mechanisms (e.g., social
franchising). And European funding will encourage this kind of collaboration across international
boundaries.
The way forward
The European Union is at a decisive moment in its history in terms of the policies it
intends to take tomorrow and the future it wants to design. With reference to social
innovation, we are not yet in midstream. Over the past five years, we have seen how
awareness has grown; how experiments have developed and how policies have begun
to assist and foster this trend. With regard to the outcomes, expectations that have
emerged and changes that could occur in Europe in the coming years, we need to measure
the distance still to go to achieve the major challenge of social innovation and move
beyond the expanding myriad of small initiatives and projects with limited results – as
successful as they are – to achieve a real systemic change that puts social innovation at
the heart of all processes and policies.
From where we stand today, building on the gains that have already been made and
in addition to the abovementioned suggestions from RAND Europe, we believe that the
following three key areas for reflection, exploration and action should be prioritised and
explored.
Improve governance in relation to social innovation
In this field, the levers for improvement and action mainly concern the following three
areas: globally speaking, a wider, more permanent support for the role of the public
sector (at European, national, regional and local level) in terms of innovation, especially
social innovation; fostering the link between social innovation and the private sector, in
particular by improving framework conditions to enable the development of enduring
partnerships; making corporate social responsibility a systematic and essential element
of analysis and operating mode of all businesses.
56 S O C I A L I N N O V A T I O N – A D E C A D E O F C H A N G E S
Clearly, to reach these goals, the European Commission should keep improving synergies
between its different services.
Focus on knowledge
Improvements in recent years to impact measurement and mapping have demonstrated
their value. Today we should continue in this direction and further enrich knowledge in
these two areas of research. Other hitherto unexplored areas deserve to be investigated,
especially the interactions between social innovation and health. Research on social
innovation must continue to move forward, in order to test new models, focus on best
practices or favour bottom-up approaches. Finally, the growing role of information and
communication technologies (ICT) in social innovation should be better incorporated in
the way we understand and treat this topic.
Support, encourage and improve the business environment
The Single Market Act (I & II) and the Social Business Initiative have already made
many improvements for European businesses that want to promote or participate in
social innovation. All possibilities for going further in this direction should be explored
and exploited: improve regulations in this field, mainly with regard to accessing finance;
encouraging partnerships to support social innovation; using public procurements as a
genuine social policy instrument; and developing a second phase of the Social Business
Initiative.
Ultimately, the addition of these initiatives, the effect of these policies and the gradual
(possibly irreversible) evolution in the way we look at social innovation could lead to side
effects of unexpected magnitude.
yy What is at stake is the ongoing struggle against inequality. We see that it continues
to rise and tomorrow it may be even more central to the issues that European policies
will have to face and fight.
yy What is also at stake is the emergence of a different conception of the economy, a
shared economy that is not focused exclusively on growth.
yy Finally, empowering the citizen remains at the very heart of social innovation issues.
This fundamental issue cannot be ignored by European policies.
3
Inclusive Workplace
3
1. Blanchard, Kenneth H. 2010. "The power of vision." Pp. 17-30 in Leading
at a Higher Level: Blanchard on How to Be a High-performing Leader.
Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall.
2. Heinemeier Hansson, David and Jason Fried. 2010. "Chapter 1." Pp. 12-19
in ReWork: Change the Way You Work Forever. Vermilion.
3. Ligeti, George. 2012. "Chapter 1 omg!" Pp. 16-33 in OMG! Not Training
Again. HumanRobot, Budapest.
Chapter 2
THE POWER OF VISION
Jesse Stoner, Ken Blanchard,
and Drea Zigarmi
When leaders who are leading at a higher level understand
the role of the triple bottom line as the right target—to be
the provider of choice, employer of choice, and investment of
choice—they are ready to focus everyone’s energy on a compelling
vision.
The Importance of Vision
Why is it so important for leaders to have clear vision? Because
Leadership is about going somewhere.
If you and your people don’t know
where you are going,
your leadership doesn’t matter.
From the Library of Lee Bogdanoff
Download at WoweBook.Com
18
Leading at a Higher Level
Alice learned this lesson in Alice in Wonderland when she was
searching for a way out of Wonderland and came to a fork in the
road. “Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from
here?” she asked the Cheshire Cat. “That depends a good deal on
where you want to go,” the cat responded. Alice replied that she
really did not much care. The smiling cat told her in no uncertain
terms: “Then it doesn’t matter which way you go.”
Jesse Stoner conducted an extensive study that demonstrated
the powerful impact of vision and leadership on organizational
performance.1 She collected information from the team members
of more than 500 leaders. The results were striking. Leaders who
demonstrated strong visionary leadership had the highestperforming
teams. Leaders with good management skills but
without vision had average team performance. Leaders who were
identified as weak in vision and management skills had poorperforming
teams.
The biggest impediment blocking most managers from being
great leaders is the lack of a clear vision for them to serve. In
fewer than 10 percent of the organizations we have visited were
members clear about the vision. This lack of shared vision causes
people to become inundated with multiple priorities, duplication
of efforts, false starts, and wasted energy—none of which supports
the triple bottom line.
A vision builds trust, collaboration, interdependence, motivation,
and mutual responsibility for success. Vision helps people
make smart choices, because their decisions are being made with
the end result in mind. As goals are accomplished, the answer to
“What next?” becomes clear. Vision allows us to act from a proactive
stance, moving toward what we want rather than reactively
away from what we don’t want. Vision empowers and excites us
to reach for what we truly desire. As the late management guru
Peter Drucker said, “The best way to predict your future is to create
it.”
From the Library of Lee Bogdanoff
Download at WoweBook.Com
19
The Power of Vision
Effective Versus Ineffective Vision Statements
A lot of organizations already have vision statements, but most of
them seem irrelevant when you look at the organization and
where it’s going. The purpose of a vision statement is to create an
aligned organization where everyone is working together toward
the same desired ends.
The vision provides guidance for daily decisions
so that people are aiming at the right target,
not working at cross-purposes.
How do you know if your vision statement works? Here’s the
test: Is it hidden in a forgotten file or framed on a wall solely for
decoration? If so, it’s not working. Is it actively used to guide
everyday decision making? If the answer is yes, your vision statement
is working.
Creating a Vision That Really Works
Why don’t more leaders have a vision? We believe it’s a lack of
knowledge. Many leaders—such as former president George H.
W. Bush—say they just don’t get the “vision thing.” They
acknowledge that vision is desirable, but they’re unsure how to
create it. To these leaders, vision seems elusive—something that
is magically bestowed only on the fortunate few. Intrigued by the
possibility of making vision accessible for all leaders, Jesse Stoner
teamed up with Drea Zigarmi to identify the key elements of a
compelling vision—one that would inspire people and provide
direction. In “From Vision to Reality,” Jesse and Drea identified
three key elements of a compelling vision:2
• Significant purpose: What business are you in?
• A picture of the future: What will the future look like
if you are successful?
From the Library of Lee Bogdanoff
Download at WoweBook.Com
• Clear values: What guides your behavior and decisions
on a daily basis?
A vision must include all three elements to be inspiring and
enduring. Let’s explore these elements with some real-world
examples.
Significant Purpose
The first element of a compelling vision is a significant purpose.
This higher purpose is your organization’s reason for existence. It
answers the question “Why?” rather than just explaining what
you do. It clarifies, from your customers’ viewpoint, what business
you are really in.
CNN is in the “hard spot news-breaking business.” Their customers
are busy people who need breaking news on demand.
Their business is to provide hard news as it unfolds—not to provide
entertainment. According to CNN, the typical family today is
too busy to sit in front of the television at 7 p.m. Dad has a second
job, Mom is working late, and the kids are involved in activities.
Therefore, CNN’s purpose is to provide news 24 hours a day. This
helps CNN employees answer the questions “What are my priorities?”
and “Where should I focus my energy?”
Walt Disney started his theme parks with a clear purpose. He
said, “We’re in the happiness business.” That is very different
from being in the theme park business. Clear purpose drives
everything the cast members (employees) do with their guests
(customers). Being in the happiness business helps cast members
understand their primary role in the company.
A wonderful organization in Orlando, Florida, called Give Kids
the World, is an implementation operation for the Make-A-Wish
Foundation. Dying children who always wanted to go to Disney
World, SeaWorld, or other attractions in Orlando can get a
chance through Give Kids the World. Over the years, the organization
has brought more than 50,000 families to Orlando for a
week at no cost to them. The organization thinks having a sick
child is a family issue; therefore, the whole family goes to Orlando.
20
Leading at a Higher Level
From the Library of Lee Bogdanoff
Download at WoweBook.Com
When you ask the employees what business they are in, they tell
you they’re in the memory business—they want to create memories
for these kids and their families.
On a visit to Give Kids the World, one of our colleagues passed
a man who was cutting the grass. Curious about how widely
understood the organization’s mission was, our colleague asked
the man, “What business are you in here at Give Kids the World?”
The man smiled and said, “We make memories.”
“How do you make memories?” our associate asked. “You just
cut the grass.”
The man said, “I certainly don’t make memories by continuing
to cut the grass if a family comes by. You can always tell who
the sick kid is, so I ask that youngster whether he or she or a
brother or sister wants to help me with my chores.”
Isn’t that a wonderful attitude? It keeps him focused on servicing
the folks who come to Give Kids the World.
Great organizations have a deep and noble sense
of purpose—a significant purpose—that inspires
excitement and commitment.
When work is meaningful and connected to what we truly
desire, we can unleash a productive and creative power we never
imagined. But purpose alone is not enough, because it does not
tell you where you’re going.
A Picture of the Future
The second element of a compelling vision is a picture of the
future. This picture of the end result should not be abstract. It
should be a mental image you can actually see. The power of
imagery has been described by many sports psychologists, including
Charles Garfield in Peak Performance: Mental Training
Techniques of the World’s Greatest Athletes. Numerous studies have
21
The Power of Vision
From the Library of Lee Bogdanoff
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demonstrated that not only does mental imagery enhance performance,
but it enhances intrinsic motivation as well.3
CNN’s picture of the future is not something vague like being
the premier network news station or being “number one.” It’s a
picture you can actually create a mental image of: “To be viewed
in every nation on the planet in English and in the language of
that region.”
Walt Disney’s picture of the future was expressed in the charge
he gave every cast member: “Keep the same smile on people’s
faces when they leave the park as when they entered.” Disney didn’t
care whether a guest was in the park two hours or ten hours.
He just wanted to keep them smiling. After all, they were in the
happiness business. Your picture should focus on the end result,
not the process of getting there.
At Give Kids the World, their picture of the future is that in the
last week of the lives of youngsters who have been there, they will
still be laughing and talking to their families about their time in
Orlando.
Some people mistakenly use the Apollo Moon Project as an
example of a vision. It is a wonderful example of the power of creating
a picture of the future, but it’s not an example of a vision.
In 1961, when President John F. Kennedy articulated a picture of
the future—to place a man on the moon by the end of the 1960s
and bring him home safely—the United States had not even
invented the technology to accomplish it. To achieve that goal,
NASA overcame seemingly insurmountable obstacles, demonstrating
the power of articulating a picture of the future.
However, once the goal was achieved, NASA never re-created its
spectacular achievement, because it was not linked to a significant
purpose. There was nothing to answer the question “Why?”
Was the purpose to “beat the Russians” or to “begin the Space
Defense Initiative” or—in the spirit of Star Trek—“to boldly go
where no one has gone before”? Because there was no clear purpose,
there was no way to guide decision making going forward
22
Leading at a Higher Level
From the Library of Lee Bogdanoff
Download at WoweBook.Com
and answer the question “What next?” The second element—a
picture of the future—is powerful, but it alone does not create an
enduring vision.
Clear Values
The third element of a compelling vision is having clear values.
High performing organizations have clear values. Values define
leadership and how employees act on a day-to-day basis while
doing their work.
Values provide guidelines for how you should proceed as you
pursue your purpose and picture of the future. They answer the
questions “What do I want to live by?” and “How?” They need to
be clearly described so that you know exactly what behaviors
demonstrate that the value is being lived. Values need to be consistently
acted on, or they are only good intentions. They need to
resonate with the personal values of the members of the organization
so that people truly choose to live by them.
The values need to support the organization’s purpose.
Because CNN is in the journalism business, not the entertainment
business, its values are “to provide accurate, responsible
journalism and to be responsive to the news needs of people
around the world.” These values help reporters and producers
make on-the-spot decisions about news coverage and would be
quite different if CNN were in the entertainment business.
Robert Johnson founded Johnson & Johnson for the purpose of
alleviating pain and disease. The company’s purpose and values,
reflected in its credo, continue to guide the company. Using its
values to guide its decision making, Johnson & Johnson quickly
recalled all Tylenol capsules throughout the United States during
a 1982 tampering incident that was localized in the Chicago
area. The immediate cost was substantial, but not knowing the
extent of the tampering, the company didn’t want to risk anyone’s
safety. In the end, Johnson & Johnson’s triple bottom line
was served, demonstrated by the company’s long-term gains in
reputation and profitability.
23
The Power of Vision
From the Library of Lee Bogdanoff
Download at WoweBook.Com
Most organizations that do have values either have too many
values or have not rank-ordered them.4 Research done by Ken
Blanchard and Michael O’Connor shows that people can’t focus
on more than three or four values that really impact behavior.
They also found that values must be rank-ordered to be effective.
Why? Because life is about value conflicts. When these conflicts
arise, people need to know which value they should focus on.
The Disney theme parks have four rank-ordered values: safety,
courtesy, the show, and efficiency. Why is safety the highest-ranked
value? Walt Disney knew that if guests were carried out of one of
his parks on a stretcher, they would not have the same smiles on
their faces leaving the park as they had when they entered.
The second-ranked value, courtesy, is all about the friendly
attitude you expect at a Disney park. Why is it important to know
that it’s the number-two value? Suppose one of the Disney cast
members is answering a guest question in a friendly, courteous
manner, and he hears a scream that’s not coming from a roller
coaster. If that cast member wants to act according to the park’s
rank-ordered values, he will excuse himself as quickly and politely
as possible and race toward the scream. Why? Because the
number-one value just called. If the values were not rank-ordered
and the cast member was enjoying the interaction with the guest,
he might say, “They’re always yelling in the park,” and not move
in the direction of the scream. Later somebody could come to that
cast member and say, “You were the closest to the scream. Why
didn’t you move?” The response could be, “I was dealing with our
courtesy value.” Life is a series of value conflicts. There will be
times when you can’t act on two values at the same time.
For a vision to endure, you need all three elements—a significant
purpose, a picture of the future, and clear values—to guide
behavior on a day-by-day basis. Martin Luther King, Jr. outlined
his vision in his “I Have a Dream” speech. By describing a world
where his children “will not be judged by the color of their skin
but by the content of their character,” he created powerful and
specific images arising from the values of brotherhood, respect,
24
Leading at a Higher Level
From the Library of Lee Bogdanoff
Download at WoweBook.Com
and freedom for all—values that resonate with the founding values
of the United States. King’s vision continues to mobilize and
guide people beyond his lifetime because it illuminates a significant
purpose, provides a picture of the future, and describes
values that resonate with people’s hopes and dreams.
A Compelling Vision Creates a Culture of Greatness
A compelling vision creates a strong culture in which the energy
of everyone in the organization is aligned. This results in trust,
customer satisfaction, an energized and committed workforce,
and profitability. Conversely, when an organization does not live
up to its stated values, employee and customer trust and commitment
erode, negatively impacting all aspects of the bottom line.
For example, Ford lost credibility and market share when its stated
value—“Quality Is Job One”—was tested by its hesitation to
take responsibility in the recall of the defective Firestone tires on
its Explorer sport utility vehicle in 2000.5
Vision Is the Place to Start
Research clearly demonstrates the extraordinary impact of a
shared vision, or core ideology, on long-term financial performance.
The cumulative stock returns of the HPOs researched by
Collins and Porras were six times greater than the “successful”
companies they examined and 15 times greater than the general
market over a 50-year period of time!6 For this reason, vision is
the place to start if you want to improve your organization’s HPO
SCORES and hit the target.
Research has demonstrated time and again that an essential
characteristic of great leaders is their ability to mobilize people
around a shared vision.7
If it’s not in service of a shared vision, leadership can become
self-serving. Leaders begin to think their people are there to serve
them, instead of the customer. Organizations can become
25
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26
Leading at a Higher Level
self-serving bureaucracies where leaders focus their energies on
recognition, power, and status, rather than the organization’s
larger purpose and goals.The results of this type of behavior have
been all too evident recently at Enron, WorldCom, and others.
Once the leader has clarified and shared the vision, he can
focus on serving and being responsive to the needs of the people,
understanding that the role of leadership is to remove barriers
and help people achieve the vision. The greatest leaders mobilize
others by coalescing people around a shared vision. Sometimes
leaders don’t get it at first, but the great ones eventually do.
Louis Gerstner, Jr. is a perfect example. When Gerstner took the
helm of IBM in 1993—amidst turmoil and instability as the company’s
annual net losses reached a record $8 billion—he was quoted
as saying, “The last thing IBM needs is a vision.” A lot of people
asked us what we thought about that statement. Our reply was, “It
depends on how he defines vision. If he means a ‘pie-in-the-sky’
dream, he’s absolutely right.The ship is sinking. But if all he’s doing
is plugging the holes, the ship isn’t going anywhere.” We were
amused to read an article in The NewYork Times8 two years later. In
that article, Gerstner conceded that IBM had lost the war for the
desktop operating system, acknowledging that the acquisition of
Lotus signified that the company had failed to plan properly for its
future. He admitted that he and his management team now “spent
a lot of time thinking ahead.” Once Gerstner understood the importance
of vision, an incredible turnaround occurred. It became clear
that the company’s source of strength would be in integrated solutions
and resisted pressures to split the company. In 1995, delivering
the keynote address at the computer industry trade show,
Gerstner articulated IBM’s new vision—that network computing
would drive the next phase of industry growth and would be the
company’s overarching strategy. That year, IBM began a series of
acquisitions that positioned services to become the company’s
fastest-growing segment, with growth at more than 20 percent per
year. This extraordinary turnaround demonstrated that the most
important thing IBM needed was a vision—a shared vision.
From the Library of Lee Bogdanoff
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If an organization’s vision is compelling, the triple bottom line
is served. Success goes way beyond mere financial rewards. Vision
generates tremendous energy, excitement, and passion, because
people feel they are making a difference. They know what they
are doing and why. There is a strong sense of trust and respect.
Managers don’t try to control, but rather let others assume
responsibility, because people know they are part of an aligned
whole. People assume responsibility for their own actions. They
take charge of their future, rather than passively waiting for it to
happen. There is room for creativity and risk taking. People can
make their contributions in their own way, and those differences
are respected, because people know they are in the same boat—
all part of a larger whole going “full steam ahead!”
Vision Can Exist Anywhere in an Organization
You don’t have to wait for an organizational vision to begin. Vision
is the responsibility of every leader at every level of the organization.
It’s possible for leaders of departments or teams to create shared
visions for their departments even when the rest of the organization
doesn’t have one. Consider our work helping a tax department in a
Fortune 500 company. The leader of the department stated:
“We began to understand our own and each others’ hopes
and dreams and discovered how close they were. We found
ways to work together more effectively and began to enjoy
work a lot more. We discovered what business we were
really in: ‘Providing financial information to help leaders
make good business decisions.’ As a result, we began to
partner more effectively with business leaders. Our department
gained more credibility in the company, and other
departments began asking us what we had done to make
such a turnaround. They became interested in creating a
vision for their own department. It was contagious.”
Too often, leaders complain that they can’t have a vision
because the larger organization doesn’t have one. Again, it’s not
27
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necessary to wait. The power of vision will work for you and your
team, regardless of your level in the organization.
Make Your Vision a Reality
In their book Full Steam Ahead! Unleash the Power of Vision in Your
Company andYour Life, Ken Blanchard and Jesse Stoner define vision
as “knowing who you are, where you’re going, and what will guide
your journey.”9 Knowing who you are means having a significant
purpose. Where you’re going means having a picture of the future.
What will guide your journey are clear values. However, vision alone
is not enough. For a leader to ensure that the vision becomes a
reality—a shared vision that mobilizes people—Ken and Jesse identify
three important guidelines that people must follow: How the
vision is created, how it’s communicated, and how it’s lived.
How It’s Created
The process of creating the vision is as important as what the
vision says. Instead of simply taking the top management to a
retreat to put the vision together and then announcing it to others,
encourage dialogue about the vision. While the initial
responsibility for drafting an organizational vision rests with the
top management, the organization needs to put in place mechanisms
to give others an opportunity to help shape the vision—to
put their thumbprint on it.
For a departmental or team vision, it’s possible to craft the
vision as a team. Although the leader must have a sense of where
he’s going, it’s important that he trusts and utilizes the knowledge
and skills of the people on the team to get the best vision.
Regardless of how you initially draft the vision, it’s important
that you get input from those it affects before you finalize it. Ask
people these questions: “Would you like to work for an organization
that has this vision? Can you see where you fit in the vision?
Does it help you set priorities? Does it provide guidelines for making
decisions? Is it exciting and motivating? Have we left anything
28
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29
The Power of Vision
out? Should we delete anything?” Involving people will deepen
their understanding and commitment and create a better vision.
How It’s Communicated
Creating a vision—for your organization or department, for your
work, and for your life—is a journey, not a one-time activity.
In some organizations, a vision statement may be found
framed on the wall, but it provides no guidance or, worse, has
nothing to do with the reality of how things actually are. This
turns people off. Visioning is an ongoing process; you need to keep
it alive. It’s important to keep talking about the vision and referring
to it as much as possible. Max DePree, the legendary former
chairman of Herman Miller and author of Leadership Is an Art,
said that in his visionary role, he had to be like a third-grade
teacher. He had to keep on saying it over and over and over until
people got it right, right, right!The more you focus on your vision,
the clearer it will become, and the more deeply you will understand
it. In fact, aspects of what you thought was the vision may
change over time, but its essence will remain.
How It’s Lived
The moment you identify your vision, you need to behave as if it
were happening right now.Your actions need to be congruent with
your vision. As others see you living the vision, they will believe you
are serious, and this will help deepen their understanding and commitment.Two
strategies will support your efforts to live your vision:
• Always focus on your vision. Your vision should be the
foundation for your organization. If an obstacle or
unforeseen event throws you off-course, you may have to
change your short-term goals, but your vision should be
long-lasting. Change is bound to happen. Unforeseen
events are bound to occur. Find a way to reframe what is
happening as a challenge or opportunity on the road to
living your vision.
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30
Leading at a Higher Level
• Show the courage of commitment. True commitment
begins when you take action. There will be fears;
feel them and move ahead. It takes courage to create a
vision, and it takes courage to act on it. In the words of
Goethe, “Whatever you can do, or dream you can, begin
it. Boldness has genius, power, and magic in it.”
Vision and Leadership
Vision always comes back to leadership. People look to their formal
leaders for vision and direction. While leaders should involve
people in shaping direction, the ultimate responsibility for ensuring
and maintaining a vision remains with the leaders and cannot
be delegated to others. Creating a vision is not an activity that
can be checked off a list. It’s one of the most critical ongoing roles
of a successful leader. It means the difference between high and
average performance, whether it’s an entire organization, a
department, or a team.
Once a vision is agreed upon, it is up to the leader to ensure
that people respond to the vision. The leader’s job is to support
people in accomplishing the vision by removing barriers; by
ensuring that policies, practices, and systems make it easier for
them to act on the vision; and by holding themselves, their peers,
and their people accountable for acting consistently with the
vision. This way people serve the vision, not the leader.
Vision calls an organization to be truly great, not merely to
beat the competition and get big numbers. A magnificent vision
articulates people’s hopes and dreams, touches their hearts and
spirits, and helps them see how they can contribute. It aims
everyone in the right direction.
COMPANION
ONLINE
RESOURCE
Visit www.LeadingAtAHigherLevel.com
to access the free virtual conference titled
Set Your Sights on the Right Target and Vision.
Use the password “Target” for your FREE access.
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310
Leading at a Higher Level
Chapter 2
1 Jesse Stoner, Visionary Leadership, Management, and High
Performing Work Units (doctoral dissertation, University of
Massachusetts, 1988).
2 Jesse Stoner and Drea Zigarmi, “From Vision to Reality”
(Escondido, CA: The Ken Blanchard Companies, 1993).
The elements of a compelling vision were also described
by Stoner in “Realizing Your Vision” (Provo, UT: Executive
Excellence, 1990)
3 Charles Garfield and Hal Bennett, Peak Performance:
Mental Training Techniques of the World’s Greatest Athletes
(New York: Warner Books, 1989).
4 Ken Blanchard and Michael O’Connor, Managing by
Values (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 1997).
5 Ford Motor Company documents indicate that company
officials had data that Firestone tires installed on
Explorer sport-utility vehicles had little or no margin for
safety in top-speed driving at the tire pressures that Ford
recommended. The papers were part of a collection of
documents that Congressional investigators released
before the third round of Congressional hearings investigating
Ford’s and Bridgestone/Firestone Inc.’s handling
of tire failures.
6 Jim Collins and Jerry Porras, Built to Last: Successful
Habits of Visionary Companies (New York: HarperCollins,
1994).
7 Research studies described in Leaders: The Strategies for
Taking Charge by Warren Bennis, 1985, and The Leadership
Challenge by Kouzes and Posner, among others.
8 New York Times, August 2, 1995.
9 Ken Blanchard and Jesse Stoner, Full Steam Ahead:
Unleash the Power of Vision in Your Company and Your Life
(San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2003).
From the Library of Lee Bogdanoff
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CHAPTER
TAKEDOWNS
Ignore the real world
“That would never work in the real world.” You hear it all the time when you tell people
about a fresh idea.
This real world sounds like an awfully depressing place to live. It’s a place where new
ideas, unfamiliar approaches, and foreign concepts always lose. The only things that win are
what people already know and do, even if those things are flawed and inefficient.
Scratch the surface and you’ll find these “real world” inhabitants are filled with pessimism
and despair. They expect fresh concepts to fail. They assume society isn’t ready for or
capable of change.
Even worse, they want to drag others down into their tomb. If you’re hopeful and
ambitious, they’ll try to convince you your ideas are impossible. They’ll say you’re wasting
your time.
Don’t believe them. That world may be real for them, but it doesn’t mean you have to live
in it.
We know because our company fails the real-world test in all kinds of ways. In the real
world, you can’t have more than a dozen employees spread out in eight different cities on
two continents. In the real world, you can’t attract millions of customers without any
salespeople or advertising. In the real world, you can’t reveal your formula for success to
the rest of the world. But we’ve done all those things and prospered.
The real world isn’t a place, it’s an excuse. It’s a justification for not trying. It has nothing
to do with you.
Learning from mistakes is overrated
In the business world, failure has become an expected rite of passage. You hear all the time
how nine out of ten new businesses fail. You hear that your business’s chances are slim to
none. You hear that failure builds character. People advise, “Fail early and fail often.”
With so much failure in the air, you can’t help but breathe it in. Don’t inhale. Don’t get
fooled by the stats. Other people’s failures are just that: other people’s failures.
If other people can’t market their product, it has nothing to do with you. If other people
can’t build a team, it has nothing to do with you. If other people can’t price their services
properly, it has nothing to do with you. If other people can’t earn more than they spend …
well, you get it.
Another common misconception: You need to learn from your mistakes. What do you
really learn from mistakes? You might learn what not to do again, but how valuable is that?
You still don’t know what you should do next.
Contrast that with learning from your successes. Success gives you real ammunition.
When something succeeds, you know what worked—and you can do it again. And the next
time, you’ll probably do it even better.
Failure is not a prerequisite for success. A Harvard Business School study found alreadysuccessful
entrepreneurs are far more likely to succeed again (the success rate for their
future companies is 34 percent). But entrepreneurs whose companies failed the first time
had almost the same follow-on success rate as people starting a company for the first time:
just 23 percent. People who failed before have the same amount of success as people who
have never tried at all.* Success is the experience that actually counts.
That shouldn’t be a surprise: It’s exactly how nature works. Evolution doesn’t linger on
past failures, it’s always building upon what worked. So should you.
Planning is guessing
Unless you’re a fortune-teller, long-term business planning is a fantasy. There are just too
many factors that are out of your hands: market conditions, competitors, customers, the
economy, etc. Writing a plan makes you feel in control of things you can’t actually control.
Why don’t we just call plans what they really are: guesses. Start referring to your business
plans as business guesses, your financial plans as financial guesses, and your strategic plans
as strategic guesses. Now you can stop worrying about them as much. They just aren’t worth
the stress.
When you turn guesses into plans, you enter a danger zone. Plans let the past drive the
future. They put blinders on you. “This is where we’re going because, well, that’s where we
said we were going.” And that’s the problem: Plans are inconsistent with improvisation.
And you have to be able to improvise. You have to be able to pick up opportunities that
come along. Sometimes you need to say, “We’re going in a new direction because that’s
what makes sense today.”
The timing of long-range plans is screwed up too. You have the most information when
you’re doing something, not before you’ve done it. Yet when do you write a plan? Usually
it’s before you’ve even begun. That’s the worst time to make a big decision.
Now this isn’t to say you shouldn’t think about the future or contemplate how you might
attack upcoming obstacles. That’s a worthwhile exercise. Just don’t feel you need to write it
down or obsess about it. If you write a big plan, you’ll most likely never look at it anyway.
Plans more than a few pages long just wind up as fossils in your file cabinet.
Give up on the guesswork. Decide what you’re going to do this week, not this year. Figure
out the next most important thing and do that. Make decisions right before you do
something, not far in advance.
It’s OK to wing it. Just get on the plane and go. You can pick up a nicer shirt, shaving
cream, and a toothbrush once you get there.
Working without a plan may seem scary. But blindly following a plan that has no
relationship with reality is even scarier.
Why grow?
People ask, “How big is your company?” It’s small talk, but they’re not looking for a small
answer. The bigger the number, the more impressive, professional, and powerful you sound.
“Wow, nice!” they’ll say if you have a hundred-plus employees. If you’re small, you’ll get an
“Oh … that’s nice.” The former is meant as a compliment; the latter is said just to be polite.
Why is that? What is it about growth and business? Why is expansion always the goal?
What’s the attraction of big besides ego? (You’ll need a better answer than “economies of
scale.”) What’s wrong with finding the right size and staying there?
Do we look at Harvard or Oxford and say, “If they’d only expand and branch out and hire
thousands more professors and go global and open other campuses all over the world …
then they’d be great schools.” Of course not. That’s not how we measure the value of these
institutions. So why is it the way we measure businesses?
Maybe the right size for your company is five people. Maybe it’s forty. Maybe it’s two
hundred. Or maybe it’s just you and a laptop. Don’t make assumptions about how big you
should be ahead of time. Grow slow and see what feels right—premature hiring is the death
of many companies. And avoid huge growth spurts too—they can cause you to skip right
over your appropriate size.
Small is not just a stepping-stone. Small is a great destination in itself.
Have you ever noticed that while small businesses wish they were bigger, big businesses
dream about being more agile and flexible? And remember, once you get big, it’s really
hard to shrink without firing people, damaging morale, and changing the entire way you do
business.
Ramping up doesn’t have to be your goal. And we’re not talking just about the number of
employees you have either. It’s also true for expenses, rent, IT infrastructure, furniture, etc.
These things don’t just happen to you. You decide whether or not to take them on. And if
you do take them on, you’ll be taking on new headaches, too. Lock in lots of expenses and
you force yourself into building a complex businesss—one that’s a lot more difficult and
stressful to run.
Don’t be insecure about aiming to be a small business. Anyone who runs a business that’s
sustainable and profitable, whether it’s big or small, should be proud.
Workaholism
Our culture celebrates the idea of the workaholic. We hear about people burning the
midnight oil. They pull all-nighters and sleep at the office. It’s considered a badge of honor
to kill yourself over a project. No amount of work is too much work.
Not only is this workaholism unnecessary, it’s stupid. Working more doesn’t mean you
care more or get more done. It just means you work more.
Workaholics wind up creating more problems than they solve. First off, working like that
just isn’t sustainable over time. When the burnout crash comes—and it will—it’ll hit that
much harder.
Workaholics miss the point, too. They try to fix problems by throwing sheer hours at
them. They try to make up for intellectual laziness with brute force. This results in inelegant
solutions.
They even create crises. They don’t look for ways to be more efficient because they
actually like working overtime. They enjoy feeling like heroes. They create problems (often
unwittingly) just so they can get off on working more.
Workaholics make the people who don’t stay late feel inadequate for “merely” working
reasonable hours. That leads to guilt and poor morale all around. Plus, it leads to an ass-inseat
mentality—people stay late out of obligation, even if they aren’t really being
productive.
If all you do is work, you’re unlikely to have sound judgments. Your values and decision
making wind up skewed. You stop being able to decide what’s worth extra effort and what’s
not. And you wind up just plain tired. No one makes sharp decisions when tired.
In the end, workaholics don’t actually accomplish more than nonworkaholics. They may
claim to be perfectionists, but that just means they’re wasting time fixating on
inconsequential details instead of moving on to the next task.
Workaholics aren’t heroes. They don’t save the day, they just use it up. The real hero is
already home because she figured out a faster way to get things done.
Enough with “entrepreneurs”
Let’s retire the term entrepreneur. It’s outdated and loaded with baggage. It smells like a
members-only club. Everyone should be encouraged to start his own business, not just some
rare breed that self-identifies as entrepreneurs.
There’s a new group of people out there starting businesses. They’re turning profits yet
never think of themselves as entrepreneurs. A lot of them don’t even think of themselves as
business owners. They are just doing what they love on their own terms and getting paid
for it.
So let’s replace the fancy-sounding word with something a bit more down-to-earth.
Instead of entrepreneurs, let’s just call them starters. Anyone who creates a new business is
a starter. You don’t need an MBA, a certificate, a fancy suit, a briefcase, or an aboveaverage
tolerance for risk. You just need an idea, a touch of confidence, and a push to get
started.
*Leslie Berlin, “Try, Try Again, or Maybe Not,” New York Times, Mar. 21, 2009.
16
chapter 1 omg!
Team: brrrr!
Why is the word "team" being used so often
in the corporate world, or in the world of work
at all? Teams compete in sports and in games.
Companies, local government departments, or
NGOs have rather built little communities and
teams do not exist in civilian life at all.
Well, to be precise they do, but only in our
heads. This is what makes playing in "teams"
reality and this is the line along which people
will identify with either the blue or red team
(telecommunications company, TV channel,
food chainstore). This is the phenomenon the
business world has learned to exploit so well.
If, let's say, we consider ourselves part of the
Monkey Informatics team, then we will get into
battle against Donkey Software with much
greater vehemence and determination on the
battlefield of business. Once we have
established team consciousness among the
17
team members, then they can work 18 instead
of 8 hours a day, and are prepared to commit
smaller or greater infringements or acts of
immorality to the detriment of the other
company, motivated purely by a desire to
"win".
To win the "competition". But what
competition? Is it really a competition? Is there
a start and a finish line? Is there a moment
when somebody blows the whistle to signal the
end of the match and we know whether it's the
Monkeys or the Donkeys who have won? In
reality the winners are the owners, who take
their winnings home at the end of the year in
the shape of dividends. They, more often then
not, have a share in the Monkey and Donkey
company alike.
Training is often used to build a team. This
is even though real team building should not
be achieved at a place distant from work and
not with the involvement of an outside figure,
but rather during normal business hours at
work.
Team is not built by the training session or
the trainer, but by the leader and the
18
community itself. Team is built on an average
busy Thursday, or in the evening when the
server suddenly breaks down, but the
assignment must be completed by morning the
next day the latest. And there is a leader and
all the staff members are ready to join hands
and without concern for themselves or for the
others, they overcome the situation and tackle
the problem. They do it for each other. Not out
of fear of the upcoming deadline, and not for
praise or money; but simply for each other.
Now, that is team building. All the rest is
maraschino cherry on top of the cake.
If a set of people does not evolve into a real
community (all right, let's call it a "team")
sooner or later, it is probably due to poor
organisational climate. Company culture is
shaped and developed by the management.
humanrobot: Is it not food for thought when
advisers - for very high hourly rates - have no
alternative but to advise the top management of a
company of about ten thousand employees that they
should - at least once a week - have lunch together
with the workers in the company canteen?
19
Road to training
All training must serve the improvement of
the organisation. Training programmes range
on a very wide scale, but if training is not part
of a consciously thought-out and implemented
building/development process, then training
has very little to add.
Where do things go astray? Some training
sessions just don't work; that's happened to
me, too. Also there are bad trainers. But the
seed of poor training is always sown during the
preliminary ordering phase. This may be a
realistic threat when
1. the expectations and responsibilities of
the parties are not clarified,
2. training is wanted because there's some
money left at the end of the year, or when
there is not enough money and the client is
seeking to get a bit of a facelift rather than
root-level improvement,
3. client has some hidden objective or
expectation of training,
20
4. the to-be participants do not have the
faintest clue of what their boss has got in store
for them.
When the expectations and
responsibilities of the parties are not
clarified: the client cannot clearly express
what he wants to achieve through training; the
developers – in the hope of financial and
professional gains – are willing to go into any
length to please the client and they do not
squeeze out all the required information; the
participants only spring to attention when they
learn that participation is compulsory; the
venue used only provides what is customary
but fails in giving custom-tailored services.
When training is wanted because there's
some money left at the end of the year: "It
doesn't matter what it is..., just do something!",
goes the task description. Now, it is up to the
trainer to decide if he will take on an
assignment like that in exchange for pocket
money or the survival of his enterprise, or - on
the grounds of protecting his own or the
client's business interests - tactfully refuses
suggesting that they should be reconsidering
21
the proposal at the beginning of next year in
view of the long-term objectives.
When there is not enough money, but the
client is seeking to get a bit of a facelift
treatment instead of real improvement:
although people ought to be paid higher or
more staff is needed because of increased
workload, the company is unable or unwilling
to spend more. Well, why don't we just give
them a slap on the shoulder? Instead of
sending them off for two days to a wellness
hotel, the management gets them two trainers
to do something with the overworked and
underpaid staff.
When the client has some hidden
objective or expectation of the training:
there was one school principal who wanted
training from me because he feared that the
mayor would not make him school principal
when his mandate was over unless he had his
teachers' support. He thought training would be
a form of reward to his staff.
When the to-be participants do not have
the faintest clue of what their boss has got
in store for them: I have been witness to a
22
development programme - which, by the way,
required many days of preparation - in which
participants begged the trainer like school
children not to make them do anything.
What it all boils down to is that the decisionmaker
(leader number one or the HR manager)
decides that the organisation needs developing
or, alternatively, staff members or teams need
skills development or improvement in specific
special areas of expertise. Or that
development is needed across the entire
organisation as they want to introduce an
entirely new organisational culture. Of course,
culture will not change overnight during
training; the most a trainer can do is make
people aware of the realisations that are
already there lurking inside people's heads.
23
Most of the time, this is not recognised by
the participants. Only felt or sensed.
humanrobot: "Hi there, we've got a little money
left over in our budget, which we must either pay the
government in taxes or alternatively, we can buy a
research project. Could you not do some management
programme on the pretext of research for us? You
know, the bosses go down to the country each year.
Now, this we could link this to a management training
programme, a little bit of wine tasting and mini golf
at the end", goes the typical rhetoric of the company
HR.
24
What is training definitely not about?
Training - and I must stress this again - is a
means of organisation development. If it is
wanted by a small market enterprise, the final
and sole objective might just be to improve
profitability. Nothing else. After all, the
company was originally set up to make profit.
What else? Of course, the other question is the
price the company is paying to achieve the
expected return.
Training is not a form of reward. Going
sailing or spending one week in Barcelona
(often coined incentive training) by the top
management is more like a company holiday
rather than organisation development. It may
well be that the participants will have a good
time and can unwind, they may also inevitable
get to know each other better; even more so,
loyalty to the generous boss will increase, after
all, this great guy/girl is paying for the bill. Yet
I insist that this has nothing to contribute to
company development.
Training is not a form of punishment. "I am
here because they put my name on the list,
25
just now when I have a deadline to meet
tomorrow." Too many of my training sessions
start out like this. In a better scenario,
participants and I reward the sincerity of the
comment with roaring laughter. Things are not
going right? Well, just enrol them in some
effectiveness-booster training. That'll make a
difference. Is the staff overconfident? We'll
send them off to an overnight survival course.
But why?
Training is not the place for the trainer to
hold theatrical shows. The trainer is a
facilitator who is tasked with eliciting the
thoughts and feelings that are already there
inside the participants. The trainer is there to
encourage people to say certain things, look at
various life situations from different angles,
express different problems and find the
solutions if solutions can in fact be identified.
During all this, it is not the task of nor the time
for the trainer to make himself popular or
likeable. Of course, there are times during
training when the trainer is acting, as may be
the case with short theoretical type
presentations. There are moments when
theatrical skills are called for, when the trainer
26
is driven by empathy. Nonetheless, all these
moments must be used to serve the purpose of
development and not the acceptance of the
trainer, or the satisfaction of the trainer's
personal desire to be in the centre of attention.
Training is not designed to pave the way for
an unpleasant discussion. "People will feel
better and it will be easier for them to take the
pill", said one potential client; eventually, I
declined the offer. The act of announcing any
unpleasant news is an organisation
development tool itself: having an open and
clear approach, the honest exploration of the
troubles and their causes, the ability to identify
with the people concerned by the management
is the best possible developmental tool that
cannot be matched by even the best of
trainers.
27
humanrobot: "Unfortunately, as it turned out, I
could not attend the event; I had a foreign
delegation to meet", says one director as he invites
me for coffee behind the imitation leather padded
door of his office. "Nevertheless, I would love you
to tell me a few words about the people, who was the
best of them all, perhaps the most cooperative and
who impeded progress most. You know, I need this info
to deal with these people in my everyday work." You
would have to be a real tacky diplomat to get out of
a tight situation like this one. After all, the
client is your client even if he had failed to turn
up at the training. He will issue you with your
performance certificate, he will pay you, and it is
up to him whether you will use this as a reference
work, or quietly conceal that you have ever been near
the place.
28
The selling phase
It is always difficult to sell. Especially if you
are selling a service, which most people
believe they have some understanding of. Now
organisation development is just such a
service. I tend to feel I am really screwed when
I find that my client has some vague knowledge
of the subject and they keep wanting to convert
the little they know into loose change. (This
kind of work presents a real challenge because
on the one hand I can utilise the eagerness of
my partner but at the same time use a bit of
tactfulness and diplomacy to keep my fingers
on the steering wheel.
Let's call this group of people sciolists. They
will show off their patchwork knowledge
already during initial consultation. A typical
example for this when they want to show off
before their superiors or employees. Or they
may want to get a training product from you
that they may have heard of before and have
grown to like it for some reason, and are most
certainly not willing to hear the sad news from
29
you that this is exactly what they do not
actually need.
There is, however, a group of clients that
are either highly educated or totally ignorant
on the subject. This latter group, recognising
their ignorance, are excellent partners hence I
put them in the same category with the
educated ones. These clients
1. do not see their roles in a relationship of
subordination / domination, but focus on
identifying shared goals,
2. are ready and willing to learn and
understand the entire training process, and
3. are happy to share information - which
we, service providers, can also learn a lot from
and can offer them custom-tailored
programmes,
4. do not disguise problematic organisational
components or shun their own responsibility.
Many service providers are irritated if the
client wants to be part of the process in a
creative way. However this is normally for the
better since the client
30
1. will identify with the project if personally
involved,
2. will find participation rewarding and
realise their own responsibilities,
3. will be of assistance to you since they will
most certainly know more about their
organisation than you.
All you have to realise and consequently
indicate to them is the border line between
their and your responsibility.
humanrobot: We were holding a training session for
the teaching staff of a vocational school in a small
town. The programme was a great success mostly
because the weaving and wood-carving teachers were
open to the development methodologies we applied,
which - by the way - were very detached from their
everyday reality. They were able to laugh at
themselves and could even tell us what they believed
in, and the things they would not like to make
changes to because they were convinced they had been
doing well. When we finished, there was an Angel of
Silence. Then suddenly, appearing seemingly from
nowehere, the school principal asked a young lady
teacher to hand out photocopies of a story and asked
the teachers to read it and "nod one by one if you
think you have understood it".
31
Boxing and whitewater rafting
An organisation developer company was
launching a new business branch and ran
boxing training for the managers. According to
the concept underlying the programme, world
one has to learn to give and take punches in
the business. Does it not occur to you that
such a programme might , in fact, be organised
for the sole reason to make the organisation
developer stand out from the rest. At all costs?
The question is: why is any knowledge of
boxing required to sell an IT system, build a
residential estate, or introduce a new brand of
swimming suits? Many think that the business
world is like a boxing ring into which one only
steps if armed from head to toe.
Whitewater rafting Some like it. And some
loathe it. Our likes and dislikes and the way we
relate to extreme sports vary, and rightly so.
What may seem extreme sport to one person
may be daily routine for he other.
Some of the feelings experienced in training
courses, the thoughts and arguments of others,
32
and the mutually worked out solutions may be
carried over into the realm of everyday reality.
This is the real meaning and purpose of
training. There is, however, a limit beyond
which scaring or frightening people is
expressly hazardous. And also unethical. Just
because someone, having a helmet on his
head, detests getting into an incessantly
swaying rubber dinghy with three other people
from the controlling department, it does not
mean that they cannot be excellent payroll
accountants who never make a mistake in
thirty years, especially not at the cost of the
company. It is not freezing to death in the icy
waters and rolling over rocks that grinds you
into a team - this is so even if the water, the
boat and progress are fantastic metaphors in
the various areas of business.
33
humanrobot: I've often had participants shyly
eyeing the noses of their shoes and coming up to me
directly before the training was about to begin to
ask me about the type of activities they will be
expected to perform. After a significant number of
similar cases that showed the same pattern, I came to
the realisation that people were worried that they
would be subjected to humiliating exercises. In these
cases it transpired that the manager responsible for
organising the training failed to inform the
participants on what they were to expect. In one
development programme, an excessively obese lady came
up to me, her neck badly covered with moles, and she
asked me on a soft tone full of concern what type of
activities we would be playing during the day. She
told me how much she feared to make any physical
contact with anyone because she had the belief that
no-one would feel comfortable touching her under any
circumstance. She also shared with me some of her
former bad experiences. It transpired that a few
years before the lady had looked perfectly average;
she was a mother and a wife, but recently she had
been diagnosed with a tumour, which produced the
above symptoms. There were no activities on the cards
that involved the touching of each other on this
training session.
4
Dynamics of Social Inclusion/Exclusion in Public
Space
4
1. Kennett, Patricia. 1999. "Homelessness, citizenship and social exclusion."
Pp. 37 – 60 in Homelessness: exploring the new terrain, edited by Patricia
Kennett and Alex Marsh, Bristol: The Policy Press.
2. Mathieson, Jane, Jennie Popay, Etheline Enoch, Sarah Escorel, Mario
Hernandez, Heidi Johnston, and Laetitia Rispel. 2008. "The meanings of
social exclusion." Pp. 11-38 in Social Exclusion. Meaning, measurement
and experience and links to health inequalities. A review of literature.
WHO Social Exclusion Knowledge Network Background Paper 1.
(Available on-line at:
http://www.who.int/social_determinants/media/sekn_meaning_measuremen
t_experience_2008.pdf.pdf).
37
THREE
Homelessness, citizenship
and social exclusion
Patricia Kennett
This chapter considers the relationship between homelessness and the
concepts of citizenship and social exclusion. The connections are complex
and numerous while at the same time nebulous and changing. The
meanings of the concepts themselves represent ‘contested terrain’. This
chapter will argue, however, that this conceptual framework contributes
to an understanding of the multiple connections between the ensembles
of social rights, institutional and policy arrangements within and through
which homelessness has been understood and through which the
boundaries of citizenship and social exclusion have been drawn. The
discussion will be located in the context of the contemporary
‘entrepreneurial’ city.
This chapter will begin with a brief discussion of the concepts of
citizenship and social exclusion (for fuller discussions see Turner, 1993;
Room, 1995; Bulmer and Rees, 1996; Jordan, 1996; Levitas, 1998; Lister,
1998). Developments in the post-war period will then be explored to
establish the institutional,ideological and discursive context through which
homelessness was constructed and the boundaries of citizenship and
inclusionary and exclusionary criteria were established. The chapter will
then consider the emergence of the new homelessness within an alternative
policy discourse. Particularly from the early 1980s, this discourse was
accompanied by the renegotiation of the content and meaning of
citizenship rights. The chapter will argue that the current model of
social integration and citizenship seems to be one in which there has
been a re-evaluation of the notion of civil rights and an increasing emphasis
on the‘privatised’ citizen (Lister, 1990), active in the workfare state of the
stakeholder society.
38
Homelessness
Citizenship and social exclusion
The concept of citizenship has a long history but is most commonly
associated with the work of T.H. Marshall (1950) for whom citizenship is
based upon rights and entitlements. His central theme was that the rights
of citizenship involve national constitutional rights such as civil and political
rights,as well as embracing social rights,each of which is closely associated
with social and political institutions. The hallmark of advanced industrial
democracies is the eventual institutionalisation of all three types of rights
and, in particular, social citizenship. For Marshall, the citizenship rights
that accrue to members of a political community integrate previously
unintegrated segments of the population and serve to mitigate some of
the inequalities of class, thus altering the pattern of social inequality.
Marshall discusses‘class fusion’which he refers to as the“general enrichment
of the concrete substance of civilised life, a general reduction of risk and
insecurity,and equalisation between the more or less fortunate at all levels”
(Marshall,1950,p 6). This leads“...towards a fuller measure of equality,an
enrichment of the stuff of which the status is made and an increase in the
number of those on whom the status is bestowed”(p 29). Marshall’s thesis
has been criticised for its evolutionary and Anglocentric nature (Giddens,
1982; Mann, 1987), as well as its emphasis on class. As Marsh (1998)
points out,general accounts of citizenship often render other social divisions
in society,such as gender and ethnicity,invisible. Marshall (1950) also fails
to recognise the contingency, flexibility and fragility of the social contract
between the state and the individual and that the attainment of citizenship
rights and the opportunity to exercise such rights is a process of constant
struggle and negotiation. The progression from civil to political and social
rights is not the smooth, inevitable process Marshall suggests, but has
always been dependent on political struggles between social movements,
groups and classes. Retrogression and the erosion of the rights of particular
groups are an ever-present possibility.
Byrne (1997) describes the term social exclusion as “currently the
most fashionable term” (p 28) for describing social divisions in European
capitalist societies. It has been the catalyst for extensive debate regarding
the nature of social differentiation (for example, Rodgers, et al, 1995;
Room, 1995; Jordan, 1996) and is now widely utilised both in national
and international policy arenas (for example,European Commission,1994;
Social Exclusion Unit, 1998). Saraceno (1997) argues that the
reconstruction of debates from poverty to social exclusion has involved
“an actual conceptual shift, and a change in perspective; from a static to
39
a dynamic approach, as well as from a distributional to a relational focus”
(p 177). Lee and Murie (1997) point out that the term social exclusion
is more explicitly concerned with the social rights of citizenship and the
ability to exercise such rights, particularly in relation to accessing services
such as housing, employment and healthcare. And, according to
Abrahamson (1997) “the element that distinguishes social exclusion from
poverty and makes it, perhaps, more potent, is ... the affiliation with the
issue of citizenship rights” (p 148). So while Room (1991) had defined
social exclusion in relation to social rights and the inability of ‘citizens’ to
secure these social rights, for Tricard social exclusion refers to:
... processes and situations by which persons or groups tend to
be separated or held at a distance from ordinary social exchange
or positions which promote or allow integration or ‘insertion’ –
that is,from participation in institutions or from access to rights,
services or resources which imply full membership of society.
(Tricard, 1991, p 2)
The relational dynamics between housing and social exclusion have
recently been explored by Lee and Murie (1997) who seek to show “the
way in which the housing system forms part of the process through
which poverty and deprivation arises and is experienced”(p 4). Somerville
(1998), in applying the theory of social exclusion to housing processes,
explores the themes of housing production, housing tenure, residential
segregation, mobility and processes associated with homelessness and
leaving home. He seeks to show “how housing processes cut across the
different social levels (labour process, social reproduction and ideology),
how they reflect prevailing patterns of social exclusion,and how they can
mitigate or reinforce those patterns” (p 761). Anderson (1999), however,
argues that debates linking housing and social exclusion have tended to
“neglect a significant group of people who have no accommodation, or
have shelter which is much less secure than council housing – single
homeless people” (p 157). Yet, Pleace (1998) argues that the concept of
social exclusion offers the opportunity to reconceptualise single
homelessness and rough sleeping. He states that “‘homelessness’ does not
actually exist as a discrete social problem” (p 50). Single homelessness is
best seen as an outcome of processes of social exclusion, particularly “the
inability of a section of the socially excluded population to get access to
welfare services and social housing” (p 50). He sees the recent policy
initiatives around resettlement and inclusion for single homeless people
Homelessness, citizenship and social exclusion
40
Homelessness
(for example, the Rough Sleepers Initiative) as a “development of the
relationship between the understanding of single homelessness and the
concept of ‘social exclusion’” (p 51).
This chapter will argue, however, that while recent policy initiatives
have indeed brought the issues of rough sleeping and single homelessness
back onto the agenda it has been in the context of the promotion of a
‘productivist’rather than a redistributive social policy agenda,emphasising
the active rather than the passive citizen, with labour market insertion
the key to inclusion (Levitas, 1998). These themes are encapsulated in
the 1994 White Paper of the European Union, European social policy – A
way forward for the Union:
... it is clear that there needs to be a move away from more
passive income maintenance measures towards active labour
market measures designed to ensure the economic and social
integration of all people. This means giving a top priority to
employment,securing new links between employment and social
policies by developing a ‘trampoline’ safety net, and recognising
that those who are not in the labour market also have a useful
role to play in society.... (European Commission, 1994, p 34-5)
As Esping-Andersen (1996) argues,“the idea is to redirect social policy
from its current bias in favour of passive income maintenance towards
active labour market programmes that ‘put people back to work’, help
households harmonise work and family obligations, and train the
population in the kinds of skills that post-industrial society demands” (p
3). The promotion of the active citizen is now said to be an essential
element of the enterprise culture and the entrepreneurial, competitive
city. It signifies the emergence of an alternative mode of integration to
that maintained and supported through the post-war era of Keynesian
welfare capitalism. The dimensions of citizenship, social exclusion and
homelessness during this period will now be explored to highlight the
contingent and temporally specific nature of citizenship, social rights and
integration.
Homelessness: a thing of the past
A mode of integration in any phase of capitalist development emerges
through the relationship between the state, the family, the individual and
the institutional framework. Its sustainability depends on its resonance
41
with broader public and ontological narratives, that is, narratives which
are attached to cultural and institutional formations larger than the single
individual,and“personal narratives rooted in experience”(Sommers,1994,
p 619). The narratives encapsulated within the institutions of the postwar
welfare state provide an insight into the nature of the webs of
relationality within a mode of inclusion and their cultural and temporal
specificity. The economic and political context was the promotion of
Keynesian welfare capitalism organised around mass production and mass
consumption of capital goods, within a largely national context. The
welfare consensus emphasised an explicit commitment to state intervention
through universal access to direct public provision of welfare benefits. It
accepted an extended role for the state in economic and social policy and
implicitly guaranteed social rights of citizenship for the whole population
as a right. The discourse was that the state would ensure all citizens
enjoyed a certain minimum standard of life and economic security as a
matter of right. The mass consuming, mass producing, wage-earning
society of the Fordist era was supported by a mode of integration
encompassing a commitment to Keynesian capitalism,universal citizenship
and collectively minimised individual risk, in that the state was seen as
the primary guarantor against the vagaries and uncertainties of everyday
life. Radical class struggle faded from political discourse and, according
to Bowles and Gintis,“the language of liberal democracy, the lexicon of
rights,was ...installed as the nearly universal means of political discourse”
(Bowles and Gintis,1982,p 64). The boundaries of social rights,however,
were constructed within a specific narrative and that narrative reflected
the privileged status of the white, male working class and the “partial
citizenship”of women and black men (Kennett,1998). While the Fordist
welfare state linked the interests of capital and labour in a programme of
full employment and social welfare it also involved the interplay of forms
of social power other than class, such as racism and patriarchy (Williams,
1994). Thus the welfare settlement of the post-war period was a product
of the “interrelation between capitalism, patriarchy and imperialism”
(Williams, 1994, p 61).
In Britain the ethos of egalitarianism prevailed and the trends were
towards decreasing social inequality and the gradual inclusion of previously
excluded or marginal populations. On the new housing estates the move
was to a more fragmented, home-centred culture as rising working-class
living standards started to establish themselves. This was a period in
which growing middle-class affluence enabled the further development
of home-owning suburbia, while the ‘estate’ provided mass housing for
Homelessness, citizenship and social exclusion
42
Homelessness
the‘respectable’working class. The Fordist regime could be characterised
in terms of housing as a social right, universalism of subsidies and tax
breaks and as an era of mass suburbanisation and direct state housing
provision (Florida and Feldman, 1988). Personal disposable incomes
rose,the rate of inflation was modest,the scale of unemployment was low
and the majority of the population were well-housed. However, for the
poor to be incorporated into the home ideal they had to meet certain
criteria relating to personal decency and the acceptance of established
behavioural norms. Issues relating to class, race, gender and sexuality
were major considerations in how home was defined and who was able
to gain access. Women and people from ethnic minorities were unlikely
to have equal access to the capital through which the suburban home
ideal could be achieved, and were likely to be denied access to local
authority waiting lists (Rex and Moore, 1967; Castles and Kosack, 1973;
Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Henderson and Karn, 1987; Smith, 1989).
Nevertheless, the provision of state housing served to justify the
institutions of the Keynesian welfare state and support the hegemony of
the post-war settlement at the micro level. In Britain in 1960 7.5 million
people were living in poverty (Coates and Silburn, 1970) and there were
2,558 households (10,270 by 1976) in temporary accommodation (Burke,
1981). Yet for the majority of individuals the ideological commitment to
equality and welfarism was compatible with the ‘lived’ experience at the
micro level. As Byrne points out:
... in the Fordist era, good council housing was the locale in
space of an employed working class and movement into it from
poor council housing and out of it to the cheaper end of the
owner-occupied system was simply an incremental matter.
(Byrne, 1997, p 33)
The prevailing ideology was one in which income and housing need had
been met and poverty and homelessness involved a small number of people
on the margins of society. The homeless population, under the 1948
National Assistance Act, was to be the object of welfare services rather
than housing departments. This served to construct and maintain the
undeserving status of the homeless and reinforce the individual,
pathological model of homelessness. The way in which the homelessness
problem was constructed, “which stressed the deviant characteristics of
homeless individuals rather than issues such as housing shortage” (Neale,
1997, p 37), contributed to a policy agenda which served to render the
43
homeless population ‘invisible’ and perpetuate the logic of the public
narrative that this was an era in which poverty and homelessness were a
thing of the past.
Redrawing the boundaries of citizenship:
risk, insecurity and the active citizen
The last 25 years have been a period of substantial flux and change during
which the landscape of capitalism has been reshaped: economic, political,
social and cultural activities are said to have created a new set of conditions
from the past. According to Jessop selective narratives of past events
generate distinctive accounts of current economic, social and political
problems, from which emerge “a limited but widely accepted set of
diagnoses and prescriptions for the economic and political difficulties
now confronting nations,regions,and cities and their populations”(Jessop,
1996,p 3). The redrawing of the boundaries of citizenship can be seen in
this context. Allen argues that “discourses of citizenship are shaped not
only by the material and political realities which they (selectively) reflect,
but also by the way they seek to provide justificatory explanations for,
and principles to guide, the social activities which organise that reality”
(1998).
As economic conditions deteriorated during the mid-1970s, the postwar
consensus began to crumble. The institutional arrangements of the
post-war period which had supported specific configurations of citizenship
were increasingly perceived as barriers and impediments to the deploying
of new methods of production and consumption. In Britain, the erosion
of the post-war consensus occurred in the context of rampant inflation
in the wake of the oil crisis, and involved the acceptance by the 1976
Labour government of the International Monetary Fund’s prescription
of income restraint, cuts in social expenditure and, ultimately, the
abandonment of Keynesian policy. By the 1980s a major structural reform
of the welfare state was underway linked to an alternative economic
doctrine, philosophical tradition and an anti-collectivist orthodoxy.
Economic individualism and supply-side economics, as advocated by
Hayek and Friedman,provided the framework for the policy formulations
of monetarism, and the rhetoric for the devaluation of the welfare state
portraying it as a barrier to economic recovery and the road to ‘serfdom’
and economic ruin. Writers such as Nozick (1974) influenced the notions
of the minimal state and the atomistic individualism. The critique and
devaluation of state intervention incorporated all three elements as
Homelessness, citizenship and social exclusion
44
Homelessness
governments sought to reintroduce market processes into the welfare
state and public sector. Connotations of a bloated, self-interested and
inefficient bureaucracy were introduced and supported by‘public choice’
theorists (Niskanen,1971,1973) with recommendations for the reduction
in the size and power of government agencies and the introduction of
competition and market forces into welfare provision. By the end of the
1980s there was an explicit policy emphasis on market-based approaches
to the delivery of services, the role of local authorities became more
focused on that of enabler rather than provider, and the ‘desirability’ and
increased role for voluntary and private agencies in social policy was
enhanced. As Dean argues,“the burden of welfare provision was shifted
from the state to the informal, voluntary and commercial sectors and the
character of welfare transactions became, if not literally private, more
akin to contractual relations in the marketplace” (Dean, 1999, p 218).
These developments were accompanied by the erosion of the relative
predictability and certainty of the mass producing,mass consuming Fordist
era of welfare capitalism, and a change in the balance of class relations
reflecting the changing relative status of different groups and their
relationship with the state.The Fordist industrial order of stability in which
the life cycle of the “working-class [male] masses was predictable and,
mobility wise, generally flat” (Esping-Andersen, 1993, p 227) has come to
an end. The decline of Fordism has been accompanied by the rise in both
professional and lower-end service occupations, changes in class
composition and a recrystallisation of class forces, resulting in a declining
overall standard of living for large sections of the population and a reduction
in the number and quality of employment opportunities. As discussed in
the last chapter, the stable, predictable patterns of the conventional Fordist
life cycle, underpinned by the institutions of the welfare state, have given
way to greater variety and less predictability. Thus,in contrast to the postwar
period, there seems to be increasing insecurity not only in the labour
market but in many aspects of day-to-day life. Changes in the structure of
employment combined with the reorientation of the welfare state are said
to have created an arena of risk,insecurity and uncertainty for the majority
of the population,not just the poor (Forrest and Kennett,1997),in contrast
to the previous mode of inclusion.
According to Beck (1992) insecurity has emerged in the context of
the increasing individualisation and autonomisation of contemporary
society,and Giddens (1991,1992,1994) argues that in this era of reflexive
modernity “the concept of risk becomes fundamental to the way both
lay actors and technical specialists organise the social world” (Giddens,
45
1991, p 3). Within this risk culture individuals are constantly required to
assess their risk status and make decisions regarding potential risk“through
contact with expert knowledge ...”(Giddens,1991,p 5). Life-style choice,
life-planning and the reflexivity of the self are central to the construction
of an individual’s identity in this risk environment and,in turn,are linked
to the notion of ontological (or emotional) security (Giddens, 1991).
Increasingly,the social relations of everyday life have come to be associated
with complexity and uncertainty, independence and individualism. The
‘collective management’ of uncertainty during the post-war period has
given way to what Marris refers to as “the competitive management of
uncertainty” (Marris, 1996, p 14) where strategies for containing
uncertainty and risks must be developed individually. Thus, there has
been a transfer of risk from the state and the employer to the family and
the individual and a redrawing of the boundaries of citizenship (Kennett,
1998). This reorientation is an indication that the nature and significance
of the social relations of welfare change over time as does the relationship
between the individual and the state. This relationship is encapsulated in
the institutions and ideology of the welfare state through which the
inclusionary/exclusionary boundaries of citizenship are articulated and
perpetuated.
This restructuring of relations between state and civil society and the
establishment of new forms of intervention were most evident during
the Conservative era in Britain when there was the most profound shift
towards‘welfare pluralism’(Dean,1999). However,following their election
in May 1997,the Blair government has pursued similar strategies indicating
according to Marquand (1998) that New Labour “has turned its back on
Keynes and Beveridge” (quoted in Dean, 1999, p 221). According to
Dean (1999) “New Labour has combined the economic liberalism of the
Thatcher/Reagan orthodoxy, with something approaching socially
conservative Christian democracy” (p 221). Key policies of New Labour
have been Welfare-to-Work and the New Deal. Initially introduced to
overcome the problem of unemployment among young people the scope
of the New Deal has been extended to include, for example, lone parents
and those over 25. According to King and Wickham-Jones:
The policy recast in fundamental fashion Labour’s strategy to
tackle poverty: previously, Labour administrations and social
democrative thinkers had placed much weight on amelioration
of general destitution through State-directed public spending
programmes. New Labour, by contrast, emphasised paid work,
Homelessness, citizenship and social exclusion
46
Homelessness
seemingly to the exclusion of other approaches. (King and
Wickham-Jones, 1999, p 271)
They go on to point out that in contrast to the commitment to universal
and unconditional social rights which was central to Marshall’s conception
of citizenship and to the Labour Party’s welfare agenda between 1945
and 1992, conditionality, compulsion and coercion appear to be the
hallmarks of the policies of the Blair administration. Sanctions and
penalties, such as loss of benefit, will fall on those who either refuse to
participate or who are unable to finish the New Deal programmes. The
implications of this move towards conditional citizenship are as yet unclear.
King andWickham-Jones (1999) point out the uncertainty in calculating
the numbers denied benefit because ofWelfare-to-Work. The most recent
figure they cite is that of “1,352 individuals who had lost benefit because
of their failure to participate” (p 279). Dean (1999) argues that in the
context of conditional citizenship one outcome might be that “more
citizens will defect from their contract with the State, in the sense that
they will ‘disappear’ into the shadowy world of the informal economy. If
welfare reform does not work with the grain of everyday survival strategies
the result may be more not less social exclusion” (p 232). And similarly,
the emphasis on labour market insertion as the means to social inclusion
fails to take account of the nature and content of employment and the
fact that low pay and casualisation characterise large sectors of the labour
market today.
Drawing on the work of Jessop (1994) Dean argues that “the space
between the individual and the State is itself ‘hollowed out’ as it is
subordinated to economic forces and made increasingly conditional on
the citizen’s individual ‘stake’ in the economy as a paid worker” (p 225).
While recognising the importance of the political and cultural dimensions
to inclusion and exclusion Madanipour argues that:
... the main form of inclusion is access to resources, which is
normally secured through employment.... Marginalization and
long-term exclusion from the labour market lead to an absence
of opportunity for production and consumption, which can in
turn lead to acute forms of social exclusion. (Madanipour,1998,
p 77)
However,participation in the labour market does not necessarily guarantee
inclusion, particularly because of inadequate access to resources and the
47
nature of employment available. For example, a recent study on the
distribution of poor households within the countries of the European
Union indicated that 35% of poor households were classified as working
poor (EAPN, 1997). As Levitas (1998) argues, labour market insertion as
the key to inclusion serves only to obscure the differential access to
resources which exists within the working population not just between
those within the labour market and those outside. This approach obscures
the complex interplay of processes which structure opportunities
particularly in relation to gender and ethnicity (issues discussed further
in Chapters Five and Six of this volume) and which enable people to
access and maintain a reasonable standard of life. Evidence suggests that
the restructuring of capitalism combined with a renegotiation of the
context of citizenship rights has been accompanied by a shift towards
increasing inequality,social exclusion and homelessness,particularly among
young people, women and people from ethnic minorities who are
increasingly likely to enter into the sphere of the state and be reliant on
more basic and coercive forms of social assistance.
Homelessness and the entrepreneurial city
Homelessness is not a new or transient phenomenon, but recently has
emerged as a problem affecting different kinds of areas from inner cities
to rural areas, and has involved a widening spectrum of the population.
A recent Survey of English Housing (1995/96) reported on people’s
experiences of homelessness. Six per cent of respondents reported that
they had some experience of homelessness in the last 10 years. Of those
aged 16-24 20% said that they had been homeless during the same time
period and among lone parents with dependent children the figure was
29% (Green et al, 1997). Although the number of statutory homeless has
continued to drop from its peak of 178,867 households in 1991, in 1996
it still represented 131,139 households in Great Britain, higher than any
year before 1989 (Wilcox, 1997). Nor is homelessness among single
women the ‘hidden’ homelessness of the past. More women can be seen
sleeping rough and, particularly among younger women, there is likely
to be greater use made of night shelters, with a rise of 70% in 1995 of
women under 21 years old using winter shelters.
Hopper (1991) recognises novel elements of the phenomenon in terms
of the scale, the heterogeneity of the homeless population in terms of
gender, race and age, and the episodic nature of homelessness. While for
Marcuse contemporary homelessness is distinguishable as:
Homelessness, citizenship and social exclusion
48
Homelessness
... large-scale, permanent and independent of the short-term
business cycle,a combination never before existing in an advanced
industrial society. It represents the inability of the market and
the unwillingness of the state to care for the most basic needs of
a significant segment of the population ... and their consequent
complete exclusion from or suppression in the spatial fabric of a
technologically and economically advanced city. It may thus
fairly be called ‘advanced homelessness’. (Marcuse, 1993, p 359)
As alternative narratives have converged and combined in the
contemporary city, so “economic, political and cultural spaces have been
opened up, resulting in a restructuring of relations of inclusion and
exclusion, of centrality and marginality” (Mommas, 1996, p 196). For
Jessop the “intersection of these diverse economic, political and sociocultural
narratives” (Jessop, 1996, p 4) has crystallised in the context of
the‘entrepreneurial’city where the processes through which homelessness
occurs and the policy context in which it is maintained are most stark.
The rhetoric of competitiveness,partnership and cohesion has dominated
the discourse at both national and European Union levels. According to
Oatley (1998) urban policy in Britain“has shifted from a welfare approach
dominated by social expenditure to support deprived groups in depressed
areas (1969–1979) to entrepreneurialism aimed at generating wealth and
stimulating economic development” (p 203). Oatley lists a range of
initiatives introduced during the 1990s, from City Challenge in 1991 to
the Single Regeneration Budget which has become the central plank in
the government’s regeneration policy,which he claims marked“a paradigm
shift”. According to Oatley “These initiatives radically altered the way in
which policies aimed at tackling problems or urban decline and social
disadvantage were formulated,funded and administered”(1998,p x). While
there is nothing new about characterising the city as the site of
entrepreneurialism, what has been radically altered is the intensification
of competition between urban regions for resources, jobs and capital and
the policy agenda which has accompanied this intensification. With the
growing importance of international competition in the global marketplace,
which had played a fairly minor role in the Fordist 1950s and
1960s,major cities act as centres of economic,social,cultural and structural
change as the arena is created in which cities promote innovation and
entrepreneurialism in order to secure competitive advantage. The
‘managerialism’ of the 1960s has given way to what Harvey (1989) refers
to as ‘entrepreneurial’ urban governance, thus facilitating the
49
transformation from the rigidity of Fordist production systems supported
by Keynesian state welfarism,to a more geographically diverse and flexible
form of accumulation. For Harvey, the basis of this new urban
entrepreneurialism:
...rests ...on a public private partnership focussing on investment
and economic development with the speculative construction of
place rather than the amelioration of conditions within a
particular territory as its immediate (though by no means
exclusive) political and economic goal. (Harvey, 1989, p 16)
In both social and urban policy the emphasis is on reducing public services
and stressing the role of agencies alternative to local government, and the
need for a mix of private, not-for-profit and voluntary inputs. As larger
cities endeavour to become transnationally important financial and control
centres, urban initiatives concentrate on establishing special corporations
for economic promotion in close cooperation with the private sector,
thus incorporating elements of deregulation, privatisation and public–
private partnership (Fainstein,1991;Krätke and Schmoll,1991). So while
in the 1960s urban problems of poverty and inner-city decay were met
by welfare initiatives and redevelopment, more recently the emphasis has
been on growth based on market-oriented solutions and‘wealth creation,’
with the consequences that:
... the inner city ... becomes a microcosm for growth strategies
based on financial services and property development, on
deregulation and on polarised labour markets characterised by
divergent skills and growing social inequality. (Hill, 1994, p 166)
The affluent consumer and powerful corporations have become the object
of urban policy and have, according to Harvey (1989), been subsidised at
the expense of local collective consumption for the working class and
the poor. The‘public interest’has become subsumed under private interests
(Marcuse, 1993), increasing social division as well as reinforcing spatial
divisions of consumption. The refurbishment of urban space and emphasis
on cultural renewal facilitates gentrification processes and the promotion
of consumption palaces, festivals and other leisure and cultural facilities
as civic boosterism and place identity have become the“favoured remedies
for ailing urban economies” (Harvey, 1989, p 28). As Griffiths (1998)
argues “Entrepreneurialism is founded on speculation and risk-taking;
Homelessness, citizenship and social exclusion
50
Homelessness
competition by its very nature, throws up winners and losers” (p 43). For
the displaced and the poor the ‘image of affluence’ is likely to offer, at
best,the opportunity of low paid, insecure employment and, at worst, the
prospect of locating a pitch from which to panhandle for a few hours
(seeWinchester andWhite, 1988) before returning to the excluded space
of the “multiply divided city” (Marcuse, 1993). Zero tolerance and
coercion have become the response to destitution and poverty. Prestigious
office locations install deterrents such as sprinkler systems to prevent the
homeless from sleeping in their doorways, at the same time as major
companies enter into a range of partnerships with voluntary organisations
in the spirit of“new philanthropy”(Housing,1991) for the young homeless.
Carlen argues that“at the end of the twentieth century in England the
management of homelessness is not merely about housing scarcity but
has also become a site of struggle over social change” (Carlen, 1996, p
10). Agencies seeking to work with the homeless have themselves become
embedded in the entrepreneurialism of the city. With the emphasis on
civic boosterism,according to Ruddick (1996),through their involvement
with local growth coalitions in the spirit of public–private partnerships,
service providers have, to some extent, become the intermediary in the
production of a new social urban space in that they “manage the tensions
between the visible impoverishment and global cities” (Ruddick, 1996, p
185).
Hopper (1991), Marcuse (1993) and Carlen (1996) have all pointed to
the changing role of government and the nature of the homelessness
industry who construct and manage the problem within the narratives of
the entrepreneurial city. For Carlen “agency-maintained homelessness”
occurs through:
...the bureaucratic or professional procedures for the governance
of homelessness which deter people from defining themselves as
homeless; deny that homelessness claims are justifiable under
the legislation; or discipline the officially-defined homeless into
rapidly withdrawing their claims to homeless status. (Carlen,
1996, p 59)
As well as the practices engaged in by local authorities, she highlights the
“quality assurance” and “exclusionary categorisation and referral
procedures”(p 59) utilised by hostel staff in the selection and management
of hostel populations. Hopper (1991) argues that agencies providing
services are in fact powerful interest groups in themselves and they
51
manipulate definitions of the problem and change their policies in ways
that are most consistent with their continued existence. In Britain, as the
providing state has become the enabling state, so attempts have been
made to introduce market-based approaches to the delivery of local
services. Thus local authorities have developed a strategic role to facilitate
services and provision for the homeless through housing associations and
non-profit organisations by distributing funds for which organisations
have to compete. As service providers“they are the intermediaries through
which flow the resources of relief to the homeless, and the people who
outline how we should respond to this social phenomena” (Robertson,
1991,p 142). The‘professional’providers,through the bureaucratic process
of fund-getting, supply information that appeals to the funding source,
encouraging the development of specialised programmes which catalogue
the homeless according to a range of individual vulnerabilities. The
‘homeless problem’thus becomes defined not in terms of structural causes,
but as merely an aggregate of social ‘characteristics’ symptomatic of
underlying causes. The homeless population is thus reclassified as provision
fragments and funding focuses on the pathological and individual
characteristics of the homeless (that is, alcoholic, mentally ill) to which
specialised professional skills are matched to specialised populations. It is
the perceived need which becomes the social problem to which specialised
caretakers can respond. Not only do these developments influence the
labelling and stigma attached to being homeless, but also affect how the
homeless person perceives themselves. In order to negotiate the
burgeoning networks of agencies the homeless person must (re)classify
her/himself into an appropriate category of perceived need.
These processes are particularly apparent in one major government
initiative to combat homelessness which has been the Rough Sleepers
Initiative (RSI). First initiated in London it is credited with reducing the
numbers of central London rough sleepers from 1,000-2,000 in 1990 to
around 270 in May 1995. (DoE, 1995). This was accompanied by the
Department of Health’s Homeless Mentally Ill Initiative (HMII). The
government committed £96m for the first phase of the RSI (1990-93) to
organise direct access accommodation, advice, outreach work and some
permanent housing association lettings. However,the 1995 Consultation
Paper reported that:
...people continue to sleep out at several main sites,for example,
the Strand and the Bullring at Waterloo. Their evident plight is
distressing not only for them but also for those who live, work
Homelessness, citizenship and social exclusion
52
Homelessness
and visit the centre of the capital, and it is frustrating for those
who seek to promote London as a world-class centre for business
and tourism. (DoE, 1995, p 4)
The initiative was extended for a further period and a greater emphasis
was placed on“those sleeping rough or with a clear history of sleeping rough”
(DoE, 1995, p 7; emphasis original). By March 1996 £182m had been
spent on the initiative.
In 1995 the RSI model was extended outside London and local
authorities were required to “quantify the extent of rough sleeping in
their area,and if it existed,to examine its causes”(DoE,1996,p 21). Only
Bristol was able to ‘prove’ and document to the satisfaction of the DoE
that rough sleeping was a significant problem and they were awarded
£7.5m in 1996. More recently the RSI has been extended to Brighton,
following their successful bid for capital and revenue funding. It could be
argued that the distribution of funds has been based on a local authority’s
expertise in formulating a bid rather than real need. In addition, this
major focus on RSI has contributed to the perception of homelessness as
rooflessness and funding has not been directed towards those people living
in insecure and inappropriate condition. The emphasis on‘rough sleepers’
has been perpetuated by the Social Exclusion Unit, and the Unit has set
itself the target of reducing rough sleepers by two thirds by 2002 (Social
Exclusion Unit, 1998). However, according to the Homeless Network:
...it is our contention that without either a continuing supply of
new accommodation, or a significant reduction in the flow of
newly homeless people into London, we are likely to see the
numbers of street homeless people increase sharply over the next
18 months. (quoted in Social Exclusion Unit, 1998, p 12)
A recent report has indicated that while for many homeless people (636
or 13%) the resettlement process had had ‘positive outcomes’ in that the
individuals involved were in non-RSI housing (Dane, 1998), for others
(787 or 16%) the tenancy was considered to have been unsuccessful with
the vast majority ending in abandonment. As one ex-tenant states“When
I left I’d just had enough. It was just a big relief to walk out that door”.
For another:
“... it was like living a shell hermit-like existence. I was lonely,
didn’t have the money to travel into the East End I knew,couldn’t
53
live on my benefits. My referral agency stopped visiting me
after six months and my housing association wasn’t interested. I
knew after six weeks that there was no future in that place for
me”. (quoted in Dane, 1998, p 15)
Clearly, there could be a number of explanations for these developments.
They could be seen as the result of ineffective allocation, management
and monitoring strategies adopted by the agencies involved. They could
be seen as an example of the contradictions between the images and
aspirations of the homeless themselves, and the political and policy
narratives instituted by governments, for example, the assertion that “a
place in a hostel has to be the start of a process that leads back to the
things most of us take for granted” (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998, p 2).
They could also be seen as an example of a policy agenda in which the
diverse needs, expectations and aspirations of homeless people are
subordinated to or subsumed within a strategy of stimulating wealth
creation and enhancing competition.
Conclusion
In the context of growing inequality and insecurity, labour market
participation has become the panacea for an inclusive society. While the
rhetoric of social exclusion has permeated the policy discourse it is not
the comprehensive and dynamic approach offered by Berghman (1995),
which looks beyond the experiences of work and income which has
been adopted. It is a more narrowly applied definition which is
encapsulated in the emerging model of citizenship and welfare. There
has been a changing balance between rights and responsibilities and
between the state and civil society. Work appears to be replacing welfare
while social rights focus on contractual relations and coercion.
The policy responses to increasingly visible destitution and homelessness
in British cities are an indication of the changes mentioned above. The
Social Exclusion Unit has shown little concern with tackling the
multifarious processes through which people find themselves homeless.
Instead, as cities seek to compete in the international arena, the image of
people sleeping in the streets contradicts and undermines the strategies
of competitiveness, partnership and cohesion. Thus, it is those sleeping
rough who have become the object of a narrowly defined set of policy
solutions aimed mainly at restoring legitimacy in the entrepreneurial
city. The definition of inclusion perpetuated by the government combined
Homelessness, citizenship and social exclusion
54
Homelessness
with the reformulation of welfare and citizenship rights will do little to
stem the flow of homeless people, nor to support and maintain those
attempting to reconstruct a life off the street. This unidimensional
construction of social rights and emphasis on entrepreneuralism and
competitiveness may benefit some. However,it is unlikely to be a context
for developing a policy and institutional framework through which
homeless people can achieve forms of social inclusion which are both
appropriate and sustainable. As Power et al (1999) argue, factors
perpetuating the homeless life-style might begin with lack of
accommodation but there are other interrelated and complex factors,
such as marginalisation, insecurity, identification, vulnerability, lack of
choice, isolation and lack of income/employment. The narrow
interpretation of social exclusion evident in current policy does not
connect with the multidimensional nature of contemporary homelessness,
nor utilise the existing social networks and (limited) resources which
exist among the homeless themselves. Within the current mode of
integration there is little likelihood of addressing the homelessness issue
and it would appear that at the end of the 20th century the most extreme
manifestations of social exclusion – homelessness – will continue to be a
feature of British cities.
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in B. Loader and R. Burrows (eds) Towards a post-Fordist welfare state?,
London: Routledge, pp 49-73.
Winchester, H.P.M. and White, P.E. (1988) ‘The location of marginalised
groups in the inner city’, Environment and Planning D, Society and Space,
vol 6, no 1, pp 37-54.
Social exclusion literature review September 08
11
3. The meanings of social exclusion
‘“Exclusion” is not a concept rooted in the social sciences, but an
empty box given by the French state to the social sciences in the
late 1980s as a subject to study… The empty box has since been
filled with a huge number of pages, treatises and pictures, in
varying degrees academic, popular, original and valuable’. (Murard,
2002:41)
Given its origins and rapid spread across nation states and global regions,
it is perhaps inevitable that the phrase ‘social exclusion’ is used in
different ways at different times reflecting different institutional, political,
historical and geographic contexts. In this section we describe some of the
meanings attaching to the concept of social exclusion and consider the
relationship between these meanings and policy and actions aimed at
addressing social exclusion.
3.1 Constituent elements of the concept of social exclusion
Definitions of ‘social exclusion’ variously emphasise:
• The groups at risk of being excluded: for example, Lenoir (1974)
quoted in Silver (1994:532) wrote: ‘the excluded made up onetenth
of the French population: the mentally and the physically
handicapped, suicidal people, aged invalids, abused children, drug
addicts, delinquents, single parents, multi-problem households,
marginal, asocial persons, and other social misfits’
• What people are excluded from: for example, Silver (1994: 541)
notes that: ‘the literature says people may be excluded from: a
livelihood; secure, permanent employment; earnings; property,
credit or land; housing; the minimal or prevailing consumption
level; education, skills and cultural capital; the benefits provided by
the welfare state; citizenship and equality before the law;
participation in the democratic process; public goods; the nation or
the dominant race; the family and sociability; humane treatment,
respect, personal fulfilment, understanding’
• The problems associated with social exclusion: for example,
England’s Social Exclusion Unit (SEU’s) defined social exclusion as:
‘a shorthand for what can happen when people or areas suffer from
a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor
skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments, bad
health and family breakdown’(SEU, 1997)
• The processes driving exclusion and the levels at which they
operate: for example, Estivill (2003:19) argues that: ‘Social
exclusion must … be understood as an accumulation of confluent
processes with successive ruptures arising from the heart of the
economy, politics and society, which gradually distances and places
persons, groups, communities and territories in a position of
Social exclusion literature review September 08
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inferiority in relation to centres of power, resources and prevailing
values’
• The agents and actors involved: for example, Mike Rann, Prime
Minister of South Australia commented that: ‘social exclusion is
created by harsh and unjust economic conditions compounded by
difficult social environments and made worse by insensitive
government policies and government neglect…’ (South Australian
Labor Party, 2002).
Importantly, the differing emphasis on one or more of these facets of
‘exclusion’ has different implications for policy/action to address exclusion.
A selection of definitions of social exclusion is provided in Appendix 1.
These definitions are drawn from academic literature, reports from
governmental and intergovernmental agencies; and from the ILO country
case studies. Whilst not exhaustive they do illustrate both recurring
elements and subtle differences in the ways in which social exclusion is
defined.
Much of the ‘common ground’ apparent across these definitions can be
attributed to Graham Room (1992, 1995), who was instrumental in
establishing social exclusion as a multidimensional, dynamic and relational
concept. These three constituent elements deliver insights into the nature,
consequences and implications of unequal power relationships, and point
to the important conceptual contribution that ‘social exclusion’ can make
to understanding and addressing social and health inequalities.
Multidimensional: Room’s conceptual shift from poverty, as primarily
concerned with income and expenditure, to social exclusion, which he
argues implies multidimensional disadvantage, has since been expanded
upon in the literature. Definitions now typically refer variously to different
dimensions (social, economic, cultural, political) and different levels
(micro e.g. individual, household; meso e.g. neighbourhoods; and macro
e.g. nation state and global regions) along which a social
exclusion/inclusion continuum is seen to operate.
The consensus that social exclusion is a multidimensional phenomenon is
present both in the English and the Spanish literature. García Roca (1998)
for example, identifies three dimensions to social exclusion: a structural or
economic dimension referring to a lack of material resources associated
with exclusion from the labour market; a contextual or social dimension,
expressed in a lack of integration into family life and the community; and
a subjective or personal dimension expressed in an erosion of self worth
and increased sense of anomie. Kronauer (1998) argues that the concept
of social exclusion derived from France needs to be combined with
elements of the concept of the “underclass” as used in the United States
of America (USA) and the UK (Murray,1990), to differentiate it from
poverty. According to Kronauer, social exclusion arises when a marginal
economic position and social isolation combine. In this context he argues
social exclusion is a product of people’s relationships with: the labour
market, consumption, institutions, social relationships, culture and
geographical space. Other relevant arguments have been developed by
Social exclusion literature review September 08
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Gaviria, Laparra and Aguilar (1995), Minujin (1998), Cabrera (2000) and
Velásquez (2001), based on Tezanos (1999).
Dynamic: This refers to the changing and interactive nature of social
exclusion along different dimensions and at different levels over time.
Some, including Room (1995) and Barnes (2005), contend that
persistence over time is an integral aspect of social exclusion, while others
(Levitas et al., 2007) have argued that judgements about the importance
of persistence are neither theoretically nor empirically based. Most
definitions recognise that the experience of social exclusion is unequally
distributed across socio-economic and ethnic groups and that it is not a
static state experienced by the same social groups at all times in all
places. The experience and consequences of stigmatising conditions such
as HIV/AIDS, for example, differ profoundly between South Africa and the
USA and between ethnic groups in the USA. Additionally, rapid structural
transformations and in particular the impact of globalisation are altering
the contours of exclusion and inclusion within and between nation states
and global regions.
In elaborating on the dynamics of social exclusion Castel (1997) argues
that the causal relationship between poverty and disadvantage and wider
inequalities must be recognised: the linkage between the experience of
those at the margins of society and the fundamental working of societies.
To do this, he suggests, ‘exclusion’ should be replaced by ‘disaffiliation’
because “Exclusion is immobile. It designates a state or, rather, privation
states […] To speak of disaffiliation, on the other hand, is not to confirm a
rupture, but to delay a journey. The concept belongs to the same
semantic field as dissociation, disqualification or social invalidation.
Disaffiliated, dissociated, invalidated, disqualified, with relationship to
what? This is in fact the problem. [...]To look for the relationships
between the situation in which one is and that from which one comes, not
to autonomise the extreme situations but to link what happens in the
peripheries and what arrives to the centre’ (Castel, 1997:16-17). It is
apparent that Castel’s argument refers not only to the dynamism of the
social exclusion concept but also to its relationality.
Relational: This refers to the critical conceptual shift from the focus on
distributional outcomes within a poverty discourse (i.e. the lack of
resources at the disposal of individuals, households and/or wider social
groups) to a focus on social relationships. However, there are two linked
but importantly different strands to this argument.
One focuses on the idea that social exclusion involves the rupture of
relationships between people and the society in which they live. This is
vividly described by Room who notes that the concept is referring to:
“people who are suffering such a degree of multidimensional
disadvantage, of such duration, and reinforced by such material and
cultural degradation of the neighbourhoods in which they live that
their relational links with the wider society are ruptured to a degree
irreversible. This is the core of the concept (..) inadequate social
Social exclusion literature review September 08
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participation, lack of social protection, lack of social integration and
lack of power."
In his writing on social exclusion and capability deprivation Amartya Sen
adopts a related perspective arguing that social exclusion focuses
attention on to the disadvantages arising from being excluded from
shared opportunities enjoyed by others. Looking back to classical Greece,
Sen (2000:4) writes: ‘In this Aristolelian perspective, an impoverished life
is one without freedom to undertake important activities that a person has
reason to choose’. He draws parallels with the eighteenth century writings
of Adam Smith, according to whom: “the (in)ability to appear in public
without shame” is an important deprivation in itself. Indeed, for Sen,
(2000:8):
‘the real importance of the idea of social exclusion lies in
emphasizing the role of relational features in the deprivation of
capability and thus in the experience of poverty’.
A second interpretation of a relational perspective on social exclusion is
that it focuses attention on inequalities as the product of social
relationships that are defined historically by normative systems that
assign social identities and associated power and status to different
individuals, groups, classes, and even States. As in Norbert Elías’ famous
study in the 1960s of the English town given the pseudonym ‘Winston
Parva’, “the exclusion and the stigmatization of those excluded turned out
to be powerful weapons that were used by the old-established residents to
keep their identity, to reaffirm their superiority, to maintain the outsiders
firmly in their place” (Elías, 1998, [1993]:86). This approach to a
relational perspective on exclusion demands a group, rather than an
individual, analysis, that recognizes human interdependence as its
foundation. In Michael Mann's analysis (1986:2), it is to understand the
place that human groups occupy in “social power networks”.
The exercise of power (economic, political, ideological or military) by
human groups in social networks is unequal and it is from here that
hierarchies are derived (Mann, 1986: 4). From this relational perspective,
social reality viewed through the lens of social exclusion is the product of
an unequal balance of power between social groups, nation states and
global regions which contributes to an unequal distribution of goods and
services. For these writers, without the two ingredients of redistribution
and recognition it is not possible to overcome exclusion (Fraser, 1997:18).
For this reason, a relational perspective implies an emancipatory
dimension (involving new less hierarchical social systems), a political
dimension (involving new political actors) and an institutional dimension
(involving new public administrations and materiality of the state) (Fleury,
1998: 13-14).
There are other important differences in the way social exclusion is
conceptualised. For example, it can be understood as a phenomenon
operating in a continuum across society, or as affecting a segment of the
population placed outside mainstream society. Similarly, it may be
conceptualised as a process - a way of explaining power relationships
Social exclusion literature review September 08
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underlying and producing inequalities - or as a state, a way of describing
the most disadvantaged people or social groups, who are assumed to be
‘excluded’ from social systems and relationships. In most definitions this
‘state’ is seen to be associated with (extreme) poverty.
There is also a distinction between schools of thought that emphasise lack
of participation of individuals in society in general and labour markets in
particular and those that identify social exclusion as a lack of access to
rights as a citizen and/or member of particular group, community, society
or country (Curran et al., 2007). The participation approach underpins
much of the European writing on exclusion/inclusion, whereas the rightsbased
approach is more strongly associated with the development
literature (Gore & Figueiredo, 1997). Curran et al. also suggest that the
rights-based approach may be particularly relevant in the context of
mental health.
However, Curran et al. (2007:295) have suggested that ‘in the face of
globalisation and greater international labour mobility, the rights-based
and participation approaches become increasingly difficult to separate’
(2007:295). The definition offered by Levitas et al. (2007:25) illustrates
how both approaches can be integrated: ‘Social exclusion is a complex
and multi-dimensional process. It involves the lack or denial of resources,
rights, goods and services, and the inability to participate in the normal
relationships and activities, available to the majority of people in a
society, whether in economic, social, cultural or political arenas. It affects
both the quality of life of individuals and the equity and cohesion of
society as a whole’.
Burchardt et al.’s (1999) definition emphasises participation: ‘an individual
is socially excluded if he or she does not participate in key activities of the
society in which he or she lives’. This type of definition implies that social
exclusion is relative, applicable to individuals living in a particular society.
It leaves open question of who should decide which activities may be
regarded as ‘key’. This is not only an empirical question, implying the
existence of a measurable inclusion/exclusion threshold according to the
degree of participation in a particular activity, but also a normative one,
involving the choice of key activities (or dimensions of participation
necessary for inclusion) at a specified time and place.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is a strong advocate
of a human rights-based approach to address social exclusion. At a recent
virtual round table facilitated by the UNDP (UNDP, 2007a), it was argued
that translating social exclusion as the UN non discrimination clause
enables the concept to be grounded in international law applicable to the
majority of states, and allows the necessary relationships between ‘duty
bearers’ and ‘claim holders’ to be cultivated. From this perspective, social
exclusion is understood to involve discrimination on the basis of social
attributes and social identity. Marshall (1964) identified three stages in
the development of rights: civil rights, political rights, and social rights.
Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, a series of
legally binding international treaties have established human rights
standards which signatories have obligations to respect, protect and fulfil.
Social exclusion literature review September 08
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Civil rights include the rights to life, liberty and personal security; the
right to equality before the law; the right to protection from arbitrary
arrest; and the right to religious freedom. Political rights include free
speech, expression, assembly and association, and political participation
and vote. Economic and social rights include the rights to a family, to
education, to health and wellbeing, to social security, to work and fair
remuneration, to form trade unions, and to leisure time. Cultural rights
include the right to benefits of culture, to the ownership of indigenous
lands, rituals and shared practices, and the right to speak one’s language
and to ‘mother tongue’ education. Todd Landman (2006), in work
commissioned by the UK’s Department for International Development
(DFID), argues that social exclusion is a form of rights violation if
systematic disproportionality of treatment of people across social,
economic and political spheres can be demonstrated. He further argues
that human rights deficits can increase people’s vulnerability to exclusion.
Another key conceptual issue in the literature on social exclusion is that of
agency. This is usually understood as a question of “who is doing the
excluding?” (Atkinson, 1998) and is highly contested in the literature with
attention having been directed at the causal role of ‘agents’ ranging from
globalisation, multi-nationals and international agencies such as the World
Bank and IMF, through nation states and their institutions, to excluded
individuals/groups themselves. There appears to have been relatively
little empirical research on the potential for agency amongst groups most
severely affected by exclusionary processes. However, there is a rich
literature from civil society and other sources demonstrating that rather
than passive victims such groups can actively mould and/or resist
exclusionary processes and their social, economic and health
consequences. Importantly, this literature also gives more emphasis to
the role of public services in addressing social exclusion and to issues of
social justice and social solidarity than is apparent in much of the
academic literature (Popay et al. 2008).
3.2 Making sense of diverse definitions of social exclusion
The discussion so far suggests that whilst it is possible to identify common
constituent elements in the meanings attaching to the concept of social
exclusion there are also important differences in emphasis and tone.
Frameworks developed by Hilary Silver (1994), Ruth Levitas (1998; 2005)
and Jo Beall (2002) have made important contributions to understanding
the ideological and political roots of these differences and illuminating the
implications for policy/action to address social exclusion.
Hilary Silver’s paradigms of social exclusion
Silver argues that social exclusion is ‘polysemic, i.e. it has multiple
meanings and therefore requires extensive semantic definition’ (1994:
536). She identifies three paradigms in which she argues the different
meanings and usages of the term social exclusion are embedded. She
borrowed Kuhn’s definition of a paradigm as ‘a constellation of beliefs,
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values, techniques and so on shared by the members of a given
community’ (Kuhn, 1970:175). According to Kuhn (1970:7) such
paradigms ‘specify not only what sorts of entities the universe does
contain but also, by implication, those that it does not’. As Silver notes:
‘Each paradigm attributes exclusion to a different cause and is
grounded in a different political philosophy: Republicanism,
liberalism and social democracy. Each provides an explanation of
multiple forms of social disadvantage – economic, social, political
and cultural – and thus encompasses theories of citizenship and
racial-ethnic inequality as well as poverty and long-term
unemployment’ (Silver 1994: 539).
The Solidarity paradigm is embedded in French Republican political
ideology, and views exclusion as the breakdown of a social bond between
the individual and society that is cultural and moral, rather than
economic. It draws on Durkheimian social theory: ‘like deviance or
anomie, exclusion both threatens and reinforces social cohesion’ (Silver
1994:542). More recent uses incorporate multicultural notions of how the
basis of solidarity is reconfigured.
The Specialization paradigm typifies Anglo-American liberal thought about
exclusion. It perceives social actors primarily as individuals, who are able
to move freely across boundaries of horizontal social differentiation and
economic divisions of labour. This paradigm holds that exclusion is a form
of discrimination. The roots of exclusion are to be found in unenforced
rights and market failures. The specialization paradigm emphasises the
individual and micro-sociological causes of economic exclusion; however,
social liberals are also cognisant of the effects of structural change.
According to Silver (1994:560): ‘The split between supply-side and
demand-side theories parallels the division between classical and social
liberalism… In contrast to supply-side theoreticians who attribute poverty
or unemployment to individual failings, most sociologists now accept that
the new poverty and long-term unemployment have demand-side or
structural causes’.
The Monopoly paradigm, influential on the European Left, sees exclusion
as the result of the formation of group monopolies, restricting access of
outsiders to resources. ‘Drawing heavily on Weber, and, to a lesser
extent, Marx, it views the social order as coercive, imposed through a set
of hierarchical power relations. In this social democratic or conflict theory,
exclusion arises from the interplay of class, status and political power and
serves the political interests of the included… Exclusion is combated
through citizenship, and the extension of equal membership and full
participation in the community to outsiders’ (Silver 1994: 543). In this
paradigm, theories of labour market segmentation epitomise the link
between social closure and economic exclusion.
Importantly, the focus in Silver’s analysis is on the role of political
ideology in generating different understandings of the nature and causes
of social exclusion, and by implication different approaches to
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policy/action to address social exclusion. However, there are limitations
to this typology. Each of Silver’s paradigms presents exclusion as based
in social relationships between two groups: the included and the excluded.
Whilst drawing attention to the ‘actors’ and ‘forces’ driving exclusionary
processes this dichotomous approach fails to take account of the social
gradients in access to resources and power evident in all societies. The
paradigms also fail to account for the differential emphasis placed in
different definitions on the potential for agency by people experiencing
exclusionary processes. Finally, and importantly from the perspective of
this paper, Silver’s paradigms are shaped around advanced Western
democracies. Their applicability in the global context remains therefore to
be demonstrated, although in later writings, Silver extended the analysis
to the Americas (2004, 2005).
Ruth Levitas’ discourses of social exclusion
Silver is primarily concerned to illuminate the political ideologies
underpinning different definitions of social exclusion. Whilst she raises
questions about the significance for policy of these differences she does
not consider these in detail. In contrast, Ruth Levitas (2005) is primarily
concerned to illuminate how ideological underpinnings for concepts of
social exclusion change over time and how these are translated into
different policies/action. Her focus is the UK and her work is based on an
analysis of political discourse over the past two decades or more. As she
notes: ‘a discourse constitutes ways of acting in the world, as well as a
description of it. It both opens up and closes down possibility for action’
(Levitas: 2005:3). Levitas identifies three different social exclusion
discourses in the UK. These are described briefly below.
The redistributionist discourse (RED), emphasises poverty as a prime
cause of social exclusion. It posits citizenship as the obverse of exclusion:
‘poverty spells exclusion from the full rights of citizenship… and
undermines people’s ability to fulfil the private and public obligations of
citizenship’ (Lister,1990:68). RED addresses social, political, cultural and
economic citizenship, broadening out into a critique of inequality (Levitas,
2005:14).
The moral underclass discourse (MUD) emphasises cultural rather than
material explanations of poverty, resonating with the work of Charles
Murray (1990), whereby the excluded are to blame for their fate. It
focuses on the behaviour of the poor and implies welfare benefits are bad
as they undermine people’s ability to be self sufficient creating
dependency. It is a strongly gendered discourse. (Levitas 2005:21).
The social integrationist discourse (SID) sees social inclusion and
exclusion primarily in terms of labour market attachment. It obscures
inequalities between paid workers, particularly gender inequalities
(Levitas,2005:26).
Levitas argues that RED, SID and MUD are:
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‘… ways of thinking about exclusion that imply different strategies
for its abolition. In RED, the assumption is that the resources
available in cash or kind to the poor need to be increased both
relatively and absolutely, implying both improved levels of income
maintenance and better access to public and private services. In
SID, the solution is increased labour market participation, for paid
work is claimed to deliver inclusion both directly and indirectly
through the income it provides. In MUD, the emphasis is on
changing behaviour through a mix of sticks and carrots –
manipulation of welfare benefits, sanctions for non-compliance and
intensive social work with individuals’ (Levitas,2005:x).
Her analysis is strongly informed by a socialist feminist perspective. In
particular she points to the contradictions inherent in policies that valorise
unpaid work (e.g. promote good quality parenting as a mechanism to
address anti-social behaviour) whilst at the same time linking income
maintenance entitlement to formal employment.
Although Levitas’s framework focuses on contemporary Britain and is
particularly applicable to states with established welfare systems, it has a
broader relevance highlighting key issues concerning the nature of public
policy responses to multiple social disadvantages. In the context of the
UK, for example, she argues that policies to address social exclusion have
moved from a concern with distributional equality to focus on ways of:
‘lifting the poor over the boundary of a minimum standard – or to
be more accurate, inducing those who are sufficiently sound in wind
and limb to jump over it – while leaving untouched the overall
pattern of inequality, especially the rich’ (Levitas, 2005:156).
In a similar vein, Veit-Wilson (1998), differentiates between ‘weak and
‘strong’ political discourses of social exclusion in Europe, noting that
power relationships are absent from the ‘weak’ version:
‘In the weak version of this discourse, the solutions lie in altering
these excluded people’s handicapping characteristics and enhancing
their integration into dominant society. Stronger forms of this
discourse also emphasise the role of those who are doing the
excluding and therefore aim at solutions which reduce the powers
of exclusion” (Veit-Wilson, 1998: 45).
Jo Beall’s approaches to social exclusion
Jo Beall (2002) has identified three approaches to social exclusion which
are described below.
The neo-liberal approach views social exclusion as ‘an unfortunate but
inevitable side effect of global economic realignment’ (Beall, 2002:43). As
a consequence of the emergence of free trade and a single global market,
Social exclusion literature review September 08
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workers are now excluded from the benefits of trade barriers and social
and employment protection.
A second approach argues that ‘social exclusion represents little more
than an unhelpful re-labelling of poverty or acts to distract attention from
inequality generated by the workings of the economic system’ (Beall,
2002:44) (emphasis added).
The third, transformationalist, approach focuses attention on social
relations embedded in formal and informal institutions, and ‘signals the
use of the social exclusion framework to analyze international processes
and institutional relationships associated with rapid social and economic
global change and local impacts and responses’ (Beall, 2002:44).
Of these three approaches, the neo-liberal and re-labelling of poverty
approaches conceptualise social exclusion as a ‘state’ whereas the
transformational approach focuses attention on exclusionary processes.
This latter approach is concerned with social interactions and power
relationships at different levels – from global to local – and recognises the
social, political and cultural, as well as the economic, dimensions of
power.
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3. 4 Key points: the meanings of social exclusion
The concept of ‘social exclusion’ is contested, and has multiple meanings.
These meanings are being continually redefined over time and have
different policy implications.
The term ‘social exclusion’ has been used to describe: groups at risk of
exclusion; what people are excluded from; the states associated with
exclusion; the processes involved and levels at which they operate; and
the actors involved.
There is some consensus that ‘social exclusion’ is: (a) multidimensional,
encompassing social, political, cultural and economic dimensions, and
operating at different social levels; (b) dynamic, impacting in different
ways to differing degrees at different social levels over time; and (c)
relational. A relational perspective has two dimensions. On the one hand,
it focuses on exclusion as the rupture of relationships between people and
the society resulting in a lack of social participation, social protection,
social integration and power. Alternatively, a relational perspective points
to exclusion as the product of unequal social relationships characterised by
differential power i.e. the product of the way societies are organised.
Definitions also differ in other fundamental respects. ‘Social exclusion’ has
been conceptualised as a continuum across society, or as affecting a
segment of the population outside mainstream social systems and
relationships. Similarly, social exclusion may be defined as the processes
embedded in unequal power relationships that create inequalities or as a
state of multiple disadvantage. There is also a distinction between schools
of thought that emphasise lack of participation of individuals in society and
those that identify social exclusion as a lack of access to citizenship rights
for members of particular group, community, society or country.
In terms of who or what is driving exclusion, attention has been directed at
the causal role of diverse ‘agents’ ranging from globalisation to excluded
individuals/groups themselves. Although there has been little research on
the agency of groups most affected by exclusionary forces there is ample
evidence from other sources that they are rarely passive victims.
Silver (1994), Levitas (1998; 2005) and Beall (2002) have made important
contributions to our understanding of the ideological and political roots of
different definitions and illuminated the implications for policy/action to
address ‘social exclusion’. While many definitions of ‘social exclusion’
incorporate apparently contradictory connotations, the labelling approach
distinguishing ‘the excluded’ from the rest of society, dominates attempts
to operationalise and measure ‘social exclusion’ and policy/action to
address it.
Social exclusion literature review September 08
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4. Exclusionary Processes
‘The concept [social exclusion] takes us beyond mere descriptions
of deprivation, and focuses attention on social relations and the
processes and institutions that underlie and are part and parcel of
deprivation’ (de Haan, 2001:26).
The previous section explored some of the differences - often implicit underlying
definitions and descriptions of ‘social exclusion’. A key theme
has been the distinction between social exclusion conceptualised as a
‘state’, a ‘process’, or both. As de Haan notes, conceptualised in relational
and process terms, social exclusion can help increase understanding of the
causes and consequences of deprivation and inequalities. In this section,
we focus on some of these exclusionary processes. As Sen (2000) has
noted a distinction can be drawn between active exclusionary processes
that are the direct and intended result of policy or discriminatory action
including, for example, withholding political, economic and social rights
from migrant groups or deliberate discrimination on the basis of gender,
caste or age; and passive exclusionary processes, which in contrast, arise
indirectly, for example when fiscal or trade policies result in an economic
downturn leading to increased unemployment. Whether active or passive,
exclusionary processes operate at many levels – in households, villages
and cities, nation states and global regions – and encompass, for
example: institutionalised and informal racism, discrimination and
xenophobia; deeply rooted social structures such as patriarchy; political
ideologies such as neo-liberalism and the policies that flow from these;
and the workings of global, national and local economies. Climate change
is creating new powerful exclusionary processes and these will increase in
the future whilst conflict, fuelled by competition over land and resources,
by hatred and greed has long been a powerful exclusionary force and
continues to be so. In a review of this nature we cannot cover the full
range of exclusionary processes nor do justice to their complexity instead
we have sought to illustrate the complexity, pervasiveness and scale of
the processes involved. We focus on the economic, social, political and
cultural domains, in particular: the exclusionary processes accompanying
globalisation; the potentially exclusionary impacts of public policy; and
the stigmatising and exclusionary impacts of certain cultural and symbolic
processes. This section ends with a discussion of the distinctive
contribution of the social exclusion relational ‘lens’.
4.1 Economic transformation and globalisation
The concept of social exclusion emerged from the 1970s onwards during a
period of rapid social and economic transformation at national, regional
and global levels. As Silver (1994) and others have highlighted these
transformations created what were perceived to be new social problems
that challenged the assumptions underpinning Western welfare state
provision concerning the operation of labour markets, the potential for full
Social exclusion literature review September 08
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employment, the relationship between paid and unpaid work and the
nature of citizenship and entitlement1
.
The economic crisis of the 1970s triggered a rise in the power and
influence of neo-liberal ideologies and policies including: industrial
restructuring, the opening up of labour markets, moves to reduce workers
protection and the retreat of state provided welfare. Production was
relocated and decentralised often moving to low wage economies, capital
investment in new technologies contributed to growing unemployment in
the older established industrial heartlands of Western Europe, North
America and Australia, differentially affecting already disadvantaged
groups and whole geographic areas. These trends were reinforced by the
progressive growth of the tertiary sector of the economy from the 1960s,
especially of the financial sector. As the financial sector became more
global the monetary sovereignty of the nation state was undermined.
These dynamics in the financial sector added to the pressure for greater
labour flexibility, expressed in higher unemployment, more precarious
employment and loss of the old mechanisms of social protection for many
workers (Salama, 2006:64-72; Castel, 2004:75-86).
The nature and impact of globalisation and employment conditions around
the world are considered in detail in the final reports of two other WHO
Knowledge Networks (Benach, et al.,2007; Labonte, et al.,2007),
including the dramatic impacts of these changes on the distribution of
income and wealth and social relationships. Organised labour
organisations and informal networks of solidarity have been undermined,
individuals, households and entire communities have been put under
extreme social and economic pressure, working conditions have
deteriorated for millions of people, poverty increased and income
inequalities widened. It was in this context that ‘social exclusion’ was
seen to provide greater explanatory power than the concept of poverty:
not only does it move beyond the economic domain to highlight the multidimensionality
of inequalities, but it also illuminates causal processes.
Some commentators went further arguing that the concept of social
exclusion opened up new ways of investigating and understanding global
exclusionary processes. Beall (2002:50) for example, suggests that it
provides:
‘a way of understanding the relational and institutional dynamics
that serve to include some and keep others out in a connected but
polarized global economic context. As such, it is an analytical
construct compatible with the study of global economic processes
and the poverty and inequality to which they increasingly give rise’.
As Castells (1998:162) has noted: ‘globalization proceeds selectively,
including and excluding segments of economies and societies in and out of
networks of information, wealth and power that characterize the new
dominant systems’. And whilst the economic and social impact of these
transformational forces may have been felt initially in high income
1
Feminist writers, amongst others had, of course, challenged the assumptions underpinning western
welfare states before these macro economic and social changes became prominent.
Social exclusion literature review September 08
24
countries, they have been both global and local in their reach. For
example, Beall (2002), using examples from the cities of Faisalabad and
Johannesburg, highlights the ways in which exclusionary processes
associated with globalization graft themselves onto local dynamics of
social exclusion. At the same time it is not just segments of societies that
are subject to exclusionary processes but whole nations and regions of the
world notably for example Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
Some writers, such as Amartya Sen, caution against a wholesale
condemnation of globalisation arguing that it can be both a threat and an
opportunity. For example, the positive impact on women’s lives of paid
employment in the garment industry in Bangladesh despite poor working
conditions is described in the final report of the SEKN (Popay, et. al.
2008). For Sen, it is not globalization and markets per se that are
problematic. Indeed, in a sense Sen sees markets as value-free,
representing the ‘basic arrangement through which people can interact
with each other, and undertake mutually advantageous activities’ (2000:
28). Rather, Sen argues, it is the malfunctioning of markets and the lack
of adequate governance of globalizing forces that are the root of the
problem. The role of public policy in this regard is considered next.
4.2 Public policy and exclusionary processes
For many writers, broadly positioned on the ‘democratic left’, exclusionary
processes are not simply an unintended consequence of the economic
restructuring that has taken place in the past 40 years: rather they are a
necessary condition for it in a situation where, as David Byrne has argued
(1999:128) ‘post-industrial capitalism [is] founded around a flexible
labour market and … a systematic constraining of the organizational
powers of workers as collective actors’. For Byrne, ‘the excluded’ are a
reserve army of labour, moving in and out of employment at the bottom
end of the labour market, mobilised or demobilised according to
fluctuations in the economy. These writers point to the exclusionary
processes associated with economic and social policies enacted by many
Western states. For example, Navarro and colleagues (Navarro and Shi,
2001; Navarro et al., 2006) have analysed the relationship between
political commitment to redistributive policies in high income capitalist
countries and levels of income and social and health inequalities, arguing
that where this commitment is weakest, in liberal democracies such as the
USA, Canada and the UK, income and health inequalities are greatest.
Similarly, Townsend (1997) has argued that the principle causes of
increased levels of relative poverty in Britain from the 1980s onwards are
deregulation; privatisation; unemployment; reduction in public spending;
restructured taxes; and the centralising of political control.
The dominance of the international financial sector led to economic and
political pressure on many low income countries to repay the debt
accumulated in the post-war period. Multilateral banks pressed for
structural adjustment policies in the 1980s, which became known in the
1990s as “the Washington Consensus”. These ‘adjustments’ included
opening up economies to international competition, increasing labour
Social exclusion literature review September 08
25
flexibility, restricting public social expenditure and the introduction of new
‘pro-market’ forms of social protection for the poor underpinned by neoliberal
theories (Stewart,1998: 38-42; Salama, 1999). These involved a
shift away from the public funding and provision of essential services (e.g.
healthcare) to a focus on subsidising demand for services from private
sector providers (Hernández et al., 2002:323-333) and an increasing
reliance on conditional cash and/or service transfers primarily to the poor
(Popay et al., 2008; Hernández, 2003:352-358; Rodríguez, 2007).
However, many commentators argue that these selective programmes
have not had the impacts anticipated by their proponents. Instead, it is
argued, they have increased social inequalities creating new forms of
‘social exclusion’. These critics maintain that social protection systems
that are conditional upon people's capacity to pay rather than their
citizenship status (as in universal systems) will inevitably be exclusionary
as well as being expensive to administer and difficult to target effectively
(Hernández, 2002; Lauthier, 2005; Le Bonniec, 2005; Rodríguez, 2005;
Mkandawire, 2005; Townsend, 2007).
An alternative view, from the radical left, is that the link between the right
to an income and the obligation to earn or use it in ways consistent with
the economic and cultural hegemony of capitalism should be broken
(Bowring, 2000, in Davies, 2005:5). Bowring argued that redistributionist
scholars, by emphasising participation in work, income and commodity
relations, implicitly equate exclusion with normative deviation and
inclusion with conformity to social convention. He also argued for the
assertion of the existence of new, non-commodified, needs, which cannot
be satisfied by capitalism and which prefigure a different kind of society
(2000:309). Moreover, for Bowring (2000:314) ‘assuming people are
ashamed of poverty is… a scandalous attribution to make’; and many
people living on substandard incomes are reluctant to describe themselves
as such. )
4. 3 Discrimination, stigma and human rights
The discussion so far has highlighted exclusionary processes embedded in
economic, political and social relationships operating within and between
nation states. However, as Estivill (2003) has argued, these processes are
overlain and reinforced by cultural and symbolic processes which
differentiate and stigmatise particular groups, nations and global regions.
Estivill (2003:45) describes three stages in the development of these
dominant social values and attitudes. Dominant institutions start by
applying negative labels and attributes to define and classify those who do
not conform to dominant social ‘rules’. The victorious ‘social mindset’
then uses its categorization to legitimize differences in the treatment of
others. The third stage is characterised by strong repression and
stigmatisation. This description resonates with Durkheim’s (1895) analysis
of deviance:
‘Imagine a society of saints, a perfect cloister of exemplary
individuals. Crimes (or deviance) properly so called, will there be
unknown; but faults that appear venial to the layman will create
Social exclusion literature review September 08
26
there the same scandal that the ordinary offence does in ordinary
consciousnesses. If, then, this society has the power to judge and
punish, it will define these acts as criminal (or deviant) and will
treat them as such.’
Public attitudes towards the poor in Britain illustrate the exclusionary
potential of these processes. For example, research by Gough and
Eisenschitz (2006) suggest that these attitudes are at best indifferent, at
worst, hostile, in a context of socio-spatial separation of the poor from the
better off. They argued that this hostility is shaped, among others, by
popular culture and political ideology propagated by the mass media,
competition for jobs and other resources, and fear of poverty. A Fabian
Society Report on child poverty (2006) reinforces this picture arguing that
there would be little public support for a more progressive tax regime in
the UK. However, a more nuanced picture emerges from the Joseph
Rowntree Foundation’s 2007 report on public attitudes to income
inequality, with a majority of people thinking that the gap between high
and low incomes is too great although this does not translate directly or
simplistically into support for more redistributive policies.
Whilst Durkheim’s theories are deterministic – leaving little space for
agency on the part of disadvantaged people – more recent theorists have
acknowledged that people are not necessarily passive victims. For
example, Estivill (2003:14) argues that in the face of powerful
exclusionary processes individuals and/or groups ‘either try to find a way
out through their own networks of relations or, if they so decide, they can
fight against the circumstances of their exclusion and criticize society for
its lack of recognition’. However, as Gough and Eisenschitz (2006:131)
point out: ‘In an individualistic society, it is natural to blame social failure
on oneself’ (Gough and Eisenschitz, 2006:131). They suggest that
prevailing negative attitudes can increase the sense of powerlessness felt
by people living in poverty and undermine their capacity for collective
action. In addition to the lack of realistic opportunities for advancement,
the ability of disadvantaged groups to improve their circumstances is
further compromised by the social specificity of what Bourdieu (1986) has
called ‘cultural capital’: a composite of social behaviours, accent, physical
demeanour, cultural tastes and attitudes acquired in childhood. While
higher-class cultural capital is regarded as universal, lower-class capital
has limited socio-spatial recognition. Gough and Eisenschitz (2006: 111)
contend that despite the mass media, the class gap in cultural capital in
the UK is probably not narrowing, and that everyday behaviours still
stigmatise and exclude the poor.
Negative social values and attitudes towards the poor and poverty in high
income countries also create downward pressure on the level of aid
monies going to low income countries. For example, a household survey
of public attitudes towards poverty in developing countries commissioned
in 2006 by DFID in the UK echoed, at a global level, negative and
paternalistic perceptions of recipients of aid (Lader, 2007). On the positive
side, over four fifths of respondents were concerned about poverty in
developing countries, and 53% thought the UK government’s commitment
to poverty reduction in developing countries was too little. However, two
Social exclusion literature review September 08
27
fifths of respondents agreed with the statement: ‘some people have said
that most aid to developing (poor) countries is wasted’, generally blaming
developing countries themselves for wasting aid, through corruption
(76%) and inefficiency (46%). The most popular policy to help countries
with corrupt governments was putting strict conditions on how the money
was spent.
The impact of cultural and symbolic exclusionary processes is not confined
to attitudes towards the poor. Operating through formal legalised and
institutionalised systems as well as informally, these processes devalue
and undermine the cultures and voices of indigenous peoples around the
globe. They are contributing to the displacement of millions, rendering
many stateless and condemning them to live in extreme poverty and
constant fear with limited if any rights (Popay et al., 2008). Economic,
cultural and symbolic exclusionary processes are together fuelling an
unprecedented growth in the numbers of people without citizenship. These
include refugees in countries with no asylum legislation; the displaced;
failures in the birth registration system; and illegal immigrants. ‘Noncitizens’
implicitly do not exist in the eyes of social institutions and are not
in a position to make claims to human rights, social protection or public
services. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) reported that at the end of 2005, the number of people with
‘official’ refugee status or protected or assisted by the UNHCR because
they were at risk stood at 21 million. A year later this had increased by
56% to 32.9 million (UNHCR, 2007).
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has made a major
contribution to understanding the nature of exclusionary processes in both
developed and less economically developed countries (LEDCs) drawing
particular attention to the significance of fundamental civil and political
rights (Figueiredo and Gore, 1997). In many countries of the South,
particularly those still struggling to free themselves from the negative
legacies of their colonial past, political exclusion remains a powerful
constraint on people’s participation in formal institutions. Importantly, the
contours of political exclusion are frequently mapped onto and reinforce
patterns of cultural discrimination and stigmatisation.
4. 4 Social exclusion and other relational concepts
Social exclusion is one of a number of relational ‘lens’ used by social
scientists to make sense of patterns of social differentiation and
inequalities. Notable others include gender, social class, religion, caste
and ethnicity and all are complex and contested. Arguably, at the very
least there are important overlaps between the social realities these
concepts seek to describe; the particular contribution of social exclusion
may be to focus attention on to the interaction and impact of multiple
exclusionary processes.
Participants at a recent Round Table on social exclusion (UNDP, 2007a),
mostly drawn from the UNDP and other UN agencies, highlighted the
unequal power relationships underlying poverty, and the experiences of
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exclusion of non-citizens, migrant workers and indigenous groups (for
example the Janajati in Nepal and the Roma in Eastern Europe) and of
stigmatised groups (for example the Dalits in India and Burakumin in
Japan). They acknowledged that the concept of ‘social inclusion’ may be
double-edged for ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities and indigenous
peoples, with the potential for states to adopt policies of forcible
displacement or assimilation that eradicate cultural differences. Minority
groups often seek recognition of equal rights, including recognition of
diversity2
. Women and children were identified as being particularly
vulnerable to exclusion, due to their weak economic and political power
and lack of status in their communities, violence against women,
increased HIV/AIDS vulnerability, and their exposure to ritual exclusion
(eg women who refuse genital mutilation or rites of widowhood in the
Cameroun).
The UNDP round table participants identified failure on the part of states
to address exclusion based on caste, ethnicity, gender and geography as
one of the causes of conflict. Examples of groups resisting discrimination
by violent action include the Maoist people in Nepal, conflict in Sudan, and
action by militant youths in the Niger delta, where the poorest and most
excluded indigenous groups have had no share in the benefits of natural
resources exploited by oil companies and the state (Mathieson et al.
2008). An estimated three-quarters of the world’s conflicts have an ethnic
or religious dimension, most often linked to exclusion from economic or
political opportunities and/or suppression of cultural identity.
The insistence by some commentators to distinguish between causal
processes underpinning different axes of social differentiation is linked in
part to the earlier discussion of the diverse meanings attaching to social
exclusion. Beall (2002), for example, adopting a definition reflecting the
European orgins of the concept, argues that experiences under apartheid
in South Africa are best understood as racial oppression, exploitation and
denial of citizenship rights rather than social exclusion. In contrast, she
suggests, social exclusion is primarily speaking to class based divisions
driven by economic processes and labour market dynamics and hence is
more relevant to understanding the genesis of inequalities in postapartheid
urban South Africa where:
‘… new forms of capitalist production and changes in employment in
Johannesburg, associated with the rise in importance of the service
sector, have begun to erode the entrenched correspondence
between racial and class divisions that characterized racial
economic development and employment patterns during much of
the apartheid era. The new socially excluded residents of
Johannesburg are not only those who are black but also white who
2
Following many years of lobbying by indigenous and non-indigenous people, on 13 September 2007,
the United Nations General Assembly adopted a declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
which although non-binding, sets out the individual and collective rights of indigenous peoples and
prohibits discrimination.
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are superfluous to the requirements of the global economy and
Johannesburg’s place in it’ (2002:49).
Concerns about the relationship between different dimensions of social
differentiation and inequality and the relative salience of different causal
processes are important. The concept of social exclusion has considerable
analytical potential to enhance understanding and inform policy/action. It
focuses attention simultaneously on the complex causal processes driving
poverty and disadvantage and on the multidimensional nature of the
experience or outcome of these processes. However, the insights
provided by the social exclusion ‘lens’ cannot replace those provided by
the lens of gender, ethnicity, caste, age, disability and so on. Only taken
singly and in combination will the understanding provided by these
concepts make the maximum contribution to achieving more equitable
and cohesive societies and global systems.
4.6 Key points: the processes of exclusion
A relational approach to defining social exclusion that focuses on
multidimensional, dynamic, processes embedded in unequal power
relationships has ‘investigative advantage’ in understanding the causes
and consequences of poverty and deprivation.
These processes operate and interact across economic, social, political and
cultural dimensions, through social relations within and between
individuals, communities, institutions, nation states and global regions. A
focus on exclusionary processes can:
• Highlight the impacts of economic and social transformation driven by
relational and institutional power differentials;
• Reveal linkages between processes associated with globalisation and
local exclusionary dynamics;
• Illuminate the active and passive exclusionary processes arising from
public policy;
• Expose the role of cultural and symbolic processes as drivers of
exclusion stigmatising the poor and other population groups, restricting
human, civil, political and cultural rights and constraining capacity for
collective action.
In theory the concept of social exclusion has considerable analytical
potential. It can focus attention onto the interaction between multiple
exclusionary processes operating across systems of social stratification
associated with gender, ethnicity, caste, religion, social class etc.
However, insights provided by the social exclusion ‘lens’ are
complementary to these other relational lens rather than providing an
alternative way of conceptualising these.
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5. Alternative and parallel discourses
‘…the concept of social exclusion as it originated in Western Europe,
seems to have played a role in the re-opening of old debates and
discussions… under new terminology’ (Saith, 2001:10)
5.1 Which alternative discourses?
As Saith highlights, debates surrounding the concept of social exclusion
have echoes in and to some extent have replaced older debates. In the
previous section important overlaps with debates about the nature and
causes of inequalities associated with major axes of social differentiation
notably gender, race/ethnicity, caste, age and ability/disability, were
discussed. It was noted that the particular feature of the social exclusion
lens is that it focuses attention on the role played by relationships
between individuals, groups and whole nations, and particularly
differential power embedded in these relationships, in the generation of
poverty and inequality. In addition to overlaps with other relational
concepts there are therefore important links with more proximal concepts
– concepts which may have greater policy/action salience than social
exclusion in some parts of the world. Poverty is clearly the most obvious
alternative concept from this perspective but there are others: basic
needs, sustainable development, social cohesion, social capital, etc. We
have chosen to focus here on just two alternative discourses – poverty
and social capital - partly because they are the most proximal to social
exclusion but also because these discourses and their relationship to social
exclusion are arguably the most contentious.
5.2 Poverty, vulnerability, capability and human development
The concept of poverty is fast evolving, and when broadened to
incorporate notions of relativity, vulnerability and capability deprivation, it
tends to dovetail with thinking about social exclusion. Notwithstanding this
common ground, most commentators would argue that the concepts of
poverty and social exclusion are not synonymous.
Poverty was long conceptualised in absolute terms typically in terms of a
minimum consumption basket to meet an individual’s basic needs
(Rowntree, 1901). It has more recently been redefined in relative terms,
placing emphasis on the distribution of income and wealth in a society.
There has been a corresponding move from defining an absolute poverty
line - denoting a minimum standard of living that is similar in any country
at any time - to a relative poverty line, set for example as a proportion of
the national average income at a point in time.
Peter Townsend’s landmark work in the UK was instrumental in this reconceptualisation
of poverty, establishing a set of resources, in the form
of goods and services, governing standards of living, and moving towards
a multidimensional, relative, definition of poverty. He also includes social
participation – another relational concept - as a resource necessary to
avoid poverty and its consequences.
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‘Individuals… can be said to be in poverty when they lack the
resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the activities
and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary,
or at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which
they belong’ (Townsend, 1979:31).
This relative concept of poverty is now prevalent in many countries in
South and North America, Western Europe and Australasia. In the UK it
was recently reiterated by the newspaper columnist Polly Toynbee: ‘To be
poor is to fall too far behind what most ordinary people have in your own
society’ (Toynbee, 2006). And it has gained credence to the right of the
political spectrum in the UK: whereas in the past Conservative
administrations have tended to dismiss relative poverty as reflecting no
more than unavoidable, almost natural, inequalities in society (Beresford
et al., 1999), in 2006 the Conservative Party leader David Cameron was
quoted as saying: “Even if we are not destitute, we still experience
poverty if we cannot afford things that society regards as essential”
(Cameron, 2006). Measures of poverty in the UK, the EU and many other
countries are consistent with this conceptualisation (for example, in the
UK, poverty is assessed against low-income thresholds linked to
contemporary median incomes).
As noted in earlier sections whilst some Northern Hemisphere
commentators have voiced a concern at the way in which the discourse of
social exclusion is decentring poverty discourses, others have focused on
the additional benefits of the exclusion ‘lens’. From an Anglo-Saxon
poverty tradition, Matt Barnes (2005:15) has attempted to draw
distinctions between poverty, deprivation and social exclusion. In his
schema, and in contrast to poverty and deprivation, the concept of social
exclusion ‘evokes a multi-dimensional notion of participation in society,
involving a combination of physical, material, relational and societal
needs, over a period of time’ (Barnes, 2005:16). This approach echoes
Estivill’s suggestion (2003:21) that: ‘if poverty is a photograph, exclusion
is a film’.
Table 1: Comparison of poverty, deprivation and social exclusion
Poverty Deprivation Social exclusion
One-dimensional Multi-dimensional Multi-dimensional
Physical needs Physical needs
Material needs
Physical needs
Material needs
Societal participation
Distributional Distributional Distributional
Relational
Static Static Dynamic
Individual
Household
Individual
Household
Individual
Household
Community
Source: Barnes (2005)
Social exclusion literature review September 08
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However, whilst social exclusion has become the dominant inequality
discourse in Europe and Latin America this is not necessarily the case
around the globe. In other regions, notably South East Asia and SubSaharan
Africa the discourse of poverty, defined in both absolute and
relative terms and extending to include notions of vulnerability, basic
needs, capabilities, resource enhancement and sustainable human
development and have greater policy/action relevance and salience. This
is discussed in other SEKN documents and the SEKN’s final report (Popay,
et al. 2008; Rispel et al. 2007; Johnston et al. 2008).
Not-with-standing the pioneering work of scholars such as Peter
Townsend, euro-centric approaches to defining and measuring poverty
and deprivation have been criticised from a development perspective for
placing too much emphasis on income disadvantage. For example, Robert
Chambers (1997) on the basis of participatory research with people
experiencing poverty and disadvantage in Africa, Asia and Latin America,
emphasises the notion of vulnerability, which he defines as exposure to
risk and shocks, and defencelessness, or the lack of means to cope
without damaging loss. As Chambers (1997:45) argues:
‘Deprivation as poor people perceive it has many dimensions,
including not only lack of income and wealth, but also social
inferiority, physical weakness, disability and sickness, vulnerability,
physical and social isolation, powerlessness and humiliation … In
practice, much of this wide spectrum of deprivation and ill-being is
covered by the common use of the word poverty… [However]
poverty is then defined as low income, or often as low consumption,
which is more easily and reliably measured. Surveys are carried out
and poverty lines constructed. This limits much of the analysis of
poverty to the one dimension that has been measured’.
Castel also focuses on the notion of ‘vulnerability’ pointing to need for a
better understanding of the trajectory of groups and individuals along a
‘continuum of vulnerable situations’ (Castel, 1998: 129). In Castel’s
formulation vulnerability is not understood as an individual weakness, but
as a range of situations that human groups share but the resources and
capabilities to avoid or escape them is unequally distributed. Minujin
similarly proposes a continuum from inclusion to exclusion characterised
by increasing vulnerability (Minujin, 1998: 176-187).
Of particular relevance at a global level is the notion of human
development: the process of enlarging people’s choice by expanding
human capabilities and functioning. This understanding of the common
global development challenge regardless of GDP has been promoted by
the UNDP, inspired by Amartya Sen’s work on capabilities:
‘At all levels of development the three essential capabilities for
human development are for people to lead long and healthy lives,
to be knowledgeable and to have a decent standard of living. If
these basic capabilities are not achieved, many choices are simply
Social exclusion literature review September 08
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not available and many opportunities remain inaccessible. But the
realm of human development goes further: essential areas of
choice, highly valued by people, range from political, economic and
social opportunities for being creative and productive to enjoying
self-respect, empowerment and a sense of belonging to a
community’ (UNDP, 2007b).
The UNDP’s first Human Development Report published in 1990
introduced the Human Development Index (HDI) which incorporates Sen’s
three ‘essential’ capabilities. Since then three other indices have been
developed, including a Human Poverty Index (HPI). These are described in
section 6.6 below.
In contrast to the UNDP’s broad conceptualisation of poverty as
deprivation in elements essential for human life, the World Bank uses a
reductionist monetary figure of $US 1 a day to define absolute poverty.
This measure is now widely adopted by international agencies although it
fails to take account of social needs and local complexity. Indeed, the first
of the eight Millennium Development targets is to halve, between 1990
and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than $US 1 a
day, using a 1993 measure of purchasing power parity (PPP) to adjust for
differences in prices between countries. In developing countries,
measures of poverty generally reflect an absolute approach relying on
calculation of the costs of a ‘basket’ of basic needs.
5.3 Social exclusion and social capital
Social capital, like social exclusion, is a contested concept which has
received much attention in recent years. It has been described as a
relational concept, concerned with ‘identifying the nature and extent of
social relationships’ (Szreter and Woolcock, 2004:650). Whereas the
conceptual literature linking social exclusion to health is limited, social
capital has been widely theorised as a mediating link between socioeconomic
inequality and health, building on Richard Wilkinson’s influential
book, Unhealthy Societies (1996). There has also been extensive empirical
research in this area, the interpretation of which is a subject of ongoing
debate (see section 8 of this paper).
Robert Putnam, one of the key advocates of the concept, defines social
capital as: ‘features of social organisation such as networks, norms and
trust’ (Putnam, 1993). Types of networks range from the informal (family,
friends, neighbours) to the formal (sports clubs, civic associations); norms
are ‘those unstated rules or standards that often govern actions during
informal or spontaneous social relations’ (Hean et al., 2004); and trust
has been defined as ‘belief in the goodwill and benign intent of others’
(Kawachi et al, 1997).
Putnam (1993, 2000) sees social capital as the social infrastructure
(‘wires’) that enables individuals to gain access to resources. Viewed at a
relational level, social capital is thus for Putnam the property of
individuals, but only by virtue of group/community membership. In
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contrast, network scholars, notably James Coleman (1988), argue that
social capital refers to the resources that flow through networks (for
example, material resources, willingness of network members to offer
assistance, information): i.e. the electricity rather than the wires
themselves.
Bourdieu (1986) a French socialist and sociologist writing from a radically
different theoretical and political position to Putnam, also defines social
capital in terms of networks but emphasises their role in the constitution
and maintenance of hierarchical class relations and social and economic
inequalities. This is part of his account of different forms of capital
(economic, cultural, social and symbolic) and their interrelationships.
According to Virginia Morrow (2002:11), ‘Bourdieu is primarily concerned
with how economic capital underpins these other forms, how forms of
capital interact with wider structures to reproduce social inequalities, and
how the day-to-day activities of social actors draw upon and reproduce
structural features of wider social systems’.
Much of the empirical research on social capital has been underpinned by
the Putnam approach to understanding the concept. In this context, the
unit of analysis to which the concept can be applied is contentious. While
some neo-classical economists see social capital as the property of
individuals, others, including the neo-conservative Francis Fukuyama
(1995) see it as a characteristic of spatially defined communities ranging
from villages to entire societies. It has been suggested that communities
possessing high levels of social capital may obtain benefits including faster
economic development, better government and improved health.
However, most commentators recognise that social capital can be
associated with either good or bad outcomes: the purposes for which
resources are used being analytically and practically distinct from how
they are obtained. Thus high levels of social capital may be associated
with criminal and ‘terrorist’ activity, corruption and nepotism and/or social
control, blocking the access of ‘out-groups’ to ‘community’ resources.
Conventionally, within the Putnamesque approach, two types of social
capital have been identified: ‘bonding’ social capital, referring to relations
between members of a group or network who share a common identity;
and ‘bridging’ social capital, which transcends these divides (for example,
of age, ethnicity, class), through participation in associational activity.
More recently, a third dimension, ‘linking’ social capital, has been
introduced, defined by Szreter and Woolcock (2004:655) as ‘norms of
respect and networks of trusting relationships between people who are
interacting across explicit, formal or institutionalized power or authority
gradients in society’. Linking social capital, according to Szreter and
Woolcock (2004:656), is: ‘particularly relevant for the effective
implementation of measures to assist the ill, poor, and the ‘socially
excluded’. For example, they argue that without relationships of trust and
respect between those involved in delivering public services and ‘the
poor’, these measures are unlikely to succeed. Szreter and Woolcook
conclude that a three-dimensional conceptualisation of social capital:
Social exclusion literature review September 08
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‘places great emphasis on both the quality and quantity of
relationships between all citizens. It also places emphasis on
whether or not these relationships are founded on mutual respect
between people, differentiated either horizontally by their varying
social identities or vertically by their access to different levels of
power and authority’ (Szreter and Woolcock, 2004:663).
It has been argued that much empirical research on social capital has
suffered from a lack of theoretical clarity (Hean et al., 2004) and attempts
at measurement reflect the conceptual debates described above.
Criticisms include: a preponderance of indicators that reflect the same
‘elasticity’ with which the term ‘social capital’ is used in different
disciplines and approaches; a lack of clarity about the choice of unit of
analysis or level for measurement (e.g. individual, aggregate, or
community); over-reliance on self-reports; a large number of potentially
omitted variables; and problems with the transferability and
appropriateness of survey instruments to different geographic contexts
and disciplinary realms. Blaxter argues that these problems have
implications for the study of the putative relationship between social
capital and health because:
‘…there is a tendency to define as social capital whatever social
indicators best predict health status. This becomes tautologous:
social capital promotes good health, but is at the same time defined
by those things known to be health promoting’ (Blaxter, 2004:15).
In part because of these measurement difficulties, there are conflicting
views on the relationship between social capital and health outcomes. For
example, whilst Szreter and Woolcock, (2004:65) claim that the ‘specific
research connecting social capital to health outcomes via a social support
mechanism is vast’ , Muntaner (2004:765), argues that ‘the health effects
of social capital cannot be taken for granted and in spite of some
promising findings, the burden of proof is still on the ‘social capital’
hypothesis’. Morgan and Swann (2004:190), in the conclusion of their
secondary analysis of surveys relating to social capital and health
conclude that ‘the positive relationships that have been found are only
true for some indicators of social capital and vary according to the health
outcome of interest. Moreover, while some independent effects have been
found, social capital has less power to predict health than other more
familiar indicators of socio-economic status’.
Swann and Morgan (2002:6) have also reviewed qualitative research on
social capital to ‘look beneath the surface at the hard-to-measure
processes and actions of people’s relationships to others, at community
structures, and the ‘life’ of communities and networks’. This review
identified a number of barriers to the acquisition and utilisation of ‘social
capital’, including differential power and the experience of
disempowerment, social identity, rights and aspects of place. Attempts
have also been made to observe community relationships and norms
directly.
Social exclusion literature review September 08
36
At a general level, the utility of the Putnam approach to defining the
concept of social capital has been criticised because of its foundation in
the liberal traditions of utilitarianism and individualism (Skocpol, 1996;
Hernández et al., 2001). From this perspective it is the notion of ‘capital’
available for individual roots - with its root in economics – that is the
problem, notwithstanding the focus on personal relationships and
voluntary association. These commentators challenge the assumption
that “values” related to mutual trust and reciprocity will generate
individual wealth and make for successful societies and criticise attempts
to create hierarchies of societies based on the level of social capital
(Inglehart, 1997). These approaches, it is argued, fail to recognise that
conflict and power relationships do not necessarily lead to social failure
and that voluntary relationships and the action of voluntary associations
are not necessarily freely chosen but may result from potentially invisible
pressure from states and institutions (Hernández et al., 2001:21-23).
Recent approaches to using the concept of social capital in research and
policy has also been criticised for distracting from more pressing economic
and political issues. For example, Muntaner (2004:677) has argued that:
‘the political use of social capital outside public health leans towards
tolerance for social inequality and against egalitarian social change’. He
adds that an emphasis on the measurement of ‘social capital’, to the
detriment of data reflecting political and economic processes, can lead to
‘pseudo explanations’ where:
‘Crime, isolation, drug use, broken windows, sexually transmitted
diseases and other diseases are seen as the outcome of some
intrinsic deficiency of the community’ (Muntaner, 2004: 678).
There are then major controversies surrounding the value of social capital
as a conceptual lens through which to understand the nature and
consequences of social relationships at micro, meso and macro levels
within societies – controversies that mirror those surrounding the concept
of ‘social exclusion’. A pre-requisite for any analysis of the relationship
between these two concepts is clarity of theoretical and ideological
position and definition. Thus, for example, Putnam sees social capital as
associated with social benefits or social problems – and hence as
potentially a focus of social policy. Bourdieu on the other hand uses the
concept as part of his social theory of inequality and does not develop it
as a single cause of social ills or argue that policy should seek to impact
on it specifically as distinct from social inequalities in general. Putnam’s
neo-Durkheimian perspective on social capital aligns itself most obviously
with Levitas’ SID discourse, and Silver’s ‘solidarity’ paradigm, described in
section 3. Bourdieu’s analysis is closer to radical redistributionist
interpretations of social exclusion, drawing on conflict theory, as
exemplified by Silver’s ‘monopoly’ paradigm and Beall’s
transformationalist approach. A three-dimensional conceptualisation of
social capital goes some way towards exploring links between micro- and
macro-sociological phenomena, but falls short of the ‘integrated analysis
of institutions’ that Sen (2000) sees as essential to a relational approach
to social exclusion; neither does it take full account of the dynamic
structural aspects of global exclusionary processes. In summary, as
Social exclusion literature review September 08
37
Levitas cautions (2006:136): ‘the conceptual background and political
implications of ‘exclusion from social relations’ and ‘social capital’ are not
the same’, and care should be taken to avoid defining, measuring, and
interpreting them interchangeably.
5.3 Key points: alternative and parallel discourses
This section has considered concepts that may act as alternatives to social
exclusion as ‘lens’ through which to understand and act on social
inequalities. Poverty and social capital have been selected for attention
here as the most proximal concepts and arguably the most contentious.
There are other concepts which might have been considered including, for
example, human rights, basic needs and sustainable development.
The conceptualisation and measurement of poverty and related notions of
vulnerability and capability deprivation, have become increasingly
sophisticated in recent decades. It is now widely accepted that poverty is
relative (defined in terms of a particular spatial, cultural and temporal
context) and multi-dimensional, encompassing lack of social as well as
material resources. However, in contrast to the notion of ‘social exclusion’,
contemporary measures of poverty tend to be restricted to distributional
(rather than relational) resources, and to focus on the individual and
household levels.
Whilst poverty continues to dominate the policy agenda in many low
income countries/regions, eurocentric conceptual approaches have been
challenged, in particular through Chambers’ work on vulnerability and
Sen’s work on capabilities. In response to such critiques, since 1990, the
UNDP has produced the Human Development Index, a composite measure
of life expectancy, educational attainment and income, and more recently,
a Human Poverty Index which adopts a relative rather than absolute
approach. In contrast, the World Bank promotes an absolute measure of
poverty and continues to set the extreme poverty line at $US1/day
Despite criticisms that this level is now out of step with increases in
commodity prices/costs of living and should be increased to $2 per day at
a minimum, it is still widely adopted by policy makers focused on
international poverty reduction targets e.g. Millennium Development
Goals.
Social capital is a relational concept which, like social exclusion, has
received much attention in recent years and is highly contested. Leading
theories differ as to the nature, role and benefits of social capital. The
operationalisation and measurement of social capital reflects these
controversies including: a lack of theoretical and definitional clarity;
contested choices of indicators and levels of measurement; reliance on
self-reports; and limited transferability.
In contrast to social exclusion, the relationship between social capital
(defined in terms of relationships of trust and reciprocity) and population
health/health inequalities has been widely theorised and is the subject of
extensive empirical study. Research linking social capital to health
outcomes is controversial whilst qualitative research has highlighted
Social exclusion literature review September 08
38
barriers to the acquisition of social capital in disadvantaged communities.
More generally, the concept within the Putnamesque approach is criticised
as emanating from the liberal traditions of utilitarianism and individualism,
and for distracting attention for the political and economic causes of
inequalities.
A pre-requisite for any analysis of the relationship between ‘social
exclusion’ ‘poverty’ and/or ‘social capital’ is clarity of ideological and
theoretical position and definition. Care should be taken to avoid defining,
measuring, and interpreting these concepts interchangeably.
Social exclusion literature review September 08
74
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5
Inclusive Education
5
1. Clough, Peter, and Jenny. Corbett. 2000. "Routes to Inclusion:
Introduction." Pp. 3-33 in Theories of Inclusive Education: A Students'
Guide. London: Paul Chapman publishing.
2. European Agency for Special Needs and Inclusive Education. 2014.
"Inclusive Education Benefits All." Pp. 11-15 in Five Key Messages for
Inclusive Education: Putting Theory into Practice. Odense: European
Agency for Special Needs and Inclusive Education.
             
                     
 
         
         
       
             
     
   
       
           
                       
                   
               
                 
 
             
   
     
                   
             
             
       
           
             
 
               
           
       
         
     
   
INCLUSIVE EDUCATION BENEFITS ALL
Introduction
There is increasing recognition across Europe, and more widely at international 
level, that moving towards inclusive policy and practice in education is an 
imperative. The Council conclusionson the social dimension of education and
training state that: ‘Creating the conditions required for the successful inclusion of 
pupils with special needs in mainstream settings benefits all learners’ (Council of the 
European Union, 2010, p. 5). 
The Commission of the European Communities’ Green Paper on Migration and 
Mobility underlines that: 
Schoolsmust play a leading role in creating an inclusive society, as they
representthe main opportunity for young people of migrantand host
communitiesto get to know and respecteach other … linguistic and cultural
diversity may bring an invaluable resource to schools (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2008, p. 1). 
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
(2009) clearly indicates that inclusive education is a question of equity and is 
therefore a quality issue impacting upon all learners. Three propositions regarding 
inclusive education are highlighted: inclusion and quality are reciprocal; access and 
quality are linked and are mutually reinforcing; and quality and equity are central to 
ensuring inclusive education. 
A number of Agency projects have also focussed on this issue. The report on the 
Agency’s Raising Achievement for All Learners(RA4AL) conference (European 
Agency, 2012c) highlights that issues surrounding the definition of inclusion have 
become increasingly important, but that there appears to be growing agreement on 
the need for a rights­based approach to develop greater equity and social justice 
and to support the development of a non­discriminatory society. The debate about 
inclusion has, therefore, broadened from one that used to focus on relocating 
children described as having special educational needs into mainstream schools, to 
one that seeks to provide high­quality education – and consequent benefits – for all 
learners. 
As more countries move to a wider definition of inclusive education, diversity is 
recognised as ‘natural’ in any group of learners and inclusive education can be seen 
as a means of raising achievement through the presence (access to education), 
participation (quality of the learning experience) and achievement (learning 
processes and outcomes) of all learners. 
Putting Theory into Practice  11 
   
 
     
             
             
                   
                       
   
     
               
     
             
           
       
             
             
 
       
 
   
               
     
   
 
Agency work on Key Principlesfor Promoting Quality in Inclusive Education
(European Agency, 2009b) reinforces the importance of learner­
centred/personalised learning approaches, teacher assessment that supports 
learning, and collaborative work with parents and families – these are, however, key 
to improving the quality of education for all learners. 
Inclusive educationas an approach to raise achievement for all learners
Wilkinson and Pickett note that ‘greater equality, as well as improving the wellbeing 
of the whole population, is also the key to national standards of achievement’ 
(2010, p. 29). They stress that if: 
a country wantshigher average levelsof educationalachievementamong its
schoolchildren, it must addressthe underlying inequality which createsa
steeper social gradientin educationalachievement(ibid., p. 30). 
Challenging the idea that including all learners may somehow be detrimental to high 
achievement, the Organisation for Economic Co­operation and Development (OECD, 
2011) shows that improving the lowest performing students does not have to be at 
the expense of higher performers. The findings of the UNESCO report Learning
Divides (Willms, 2006) also provide evidence that strong school performance and 
equity can go hand­in­hand and that countries with the highest levels of 
performance tend to be those that are successfully raising the achievement of all 
learners (European Agency, 2012d). 
According to the Agency’s RA4AL report, 
Farrelland colleagues(2007) … found a small body of research to suggest that
placing learnerswith SEN in mainstream schools hasno major adverse
consequencesfor allchildren’sacademic achievement, behaviour and attitudes.
A systematic review of the literature commissioned by the Evidence for Policy
and Practice Initiative (EPPI) (Kalambouka etal., 2005) also found that, in
general, there are no adverse effects on learnerswithoutSENwhen learners
with special needsare included in mainstream schools (European Agency, 
2012d, p. 8). 
Several studies outline the benefits of inclusion for learners without disabilities. 
These benefits include: 
increased appreciation and acceptance of individualdifferencesand diversity,
respectfor all people, preparation foradultlife in an inclusive society and
opportunitiesto master activities by practising and teaching others. Such
effects are also documented in recentresearch, for example Bennettand
Gallagher (2012) (European Agency, 2012d, p. 8). 
Five Key Messages for Inclusive Education 12 
   
               
       
       
       
 
     
           
             
     
       
   
     
 
       
 
       
   
The positive impactof inclusive placementson learnerswith disabilities is
noted by research such as MacArthur etal. (2005) and de Graaf etal. (2011).
This includes improved social relationshipsand networks, peer role models,
increased achievement, higher expectations, increased collaboration among
schoolstaff and improved integration of families into the community
(European Agency, 2012d, p. 8). 
Further benefits may include access to wider curriculum opportunities and 
recognition and accreditation of achievement. 
Consideration should be given to improving the organisation of ‘spaces’ for
learning and providing more opportunitiesfor learnersto discover talents in a
range of areasbeyond academic learning (ibid., p. 25). 
Research by Chapman et al. (2011) focussed specifically on: 
leadership that promotesachievementfor learnerswith SEN/disability and
suggested that the presence of a diverse student population can, under the
rightorganisationalconditions, stimulate collaborative arrangementsand
encourage innovative waysof teaching hard to reach groups(European Agency, 
2012d, p. 21). 
‘What is good for pupils withSEN is good for all pupils’
This statement made in the Agency publication Inclusive Education and Classroom
Practice (European Agency, 2003, p. 33) has, since that time, been frequently 
reiterated in Agency work. 
For example, the same study highlighted that: 
peer tutoring or co-operative learning is effective in both cognitive and affective
(social-emotional) areasof pupils’ learning and development. Pupilsthat help
each other, especially within a system of flexible and well-considered pupil
grouping, profitfrom learning together (ibid., p. 23). 
In Agency work on inclusive practice in secondary schools in 2005, it was stressed 
that: 
All students – including students with SEN – demonstrate improvementsin their
learning with systematic monitoring, assessment, planning and evaluation of
their work (European Agency, 2005, p. 8) 
and that: 
All students benefitfrom co-operative learning: the studentwho explains to the
other student retainsinformation better and for longer and the needs of the
student who is learning are better addressed by a peer whose level of
understanding isonly slightly higher than his or her own level (ibid., pp. 18–19). 
Putting Theory into Practice  13 
     
 
   
           
             
 
                     
           
                 
       
           
                   
                     
         
       
             
             
             
           
               
     
                 
                 
             
     
                 
           
             
                 
       
                       
               
         
         
 
The RA4AL report states that: 
a system that allowslearnersto progresstowardscommon goals, butthrough
differentroutes, using differentstyles of learning and assessment, should be
more inclusive and raise the achievementof all learners(European Agency, 
2012d, p. 25). 
Agency work on Assessment in Inclusive Settings also notes the need to involve all 
learners and parents/families in both the learning and the assessment process 
(Watkins, 2007). 
The same report points out that the process of differentiation needs careful 
consideration. Although it may also be associated with individualisation and 
personalisation and seen as a way to meet more specific individual or group needs, 
it often remains teacher­centred rather than learner­led. Personalisation needs to 
start with the needs and interests of all learners. 
In the Agency’s more recent i-accessproject, it is noted that the benefits of assistive 
technology or ‘enabling technology’ often prove useful for a large variety of users. 
‘Accessibility benefits users with disabilities and/or special educational needs and 
may often benefit all users’ (European Agency, 2012e, p. 22). 
The views of young people with and without disabilities expressed in the Young
Views on Inclusive Education publication provide a clear summary of the benefits of 
inclusive education for all learners. As one young learner said: ‘Inclusive education is 
for all children. Normal schools should be near their homes. This experience 
promotes meeting people from the neighbourhood’ (European Agency, 2012a, 
p. 11). Others added: ‘Students with and without special needs can learn from each 
other and exchange their knowledge’, ‘It is good for us – good for them. It is 
important to recognisethe benefits to everyonein the class’ and ‘Inclusive 
education helps mainstream children to become more tolerant, with more open 
minds’ (ibid., p. 22). 
Monitoring progress
As inclusive education has broadened to consider quality education for all learners, 
it is necessary to find new ways to monitor progress. It is suggested in Agency work 
on indicators and the MIPIE report (2011a) that, at school level, data collection 
could consider the factors that impact upon the quality of schools’ admission 
strategies, such as: non­discriminatory admission rules and policies; policies and 
strategies developed to support learners in disclosing their needs; the existence of a 
clear policy statement against bullying; implementation of existing codes of practice 
on inclusive education; staff training sessions on admission issues and on creating a 
welcoming school climate; working respectfully and collaboratively with learners 
Five Key Messages for Inclusive Education 14 
                         
           
         
       
           
       
           
                   
             
         
           
           
               
       
 
   
and families; strategies to help learners and families to participate actively in the 
school community and classroom; and the availability of information, counselling 
and advice strategies and their impact on learners. 
In conclusion, the broader inclusion debate now seeks to provide high­quality 
education – and benefits – for all learners. Strong school performance and equity 
can go hand­in­hand. 
The education system is complex and fragmented and, at present, lacks coherent 
thinking about inclusiveeducation. In general, there is little support for principals 
and leaders who may be trying to bring about change in isolated situations. Diversity 
is increasing across the system, but the traditions of the past restrict action. Schools’ 
capability must be developed through context awareness, correspondence 
(between legislation and policy/practice), conceptual clarity and a continuum of 
support – for all stakeholders – that encourages schools to be proactive rather than 
reactive. Getting to know all learners and intervening early will develop quality 
support for all learners that it is seen as part of regular education. 
Putting Theory into Practice  15 
     
 
   
         
         
     
   
       
   
 
   
           
   
         
       
 
   
 
           
       
 
   
           
     
     
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Putting Theory into Practice  37 
6
Political Aspects of Social Inclusion – What Are
Inclusive Policies?
6
1. Etzioni, Amitai. 2001. The Third Way to a Good Society. Center for
Communitarian Policy Studies of The George Washington University,
Washington, DC.
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and Services for People with Learning Disabilities.”Disability and Society
19 (3): 195-207.
THE THIRD WAY TO A GOOD SOCIETYl
Amitai EtzioniW
Abstract
TheThird Waydebatehas,sofar, not beenvery successful.Whilegovernmentsacross
theworld searchfor a newpolitical synthesis,thetheoretical debatehasofferedlittle to
those interested in a newframework for progressive politics. This essaypresentsan
account ofwhat the Third Wayreally means,and roots it in a communitarianvision of
thegoodsociety.It arguesthatsuchsocietiesachievea dynamicbalancebetweenstate,
market and community, and blends theoretical discussion with the practical
implications ofsuch an approach.At the core oftheanalysisis theideathat the Third
Wayis an ethical position that seeksto treat people as endsin themselves.While
flexibility andpragmatism are important to thenewpolitics, theyshouldbe understood
as componentsofa broaderframework, in which socialprogress is measuredby more
than theaccumulation ofmaterial goods.How dowe managedevolutionsuccessfully?
Whatapproach shouldgovernmenttaketoinequality? Whatis theproper relationship
betweenrights andresponsibilities? Theessayilluminates theseandother issues,and
callsfor a broad-ranging moral dialogue to addressthem.
The GoodSociety:First Principles
TheVision
We need a clearer vision of where the Third Way is taking us. While debateson
improvementsto public programs or legal structuresfascinate some,mostpeopleare
not interested in technocraticdetails. Theyyearn for a vision of wherewe are headed,
one that provides a way of assessingpastaccomplishmentsandplans for the future.
Sucha vision inspiresandcompels;it lendsmeaningto ourendeavorsandsacrifices,to
our lives.
We aspireto a society that is not merely civil but is alsogood. A good societyis
one in which people treat one another as ends in themselves and not merely as
instruments; aswhole personsratherthan asfragments; asmembersof a community,
bonded by ties of affection and commitment, ratherthan only as employees,traders,
consumersor evenas fellow citizens. In the terms of the philosopherMartin Buber,a
good society nourishes 'I-Thou' relations, although it recognizesthe inevitable and
significant role of 'I-It' relations.
Some core values of a good society canbe directly derived from its definition.
Child abuse, spousal abuse, violent crime in general imd of course civil and
international war offend thebasicprinciple of treating peopleasends.Hence,our love
of peace. Furthermore,we hold that violating individual autonomy,unlessthere are
strongcompelling public needs,is incompatiblewith treatingpeopleasends.This isthe
ultimate foundation of our commitmentto liberty.
.Amitai Etzioni is University ProfessorandDirector of the Centerfor Communitarian Policy Studiesof The GeorgeWashington
University, Washington,DC.
5
Whenwe find value in creatingor appreciatingart,musicandotherexpressionsof
culture, orengagein learning for its own sake,we typically are in the realmof ends.In
contrast,whenwe trade in theseitemswe are in the instrumentalrealm, which is quite
legitimate, aslong as it doesnot intrude on, let alone dominate,thatof ends.
Whenwe bond with family, friends or community memberswe live upto thebasic
principle of thegoodsociety.Thevaluesof love, loyalty, caringandcommunity allfind
their roots here. In contrast,whenwe 'network' -bonding for a utilitarian purpose
rather for its own sake-we abandonthis realm.
The relationship of the basic principle to socialjustice is a complex one. The
priority of treating peopleasendsrequiresmore than equality of opportunity but less
than equality of outcomes; it denotesa rich basic minimum for all. Still othervalues
arisemore indirectly, we shall see,outof moraldialogues.Theseseekto limit conflict
and cultural wars and put a premium on reaching sharedunderstandings-a major
attribute of good societies.
The ethicaltenetthatpeopleareto betreatedaspurposesratherthanoQlyasmeans
is commonly recognized. Less widely accepted is the significant sociological
observationthat it is in communities,not in the realmof the statenor the market,that
this tenetis bestinstitutionalized.
Equally pivotal is the recognition thatonly in a societywhereno oneis excluded,
and all aretreatedwith equalrespect,areall peopleaccordedthestatusof beingendsin
themselvesand allowed to reach their full human potential. Furthermore,the core
communitarian idea -that we have inalienable individual rights and social
responsibilities for each other -is based on the samebasic principle: we are both
entitled to be treated as ends in ourselves and are required to treat others and our
communities in this way.
The good societyis onethatbalancesthree often partially incompatible elements:
the state,the market,andthe community. This is theunderlying logic of the statements
above.The good societydoes not seekto obliterate thesesegmentsbut to keepthem
properly nourished-and contained.
Similarly, muchhasbeenmadealreadyof the fact thattheThird Way(neueMitte,
centrist approach, communitarian thinking) does not view the government as the
problem or asthe solution but asone partnerof the good society. Nor does it seethe
marketasa sourceof all that is good or evil but asa powerful economic engine that
mustbe accordedsufficient spaceto do its work while alsoguardedproperly.
Different Third Way societies still struggle with finding the proper point of
balance.The continentalsocietiesstill havealong wayto gotowardcurtailing thestate
and allowing the market to function properly. The United States may well have
overshotthe point of balance by according the market too much space.The United
Kingdom andHolland might be drawing closerto the point of balance.Germanyand
aboveall Franceare still reliant onthebig state.However,thethird partnerof thegood
society-the community -has not beengivenits propershareof the social division of
labor in all Third Way societies.
The vision of agood societyis a tableauonwhich we project our aspirations,nota
full checklistof all thatdeservesourdedication.And the vision is oftenreformulatedas
the world aroundus changes,andaswe change.Moreover, it points to different steps
that different societiesbestundertake,dependingon theirplace onthe Third Way. But
the ultimate vision is oneandthe same.
I;
The good society is 'an ideal. While we may never quite reach it, it guides our
endeavors,andwe measureourprogressby it.
2 The Third Way
The Third Wayis a road that leadsus toward thegoodsociety. However, it should be
acknowledged atthe outsetthatthe Third Way is indeedfuzzy atthe edges,not fully
etched.As TheEconomist (1998)wrote aboutthe Third Way: 'Trying to pin down an
exactmeaning is like wrestling aninflatable man.If you geta grip onone limb, all the
hot air rushesto another.' ProfessorStevenTeles (n.d.) of Brandeis University has
calledtheThird Way' a masterworkof ambiguity'. But this is oneof the mainvirtuesof
this approach: it points to the directions that we ought to follow, but is neither
doctrinaire nor an ideological rigid system.
The Third Way is not American, British or the property of any other nation or
region or culture. Among its numerousorigins arethe Old andthe New Testament;the
teachingsof the Ancient Greeks;Asian, Muslim and Jewishconceptionsof harmony
and responsibility for others thanself; Fabianthinking; Catholic socialthought; and
much else?
The Third Way hasoftenbeendepictedin negativeterms,in termsof thatwhich it
is not. It is correctly stated as neither a road paved by statist socialism nor one
underpinned by the neoliberalismof the free market. It tilts neitherto the right nor to
the left. (In the US -which hashadno significant socialist tradition -the Third Way
runs betweena New Deal conceptionof big state,which administerslarge-scalesocial
programs and extensively regulatesthe economy, and a libertarian or laissezfaire
unfettered market:)
Here, an attempt is made to furnish it with a positive and normative
characterization as a:public philosophy that both provides principles and points to
public policy implications. Above all,we suggestchangespeoplewill haveto introduce
into their own ways of conductand their institutions.
Is thereoneThird Way ormultiple Third Ways?While somesocietiesdrive more
in the left lane (France,Italy) andsomemore in the right (the United States),the road
they all travel is fully distinct from the one charted by totalitarian and libertarian
approaches.Moreover, while the various Third Way societies differ in their specific
synthesisof theways of the stateandthe market,theyarepulling closerto oneanother.
Much has been written aboutthe needto find a way that will allow European
economiesto compete globally but not becomeAmericanized; to enhanceeconomic
flexibility and productivity but not yield all to the service of mammon;to develop a
new European social model. Much of what follows addressesthese questions by
focusing ontwo keyissues:therole of community ontheThird Wayandtheneedto set
clear limits on how far one oughtto tilt in the American direction.
7
The
Rolesof the Cornrnunity
2The
NeglectedPartner
2.
CommunitiesdefinedCommunities
arethe main socialentitiesthatnourishends-based(I-Thou) relationships,while
the market is the realm of means-based(I-It) relationships. The state-citizen
relationshipalsotendsto the instrumental. True,somepeoplebond at work, andsome
barter in communities, but by and large without communities a deficit in ends-basedrelati
is sureto bepronounced.As JohnGray(1996: 16)putit: 'The flourishing
of individuals presupposes strong and deep forms of common life. ' In short,
communities area major componentof good societies.
The conceptof community is often saidto be vague and elusive. This chargeis
alsomadeagainstotherwidely usedconceptssuchasclass,elites and evenrationality.
Communities, in my understanding,are based on two foundations, both of which
reinforce I-Thou relationships. First, communitiesprovide bondsof affection thatturn
groups of people into social entities resembling extended families. Second, they
transmit a sharedmoral culture (a setof sharedsocial meanings and values, which
characterize that which the community considers virtuous versus unacceptable
behavior) from generationto generation,aswell asreformulating this moral framework
day by day. Thesetraits define anddifferentiate communities.
While in earlier eras, and to some extent today, communities were largely
residential (membershipwas geographicallydefined,as in villages), this i&now often
not the case.Contemporary communities evolve amongmembers of one profession
working for the sameinstitution (for example,thephysiciansof a given hospital orthe
faculty of a college); membersof an ethnic or racial group evenif dispersedamong
others(a Jewishcommunity oroneof Bangladeshiimmigrants in eastLondon); people
who sharea sexualorientation; or intellectualsof the samepolitical or cultural feather.
Somecommunities arequite large,and in part imagined; for instance,many gay men
visiting anotherpart of the country know socially somepeoplewho live thereand feel
closeto others they meetthere for the first time.
Groups that merely sharea specific interest-to preventthe internet from being
taxed orto reducethecostsof postage-are solelyan interestgrouporlobby. They lack
the affective bonds and sharedculture that make communities into places that truly
involve people ratherthan focusing ona narrow facetof their lives.
Critics correctly point out thatcommunitiesarenot necessarilyplacesofbrotherly
and sisterly love; they may be oppressive,intolerant, nasty. This is largely true of
communities in earlier eras. In democratic societies,people often choose which
communities to join and participate in, making communities as a rule less
overpowering. While evencontemporarycommunities are far from perfect,the same
obviously holds for the stateandthe market. We must stopcomparing existing social
entities to somevisionary utopia and askinsteadhow they canbe improved. And we
mustrecognizethat eachof the threepartnersis better(not necessarilygood) atsome
tasks than the others. Communities are often overlooked as a very important social
factor evenby Third Way advocates,who tendto focus onseekingthe properbalance
betweenthe stateandthe market.4In a well balancedsocietyall three complementand
containoneanother.
8
Therelative advantage 6fcommunities
The specialcapacityof communitiesto moveustowardthegood societyis highlighted
by the finding that people who live in communities live longer, healthier and more
contentlives thanpeople who arebereft of suchmembership.Theyare likely to have
significantly fewerpsychosomaticillnessesand mentalhealthproblemsthanthosewho
live in isolation. And, with their craving for sociality well sated,community members
are muchless likely to join violent gangs,religious cults or militias.
The fact that social isolation is dangerousfor mental healthwas highlighted in
1955 during the first mission to establisha US base in Antarctica, where isolation
provoked paranoid psychosis (Stuster 1996: 8). Since then, numerousstudies have
shownthat isolation significantly increasesvarious psychologicalhealthrisks.5In their
classic study of New Yorkers lonely in high-rise apartments,Mental Health in the
Metropolis, Leo Srole andhis associates(1962)found that 60percentof the residents
had sub-clinical psychiatric conditions and 20 percentwere judged psychologically
impaired. Numerousstudieshavedemonstratedthat,afterwork-related stress,the most
important socialfactor in mentalhealthis marital, familial andfriendshiprelationships
(Walz 1994: 56-57). Elderly people who live alone,have no friends, or have poor
relationships with their children are 60 percentmore likely to developdementiathan
thosewhose social contactsaremore satisfying,accordingto a studypublished by the
medicaljournal TheLancet (Fratiglioni 2000).
Communities, datashows,canplaya majorrole inproviding preventiveandacute
care,reducing the need for publicly funded socialservicesas divergent aschild care,
grief counsellingandprofessionaldrugandalcoholabusetreatment,aswell asassisting
in curtailing juvenile delinquency.
The strongestevidencefor thesestatementsis found inreligious communities that
meetmy definition of sharedaffective bondsanda moralculture. Practically all kinds
of anti-social behavior are relatively low among Mormon communities in Utah,
Orthodox Jewishcommunities in New York, and Black Muslim groups.Theyarealso
lower, on average,in villages and small-town America as comparedto large cities,
where communities are lessprevalent.
There are scoresof studies similar to the ones summarizedhere that highlight
communities' important role. Patrols of volunteers,called OrangeHats,chaseddrug
dealersout of their neighborhood in Washington,DC. In the process,membersof the
community alsobecamecloserto oneanother.
In 1988, Wellsburg, West Virginia, had a particularly high incidence of heart
disease -29 percent above the national average. By 1996, the community's
cardiovascular health profile was among the best in the state,according to a study
conductedbyMary Lou Hurley andLisa Schiff. The improvementreflectedcommunity
organizedwalks, healthypotluck suppersandnumerousclassesinaerobicsandways to
reducecholesterol,blood pressureandstress.A screeningof 182communitymembers
found that they had maintained their weight loss and most of the reduction in
cholesterol and blood pressure.According to the researchers,'the averagewellness
score ...topped the 1988baseline by 12 percentand the averagefitness score by 42
percent' (Hurley & Shiff 1996).
In the county of Tillamook, Oregon, diverse community groups, including
religious and liberal ones,decidedto collaborate onthe problemof teenagepregnancy,
leading to a decreasefrom twenty-four pregnancies per thousand girls age ten to
seventeenin 1990to sevenperthousandin 1994(Luke & Neville 1998).
9
Theseare buta few illustrative findings. Aside from significantly reducingpublic
costs,communalprovisions suchastheseare often muchmore individually tailoredth
public programsand canbe made muchlessalienating than governmentaction.
Ergo, next
For all thesereasons,cultivating communitieswherethey exist,andhelping themform
where they have been lost, is essentialfor future provision of much social good; it
should be a major priority for future progressalong the Third Way.
In the next yearscommunities should be increasinglyrelied uponto shouldera
greatershareof those socialmissions that mustbe undertaken,because-to reiteratecommunities
can do so at a much lower public costand with greaterhumanity than
either the state or the market. In effect, communitiesmaywell be the most important
newsource ofsocial servicesin theforeseeablefuture, asthe ability to increasetaxes
topayfor social servicesis nearly exhausted;and thetotal costswill continueto rise at
rates higher thaninflation.6
Seeking much greaterreliance on communities is not an attemptto replace the
welfare state.Onthe contrary,byreducingthe burdenonthewelfare state,communities
help sustainit.
Existing public policies andproceduresshouldbereviewedregularlyto ensurethat
the renewalandmaintenanceof existing communitiesis not inadvertentlyundermined
(for example,bypreempting their naturalroles)andthatthesepolicies andprocedures
opportune community developmentona local, regionaland societallevel.
To fostercommunitiestheprime minister may call onall ministersto provide him
annually with reportsonstepsto involve communitiesmore in their work; community
'audits' could further assesswherethereis room for greatercommunity involvement;
and statistics oughtto be published regularly aboutprogressin the neededdirection.
However, experienceshows that suchmeasuresare much more effective if they are
represented,symbolically and in practice, by high profile institutions. This strongly
suggests that one should create a special division within a suitable ministry (for
example,the Home Office or the Departmentfor the Environment, Transportandthe
Regions) or better yet, createa new ministry dedicatedto community development.
While critics are likely to complain aboutcentralism,forming somekind of permanent
taskforce for community development in a government departmentwould further
reinforce this important mission.
Much hasbeenmade in recentyears aboutthe newways through which the state
might projectitself. It hasbeensaidit shouldbean'enabler' anda 'catalyst' ratherthan
itself directing andfinancing socialprograms.This postrnodernmanagementis saidto
be flat rather than hierarchical; based on networking rather than directive; serving
public goals indirectly via the market. A good part of this is true, and needs no
repeatinghere.Someof it is over-hyped;the managementstyle mostsuited for social
work may not bethe samefor building a destroyerand so on. Above all, Third Way
management styles must be tailored not merely to take into account various
combinations of the stateandthe market but alsoto involve communities.
10
2.2
MutualityandVoluntaryAssociations
A good societyrelies evenmore onmutuality than onvoluntarism. MutUalityis a form
of community relationship in which people help eachotherratherthan merelyhelping
thosein need.7TheNeighborhoodWatchschemeandanti-crimepatrols(by community
volunteers) suchas in Balsall Heath in Birmingham, where crime wasreducedby six
citizen teams regularly patrolling the streets (Leadbeater 1997), are examples of
mutuality. Soareconsumerandproducercooperatives,like LocalFoodBuying Groups
and mutual saving associationssuchas credit unions (Leadbeater& Martin 1998).
Fostering Tenant ManagementAssociations in council estatesrather than relying
mainly on governmentor profit-making managementis anothercasein point.
Mutuality-based associationshave always existed and have beenon the rise in
recentyears. Still, theyneedto be much expanded,encouraged,andfurbishedwith the
neededresourcesin orderto carrymore of the socialburdensin the yearsto come.
Mutuality is commonly and naturally practiced among family members,friends,
neighbours,colleaguesand membersof voluntary associations.It canbean important
sourceof child care(suchasin parentcooperatives,where parentsprovide a few hours
of service each week, thereby reducing public costs and providing natural staff
accountability); sick care (for instance, when people are discharged 'early' from
hospitalsto behelpedby kin and othercommunity members);grief support;andmuch
else.
Mutual-help groups (oddly often called self-help groups)canplaya major role
coping with cancer,contagiousdiseases,alcoholism, obesityandthelike (probablythe
best known is the highly successfulAlcoholics Anonymous -Wuthnow 1994: 71).
Theyarea vastlyunderusedresource.In the new century,public services,especiallythe
National Health Service and welfare agencies, should greatly increase efforts
highlighting the value of such groups, as well as help prime them and provide
resources. It must, however, ensure that its role in initiating and conducting these
groupsdoesnot sapthesegroups' naturalcommunalflows or stunttheirdevelopment.
Mutuality is undermined when treated like an economic exchangeof services.
(Undermining occurs,for example,whengovernmentspayfriendsto befriendsassome
countriesdoto ensurethatsomeonevisits andinformally assiststhosedischargedfrom
hospitals.) Mutuality is based on an open-ended moral commitment. In mutual
relationships, people do not keep books on each other but have a generalized
expectation that the other will do his or her turn if and when a need arises.Public
policies and arrangementsthat attemptto organize mutuality asif it wereanexchange
will tend to undermine this moral foundation. Examples of suchpolicies are 'time
banks', in which hours spentbaby sitting, for example, are recordedand the same
amountof hours in voluntary serviceare expectedin return, or establishingprograms
like used clothing exchanges, in which the amount of clothes one contributes
determinesthe amountonereceivesfrom the exchange.Much looser,more informal
'arrangements' -of the kind that prevail among people who 'exchange' gifts -are
preferred. At the same time, posting on a website or other public place the time
contributions various membersof a community have made,asonedoesfor financial
donations,may help foster suchcontributions.
To favQrmutuality is notto make light of voluntarism. Indeed,it shouldbe further
encouraged.A good start in this direction are Chancellor Gordon Brown's policies
encouraginga spirit of voluntarismandcivic patriotism. His measuresincludematching
peoplewho wantto offer theirtime andmoneythrough voluntary work with charitable
and voluntary organizationsseekingvolunteers,via a dedicatedwebsite.
Theimportanceof voluntarismfor community building,civic spiritanddemocratic
governmenthasbeensetout manytimes andrequiresno repetition. It shouldbe noted,
however,that severalThird Way societies,especiallyonthe continent,still havealong
way to go before voluntarism is properly developedand canassumeits shareof the
socialbusinessthat mustbe conducted.
Voluntarism is bestcarried out, wheneverpossible,in the servicelearningmode.
Service learning is a form of voluntarism in which thosewho servedo not maintain
they areacting purely through altruism but insteadacknowledgethat theythemselves
benefit educationallyandsocially from theirexperience.It is especiallycompatiblewith
the idealof treatingpeopleasends,although all forms of voluntarismarepreferableto
pure means-basedrelationships.
The questionoftenarises:who will beableto provide moretime for mutualityand
voluntarism, given thatmoreandmore women,who usedto bea majorsourceof both,
are now in paid employment? One answer may well be seniorcitizens. They are a
rapidly growing class;live longerandhealthierlives than theirpredecessors;consumea
growing proportion of the societalresources;andwould greatly benefit from staying
involved in pro-socialroles. Without their contribution, societiesmaywell notbeable
to attendto a large andgrowing portion of its socialbusiness.
While eachmemberof everycommunity oughtto bebothrequiredandexpectedto
make contributions to the common good above and beyond that of their own
community (for instance,by paying taxesdue in full), theyshouldbe allowed,indeed
encouraged,to provide 'extras' for their own community. Hence, it is crucial for
communities to befree to levy someform of fees,duesortaxesabovethoselevied by
the state.Parentsshouldbewelcomed whentheycontribute services,moneyandassets
to their children's schools rather than be expected to put their resourcesinto an
anonymouspot from which all schools may draw. Ethically, it is too heroic to expect
thatpeople will be willing to do for one and all as muchas they arewilling to do for
their own communities. And limiting contributions to universalpots is incompatible
with a society thatviews communities as essential,constitutive socialentities.
At the sametime communitiesshouldbeencouragedto careaboutthefateof other
communities;for example,better-off communitiesshouldbeexpectedto helpthoseless
endowed.To the extentthey assisttheir sistercommunities,the affluentonescould be
celebratedandgiven taxbenefits.Specialleviescould bededicatedto specific projects,
making themmore readily acceptedthan increasesin generaltaxes.
Much more realistic and valuable programs are regional ones, in which
communities helpone anotherwith arrangementsthatvary fromrapid transitsystemto
coordinating police efforts, from building highways andbridgesto sharinganairport.
These sharing arrangementsare often quite properly touted as enhancing efficiency
(indeed many would not be possible without regional collaboration). However, they
often -although by no means always -do serve as somewhat indirect forms of
reallocation of resources,asthe better-off communities pick up a largershareof the
coststhan the other ones,or the lessendowedonesreapadisproportionatepart of the
benefitsgenerated.
12
2.3
Pro-communityPublicPolicies
Community renewalcanbeenhancedbyproviding occasionsfor socialgatherings(for
example, opening schools for community meetings; fostering neighborhood street
festivals). Temporary organizerscanbeassignedto anareato initiate groupformations.
And community renewalbenefitsfrom improving the physical conditions,safety,and
accessibility of public spaces.(Foracompelling example,seethe discussionof schools
as community hubs in Bentley 1998and Jupp 1999.)
Renewalis alsofosteredbyinviting groupsof peoplesharingtheuseof a property,
area or public service to participate in decision-making regarding its use. Examples
include citizens settingthe hoursa park is open,who mayuse it (children and dogs?)
and for what purposes(public assemblyor communing with nature?).More support
mustbe given to groupsof citizenslike thosewho setparkopeningtimesandbylaws in
the Phoenix Community ParknearCharingCrossRoad in centralLondon(Warpole &
Greenhalgh 1997). Calling on such groups to assume some responsibility for
maintaining sharedfacilities can further enhancebonds among the members.Major
benefits can be achieved if peoplearehelpedto form shopping coops,mutual saving
andloan associations,andotherformsof economicorganizationthatparallelandhence
enforce communal bonds.
For communities to flourish, public policies must take into account that often
communities' boundariesdo not conform to administrative ones.Theseboundaries
should be tailored to the communities' lines ratherthan attemptto makecommunities
adhereto a presetadministrative geography.
In addition,public policies needto betailoredto smallersocialunitsthanare often
encompassedin one administrative district, becausecommunities are often smaller.
This applies to policies such as the New Deal for Communities, aimed at smaller
neighbourhoods of 2-5,000 people, and the National Strategy for Neighborhood
Renewal. The reorganization of core social policy programs around smaller
neighbourhoodunits is anongoingpriority. Increaseddevolution allows more citizens
to participate in their own government,becomemore politically engaged,andincrease
their civic skill andeffect. For instance,neighborhoodofficersentrustedwith patrolling
local areasfor deteriorating facilities, environmentalproblemsand socialconflicts can
be helpful especiallyif electedratherthan appointed,andif theirpriorities are seteither
solely by the affected communities or at leastin close consultationwith them.
Policy-makersshouldtakeinto accountthatcommunitiesneednotbe residentialor
include members who live next to one another. Communities can form around
institutions (universities, hospitals)orprofessions(longshoremen,accountants).They
are often ethnically basedand canevenform in cyberspace(virtual communities).Best
results are achieved when communities that already share social bonds are further
reinforced by providing them with accessto a sharedonline 'wired' space.
Thriving communities often need core institutions such as local schools,
courthouses,postoffices and downtownshoppingareas.Undersomeconditions, such
as when an area has been largely depopulated, it might make senseto yield to
considerations of economic and administrative efficiency and consolidate or
'regionalize' such institutions or allow downtown shopping to be replaced by
supermalls. However, sucheconomicandadministrative efficiencies should neverbe
consideredthe only relevantconsiderations.To put it differently, aThird Way society
gives much weight to social costs that include costs resulting from the loss of
13
community when its core institutions are shut down. Only when non-socialconsidera
clearly outweigh socialonesshouldcore institutions, the mainstaysof
community, be closed.
2.4 CommunitySafety
Policies that seek to sustain or renew communities must take into account that
communities are formed and reinforced large)y in public spacesrather than in the
privacy of one's home. To the extent that these spacesare unsafe or depleted,
communities are diminished. Therefore, communities should take special care to
maintain public playgrounds, sidewalks,pedestrianwalkways, parks andplazas. For
non-residentialcommunitiesthis might entailproviding meetingspacesin, for instance,
public schools or libraries; setting aside segmentsof public parks for picnics; and
providing group-based transportation, such as vans that bring senior citizens or
handicappedpeopleto daycenters.
Public safety and community welfare benefit from the introduction of 'thick'
communitypolicing thatentails muchmorethanmerelygettingcopsoutof theircarsto
walk the beat.This involves the community in settingpriorities for the police and in
overseeingtheir conduct.And it requiresinvolving thepolice in conflict resolutionand
in the protection of the overall quality of life.8
All future building, street,neighborhood and town planning should provide for
enhancedpublic safetyandcommunitybuilding. Among thenumerouspossibilities are
wider sidewalks,porchesthatabutsidewalks,gatesthatblocktraffic but notpedestrians
and muchmore. (The British experiment in modem tower-block building during the
1970's which decimated communities that had existed in many working class
neighborhoodsparallels similar calamitousprojects in the United States.)
Currently in the UK there is no dutyto inform localresidentsaboutrepeatsexual
offenders released into a community. When pedophiles, who have a very high
recidivism rate,arereleasedfrom jail andmoveinto a neighbourhood,thereshouldbea
dutyto inform communities. At the sametime,communitiesshouldbewarned against
harassingtheseoffenders. (While sucha combination maysound utopian, it hasbeen
approximated in the US stateof Washington.)
Criminals who have paid their duesto society,served their sentencesand led a
legitimate life without any new arrests for ten years should have their rights fully
restoredand their recordssequestered.Suchrecordswould be reopenedbefore
sentencingonly if they have beenreconvicted. In this way a good society can foster
repentance,leading to full restoration of former criminals to membership in the
community.
Restorativejustice, especiallyfor non-violentfirst-time offenders,servesthesame
purpose.This practice requiresoffendersto meetwith their victims in the presenceof
third parties from the community. In the process,offenders learn aboutthe victims'
suffering,expresstheir regrets,andmakeamends.The goalis to mix punishmentwith
rehabilitation, and to keeptheseoffenders asintegratedmembersof the community
(Clear & Karp 1999).
3
Moral Culture andits Institutions
3.The
Powerof theMoralCultureof Communities
The primary socialrole of communitiesis often seento beits fosteringof interpersonal
bonding, ratherthan its provision of moral culture. However, bothhavean important
role in nourishing I-Thou relationshipsand in undertaking important socialfunctions.
While community bondingsatisfiesaprofound humanneed,moral culture canserveto
enhancesocial order significantly while reducing the needfor state intervention in
social behavior.Oneshouldnot allow legitimateambivalenceaboutthe moralvoicesof
communities (which will beaddressedshortly)to overwhelmtheirtremendouspotential
contributions to good forms of socialorder.
There are clearly someforms of behavior thata good societyconsidersanathema
and must seekto curb (suchasdamagingthe environment,domesticviolence, neglect
of children, selling liquor and cigarettes to minors). The moral culture of the
community helpsto define suchbehaviors.Most importantly, the community's ability
to draw onsubtleand informal processesof social regulation, suchasapprobationand
censure,is much more compatible with ends-basedrelations than relying on the
coercive powers of the state.
Extensive studies have demonstratedthat theseprocessesplaya-major role in
curbing drug abuse,preventingpettycrime andviolation of the environment,andmuch
else(Luke & Neville 1998).Aside from curbing anti-social behavior,the moralculture
of communitiescanalso fostergood conduct,including attendingto one's childrenand
elders,paying taxes,volunteeringandmanyotherpro-socialactivities (Sampson1997).
While one should not exaggerate the role that community forms of social
regulation play in reducing serious crime, the considerablesuccessof those already
implemented shows both the value of mobilizing communities on the side of social
order and one way thesereductionscan be achievedmuchmore extensivelythan has
beendoneso far.
Oneof the mainvirtues of drawing onthe informal regulationof communitiesto
fosterpro-socialbehavioris thatfew if anypublic costsareexacted,andsuchprocesses
are muchmore sensitiveto subtle individual differences than official programs.9
Third Way governments do best when they resist the rush to legislate good
behavior. Whenthere is a valid needto modify behavior,the stateshouldrealize that
relying on informal community-basedprocessesis preferableto relying onthe law.10
Third Way governmentsshould realize that legislation often numbs the moral
conscience.When legislationis introduced in placeswhere amoralculture doesexist,
the result frequently will be to diminish the moral voices of the community. For
example,if the governmentwereto rule thatalcoholicsattendAA meetingsorfacejail
sentences,suchmeetings would be far less effective than those in which attendees
participatebecauseof their own innermotivationsandthe encouragementof thoseclose
to them.
We have also learned from attempts to suppress divorce, abortions and
consumption of alcohol by law that such policies tend to backfire and should be
avoided,whetheror notoneopposesthesebehaviors.Oneshouldhavefaith in faith; the
shortestline to pro-social conduct,whateveroneconsiderssuchconductto be,entails
convincing people of the merits of the moral claims we lay on them. The law best
15
follows newsharedmoralunderstandingsratherthantrying to leadthem.TheAmerican
Prohibition is a telling casestudyof what happenswhenthis point is ignored.
This is not to suggestthatthere is no room for legislation concerning moral and
social issues.However, it is far better for informal socialprocessesto underpinprosocial
behavior than for the police, courts, and inspectorsto do so. And laws that
supplementand help sustainmoral cultures will be more effective and humanethan
those that try to takethe lead.
The differencebetween'naked' laws (not precededor backedby moral
commitments)and 'well-covered' oneshas major implications for public leadersand
politicians. Leadershavetwo ratherdistinctroles. One,oftenunderscored,isto prepare
legislationandbuild supportfor it amongthe legislators.The otherratherdifferentand
less well understood role is to build up and change the moral culture. They best
combine both attributes and lead with moral persuasionbefore they call on the
legislature. Suchleaderscan carry their societymuch further along the Third Way.
3.2
imiting the Powerof Communities
While the moralculturesof communitiesarea majorwellspring for constructingagood
society,community-basedmorality itself needsto bescrutinizedby membersaswell as
outsideobservers.Onemethodis to assessthe community's moral culture by drawing
onsharedsocietalvaluesasenshrinedin thebasiclaws orthe constitutionof the state.
Communities mustbecontainedandbalanced,just like all the otherelementsthatmake
for a good society.11
While onemaydiffer aboutspecifics,inprinciple no communitycanbefully relied
upon to determine that which is right and wrong. For example, should immigrant
communities be allowed to arrangemarriages evenif there is a large agedifference
betweenthecoupleandconsentis doubtful? Shouldfemale circumcision orchild labor
be tolerated?Theseare not questions over which communities should havethe final
say,as they concernbasichumanrights.
Communities in earlier ages,and evensomein contemporaryfree societies,have
oppressedindividuals andminorities. It istherole of thestateto protectthe rightsof all
members in all communities as well as those of outsiders present within the
communities' confines. Thus,no community should be allowed to violate the right to
free speech,assemblyand so on of anyone -whether they are members,visitors,
passers-byorotherwise.Any notion thatcommunitiescanberelied uponasthe soleor
final arbitratorof morality falls apartwith thesimple observationthata communitymay
reach100percentconsensusin discriminating againstsomepeopleonthebasis.of race.
This vision of contained yet thriving communities is not farfetched. Numerous
communities existwithin democraticsocietiesthatabideby theirconstitutionsorbasic
laws. The rules that contain communities may be further extended or curtailed as
constitutionsare modified, but thebasicprinciple is the same:unfetteredcommunities
are no better than unfettered markets or states. A good society achievesa balance
through mutual containment of its core elements;the community is not exempted.
However, the fact that communities can get out of hand should not be used as an
argumentagainstcommunities perse.Like medicine,food and drink, if takenin good
measurecommunities are essentialelementsof the good life; if takento excess,they
can destroyit.
16
3.3 RightsandResponsibilities
Somepeople championindividual andhumanrights andcivil libertiesasanunbounded
principle, to which exceptionsareto be tolerated only under very specialconditions;
others demand that people live up to their duties (whether prescribed by state or
church), with very little concernfor their rights. At the coreof the Third Way oughttobe
the recognition that a good society combines respect for individual rights and
fulfillment of basic humanneedswith the expectationthat memberslive up to theirrespon
to themselves,their family and friends,andto the community atlarge.
Oneof the greatestachievementsof the communitarianapproachhasbeencurbingthe
languageof rights thathasturned everywant and interestinto a legal entitlement,
fostering unnecessarylitigiousness.12While this is largely anAmericanmalaise,in the
UK compensationclaims have risen exponentially in the past ten years. In the US
'rights talk', which fosters a disregard of social responsibility, was dominant in the
1980's, in the daysof rampantindividualism. Today, it hasbeenlargelyreplaced by a
wide recognition that both individual rights and social responsibilities must be
respected(Giddens 1998;Etzioni 1993).
What exactlyis meantby 'rights and responsibilities'? Basic individual rights are
inalienable, just asone's socialobligations cannotbe denied. However, it is a grave
moral error to arguethatthereare 'no rights without responsibilities' or vice versa.13
Thus, people who evadetaxes,neglect their children or fail to live upto their social
responsibilities in someotherwayare still entitled to a fair trial, free speech,and other
basicrights. The numberof basicrights we shouldhavemaybe debated,butthosethat
are legitimate are not conditional. Hence,policies that denycriminals the right to vote
while in jail (as holds in boththe UK andthe US), some evenafter they have served
their term (asis the casein manystatesin the US), shouldbemodified. Following the
sameprinciple, nobodyshouldbedeniedthebasicnecessitiesof life evenif theyhave
not lived up to their responsibilities, such as to find work. Society can show its
disapproval and punish irresponsible individuals without disenfranchising them or
condemning themto abjectpoverty.
As a corollary, a personwhose rights have beencurbed-perhaps a personhas
beendeniedthe right to vote becauseof a registration foul-up orjail sentence,or has
beensilencedthrough ameritlesslibel suit-is still not exemptfrom attendingto his or
her children, not littering and other socialresponsibilities.
In short,while rights andresponsibilities arecomplementaryandnecessitateone
another, each has its own moral standing and is part and parcel of ends-based
relationships. A good societydoesnot denypersonstheir basicrights evenif they do
not live upto their responsibilities,just as it doesnot exemptfrom responsibility those
whose rights have not beenfully honored.
Responsibilityfrom all,for all
Responsibilities from all means that a good person, a memberof a good society,
contributesto the commongood.No oneis exempt,althoughof coursepeoplewill vary
greatly in the contributions they can make. In considering this matter, consider aparap
Ylho has lost the useof his limbs. He is permanentlyinstitutionalized. He
usesa small stick in his mouthto turnpagesof a book. Shouldwe provide him with a
nurse's aideto turnthepagesor expecthimto take thatmuchresponsibility for his own
well-being? In order to serve both the person's dignity and the expectation that
7
everyone will do as much for the commongood as they can,we would expecthim to
turn the pages himself, assuming he can do so without undue effort. If assuming
responsibility to the bestof one'sabilities appliesunderthesecircumstances,surelyno
one is exempt from contributing to the commongood in line with his or herability.
Accordingly, high schoolstudentsshouldbeencouragedto do communityservice
as part of their civic practice, perhaps as 'millennium volunteers' (Briscoe 1995).
Seniorcitizens should be expectedto help eachother,membersof their families and
their community. Thosewho receivewelfare andcannotfind gainful work shouldhold
community jobs. People with contagiousdiseasesshould be expectedto take special
pain not to spreadit to othersandso on.
The referencehereis not primarily to legal commitments,enforced bycourtsand
by the police, but to moral obligations.14And dischargingone's responsibility should
not be considereda sacrifice or a punishmentbut an ennobling activity, somethinga
good persondoes.Indeed,high schoolstudentscangaindeepsatisfactionfromworking
in soupkitchens,as seniorcitizens canby voluntarily running socialcentersfor other
seniors,and so on.
Responsibility from all is to beparalleledby responsibilityfor all. Responsibility
for all meansthat everybodyis to be treatedwith the respectdueto all humanbeings.
This meansfirst of all socialinclusion. Communities canplay an especiallyimportant
role in ensuring that everyoneis included andtreated with the full respectentitled to
thembythemere factof their humanity,asanendinthemselves.lsAn obviousexample
is that discrimination based on race, ethnicity, gender, sexual preference,religious
background or disability shouldbe the focus of moral dissuasionand legally banned.
Discrimination not only offends our elementarysenseof justice -it is incompatible
with treating people asendsin themselves.
Responsibility for all also meansensuring that everyonehasaccessto the basic
necessitiesof life. Voluntary associations,extended families, friends, mutual saving
associationsandreligious charitycanhelpto provide someof these,but cannottake on
the final responsibility to ensurethat all will beattendedto. It is the responsibilityof the
stateto ensurethat suchprovisions areavailableto all.
One of the core implications of treating every humanbeing asanendmeansthat
all deservea rich basicminimumstandard ofliving,irrespectiveof theirconduct.These
arethings which are everyone'sdue. They deserveat leastfood, shelter,clothing and
elementaryhealth care. Peoplewho act in anti-social ways or do not dischargetheir
social responsibilities -whether becauseof their genes,parents,'the system', poor
upbringing, or characterfailing -are notto bedeniedthe elementarylife necessitieswe
provide to inmates,prisonersof war andpets.
No one's basic humanity and membershipin the community shouldbedenied.It
follows that no oneshouldbe completelycut offwelfare ordumpedinto thestreetseven
if theyrefuseto work, attendclassesor do community service.The provisions to such
idle or selfishpeople(who area minority of benefitsrecipients)maybe reducedandnot
include cashbeyond some small amount,but the state's duty in a good societyis to
ensurethatno onegoeshungry,homeless,unclothedor sickandunattended.Theymay
well deservemuch more,and what is 'enough' -for instancein termsof healthcaremight
be rather difficult to define.16
Similarly, there is considerable room for debate over what such a rich basic
minimum entails (Nathanson 1998), that understanding is sure to differ with the
economicconditions of the society,theageof thoseaffectedandtheir healthstatus,and
18
the
community's specific moralsharedunderstanding.But thesedeliberationsoughttobe
abouthowextensivethe provision of thesebasicgoodsshouldbe-not whethertheyshould
be provided atall.
Providing abasic minimum to peoplewill not kill the motivationto work for most,as
long as work is available and they are able. Though somewill abusethe system,agood
societyshould considerthis a smallprice to pay for affirming thebasichumanityof
everyone.Putting mental patients,alcoholics,motherswith children or anyoneelseonto
the streets,cutting off all benefitsto them,is simply not compatiblewith treating
all peopleasends in themselves.
During the 1990's, welfare systems,which badly neededto be reformed,wererestructu
However,herewe seea clear caseof over-correction, arguablythe mostextreme
of many that took place in recentyears.The reform entailedcutting off somepeople
in toto -not lowering benefits but terminating them -and terminating not
merely cashsupportbutalsohousing allowances,food stampsand healthinsuranceforchildren.
Overthe next years,thesereforms needto be re-reformed if we areto ceasethis
violation of this basic tenetof agood society.Thereis muchroom for deliberationconcern
what exactly societyowes eachpersonand at what levels benefitswill cut
into motivation to work and to refrain from anti-social behavior. For instance,furnishin
cashwould not necessarilybe a part of such a state (or even charity)provided
package.To ensurethatcommunityjobs keeppeopleabovethepovertyline ofthe
kind alreadydiscussed,their income from wagespublicly provided and from otherkinds
of benefits -whether in kind or in cash-should be high enoughto meetthe
'minimum' test.
In many areasthere is a complex and tense relationship betweenrights andresponsi
In thesesituations it is agravemistaketo presumethateitherrights orresponsi
are dominant. Rights and responsibilities should be treated as two
cardinal moral claims. In the bestof all worlds, both canbe fully honored.In reality,policies
cannotoftenmaximize both. But no apriori assumptionshouldbemadethat
priority will be given to one ratherthanthe other.I?
All policies that impinge on the balance between individual rights and socialresponsi
shouldbereviewed andadjustedaccordingly. The right to privacy, for
example,is to be respected,but it should not take priority over protectionof life and
limb. For instance,mandatorydrugtestingof schoolbusdrivers,train engineers,andairtraffic
controllers is legitimate becausein thesecases,the violation of privacy is smallwhereas
the dangerto thc;>sethey areentrustedwith is considerable.At the sametime,the
ban onthe violation of the privacy of medicalrecordsby employers-records that
concernthe mostintimate partsof our life andwhose violation yields at bestminimal
social benefits-should beupheld and fully enforced.
, A balanced societyapproachesthe tension betweenindividual rights and social
responsibilities along theselines andadjustsitspolicies accordingly. In someareasit
might enhancethe reachof rights (for instancein the protectionof personal
information) while in othersthe claim of socialresponsibilities (for instance,keeping
DNA profiles of all criminals), without sucha combined approachbeing inconsistent.
The sameholds for increasing freedomof information, subjecting the police to race
relationslaws andthe armedforcesto humanrights,asdefined by theEuropeanCourt
of Human Rights onthe one hand,while alsoenablingpolice to interceptanddecode
email messageson the other. Along the sameline, drug dealers in prisons should be
stoppedandroutine testing of inmatesshould be introduced.
10
3.4 MoralDialogues:ChangingMoralCultures
Debatesaboutour moralcultureareoftenunnecessarilypolarized.Weare notlimited to
eitheradheringto traditional, conservativemores (for example,traditional two-parent
families, with mothers athome)ortreating allbehaviorsasif theyhadequallegitimacy
(two parents,single parents,gay marriages,sequentialmonogamies,polygamy). We
can expressa preference for peermarriages (in which fathers and mothershavethe
same rights and the same responsibilities) over other forms of family without
condemningthe latter. There are socialand moral options betweenrigidly sticking to
tradition (as parts of the religious right demand)and a cultural-moral free-for-all (as
someonthe left have,in effect, advocatedin the past).
While initially the moralculture of a given community or groupof communitiesis
handed down from generation to generation, this culture need not be fixed or
'traditional'. On the contrary, moral culture is continually recastto reflect new social
needs,demands,insights and,aboveall, moralclaims.This occursthroughaprocessof
specialimportanceto thoseseekingagoodsociety:moraldialogue.Moral dialoguesare
'give and take' discussionsthat engagevalues ratherthan merely interestsor wants.
Theyinvolve morethanfactsandreasons;theyengageourbeliefs. Theyarecomposed
of the many hours spentover meals, in pubs,while commuting, at work and in the
media discussing moral issues.
Local communities,whole national societies,and eveninternationalcommunities
engage in extensive dialogues about acute moral issues, such as our duty to the
environment,women's rights andsexualdiscrimination,andspecific questionssuchas
gay marriages,putting children on trial asadults,the deathpenalty, crueltyto animals
andtesting a whole village's DNA in orderto catcha criminal.
Usually only one ortwo topics arethe subjectof intensive moral dialogue at any
one time. Practically anyone can try to initiate a moral dialogue, from the prime
minister to a local poet, from a media personalityto a groupof protesters.However, it
is ultimately the public atlarge thatdecideswhich it will engagein. Despiteclaimsto
the contrary, the media -which servesasan important venue for moral dialoguescontrols
neitherthe agendanorthe outcome,althoughof courseit influencesboth. This
is becausethe media itself is not of one mind, and becausethe public is much less
susceptibleto brainwashingthan is oftenassumed.IS
Moral dialogues are largely aboutvalues. They are not dialoguesamongexperts
but amongcitizens. Moral dialoguesoften draw on factualand logical arguments,but
they are mainly ethical, rather than empirical, in nature. Recall, for instance,the
argumentsthathavetakenplace overbombing Serbiaduring theKosovo war,releasing
Pinochetor allowing gaymarriage.
When a community is engagedin a moral dialogue,the discussionoften seems
disorderly, meandering and endless.However, it frequently does lead to a genuine
recasting of that community's voluntary moral culture, that which the community
condonesor censures.
Most importantly, through theprocess ofmoral dialoguepeopleoftenmodifytheir
conduct,feelingsandbeliefs.For example,inthe 1950smostcommunitieshadnosense
of a moral obligation toward the environment. A profound moral dialogue that
developedin the 1960sand 1970sled not merelyto a sharedmoral senseof our dutyto
Mother Earth(althoughcommunitiescontinueto differ onwhat exactlythatentails)but
also to a fair measure of changed behavior, such as voluntary recycling and
20
conservationof energy. In short,if acommunityneedsto changeitssocialpolicies in a
significant way, such changes are bestpreceded (as far as public policies are
concerned)and largeley generated(asfar as changesinpersonal and social conduct
are concerned)by moral dialogue.
Moral dialogues can follow what sociologists call 'moral panic' but thesetwo
should not be conflated. Panic alarmspeople and can leadthem to embracedubious
policies. In contrast,moraldialoguesleadthemto reexaminetheir beliefs,world views
and prejudices,andto recastthem.
One of the great weaknessesof some of the Third Way governmentsis their
tendencyto take shortcuts,oftenskirting orshort-changingtheneedfor moraldialogue.
For instance,thereleaseof aThird Way framework documentin Germanyin mid-l 998
by ChancellorGerhard Schroderwas notprecededby adialogue with the membersof
the SocialDemocratic Party or evenits leadership,notto mentiontheGermanpublic at
large. In contrast, changing Clause IV of the Labour party platform followed 'the
widest consultation exercise ever undertakenby a British political party... Tens of
thousandstook part, almosthalf the party participated' (Blair 1997:51).
Currently moral dialogues are badly needed on issues such as limiting the
centrifugal effects of devolution, deeper involvement in the European Union, the
implications of continued immigration andthe effectsof growing multiculturalism on
the core values of the society. The rise of right-wing parties in Austria, Switzerland,
Germany and France, and the romanticisation of Communist regimes in eastern
Germany,are in part driven by lack of sufficient dialogue onthesematters.
Another topic that calls for a moral dialogue is in the area of international
humanitarian efforts. What are the limits and scope of foreign aid? When should
economic sanctionsbe applied? When is the exerciseof force justified? When is it
appropriateto cancelthe debtof developingnations?Shouldwe putpressureon other
countriesto changetheir moral cultures in mattersranging from child laborto female
circumcision?
While there are no guaranteedways to trigger moral dialogues or ensure their
development,devices suchasextensivepublic hearingsby Parliamentarycommittees
andinquiries by citizen commissionsmayinitiate dialogue.The latterhaveno official
standingand maybe establishedby a think tank, foundation or someothercivic body.
They arecomposedof therepresentativesof major segmentsof societyaffected bythe
issuesunder study,conductpublic hearingsandpublishrecommendationsbasedonthe
dialogue theytrigger. Suchdevicesmustbeusedmuchmoreextensivelyif morepeople
areto becomefurtherengagedbythe moralandpolitical issuesattheheartof theThird
Way.
Many groups that are strongly committed to specific valuestend to demandthat
public leaderspushtheir agendathrough,engineeringpublic supportif it doesnotexist.
The power of leadership in a democratic society is, thankfully, much more limited.
Political leadershipin freesocietiesmustjudiciously chooseoccasionsonwhich major
changesare sought,with newcoalitions built andpolitical capitalput atrisk, ratherthan
vainly tilting with the wind.
Suchwillingness to assumerisk at selectpoints was evident when Old Labour
transformed into New Labour, when the old opposition betweenleft and right was
leapfrogged onthe road to a Third Way. It is evident in the continuedrecastingof the
welfare state, and in guiding countries from an industrial to a knowledge-based
economy. It will be called upon againto face the next major challengesof the Third
21
Way:
curbing inequality; balancing devolution with building a community ofcommunities;
and defining the place of the national community within the European
one,amongothers.
Involving thepublic more in dialoguesaboutmajorpolicy change,especiallythoseconcerning
moral and social issues,makes it more difficult to govern. Suchdialoguesare
time-consuminganddo not necessarilyconcludeasgovernmentmaywish. But it is
doubtful that it would bepossibleto achieveprofoundandlasting socialchangewithout
suchdialogues.To put it more starkly: a governmentcanmake incrementalchangesyear
on year without profoundly engaging the public -or it can truly lead in newdirections.
This can only be done if the public hasbeenengagedand won over-oftencausing
significant changesinthe direction governmentwasseekingto move.After all,
democracyentails muchmore than a solid majority in the parliament.
3.5 Family:TheNeedforaDefinitiveNewLook
Throughout history, in all societies, families have been entrusted with initiating
character formation, introducing younger generationsto the moral culture of the
community,preparing themto be good people.
Before one can settle any of the numerous specific issues that arise from the
transition from traditional forms of families to 'postmodern' ones,we require a more
conclusive examination of the evidence aboutthe effects of highly divergent social
arrangements.To proceed,the governmentshouldconvenea 'sciencecourt', aninquiry
composed of expert social scientists.19The court would hold public hearings,
interrogatingscientific witnessesandrepresentativesof the various bodiesof thought
on the subject. The court might require additional analysis of existing data or the
generationof new data,to provide a strong and sharedbody of relevantevidence.In
this way it should be ableto reachsolid credible conclusionsaboutcritical issuesthat
ariseconcerningour ability to replacethetwo parentfamily, andhelpmoveto settlethepublic
dialogue ontheseissues.Clearly it makesa greatdealof difference for the moral
cultureandforpublic policy whetherchildren suffergreatlyor actuallybenefit,assome
maintain, from new forms of family arrangementsand the institutionalization of
children.Thesciencecourtshouldfocus onchildrenof young age,especiallyfrom birth
until five, the years in which manybelieve the foundationsof characterareformed.
.The sciencecourt should investigate not merely whetherthe absenceof a second
partneris harmful, but also the implications of a growing 'children deficit'. There is
evidencethatthe birth ratein severaldevelopedsocietiesis falling belowthe population
replacementlevel,with numerousill consequencesfor society!OTo put it more sharply,
if we onceheld thatthe first socialdutyof the family is the moral educationof children,
we may now wish to amend this to say that duty calls for having children at all!'
Millions seechildrenasa burden,interfering with theircareersandlifestyle. This is just
anotherdisconcertingreflectionof thepressuresof globalismandradicalindividualism.
The introduction of severalnew family policies might bestbe delayed until the
work of the sciencecourtis completed.This holds,for instance,for legal authorization
of newforms of marriage(Wilkinson 1999),suchastime-limited commitments,givin§
full legalendorsementto householdpartnerships,andintroducing covenantmarriages!
There are those who ask: Why do we have to rule which form of marriage we
oughtto favor ratherthan let eachpersonmake herorhis ownchoices?Firstly, aslong
asmarriageremainsa statesanctionedand enforced institution, we mustdecidewhat
22
amounts
to a marriage.The sameis true for the questionof who is entitled to benefitsavailable.
to thosewho are married. Even if all state involvement was abolished,thescience
court woulg still be neededto help focus the moral debate,which reshapes
voluntary moral culture. If one form or anotherof marriage and family wereto prove
harmful to children,we still shouldnotnecessarilyban it, butfamilies andcommunities
ought at leastto know aboutit.
Somekey matters,though,requireno studyor inquiry. Thereshouldbeno return
t9 'traditional' forms offamily, in which womenwere treatedassecondclasscitizens.This
would violate the principle of treating all asends(Wilkinson 1999).Fathersandmothers
should have the samerights and responsibilities. Fathersobviously can look
after children andwomenwork outsideof thehousehold.A substantivestepinthe right
direction will bemadewhenlaws that allow mothersof newborn childrento takepaid
leave and have their jobs held for them for a given number of years are also fully
applied to fathers.
There is no one correctway to balancework and family; eachpersonandcouple
must work this out. It is, however, in the interestof a good societyto encourageand
enableparentsto spendmore time with their children.
3.6 SchoolsasPlacesof CharacterForn1ation
Much has been written about making schools into more effective tools for the
competitive information economy,and on the needto improve academicskills and
knowledge of graduates. However, we have also known since Aristotle about the
importanceof characterdevelopment.In our society,schoolsaretheplacesin whichthe
characterof young peopleis developed.Theyarethe placewhereyoungpeople learn,
or at least ought to, how to control their impulsesand develop empathy,essentialfor
treating one anotherasendsratherthan only asinstruments. Theyaretheplacewhere
young peopleshould learnhowto dealcivilly with one anotherandto resolveconflicts
peacefully. Most importantly, in schoolsyoungpeoplelearn thattreatingothersonly as
instrumentsis profoundly unethical,andthattheyhaveresponsibilities foroneanother,
their family andthe community.
A good societyrequiresgoodpeople; it cannotallow for charactereducationto be
driven out by academics.The directexperiencesandnarrativesoffered by schoolsare
more important for characterformation than lectures on ethics or civics. Community
service, peer mentoring and other ways of taking responsibility, role playing and
participation in mockgovernmentsare all vastly superiorforms of civic educationthan
formal and abstractlectures aboutdemocraticgovernment.
To ensurethatthis core educationprinciple will be heeded,an annualassessment
should be made in all schoolsof the educational(as distinct from teaching)messages
they impart,andof their approachto characterformation. If thesearedefective,schools.
should be helped by personnelespeciallydedicatedto this issueto restructure their
approach.
Educational,family andwelfare policies are oftendevelopedin isolation from one
anotherand,mostof all, from work practices.But if peopleareto be treatedas ends,
they cannotbeviewed asfragments,asstudentsor parentsor workers. Eachindividual
mustbetreatedasawhole. This, in turn,requiresa muchbetterdovetailing of different
policies. For example,schooldaysendbeforemostparentsfinish work. Unsurprisingly,
23
a high level of juvenile crime occurs between3 and 6 PM. Gapslike theseml;istbe
bridged with policies that treatthe many aspectsof societyas segmentsof onewhole.
The OtherPartners:Stateand Market
The good society is a partnershipof three sectors: government,private sector,and
community. Eachone reflects and servesa distinct facet of our humanity. Only by
serving all three,ratherthanfragmenting them or settingone againstthe other,canwe
achievea societythatencompassesthewhole person,essentialfor theirbeingtreatedas
endsin themselves. .
While thesepartnersmay differ in terms of their respectiveroles,andthesemay
changewith socialconditions,in agood societythethreesectorsseekto cooperatewith
oneanother. Eachis partof the solution; noneis blamed asthe sourceof theproblem.
Theyare complementaryratherthanantagonistic.Most importantly, eachpartnerhelps
containthe others,to ensureone will not usurpthe missions bestaccomplishedbythe
others.Maintaining this three-waybalanceis atthe heart of the good society.
4.The
State
TheThird Way approachmaintains thatsweepinganddetailed controlof the economy
and societybythe stateis incompatible with agood society,asis anunfetteredmarket.
It also follows thatwhile the statecan and should be slimmed down, there are many
tasks thatareits legitimate domain.
.The main responsibility for public safetyshould restwith the state.Therefore,to
the extent that the society draws on private policing (suchashired guards)and
profit-making prisons,their conductshouldbe closelyregulated.At thesametime,
the state's function in this arena should be contained by the community. For
instance, civil review boards can help ensure that the police do not brutalize
citizens. Another form of containmentis scrutiny by a free press.
.Citizens should not be armed in a good society, and police arms should be
minimal. Thestateshouldensurethecontinueddisarmamentof thepopulation.To
the extent that a civil militia is needed,asthe Swiss for instancehold, arms are
bestdepositedin public armories.Holding a gun upto a personis aboutasfar as
one canget from treating peopleasends.
.A major goal for the next decadeshould be significantly increasing certitude
(sometimesreferredto as 'celerity') thatthosewho violate the law will be caught,
those caught will be convicted and those convicted will serve their term. An
increasein certitude would allow a reduction in the length of prisontime andthe
harshnessof the term (for example,less solitary confinementandlessreliance on
high securityprisons)while atthesametime enhancingpublic safety.The resultis
amorehumanetreatmentof criminals andgreaterpossibility of theirrehabilitation,
in line with our criteria for the good society,aswell as significantly lower public
costs(after a transition period):3
Punishing those who violate the law is unavoidable in an orderly and just
society. Increased certitude combined with shorter sentences will ensure
punishmentand curtail the inhumanand costly treatmentthat often ensueswhen
people are incarcerated.Hopefully suchan approachwould also detercriminals
more effectively.
24
The stateshouldberesponsiblefor public health,that is,for healthmattersthatare
in the interestof the community aboveandbeyond thatof individual patients,for
example: containing communicable diseases,ensuring the safety of drugs and
foods, and undertaking some forms of preventive health such as mandatory
vaccinations and water fluoridation.
Illness andthe resulting dependencynot only exactincreasinglylargepublic
costs, but are also incompatible with people achieving their full potential.
Preventivecareis the bestantidote.Specificgoalsforpreventivecareshouldbe set
for eachdecade,including contributions expectedfrom citizens, for instance,by
increasing the amount of exercise they take. Decreasing the rate of smoking,
especiallyamong teenagers,is thesingle most important preventive goalfor the
next ten years. While figures differ, the importance of preventive care is
highlighted by the finding that in a givenperiod in the United Stateschangesin
lifestyle added 11.5 years to life expectationwhile improvements in medical
servicesadded only 0.5 years.
A good societyshould view the marketasakinto nuclearenergy:it canprovide an
enormous and growing bounty of products and services,and help to servethe
commongood,including cultureandarts,scienceandeducation,public healthand
welfare. However, it mustbewatchedovercarefully. If excessivelyrestrictedthe
market cannotperform well. At the sametime, a good societyassumesthatif the
marketis not properly contained,it maydehumanizepeopleandwreak havoc on
local communities, families and socialrelations. Indeed,unfetteredmarkets can
undo I-Thou relations and allow I-It onesto dominate.
The Third Way doesnotleadto afree marketanymorethan it favors football
without rules orreferees.The markethasalwaysoperatedwithin a socialcontext,
which hasincludedafabric of socialvalues,laws,andregulatorymechanisms.The
role of the government is not to abolish these but to adapt them to changing
conditions, especiallyto the cyber-age.
The main questionThird Waysocietiesstrugglewith is whento allow market
forcesa free rein andwhento put upcontainingwalls. (An obviousexampleof an
areathe market mustbe kept frompenetratingis the distribution of transplantable
human organs.)There are significant differencesamongThird Way societieson
this viewpoint, which reflectshow muchprogresstheyhavemadeonthis journey,
especially betweensocietiesthathave beenThatcherized(mainly the US andthe
UK) andthose thathave nottravelled far downthis road. However, all Third Way
societiesshouldbemuch clearer abouttheareasinto which marketforces mustbe
prevented from intruding. This is essential if the proper balance betweenthe
instrumental realm and that ofendsis to beachievedand sustained.
Third Way societiesarecurrentlymakingnumerousincrementalchangesthat
favor marketforces.Theseinclude greaterflexibility in work rules,lowerpersonal,
capital gains andcorporatetax rates,lower benefits,higherco-insurancecharges,
further privatization, enabling firms to issue sharesto their workers, enabling
workers to purchasesharestax free,reforms of insolvencyand muchelse.
Suchchangeswill remainunnecessarilythreateningandunprincipled aslong
as it is not clearly indicated which social boundaries will not be breached.
EspeciallY,significantonthis matteris the questionof whetherpeoplecanreliably
assumethat whateverthe changesin economic policy, they will still havesecure
safety nets protecting their basic health insurance,retirement income and basic
subsistence.Canpeopletake for grantedthat evenif thesenetswere setat lower
levels,no onewould be allowed to fall throughthem? Will work beavailable for
all thosewho seekit or arepressuredto find employment? Will the income from
work be sufficient to keeppeople out of poverty? Will training be available for
thosemade redundant by technologically driven changes?While details can be
debated,people in agoodsocietyare accordeda basicsenseofeconomicsecurity.
Markets cannotbe free from public oversight and regulation. To a limited
extent one can and should rely on the market to self-regulate (for instance,
industries agreeing not to target young children in their advertising), and
communitiescanplaya containingrole. For example,manyconsumergroupsplay
an important role as unofficial 'watchdogs' of corporatebehavior. But the main
responsibility for containing the market-experience shows-must restwith the
state.To ensurethatstateregulationsdo notbecomeexcessive,theyshouldremain
in effect only if examinations show that they do not unnecessarilyrestrainthe
market or that they cannot be replaced by better regulations or other ways of
achieving the samesocialpurposes.
The notion thatcyberspacecanbea newutopian world, free from statecontrols,in
whichpeoplegovernthemselves,is without reality orjustice. Cyberspacehaslong
since turned from a virtual village into a metropolis in which people do need
protection.As the proportion of transactionsconductedincyberspacecontinuesto
increase,so mustpublic oversight. Prescriptiondrugssold onthe internet cannot
be free from the protections that customersrequire off-line. Taxes cannotbe
avoided.Messagestransmitted by drug lords,pedophilesandterrorists cannotbe
exemptfrom the reachof the law. Libel onthe internetis not different from any
other.
Somecontrols canbe exerted by parentsand educators.Otherscan rely on
self-regulationand transparency(for example,the posting of privacy policies and
the useof trustmarks). However, increasinglythe virtual world will becomelike
the restof the world, and will needthesamecarefulbalanceof freedomandpublic
scrutiny.
While thebasicneedfor containingcyberspace'seconomicandtechnological
forces is the sameas in other markets,the tools may well be different. Because
cyberspaceknows no nationalborders,developmentof worldwide agreementsand
enforcementmustbe achievedas rapidly aspossible. .
Ensuring basic accessfor all is anotherrole for the state,so thatcyberspace
does not become another arena for social exclusion. This will be especially
important asmore educationandvoting takesplace in virtual formats.
Given the close associationbetweenwork and a senseof self-worth, which is a
vital foundationof ends-basedrelationships,public policy shouldaim bothto hold
inflation at bay and also to stimulate the economy,enabling higher growth in
general and low unemployment especially. Given recent evidence that higher
growth and lower unemployment than previously considered possible can be
achieved without rekindling serious inflation, and given the inhumanity of
joblessnessevenin astatewith broadwelfareprovisions-public policy shouldtilt
more toward growth and lesstoward inflation fighting. An annual growth rate
above3 percentand anunemploymentrate below 5 percentshouldbeconsidered
realistic targets.
26
Expanding available work throughthe market until unemploymentis low is
the mostdesirableoutcome.However,to the extentthatthis is impractical,policies
which distributeavailable work arepreferableto thosethat protectjob privileges
but keepunemploymenthigh (for instance,bycurbingpart-time work). Surelyit is
betterfor all who seekandareableto work to beemployedthan for someto have
high salariesand benefits well protected,only to be highly taxed in orderto pay
unemploymentbenefitsto thosewho are kept out of the labormarket.The Dutch
approachto employmentis closerto anends-respectingmodelthanthatof several
otherThird Way countries (Hemerijck & Visser 2001).
As a last resort,communityjobs shouldbeavailable for all thosewho cannot
find gainful. work in the marketplace or public sector!4 These could include
environmentalimprovementsandteachingaides,aswell asotherwork thatwould
not be carried out if it had to be paid for. Thus, community jobs would not
competewith otherforms of job creationor with thosewho hold low-payingjobs.
The state should be attentive to environmental needs and coordinate those
activities neededto shoreupthe environment,but it shouldnot shoulderthemall!5
To someextentenvironmentalprotectioncanbereconciled with marketinterests,
andbecomea sourceof newjobs andtechnologicalinnovation. At the sametime,
the state in a good societyrecognizesour duty to passonthe environmentto our
children in good or better condition thanwe inherited it, and that sucha social
commitmententails some netpublic costs.
Thesecostscanbe reducedaspeople increasinglyrecognizethatprotecting
the environmentis apart of everyone's socialmoral responsibilities,an important
sourceof communityjobs anda place for volunteering!6
To help sustainthe three-way partnership,the state fosters communities where
they existandhelpsprime their developmentwhere theyhavefailed. It is careful
notto contributeto their ossificationanddecaybypreemptingtheirrole. Hence,as
arule the stateshould not bethe first sourceof socialservices.Small loans,child
care,sick care,counselingand muchelseis bestprovided in the first instanceby
membersof the immediate and extended family, local and other communities,
voluntary associations,workplacesandothers.Whenthestatebecomesthe first or
sole source of these services, it undermines, demoralizes and bureaucratizes
relationships thatare atthe core of communallife.
In orderto encouragecommunities' role in social services,all stateagencies
should have citizen participation advisory boards. Their taskwould be to find
ways for citizensto participate asvolunteers in delivering someservicescurrently
carried bythe state.They shouldalsoplaya role in providing timely, relevantand
informed feedbackonthe performanceof serviceproviders.
The stateshould fostereconomic and social entrepreneurship,andtherefore
notimposetaxesorregulations which disabletheeconomicenginesof innovation
andchange.At the sametime, taxesshould not disadvantagethosewho labor in
favor ofthosewhoinvest.If taxesarewithheld at source,theyshouldbewithheld
from both workers and investors. (Becauseof the dangersof capital flight, to
proceedmaywell require carrying this measureout onthe levelof the EU, or most
likely the OECD.)
27
4.2 ThePrivateSector
'We arenot againstmarket-basedeconomybutmarket-basedsociety.'Lionel
Jospin,PrimeMinisterof France.
Third Waysocietiesrecognizethatthe marketisthe bestenginefor productionof goods
and services,of work andthusjobs, of economicprogress.Moreover,theprivate sector
may foster innovation that adapts the economy to changing conditions and
opportunities.
While muchattentionis properly paidto socialproblemscreatedby marketforces
-factory closures,loss of job security, overwork in someindustries and idlenessin
others -such problems should not blind us to the basic merit of strong economic
growth. So,for example,rising internationaltraderaisesa hostof problemsconcerning
laborand environmentalstandards,butwe shouldalsorecognizethattrade,inthelong
run, benefits most societiesand most membersof society.
Thosewho lose theirjobs asa resultshouldbe helped by the community andthe
state. Policies such as the United StatesTrade Adjustment Assistance (providing
targeted support for those dislocated by economic change) should be increased,
allowing redundant workers to be retrained and, if necessary,resettled, or given
communityjobs!7
Someclaim thatmost socialstandardsmustbesuspendedfor a nationto beableto
competein the globaleconomy.While someadaptationsare necessary,eachshouldbe
critically examined.It is empirically incorrectandmorally falseto assumethata society
cannotrespondto the negativeeffects of globalization, or that,if it could respond,the
loss of economic efficiency would apriori not be worth paying.
It is equally importantto recognizethatglobalization calls for the developmentof
national, regional and global social and political institutions. As corporations and
internetbusinessesincreasinglybecomecross-nationalandglobal forces,sobalancing
groups-from laborunionsto environmentalists-must link armsacrossnationallines,
andregulatoryandotherpublic institutions mustbe regionalandglobal in scope.Limits
on violations of the environment, land mines, trade in ivory and much else are
preliminary and ratherweak examples,but they point to what mustbe done.
4.3 TheArt of Combinations
The tendencyto view the state and the market as opposites, at least as alternative
approachesto social issues,concealsthe fact thatsomeof the bestand most important
work of a society thataspiresto be good is conductedeither by the third sectoror by
hybrids. Thesearevariousamalgamsin which elementsof two or eventhreesectorsare
combined.Examplesfollow. Their purposeis to urge much greaterattentionto these
neitherprivate norpublic nor communalbodies.Assumingasystematicexaminationof
their qualitiesandlimitations would showthat in manyareastheseare superiorto pure
sectortypes,manymore missions should be entrustedtot thesehybrids.
Examplesinclude:
.Religious institutions and voluntary associationsthatprovide social services,but
arefinanced in part by the government.
.Privately run or not-for-profit cultural institutions, suchasuniversities,museums
andtheatres,whose initial capitalcostsor start-upfundsareprovided bythe state.
28
Theseinstitutions maycontinueto rely onsomepartial governmentsubsidiesbut
should drawthe majority of theiroperatingfunds from theirgift shops,restaurants,
entranceticket-salesandsoon.
.State vouchers that allow people to purchase community services or market
products, for instance,housing allowancesand pre-schoolchild care.
.Public corporations,suchasthePublic BroadcastCorporation(whichprovides for
public TV) andthe National Public Radio (NPR). Thesepublic media outletsare
especially important in an age of increasingly commercial forms of communi-
cation.
There is muchmore scopefor combinations in mattersconcerningutilities (especially
water),public services(transportation),andmanyothers.Letusswearoff thesimplistic
market-or-governmentdichotomy.
4.4 TheKnowledgeSocietyandCurtailingScarcity
Much has been stated,correctly, aboutthe importanceof fostering the transition to a
knowledge-based economy. Such a transformation -which entails prioritizing
investment in people (via educationand lifelong learning)as well as technology -is
said to be essentialfor prosperity. It could alsobe a good way to reducemenial labor
and increasethe numberof jobs that are stimulating, family-friendly andcompatible
with theneedsof the environment. However, surprisingly little attentionhasbeenpaid
to an attribute ofaknowledge-basedeconomythat byitselfjustifies heavyinvestmentin
it: its potential to reducescarcity and enhancesocialjustice.
Knowledge as a resource differs greatly from those relied upon in industrial
societies-capital goods,from steelto petrol- in that it canbe sharedand consumed
manytimes over. Thus,if a factoryusesa tonof steel,this steelis no longeravailableto
anyotheruserand,asa result,issuesof resourceallocationand scarcityarise.However,
when a person puts a design on the internet -for a better mousetrap,car, home,
software program or whatever -millions can use it and the originator still has the
original.2 Similarly, manythousandsof peoplecandownloadapieceof music,poetry
or film and it can still be consumedagain.While not all knowledgeis or canbeshared
in this manner,a growing numberof new 'goods' arebeing sharedonthe internet in
this way.
Of course, there are tricky problems that must be worked out concerning
intellectual property andpatentrights. However,oneshould not overlookthatthereare
very largebodiesof knowledge thatcanbesharedlegally inthis almostmiraculousnew
way -including numerousbooks,music,and art for which the copyright hasexpired
and thatare in thepublic domain.Thesameshouldhold for mostinformationproduced
by the government,from national statisticsto text of parliamentarydebates.
The morepeoplesatisfy theirwantsbydrawing onfree knowledge,saybyreading
downloaded files, playing chessonthe internet orjoining virtual self-help groups,the
scarcerscarcity becomesand the smallerthe I-It sectora societymustbear. Scarcity
will neverbeeliminated. However,themorepeople(oncetheirbasicmaterialwantsare
sated)draw on opensourcesof knowledge (including culture), the more ends-based
their relations canbecome.
Lastbut not least.thereis aprofound connectionbetweenfosteringtheknowledgebasedeconomyandenhancingsocialjustice.
Most earliertheoriesof justice arebased
onthe ideaof transferring largeamountsof resourcesfrom thehavesto the have-nots.
29
This raisesobvious political difficulties. However,to the extentthatthosewhosebasic
needsare met draw their additional satisfaction from non-scarceresources,the door
opensto a whole new world, in which thosebetteroff may well belessopposedto the
transferof materialgoodsto thoselessendowed.And thosewho havelesscould benefit
from non-scarceknowledge resources,oncethe community andstateensurethatthey
havethe basic skills andresourcesneededto accessthe newworld of knowledge.
This may seemfar-fetched,visionary andutopian. Yetwhile suchaworld maybe
far in our future, its harbingersare all aroundus. The more we fostera transition to a
knowledge-basedeconomyandbasic accessfor all, the closerwe cometo living in a
society that is driven less by scarcity-and is more equitableasa result.
4.5
,imiting
Corruption
Few issues concerning the proper balance between market and state are more imporant
than preventing those with economic power from also concentrating political power. In
numerous free societies there is a growing stream of private monies into public handseither
in the old-fashioned form of personal bribery and favors, or in the modern form
of special interests 'contributing' funds to political parties, legislators or government
officials in exchange for special treatment at the public's cost. Few things are more
corrosive for the Third Way than the corruption of public institutions. Such doublefisted
concentration of power violates a profound precept of a truly democratic society,
whereby all member are equal citizens, whatever their wealth differences.
Trust is a key element of ends-based relationships; while general social trust
among the general public has been diminishing, trust in public leaders and institutions is
particularly vulnerable. The American public has become rather cynical of a political
system in which limiting the role of private monies in public life is almost impossible.
European societies must pay more attention to this matter than they have hitherto.
While the problem may well be less severe in the UK than in many other societies, the
best time to lock the barn is before the horse is stolen. Several new laws and regulations
in the UK seek to curb the corruption of politics -these include banning foreign
funding and paid questions, declaring all interests in a public register, and publicizing
donations to political parties over £ 2,000. It remains to be seen whether these will
suffice to protect public life from private monies:9
5 Sustainingthe Communityof Communities
5.1
Devolution Coupled with Nation Building
The Labour governmenthaslived upto itspromiseof devolution. However,theprocess
has revealed a slew of new issuesto be addressed.One concernsways to devolve
further 'down', bringing power closerto the people,to the level of communities rather
than regions such as Scotland and Wales, or even cities as large as London. If
devolution is extendeddownward,citizens will havemore opportunitiesto participate
in their own government,andaremore likely to becomepolitically engaged.
A more urgent challenge is learning to devolve power while reinforcing the
loyalties and bonds that maintain a national society. The mere mention of Scottish
independence,and the intense squabblesbetweenregions over variation in central
government funding, are indications thatthis issuerequires urgentattention.
30
A strong economy, reallocation of wealth, sound environmentalprograms and
respectfor basiclaws can only be advancedif smallercommunitiesarepartsof moreencompas
ones. England or Scotland alone could not achieve the kind of
international leadershipandeconomic power Britain currentlyprovides.In the current
environment,nationscannotavoid fragmentationwithout activeleadershipandconcrete
society-building measures..
The questfor suchmeasuresis, for the most part, yet to beundertaken.Formingnationwide
work groups,projects andprograms that cutacrossregionalborders-for
example, economic development programs encompassing northeastEngland and
southernScotland-might servethis end.Changingthe National Curriculumto include
more historical material focusing on the achievementsof the union and less on civil
wars might help.'Honoring thosewho foster unity ratherthan separatenesswould be
useful. But thesealone will not suffice. Much new thinking is still required on this
issue.
The vision of societyasa community of communitiesappliesto geographic,racial
and ethnic communities alike. A good society thrives on a diversity of cultures that
enrichespeople's lives throughthe arts,music,dance,socialcontact,cuisineandmuch
more. But sucha multicultural society cannot flourish without a sharedframework,
which itself will evolve overtime. Its elementsinclude commitmentto a democratic
way of life, to basic laws or the constitution, to mutual respectand,above all, to the
responsibility to treatall othersasendsin themselves.Diversity shouldnotbecomethe
oppositeof unity, but should exist within unity.
Sustaining a given community of communities does not contradictthe gradual
development of more encompassingcommunities, such as the EuropeanUnion or,
eventually, a world community. These too will be composed of networks of
communities rather than hundreds of millions of individuals, or evenhundreds of
fragmented socialentities. It is foolish to believe thatthe collapseof nationsdoesnot
matter becausethe fragments may thenjoin the larger Europeancommunity in what
Philip Dodd (1995)refersto as'the Euro-federalist solution to the presentbattle over
Britain'. Suchnotions are unduly optimistic about the pace and scopeof Europe's
developmentas a true community. They disregard the fact that more encompassing
communities are not composedof numerous small fragments: they arean additional
layer of community, ratherthan one thatpreemptsthe others.
Finally, deeper involvement in the EU is best preceded by extensive moral
dialogues, not merely one referendum about the euro. While there seemsto be
considerable support for joining a European community, below the surfacethere are
strong euro-scepticalsentimentsthat mustbe takenseriously.
5.2 Limiting Inequality
Societycannotsustainitself asa communityof communities if disparitiesinwell-being
and wealth betweenelites andthe restof societyaretoo great.While we maydebate
exactly what socialjustice entails,there is little doubt what community requires. If
some members of a community become further removed from the daily living
conditions of most other members -leading lives of hyper-affluence in gated
communitie~,with chauffeured limousines,servantsand personaltrainers-they lose
contactwith the restof the community. Suchisolation not only frays socialbondsand
insulatesprivileged people from the moral cultures of the community, but alsoblinds
31
themto the realities of their fellow citizens' lives. This in turn maycausethemto,favor
unrealistic policies ('let them eat cake'), which further underminesthe community's
trust in them.
To preventthis problemit hasbeensuggestedthatthestateshouldprovide equality
of outcomes.However,during the twentieth centurywe havelearnedthatthis treatment
goesagainstthe grainof afreesociety.As a result,evencommandandcontrolsocieties
have beenunable truly to implement this approach.We also learnedthat, when it is
approximated, it undermines creativity, excellence and motivation to work, and is
unfair to thosewho do applythemselves.Furthermore,the resulting laborcostsareso
high asto rendera societyuncompetitive in the global economy.
Equality of opportunity has been extolled as a substitute. However, to ensure
equality of opportunity for all, everyonemusthavea similar startingpoint. Thesecan
beprovided only if all are accordedcertain basics,which we havealreadyestablished
is a core part of treating all asendsand not merely asmeans.
Additional policies to curb inequality further canbemadeto work at bothendsof
the scale. Specialeducationefforts to bring children from disadvantagedbackgrounds
upto par, suchasSurestart(in the UK) andHead Start(in the US),andtraining workers
releasedfrom obsolescentindustries for newjobs, areexamplesof programsproviding
a measureof equality of outcometo make equality of opportunitypossible.However,
the results often revealthemselvesvery slowly. Hence inthe shorterrun greatereffects
will be achieved by raising tax credits and the minimum wage and by creating
initiatives that encouragesharingof resourcesbetweencommunities.
Raising the minimum wage invites the criticism thatpeoplewill bepriced out of
thejobs market. However, if the level of minimum wageis tied to whatpeopleneedto
provide for their basicneeds,it is the moral obligation of agood societyto provide for
this standard of living. The only alternative to a proper minimum wage would be
welfare payments-which tendto be degrading,developdependencyandarepolitically
more unattractivethan minimum wage. However, it doesnot follow thatthe minimum
wage should automaticallybetied to a relative poverty line -one thatrisesasquickly
as otherwages in society. A rich basic minimum is defined in absoluteterms,not asa
statisticalartifact.
Fora long time it hasbeenknown thatthe poor will be with us,evenif they work,
aslong astheyhaveno assets.Peoplewho own assets,especiallyaplaceof residence
(whetherahouseor anapartment),aremore likely to 'buy' into a society,to feelandbe
part of the community and to be an active memberof it. One major way to advance
home ownership is through schemesthat allow those on low incomes to obtain
mortgages,asprovided intheUnited Statesby federallycharteredcorporationssuchas
FannieMae. More shouldto be done onthis front.
We suggestthatthis might be achievedby following the samemodelusedin the
EarnedIncome Tax Credit in the US andthe Working Families Tax Credit in the UK:
providing low incomepeople with earnedinterest on mortgages.Thosewhoseincome
is below a certain level may earn, say,two dollars for every dollar they setasideto
provide them with the seedmoney for buying a home. Alternatively, 'sweat' equity
might be used asthe future owners' contribution, for instanceif they work on their
housing sites.While raising the income and ownershipof the poor might ensurethat
everybody can afford the basic minimum essentialto the core principle of a good
society, suchmeasureswill not suffice for thepurposesof communitybuilding. Other
32
measuresthatpreventeverhigherlevelsof inequalityshouldbe undertakenif wealthier
people are not to becometoo distancedfrom the restof society.
Suchmeasuresm.ayinclude maintaining progressivetaxation from mostif not all
sources,increasing inheritance tax andensuring that tax on capital is paid as it is on
labor. Given that such measurescannotbe adopted if they seriously endangerthe
competitive status of a country, they would be difficult to implement solely at the
national level. A number of inequality curbing measures may well require cointroduction
or harmonization at leastwithin the EU and preferably with the OECD
countries; better yet (in the long term) worldwide.
Ultimately this matter,as with many others,will not be properly addresseduntil
there is a seachange in the moral culture of societyandthe purposesthatanimateit.
Major reallocation of wealth cannotbe forced by a democratic society,andvigorous
attemptsto impose it will causea flight of wealth and damagethe economy in other
ways. In contrast, history from early Christianity to Fabian socialismteachesus thatpeople
who shareprogressivevalues will be inclined to sharesomeof their wealthvoluntar
A good society seeksto promote such values through a grand moral
dialogue ratherthan by dictates.
6 The NextGrand Dialogue:A ModerateReturnof Counterculture?
The good societyunderstandsthat ever-increasinglevels of material goods are not areliable
source of human well-being and contentment,let alone of a morally sound
society. It recognizes that the pursuit of well-being through ever higher levels of
consumptionis Sisyphean.This is notan argumentin favor of poverty andself-denial.
However, extensive data shows that, once basic material needs are well sated and
securelyprovided for, additionalincomedoesnotaddto happiness(Myers 2000). Theevidence
shows that profound contentment is found in nourishing ends-based
relationships,in bonding with others,in communitybuilding andpublic service,andin
cultural and spiritual pursuits. Capitalism neveraspiredto addressthe needsof thewhole
person; at best it treats a person as an economic entity. Statist socialismsubjuga
ratherthan inspired people. It is left to good societiesto fill the void.
The mostprofound problems thatplaguemodernsocietieswill be fully addressed
only when thosewhosebasic needshave beenmet shift their priorities up Maslow'sscale
of human needs.That is, onlY after theyaccorda higher priority to gaining andgiving
affection, cultivating culture, becoming involved in community service andseeking
spiritual fulfillment. Sucha shift in priorities is also required before we can
truly come into harmony with the environment, as these higher priorities replace
material consumption. Sucha new setof priorities may also be the only conditions
~nder which those who are well endowed would be willing to support serious
reallocation of wealth andpower,astheir personalfortuneswould no longerbebased
on amassingever largeramountsof consumergoods:OIn addition, transitioning to aknowled
economy would free millions of people (one hopes all of them,
gradually)to relateto eachotherasmembersoffamilies and communities,thus layingthe
socialfoundations for a societyin which ends-basedrelationshipsdominatewhile
instrumentalonesare well contained.
The upward shift in priorities, a returnto a sortof moderatecounterculture,a turnto
voluntary simplicity -these requireagranddialogue aboutour personaland shared
goals. Intellectuals andthe media canhelp launchsucha dialogue and model theftew
fOnDSof behavior. Public leaders can nurse the recognition of these values, by
moderating consumption at public eventsand ceremonies,and by celebrating those
whose achievementsare compatible with the good society ratherthan with a merely
affluent one. But ultimately, suchashift lies in changesin the heartsand minds, in the
valuesand conduct,of usall. We shallnot travelfar toward agood societyunlesssuch
a dialogue is launchedandadvancedto a positive conclusion.
NoteD
I. This essaygrew out of adiscussionbetweenGeoffMulgan andmyself. I amindebtedto Tom Bentleyfor numerousanddetailed
suggestionsandqueries.I alsobenefitted greatlyfrom commentsbyStevenLukes,JohnGray, Martin Albrow and RobinNiblett for
commentson a previousdraft. I washelpedmuchby editorial assistanceby Natalie Klein, JenniferAmbrosino, andRachelMears
andby researchassistanceby Matthew Home andJasonMarsh. A ratherdifferentversion of this essayis published intheUnited
Statesunder the title Next: TheRoad to the GoodSociety, NewYork: Basic Books,2000.
2. E. Frazer, Official Fellow, Tutor, and Lecturer in Politics at the University of Oxford, has written that 'Tony Blair's
communitarianism wasinfluenced by the philosophy of JohnMacMurray.' Frazer1999:25.
3. On this point seeChait 1998: 19.
4. According full attention tothe importanceof communitiesis what is mostlacking on the Third Way, which otherwiseretraces
quite closely newcommunitarianthinking. OncommunitarianismseeEtzioni 1993; Etzioni 1996;Tam1998; Gray1996;Giddens
1998; Selznick 1992; The CommunitarianNetwork Website.
5. Seefor instanceAltman 1973; Barabaz1984: Johnson1976; Harrison etal. 1991.
6. The reasonfor this is thatsocial servicesarelabor intensive,and labor costsrise more rapidly than capital costsbecauselabor
flows are not nearly asfluid and global ascapitalflows. Ergo, workers in onecountry have a greaterability to gain or maintain
higher wages and benefits than those in anothercountry. In contrast, banks and other financial institutions cannot charge
significantly higher interestratesthansimilar institutionsin othercountries.For instance,thedifferencesin yield thatAmericanand
Europeanbanksprovide areminusculecomparedto the differences insalariesandbenefits theirworkersearn. Giventhat general
inflation ratesreflect both labor and capital costs,and given that one componentB capital B is lower than the average,it is a
mathematicalcertainty thatthe other B labor B will behigher.
7. For discussionof this concept,seeLeadbeater& Christie 1999aswell asLeadbeater1997. Seealso Etzioni 1993.
8. For more discussionseeLeadbeater1996.
9. For backgrounddiscussionsseeJupp1999; Gray1996;Hargreaves& Christie 1998; Hargreaves& Christie 1999;Kruger 1998;
Mulganetal.1997.
10. To the extent thatthe Blair governmentis increasinglyseenasa 'nanny state' that nagsthe public andtries to establishmoral
codesfrom above,a clarification of the government position on this issueseemsto becalledfor.
II. The valuesenshrinedin thelawsof the stateinturn maybeassessedbydrawing on still moreencompassinglaws,suchasthose
of the EU andtheUN. For more discussionseeEtzioni 1996: Chapter8.
12. As the UK movescloserto having a written constitution, or as it adoptsEU codes,the Americanmalaiseof litigiousnessmay
becomemorecommonon theseshores.At thesametime itis not atall obviousthatwritten constitutionsare superiorto basiclaws,
common law and strong democratictraditions.
13. While I generally agree with Anthony Giddens,we differ on this point. He writes, 'Government has a whole clusterof
responsibilities for its citizensandothers,including theprotectionof thevulnerable. Old-style democracy,however,wasinclinedto
treat rights asunconditional claims. With expanding individualism should come an extensionof individual obligations... As an
ethical principle, "no rights withoutresponsibilities" must apply notonly to welfare recipients, but to everyone.'
14. To keep this crucial point in mind, one may refer to 'voluntary moral culture' as distinct from the coercive one, found in
Afghanistan and Iran in an extremeform and, in more moderateways, in many non-freesocieties.
15. 'Inclusion refers in itsbroadestsenseto citizenship,to the civil andpolitical rights andobligations thatall membersof asocietY
shouldhave,notjust formally, butasa realityof their lives' (Giddens1998:102-103).As Philip Selznick putit,' All personshave
thesameintrinsic worth... Everyonewho is apersonisequally anobjectof moralconcern. This isthe essenceof justice.' Selznick
addsthatthe most importantthreatto socialjustice is socialsubordination. Hencesocialpower should be'dispersedandbalanced'
but not wiped out. SeeSelznickn.d.: 63.
16. IntheUnited States,the stateof Oregoncontributedto thedialogueonappropriatehealthcareprovisions. In itshealthcareplan,
thestateranked688 medical proceduresaccordingto their costsandbenefits; ultimately, it wasdecided thatthe first 568services
listed would becovered by the OregonMedicaid program.Whether or notthis was the right cutoff point cannot bedetermined
without adetailedexaminationof theplan. The caseshows,however, thatthediscussionof what mustbeincluded can bemadein
rather specific termsrather than asan abstractmoral principle (Houston Chronicle News Service1993).
17. The conditions under which 'trade offs' mayoccur is discussedat length in Etzioni 1999. Briefly, a trade off should be
consideredonly if there isa major socialproblem,for instancethe rapid spreadof HIV, if thereareno effective treatmentsthat do
not entail trade offs, and if the intrusions proffered areasminimal aspossible.
18. The problems that arise from the increasedcommercialization of the media and the concentration of ownershipdeservea
separatetreatment. Suffice itto sayhere thatpublicly ownedandoperatedmediashouldbecherishedandsupportfor it expanded,
bestby granting them largeendowments.
19. For further discussionof 'sciencecourts', see SmithII 1999. Seealso Mazur1993.
20. Thesecan beamelioratedto someextentby high levelsof immigration, but thatwould poseahostof challengesall by itself,by
34
deepeningthe tensionsraisedby multiculturalism.
21. One must, of course, stressthat no stigma should be attachedto families that cannot have children or seethemselvesas
psychologically ill qualified to bring themup.
22. The latter provides couples with the opportunity to bind themselvesvoluntarily to higher level of commitmentby agreeingto
participate in premarital counseling,counselingwhile married if onespouserequestsit, anddelayingdivorce for two yearsif one
partnerfiles for it, except in caseswhere a crime hasbeencommitted. See,for example,Etzioni & Rubin1997.
23. This approachdeservessomeelaboration. Peoplewho areinclined to commit crimesaredeterredby two factors thatrelateto
one anotherastwo variables in a mathematicalformula: sizeof penalty(Pe) multiplied by the probability of being caughtand
punished(Pr) equalspublic safety. That is, ahigher level of public safetycan beachievedby increasingeithervariable. Given that
Prcosts muchlessthan Pe inhumansocial andeconomicterms,increasingPr is obviouslypreferable. Moreover, given thatdata
show1hatincreasesin Praremuch moreeffective than inPe,thesefactsaloneprovide acompelling reasonfor trying to increasePr
ratherthan Pe inthe next years(Grogger 1991,seeespeciallypage304).
24. This is of coursemuch lessof anissuewhen unemploymentislow. However,having communityjobs asanintegralpart of the
programis importantevenif thesejobs becomea major factor only inothersituations.
25. 1 draw hereon Mulgan etaI. 1997: 19.
26. Seethe community recycling initiatives describedin Murray 1999.
27. To whatextentthe EuropeanStructural Fund coversthis matterremainsto beestablished.
28. Someminimal useof traditional resourcesareinvolved, suchaschargesfor connectingto the internet,butthecostsfor theseare
trivial.
29. Among themattersthatmayneedmore attentionarethewayscandidatesgetaroundexpenditurelimits by notreportingcertain
costs,under-reporting expenses(such astravel expensesfor the candidateandhis family), and bystocking up on electioneering
supplieswell before theelection. SeeKlein 1999.
30. For additional discussion,seeEtzioni 1998.
35
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40
Disability & Society, Vol. 19, No. 3, May 2004
Social capital, social inclusion and
services for people with learning
disabilities
Peter Batesa
* and Fabian A. Davisb
a
National Development Team, Ipswich, UK; b
Bromley Mental Health Services, Oxleas
NHS Trust, Chislehurst, Kent, UK
Both social capital and social inclusion have emerged as significant concepts for human services
in the last decade and yet their inter-relationship remains largely unexplored. This article argues
that, whilst they are similar in their vision for a healthy society, they adopt sufficiently different
perspectives to stimulate and challenge each other. This can be well illustrated by reference to
services for people with a learning disability. Commissioners and providers of learning disability
services are encouraged through this article to harness both concepts in order to assist in the
process of modernizing services and increasing life opportunities for the people they support. It
is argued that it is not possible to understand the full consequences of adopting either theoretical
position without an adequate understanding of the other. Examples are given of the implications
of this for advocacy services, day opportunities, rural communities, transition and staff training.
Introduction
The concept of social capital (Putnam, 2000) has become popular just as the
English White Paper ‘Valuing People’ (Department of Health, 2001b) has required
learning disability services to work towards social inclusion. This article points a
spotlight on useful insights in both social capital and social inclusion approaches that
may help in the development of learning disability services, and notes some of the
hazards of an unthinking adoption of either of these frameworks in isolation from the
other.
Social capital: investment in human society
Mrs Rose has decided to re-open the old school in our village as a community centre.
She sent round a questionnaire asking each household how they could contribute their
time and skills. She had 94 responses—more than the number of households in the
village. As she says, ‘I don’t know why I’m doing this. I’m nearly 80 and I won’t live
to see this place open. But there’s such a lot of talent in this community and
somebody’s got to get people together.’ I always had the capacity to get involved, but
I’m only using my capacity because Mrs Rose asked. (Ritchie, 2001)
Robert Putnam (2000) calls buildings, plant and equipment physical capital; people,
*Corresponding author: National Development Team, Unit 10, Hill View Business Park, Old
Ipswich Road, Claydon, Ipswich IP6 0AJ, UK. Email: pbates@ndt.org.uk
ISSN 0968-7599 (print)/ISSN 1360-0508 (online)/04/030195-13
 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/0968759042000204202
196 P. Bates & F. A. Davis
skills, knowledge and experience human capital; and social networks and norms of
trust and reciprocity social capital. This distinction was taken up Prime Minister
Tony Blair when he said that ‘in the future, we need to invest in social capital as
surely as we invest in skills and buildings’ (Corrigan & Miller, 1999).
Putnam (2000) goes on to observe that the term ‘social capital’ has been coined
at least six times during the twentieth century, while Schuller (2000) has suggested
that its roots lie in a variety of intellectual traditions, including Alexis de Tocqueville
(1835) on voluntary associations, Elizabeth Bott (1957) on social networks, John
Dewey (1929) on shared concerns, Jurgen Habermas (1984) on trust, Amitai
Etzioni (1996) on communitarianism and Albert Bandura (1977) on self-efficacy.
Despite this rich intellectual heritage, the notion of social capital remains fluid and
lacks a precise definition, so, for example, Grootaert (2001) offers a list of 50
indicators that have been used in empirical studies, while the Social Action Research
Project (Health Development Agency, 1999) baseline study used the following six
components as a working definition:
• Participation in the local community: do you think of yourself as part of the local
area? Are you an active member of a local group? Have you participated in
voluntary or religious activities?
• Reciprocity: have you done or received a favour from someone living nearby? Do
local people look after each other? Who would you turn to for advice or to share
some good news?
• Feelings of trust and safety: in your own home or going out at night. Have you
been a victim of crime? Can people round here be trusted?
• Social connections: have you chatted with family, friends or neighbours recently?
Do you have close friends round here? How many people did you talk to
yesterday? Do you go outside this area to visit your friends?
• Citizen power: have you formally complained about a local service? Have you
joined a committee to fight for a local cause?
• Community perception: do you pick up other people’s rubbish? Do you enjoy
living here? Are there enough community facilities and public transport?
Social inclusion
Social inclusion is another fluid term with a variety of meanings (Bates, 2002a). For
the purposes of this article, social inclusion means ensuring that people with learning
disabilities have full and fair access to activities, social roles and relationships directly
alongside non-disabled citizens. Over the past 30 years an informal network of
writers (Wolfensberger, 1972; O’Brien, 1987; Falvey et al., 1994; Rusch & Hughes,
1989) have shown how support can be provided so that people with disabilities can
be employed rather than attend a sheltered workshop, live in their own home rather
than in a hostel, and participate in friendships and community life with a diverse
array of citizens, rather than conducting their whole lives within segregated disability
services.
Since New Labour established the Social Exclusion Unit in 1997 (Social
Social capital, social inclusion and services 197
Exclusion Unit, 1998), the notion of social exclusion has also been used to embrace
poverty, unemployment and threats to community safety, along with poor access to
healthcare and decent housing.
Recent policy convergence
We would argue that social capital is an idea whose time has come. It has been
enthusiastically adopted by the World Bank, American, European and UK
governments, and has permeated the areas of health, education, community care,
community regeneration and employment (Mitchell & Harrison, 2001).
Increasing social capital is expected to generate improvements in all the above
areas because it is argued that increased civic participation will invigorate government,
information flowing through informal networks can enhance job prospects,
supportive friendships buffer against distress and illness, reciprocal relationships
create a culture where learning and contribution flourishes, and heightened trust
leads to a reduction in crime. As such, social capital theory should be of interest to
Local Strategic Partnerships, Learning Disability Partnership Boards, Health
Improvement Programmes, Community Safety Partnerships, and a host of other
initiatives that directly or indirectly impact the lives of people with learning
disabilities.
The 2001 White Paper ‘Valuing People’ (Department of Health, 2001b) introduces
person-centred planning (O’Brien, 1987) as a driver to promote service
change. The White Paper assumes that the majority of people with a learning
disability will want to move towards an independent life in the community, leading
to the demise of segregated services. A major part of this change is to be day service
modernization by 2006 and the promotion of social inclusion will be an essential
component of this change (Love et al., 2002). As a result, many services are looking
towards social inclusion advocates and social ‘capitalists’ for a comprehensive and
detailed conceptual framework within which to plan and manage such major change.
Thus, developments in learning disability provision, social inclusion and social
capital all meet in the growing policy emphasis upon citizenship, so that ‘the world
disabled people will occupy will extend way beyond their specialist services’
(Simons, 1998).
Contrasting social inclusion and social capital
The introduction above has hinted at some significant challenges to learning
disability services that emerge from singular analyses of the implications of adopting
either a social capital or social inclusion perspective. The Health Development
Agency’s framework for social capital is now used to look at some of these areas and
to explore implications where the two theories need to be considered in tandem.
Real examples from services for people with learning disabilities are used to illustrate
the synergy or divergences between the two theoretical discourses.
198 P. Bates & F. A. Davis
Participation in the local community
Those people who have been deliberately segregated in prisons, long-stay hospitals
and other institutions are rarely mentioned in social capital thinking, while social
inclusion advocates strongly assert that society should find ways of bringing this
group back home (Mansell, 1993). A brief glance at policy documents such as
Valuing People would suggest that services should promote inclusion, but despite
this, current service arrangements often segregate learning disabled people, particularly
those with the least natural ability to articulate their interests.
However, bringing people back home demands more than relocating their beds—
relationships have to change as well. In both social capital and inclusion thinking,
service users are recognized as citizens, and the traditional focus on the relationship
between worker and service user is replaced by an emphasis upon the reciprocal
relationship between citizen and community:
Two women with learning disabilities wanted to take up yoga. No local groups existed,
so the worker found a tutor and a community hall, and put adverts around the
neighbourhood. A mixed group of citizens joined and everyone welcomed each
other—including the people with learning disabilities. Nine years later the group is still
running—long after the worker moved to another job. (Christine Burke, personal
communication)
This paradigm shift is also enacted as people are supported to take up open
employment and to participate in community Timebanks (Reed & Boyle, 2002) and
local exchange trading schemes (Seyfang, 2001). Advocates of social inclusion have
rightly highlighted the importance of waged employment as a route to income, status
and relationships, while social capitalists point the spotlight on informal roles and
relationships. In addition to the opportunity to earn a wage, people with learning
disabilities may participate in the community via education, volunteering or leisure
pursuits.
Mainstream learning providers have a renewed focus upon developing citizens’
social and civic skills, and this may lead to a renaissance of non-vocational training
to counter the recent emphasis upon developing only those skills that directly
contribute to the economy. Such a shift in emphasis would have a disproportionately
beneficial effect upon people with learning disabilities.
Similarly, a social capital perspective highlights the benefits of volunteering. For
many years, services have arranged a few opportunities for people with learning
disabilities to become volunteers in the community. Each placement must find a
path between employment (volunteering as work simulation in order to attain
vocational experience and skills) and community participation (volunteering as a
means to harness altruistic endeavour and build affiliation and membership). Social
capitalists helpfully wrest volunteering back from a single-minded attempt to use
volunteering solely as work preparation and remind us that volunteering builds
community, trust and reciprocity. Care is needed to ensure that volunteering
opportunities are safe, rewarding, and respectful and contribute to the formation of
social capital (Bates, 2002b):
The VALUES project based at Leicester Volunteer Centre supports people with
Social capital, social inclusion and services 199
learning disabilities to contribute their time and skills to the local community. Individuals
make a difference in the museum, charity shops, environmental projects, and lunch
clubs—all sorts of places.
Reciprocity
The way in which people with learning disabilities are perceived by others can be
even more important to their capacity to contribute to the development of social
capital and their own social inclusion than their disability. For example, if members
of the public label people with learning disabilities as fraudulent, attention seeking,
disinterested in civic affairs or unable to make a positive contribution to the
community, this will limit their potential for reciprocal relationships with nondisabled
community members. While it can be hard to identify the unique contribution
that a particular person enjoys making and for which they will be genuinely
appreciated, without opportunity this may never be discovered at all.
The two theoretical positions bring complimentary insights to the topic of reciprocity.
Putnam (2000) makes a distinction between bonding and bridging relationships
in which bonding relationships form between people who share a common
bond, while bridging relationships bring diverse people together.
Respectful bonding relationships between people with learning disabilities are
important, of course, but social inclusion theorists envisage a society in which
bridging relationships span all the structural divisions in society (Amado, 1993). An
included life with an ordinary home, job and leisure pursuits (rather than segregated
in residential units, day centres and ‘group trips’) is a prerequisite for building these
socially inclusive bridging relationships. Social inclusion theorists argue that society
should nurture relationships between people with a learning difficulty and those
without (e.g. Amado, 1993) and assert that everyone can feel at home in mainstream
society, while social capital theorists do not make this explicit. Any service would be
limited by adopting a social capital analysis alone as this could lead to a diminished
vision that confined bonding relationships to those between peers in a day centre
and bridging relationships to those that formed between centres, such as at the
Special Olympics.
Bridging social capital provides what Granovetter (1973) referred to as weak
ties—a valuable source of information and contacts that can help people with
everything from job-finding to problem solving. Similarly, while Putnam rather
derides ‘mail-order’ membership, belonging to an association that collects subscriptions
and provides publicity can contribute to a sense of identity and provide
material for conversation with others. Social capital reminds us of the importance of
nurturing these connections with ‘insignificant others’ alongside more intimate
connections:
Building sustainable relationships
Seventeen people with learning disabilities have fenced 144 gardens on the Oakwood
Estate in Bridgend. As well as forming a tight-knit team, they have gained work
experience and qualifications in amenity horticulture by linking with the local college.
One group member said ‘my self esteem has improved, I feel physically fitter and I feel
200 P. Bates & F. A. Davis
being part of the group is helpful for character building.’ Using locally grown renewable
timber, the fencing has created ‘defensible spaces’ as a means of reducing crime and
nuisance. Stolen cars used to be driven on the lawns between the houses, but now that
the gardens are in place there is no room. They say that it is all about creating
sustainable projects and sustainable relationships. The people with learning disabilities
feel safe and welcome on the estate. Local residents hold the project in very high esteem
and they advocate for and defend its members if the need arises. Local children have
joined in with painting the fences during school holidays, leading to a reduction in
vandalism. One tenant said, ‘We find that friends and neighbours are far more willing
to pull together and to help each other, and are once more gaining pride and enjoyment
in our community’.
Feelings of trust and safety
Putnam’s position moves us from the privacy of a friendship into the public arena
by including the concept of ‘thin trust’ in his description of social capital. Thin trust
is present when strangers view each other as potential friends and absent when they
regard each other as potential enemies. Campbell’s team (1999) failed to find much
thin trust in an English housing estate, and the MENCAP (1999) inquiry into
bullying showed just how reasonable it is for many people with learning disability to
avoid public spaces and public transport, especially the school run.
Unfortunately, inclusion advocates tend to ignore the shameful reality of bullying,
oppression and discrimination that is a daily experience for many people with
learning disabilities (MENCAP, 1999). It is curious to note that Valuing People is
silent on the matter of bullying, while the Department of Health does require mental
health services to address it (Department of Health, 2001a). It is here that social
capitalists have the advantage, since their goal of increasing thin trust precisely
attends to this agenda.
We all have to run the gauntlet of meeting strangers from time to time and
negotiate our way through thin trust in order to locate the new friends and
colleagues with whom we might enjoy thick trust, but there are extra challenges for
visible minorities, and this includes some people with learning disabilities.
Social capitalists task us with addressing these problems by challenging media
stereotypes, providing learning disabilities equality training, and actively promoting
positive relationships between people with and without disabilities. While social
capitalists are developing instruments to measure these things, they have no guidance
to offer on which tools are needed to make these changes, so we must look for
advice to inclusion advocates, as well as media studies, community development,
health promotion and students of the social psychology of stigma.
Inclusion advocates who wish to build links with community development workers
may find that social capital is the linking concept that will bring them together.
Any examination of trust and safety quickly moves into a consideration of
structural inequalities. Despite this, few inclusion advocates or social capitalists have
given much attention to the way in which structural inequalities around race or
gender impact upon the lives of people with learning disabilities. Social capital can
systematically oppress women (Riddell et al., 2001), people from black and ethnic
Social capital, social inclusion and services 201
minority communities (Campbell & MacLean, 2002), people with disabilities, and,
as Putnam notes, terrorist groups are strong on bonding relationships. Campbell
(2000) sums all this up as ‘antisocial capital’, although it is likely that many groups
have a mixture of benevolent and toxic effects, and few, if any, are unambiguously
virtuous or destructive.
Staff will need to respond to these complexities at a number of levels. First, a
focus on leisure and voluntary participation in the community will require services
to offer support in the evenings and weekends in ordinary community locations away
from learning disability premises, and so working arrangements will need to support
these activities. Secondly, staff will need to respond imaginatively to bullying, thin
trust and structural inequality.
Social connections
Both social inclusion and social capital theorists invite us to think about people with
learning disabilities as citizens who are able to make a contribution to the whole
community. This clashes with the current reality, where perhaps only a third of the
people utilizing learning disability services have even one non-disabled friend
(Robertson et al., 2001). Friendships between people with learning disabilities and
non-disabled people must overcome some difficulties, especially where there are
inequities in communication skills, disposable income and freedom of choice (Zetlin
& Murtaugh, 1988), but can be very rewarding for participants (Newton et al.,
1995). Indeed, we think that people with learning disabilities may well have the
potential to make an above-average contribution to the community.
Inclusion advocates have been eager to support people with learning disabilities to
take up positive social roles, such as householder, employee or student. While lip
service has been paid to participation as well as presence in the community, social
capitalists insist that attention is given to the quality of social relationships in these
settings. Simply achieving the status of a student does not build social capital if there
are few opportunities for networking and relationship building. Bridging relationships
with non-disabled students are not enhanced if the student is attending a
special class, at a special time and taking lunch in a special, segregated cafeteria. Just
as important is the support that is made available, for co-location alone does not
guarantee the development of friendships. So, for example, poorly skilled jobcoaches
may unwittingly detach learning disabled workers from their non-disabled
work colleagues in order to provide intensive task training.
There are also particular challenges that arise from taking a focus on informal and
unregulated relationships. A learning disabled customer is legally entitled to fair and
equal service from the bar staff, but the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 does not
govern the behaviour of other drinkers in the public house. This means that a host
of awkward, unfriendly or downright hostile responses may be more in evidence in
unregulated social relationships—exactly in those areas that are well covered by
social capitalists.
A second reason why discrimination may be amplified in unregulated relationships
revolves around the practical transaction with the bar staff. This is governed by
202 P. Bates & F. A. Davis
clear rules for the encounter (placing an order, pulling the pint, paying for the
drink), while the informal connections with other drinkers in the pub are less defined
and, consequently, more difficult to negotiate. Similarly, in the workplace, practical
tasks may enable people with learning disabilities to demonstrate their abilities at
work and so allow social interaction to grow as their competence is recognized,
whilst equal opportunities policies constrain potentially negative responses of colleagues.
In contrast, unregulated places that are about talking and little else may
provide few opportunities for this kind of broader relationship to emerge and so
people who don’t seem to fit in may be more comprehensively ostracized. One
person said, ‘I have a job, but no-one wants to go out with me in the evenings’.
Social capitalists demand that these challenges are addressed.
An analysis of social capital through the life-course reveals how there are particular
rites of passage when capital accrues or is lost. A move into residential care,
perhaps on the death of a parent, can wipe out stocks of social capital—especially if
it involves relocation into a different neighbourhood (Riddell et al., 2001). Indeed,
entry into any care system may burn-off social connections, trust and reciprocity.
Staff need to be aware that addressing these issues can be just as important as the
selection of appropriate accommodation, medication or counselling.
Citizen power
Both social inclusion and social capital theories offer a familiar challenge in this
domain—that of increasing service user participation and advocacy.
Traditional services have been characterized by ‘vertical’ relationships in which
staff hold power over service users, while social capitalists and service user advocates
seek ‘horizontal’ relationships (Riddell et al., 1999).
There are a number of potential pit falls to watch out for here. As a social capital
perspective gains ground, there are the ever-present dangers to be avoided, includ-
ing:
• preferring ‘white’ social capital over culturally diverse manifestations of relationships,
trust and civic participation;
• adding informal community connections to the list of things that it is acceptable
to ‘prescribe’ for people using services;
• reproducing traditional power relationships of control and containment within
new community locations;
• that individuals who do not engage may be blamed for their situation.
From our experience these problems can come about because both social capital and
inclusion theorists risk unduly focusing on ‘slotting in’, rather than transforming
society. From this standpoint, society is perceived as fundamentally just and stable,
so that learning disability services simply need to locate a menu of vacant slots and
help the person to decide what they would like to do, learn the correct behaviour and
then engage in the social opportunity of their choice. Bourdieu (1983) challenges
this perception by reminding us how the ‘old boy’ networks use social capital to
Social capital, social inclusion and services 203
maintain their power and control, and advises us that this kind of social capital
should be dismantled and replaced by more equitable relationships.
Paradoxically and despite the above we suggest that it is also vital to take an
optimistic overview of communities. Reviews of supported employment (Riddell et
al., 1997) and volunteering (Bates, 2001b) note that expansion of the service is
restricted, not by a shortage of ‘hosts’ willing to offer opportunities to people with
learning disabilities, but by a shortage of state funding and therefore support staff.
By extension we may assume that there will be plenty of informal social settings that
would welcome people with learning disabilities, so long as we could arrange
adequate support.
A further example of the synergy possible by taking a dual perspective involves
advocacy services. These have devoted much time to supporting people with
learning disabilities to engage in formal decision-making processes. Service users
have learnt how committees work, how records are kept and distributed, as well as
the subtler tasks of lobbying and negotiating with senior managers. Meanwhile,
social capitalists have observed that, while the general membership of civic and
community associations have been falling, there has been an even faster decline in
the number of people willing to take office in these associations. In addition, recent
urban regeneration and service improvement strategies have emphasized the value of
public consultation and involvement, and sought new methods of reaching traditionally
excluded groups. This means that market expansion and labour shortages in
these community and civic associations neatly coincides with a new generation of
skilled and experienced people who happen to also have a learning difficulty.
Advocacy groups that have traditionally focused on long-term bonding in order to
reform the learning disability service could build bridging relationships with local
community organizations and campaigns. Some people with learning disabilities
might eventually leave the advocacy group in order to join other advocates for the
local community improvements that most interest them as citizens.
While there is general approval for specific social roles, such as that of employee
or student, taking an active part in civic, political or informal associations does not
earn universal praise. Staff operate within a contemporary society that appears to
place great store on garden redesign, for example, but which ridicules train spotting.
This might result in staff feeling comfortable about arranging a taxi for the learning
disabled person who wants to attend the agricultural college, but the same worker
may be less willing to arrange transport to a meeting of the local branch of railway
enthusiasts!
Separating out one’s rights as a citizen from one’s rights as an employee or for that
matter as a service user, can lead to contradictory allegiances for staff. A person’s
interests or eagerness to write to the newspapers about litter may embarrass the day
service staff member or spill over into unwelcome publicity for an employer. Despite
this, social capitalists demand that we support people with learning disabilities who
wish to vote, contribute to public discussions or agitate for social change.
In addition, those who provide formal or informal civic education should be
equally interested in the parallel questions, ‘How do I contribute to my community?’
and ‘How can I transform my community?’ Paulo Freire (1972) and other educators
204 P. Bates & F. A. Davis
of the liberation school have shown how the task of transforming society can be
attempted through alliances between disabled and non-disabled people; that is,
through the development of bridging social capital.
Community perception
In a recent training seminar, one day-centre worker described his own leisure time
as occupied entirely with solitary visits to the off-licence and watching TV game
shows, and therefore he did not see why isolation was a problem for disabled people.
We do not know if staff in learning disability services engage in community life to
a greater or lesser extent than the average, but it is likely that the personal attitudes
of staff will have a real impact on the lives of service users. This is illustrated by a
Department of Health study where inappropriate staff attitudes and behaviour was
the most frequently cited barrier to access by disabled people (Disability Matters
Limited & NHS Executive, 1999).
This suggests that there is some danger of staff defining service users’ lives by their
own personal choice of lifestyle, either by assuming that people with learning
disabilities will not be interested in community engagement or by evangelically
promoting their own personal interests.
Staff in learning disability services may also favour urban settings, as they appear
to offer more venues to people who use services, despite the high transport costs of
bringing everyone into a single point. Small, rural communities have fewer events
and buildings, but arguably more networks and informal opportunities to connect.
When there are more bridging relationships between groups in small communities,
positive or negative reputations can also spread quickly, and create or deny a new
resident a chance of a fresh start in a new social setting. This means that workers
engaged in community relocation should recognize informal networks as sources of
social capital and develop strategies in supporting service users to navigate them
successfully.
Staff and other allies therefore have a two-fold task: to recognize the unique
individuality of the learning disabled person and to similarly recognize the unique
attributes of the many available communities to which that person might contribute.
Such creative and individualized responses defy simple categorizations and press us
to create systems that promote artistry, rather than the regimented production of
standardized care packages. Since people with learning disabilities are likely to want
and need unique arrangements, there is a danger that the introduction of standard
monitoring systems will close down their leisure options to those listed on monitoring
forms, whilst treating the richness of local human communities as no more than
an arrangement of blank, featureless buildings and facilities.
Discussion
Attention to social capital is welcome as long as this emphasis does not eclipse other
important goals in the minds of service developers. For example, Wilkinson (1996)
asserts that income inequality is a fundamental cause of health inequality and that
Social capital, social inclusion and services 205
social capital plays no more than a mediating role in this relationship, while Putnam
(2000) sees social capital as the primary factor. We would argue therefore that
working on social capital must not become a cheap alternative to reducing income
inequality and must not divert us from the task of developing services that provide
for basic human dignity (Morgan, 2001).
As long as many learning disabled people lack a decent home, satisfactory income,
good health, meaningful employment, and freedom from discrimination and abuse
they are unlikely to view or be viewed as an asset to their neighbourhoods. The
complimentary relationship between social inclusion and social capital reminds us
that promoting social capital as a human service aim is a legitimate and long-term
solution to the isolation and segregation of many devalued groups. However, it is not
a panacea and needs bolstering with other approaches.
Social capitalists collect a diverse array of data from whole populations, as
illustrated by the range of issues under discussion. As there are a host of comparative
indicators already in use with the general population, some of these might also be
suitable for collecting aggregate data about people with learning disabilities and
comparing findings with the general population in order to discover the size of the
‘inclusion gap’ (Love et al., 2002). However, population-level data is a poor source
of guidance for what to offer to named individuals, and so care is needed in
interpreting these findings:
Sue lives in a suburb and works long hours in the city. She leaves early each morning
and gets home late at night. Almost every weekend she travels to visit friends in other
parts of the country. As a result, she does not know her neighbours. Despite her house
being often empty, she is safe from burglary as many of her neighbours are unemployed
and they maintain a vigorous neighbourhood watch group.
Social inclusion theorists would look at Sue’s connections with her neighbours, while
social capitalists look at the whole street and recognize that she benefits from the social
capital built up by her neighbours.
At the individual level, those staff who work on developing social capital therefore
also need to be skilled in recognizing other factors and have access to the expertise
of social inclusion advocates in how to choose, get and keep a home, a job and a
social life. Managers should be aware of the tension and difference in priorities that
each theoretical position taken on its own could have on resource allocation, and
strike an appropriate balance that supports people who use services and simultaneously
invests in the whole community. Service designers need to strike a balance
between attempting to develop new ‘social capital or inclusion projects’, and the
subtler task of threading the approach through existing services.
Conclusion
If interpreted with care, the concept of social capital provides a helpful additional
perspective to learning disability services that are striving to promote social inclusion.
The relationship is reciprocal, however, as inclusion advocates working with
learning disabled people have insights and experience that will support the pro-
206 P. Bates & F. A. Davis
motion of social capital for the whole community, as well as service users. Finally,
many of the issues that have been highlighted in this article apply equally to many
other groups who are at risk of exclusion. There is room for further dialogue.
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7
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10
Designing a Research Proposal
✓✓ To examine the role of the proposal within
research
✓✓ To inform readers of the criteria by which
successful proposals are judged
✓✓ To examine an example of a successful
research proposal
✓✓ To identify distinctions between quantitative
and qualitative proposals
✓✓ To provide a framework structure for a
research proposal
•• Introduction
•• What is a research proposal?
•• The reviewers’ assessment criteria
•• Quantitative and qualitative
research proposals
•• Is there a formula for writing
successful research proposals?
•• Outline of the proposed research
•• Summary
•• Recommended reading
Introduction
All researchers should be able to prepare a proposal for a research topic to a
professional standard. Being able to produce such a proposal is an important skill.
Intending doctoral students are required to prepare such a proposal when applying
for studentships and seeking formal registration for their project. Such requirements
are also common on many university Masters courses.
Outside of the academic arena, there are also many organisations that provide
funding for social research. Where this is the case, how do you convince a funding
body that may be assessing a large number of competing proposals that your
research is worthy of support in preference to the others that it will look at? You may
have a great idea that immediately captures the imagination, but are you capable of
transforming this idea into a feasible project?
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The research proposal is the means by which we are able to demonstrate that we
are able to do this. As such, it allows us to spell out what exactly is the research
problem that we are intending to investigate, why this is worthy of investigation,
and how we intend to carry out the research. In putting such a proposal together
we shall not only need to demonstrate our knowledge of the area in which we are
interested, but also be required to show that we have the necessary methodological
competence and sensitivity to carry out the research.
This chapter covers the essential ground in constructing a high-quality research
proposal. Specifically, it considers:
• What is a research proposal?
• What is the value of a research proposal?
• What should be included in a good research proposal?
• How should a research proposal be structured?
• By what standards are research proposals assessed?
What is a research proposal?
The research proposal is an application that is prepared by a research student,
university academic, or professional researcher for support prior to embarking
upon a research study.
At one level, the objectives of a research proposal may be seen as providing
a statement about the purposes of the research, how it is to be carried out, the
resource implications of the proposed investigation, as well as the timescale for
completion. At another level, however, the research proposal is an argument.
Through the document, you are presenting a case, in which the intention is to
convince others of the general merits and feasibility of the proposed study.
The research proposal should therefore aim to convey three key aspects of an
intended research project:
1. its objectives and scholarly significance;
2. your technical qualifications; and
3. the level of funding required.
The objectives and scholarly significance of the proposed study
The general research issues to be examined, together with the methodological
strategy to be pursued, need to be carefully explained to the reviewer. Each must
also be fully justified.
The proposal, then, should communicate your specific intentions. This involves
a clear overview of the purpose of the proposed study and of its importance,
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together with a step-by-step plan for conducting it. The research problem(s)
needs to be identified, questions or hypotheses should be stated, and key terms
defined. You must specify and justify which target group is to be included
in the sample, together with the research design to be adopted, the research
instrument(s) to be used, the procedures to be followed, and the methods of
analysis to be used.
All of these aspects of the project should be covered, and at least a partial review
of previous related literature must be included. This will enable you to ‘ground’
your project theoretically – to make explicit links between this and existing ideas
and debates that are taking place within the wider academic or policy community.
The literature review will also enable you to demonstrate the suitability of your
proposed research strategy. Your case will be strengthened if you: (a) reference the
type of methods used by other authors in the past to conduct similar studies; (b) are
then able to demonstrate from this that you have appraised the effectiveness of
these approaches in generating data to examine the issues at hand, and therefore
justified your own choice of research strategy.
The technical qualifications of the researcher
This will need to be stated, whether you are a student intending to commence with
a Masters or doctoral research programme, or a project leader applying for funding
support. Your experience and level of expertise should be carefully set out, in terms
of both your knowledge of the subject area and your methodological ‘qualifications’
and skills. (Note that when applying for funding, it should not be assumed that by
‘experience’, precedence is inevitably given to those who are well published with
a long history of research in the field, over new and aspiring researchers. As we
shall see, an application is judged on the basis of the applicant’s track record to
date, which will be measured against the particular stage reached in her or his
academic career.)
The level of funding required
It goes without saying that all review committees will need to be convinced that
the intended project provides ‘value for money’. This, as we shall see, does not
necessarily mean that cheapest is always best. Instead, it requires that the researcher
provides evidence that she or he has carefully costed the proposed project, and that
the level of funding sought is warranted, given both the aims and objectives of the
study and the methods to be used to implement it.
If yours is a proposed Masters dissertation or doctoral thesis, and you are not
applying directly for financial support, you will nonetheless need to convince the
course team that you have access to sufficient resources to complete your study.
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The reviewers’ assessment criteria
The essential criteria for assessment of the research proposal will be broadly the
same, regardless of which body the prospective researcher is targeting. This will be
the case, whether or not you are applying for funding from an external agency or a
university research committee, or to a postgraduate course team in order to receive
its approval to proceed with a postgraduate dissertation. The proposal should
contain sufficient information to persuade both specialist and non-specialist
members of the review committee that the proposed activity is sound and worthy
of support under their criteria for the selection of projects.
Activity 10.1 Review Committee’s judgement
of a research proposal
What do you think the research review committee will consider most
important in assessing a research proposal? Make a list of the
areas that you think members of such a committee would focus
upon when considering a research proposal.
But what are the key criteria that such bodies
use to assess a research proposal?
The criteria most typically used by review committees to measure the potential of
your research proposal can be listed as:
• Track record
• Originality
• Feasibility
• Clarity
• Outputs
Activity 10.2 Review committee assessment criteria
Consider the assessment criteria listed above. Which do you think the
research review committee will consider most important in assessing a
research proposal? How would you rank them in terms of their priority
for such a committee? For each, write short notes explaining why you
think it is a low- or high-level criterion for review committees.
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Clarity
The assessors will be scrutinising a research proposal to ensure that there is an
internal coherence to the project:
• Is it clearly thought through in terms of what you have set out to do?
• Is there a clear identification of the research problem that you intend to investigate?
It will be anticipated – indeed expected – by the review committee that the research
proposal will not be deficient in these areas. Therefore, clarity is a low-level criterion.
Very few research proposals would be expected to fail because they lacked internal
coherence.
Feasibility
Can you achieve what you initially set out to do in your proposal (within your
budget and your estimated timescale, and using your initial research strategy)?
You should think through your research plans carefully, and try to anticipate all
possible issues and detours that you may encounter during your study. But the review
committee will be sufficiently experienced in these matters to appreciate that research
programmes cannot be precisely mapped out, particularly for emergent qualitative
research studies. Certainly, the notion of ‘delivery within budget’ is a red herring.
And there will be issues that arise during the course of your study which may
impact upon your initial methodological strategy – issues that you could not
realistically have predicted at the outset. Perhaps these will be in terms of access
difficulties encountered, or sickness of a key ‘gatekeeper’, or ethical matters that
arise additional to those discussed in your research design.
Feasibility is an important issue, and the review committee will use this as one
of the criteria upon which they will assess your research proposal. However, risk
will take precedence over predictability. Producing a book on time is of course
important, but the review committee will ask the question, ‘will the book be read
by 5, or 500, or 5,000 people?’ before they ask, ‘will the applicant meet his/her
deadline?’ Similarly, If you can demonstrate that your research is innovative, then
your proposal is likely to be considered very seriously by the review committee.
The exciting, yet expensive, research idea has a greater likelihood of approval than
a proposal that is considerably cheaper, but is nonetheless not as inspiring.
Feasibility is an important criterion therefore – more so than clarity – but it is
nonetheless a relatively low-level one.
Track record
Understandably, if your research proposal is to be assessed competitively against
those submitted by other candidates, the review committee will take into account
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the track records of each applicant. But an established track record by itself is
certainly no guarantee of success. And review committees will be realistic enough to
appreciate that a ‘new’ researcher can only develop a good track record if bodies like
their own provide the researcher with the support to embark upon a research career.
Furthermore, such committees will have different expectations of ‘new’ and
more ‘long-standing’ applicants. Indeed, a good track record can be achieved even
at a relatively early stage for researchers. The expectations held by assessors of
what counts as a good track record is relative to the stage of a research career
achieved by a particular applicant. New and aspiring researchers should therefore
pitch their application for research support appropriately. Typically, the route to
be taken is a ‘staged’ one. It involves the aspiring student applying initially for
a university postgraduate course. Paid academic research posts, or practitioner
research posts, are likely to follow only after qualification. Such a trajectory may be
a long and arduous one, but achieving a good track record comes only with talent
and hard work.
Outputs
This is a very important criterion, more so than those already mentioned. The
review committee will be particularly interested in supporting project proposals
that have the potential for achieving publication, or which may have ‘utility’ for the
wider policy community.
Extract 10.1 provides an example taken from a (successful) research proposal –
the Youth and Politics project (Henn and Weinstein 2000) – that was awarded a
research grant from an external research-funding agency (the Economic and Social
Research Council). Here, the applicants were required to demonstrate the relevance
of the research for different user groups.
Notice that there are very explicit statements from the funding agency concerning
its expectations about:
• the usefulness of the proposed research for this community;
• that there is evidence that such organisations and individuals have had some
input into the design of the research;
• that the research is of sufficient interest to practitioners that they may have
provided tangible support to the project (perhaps in terms of part-funding or a
letter of support).
You may not have been able to achieve this level of external support, but it will
significantly add to the robustness and credibility of your research proposal if you
can demonstrate that it has importance to the wider practitioner or policy-making
communities. This will be the case regardless of whether or not you are applying
for external funding for research, or you are preparing a research proposal for a
thesis.
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EXTRACT 10.1 Youth and Politics project (Henn and Weinstein 2000)
Relevance to ‘user’ groups
Please explain below the likely contribution to policy or practice; details of
consultation with user groups (such as public, private and voluntary sector
practitioners and policy makers) in the development of the research and
proposed collaboration/communication with such groups during the research
should be included. Details of any potential co-funding or support in kind should
also be included here. Do not exceed one side.
1. The proposed research will be of value to policy users and to the wider political
community. In previous research, we have dealt with a number of agencies
and organisations that have links to youth, including amongst others, the
Institute for Citizenship, the Citizenship Team at the Department for Education
and Employment, the National Union of Students, various trades unions (notably
the GMB), and the party youth sections. Meetings will be held to further progress
these links through the research, in terms of: the design of the research and
the survey questionnaire; testing out the plausibility and utility of the research
findings; the dissemination of the findings through presentations at the end of
the research. Together, these organisations will be able to provide invaluable
advice and support to the project.
2. Non-technical summaries and briefing papers shall be disseminated to
various policy users and other interested groups, including those mentioned
in 1. above, but also others such as the British Youth Council, the Young
Fabians, as well as all members of the Crick Commission, and think-tanks.
3. Academics will be consulted during the design stage of the research –
particularly in terms of discussion of theoretical issues in the development of
the questionnaire.
4. Research results will be communicated to the academic community via
conferences (the annual meetings of the UK Political Studies Association and the
British Sociological Association) and academic journals (papers will be submitted
to the ‘British Journal of Political Science’, and ‘Sociology’ in the first instance).
5. Earlier research that we have conducted has already been widely
disseminated through the national and local media. It is anticipated that the
proposed research will lead to similar levels of media exposure, and press
releases will be produced for this purpose.
Originality
Members of a review committee who are charged with the task of reviewing your
research proposal will recognise that the project’s perceived contribution to the
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external users, or its potential for publication in an academic journal, or to gain a
good pass on a Masters course, will be largely dependent upon its originality. The
potential to generate new knowledge is the key to a good research proposal. If you
can convince the review committee that you have met this criterion, then and only
then will they assess your proposal on the basis of the other criteria mentioned
above. By the same token, if you fail to convince these assessors that you have an
original idea that you intend to investigate through your proposed project, then the
reviewers are unlikely to consider your application further.
But different types of reviewer will have different yardsticks against which to
measure ‘originality’:
1. External funding agencies (higher education funding councils like the ESRC,
charitable funding bodies like the Nuffield Foundation) – will assess originality
in terms of an expected significant contribution to knowledge likely to follow
from the proposed research.
2. Ph.D. review committees – will look for indications that the intended study
programme has a significant potential for publication.
3. Masters supervisors – will be concerned that the dissertation proposal will lead
to an authentic and independent research project.
So, how will you discover your ‘big idea’?
It is likely to develop organically from your own research interests. Most
importantly, you must read widely – adopting too narrow a focus in your reading
may limit your ability to discover your research question. You must look consciously
for it. This will by necessity involve you in one or more of the following:
• Developing an awareness (through reviewing the literature and/or attending
conferences) of the research which is currently being developed in your field. As
you do so, search for an idea which you consider to be significant by its omission
from your field. Try to identify what is conventionally referred to as a research
gap in your chosen area.
• Challenging current thinking in your field (to do this requires you to be aware
of the key issues and debates in your subject area first of all).
• Applying an existing idea to a new field or a different academic or policy
context. This may not involve you in developing a ‘new’ idea as such, but the
way in which you use that existing idea will be innovative. It therefore has the
potential to make an original contribution to knowledge. An example might
involve you examining a marketing technique that is used widely within the
general field of business studies, and researching the extent of its usage by
political parties in their campaigning. Through your research, you may gain a
greater understanding of the development of modern electioneering methods.
The research proposal is therefore an important document. As such, it will take
significant time, effort, and patience to get it right. It will also likely involve the
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preparation of several drafts, as well as feedback from colleagues in the field, before
it is ready for submission. But such preparation has some important potential benefits
for the project. Submitting the research proposal enables an expert review committee
to evaluate the merits of your research plans, and in so doing – especially where they
may offer suggestions for revision – provides important ‘expert’ insight into how to
improve the study.
Quantitative and qualitative research proposals
Prior to the drafting of a research proposal, the nature of the research design to be
selected should be set out. Whether one is intending to adopt a broadly qualitative
research design, or a strategy that is largely quantitative in nature, is likely to affect
the shape and format of the research proposal. Of course, those charged with
reviewing proposals would have very clear expectations that certain content will be
included in the proposal, regardless of the intended research strategy. However,
some elements of a quantitative research proposal will not be included in a
qualitative research proposal, and vice versa. Furthermore, quantitative research
proposals are likely to be more uniform than those designed for broadly qualitativebased
studies. As K.P. Punch (1998, pp.269–70) notes:
It is easier in many respects to suggest proposal guidelines for a quantitative
study, since there is greater variety in qualitative studies, and many qualitative
studies will be unfolding rather than prestructured. An emerging study cannot
be as specific in the proposal about its research questions, or about details of the
design. When this is the case, the point needs to be made in the proposal.
In the remainder of this chapter, the core elements of a research proposal will be
reviewed. Where appropriate, the specific aspects that are necessary for drafting
either a qualitative or a quantitative proposal will be noted.
Is there a formula for writing successful
research proposals?
A research proposal, then, is a written plan for a study. It spells out in detail what
the researcher intends to do. It permits others to learn about the intended research,
and to offer suggestions for improving the study. It helps the researcher to clarify
what needs to be done, and aims to avoid unintentional pitfalls or unknown
problems.
Before examining what a research proposal might look like, it is important to be
aware that what will be suggested in the remainder of this chapter is intended to
serve as a general framework, not a definitive set of instructions. The only general
rule that must always be adhered to is that the research proposal should be both
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succinct and complete. Other than that, each university research committee or
external funding agency will have its own expectations about the actual format of
the research proposal, and some will be more explicit than others in this respect.
Research proposals often vary significantly in terms of length. In some cases,
application forms that prescribe precisely what is wanted will need to be completed.
In others, the researcher will have more latitude to decide upon the format of the
proposal.
However, the onus will be on the researcher to ‘bend’ to meet the requirements
of the university review committee or external funding agency.
Outline of the proposed research
In the absence of any forms or guidelines, there are general themes that you might
use to structure your own research proposal, whether this is for a postgraduate
dissertation, or an application for external research funding. However, what
follows are ‘elements’ of a proposal – you do not need to have each as a particular
heading.
Title page
This should include each of the following: your name, the title of the proposed
project, any collaborating agencies which have been involved in the preparation of
the proposal, the date of submission, and, if applicable, the funding agency to
which you are applying for support.
Abstract
The abstract is a brief synopsis of the planned research investigation. It appears at
the front of the proposal, but it is usually the last element to be written. It should
include two key areas – the major objectives of the proposed study, and the
procedures and general methodological strategy that are to be used in order to meet
these objectives. The abstract should be approximately one page or less in length.
The abstract is an important strategic element of the proposal, and therefore
should be afforded considerable attention in the drafting of your proposal. It serves
three key interlinked purposes:
• The reviewer usually reads it before the full proposal to gain a perspective of the
study and of its expected significance.
• The reviewer uses it as a reference to the nature of the study if the project comes
up for discussion.
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• It will sometimes be the only part of the proposal that is read when making
preliminary selections of applicant proposals.
Read through Extract 10.2. As you do so, look carefully at the two aspects of an
abstract outlined above, and note how they are covered.
EXTRACT 10.2 Abstract: Youth and Politics project (Henn and Weinstein 2000)
Conventional wisdom holds that young people in Britain are alienated from the
political process. Moreover, some have suggested that there is an ‘historic
political disconnection’ of youth from formal party politics, with this group more
likely to participate in new politics formations. Paradoxically, there is a recognition
that formalised youth activities are a potentially significant aspect of party
development. They serve the purposes of recruiting the future political elite,
raising political awareness among young people, and widening the pool of party
activists. The aim of this project is to reveal the level of engagement that young
people have with party politics in Britain. Specifically, the research will examine
whether there is a crisis of democratic legitimacy in terms of the attitudes of
young people toward party politics. It will also investigate differences in this
respect, along socio-demographic and spatial lines. Importantly, regional analysis
will enable an examination of the efficacy of new political institutions in Wales,
Scotland and London for strengthening levels of young people’s political
engagement. Quantitative data will be collected by means of a national postal
survey of young people. This will be the first British nation-wide study to focus
exclusively on first-time voters with only limited experience of formal politics.
Activity 10.3
Think about a research project that you intend to conduct. Write an
abstract of between 200 and 250 words, setting out (a) the general
issues and debates/or policy field that you intend to engage with
through your study, (b) your specific aims and objectives, and (c) the
research strategy that you propose to follow to meet these objectives.
Research problem to be investigated
There are usually four areas to be addressed in this section of the research proposal:
the purpose of the proposed study, a justification for the project, the specific research
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questions that you intend to explore, and a definition of the key terms and concepts
that you will examine. However, you will write only one section. This must contain
all of these four aspects; you will not deal with each under a separate heading.
Purpose of the study
This section expects you to state succinctly what the research proposes to
investigate. The purpose should be a concise statement, providing a framework to
which details are added later. Generally speaking, any study should seek to clarify
some aspect of the field of interest that is considered important, thereby contributing
both to the overall knowledge in the field and to current practice.
Justification for the study
The researcher must make clear why this particular study is important to
investigate. You must present an argument for the work of the study.
As an example, you might be interested in the general field of organisation studies.
If you intend to study a particular method through which a local authority deals with
harassment at work, you need to make a case that such a study is important, and that
people are or should be concerned with it. Perhaps it is particularly prevalent in a
particular department compared to the overall situation within the local authority.
You might indicate that previous studies have identified a pattern of harassment
that is linked to poor morale within the workplace, increased incidences of people
suffering from occupational stress, and high levels of absenteeism. Or perhaps, where
the issue is not checked, it may lead to poor industrial relations. The net result either
way may lead to an erosion of quality within the particular department, and a decline
in public confidence in the service.
Alternatively, you may be interested in conducting a research study which aims
to evaluate the effectiveness of ‘care in the community’ solutions for mental health
patients. Existing research may indicate that since the introduction of the current
arrangements, there has been a marked increase in the general suicide rate amongst
this group, or perhaps an expansion in the rate of homelessness among people with
severe learning difficulties.
You must also make clear why you have chosen to investigate the particular
method adopted by organisations to tackle such problems. In many such proposals,
there is the implication that current methods are not adequate to tackle the problem
seriously.
Coley and Scheinberg (1990, p.41) have developed a useful framework for
conceptualising issues for research that helps to justify how research may reveal
interesting new insights into the problem. The framework may not, in its entirety,
be appropriate for all styles of research, but the general method they adopt is a
useful way of beginning to think about how you may structure the ‘case’ for your
proposed study:
People with ‘A’ characteristics and background live in ‘B’ conditions/environments
and have ‘C’ problems/needs that are caused by ‘D’.
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People are blocked from solving these problems because of ‘E’. This problem
is related to other problems ‘F’, and have ‘G’ short- and long-term impact if not
addressed.
The impact of their needs/problems on the community is ‘H’. Others have
addressed their needs/problems by doing ‘I’, the result of their interventions
have been ‘J’.
The most promising strategy for intervention now is ‘K’.
Key questions to ask yourself at this point are:
• Have I identified the specific research problem that I wish to investigate?
• Have I indicated what I intend to do about this problem?
• Have I put forward an argument as to why this problem is worthy of
investigation?
The research questions
The particular research questions that you intend to examine should be stated
next. These are usually, but not always, a more specific form of the problem in
question form. For quantitative researchers, research hypotheses will be set out at
this stage for reasons of clarity and as a research strategy. If a researcher has a
hypothesis in mind, it should be stated as clearly and as concisely as possible. It is
unnecessarily frustrating for a reader to have to infer what a study’s hypothesis or
hypotheses might be. Examples of the research questions that were to be pursued
in the Youth and Politics project noted in Extracts 10.1 and 10.2 are included in
Extract 10.3.
For qualitative researchers, especially those adopting an emergent research
design, the actual research questions and hypotheses will not become clear until the
research has begun. Typically, these begin to take shape in the course of data
collection and analysis. As K.P. Punch (1998, p.270) notes:
If a tightly structured qualitative study is planned, the proposal can proceed
along similar lines to the quantitative proposal. If a more emergent study is
planned, where focus and structure will develop as the study proceeds, this point
should be made clearly (in the research proposal). In the former case, there will
be general and specific questions. In the latter case, there will only be general
orienting and guiding research questions.
Key questions to ask yourself at this point are:
• Have I asked the specific research questions that I wish to explore through my
research?
• Do I have any hypotheses in mind? If so, have I expressed them clearly and
appropriately?
• Do I intend to investigate a relationship between different phenomena or
variables? If so, have I indicated the variables that I think may be related?
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EXTRACT 10.3 Key research questions: Youth and Politics project
(Henn and Weinstein 2000)
• Popular understanding of parties.
• Are young people indifferent, or even hostile to political parties?
• What, if anything, do they like about them?
• Do their attitudes towards parties significantly differ from those of other
sections of the population (such as their parents’ generation)?
• Is there evidence to suggest that young people are now more disaffected from
parties than at any time since the introduction of universal suffrage?
• And is there a case for arguing that young people, given their particular
socialisation and formal educational experiences, might actually be more
predisposed to party appeals?
Activity 10.4
Write down a list of five key questions that you aim to research in
your project. As you do, make brief notes to remind yourself why you
are asking these questions – what do you aim to achieve in doing so?
Definitions of key terms and concepts
All key terms should be defined. In a quantitative hypothesis-testing study, these
are primarily the terms that describe the variables of the study. Your task is to make
your definitions as clear as possible. If previous definitions found in the literature
are clear to all, that is well and good. Often, however, they need to be modified to
fit your proposed study. It is often helpful to formulate operational definitions as a
way of clarifying terms or phrases. While it is probably impossible to eliminate all
ambiguity from definitions, the clearer the terms used in a study are – to both you
and others – the fewer difficulties will be encountered in subsequent planning and
conducting of the study.
For instance, if you are conducting a study which involves researching
harassment at work, you will want to examine different aspects and dimensions
of this key concept. One of these may be violence, and you should carefully define
this by taking account of the different forms of violence – physical, verbal, and
emotional. Now review the section on operationalising concepts in Chapter 3.
In an emergent qualitative-based research study, however, the key concepts that
you intend to engage with in your research will not all be clear to you at the outset
of your research. The key issues, their dimensions, and how you intend to define
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them will only become clear in the course of the actual empirical investigation.
Where this is so, you should state this clearly within your proposal.
A key question to ask yourself at this point is:
• Have I defined all key terms clearly and (if possible) operationally?
Review of the literature
In a research proposal, the literature review is a partial summary of previous work
related to the focus of the study. You will need to demonstrate to a review committee
that you are familiar with the major trends in previous research as well as opinions
on the topic, and that you understand their relevance to your planned study. The
major weakness of many literature reviews is that they cite references without
indicating their relevance or implications for the planned study.
You need to review the literature comprehensively prior to the development of
your research proposal – in order for instance to identify a research gap that will
serve as a stimulus for your study. However, the space available for you to develop
this in your research proposal will be limited. You will therefore need to be concise
and succinct in your review.
Cormack (1984) provides a useful overview of the three key uses of a literature
review. It will:
• provide you with a wide range of documentary information on facts, opinions,
and comments concerning the topic to be investigated;
• help you to discover whether the topic has already been studied, and, if so, to
what extent your work will be affected;
• help you to decide which research techniques will be most appropriate for your
study.
In the early stages, the literature review will consume much of your time and
energies. However, it should be regarded as a continuous process, with new
information added as the project proceeds.
You should take a structured approach to your literature search. Ask yourself,
what information are you after? If you are going to use word searches on CD-ROMs
or the Internet, you should list all the possible keywords and synonyms that you
consider to be relevant to your research question(s). You should also be clear about
which timescale you intend to cover in your project (only articles since 1991?), and
what the geographic boundaries are that you intend to work within (Australian but
not Canadian studies?). Finally, you should be flexible about the range of material
that you consider for your literature review – especially if your initial searching
fails to uncover a sufficient body of literature for your study. For instance, you may
consider studies that investigate the sources and impact of occupational stress in
the teaching and nursing professions, and how these experiences apply to the fire
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service in terms of the implications for safety. Or perhaps in a project focusing on
youth engagement with politics, you might find it valuable to consider studies that
examine the political participation of ethnic minority groups. For more information
about consulting the literature, see Chapter 9.
Key questions to ask yourself at this point are:
• Have I surveyed and described relevant studies that are related to my research
problem?
• Have I surveyed existing expert opinion on the problem?
• Have I summarised the existing state of opinion and research on the problem?
Methodology to be used for conducting the research
The methodology section should include a discussion of your intended research
design, the sample you will examine, the instruments to be used to conduct the
investigation, procedural detail for collecting your empirical evidence, and the data
analysis technique(s) to be used.
Research design
The particular research design to be used should be identified, as well as how it
applies to the present study. You therefore need to ensure that your choice of
approach is justified in this section (see Extract 10.4). Typically, the basic design is
fairly clear cut, and fits one of the following models:
• Survey research
• Historical research
• Experimental research
• Observational/ethnographic research
• Documentary research
However, you may want to use a variety of approaches. Combining methods and
strategies may help to add depth to your study, as well as enable you to identify
whether your approach is valid and reliable. See Chapter 3 for a discussion of this
mixed method research design.
Emergent qualitative research designs may involve you in approaching your
methods more flexibly during the course of the study. As K.P. Punch (1998, p.273)
explains, when opting for such a research design: ‘There is a need to explain the
flexibility the study requires and why, and how decisions will be made as the study
unfolds’.
Nonetheless, you should be as explicit as you can be in your proposal about the
general research design that you intend to use, and provide as much material about
your plans as you are able.
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EXTRACT 10.4 Youth and Politics research proposal
(Henn and Weinstein 2000)
As you read through this extract, notice how the two methods are justified with
respect to the project aims and objectives.
Focus on attainers
As a methodological innovation, we will focus exclusively on ‘attainers’ – young
people eligible to vote for the first time when the 2001 electoral register comes
into force. As far as we are aware, the proposed study would be the first of its kind
to focus solely on attainers. Our intention in limiting our study to this age group is
twofold. Firstly, in research terms, attainers are a relatively unique target group.
Most social and political surveys that examine the views of young people tend to
combine their views with older youths. Hence, attainers will typically be analysed
as part of an 18–24 (or 18–25) year old group (see, for instance Parry et al. 1992)
or included in studies of students (e.g., Denver and Hands 1990), often alongside
respondents with an increasingly mature age profile as Higher Education is opened
up to new entrants. Secondly, they will have had minimal formal experience of
participating in politics in terms of voting, with the possible exception of the 2001
local elections.They are, therefore, relatively inexperienced politically in comparison
to older people and are therefore less likely than their older contemporaries to
have formed deep-seated views about politics, parties and politicians. As a
consequence, attainers provide a fascinating target group for study in terms of
their perceptions of political institutions and actors in Britain. The study will form
the baseline for understanding future developments in youth attitudes of, and
orientation towards, British political parties as these attainers gain experience of
engaging with politics. There is potential therefore to track attitudes over time for
comparative purposes.
Activity 10.5
Decide what is to be the research design for your intended study.
State clearly why you have chosen that particular approach in terms of
the aims and objectives you set out for your project in Activity 10.4.
Sample
In your proposal, you should indicate in considerable detail how you will include
participants – the sample – for investigation in your study. You should indicate
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what the size of the sample will be, how members will be selected, and what claims
you may legitimately make about the representativeness of your sample. For a
quantitative research study, you should aim, if at all possible, to adopt a random
sampling technique, or, if this is unrealistic, a quota sampling method should be
used in an attempt to maximise representativeness.
However, for small-scale projects of the type likely to be undertaken by
postgraduate students where your study will be subject to various resource
constraints, it may be legitimate to use other less rigorous sampling methods such
as the convenience sample. It is more important to complete a project with an
unrepresentative sample than abandon the study because it fails to achieve a
sample that is representative of your target group. If a convenience sample must
be used, relevant demographics (gender, ethnicity, occupation, age, housing, and
any other relevant characteristics) of the sample should be described. The
legitimate population to which the results of the study may be generalised should
be indicated.
For emergent qualitative research designs, you are likely to use theoretical
sampling to select your research participants. Where this is the case, you are much
more likely to include respondents whose presence is designed to maximise
theoretical development than to achieve representativeness. Your reasons for
choosing this sampling strategy should be indicated (and justified) within this
section of the research proposal, together with an acknowledgement that: (a) the
sample has been chosen to generate insights (as opposed to definitive conclusions)
about your research area; and (b) the results will be indicative, rather than
representative, of the views of the wider population. For a further discussion of this
point, see the section on case selection from Chapter 3.
Key questions to ask yourself at this point are:
• Have I described my sampling plan?
• Have I described the relevant characteristics of my sample in detail?
• If you are using a predominantly quantitative research design, have I identified
the population to which the results of the study may legitimately be generalised?
• If you are using a predominantly qualitative research design, have I demonstrated
that my selection of cases is reasonably typical of what might be expected if I had
conducted my research elsewhere?
Instruments to be used
Whenever possible, existing research instruments should be used in your study,
since construction of even the most straightforward test or questionnaire (or
selection of questions) is often very time consuming and difficult. Furthermore,
doing so will enable you to make comparisons between your findings and the
results from the earlier study from which the research instrument was borrowed.
However, you cannot justify using an existing research instrument if it is not
appropriate for your purpose, even though it may be more convenient. You will
therefore need to assess whether existing instruments are suited to your needs.
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In the event that appropriate instruments are not available, the procedures to be
followed in developing your own research instruments to be used in the study
should be described with attention to how validity and reliability will be enhanced.
It will be important to indicate within your proposal that you intend to build a pilot
stage (Extract 10.5) into your project, or, if the research instrument has already been
tested for these purposes, include a version within the appendices. For example, if
you are conducting a survey, you should include a specimen questionnaire or some
questions that you consider to be good illustrations of what you will ask. For a more
qualitative research design, you might include an observation schedule, or a topic
guide for in-depth interviews.
EXTRACT 10.5 Pilot stage: Youth and Politics research
proposal (Henn and Weinstein 2000)
As you read through the following extract, you will notice how a pilot study has
already been conducted to examine both what sorts of question areas will likely
need to be explored for the qualitative part of the project, and how the quantitative
aspect will take advantage of an existing research instrument.
Pilot research
A qualitative-based pilot study, using focus groups, has already been completed
by the research team in preparation for this full project (Henn, Weinstein and Wring
1999). This preliminary research was designed to help establish which questions
should be asked, as well as their structure. We will also hold meetings with various
party youth activists and youth organisers, interested user groups, and academics in
order to further our understanding of which questions to include in the questionnaire.
In addition, the proposed survey will include questions that appear on other national
political opinion studies to enable comparative work with other age groups (including
amongst others, the British Social Attitudes surveys, the British Election Studies
surveys, and the British Election Panel surveys). Considerable attention will be paid
to the design and layout of the questionnaire to ensure an attractive presentation of
the postal survey.This will draw on previous experience of conducting postal surveys
of this particular target group (Wring, Henn and Weinstein 1999; Henn, Weinstein and
Wring 2000). A pilot study will be conducted in the Nottingham area in order to test
the efficacy of the questions to be used in the postal survey.
Key questions to ask yourself at this point are:
• Have I described the instrument(s) to be used?
• Have I indicated their relevance to the present study?
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• Have I stated how I will check the reliability and validity of my data collection
instruments?
• Have I built a ‘piloting the instrument’ stage into the research design?
Procedures and data collection
Outline your proposed method(s) of research. This should be presented in sufficient
detail for the reader to know whether the project is realistic, feasible, and worthwhile.
You will need to describe how you intend to access your target group, and contact
your research participants. Is your target group one that is typically difficult to
involve in research studies of your kind? If so, what steps will you take to maximise
your response rate, and minimise bias? What method of data collection will you
use? For instance, if your proposed study involves the use of a questionnaire, you
should indicate whether you intend to use a self-completion version, or implement
it in a face-to-face situation, or via the telephone.
It is important to make your procedures of data collection clear so that if another
researcher wants to repeat the study in exactly the same way as the original, you
have made your procedures as clear as possible so they can be replicated. Certain
procedures may change from those previewed in the proposal as the study is carried
out, but a proposal should always aim to have this level of clarity as its goal. Explain
why you think this is the best method for investigating the research problem.
A key question to ask yourself at this point is:
• Have I fully described the procedures to be followed in the study – what will be
done, where, when, and how?
Data analysis
The researcher should indicate how the data to be collected will be organised,
interpreted, and analysed. You should explain which statistical procedures and
tests you intend to use for quantitative-based studies, and why you are choosing to
do so. Similarly, if you intend to conduct a qualitative research study, then you
should indicate the methods of analysis you will use to analyse the data. Perhaps
you intend to quantify the results obtained from your unstructured interviews?
If your project is more emergent in nature, you may be proposing to adopt a
grounded theory approach.
Ethical considerations
The review committee will have been alerted to any potential or any actual ethical
problems likely to arise from your proposed study while reading the methodology
section. The proposal may be reviewed by a committee whose primary objective is
to assess the scientific methods of a study, but they will also be aware of ethical
issues.
It is important that you anticipate gaining written consent from adults or
parents or guardians when members of your target group cannot themselves give
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approval. Ethical matters may also be relevant to protecting these research
participants from any negative consequences of your study. However, you will also
need to demonstrate to the review committee that you have taken adequate steps
to ensure that both yourself and others associated with your intended project are
protected from harm, particularly if the research situation is one that has the
potential to place people in positions of danger.
At some point in the proposal it is necessary to indicate clearly what you regard
as the major ethical issues of the project, and to state clearly how these will be
handled. Alternatively you may state that the proposal raises no ethical issues. In
order to complete this section effectively and convincingly, you should pay close
attention to the ethical guidelines that are set out in the codes of conduct that many
academic and professional organisations have developed. For a full discussion of
ethics, see Chapter 4.
Timescale
The amount of time you need to devote to the study should be set out in the
proposal. It may be that this is a proposal for a full-time commitment or for only a
few hours in a week. But whichever is the case, the research proposal must specify
the amount of time involved (Extract 10.6). The review committee will need to know
how long the project will take when considering whether to fund it, or, if yours is a
proposal for a Masters dissertation, whether the project can be finished within your
deadline.
EXTRACT 10.6 Timetable for the Youth and Politics project
Completion of all preparation and design work (3 months); commencement of
survey data collection phase of study (3 months); completion of survey
data collection phase of study (6 months); commencement of analysis phase
of study (6 months); completion of analysis phase of study (14 months);
commencement of writing up of the research (12 months); completion of
preparation of any new datasets for archiving (14 months); completion of writing
up (18 months).
Facilities and resources
Describing particular forms of expertise or backup facilities can strengthen a
proposal. Good computer and library facilities fall into this category. Where
established networks are integral to a project, or co-operation has been obtained
from particular agencies or institutions, some indication of this, like a letter of
agreement, may be included as a helpful appendix.
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Budget
Preparing a research budget is as much a skill as preparing other parts of the
proposal. Part of the skill lies in locating other people who know the price of all
appropriate commodities: staff time, tape-recorders, photocopying, travel costs,
and so on. Preparing a budget means translating the timescale and plan of work
into financial terms.
In preparing a budget, use a checklist to include main headings such as:
• Research salaries
• Data collection costs (purchase of equipment and other materials, printing,
travelling expenses)
• Stationery and postage
• Data analysis expenses
Pre-submission
It is likely that a research proposal will go through many drafts. Indeed, there
would be major cause for concern if it did not. There are a number of things to be
achieved in reviewing a proposal – not least considering its physical presentation.
Legibility, lucidity, and clarity of presentation are all important. While readers of a
proposal will not be evaluating its presentation, the relatively small amount of time
it takes to ensure a layout that is easily followed will be time well spent.
Check carefully that the proposal meets all of the criteria set by the review
committee.
Perhaps most importantly, ask colleagues to read and comment upon your
proposal, and take any criticisms that they may have of it seriously. As Hessler
(1992, p.287) states:
We assume too much, taking for granted the nuances and assumptions of our
research, which is tough on readers who do not share this knowledge ... take
nothing for granted. If in doubt, spell it out, even to the point of repeating
yourself. Redundancy is not the worst sin in grant writing.
SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed the process of constructing a research proposal, setting
out the main points that need to be considered in producing a professional and
convincing document. As we have seen, in any proposal it is of paramount
importance that the research that is envisaged is clearly articulated and is of value
to the body looking to support the research.
In assessing your proposal, a reviewer will also be looking to see that your
proposed study is a feasible one. As well as capturing a reviewer’s imagination
with the subject of your research, you will have to satisfy the reviewer that you
are in a position to carry the research out to a high standard. Having a bright idea
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is the starting point from which you have to construct a compelling case that your
research is not only interesting, but also capable of execution.
In this respect the reviewer will be looking for you to demonstrate your
methodological proficiency and sensitivity. For example, have you adequately
addressed the complexities of the sampling strategy that will need to be adopted
and are you fully aware of any potential issues that may preclude you obtaining
access to your intended research participants?
As we have seen, there are different audiences for different sorts of research
proposals. If your research is intended to be carried out as part of a Masters
course at a university, you may be primarily focused on persuading your tutors
that you have located your research in a particular body of specialist literature.
On the other hand, if you are applying for funding from an external agency that
places a high premium on policy-oriented research then you will need to convince
the reviewing panel that your research not only is of academic interest, but also
has wider societal value.
Of course, all reviewers will have their own set of criteria by which they will
judge the proposals that come before them. Unfortunately, there is no easily
applied formula that can be applied to all research proposals that can guarantee
success. However, the more consideration that you have been able to give to the
research you plan to carry out, reflecting on the outline elements that have been
covered in this chapter, the more likely it is that you will have produced a
proposal that stands up to keen scrutiny.
RECOMMENDED READING
Blaikie, N. 2000. Designing Social Research. Cambridge:
Polity Press.
Brewer, E.W., Achilles, C.M. and Fuhriman, J.R. 1993.
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Funding: Grant Writing for the Financially Challenged
Educator. London: Sage.
Bryman, A. 2001. Social Research Methods. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Coley, S.M. and Scheinberg, C.A. 1990. Proposal Writing.
London: Sage.
Hart, C. 2001. Doing a Literature Search: A
Comprehensive Guide for the Social Sciences. London:
Sage.
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Henn, M. and Weinstein, M. 2000. First-Time Voters’
Attitudes towards Party Politics in Britain [online].
Economic and Social Research Council. Available at
<http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_social/Peo
ples_ perceptions_social_capital.pdf> (Accessed 9
January 2004).
Punch, K.P. 1998. Introduction to Social Research:
Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches. London:
Sage.
Punch, K.P. 2000. Developing Effective Research
Proposals. London: Sage.
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Social Inclusion: Perspectives, Practices and Challenges within the Visegrad Region
SOC607
Course Reader
2016
Text selection by Mgr. Elena Gallová Kriglerová; Doc. Ing. Anna Kadeřábková; Mgr. Lenka Kissová;
George Ligeti, Ph.D., Csc.; Marcjanna Nóżka, Ph.D.; Mgr. Ivana Rapošová; PhDr. Michal Vašečka,
Ph.D.
Reader editors Lenka Kissová, Ivana Rapošová
Layout by Peter Kotvan
Cover page by Michal Kotvan
Please, note that this reader is a study material compiled exclusively for the course Social Inclusion:
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