Evolution of EU crisis management Jana Urbanovská, Ph.D. Masaryk University urbanovska@fss.muni.cz 21 & 28 November 2017 Content •EU as a security actor: what we are talking about? • •Establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy: when & why? • •European Security Strategy & the comprehensive approach to crisis management • •EU crisis management: civilian & military dimension • •EU crisis management operations: an overview • •Added value of EU crisis management • •Role of EU crisis management operations • •EU’s performance in crisis management: main features • •Current developments • European Union as a security actor: any ideas? Crisis management ESDP/CSDP Security Sector Reform European Security Strategy Battlegroups EUFOR Petersberg Tasks Balkans Africa Soft vs. hard power Rule of law EU Global Strategy Police Comprehensive approach Mogherini •EU as “an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm“? •Saint-Malo Declaration (1998) • –“The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage.” – –“…the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.” – –“…Atlantic Alliance … is the foundation of the collective defence of its members.” – –“Europe needs… a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology.” • •à Establisment of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999 –= A new chapter in EU history – •Crisis management as a core part of the ESDP/later CSDP • •Start of a process of: • –Institutions building –Capacities building – •Two basic lines: • –Military crisis management –Civilian crisis management •Previous attempts: –Brussels Treaty (1948) and the Western European Union –European Defence Community (1950s) –Fouchet Plan (1962) –European Political Cooperation (1970s) • •à Any idea why the EU has decided to establish its own security and defence policy? Výsledek obrázku pro otazník •Reasons for the establishment of ESDP: • •1) logical outcome of the end of the Cold War • •2) change of US attitude • •3) desire of the EU to be a fully-fledged international actor • •4) change of British and French attitudes (Blair + Chirac) • •5) reappearance of military conflict in Europe (performance of the EU very weak) • •6) high public support for EU action • European Security Strategy •Javier Solana European Security Strategy •“A Secure Europe in a Better World” (2003) • •Expression of normative strategic thinking • •Lack of any coherent strategy • •Adoption considered politically unfeasible • •High symbolic value but little real impact? • •Tactical use of the strategy • •To overcome the “Iraq divide” – acceptable for both Europeanists and Atlanticists •Introduction: • –“…the European Union is inevitably a global player.” –„Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.“ – •Global Challenges & Key threats • •Strategic objectives • •Policy implications • •Comprehensive approach to crisis managament! à EU as a special security actor – • http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Comprehensive-Approach-ECDPM.jpg •Comprehensive approach to EU crisis management •in practice: •“EU NAVFOR Atalanta” • •https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jMS-7mwuXgY •EU approach to the security in the Horn of Africa: What are the features of the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management? Výsledek obrázku pro otazník EU crisis management as a flagship of CSDP •I. Civilian crisis management • •police (fulfilling advisory, assistance and training tasks) • •rule of law (capable of both strengthening and substituting local judiciary/legal system) • •civilian administration (providing basic services that the national or local administration is unable to offer) • •civil protection (offering assessment, coordination and intervention teams) • •monitoring capabilities (i.e. border monitoring, human rights monitoring, observing political situation) • •generic support capabilities (supporting the work of EU Special Representatives or forming part of an CSDP mission; include experts in the field of human rights, political affairs, security sector reform, mediation, border control, disarmament, media policy etc.) • •II. Military crisis management • •“Petersberg Tasks“ (1992): –Humanitarian and rescue tasks –Peacekeeping tasks –Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking • •“Berlin Plus” (2003): –Agreement with NATO for the use of NATO structures, mechanisms, and assets to carry out military operations if NATO declines to act • •Lisbon Treaty (2009): –Expanding Petersberg Tasks to include: •Joint disarmament operations •Military advice and assistance tasks •Tasks in post-conflict stabilization • •EU Battlegroups: • –2004 UK, France and Germany • –A BG = cca 1 500 troops (+ combat support elements), high state of readiness, highly military effective – –Formed by one nation or a group of nations (a roster) – –2 BGs take responsibility for a six-month period – –No use so far à doubts – –“Costs lie where they fall” principle – –Reform of financing • Overview of the current EU mission and operations (October 2017) Types of EU CMO •Police missions –E.g. EUPOL Afghanistan, EUPOL COPPS, EUPOL DR Congo •Rule of law missions –E.g. EULEX Kosovo, EUJUST Lex, EUJUST Themis •Monitoring missions –E.g. EUMM Georgia, Aceh Monitoring Mission •Capacity building missions –E.g. EUCAP Sahel, EUCAP Nestor •Advisory missions –E.g. EUAM Ukraine, EUAM Iraq •Security sector reform missions –E.g. EU SSR Guinea Bissau, EUSEC RD Congo •Training missions –E.g. EUTM Mali, EUTM Somalia, EUTM RCA •Stabilizations missions, incl. peace enforcement –E.g. EUFOR Althea, EUFOR TCHAD, EUFOR RCA, EUFOR RD Congo •Naval oprations –Atalanta (EUNAVFOR Somalia), Sophia (EUNAVFOR MED) – – – •20 EU crisis management operations •More than 30 crisis management operations •Some in EU’s extended neighbourhood •Cooperation with other IOs on the ground •Quality X quantity •Limited size •Majority civilian missions, small support missions •Only few comparable to NATO/UN missions •Vast majority initiated before 2009 • Numbers of personnel in EU missions in comparison to other IOs Added value of EU crisis management •EU’s comparative advantage – decisive contribution in three types of situations: •The EU was willing and capable to act… • –1) where other organizations were not •Others not willing / politically capable of acting (Kosovo, Georgia) •Others could not deploy quickly enough to stabilize the situation (“bridging operations” Tchad, CAR, DR Congo) •European presence à mitigating effects (EUFOR DRC) •EU MSs offered specific capabilities (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) •EU contribution linked to its geographical scope (Horn of Africa, Sahel, the Balkans) –2) when there was a specific demand for the EU to intervene •EU perceived as particularly legitimate to help solve a conflict in its neighbourhood (the Balkans, Georgia) •EU perceived as more neutral (Aceh, Rafah) •EU acting as a mediator in the conflict (Aceh, Georgia) •EU covering specific needs which others did not address: security sector reform, rule of law, border management, airport security •A broad range of diplomatic, civilian and military tools was needed to deal with the situation + presence of an EU Delegation on the ground –3) in low- to medium-intensity conflict environments •Mostly pre- or post-conflict situations •NATO – high intensity conflicts •UN – needs peace to keep before deploying • –Otherwise… •EU serves as a clearing house for member states’ contributions (e.g. Lebanon, Haiti) •EU contributes to UN PK or monitoring missions by other means •EU builds the capacity of other regional organizations (e.g. AU, ECOWAS, Arab League of States) Role of EU crisis management operations •EU crisis management missions & operations (CMO) = major vehicle for realizing EU security policy –From an instrument at the service of the CFSP to a major driving force of the EU’s external policy –ESDP as a boost of CFSP which lacked the tools to deliver –ESDP relatively isolated; rapid development; British-French tandem – •Serve the broader aim of positioning the EU on the international stage –CMO as a symbol of the search for a niche on the world stage –CMO as the most significant / defining feature of the ESDP •What EU CMO are? –Formally = reactions to crisis on the ground –X More than crisis management tools –Provide important building blocks in the construction of an EU security policy •Artemis (autonomous military operation) •Aceh MM (“going global”) •The Balkans/ME (commitment to the neighbourhood) • •Deployment decisions as a strategic search for opportunities, directed towards the external as well as internal audience • •EU CMO as a response to an international security issue & a political means to advance a particular agenda • •EU looking for deployments that promise to generate maximum political capital & avoiding challenges that might end up in total disaster • •= Strategic approach à EU CMO as a success story • EU’s performance in crisis management: main features •Civilian crisis management •… •… •… •Military crisis management •… •… •… Výsledek obrázku pro otazník Current developments •EU Global Strategy (EUGS) •Unfortunate timing (June 2016) •Defines common ends of the EU´s external action and identifies means to achieve them •Presents a fairly realistic, pragmatic and cautious picture of what the EU does, and can do •Goes back to the basics and puts the immediate interests of European citizens first •While normative power Europe is perhaps dead, civilian power Europe is very much alive •Has created a momentum on EU security and defence •„Resilience“ as a new leitmotif of the EU´s external action •Broadens the understanding of the comprehensive approach to crisis management •Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) •Treaty of the EU (Lisbon Treaty), Articles 42(6) and 46 •A Treaty-based framework and process to deepen defence cooperation amongst EU MSs who are capable and willing to do so •Key requirements: –To enhance coordination in defence affairs –To increase investment in defence –To increase cooperation in developing defence capabilities •Binding commitments undertaken by participating MSs •Participation voluntary •Decision-making in the hands of participating MSs (unanimity) •November 2017 – 23 MSs signed a common notification on the PESCO = the first formal step to set up the PESCO (now waiting for a Council decision establishing PESCO) • • Sources •Biscop, Sven. 2008. “The European Security Strategy in Context”. In The EU and the European Security Strategy, edited by Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson. Oxon: Routledge. •EU. 2003. “A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf). •EU. 2016. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy (http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/pages/files/eugs_review_web_13.pdf). •EU. 2017. “Overview of the current EU mission and operations“ (https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/430/Military%20and%20civilian%20missi ons%20and%20operations). •Hazelzet, Hadewych. 2013. “The added value of CSDP operations.” ISS EU (http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_31.pdf). •Howorth, Jolyon. 2014. Security and Defence Policy in the European Union. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. •“Joint Declaration on European Defence”, Franco-British Summit, Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998 (http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html). •Kurowska, Xymena. 2008. “The Role of ESDP Operations.” In: European Security and Defence Policy. An implementation perspective. Eds. Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite. London – New York: Routledge, 25–42. •Sherriff, Andrew. 2013. Time to clear the confusion around the Comprehensive Approach. European Centre for Development Policy Management (http://ecdpm.org/talking-points/clear-confusion-around-the-comprehensive-approach/).