

# AFRICAN UNION PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

December 2017

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- African Union
- Need for peace enforcement
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# A need for a regional actor

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- UN consensus hindrance
- Strategic interests of major powers not in Africa
- Delayed reaction, speed is key
- Lack of possibility to get consent
- Failed state and CPE challenges
  
- Imperialist and interventionist resentment
- Local ownership means African ownership

# Character of African peace challenges


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- All in **African context** – the most conflict prone
  
- **Fewer** conflicts
  - ▣ Peak already reached in 80s and then in 90s
- Less deadly conflicts
  - ▣ **More peripheral** conflicts
- **Transnational** conflict
- **Extremist** conflict
  
- But **protracted, less international-intervention-prone**
- African ownership

# African Union

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- 54 member states
- Organization of African Unity 1963  
AU 2002
- 2004 PSC – Peace and Security Council - **consensus**
- from **non-interference** to **non-indifference**
- (g) non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another;
- (h) the **right of the Union to intervene** in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: **war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity**;
- African solutions first




# Crisis management structure

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- **PSC – 15 elected members –**
  - ▣ Main crisis management body, reactive not preventive
- **CEWS –**
  - ▣ Addis Ababa, evolved, but understaffed and underrated by the PSC
- **Panel of the Wise –**
  - ▣ Preventive diplomacy body, facilitator and mediator, since 2009
- **Peace Fund –**
  - ▣ Main fund for CMOs, subsidized by the EU
- **Standby Force (ASF)**
  - ▣ Similar to EU Battlegroups, so far not utilized
  - ▣ Only for CM goals, no relief or assistance, 2500 troops within 30days, 1000 within 14days, robust RoE

# AU - African Peace Security Architecture - APSA

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# Crisis management operations

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- conditions for CMOs require
  - **unconstitutional changes of government**
    - do now include not only military coups, rebel uprisings, but also illegal means of usurping power, i.e. rigging elections
  - **humanitarian intervention**
    - so far not invoked (not even Darfur or Libya)
- CMOs consist of military element only

# AU crisis management tools

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- **Political engagement** in prevention
  - ▣ early and strong engagement from the **PSC** can serve to diffuse crises prior to escalation
- **Suspension** of membership –
  - ▣ Madagascar 2009, CAR 2012, Egypt 2013
- **Sanctions** –
  - ▣ economic, financial, or travel bans
  - ▣ Togo 2005, Guinea, 2008, Eritrea 2009
- **Preventive deployment**
  - ▣ observation missions Comoros 2008, Rwanda 2009
- **Peace support operations**



<b>Mission</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Size (approximate maximum)</b>	<b>Main Troop Contributors</b>	<b>Main Task(s)</b>
AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB)	Burundi	2003–2004	3,250	South Africa	Peacebuilding
AU Military Observer Mission in the Comoros (MIOC)	Comoros	2004	41	South Africa	Observation
AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS)	Darfur	2004–2007	c. 7,700	Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal, Ghana	Peacekeeping/ Civilian Protection
Special Task Force Burundi	Burundi	2006–2009	c. 750	South Africa	VIP Protection
AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC)	Comoros	2006	1,260	South Africa	Election Monitor
AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)	Mogadishu	2007–present	c. 9,000	Uganda, Burundi	Regime Support
AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES)	Comoros	2007–2008	350	South Africa	Election Support
Democracy in Comoros	Comoros	2008	1,350 (+450 Comoros)	Tanzania, Sudan	Enforcement
AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) (UN pays)	Darfur	2008–present	c. 23,000	Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt, Ethiopia,	Peacebuilding/ Civilian Protection

# Largest current AU operations


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- Somalia – AMISOM – 17000
- Sudan/Darfur – UNAMID – 14 000
- Central African Republic – MISCA – 3000
- Regional Task Force against LRA – 3500
  
- Overwhelming part of the CMOs **budget comes from outside of Africa** (EU, UN, US, China)
  - Insufficient funding and capabilities to deploy and maintain full-fledged CMOs

# Budget

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- Hindrance of external funding to African ownership
- **US\$416,867,326**
- **US\$169,833,340** Member States
- **US\$247,033,986** International Partners.
  - ▣ Majority for administrative costs
  - ▣ 5 largest states account for majority of contributions, many late payers or defaulters
  
- Proposed solution 2016: 0.2% levy on imports to African countries





# FINANCING THE AFRICAN UNION



## PREVIOUS DECISIONS

**2005**  
By **Abdoulaye Wade**,  
Former president of Senegal  
**20%** Levy on non-AU imports  
**\$242-360** Million

**2014**  
High Level Panel on Alternative  
Sources of Financing led by:  
**Olusegun Obasanjo**,  
former President of Nigeria  
**Levies on hotels, airfare and SMS**  
**\$2.3** Billion

**2015**  
**AU Summit decision:**  
Member states  
should finance **25%**  
**75%** By international  
partners

**SIMILAR EFFORTS**  
**ECOWAS**  
**0.5%** levy on imports from  
non-member states to  
finance activities

**2016**  
Financing the Union: Africa's  
Predictable, Reliable and Sustainable  
Means of Financing - **Kaberuka Report**

**Assembly/AU/Dec.605 (XXVII)**  
**0.2%** Levy on eligible imports

**Levy to raise** | **\$1.2** Billion annually  
| **100%** Operational Budget



## CURRENT STATUS OF THE AU BUDGET

### 2 COMPONENTS



Operations budget



Programme budget

**67%** of assessed contributions are collected annually from Member States.



**30** Member States default either partially or completely

### 2016 Budget




**\$416** Million



**\$247** Million

**\$150** Million – Operating budget



**\$169** Million

**\$266** Million – Programme budget

### 2017 Budget



**\$782** Million

**27%**

**\$212** Million – MS

**73%**

**\$570** Million – International Partners

**\$493** Million – Operating budget  
(including **\$325** million to Peace Fund)

**\$289** Million – Programme budget

Sources: [www.au.int/financingAU](http://www.au.int/financingAU) - Pan-African Parliament, African Union



## WHAT IS THE AU PEACE FUND?

Peace Fund will be used to finance the AU's peace and security operations



Transition year: **2017**



Legal basis established in **1993**



**Donald Kaberuka**  
AU High Representative for the Peace Fund

### ACTIVITIES

Mediation and Preventive Diplomacy

Peace Support Operations

Institutional Capacity



### AIMS

- To promote greater African ownership in continental initiatives
- To provide reliable and predictable funding
- To provide an equitable and predictable source of financing
- To reduce dependency on partner funds
- To relieve the pressure on national treasuries



### MAIN ELEMENTS

- 0.2%** levy on eligible imported goods from outside the continent
- Funds to be paid automatically from AU accounts in national central banks
- Establishment of Committee of Ministers to prepare annual AU budget



### MAJOR STAKEHOLDERS

- Member states
- Finance ministers (**F10**)
- Peace Fund secretariat
- AU-UN partnership: UNSC Resolution **2320**
- AU Peace Support Operations Division




### STRUCTURE

- Window 1** Mediation and Preventive Diplomacy
- Window 2** Institutional Capacity
- Window 3** Peace Support Operations
- Window 3** Crisis Reserve Facility



### OPTIONS FOR FINANCING

**Option 1**  
Funded solely by AU with no contributions from external partners



**Option 2**  
Funding by AU  
UN and other contributions



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# Burundi success - AMIB

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- First AU PSO
- Model mission
  
- Support of political solution agreed upon by belligerents
- Strong and reputable head of mission
- Strong drive of head country and commitment of adequate resources


# Deficiencies of the AU PSOs

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- inappropriate mission planning (no DPKO or Field support body)
- inadequate and restricted peacekeeping mandates
- planning peace missions with unrealistically small force numbers
- Planning incompatibility with UN forces to take over
- Lack of any aerial capabilities, C2 structures

# ECOWAS

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- 15 members, established in 1975
- 370 mil. Population, very low HDI
- Following EC  EU integration model
- 1981 Protocol, Article 4:
  - ▣ *ECOWAS is compelled to intervene in internal armed conflict within any Member State engineered and supported actively from outside likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire Community*
  - ▣ legitimate internal intervention clause (unlike AU or UN)
- ECOWAS peacekeeping force – **ECOMOG**
  - ▣ Soon to become ESF (within the AU ASF)

# ECOWAS crisis management

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## □ **Goals** reframed within AU APSA

- *conflict prevention, management and resolution; humanitarian action and disaster response; post-conflict reconstruction and development; arms control and disarmament; counter-terrorism and the prevention and combating of trans-national organized crime; border management; capacity building, training and knowledge sharing; and resource mobilization*

## □ **Current formula**

- Crisis  $\longrightarrow$  political solution (mediation, facilitation)  
Council of the Wise  $\longrightarrow$  sanctions/suspension of membership (AU element since 2012 Mali)  $\longrightarrow$  vanguard force deployment to separate  $\longrightarrow$  stabilization force upgraded  $\longrightarrow$  conversion to UN mission

# ECOWAS crisis prevention?

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- **Reactionary** rather than preventive (apart from economic integration and development support)
  - ▣ however success in Guinea Bissau (2003) and Togo (2005)
- **ECOWAS Early Warning System**
  - ▣ only 30 field monitors
  - ▣ effective subsidiary of the CEWS
- ***2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework***
  - ▣ admission of ECOWAS shortcomings and insufficient capabilities to deal with
    - ungovernable regions (Niger delta, Ghana/Mali/Niger borders)
    - population boom (430 mil. by 2020 – 45% under 15)

# ECOMOG force

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- Formerly ad hoc, BUT with UN mandate
- 1999 - *Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security*
- ECOWAS CMOs often serve as interim bridgeheads, before **re-hatting** to UN forces
  - ▣ very fast ability to deploy
  - ▣ stopgap forces mostly without ANY civilian components
  - ▣ but preparing for future UN force structure with increased fact-finding and civilian oversight

# ECOMOG/ESF operations

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- **Liberia 1990-1998, 2003** (3500 troops)
  - 12,000 troops
- **Sierra Leone 1996-1999**
  - 13,000 troops
- **Guinea-Bissau 1998-2000** (1000 troops)
- **anti-LURD 2001**
  - 1,800 troops
- **Cote d'Ivoire 2002**
  - 2000 troops
- **Mali 2012 -**
  - 7,400 troops