AFRICAN UNION PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS December 2017 Content ¨African Union ¨Need for peace enforcement ¨Structure ¨Reasoning ¨Forces ¨Missions ¨ECOWAS in APSA ¨ ¨ ¨ 2 A need for a regional actor ¨UN consensus hindrance ¨Strategic interests of major powers not in Africa ¨Delayed reaction, speed is key ¨Lack of possibility to get consent ¨Failed state and CPE challenges ¨ ¨Imperialist and interventionist resentment ¨Local ownership means African ownership ¨ ¨ 3 Character of African peace challenges ¨All in African context – the most conflict prone ¨ ¨Fewer conflicts ¤Peak already reached in 80s and then in 90s ¨Less deadly conflicts ¤More peripheral conflicts ¨Transnational conflict ¨Extremist conflict ¨ ¨But protracted, less international-intervention-prone ¨African ownership ¨ 4 African Union ¨54 member states ¨Organization of African Unity 1963 AU 2002 ¨2004 PSC – Peace and Security Council - consensus ¨from non-interference to non-indifference ¨(g) non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another; ¨(h) the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; ¨African solutions first ¨ 5 6 Crisis management structure ¨PSC – 15 elected members – ¤Main crisis management body, reactive not preventive ¨CEWS – ¤Addis Ababa, evolved, but understaffed and underrated by the PSC ¨Panel of the Wise – ¤Preventive diplomacy body, facilitator and mediator, since 2009 ¨Peace Fund – ¤Main fund for CMOs, subsidized by the EU ¨Standby Force (ASF) ¤Similar to EU Battlegroups, so far not utilized ¤Only for CM goals, no relief or assistance, 2500 troops within 30days, 1000 within 14days, robust RoE ¨ 7 AU - African Peace Security Architecture - APSA 8 Crisis management operations ¨conditions for CMOs require ¨ ¤unconstitutional changes of government ndo now include not only military coups, rebel uprisings, but also illegal means of usurping power, i.e. rigging elections n ¤humanitarian intervention nso far not invoked (not even Darfur or Libya) ¨ ¨CMOs consist of military element only 9 AU crisis management tools ¨Political engagement in prevention ¤early and strong engagement from the PSC can serve to diffuse crises prior to escalation ¨Suspension of membership – ¤Madagascar 2009, CAR 2012, Egypt 2013 ¨Sanctions – ¤economic, financial, or travel bans ¤Togo 2005, Guinea, 2008, Eritrea 2009 ¨Preventive deployment ¤observation missions Comoros 2008, Rwanda 2009 ¨Peace support operations ¤ ¨ 10 African Standby Force 11 12 Largest current AU operations ¨Somalia – AMISOM – 17000 ¨Sudan/Darfur – UNAMID – 14 000 ¨Central African Republic – MISCA – 3000 ¨Regional Task Force against LRA – 3500 ¨ ¨Overwhelming part of the CMOs budget comes from outside of Africa (EU, UN, US, China) ¤Insufficient funding and capabilities to deploy and maintain full-fledged CMOs 13 Budget ¨Hindrance of external funding to African ownership ¨US$416,867,326 ¨US$169,833,340 Member States ¨US$247,033,986 International Partners. ¤Majority for administrative costs ¤5 largest states account for majority of contributions, many late payers or defaulters ¤ ¨Proposed solution 2016: 0.2% levy on imports to African countries ¨ 14 15 https://au.int/web/sites/default/files/blocks/31857-img-actual_vs_planned1.png 16 http://www.ipss-addis.org/y-file-store/Infographics-Posters/financing_the_african_union.jpg Burundi success - AMIB ¨First AU PSO ¨Model mission ¨ ¨Support of political solution agreed upon by belligerents ¨Strong and reputable head of mission ¨Strong drive of head country and commitment of adequate resources 17 Deficiencies of the AU PSOs ¨inappropriate mission planning (no DPKO or Field support body) ¨inadequate and restricted peacekeeping mandates ¨planning peace missions with unrealistically small force numbers ¨Planning incompatibility with UN forces to take over ¨Lack of any aerial capabilities, C2 structures 18 ECOWAS ¨15 members, established in 1975 ¨370 mil. Population, very low HDI ¨Following EC EU integration model ¨1981 Protocol, Article 4: ¤ECOWAS is compelled to intervene in internal armed conflict within any Member State engineered and supported actively from outside likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire Community ¤legitimate internal intervention clause (unlike AU or UN) ¨ECOWAS peacekeeping force – ECOMOG ¤Soon to become ESF (within the AU ASF) 19 ECOWAS crisis management ¨Goals reframed within AU APSA ¤conflict prevention, management and resolution; humanitarian action and disaster response; post-conflict reconstruction and development; arms control and disarmament; counter-terrorism and the prevention and combating of trans-national organized crime; border management; capacity building, training and knowledge sharing; and resource mobilization ¤ ¨Current formula ¤Crisis political solution (mediation, facilitation) Council of the Wise sanctions/suspension of membership (AU element since 2012 Mali) vanguard force deployment to separate stabilization force upgraded conversion to UN mission ¨ 20 ECOWAS crisis prevention? ¨Reactionary rather than preventive (apart from economic integration and development support) ¤however success in Guinea Bissau (2003) and Togo (2005) ¨ECOWAS Early Warning System ¤only 30 field monitors ¤effective subsidiary of the CEWS ¨ ¨2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework ¤admission of ECOWAS shortcomings and insufficient capabilities to deal with nungovernable regions (Niger delta, Ghana/Mali/Niger borders) npopulation boom (430 mil. by 2020 – 45% under 15) 21 ECOMOG force ¨Formerly ad hoc, BUT with UN mandate ¨1999 - Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security ¨ ¨ECOWAS CMOs often serve as interim bridgeheads, before re-hatting to UN forces ¤very fast ability to deploy ¤stopgap forces mostly without ANY civilian components ¤but preparing for future UN force structure with increased fact-finding and civilian oversight 22 ECOMOG/ESF operations ¨Liberia 1990-1998, 2003 (3500 troops) ¤12,000 troops ¨Sierra Leone 1996-1999 ¤13,000 troops ¨Guinea-Bissau 1998-2000 (1000 troops) ¨anti-LURD 2001 ¤1,800 troops ¨Cote d’Ivoire 2002 ¤2000 troops ¨Mali 2012 - ¤7,400 troops ¤ ¨ 23