OSCE CRISIS MANAGEMENT Fall 2017 OSCE ¨definition of civilian actor, no military capacities ¨57 member states, largest security org. ¨approximately 3500 international staff in the field and HQ ¨CSCE transformation through the 1990s 1995, perceived impartiality is a strong positive ¨focus on: ¤preventing crises and providing security solutions in ongoing crises to fill security deficit areas and support arms control 2 3 Image result for osce countries CSCE/OSCE – three dimensions/baskets ¨Security ¤Arms control, conflict prevention, military reform, border management, monitoring ¨Rule of law ¤Democratization, anti-trafficking, election monitoring, media freedom, gender ¨Economy and environment ¤Energy security, development and ecology 4 OSCE crisis management instruments ¨Multidimentional ¨3 dominant dimensions of OSCE CM: ¨Security (Political-Military) ¤Preventive diplomacy, confidence and trust building measures, impartial analysis, arms control ¨Human rights ¤Promotion of HR, tolerance, rule of law, democratization, development, monitoring elections, supporting free press ¨Economic ¤Supporting development, security, good governance, cooperation, post-conflict rehabilitation ¨ ¤ 5 OSCE crisis management ¨Emphasis on prevention and early political engagement in the conflict cycle ¨1990 - Conflict Prevention Centre ¤first of its kind ¤provides early warning, but also negotiation, mediation, cooperation support and impartial resolution capacities ¤civilian experts deployed in earliest phases of crises (security provided by stature) ¤also serves as DPKO 6 OSCE crisis management ¨Gets “invited” due to perceived impartiality and multidimensional nature ¨Focused purely internally – distinct “local advantage” ¨Wavering focus, dependent upon chairmanship and topic-of-the-year ¨Lacks the power to impose solutions ¤Non-binding resolutions ¤Processes are voluntary ¤Missions require constant consensus ¤Declining budget (151mil USD) ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 7 OSCE field operations ¨Approximately 800 personnel deployed outside of permanent field workers, highly fluctuates ¨Southeastern Europe ¤Albania, Montenegro, Kosovo, Serbia, Skopje, BiH ¨Eastern Europe ¤Moldova, Ukraine ¨South Caucasus ¤Baku, Yerevan ¨Central Asia ¤Ashgabat, Astana, Bishkek, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan ¤ ¤2017: http://www.osce.org/cpc/74783?download=true 8 OSCE Ukraine example ¨Special monitoring mission ¤Independent fact-based monitoring and reporting, implementation of Minsk agreements ¤ ¨Project coordinator ¤Government assistance in crisis management, stabilization, and continuation of democratization ¤ ¨Observer mission at Russian checkpoints ¤at Russia’s request not on Russian border ¨ ¨Freedom of media representative, Minorities commissioner, ODIHR election monitoring, OSCE Secretary general mediation 9 CURRENT CHALLENGES CRISIS MANAGEMENT POST-2017 Fall 2017 UN ¨Will UN transform its approach to peacekeeping? How? ¨ ¤declining budget (by 1/8 next year) ¤changing main players nChina – testing deployment and following interests? nUS – reading week arguments nCanada – shying away from commitment ¤ever more demanding deployments ¤increasing death toll ¤prosecution threat 11 NATO ¨Any room left for out-of-area? ¨ ¤reuniting internal threat to the east ¤Afghanistan/Libya unresolved nails in the coffin? nespecially compared to previous missions ¤US reluctance to bankroll or risk nquestion of administration change? ¤new defense expenditures (cyber) ¤challenges increasingly in the “European theatre” ¤ ¤ ¤ 12 EU ¨Will / should the EU step up as a military/complex crisis management actor? ¨ ¤Brexit opens new avenues ¤MENA region as well as eastern flank + Turkey proving less stable ¤Sofia mission nfirst inwardly directed MCMO – model? ¤PESCO inward or outward ndefense or crisis management? ¤ 13 AU ¨Can the AU replace UN/EU/NATO involvement? ¤political roadblocks ¤money issues nmany donors drawing back nChina not investing in AU other than buildings nself-funding? ¤military solutions alone do not work? ¤lack of post-conflict/complex capabilities for peacebuilding and sustainability 14 Crisis management in general ¨who should be doing crisis management? ¤for example in Lebanon/Algeria/Armenia ¨ ¨pragmatic approach resistance ¤inherent inflexibility of financial and political backers to adjust mandates and benchmarks ¤collaboration still one of the hardest issues ¤ ¨local ownership discussion ¤who reconstructs? who nation-builds? ¤ 15