

# ORGANIZATION OF UN PEACEKEEPING

Fall 2017

# Content

2

- Launching UN peacekeeping operations
- Running UN peacekeeping operations
  - Department of Peacekeeping Operations
  - Assembling and deploying troops
- Troop contributing countries
  - Cold and post-Cold war era
  - Motivations for state participation
  - Top contributors
- Financing UN peacekeeping operations

# Launching UN peacekeeping operations

# Launching UN peacekeeping operations

4

- first, the UN Security Council (SC) / the UN Secretary General (SG) **identifies a threat to peace and international security**

## **Article 39**

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

## **Article 99**

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

# Launching UN peacekeeping operations

5

- next, the **SC authorizes the operation**
- support from at least 9 of the 15 members of the SC, incl. all 5 permanent member states

## **Article 41**

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

## **Article 42**

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

# Launching UN peacekeeping operations

6

- Cold War – difficult to come to a **unanimous decision** in the SC
- → to overcome a veto, the **General Assembly (GA)** adopted the “**Uniting for Peace**” resolution (1950) (Korea)
  - GA empowered itself to **recommend collective security measures whenever the SC is unable to reach a decision**
  - utilized to launch UNEF I and ONUC
  - questions the authority of the SC
- the SC **determines the mandate** of the operation
- **varying extent** of Cold war and post-Cold war resolutions (see ONUC vs. MUNOC)

**143 (1960). Resolution of 14 July 1960**

[S/4387]

*The Security Council,*

*Considering* the report of the Secretary-General<sup>6</sup> on a request for United Nations action in relation to the Republic of the Congo,

*Considering* the request for military assistance addressed to the Secretary-General by the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo,<sup>7</sup>

1. *Calls upon* the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo;

2. *Decides* to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Govern-

Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as appropriate.

*Adopted at the 873rd meeting by 8 votes to none, with 3 abstentions (China, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).*



## Security Council

Distr.  
GENERALS/RES/1291 (2000)  
24 February 2000

## RESOLUTION 1291 (2000)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4104th meeting,  
on 24 February 2000

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1234 (1999) of 9 April 1999, 1258 (1999) of 6 August 1999, 1273 (1999) of 5 November 1999, 1279 (1999) of 30 November 1999, and other relevant resolutions, and the statements of its President of 26 January 2000 (S/PRST/2000/2), 24 June 1999 (S/PRST/1999/17), 11 December 1998 (S/PRST/1998/36), 31 August 1998 (S/PRST/1998/26) and 13 July 1998 (S/PRST/1998/20),

Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the obligation of all States to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and all States in the region,

Reaffirming also the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo over its natural resources, and noting with concern reports of the illegal exploitation of the country's assets and the potential consequences of these actions on security conditions and the continuation of hostilities,

Expressing its strong support for the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (S/1999/815), which represents the most viable basis for the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Reiterating its call for the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in accordance with the Ceasefire Agreement,

Noting the commitment of all the parties to the Ceasefire Agreement to locate, identify, disarm and assemble all members of all armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo referred to in Annex A, Chapter 9.1, of the Ceasefire Agreement and the commitment of all countries of origin of these armed groups to take the steps necessary for their repatriation, and noting that these tasks must be conducted by the parties in accordance with the Ceasefire Agreement,

Endorsing the selection by the Congolese Parties, with the assistance of the Organization of African Unity, of the Facilitator of the National Dialogue provided for in the Ceasefire Agreement, and calling on all Member States to provide political, financial, and material support to the Facilitation,

Recalling the report of the Secretary-General of 17 January 2000 (S/2000/30),

Stressing its commitment to work with the parties to implement fully the Ceasefire Agreement, while underlining that its successful implementation rests first and foremost on the will of all parties to the Agreement,

Stressing the importance of the re-establishment of state administration throughout the national territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as called for in the Ceasefire Agreement,

Stressing the importance of the Joint Military Commission (JMC), and urging all States to continue to provide it with assistance,

Emphasizing that phase II of the deployment of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) should be based on the following considerations:

(a) that the parties respect and uphold the Ceasefire Agreement and the relevant Council resolutions;

(b) that a valid plan for the disengagement of the parties' forces and their redeployment to JMC-approved positions is developed;

(c) that the parties provide firm and credible assurances, prior to the deployment of MONUC forces, for the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and related personnel,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of the United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994 and the statement of its President of 10 February 2000 (S/PRST/2000/4),

Welcoming and encouraging efforts by the United Nations to sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases in all its peacekeeping operations,


Expressing its serious concern over the humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and encouraging donors to respond to the United Nations consolidated humanitarian appeal,



Stressing the importance to the effectiveness of such humanitarian assistance and other international operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo of favourable conditions for local procurement and recruitment by international organizations and agencies,

Expressing its deep concern at all violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law, in particular those alleged violations referred to in the report of the Secretary-General,

Expressing also its deep concern at the limited access of humanitarian workers to refugees and internally displaced persons in some areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and stressing the need for the continued operation of United Nations and other agencies' relief operations, as well as human rights promotion and monitoring, under acceptable conditions of security, freedom of movement, and access to affected areas,



# Authority, Command & Control in UN PSO



# Launching UN peacekeeping operations

12

- Secretariat is the link between the will of the UNSC to respond and the multi-dimensional realities of the field operations
- Crafting a mandate must be **more inclusive than the current needs**
  - To ensure preparedness and prevent ad-hoc adjustments with delay
  - Presents a significant obstacle
  - Crucial for preparedness to protect civilians in cooperation with government – when government is itself the problem
- **Post 1999 - 'United Nations operations do not deploy into post-conflict situations so much as they deploy to create such situations' (Brahimi Report)**
- Daily administration by DPKO and Department of field support

# Launching UN peacekeeping operations

13

- approval for a **six-month period** and **subject to renewal**
  - ▣ usually reauthorized without much debate or change in mandate
- **implementation of UN PKOs** – responsibility of the SG
  - ▣ SG makes recommendations on how the operation is to be launched and carried out
  - ▣ selects the force commander (military figure)
  - ▣ reports to the Security Council on the mission's progress
  - ▣ appoints a “**Special Representative**” to a mission (diplomatic figure)

# Where do peacekeepers go?

14

- Elements increasing the likelihood of deployment (Gilligan, Stedman):
  - **Number of deaths** - The more severe a conflict, measured by the number of deaths, the more likely the United Nations is to intervene.
  - **Length of conflict** - The probability of a UN intervention in a given war increases as the war drags on
  - **Small army size** - The United Nations is significantly less likely to intervene in civil wars in countries with large government armies


# Biased preconceptions

15

- There **is evidence** of regional bias in the UN's selection of missions, but the worst **bias is against Asia, not Africa**. (more deaths needed in Asia to trigger)
- There is **no evidence** that the United Nations intervenes in secessionist conflicts at a different rate than it intervenes in attempts to take over control of the government.
- There is **no evidence** that the United Nations intervenes more in countries with high **primary commodity exports** (banana republic interventionism)
- There is **no strong evidence** that the United Nations intervenes in democracies at a lower rate than it does in non-democracies (almost equal rate)
- There is **no evidence** that the United Nations intervenes in **former colonies** of permanent members of the Security Council at a higher rate than it does in other areas.

**FIGURE 2.26** UN DEPLOYED PEACEKEEPERS BY REGION, NOVEMBER 1990 TO FEBRUARY 2017

In 2016, 94 per cent of peacekeeping personnel were deployed in MENA and sub-Saharan Africa.




Source: International Peace Institute Peacekeeping Database



**FIGURE 2.28** PEACEKEEPING OF PERSONNEL DEPLOYED TO COUNTRIES WITH ACTIVE ARMED CONFLICT, (ANNUALISED AVERAGE) 1990-2015

Peacekeepers are increasingly active where armed conflicts are still going on. In 2015, roughly 53 per cent of peacekeepers were deployed in countries with active armed conflicts.



Source: IPI Peacekeeping Database, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset


# State of affairs

18

- The number of active peacekeepers has doubled in the past 25 years, from roughly **50,000 to nearly 100,000 deployed personnel**.
- At the start of **2017**, there were **21 active peace operations** around the world. Of the **100,000 deployed personnel**, about 85 per cent of peacekeepers are military troops and 15 per cent are police and experts or military observers.
- **The average mission lasts 31 months**, although there are five ongoing missions that are over 26 years old.
- In 2016, **94 per cent of peacekeepers were deployed to sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa**. There has been a significant increase in the number of peacekeepers deployed in the Middle East and North Africa since 2005.
- Peacekeeping is no longer only a post-conflict activity, with approximately **53 per cent of personnel deployed in countries with an active armed conflict**, such as Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

**FIGURE 2.24** UN DEPLOYED PEACEKEEPERS, NOVEMBER 1990 TO FEBRUARY 2017

Deployment of peacekeeping troops, police and expert observers has doubled in the last 25 years, from about 50,000 personnel in 1993 to nearly 100,000 in early 2017.



Source: International Peace Institute Peacekeeping Database

**FIGURE 2.25** POLICE AND OBSERVERS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DEPLOYED PERSONNEL, 1990 TO 2017

Police, observers and other “experts on mission” have made up roughly 15 per cent of deployed personnel for the last decade.



Source: International Peace Institute Peacekeeping Database

# Running UN peacekeeping operations

# Department of Peacekeeping Operations

22

- **day-to-day management** of operations
- **none till 1992**; before, peacekeepers could reach UN headquarters only from 9 am till 5 pm NY time...
- tasks: to **plan, prepare, manage and direct** UN PKOs
- **political and executive direction** to UN PKOs
- **maintains contact** with the SC, troop and financial contributors and parties to the conflict
- aims to **integrate the efforts** of UN, governmental as well as non-governmental entities
- guidance and support to other UN political and peace building missions

# Assembling and deploying troops

23

- **Kofi Annan:** *“Our system for launching operations has sometimes been compared to a volunteer fire department, but that description is too generous. Every time there is a fire, we must first find fire engines and the funds to run them before we can start dousing any flames. The present system relies almost entirely on last minute, ad hoc arrangements that guarantee delay, with respect to the provision of civilian personnel even more so than military.”*
- the SG asks member states to **contribute troops and other personnel**
- **supplies, equipment, transportation and logistical support** from member states or private contractors (1989/2001 Convention)
- **civilian staff** – personnel from within the UN system, loaned by member states, or recruited internationally

# Assembling and deploying troops

24

- the **time necessary to deploy a mission** varies, depending on:
  - ▣ political will of member states to contribute troops
  - ▣ availability of financial resources
  - ▣ complexity of mandates and logistics
  
- elements of **UNEF II** deployed within 24 hours X **high-risk environments** – within months
  
- Usual troop strength below resolution provisions for entire duration



# UN and PMSCs

25

- 1989 / 2001 - Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries
  
- however **recruitment is common practice** without
  
- **Non-combat** roles for PMSCs – specifically:
  - ▣ logistics, intelligence, demining
  - ▣ most frequently policing and protection of civilian personnel
  - ▣ encroachment on traditional UN roles as well in DDR and SSR

# Troop contributing countries

# Cold and post-Cold war era

27

- **Cold war operations**
  - states **without direct involvement in the conflict**
  - dependence on **host state consent** → any bias could ruin the operation
  - exclusion of contributions from the **superpowers**, other **permanent members of the SC** and **closely allied states**
  - if, then contributions from one member of the **Warsaw Pact** (e.g. Poland) and one from **NATO** (e.g. Canada)
  - important role of “**middle powers**” (e.g. Australia, Canada, India) – well-trained personnel,
  - other willing and able peacekeepers: e.g. Scandinavian states, Ireland, Austria
  
- **post-Cold war operations**
  - restrictions on participation partly lifted
  - predominant contributors still the same

# Top troop contributors




28

- expansion of peacekeeping after 1988 → **expansion in the number of countries involved**
  - 1988 – **26** countries
  - 1995 – more than **80** countries
  - 2013 – **116** countries
- Great shift in contributors during the 1990s
- Guess which states contribute most to UN PKOs?


# 1991- 03/2015

### Surge in Uniformed UN Peacekeeping Personnel from 1991- Present



**FIGURE 2.27** PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL BY INCOME LEVEL OF CONTRIBUTING COUNTRY, NOVEMBER 1990 TO FEBRUARY 2017

In 2016 and 2017, 43 per cent of peacekeepers came from lower-middle income countries.




Source: IPI Peacekeeping Database, World Bank income level classifications, IEP calculations

# Top troop contributors

31

## Top 20 Contributors of Uniformed Personnel to UN Peacekeeping Operations

As of 30 November 2012



# August 2015 contribution contrasts

32

Month of Report :  
31-Aug-15

## Country Totals

Bangladesh	9,432
Ethiopia	8,309
India	7,794
Pakistan	7,533
Rwanda	5,685
Nepal	5,346
Senegal	3,628
Ghana	3,242
China	3,079
Nigeria	2,968

Month of Report :  
31-Aug-15

## Military Experts

Ethiopia	113
Pakistan	95
Bangladesh	74
Egypt	72
Ghana	67
Yemen	66
Russian Federation	60
Nepal	51
India	51
Nigeria	40



# UN Standby force promise?

33

## □ **Standby force**

- 50 nations, 40 000 troops, China 8 000

## □ **Currently - China**

- 2833 troops in 9 missions
- 2 force commanders
- High value assets – hospitals, engineers, logistics
- 2<sup>nd</sup> largest financier of UN PKOs
- Possible upgrade to UN aerial capabilities

## □ **Return of Canada and the USA?**

# Motivations for contributing

# Motivations for state participation

35

- realist motives – to **support own interests**
- idealist motives – to **promote norms and values** (international peace and security, cooperation, multilateralism)
- liberal motives – to contribute to the **continuation of status quo** and **foster values** such as democratization and good governance
- **prestige** (smaller or developing states)
- **national image and reputation**
- fulfillment of **responsibilities**, expression of **commitment** to the UN
- **training and experience**
- **profit** (payment from the UN for each soldier)
- campaign to become **nonpermanent members of the SC** (e.g. Morocco, Spain, Czech Republic)

# Motives

36

- to answer **outside pressures** (from allies or organizations)
  - ▣ to lend a multinational character to missions; to increase the legitimacy
- to contribute to the **maintenance of global peace and security**
- to make **positive impression** on the world stage, to build image and prestige
- **down payment for potential assistance** of the international community
  - ▣ Baltic States – fearing inference of Russia
- to demonstrate the **ability to contribute to an operation**
  - ▣ Central and Eastern European states – NATO membership

- to **repay a debt** for an “own” peacekeeping operation in the past
- to **keep armed forces occupied outside the country** rather than meddling into domestic affairs
  - ▣ esp. Third world states where the military is not entirely under civilian control
- to profit **financially**
- to benefit by **receiving equipment**
- to get **experience**
- to get **contact with other military forces**

# Small states and CMOs

38

- **limited role** in international politics
- influence by **acting through IOs**
- often **included in peace operations** (political reasons)
  - “international image”, legitimacy
  - ambition to play a role too („we-too“ phenomenon)
- a lot of small states have gained a **reputation as peacekeepers**
- history of small states’ participation in peace operations:
  - **earlier peace operations** – small states contributed police
  - **interwar years** – small states started to participate militarily
  - **during the CW** – small states perceived as better peacekeepers X policies still set by powers

- **advantages** of small states' participation in CMO:
  - absence of a power status → **less polarized reactions**
  - **involvement or interest in a conflict less obvious** (colonial past either forgotten, minimal or non-existing)
  - **positive / crucial role in negotiations** (easier to act as “honest brokers”, risk less “loss of face”)
  - attempt **to do the best** in order to show their ability
  - limited defence budgets → **more flexible and used to improvise**
  
- *Do you see any disadvantages?*

- **disadvantages** of small states' participation in CMO:
  - **carry less weight in the international system** → difficult to influence policy
  - **kept out of decision-making processes** → influence on their troops
  - **appear less convincingly** in an operation (not backed up by an intense military force)
  - able to contribute only **limited contingents**
  - possible **shortages in modern equipment**
  - **harder to bear casualties**



# Financing UN peacekeeping operations

# Financing UN peacekeeping operations

42

- **two basic budget levels** within the UN:
  - ▣ regular budget (5bn USD)
  - ▣ peacekeeping budget (8,4bn USD)
- UN PKOs generally financed through their own **separate budget**
- standard practice established with the authorization of **UNEF I** (**special account** created)
- exceptions funded through the **regular UN budget**
  - ▣ **military observer missions** with small budget (e.g. UNTSO in the Middle East, UNMOGIP in India and Pakistan)
- possible **funding by the parties** to the conflict (e.g. UNYOM in Yemen)

# Financing UN peacekeeping operations


43

- **basic guidelines** for sharing the financial burden of PK set in 1960s:
  - **collective responsibility** of all member states
  - member states encouraged to make **voluntary contributions**
  - economically **less developed countries** – limited capacity to make contributions
  - **permanent members** of the SC – special responsibility for peace and security
  
- the SC requested to open a **special account** into which the member states would contribute according to a **graded scale**:
  - 63,15 % paid by the five **permanent members** of the SC (Group A)
  - 34,78 % by economically **developed states** that are not permanent members of the SC (Group B)
  - 2,02 % by economically **less developed states** (Group C)
  - 0,05 % by economically **least developed states** (Group D)

# Peacekeeping operations expenditures


44

Figure 1. | **U.N. Peacekeeping Budget, 1950-2013**



# Those who pay, rarely play ...

## Top 10 financial contributors to UN peacekeeping budget



## ... and those who play rarely pay *Top 10 contributors to UN peacekeeping operations*



= 1000 troops, police or UN military experts

Source: United Nations as of 31 October 2015

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