

Contents

1


- financing
- troop contributions
- judging success
- missions' assessments
- failures
- lessons learned mechanisms
- modern challenges

Financing UN peacekeeping operations

Peacekeeping operations expenditures

3

Figure 1. | **U.N. Peacekeeping Budget, 1950-2013**



Financing UN peacekeeping operations

4

- **two basic budget levels** within the UN:
 - ▣ regular budget (4bn USD)
 - ▣ peacekeeping budget (8,4bn USD)
- UN PKOs generally financed through their own **separate budget**
- standard practice established with the authorization of **UNEF I** (**special account** created)
- exceptions funded through the **regular UN budget**
 - ▣ **military observer missions** with small budget (e.g. UNTSO in the Middle East, UNMOGIP in India and Pakistan)
- possible **funding by the parties** to the conflict (e.g. UNYOM in Yemen)

Financing UN peacekeeping operations

5


- **basic guidelines** for sharing the financial burden of PK set in 1960s:
 - **collective responsibility** of all member states
 - member states encouraged to make **voluntary contributions**
 - economically **less developed countries** – limited capacity to make contributions
 - **permanent members** of the SC – special responsibility for peace and security

- the SC requested to open a **special account** into which the member states would contribute according to a **graded scale**:
 - 63,15 % paid by the five **permanent members** of the SC (Group A)
 - 34,78 % by economically **developed states** that are not permanent members of the SC (Group B)
 - 2,02 % by economically **less developed states** (Group C)
 - 0,05 % by economically **least developed states** (Group D)

TABLE 1

United Nations Scale of Assessments for 2016


	REGULAR BUDGET		PEACEKEEPING BUDGET	
	Percent	Dollars	Percent	Dollars
6 Total		\$2,700,897,200		\$8,275,565,500
Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council				
United States	22.000	\$594,197,384	28.5738	\$2,364,643,535
France	4.859	\$131,236,595	6.3109	\$522,262,663
United Kingdom	4.463	\$120,541,042	5.7966	\$479,701,430
China	7.921	\$213,938,067	10.2879	\$851,381,903
Russian Federation	3.088	\$83,403,706	4.0107	\$331,908,106
Other Notable Contributors				
Japan	9.680	\$261,446,849	9.6800	\$801,074,740
Germany	6.389	\$172,560,322	6.3890	\$528,725,880
Brazil	3.823	\$103,255,300	0.7646	\$63,274,974
Italy	3.748	\$101,229,627	3.7480	\$310,168,195
Canada	2.921	\$78,893,207	2.9210	\$241,729,268
Australia	2.337	\$63,119,968	2.3370	\$193,399,966
Saudi Arabia	1.146	\$30,952,282	0.8404	\$69,547,852
India	0.737	\$19,905,612	0.1474	\$12,198,184
Iran	0.471	\$12,721,226	0.0942	\$7,795,583
Israel	0.430	\$11,613,858	0.4300	\$35,584,932
South Africa	0.364	\$9,831,266	0.0728	\$6,024,612
Nigeria	0.209	\$5,644,875	0.0418	\$3,459,186
Pakistan	0.093	\$2,511,834	0.0186	\$1,539,255
Cuba	0.065	\$1,755,583	0.0130	\$1,075,824
North Korea	0.005	\$135,045	0.0010	\$82,756
Lowest Assessment (32 Countries—Regular Budget, 18 Countries—Peacekeeping Budget)	0.001	\$27,009	0.0001	\$8,276



Area	Total Spending	Area	Total Spending
1 Sudan	\$20,021,059,400	24 Egypt	\$660,700,000
2 Dem. Rep. Congo	\$17,523,061,500	25 Iraq/Kuwait border	\$600,000,000
3 Southern Lebanon	\$9,515,697,550	26 Mozambique	\$492,600,000
4 Liberia	\$7,575,500,530	27 Rwanda	\$453,900,000
5 Haiti	\$7,235,676,600	28 Croatia	\$450,662,000
6 Côte d'Ivoire	\$5,924,980,100	29 Georgia	\$396,860,000
7 South Sudan	\$4,669,156,900	30 Namibia and Angola	\$368,600,000
8 Yugoslavia	\$4,616,725,556	31 India/Pakistan border	\$276,220,425
9 Kosovo	\$3,427,176,000	32 Macedonia	\$185,000,000
10 Central African Republic	\$2,934,091,200	33 Iran and Iraq	\$177,900,000
11 Sierra Leone	\$2,853,600,000	34 El Salvador	\$107,700,000
12 East Timor	\$2,382,297,900	35 Central America	\$92,400,000
13 Mali	\$2,356,007,500	36 Tajikistan	\$63,000,000
14 Cyprus	\$1,822,941,757	37 Syria	\$16,800,000
15 Somalia	\$1,642,900,000	38 Afghanistan and Pakistan	\$14,000,000
16 Cambodia	\$1,600,000,000	39 Western New Guinea	\$5,505,833
17 Golan	\$1,509,433,614	40 Guatemala	\$3,900,000
18 Angola	\$1,373,103,500	41 Beirut	\$3,700,000
19 Ethiopia and Eritrea	\$1,320,000,000	42 Uganda	\$2,300,000
20 Western Sahara	\$1,255,915,013	43 Yemen	\$1,800,000
21 Middle East	\$1,101,205,650	44 Dominican Republic	\$275,831
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina	\$1,094,056,917	45 Chad	\$64,471
23 Burundi	\$678,300,000	Total	\$108,806,775,747

FIGURE 1.6. Nicaragua, 1950–2009

Inflation, population,
and purchasing power
parity-adjusted per capita GDP
(I\$, base year = 2005)




Source: Penn World Table 7


Motivations for contributing troops

Those who pay, rarely play ...

Top 10 financial contributors to UN peacekeeping budget



... and those who play rarely pay *Top 10 contributors to UN peacekeeping operations*



= 1000 troops, police or UN military experts

Source: United Nations as of 31 October 2015

Motivations for state participation

12

- realist motives – to **support own interests**
- idealist motives – to **promote norms and values** (international peace and security, cooperation, multilateralism)
- liberal motives – to contribute to the **continuation of status quo** and **foster values** such as democratization and good governance
- **prestige** (smaller or developing states)
- **national image and reputation**
- fulfillment of **responsibilities**, expression of **commitment** to the UN
- **training and experience**
- **profit** (payment from the UN for each soldier)
- campaign to become **nonpermanent members of the SC** (e.g. Morocco, Spain, Czech Republic)

Motives

13

- to answer **outside pressures** (from allies or organizations)
 - ▣ to lend a multinational character to missions; to increase the legitimacy
- to contribute to the **maintenance of global peace and security**
- to make **positive impression** on the world stage, to build image and prestige
- **down payment for potential assistance** of the international community
 - ▣ Baltic States – fearing inference of Russia
- to demonstrate the **ability to contribute to an operation**
 - ▣ Central and Eastern European states – NATO membership

- to **repay a debt** for an “own” peacekeeping operation in the past
- to **keep armed forces occupied outside the country** rather than meddling into domestic affairs
 - ▣ esp. Third world states where the military is not entirely under civilian control
- to profit **financially**
- to benefit by **receiving equipment**
- to get **experience**
- to get **contact with other military forces**

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15

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SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF UN PEACEKEEPING

Fall 2017

Content

17

- **What does “success” mean?**
- **Overall record of UN peacekeeping**
 - Stories of success
 - Stories of failure
- **Causes of failure**
 - “Lessons learned”
- **How about giving it all up?**

What does “success” mean?

What does “success” mean?

19

- discussion on **what actually is a PKO success**
- multiple **criteria** X no unity
- depending on the **point of view** one adopts, the same operation can be identified either as a success or failure
- **implications for policy making** (which model to adopt / avoid?)

Criteria of judging success

20

- **conflict management** – reducing armed conflict, limiting casualties
- **conflict resolution** – addressing the underlying causes of conflict
 - ▣ not all peacekeeping missions have the task of solving the causes of a conflict!
- **mission mandate** X mission outcome
 - ▣ mandates often vague, complex, changing
- **prevention of spill over**
- evaluation should be done in light of the **constraints under which missions operate!** (e.g. funding, equipment, personnel, the degree of cooperation of the conflict parties)
- long- or a short-term **perspective**

Overall record of UN peacekeeping

UN peacekeeping – overall record

22

- many cases of success as well as failure, mostly - **mixed results**
- **failures always get more publicity than successes!** 1988 Nobel Peace Prize
- Diehl (1987): most operations accomplished a **minimization of armed conflict**, but ineffective in helping to **resolve the underlying sources of the dispute**
- Bratt (1996): 39 UN PKOs, 1948-1996:
 - ▣ **mandate performance** → 19 missions completely and 3 moderately successful
 - ▣ **conflict containment** → 11 missions completely and 3 moderately successful
 - ▣ **conflict resolution** → 21 missions completely and 4 moderately successful
 - ▣ **limitation of casualties** → 19 missions completely and 4 moderately successful

UN Peacekeeping – overall record

23

Pushkina (2006): 17 UN PKO, 1945-1998:

- ▣ completion of the mandate
 - ▣ limiting violence
 - ▣ number of violent deaths
 - ▣ situation of refugees and internally displaced people
 - ▣ spread of conflict and return to war
- **success:** UNTAG (Namibia), ONUMOZ (Mozambique), UNTAES (Eastern Slavonia), UNSMIH (Haiti), UNMIH (Haiti), UNPROFOR-Macedonia and UNPREDEP (Macedonia)
- **partial success:** UNFICYP (Cyprus), UNTAC (Cambodia) and ONUC (Congo)
- **failure:** UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNOSOM II (Somalia), UNPROFOR-Croatia, UNPROFOR-Bosnia, UNCRO (Croatia) and UNAMIR (Rwanda)

Stories of success

24

- **ONUMOZ in Mozambique (1992-94)**
 - major violence ceased
 - demobilization implemented
 - overall security improved
 - stable environment for the return and resettlement of refugees

- **UNTAG in Namibia (1989-90)**
 - managed to run free and fair elections
 - ensured the withdrawal of South Africa's troops
 - cooperation of parties, support of the SC, timely provision of resources
 - model operation for many subsequent cases

- **UNTAET in East Timor (1999-2002) + UNMISSET follow-up**
 - managed to establish an effective administration
 - enabled refugees to return
 - ensured humanitarian assistance
 - supported capacity building for self-governance

ONUMOSZ 1992-1994

25

□ Set up for failure

- Delayed compliance, soaring budget, obstructions and ineffective command and control, parallel structures by humanitarian UNOHAC, incorrect assets – lacking air support or transport in a country with little infrastructure

FIRST COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY CONTINGENTS WAS ALSO A DISASTER WHO REFUSED TO SHARE INFORMATION WITH ANYONE, INCLUDING AJELLO, OR TO DEFINE HIS RESPONSIBILITIES IN ANYTHING BUT THE NARROWEST POSSIBLE TERMS.

10. IN FACT THE SMALL CONTINGENT OF MILITARY OBSERVERS CARRIED THE MAJORITY OF THE MISSION BURDEN AS THEY STAFFED ASSEMBLY AREAS, ASSISTED DEMOBILIZATION, COLLECTED ARMS CACHES AND VERIFIED WEAPONS DEPOSITS. THE BULK OF THE MILITARY CONTINGENTS, ON THE OTHER HAND, SPENT THEIR TIME PATROLLING TRANSPORTATION CORRIDORS IN A BENIGN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT THREATENED ONLY BY AN OCCASIONAL FLAT TIRE. THEIR BIGGEST CHALLENGE CAME WHEN SOLDIERS DEMANDING DEMOBILIZATION OR FOOD WOULD RIOT. THEN THE BLUE HELMETS WERE USEFUL FOR DIRECTING TRAFFIC AWAY FROM THE DISTURBANCE AND IN DELIVERING SUPPLIES TO PLACATE THE SOLDIERS.

ONUMOZ 1992-1994

26

□ Strong suits

- ▣ high donations, strong leadership (Aldo Ajello), aggressive diplomacy

□ Success

- ▣ will to demobilize stronger, than UN capacity – employment of large number of NGOs
- ▣ diligent peace commissions oversight
- ▣ emphasis on observers rather than troop presence
1000/6500
- ▣ media engagement

Story of success to failure and back?

27

- **MONUC/MONUSCO DRC 1999+**
 - successful elections
 - 2 year peace
 - 22,000 troops

 - repeated violations of the Lusaka agreement
 - rape capitol of the world
 - east controlled by armed groups
 - foreign involvement and support
 - loss of government control (M23, LRA)

Success achieved by UN?

28

- **UNAMSIL – Sierra Leone 1999-2005**
 - failure of ECOWAS
 - success through peace enforcement? Role of GB – Operation Pallisier
 - enforcement of Lomé Peace Agreements
 - DDR, SSR, Truth and Reconciliation commission
 - economic recovery

- **UNMIL – Liberia 2003+**
 - ECOWAS success, Nigerian mediation
 - Post-violence, post-regional intervention
 - Stabilization and economic recovery
 - SSR

Stories of failure

29

- **UNOSOM in Somalia (1992-95)**
 - difficult environment of a failed state
 - warlords fighting against the UN presence
 - after the killing of 18 American soldiers, US closed support to the mission
 - US presidential directive → conditions for US involvement in UN peacekeeping: possibility to advance US interests, acceptable risk, clear exit strategy etc.

- **UNAMIR in Rwanda (1993-96)**
 - weak political will in the SC after Somali experience
 - information about genocide overlooked
 - lack of necessary resources
 - withdrawal after 10/2500 troop deaths

- **UNPROFOR in Bosnia (1992-95)**
 - no peace to keep → UN soldiers trapped between the belligerents, frequent target
 - the fall of Srebrenica (“safe haven”) → massacre of 8 000 Bosniak men

Causes of failure

Causes of failure

31

- **lack of political will**
 - ▣ intrastate conflict as a domestic issue (principle of non-intervention, to avoid precedents)
 - ▣ unwillingness to engage in distant places outside the sphere of interests
- **lack of resources**
 - ▣ mismatch between poor resources and broad tasks
- **inadequate mandates**
 - ▣ too broad, too vague or out-of-date
 - ▣ need for clear, appropriate mandates, reflecting the realities on the ground
- **cooperation of the actors of the conflict**
 - ▣ spoilers that are against mission's presence
 - ▣ diplomatic or enforcement measures to ensure compliance with mission's mandate
- **suitability of traditional principles?**
 - ▣ same principles X different conditions

MODERN CHALLENGES OF UN PEACEKEEPING

Fall 2017

“Lessons learned”

33

- **“Lessons learned” reports** in cooperation with troop contributing countries, NGOs and academic institutions
- **Lessons Learned Unit** within the DPKO established in 1995
- **“An Agenda for Peace”** (1992) – B. Boutros-Ghali; first comprehensive UN report; early 1990s euphoria about the ability of the UN to accomplish new tasks + warning about the emerging gap between means and ends
- **“Supplement to an Agenda for Peace”** (1995) – step back from radical innovations of the AfP; involvement in peacekeeping only
- **Lessons learned report on Somalia** (1995) – related to the UN in/ability to use force effectively and appropriately; necessity of clear mandates, adequate means, improved coordination, better public information campaigns and humanitarian assistance strategy

“Lessons learned”

34

- **Lessons learned report on Rwanda (1996)** – avoidance of peace enforcement (reflection of the contraction period); dismissed the argument that UNAMIR should have been able to use force to protect civilians
- **Lessons learned report on Srebrenica (1999)** – unusually frank and detailed appraisal; inadequacy of symbolic deterrence, ambivalence about using force, blind insistence on the ideology of impartiality

„Lessons learned”

35

- **“Brahimi Report”** (2000) – high-level panel lead by L. Brahimi; the most comprehensive “lessons learned” appraisal; need for clear and achievable mandates, better preventive action and peace building strategy, use of integrated mission planning etc.
- **smaller “lessons learned”** focused on particular missions or issues connected with PK (use of force, gender issues, human rights issues)
- implementation record of these reports = **mixed results**
- **2010 UN GA Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations** – reversal?

Current challenges

36

- Same old, same old
- Move toward peace enforcement
- Local ownership mantra
- Outsourcing conundrum
- Conditional support
- Wrongful conduct

Same old, same old - resources

37

- **Authority over armed forces**
 - ▣ National contingents may be withheld, reassigned, reconstituted, or withdrawn
- **National caveats**
 - ▣ Limitations by national contributors must be observed, fine line of communication
- **Peace doesn't always reflect the situation on the ground, nor is it always inclusive**
 - ▣ The character of the peace to keep is fluctuant
 - ▣ Victories may leave spoilers
 - ▣ Negotiated settlements may leave malcontents

Peace enforcement taking over?

38

- ❑ **Brahimi report replaced by R2P**
- ❑ **No peace to keep is overcome**
- ❑ **From “robust” mandates to “stabilization”**
- ❑ **Robust peacekeeping is not peace enforcement.** Robust peacekeeping is distinct from peace enforcement where use of force is at the strategic level and pursued often without the consent of the host nation/and or main parties to the conflict. The threat and use of force in robust peacekeeping is at the tactical level, limited in time and space, and aimed at countering or containing specific spoiler and residual or looming threat in a conflict or post-conflict environment. Large scale violence or one where the major parties are engaged in violent conflict is no longer a robust peacekeeping context. Robust missions are not configured or intended to address any systemic breakdown in a political process (*UN General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2010*)

Peace enforcement taking over?

39

- Complex political emergencies require **stabilization more often**
 - ▣ Coupled with POC mandates, result in the necessity of fast and robust reactions

- **Enforcement includes danger of interstate tensions**, as Africans keep peace next door via peace enforcement
 - ▣ Main peacekeeper contributors are close to conflicts they invest in (Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia) – fine line to **meddling**

- Drones, intelligence gathering, **counterinsurgency tactics** from other
los
 - ▣ Changing the nature of UN missions under Chapter VII

Local ownership

40

- Local ownership and cooperation
- Outreach
 - Presentations
 - Teams
 - Quick impact projects
 - Building of centers but NOT development
- Increases legitimacy of UN peacebuilding
- Increases peace sustainability
- Increases democratic reform

Local ownership

41

- **Goes two ways**
- Preventing “engineered” democracy projects promoting strategic interests of present international forces
- vs.
- Preventing overinclusion vs. exclusion

- **Support for local solution vs. local support for international solution?**

- Elections not the best answer?
 - ▣ Lessons learned in late 1990s, yet still perpetuated

“Outsourcing”

42

- **Authorizing regional organizations**
 - Coalition Gulf 1991, or AMISOM in Somalia 2007
- **Deployment delays**
 - Serval Mali 2012
- **Enforcement**
- **Funding lack**
 - 1997 ECOMOG, Sierra Leone
- **Strike force requirement**
 - Force Intervention Brigade DRC 2013
- **High risk of combat**
- **Offer acceptance**
 - Libya 2011
- **“Rehatting” going the other way?**

Support conditionality

43

- Enforcement and conditionality of support since 2010s
- When governments (interim or otherwise) rely on UN support in the field:
- **HRDDP - Human Rights Due Diligence Policy** on UN support to non-UN security forces
- Withdraws support if HR aren't respected by supported army (FARDC)
 - Hard bargaining position when accusations mounting

Wrongful conduct

44

- **Wrongful conduct – who's to blame?**
 - UN may not be held accountable at any court
- Peacekeepers are **guaranteed immunity in the host state** judicial system
 - High recurrence of sexual assault allegations
 - Court martials are a rare occurrence
 - Entire contingents may be affected (DRC units from MINUSCA)
- **Reluctance to assign blame**, official reports may not reflect intelligence
 - Rwandan role in homicides in Mali

Wrongful conduct

45

- Preying on vulnerable individuals causes **irreparable damage to UN reputation** – as does a lack of repercussions for perpetrators
 - Number of prostitutes in Cambodia rose from 6,000 in 1992 to 25,000 at the height of peace mission (Whitworth 2004:67)

- At the same time Gender is an issue in:
 - Civilian personnel 30%
 - Police forces 20%
 - Armed forces 7%

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