Contents ¨financing ¨troop contributions ¨judging success ¨missions’ assessments ¨failures ¨lessons learned mechanisms ¨modern challenges ¨ ¨ 1 2 ¨ ¨ ¨Financing UN peacekeeping operations Peacekeeping operations expenditures 3 Financing UN peacekeeping operations 4 ¨two basic budget levels within the UN: ¨ ¤regular budget (4bn USD) ¤peacekeeping budget (8,4bn USD) ¤ ¨UN PKOs generally financed through their own separate budget ¨ ¨standard practice established with the authorization of UNEF I (special account created) ¨ ¨exceptions funded through the regular UN budget ¨ ¤military observer missions with small budget (e.g. UNTSO in the Middle East, UNMOGIP in India and Pakistan) ¨ ¨possible funding by the parties to the conflict (e.g. UNYOM in Yemen) ¨ Financing UN peacekeeping operations 5 ¨basic guidelines for sharing the financial burden of PK set in 1960s: ¨ ¤collective responsibility of all member states ¤member states encouraged to make voluntary contributions ¤economically less developed countries – limited capacity to make contributions ¤permanent members of the SC – special responsibility for peace and security ¤ ¨ ¨the SC requested to open a special account into which the member states would contribute according to a graded scale: ¨ ¤63,15 % paid by the five permanent members of the SC (Group A) ¤34,78 % by economically developed states that are not permanent members of the SC (Group B) ¤2,02 % by economically less developed states (Group C) ¤0,05 % by economically least developed states (Group D) ¤ ¨ ¨ ¨ 6 7 Financing UN peacekeeping operations 8 ¨few operations can really start right after being approved by the SC ¨ ¤mission budget first prepared by the office of the SG ¤then submitted and approved by certain committees and the GA ¤à adds to the difficulties of mobilizing and transporting troops to the area of operation ¤ ¨compared to the costs of war, peacekeeping is in fact inexpensive! ¨ ¨reform of financial arrangements – 3 groups of proposals: ¨ ¤Incremental change proposals ¤International taxes ¤New programs and ideas ¤ ¨ 9 ¨ ¨ ¨Motivations for contributing troops 10 11 Motivations for state participation ¨realist motives – to support own interests ¨ ¨idealist motives – to promote norms and values (international peace and security, cooperation, multilateralism) ¨ ¨liberal motives – to contribute to the continuation of status quo and foster values such as democratization and good governance ¨ ¨prestige (smaller or developing states) ¨ ¨national image and reputation ¨ ¨fulfillment of responsibilities, expression of commitment to the UN ¨ ¨training and experience ¨ ¨profit (payment from the UN for each soldier) ¨ ¨campaign to become nonpermanent members of the SC (e.g. Morocco, Spain, Czech Republic) ¨ 12 Motives ¨to answer outside pressures (from allies or organizations) ¤to lend a multinational character to missions; to increase the legitimacy ¤ ¨to contribute to the maintenance of global peace and security ¨ ¨to make positive impression on the world stage, to build image and prestige ¨ ¨down payment for potential assistance of the international community ¤Baltic States – fearing inference of Russia ¤ ¨to demonstrate the ability to contribute to an operation ¤Central and Eastern European states – NATO membership ¨ 13 ¨to repay a debt for an “own” peacekeeping operation in the past ¨ ¨to keep armed forces occupied outside the country rather than meddling into domestic affairs ¨ ¤esp. Third world states where the military is not entirely under civilian control ¤ ¨to profit financially ¨ ¨to benefit by receiving equipment ¨ ¨to get experience ¨ ¨to get contact with other military forces 14 Sources 15 ¨Bellamy, A. J. – Williams, P. – Griffin, S. (2004): Understanding Peacekeeping, Cambridge, Polity Press. ¨Bureš, O. (2008): United Nations Peacekeeping: Bridging the Capabilities-Expectations Gap, Saarbrücken, VDM Verlag. ¨Daniel, D. C. F. – Caraher, L. C. (2006): Characteristics of Troop Contributors to Peace Operations and Implications for Global Capacity, International Peacekeeping, Vol XIII, No 3, pp. 297-315. ¨Diehl, P. (2008): Peace Operations, Cambridge, Polity Press. ¨Global Policy (2005): Peacekeeping Operations Expenditures: 1947-2005, on-line text (http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Z/pk_tables/expend.pdf) ¨Ramsbotham, O. – Woodhouse, T. (1999): Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations, Santa Barbara, ABC-Clio. ¨S/RES/143 (1960), on-line text (http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/157/32/IMG/NR015732.pdf?OpenElement) ¨S/RES/1291 (2000), on-line text (http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/313/35/PDF/N0031335.pdf?OpenElement) ¨UN (2005): In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all. Report of the Secretary-General, on-line text (http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/270/78/PDF/N0527078.pdf). ¨UN (2012): Background Note UN Peacekeeping, on-line text (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/backgroundnote.pdf) ¨UN (2013): Department of Peacekeeping Operations (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/). SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF UN PEACEKEEPING Fall 2017 Content ¨What does “success” mean? ¨ ¤ ¨Overall record of UN peacekeeping ¨ ¤Stories of success ¤ ¤Stories of failure ¤ ¨Causes of failure ¨ ¤“Lessons learned” ¤ ¤How about giving it all up? ¤ ¤ ¤ ¨ •17 ¨ ¨ ¨What does “success” mean? ¨ •18 What does “success” mean? ¨discussion on what actually is a PKO success ¨ ¨multiple criteria X no unity ¨ ¨depending on the point of view one adopts, the same operation can be identified either as a success or failure ¨ ¨ ¨implications for policy making (which model to adopt / avoid?) •19 Criteria of judging success ¨conflict management – reducing armed conflict, limiting casualties ¨ ¨conflict resolution – addressing the underlying causes of conflict ¤not all peacekeeping missions have the task of solving the causes of a conflict! ¤ ¨mission mandate X mission outcome ¤mandates often vague, complex, changing ¤ ¨prevention of spill over ¨ ¨evaluation should be done in light of the constrains under which missions operate! (e.g. funding, equipment, personnel, the degree of cooperation of the conflict parties) ¨ ¨long- or a short-term perspective ¨ •20 ¨ ¨ ¨Overall record of UN peacekeeping •21 UN peacekeeping – overall record ¨many cases of success as well as failure, mostly - mixed results ¨ ¨failures always get more publicity than successes! 1988 Nobel Peace Prize ¨ ¨Diehl (1987): most operations accomplished a minimization of armed conflict, but ineffective in helping to resolve the underlying sources of the dispute ¨ ¨Bratt (1996): 39 UN PKOs, 1948-1996: ¤mandate performance à 19 missions completely and 3 moderately successful ¤conflict containment à 11 missions completely and 3 moderately successful ¤conflict resolution à 21 missions completely and 4 moderately successful ¤limitation of casualties à 19 missions completely and 4 moderately successful ¨ •22 UN Peacekeeping – overall record ¨Pushkina (2006): 17 UN PKO, 1945-1998: ¨ ¤completion of the mandate ¤limiting violence ¤number of violent deaths ¤situation of refugees and internally displaced people ¤spread of conflict and return to war ¤ ¨à success: UNTAG (Namibia), ONUMOZ (Mozambique), UNTAES (Eastern Slavonia), UNSMIH (Haiti), UNMIH (Haiti), UNPROFOR-Macedonia and UNPREDEP (Macedonia) ¨ ¨à partial success: UNFICYP (Cyprus), UNTAC (Cambodia) and ONUC (Congo) ¨ ¨à failure: UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNOSOM II (Somalia), UNPROFOR-Croatia, UNPROFOR-Bosnia, UNCRO (Croatia) and UNAMIR (Rwanda) •23 Stories of success ¨ONUMOZ in Mozambique (1992-94) ¤major violence ceased ¤demobilization implemented ¤overall security improved ¤stable environment for the return and resettlement of refugees ¤ ¨UNTAG in Namibia (1989-90) ¤managed to run free and fair elections ¤ensured the withdrawal of South Africa’s troops ¤cooperation of parties, support of the SC, timely provision of resources ¤model operation for many subsequent cases ¤ ¨UNTAET in East Timor (1999-2002) + UNMISET follow-up ¤managed to establish an effective administration ¤enabled refugees to return ¤ensured humanitarian assistance ¤supported capacity building for self-governance •24 ONUMOZ 1992-1994 ¨Set up for failure ¨Delayed compliance, soaring budget, obstructions and ineffective command and control, parallel structures by humanitarian UNOHAC, incorrect assets – lacking air support or transport in a country with little infrastructure ¤ 25 ONUMOZ 1992-1994 ¨Strong suits ¤high donations, strong leadership (Aldo Ajello), aggressive diplomacy ¨ ¨Success ¤will to demobilize stronger, than UN capacity – employment of large number of NGOs ¤diligent peace commissions oversight ¤emphasis on observers rather than troop presence 1000/6500 ¤media engagement ¨ 26 Story of success to failure and back? ¨MONUC/MONUSCO DRC 1999+ ¤successful elections ¤2 year peace ¤22,000 troops ¤ ¤repeated violations of the Lusaka agreement ¤rape capitol of the world ¤east controlled by armed groups ¤foreign involvement and support ¤loss of government control (M23, LRA) ¤ ¤ ¨ 27 Success achieved by UN? ¨UNAMSIL – Sierra Leone 1999-2005 ¤failure of ECOWAS ¤success through peace enforcement? Role of GB – Operation Pallisier ¤enforcement of Lomé Peace Agreements ¤DDR, SSR, Truth and Reconciliation commission ¤economic recovery ¨ ¨UNMIL – Liberia 2003+ ¤ECOWAS success, Nigerian mediation ¤Post-violence, post-regional intervention ¤Stabilization and economic recovery ¤SSR ¤ 28 Stories of failure ¨UNOSOM in Somalia (1992-95) ¤difficult environment of a failed state ¤warlords fighting against the UN presence ¤after the killing of 18 American soldiers, US closed support to the mission ¤US presidential directive à conditions for US involvement in UN peacekeeping: possibility to advance US interests, acceptable risk, clear exit strategy etc. ¤ ¨UNAMIR in Rwanda (1993-96) ¤weak political will in the SC after Somali experience ¤information about genocide overlooked ¤lack of necessary resources ¤withdrawal after 10/2500 troop deaths ¤ ¨UNPROFOR in Bosnia (1992-95) ¤no peace to keep à UN soldiers trapped between the belligerents, frequent target ¤the fall of Srebrenica (“safe haven”) à massacre of 8 000 Bosniak men •29 ¨ ¨ ¨Causes of failure •30 Causes of failure ¨lack of political will ¤intrastate conflict as a domestic issue (principle of non-intervention, to avoid precedents) ¤unwillingness to engage in distant places outside the sphere of interests ¤ ¨lack of resources ¤mismatch between poor resources and broad tasks ¤ ¨inadequate mandates ¤too broad, too vague or out-of-date ¤need for clear, appropriate mandates, reflecting the realities on the ground ¤ ¨cooperation of the actors of the conflict ¤spoilers that are against mission’s presence ¤diplomatic or enforcement measures to ensure compliance with mission’s mandate ¤ ¨suitability of traditional principles? ¤same principles X different conditions •31 MODERN CHALLENGES OF UN PEACEKEEPING Fall 2017 “Lessons learned” ¨“Lessons learned” reports in cooperation with troop contributing countries, NGOs and academic institutions ¨ ¨Lessons Learned Unit within the DPKO established in 1995 ¨ ¨“An Agenda for Peace” (1992) – B. Boutros-Ghali; first comprehensive UN report; early 1990s euphoria about the ability of the UN to accomplish new tasks + warning about the emerging gap between means and ends ¨ ¨“Supplement to an Agenda for Peace” (1995) – step back from radical innovations of the AfP; involvement in peacekeeping only ¨ ¨Lessons learned report on Somalia (1995) – related to the UN in/ability to use force effectively and appropriately; necessity of clear mandates, adequate means, improved coordination, better public information campaigns and humanitarian assistance strategy ¨ ¨ ¨ •33 “Lessons learned” ¨ ¨Lessons learned report on Rwanda (1996) – avoidance of peace enforcement (reflection of the contraction period); dismissed the argument that UNAMIR should have been able to use force to protect civilians ¨ ¨Lessons learned report on Srebrenica (1999) – unusually frank and detailed appraisal; inadequacy of symbolic deterrence, ambivalence about using force, blind insistence on the ideology of impartiality ¨ •34 „Lessons learned” •35 ¨“Brahimi Report” (2000) – high-level panel lead by L. Brahimi; the most comprehensive “lessons learned” appraisal; need for clear and achievable mandates, better preventive action and peace building strategy, use of integrated mission planning etc. ¨ ¨smaller “lessons learned” focused on particular missions or issues connected with PK (use of force, gender issues, human rights issues) ¨ ¨implementation record of these reports = mixed results ¨2010 UN GA Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations – reversal? Current challenges •36 ¨Same old, same old ¨Move toward peace enforcement ¨Local ownership mantra ¨Outsourcing conundrum ¨Conditional support ¨Wrongful conduct ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ Same old, same old - resources •37 ¨Authority over armed forces ¤National contingents may be withheld, reassigned, reconstituted, or withdrawn ¨National caveats ¤Limitations by national contributors must be observed, fine line of communication ¨Peace doesn’t always reflect the situation on the ground, nor is it always inclusive ¤The character of the peace to keep is fluctuant ¤Victories may leave spoilers ¤Negotiated settlements may leave malcontents Peace enforcement taking over? •38 ¨Brahimi report replaced by R2P ¨No peace to keep is overcome ¨From “robust” mandates to “stabilization” ¨Robust peacekeeping is not peace enforcement. Robust peacekeeping is distinct from peace enforcement where use of force is at the strategic level and pursued often without the consent of the host nation/and or main parties to the conflict. The threat and use of force in robust peacekeeping is at the tactical level, limited in time and space, and aimed at countering or containing specific spoiler and residual or looming threat in a conflict or post-conflict environment. Large scale violence or one where the major parties are engaged in violent conflict is no longer a robust peacekeeping context. Robust missions are not configured or intended to address any systemic breakdown in a political process (UN General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2010) Peace enforcement taking over? •39 ¨Complex political emergencies require stabilization more often ¤Coupled with POC mandates, result in the necessity of fast and robust reactions ¤ ¨Enforcement includes danger of interstate tensions, as Africans keep peace next door via peace enforcement ¤Main peacekeeper contributors are close to conflicts they invest in (Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia) – fine line to meddling ¤ ¨Drones, intelligence gathering, counterinsurgency tactics from other Ios ¤Changing the nature of UN missions under Chapter VII Local ownership •40 ¨Local ownership and cooperation ¨Outreach ¨Presentations ¨Teams ¨Quick impact projects ¨Building of centers but NOT development ¨Increases legitimacy of UN peacebuilding ¨Increases peace sustainability ¨Increases democratic reform Local ownership •41 ¨Goes two ways ¨Preventing “engineered” democracy projects promoting strategic interests of present international forces ¨vs. ¨Preventing overinclusion vs. exclusion ¨ ¨Support for local solution vs. local support for international solution? ¨ ¨Elections not the best answer? ¤Lessons learned in late 1990s, yet still perpetuated ¨ “Outsourcing” •42 ¨Authorizing regional organizations ¤Coalition Gulf 1991, or AMISOM in Somalia 2007 ¨Deployment delays ¤Serval Mali 2012 ¨Enforcement ¨Funding lack ¤1997 ECOMOG, Sierra Leone ¨Strike force requirement ¤Force Intervention Brigade DRC 2013 ¨High risk of combat ¨Offer acceptance ¤Libya 2011 ¨“Rehatting” going the other way? Support conditionality •43 ¨Enforcement and conditionality of support since 2010s ¨ ¨When governments (interim or otherwise) rely on UN support in the field: ¨HRDDP - Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN support to non-UN security forces ¨ ¨Withdraws support if HR aren’t respected by supported army (FARDC) ¨Hard bargaining position when accusations mounting ¨ Wrongful conduct •44 ¨Wrongful conduct – who’s to blame? ¤UN may not be held accountable at any court ¨Peacekeepers are guaranteed immunity in the host state judicial system ¤High recurrence of sexual assault allegations ¤Court martials are a rare occurrence ¤Entire contingents may be affected (DRC units from MINUSCA) ¨Reluctance to assign blame, official reports may not reflect intelligence ¤Rwandan role in homicides in Mali ¨ Wrongful conduct •45 ¨Preying on vulnerable individuals causes irreparable damage to UN reputation – as does a lack of repercussions for perpetrators ¤Number of prostitutes in Cambodia rose for 6,000 in 1992 to 25,000 at the height of peace mission (Whitworth 2004:67) ¨ ¨At the same time Gender is an issue in: ¤Civilian personnel 30% ¤Police forces 20% ¤Armed forces 7% ¨ ¤ ¨ ¨ Sources ¨Bratt, D. (1996): Defining Peacekeeping Success: The Experience of UNTAC, Peacekeeping & International Relations, Vol XXV, No 4, pp. 3-5. ¨Bureš, O. (2008): United Nations Peacekeeping: Bridging the Capabilities-Expectations Gap, Saarbrücken, VDM Verlag. ¨Heldt, B. (2001): Conditions for Successful Intrastate Peacekeeping Missions, National Defence College of Sweden, Stockholm. ¨Luttwak, E. N. (1999): “Give War a Chance.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4, pp. 36-44. ¨Pushkina, D. (2006): A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeping Mission, International Peacekeeping, Vol XIII, No 2, pp. 133-149. ¨UN: Charter of the United Nations, on-line text (http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/). ¨UN (2000): Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. Summary of Recommendations, on-line text (http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/). ¨UN DPKO (1996): Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, on-line text (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/lessons/rwanda.htm). ¨Yilmaz, M. E. (2005): UN Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, International Journal of World Peace, Vol XXII, No 2, pp. 13-28. ¨ •46