

NATO PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Fall 2017

History

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- **Est. 1949**
- **Collective defense organization** of containment and balancing
- Article 5:
- *“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.*

Adaptation

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- **From territorial defense to expeditionary engagement to holistic approaches**
- Non-article 5 role evoked as soon as **1992 (Oslo)**
 - ▣ MC327 „NATO Military planning for peace support operations“
- **NO PSO doctrine until 1999**
- Out-of-area **peace enforcement** enshrined as best suited to NATO in support of other organizations **UN/OSCE**
- Post-Kosovo experience – **more independent out-of-area action**


Article 5 vs. Non-Article 5 operations

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- **Article 5** – invoked only once, post 9/11, support for Eagle Assist and Active Endeavour


- **Non-Article 5**
 - Bosnia 1995, UN Mandate
 - Kosovo
 - Macedonia
 - Afghanistan
 - Mediterranean
 - Piracy
 - Libya
 - AU support
 - Pakistan

CURRENT AND PAST NATO MISSIONS



Types of PSOs

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Doctrine

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- **Military response for**
- **a political solution**




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ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

June 2010

NATO PSO



Holy trinity implemented by NATO

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□ **Impartiality**

- Mandate implementation equally always in relation to mandate

□ **Consent**

- If not invited should be built gradually

□ **Restraint**

- proportional responses

□ **Legitimacy**

- UN mandate ideal

Doctrinal build over trinity

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- Credibility
- Security
- Mutual Respect
- Transparency
- Freedom of Movement
- Objective / End State
- Unity of Effort

Adaptation – going comprehensive

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- **2010 Strategic Concept**
- **Neither 1991 nor 1999 Strategic concepts envisioned any other tools than military, while acknowledging the role of crisis management**
- “An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of UN Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace”. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peace-making, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace building and/or support to humanitarian assistance”.

Operations mirroring adaptation

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- **Assisting UN in Bosnia 1995-2004**
 - First out-of-area mission
 - Initial monitoring upscaled to 2-week bombing campaign
 - Followed by peacekeeping force IFOR > SFOR
 - Taken over by EU in 2004

- **Kosovo, 1999-**

- **Macedonia, 2001-2003**
 - DDR, observation, stabilization
 - Initiated after failure to renew UN mission mandate

Operations mirroring adaptation

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- **ISAF, 2001-2014**
 - Peace enforcement mandate
 - Largest mission to date
 - Crucial learning point

- **Iraq, NTM, 2004-2011**
 - Police and military training mission

- **Pakistan, 2005-2006, Katrina 2005**
 - Disaster relief

Operations mirroring adaptation

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- **AU support, Sudan 2005 - 2007**
 - airlift provision to AU forces

- **AU support, Somalia 2007 –**
 - airlift provision to AU forces

- **Ocean shield, 2009 –**
 - Counter-piracy off the Horn of Africa

- **Libya, 2011**

- **Afghanistan 2015 -**

Holistic approach to crisis management?

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- **Integration of military instruments with Civilian**
 - The military is always in **support of the larger political / civil mission** (military is a component of a larger effort).
 - There is **neither an enemy nor a military victory**. Military task is to set conditions to enable other agencies to achieve political end state.

- **Military can:**
 - Temporize
 - Maintain situation
 - Reduce levels of violence
 - Induce compliance

CIMIC

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- IFOR and SFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been essential to the evolution of NATO's CIMIC doctrine
- **Coordination and cooperation**, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including local population and authorities, as well as international national and non-governmental organizations
- MC 411/1 and Allied Joint Publication AJP-9
- Facilitating humanitarian aid by NGOs or IOs as an objective in itself
- **Core functions: 1. Civil-Military Liaison 2. Support to the civil environment 3. Support to force**

PRT - Provincial reconstruction teams

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□ PRT

- Combination of security with development, direct, and structural prevention
- Winning hearts and minds, improving legitimacy and popular support for government cooperation and programs
- Job opportunities, trustbuilding
- Duration limited by government ability to replace programmes

□ Afghanistan and Iraq

- Most positive and negative impacts?
 - Duplicity in structures
 - Temporary opportunities
 - Subverting government legitimate reach

Role definition?

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- **Military primacy still remains**

- Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), 2006
 - ▣ Crucial interaction with UN and EU
 - ▣ Understanding and embracing specific role

- **Improvement of inter institutional cooperation**
 - ▣ Hindrances perpetuated by Turkey / Greece / Cyprus

- **NATO seeks to support other actors in their civilian efforts**