Germany and European Security and Defence Cooperation: The Europeanization of National Crisis Management Policies?

Eva Gross

Security Dialogue 2007 38: 501
DOI: 10.1177/0967010607084998

Germany and European Security and Defence Cooperation: The Europeanization of National Crisis Management Policies?

EVA GROSS*

Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

This article analyses German preferences towards the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The lens of Europeanization, which traces both the top-down and the bottom-up influences between the European and the national levels, makes it possible to highlight the ways in which Germany was able to shape – and was shaped by – these two institutions. The analysis of decisions taken by the Schröder government in relation to the crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the war in Afghanistan in particular shows that, although moves towards the Europeanization of national foreign policy can be observed, transatlantic relations and national biases determined policy choices that involved the use of military force. The article concludes that although there is evidence of Europeanization of German foreign policy, the continuing influence of both NATO and domestic factors on policy outcomes means that conclusions regarding the Europeanization of national foreign policy can be easily overstated, particularly when it comes to the use of military force.

Keywords Afghanistan • CFSP/ESDP • Europeanization • FYROM • Germany

Introduction

WITH THE END of the Cold War, Germany's traditionally held post-war foreign policy priorities, in particular the reluctance to use military force as part of Germany's 'civilian power' profile (Maull, 2000), came under increasing pressure. Changed political realities and allies' expectations following the first Gulf War put Berlin under increasing pressure to depart from its 'chequebook diplomacy' and to contribute to military crisis management operations. Domestically, the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in the Balkans raised the normative question of whether pacifism

SECURITY DIALOGUE

SAGE Publications, http://sdi.sagepub.com
Vol. 38(4): 501–520, DOI: 10.1177/0967010607084998

was the only, and the most appropriate, historical lesson to draw from the experience of World War II (Janning, 1996). These pressures culminated in the Kosovo war in 1999, widely regarded as a sea change in German foreign policy, where Berlin for the first time since the end of World War II took part in offensive military operations against a sovereign state.

The end of the Cold War and the conflicts in the Balkans during the 1990s exerted pressures for change not only on individual member states but also on the European Union as a whole. Together, they provided a strong impetus for the creation of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993 and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999 (Duke, 1999; Howorth, 2005). Rhetorically at least, Germany has been a staunch supporter of both the CFSP and the ESDP. In addition to a changing view on the use of military force, Germany also moved from its postwar transatlanticist orientation to one that accommodated the emergence of the ESDP.

Given the changes in German policy priorities over the course of the 1990s, as well as the institutional construction of the CFSP and the ESDP, it is worth posing the question of what role Germany has assigned to policy instruments located in the CFSP and the ESDP in crisis management since 1999. This arises out of two contradictory observations: although a growing body of academic literature offers evidence of the 'Europeanization' of the national foreign policies of EU member-states (Irondelle, 2003; Miskimmon, forthcoming; Wong, 2006; Tonra, 2001), other studies have observed that ESDP instruments have been used selectively since the policy's creation (Biscop, 2006). This apparent paradox renders worthwhile an investigation of the Europeanization of national foreign policy, particularly in the case of Germany, a country that has been termed a European *Musterknabe* (star pupil) (Miskimmon, 2001).

This article first reviews the current literature on Europeanization and suggests ways in which the latter concept can be successfully applied to the analysis of foreign and security policy. It then applies the Europeanization framework to the analysis of foreign policy decisions and underlying motivations on the part of key decision-makers and bureaucracies in Germany, including elected officials, the Federal Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence. The analysis shows that the level of Europeanization varied among government bureaucracies and elected officials, and that policy outcomes were significantly affected by transatlantic considerations and domestic priorities rather than by considerations that would point towards Europeanization, particularly when it came to the use of force.

Europeanization: Fad – or Filling a Void?

While the EU CFSP has often been criticized for its incoherence and ineffectiveness (Stavridis et al., 1997; Zielonka, 1998), EU member-states have nevertheless made continuous efforts to create effective institutional structures and to formulate common policies. The creation of the ESDP has additionally raised expectations of increasing foreign policy activities on the part of the Union. These developments challenge realist assumptions about the limits of cooperation and pose a general problem for International Relations (IR) theory, as they question the notion of state sovereignty: the European Union is 'neither a state, nor a traditional alliance, and . . . presents a heterodox unit of analysis' (Andreatta, 2005: 19). The EU is also unique in the nature of its international cooperation and integration (Wallace, 1994), even if the area of foreign and security policy is intergovernmental and likely to remain so.

Possibly as a result of increasing integration, the concept of Europeanization has been increasingly used to study aspects of European integration and to analyse the ways in which 'Europe matters' in a specific policy field (Börzel, 2003; Green Cowles, Caporaso & Risse, 2001; Dyson & Goetz, 2003; Knill, 2001). Recently, the applicability of the concept to foreign and security policy has also been posited (Major, 2005; Major & Pomorska, 2005). To be sure, owing to the intergovernmental nature of the EU foreign policy process, pressures emanating from the EU level in relation to foreign policy are not as strong or direct as those in areas that fall under the first pillar, such as economic and social policy, where research has established modifications occurring in national policies and institutional structures (Börzel, 1999; Bulmer & Burch, 1999; Cole & Drake, 2000).

Still, EU membership has resulted in an adaptation process for both new and founding EU member-states, in terms of both their policies towards previously external states as they join the EU and their policies towards third states to ensure alignment with existing EU policies (Manners & Whitman, 2000). Although the effects of Europeanization on national foreign policy are weak in comparison with policy areas located in the first pillar, there are a number of documented changes in states' foreign policy as a result of national and European interactions. For instance, research has shown that repeated interactions and the quantity and quality of information available has changed working patterns among the diplomats of EU member-states (Nuttall, 1992; Forster & Wallace, 2000), resulting in a coordination reflex going beyond calculated exchanges of information (Tonra, 2003). Europeanization has also been used to document changes in national foreign policy as a result of EU accession in the case of Ireland (Keatinge, 1984) and Spain (Torreblanca, 2001). Tonra (2001) has analysed the Europeanization of Dutch, Danish and Irish foreign policies, Wong (2006) that of French policy in Asia, and Miskimmon (forthcoming) that of Germany.

The increasingly frequent application of the Europeanization concept has also revealed a number of methodological problems. First, the broad usage of the term presents a challenge for researchers wishing to employ the concept, as Europeanization has been conceptualized as a historical phenomenon, as transnational cultural diffusion, as institutional adaptation, or as the adaptation of policies and policy processes (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003). Second, Europeanization is an analytical concept rather than a theory that could predict foreign policy behaviour. In response to these criticisms, it has been argued that, rather than serving as an explanatory concept or theory, Europeanization can be useful 'as an attention-directing device and a starting point for further exploration' (Olsen, 2002: 943). The potential contribution of the application of the concept of Europeanization thus lies in aiding the analysis of the impact of the EU on the national level, and in being able to focus on processes of change (Radaelli, 2004). Europeanization allows the researcher to address puzzles that go beyond the cause of European integration or the nature of EU decisionmaking, and to inquire into the nature of the 'reciprocal relationship' between the European and the national levels (Börzel, 2002: 195).

But, how should one define Europeanization in the context of foreign and security policy? A commonly cited definition of Europeanization focuses on domestic change caused by European cooperation and defines Europeanization as 'an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of policies to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making' (Ladrech, 1994: 69). In addition to a process of domestic change, however, analysts adopting a bottom-up perspective understand Europeanization as 'the emergence and development at the European level of distinctive structures of governance' (Risse, Green Cowles & Caporaso, 2001: 3). And, because member-states initiate these EU policies that they later adapt to, the two dimensions of Europeanization are linked in practice, suggesting that Europeanization is a mutually constitutive process of change at both the national and the European levels (Radaelli, 2002; Börzel, 2003). In addition, socialization mechanisms and the potential for resulting cognitive change also suggest a third dimension of Europeanization, where change comes about through the transfer of norms or ideas. Wong (2005) therefore suggests that three conceptions of Europeanization in particular can be useful in explaining possible changes taking place in foreign policymaking in EU member-states: national adaptation (a top-down process), national projection (a bottom-up process) and identity reconstruction (changing interests and identities).

National adaptation understands Europeanization as a reactive, top-down process that introduces change from the European level to the national level of policy decisionmaking. Europeanization as national adaptation can be defined as 'the process of change at the domestic level (be it of policies,

preferences or institutions) originated by the adaptation pressures generated by the European integration process; a process of change whose identity and character depend on the "goodness of fit" of domestic institutions and adaptation pressures' (Torreblanca, 2001: 3).

Following Smith (2000), one can expect to observe changes in one or more of the following as a result of Europeanization as national adaptation: bureaucratic reorganization, constitutional change, elite socialization and shifts in public opinion. In addition, adaptation can be expected to result in a more general change in policies, preferences and institutions; increased salience of the European agenda; adherence to common policy objectives; policies agreed to for the sake of EU unity (high price of defection); and the relaxation of traditional policy positions to accommodate progress of EU projects. In the context of decisions taken in crisis situations, or decisions that concern the application of a policy instrument located in the CFSP and the ESDP in a specific instance, bureaucratic reorganization and constitutional change are less likely to be observed. One could expect to find, however, a high degree of salience of the European agenda; the adherence to common objectives; and the relaxation of national policy positions in order to accommodate the progress of EU policy and institutions. 'Salience' can be understood as the general importance or prominence of the CFSP and the ESDP in national foreign policy. 'European agenda' here refers to the development of EU security institutions. In practice, this means that an increased importance of the CFSP and/or the ESDP in the minds of decision-makers leads to advocating increased application of instruments located in the two institutions.

Europeanization as national projection (a bottom-up process), on the other hand, can be regarded as a process where states seek to export domestic policy models, ideas and details to the EU (Bulmer, 1998). The concept of politics of scale (Ginsberg, 1989), which highlights the benefits of collective action in conducting foreign policy actions at lower costs and risks than member-states acting alone, applies here as well. States are not just passively reacting to changes at the institutional level; they are the primary actors in the process of policy change and proactively project preferences and policy ideas and initiatives to the European level. By 'Europeanizing' previously national policies and generalizing them onto a larger stage, a dialectical relationship between the state and the EU level is created, which in turn feeds back to the national level. The benefits of national projection are, first, that the state increases its international influence; second, that the state reduces the costs of pursuing a controversial policy against an extra-European power; and, third, that a strong European presence in the world is potentially beneficial to all EU members, as it increases individual states' international influence (Regelsberger, 1997). Policy outcomes of national projection could see states taking advantage of the EU to promote specific national interests, states attempting to increase national influence in the world by participating

in or initiating EU policies, and states using the EU as cover to influence the foreign policies of other member-states.

The third conception of Europeanization, that of changing policy preferences, moves the definition of Europeanization closer to notions of integration and suggests the possibility of eventual convergence of national foreign policy. It evokes the concept of security communities (Deutsch, 1957), and that of elite socialization previously referred to (Smith, 2000), as well as the broader literature on national identity. Such readings of European identity also focus on the redefinition and negotiation of identities within EU institutions, as well as national citizenries, mirroring a neofunctionalist reading of a gradual transfer of identity and affiliation towards a new supranational Europe (Haas, 1960), even if it should be quite obvious that Europe as an identity category is far from replacing national identity and that Europe does not enjoy the same level of legitimacy that the individual nation-states do. In the context of Europeanization, 'Europe' as an identity category co-exists and can be incorporated in a given nation-state identity, depending on the degree of resonance. The question then becomes how much space there is for 'Europe' in collective nation-state identities, and how these identity constructions of 'Europe' relate to given nation-state identities and ideas about the European political and economic order (Risse, 2001). Evidence of the Europeanization of conceptions of national identity includes the emergence or existence of norms among policy-making elites, shared definitions of European and national interests, increase in public support for European political cooperation, and shared or overlapping definitions of the state's and Europe's role in the world, as well as of Europe's security parameters. Indicators of Europeanization as a result of identity formation can be expected to include the recourse to the European option as an instinctive choice or the value attached to a European approach in a particular policy decision. This third reading of Europeanization points towards long-term processes of change that are not necessarily captured in single-case decision-making; this does not mean, however, that norms and, more generally, the value attached to a 'European approach' cannot affect national decision-making. The application of the three conceptions to policy case studies that follows below will establish to what extent national foreign policy shaped, and was shaped by, the EU's CFSP and ESDP. Significant evidence of Europeanization, manifested as policy responses as a result of either adaptational pressures or the export of national preferences onto the European platform, can be expected to result in a significant role for the CFSP and the ESDP. But, evidence of Europeanization may not necessarily result in such a role if domestic preferences or considerations of alliance politics played a bigger role in national decision-making.

'Europeanized' Decisionmaking in Practice?

The crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the war in Afghanistan in 2001 suggest themselves as test cases for the Europeanization of national foreign policy: both called for a European response, both necessitated the use of force, and they were the first two crises to occur after Kosovo and the creation of the ESDP. They also illustrate seemingly conflicting values with respect to the EU's CFSP and ESDP: whereas Secretary-General/High Representative Javier Solana was very active in the political mediation of the crisis in FYROM, and the country eventually came to host the first ever ESDP military operation, both the CFSP and the ESDP seemed eclipsed by transatlantic and domestic preferences in the case of Afghanistan, and an ESDP civilian operation in that country only came to be publicly discussed as a concrete possibility in 2006. At the same time, responses towards the war in Afghanistan from the outset included the use of CFSP instruments and successful coordination efforts on the part of member-states contributing to the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF). This makes Afghanistan a promising case for delineating states' European, domestic and transatlantic commitments and their relative weight in decision-making.

FYROM: A Successful Test Case for EU Foreign Policy

FYROM is often and justifiably cited as not only a test case but also a success for EU crisis management (see Piana, 2002). It had strong symbolic character for EU crisis management and was a 'first' in several respects: in the mediation of the 2001 crisis, the EU for the first time made use of crisis management tools located in the CFSP; NATO and the EU for the first time worked together on a practical level; and the first military mission was suggested and eventually realized under the ESDP framework. 'Operation Concordia' was launched in 2003 and put into practice the 'Berlin Plus' agreements that give the EU access to NATO assets. And, indeed, German reactions towards the crisis support several indicators of Europeanization: the salience of the CFSP in the negotiation in the crisis was evident, and there was at least a rhetorical commitment to a growing role for the EU and Europe in contributions to NATO and later also ESDP operations. But, different agencies in the German government held different views on the best approach to resolving the crisis; and with respect to an eventual takeover of ESDP from NATO German policy-makers prioritized transatlantic relations and insisted on the conclusion of the 'Berlin Plus' agreement prior to launching an ESPD operation. This shows that Europeanization is evident with respect to the CFSP rather than the ESDP: in other words, on the political rather than the military dimension of foreign policy.

Germany was sensitive to the crisis because it threatened to undermine the broader regional framework that had been put in place after the end of the conflict in Kosovo. The EU was already an important platform for the political and economic process of regional post-conflict reconstruction; and, given the goal of eventual integration of the countries of the Western Balkans into the EU, together with the goal of a greater role for the EU as a regional political actor, the EU CFSP was a natural institutional venue for resolving the crisis from the perspective of German policymakers.[1] Success for the CFSP in resolving the crisis, therefore, was of high salience. This supports conclusions of Europeanization understood as national adaptation.

But, whereas elected officials supported the application of CFSP instruments, Germany's Federal Foreign Office emphasized restoring stability over the application of new instruments and displayed a more cautious attitude. This shows that although the use of CFSP instruments in the negotiation of the crisis was supported and deemed important on account of the symbolism for the evolution of the EU as a political actor, this position was not given equal importance among all participants in the governmental process. Once Javier Solana had been given a mandate to conduct the political negotiations, member states had little influence on the outcomes of the negotiating processes within the CFSP. Rather, Germany continued to participate in multilateral negotiations in the framework of the Contact Group. Policymakers, particularly those in the Federal Foreign Office, regarded the Contact Group as an important platform because US involvement was deemed crucial in resolving the conflict, and considered it an effective platform for influencing broader policy responses to the crisis among the major powers involved.[2]

When it came to military instruments, Germany faced pressure to commit military forces to the NATO operations but did not take a lead in the operations or advocate the use of ESDP instruments. For his part, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder pushed for an increasing profile for Germany in NATO to demonstrate that Germany was no longer bound by its past. A fundamentally transatlanticist orientation in German foreign policy (Fischer, 2001) constituted an important factor in German decision-making in this case. However, in domestic debates, international responsibility and solidarity with NATO allies were often portrayed as necessary preconditions for Europe to act. To illustrate, members of the ruling coalition stressed the credibility of the still-developing CFSP (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001b: 18069) and termed the NATO operation an 'important part of the preventive war and conflict prevention strategy of the EU towards Macedonia' (Peter Struck, cited in Deutscher Bundestag, 2001b: 18191c). This points towards some evidence of European-

[1] Interview with German official, Berlin, 21 November 2005.
[2] Interview with German official, Berlin, 21 November 2005.

ization, as these statements can be taken to reflect an emerging preference formation towards the application of CFSP and ESDP instruments.

But, the emphasis on a multilateral framework and the overall comprehensive preventive concept as part of the EU approach (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001a: 15494d) has to be understood in a specific domestic context, where the use of force remained contested and a 'European approach' was bound to be more attractive and persuasive than military deployment under NATO. Domestic objections to military deployment arose out of two separate positions. The long-held taboo against the use of force was a source of reservations, particularly among members of the ruling Red–Green coalition. Members of the Christian Democrats, the leading opposition party, on the other hand, argued that insufficient defence budgets and the resulting military overstretch of Germany's armed forces would prevent Germany from playing the leadership role in Europe advocated by Chancellor Schröder (Volker Rühe, cited in Deutscher Bundestag, 2001a: 15366c). Schröder was constrained by allies' expectations that Germany would provide troops, on the one hand, and by domestic reservations about German deployments, on the other. In a classic example of a two-level game (Putnam, 1988), Schröder pushed for Germany to assume increasing responsibility in the field of security and defence by pledging troops to the NATO operation while at the same time negotiating domestic support.

Schröder argued that the German government should act within the framework of the EU and NATO to enable a peaceful solution to the conflict; that Germany should participate in a NATO mission for reasons of solidarity with Germany's partners; and that Germany should not risk damaging its relations with its allies out of fears of a parliamentary defeat (*Financial Times Deutschland*, 2001a). Although the government eventually consented to the deployment of forces, Schröder could not rely on his own party to carry the vote: 20 Social Democratic Party members had written an open letter opposing the NATO operation. When 'Operation Essential Harvest' was voted on, of 635 votes, 497 voted in favour, 130 against, and 8 abstained (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001b: 18210a). This gave the government the mandate it needed, but signalled weak support for Schröder within the ruling coalition.

Chancellor Schröder assigned political priority to the participation in NATO on account of discussions with Germany's allies and the need for solidarity with European partners in the NATO framework. Preserving Germany's influence in the emerging ESDP was a secondary but nevertheless important concern: if Germany did not pull its weight in NATO in FYROM, Britain and France would continue to dominate (*Financial Times Deutschland*, 2001b). This indicates a general preference on the part of the German government for a leadership role in Europe, but one that includes NATO as well as the ESDP. Germany was not in favour of French suggestions of an ESDP takeover of Operation Essential Harvest, because this was considered too

early as far as both the institutional setup of the ESDP and conditions on the ground in FYROM were concerned. Only when the security situation had improved to the point where an ESDP mission was considered safe, and only on the condition that the institutional arrangements between NATO and the EU would be resolved, did Germany support the ESDP takeover of the NATO operation.[3] An ESDP operation was, therefore, not considered expedient until much later, and the EU expressed willingness to take over the NATO mission in FYROM at the Copenhagen Council in December 2002 (Council of the European Union, 2003). This suggests that, despite the high profile of the CFSP and the ESDP in governmental debates, and despite the professed goal on the part of the Chancellor for Europe to play a greater part in matters of security, considerations of alliance politics overwhelmingly determined German decisionmaking with respect to the timing of the handover from NATO to the ESDP.

However, different actors within the German government viewed the matter of the takeover differently, both in relation to timing and in terms of principle. Whereas Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer – along with Javier Solana – were in favour of a handover early on,[4] the Foreign Office itself did not concur with Fischer's position but considered the timing of the initial suggestion premature.[5] The Ministry of Defence, on the other hand, objected to an ESDP takeover for reasons of both principle and practicality.[6] This demonstrates that while EU assumption of military responsibility in FYROM was viewed favourably on the political level, government bureaucracies both in the Federal Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence viewed the matter of an ESDP takeover with more caution. NATO was considered an appropriate institutional venue both for host-country credibility and for the symbolism of US involvement.[7] The Federal Foreign Office also did not consider the ESDP ready to take on such a mission, and the Balkans and ESDP departments within the Federal Foreign Office both shared this cautious attitude, albeit for different reasons: the Balkans department because it considered the situation still too risky for the ESDP to assume command,[8] and it was not necessarily in favour of the ESDP to begin with,[9] and the ESDP department because it insisted on the conclusion of the Berlin Plus agreement between NATO and the EU before launching an ESDP mission.[10] This reflects both utilitarian and transatlantic preferences within branches of the Federal Foreign Office. The bureaucracy thus acted as a 'retarding

[3] Interview with German official, Berlin, 21 November 2005.
[4] Interview with German official, London, 3 November 2005.
[5] Interview with German official, Berlin, 21 November 2005.
[6] Interview with former German official, Berlin, 8 February 2006.
[7] Interview with German official, Berlin, 21 November 2005.
[8] Interview with German official, Berlin, 21 November 2005.
[9] Interview with German official, London, 3 November 2005.
[10] Interview with German official, London, 3 November 2005.

element' rather than a ready facilitator of a transition to more responsibility for ESDP.[11] To be sure, there was no objection to an ESDP mission in principle, especially given the small size of the mission, but it was only when stability in FYROM was guaranteed and the Berlin Plus agreement concluded that the foreign ministry gave the green light for an ESDP.[12]

The Ministry of Defence, on the other hand, objected to the utilization of ESDP instruments altogether, primarily on utilitarian grounds: NATO was conducting three active operations in the Balkans at the time, and it was not considered useful to dislodge one of these operations in order to start an ESDP operation.[13] What spoke in favour of the ESDP takeover in the minds of defence officials was the chance to improve the working mechanisms by arriving at a formalized agreement between NATO and the EU. The prospect of such formal cooperation mechanisms and the absence of US opposition to the assumption of the mission by the ESDP subsequently led to the endorsement of the proposal at the European Council of Copenhagen in December 2002. This shows that, with respect to the Europeanization framework, considerations of Europeanization did not significantly condition policy responses with respect to military crisis management. And, although the salience of the European agenda was evident with respect to the objective of the EU to 'show face' in the political resolution of the crisis, Germany continued to engage in other diplomatic venues, most notably the Contact Group. Even an unqualified success for EU crisis management and a first ESDP operation, then, did not reflect the Europeanization of national foreign policy at the expense of the transatlantic alliance and domestic preferences.

Afghanistan I: The Rediscovery of the CFSP

German reactions towards the attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington reveal both solidarity with the USA and a further move towards Germany's 'normalization' with respect to the use of force and Germany's international standing. As was the case initially in FYROM, contributions to EU military cooperation did not extend beyond rhetorical commitments to a growing role for the EU in the world. But, Germany utilized the EU's CFSP as a platform to increase its action radius in addressing the question of Afghanistan's reconstruction and to give the EU a voice. This points towards evidence of Europeanization – in a case that is not usually associated with Europeanization pressures, but one where individual EU member-states, the big three (Britain, France and Germany) at the forefront, sought to contribute to the US-led 'war on terror' and to demonstrate their solidarity with the United States. Reactions towards the war in Afghanistan analysed below

[11] Interview with German official, London, 3 November 2005.
[12] Interview with German official, Berlin, 21 November 2005.
[13] Interview with former German official, Berlin, 8 February 2006.

show that even overwhelming transatlantic commitments and appearances of a (re)nationalization of foreign policy (Hill, 2004), therefore, do not negate the Europeanization of national foreign policy.

Germany's participation in and contribution to the war and reconstruction in Afghanistan was significant. Berlin pledged a total of 5,100 of troops to 'Operation Enduring Freedom' (OEF) (3,900) and ISAF (1,200). Chancellor Schröder in particular regarded military participation in OEF and ISAF – apart from an expression of solidarity with the USA – as a means to increase Germany's independence and latitude for action in world politics. Although the main consideration for Germany in participating in OEF was to respond to greater systemic forces and the policy preferences of the USA and to show solidarity after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, participation in OEF also served to increase Germany's international standing and to signal Berlin's growing international ambitions. As for policies for tackling the 'war on terror' more broadly and beyond Afghanistan, the EU was considered an important platform. This indicates Europeanization processes as far as political instruments under the CFSP are concerned along all three dimensions of Europeanization outlined previously.

Chancellor Schröder in particular assumed a key position in the formulation of policy responses, going as far as to link German consent to military deployment to a vote of confidence in his government in order to ensure the support of members of the ruling coalition rather than having to rely on votes from the opposition, as had been the case with Germany's participation in NATO's 'Operation Essential Harvest' in FYROM. For Schröder, the aim of increasing Germany's action radius and global standing in security and defence policy, which had been one of the objectives in the military participation in Operation Essential Harvest, was also a key goal in the case of OEF. As had been visible in the case of FYROM, the war in Afghanistan presented an opportunity for Germany to play a more assertive role in international politics, and one that was not pursued entirely through international institutions, as the contribution to OEF, which constitutes a 'coalition of the willing', demonstrates. Although much of this was done also on account of solidarity with the USA, the size of the contribution and the departure from previously held preferences and positions, particularly with respect to the use of military force, support the conclusion that this was also to increase Germany's international profile and arose out of national preferences rather than merely transatlantic solidarity.

Consequently, in the Bundestag, Schröder stressed the need for solidarity with the USA and Germany's willingness to contribute militarily to the 'war against terror', stating that 'we as Germans and Europeans aim for unqualified solidarity with the USA' (cited in Deutscher Bundestag, 2001c: 18302a). He also frequently emphasized Germany's increasing international role and standing, stating that the period of German postwar foreign policy where

allies would expect 'something like secondary assistance' had irrevocably passed with the attacks of 11 September 2001. Instead, Germany would have to take seriously its responsibility (cited in Deutscher Bundestag, 18 October 2001: 18682c).

The decision to contribute troops to the US-led 'war on terror' created significant unease among the German public, and particularly among the ruling coalition, where Schröder faced a potential revolt from members of his own Social Democratic Party and its Green coalition partner. By contrast, for the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, the attacks of 11 September 2001 had reinforced the parties' transatlantic leanings as well as the conviction that German security interests would have to be protected with political as well as military means – and wherever threats to German security originated geographically (Katsioulis, 2004: 227–252). In the light of a growing level of dissent within the governing coalition and the prospect of having to rely on opposition votes to secure a parliamentary majority for military support (*Financial Times*, 2001a), Schröder went as far as to link parliamentary approval for the deployment of 3,900 Bundeswehr troops, including by January 2002 about 100 members of the special forces, to a vote of confidence in his government on 16 November 2001, in order to secure the necessary votes in favour of Bundeswehr deployment from his own party (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001e). He narrowly survived the vote of confidence by a count of 334 (of 662) votes.

Foreign Minister Fischer, in contrast, emphasized the multilateral nature of the response to the attacks. This signalled that Fischer, although not necessarily objecting to Schröder's emphasis on Germany's changed role in the world, emphasized a more traditional German foreign policy position by focusing on multilateral institutions and initiatives through which to pursue German responses to the 'war on terror'. With respect to the EU, Fischer stated that Germany would 'pursue a parallel policy, that of making a national contribution – in the question of the political solution, in the question of humanitarian initiatives – but also to strengthen European visibility and to accomplish more of a common foreign and security policy' (cited in Deutscher Bundestag, 2001d: 18993c).

Early on, German policy-makers raised the issue of post-conflict reconstruction of Afghanistan with other relevant actors, including the UN, the USA and other EU partners. There had also been informal bilateral talks on Afghanistan between the Federal Foreign Office and the British Foreign Office in early 2001;[14] and while these talks did not lead to specific policy proposals or initiatives, they show that Germany had a strong interest in Afghanistan. Following 11 September 2001, German policymakers aimed at playing a key role in this area – but did so through the auspices of interna-

[14] Interview with EU official, Brussels, 11 September 2006.

tional institutions, notably the UN but also the EU. This points towards Europeanization understood as national projection as well as national adaptation and policy preferences: giving the EU a voice in the war in Afghanistan and utilizing CFSP instruments were of high salience for policy-makers.

A single voice for the EU and a profile for the EU's CFSP were not only of high salience for German policy-makers, but also viewed as vehicles to increase Germany's scope for action and to export national preferences onto the EU level. Berlin's increasing engagement took place through international institutions and reinforces the fundamentally multilateral conception of German foreign policy. The CFSP came to play a vital role in this conception, thereby supporting the Europeanization hypothesis. Germany hosted the Bonn Conference on the future of Afghanistan, at which Afghan factions agreed on a transition process, at the request of UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi, and the Bonn Agreement was endorsed by the United Nations Security Council on 7 December 2001. This signalled the substantial stakes and interest for Germany in the international efforts of Afghanistan. The presence of both Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Fischer at the signing ceremony signified the importance of the policy for the German government. Germany's political engagement for the reconstruction of Afghanistan was also due to the fact that Germany had a historically strong interest in and connection to Afghanistan, including a close relationship with Afghan exiles in Germany. Berlin therefore had a reputation as an honest broker in Afghanistan. Echoing sentiments of increasing Germany's independence and room for manoeuvre, Berlin's political and military engagement in the reconstruction of Afghanistan was also a question of playing a significant role through and in EU efforts, given that 'Germany is a net payer in the EU'.[15] This signals that the EU CFSP was perceived as a useful political platform for exporting and reinforcing national preferences, thus providing evidence of Europeanization.

The priorities with regard to the CFSP in this case were both to consolidate and to make visible EU efforts in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and there were no differences in view among the key participants in the German government. Given the extent of Germany's involvement in the formulation and coordination of reconstruction efforts, the EU represented an important platform through which to pursue German national interests and consolidate policy efforts. The appointment of a German diplomat, Klaus-Peter Klaiber, as EU Special Representative (EUSR) to Afghanistan also supports this conclusion. It was a German initiative to appoint an EUSR; a German national was nominated for the position; and Germany drew up the mandate and paid for much of the expenses (Missiroli, 2003). Klaiber's appointment was to help the EU speak with one voice again, despite the shift towards bilateralism

[15] Interview with German official, London, 1 September 2005.

in the wake of 11 September 2001 (Klaiber, 2002). The extensive use of the EU platform also suggests an inherent preference on the part of German government officials and the Federal Foreign Office for the use and application of CFSP instruments, further supporting the Europeanization hypothesis.

Afghanistan II: Between NATO and the ESDP?

As in the case of FYROM, Afghanistan demonstrates that Europeanization was much more pronounced when it came to utilizing the CFSP for political initiatives. Considerations of military participation in ISAF, by contrast, were not determined by considerations that would significantly support the Europeanization hypotheses. ISAF, the peacekeeping force assembled under the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1378, has three principal tasks: to aid the interim government in developing national security structures; to assist in the country's reconstruction; and to assist in developing and training Afghan security forces. Among government officials in both the Ministry of Defence and the Federal Foreign Office, as well as with the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister, participation in ISAF was uncontested. As in the debates over German participation in OEF, Chancellor Schröder pushed for Germany's growing international role, including military deployment, out of transatlantic solidarity, emphasizing that ISAF 'is a consequence of politically decisive action. It is also a consequence of the unrestricted solidarity, which included military means' (cited in Deutscher Bundestag, 2001f: 20822c). Although strengthening the European agenda was of salience to policy-makers and frequently used as a rhetorical device in domestic debates, this did not translate into support for an 'EU force', and the suggestion on the part of the Belgian Presidency that ISAF could constitute such a force was subsequently rejected. At the EU Council in Laeken on 14 December 2001, EU leaders agreed that member-states would take part in ISAF, even if the EU was not putting together its own force for Afghanistan.

With respect to German preferences and perceptions of the role of the EU in Afghanistan, Foreign Minister Fischer subsequently stated that 'of course 11 September made clear that the EU is not prepared to make decisions on war and peace. Of course we would have wished for a stronger European effort' (cited in Deutscher Bundestag, 2001f: 20827c). The issue of an EU format for the European contributions did lead, however, to some discord among EU member-states, and was at least informally discussed as a possible option in the Political and Security Committee, even if no specific plans for a concrete operation followed from these discussions.[16] Publicly, however, member-states were quick to distance themselves from the statement of then Belgian

[16] Interview with former German official, Berlin, 8 February 2006.

foreign minister Louis Michel that the contributions to ISAF of the individual EU member-states were an EU force, with then UK foreign secretary Jack Straw stating that there was 'no question of the EU being able to deploy a defence force it doesn't have in Afghanistan' (*Financial Times*, 2001b).

This demonstrates that although a preference for a more visible role for the EU existed on the part of Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Fischer, this was not appropriate in practice, as, in the words of the foreign minister, Europe was 'not yet built for the question of war and peace' (Fischer, 2002). For one, the appearance of a coordinated EU force gave rise to criticism from other NATO partners and created some unease among other EU member-states, notably Britain (UPI, 2002). And, from the perspective of a former German official, 'ESDP at that time was still in its infancy and not robust enough to undertake such an operation'.[17] Given Germany's commitment to NATO and transatlantic relations, however, it seems unlikely that a consensus in favour of a military ESDP operation would have been reached even if the institution had been further developed – despite statements on the part of the foreign minister that point towards an inherent preference for an EU approach.

NATO's taking up ISAF command in 2003 and current preparations for an ESDP operation bear this argument out: given NATO's operational capacities, Germany regarded NATO as the prime forum for taking over command of ISAF,[18] in particular once the initial 'lead nation' model with a six-month rotation proved too cumbersome, and once restrictions on NATO's geographic scope had lifted. The ESDP operation launched in June 2007 is a civilian rather than a military operation, and reflects questions over the ongoing definition of a division of labour as well as coordination between NATO and the EU in Brussels and the field, rather than questions over the role of the ESDP in crisis management.

Conclusion

The analysis presented above shows that considerations of Europeanization applied with respect to the CFSP in both of the cases examined. This attests both to the applicability of the Europeanization concept to foreign policy and to the influence of the CFSP in national decision-making. However, considerations of Europeanization did not apply when it came to military operations. This was true both in the case of a systemic crisis (Afghanistan) and in the case of a regional crisis (FYROM), where the EU was clearly seen as the appropriate and responsible organization/institution. These decisions stand

[17] Interview with former German official, Berlin, 9 February 2006.
[18] Interview with former German official, Berlin, 8 February 2006.

in stark contrast to Germany's Europeanized rhetoric, which suggests a general salience of the European agenda. Instead, decisions over the application of military force were conditioned by transatlantic considerations over the lacking formalized agreement between the EU and NATO, as well as by domestic preferences and priorities. This shows that pushing for a greater role for Europe was contingent on other factors, notably NATO and domestic preferences. Although this article has analysed the Schröder government, the weight of transatlantic commitments along with national preferences with respect to the use of force can be expected to continue under Chancellor Merkel's tenure. At the same time, the growing role of the ESDP in civilian and military crisis management also indicates that policy-makers will have to take the development and application of ESDP instruments into greater consideration when formulating policies towards international crises or international interventions, thereby increasing (in)direct Europeanization pressures in decisions that concern the use of force. Reluctant German commitments to the military operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo last year represent a case in point, as Germany acquiesced to another EU member-state's pressure, indicating growing adaptational pressures in the case of EU military operations in addition to opportunities for policy projection inherent in the CFSP and ESDP platform. But, in order for the ESDP to be(come) a truly successful policy, a more forceful commitment on the part of its member-states, both where resources and where political will are concerned, will be required.

* Eva Gross is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels. E-mail: eva.gross@vub.ac.be. The research for this article was made possible by a fellowship from the Volkswagen Foundation under the auspices of the 'European Foreign and Security Policy Studies Program' in 2005–06 and by an ESRC +3 studentship. The author would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers of a previous version of this article for their insightful comments.

References

Andreatta, Filippo, 2005. 'Theory and the European Union's International Relations', in Christopher Hill & Michael Smith, eds, *International Relations and the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (18–38).

Biscop, Sven, 2006. 'The Ambiguous Ambition: The Development of the EU Security Architecture', paper presented at the colloquium 'The EC/EU: A World Security Actor? An Assessment After 50 Years of the External Actions of the EC/EU', EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 15 September.

Börzel, Tanja, 1999. 'Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation to Europeanization in Germany and Spain', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 37(4): 573–597.

Börzel, Tanja, 2002. 'Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses to Europeanization', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(2): 193–214.

Börzel, Tanja, 2003. 'Shaping and Taking EU Policies: Member States Responses to Europeanization', Queen's Papers on Europeanization 2/2003. Belfast: School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy, Queen's University of Belfast.

Bulmer, Simon, 1998. 'New Institutionalism and the Governance of the Single European Market', *Journal of European Public Policy* 5(3): 365–386.

Bulmer, Simon & Martin Burch, 1999. 'The Europeanization of Central Government: The UK and Germany in Historical Institutionalist Perspective', ARENA Working Paper 99/30. Oslo: Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo (ARENA).

Cole, Alistair & Helen Drake, 2000. 'The Europeanization of the French Polity: Continuity, Change and Adaptation', *Journal of European Public Policy* 7(1): 26–43.

Council of the European Union, 2003. 'Presidency Conclusions – Copenhagen, 12 and 13 December 2002', Brussels, 29 January; available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf (accessed 15 August 2007).

Deutsch, Karl, 1957. *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Deutscher Bundestag, 2001a. Plenarprotokoll 14/158, 15 March.

Deutscher Bundestag, 2001b. Plenarprotokoll 14/184, 29 August.

Deutscher Bundestag, 2001c. Plenarprotokoll 14/187, 19 September.

Deutscher Bundestag, 2001d. Plenarprotokoll 14/195, 18 October.

Deutscher Bundestag, 2001e. Plenarprotokoll 14/202, 16 November.

Deutscher Bundestag, 2001f. Plenarprotokoll 14/210, 22 December.

Duke, Simon, 1999. *The Elusive Quest for European Security: From EDC to CFSP*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Dyson, Kenneth & Klaus H. Goertz, 2003. 'Living with Europe: Power, Constraint, and Contestation', in Dyson & Goertz, eds, *Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (3–35).

Featherstone, Kevin & Claudio Radaelli, eds, 2003. *The Politics of Europeanization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Financial Times (London), 2001a. 'Schröder Takes Gamble on Vote of Confidence: Troop Mobilisation – German Chancellor Forces Vote in Order To Put Pressure on Dissenting Coalition Legislators', 14 November.

Financial Times (London), 2001b. 'Peacekeeping Dispute Mars First Day of EU Summit', 15 December.

Financial Times Deutschland (Hamburg), 2001a. 'Sondersitzung des Bundestags zu Mazedonien-Einsatz möglich' [Special Session of the Bundestag on Deployments in Macedonia Possible], 28 June.

Financial Times Deutschland (Hamburg), 2001b. 'Bundeswehr vor Nato-Einsatz in Mazedonien' [Bundeswehr Faces NATO Deployment in Macedonia], 2 July.

Fischer, Joschka, 2001. Die Antwort auf fast alle Fragen ist: Europa' [The Answer to Almost All Questions Is: Europe], *Die Zeit*, December; available at http://www.zeit.de/2001/12/200112_fischer.neu9.3..xml (accessed 15 August 2007).

Fischer, Joschka, 2002. Interview mit Bundesaussenminister Joschka Fischer [Interview with Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer], *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), 21 January.

Forster, Anthony & William Wallace, 2000. 'Common Foreign and Security Policy: From Shadow to Substance?' in Helen Wallace & William Wallace, eds, *Policy-Making in the European Union*, 4th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press (461–491).

Ginsberg, Roy, 1989. *Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: The Politics of Scale*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Green Cowles, Maria; James Caporaso & Thomas Risse, eds, 2001. *Transforming Europe:*

Europeanization and Domestic Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Haas, Ernest, 1960. 'International Integration: The European and Universal Process', *International Organization* 4: 607–646.
Hill, Christopher, 2004. 'Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 42(1): 143–163.
Howorth, Jolyon, 2005. 'From Security to Defence: The Evolution of CFSP', in C. Hill & M. Smith, eds, *International Relations and the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (179–204).
Irondelle, Bastien, 2003. 'Europeanisation Without the European Union? French Military Reforms 1991–96', *Journal of European Public Policy* 10(2): 208–226.
Janning, Josef, 1996. 'A German Europe – A European Germany? On the Debate over Germany's Foreign Policy', *International Affairs* 72(1): 33–41.
Katsioulis, Christos, 2004. 'Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik im Parteiendiskurs: Alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen' [German Security Policy in Party Discourse: Old Wine in New Wineskins], in Sebastian Harnisch, Christos Katsioulis & Marco Overhaus, *Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik: Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schröder* [German Security Policy: A Balance Sheet of the Schröder Government]. Baden-Baden: Nomos (227–252).
Keatinge, Patrick, 1984. 'The Europeanization of Irish Foreign Policy', in Patrick Joseph Drudy & Dermott McAleese, eds, *Ireland and the European Community*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (33–57).
Klaiber, Klaus-Peter, 2002. 'The European Union in Afghanistan: Impressions of My Term as Special Representative', National Europe Centre Paper No. 44: Canberra: Australian National University; available at http://www.anu.edu.au/NEC/Archive/klaiber.pdf.
Knill, Christoph, 2001. *The Europeanization of National Administrations: Patterns of Institutional Change and Persistence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ladrech, Robert, 1994. 'Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 32(1): 69–88.
Major, Claudia, 2005. 'Europeanization and Foreign and Security Policy: Undermining or Rescuing the Nation State?', *Politics* 25(3): 175–190.
Major, Claudia & Karolina Pomorska, 2005. 'Europeanisation: Framework or Fashion?', *CFSP Forum* 3(5): 1–4.
Manners, Ian & Richard Whitman, 2000. *The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Maull, Hanns W., 2000. 'Germany and the Use of Force: Still a "Civilian Power"?', *Survival* 42(2): 56–81.
Miskimmon, Alister, 2001. 'Recasting the Security Bargains: Germany, European Security and the Transatlantic Relationship', in Douglas Webber, ed., *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy: German Foreign Policy Since Unification*. London: Frank Cass (83–106).
Miskimmon, Alister, forthcoming. *Germany and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Between Europeanisation and National Adaptation*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Missiroli, Antonio, 2003. 'Euros for ESDP: Financing EU Operations', Occasional Paper no. 45. Paris: Institute for Security Studies.
Nuttall, Simon, 1992. *European Political Cooperation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Olsen, Johan, 2002. 'The Many Faces of Europeanization', Arena Working Paper 02/02. Oslo: Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo (ARENA).
Piana, Claire, 2002. 'The EU's Decision-Making Policy in the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 7(2): 209–226.
Putnam, Robert, 1988. 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', *International Organization* 42(3): 427–460.

Radaelli, Claudio, 2002. 'Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change', *European Integration Online Papers* 4(8); available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008.htm (accessed 1 August 2007).

Radaelli, Claudio, 2004. 'Europeanization: Solution or Problem?', *European Integration Online Papers* 8(16); available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-016a.htm (accessed 1 August 2007).

Regelsberger, Elfriede, ed., 1997. *Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond*. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner.

Risse, Thomas, 2001. 'A European Identity? Europeanization and the Evolution of Nation-State Identities', in Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso & Thomas Risse, eds, *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (198–216).

Risse, Thomas; Maria Green Cowles & James Caporaso, 2001. 'Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction', in Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso & Thomas Risse, eds, 2001. *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (1–20).

Smith, Michael E., 2000. 'Conforming to Europe: The Domestic Impact of EU Foreign Policy Cooperation', *Journal of European Public Policy* 7(4): 613–631.

Stavridis, Stelios; Elias Mossialos, Roger Morgan & Howard Machin, eds, 1997. *New Challenges to the European Union: Policies and Policy-Making*. Aldershot: Dartmouth.

Tonra, Ben, 2001. *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union*. Aldershot, Ashgate.

Tonra, Ben, 2003. 'Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of a Cognitive Approach', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 41(4): 731–756.

Torreblanca, José, 2001. 'Ideas, Preferences and Institutions: Explaining the Europeanization of Spanish Foreign Policy', Arena Working Paper 01/26. Oslo: Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo (ARENA).

United Press International (UPI) (London), 2002. 'Analysis: All-European Force Criticized', 10 January.

Wallace, William, 1994. *Regional Integration: The West European Experience*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Wong, Reuben, 2005. 'The Europeanization of Foreign policy', in C. Hill & M. Smith, eds, *International Relations and the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (134–153).

Wong, Reuben, 2006. *The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy: France and the EU in East Asia*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Zielonka, Jan, 1998. *Explaining Euro-Paralysis: Why Europe Is Unable To Act in International Politics*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.