New
New Power
New Responsibility
Elements of a German
foreign and security policy
for a changing world
A paper of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
and the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF)
2
SWPStiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit
The German Marshall Fund
of the United States
G | M | F
STRENGHTHENING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION
3
Table of Contents
I.	Introduction 2
II.	 Germany and the International Order 12
III.	Germany and Europe 20
IV.	Germany and its Strategic Relationships 30
V. 	Germany and International Security 38
The Project and its Participants 47
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I.	Introduction
Germany has never been as prosperous, secure, and free as it is
today. But power and influence entail responsibility. This also means that it has to take on
new responsibilities.
Before 1990, (West) German foreign policy was derived from a conceptual
framework with two fixed points of reference: a past to overcome, and a future to
be achieved. From Germany’s past followed an unconditional commitment to human dignity,
freedom, the rule of law, and democracy, as well as to an international order based on universal
norms. This commitment remains valid. Germany’s objective of national unity and the
threat from the East became the basis for its integration into Europe and the Atlantic Alliance.
This second point of reference vanished with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution
of the Warsaw Pact. The UN, EU, and NATO remain the defining framework for Germany’s
foreign policy – but at the same time, it is also looking for new orientation.
The caesura of 1990, of course, did not lead to the end of history,
not even of German history. On the contrary, Germany’s strategic environment has changed
dramatically since then. Globalization has opened up new spheres of freedom and development,
but also creates new dependencies and vulnerabilities, and limits the ability of governments
to articulate and implement policy. The declared enemies of yesteryear have given way
to diverse and diffuse security risks. Emerging powers are demanding greater participation.
The international post-war order is faltering, but a new one is not in sight. The United Nations,
NATO, and the European Union are undergoing major changes; the European integration process
in particular is in crisis.
Germany must respond to these changes. Mere pledges of support
for the existing international order are no longer enough. But the chaotic new situation and
the loosening of traditional ties does not mean a free pass for German unilateralism in the
world, because Germany has – and that is the paradox of Germany’s post-unification foreign
policy – regained its formal sovereignty under international law at a time when hardly a foreign
policy challenge can be solved anymore by one nation acting unilaterally.
Addressing this problem, then, is the key task task of German foreign
policy today. Above all, it must be based on the realization that Germany is more exposed
to globalization than many other countries. Its citizens are deeply integrated in Europe and
are networked globally; its companies operate on all continents. Germany benefits like few
other countries from globalization and the peaceful, open and free world order it makes possible.
At the same time, Germany is also especially dependent on this order working well. It is
therefore particularly vulnerable and susceptible to the effects of disturbances in the system.
Germany has never been
as prosperous, secure
and free as it is today.
But power and influence
entail responsibility
3
Germany profits like
few other countries from
globalization, and from
the peaceful, open, and
free global order that
enables it
Germany’s overriding strategic objective is the preservation and
continued adaptationof this free, open, and peaceful order. In future, Germany will have to
invest more than it does now to preserve this beneficial status quo. It will in fact have to
undertake greater efforts than ever ever to adapt regional and global governance structures
to the new challenges. But it can only do this together with others.
What is needed is more creative determination, ideas, and initiatives.
Germany will have to take the lead more decisively and more often. But as a country
that is deeply integrated in networks of mutual dependence – especially in the context of
multilateral commitments it has chosen itself (UN, EU, NATO) – this can only mean: leading
towards common goals, with others, and for others.
Germany’s new strategic environment
Expedited by major technical developments, globalization has created
political, economic, and social networks that now span almost the entire globe. These
networks have created spheres of freedom and opened up new opportunities for growth and
development throughout the world, because they move people and goods through physical
space, as well as information and ideas through the cyber space. They have revolutionized
communications and commerce and connected previously insular societies to global markets
and debates. But this interdependence is double-edged: it also causes an unprecedented
degree of interdependence and vulnerability, with profound consequences for the autonomy
of nation states.
In Germany, located as it is in the middle of a more and more
deeply integrated European Union, this is especially evident. Europe benefits from globalization,
and Germany benefits from the Union. The economic and political integration of the
EU’s member states gives them a clout in international affairs that even the major European
nations no longer can bring to bear on their own. Conversely, whatever threats and risks
Europe faces almost always affect all of Europe’s states; it makes less and less sense to conceptualize
and organize risk management and protection against threats within a purely national
framework.
This new interdependence and its consequences are also evident
in security policy. States are still the main actors in world politics; power, competition and
geography are still key determinants of international relations. Traditional threats – war, the
4
Authoritarian powers
are by no means better
equipped to cope with
shocks and crises than
democracies
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – continue to exist. However, globalization has
accelerated the privatization and individualization of violence in the form of terrorism and
organised crime. It has also added a wide range of cross-border risk factors, which tend to crop
up together and reinforce each other, and against which the sovereign power of the state can
do very little: climate change, demographics, uncontrolled migration, resource and food shortages,
pandemics, as well as weak and failing states. As a result, risk management has become
the new paradigm of security policy.
The global financial crisis has also shown that networks and integration
can also make national economies vulnerable in completely new ways – and societies
and governments, too. The euro crisis has shown that imbalances or dysfunctional national
economies can threaten the stability of the whole currency area; the closely integrated transatlantic
financial market has likewise proven to be highly susceptible. The impact of the crisis
can be seen on both sides of the Atlantic in the form of political and institutional impasses, or
the success of populist movements. That said, authoritarian emerging powers are by no means
better equipped to cope with such shocks than Western democracies.
The new technologies – the key drivers of this recent deepening of
globalization – have an ambivalent impact on state power. On the one hand, they strengthen
state executives, because they provide completely new capabilities to monitor and control
citizens. The same technologies, however, have also empowered private actors – from freedom
fighters and public-spirited citizens, via consumers and businesses, all the way to criminal
organizations and terrorists.
The diffusion of power within states is accompanied by power
shifts in the international order. Overall, the post-war international order has proved to be
remarkably resilient. There has been no alternative universalist challenge to the West, with
its model of a legitimacy based on human rights, the rule of law, separation of powers, and
democracy. And the power that has guaranteed this order for decades, the United States, continues
to be, at least for the foreseeable future, the only superpower with global reach and
the will to impose order on the globe.
5
Th United States’ engagement
in the world
will be more selective.
For Europe, and for Germany,
this means more
tasks and responsibilities
Yet the United States – conscious of its reduced resources – is
sending clear signals that their engagement in the world will be more selective in future, and
that its expectations of partners will be correspondingly higher. This means that Europe, and
Germany in particular, will have to take on a lot more tasks and responsibilities.
The three institutions that provided the orienting framework of
German foreign policy in the global post-war order for over half a century – the United
Nations, NATO, and the European Union – are themselves in transition. All three are undergoing
fundamental disputes among their members about their purpose, remits, and architecture.
At the same time, emerging powers are demanding a more equitable representation in
international institutions; some of these powers also question their normative foundations
or even their legitimacy altogether. But they only rarely offer an alternative. Often, they are
only spoilers, not balancers. And Western states themselves, faced with persistent dissent and
stalemates, increasingly bypass proven multilateral institutions, relying instead on “coalitions
of the willing” or informal formats in order to cope with crises, and to solve problems.
These shifts and disruptions in Germany’s strategic environment –
in the global order, in European affairs, in its relations with other states, and in international
security – require a redefinition of German national objectives.
Germany’s goals, values, and interests
Germany’s commitment to human dignity, freedom, democracy,
the rule of law, and to an international order that is based on universal norms remains valid,
as does its commitment to working within the frameworks of the United Nations, European
Union and Atlantic Alliance. In light of the changed strategic environment, however, new elements
must be added to this definition of German national objectives.
Germany, with its free and open civil society, benefits from globalisation
like few other countries. Its current strength is largely owed to its ability to implement
reforms that have preserved its competitiveness and capacity for innovation – but it is
owed even more to its success as a trading and exporting nation. Its very existence depends on
exchange (of people, goods, resources, ideas, and information) with other societies. Germany
therefore depends on demand from other markets, as well as on access to international trade
routes and raw materials. But what it needs even more is the stable and vital global environment
that makes those freedoms possible in the first place: a strong Europe and a liberal,
6
Germany’s overriding
strategic goal must be to
preserve, protect, and
adapt the liberal world
order
rule-based international order with free and open states and societies. Germany’s overriding
strategic goal must therefore be to preserve, protect, and adapt this world order.
At the same time, however, Germany also maintains strategic relationships
with countries that, though promising high growth rates and returns, so far show
lit­­­­­tle inclination to accept the Western political and social model as an example to emulate. But
this tension does not imply that Germany, in keeping with a new Realpolitik, should have to
choose between its traditional normative and multilateral orientation and a geo-economically
oriented foreign policy; or that it might – to put it even more bluntly – be forced to decide
between between its values and its interests. What is true is that conflicts between German
values and interests, especially in dealing with authoritarian states, are often unavoidable in
the short term and that they must be balanced from case to case. In the long-term, however,
a commitment to values is an existential interest for any Western democracy.
For human dignity, civil liberties, rule of law, and participation do
not undermine the stability of individual countries and regions; they are its prerequisite. Nor
are authoritarian regimes necessarily stable just because they are authoritarian. (East) Germany’s
recent history in particular has shown how fragile autocratic power can be. Supporting
these goals in other countries, therefore, is an expression of Germany’s values as much as of
its strategic interests. For Germany to be not only a successful but a credible player in foreign
policy, it must defend the values it upholds at home in its foreign policy as well. That said,
the centrifugal forces of globalization (reinforced by the economic crisis) undeniably affect
not only Western states, but also their citizens. Societies have become more fragile, social
contracts more brittle. So, conversely, Germany must make sure that it credibly defends the
values it advocates in its foreign policy at home, too. This is not something to be taken for
granted. The global economic crisis has done away with the illusion that modern democracies
are immune to populist temptations or to anxious attempts to pull up the drawbridges; this
is as true for Europe overall, as it is for Germany in particular. The legitimacy and appeal of
the Western model, however, depends on its also being resolutely defended against challenges
at home.
7
The legitimacy and
appeal of the Western
model depends on its
being defended against
challenges at home
The domestic dimension of German foreign policy
German foreign policy will continue to deploy the full range of foreign policy
instruments, from diplomacy, foreign aid and cultural policy to the use of military
force. However, the fact that it is globally networked and interdependent also
requires new approaches at the national level: closer coordination between
departments; closer cooperation between the executive and legislative, as well
as with research institutions; a more effective political control; and a greater
commitment to communication with the German public.
Foreign ministries have nothad a monopolyon the definition and implementation
of foreign policy for some time now. They will have to evolve even further, and
become initiators and network managers who organize processes of assessment
and decision-making. More and more ministries claim a say in foreign policy
today; that makes it all the more necessary to aggregate and concentrate
governmental analysis, management, and leadership capabilities. Just by way of
example: crisis prevention, management, and follow-up in Germany continue
to be hampered by a lack of cooperation between civil, diplomatic, police, and
military forces.
A more complex environment with shortened response times also requires better
cognitive skills. Knowledge, perception, understanding, judgment and strategic
foresight: all these skills can be taught and trained. But that requires investments –
on the part of the state, but also on the part of universities, research institutions,
foundations, and foreign policy institutions. The goal must be to e­stablish an
intellectual environment that not only enables and nurtures political creativity,
but is also able to develop policy options quickly and in formats that can be
operationalized.
More is also required of Germany’s political supervisory bodies. Policymakers
and the public alike will have to get used to the idea that a more prominent
German role on the global stage will require more resources. Nor should the fact
be underestimated that a more forward-leaning German foreign policy does not
make political control any easier. This may exacerbate issues of legitimacy at
home. A more active German foreign policy also requires appropriate monitoring
and control by the legislature. If nothing else, this requires strengthening the
human and financial resources of Parliament.
8
German civil society
not only observes and
comments on foreign
policy – it contributes
to shaping it
Finally, policymakers as well as experts in Germany like to complain about the
public’s lack of understanding of foreign policy. But it is up to them to change
this, because there is no lack of interest. Today, civil society (at home and
elsewhere) not only observes and comments on German foreign policy as never
before, but even contributes to shaping it. Policymakers must therefore learn to
communicate their foreign policy goals and concerns more effectively to convince
Germany’s own citizens, as well as international public opinion.
Partners of German foreign policy
German foreign policy will continue to work with partners old
and new: with proven like-minded friends and allies, with challengers, and sometimes even
with rogue states. But today cooperation in all its formats – from multilateral institutions
via alliances to supra-national integration – is about more than sharing burdens, maximizing
resources and forces, or providing legitimacy. More and more often, a country that is as deeply
integrated in the global economy as Germany will simply have no other choice than to act
together with others, because close cooperation across national borders is the only practical
or even possible format to solve problems, manage risks, or ward off threats.
There are many examples in the recent past (Libya, Mali, Syria)
that show that disagreements among allies are likely and even legitimate despite this interdependence.
That is why Germany must factor its globally networked condition and its interdependence
into its foreign policy calculus in future. But the reverse is also true: Germany’s
partners are similarly dependent on Germany. Sovereignty in a networked world, therefore,
requires mutual consideration and taking responsibility for the impact of national decisions
on others.
The key reason why Germany has a strategic interest in being a
good neighbour, ally, and partner is also a consequence of the fact that it lives in global networks.
The greatest of all foreign policy challenges – the renewal, adaptation, and reorganization
of the international order – cannot be shouldered by any country alone. But Germany
has been selective and hesitant even in offering ideas or spearheading initiatives, at least in
relation to its economic strength, geopolitical clout, and international standing. In this sense,
at any rate, Germany remains a global player in waiting.
9
Germany will also have to lead more often in the future. This does
not mean always taking the initiative and expecting others to follow. Rather, it means investing
in long-term relationships and compromises; that calls for patience and empathy. This
kind of collaborative leadership entails sacrifices. They are worth making, because only a
leadership style that is seriously committed to consensus-building and balancing interests
can count on success in international relations. Germany must play a greater role in shaping
global affairs, but it either does so together with others, or stops altogether.
The following four chapters deal with four key areas of this new responsibility:
•	 Germany and the international order
•	 Germany and Europe
•	 Germany’s strategic relationships
•	 Germany and international security
 
Sovereignty in a
networked world
requires consideration
and taking responsibility
for the impact
of nation­­al decisions
on others
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The architecture of
the international order
is under enormous
pressure today
II.	Germany
and the International Order
The emergence of a polycentric world in the wake of globalization
entails many benefits, but also great new challenges for Germany. Germany benefits like few
other countries from globalization and from the open, peaceful, free, and cooperative international
order that makes it possible. At the same time, Germany is especially dependent on
this order working well, and is particularly vulnerable and susceptible to the effects of disturbances
in the system. The protection and adaptation of the international order must therefore
be Germany’s supreme strategic objective – if only out of self-interest.
The challenge: an international order in flux
The current international order was shaped primarily by the United
States and its allies in 1945, with new rules and institutions – above all the United Nations –
that were meant to ensure peaceful relations among states. A complex architecture of regional
and sectoral systems, each with their own norms and institutions, evolved under the auspices
of the world organization and its charter. They include almost all regions of the world (NATO,
ASEAN, ECOWAS, Mercosur, etc.) and almost all aspects of public life, from human rights via
issues of peace and security to the economy, trade, and development. Over time, global commons
like the Arctic, the oceans, airspace, and space were included. There were wars and conflicts
nonetheless, but this post-war order enabled significant gains in peace, prosperity and
freedom for more than 60 years. For Germany, active participation in this order over decades
has been both an amplifier of influence and a source of legitimacy.
But there is no mistaking the fact that today the architecture of
the international order is under enormous pressure, exacerbated by the global financial and
debt crisis. Globalization, expedited by technical innovations, has integrated the world politically,
economically, and socially; this has created new spheres of freedom, and provided states
and societies with new opportunities for communication, growth, and development. But there
are also formidable counterforces at work: climate change, demographic shifts, uncontrolled
migration, poverty and social disparity, ethnic and religious tensions, and increasing competition
between an ever larger number of stakeholders over increasingly scarce resources, food,
and access to trade routes and technologies. Even the global commons are increasingly contested
and subject to disputes over access, usage, and exploitation rights. These fragmenting
and centrifugal forces make countries vulnerable and government policy less controllable; this
is even more the case for international governance and its institutions. The implementation
and enforcement of binding rules remains difficult, whereas expectations regarding effective
governance and an international order guaranteed by the states have, if anything, grown. In
13
Globalisation has
reduced the power
of states, even
the strongest
conjunction, these effects are potentially destabilizing. Globalization has reduced the power
of states, even the strongest. And it has made the world, for all the gains in freedom, smaller
and more contested.
Then there is the global power shift. The United States, conscious
of its reduced resources, is no longer willing to play the role of global hegemon and guarantor
of the international order on its own. The European Union, which is still struggling with the
financial crisis and its consequences, currently appears neither willing nor able to take on a
similar role. The international engagement of individual European countries has also declined
significantly during the crisis. Thus, the ability of the West to set agendas and build coalitions
has dwindled. The result is a leadership vacuum at the global level.
In this situation, new players are thronging onto the stage of
international politics, driven by the development of the global South. This trend is not uniform
by any means, as many states continue to stagnate politically and economically, while
others are menaced by failure. But it has lifted millions of people out of poverty and promoted
the emergence of an increasingly prosperous and politically assertive middle class worldwide.
Moreover, it has led to the rise of emerging powers that have established themselves as new
power centres besides the established powers of the “West.” Germany has advocated and
promoted this development for decades under the aspect of poverty reduction and global
burden-sharing. Germany has also benefited greatly from this development: it has opened up
the emerging nations as new export and investment markets, thereby generating high profits.
Germany’s new power and influence is based to no small degree on this development.
But the rise of these new powers also represents a fundamental
challenge - for the West, for Europe, and especially for Germany, which has labelled its relationships
with many of these countries as “strategic partnerships.” The new powers demand
a representation in the existing institutions of international order that is commensurate
with their new clout, and in doing so challenge the dominant role Germany and other Western
states have played in these forums until now. Some of them share an interest in a free,
peaceful, and rule-based world order, and say they share values such as the rule of law and
good governance. Other rising powers, however, question the norms and architecture of the
international order itself; some do so because they see international politics as a zero-sum
game among major powers, and hope to be able to assert their interests more successfully in
an unregulated competition. Mostly, they do not articulate an alternative. But some have
established counterweight institutions (such as the Eurasian Union, or the proposal of a BRICS
Development Bank). Yet, for now, no alternative bloc has managed to establish itself firmly.
14
The goal of reform
should be to adapt and
expand the international
order
The states of the West have contributed to weakening the existing
architechture of global norms and institutions, whether by acting inconsistently or using
double standards, by employing trade discrimination, or even by not sufficiently legitimizing
the use of military force, by resorting to informal “coalitions of the willing” and ad-hoc
formats such as the G-20, or simply by their failure to appropriately adapt the international
order to the new challenges until now.
The task: shaping the international order together with others
A German role in the adaptation of the international order must be
based on the fundamental values of human dignity, freedom, rule of law and good governance,
democratic participation, a global social market economy, sustainable development, peace and
security. The starting point for any efforts at reform must be the current liberal and collaborative
world order. The goal of reform should be to adapt and expand it, not to transform, let
alone reorganize it. Nor is this about Germany forging ahead with a comprehensive blueprint
of its own design. Rather, it should work with like-minded partners and in consultation with
those emerging powers with similar values and interests, to offer ideas and incentives for
change on a broad array of issues.
At the top echelons of international governance, Germany should
push for reform of the United Nations and the international financial institutions. But this
will require changes that ensure that room is made for participation by the emerging powers,
and that their interests are taken seriously. Those new shaping powers who are able and willing
to assume responsibility for the international order ought to be represented in the Security
Council. This includes Germany; yet a European seat on the Security Council is desirable
in the long term. Western nations – including Germany – will have to give up some of their
voting rights in the decision-making bodies of the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund so that emerging powers are adequately represented. Germany may still continue
to work within informal or weakly formalized structures, such as the G-20 group, if only to
preserve the ability to act and to solve problems in a crisis, an impasse, or simply when established
institutions prove to be ineffective. Over time, though, such formats should be codified
or at least be broadly formalized in order to make them transparent, predictable and stable.
Germany also has an interest in functioning regional governance –
above all, in the renewal of the European Union itself. But as a globally networked economy,
it also has a vested interest in the stability and prosperity of other world regions. Even if
15
Germany should not
be indifferent to
tensions in the Far East
other countries show little inclination to hand over responsibilities to supranational authorities
like their European counterparts, Europe and Germany have a lot of experience to offer,
from coming to terms with war crimes via arbitration procedures for border and territorial
disputes to fighting corruption. In all this, Germany should pay greater attention to issues of
security policy: it is precisely because Germany has a vital interest in trade with China and
its neighbors that it should not be indifferent to the tense relations between the countries in
southeastern and eastern Asia.
Germany should also push for the adaptation, consolidation and,
where possible, legal regulation of sectoral governance. One of the greatest achievements of
the liberal post-war order was to set out a framework for the creation of a series of groundbreaking
multi-lateral conventions: on human rights and international criminal justice, on
trade and finance, on disarmament and arms control, as well as on maritime and space law.
But many of these instruments now need to be renewed, typically because new developments
(such as new techniques of extracting raw materials and deep sea drilling for oil and gas, the
melting of the polar ice caps or the privatisation of space) have opened up new unregulated
– and increasingly contested – spaces.
The global commons and their critical infrastructure enable the
mobility of people, goods, and information that is necessary in a globalized world; it is vital
to protect them. This includes airspace and space (satellites) and the world’s oceans (telecommunication
cables). Cyber space, which has become part of almost all aspects of political
and social life, has generated a particular potential for conflict, from cyber war, terrorism,
and espionage to organised crime and shadow banking. Finding an international regulatory
approach here is a particularly complex challenge, but it is no less urgent.
Support of effective statehood – be it through poverty reduction,
development cooperation, crisis prevention and management, or through support for peacebuilding
measures or transformation partnerships – remains an important component of any
rule-based international order. Free societies and functioning social contracts are also essential
aspects of effective statehood. German diplomacy and development aid must not only
address state elites, but must be based on the principle of human security.
16
Shaping power means
the ability to help solve
problems
The path: influence in a networked world
In a polycentric, globalized world, the classic elements of state
power, such as gross national product, resources, and military power, have by no means
become meaningless, but they no longer suffice to confer real clout in international relations.
Today a state is a shaping power in international affairs if it is able to solve problems and
conflicts affecting parts or all of the international community; to articulate ideas, provide
incentives and offer compromises, rather than dictating terms unilaterally; and if it works
towards its goals in coalitions and networks of like-minded states, using negotiation platforms
that are both open and transparent; and if it includes both states and non-government actors
in the process. Above all, influence is wielded by states that demonstrate they are guided by
the principle of legitimacy in their efforts to shape the international order.
Since any peaceful adaptation of the international order is possible
only with, and not against, the new powers, Germany will have to engage with actors
that profess values and interests that clearly differ from its own or from those of other likeminded
partners – for example in the fight against climate change, or in the shift to renewable
energies, or when negotiating sustainable production and consumption standards. Germany
will therefore be compelled to make compromises and concessions, because of its overwhelming
systemic interest in maintaining international rules and institutions: better compromises
than a crumbling international order. Yet at the same time, it will have to press for more
global responsibility from the emerging powers, because these new powers are too often only
consumers, but not producers of global common goods and security.
However, where spoiler states questions the international order,
where they violate basic international norms (such as the genocide prohibition or the prohibition
on the use of weapons of mass destruction), where they lay claims to – or even attack –
the commons or the critical infrastructure of globalization. In other words, where offers of
compromise or dispute resolution are made in vain, Germany must be willing and able to use
military power within the framework of collective measures sanctioned by international law
(or at least credibly threaten its use), in order to be able to protect these goods, norms, and
collective interests.
17
Recommendations:
•	In the long term, Germany should see itself as a provider of ideas for organizing the adaptation
of the international order.
•	Germany should advocate reforming the institutions of the international order, in particular
for making the UN system more effective and legitimate. This also includes reforming
the Security Council with German participation.
•	Germany should work towards the adaptation, deepening, and legal regulation of sectoral
governance, and for the protection of the commons.
18
 
19
-
20
The story of European
integration has begun
a new chapter
III.	Germany and Europe
The serious crisis of the European Union has caused many inside
and outside the EU to lose faith and confidence in the project of European integration. This
has led some critics and doubters to conclude that the project itself has had its day: the European
unification process, they argue, has bestowed an unprecedented level of peace, prosperity
and freedom on the continent for more than 60 years, and has now come to its natural
end. That would mean there can be only two ways out of the crisis: freezing the status quo,
or “downsizing” the EU to a healthier state.
But the story of European integration is by no means at an end; it
has only begun a new chapter. The challenge now is to ensure both Europe’s capacity to act
and its democratic legitimacy in an era of globalization and the rise of new powers. Economic
and political integration has given Europe’s states international clout – a clout that even the
major European nations can no longer bring to bear on their own. Without a deepening of the
European project, Europe will not withstand the challenges of globalization.
Why Europe?
As a country that is globally networked like few others, Germany
has a vital interest in the success of European integration, from which it has benefited more
than any other member state. At the same time, its history and location at the center of
Europe, but even more its present economic strength and new geopolitical weight, confer
a special responsibility on Germany for the preservation and development of the European
Union. Germany will have to take the lead in this field more often and more decisively; but
it must do so for common European objectives, and only for the benefit of and together with
other member states.
Overcoming the current crisis in the EU is also a prerequisite for
Germany achieving other strategic goals. Without economic recovery and stabilization of the
euro area, there can be no long-term prospect of strong growth for the Federal Republic; without
overcoming the crisis, there will be no European leverage for Germany’s ideas on global
order.
Germany’s European policy must therefore be directed at deepening
the Union in order to enable it to cope with the internal and external challenges facing
the EU. The ultimate goal here is not the creation of a European superstate. What is at
stake, however, is restoring confidence in the Union’s ability to act and improving the demo-
21
Europe’s architecture
must be reformed
so as to make it
better prepared
against future crises
cratic legitimacy of EU decisions by taking further steps towards integration. In doing so, the
strengthening of the euro area has to be balanced against the goal of keeping all EU member
states in the Community.
The price of failure
Europe’s crisis means many things to many people: a banking and
sovereign debt crisis, an adjustment and growth crisis, a political and social crisis, a leadership
and legitimacy crisis. And the potential way out of the crisis involves other dangers: the
deepening of European integration could itself split the Union. Since the crisis remains menacing,
the time has come to reform the architecture of Europe beyond crisis management and
the pragmatism of small steps, and in a way that makes it better prepared for future crises.
The crisis remains a menace because it might yet evolve from an
acute into a chronic stage and thereby derail the entire project of European integration. Nor
is Germany’s current strength unlimited. The rapid aging of the German population could put
an end to the economic miracle. It is the South that is implementing economic reforms, not
Germany; and other EU states will aim to limit Germany’s influence.
This is why deeper integration is not one alternative of many, but
the alternative to failure. A failure to act would lay the seed for the next phase of the crisis.
The crisis has starkly revealed the interdependencies and systemic risks operating in the euro
area, and demonstrated the vulnerability of member states. This fragility is rooted in the
incompleteness of monetary union, which makes the public finances of the member states
susceptible to market fluctuations, hampers economic recovery, exacerbates social disparities
and deepens the divide between the EU and its citizens. The political consequences of these
tensions can already be seen throughout Europe. It is not only the EU and the idea of further
European integration that are losing support among the population. National democracies are
also being destabilized, either by the growing influence of populists or even by reforms that
threaten democracy and the rule of law.
It cannot be ruled out that the centrifugal forces in the EU will
increase under these conditions, and that European policy makers will no longer be able to
keep the Union together. If the Euro fell apart, this would most likely also tear away part of
the internal market. From Germany’s perspective, the loss of these achievements would entail
immense political and economic costs.
22
The stabilization of the
euro area remains the
central task of German
EU policy
The way forward: two integration options
Under the pressure of the crisis, some crucial institutional and
political reforms – such as the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism and the
European Semester – were set in motion, and the European Central Bank has taken on a central
role as a crisis manager. This has temporarily calmed the situation. But these steps alone
are not enough; the greatest challenges still lie ahead.
The stabilization and development of the euro area with its 17
(soon to be 18) members remains the central task of German European policy. But the economic
and budgetary policies of member states in the European monetary union also cannot
remain a purely national concern forever – another lesson taught by the crisis. The monetary
union must therefore be supplemented by an economic and fiscal union. The challenge here is
not simply the formulation of fiscal and economic policies in the member states designed to
achieve stability and competitiveness, as well as greater convergence in the euro area; and the
latter cannot be achieved exclusively by adjustments in the countries affected by the crisis.
A German contribution to convergence could, for example, take the form of a liberalization
of the service sector, or of investments in infrastructure, education, and innovation. Nor is
all this merely a question of technocratic optimization processes. What is at stake, rather, is
the promotion of a pan-European consensus on common economic and financial policies that
is supported by European publics. To this end, the European Parliament and national legislatures
must be involved in the policy-making process more closely than before. Only this can
make the European Union plausible as a part of European democracy, instead of a threat to
it.	
How to achieve these goals remains controversial. Should responsibility
lie with national governments, or ought there to be greater solidarity between the
states? Should there be more rules or more political decision-making power at the European
level? Ought there to be more or less citizen participation? The challenge here is readjusting
two delicate balances: between national autonomy and the common European interest on
one hand, and between institutional capacity to act and democratic accountability on the
other – and all this under conditions of globalization and interdependence. Solutions to these
questions can only be found together with the European partners, and with the participation
of European publics. But German European policy must be able to offer its own answers and
ideas – if only to avoid being caught on the defensive.
German policy for Europe has two models to choose from. They
are not alternatives; they differ only in terms of the degree and depth of integration they
23
Deeper integration must
go together with a deepening
of democracy
envisage, as well as in the specific balance they strike between intergovernmentalism and
integration. The second model is premised on the first, and builds on it. In both cases, deeper
integration must go together with a deepening of democracy. Both models will inevitably lead
to further political and institutional differentiation in the EU.
Model 1: a stronger European framework for national reforms
This option continues on the path of pragmatic integration, focusing
on further fiscal consolidation, and strengthening the competitiveness of the member
states. Recent reform efforts should be consistently continued and expanded. At the same
time, Germany should work towards closer political cooperation in Europe. The member states
and their legislatures would continue to retain control over the reform process, but the EU
Commission would play an important role in the control of national budgetary and fiscal
policy. The potential of the existing European treaties concerning budgetary control could be
further exploited.
European countries suffering under the impact of the crisis need
support and incentives to continue to reform their economies and to get back on a growth
path. First, the EU budget, which currently focuses heavily on agriculture and infrastructure,
should be used in a more targeted way to support economic reforms. Second, a special
fund should be set up and financed by the member states to promote structural reforms and
measures to increase competitiveness in member states that comply with European recommendations.
Third, consultations on economic policy in the euro area should be intensified
at the executive and ministerial level. An ageing population will become a heavy burden on
public finances in some member states. In the long term, this will make it more difficult to
reconcile the consolidation of national budgets with incentives for growth and jobs. Which
is why – fourth – the European Stability Mechanism should in the medium term be developed
into a European Monetary Fund which, among other things, would provide for a procedure to
deal with sovereign defaults.
Convergence in the eurozone area is only possible if the euro countries
comply with the debt limits of the Stability Pact. This is why this model requires not
only incentives, but also sanctions. If the budget of a eurozone state repeatedly exceeds the
deficit limits set by the Pact, the EU should be allowed to declare it invalid. The European
Court of Justice should exercise this authority at the request of the Commission or individual
member states.
24
Budget consolidation
and structural reforms
must continue
In the European Parliament, decisions about the eurozone area
should be the exclusive privilege of representatives of the eurozone countries. Furthermore,
national parliaments should be more engaged in decisions made in Brussels. Legislators from
the member states should, above all, be more involved in consultations on decisions concerning
the euro group. This could include the creation of a second chamber in the European
Parliament, in which members of the national parliaments would be represented.
Model 2: more common capacity to act on the European level
The second model partly builds on the steps towards further integration
taken in the first model. But it represents a qualitative leap: it is based on the
insight that the integration of monetary and financial markets massively constrains national
capacities to act, and makes public finances vulnerable. It concludes that a policy of converging
reforms at the level of member states is no longer enough to stabilise the euro area.
Consequently, this model proposes that to regain the ability to act and take control, greater
integration steps are needed. However, any further integration is only acceptable – and this
is especially true for Europe’s donor states – if the countries affected by the crisis resolutely
continue with the consolidation of their national budgets and with structural reforms to
improve their competitiveness.
A package of three measures would stabilize the monetary union
and make it less vulnerable in the long term. First, the completion of a banking union, including
a common bank resolution regime and sufficient funds to restructure banks, in order to
break the link between public finances and the stability of banks. Second, the creation of a
euro area budget that can be used not only to support national reform efforts, but to mitigate
cyclical divergence through automatic stabilizers (e.g. a European unemployment insurance
scheme). In the long term, and combined with the structural reform efforts, this could reduce
cyclical divergences and to that extent enable the European Central Bank’s monetary policy
to better “fit” the euro area. Third, if control over fiscal policy is strengthened as described
in Model 1, common euro bonds could be introduced for a share of the national debt. This
would be done to help break the mutual dependence between public finances and the banking
system, which has led to a parallel banking and sovereign debt crisis. Above all, it would
make public finances less vulnerable to fluctuations on the financial markets – a key risk
since national central banks can no longer act as lenders of last resort after the power to set
monetary policy was transferred to the ECB.
25
European integration
should not overburden
either the states or
their citizens
The overarching goal of German European policy, were it to opt for
the second model of deeper integration, would be the creation of a transnational European
multilevel democracy. A central element of this second model would be the development of
the Commission into an economic government that reflects the political composition of the
European Parliament and is accountable to it. The Federal Constitutional Court’s admonition
that the German legislature should play a greater role in matters of European policy ought
to be taken seriously, but without setting the European Parliament and the Bundestag up
as competitors. In future, national parliaments should continue to stay out of the ordinary
legislative process of the EU; they should, however, play a key role in fundamental policy
decisions. Not least to ensure the democratic accountability of these reforms, Germany should
work towards convening a Convention on a parliamentary basis.
In both of the two models, European integration will proceed in
a differentiated manner; European integration should not overburden either the states or
their citizens. But at the same time, it must not drive a wedge between the members of the
eurozone and the other member states. Regardless of the depth of future integration, German
European policy should take great care to be inclusive and Community-friendly, but not at
any price. Inducing individual member states to stay in the Union ought not to be achieved at
the cost of turning back the clock of European integration. Conversely, a German leadership
in Europe that is based on partnership requires patience, empathy, and, above all, a willingness
to compromise – and not just with regard to those partners with which it collaborates
most often.
European foreign policy
Europe can only be a shaping power if the European Union has a
more unified external representation. Germany’s foreign policy should seek to ensure that the
EU’s enlargement and neighborhood policies are adapted to current developments, that the
Common Foreign and Security Policy is revived, and that the EU becomes a strong player on
the world stage.
In 2003, the EU committed itself to admit the countries of the
Western Balkans. It is in Germany’s interest to ensure that this promise is kept, so as to permanently
pacify and stabilize this part of Europe. Yet for those countries still willing to accede,
the EU has undeniably lost some of its transformative power. Conditionality and financial as
well as technical assistance programs are often no longer enough to advance the necessary
26
Germany must
contribute to the EU
becoming a strong
global player
reforms for EU membership. But failed reforms in the candidate country stand to threaten the
political, economic, and social stability of the new member state. Once a country is a member,
though, the EU has even fewer incentives and sanctions. Germany will therefore need to do
more to make candidates ready for accession, and should actively encourage a constructive
debate about these changing circumstances. Regardless of the success of the accession negotiations
with Turkey, Germany has an interest in a Turkey that looks toward and is anchored
in Europe – that is, in a close and stable EU-Turkey relationship which includes enhanced
economic cooperation, closer cooperation on security matters, and a more flexible visa policy.
As a regional stabilizing power, the EU must strive for stability and
good governance in Europe’s southern and eastern neighbourhood and direct its efforts not
only at governments, but also at civil societies. To this end, it should systematically deploy all
the economic, diplomatic, and security policy instruments at its disposal. The advancement of
democracy, pluralism, rule of law, and respect for human rights in transitional societies and
in countries under authoritarian rule remains a key objective of the EU and the goal in any
cooperation with the relevant states. Germany should help to ensure that the EU forges ahead
with opening the internal market for goods, labor and services to neighboring countries to
provide incentives for domestic reforms. The promotion of mobility between the EU and the
neighboring European countries is key here, especially for the younger generations.
The development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) remain key objectives of any
deeper integration. Indeed, the cooperation between member states on foreign policy issues
has been mostly issue-by-issue to date, for example on Iran. This puts the EU at risk of being
marginalized in international affairs. Preventing this should be a main objective of its policy
for Europe. This also includes strengthening the role of the High Representative and of the
European External Action Service. In the medium term, the content and speed of foreign
poli­cy decisions would benefit from the introduction of qualified majority voting.
Within the international institutions, the EU member states will
lose influence due to recent global power shifts. In the long term, therefore, the interests of
the member states can only be preserved by strengthening the role of the EU. Accordingly,
Germany should encourage a more coordinated approach among the EU members in the IMF
and World Bank and support existing plans for the consolidation of voting rights of the euroarea
members, which should be exercised by a Euro Executive Director in future. In the United
Nations, its short-term goal should be to maintain the EU’s share of permanent and nonpermanent
seats. A comprehensive reform of the Security Council (which Germany supports),
27
The EU’s role in
international institutions
should be reinforced
could in the long term involve an EU seat in a slightly enlarged circle of permanent members,
and additional non-permanent seats that would be rotated within the EU.
Germany must be willing to be represented internationally by the
EU, even in policy areas involving shared authority between the EU and the member states,
e.g. the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Being able to influence the EU position, however,
requires a clear articulation of German interests and goals. For the purpose of an effective pursuit
of European interests, all EU policies should be coordinated as far as possible by a single
instance. To do so, transparent procedures should be established in Brussels that provide
information on the status and content of negotiations. A leverage effect that goes beyond the
boundaries of individual policies can only be achieved through better coordination. Effective
coordination requires strong coordinating bodies.
28
Recommendations:
•	Germany must work to deepen European integration in order to enable the European Union
to master the internal and external challenges facing it, without compromising on democ-
racy.
•	Germany should push for the enlargement of the EU through accession of the Western Balkans;
strive for a close and stable relationship of the EU with Turkey; and ensure that the
EU, as a regional power, consistently uses all its instruments to promote stability and good
governance in its southern and eastern neighborhoods.
•	Germany should seek to ensure that the CFSP and CSDP are developed further; that the
EEAS and the High Representative are strengthened; and that qualified majority decisions
are made possible.
29
30
Germany, too, has joined
the league of global
players
IV.	Germany and
its Strategic Relationships
Globalization and the rise of new powers have made the international
system more disordered and contested. For a country like Germany, which benefits from
globalization and plays an active part in it, this is a double challenge. The paramount strategic
goal of German foreign policy must be to ensure that the international order remains peaceful,
free, rule-based, and cooperative. That entails adapting it to the new situation – in particular,
to reflect the rise of new powers. However, the new players must also be encouraged to take
on greater responsibility for confronting global problems; and where they act as spoilers, they
must either be engaged or contained. In doing so, German foreign policy should not focus only
on cooperation between governments, but must engage civil societies as well. For all of this,
Germany will have to work together with like-minded allies.
Yet Germany, too, finds itself in a new situation, because it has
joined the league of global players itself. This was not always the case. Before unification,
German foreign policy was largely focused on the East-West axis, whereas its relations with
the global South focused on development policy, as well as recognition for and support of Germany
in the United Nations and other international organizations. The Bonn Republic lacked
both the weight and freedom of movement for independent relations with partners beyond the
European and transatlantic frameworks. Today, Germany’s new strength gives it new opportunities
to use its influence. This, too, is cause for reassessing its international relationships.
Germany’s strategic relationships: a framework
Countries are strategically relevant for Germany if and to the
extent that their decisions and internal developments have a major effect on German interests
and the international order as a whole. The classical criteria for the calculus of relevance are:
military power, economic clout, population, resources, capital, and geographic location. But
what makes a country strategically relevant in the context of foreign policy is its capabilities
and shaping power – that is, the ability and the will to bring political, economic, cultural,
or religious influence to bear in bilateral relations with third states, in multilateral formats,
or on a strategic market. Even small countries can achieve strategic importance in this way.
Germany’s practice of officially designating certain countries as “strategic partners” already
points in this direction, but is still characterized by a lack of consistency (see chart).
31
Germany’s relations with these powers are primarily governed by
how closely their values and interests match its own. The greater the divergence between their
worldview and goals and those of the West, the more difficult it will be to engage them and
to bring them closer, and the more there will be conflicting objectives.
U.S..
China
Russia
Pakistan.
India
.Singapore
Vietnam
.Nigeria
.Qatar
 bilateral strategic partnership
Brazil
.Indonesia
.South Africa
Japan.
Canada.
Iran.
Syria.
North Korea.
Cuba.Venezuela.
Mexico.
allies challengers spoilers
primary
secondary
UAE Saudi Arabia.
Egypt.
containment
engagement
divergence
.Australia
.New Zealand
.EU
.Israel
Turkey.
South Korea.
relevance
Germany’s strategic relations
32
Like-minded partners
act as amplifiers for
German foreign policy
Germany’s strategic relationships: a typology
Proven partners and like-minded allies: The guiding principles of German
post-war foreign policy – alignment with the West, reconciliation, European integration,
and effective multi-lateralism – remain a valid framework for the pursuit of Germany’s values
and interests. On most key issues – peace and security, a rule-based global order, rule of law
and human rights, functioning markets, secure supplies of energy and raw materials, the environment
and climate change, or human development – a comparison of German positions with
those of its proven European and transatlantic partners will show broad agreement, despite
disparities on specific issues. The circle of these partners with influence and shaping power
extends beyond the “West” and includes (in concentric rings) not just the EU member states
(indispensable partners) and the NATO allies United States, Canada, and Turkey (key partners),
but countries like Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, and Israel (important
partners). Nurturing these proven partnerships and deepening bilateral relations with other
like-minded allies should be a priority for German foreign policy, because these relationships
act as amplifiers: they expand the scope, reach and legitimacy of German shaping power. This
is especially true in relation to the world’s emerging powers.
Challengers: This group includes countries of very different political
clout and ambitions: the major powers China and Russia, as well as rising developing
countries such as India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia and others. Germany now maintains
relationships with most of these countries that extend considerably beyond mere economic
cooperation. Some of them share an interest in a free and peaceful world order, and not a few
expressly acknowledge that they share values such as the rule of law and good governance.
However, societies in many of these countries do not see the “West”
as a role model at all. Nor are all of their governments willing to grant their citizens political
and social rights and freedoms. Some governments even question the universality of human
rights. Much as the self-empowerment of civil societies and the rise of new wealthy and selfconfident
middle classes may be apparent throughout the world, there can still be no question
of an inevitable convergence towards free, democratic, and liberal systems.
Inevitably, this will lead to competition and conflicts in Germany’s
relations with the new economic and political power centers of the world: struggles about
influence, and access to resources, but also about the architecture of the international order
as well as the validity of the norms on which it is based. It is in Germany’s interest to ensure
that they are directed into peaceful channels. This will require an adaptation of the interna-
33
New powers should
be represented in
international institutions
tional order, which currently still reflects the post-war distribution of power. The new powers
will have to be appropriately represented there – if only to prevent the formation of new
blocks which might challenge the liberal order (the beginnings of which can already be seen).
In this process, some challenger states could become real partners for Germany, but it is also
conceivable that some will opt for confrontation. Here, Germany will have to combine engagement
and containment in concert with other like-minded states.
Spoilers: Both strong and functioning as well as fragile or failing
states can act as spoilers in the international order. Iran and North Korea (and, much less
importantly, Venezuela or Cuba) belong to the first category, the latter include states such
as Syria, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Mali. Their spoiler potential can result from the fact that
they possess or proliferate weapons of mass destruction or that they support or harbour terrorists;
from their location (for example at a strategic transport route or a maritime choke
point); or from internal conflicts that have an impact on their neighbors and quite often
on the entire region. In today’s globalized world, a local problem can quickly develop into a
regional or international problem. The interests (and values) of a globally networked country
like Germany can therefore be severely compromised even by a small or distant spoiler state.
Strategic relationships: guiding principles
For all its new strength, Germany is well advised to continue relying
on multilateral cooperation with reliablen partners and other like-minded allies on the
major questions of reshaping the international order. For Germany, it remains a wise strategy
to continue to be a reliable and predictable partner and to nurture its long-term partnerships.
Conversely raising its own profile at the expense of others – such as the European Union – is
short-sighted, because even the global player Germany is no more than a middle power on the
international stage. Indeed, the recent discussions about the cooperation and competition
between Western intelligence services show that trust cannot be taken for granted, even in
the context of these proven partnerships, but must be continually renewed. Moreover, it is all
too easy for powers such as China and Russia to take advantage of competition among Western
nations, and to drive a wedge between the members of the EU or the transatlantic alliance.
By contrast, two key questions shape Germany’s strategic relations
with the challengers and rogue states: which instruments should German foreign policy
employ in its dealings with them to further its objective of a peaceful and rule-based inter-
34
Some spoilers have
turned down Western
offers for years
national order? And what price is German foreign policy prepared to pay for this overriding
objective in the event of conflicting interests?
Incentives and cooperation mechanisms have always served German
(and European) foreign policy well. In the German “Ostpolitik” of the 1970s (“change
through rapprochement”) as well as the EU’s eastward enlargement, this form of influence
has been very successful. But many of Germany’s key bilateral relationships unmistakably
demonstrate the limits of a policy based explicitly on cooperation. Incentives have produced
few tangible results in the context of the EU’s neighborhood policy or of the “modernization
partnership” with Russia; China can choose which offers of cooperation to accept and which
to reject. And among the spoilers, Iran and North Korea have turned down Western offers for
years.
Meanwhile, Germany also regularly participates in the imposition
of sanctions within the framework of the EU or UN. In the case of Iran, it was only the severe
sanctions of the West that brought Tehran back to the negotiating table. Sanctions will continue
to be one of the instruments of German foreign policy.
The inherent tension between Germany’s governance interest in a
peaceful reshaping of the international order on one hand and its interest in bilateral trade
relations with high growth rates, returns on investment, and access to key resources on the
other becomes particularly sharp where it is dealing with countries that are economically and
politically strong enough to dictate the terms of bilateral relations themselves. If they are also
autocratically governed states, trade relations with them may touch on fundamental German
values – such as human dignity, civil liberties, rule of law, good governance and participation.
Over time, such trade relations may themselves boost civil societies in these countries; they
can also lead to improved integration of the country in international governance frameworks,
create incentives for constructive behavior, and perhaps even encourage social change in the
country itself. But it is equally conceivable that trade contributes primarily to stabilizing
a regime, or even gives it new leverage over its own civil society. Such tensions are neither
avoidable, nor do they lend themselves to simple resolution. Conversely, and contrary to what
is sometimes claimed, they by no means force German foreign policy to choose between its
traditional normative and multilateral orientation, and a more geo-economic orientation.
35
Arms exports should
be closely scrutinized:
Could they be used
against civil society?
Nonetheless, it is possible to formulate guiding principles on how
to deal with such tensions, as well as red lines that German foreign policy may not cross
without being compromised. First, Germany, with its new economic power, is a key player,
especially (but not only) in the EU; the weight of its support will often be decisive for the success
of incentives as well as sanctions. This implies a certain responsibility. Second, Germany’s
relations with partners are usually so diversified that the loss of a single transaction will not
jeopardise the economic basis of the entire relationship. Third, these partnerships are two-way
streets. The partners, too, have a greater interest in a vibrant, multi-dimensional relationship
with Germany: in goods, investments, technology transfers, and training cooperation, but also
in collaboration on other issues such as resolving regional conflicts. Fourth, Germany should
avoid dependency on any particular bilateral relationship, for example by diversifying its
energy imports. Fifth, when weighing between bilateral trade and governance interests, the
opportunity costs of a deal must also be taken into account. If there is reason to believe that
multilateral negotiations or institutions will be compromised by it, then German long-term
interests, too, will be compromised. Sixth, in its dealings with autocratic regimes, Germany
must meticulously scrutinize goals, means, costs and compatibility with its values. This is
especially true for arms exports or police training – all the more if there is reason to believe
that a government will use these supplies or capabilities against its own people. Seventh, Germany
is naturally more strongly interested in the internal development of countries in the
immediate EU neighborhood, whether in the East or in the South, than in that of more distant
states. This must be reflected appropriately in Germany’s support for a sustainable transformation
of its neighbours towards stability and democracy, rule of law, and a market economy. The
fact that the Eastern European countries in particular have formally committed themselves
to these values should be helpful in this regard. But Germany must do more to make sure
that these commitments are kept, and at the same time promote closer ties of these Eastern
and Southern neighbourhoods with the EU. Eighth, Germany must not become vulnerable to
extortion. In terms of its security, the best guarantee to prevent this is active membership in
the North Atlantic Alliance. In economic terms, this requires further diversification of German
export markets and sources of raw materials; in particular, it necessitates a sustainable
strengthening of Europe’s economic power and the expansion of transatlantic free trade.
A different kind of tension is at play where fragile and failing
states (Afghanistan, Mali, Somalia) are concerned. These countries are at the bottom of the
development scale, and as the losers of globalization they have often missed out on economic
and social development. It would be pointless to pressure or offer incentives to governments
that de facto have little or no control over their countries. Here, too, German foreign policy
must deploy the full range of its foreign policy instruments – from humanitarian aid, develop­
36
Pressure can achieve
little against a failed or
failing state
ment cooperation and diplomacy to military stabilization missions. The immediate goal is to
end conflicts and promote stability, while the long-term goal is to create conditions that allow
legitimate and capable governments to fulfil their government functions themselves.
If Germany uses its new potential together with its allies and likeminded
partners, it can contribute to peace, freedom, security, and prosperity in the world,
and even take the lead on certain issues. Yet for this, it needs political, economic, and military
partnerships that are reliable and resilient more than ever.
Recommendations:
•	Germany should maintain, strengthen, and expand its proven partnerships in the frameworks
of the EU, NATO and the United Nations. These should take precedence over relationships
with emerging powers.
•	Germany should enhance its partnerships with challengers whose interests largely coincide
with those of Germany and Europe. Specifically, it should promote regional leadership roles
for such countries, as well as their participation in international organizations.
•	German foreign policy must either integrate challengers by encouraging them to act constructively,
or contain them by limiting their scope of action (e.g. by diversifying its supplies
of raw materials, or by supporting regional competitors).
37
38
EU and NATO
enlargement has
placed a ring of stable
democracies around
Germany
V. Germany
and International Security
Germany’s citizens have been enjoying a phase of unprecedented
security. Their country is at peace with its neighbors in Europe and is a member of the most
powerful military alliance in the world. The enlargement of the EU and NATO has placed a protective
ring of stable democracies around Germany. But that does not mean that the protection
of individual, social, and national security in Germany is now merely an issue of internal
security. The world remains full of uncertainties and threats. For a globally networked state
like Germany, this means that the security of the world and German security are inextricably
linked.
Traditional threats like war, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and terrorism continue to exist. In recent times, we have seen a wide range of
new security risks, from climate change and shortages of resources and food to pandemics,
from open data networks, and the erosion of government power (up to the point of state failures)
to the empowerment of private actors. Germany’s Southern and Eastern neighborhoods
– from North Africa and the Sahel, the Western Balkans and the Middle East, to the Caucasus,
and Central Asia – remain the scene of tensions, crises, and violence.
Germany’s openness and integration in global trade, transport, and
communication networks affects its security in two ways. They make Germany susceptible
and vulnerable to anything that disturbs these networks. At the same time, pulling up the
drawbridges would not be a realistic option, because it would mean cutting off the country’s
lifeblood. If Germany, then, is existentially dependent on exchange with other societies, this
means that the vulnerability of its neighbors, allies, and partners also affects German security,
and their protection is in Germany’s interest. Moreover, Germany has a strategic interest in
the open and free world order that makes globalization possible in the first place, as well as in
protecting the domains (sea, air and space, cyberspace) that are global commons, but are also
increasingly contested due to new technological developments. If Germany wants to preserve
and protect its own way of life, it must work for a peaceful and rule-based world order, using
all legitimate means at its disposition, including military force where and when required.
The growth of Germany’s power and influence mean that it must
also exercise greater responsibility. For decades, Germany was a consumer of security, guaranteed
by NATO and especially by the United States. Today, its allies and partners expect
Germany to become a provider of security, and not only for itself.
For all these reasons, German security policy can no longer be conceived
otherwise than globally. That said, Germany’s history, its location, and scarce resources
are reasons to be judicious about its specific strategic objectives. This also means that a
pragmatic German security policy, especially when costly longer-term military operations are
39
Security policy today
means risk management
called for, will have to concentrate primarily on the increasingly unstable European vicinity,
from Northern Africa and the Middle East to Central Asia, not least to relieve Germany’s
U.S. allies in NATO, as the United States increasingly focuses on Asia. On the other hand, an
exclusive emphasis on the management of acute crises at the expense of long-term strategic
action must be avoided. German security policy must be able to do both at the same time: fast
response and pursuit of long-term goals.
Security policy as risk management
Germany, as a globally networked country, must conceptualize
and organize its security in terms of a whole-of-government risk management approach that
includes defense, and domestic as well as external security. Security provision must begin
with cognitive capabilities like knowledge, perception, analysis, judgment, and strategic foresight.
A security policy that is defined within a risk management paradigm covers the full
range of government instruments, from development cooperation and humanitarian aid via
classical diplomacy and intelligence services to disaster prevention and the use of military
force. Internal and external security connect seamlessly. A forward-looking, comprehensive
security policy must include all relevant ministries and institutions (and, where appropriate,
civil society).
Risk management places high demands on communication between
government and the public. Risk assessments, priorities, and consequences must be convincingly
explained and justified to the citizens. There can be no all-encompassing protection
in an open society. Not all risks can be avoided, not all dangers can be averted. In the new
strategic environment, the limited ability of states to control the implementation of security
policy with sovereign instruments has become clear. This is why a risk management approach
also requires that government, the business sector and society learn to understand their own
vulnerability and build up resilience, in systems that are as decentralised as possible.
Instruments of German security policy
The instruments of German security policy must be enhanced and
better networked with each other. Overall, despite a commitment to a “national” or “networked”
approach, inter-agency coordination is mostly practised on an informal and ad hoc
basis in Germany, or not at all. Any further expansion of interagency coordination so far has
40
The Bundeswehr must
continue to be prepared
for missions beyond
Europe
always run up against the departmental principle (Ressortprinzip). Like other states before it,
Germany will have to strengthen its ability to integrate systems. In particular, crisis prevention,
management, and post-conflict follow-up are still characterized by a lack of coordination
between civilian, police, and military forces. Germany is ahead of many EU and NATO partners
in its ability to send civilian personnel, such as police officers, judges, or election observers,
to crisis areas. Nevertheless, its performance often lags behind its own ambitions in this area.
Germany’s armed forces (together with its allies and partners)
make a wide-ranging contribution to providing security. They provide situational awareness
and contribute to early warning; they remain necessary for national and alliance defence; they
help to prevent crises and to mitigate, contain, and end conflicts; they participate in securing
lines of supply and transportation; and they rescue German citizens abroad where necessary.
Their missions today range from humanitarian aid to military advice, support, reconnaissance,
and stabilization operations, all the way to combat operations.
National and alliance defence remains the primary focus of Germany’s
security policy, because the risk of intra- and inter-state conflicts as well as the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems continues to grow
in Europe’s southern and eastern neighbourhoods. This gives new urgency, for example, to
Germany’s participation in the establishment of a common NATO missile defence shield in
Europe. At the same time, the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) must continue to be
prepared for missions of crisis prevention and crisis management beyond Europe, even after
their withdrawal from Afghanistan. Germany should also continue to contribute its armed
forces to the enforcement of international law within the frameworks of the United Nations,
NATO, and the EU.
41
Germany should use
its new influence
to strengthen the UN,
the EU, and NATO
Dissent: Use of military force without a mandate of the
UN Security Council?
How should Germany act when there appears to be an urgent need for military action
to prevent, for example, an imminent genocide, ethnic cleansing, or the use of internationally
prohibited weapons, and a consensus in the Security Council cannot be
reached in time – especially if such consensus is blocked by a veto?
Positions on this question remained irreconcilable within the project.
No military intervention without a Security Council mandate: According to the Charter of
the United Nations, the use of military force is only permissible if authoriszed by the
UN Security Council to maintain or restore international peace, or in the case of indivisual
or collective self-defence. The prohibition on the unilateral use of force expresses
the need for a reliable, rule-bound international order; it is intended to prevent abuse
and errors of judgment. This prohibition ought to be respected by every state that
wishes to retain the ability to invoke it in the future. While the UN General Assembly
established the principle of “Responsibility to Protect” in 2005, this does not oblige
the Security Council to make the protection of threatened civilian populations a primary
consideration in its decisions, let alone to authorize a military operation. Consequently,
no military intervention is permitted without a Security Council mandate
– not even to prevent a genocide.
Intervention without a Security Council mandate in exceptional cases: In very narrowly
defined exceptional cases, such as an imminent threat of severe human rights violations,
and if the use of military force appears inevitable to avert an imminent danger,
so-called “humanitarian interventions” should be permissible without authorization
by the UN Security Council. In situations of this nature, there is a conflict between
ethical considerations of human security on one hand and international law on the
other; accepting a genocide is a greater breach of fundamental taboos and civilizational
norms than breaching the ban (indeed often broken in practice) on the use of
force. In such situations, therefore, Germany should be open to a collective military
action. Germany bears a special responsibility in this regard because of its overwhelming
interest in a world order that is bound by values and because of its commitment
to human rights.
42
Cooperation across
borders is a necessary
consequence of
interdependence
Partners of German security policy
Today, security cooperation with neighbors, partners, and allies –
from ad hoc coalitions via formal alliances to supranational integration – no longer merely
serves to leverage scarce resources, to multiply forces, or to establish legitimacy. Security
cooperation across national borders is now the necessary consequence of interdependence.
But all three institutions that for decades have provided the framework
of German security policy – the United Nations, NATO, and the EU – are going through
fundamental debates about their purpose, remits, and architecture. Germany’s contributions
therefore should not be limited to specific policy issues or participation in individual operations.
It needs to offer ideas and initiatives to promote the renewal and adaptation of these
institutions.
The United Nations is the only organization with universal membership.
For all its weaknesses, it offers a uniquely legitimate forum for the cooperative settlement
of contested issues such as the protection of the global commons, security of supply
routes and access to raw materials; and its charter provides the framework for a rule-based
international order, in whose preservation Germany has a special interest. Where law and
rules are recognized, there is no need to enforce them. It is therefore worthwhile for Germany
to invest in the recognition – and where necessary, in the adaptation – of international law.
Strengthening the United Nations and its affiliate organisations therefore remains a goal of
German foreign policy. Nevertheless, NATO and the EU must continue to expect to be called on
by the UN to enforce international law, if necessary by military means.
As an alliance of Western democracies with standing political and
military structures, a broad range of instruments and capabilities for collective defence and
the preservation and and enforcement of peace, and a worldwide network of partners, NATO
is a unique amplifier of German security policy interests. However, the impending end of the
ISAF mission in Afghanistan, the new priorities of U.S. foreign policy, drastic cuts in European
defence budgets, and a public that is sceptical of military operations, all put a question mark
over the future direction of the alliance.
Germany must use its increased influence to contribute to shaping
the future of the alliance. It has an interest in the continued existence of a strong and effective
NATO, because the alliance is a proven framework for political consultation and military
43
Europe and Germany
must do more for the
security of their
neighborhoods
operations, in particular with the United States. The need for consultation at the strategic
level will only grow, and here too the United States will expect far more input from Europe
and Germany. On the military-operational level, however, the Europeans will have to get used
to the idea that the United States will not only assume a leadership role less often, but will
also want to participate in fewer joint missions. Europe and Germany must therefore develop
formats for NATO operations that rely less on U.S. contributions. This requires greater investment
in military capabilities, and more political leadership. Europe in particular will have to
provide more security in its own neighborhood. This is Europe’s unique responsibility, and
Germany will have to make an investment that is commensurate with its strength.
With its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the European
Union has been able to distinguish itself in civilian, civil-military, and military operations
of low and medium intensity. It cannot replace NATO, but it plays an indispensable role in
European security policy because (unlike NATO) it has a comprehensive range of policy instruments
at its disposal. However, the financial crisis, the dispute among Member States about
the future direction of the Union, and uncoordinated cuts in defence budgets have weakened
the credibility of the Union and prevented a strengthening of CSDP.
But it is precisely their political integration – including CFSP and
CSDP – that gives the European countries their international clout. Consequently, Germany
must use its new responsibility to help the CSDP regain new vigor. This can only be successful
if such an initiative is coupled with the development of specific civil and military capabilities.
But the member states have been half-hearted in their efforts to counter budget cuts by pooling,
sharing, and specialization of capabilities and equipment. There is already (within NATO)
an integrated air defence system with joint air surveillance. Even a common European border
police, coastguard, or a military procurement according to the rules of the single European
market – including uniform technical standards and certification procedures – is conceivable.
Modern defence technologies are becoming increasingly complex and costly. An internationally
competitive European defence industry can only be maintained in the long term by a
broad consolidation of national industries within the European context. This is therefore in
Germany’s interest.
Just as important as the hardware of CSDP, however, is the Europeanization
of its software: the development of common strategic foresight and planning capabilities,
as well as of joint training, doctrines, and exercises.
44
Germany and its partners
are mutually dependent.
That entails a special
consideration
All this should lead to the development of military and civilian
capabilities that can be used interchangeably within the framework of the UN, NATO, or EU
(or in joint operations). If nothing else, this should make the Europeans more effective as
partners. A stronger, more responsible role for Europe in NATO requires an EU that is capable
of providing security effectively on its own.
What does alliance solidarity mean under these circumstances?
The use of military force will always be a highly sensitive issue in Germany. Germany’s Basic
Law and international law provide the mandatory frame of reference for any decision to use
force; and the participation of the legislature (Bundestag) is constitutionally required. Yet
cases in which law or circumstances actually compel Germany to use military force will remain
rare exceptions. And if risk management, rather than just defense, is taken as the overarching
paradigm of security policy, legitimate disagreements on specific risk assessments or priorities
within NATO or the EU/CSDP will be all the more likely, perhaps even the norm. Like other
member states, Germany will therefore have to be clear(er) in articulating its own interests
and values. But it must also include the fact of its mutual dependence with others in its calculations.
Not only does the Federal Republic rely on its allies and partners, they are also reliant
on Germany. In sum, alliance solidarity in a networked world requires special consideration
of the needs and interests of allies, and taking responsibility for the impact that a sovereign
decision has on them.
Recommendations:
•	A risk management paradigm for Germany’s security policy requires a whole-of-government
approach and the reinforcement of capabilities in the areas of knowledge, analysis, and
strategic foresight – including an inter-departmental strategic risk analysis.
	
•	A crisis and military deployment committee should be established in the German Bundestag.
Parliamentary participation in deployment decisions should be made more flexible, for
example by making missions subject to recall, combined with an earlier involvement of the
legislature by the executive, and information exchanges with allied legislatures.
•	To better inform the German public about current security challenges, the Federal Government
should regularly submit a report on Germany’s security to the Bundestag.
45
 
 
New Power
New Responsibility
46
>>
47
The Project and its Participants
The project
This paper is the result of “Elements of a Foreign and Security Policy Strategy for Germany,”
a joint initiative of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Stiftung Wissenschaft
und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs) and was funded by
the Policy Planning Staff of the Federal Foreign Office. The participants were foreign and security
policy experts from the Bundestag, administration, science, industry, foundations, think
tanks, media and non-governmental organizations.
The paper reflects the consensus, but also the dissent in their discussions, which were held in
four working groups between November 2012 and September 2013. The analyses and recommendations
contained therein are not necessarily shared by all members of the project.
Project Management
Dr. habil. Markus Kaim, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Dr. Constanze Stelzenmüller, The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Working Group Coordinators
Dr. Lars Brozus, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Dr. Jörg Forbrig, The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Dr. Ronja Kempin, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Dr. Claudia Major, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Assistants
Birthe Tahmaz, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Thomas Friebe, The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Participants
Niels Annen, Friedrich-Ebert Foundation
Dr. Thomas Bagger, Federal Foreign Office
Peter Beyer, Member of the German Bundestag
Dr. Jochen Bittner, DIE ZEIT
Prof. Dr. Tanja Börzel, Freie Universität Berlin
Knut Brünjes, Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology
Dr. Christian Buck, Federal Foreign Office
Dr. Nikolas Busse, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
Michael Flügger, Federal Chancellery
48
Dr. Arndt Freiherr Freytag von Loringhoven, Federal Foreign Office
Prof. Dr. Manuel Fröhlich, Friedrich-Schiller University Jena
Dr. Bastian Giegerich, Federal Ministry of Defence
Wolfgang Grenz, Amnesty International
Dr. Ulrike Guérot, European Council on Foreign Relations
Dr. Wibke Hansen, Center for International Peace Operations
Prof. Dr. Gunther Hellmann, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt/Main
Martin Jäger, Daimler AG (until August 15, 2013)
Alexandra Jonas, German Armed Forces Military History Research Office
Dr. Patrick Keller, Konrad-Adenauer Foundation
Roderich Kiesewetter, Member of the German Bundestag
Dr. Katrin Kinzelbach, Global Public Policy Institute
Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, The German Marshall Fund of the United States (until August 15, 2013)
Stefan Liebich, Member of the German Bundestag
Dr. Barbara Lippert, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Heike MacKerron, The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Dr. Stefan Mair, Federation of German Industries
Prof. Dr. Hanns Maull, University of Trier
Rainer Meyer zum Felde, Federal Academy for Security Policy
Dr. Stormy-Annika Mildner, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Prof. Dr. Jürgen Neyer, European University Viadrina
Dietmar Nietan, Member of the German Bundestag
Prof. Dr. Georg Nolte, Humboldt University Berlin
Omid Nouripour, Member of the German Bundestag
Prof. Dr. Volker Perthes, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Dr. Tobias Raffel, Roland Berger School of Strategy and Economics
Dr. Karsten Sach, Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety
Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider, German Council on Foreign Relations
Jürgen Schnappertz, Federal Foreign Office
Dr. Daniela Schwarzer, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Svenja Sinjen, German Council on Foreign Relations
Joachim Spatz, Member of the German Bundestag
Gerd Tebbe, German Bundestag
Dr. Hinrich Thölken, Federal Foreign Office
Stefani Weiss, Bertelsmann Foundation
Dr. Jasper Wieck, Federal Foreign Office
Power
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©Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik + German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2013