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Transformational and Charismatic Leadership Revisited: Contribution to the elaboration of the Leadership Capital Index.

Abstract:

The aim of this paper is to analyse two of the most influential versions of one type of leadership, ‘transformational’ and ‘charismatic’, as identified by James MacGregor Burns (1978) and Max Weber (1964). We shall look at the issue from a theoretical perspective, and identify and critique transformational leadership from an operational perspective, and charismatic leadership from the definitional perspective. We shall then elaborate what we see as a more helpful (working) definition: leadership as a performed ‘event’ within an (imagined) relationship. We shall also pay special attention to the iconographic as integral to performance-as-event. There then follows case study analysis and comparative analysis of four political ‘performances’ from leaders on the left of the political spectrum (2 British, 2 French) – Tony Blair, François Mitterrand, François Hollande, and Ed Miliband; that is to say, four performances of ‘themselves’, and their deployment and display of a character with personality traits. We will test our own notion of ‘characterial capital’ and the ‘personalised political’, and their contribution to Bennister, Worthy and t’Hart’s working definition of political capital and their development of a leadership capital index. We shall place special emphasis upon the cultural conditions of performance: national, historical, institutional, and narrative/ideological. The four case studies are: Blair and the death of Diana (we shall draw upon research already done here, particularly by Bennister); the iconography of Mitterrand in the 1988 presidential elections; the first year in office (May 2012-May 2013) of Hollande; and the rhetorical performance of Miliband as party leader (here we will draw on our own previous research, and an emerging body of recent research by *inter alia*, Finlayson, Atkins, Street). Emphasis will be placed in our analysis upon the ‘actual performance’ itself in our case studies, and the relationship of each to their own formative narratives, institutions, and political culture. For the first two case studies (Blair and Mitterrand), we shall treat briefly just the ‘event’ itself. In the second two (Hollande and Miliband), we shall also examine the wider situation of the left and of leadership in France and the UK.

Looking for Leadership: The Conditions of Production and the Morphology of Leadership Performance

This contribution to the workshop is intended to add to and interrogate Bennister, Worthy and t'Hart's development of the concept of leadership capital and the leadership capital index, by analysing the place and role of culture and performance in the creation and mediation of political leadership persona. We shall concentrate on two versions of one characteristic type of leadership, transforming leadership as identified by James MacGregor Burns (1976) and charismatic leadership as defined by Max Weber (1964). We shall identify and critique the notion of transformational leadership from an operational perspective. MacGregor Burns' transactional/transformational leadership types have become currency in leadership studies and public perceptions of leadership. We shall then critique the universally influential yet in my view inadequate notion of charismatic leadership, in particular, from the definitional perspective. Our comparative analysis of four political 'performances' from leaders on the left of the political spectrum – Tony Blair, François Mitterrand, François Hollande, and Ed Miliband – performances of 'themselves' as it were, and their deployment or display of a character with personality traits, will test our own notion of 'characterial capital', its place within the wider political culture, and its contribution to Bennister, Worthy and t'Hart's working definition of political capital and its role in developing a leadership capital index.¹ As we identify and elaborate types of leadership, and deepen the notion of political capital, I want to look at one obvious category or area i.e. transformational/charismatic leadership, because it is perhaps the most demonstrative and widely-recognised type or variation of leadership and certainly, by its nature, the most compelling.

Following MacGregor Burns², transformational (or rather, 'transforming') leadership – unlike its counterpart or antithesis, transactional leadership – is inspiring, visionary, i.e. not transactional. A first question is: assuming we are not talking about ideal types (which this author has always considered a severely questionable intellectual category in the social sciences), and assuming for the moment that transformational leadership exists: can a leader be 100% transformational? That is to say, what is the nature and range of this transformational quality and can it be all of a leadership, all of a leader? If the essential quality of the transformational is to transform, a further series of operational questions arise related to the act of transforming and the experience of being 'transformed' (assuming for a moment that it is those who are led who are transformed); how much are they transformed? When? What exactly is the transformational leader transforming? Is he/she doing this all of the time? What emotions are related to the 'being transformed'? Can being transformed be a state of mind? Is it an

intellectual, rational decision or recognition of a changed state of mind (Gandhi transforms me), or an emotional one, of varying (and how varying?) degrees of emotion? Is there a heightened perception, a sense of well-being? Is the transformation to these 'higher states' (both intellectual and emotional) a gradual, a sudden, a durable, a permanent process? Is becoming transformed different from being transformed? And how is such a synthesis or synchrony between leader and led maintained over time? Or is transformational merely a way of describing the attractiveness of a particular leader?

In the area we are studying here, along with Weber on Charisma, James MacGregor Burns' Pulitzer Prize-winning study of political leadership has become normative, in particular his distinction between 'transactional' and 'transformational' leadership. We need, therefore, to devote some space here to a critique of MacGregor Burns. Received wisdom in academia but also in politics, business, the media, and public perceptions is that this distinction exists and is explanatory of types of leadership, types of leader. So strong are the assumptions, leaders can be – and are – slotted easily into one of the two categories: e.g. Churchill transformational, Attlee transactional; de Gaulle transactional, the Fourth Republic's politicians transactional; Kennedy transformational, Johnson transactional, and so on. A thorough review of the book ³ shows that this is not the thrust of MacGregor Burns' argument at all. In fact, a first point to note is that he does not actually use the term 'transformational' but 'transforming' (transactional, he does use); and we can immediately note that 'transforming' is what a leader does (transactional what s/he is). We shall come back to this crucial distinction.

If we return to our transformational list – Churchill, de Gaulle etc., MacGregor Burns himself hesitates over other 'obvious' candidates, in particular Hitler. For MacGregor Burns, Hitler is not in fact a transformational nor transforming leader, but a 'power wielder', as is Lenin, and so on (and he qualifies this sometimes with 'naked' (p. 19) or 'raw' power (p. 106)). A first conclusion we can draw is that his leadership categories are a mixture of analytical/descriptive and moral/normative. In this extremely long and influential book we realise that it is almost impossible to put Hitler into that category. ⁴ In fact, throughout the book although he refers to scores of actual leaders throughout history, it is extremely difficult to clearly place *any* of them in one of the two categories transforming/transactional, and that most *seem* to be in the transactional category. It is also, difficult to see, first, if 'power wielders' and 'tyrants' are leaders at all, and second, whether all of his other categories: revolutionary leadership, heroic leadership,

reforming, ideological, opinion, group, legislative, party, or executive leadership are sub-categories of transforming/transactional or variants, or other forms of equal (or category-mistake non-comparable) leadership types.

For MacGregor Burns, that is not really the issue, for his interest lies not in what leadership is but what it should be. It is no wonder that Hitler and Stalin (Lenin is a borderline case, but for MacGregor Burns the second generation of leaders – e.g. Stalin - always reverts to the transactional) cannot be transforming, because MacGregor Burns' *Leadership* is, because partly normative, a guide to leadership. In Hitler's case, he is a 'power holder', because of his 'abdication of any potential for transforming leadership after he won total authority' (p. 92). For us, we wish to know from what it was he abdicated.⁵ MacGregor Burns' argument allows him to keep evil leaders out of his category by characterising transforming leadership as something that transforms (hence the verb) fundamentally. This renders his categories if not unusable generally, then certainly not for our purposes. This is in part because the transformations have to be, more or less, in the moral direction of history – genocide therefore precludes the 'power' leader; the relationship leader/led also has to be positive and interactive although it is clearly pedagogical; it is to 'induce people to be aware or conscious of what they feel' (p. 44); although this begs the question of the depth and complexity of 'feeling'; and the transforming has to be intended (p. 414). The first category (moral direction) is too subjective to use, the last (induce feelings) is very weak from the leadership psychology point of view, as if a leader is able to make a clear link between what they intend and what they do; and there is a curious link made between *intention* and *success*, because leadership will be 'tested by the achievement of purpose' (p. 251). Churchill's leadership is transformational only on condition Britain wins the War ... Curiously, de Gaulle would fail on that count, because to claim that in 1958 he actually knew what he wanted (apart from power) would be a mistake. More curiously still, for MacGregor Burns de Gaulle is not a transforming leader at all because he did not bring about fundamental change in French society. Apart from this being very debatable (although this is, in fact, the received view of de Gaulle, outside France), it demonstrates that MacGregor Burns' categories are of no use, as he is uninterested in leadership as performance; and so, methodologically, appraisal can only be retrospective (and probably therefore alterable which invalidates the category);⁶ so much so that throughout the book there are no descriptions of actual examples or moments of transforming leadership.

On this question of psychology, MacGregor Burns' psychological characterisation of the followers is very simplistic. He argues, innovatively, that 'true' leaders make leaders of their followers, that leadership is a structure of interaction; but throughout his analysis, the followers are near-Pavlovian in their needs and wants. They have a hierarchy of needs, from satisfying hunger, through safety, affection, belief, and esteem; but it is not clear whether they would respond to leadership on a sliding scale from transforming to transactional, or the other way round. For us, the 'transformational' is not a quality of the effect, but a quality of the act of leadership. Because of this, we need to know *why* a Churchill speech made people want to go down to the beaches of Whitstable and Eastbourne and fight off the invaders. Nowhere does Macgregor Burns show *how* transforming is something that is desired. One wonders whether MacGregor Burns' imagined audiences could feel such emotion. Nevertheless, the transforming leader recognises the needs of his audience/followers and lifts them up to a higher level (p. 4). There is something Platonic or Aristotelian in MacGregor Burns' conception of leadership. Leadership is the proper use of power. Indeed, in his discussion of intellectual leadership he calls it 'transforming', though it is difficult to see of what. He clearly has much more sympathy for the *philosophes* than for Robespierre, but can see they only offer the intellectual context of revolutionary leadership.

Towards the end of his analysis MacGregor Burns tries to solve the dilemma he has created by arguing that transforming leadership can take place within a system as well as being transforming of systems, that most systems don't change but change within systems can be transforming (pp. 415-420). One could counter this by saying that in fact there is no such thing as the overall change of a system anyway (just as there is no such thing as a revolution). It is arguable MacGregor Burns is by this point in his analysis lost as to what he means by 'transforming'. He defines it thus: 'I mean here *real* change – that is, a transformation to a marked degree in the attitudes, norms, and behaviours that structure our daily lives (p. 414). First, how do we measure the 'marked degree' and do all of the above have to change; and how do we define change? Transformation? The argument is tautologous.

One ends with the view that MacGregor Burns' real desire is that transactional leadership be transforming. One even has the impression that leadership performance is itself part of the problem: 'The ultimate success of the leader is tested not by people's delight in a performance or personality but by actual social change' (p. 249).

We return to our search for the performance of leadership.

MacGregor Burns' approach seems to raise more questions than it provides answers. One wonders whether any of our earlier questions can be addressed using MacGregor Burns, other than transformational is not transactional. We need not go into the nature of transactional here, but can raise similar questions: transactional when? transactional where? (in the leader? in the follower?); in a word, transactional how? Let us use Burns' term – or the received view of them – for a little longer.

A second question is related to the first concerning transforming leadership's definition or quality: is there a moral dimension to transforming leadership? As we have seen, this is certainly true for MacGregor Burns. Let us just assume for a moment that Adolf Hitler was a transformational or transforming leader. Winston Churchill was a transformational leader too, but more important perhaps in the appraisal, certainly of the latter and arguably of the former, were the status and role of the speeches in terms of their transforming status (our references to the former and the latter mean simply that the claim to transform in the case of Hitler is mitigated by the severely coercive nature of Nazism, not as, for Burns, it was a failure because it was not unpinned by 'end values' (pp. 74-5)).

A third and related question for us is: can a leader be a transforming leader through his/her speeches? Transforming leadership is perhaps dependent upon rhetoric, but if so, *how* is an audience transformed by a transforming leader or a transforming speech? What are the rhetorical modalities of transformation? Is the transforming leader one who transforms his/her audience, i.e. is there a relationship involved somewhere? And if so, where? And if so, what is the nature of the relationship? How should we characterise the relationship between a transforming leader and his/her audience?

On this crucial question of the leader/follower relationship perhaps we should begin by saying this is not necessarily where the answer lies i.e. 'transformational leadership is part of a relationship', but that this is where the question lies: what *is* it about the leader/follower relationship that makes the *site* and *quality* of the transformational so difficult to identify? The Hitler/Churchill contrast is instructive here. It may well be a false distinction but in part, because of history and we would hope, ethically, Hitler is the villain and Churchill the hero. This is also related to the question of consent in each case. Most studies of Hitler's charismatic 'appeal'⁷ are based upon a premise of manipulation, coercion, and an allegiance not freely given but 'taken'; a nation

bewitched by evil intent. This may tell us something about Nazi methods, but tells us little about the relationship.⁸ Churchill studies, on the other hand, emphasise his ‘inspirational’ qualities, the intensity of allegiance given – albeit in severe and dramatic psychological circumstances – freely. Neither of these approaches touches upon the operational vectors of the relationship or the allegiance; and each approach is rudimentary – and philosophically confused – in its psychological or emotional analysis, of the kind, Hitler is bad and (therefore) coercive (and vice versa); Churchill is good and therefore not (and vice versa).

We should also mention the question of office here (and there are cultural questions here too which we shall return to later - i.e. that the norms, powers, perceptions of office are culturally informed; there is a morphology to leadership/s). Put simply, one of the reasons for the perceived leadership of both Hitler and Churchill was the fact that they were, in reality, leaders. Leaders, unlike those not in leadership positions, lay easy claim to leadership; and such claims are recognised as legitimate: people take orders from leaders, leaders have the apparatus of the state at their disposal, and in varying degrees, access to the media and public communication, and so on. These structures, processes, and institutions will shape leadership – although they will not exhaustively define it. To distinguish between, say, Winston Churchill and Clement Attlee’s leadership as Prime Minister, however, we would need to examine the office, but also the style of the men, and the circumstances of their office, namely - and this too is crucial to our overall analysis and definitions - the nature of the ‘crisis’ they operate within. This raises the further question of what has been called transforming leadership being itself a leadership of crisis. This too would need to be defined properly (e.g. one could argue that Attlee’s premiership was not at a time of crisis, and therefore, one of a different nature from Churchill’s), as would the idea of crisis itself.

On this question of office and its relationship to style, the French case is instructive. The question usually asked about French presidentialism is why was Charles de Gaulle seen as the quintessence of French presidentialism by which all subsequent Presidents would be judged? And at the time of writing, a breathtaking comparison can be made between de Gaulle and the actual incumbent, François Hollande. The problem with this approach is the assumption that Charles de Gaulle ‘possessed’ presidential qualities and that François Hollande does not possess them. We can add the caveat that Hollande often makes appeals to such presidentialism – attempts at gravitas, constant references to the majesty of the state or of France, ‘the values of the Republic’, his central

role in decision-making, the developing role of the first person pronoun in his discourse, and so on. But a great deal more mileage can be gained by asking a different question or set of questions, *before* we, in our turn, ‘assume’ we know what presidentialism is or presidential qualities are. If we ask a different question: what did Charles de Gaulle bring to or do with the *office* of the presidency, we go to the heart of the issue. He was indeed aloof, ‘presidential’ etc., but it was the bringing of *himself* to the configuration and mobilisation of the institutions in and after 1958 that gives us insight into the true nature of the Fifth Republic; the bringing of ‘himself’ and the idea that although he had not been ‘chosen’ by the French (he had been chosen by history), he had been ‘recognised’ by them (and given authority to act by them). In no other regime in France – and this includes absolute monarchy where roles are severely prescribed and proscribed – was such scope given to the construction of an imagined relationship between a personal leader and an (imagined?) public as in the Fifth Republic, with all the consequent effects upon it of the ‘character’ of the principal actor, and the relationship of the public to the presidency and the regime. We shall come back to the role of character within institutions (and culture) in the body of our analysis. First, however, let us sum up so far and suggest what we might call the morphology of leadership performance.

Leadership can best be understood as a performance. The performance itself takes place within a configuration of institutions which have two essential aspects. The first is a practical one: institutions and structures offer practical benefits to leaders in the form of resources and ‘places’ to perform. They also offer, and in terms of our analysis this is probably more important, legitimacy and symbolic status: the leader enters the hall last because he/she is the leader. He/she is above us upon a stage with a sound system because he/she is the leader. We listen because he/she is the leader. Institutions, therefore, are the practical and symbolic conditions of leadership performance. The institutions, and especially their configuration and status, are also embedded within and continuously informed by culture, and culture in both its prevailing and deeper context. By the former we mean its tangible/visible expression – ways of doing things; the culture of Whitehall, the role of committees in one polity as opposed to decisive and consequent action by individuals in another, or the formative role of back-room deals and unofficial agreements or understandings in another, the role of drama and adversarial politics in one polity, or its absence in another, and so on. All of these correspond to the institutionalism identified first by March and Olsen.⁹ And in this, they are everyday expressions and assumptions of historically determined developments (though perhaps ‘determined’ is not the right word). Also

historically determined or conditioned are deeper cultural traits. To give a comparative Anglo-French example, we can point to the dramatic difference in the role of and cultural allegiance to personal leaders and ‘personality politics’. In each country, this is a historical and institutional phenomenon, and has significant effects upon forms of political association and thereby upon organisation. It also is in a dynamic relationship with rhetoric and discourse, and is related to notions such as the idea of crisis and the role of individuals in relation to it, and the activity and influence of the myths and symbols related to these.

The morphology of leadership performance is such, therefore, that leaders have a constructed image (constructed by them, the institutions, the culture, the audience, and the performance), and performance takes place within a historically fashioned institutional configuration which is imbued with norms and expectations, as well as opportunity itself, and is embedded within – and this more or less deeply and therefore consequently according to each case – a culture which informs the way in which institutions and leadership operate, both in terms of constraints and opportunities.

If the contexts of leadership performance are necessary conditions of its production, and of our understanding of it, we still return to the question – in its transforming or charismatic expression, what is it? One of the elements that we shall elaborate below in relation to Max Weber is the question of the relationship between leader and followers. In leadership studies, the relationship is contentious but is always an element; indeed, it has to be a given in that leadership is inconceivable without it. Without it, leadership becomes an absurdity. But what kind of relationship is it? In one sense, this brings us to a central issue because it raises the question of who thinks what – or feels what – in the relationship, and the degree of autonomy/coercion or autonomy/seduction in the relationship, and the question of the assumption of or the possession of, or the dichotomy of, leadership’s transforming or charismatic qualities. We can here, however, make three obvious points about the relationship which we can take to be true and formative (but which are singularly lacking in most studies). First, the relationship takes place, as we have seen, in a situation, i.e. in the Sartrean (*en situation*) sense of a context in which the relationship is implicated (Sartre 1943). Second, it is a relationship in which inspiration or a ‘higher level’ of experience occurs, and third and relatedly, it is an emotional relationship, or one in which emotions play a part.

This raises the fundamental question of the status and contribution of ‘each’ in the relationship; and we have to immediately concede that

although there may be communion there is not, almost by definition, equality. Whether ‘raised up’ or moved to emotion, the audience depends upon, is dependent upon the ‘transforming’ leader/speaker. At best, in order that this state be attained, the leader seduces, bewitches, enchants. We also need to interrogate the extent to which audience agency is involved here. Are the bewitched free agents? Perhaps not. Are the enchanted? Perhaps. So in one sense, another aspect of the relationship is that in a range of degrees of allegiance or recognition, the art of leadership persuasion is an act of seduction. Can we also say there is always, therefore – in the moment of seduction or if the seduction is maintained over time – some kind of charismatic bond that is binding of the receiver by the sender?

Let us then look at Weber’s theorisation of the concept of charismatic leadership. In the case of MacGregor Burns, what interested us in particular was the unhelpful operational nature of its definition or characterisation and its problematic normative nature; in the case of Weber, we take issue with its problematic definitional ambivalence.

In spite of a century of theoretical/methodological difficulty¹⁰ with Weber, his notion of ‘charisma’, elaborated in *Economy and Society*, and later in ‘Politics as a Vocation’ (1964; 2004) still dominates.¹¹ Inside academia, it prevails. Outside academia it is universal. But, it is my view that the continuing emphasis upon and use of (a version of) charisma is one of the reasons for our other dilemmas regarding the normative and the manipulative, their relation to rhetoric and the interpolation of persona within it, and the perpetually vexed question of where charisma resides and what is its nature or what are its elements. Let us look at Weber’s definition:

‘A certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader’ (Weber, 1964, 358).¹²

What can we say about this definition? A striking yet uncontentious first point we can make is that it is long. Do long definitions actually ‘define’? But it is not just long; it is unclear, tentative and assertive at the same time, and contradictory. It is as if the ‘definer’ himself is trying to identify charisma rather than tell us what it is. And closer inspection of this iconic definition confirms this notion of definitional hesitation. What is the difference between a quality and a ‘certain’ quality. And are there

charismas (exceptional powers (plural) or just charisma (a quality)))? And are 'powers' and 'qualities' different entities? Does this mean that there are specific powers and/or qualities? What does 'by virtue of which' mean? Does it mean 'and because of this' or 'which has as a consequence'? The charismatic individual is 'set apart from ordinary men'. How? In the minds of the 'ordinary men'? Is it they who do the setting apart or does it just happen because of the qualities? Is being ordinary a necessary quality to recognition? Would a more than ordinary man 'see through' the qualities? Or is it simply the consequence of their not possessing this quality or these qualities? How though do they recognise the charismatic individual? Is it because he is simply not like them? How? Are 'supernatural', 'superhuman' and 'exceptional' the same thing? Is there a difference in quality between the divine and the exemplary? Are these two types or else two ways of seeing one type? And of course there remains the long-standing problem with the term (because of different emphasis in different sentences) as to whether the quality or qualities are possessed or ascribed: they are only 'regarded as' divine. Does this mean the ascription may be a false one? What does this mean about the qualities? Moreover, the definition is 'framed' in three 'ascribed' assertions: at the beginning 'treated as', in the middle 'regarded as', and at the end 'treated as' again. But we cannot get away from the fact that these are also qualities of 'personality' that are being ascribed or perceived, and that the thrust of the definition still points to something – or some things – that is or are very special.

What is charisma then for Weber? Well, from the definition, it is difficult to pin down *what* it is, mainly because it is difficult to pin down *where* it is. It is based on *several* things not one thing ('qualities ascribed'), as well as upon both qualities (plural) and ascription. If we are talking about where the charisma is, is it in the ascribed or the ascribing? And 'where' is each of these? The latter, ascribing, is where the focus of attention has come to be placed, in our post-modern, relativist world. It is in the eye/s of the beholder/s, rather than in the qualities held. Does this actually get us very far? In fact, it takes us off in the wrong direction, away from the persona we are trying to analyse. The most extreme form of this view, and extremely influential, is Theodore Adorno's development of the idea of the 'authoritarian personality' (Adorno, 1950). In a word, Adorno identified Hitler's persuasive power as lying in the psychic dependence of a particular type of audience (possibly comprising virtually the whole German nation), and its need for authority and domination. General use of this idea is more benign than Adorno, namely, that the power of charisma proceeds from those in its thrall. We do not, however, get very far in identifying charisma if, in response to the statement 'That man has

charisma’, we ask, ‘Then tell me about you’. Similarly, the following does not get us very far either: I am charismatic because you are delusional or seriously neurotic, at worst; I am charismatic because you ascribe to me the quality of possessing grace, at best. Neither of these helps us; or helps us identify either a Hitler or a Churchill (as a deployed and/or imagined character). Hitler, in part because it does not matter – if the ascribing is done by mass neurosis we hardly need to probe any further than: here we have a nasty man, and for some just a clown, yelling and threatening the heavens with his fist, in the context of a clinically bizarre nation of very gullible Germans; Churchill, because it is the motives for the ascription, through emotional allegiance, of the qualities of an inspirational leader, which is all we need to know. Britain somehow ‘needed’ a Churchill and provided one (though we still do not know what the ‘one’ is). We must, however, return to the term, charisma. After the war, in radio and television programmes about the 1939-45 period, there was often a fierce allegiance to Churchill expressed by many interviewees which was highly emotional and ‘attached’. The memory, at least, of those interviewed was that they would have done anything for the war effort *because of Churchill’s speeches*. Responses were of the kind ‘We would have gone down to the beaches and fought the Germans with broomsticks’ (in fact, in 1940 there were only broomsticks, most of the military hardware having been left on the beach at Dunkirk...). What we need is some way of apprehending both this relational allegiance and its intensity (whether real or ‘constructed’ later is a separate issue), as well as the elements of the rhetoric and the persona of Churchill. Essentially (especially given the actual effect of – i.e. none at all – hitting a Panzer Tank with a broomstick), what is being expressed is a willingness to die because of dramatic radio broadcasts in a crisis situation. Charisma as a concept does not really offer very much, either as a relational concept – leadership qualities ascribed and (perhaps) possessed; nor does it help us see *why* the listener was prepared to die, or what precisely it was they were prepared to die for. The listener’s emotions are involved in a series of complex relationships with all the elements of rhetoric, but we can see that, apart from our criticisms of Weber’s definition, what is dramatically missing from Weber’s analysis is precisely the drama of the relationship, its emotional character (Willner, 1984). What it is that provokes the emotion and allegiance is very difficult to grasp. Could we say perhaps that there is something in the nature of the, let us call it here ‘charisma’, that we do not know what it is? Is charisma a *Je ne sais quoi*, I know not what? Of course, that is not sufficient for scientific analysis; but the problem with seeing charisma as just a relational concept (however complex), is that it still leaves us with the ‘not knowing’ of ‘what’, the *je ne sais* of *quoi*! Having said that, and before moving on, this writer does

hesitate over his own argument (the idea that we are indeed searching for the ‘qualities’ of leadership): surely Churchill’s leadership of the British public, 1940-1945, *is* relational; and that that fact is a key to understanding Churchill’s ‘success’? There is something very profound in a relationship that is akin to an emotional interdependence, or an emotional complicity about something treasured, e.g. ‘our island’ (Cannandine, 1989). Although it is clearly not a one-to-one relationship (there is only one speaker, and it is he who discursively invents the ‘island’, and probably the qualities of the audience too), but there is something emotionally shared by all those subscribing to the relationship. It is perhaps akin to, or rather an adaption of, another Sartrean notion, that of the group-in-fusion (Sartre, 1960) – that each person, through sharing what is both an ontological and emotional relationship to Churchill, shares with one another, and that each is ‘held’ by the other in their mutual emotion vis-à-vis Churchill, and this is dramatically reinforced by their sharing the same crisis situation. The difference from Sartre is that, in the ‘Churchill’ case, the leader participates in the relationship (replacing ‘revolution’ as the agent of ‘fusion’), and shares a place within the crisis of the impending invasion. But if the audience is ‘sharing’ with each other the perception of a quality ascribed, what is the ‘*quoi*’ of the quality?

We shall come back to Churchill below, but the ‘charisma’ and the rhetoric must be linked to the notion of leadership ‘success’ or rhetorical purpose (however we define these).¹³ There is a detailed literature on this (Kohrs Campbell and Hall Jamieson, 1990; Hall Jamieson, 1992; Windt and Ingold, 1992; Wills, 1992; Cohen, 2013), on what success or purpose is and how to measure it in terms, for example, of presidential ‘effect’, the effect of presidential discourse, for example upon agenda-setting. However, we need to know not only (or for our purposes, even) what its effects are, but what it *is*, what presidential discourse, for example, is in its deep texture and complexity, and beyond its ‘success’ in, or beyond, the discourse, what the cherished leadership ‘image’ or persona is, as it were, phenomenologically. What is it that is successful? Once again, saying it is relational does not capture it (although we must accept that it is relational, either before, during or after the rhetorical experience). Perhaps we have to accept that the thing we are trying to capture seems to exhibit the quality of the *ineffable*, perhaps even unknowable, a truly *je ne sais quoi*. That is not to excuse our efforts at trying to capture it, nor to say that we cannot, but simply to say a) how difficult it is to grasp, and b) that the ineffability may be one of its major qualities *and* functions. This is truly tantalising. Part of the quality we are trying to grasp may be by definition elusive, hence its allure and compelling nature. This may also

have a psychological dimension. Our response to leadership may have a relationship to childhood, perhaps even the pre-verbal (hence the inability to ‘put it into words’ – or it may, indeed, be like listening to music); or the symbolic e.g. the leader as the (literal) embodiment of desire; and it may – surely does – have a mythical dimension too, mythical in the sense that the leader or aspirant leader evokes legend (e.g. Lancelot undergoing trials, slaying dragons etc., in a (mythical) place the speaker has taken us to), or religious/symbolic interpolations: it is not without significance that many of the aspects informing Western leadership – special grace, the bringer of comfort, justice, succour, deliverance, and so on, evoke the West’s Christian tradition (itself ‘mythical’); not without significance that the cult of Eva Peron (after her death, because of her life) occurs in a deeply Catholic, Madonna-fixated culture, and, of course, that charisma means ‘grace’.

Those leaders we call ‘charismatic’ do seem to possess ‘a certain something’ and a something that we can’t quite ‘put our finger on’. No wonder Weber’s definition is long; ‘charisma’ is truly hard to define. Social science, in fact, seems here to be little further forward than ‘The X factor’; charisma as ‘Star quality’. We have, therefore, a term which almost will not go away, and yet is highly problematic, if not downright misleading. Moreover, if it is related or contained within Bennister *et al*’s notion of political capital, it can be both won (unless it is already possessed) and lost through a series of factors: changes in comportment, performance, institutional framework, culture, audience response, or events.¹⁴

If not MacGregor Burns or Max Weber, however, who can help us out of our dilemma? Let us see if Aristotle can. For Aristotle, as for MacGregor Burns with leadership, we need to address, before we continue, the issue of rhetoric as normative. For Aristotle, rhetoric is infused with normative concerns; one might arguably or ultimately say just one normative concern, namely, that rhetoric be used to good purpose; the *Rhetoric*, in parts, reads like a manual designed to enhance and nurture the happiness and the good life advocated in the *Politics* and the *Ethics* (Aristotle, 1991, 1981, 2009). Today, such preoccupation is – quite rightly – driven to the edges of rhetorical studies; rightly, in that concerns with normative outcomes should not interfere with analysis, as we have argued as regards MacGregor Burns. If we take two emotional and morally-charged examples: we cannot analyse Ronald Reagan’s Challenger Disaster speech (28 January 1986), or Tony Blair’s speech on the death of Diana (31 August 1997), while imposing our normative intent upon Reagan and Blair’s normative intent. We cannot – to put it bluntly – understand the

rhetoric of homage and of sadness while maintaining the view that the violent death of the young and beautiful is tragic. We have to be aware only that such rhetoric takes place in situations where such views prevail. The analysis of rhetoric has to be sensitive to the strategic intent prefacing it, and political effects flowing from it; and to that extent, it is helpful to ‘put ourselves in their shoes’; but our concern is structural and stylistic. Or, rather, it should be. To put it bluntly again, is the prescription I am advocating sustainable? Can the study of rhetoric be value neutral? There is, moreover, an irony in Aristotle’s own prescription, in that the rhetoric of malevolence has known much more attention over the last century (perhaps the last twenty centuries) than the rhetoric of homage. Much of Aristotle’s endeavour, in his identification and proscription of the all too prevalent other feature of rhetoric: demagoguery, was to counter appeals to unreflective surges of emotion (Le Bon, 1986). He is concerned with appeals to all the emotions, even anger; but he is quite restrictive about who should do the appealing and who should be getting angry. Much of this concern was political. Aristotle’s political paradigm was for enlightened but limited democratic rule by an aristocracy, and this in the context of a fundamental disapproval of democracy itself, viewed by him as a kind of rule by the mob, or rather by the demagogues who might inflame the mob. Our thinking today too is informed significantly by notions of the rhetoric of manipulation for the purposes of evil, and this, from the soap powders promoted by the hidden persuaders (Packard, 1980), to the populism of a resurgent far right, to the mix of high emotion, dissimulation, and appeal to cruelty of a Goebbels, for example. Perhaps the normative is inescapable after all, and there is no benign approach to rhetoric. Because of the close relationship between atrocity and rhetoric in the twentieth and, still, twenty first-century, the analysis of the rhetoric of ‘demagoguery’ is unavoidable, and value neutral analysis is arguably impossible. Their norms v. our norms, and this, ironically again, thanks to the teaching of the master himself, Aristotle and others (Cicero, 2006; Quintilian, 2010). It is perhaps inevitable that we study Aristotle but try to believe in the morally relative Machiavelli (Machiavelli, 2003), and all this while trying to behave, or approach our objects of study, like objective evidential scientists. Standing in the wings of all rhetorical inquiry, therefore, are the ghosts of the normative and, by extension, the prescriptive, ready to beguile our efforts. The post-twentieth century intellectual is constantly drawn back to the normative, knowing that rhetoric really should serve the good life because it so often serves the bad. All rhetoric is, in some form, the art of seduction; and as often as not, perhaps more often than not, the seducer intends to deceive, intending something other than what the seduced, upon sober reflection,

might perceive as their own good. By definition s/he would have us in another place to where we would be without the rhetorical appeal or exchange. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the rhetoric of crowds and of state propaganda brought, as often as not, utter ruin. The rhetoric inviting us towards the good life (for Aristotle, enlightened aristocracy, for us enlightened democracy (Uhr, 2014)) is usually more subtle and more quiet and, because less passionate, has gone hand in hand with evidence: higher living standards, relative freedoms, education, security, and social harmony; although we need to add that passion here too has been of the essence in bringing these things to pass: nothing, as Emmeline Pankhurst told us, was ever gained from the British government without something approaching a revolution. The rhetoric of the democratic state seems generally, however, less ‘empty’ than the ‘signifieds’ of demagoguery, and perhaps more empty than demagoguery’s signifiers. Since the Enlightenment, the drive towards democracy has, however, in spite of the struggle for democracy, been ever prey to the rhetoric of populism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). Indeed, as we have said, we would probably not have attained the levels of democracy we have without it. So if we cannot free analysis of the haunting presence of the normative, then we need also to recognise that rhetoric is an emotional and dramatic issue (Marcus, 2002).

The rhetoric of drama can serve ‘the good’, but often only in crisis. One thinks again of Churchill’s rhetoric versus Hitler’s (Cannadine, 1989; Burke, 1989; Bosmajian, 1960), although – returning to our earlier point about the normative – choosing between the British Empire and Nazi Germany – is a classic example of the analyst’s difficulty finding neutral ground.¹⁵ Moreover, as we venture towards the rhetoric of drama, we should add that one person’s – perhaps also one analyst’s – rabble rouser is another’s inspiration. Perceptions of Malcolm X in the 1960s would be a good illustration of this, but we could put a Martin Luther King into this category too (Washington and King, 1986; Breitman, 1990). For many at the time, King was nothing but a troublemaker. Now, he is a saint (as X perhaps, should also be). Perhaps the rhetoric of persuasion, by definition a rhetoric of ‘trying to get things done’, depends for its ultimate analysis and significance upon what subsequently does get done. Such relativism does not preclude analysis: grasping the structure of the March on Washington Speech does not depend upon the outcome of the Civil Rights movement’s struggle; nevertheless, others’ normative concerns, as well as, at a further remove, our own, should not determine our analysis of rhetoric, but they do seem to be its ever-changing context. That rhetoric will always have in some sense a political purpose informs all analysis. And as regards ‘the good life’, Aristotle is a handbook for

contemporary democracy, although he himself was not a democrat. For Aristotle, good rhetoric, therefore, from a normative point of view, is that which contains and nurtures, in today's terms, democracy and the good life; and bad rhetoric is that which draws us down the road to destruction. That is demagoguery. So a fundamental problem here, analytically, is that rhetoric is not just about rhetoric, but about values, and about the analyst's worst enemy, emotion, which we shall come on to below. Here we can say that in the study of rhetoric, the analyst's relationship to the normative is a constant preoccupation but, as we have indicated, should not deter us.

The emphasis within rhetoric (epideictic, forensic, political and demagogic) upon persuading people to do, think, or feel something other than what they are doing, thinking, and feeling (or to remember or relive already experienced thought or feeling) brings us to a second and related point. The analysis of rhetoric is ever-subject to an understanding of the social, cultural, institutional, and political relationship between listener and hearer, both in the minds of each and in the rhetoric itself (Kane, 2001). In order to understand the tale, we must inevitably understand the teller and his/her relationship to those they are telling their tale to, so that concern with the relationship between (or, rather, imagined relationship between) speaker and listener is a constant (Gaffney, 2001). Second, fundamental to that relationship, in order that it be lived as 'real' and to purpose, is the question of trust. Trust or empathy is perhaps essential to rhetoric's effectiveness upon the listener, but is so upon the analyst too in a strange sense (Warren, 1999). One does not need to be a Nazi to appreciate Hitler's rhetoric, but at least pretending to be a bit of a sympathiser in order to grasp the Fuhrer's rhetorical power probably helps. Third, just as norms do not determine rhetoric or its analysis but are its ever-active context, so too are emotions such as desire (to be persuaded or delivered or included), sorrow, need, exhilaration, and trust, and so on: emotion is ever-present in or around the rhetoric. This brings us again to Aristotle, and to his categories of *ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos*. Contemporary rhetorical studies emphasise the latter two, and in particular how, to good or bad purpose, they interact with one another: how argument and emotion interact with one another to consequential reaction. What has been less focused upon (and often taken out of the Aristotelian triptych and treated separately as 'image', persona, or character) is *ethos*. This is in part because, unlike Aristotle, we are less interested today in the standing of the speaker and whether or not he (then, only he) is worthy etc. But the standing of the speaker *in the rhetoric* and, therefore, *ethos* as a *relational* term (to *pathos*, *logos* and the audience) is crucial to the contemporary analysis of rhetoric. In fact, I

would argue that not only is *ethos* the least focused upon today, it is the most important element. *Ethos* is the fundamental component of rhetoric: the imagined persona of the speaker as an active, enacting part of the rhetoric, and his/her imagined or perceived relationship to normative issues, to emotion, to argument and, especially, to the audience, are the keys to contemporary rhetoric.

Underlying these three ideas concerning social and other contexts is the notion of the comportment and character of the speaker; his/her 'personality', projected in the rhetoric as well as imagined outside it (as with Aristotle). So for us – as analysts – what 'today's' Aristotle means when he ponders whether rhetoric serves the good or the bad is: what is the intention (strategic and political, as well as emotional and moral) of the speaker vis-à-vis the audience; and, for us also, how does the audience see and feel about him/her in the context of his/her intentions and their desires? Let's take as an analogy the Pied Piper of Hamelin: the tune (its 'rhetoric') was there to enchant, and we could analyse how it did so (if only we knew the tune). The tune he played and the way he played it would be our focus. But we cannot help but witness the results and reflect: see the foolish children go, and the foolish parents deceived. The Piper's tune was literally, musically, *enchanting*. What did the Piper get out of this? We shall never know of course. Do we need to know the Piper's intention or desire to understand the tune and its effects? Hamelin the village gained nothing but disaster and heartbreak (and bitter wisdom). Normatively and prescriptively, and as regards demagoguery, proscriptively, rhetoric is 'bad', if intention is bad. In *The Odyssey*, the Sirens' music was, by definition, irresistible. The ropes that lashed Ulysses to the mast were the only form of resistance to its call. Yet the intention was nefarious – the Sirens' desire was to emotionally disarm before dashing the crew cruelly upon the rocks (it really would be good to know what all this music sounded like!); so, should we leave to the moraliser, the Piper and Sirens' intention; to the 'rhetorician', the analysis of their enchanting tunes? It should be that simple. Among analysts, it is probably the general view that today the rhetor's norms should not worry us unduly. Few believe (anymore) that rhetoric is 'understandable' by its ends or – speaking as scientists – that its ends should be to enhance 'the city' (although we should bear in mind the normative preoccupations of MacGregor Burns and others). Second, and conversely, 'fear' of rhetoric remains very strong, socially and culturally, and the analyst is probably not free of this either. Third, the fact that rhetoric can enhance the purposes and interest of the uncivic individual haunts the city and the study of the city. Fourth, those whose rhetoric contributes to a self-serving purpose should not persuade us; and yet in a strategic sense all

rhetoricians have only this purpose. The thing about rhetoric is, as we have seen, that the purposes of listener and speaker are often not the same. The Pied Piper must have had a cruel or heartless reason to take all those children away and break so many hearts (although even here, there was perhaps some pedagogical purpose to the act (don't trust strangers with piccolos!); and, indeed, in some rare versions of the story, the children live happily ever after in their new home). Our point is that, whether normative or other, the *ethos* of the speaker informs everything, and in leadership studies, the overwhelming need for analysis is to show how argument and emotion serve the purpose of enhancing the relationship between speaker (leader) and audience. We are as concerned with what the leader/speaker made the audience feel about the leader/speaker as we are about what they made the audience feel about the issues.

We can see, therefore, that we cannot distinguish completely between the speaker or rhetor's intention, the interpolation of intention (the rhetoric), the audience relation to the speaker, and the audience's relationship to culture and norms, and to its (or their) own desires. But the task for the analyst is nevertheless forensic. Like a psychoanalyst or biographer, or a surgeon, or a UN investigator gathering evidence for crimes against humanity, we negotiate norms and emotions, while also knowing we should try never to make the analytical distinction between the rhetoric of Hitler and the rhetoric of Churchill on the basis of anything other than their rhetorical qualities. 'How do they get us out of our seats', not 'why?' should be our main question – although we are constantly drawn to wanting to know why too (Roberts, 2004). Since the Enlightenment, our mission is secular, but it, the normative, is there all the time. The analysis of rhetoric falls into the interpretivist tradition (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003). Our essential point is that all of the issues we have identified as inevitably informing, if not 'interfering', in our analysis of rhetoric, apply even more so to our appraisal of one rhetorical element, the *ethos*, the 'character' of the persona – deployed in discourse, perceived through the rhetoric, and 'imagined' before, during, and after delivery. Analysing the persona who interpolates the rhetoric, who is the rhetoric's 'voice', raises methodological but also normative issues which inform us, of the kind: what do I think of this (imagined) person? In this way, normative and moral concerns are at their most acute when it comes to the deployment of the character of the speaker. Our norm-based emotions (and our curiosity?) about the character of the speaker is the context of our analysis of the speaker's treatment (the rhetoric) of the audience's norm-based emotions.

In leadership rhetoric, therefore, we make a distinction about the person, or rather the imagined persona of the speaker. Although the ‘secular’ analysis of rhetoric is our aim, the moral and other dimensions (e.g. psychological) of the teller of the tale inform our view of the tale told, and are linked to the idea that the rhetoric’s purpose is to tell us about the speaker, as well as about the speaker as an agent in the process of persuasion.

If we cannot or should not make a distinction between rhetoric to good or bad purpose, perhaps we can overcome the problems posed by normative, and possibly emotional ‘interference’, by taking the bull by the horns and saying that Hitler and Churchill had *precisely* the same purpose and should be analysed accordingly? That the only intent of the speaker that should interest us is the desire to make a good speech and win allegiance to the ‘self’ of the speaker. We need perhaps to depict ‘self’ as persuasive and exemplary in order to show how self persuades and exemplifies, and to ‘neutrally’ (re)construct his or her persona. We need therefore, to analyse leadership rhetoric, its relation to intention, and to its audience, in terms of that element within it concerned with ‘the character’ portrayed by the rhetoric, but who also is outside the rhetoric, i.e. the (perceived or constructed) speaker imagined and/or standing right in front of us, the audience. What is the nature of the ‘imaginative’ interaction of speaker and audience? And *why* are *they* listening to *him* or *her*?

Before looking at our four contrasting examples, let us make a methodological point, which is that the performance of a political leader can be analysed from a myriad of perspectives: from one performance, a speech for example, or performances over a period of time, or from the point of view of the leadership image deployed, the rhetoric used, the world view projected, and so on. The potential analytical perspectives are almost infinite. Our appraisals will touch upon several of these, but we shall give special emphasis to two things: 1). the way in which culture informs performance and 2). how leader performance both mediates ideas and fashions leadership persona. In order to do this, we need to introduce more firmly into our appraisal, questions of language and rhetoric, as well as the roles of institutions and culture.

1). Tony Blair and the Diana Speech 31 August 1997 ¹⁶



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worth pointing out here, indeed reminding ourselves, how popular Blair was at this time. He enjoyed the longest ‘honeymoon’ a modern British Prime Minister had ever enjoyed. We should also remember how he had already begun to ‘mix’ the public and the private selves before becoming Prime Minister (receiving journalists, mug of tea in hand; declaring himself a ‘regular guy’ on radio) so that when, as Prime Minister, he stepped forward to make the Diana speech he was already a new kind of politician, young and trendy, indeed, in a comparable vein to the person whose life he was commemorating in such an apparent state of grief.

Tony Blair made his Diana speech on the afternoon of her violent death in Paris in the early morning. ¹⁷ The clip shown on television and which has become ‘the speech’ (he actually made several more remarks in the full version) was 286 words long. The short speech is a rare example of a speech that captures a national mood. We need, however, to show how this ‘mood’ is ‘captured’; in fact, the speech both captures and creates the mood, and it is this that gives it its iconic status.

A first point we can make is that Blair’s speech, through hesitations, pauses, slightly trembling lips, sentence constructions of a kind that suggest someone searching for expression, a mixture of phrases that seem

to mix the ‘official’ and the spontaneous, and a combination of clichés and personal comment, does three things; it expresses: a truly national disbelief at the unexpected, violent and painful death of – at the time – Britain’s most famous and iconic and highly mediatised woman; the highly emotional public reaction that accompanied the disbelief; and, perhaps most importantly, the immediate posthumous rhetorical invention of a new Diana, associated forever – through the short speech – with Blair himself. This was an event, like the death of JFK or the release of Mandela, that certainly the whole UK and much of the world population took (passive) part in. Blair therefore, perhaps more than anyone else, literally gave voice to this shocking event.

Another immediate context was its protocollary aspect. Blair ‘assumed’ responsibility for public comment about the death. She had no constitutional position, nor he, therefore, any official role. Not that anyone knew who was supposed to say what to the press/nation. In this way, Blair was a kind of official/unofficial spokesperson for a media icon rather than the official commentator on the death of a member of the royal family. A further immediately influential factor was that everyone knew that she was dead. Blair’s was not an announcement but a comment, a (national) expression, of an event that everyone knew had taken place, and which was captured in the opening line: ‘I feel like everyone else in this country today’, expressing his own disbelief and emotion which immediately become an articulated sense of national disbelief.

The setting for the speech was also arresting in its simplicity and symbolism. Blair stood in front of an old churchyard wall (it was in his Sedgewick constituency) beyond which one could see the tops of old gravestones, and the stone church. Between Blair and the bottom of the wall there is grass, and behind him on either side in the Churchyard are tall green trees, in front of him three (grey) microphones clumsily taped together. The colours are all muted yet complementary: shades of green, grey and brown, and in fact his own more defined tan, and brown hair, and black (his suit and tie), and a touch of white (his shirt) ‘foregrounding’. The scene is, moreover, in four almost equal horizontal parts: the strip of grass, the church wall, trees and church, and the church roof and sky. The three main colours (grey, green, brown) are separate yet complement each other, and there are shades of each. The scene therefore is (with each of the three main colours sharing a hint of the other two - there is, for example, green in the grey wall, rich brown in the green trees, all ‘backgrounding’ the speaker); like a rather perfect

watercolour of a nineteenth century ‘authentic’ scene (Austen, Brontë), sombre, muted, rural, and quintessentially ‘English’.

Blair’s head movements also complement the sense of authenticity. It is not just the hesitations of voice, but the way (with no script) he turns his head throughout slightly to the right. The impression is of someone searching – spontaneously – for expressions (and his eyes are constantly moving as if he is trying to find his place/comprehend the event. It is clear he is indeed doing this in part, searching for at least the central threads of his ideas (semi-prepared speech). He also is in fact turning to the figure, just off to the right, and who we cannot see, and who triggers his speech with ‘can we have your reaction’). Given these idiosyncrasies, when Blair does turn full face to the camera (us, the viewers), the effect is all the greater, the words all the more effective, because we have seen him as if struggling with emotion, searching for the right words then overcoming this, and looking straight at us: ‘how many times shall we remember her, in how many different ways ...?’ not just addressing us directly but sharing the emotions projected (‘we’ ‘many times’ ‘in many ways’).¹⁸ Blair’s language is – indeed, like a lot of people who speak at funerals or commemorations these days – like everyday language, but one that visibly strives for a higher register. We should point out here that Blair’s language is not only ‘like ours’ – and like ours in an emotional moment, suggesting the veering away from what has to be said, as it were, to emotional disarray and back again, but it is ‘like ours’, in that it resembles the dominant media clichés of the time, used in both the tabloid and serious press: ‘her two sons, the two boys’, ‘our hearts go out’, ‘wonderful and warm’, ‘with joy and with comfort’ (cf. ‘comfort and joy’ of the carol), ‘deeply painful’ and so on, all topped off by the *Hello Magazine* ‘people’s princess’ cliché (evoked more strongly because ‘people’ appears twice in the previous sentence). Blair thus contributes to the instant mythification of Diana that was already taking place. Twice, Blair refers to the difficulties of her life. This too was a true expression of Blair’s style and overall manner. The automatic response – as is normally the case with ‘famous’ deaths – would have been eulogy. This speech, as Bennister has pointed out, is part epideictic, part conversational,¹⁹ part oration, part confessional; for Blair insists not just upon the Diana of official status but the Diana in the popular imagination and media fame. Diana had been divorced the year before, 1996, and both when married and during her divorce she had gained vast media exposure and public sympathy (along the lines of a fragile young woman in search of love after a loveless marriage), and not a little public concern that she was becoming mentally unstable. In 1995, one year before her divorce, she had given a very strange TV interview to the BBC on ‘Panorama’ (she

even looked very strange with an inordinate amount of mascara, for example) where she referred to herself as the ‘Queen of Hearts’ an expression echoed by Blair ‘The People’s Princess ... will remain in our hearts’. Rumours abounded about her private life, nocturnal trysts, the paternity of Harry, her relationship to Dodi Fayed, to name just a few. Blair’s allusions to these ‘How difficult things were for her’ brought out this aspect of the public’s riveted interest in this side of the complex Princess Diana. Interestingly, Blair – who knew her personally – does not present himself as an acquaintance of Diana. In fact, and this explains in part the public effect of the speech, he speaks throughout as if his knowledge of her is our knowledge of her, the tabloid Diana, the tragic and complex Diana of Anna Karenin proportions. Having alluded to this (‘often sadly touched by tragedy, she touched ...’), Blair then moves from the troubled Diana to the Lady Bountiful Diana, arguably an archetypal female myth in British society: ‘she touched the lives of so many’, and the image of the other Diana, or the ‘other side’ of Diana (also highly mediatised throughout the 1990s): her devotion to causes – sick children, Aids, the abolition of landmines – coexisting with the tragic Diana. Blair refers to her ‘compassion’, but interestingly it is an archetypal female compassion; all her causes were about caring, nurturing, giving succour, and protecting children and the vulnerable, and of course she was herself, as we are reminded, a young mother.

Paradoxically, therefore, Blair’s oration, born of surprise and disbelief, elevates Diana to the status of an icon; born to die young like Marilyn, James Dean, JFK, etc, she is raised to their status as if joining them and confirming the myth ‘only the good die young’.


It is impossible to know what role Blair’s speech played in the rapid media-saturation of national grief that Diana’s death generated. However, it clearly legitimated, from government, a kind of semi-official national state of mourning. For those who remember her death and funeral, the astonishing placing of millions of flowers, bouquets, and wreaths in public spaces in the days and weeks after her death (echoed by the flowers from the lined streets thrown across her hearse on the long slow drive from London to Northamptonshire), Blair’s speech legitimated a new form of national grief. It was also evidence of his acute sense of the national mood beyond the chattering classes’ and left’s general lack of interest in or sympathy for Diana in life. And this is the key to Blair’s 286 words. He says ‘country’ once, ‘this country today’, ‘Britain’ three times, ‘nation’ once, ‘a nation in a state of shock’, ‘the people’ three times, ‘we/our’ nine times, ‘they’ (i.e. the British and everyone) four times – and all these ‘signifieds’ are associated with her, named or named

pronominally, fifteen times. There is, therefore, a large discursive association of the country, us, with her. In this way, Blair in part transformed her violent death, and gave voice to her death as a national event. In so doing, Blair ‘invents’ this nation in his speech, and rhetorically ‘invents’, as it were, the ‘People’s Princess’.

At the end of the speech Blair partly lowers his head after saying ‘in our hearts and in our memories forever’ signalling the end of the speech, as if bowing to pray (in the actual speech delivered he says two lines more, but the BBC clip has become the kind of ‘official’ speech).

2). François Mitterrand. Campaign Poster for the 1988 Presidential Elections.

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The above was François Mitterrand’s main campaign poster the 1988 presidential elections. It was part his successful bid for second seven-year term, and before and during this campaign Mitterrand had become extremely popular, with a ‘Father of the Nation’

image (which was projected on to the public as ‘Génération Mitterrand’, thus including it in the relationship). In order to grasp the significance of

this poster, let us make a series of points in the form of questions. First, what is he looking at? Most people would say at France or the future or the future of France or 'La France Unie'.²⁰ This is an immediate indication that political images have a 'grammar' understood by the designers but also by the public. And yet, the real answer is that we do not know. And that also is a clue: he is looking at something (France, the future) we cannot see. And we can add that we understand the 'grammar' of the iconographic because we think what we think (about him) partly because he is turned away but partly quite simply because there is a light shining upon his face; Western (and specifically French) culture 'recognises' that light upon the face of the 'gazer' is religious in origin – the light of grace or otherworldliness. A good contrast to this, moreover, would be UK or US political posters – only very rarely would such an angle be used. In fact, Anglo-Saxon posters are much more likely to have a full face, smiling 'honest' friendliness. In France, the fact that the subject is contemplating – looking away from us – is complimentary to his image. In the UK, such a gaze would be seen as suspect, suggesting almost the delusions of a Mussolini.²¹ But in France, the political contender can also be a philosopher, a thinker, and one therefore capable of contemplating something we literally cannot see. This is, in fact, the essence of French leadership: the leader who can 'envision': so we have here a glimpse of him envisioning, not us, but 'la belle France' or some such (something we ourselves would like to envision).

What of the angle of the photo itself? No matter where the viewer places him/herself, he/she is 'below' the subject looking up. The figure is benign – contemplating, almost the beginnings of a smile, a knowing gaze, and the perhaps reassuring 'crow's feet' wrinkles around the eyes – portraying the wisdom of age. In fact, the crow's feet give us another clue: we are not only below the subject but very close to it (one is still photographically close even if far away – and many of these posters were billboard size). This raises a further question, that of 'intimacy'. How close does one need to be to another person before they see crow's feet? As close as a lover? Or perhaps a child? So a certain physical intimacy between viewer and viewed is present, is imagined. The angle or view therefore becomes that of a child 'looking up' to a kind figure of authority like a father or grandfather. The wise kind human features also, however, suggest their opposite (political iconography often mediates opposites or contrasts: attractiveness/wisdom, kind/austere, etc), namely, something statuesque about the pose. The features are chiselled, and not only by the light. The 'looking up' is therefore transformed into as if looking up at a statue – in fact, were one to push the nose slightly to profile we would have the profile of an emperor, as on a Roman coin. So

we have a blend of wisdom and kindness, imperium and intimacy, reverence and subservience from us, all linked to the envisioning gaze of the intellectual ‘hero’. This is a million miles from say UK political culture, yet a perfect expression of the chivalric myths underpinning the presidentialism of de Gaulle’s – here Mitterrand’s – Fifth Republic.

3). François Hollande. His First Year in Office



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François Hollande’s presidential persona should be seen in the context of the points we have made about François Mitterrand. Hollande gained the presidency in 2012 as the first Socialist Party President since the end of Mitterrand’s presidency in 1995. Between then and 2012, the right had won three presidential elections, two by Jacques Chirac (1995-2007) and one by Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012). All of Hollande’s predecessors, de Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard d’Estaing, Mitterrand, Chirac, and Sarkozy had been very well known to the public before they became President, and each in their own way responded to the exigencies of the Fifth Republic presidency i.e. by entering into versions of the ‘self’/France relationship outlined earlier. Sarkozy had somewhat abused this balance by pushing the relationship between ‘self’ and France/the French to the point of a kind of ‘disenchantment’ of the presidency. He seemed too active, too involved with his relationship to the public (thanks in part to the emergence in the 2000s of the ‘peoplisation’ of politics), and too little involved in the ‘higher’ relationship of self to ‘France’: too much like an overactive Prime Minister and too little like a President. Moreover, the move (voted in 2000) from the seven to the five year term has dramatically altered the ‘presence’ of the President. It was designed simply to align the presidential and legislative terms, but it has meant that the President is expected to be ever present, and ever-performing. This in turn has major effects upon the symbolism of the presidency, in part

reducing it but, more importantly and worryingly, making the two sides – the political and the symbolic – interface with one another on an almost daily basis. Hollande’s response (successful for the duration of an anti-Sarkozy election campaign) was to adopt a persona, ‘Mr Normal’ that was the negation of Sarkozy’s persona. Sarkozy’s persona was indeed a near-abuse of the role of presidential self; Hollande’s persona a rejection of this, but implicitly it was also a rejection of the presidential ‘model’ of the Fifth Republic. When we say ‘model’ we simply mean by this that there is something chivalric about the French presidency. Because of de Gaulle’s very romantic world view, the President is a knight, come to rescue ‘France’, and display devotion to ‘her’, and so on. To trivialise this is to undermine one of the presidency’s strengths. Hollande entered the presidency without a presidential self, and within a few months had become the most unpopular – and most rapidly unpopular – President of the Fifth Republic. Let us now look at his first year in office. We shall see that the dramatic effects of the string of mishaps were the result of a fundamental failure to understand the symbolic exigencies of the Fifth Republic, in particular the need for ‘character’, which Hollande had replaced with a series of claims to moral exemplarity, but which would very rapidly become a new persona, created by circumstances: indecisive, blustering, incompetent, unreliable, and very ‘ordinary’, a person inadequate to the office.

On the day of François Hollande’s inauguration as the seventh President of the French Fifth Republic, 15 May 2012, it poured with rain all day long. Inexplicably, no one offered him a raincoat or the protection of an umbrella. He spent the day’s ceremony drenched to the bone, his glasses steamed up, his sopping wet suit and shirt flattened against him. It was a sign. It seemed to rain forever after.

Less than three months into his five year term, François Hollande was close to becoming a lame-duck, if not a dead-duck President. He still carried the legitimacy of direct election, but very little authority. By the time of the 8 May 2013 commemorations of the Allied victory of 1945, Hollande was there, of course, as was his government, the military, and the veterans, but the Champs Élysées were deserted. The year before – to show how near to the people he was, and as he had throughout his election campaign – he went walkabout into the crowds, shaking hands and kissing babies. Now, there was no one to shake hands with, no women to ‘faire le bisou’ with, and no babies to kiss. There weren’t even any Japanese tourists. How did this happen?

It is not as if he had no political power base. François Hollande, the Socialist Party's candidate, was elected President in May 2012, ousting the deeply unpopular President Nicolas Sarkozy. Hollande saw himself as a kind of antithesis of Sarkozy, a 'Mr Normal' to Sarkozy's 'Mr Bling'. The Socialist left had never been so strong politically. Upon his election, the National Assembly was dissolved, and in the June 2012 parliamentary elections, with its Radical Left allies, the Socialists won an outright majority. They therefore controlled the presidency, the government, both houses of parliament, the regions, and all the big towns and cities. Neither the right nor the left had ever held such power. Hollande held in his hands a royal flush no one had ever dreamed of, and he could have done whatever he wanted. And yet in his first twenty four months in office, President Hollande and his government did virtually nothing while everything got worse and worse. Why? There were lots of things they could and should have done, and lots of other things they would much better have avoided doing. Why such potential power to change France forever and yet such impotence to do anything at all; why such inaction, such mis-management, and above all such bad leadership? That is the lesson, the question raised by Hollande's catastrophic first two years.

Part of the problem was that the party had no ideas; no strategy, no vision, no policies holding the party together and moving it forward. For the previous ten years, at the national level, the party was just an irrelevance, going nowhere, its leaders fighting with one another like cats in a bag. Just as importantly, the party had theorised nothing; not the economy, not society, nor the regime itself, and certainly not the presidency they coveted, nor what a strange multi-faceted institution it was. They had had ten years and more to rethink it and themselves, and French society, and the regime, yet they did nothing to prepare for power. Hollande's successful election campaign in 2012 was based quite simply upon exploiting the quite visceral public dislike of the hyperactive, inconsistent, and noisy Nicolas Sarkozy. Hollande presented himself in all things the antithesis of Sarkozy: modest not bling, moral not immoral, uninterested in money, simple and 'normal', as opposed to part of the celebrity culture and one of the beautiful people; calm not prone to hyperventilating with rage, exemplary and attentive to people, unlike the incumbent, who had been interested only in banquets and yachts. Whether or not Hollande believed this myth, made of partial truths and many misperceptions – for such differences are stylistic, and politics – and people – are more complicated than such Manichean notions suggest, as Hollande would soon learn – the result was that he had given no thought to how to 'inhabit' this strange office, and how to be the things he claimed he was. And the fundamental problem with his holier-than-

thou approach is that it actually enhanced the main feature of the French Republic that Hollande was trying to ‘tame’, namely, its emphasis upon the personal and upon character: what Hollande did by putting a searchlight upon Sarkozy’s fault, was to walk into the Elysée Palace with every searchlight trained upon him; upon him and his claim to exemplary moral status, and modesty, as well as upon the idea that these qualities alone would deliver France from its growing sense of economic and social turmoil.

After his election, he appointed his government. As a gesture, everyone including the President took a salary cut. There were a lot of them to do so, 38 ministers in all. There was also gender parity, a first in French politics. It was as if the new, exemplary President would now transform the unjust regime into an Exemplary Republic. And at several international meetings in quick succession immediately following his inauguration, he seemed relatively at ease and capable. Two anecdotes are worth recording here, however, and involve his meeting with Angela Merkel, followed by one in the US with Obama. Each tells us about how things would develop. The meeting with Merkel was frosty, and relations with Germany deteriorated for months to come; but for our purposes, what is crucial is that Hollande was already using his presidential ‘self’ as the embodiment of France, not ‘giving in’ to austere and exacting Germany. His public ‘friendly tension’ with Merkel, as he called it, saw the personalised use of hostility to prevailing European policy, tinged with a slight virility issue – Hollande, the man imposing himself upon Merkel, the woman. This was a serious personalised miscalculation which by the end of the year had escalated into wild attacks by Hollande’s own party upon Germany as the cause of Europe’s ills, and upon the ‘selfish intransigence’ of Merkel herself (and in the end, Hollande signed the agreement he had said he would change, without a comma having been altered). In the US, with Obama, there was no frostiness (even though Hollande had come to tell Obama he was withdrawing all French troops from Afghanistan). What did strike observers though was related to image. Next to the gazelle-like nonchalant elegance of his smiling American counterpart, in his open-necked shirt, Hollande seemed like an uncomfortable insurance salesman. ‘Normal’ next to ‘presidential’ was never more stark.

Throughout the summer of 2012, the sense of growing crisis was palpable – Peugeot-Citroën inconveniently announced 8,000 redundancies; unemployment was going through the roof (in the first year unemployment rose relentlessly to over 10%). Hollande’s first response as the new captain of the ship now heading directly into the hurricane

was... to go on holiday. National disbelief was now palpable too, and the incredulity never stopped growing. If Hollande had stayed in Paris working with a small team around him, while others – and the French themselves – took their holiday (with an ‘I’ll come down for a long weekend’ to his partner, Valérie Trierweiler), Hollande’s presidency would have started in a fundamentally different way. Indeed, the symbolism of staying behind at the office to sort out France’s crisis problems would have made a profound statement about Hollande’s desire to find new solutions for France’s old problems, and would have been a real display of ‘character’. He did do this the following year, but it was too late; but by 2013 his popularity ratings had fallen to circa 20% and would not move.

The reasoning was that he wanted to demarcate himself from his hyperactive predecessor, so he made no move at all – twiddling his thumbs – or, rather, swimming, and strolling around in his chinos in Brégançon - while Paris and unemployment, as it were, burned. The obsession with being and doing everything that Sarkozy was not made Hollande oblivious to the actual situation the country was in. This mistake of defining himself in relation to his predecessor rather than to an ‘imagined’ and imaginable ‘François Hollande, President of the Republic’ stemmed from a more fundamental mistake or failing, namely, an incomprehension of the subtle norms and exigencies of the office he held; in a word, he and the people around him did not understand the republic they were in charge of. This not understanding the republic and its presidency explained every dreadful mistake Hollande made. The result was that he was the architect of his own misfortunes. By September 2012, Hollande’s popularity was already below 50%, and the new government had barely started. It then went into free-fall.

Hollande had fought the election campaign claiming he would be a Normal and Simple President, like a Prime Minister in fact, which is not what the French presidency is (although it is, in all but name, that too). The presidency is a major site of ambivalences, and is in a complex relationship to the French and their problems, anxieties, desires, and reflections. There is a psychic dimension to the French presidency and its relationship to the French. And there is an element of narcissism, in its clinical sense, in the French and their desire for a President (when everyone else gets on with having a P.M. or a Chancellor for the political life) as both their political leader and their Head of State. The President embodies metaphorically, indeed almost literally, the French state itself. It was not just that unemployment was going up. It was also about what the relationship of the President was to the country. It was not just his

policy intentions that mattered, but his emotional relationship to the people his policies affected. It was not just about displaying competence but about gaining public confidence. The emotional subtlety of the office means that a strongly ethical dimension to the persona of the President was inevitable. This can hook on to, as it were, issues such as a devotion to France, or republican integrity, or modernisation, or confronting injustice or righting wrongs. However, to state this claim to ethics overtly is a fundamental mistake with enormous ramifications. Hollande's constant stress upon his greater moral status than Nicolas Sarkozy and upon the idea that he would bring integrity through his own comportment and that of the people around him was to expose him to constant scrutiny – and lampoon – almost from the moment he took office. The searchlights would seek out not just the simple and normal persona and its variants, but every ethical implication of every action. It also meant that every move he made – or did not make – would be as if driven by 'justice' rather than efficiency, by the righteousness of the new Good King, rather than because it actually worked. 'Normal' and 'Simple' were bound to descend very quickly into farce; Hollande's claims to virtue would, if undermined, turn farce into tragedy. Every personal characteristic, trait and failing, especially anything to do with personal morality and ethical comportment – anything that suggested he was 'just like all the others', or hypocritical - would be exposed to scrutiny. Every move he made would be subject to moral appraisal. He had said there would be no more corruption, no more bling, no more scandals, no more headlines in the *Hello Magazine* press. There were to follow two years of nothing else. Three moments in the first year stand out.

The first was the bizarre and headline-attracting comportment of his partner, Valérie Trierweiler. She soon put paid to the no more headlines issue. First, her barely concealed feud with Hollande's former partner and presidential candidate, Ségolène Royal, became a national talking point in June 2012 when she tweeted – i.e. told the whole of France – her support for Royal's rival in the legislative elections (and Royal lost...). Also, as a journalist (for *Paris Match*), she said she did not want to be a 'potiche' (a trophy) First Lady. But then she kind of did. Her uncertainty betrayed a self-centred caprice, in an ingenuous relationship with both the office and the media (a slight echo of Princess Diana's relationship). She also, indeed, appeared to have a temper.

Polls saw Trierweiler, the 'First Girlfriend', disowned by the French with a 67% disapproval rate. Hollande was caught on camera on one of his walkabouts being told by a very ordinary local woman not to marry her, and that the French did not like her. Trierweiler remained in the headlines

throughout the first two years until February 2014 when – because of the ‘Closergate’ affair, she became the only headline, with Hollande’s presidency now resembling an episode of ‘Dallas’.²²

The second ‘moral’ hostage to fortune was the myriad of little lifestyle changes Hollande and his entourage undertook to (ostentatiously) remove ostentation from the presidential function: he would take trains instead of taking jets. In reality, his taking trains - usually accompanied by Valérie – became media events (and the couple never seemed to have any luggage); and he might take the train there and the jet back (which had to fly there to get him), or else take the official limousine back, which early on was clocked at 110 miles-an-hour on the A1 motorway. Hollande told his ministers off for taking private jets to get about, and then used them himself. He would live simply, except that Valérie spent a fortune (paid for by the state?) on cushions and such and their transportation to their summer holiday residence in 2012. It no longer mattered whether half these things were true; the damage was done because of the earlier claims to moral rectitude. Any pol.com advisor should have told him, if you want to win you can use the moral card; if you then want to effectively govern or preside, you had better not. The fall in Hollande’s popularity was vertiginous. In January 2013, a successful military operation and the freeing of a family held hostage in Nigeria barely made a blip on his popularity ratings. By this time, a qualitative decline in not just Hollande’s popularity but his credibility had taken place. He had said he would, throughout his mandate, stay in touch with the people through provincial tours and visits, for example to his adopted Corrèze. Hostility or even worse, indifference, met him everywhere. By the Spring of 2013, the provincial visits had become yet another PR disaster. And when it seemed it could not get any worse, the third scandal, the Cahuzac affair, was of nuclear proportions.

The Jerome Cahuzac affair was the catalyst for an avalanche of crises engulfing the government in the early months of 2013. It started off as a relatively ‘discrete’ issue, involving only one man, albeit a Government Minister: did Jerome Cahuzac, the Budget Minister, have a secret overseas bank account, and if he did, he would have to resign (he said he didn’t have one). But the shockwaves from his resignation on 19 March (yes he did have a secret Swiss bank account, and admitted as much) seemed never-ending to the point where not just the government but the regime itself appeared in danger of going into a tailspin. What is astonishing is that this was not foreseen – not the Swiss bank account, which many insiders were clearly aware of – but the fall-out. The reason why the fall-out was not foreseen is the same reason why Hollande and

his team got into such a mess: they did not understand the nature of the Republic they so extolled, nor the symbolism of leadership in it. The Cahuzac affair was a personal tragedy for Cahuzac and a sad comment about politics (he was a tax fiddler whose job it was to – with due and righteous indignation - chase tax fiddlers). But, politically, it is Hollande who was the real victim. It was not Hollande's own integrity which was being pilloried at this point but his incompetence. If he knew the truth about his Budget Minister he looked bad; if he didn't know, he looked equally bad; as if he were the last to work out what was going on. The press compared the hapless Hollande to Mitterrand, the master Machiavellian: none of his ministers would have dared lie to him. Hollande's earlier campaign association with Mitterrand, to the point of quite literally impersonating him – e.g. in his Le Bourget speech – now made him look pathetic, and their righteousness of Hollande's comments following Cahuzac's disgrace, even more so.

Hollande reacted falteringly to the Cahuzac scandal, promising major changes (most of the measures actually existed) including making all government ministers declare their fortunes and tax arrangements. The ones with little fortune declared immediately (although in some cases declaring the value of their homes when they had bought them rather than their current value immediately gave the whole procedure an air of suspicion). No one seemed to have a car (all used ministerial cars). No one invested in the dynamic economy. Property (or properties) was the main source of wealth. And there were eight millionaires in the government! The combination of voyeurism and the perception of large fortunes made the situation even more farcical, and the President did not declare his own fortune... One of the little-remarked upon features of this affair was that Hollande made the situation worse by his own self-dramatization. He had by this time lost all reputation through his inaction; now, by being so solemn and self-righteous in his pronouncements, upon something he should have ensured did not happen in the first place and for which he had been elected to make not happen, made him look like a ham actor rather than a President.

In a poll in early May 2013, it appeared that if a presidential election were to take place, Hollande would not even make it through to the second round. 7 in 10 of those polled in April already thought Hollande as President was a disaster. By the end of the month, 8 in 10 were in favour of a new government of national unity. The public were clearly very angry, and what was worse, utterly disillusioned with politics. When a population – particularly one in the middle of a crisis like France was going through, with unemployment over 10% and hundreds of firms

closing every week – believes that all politicians are corrupt ('tous pourris' or incompetent), this helps the extremes, in particular the extreme-right who stood to gain from this growing sense of economic, political, and now moral turmoil.

The fragility and complexity of French politics was exposed by this scandal. Much of the stability is based upon the intricate and interactive relationship between the French and their President. François Hollande seemed after year one to have completely lost the French along the line (and they weren't expecting that much in the first place, but they certainly weren't expecting what they got). And the republic was not more simple, normal, or moral than it was before. In mid-May 2013 a staggering 75% of those polled actually said nothing had improved from a year ago. Part of the disillusion stemmed from three issues – two things he did not do, and one he did: he did not make it clear how difficult the economic and social trials were going to be; he did not make it clear how deep the cuts in spending would be; but what he did do was he told the French that ethically, his rule was going to be a new dawn. In fact, it turned rather into something of a nightmare. The negative impact of these three issues made him appear dishonest as well as aimless. In all polls, the French overwhelmingly did not know where the government was going, or where the President even wanted to go; worse, no one believed a word he said anymore. In the autumn of 2012 he gave a TV interview to *France 2*, and later a press conference. He made a robust New Year's message at the end of 2012, watched by millions. 75% of viewers didn't believe a word of it. It was the same for his long TV interview of March 2013 on *Fr2*., then his interview to AFP at the end of April followed by a further press conference, end of year wishes, and another press conference in January 2014 (as the Closergate scandal broke). After every public intervention his ratings fell, so that every appearance, every performance, became a moment in his decline in popularity. One had the impression that even if people were listening, they did so with a profound scepticism and in the vain hope that they might just catch something positive; this was the case briefly for the 'Responsibility Pact' he announced in his January 2014 press conference, but within weeks this too had run into the ground dragging his popularity down further.

No President of the Fifth Republic had become so unpopular, so fast. No other had shown how complex is the architecture of French political leadership.

4). Ed Miliband. Leadership and Authorship in Opposition

In this



section, we are concerned with how Ed Miliband attempted to shift the ideational and discursive parameters of the UK Labour Party and then become, through a particular rhetoric and image, the spokesperson for, then the author of, the party's 'new' discourse. Our analysis here is based upon two pieces of research.²³ The first took all the main party texts after the defeat at the general election in 2010. We identified major texts, approximately a dozen of them; in fact, one of them predated the election defeat which offers a clue to what they were all doing. The debates, colloquia, articles, booklets, books, and radio programmes, were essentially an ideological revision in the form of a Policy Review. The texts pre-dating the election point to the idea of an origin, a founding moment (of the search for truth) before the disastrous 2012 election (arguably the worst defeat in Labour's history). The texts indeed follow the structure of a narrative. There is a beginning, as we have said, then catastrophe (the election), then the search for truth through various texts and from various sources as the 'story' tries to identify the wrong paths taken (1979-2010) (at one point, with Blue Labour, even 1945 is a wrong road), and highlight the right road, namely an earlier (utopian?) time when communities thrived (1930s socialism) and the left knew its purpose. This then becomes the application of this ethos to now (One Nation) and policy elaboration in the future. Thus the party created a new discursive, narrative 'arc' from circa 2010 to ... 2015 (and hopeful triumph and the victory of the good). By applying narrative theory to the party political texts emerging within the UK Labour Party after 2010, which make up the corpus of One Nation discourse, we can grasp the underlying significance of this ideational revision of Labour Party and leftist thought thus:

	07/2009	05/2010	09/2010	11/2010-05/2012	03/2011-	07/2011-09/2011	05/2012-	10/2012	01/2013	05/2013	2013-2014	2015
S T O R Y	Open Left. Thinkers and activists, Rutherford et al. Planning The Oxford London Seminars.	General Election. Labour loses power. Fall of Gordon Brown.	Ed Miliband elected as Labour Party leader.	Policy Review Mark I. <i>New politics. Fresh ideas.</i> <i>Refounding Labour.</i> <i>A better future for Britain.</i>	BBC Radio 4 Analysis programme 'Blue Labour'.	<i>The Labour tradition and the politics of paradox.</i> <i>The Purple Book.</i>	Policy Review Mark II. Gradual rejection of New Labour.	Labour Party Annual Conference. Ed Miliband's 'One Nation' speech. IPPR: <i>The Relational State</i> (11/2012).	<i>One Nation Labour – debating the future.</i>	BBC Radio 4 Analysis programme 'Labour's New New Jerusalem'. Rejection of 1945 settlement.	Policy elaboration. IPPR: The Condition of Britain. Policy Review moving to policies.	General Election. Labour government. Ed Miliband prime minister.
P L O T	Small band of 'seers'. Cassandras gathering.	Calamity. Catastrophe. Disequilibrium. Disharmony.	New leader gives instruction. Quest for (new) truth.	To go back down to the people (false starts) (Byrne). To return with answers (mistaken). Thinkers continue to reflect.	To listen to another forgotten voice/truth to 'imagine' a perfect past/future (Glasman).	Other thinkers. Gathering. Reflection. Enrichment. Other voices (Graf, Sandel, Blond, etc, (Wood)).	New knight/philosopher (Cruddas). Rejection of those who took the wrong path. Promise. Narrative evolving.	Leader captures the narrative, makes it his own, fills it with emotion and hope. Inspires his following. Tells his story.	All bear witness to the leader's inspiration. One Nation becomes the party's narrative. Cruddas' rhetoric. Call to arms. Rally forming. Inspiration.	Depiction of new world built from re-connecting to old mysteries, forgotten truths. The past offers hope.	Sharpening of weapons, gathering for the great battle. Inspirational rhetoric to rally the troops.	Triumph. Harmony. Happiness. Equilibrium.

(Gaffney & Lahel, 2013b).

Through an identification and analysis of the sequence of texts and their constitution as a 'story' that interpolates an underlying 'plot', we can see how a revision of Labour's 'tale' offered to leadership a new party discourse appropriate to it, mediating – if not reconciling – the problematic duality of narrative authorship by both party and leader.

Into this developing 'narrative arc' the leader enters – in particular at the Manchester party conference of 2012. At this conference, through his speech, the leader, Ed Miliband, becomes the author (and hero) of the narrative itself. Two aspects of the Miliband's appropriation of the One Nation discourse, over and above his adapting and giving voice to its ideas (as if they were indeed his own ideas), impose themselves. The first is that his adopting One Nation as a moral code is the result of a very personal narrative. In the Manchester speech, Miliband talked at length about his childhood and the moral, political, and personal experiences that shaped him. In this way, through affect and morality, the child is the father of the man, the child's experience the father of the man's narrative. The second is that in the Manchester speech a great deal of emotion irrigates the appropriation of the One Nation narrative. There is humour which is also part of the presentation of the character, but the most

significant feature is the projection of emotion such as his references to the Milibands' family friend, Ruth First, assassinated by the South African police.²⁴

From our analysis we can see the role of rhetoric, persona and celebrity, and the effects of performance on the political process. Our analysis identified how, through performance of 'himself' and the beginnings of the deployment of an alternative party narrative centred on 'One Nation', Ed Miliband began to revise his 'received persona'. By using a range of rhetorical and other techniques, Miliband began to adapt the Labour narrative to what we have termed the 'personalized political'.

By 2014, the Labour Party began to bring forward policies for 2015 (not a moment too soon). The time for Policy Reviews, which really were a synopsis of contemporary social theory and philosophical reachings back for inspiration, and not of policy, then went into partial eclipse; it has served its narrative purpose. Miliband (and his new cabinet reshuffled in Autumn 2013) began talking real bread-and-butter issues, the 'cost of living crisis': a price freeze on energy bills, a levy on the payday loans industry to pay for local credit unions, joined-up healthcare, Rachel Reeves being tough on benefits, tough on the causes of benefits. For the next six months Labour continued filling its market stall of policies before the general election, each policy being announced by the leader or people close to him.

Miliband was seen to ruffle a few feathers in the process, especially by pledging to freeze energy prices for the first two years of a Labour Government. It is not worth repeating the arguments against the move. Safe to say, however, that the policy is most likely unworkable; even Miliband admitted he could not control fluctuating global oil and gas prices. But to criticise the policy for this reason alone was fundamentally misguided. Polls showed the energy freeze was popular. Polls also showed that it was considered probably unworkable. How could both of these ideas be held as being true?

What was missing from analysis, by supporters and 'Milibashers' alike, was that the measures Miliband announced were not designed to be technocratic responses to the rising cost of living. Instead, they marked the creation of a narrative of leadership in the Labour Party. Miliband had spent the last three years having his credibility as a future Prime Minister questioned. By personalizing party discourse, he began mounting a challenge to this narrative.

This revamped narrative depicted a strong leader who was not afraid of overruling predatory markets to get fair outcomes for struggling and marginalised groups. The narrative was a direct appeal to emotions by the leader of the left, and this made it almost populist, no doubt. Populism – the rhetoric of popular appeal, at least, particularly when it is personalised – is an effective discursive strategy, especially when the Opposition was setting the agenda in order to focus on the everyday, human impact of the coalition’s economic policy.

We can see then how the measures contributed to the cultivation of an understanding of Miliband’s character in the public’s imagination. He built policy not just on calculations of cost and benefit, but also on how policies would fundamentally reflect his own moral values. Miliband positioned himself as friend of those who could not make ends meet, a loving son defending his father’s memory,²⁵ a bulwark against vested interests, and the ethical leader prepared to stand up to the likes of Rupert Murdoch, or against a rash military attack upon the Syrian regime, and so on. Labour’s emerging policies were to make Miliband the tribune of Labour’s anticipated constituencies. As the policies emerged, ‘joined up’, over the coming months, on housing, on healthcare, on families, on community, they had strong emotional appeal, for him and his team to – literally – give voice to them.

It was not just the policies he and his team were now beginning to deploy, but Miliband himself and the character he was trying to portray which was important, Miliband’s *personal* vision of society before 2015, in a Britain that was fair, local, secure and respectful. Through this rhetoric of the ‘personalised political’, the strategy allowed the public to ‘see’, as it were, One Nation Britain.

Conclusion

We can draw conclusions relevant to the development of the overall Bennister et al project by contrasting some of the elements related to leadership performance. Before doing this, we can make a few specific observations. First, the role of character in the political process is part of the political process, and in particular moments it almost is the political process itself. Second, and relatedly, a moral dimension has become a part of leadership performance, although it is a highly unstable or unpredictable political resource. Not to refer to it and the leader appears without depth; overuse or over referencing as in the case of François Hollande, and the topic can become very disadvantageous, as any failing or inappropriateness can trigger the charge of hypocrisy. Third, emotions on a range from humour to deep sadness are now mainstream elements

within political discourse, in part because of the heightened focus upon the personal and therefore upon the personality of the leader, but also because of the personalising of the political itself (e.g. Miliband's credentials being marked out personally); so the political becomes personalised and the personal politicized. In turn, this focus means that personality is in a dynamic relation to policy and policy elaboration, sometimes almost replacing these, sometimes becoming the vehicle of their presentation, such as Miliband's announcing an energy price freeze at the 2013 Labour Party Conference. Fourth, not simply because politics is largely a male affair through force of numbers but because of the myths underpinning political systems, in particular myths about male courage, vigour, potency, action etc, leadership performance is in a relationship to what is perceived as 'male' – not necessarily 'masculine' in a traditional virile way – but leaders need to negotiate this role which appears to be one made for a male, preferably an alpha-male. This also means that the leader's relationship to women and to ideas about women will become more than significant in the projection of leadership persona (in our examples, this is particularly true of Blair, of course, and Hollande, but also of Mitterrand in terms of his patriarchal pose). Finally, we can say that the different institutions play a part but do not always function in the way they are designed. The relative presidentialisation of the UK premiership can be noted, as can the more prime ministerial style of François Hollande. What really distinguishes the two countries is the culture that underpins the institutions. As regards the personalisation of politics, because of a long tradition of allegiance or recourse to the 'providential man', France is very receptive to if not indeed dependent upon it. Leaders may 'envision' because the French believe there are such men. In the UK too, personalisation has become part of the fabric but it is of a different type, more akin to the projection of a competent, affable, 'regular guy' image, although not exclusive of more grandiose claims, depending upon the occasion.

If we turn now to contrasting our subjects, the contrast between Mitterrand and Hollande demonstrates that a kind of presidential grandeur is not given but has to be 'performed'. The 'real' innovation of the Fifth Republic was to bring 'self' centre stage, much more so than before or elsewhere. What becomes of self, however, depends upon a series of things including and especially leadership performance.

One of the consequences of the French system as opposed to the UK is that leaders can 'own' discourse and rhetoric more easily. By creating changes within the French Socialist narrative (essentially by heightening Millenarianism), Mitterrand was able to create a leftist rally discourse

around himself, and harness it to an idea of a movement that carried him and the left to power.²⁶ This was so successful that after gaining power, by the mid-1980s Socialist discourse was whatever he happened to be saying; he completely owned it, more or less until he left power in 1995. The effect upon French Socialism itself was to drain it of its narrative. One can argue that it never recovered from the experience, and even the evolution and development of a coherent social democratic discourse, better adapted to political conditions today, and which Hollande might have rhetorically profited from, has still not taken root (his claims to being a social democrat in his January 2014 press conference sounding almost childish is its lack of reflection).

In the UK, there is an opposite phenomenon. One of the striking features of the narrative evolution of the Labour Party after the 2010 defeat and the ‘fall’ of Gordon Brown, was how rich the textual production and creativity was. The Party saw the blossoming of a kind of community-based socialism reminiscent of 1930s socialism, adapted to the present, and given voice quite literally by Miliband himself. The difference between this and the French Socialist Party of the 1970s and 1980s was that the UK’s much more restricted use and tradition of personalisation meant that Miliband was much less able to ‘lift’ the narrative to a rally around himself. He faced strong criticism from the spokespeople of other narrative traditions such as the post-war left e.g. Roy Hattersley, the radical 1980s left represented by such figures as Billy Bragg, a more sober social-democratic left highly critical of Blue Labour (e.g. Polly Toynbee), and so on. More significantly still, the other ‘big beasts’ in the shadow cabinet like Ed Balls, Yvette Cooper, Andy Burnham, and others made no reference to Miliband’s putative One Nation rally discourse. The kind of personalist rally around Miliband was both ideologically (the UK left is very hesitant about such) and rhetorically limited, severely so when contrasted with the French case.

A further contrast that emerges from our study is that, acutely so in the French case, ‘performance’ politics is gendered. Interestingly, of the four leaders examined here, Tony Blair is the least implicated by this and yet arguably the most ‘attractive’. This perhaps reflects the culture of the period; and his own persona: unpretentious, talkative, modern, and, paradoxically, the occasion itself that implied no male dominance.²⁷ When he became Prime Minister he was seen as a young modern 40-something husband (a widely circulated picture of loving happiness of he and his wife showed them hugging and smiling on the steps on No. 10). He had small children, and in fact, he was the only Prime Minister in living memory whose wife conceived while in office (Cherie Blair’s later

allusions to their highly active sex life probably damaged this image rather than enhanced it). The overall image of Blair in 1997 created an ideal persona to represent a nation and a generation's grief when the iconic, young, beautiful (and female) Diana was killed.

For Mitterrand, the attractive male but now older sage-like image of the 1988 poster had as its gender context, the widespread unofficial knowledge of Mitterrand's many romantic conquests, even though married (in fact, it later emerged that he had two families and a 'secret' daughter, Mazarine). This sexual dimension to French leadership, until the 'DSK affair' of 2011 (and even then ...), has, unlike in the UK, always been seen as permissible, if not almost necessary. All French Presidents have been known for their amorous adventures, as it were (apart from the faithful, Catholic, and austere de Gaulle, although there were even rumours about him and a woman from the Comédie Française). In the case of Hollande, this backfired and seriously damaged his image at the start of his presidency because of the 'Valériegate' affaire.²⁸ There was no disapproval of his separation from his former partner Ségolène Royal (in fact, it was never clear who actually ended the relationship), and his new life with Valérie Trierweiler (although their not getting married when he became Head of State was viewed with public concern, particularly as regards (international) protocol – an aspect of life the French are obsessed by). But Trierweiler's outburst against Royal – in the form of tweeting support to her rival for a parliamentary seat in 2010 – gave the impression – he was relentlessly lampooned in cartoons and comedy shows – of a man utterly incapable of controlling 'his women' and at the mercy of female fury. The image, coupled with his own relative unattractiveness, severely undermined his image as a powerful leader. He seemed more like the henpecked husband of saucy seaside postcards. In fact, he seemed the antithesis now of the man who should have been 'king' but who fell from grace for the opposite reasons of Hollande's 'harmless' sexual image, Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Hollande's affair with Julie Gayet, revealed in January 2014, altered his image once again. And, in fact, his somewhat cold announcement of the end of his relationship with Trierweiler gained her sympathy, and he the image of a rather heartless man.

Ed Miliband, again, in part because of the culture, is much more in the tradition of Blair. In fact, he strove to adopt and even update that image with many publicity shots of him 'naturally' as a thoroughly modern dad. He lacked the 'sex appeal' of a Blair given his rather ordinary looks (caricatured as Wallace of Gromit fame), but also because of the more glamorous older brother David – the rightful heir, as it were – who he

beat in the 2010 party leadership contest. Ed Miliband's image was also affected by a somewhat 'nerdy' received public image.

We can see that the institutional configuration is crucial to an appraisal of leadership performance, and the difference between a presidential and a parliamentary regime is marked, for better and worse. The former lends itself more easily to the stress upon individual leadership. It is not, however, the institutions alone which drive performance, nor even the differences between the UK and France, but the culture. The expression upon Mitterrand's face as he gazes into the distance has a long pedigree in French political history.²⁹ And the institutional structure of the Fifth Republic encourages and legitimises this deep trait in French political culture, if not indeed in the French psyche. There are also, as we have seen, more minor cultural traits that inform leadership performance and image; the one we concentrated upon here was the question of the gendering of leadership, for French political culture is male in as much as it is chivalric: the state/France/republic – the latter two often seen as 'female' – face periods of crisis and danger. France is like a beautiful but vulnerable woman. Romantically, individuals arise whose destiny it is to overcome crisis and decadence with vigour and will. This is not, of course, the case in the UK where leadership is more diffuse (and the institutions much more solid). Here, however, leadership has often had the function of giving voice to a national sentiment, and acting as a spokesperson for that. Blair's Diana speech should be seen in that tradition.

One final point regarding the doctrinal/party provenance of the four case studies. Being on the left in Blair's case probably had an oblique effect. As Prime Minister, Blair was in a national rather than partisan role, and he represented a 'new' left, a modernising, centrist left, untied to leftist doctrine, nor to any hostility to or disapproval of the monarchy. He does, moreover, talk in a relatively casual way. This is to speculate, but a Conservative PM would probably have sounded more protocol-bound and official. Blair's down-to-earth sadness is the key to the speech's success.

In the case of Mitterrand, we can see the extent to which French Socialism had succumbed to personalisation. By the time of the 1988 election, French Socialism had become whatever Mitterrand said it was. He, indeed, incarnated it – much to the dismay of the party by this time, and much to the party's subsequent difficulties in developing as a doctrine. The current difficulties of the Hollande presidency are in part due to this.

As for the François Hollande case study, not only was socialism unready for power, it was also unready for presidentialism. Although the left had adapted to the personalisation of the regime, it did not really know what this meant (even though Mitterrand had shown them). Hollande's early attempts to domesticate the presidency and make it 'normal' were an early indication of the depth of the misunderstanding.

Miliband is our only case study of a left leader not in power, and in some ways is the most interesting from the point of view of the leader and the left. What we see with Miliband is a UK leader attempting to oversee the emergence of a new/old party narrative, and then take authorship of it, and move towards policy elaboration using his persona (personalisation, use of humour, emotion, and so on, as we have seen) and the new narrative as the rhetorical vehicle of policy presentation.

Notes

¹ 'Leadership Capital. Measuring the Dynamics of Leadership'. M. Bennister, P. t'Hart & B. Worthy. *Political Leadership and Statecraft in Challenging Times*. UEA, 17/1/2014.

² J. Macgregor Burns (1978) *Leadership*. New York: Harper Collins.

³ I first read the book 30 years ago. Rereading it, it is clear that transforming leadership is a minor concern of MacGregor Burns. Leadership in its many forms is his real subject.

⁴ MacGregor Burns does have a particular fascination with Mao Tse Tung who he does regard as a transformational leader. Also in his references to Bolivar, Ho Chi Minh, Castro *inter alia*, he has a particular belief in revolutionary leadership, and it needs to be said, in revolutions too, i.e. that they exist, which this author is much less certain of.

⁵ There is also a great irony in that MacGregor Burns pays great respect to the classic self-help book *How to Gain Friends and Influence People* by Dale Carnegie. There are, in fact, striking similarities between the two works.

⁶ The nearest MacGregor Burns gets to performance is his discussion of 'Activation' (p. 130) 'an initial act that stimulates a response'.

⁷ See Gaffney, J, 'The Dark Matter of Charisma: Lessons from the Nuremburg Rallies', *Berfrois*, 19 December 2012.

⁸ T.W. Adorno (1950) *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: John Wiley and Sons (1964).

⁹ March, J. G & Olsen, J. P. (1984) 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life'. *American Political Science Review*. Vol.78. No. 3. pp. 734 – 749.

¹⁰ A.R. Willner (1984) *Spellbinders: The Charismatic Political Leadership*, Willner: Yale University Press. This text has a very good (and positive discussion) of Weber's term. For sources critical of charisma, see the many articles on Weber in the *Journal of Classical Sociology* (London: Sage) and the *British Journal of Sociology* (Oxford: Blackwell).

¹¹ Parts of the text here are taken from J. Gaffney 'Performative Political Leadership' in P. t'Hart and R. Rhodes (eds) (2014) *The Oxford Companion to Political Leadership*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹² "Charisma" soll eine als ausseralltaglich (ursprunglich, sowohl bei Propheten wie bei therapeutischen wie bei Rechts-Weisen wie bei Jagdfuhren wie bei Kriegshelden: als magisch bedingt) geltende Qualitat einer Personlichkeit heissen, um derentwillen sie als mit ubernaturlichen oder ubermenschlichen oder mindestens spezifisch ausseralltaglichen, nicht jedem andern zuganglichen Kraften oder Eigenschaften oder als gottgesandt oder als vorbildlich und deshalb als "Fuhrer" gewertet wird. Wie die betreffende Qualitat von irgendeinem ethischen, sthetischen oder sonstigen Standpunkt aus "objektiv" richtig zu bewerten sein wurde, ist naturlich dabei begrifflich vollig gleichgultig: darauf allein, wie sie tatsachlich von charismatisch Beherrschten, den "Anhangern", bewertet wird, kommt es an. (M. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, vol. 1., Koln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1964, p.179).

¹³ I do not mean success in MacGregor Burns' terms but in terms, say, of gaining the audience's allegiance, inspiring them, getting them to agree, persuading them of his/her leadership quality, and so on.

¹⁴ See note 1 and J. Kane (2001) *The Politics of Moral Capital*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁵ I am, for the purposes of analysis, idealising somewhat one of the two protagonists of 1940-1945. It would be extremely difficult to overstate Hitler's wickedness; regarding Churchill, I am treating him here as the hero of the Battle of Britain and the Blitz (though this too can be contested, Calder, 1991; Knight, 2009). There is the question of his recklessness or questions concerning his moral rectitude in other areas e.g. support for 'Bomber Harris' tactics; or again the role of the Black and Tans in Ireland who, when under the authority of the then Home Secretary, Winston Churchill, among other things, blew this author's grandfather's house up.

¹⁶ Tony Blair, Prime Minister (31st August 1997). Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yX8nuyI9WJY>

I feel like everyone else in this country today -- utterly devastated. Our thoughts and prayers are with Princess Diana's family -- in particular her two sons, the two boys -- our hearts go out to them. We are today a nation, in Britain, in a state of shock, in mourning, in grief that is so deeply painful for us.

She was a wonderful and warm human being. Though her own life was often sadly touched by tragedy, she touched the lives of so many others in Britain -- throughout the world -- with joy and with comfort. How many times shall we remember her, in how many different ways, with the sick, the dying, with children, with the needy, when, with just a look or a gesture that spoke so much more than words, she would reveal to all of us the depth of her compassion and her humanity. How difficult things were for her from time to time, I'm sure we can only guess at -- but the people everywhere, not just here in Britain but everywhere, they kept faith with Princess Diana, they liked her, they loved her, they regarded her as one of the people. She was the people's princess and that's how she will stay, how she will remain in our hearts and in our memories forever.

¹⁷ In contrast to the Queen who did not comment publicly for several days. Blair may have saved the monarchy.

¹⁸ In another slightly longer version, we see the ('can we have your reaction') person and another, and Blair's wife and children pass behind him very briefly, as if at a funeral; so our mental image of them, as they walk quickly left to right behind him, is that they are going into the Churchyard or Church.

¹⁹ M. Bennister (2014) 'The Oratory of Tony Blair' in Hayton, R. and Crines, A. (eds) *Labour Oratory from Bevan to Brown*. Manchester University Press.

²⁰ Note that his name is small below *La France Unie* as if his real identity is not his name but his being *La France Unie*.

²¹ Ironically, the Le Pens, both father and daughter, use much more often the Anglo-Saxon full-on face

²² J. Gaffney (2014) 'Hollande and the French Kiss Goodbye to era of private presidential affairs', *New Statesman*. Available at: <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2014/01/hollande-and-french-kiss-goodbye-era-private-presidential-affairs>

See also, J. Gaffney, (2014). 'Sex and the King's Two Bodies: the French Presidency and the Hollande-Gayet Affair'. [Online]. Available at:

http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/professor-john-gaffney/francois-hollande-affair_b_4600434.html

²³ Gaffney, J. & Lahel, A. (2013a) 'Political performance and leadership persona: The UK Labour party conference of 2012'. *Government and Opposition*, 48, 4, 481-505, and Gaffney, J. & Lahel, A. 'The Morphology of the Labour Party's One Nation Narrative: Story, Plot and Authorship'. *The Political Quarterly*, (2013b) 84, 3, 330-341. Also distributed as part of a special collection of essays at the 2013 Labour Party Conference.

²⁵ In September and October 2013, the *Daily Mail* ran stories attacking the character of Miliband's father the Political Scientist, Ralph Miliband. The attacks were pathetic and the paper apologised.

²⁶ See J. Gaffney 'From the République Sociale to the République Française' in G. Raymond (ed) (1994) *France During the Socialist Years*, Aldershot: Dartmouth.

²⁷ A. Finlayson (2002) 'Elements of the Blairite image of Leadership'. *Parliamentary Affairs*. 55, 3, 586-99.

²⁸ See J. Gaffney 'The French First Lady has Found a Role for Herself: Making the President Look Stupid'. *Berfrois Magazine*, 4/7/2012. Available at: <http://www.berfrois.com/2012/07/john-gaffney-a-royal-incident/>

²⁹ J. Garrigues (2012), *Les Hommes providentiels*, Paris, Seuil.

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