

If you're wondering why you should buy this new edition of *Political Science*, here are ten good reasons!

1. New “Comparative” boxes in every chapter highlight similarities and differences among diverse political systems.
2. Chapter 3, “Political Ideologies,” analyzes ideological clashes over **healthcare and financial industry reforms** in the United States.
3. Chapter 4, “States,” covers the rise of **piracy on the Somali coast**.
4. Chapter 5, “Rights,” discusses the implications of the American Supreme Court’s ruling to allow **unlimited campaign contributions** from corporations.
5. Chapter 6, “Regimes,” debates the pros and cons of **U.S.-style democracy versus Chinese-style authoritarianism**.
6. Chapter 8, “Public Opinion,” looks at the financial bailouts across the world and the problems with **using public opinion to govern**.
7. Chapter 9, “Political Communication,” explores how **the digital media** is eating into the conventional media with uncertain political results.
8. Chapter 10, “Interest Groups,” covers the **epic lobbying wars** in the United States over healthcare and finance reforms.
9. Chapter 13, “Legislatures,” analyzes **Britain’s “hung parliament” of 2010** as an illustration of how the party system can undermine government stability and open the cabinet to a vote of no-confidence.
10. Chapter 18, “International Relations,” delves into **China’s economic rise**—and potential bubble.



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Political Science An Introduction

Twelfth Edition

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Political Culture



Activists of The National Confederation of Dalits (untouchables) rally for more economic aid from the Indian government. (Prakash Singh/AFP/Getty Images)

The Obama administration encountered a big problem with American political culture. It argued that healthcare reform was urgent and something most Americans wanted. But roughly half of Americans said they opposed the measure, and it barely squeaked through Congress in 2010. The Obama administration tried to make a rational case that the reforms were moderate and not too expensive, but it neglected a deep-seated part of American *political culture* (see page 11), namely, its visceral dislike of big government and high taxes. Europeans and Canadians, equipped with political cultures that have long accepted state supervision, including of medical plans, were perplexed at the U.S. debate. They were amazed that the United States, like any advanced democracy, did not have national healthcare. Political culture sets a country's norms and limits; it is not easily overridden.

WHAT IS POLITICAL CULTURE?

Each society imparts its norms and values to its people, who pick up distinct notions about how the political system is supposed to work and about what the government may do to them and for them. These beliefs, symbols, and values about the political system are the political culture of a nation—and it varies considerably from one nation to another.

The political culture of a nation is determined by its history, economy, religion, and folkways. Basic **values**, laid down early, may endure for centuries. Political culture is a sort of collective political memory. America was founded on the basis of “competitive individualism,” a spirit of hustle and looking out for oneself, which is still very much alive. The millennia-old Hindu emphasis on caste persists in

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

1. What is political culture?
2. How does political culture differ from public opinion?
3. How do Russia and Iraq exhibit problems of political culture?
4. Explain the three types of political culture found by Almond and Verba.
5. If Americans are participatory, why do they vote so little?
6. What happened to U.S. attitudes starting in the 1960s?
7. How do elite and mass political cultures differ?
8. Why do some cultures lead to economic growth?
9. How can you tell if a group forms a distinct subculture?
10. What are the most potent agents of political socialization?

values Deeply held views; key component of political culture.

present-day India despite government efforts to abolish it. The French, after centuries of *étatisme*, still expect a big state to supervise the economy. Iraq, for centuries part of Arab and Turkish empires, has known only autocracy, recently under the brutal Saddam Hussein. Democracy has no roots in Iraq's political culture.

As defined by political scientist Sidney Verba, political culture is "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values, which defines the situation in which political action takes place." Much of this goes far back. Americans always liked minimal government. In Japan, where the vestiges of a traditional feudal class system still exist, those who bow lower indicate they are of inferior status. The Japanese still tend to submit to the authority of those in office, even when they dislike their corruption and incompetence. Americans, who traditionally do not defer to anyone, consider it their democratic birthright to criticize the way the country is governed, even if they know little about the issues. In political culture, Japan and the United States are vastly different.

Political Culture and Public Opinion

Political culture and public opinion overlap, for both look at attitudes toward politics. Political culture looks for basic, general values on politics and government. Public opinion, on the other hand, looks for views about specific leaders and policies. Political culture looks for the underpinnings of legitimacy, the gut attitudes that sustain a political system, whereas public opinion seeks responses to current questions.

The methodologies of political culture and public opinion also overlap: Random samples of the population are asked questions, and the responses are correlated with subgroups in the population. The questions, however, are different. A political culture survey might ask how much you trust other people; a public opinion survey might ask if you think the president is doing a good job. A political culture study may ask the same questions in several countries to gain a comparative perspective. Both may want to keep track of responses over time to see, in the case of political culture, if legitimacy is gaining or declining or, in the case of public opinion, how a president's popular support changes.

Political culture studies often go beyond surveys, however. Some use the methods of anthropology and psychology in the close observation of daily life and in the deep questioning of individuals about their feelings. Public opinion studies rarely go beyond quantified data, whereas political culture studies can use history and literature to gain insights. For instance, the observations of nineteenth-century European visitors show continuity in American political and social values. Indeed, the brilliant observations of Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville, who traveled through the United States in the early 1830s, still generally apply today. Tocqueville was one of the founders of the political culture approach in political science.

It used to be assumed that political culture was nearly permanent or changed only slowly, whereas public opinion was fickle and changed quickly. Recent

studies, however, have shown that political culture is rather changeable, too. Periods of stable, efficient government and economic growth solidify feelings of legitimacy; periods of indecisive, chaotic government and economic downturn are reflected in weakening legitimacy. Public opinion, if held long enough, eventually turns into political culture. In the 1960s, public opinion on Vietnam showed declining support for the war. Over precisely the same time, confidence in the U.S. government also declined. Public opinion on a given question was infecting the general political culture, making it more **cynical** about the political system.

To be sure, a country's political culture changes more slowly than its public opinions, and certain underlying elements of political culture persist for generations, perhaps for centuries. The basic values Tocqueville found in America are largely unchanged. The French still take to the streets of Paris to protest perceived injustice, just as their ancestors did. Italians continue their centuries-old cynicism toward anything governmental. Russians, who have never experienced free democracy, still favor strong leaders and shrug off democracy. Although not as firm as bedrock, political culture is an underlying layer that can support—or fail to support—the rest of the political system. This is one reason Russia's attempt at democracy faded.

Participation in America

Even in America, not all citizens actively participate in politics. How, then, could Almond and Verba (see box on page 122) offer the United States as their model of a

cynical Untrusting and suspicious, especially of government.

KEY CONCEPTS ■ CIVIL SOCIETY

The concept of "civil society" is closely related to political culture. Hobbes used the term to indicate humans after becoming civilized; Hegel used it to designate associations bigger than the family but smaller than the state—churches, clubs, businesses, and so on. Edmund Burke called these the "little platoons of society" that form the basis of political life. They encourage cooperating with others, rule of law, restraint, and moderation—what Tocqueville called "habits of the heart." Without them, politics becomes a murderous grab for power.

With the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the concept attracted new interest to explain the growth of democracy—or the lack of it. The Communist regimes had attempted to stomp out civil society and control nearly everything. When a

totalitarian (see Chapter 6) regime collapses, it leaves a vacuum where there should be a civil society. Nothing works right; lawlessness sweeps the land. Americans supposed that, after Communism, Russia would quickly become like us, but Russia had no civil society and soon reverted to authoritarianism. Likewise, we supposed that, after Saddam Hussein, Iraq would become a stable democracy, but with little civil society Iraq degenerated into chaos.

A vibrant and developed civil society is the bedrock of democracy. Central Europe—especially Poland's strong Catholic Church, which always taught Poles to ignore communism—had some civil society and moved quickly to democracy. Without a civil society, democracy may not take root.

participatory Interest or willingness to take part in politics.

political competence Knowing how to accomplish something politically.

political efficacy Feeling that one has at least a little political input (opposite: feeling powerless).

“civic culture”? One of their key findings was that participation need only be “intermittent and potential.” In effect, they offer a “sleeping dogs” theory of democratic political culture. Leaders in a democracy know that most of the time most people pay little attention to politics. But they also know that if aroused—because of scandal, unemployment, inflation, or unpopular war—the public can vote them out of office at the next election. Accordingly, leaders usually work to keep the public passive

CLASSIC WORKS ■ THE CIVIC CULTURE

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba did the pioneering study of cross-national differences in political beliefs and values. The researchers interviewed some 1,000 people each in five countries in 1959 and 1960 to measure underlying political views. From the data, Almond and Verba discerned three general political cultures: participant, subject, and parochial. Every country, they emphasized, is a varied mixture of all three of these ideal types.

Participant

In a **participant** political culture, such as the United States and Britain, people understand that they are citizens and pay attention to politics. They are proud of their country’s political system and are willing to discuss it. They believe they can influence politics and claim they would organize a group to protest something unfair. Accordingly, they show a high degree of **political competence** and **political efficacy**. They say they take pride in voting and believe people should participate in politics. They are active in their communities and often belong to voluntary organizations. They are likely to trust other people and to recall participating in family discussions as children. A participant political culture is clearly the ideal soil to sustain a democracy.

Subject

Less democratic than the participant political culture is the **subject** political culture, predominant at that time in West Germany and Italy, in which people still understand that they are

citizens and pay attention to politics, but they do so more passively. They follow political news but are not proud of their country’s political system and feel little emotional commitment toward it. They are uncomfortable discussing politics and feel they can influence politics only to the extent of speaking with a local official. It does not ordinarily occur to them to organize a group. Their sense of political competence and efficacy is lower; some feel powerless. They say they vote, but many vote without enthusiasm. They are less likely to trust other people and to recall voicing their views as children. Democracy has more difficulty sinking roots in a culture where people are used to thinking of themselves as obedient subjects rather than as participants.

Parochial

Still less democratic is the **parochial** political culture, where many people do not much care that they are citizens of a nation, as in Mexico at the time of the survey. They identify with the immediate locality, hence the term *parochial* (of a parish). They take no pride in their country’s political system and expect little of it. They pay no attention to politics, have little knowledge of it, and seldom speak about it. They have neither the desire nor the ability to participate in politics. They have no sense of political competence or efficacy and feel powerless in the face of existing institutions. Attempting to grow a democracy in a parochial political culture is very difficult, requiring not only new institutions but also a new sense of citizenship.

and quiet. Following the **rule of anticipated reactions**, leaders in democracies constantly ask themselves how the public will likely react to their decisions. They are happy to have the public *not* react at all; they wish to let sleeping dogs lie.

This theory helps explain an embarrassing fact about U.S. political life, namely, its low voter **turnout**, the lowest of all the industrialized democracies. Until recently, only about half of U.S. voters cast ballots in presidential elections, although it is now somewhat higher. Even fewer vote in state and local contests. In Europe, voter turnout has been about three-quarters of the electorate (but is declining there, too). How, then, can the United States boast of its democracy? Theorists reply that a democratic culture does not necessarily require heavy voter turnout. Rather, it requires an attitude that, if aroused, the people will participate—vote, contribute time and money, organize groups, and circulate petitions—and that elected officials know this. Democracy in this view is a psychological connection between leaders and followers that tends to restrain officials from foolishness. It is the potential and not the actual participation that makes a democratic culture.

Another of Almond and Verba’s key findings was the response to the question of what citizens of five countries would do to influence local government regarding an unjust ordinance. Far more Americans said that they would “try to enlist the aid of others.” Americans seem to be natural “group formers” when faced with a political problem, an important foundation of U.S. democracy. In what Almond and Verba called “subject” cultures, this group-forming attitude was weaker.

Other studies show that Americans are prouder of their system and more satisfied with the way democracy works in their country compared with the citizens of other lands. A 1995 Gallup survey found that 64 percent of the Americans polled expressed some degree of satisfaction. Sixty-two percent of Canadians responded likewise, as did 55 percent of Germans, 43 percent of French, 40 percent of Britons, 35 percent of Japanese, and only 17 percent of Mexicans and Hungarians. Americans may complain about government, but their faith in democracy is still the strongest in the world.

THE DECAY OF POLITICAL CULTURE

The political cultures of most of the advanced democracies have recently grown more cynical, and voter turnout has declined. More citizens saw politicians as corrupt and government institutions as ineffective. The steepest drop was in Japan, where the economy was largely stagnant for two decades. In the 1960s and 1970s—the years of the Vietnam War, Watergate, and inflation—U.S. surveys showed a sharp decline in trust in government (see Figure 7.1). In the 1980s, under the “feel-good” presidency of Ronald Reagan, the trusting responses went up but never recovered the levels of the early 1960s. Trust fell in 2004 over the U.S. war in Iraq

subject Feeling among citizens that they should obey authority but not participate much in politics.

parochial Narrow; having little or no interest in politics.

rule of anticipated reactions Politicians form policies based on how they think the public will react.

turnout Percent of eligible voters who vote in a given election.




Figure 7.1
Americans' trust in government, 1964–2010.

Sources: 1965–1996, American National Election Studies of the University of Michigan; 1997–2010 Pew Research Center for People and the Press

secular Not connected to religion.

and in 2010 over bank bailouts and growing federal debt. The growth in cynicism made America harder to govern and is reflected in an electorate that seems to

be permanently split and unhappy with Washington. American political culture is not as unified and legitimate as it used to be.

A related development is America's "culture wars," a nasty polarization between conservatives and liberals, who dislike and vote against each other. For two centuries one spoke of the "Two Spains" because it was badly split by region and religiosity. Now America seems to be two countries. One is conservative, evangelical, small-town, and living in the middle of the country; it votes Republican (the "red states" on news maps). The other is liberal, **secular**, urban, and living on both coasts; it votes Democrat (the "blue states"). Conservatives dislike gay and women's rights, taxes, and Barack Obama (example: Fox News). Liberals dislike big corporations, the Iraq War, and George Bush (example: Michael Moore).

Richard Nixon first exploited this split to win the 1968 election, and it has grown deeper ever since. The causes of this polarization are several and disputed. The 1960s was a time of upheaval in which younger Americans repudiated authority with "drugs, sex, and rock-and-roll." In reaction, what Nixon called the "silent majority" turned to conservative Christianity and the Republican Party, which espoused "family values." This created a big gap between religious and

secular America (see box below). America may have also never recovered psychologically from the Vietnam War, and the anger returned with the Iraq War. The big spending of healthcare reform and bank bailouts inflamed conservatives. Economically and demographically, the coasts of America grew while the center stagnated. If polarization keeps growing, some fear for U.S. political stability. Dialogue between the Two Americas fails, as their views are visceral, not rational.

One factor much discussed was the decline of the American tendency to form associations, anything from volunteer fire departments to labor unions. In the 1830s, Tocqueville noted, "Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations." He was impressed by this tendency, for it was (and still is) largely absent in France, and he held it was the basis of American democracy, a point supported much later by the *Civic Culture* study. Some observers claim that these grassroots associations are fading. Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam noted, for example, that the number of people bowling has increased, but league bowling has declined. His article, "Bowling Alone," caught much attention and controversy. Putnam argued the membership loss of many associations—unions, PTAs, Boy Scouts, and fraternal orders—meant decline of our "social capital" and decay of civil society.

Others argue that Americans volunteer and join as much as ever. Old associations, such as the Scouts and Elks, may be shrinking, but new ones, such as Habitat for Humanity and Meals on Wheels, may be growing. Forty percent of American college students volunteer to help the homeless, feed the needy, tutor, participate in religious life, clean up the environment, and participate in other altruistic activities. The sudden rise of the Tea Party movement shows Americans are still willing to form associations.

Those who see the decline of America's voluntary associations, however, fear political and economic repercussions. With individuals demanding their "rights" without a corresponding sense of "obligations," demands on government become impossible. Democracy becomes less a matter of concerned

COMPARING ■ AMERICA THE RELIGIOUS

The United States has long been known as a religious nation. A 2009 Gallup survey found that 65 percent of Americans said religion plays an important part in their daily lives, far higher than Britons (27 percent), Canadians (42), Germans (40), Japanese (24), or French (30). Among the advanced, industrialized nations, the United States is an "outlier" (see page 289). In general, poorer countries are the most religious—India (90 percent), Brazil (87), and Mexico (73)—as well as Muslim lands—Indonesia (99) and Egypt (97).

U.S. religiosity is also one of the points of cultural divergence between Americans and Europeans, many of whom think the United States is dominated by Christian fundamentalists. Polls find that nearly half of Americans believe in creationism and two-thirds in the devil. A majority believes the Book of Revelation will come true. Americans' favorite reading: the "Left Behind" books, of which more than 40 million have been sold. Sarah Palin, an outspoken evangelical Christian, enjoys much support from conservative Christians. This would not work in Europe or Japan.

subculture A minority culture within the *mainstream* culture.

citizens meeting face-to-face to discuss a community problem than disgruntled citizens demanding “Gimme!” Furthermore, argued Francis Fukuyama (who earlier brought us the “end of history” theory), trust or “spontaneous sociability” underpins economic growth and stability. If you can trust others, you can do more and better business with them. Hence “high trust” societies tend to become prosperous, low trust societies not.

Another school of thought sees the growth of distrust in government as a natural thing and not necessarily bad. Politicians worldwide have for decades promised citizens more and more, promises they could not possibly deliver; there is simply not enough money. But citizens meantime have become more educated and aware of this gap and more willing to criticize. What some see as the growth of cynicism others see as the growth of “critical citizens” who are actually improving democracy by telling politicians what voters think of them.

Political culture changes. It is a combination of long-remembered and deeply held values plus reactions to current situations. These changes are responses to government performance, which almost always fall short of promises. Political cultures do not fall from heaven; they are created by government actions and inactions.

POLITICAL SUBCULTURES

Elite and Mass Subcultures

The political culture of a country is not uniform and monolithic. One can usually find within it differences between the mainstream culture and **subcultures** as well as differences between elite and mass attitudes. Elites—used here more broadly than the “governing elites” discussed in Chapter 6 (a tiny fraction of 1 percent)—in political culture studies means those with better education, higher income, and more influence (several percent). Elites are much more interested in politics and more participatory. They are more inclined to vote, to protest injustice, to form groups, and to run for office. One consistent finding of the *Civic Culture* study has been confirmed over and over: The more education people have, the more likely they are to participate in politics.

Delegates to both Democratic and Republican conventions—who are clearly very interested in politics—illustrate the differences between elite and mass culture. Usually half the delegates have some postgraduate education (often law school), far more than average voters. Most convention delegates have annual incomes much higher than those of average voters. Delegates are also more ideological than average voters, the Democrats more liberal and the Republicans more conservative. In other words, the people at conventions are not closely representative of typical voters. People with more education, money, and ideological convictions take the leading roles. There is nothing wrong with this; it is standard worldwide.

Why should this be so? Here we return to the concepts mentioned earlier: *political competence* and *political efficacy*. Better-educated people know how to participate

in political activity. They have greater self-confidence in writing to officials and the media, speaking at meetings, and organizing groups. They feel that what they do has at least some political impact. The uneducated and the poor lack the knowledge and confidence to do these kinds of things. Many of them feel powerless. “What I do doesn’t matter, so why bother?” they think. Those at the bottom of the social ladder thus become apathetic.

The differences in participation in politics between elites and masses are one of the great ironies of democracy. In theory and in law, a democracy is open to all. In practice, some participate much more than others. Because the better-educated and better-off people (more education usually leads to higher income) participate in politics far more, they are in a much stronger position to look out for their interests. It is not surprising that the 2001 tax cut favored the wealthiest, who speak up and donate money; those lower on the socioeconomic ladder do not. There is no quick fix for this. The right to vote is a mere starting point for political participation; it does not guarantee equal access to decision making. A mass political culture of apathy and indifference toward politics effectively negates the potential of a mass vote. An elite political culture of competence and efficacy amplifies its influence.

HOW TO . . . ■ USE QUOTATIONS

Do not quote everything. Quote only important statements from key figures. You might quote the secretary of state on a major foreign policy, but you should not normally quote a journalist or an academic. Their precise words are rarely that important. Instead, if you want to borrow their ideas, paraphrase them in your own words, but still cite them. For your paper, a short summary is better than a long quote.

Quote

“I have no problem with any of the substantive criticism of President Obama from the right or left,” wrote columnist Thomas Friedman. “But something very dangerous is happening. Criticism from the far right has begun tipping over into delegitimation and creating the same kind of climate here that existed in Israel on the eve of the Rabin assassination” (Friedman, 2009).

Paraphrase

Washington pundits grew alarmed at the partisan rage directed at President Obama.

Occasionally, a scholar says something so clear and provocative that it’s worth quoting: “Islam has bloody borders” (Huntington 1993). Use partial quotes instead of long quotes. Pick out the interesting or operative phrase and quote it: Pentagon officials said they had “not anticipated” chaos in Iraq (Sinclair 2003). If you must include a long quote—more than three lines—make it an indented block quote. Use ellipses (...) to indicate you have omitted unnecessary words. Use brackets ([]) to indicate you have inserted a clarification of words not in the original.

To slow down the tempo means to lag behind. And those who lag behind are beaten. The history of Old Russia shows... that because of her backwardness she was constantly defeated... We [the Russians] are behind the leading countries by fifty to one hundred years. We must make up this distance in ten years. Either we do it or we go under. (Stalin 1931)

mainstream Sharing the average or standard political culture.

integration Merging subcultures into the *mainstream* culture.

Minority Subcultures

The 2010 census showed that more than a third of U.S. residents are minorities. They might be black, Latino, Asian, Native American, or Pacific Islander. In California, whites are a minority. Even among white Americans, there are differences among ethnic, religious, and regional groups. When the differentiating qualities are strong enough in a particular group, we say that the group forms a *subculture*. Defining subculture is tricky, as not every group is a subculture. The Norwegian-Americans of “Lake Wobegon,” Minnesota, do not form a subculture because their culture and politics are **mainstream**.

But African Americans do form a political subculture. They are on average poorer and less educated than whites, more liberal, and solid Democratic voters. In attitudes toward the criminal justice system, blacks sharply diverge from whites, as the 1995 murder trial of O. J. Simpson illustrated. Most blacks, convinced the police and courts are racist and rig evidence, were glad to see Simpson acquitted. Most whites, convinced the police and courts are just and fair, thought the jury (with its black majority) ignored the evidence. Many whites had naively believed that U.S. society had made great strides since the 1950s in **integrating** African Americans; the Simpson trial and the reactions to it showed how great a gap remained. The 2008 election split over race, with a majority of whites for McCain and most non-whites for Obama.

Groups with a different language who dislike being ruled by the dominant culture constitute subcultures. Many of the French speakers of Quebec would like to withdraw from Canada and become a separate country. The Bengalis of East Pakistan, ethnically and linguistically distinct from the peoples of West Pakistan, did secede in 1971. The Basques of northern Spain and the Roman Catholics of Northern Ireland are sufficiently different to constitute political subcultures. The Scots and Welsh of Britain harbor the resentments of the “Celtic fringe” against the dominant English. They vote heavily Labour, whereas the English vote heavily Conservative. They, too, constitute subcultures.

Where subcultures are very distinct, the country itself may be threatened. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia fell apart because citizens were more loyal to their ethnic groups than to the nation. Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, by religion (Muslim) and language very distinct from their Serbian rulers, fought for independence. In India, some Sikhs seek independence for the Punjab, their home province, and resort to arms. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s Sikh bodyguards assassinated her in 1985. Such countries as Lebanon and India are not yet culturally integrated—a dangerous condition.

Should a nation attempt to integrate its subcultures into the mainstream? Such efforts are bound to be difficult, but if left undone the subculture in later years may seek independence, as did the Tamils of Sri Lanka. The Spaniards in Peru who conquered the Incas let them retain their language and culture. But now the Spanish-speaking Peruvians of the cities know little of the Quechua-speaking Peruvians of the mountains. Thirty percent of Peruvians speak no Spanish. Any nonintegrated subculture poses at least a problem and at worst a threat to the national political system.

Starting in the 1870s, France deliberately pursued national integration through its centralized school system. Many regions were backwaters and spoke strange dialects. The French education ministry sent schoolteachers into the villages almost like missionaries. The teachers followed an absolutely standard curriculum that was heavy on rote learning and on the glory and unity of France. Gradually, in the phrase of Eugen Weber, they turned “peasants into Frenchmen.” After some decades, a much more unified and integrated France emerged, an example of *overt political socialization* (see discussion following).

The United States has relied largely on voluntary integration to create a mainstream culture in which most Americans feel at home. Immigrants know they have to learn English to get ahead. The achievement-oriented consumer society standardizes tastes and career patterns. The melting pot worked—and, with nearly one in ten U.S. residents an immigrant, is still working—but not perfectly. Many Americans retain subculture distinctions in religion and cuisine, but these may not be politically important. Asian Americans integrated rapidly into the U.S. mainstream. Now some 5 percent of the total U.S. population, they hold several of the 535 elected seats on Capitol Hill.

Not all American groups have been so fortunate. Blacks and Hispanics are not fully integrated, but this too is changing. Now, with 13 percent of the population, African Americans hold about 10 percent of the seats of the House of Representatives.



A multilingual sign in California emphasizes the multicultural character of the population of that state. In an effort to promote cultural unity, Californians voted in 1986 to make English the state’s only official language. (Ted Soqui/Corbis)

francophone A French speaker.

marginalized Pushed to the edge of society and the economy, often said of the poor and of subcultures.

anglophone An English speaker.

The election of Barack Obama, who had a mother from Kansas and a Kenyan father, helped psychologically integrate African Americans. His election marked a turning point in national integration that Catholics achieved only with John F. Kennedy in 1960.

Should integration be hastened? This has been one of the great questions of post-World War II U.S.

politics. With the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* decision, the Supreme Court began a major federal effort to integrate U.S. schools. It encountered massive resistance. In some instances, federal judges had to take control of local school systems to enforce integration by busing. The integrationist Kennedy and Johnson administrations argued that the United States, in its struggle against communism, could not field a good army or offer an example of freedom and justice to the rest of the world if some Americans were oppressed and poor. Integration was portrayed as a matter of national security.

COMPARING ■ QUEBEC: "MAÎTRES CHEZ NOUS"

The French arrived in North America about the same time the English did, but France was more interested in the lucrative fur trade than in colonization and sent few French settlers; as a result, the population of New France stayed tiny compared with that of the English colonies to the south. The two empires collided in the French and Indian War, which essentially ended when the British conquered Quebec City in 1759. After the historic battle on the Plains of Abraham—which was actually quite small with only a handful killed, including both commanders—the English let the French Canadians keep their language and Roman Catholic religion. It was a magnanimous gesture, but it meant that two centuries later Canada faced a Quebec separatist movement.

Culturally and politically, Quebec province fell asleep for two centuries, an island of tradition in an otherwise dynamic North America. Quebec missed the French Revolution and thus stayed far more conservative than France. Quebec has been called "France without the Revolution." English speakers led the economy, and Montreal became a mostly English-speaking city. Many **francophones** became **marginalized**, living as poor and isolated farmers in their own province. An unstated

deal was struck: **Anglophones** would run the economy while francophones, a majority of Quebec's population, would obey local politicians and the Catholic Church.

In the 1960s, Quebec woke up in a "Quiet Revolution." Francophone attitudes shifted dramatically, away from traditional politicians and the priests. It was almost as if a new generation of Québécois said: "You have held us down and backward long enough. We want to be modern, rich, and *maîtres chez nous* (masters in our own house)." Out of this massive shift of values emerged the Parti Québécois (PQ) of René Levesque (pronounced Leveck) with its demand to separate Quebec from Canada. The PQ argued that Quebec really is a different culture and was tired of being under the thumb of English-speaking Canada.

The PQ and related Bloc Québécois became the province's largest parties. A 1980 referendum on separation failed 60–40 percent, but a 1995 referendum failed only by a whisker. Since then, Quebec separatism has subsided, and the PQ's vote has declined. Quebeckers simply got tired of the issue. For Americans, Quebec served as an example of what goes wrong with bilingualism and multiculturalism: They can lead to national fragmentation.

By the same token, should language integration be forced? Should African Americans abandon black dialect in favor of standard English, and should Hispanics learn English? If they do not, they will be severely handicapped their whole lives, especially in employment. But some blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans cling to their language as a statement of ethnic identity and pride. The U.S. Constitution does not specify any national language, nor does it outlaw languages other than English. In some areas of the United States, signs and official documents are in both English and Spanish. In 1986, California voters approved a measure making English the state's official language by a wide margin. People could, of course, continue to speak what they wished, but official documents and ballots would be in English only. In 1998, California voted to end bilingual education in order to speed the assimilation of subcultures. California is often an indicator of nationwide trends, and other states passed similar laws.

socialization The learning of culture.

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

In the **socialization** process, children acquire what are often lifelong manners and speech patterns. Although some is formally taught, most is absorbed by imitating others. In the same way, political socialization teaches political values and specific

KEY CONCEPTS ■ CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT

The recent economic growth of East Asia brought cultural explanations of why some countries stay poor while others get rich. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore have no natural resources, but they do have disciplined people who work hard, save their money, and trust each other. (Most also turned into democracies.) Some point to their common Confucian heritage, which promotes such values. China, the origin of Confucianism, has enjoyed incredible economic growth recently. The Middle East, on the other hand, has rigidly Islamic people who do not trust each other. Its oil wealth has brought only superficial modernization, no democracy, and the world's highest unemployment.

A century ago, Max Weber argued that Protestantism laid down the cultural basis of capitalism. A "Protestant work ethic" pushed people to work hard and amass capital. The Protestant

countries of northwest Europe were the first capitalist and democratic nations. Even today, these countries are rich, have high levels of trust and rule of law, and have little corruption. Countries lacking this culture, such as Rwanda or Egypt, do not take quickly to economic growth or democracy.

According to the cultural theory of prosperity, countries will stay poor until they rid themselves of traditionalism, mistrust, and fatalism, all prominent in the Middle East. Without a shift of values, outside aid often disappears into corruption. Critics of the cultural theory point out that decades ago Confucianism was blamed for keeping East Asia *backward* and that values often change *after* economic growth has taken hold. No one has been able to predict which countries will grow rapidly based on their culture or anything else; it's always a surprise.

overt socialization Deliberate government policy to teach culture.

usages. Learning to pledge allegiance to the flag, to sing the national anthem, and to obey authority figures from presidents to police officers is imparted by families, friends, teachers, and television. Children raised in cultural ghettos, such as minorities in America's inner cities, pick up subcultures that are sometimes at odds with mainstream culture. Political socialization is thus crucial to stable government.

The Agents of Socialization

The Family What children encounter earliest—the family—usually outweighs all other factors. Attempts at **overt socialization** by government and schools generally fail if their values are at odds with family orientations. Communist countries, such as Poland, had this problem: The regime tried to inculcate socialist values in a child, but the family taught the child to ignore these messages. Where family and government values are generally congruent, as in the United States, the two modes of socialization reinforce one another.

Parents influence our political behavior for decades. Most people vote as their parents did. More basically, the family forms the psychological makeup of individuals, which in turn determines many of their political attitudes. It imparts norms, values, beliefs, and attitudes such as party attachment and trust or cynicism about government. The early years have the strongest effect, especially from ages 3 to 13. Children accept parental values unconsciously and uncritically and may retain them all their lives. People often give back to the world as adults what they got from it as children. One study found that people with authoritarian personalities had been treated roughly as children. Almond and Verba found that those who remembered having had a voice in family decisions as children had a greater adult sense of political efficacy.

The School More deliberate socialization occurs in school. Most governments use history to inculcate children with pride and patriotism. Many African nations try

CLASSIC WORKS ■ THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY

One of the boldest attempts to link individual character traits with political attitudes was a 1950 book—*The Authoritarian Personality*, by Theodore Adorno and others, mostly refugees from Nazi Germany. Based heavily on the Freudian theory that personality is laid down in early childhood, Adorno and his colleagues devised a 29-item questionnaire that allegedly showed pre-fascist political views, hence its name, the F-Scale. Persons who scored high on it were conventional in lifestyle to the

point of rigidity; were intolerant, prejudiced, and hostile toward outsiders and minorities; submitted to and liked power; and were superstitious and mystical. The Adorno study attracted great interest but was soon criticized over its methodology and its direct connection of personality and politics. Many people have all or some of the F-Scale's characteristics but are good democrats. Although it has faded from view, some still find the study accurate and insightful.

to unify their tribes, usually with different languages and histories, by teaching in French or English about a mythical past when they were a great and united nation. It often does not work, as seen recently in the Congo (formerly Zaire). Communist nations also used schools to inculcate support for the regime. As we saw in 1989, though, this effort failed; family and church overrode the attempts of schools to make East Europeans into believing Communists. U.S. schools did a brilliant job of turning immigrants from many lands into one nation, something critics of bilingual education say must be restored.

The amount of schooling also affects political attitudes. Uniformly, people with many years of education show a stronger sense of responsibility to their community and feel more able to influence public policy than do less-educated citizens. Persons with more schooling are more participatory. College graduates are more tolerant and open-minded, especially on questions of race, than high-school dropouts, who are often parochial in outlook. Education imparts more open-minded attitudes, and educated people generally enjoy higher incomes and status, which by themselves encourage interest and participation.

Peer Groups Friends and playmates also form political values. For example, working-class children in Jamaica who went to school with children of higher social classes tended to take on the political attitudes of those classes, but when they attended school with working-class peers, their attitudes did not change. The relative strength of peer-group influence appears to be growing. With both parents working, children may be socialized more by peers than by families. Upholders of “family values” see this as the underlying cause of youthful drug-taking and violence.

COMPARING ■ CHINA BUILDS UNITY

China, like France, is an example of overt political socialization through education, one that seems to be working. Chinese intellectuals have for centuries stressed that China is one country and must not be broken up. China's many languages, however, work against this. The Cantonese of the south, for example, do not understand the Mandarin of the north. (And there are many dialects within each group.) A century ago, even under the tottering Empire, Beijing began a movement to make *Putonghua* (“common language”), a type of Mandarin, the national language.

It made little headway until the Communists required *Putonghua* in all schools and use it on television. Now most educated mainland Chinese

can speak it, although they may not use it much in daily life. For the first time in history, you can get by with one language in most of China (but not in Hong Kong or Macau, where Cantonese still reigns). The common language helps cement China together.

Adding to this, Chinese are well aware and proud of their record-setting economic growth. The 2008 Beijing Olympics were deliberately calculated to boost Chinese pride. The spiffed-up capital, the extravaganza of the opening and closing ceremonies, and the gold medals won made Chinese (even Hong Kongese and Macanese) proud of their country and see it as a unified whole. The old ideal of one China may at last turn into a reality.

The Mass Media Gaining in influence are the mass media, especially television. Many fear the influence is negative. Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam argued that heavy TV watching makes people passive and uninterested in community or group activities. As American children watch thousands of hours of television (the “plug-in babysitter”) a year, they witness myriad crimes and murders. Some critics charge this tends to make them heartless and violent, but this has not been proven. TV reaches kids early; even 3-year-olds can recognize the president on television and understand that he is a sort of “boss” of the nation. Senators and members of Congress receive much less and less-respectful TV coverage, a view the children may hold the rest of their lives.

As with schools, the mass media may be unsuccessful if their messages are at odds with what family and religion teach. Even Soviet researchers found that families were much bigger influences on individuals’ political views than the Soviet mass media. Iran’s mass media, all controlled by the shah, tried to inculcate loyalty to him, but believing Muslims took the word of their local *mullahs* in the mosques and hated the shah. Now, ironically, with Iran’s media controlled by Islamist conservatives, most Iranians believe the opposite of what the press feeds them. Mass media alone cannot do everything.

The Government The government itself is an agent of socialization, especially if it delivers rising living standards. Many government activities are intended to explain or display the government to the public, always designed to build support and loyalty. Great spectacles, such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics, have a strengthening effect, as do parades with flags and soldiers, and proclamations of top leaders. The power of government to control political attitudes is limited, however, because messages and experiences reach individuals through conversations with primary groups of kin or peers, who put their own spin on messages. Alienated groups may socialize their children to dislike the government and ignore its messages.

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KEY TERMS

anglophone (p. 130)	parochial (p. 123)	secular (p. 124)
cynical (p. 121)	participatory (p. 122)	socialization (p. 131)
francophone (p. 130)	political competence (p. 122)	subculture (p. 126)
integration (p. 128)	political efficacy (p. 122)	subject (p. 123)
mainstream (p. 128)	rule of anticipated reactions (p. 123)	turnout (p. 123)
marginalized (p. 130)		values (p. 120)
overt socialization (p. 132)		

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