1958-68: The Consolidation and Evolution of the Fifth Republic Between 1958 and 1962, de Gaulle moved from one matrix of support to another. In the case of the army and public opinion, he went from having particular elements support him for one set of reasons to others supporting him for a different set of reasons, arguably the opposite ones. He moved to and fro across support from the parties, the army, his own supporters, 'opinion', the electorates: legislative, presidential and referendary, Algerie Fran^aise, both in Algeria and in France, the trade unions, intellectuals, small town and village France with its local allegiances, the female vote, republican/legalistic opinion, eventually to a new configuration of sources of support. By 1962, he had almost got to the other side, as it were. As regards the parties, certain sections of the army, the media, the pieds-noirs, and some parts of fluctuating opinion, most of these had been 'for' him (for a range of reasons, and this is crucial). By 1962, all of them were now against him (for a range of reasons, and this is still crucial). It was certain, moreover, that the parties that had brought him to power to solve Algeria would, once it had been solved, try to, if not abandon him, then 'domesticate' his republic, bringing it much closer to a UK model (Debre's preference), or a Fourth Republic with all the safeguards that figures like Coty, Mendes France, Faure, Mitterrand, Pflimlin and Defferre (and Vedel • and Duverger and others) had striven for, largely in vain, in the months and years running up to May-June 1958.1 The political support de Gaulle enjoyed from the UNR was unequivocal. By 1962, its Algerie Fmngaise element had more or less been sifted out. It is worth pausing here to note that the bitterness felt by some bordered on the heartbreak of those who had been the most devoted. The emotional intensity of allegiance to de Gaulle by many cannot be overstated. With the loss of its right wing, the UNR nominally gained a 37 Politími Leadership in i'mnce left wing. The Union démocratUpw du travail was made up of left wing Gautlists such as Louis Vallon, Leo Hamon and René Capltant. It formed in Aprii 1959, bringing together many of those who had supported him since the Resistance years, some of whom, like Jacques Debú-Bridel, were even close to the Communist party. Many of them were the most intelligent, theoretically informed and intellectually interesting exponents of Gaullism. The UDT fused with the UNR in 1962. The left of the party, however, never really developed into a significant force, perhaps because of a fundamental contradiction between a left wing philosophy and the focus on an individual, but mainly because by 1962 the nature of the UNR had already been denned. The two most interesting theoretical aspects of Gaullism -Soustelle's Gaullism, and Capltant's - were almost certainly incompatible with one another but more importantly were incompatible with the exigencies of political support within de Gaulle's new Republic.2 The most politically devoted support was already becoming ideologically neutral by the time the UDT joined it. The most loyal became the least ideological and the most politically practical, acting unconditionally for de Gaulle, and efficiently on his behalf. Against the UNR were the communists who, although reduced to ten seats in 1958, remained a mass party and in clear opposition to de Gaulle. Having said this we need to recognize that at various moments they lost swathes of their voters to de Gaulle - up to 30 per cent in the 1958 referendum as well as in later referenda. And even they - against the putschists in 1961 - came out in support of him.3 In spite of their likening him to Franco or Saiazar and a version of fascism, their task was hard because he had been the leader of the resistance to Nazi Germany, and had even gone into resistance before the PCF had. He had also worked reasonably well with the PCF in the closing stages of the war; and immediately after the war had communist ministers in his government, and was on reasonable to good terms with the leaders of the Soviet Union and was respected by them, and was - increasingly after 1958 - identified by many Third World states and independence movements as non-aligned. He was, like the PCF, sceptical about Europe, had a penchant, like them, for anti-Americanism, and was not without concern for 'the social', unlike some of his contemporaries on the right. Even within their own ranks, therefore, the communists were never able to rid themselves of a reluctant respect for their arch-enemy. Nevertheless, the PCF was able to survive and prosper as the clearest anti-de Gaulle movement. It did this by portraying him as the new figurehead of a brutal capitalism, which in France, given the uneven- 1958-68: The CansalUiainm and Evolution of the Fifth Republic 39 ness of the spread of much of the prosperity in the 1950s and 1960s was true in part. As regards other oppositional political forces, the PSU (first called the PSA) was formed in April 1960 from dissidents from SFiO Algerian policy in 1956, then from progressive opposition to de Gaulle's coming to power in 1958. It was vociferously anti-Gaullist and vocal in intellectual circles (essentially Paris) and in the 'serious' press, and had some of the best minds (including Mendes France and the young ' Michel Rocard). Politically and electorally it was insignificant in terms of the political drama unfolding to 1962. However, many of its members, via rejoining the big political parties, or founding think tanks and influencing/forming political opinion, would go on to play major roles in the post-1962 period. The CNIP in the early stages of the 1958-62 legislature was the UNR's coalition partner. The CNIP or 'moderates', however, were not really a party fit for modern purpose, rather a large conservative coalition of local 'notables'. They represented a France that at the national level was about to be overtaken by a rapidly changing society and polity. Even more internally destructive was its strong support for Algerie Fran^aise. This created great internal 'stress' and meant that once Algeria was lost, it risked being washed away by the next tide. The socialists, unhappy with the social and economic policy of de Gaulle's government, and his own brand of presidentialism - which Mollet regarded as a deviation from the constitution he had helped draw up, left government in January 1959. The problem for the socialists, and this more or less throughout the following four years, was that by and large they strongly supported de Gaulle's Algerian policy. It was only from early 1962, therefore, that the SFIO could really move against his government; and one had the sense that when they did move against him they did so precipitously, and without proper reflection upon strategy, and even less upon the nature of the republic they found themselves in. The MRP was forever in a fragile situation because many of its leaders were either significantly more right wing or significantly more left wing than the MRP's electorate (essentially centre right and centre left Catholics). On top of this, on many issues, the UNR and MRP (who had wanted de Gaulle to lead them in 1946, and some of whom were with de Gaulle in the Resistance) were in broad agreement, and in terms of electorate were in fairly direct competition with one another. Moreover, as in the CNIP, Algeria had created serious stress within the MRP, and several of its ministers were in government in 1962 and in 40 Political Leadership in France disagreement with parts of their own party. The MRP, moreover, was very 'pro-European'. Any gestures of anti-Europeanism from de Gaulle would throw the party into further disarray. And de Gaulle's anti-European gestures were about to start raining down into the political arena. By 1962, it was clear that the Algerian drama was almost over. De Gaulle had been returned to power to solve Algeria, but had done the opposite of what had been anticipated. As his strategy moved towards accepting Algerian independence he took the French population with him, strengthening his support over the divided political parties through two referendums, the first in January 1961 on the question of Algerian self-determination (over 75 per cent yes), the second in April 1962 on independence (over 90 per cent yes). As French opinion followed him, the parties also followed with varying degrees of enthusiasm. At certain points, his most unequivocal support was from the PCF and SFIO. His shifts in policy involved endless speeches, ambivalence, silences, ambiguities, and then action. As the pieds-noirs and elements of the army saw their own stars waning, they reacted, first with a week of rioting (January 1960), then a military putsch {April 1961), then with an OAS terrorist campaign of increasing brutality and nihilism. With the April 1962 referendum, the drama was over. Algeria gained its independence. Nearly all of the European Algerians returned heartbroken and bitter to France. De Gaulle then turned immediately to the political challenges facing his authority, legitimacy and political capital. The real test for de Gaulle's new republic, however, was not Algeria but de Gaulle's conception of leadership politics. And the test was about to take place. The 1962 referendum and elections On 14 April, de Gaulle replaced Michel Debre as Prime Minister with the non-parliamentarian and relatively unknown Georges Pompidou, Debre had remained loyal but had agonized over Algeria. Pompidou was considered as merely the President's delegate in Parliament. One month later, on 15 May at a press conference de Gaulle made clear 'anti-European' remarks, this to the horror of France's most pro-European political party: Dante, Goethe, Chateaubriand appartiennent a toute l'Europe dans la mesure ou ils etaient respectivement et eminemment Italien, Allemand et Francais. Ils n'auraient pas beaucoup servj l'Europe s'ils 1958-oS: Tin- Consolidation and Evolution of the Fifth Republic •! 1 avaient ete des a pa hides et s'ils avaient pensc, ecrit en quelque esperanto ou voiapiik integres.5 What is striking about de Gaulle's remark is how personalized it is with its references to Goethe, etc; how deliberately provocative it is - several of his own ministers were pro-European;'how insulting it is - referring to European integration as a kind of voiapiik is denigrating and more scornful than the use of the more musical expression 'Esperanto'; and finally how extremely amusing it is. Here is one of scores of examples of how de Gaulle used his press conferences as political performances to consequential political effect. To move away from some forms of support, to move towards new policy positions, de Gaulle used himself. Henceforth, the direction of politics would follow de Gaulle's press conferences. The six MRP ministers in his government immediately resigned. As regards the CNIP, Pinay had resigned in 1960, but the party had remained silent - rather than support or oppose - over de Gaulle's Algeria referendums. Many independents wanted Giscard d'Estaing, the new Finance minister (and also pro-European) to resign. He had his own plan for future collaboration with the UNR, and he refused. Nevertheless, the new Pompidou government was now essentially a UNR government. On 8 June 1962, this time in a television broadcast, de Gaulle alluded to the idea of a constitutional reform regarding the mode of election of the President at the next presidential election. On 22 August, there was another assassination attempt (there had been a previous one on 8 September 1961). The President was in a car with his wife and son-in-law at Petit-Clamart just outside Paris when OAS activists opened fire. Such a dramatic event (and his own calm response) came at the perfect moment.5 On 12 September following a cabinet meeting, de Gaulle announced that on 28 October 1962 there would be a referendum Dn the election of the President by direct universal adult suffrage. He repeated this in a message to Parliament on 2 October 1962. This time, all the political parties except the UNR opposed it.6 They decided in fact to organize a joint 'cartel des nan' (excluding the PCF, itself, of course, also opposed). Many leading, now opposing, figures spoke out against de Gaulle's plan. Paul Reynaud, for example, spoke stirringly in favour of the spirit of republicanism. From his April voiapiik speech de Gaulle was forcing, daring the parties to oppose him in a bold move to consolidate what was now his version of the Fifth Republic. On 5 October, Pompidou's government was overturned by 42 Political Leadership in fiance 280 votes. Instead of replacing Pompidou with a new Prime Minister who could create a new majority more reflective oi the prevailing majority, the President maintained Pompidou in post and dissolved the National Assembly. The new elections to the National Assembly would fall immediately after the referendum that had provoked the motion of no confidence in the government in the first place (18 and 25 November, the referendum being set for 28 October). Many in the political parties and the print media believed that de Gaulle's act was desperate and misplaced. As well as the parties, he also now had ranged against him most legal opinion concerning the constitutionality of his proposed reform, the trade unions, all those who were spokespersons of the 'republican tradition', as well as those who saw themselves as modernizers, but who wanted a kind of updated Mendesisme, and a Fifth Republic free of the drama of de Gaulle's politics. There was no basis in his own constitution for what he was doing; what he was doing was asserting the centrality of his own action. The two factors that had helped bring him to power, fear of the army and despair over Algeria, were, by 1962, no longer issues. In several of his broadcasts at this time, de Gaulle stated that if he lost (or even if his majority was an unimpressive one) he would resign and return to his self-imposed internal exile. Most observers remarked at the time and later upon the land of blackmail such declarations exercise; that they amounted to frightening an electorate and almost threatening it. In fact, what they also did was to focus upon the true object (target and prize) of the election, himself. In terms of the regime's subsequent evolution, 1962 was a dramatic showdown between de Gaulle wanting to reinforce personality politics and almost everyone else trying to dedramatize the republic. With all sectors of political society against him and the threat of a coup or war now passed, and the fact that this really was a leap into the unknown for the republic, if de Gaulle were to win, it would be a stunning victory against the odds. And he won. There was the usual quarter of abstentions (22.76 per cent) and a majority in favour of 61.75 per cent of votes expressed. This was his lowest referendum achievement. Nevertheless, nearly 62 per cent, given the opposition and the audacity of his undertaking, was a breathtaking victory for his new style republic. It also put the drama of the assassination attempt into clearer relief: this truly was a personal (although 'imagined') relationship of some intimacy at the heart of a modern republic. With every element (except the UNR) of the political elite against him, he had won with the help of the mass of the French, dramatically demon- 1958-68: The Omsol'uhiium and Evolution uf the Fifth Republic 4:1 strating that the republic was based upon an unniediated relationship between the leader and the people. In 1958 he had set up the republic in a kind of alliance with the political elites. In 1962, the people confirmed through their vote that the republic truly belonged to him. For the 'no's, the defeat was truly significant, for it meant that with the whole political class against him they had still lost. We should remember that in the 1958 referendum they were all for him (except the PCF), and now, without the threat of major civil disorder, the 'no's had only increased their vote by 18 per cent. One could argue that the totality of political parties that stood between the PCF and the UNR totalled 18 per cent,7 This is a strong indication of the power of the personal in the political process. Events had polarized the political parties; on one side de Gaulle's supporters (with a few big names - like Maurice Schumann, MRP but a long-standing Gaullist - who rallied to the Gaullists), and on the other, virtually all of the political parties united in a land of impotent exasperation with de Gaulle's style of leadership and its consequences for Parliament and the republic. And just as in 1958, the dramatic referendum was immediately followed by legislative elections. On the Gaullists' side, Malraux and Frey organized the UNR and now the left wing Gaullists, the UDT, into an electoral Association pour la Cinquieme republiqiw, and, as the new party had done in 1958, selected the candidates to represent the party on the basis of their unequivocal allegiance to de Gaulle. Alongside the UNR-UDT were the 'Giscardians' who would form themselves in the course of the campaign into a parliamentary party, the Independent Republicans. For the opposition/ the 'cartel des non' developed a programme of desistements (standing downfor the best placed among them in round two); and the SFIO, to the annoyance of the other parties, also developed a similar plan with the PCF, so that all the political parties were ranged against the Gaullists. The abstention rate for the first round of the election on 18 November 1962, rose to 31 per cent. Between 1958 and 1962, largely because of the highly personalized referendums, all elections and participation in them was seen as an indication of support for de Gaulle. The 31 per cent abstention rate here reflected perhaps confusion and voting fatigue, but also perhaps more than a hesitation about de Gaulle's republic. The UNR-UDT, however, gained 32 per cent of the vote. No party in the history of French electoral politics had ever crossed the 30 per cent barrier. All the other parties, except the PCF who increased their vote slightly (on 1958) because of the understanding with the SFIO, either 44 Political Leadership in France just about held on to their poor 1958 score or did worse, in some cases far worse. In the second round, the UNR was only nine seats short of an absolute majority, and Giscard d'Estaing's new Republica'ms hide-pendants with 36 seats provided it. We should remember that over a third of the 1958-62 National Assembly majority had been made up of the now hostile CNIP. This non-Gaullist right almost disappeared, with in total a disparate 55 seats, hundreds of seats down from its former glory. It was as if in 1958 de Gaulle had thumped down through the National Assembly and devastated the left, and now in 1962 had thumped again and devastated the right. In the run-off, the communists' gains quadrupled because of SFIO desistements. The SFIO through desistements with the PCF and others raised its seats by 20 or so. Former Radicals and Mitterrand's fraction of the UDSR gained 39 seats.3 This was the beginnings of the emergence of a left-of-centre opposition (between them they held almost 150 seats, with what remained of the MRP and Independents another 50 or so). In quick succession, French politics had seen: a series of referendums favourable to de Gaulle, an unsuccessful coup attempt, {at least) two assassination attempts, Algerian independence, a change of Prime Minister and government, a showdown between the political parties and de Gaulle, a major constitutional revision, the near annihilation of several large political parties, and the electoral triumph of de Gaulle's own party. Let us look at the post-1962 period under three consequentially interrelated headings: Gaullism and the Gaullists; de Gaulle on the world stage; the Left opposition. But first let us examine a paradox borne of de Gaulle's 1962 triumph, for it informs the nature of de Gaulle's leadership between 1962 and 1965, the nature of the relationship between society and politics, the style of Gaullist party rule, and the political and discursive context of the left's response to the Gaullist republic. The paradox is that a condition of drama is that it cannot, by definition, be continuous. Dramatic moments, particularly if they end in triumph, are followed by calm, if not bathos. De Gaulle could now take on the 'grandes querelles' of international politics because he had 'solved' the domestic, could go on up to the higher ground where his historic destiny awaited him. Those left minding the shop seemed consequently rather dull. Such a phenomenon has political consequences, for negotiating drama (as we have seen in both 1958 and 1962) and the pauses between it; creating it, responding to it, being ready for it, knowing how to profit from it or its absence, all these become part of understanding a now very complex political process. This inter- 1958-6ti: flu: Consolidation ami Evolution of the Fifth Republic 45 relationship between drama and calm would have formative political influence throughout the next 50 years. And for the present, bathos descended upon political life. In one sense it was deliberate. De Gaulle's appointment of Pompidou was made for all the obvious reasons of ! Pompidou's competence and allegiance to de Gaulle. He was also affable, down to earth, and unpretentious; a real contrast to the fiery, tortured, larger than life Michel Debre. Pompidou represented, particularly after the November elections, the acquiescence of parliamentary politics in presidential politics, in a form of personality politics ; that saw the effacing of all personalities bar one. Reynaud's withering treatment of Pompidou in the Assembly, treating him as nothing more than 'la voix de son martre', had no effect not only because of the severe downgrading of Assembly discourse but because that was precisely why Pompidou was in position. Gaullism and the Gaullists One of the striking things about the government and the UNR, given their single purpose, was how distinct from one another they were. They were distinct phenomena that were often not that compatible. The new Prime Minister, Georges Pompidou, was not even a member of the party at this time. Debre was, although he was never its leader. One of the developmental features of Pompidou's appointment is that it shows how the relationship between President and Prime Minister was an evolving one, with ambivalences on both sides that made the relationship more subtle than it appeared. It is true that Pompidou was de Gaulle's creation in a way Debre was not. But the' relationship was not a capricious one. Pompidou remained Prime Minister from 1962 until after the 1968 elections. This was unprecedented in French history, and although unfaltering service to the President was a prerequisite to the relationship, Pompidou's ordinary , style was related to de Gaulle's as if in a land of system, as if they were I contrasting aspects of the same thing. It is true that although de Gaulle 1 could never be publicly opposed, the government often countered ■ effectively de Gaulle's arbitrary or misguided initiatives. During the | Algerian War it was counsel that prevailed over de Gaulle's wanting to | militarily crush the pieds-noirs opposition during the 'semaine des bar-| ricades' in January 1960. Similarly, as early as the spring of 1963 de t Gaulle's impetuous and old fashioned (and ineffective) requisitioning 2 of the striking miners was countered by a wiser government response t to the problem; and to an extent, the quiet competence of the new i government contrasted not only with its predecessors, and the sorry 46 Political Leadership in France state of the opposition, but also with de Gaulle's own style, and would begin to be perceived, in spite of itself, as eventually a welcome alternative to de Gaulle's own imperious style, and would become another aspect of Gaullism. The nature of power and authority in the new regime, however, was defined by de Gaulle. His press conference of 1 January 1964 was unequivocal in its stress upon the undisputed supremacy of the President. He also chaired the all-important Conseii ctes ministres (Cabinet) throughout his presidency. Pompidou's government settled into a full five-year term, addressing the implications of a booming economy and the formidable challenges of the sectors of finance, agriculture, education, and defence. It is worth noting that Pompidou's own position did not change until 1968, but in Education (the ministry dealing with the issues that would trigger the 1968 events) there were eight changes of minister. Nevertheless, no government after 1962 was overturned, and the government had a rock solid parliamentary (presidential) majority. The UNR itself, however, faced difficult times, and behind the smooth public face, had very difficult beginnings. It too saw no less than seven general secretaries in the 11 year period from 1958-69. In a sense, maintaining the party as a 'parti des godillots' (devoted followers) and as de Gaulle's 'transmission belt' was imperative, but no less difficult for that. First of all was the question of its own identity. It had been born of a surge of support for de Gaulle in late 1958, immediately after the referendum on the constitution, and brought together all the small Gaullist groups and old RPF activists and the Republicains sociaux. It had. 86,000 members in its early days, an impressive figure that grew from none. Nevertheless, this was akin to the quite small SFIO (80,000), and nothing like the alleged million-strong RPF (and PCF). It was a mass party, but one that would group sufficient cadres for the tens of thousands of elected posts nationally available to the new party. The UNR had to 'de-Ideologize' itself while maintaining an identity. We have seen how its first extremely difficult task was to oust the very members who constituted its ideological strength and its fervour: namely, the often lifelong supporters of de Gaulle and of Algerie Fran^aise, which, they had thought, were synonymous. The early years saw much heated debate, even violence, as the 'true Gaullists' like Delbeque and Soustelle were rejected by Gaullism along with Algerie Fran$aise. Nor did the UNR replace the ideologies it lost - its left wing version never took hold. This is an extremely problematic issue for a political party, 1958-68: The Consolidation and Evolution of the Fifth Republic -17 and it replaced ideology with the pursuit of power itself, in many ways the UNR became the political ideology of those who wanted to modernize the French economy, open France up to international trade, and modernize business and industry. National implantation of the party became one of the party's main concerns, particularly after the municipal and senatorial elections of March and April 1959 and again during the senatorial elections of September 1962 which demonstrated the challenges of creating a political presence at local level.5 De Gaulle's thought, as could be gleaned from his writings and speeches, could not be 'developed' by the party, as the allegiance had to be to him rather than his ideas. This alters somewhat the view10 of the UNR as a 'catch-all' party. It was ideologically 'thin' not for strategic electoral reasons but for reasons of its identity (or non-identity) and raison d'etre. The young cadres of the party, moreover, soon owed their allegiance and careers not to de Gaulle but to people like the Prime Minister, and other 'barons' of Gaullism; so that by the mid-1960s a new generation of the Gaullist political elite was emerging that had few links with the Gaullism of the RPF, let alone of the war. For the moment, and of necessity therefore, Gaullism, the philosophy of the most passionate and dramatic of political actors, lost its passion and its drama. The colonizing of the state machinery, of industry, of all walks of life by the UNR, turned UDR in 1968, would lead to the accusation, indeed the generalized perception, that there was, by the 1970s, a UDR-state.11 The weakness of parliamentary control over this highly successful party and its government involved a whole series of scandals that would also became part of the fabric of the regime.12 De Gaulle on the world stage We are not arguing here that after the victories of 1962, de Gaulle could proceed to perform unfettered upon the world stage and leave domestic politics behind.13 He maintained his grip upon domestic politics right up until the time his grip was broken almost completely in 1968. In spite of his triumphs, the inevitable negotiation with the prevailing political forces both domestically and internationally meant that even de Gaulle was in a perpetual state of political advance, concession, advantage, and retreat. In certain ways, the domestic situation became more conflictual after 1962, and 'opinion' in a whole range of manifestations appeared where it had not appeared before. The Fourth Republic had structured social conflict along classical lines of political sociology, expressing if not resolving, the myriad conflicts of interests and class that haunted France as it entered a very rapid period of 48 Political Leadership in Prance modernization and social change after World War Two. Without these conflicts being properly expressed through Parliament or political parties, itwas to the 'social' that politics-society relations would shift, and this would become a permanent feature of the Fifth Republic, channelling political activity into a range of contestatory channels, as we shall see. This was compounded by the Fifth Republic's reassertion of the state and its administration's centrality in political and social life, making it more than ever the 'target' rather than the channel of political protest and competition. The relatively stable domestic situation allowed de Gaulle to address wider foreign policy questions. Conversely, the foreign policy style of de Gaulle, the 'politics of grandeur',14 had major domestic social and political effects. An appraisal of de Gaulle's foreign policy lies outside the scope of our analysis. What we wish to demonstrate is how his style and some of the effects of his style upon policy were the result of the nature of his leadership. Domestic political stability was necessary for France to 'be itself on the world stage in the 1960s, but the way in which France would comport itself was, in a sense, could only be, the comportment of its leader, legitimated in drama and legitimating of drama in the domestic context. For de Gaulle, economic prosperity was a condition of France's greatness, not an end in itself. This would lead France down paths that could be argued as being detrimental to its economic well-being. De Gaulle, himself an austere man uninterested in the pettiness of material well-being, wanted a rich France devoted to its own greatness, not devoted to its citizens' acquisition of hi-fis, Renault Dauphines and fridges. Ironically, de Gaulle's success as a grandiose leader representing France's higher calling was utterly dependent upon the successes of this consumer society, a success he himself presided over; and which was a necessary yet contradictory condition of 'greatness'. Improvements in ordinary life - not least the acquisition of televisions through which de Gaulle's political authority was maintained - were preconditions of his ability to comport himself dramatically as if such triviality were of no consequence. Mundane self-improvement became a condition of the politics of grandeur, but it is a contradictory condition which would have consequences. The international developments and events of the 1960s were, even by de Gaulle's standards, dramatic. However, they were not dramatic in the way de Gaulle would have wanted them to be, for it was a drama - from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the end of the Vietnam War - that was 'played' by the USA and the USSR, leaving little room for manoeuvre for smaller actors. It could be argued that de Gaulle's interpretation of / 9SS-6S: The Consolidation and Evolution of the Fifth Republic 49 political action: to use personal (now national) wlonte and voloiilarisme against fatalite could only take place within the ultimate inflexibility of the super-power stand-off. It is further arguable that de Gaulle's exploitation or creation of the spaces within this overall inflexibility was not in France's interests; and that a great deal of posturing and diplomatic noise ultimately led to a series of Gaullist failures. Let us examine our own contentious suggestions. Measuring success and failure are open to enormous qualification. It has been argued that de Gaulle's role and true function was to make failure look like success.15 We could perhaps say the opposite, that one of de Gaulle's greatest successes was, apart from the Algerian tragedy, the near-pacific loss of Empire. Even though the 1958 Constitution itself devoted so much space to the 'Community', and all of its members bar one signed up to it, within a year or so, Cameroon, Chad, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Senegal, Togo, and Upper Volta were independent, leaving France with just a few overseas departments and territories. And the most successful failure was de Gaulle's bringing an end to the appalling human and economic costs of the Algerian conflict. Let us not try to measure but look at some of the consequences of his leadership style in this arena. From 1962, de Gaulle had a devoted, docile, stable and competent government, with no internal opposition. And Algeria was over. He could replace his many Algeria tours at least for new ones. He enjoyed enormous popularity at home at this point, and he was already seen as a figure of international status who had put France back on its feet, as it were. This meant of course two things: that France would be represented almost exclusively by him alone, and that the representation would be his own 'certaine idee', a definition of French independence, gTeatness, and so on, that was only given interpretation through himself. This romantic view is at once simple and elusive. It was not only that Gaullism was whatever de Gaulle happened to be doing or thinking, but rather that France itself and French Foreign policy had taken on this 'character'. Two related themes or factors dominated de Gaulle's reign. The first was that his highly personalized and uncompromising almost car-icatural assertion of France's national independence followed logically and inevitably from the assertions he had been maldng about domestic politics since the 1920s, but in particular since 1958. The second and related factor was that the context of this assertion was the overwhelming world controlling power and might of two other powers, the USSR and the USA, but as regards de Gaulle's 1960s foreign policy, in particular the USA.16 In many ways the whole of de Gaulle's decade in power 50 Political LiMikvsliip in Frtuicc was dominated by his hostile attitude to the United States. In March 1959, he took the French Mediterranean fleet out of NATO control. This semi-withdrawal from NATO would later include the fleets in the Channel and the Atlantic, the refusal to allow US nuclear weapons in France, the taking control of all French airspace and the eventual withdrawal of France from the integrated command structure of NATO and the withdrawal of all US and Canadian troops from French soil. In February 1960, France exploded its first Atom Bomb in the Sahara (and its first Hydrogen Bomb in August 1968). In March 1960, the Soviet leader Nlkita Krushchev visited Paris. Because of the subsequent U2 spy scandal,17 this came to little, but the notion of France seeing itself as a land of intermediary between West and East had been created. In June 1961, President John Kennedy made a highly popular and highly publicized state visit to France. The public and the media were very taken by Jackie Kennedy and by the warm and instant mutual admiration between her and de Gaulle. The irony here was that the 'real' enemy was never the Americans. De Gaulle's support for the US during the U2 scandal in I960 and his total support for Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 were, if one can use such a term in international relations, almost instinctive. But the logic of de Gaulle's world view when faced with US hegemony made his responses almost inevitable. It proceeded from a symbolic refusal of US domination of the 'free world'. The US gave de Gaulle ample diplomatic reason to be such a difficult ally for the US. It was in part the United States' utter command (with, In fact, Soviet bacldng) and humiliation of both the UK and France over the Suez crisis, before de Gaulle came to power, in 1956, that produced such different national responses. The UK's lesson learned was never to cross the US again; France's, and de Gaulle's, was to be sufficiently independent to be able not to have to toe the American line. De Gaulle had spent a lot of time trying to obtain a particular mode of treatment as an ally rather than a servant of the United States, but whether it was over procuring nuclear capability, nuclear related technology, greater status within NATO strategic decision-maldng and so on, from Eisenhower through to Lyndon Johnson, France was rebuffed. There was also a credible strategic logic to de Gaulle's analyses, if not his subsequent politics. The fact that the USA and the USSR could not embark on total nuclear war, meant that it was likely that the first and perhaps only (before negotiation) battleground between the superpowers would be Europe itself which in the event of a Third World War would be either destroyed, or else overrun, in about three days, by /958-fiS: Tlw Cimsolidntk)!!