10 Policy formulation

SYNOPSIS

There is a great deal of policy-making work that sits between successful agenda setting and implementation. The term 'policy formulation' is used to describe this, though an alternative perspective on this as 'policy programming' is also seen to be useful.

A policy example, where policy formulation might be expected to be quite simple, is used to illustrate the importance of this part of the process. That is followed by consideration of some policy process theory that focuses on 'instrument choice' – the fact that there are alternative ways of attempting to achieve policy goals.

The discussion of policy formulation leads on to a consideration of the literature on the power of civil servants, people who are likely to be particularly involved in this part of the policy process. While recognising the potential significance of wider propositions about the extent to which civil servants may be seen as the makers of policy, it will be suggested that a more plausible scenario is that civil servants will be very involved in the detailed programming of policy but that they may do this (as Page and Jenkins' (2005) study of British civil servants suggests) in a context in which they are guided by politicians' expectations or values.

Introduction

In the last chapter the distinction between it and this one was set out simplistically in terms of the distinction between deciding where to go (agenda setting) and working out how to get there (formulation or policy programming). But it was noted that the agenda setting/formulation distinction is a difficult one, with a strong interaction between the two very likely. Nevertheless it is worthwhile to make the distinction and to emphasise its

significance through the use of two separate chapters because the extensive range of policy-making activities that must follow on an initial policy com-mitment is often overlooked. A realistic approach to the study of the policy process must involve a recognition that if policies are to have real effects a great deal of detailed work has to be done. It has been suggested that much policy making is merely 'symbolic' (Edelman, 1971, 1977) consisting of ges-tures by politicians aimed to convince the electorate that they care and are doing things when little is in practice being achieved. Detailed policy formu-lation is fundamental to the making of what may perhaps be called *real* as opposed to symbolic policy.

Attention to policy formulation is also important to avoid falling into the dichotomisation of the policy process in which just two stages are high-lighted: one in which politicians *make* policy and the other in which civil servants merely *implement* it.

Note how the two examples of the stages model by British authors, featured in Box 8.1, included, in Jenkins' formulation 'information', 'consideration' and 'decision' after 'initiation' and even more, namely 'deciding how to decide', 'issue definition', 'forecasting', 'setting objectives and priorities' and 'options analysis' after 'deciding to decide' in Hogwood and Gunn's version. We thus see these authors clustering a number of activities around agenda setting but not making the distinction between that and formulation as used in this book. Their approach takes us back to something mentioned, but given little attention, in the chapter on agenda setting: the 'rational' approach seen as using an unrealistic view of how policy decisions are made but providing a starting point for the more realistic agenda-setting model used by the incre-mentalists and by Kingdon. Simon argues, in his formulation of the rational approach,

. . . it has not been commonly recognized that a theory of administra-tion should be concerned with the processes of decision as well as with the processes of action. This neglect perhaps stems from the notion that decision making is confined to the formulation of overall policy. On the contrary, the process of decision does not come to an end when the general purpose of an organization has been determined. The task of 'deciding' pervades the entire administrative organization quite as much as the task of 'doing' – indeed, it is integrally tied up with the latter. (1957, p. 1)

Simon attacks the notion of decision taking as external to administration, the notion that decisions are taken by politicians leaving administrators to put those decisions into 'action'. He points out that administration involves con-tinual decision taking. Such decisions can be seen as organised in a hierarchy, minor decisions being consequent upon major ones.

Simon presents decision making not as a process of 'maximising', as in economic theory, but as a process in which individual rationality is limited: 'The central concern of administrative theory is with the boundary between the rational and the non-rational aspects of human social behav-iour. Administrative theory is peculiarly the theory of intended and bounded

rationality – of the behaviour of human beings who *satisfice* because they have not the wit to *maximise*' (ibid., p. xxiv).

Simon pays particular attention to the fact that decisions are based upon premises and that these premises will involve both factual and value elements. He recognises that it is often difficult to separate these elements but suggests that in ordering the hierarchy of decisions, deciding which decisions are the key ones which should form the premises for lower-order decisions, administrators should try to give priority to value premises. While from his prescriptive position he argues that the value premises should come from politicians, he explores the difficulties about making the fact/value distinction in real situations.

Simon's treatment of this issue then leads on to questions about who does this sort of work. Is it easy to make a distinction between what politicians do and what civil servants do (bearing in mind that this topic is often approached prescriptively in terms of propositions about what each should do)? Or have we here a range of activity within which that distinction is very likely to be blurred?

The relevance here of the incrementalist challenge to Simon (discussed in the previous chapter) lies in the extent to which, however policy goals are selected, detailed policy formulation is a piecemeal activity too. Institutional theory, and particularly its emphasis upon pathways, suggests that this will be the case. There are moreover some activities, involving the adjustment of policy over time, that seem particularly likely to take that form. A good example here is the budgetary process. There have been various studies of the budgeting process outlining the ways in which government departments negotiate with the central finance department (including notably a classic study of the UK by Heclo and Wildavsky called significantly *The Private Government of Public Money*, 1981). To understand what is involved simply bear in mind what happens in voluntary organisations, large and small. On a regular basis, probably once a year, expenditure plans and income sources are reviewed. That review seldom involves wholesale reconsideration of activities. Rather the expectation is that existing activities will continue, and the existing revenue stream will remain. The questions that then get considered are about small variations in activities and small adjustments in, for example, subscriptions. Changes upwards or downwards will be *incremental*. Most governmental budgetary review processes are similar, merely just more complex.

Key aspects of policy formulation

We start therefore with an examination of what policy formulation is likely to involve. This is a topic that is quite difficult to address in general terms. Hence the more abstract discussion of the topic will be illustrated with explicit examples largely from my own country. In this respect it needs to be remembered that the distinctions between the various formal policy formulation activities

will vary from country to country. The contention here is merely that there will be equivalents to the UK phenomena identifiable in other countries, in respect of any policy where translation into action involves more than minimal complexity.

Knoepfel and Weidner use the term 'policy programming' (1982, see also Knoepfel et al., 2007, chapter 8) rather than formulation to address this issue and use a model that sees the detail of a policy as forming a series of layers around a policy core. These will include:

■ More precise definitions of policy objectives. It was noted in relation to anti-poverty policy in Chapter 1 that the adoption of such a policy must imply a stance on the definition of poverty.

■ Operational elements, which include the 'instruments' to be used to make the policy effective, a topic discussed further below.

■ 'Political-administrative arrangements', which involve the specification of the authorities whose duty it will be to implement the policy, the notion that such authorities need money and other resources to do that follows self-evidently from that point.

■ Procedural elements, namely the rules to be used in the implementation of the policy.

Box 10.1 illustrates these points with reference to the already used example of the 'right to roam' policy in England and Wales. What that example suggests is that even with a relatively simple example of a public policy, the policy

| Box 10.1 | The legislation to enact the 'right to roam' policy in England and Wales |

The relevant legislation is the Countryside and Rights of Way Act of 2000, of which this measure forms the principle part (Part 1). Part 1 of the Act, however, runs to 48 sections across 22 pages. Within it can be found:

■ 'Principal definitions' including the meaning of 'access land' in the sections to come.

■ Rights of the public in respect of access land, including some rules about things they may not do.

■ A duty given to a public agency to prepare maps, and some specifications about how those maps should be prepared.

■ Liabilities of owners of access land.

■ Specification of responsibilities of 'access authorities' – the public bodies required to administer the legislation – including powers to enable them to employ wardens.

■ Conditions under which the general right of access may be withdrawn in exceptional circumstances.

■ Rules about how access land can be 'accessed' - about fencing, gates etc.

■ Appeal rules in respect of various provisions.

formulation process may be of considerable complexity. This simple Act translating a policy objective into action runs to 22 pages. It deals with important questions about the overall definition of the 'right of access', of related rights and duties, of administering authorities and their tasks, of exceptions and of appeals.

The Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 is a British Act of Parliament. In this sense the policy formulation responsibility seems to be right where it should be in a system of representative government: with the legislature. But of course when we consider how detailed it is we must ask two questions: where did that detail come from, and how fully did the legislature scrutinise it? The answer – without going into what actually happened in this case – is that those 22 pages contain a great deal of material that was prepared by the executive assisted by unelected civil servants and that the actual legislative scrutiny will have been quite abbreviated. We will return to this below.

However, within the Act there are other things that point to policy formulation that is likely to occur outside the legislature. The Act contains in various places a power to make further regulations. For example it lists nine more specific issues in respect of the making of definitive maps (their form and scale, how the public shall be informed about them, how appeals about them should be handled) for which regulations may be made. There is also one more fundamental supplementary power 'the Secretary of State (as respects England) or the Welsh Assembly (as respects Wales) may by order amend the definition of 'open country' . . . so as to include a reference to coastal land' (clause 3). Interestingly in this case the government subsequently decided that further substantive legislation was necessary and passed the Marine and Coastal Access Act in 2009. Since then, in the light of a change to a new government committed to public expenditure cuts, the translation of that into action remains what seems likely to be a long drawn out process. At the time of writing there are simply a few pilot schemes to explore how to proceed. A great deal more precise work can be expected in years to come.

In British law Acts of Parliament regularly involve the granting of power to make subsequent 'regulations'. The procedures relating to these are complex. Technically they have to be 'laid before Parliament' but in practice there are so many regulations that only a minute quantity get any detailed scrutiny. Once through that technical law-making process they form a substantive addition to the Act. In the past this form of law making, called 'delegated legislation', has been attacked by administrative lawyers as involving the taking of arbitrary powers by the government. The consensus today is that it would be impossible to deal with detailed amplification of legislation without some sort of power of this kind. For example, social security payment rates are changed regularly to allow for movements in the cost of living, Parliament would be overwhelmed if all changes of this kind needed new Acts of Parliament. On the other hand there is an implicit – but difficult – distinction to be made between detailed adjustments of policies and clauses that enable fundamental policy change without Parliamentary scrutiny.

There are other clauses in the Countryside and Rights of Way Act that delegate more limited policy formulation responsibilities without even

the notional requirement to involve the legislature. A central government 'agency', the Countryside Agency, has a variety of duties under the Act, including the giving of guidance to other authorities. Then lower down the system the various 'access authorities', generally local governments, may make their own arrangements about how to carry out their responsibilities. Note for example that they have 'powers' not 'duties' to employ wardens.

As noted above, it is difficult to address the subject of policy formulation without the use of examples that may be dismissed as specific to individual countries. The argument here is not that legislation in other countries will have the legal shape described here, but that it may reasonably be predicted that they will have a structure that will contain most if not all of the following elements:

- Basic laws with clauses enabling later amendment.
- Provisions to make more detailed rules within the overarching legislative framework.
- Systems under which central responsible ministries will give more detailed instructions and/or advice to lower-tier agencies (including local governments).

To these may be added, in respect of forms of privatisation, the specification of much detail in contracts to non-public agencies expected to perform public functions.

This detailed formulation process involves the making of choices about ways to enact policy. This is the concern of the next section. It is followed by a section on a topic given considerable attention in the literature since the last years of the twentieth century, policy transfer, involving learning from other countries. Since that learning mostly involves policy formulation issues once a policy issue is on the agenda, it is included here rather than in the previous chapter.

Instrument choice

Knoepfel and Weidner's model of the policy formulation process has been noted as including 'instruments' within the list of operational elements. The issues about instrument choice may be very important. Howlett goes so far as to suggest that 'instrument choice . . . is public policymaking' (1991, p. 2). Efforts to specify the key instruments have involved the provision of a list that is often quite extensive. As an appendix to his article, Howlett (1991) provides a list from other work, which contains 63 items. However, in the text-book he produced with Ramesh (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003) he commends an approach to the delineation of policy instruments based upon Hood's listing of 'tools of government'. Hood (1986) classifies these in terms of

- 'nodality' – meaning the use of information;
- 'authority' – meaning the legal power used;

- ■ 'treasure' – that is the use of money;
- ■ 'organisation' – the use of formal organisational arrangements.

It is unfortunate that Hood's fondness for acronyms leads him to use this rather odd terminology (added together they make NATO), but his approach is helpful. Howlett and Ramesh (2003) go on from this starting point to a valuable discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of various policy instruments. Key issues from their analyses are summarised in Box 10.2.

Policy making involves choices about instrument use. Linder and Peters (1991) see policy instruments as in principle substitutable but argue that in practice choice depends upon:

- ■ resource intensiveness;
- ■ the extent to which precise targeting of policies is required;
- ■ levels of political risk;
- ■ constraints on state activity.

Doern, on the other hand, sees instrument choice as essentially ideological, but with governments choosing the least coercive instrument. In his work

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Box 10.2	Howlett and Ramesh's (2003) analysis of policy instruments

It is argued that instruments can be seen as within a spectrum involving increased levels of state involvement from low (at the voluntary instruments end) to high (at the compulsory instruments end). Decisions about instrument use will be influenced by the likelihood of resistance. Hence there will tend to be a preference for using low state involvement options. However, choices will be affected by the resources (as specified in Hood's list of tools) available to governments.

Howlett and Ramesh specify the following instruments (2003, p. 195):

Voluntary Instruments
> Family and community
> Voluntary organization
> Private markets.

Mixed Instruments
> Information and exhortation
> Subsidies
> Auction of property rights
> Tax and user charges.

Compulsory Instruments
> Regulation
> Public enterprise
> Direct provision.

Earlier in their book they offer a more complex formulation of this typology (p. 92).

with Phidd (Doern and Phidd, 1983, p. 134) he portrays instruments along a continuum rather like that provided in Box 10.2, from 'exhortation' through 'expenditure' and 'regulation' to 'public ownership'. More recent writing on policy instruments also emphasises the ideological dimension. Lascoumbes and Le Galès argue:

. . . public policy instrumentation . . . reveals a (fairly explicit) theorisation of the relationship between the governing and the governed: every instrument constitutes a condensed form of knowledge about social control and ways of exercising it . . . (2007, p. 3)

They go on to say:

. . . instruments that work are not neutral devices: they produce specific effects, independently of the objective pursued (the aims ascribed to them), which structure public policy according to their own logic. (ibid.)

This view treats the issues about instrument choice as much more than a pragmatic matter of deciding the best way of achieving an objective. It will be influenced by views about the right way to govern, and then – as suggested by institutional theory – chosen instruments will then give characteristics to policy that are likely to influence future decisions about the best way to carry it forward.

What the literature on instruments has made very clear is that the factors that influence instrument choice are complex. Policy type comes into play here and the issues about resistance to policy, but we may also see ideology influencing choice. In each specific case much depends on what is available, what has been done before, or what is in use in a closely related policy area. Howlett argues that it is not feasible to 'develop a general theory of policy instrument types' (1991, p. 1). Rather, he suggests that issues of instrument choice need to be linked up with issues about national policy styles:

. . . there are several areas in which much more work remains to be done. First, the relationship between policy styles and policy instruments needs to be elaborated more precisely. This involves not only additional work conceptualizing and clarifying theories of policy instrument choice, but also work clarifying the concept of national policy styles. Second, much more comparative work needs to be done to add to the number of cases of instrument choice available, thus contributing to the development of studies of national styles, whether these turn out to be truly national or sectoral in nature. (ibid., p. 16)

These questions about instrument choice connect up with another theme in the discussion of the policy process, one which is widely used in association with analyses of modern approaches to public management and to governance. Various writers have developed typologies for the analysis of policy processes, stimulated by the issues on the agenda about the use of market

mechanisms. Government has been seen to have choices between leaving matters to the market or imposing hierarchical systems. Then, with the development of network theory (see pp. 57–62), it has been suggested that networks offer a third alternative. Hence Thompson *et al.* (1991) speak of hierarchies, markets and networks as three general models of social coordination, while Ouchi (1980) distinguishes between bureaucracies, markets and clans. Bradach and Eccles (1991) and Colebatch and Larmour (1993) examine the organisation of policy action in terms of hierarchic authority (bureaucracy), individual exchanges (markets) and group activities (community). In a classic exploration of authority within organisations Etzioni (1961) outlined three ways of securing compliance, which he called 'coercive', 'utilitarian' and 'normative'. Hood colloquially calls these 'sticks', 'carrots' and sermons' (2007, p. 138).

In his work with Peter Hupe, the author's version of these alternatives is to propose the following distinctions for policy processes:

- 'authority' – where rules are laid down in advance;
- 'transaction' – where certain outputs are expected, often as specified in contracts;
- 'persuasion' – where the essential mode of operation involves collaboration or what may be called 'co-production'. (Hill and Hupe, 2003, pp. 480–1)

Table 10.1 sets out the kinds of activities for which the different modes of accountability may be appropriate. In the second row of Table 10.1 the alternative perspectives on the management of implementation draw a distinction between top-down authority in the first column, issues about the extent to which there has been conformity with a contract in the second one, and a very mixed mode of accountability in the third column called 'co-production'. In the final row the way the actual management of the system is likely to be carried out is highlighted. This is seen in the 'Authority' column as particularly concerned with inputs, that is, questions about the extent to which resources have been appropriately applied to the performance of a task. In the 'Transaction' column it is suggested that crucial for this mode is a concern with outputs – have contractual obligations been fulfilled? By contrast with these two, the concern within the 'Persuasion' mode is with success in achieving shared goals – health or education improvement, for example – where it is real results as opposed to formally specified outputs that is crucial. There are then questions about choices between the alternatives (just as explored in the policy instruments literature). These will depend on:

- considerations about the 'best' ways to organise any specific policy delivery process;
- the extent to which the relationship between inputs, outputs and outcomes is complicated;
- the ideologies of those who make the crucial choices (for example the strong preference for markets amongst many politicians of the liberal Right).

Table 10.1   Three kinds of governance

Management via	Inputs	Outputs	Outcomes as shared results
Appropriate perspective on managing implementation	Enforcement	Performance	Co-production
Core activity of government	Imposing Regulating Delivering goods and services	Creating frameworks Assessing results	Inviting participation Showing direction
	Authority	Transaction	Persuasion

Finally, there are some issues of importance for modern governance about the distinctions made in the last row of Table 10.1. Where traditional bureaucratic governance depended upon clearly specified inputs we now see the specification of expected outputs or outcomes as important. How these are specified and measured will naturally be influential. Behind this is a broad sociological point about how the development of statistical measures may influence policy discourse (Desrosières, 2002). There is considerable controversy (for example about the applicability of measures of performance in schools, hospitals and so on), and about the ways this data is published and used for future decision making (see Pollitt, 2003). Much of this focuses upon output measures that are often rather crude. All gets much more complicated if attention is shifted to outcome measures (think for example of debates about inequalities of health, social mobility or what crime measures can tell us about the state of our society). This may seem to take us a long way from pragmatic questions about instrument choice; however, data outputs from policy feed back into subsequent decisions.

Policy transfer

Some scholars have suggested a case for 'policy transfer theory' as a distinct and separate contribution to the study of the policy process. One aspect of globalist theory that is fairly self-evident is that in the modern world a great deal of effort is put into policy transfer. Not only do national policy makers look around at what is occurring elsewhere when they design their own policy, but it is also the case that there are a number of international organisations that are explicitly in the business of offering policy prescriptions – notably the various United Nations agencies, the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.

'Policy transfer' is seen as a new approach to or 'framework of' policy analysis (see Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, 2000; Dolowitz et al., 2000). It builds on Rose's (1991, 1993) work on 'policy learning'. Yet since attempts to transfer policies are so widespread, a theory of 'policy transfer' can have either a slightly

banal quality or tend to invest too much importance in the migration of ideas as a driver of policy change. Is it merely the case that:

> just as individuals open their umbrellas simultaneously during a rainstorm, governments may decide to change their policies in the presence of tax evasion, environmental pressures, such as air pollution, or an ageing population. (Holzinger and Knill, 2005, p. 786)

It leaves questions unanswered about how decisions are made to accept or reject ideas from elsewhere (see Box 10.3 for some of the key critical points). An exploration of contemporary developments in policies for long-term care by Theobold and Kern (2011) illustrates how there has been extensive policy transfer yet at the same time there are great variations between societies to the extent that they regard internal factors as crucial for any explanation of actual decisions.

However, while it may be unhelpful to talk of a theory of policy transfer, implying strong explanatory possibilities, there are distinctions to be made between simple copying and stronger influences. Box 10.4 reproduces Holzinger and Knill's table which identifies influences on the process ranging from strong ones that follow from wide, possibly supranational pressures, through weaker ones where a shared 'problem pressure' is evident to phenomena close to the 'umbrella opening' phenomenon.

Bulmer and Padgett use a policy transfer approach to the analysis of European Union policy. They describe the relationship between the European Union and the individual nation states as involving three distinctive forms of governance:

> Hierarchical governance is prevalent in policy areas like the single market where EU institutions exercise supranational authority leading to coercive forms of transfer. A second form of governance occurs where the European Union seeks to agree common rules or norms by common (or majority) consent. It is not uncommon to find norms modelled on those of one or more member state(s) in a form of transfer by negotiation. Finally, where

Box 10.3	James and Lodge's critique of theories of lesson drawing and policy transfer (2003, p. 179)

First, can they be defined as distinctive forms of policy making separate from other, more conventional forms? 'Lesson drawing' is very similar to conventional accounts of 'rational' policy making, and it is very difficult to define 'policy transfer' distinctly from many other forms of policy making. Second, why do 'lesson drawing' and 'policy transfer' occur rather than some other form of policy making? The proponents of 'policy transfer' put a set of diverse and conflicting theories under a common framework, obscuring differences between them. Third, what are the effects of 'lesson drawing' and 'policy transfer' on policy making and how do they compare to other processes?

Box 10.4 Holzinger and Knill's mechanisms of policy convergence (2005), p. 780, table 3)

Mechanism	Stimulus	Response
Imposition	Political demand or pressure	Submission
International harmonization	Legal obligation through international law	Compliance
Regulatory competition	Competitive pressure	Mutual adjustment
Transnational communication		
Lesson drawing	Problem pressure	Transfer of model found elsewhere
Transnational problem solving	Parallel problem pressure	Adoption of commonly developed model
Emulation	Desire for conformity	Copying of widely used model
International policy promotion	Legitimacy pressure	Adoption of a recommended model
Independent problem-solving	Parallel problem pressure	Independent similar response

member states retain sovereignty but coordinate policy via EU institutions (as in Justice and Home Affairs), policy transfer will take the form of unilateral voluntary exchange facilitated by the European Union. (2004, p. 104)

It may be questioned whether the term 'transfer' is the right one for the first of those forms of governance (it is pertinent to note that other analysts of this phenomenon have described it as 'implementation', see Chapter 14, Box 14.6). However, the other two are pertinent to the discussion of agenda setting and policy formulation. With the second we see a negotiated form of the model set out by Kingdon, but with more complicated institutional arrangements. The third, on the other hand, can be seen as an important exogenous influence on policy processes largely contained within nation states. Chapter 14 will give some attention to the strong pressures, and to the roles of global and other international organisation.

A feature of much of the policy transfer literature has been to explore problems associated with uncritical policy transfer (see particularly the work of Dolowitz cited above). There are obviously some important issues to raise about the conditions under which policy transfer occurs. There are clearly problems that arise from uncritical policy transfer. Governments faced with new policy problems send delegations off to other countries in search of ideas. These movements not unnaturally follow linguistic and cultural lines. These may lead to the adoption of ideas that do not easily fit in a very different

institutional framework. There are policy entrepreneurs (see Chapter 9) who play active roles in the transfer process; not surprisingly many of these come from the United States. Given what we know about the distribution of power and the funding of policy entrepreneurs it is not surprising that the interests of business and market models for the operation of the policy process are propagated though these channels.

International organisations play important roles in respect of policy transfer, particularly to developing nations and economies in need of aid. Here obviously transfer may be more compulsory, explicitly or implicitly, inasmuch as aid depends upon it. While again models from the United States are salient, and much advice comes packaged in terms of pro-market economic theory, there are sometimes rival sources of advice. This is explored further in Chapter 14 (see p. 288).

Civil servants and policy formulation: the debate about the power of civil servants

We saw in Chapter 3 that a combination of politicians, civil servants and interest group representatives is implicit in the policy networks and policy communities theories. Much of the discussion of the roles of civil servants outside that framework, however, has tended to involve seeing them as alternative, even subversive, decision makers to politicians rather than as partners in a shared system. The published diaries of one politician, Richard Crossman (1975, 1976, 1977), dealt particularly fully with his relationships with civil servants and inspired a comedy series on TV, 'Yes, Minister'. That series reversed Crossman's (predictable?) picture of his success in securing dominance in the face of manipulative civil servants and represented the minister as the hapless dupe of the top civil servant. We have noted that such a perspective has been strongly influenced by the traditional preoccupation with the relationship between politics and administration. This discussion will start from that issue but aim to move away from it to a more balanced account of how these two groups interact in the policy process. In doing so it will consider, first, some of the issues about the respective roles of politicians and civil servants and then some of the issues about the compatibility of values, or ideologies, between them.

If permanent civil servants play a key role in the policy process they may tend to give continuity to the policy agenda, pursuing a departmental line regardless of political leadership. The power of the civil service and the importance of departmental agendas was emphasised in many past studies of British public administration. The 'Whitehall model' has been seen as firmly established in Britain. Even though, as will be shown below, they suggest change is occurring, Campbell and Wilson say:

> politicians in few countries place as much faith in bureaucrats as do the British. The British system contrasts not only with the patronage system

at the top of the executive branch in the United States but also with the continental European practice (as in Germany) of placing senior civil servants in temporary retirement if a governing party loses power. . . . [t]he dependence of elected politicians on the non-partisan, permanent civil service was the core of the system that has been exported to other countries and admired by many non-British scholars. (1995, p. 293)

Nevertheless, we see similar features in some other European systems. Anderweg and Irwin's (2002) account of policy making in the Netherlands suggests the importance of departmental agendas, with civil servants as the key advisers for their ministers. In respect of France, Knapp and Wright speak of the colonisation by the civil service of areas beyond the confines of mere administration' (2001, p. 276). Knapp and Wright's discussion of this phenomenon indicates that this has come under attack but that the situation has not been changed significantly.

Obviously there will be differences between societies in how these roles are distributed. Dyson's analysis of 'strong' and 'weak' states (discussed in Chapter 4) suggested that in the 'strong' state civil servants are carriers of a tradition of service to the state, which is seen as providing a context for the more temporary concerns of politicians. Much depends here upon other aspects of the constitution. If electoral systems tend to produce unified pro-grammatic parties then there is a potential tension between the two elements in the policy-making process. Here differences between the early (agenda setting) and later parts of the policy process are likely to be relevant. But much will depend upon the extent to which either one political party is largely dominant (as in Sweden until recently) or where there is a relatively low level of conflict between the parties (as in Germany). France is an interesting case because the constitution of the Fifth Republic gives administrators consider-able autonomy. Commentators on France suggest that the period in which Mitterrand came to presidential power with innovatory socialist policies but was then forced first to water them down and then to accept 'cohabitation' with a prime minister of a different political persuasion was a crucial testing time for French democracy (Ritchie in Harrop, 1992; see also Knapp and Wright, 2001).

An alternative perspective is supplied by those states where multi-party systems dominate or have dominated (the Netherlands, Belgium, the French Fourth Republic). In these the party-political input is largely seen very early in the policy process – in the issues that are contested in elections and in the compromises that occur between the elements in a coalition – after which a kind of administrator/politician accommodation seems to apply.

One of the reasons for the preoccupation in much earlier literature with questions about whether politicians or administrators dominate in the policy process arises from a concern that civil servants 'subvert' policy because they do not share the ideologies or value commitments of democratically elected politicians. One possible way of dealing with this concern, the idea that civil servants should be 'representative' in a social sense, is explored in Box 10.5. The extent to which it is seen as a problem is influenced by the extent to

Box 10.5	Representative bureaucracy

One response to ideological differences between politicians and civil servants has been to argue that civil servants should be, as far as possible, representative of the societies from which they are drawn. Kingsley's (1944) pioneering work on this topic looked at the British civil service, arguing that it was transformed from an aristocratic into a bourgeois organisation during that period in the nineteenth century when the commercial middle class were becoming politically dominant. The British bureaucracy was thus made representative of the dominant political class, but not, of course, of the people as a whole. To work effectively the democratic state requires a 'representative bureaucracy', Kingsley argues, thus taking up the theme, developed also by Friedrich (1940), that the power of the civil service is such that formal constitutional controls upon its activities are insufficient. Kingsley sees the recruitment of the civil service from all sectors of the population as one means of ensuring that it is a 'responsible bureaucracy'.

This issue has traditionally been explored very much in class terms (see Aberbach *et al.*, 1981). More recent work has added attention to issues about gender and about ethnic, regional or religious origins or background (Meier *et al.*, 1991; Selden, 1997). Much of this new work is concerned with the behaviour of 'street-level bureaucrats' (and will be discussed in Chapter 13).

which there are significant political or ideological divisions with regard to the policy agenda. Earlier writers on the British civil service (for example, Chapman, 1970) suggest that civil servants in Britain have strong reservations about party politics while at the same time possessing commitments to particular policies. The implication is that these officials find changes in their political masters easy to adjust to so long as they do not involve violent ideological shifts. Officials can operate most easily in a situation of political consensus. Where consensus does not exist, however, their role may become one of trying to create it. Graham Wallas sums this up most neatly:

> The real 'Second Chamber', the real 'constitutional check' in England, is provided, not by the House of Lords or the Monarchy, but by the existence of a permanent Civil Service, appointed on a system independent of the opinion or desires of any politician and holding office during good behaviour. (1948, p. 262)

In the 1960s, discontent developed on the political Left about this comfortable consensual doctrine (Thomas, 1968). A response to it was to appoint temporary political advisers to ministers. But it was on the political Right that the most robust response developed during the governments led by Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s. As a consequence, Campbell and Wilson suggest that the traditional 'Whitehall model' is being destroyed by:

- the breaking of the monopoly of the civil service as advisers to ministers;
- the development of systems to help the Prime Minister contest civil service advice;
- most importantly, 'whole generations of bureaucrats and politicians have been socialised since the 1970s into very different professional norms . . . enthusiasm for government policies has been rewarded more than honest criticism' (Campbell and Wilson, 1995, p. 296);
- 'the erosion of the belief that the civil service is an established profession, like all professions delineated from society as a whole by clear boundaries' (ibid., p. 297).

That argument was developed before Tony Blair came to power in 1997. His obsessive desire to control policy and to control the way policy was presented has done much to further these developments. This led to a rather different attitude to the organisation of the upper reaches of the civil service, with more temporary civil servants being recruited and more attention being paid to the commitments of candidates for top jobs.

Campbell and Wilson chart some similar developments in other systems close to the 'Whitehall model' in Australia, New Zealand and Canada. In Australia, Pusey, however, raises a rather different issue. He explores the way in which a new ideological agenda has been pursued from within the civil service. He argues that alternative ways of managing the economy have been advanced systematically by 'economic rationalists' who have come to dominate key roles within the civil service (Pusey, 1991). An interesting ambiguity in Pusey's analysis concerns the extent to which this has been tacitly encouraged by elected politicians, on the Labour side as much as the Liberal. A similar phenomenon has been observed in New Zealand, where a determined group of 'economic rationalists' closely linked with the Treasury secured the support of first a Labor finance minister and later a National Party one. In respect of this case, Wallis writes of a 'conspiracy', in which the change of the agenda depended upon a concerted effort to win support in the civil service and the political parties (1997).

The evidence marshalled by Pusey and Wallis suggests that there may be a need, alongside interest in the way in which the relationship between political values and a permanent administration is managed, to look at how new ideological consensuses may be developed within a ruling elite. If, in fact, it is the case in the more unified systems, particularly those following the Westminster model, that the policy process is more controlled than Kingdon's analysis suggests, it may be beside the point to ask whether this control comes from the politicians' agenda or from a civil service-dominated policy agenda. We may, particularly when one party is in government for a long while or when the differences between the two parties are quite slight or when political changes often involve slight shifts within a coalition, be looking at control over the agenda exercised by a relatively unified community of politicians and civil servants. In many respects this is the picture painted by Rhodes (2011) on the basis of a qualitative study which particularly focussed on politician/civil servant relationships in the UK between

2001 and 2005. He refutes the oppositional ('Yes, Minister') view and does not support the view that the importation of outsiders has transformed the traditional civil service.

There are some interesting points to raise about the use of 'outsiders'. In respect of developments in the UK, Gains and Stoker draw upon a Parliamentary Select Committee investigation to identify three kinds of role:

- an explicitly political one 'to keep the politics in policy' (2011, p. 493);
- a role advancing a specific minister's personal agenda;
- the provision of 'independently authoritative' advice (ibid.).

There seems good reason to suggest that these get very muddled together in practice. Much depends upon the relationship between ideology and expertise.

There is one other group of special advisers, introduced into UK government since 1999, colloquially called 'tsars' (Smith, 2011). They are neither direct recruits to the civil service nor political appointees in a party political sense but experts in specific policy areas. Their roles involve a combination of concern with policy formulation and with effective implementation. The development of such roles needs to be understood in the context of the shift away from traditional notions of hierarchy in administration (as discussed in Chapter 14). What is entailed here is the giving of a measure of responsibility for solutions to a policy problem to an expert (note that many of the UK initiatives involve medical experts), placing them outside a hierarchy but expecting them to have the capacity to secure support from key actors (notably the minister) within it. These may be seen as rather more specific replications of a long-standing and more general approach to the use of expertise *within* the civil service hierarchy in respect of medical, scientific and professional expertise.

Gains and Stoker, seeing advisers (probably excluding the 'tsars', whose roles they do not explore) in Kingdon's terms as 'policy entrepreneurs' further follow his approach to write of them as operating in:

> . . . the messy interplay of problematisation, policy and politics streams in the primaeval soup of policy making . . . the role of special advisers should be understood as playing a 'brokering' role, acting as 'middlemen' between the social science, bureaucrat and political decision-making worlds. (2011, p. 495).

In respect of the introduction of 'expertise', this is an optimistic view that others do not share. In the last chapter Haas' comments on the significance of ideological compatibility (or the lack of it) between the views of expert 'epistemic communities' and those of powerful political actors were noted. Stevens, summing up his evidence on the marginalised roles of experts argues:

> It has been shown that there is little conclusive evidence available for policy-makers in the vast mass of information that is available to them. A certain group of policy-makers chose some of this information as evidence

to tell stories. They selected evidence that fitted with the stories that have previously constructed their unquestioned concept of public value. This arose ideologically from the extant distribution of power, which structured their capability to take part in policy decisions. They used evidence to tell stories that were likely to be accepted within a thought world that favoured certainty over accuracy and action over contradiction. They attempted to transform issues of ethical value into questions of financial value. (Stevens, 2011, p. 252)

This perspective is also that of Smith (2007) who explored the issue of health inequalities in the UK. The change of government in 1997 led to a policy environment in which a case for attention to health inequalities was, in general terms, on the agenda. However, the experts Smith interviewed found it difficult to extend their engagement further into the policy process. Inasmuch as they were successful it was in respect of one interpretation of the causes of health inequalities – that root them in individual behaviour – that is least challenging to the political status quo. The creditability of experts seemed to rest upon factors not necessarily related to their expertise. Smith says, cautiously, 'the factors influencing an individual's credibility in policy circles are likely to be different to, and may potentially conflict with, the factors affecting credibility in academic circles (2007, p. 1447).

These contributions focus upon issues about the introduction of expertise. The attack upon civil service values associated with the Left in the 1960s perhaps took what was, from their point of view, an optimistic view of the prospects of fusing expertise, ideology and political commitment. It is important to bear in mind that political parties may not be the driving forces with regard to the injection of ideological elements into the political process. Furthermore, when ideologies become dominant they may fuse all aspects of the policy process. Many writers at the end of the twentieth century gave attention to the way in which economic belief systems, stressing a need to restore market processes to a more central position in the determination of policy, secured acceptance beyond the ranks of the political 'new Right'. The case of New Zealand has attracted particular attention in this respect, since there it was a Labour government that took the crucial first steps (Kelsey, 1995; Massey, 1995). It was noted above that Wallis (1997) describes the New Zealand case as involving a 'conspiracy', inasmuch as 'an exclusive social network of policy participants' worked together to change policy (p. 1). Clearly, where 'policy communities' are able to dominate the policy process, shared ideologies may be important for this domination and alternative ideologies will be marginalised. In addition, it may be important to see interest groups as part of this organised community.

The implication of the above discussion is that it may be inappropriate to polarise the distinction between politician and civil service domination. Evidence from 'experts', who had expected to work with politicians who would be active innovators but had found themselves marginalised, may not be very reliable. There is another picture of the world of politician/civil service interaction, as in the account from Rhodes quoted in the next section,

in which a shared concern with short-run expediency was likely to lead to this marginalisation. Another kind of outsider introduced to deal with the media or with party-political management is more useful to politicians in this context.

Important for the continuing primacy of the traditional civil service may be a commitment to collaborative working in government regardless of ideology. The political system of the Netherlands has been seen as characterised by 'consociational democracy' (Lijphart, 1975) with extensive collaboration between opposed social 'pillars' (Catholic, Protestant, secular liberal and social democratic) in both politics and administration. While there is extensive evidence that the era of pillarisation has passed (see Anderweg and Irwin, 2002), corporatist characteristics remain very persistent in the Netherlands. Success in dealing with the need for industrial restructuring has been seen as attributable to the continuation of a weak form of corporatism which has been called the 'polder model' (Visser and Hemerijk, 1997). The question about whether it is better to have a stable traditional civil service, sceptical about ideology, or alternatively for politicians to be able to stir the government machine with enthusiasm for new ideas takes us beyond this effort to explore the roles of the various actors in the policy formulation process.

Civil servants and policy formulation: does the traditional debate miss the point?

Beyond this recognition of the prominence of the civil service role in general, a great deal of the discussion of the roles of civil servants seems to have been locked into the dated debate about the possibility of distinguishing policy making from administration. The position that has been taken in the first part of this chapter has been partly to challenge that directly but primarily to argue that it involves a very simplistic view of policy making, disregarding the complexity of the policy formulation task. But there is still much modern writing that reverts in one way or another to simplifications about policy making roles. Huber and Shipan's *Deliberate Discretion?* (2002) explores why 'politicians sometimes allow substantial discretion and at other times tell bureaucrats precisely what to do' (p. 9). But the problem is that such an approach is still searching for an easy way to dichotomise roles, in this case treating rule making as what politicians do and disregarding the complexity of this task (as illustrated above, for example, with the 'right to roam' legislation) which surely calls for some combination of roles. Campbell and Wilson's analysis of the changing role of the UK civil service seems similarly to miss the point when they write of 'civil servants increasingly defining their role as policy implementers rather than policy analysts' (1995, p. 60) disregarding tasks between agenda setting and implementation. The same is

true of an account of the changing civil service by someone with long experience of observing British government, Anthony King, heading a chapter 'Mandarins as managers' and surely – again because of disregard of detailed work – exaggerating the extent to which senior civil servants are shifting from policy-making activity to the management of implementation (2007, Chapter 9).

A study of the work of middle-ranking civil servants by Page and Jenkins (2005) supports the account of the policy formulation process set out in this chapter. It shows how civil servants, often well below the leading grades in the British civil service, play crucial roles in the formulation of policy. At the same time it challenges the view that this in any respect involves subversion of political roles. It points instead to a team-like activity in which there are close working relationships between civil servants and ministers. In some respects civil servants can be seen as paying attention to Simon's values/facts distinction, showing sensitivity to issues that might concern the politicians. They identify a variety of 'cues' used for this:

- the perceived thrust of government policy;
- experience from frequent interaction with ministers;
- departmental priorities;
- reference to documents;
- 'consensus mongering' (ibid., p. 134) implying a sensitivity to contested issues.

Another crucial concept here is the notion of a 'steer', described as 'not a command' (ibid., p. 136), and allowing for the possibility of questioning. Page and Jenkins say '. . . its general legitimacy as a guide to developing policy comes because it is directly or indirectly an expression of a minister's wishes' (ibid., p. 137). This study supplements an earlier one by Page in which attention was paid to the specific roles played by civil servants during the legislative process (Box 10.6 summarises the findings from this).

Page and Jenkins sum up by saying:

Politicians are clearly at the apex of the executive structure. In comparison with the full range of tasks they oversee, ministers can at best take a close interest only in a small proportion of the decisions taken in their name. They are highly dependent upon officials working within the policy bureaucracy who work hard to fashion policies in ways they think their ministers will like. (ibid., p. 184)

Rhodes' account of life at that 'apex' (2007) indirectly reinforces that picture. He says: 'I saw . . . little policy analysis. It is simply not done in the departmental court [the term Rhodes uses for arena he observed] but in the Directorates General by middle-ranking officials' (2011, p. 186). But what is distinctive about his research is the picture it presents of the untidy life at the top where day to day events continually confuse policy making, administrative machine management and responses to political and media pressure. While then what

Box 10.6	Page's (2003) examination of the role of the British 'civil servant as legislator'

British civil servants are drafted into 'bill teams' to work on the preparation of legislation. Such teams are typically led by civil servants drawn from the lowest grade of the 'senior' civil service. The teams tend to be formed early in the process of preparing a new policy, before it has been agreed that there will be a place for legislation in the parliamentary timetable. The decision to legislate will be a political one. However, Page shows the identification of a need for legislation may be as much a civil service activity as a political one.

Once a decision to legislate is made, teams will work on the detailed drafting of legislation. Drafting will involve the team, joined or assisted by lawyers employed by the civil service. Before being put before Parliament a draft bill will be submitted to the relevant minister or ministers, who will be responsible for steering the legislation through Parliament. To assist ministers, large briefing documents will be compiled. During the legislation process any suggested amendments will be carefully scrutinised by the team. Many will be the product of further thoughts about the legislation from within the department. Some will be inspired by pressure groups and some will come from within Parliament, but very often the aim will be to accept these in principle and secure their withdrawal so that they can be replaced by amendments compatible with the bill as a whole. Once the legislation has been steered through Parliament, the bill team is likely to move on to drafting implementing amendments and guidance on the legislation.

he is describing is neither policy making nor policy formulation as such it offers a correction to any simplistic view of relationships between politicians and civil servants:

> Distinctions between policy and management, politician and civil servant, are meaningless when confronted with the imperative to cope and survive. Both minister and permanent secretary are political-administrators, dependent on one another and, in many of their everyday tasks, interchangeable. (Rhodes, 2011, p. 163)

There is obviously an issue here about how much conclusions like these, and those in the previous section, only apply to the UK. Page and Jenkins consider this issue and indicate that there are parallels in the systems used in other European countries. There are evidently variations in the extent to which outsiders are brought in to play key roles close to ministers (particularly in respect of legislation). They acknowledge the likelihood of differences in the United States with the separation between executive and legislature, and the fact that accordingly key roles are played by staff working for members of Congress.

The long-standing concern to distinguish politics (or policy making) from administration, though it has its roots in an obvious issue about representative

democracy, manifests itself often as a naïve demand to take politics out of medicine, or education, or whatever. In practice, these issues matter too much either for politicians to be prepared to leave them alone or for the 'administrators' (including many professional staff, a point we return to in Chapter 13) to abdicate what they see as their responsibilities for doing the right thing. Hence there are large parts of the policy process in which political and administrative roles are inextricably mixed.

This discussion of administrative roles in the policy formulation process involves an exploration of what is perhaps the most ambiguous part of the initial policy process. It is certainly the most difficult to research, because so much of the action is private (in the UK we have to wait 30 years for the publication of official papers, and even then some items are protected for longer, some are purged, and many were never committed to paper records in the first place). The fact that there have been so many attempts to draw the politics/administration distinction or to delimit the political roles and interests of permanent officials indicates the complexity of this issue. The achievement of the aspiration that civil servants should be just 'managers' or just concerned with 'means' is fraught with difficulty.

Dunleavy and O'Leary refer to the 'professionalisation' of government to suggest that in areas where expertise is important, issues are pulled out of the general political arena into the more private politics of 'policy communities':

In the professionalized state the grassroots implementation of policy, and major shifts in the overall climate of debate in each issue area, are both influenced chiefly by individual occupational groups. Professional communities act as a key forum for developing and testing knowledge, setting standards and policing the behaviour of individual policy-makers and policy implementers. Knowledge elites are crucial sources of innovations in public policy-making . . . in areas where professionals directly control service delivery the whole policy formulation process may be 'implementation skewed'. (1987, pp. 302–3)

A modern twist to all the issues about the way the politician/administrator boundary is organised comes with two approaches to government which, while they have echoes in the past and particularly in pre-democratic regimes, are currently assuming increasing importance: public/private partnerships and the delegation of public tasks to quasi-independent or independent organisations. In many respects this is a subject for the discussion of implementation. Certainly this is how governments tend to present these developments – emphasising Woodrow Wilson's politics/administration distinction or stressing that 'we' still make the 'policy', 'they' are responsible for 'operations'. Invoking the already criticised Wilson distinction indicates that this should be viewed with caution. Leaving aside the new ways in which this now brings politicians into concerns about 'implementation', it will be seen that any 'agent' with responsibilities to implement a policy is likely to develop very real concerns about the way in which the policy it operates is constructed. If confronted with something

unexpectedly expensive or something unworkable, the agent is likely to lobby (probably covertly) for policy change. The 'agent' with a contract to carry out a specific task with a specific sum of money is a politically interested party (a new actor in the bargaining part of the game), and perhaps particularly likely to behave in the way predicted by public choice theory. At the end of a book of case studies from various countries Colebatch *et al.* bring together a series of observations of the diffuse nature of what they call 'policy work'. Their starting point is an observation pertinent to some of the puzzles that have been addressed in this chapter:

> . . . there are two very distinct approaches to thinking about policy practice. One is *teleological*, outcome-focused: the activity is about making policy, and focus of attention is on the problem being addressed and how the measures proposed would contribute to its solution. The alternative approach might be termed *relational*, or process focused: policy activity is a continuing but variable flow of attention among a large and diverse array of participants, who have overlapping agendas, different interpretations of the problem, and varying levels of concern about its resolution. (2010, p. 228)

They go on to indicate that they have been particularly concerned to outline the implications of the second approach. In doing so they engage very much with the issue of the extent to which decision making occurs in the context of complex 'governance'. But their observations are pertinent to the next of the boundaries between chapters in this book: the formulation/implementation one.

The policy formulation/implementation relationship

There may be situations in which much of the activity that actually creates the policy actually experienced (see the discussion of the meaning of policy on pp. 14–19) occurs during what is generally perceived as the implementation process. To return briefly to the metaphor of a journey: we may change our route during it. It is appropriate to supplement that with another 'homely' metaphor, the cooking of a meal. This is done in Box 10.7.

In the world of public policy we find a similar range of options to those set out in Box 10.7, with – as noted at the end of the box – many complications because of the existence of multiple actors. The first three options listed correspond with three degrees of high discretion in implementation contexts. In the more extreme cases this makes the implementer responsible for matters that in the other two options are seen as agenda setting or policy formulation. The situation of following a recipe book fits well with the classical staged model. The recipe book has identified dishes (policies) and formulated rules about how to make them, implementation consists of judgements around the

aspects of the recipe that are not (and perhaps cannot be) easily specified. But in the last example in the box there is action, based on previous prescriptions, but also reference back towards someone who may be seen here as in a somewhat equivalent role to those concerned with the earlier stages of the policy process. The parallel here is with one task identified by the civil servants who Page and Jenkins (2005) studied: giving advice on the interpretation of policy to implementers.

The point here is that much of the literature on implementation is about the various degrees of discretion accorded to those close to, or actually at, the delivery point for policy, but that means that issues inevitably arise about how the agenda setting/policy formulation/implementation distinctions have been made, or are worked out in practice. We will find that the implementation literature, like so much else in the literature on which this book has to draw, is very influenced by efforts to prescribe how those boundaries should be drawn; and of course the politics/administration distinction raises its head again.

Box 10.7

Alternative ways in which discretionary elements occur in the policy process: a homely example

Imagine a two-person household in which one person undertakes to cook a meal to be shared with the other. There are then a variety of possibilities, of which the following are the main ones:

■ That the cook is quite free to choose what to do.

■ That the cook is free to choose what to do within constraints such as the size of the budget, the availability of ingredients, the amount of time available and some knowledge of the likes and dislikes of the other.

■ That the ingredients were chosen in advance but that the cook then still has considerable latitude about how to use them.

■ That the recipe was chosen in advance, which means that what is to be done is closely prescribed (but following a recipe may still involve judgements about when elements are sufficiently well cooked, about seasoning 'to taste', etc.). A particularly problematic example here occurs with the making of a sauce, where adjustments in the course of action may be essential.

■ Variants of the above but with negotiations during the process – 'Would you like this?', 'How do you think I should deal with that?', 'Taste this and tell me what you think of it' and so on.

In the author's own household versions of all those five options occur, with the last very common. But of course, as many students who have lived in communal households will know, decision making may be much more complicated than the two person interaction described here.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has been concerned with the fact that, whilst agenda setting and policy formulation are closely connected, it is very clear that the translation of policy objectives into instructions for action is an extensive task often given insufficient attention in discussions of the policy process.

Various aspects of policy formulation have been identified. A recognition that much attention needs to be given to detail inevitably leads to an examination of the roles of those who do such work. It is suggested that in the British system and in many other administrative systems such work falls to full-time officials rather than to politicians or their immediate impermanent assistants. That leads the chapter into a discussion of the power of the civil service, even though much of that literature goes much wider than a concern with detailed policy formulation to postulate that civil servants often *make* policy in the strong sense of that term. Page and Jenkins' careful work on actual civil service roles brings us back to the suggestion that this postulate over-simplifies a complex team-like relationship. A fuller discussion of these relationships requires attention to implementation as well as policy formulation, the concern of the next chapter.