

SOCIAL INCLUSION

Perspectives, Practices
and Challenges within
the Visegrad Region

people

SOLIDARITY

WORK

education

innovation

Minorities

Politics

action

PARTICIPATION

SPACE



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**Social Inclusion: Perspectives,
Practices and Challenges within the
Visegrad Region**

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Foreword

“People are cast in the underclass because they are seen as totally useless; as a nuisance pure and simple, something the rest of us could do nicely without. In a society of consumers - a world that evaluates anyone and anything by their commodity value - they are people with no market value; they are the uncommoditised men and women, and their failure to obtain the status of proper commodity coincides with (indeed, stems from) their failure to engage in a fully fledged consumer activity.” (Bauman 2007: 124)

In his book, Zygmunt Bauman (2007: 124, emphasis in original) talks about the “useless” people, about *failed consumers*, who are by their more privileged countrymen seen as dangerous and worth vanishing for the sake of the society. He specifically talks about the underclass - people occupying the lowest possible place in the social hierarchy. The homeless, the beggars, the uneducated, or the disabled, people labeled as underclass have historically faced exclusion in many societies. Yet the processes of exclusion can take also more subtle forms. In the Visegrad countries, we have been recently hearing a lot about the “deserving” and “undeserving” people. These categories call for a qualitatively different form of judgement, one which is less connected to the idea of social classes and more to a moral assessment of an ability of certain individuals or groups to contribute to the society. Following this perspective, some people first need to prove they deserve governmental assistance and the solidarity of their fellow citizens - this entitlement not coming to them automatically as in case of other citizens whose entitlement has never been questioned. Ethnic or new minorities, refugees, or also people living in the long term poverty, some of them have to work to receive the basic benefit in material need, prove they are entitled to get a housing or a wheelchair, or convince the decision-makers that their lives had been endangered in their home countries and they deserve a protection. In relation to the core of the society, which is in Visegrad countries mostly defined in terms of a shared ethnicity of Slovaks, Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians, they are perceived as out-groups (Alexander 1988). If they are, moreover, categorized as “useless” or “undeserving”, these people might easily find themselves at the margins of the society and become excluded from the everyday life.

Social exclusion is usually defined as a deprivation of full participation in activities such as consumption, saving, production, or political and social activities (Mareš and Sirovátka 2008). It is a process in which individuals or groups become detached from other people and social relations - this having a negative impact on their everyday activities, life opportunities, and physical and mental health. The detachment from the social mainstream occurs within various interdependent dimensions – economic, social, political and cultural (Ibid.). The inaccessibility of a paid job leads to unemployment and has negative impacts on material standards of a household. If unemployment becomes a lasting condition, it not only leads to poverty, but also to narrowing of social networks. Decline in one's social status, stigma, and isolation usually come along. Excluded groups often do not have access to education, work, power, political participation and thus they are easily deprived of their basic political and social rights. Furthermore, structural and symbolic aspects of social exclusion are mutually reinforcing. While poverty and structural inequalities in the society are frequent triggers of social exclusion, the symbolic facets, such as prejudice or stigma, come hand in hand and further reinforce the exclusion. This often leads to a vicious circle - people willing to get out of the trap of social exclusion are further discriminated against based on the characteristics such as ethnicity, race, nationality, gender, sex, age, physical or mental dis(ability), but also a locality they live in or their family background.

To recall Bauman once again, “[i]f political rights are necessary to set social rights in place, social rights are indispensable to make political rights 'real' and keep them in operation. The two rights need each other for their survival; that survival can only be their joint achievement” (2011: 14, emphases in original). Unless all people are granted social rights, political rights become pointless and useless. On the other hand, when there is no access to political rights, social rights are more likely to be ignored or non-existent. Social inclusion thus represents a bridge between the exclusion and human rights. Even though the concept of social inclusion is quite new, flexible and therefore there is no clear definition or an agreement on its meaning (Levitas 2005), it is important to discuss it. The term social inclusion has become an integral part of strategic documents, policies, or funding schemes. Therefore, it is crucial to discuss its meanings, tools, consequences, target groups, and remedies that might lead to a greater inclusion of marginalized groups. For a start, social inclusion might represent a multi-layered process based on a mutual acceptance and full-scale

participation of all people. Among others, it entails an active involvement and access of all people to education, work, health care, social security, but also to information and cultural activities. A social inclusion thus represents a full access to political, economic and social rights.

After forty-years-long presence of the Communist regime - one party government, closed borders, planned economy, and strong nepotism - countries of the Visegrad region face various challenges in terms of social inclusion. The brisk political and economic transformation have left enough space for establishment of various forms of inequalities among people in the Visegrad countries. Different groups live lives of different qualities. There are various symbolic, but also spatial and legal boundaries dividing different groups of citizens (Lamont and Fournier 1992). As we have already mentioned, the boundaries between the excluded and the included easily emerge around the categories such as ethnicity, religion, age, gender, sex, or a health condition. Whom do we consider to be a part of the society? Who, on the other hand, remains on its outskirts? Why? What entitles us to draw these boundaries? Who has the power to do so? Why do we draw them? What does it require? What are the consequences? And how this could be changed? These are only few of the crucial questions this reader poses. The goal of this Reader is to make the readers familiar with some of the important texts dealing with the dynamics of social inclusion and exclusion. It introduces its important dimensions, the key concepts, and theoretical and practical approaches that help to alleviate social exclusion and promote more inclusive environments. Rather than offering definite answers, this Reader aims to stimulate the interest in the issues of social inclusion and exclusion, trigger a productive discussion, and offer conceptual and theoretical support to analyze this dynamics in the real life.

The Reader is a compilation of various texts - articles, book chapters, manuals, and policy papers we find interesting and relevant in order to achieve the above-mentioned aims. It starts with the theoretical overview of the topics of discrimination, equality, solidarity, and the role of political discourses. The perspective of the introductory chapter is multidisciplinary, even though the sociological viewpoint dominates. The readers will find texts discussing a boundary construction and how and why the formation of in-groups and out-groups occurs; a paper dealing with the legal aspects of social inclusion; and texts introducing the key concepts, definitions, and discourses within which exclusive/inclusive

policies are being formulated. As Daniel Béland (2007) reminds us, social exclusion (and inclusion) represents a specific form of understanding that takes part in the construction of both - social problems and policy responses to them. How these concepts are comprehended and defined affects the design of future policies aimed at dealing with social problems. Framing the exclusion/inclusion within a particular discourse means employing specific tools in order to justify certain political decisions and thus have a direct impact on the life of people facing social exclusion.

The following chapters cover key areas in which social inclusion is a relevant and discussed issue. The texts were chosen together with the lecturers from Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, who are experienced professionals in the areas of public policies, inclusive education, conflict resolution, social innovations, and more. The thematic section of the Reader consists of chapters tackling *Inequalities in education, with texts discussing vulnerabilities* of different groups in the educational process, an impact of unequal access to education on children and communities, and they document why inclusive education is an important aim. You can find also literature on *Inclusive workplace*, focusing on employment as a crucial element of all dimensions of social inclusion, not only of its economic aspects. Being deprived of work has far reaching consequences for people's lives. Even when working, a workplace is a place where stereotypes and prejudices might appear on the daily basis. On the other hand, it is also a micro world where these can be addressed and where an inclusive and supportive environment can be formed. Public spaces are often front-line areas where we can observe an exclusion of people. Spatial segregation of certain localities, constructions preventing people to sleep on the benches or in sheltered areas, missing elevators or barrier-free ramps in the buildings, these are only few examples of how public spaces are not available to everyone. Therefore, we decided to include to this Reader a chapter on *Dynamics of social inclusion/exclusion in public space* as well as a chapter on *Social innovations as a practical inclusive tool*, with a text suggesting some ways of addressing social exclusion from the practical point of view. It introduces social innovations and gives some ideas on how to work creatively while keeping inclusion at the top of the interest. Recently, far right wing politicians and groups gain support all over Europe. We find it important to include into the Reader literature on *Social norms, direct contact* as well as on *Prejudice and de-radicalisation*.

We dedicated the final section of the Reader to research, particularly to guidelines and hints on preparation of a good research proposal. Numerous people in the Visegrad countries are affected by the dynamics of social inclusion and exclusion every day and there are several aspects of these processes that deserve academic attention. Research in this field can help us to make the complex phenomena more tangible. As academicians and researchers, we can add a piece to the understanding of reasons and impacts of social exclusion and inclusion in the society and help the practitioners to address the issues more precisely.

The set of the texts in this Reader offers a complex outlook on the dynamics of social exclusion and inclusion, however, respective chapters can be also read separately. The Reader further documents that understanding of this dynamic may require a multidisciplinary approach which builds on an expertise from different fields. We would thus like to encourage the students and other readers to open their minds and become creative in thinking about different ways the inclusive environment can be created not only in the areas depicted by the Reader, but also in their immediate environment.

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1.1 Core Solidarity, Ethnic Outgroup, and Social Differentiation

THREE

Core Solidarity, Ethnic Outgroup, and Social Differentiation

Theorists of Western development have been hard put to account for the ethnic and racial conflicts that have created the recent wave of nationalist and separatist movements in industrial societies. For developing nations, such conflicts are to be expected; they are part of the "transition" period. But after industrial society is firmly established, it is believed such divisions will become residual, not systematic or indeed intensifying contradictions. (Marx 1848 [1955]; Tonnies 1887 [1957]; Weber 1904 [1958]; Durkheim 1893 [1947]).

This theoretical difficulty is fundamental; its roots lie in the complex history of Western development itself. Theories of nation building are products of Enlightenment thinking, generated by the twin revolutions of political nationalism and industrialism. As the analytic translation of these social developments, they have been rationalistic in the extreme, sharing a utilitarian distaste for the nonrational and normative and the illusion that a truly modern society will soon dispense with such concerns.

One antidote to this theoretical failing is increased sensitivity to secular myth and cultural patterns, phenomena with which theorists have been increasingly concerned (Geertz 1973a; Bellah 1970). But solidarity is the more crucial theoretical dimension for problems of emergent ethnicity and nationalist conflicts. The concept of solidarity refers to the subjective feelings of integration that individuals experience for members of their social groups. Given its phenomenological character, solidarity problems

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clearly diverge from those of economics and politics, which concern themselves, respectively, with scarcity and the self-conscious organization of goals. Yet solidarity also differs from problems of culture, which are oriented toward meaningful patterns relatively abstracted from specific time and space. Thus, although integrative exigencies are not generated by purely instrumental considerations, they are more concrete than "values." In contrast to values, social solidarity refers to the structure of actual social groups. Like religion, politics, and economics, solidarity constitutes an independent determinant of human societies and a fundamental point for sociological analysis (Shils 1975a; Parsons 1967a, 1971; Alexander 1978, 1983; cf. Nakane 1970, Light 1972).

*"Inclusion" and the Paradigm
of Linear Evolution*

Solidarity becomes a fundamental factor because every nation must, after all, begin historically. Nations do not simply emerge out of thin air, for example, as universalistic, constitutional entities. They are founded by groups whose members share certain qualitatively distinct characteristics, traits around which they structure their solidarity. No matter what kind of future institutions this "core group" establishes, no matter what the eventual liberalism of its social and political order, residues of this core solidarity remain.

From the perspective of the integrative problem, national development can be viewed as a process of encountering and producing new solidary outgroups (cf. Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1975). With religious and economic rationalization, new sects and social classes are created. With territorial expansion and immigration, new ethnic groups are encountered (cf. E. Weber 1976). In response to these developments, pressures develop to expand the solidarity that binds the core group. In this way, nation building presents the problem of "inclusion" (Parsons 1967b, 1971).

I define inclusion as the process by which previously excluded groups gain solidarity in the "terminal" community of a society. Two points are crucial in this definition. First, inclusion refers to *felt* solidarity, not simply to behavioral participation. Pariah groups that fill crucial social roles—like Western Jews in the Middle Ages or Indians in post-Colonial

Uganda—are not “included.”* Second, I am concerned here specifically with a society’s terminal community (Geerts 1973b). A dominant focus of the American tradition of race relations and ethnicity studies has focused almost exclusively on the primary group level, on whether individuals join the same clubs, make the same friends, and intermarry (Gordon 1964). While such questions are certainly significant, morally as well as intellectually, they cannot provide the only important focus for historical and comparative analysis. In defining the terminal community as the widest solidary group with which individuals feel significant integration, I am referring to those feelings that, extending beyond family and friends, create the boundaries of acknowledged “society.” Whether this terminal community is narrow and limiting or is expansive enough to encompass a range of particular groupings—this question is as ramifying an issue as the level of economic or political development or the nature of religious belief. Inclusion, then, refers to a change in solidary status. To the degree that individuals are felt to be full members of the terminal community they have to that degree been “included.”

Inclusion can be measured by the degree to which the terminal community has become more “civil” and less “primordial.” The latter refer to the given, seemingly natural ties that structure solidarity—race, territory, kinship, language, even religion (Geerts 1973b, Shils 1975b). To the degree that people share any one of these traits, they will feel direct, emotional bonds. Primordial ties are necessarily few. In aboriginal society, where the “world” ended at the farthest waterhole, sex, kinship, age, and territory presented the principal axes for solidary identification.

Civil ties, on the other hand, are more mediated and less emotional, more abstract and self-consciously constructed. Instead of referring to biological or geographic givens, they refer to ethical or moral qualities associated with “social” functions and institutions. The emergence of civil ties can be seen as a process of differentiation, one that parallels the movements toward economic, political, and religious differentiation that have been the traditional foci of modernization theory. Membership in the terminal community must, in the first place, be separated from mem-

*At its extreme, such purely behavioral participation by outgroups forms the basis of “plural societies,” in the terminology developed by Kuper and Smith (1969; Kuper, 1978). In their terms, I am dealing in this essay with the causes and consequences of different degrees of pluralization in the industrial West, a subject to which plural societies theory has not yet devoted significant attention.

bership in particular kinship groups and, more generally, from biological criteria. This community solidarity must also be differentiated from status in the economic, political, and religious community.

The primordial-civil continuum, then, provides an independent criterion for evaluating the inclusion process. This standard has usually, however, been applied in an artificial, linear way even by those theorists who have taken the integrative problem seriously. From Hegel and Tocqueville to Parsons, the transition from primordial to civil solidarity has been envisioned as rigidly interlocked with political and economic transformation. The ideal-typical point of origin is the narrow moral basis of Banfield's "backward society," a self-contained village where identification scarcely extends beyond the family to the town, let alone to occupation, class, or even religious affiliation (Banfield 1959). This primordial community is then transformed in the course of modernization into Durkheim's organic solidarity, Parsons' societal community, or Tocqueville's mass democracy; given the expansive civil ties in the latter societies, individuals "rightly understand" their self-interest (Durkheim 1893 [1933]; Tocqueville 1835 [1945]; Parsons 1971).

To a significant degree, such a universalizing transformation in solidarity has, indeed, characterized the modernization process. In the Western Middle Ages, the Christian Church provided the only overarching integration that bound distinct villages and estates. It was, after all, the Papal bureaucracy that created the territorial jurisdictions of Gallia, Germania, Italia, and Anglia long before these abstract communities ever became concrete groupings (Coulton 1935:28-29). It did so, fundamentally, because Christian symbolism envisioned a civil solidarity that could transcend the primordial ties of blood (Weber 1904 [1958]). Similarly, alongside the officers of the Church, the King's henchmen were the only medieval figures whose consciousness extended beyond village and clan. To the degree the King and his staff succeeded in establishing national bureaucracies, they contributed enormously to the creation of a civil terminal community, despite the primordial qualities that remained powerfully associated with this national core group (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1939:8-21; cf. Eisenstadt 1963). Economic development also has been closely intertwined with the extension of civil ties, as Marx himself implicitly acknowledged when he praised capitalism for making "national one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness . . . more and more impossible" (Marx 1848 [1955]: 13; cf. Landes 1969:1-40).

Civil solidarity is, in fact, fundamentally linked to differentiation in these other structural dimensions. Only if religion is abstracted from the earthly realm and oriented toward a transcendent, impersonal divine source can "individualism" emerge, i.e., an accordance of status to the individual person regardless of social position (Little 1969, Walzer 1965). Only with political constitutionalism, which is closely related to such religious developments (Friedrichs 1964), can groups respond to injustice, not in terms of reasserting primordial unity, but in terms of defending their rights as members of the wider community (Bendix 1964 [1977]). Only with the functional, impersonal form of industrial organization can positions be awarded on the basis of efficiency rather than in terms of kinship, race, or geographical origins. Civil solidarity cannot, however, simply be considered the reflection of these other differentiations. Not only does it constitute an independent, nonresidual dimension with which these institutional developments interact. It occurs, in addition, through particular, concrete mechanisms that, in responding to these developments, create wider solidarity: through more efficient transportation and communication, increased geographical and cultural mobility, urbanization, secular education, mass and elite occupational mobility and intermarriage, and increasingly consensual civic ritualization (cf. E. Weber 1976; Goode 1963:28-80; Lipset and Bendix 1960; Shils and Young 1975 [1956]:135-52).*

*Although few of the treatments of these mechanisms sufficiently relate them to the distinctive problem of solidarity, the last mechanism I have cited, civic ritualization, is rarely given any attention at all. By civic ritual I refer to the affectively charged, rhetorically simplified occasions through which a society affirms the solidary bonds of its terminal community. Such consensual rituals, microcosms of which are repeated in local milieu, include everything from the funeral ceremonies of powerful leaders to the televised dramas of national political crises (see my discussion of Watergate in chapter 5) and the spectacles of national sport championships. One crucial symbolic element often invoked by these rituals is directly relevant to the crucial historical position of any society's core group, namely, the element of "national ancestors." Every system of national symbolism involves a myth of creation, and these narrative stories must be personified in terms of actual historical persons. These ancestors become an ascriptive "family" for the members of the terminal community, as, in America, George Washington is viewed as the "father" of the American nation. As the personification of the founding core group, ethnic composition of these symbolic national ancestors is crucial, and the solidary history of a nation can be traced in terms of shifts in their purported ethnicity. In the United States, for example, there has been a struggle over whether the black leader, Martin Luther King, will be accorded such symbolic founding status. The creation of a national holiday honoring his birthday may have resolved this in the affirmative, but it is still too early for a definitive answer.

But although these systemic linkages are certainly correct, there has been a strong tendency to conflate such abstract complementarity with empirical history. Theorists of solidarity have themselves been infected by Enlightenment rationalism. From the beginning of Western society, in fact, "progressive" thinking has confidently proclaimed purely civic solidarity to be the "future" of the human race, whether this future lay in the Athenian polis, Roman law, the universal brotherhood of Christianity, the social contract, the General Will, or in classless communism.* But in historical reality differentiation is not a homogeneous process. It occurs in different spheres at different times, and these leads and lags have enormously complex repercussions on societal development (Smelser 1971, Vallier 1971, Eisenstadt 1973, E. Weber 1976). As an autonomous dimension, solidarity varies independently of developments in other spheres. As a result, civic integration is always unevenly attained. Indeed, the newly created, more expansive associations that result from differentiation will often themselves become, at some later point in time, narrowly focused solidarities that oppose any further development. This is as true for the transcendent religions and nationalist ideologies that have promoted symbolic and political differentiation as for the economic classes, like the bourgeoisie and proletariat, which after a triumphant expansion of cosmopolitanism have often become a source of conservative antagonism to the wider whole.

Most fundamentally, however, civil integration is uneven because every national society exhibits a historical core. While this founding group may create a highly differentiated, national political framework, it will also necessarily establish, at the same time, the preeminence of certain primordial qualities.† While members of noncore groups may be extended full legal rights and may even achieve high levels of actual institutional participation, their full membership in the solidarity of the national community may never be complete (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1975). This tension between core and civil solidarity must inform any theory of inclusion in industrial societies.

*Even when anticivil developments are acknowledged, they tend to be treated as deviant eruptions from the purely civil mode, as in Nolte's penetrating analysis of Fascism as an "anti-transcendent" ideology or in Mosse's analysis of blood as the common denominator of German "Volk" culture (Nolte 1965, Mosse 1964).

†This general statement must be modified in applying this model to developing rather than to developed nations. Although every society does have a historical, solidary core, the artificiality of the creation of many postcolonial societies leaves several founding ethnic blocs in primordial competition rather than a single founding group.

*A Multidimensional Model: The Internal and
External Axes of Inclusion*

My focus here is on the problem of ethnic, not class, inclusion. I define ethnicity as the real or perceived primordial qualities that accrue to a group by virtue of shared race, religion, or national origin, including in the latter category linguistic and other cultural attributes associated with a common territorial ancestry (cf. Schermerhorn 1970:12).

Inclusion of an ethnic outgroup depends on two factors: (1) the external, or environmental, factor, which refers to the structure of society that surrounds the core group; (2) the internal, or volitional, factor, which refers to the relationship between the primordial qualities of core group and outgroup. The external factor includes the economic, political, integrative, and religious systems of society; the more differentiated these systems are, the more inclusion becomes a legitimate possibility. In contrast to this external reference, the internal factor is more volitional: to the degree that primordial complementarity exists between core group and outgroup, members of the core group will tend to regard inclusion as a desirable possibility. Finally, although both internal and external factors can be measured behaviorally, their most significant impact is subjective and phenomenological. To the degree that the environment is differentiated and primordiality is complementary, the felt boundaries of the terminal community will become more expansive and civil.

While remaining systematic, this general model takes into account a wide range of factors. Each factor can be treated as independently variable, and by holding other factors constant, we can establish experimental control. Of course, such a general model cannot simply be tested; it must also be specified and elaborated. This can be accomplished by at least two different strategies.

Taking a purely analytic approach, we may trace the effects of varying each factor in turn. We can demonstrate, for example, that in terms of the external environment, differentiation in every social sphere—not simply changes in solidarity itself—has consequences for the structure of terminal integration. In South Africa, for example, while the divergence among primordial qualities remained fairly constant, more differentiated *economic development* ramified in ways that enlarged core and outgroup interaction and increased the pressures on the rigidly ascribed political order (cf. Kuper 1969). Similarly, while primordial anti-Semitism re-

mained unchanged and legal restrictions were unaltered, European mercantilism created important opportunities for the exercise of Jewish financial expertise, whose recognition eventually had wide-ranging repercussions. In nineteenth-century America, on the other hand, the black outgroup was not drawn first into qualitatively more differentiated economic production. While the primordial separation between black and Caucasian Americans remained constant, the Civil War initiated changes in the *legal system* that differentiated some (if not all) individual rights from racial qualities. As an example of variation in the *political environment*, we can refer to the processes often initiated by the construction of certain great empires. By differentiating overarching bureaucracies and impersonal rules, conquerors like Alexander and Napoleon opened up opportunities for excluded groups, like the Jews, in nations where the primordial distinctions between core group and outgroup, and other structural characteristics as well, had remained relatively unchanged.

Although the relative differentiation of religion constitutes another variable in the inclusion process, as I have indicated in the first section of this chapter and will illustrate further below, the contrast between Protestantism and Catholicism, both relatively transcendent religions, is instructive for the kinds of specifications that must be introduced in applying this model to the complexity of a concrete historical case. Whereas the greater symbolic abstraction and institutional differentiation of Protestantism, especially the Puritan variety, is generally more conducive to inclusion than Catholicism, in the exclusion produced by slavery the reverse has often been true, as the contrast between Anglo-Saxon and Iberian slave conditions has demonstrated (Elkins 1969). Indeed, in the particular conditions of slavery, two of the most traditionalistic aspects of Iberian Catholicism were particularly conducive to black inclusion: (1) Its relative paternalism generated a greater concern for the well-being of outgroups than the more individualistic voluntary principle of Protestant societies did; (2) The Catholic fusion of church and state encouraged religious interference in the political and legal order to an extent unheard of in Anglo-Saxon societies.

These broad structural changes in "external environment" have affected solidarity through the kinds of specific integrating mechanisms I outlined above: through increased interaction as effected through geographic and economic mobility, increased economic and political participation, expanded education and communication, and intermarriage. Significant

numbers of American blacks, for example, later used their upgraded legal status to emigrate to urban areas, where the racially based qualifications for economic and political participation could not be so easily enforced. Small but influential segments of European Jewry (the *Schutzjuden*, or "Protected Jews") used the limited political immunity generated by their economic prowess to gain access to the secular, homogenizing culture of nineteenth-century Europe. By the same token, it was participation in South Africa's differentiated economic life that produced for the non-whites increased access to universalistic culture through education, and economic and geographical mobility through, in part, expanding urbanization (Doxey 1961:85-109; Van der Horst 1965; Van den Berghe 1965:86, 279-80). In fact, it was precisely to inhibit and control these mechanisms—to protect core group domination from the effects of societal differentiation—that Apartheid was first introduced by the Afrikaner Nationalist elite (Kuper 1960; Van den Berghe 1965; cf. Blumer 1965).

We may, on the other hand, hold environmental factors constant and trace the effects of variation in the internal factors. Probably the most significant illustration of variation in primordial complementarity and its relation to inclusion is the widespread phenomenon of finely graded color stratification (cf. Gergen 1968). In Mexico, where light Spanish or *criollo* complexion has traditionally defined the racial core, *mestizos*, or mixed bloods, are granted significantly more inclusion than the darker skinned Indians. This continuum from the light to dark color has created a finely graded series of "internal" opportunities for inclusion. The same kind of color gradation, from black to "colored" to white affects access to the internal environment in South Africa. The rule in both cases is based on the complementarity criterion: members of a solidary outgroup have access to the degree their racial traits are conceived as closer to those of the core group. Similar kinds of gradations could be established along the dimensions of religion and national origins, as I illustrate in part 3. Variation in these internal factors facilitates inclusion by affecting the kinds of structural mechanisms I have cited above. And the latter, of course, affect the way the complementarity criterion manifests itself in turn. Thus, while Peru exhibits the same grading of color, darker "mixed blood" has gained significantly less inclusion there than in Mexico. This variation can be explained by the interaction of color with the greater differentiation of Mexican social structure, produced by the contrast be-

tween Mexican and Peruvian colonial development and by the impact of the Mexican Revolution (Harris 1964:36-40).

Having outlined the major analytic features of this inclusion model, in the following I seek to demonstrate its applicability via a specific case study.¹

*The Model Applied: The Uneven Inclusion of Europeans,
Asians, and Africans in the United States*

In discussing the U.S. case, I compare inclusion for European and non-European immigrants and consider, within each category, the variation in both internal and external factors.

The social system that confronted mass European immigration after 1820 presented, by the standards of its time, an unusually "civil" structure. In large part, this depended on America's historical past, or perhaps the lack of one (Hartz 1955; Lipset 1965:1-233). Without an American feudalism, there existed no aristocracy that could monopolize economic, political, and intellectual prerogatives on a primordial basis. Similarly, without the legacy of Catholicism and an established Church, spiritual domination and monopolization were less viable possibilities (Bellah 1970:168-89).

As a result of this legacy, and other historically specific factors as well, institutional life in America was either unusually differentiated or, at least, open to becoming more so. Schumpeter's notion of an open class system applies more to the early American nation than to Europe, for while geographical and economic mobility did not eliminate the American class structure, they guaranteed that actual class membership fluctuated to a significant degree (Thernstrom 1974). Although America had an unusually weak national bureaucracy, the political system was differentiated in other important ways. The combination of strong constitutional principles and dearth of traditional elites generated early party conflict and encouraged the allocation of administrative offices by political "spoils" rather than according to the kind of implicit kinship criteria inherent in a more traditional status-based civil service. Wide distribution of property, plus populist opposition to stringent electoral qualifications, meant significant dispersion of the franchise. Finally, the diversity and decentralized character of Protestant churches in America encouraged the proliferation of

pietistic religious sects and voluntary denominationalism rather than religious establishment (Miller 1956:16-98, 141-52; 1967:90-120, 150-62; Mead 1963:12-37 and chapter 2, above). The transcendent, abstract quality of Anglo-American Protestantism also made it conducive to the secularization of intellectual and scientific discussion and to the emergence of public, nonreligious education.

This external situation must be balanced, however, against the internal one. Despite its relatively civil structure, this American nation had been founded by a strong, self-conscious primordial core. White in race, Anglo-Saxon and English-speaking in ethnicity, intensely Protestant in religious identity, this "WASP" core group sought to maintain a paradox that, though hypocritical, was rooted in the historical experience of the American nation. They asserted that American institutions, while differentiated and civil, were, at the same time, permeated by certain primordial qualities (Jordan 1968). And, indeed, although this was a basic factor in American race relations from the outset, until the 1820s and 1830s this anomaly was not severely tested within the white society. During the seventeenth century, European immigrants were almost entirely English, and though the sources of immigration varied more in the eighteenth century, the nation's English and Protestant primordial core could still conceivably be identified with the institutional structure of the nation (Hansen 1940; Handlin 1957:23-39).

Between 1820 and 1920, America experienced massive immigration from a wide variety of European nations. As the core group tried to defend its privileged position, this process produced waves of xenophobic sentiment and exclusionary movements (Higham 1969). Yet by the middle of the present century, these outgroups had achieved relatively successful inclusion (Glazer 1975:3-32), at least within the limits established by the necessarily historical roots of national identity (Gordon 1964; Glazer and Moynihan 1963).

In terms of the internal, volitional factor in inclusion, the points of conflict and accommodation in the immigration process must be assessed in terms of the congruence between primordial solidarities (Hansen 1940; cf. Schooler 1976). While the Caucasian homogeneity of outgroup and core group prevented racial conflict, significant polarization still occurred between the WASP core and non-English immigrants. The division was most intense, however, between core and Northern European immigrants,

on one side, and Southern European groups on the other (Handlin 1957:75, 85; Higham 1969). Southern Europeans, after all, differed more strikingly from the core in national culture and language. Although this national conflict was partly offset by the Christianity that most immigrants shared, antipathy between Catholic and Protestant made the religious variable another significant point of ethnic cleavage.

In the actual empirical process of inclusion, these points of internal cleavage and convergence were combined in a variety of ways (Parsons 1967b; Blauner 1972:56, 68). The Irish, for example, played an important bridging role, for while sharing certain vital cultural and linguistic traits with the English core, their Catholicism allowed them to interpenetrate on the religious dimension with the later, more intensely excluded Catholic group, the Italians (cf. Handlin 1951 [1973]:116–24). Similarly, although the Jews were disliked for specifically religious reasons, this tension was partially offset by racial and national convergence, particularly in the cases of Northern European Jews like the Germans. Between the Christian core group and Eastern European Jewish immigrants, in fact, German Jews often played a mediating role like that of the Irish Catholics to the Southern Europeans (Howe 1976).

After they had become naturalized citizens, and within the limitations established by their primordial divergence, these European immigrants took advantage of the openings presented by differentiation in the external environment to contest the privileged position of America's WASP core (Handlin 1951 [1973]). According to their respective origins and special skills, groups took different institutional paths toward inclusion. Catholics used American disestablishment to gain religious inclusion and legitimacy, and Catholicism gradually became transformed into one Christian denomination among many (Ahlstrom 1972:546–54, 825–41). In the big cities, Catholics used America's party structure and spoils system to build political power. Jews, on the other hand, parlayed their urban-economic background into skills that were needed in the industrializing economic system (Blauner 1972:62–63). Later, the Jewish emphasis on literacy—which in its similar Old Testament emphasis on the “word” partly neutralized the Protestant religious cleavage—helped Jews gain access to the intellectual and scientific products of America's secular culture.

The internal and external situation that confronted America's non-European immigrants—those from Africa and Asia—was strikingly differ-

ent.* In terms of primordial qualities, the divergence was much more intense. Racial differences created an initial, highly flammable cleavage, one to which Protestant societies are particularly sensitized (Elkins 1969; Tannenbaum 1969; Bellah 1975:86-112). Asians and Africans were also distinguished more sharply in the religious dimension, for few shared the majority's commitment to Christianity. In fact, as "non-Christians," blacks were in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as often the butt of religious slurs as they were of racial epithets. Superimposed on these religious and racial dimensions was the sharp divergence between non-Europeans and the American core in terms of national origins, viz., long-standing American fantasies about "darkest Africa" and the "exotic Orient" (Light 1972; Blauner 1972:65).

Not only were national traditions and territory more disjunctive, but also there existed no common linguistic reference or (for Africans at least) urban tradition to bridge the gap (Blauner 1972:61; Handlin 1957:80-81). The WASP core group, and indeed, the new European immigrants themselves, reacted strongly against such primordial disparity: the history of mob violence against Chinese and blacks has no precedent in reactions against European immigrants.

Equally important in the fate of these immigrants, however, was the nature of the external environment they entered (cf. Blauner 1972). Entering as slaves in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, blacks were without legal right^o. Because their participation in American institutional life was at every point legally fused with the biological criteria of race, they faced a closed, not an open and differentiated, social system. Although the circumstances were much less severe for the Chinese immigrants who entered in mass in the 1850s, their common status as indentured labor sharply limited their mobility and competitiveness in the labor market (Bean 1968:163-65; Lyman 1970:64-77). This external inhibition exacerbated primordial antagonism, and the California state legislature passed a series of restrictive pieces of legislation that further closed various aspects of institutional life (Lyman 1970:95-97). Similarly, whereas the Japanese did not face any initial external barriers, the primordial reaction against the agricultural success of immigrant Japanese

*A complete picture of the U.S. situation would have to include also the core group conquest of the native North American Indian civilization and the incorporation of the Mexican population of the Southwestern United States. Although I believe that these more explicitly colonial situations can be analyzed within the framework presented here, specific variations must be introduced. See the section that follows in the text.

farmers produced California's Alien Land Law, which fused farm ownership with naturalized citizenship, a status denied to all non-Caucasian, first-generation immigrants (Bean 1968:332-35; Modell 1970:106-10). This law partly undermined their agriculture production, forcing masses of Japanese into the cities (Light 1972:73-74). At one time or another, then, each non-European group faced a social environment that was "fused" to one degree or another. Simply in terms of external factors alone, therefore, non-European immigrants could not as easily transform their numbers into political power, their economic talents into skills and rewards, and their intellectual abilities into cultural accomplishments.

Uneven institutional differentiation and internal primordial divergence together generated massive barriers to African and Asian inclusion that protected not only the WASP core group but also the partially included European immigrants. To the degree that American blacks and Asians have moved toward inclusion, it is the result of accommodation on both these fronts. In terms of internal factors, widespread conversion not only to Christianity but also to "Americanism," the adoption of the English language, and the assumption of an urban life style have had significant impact, as have the changing religious sensitivities of the Christian majority and the continued secularization of American culture.

On the external side, institutional differentiation has opened up in different dimensions at different times. With the legal shift after the Civil War, economic and cultural facilities (Lieberson 1980:159-69) began to be available for some blacks, particularly for those who immigrated to Northern cities after the First World War. Only after further legal transformation in the 1950s and 1960s, however, has political power become fully accessible, a political leverage that in turn has provided greater cultural and economic participation. In the Asian case, discriminatory legislative enactments were gradually overturned in the courts and formally free access to societal resources was restored by the end of World War II. Two facts explain the remarkably greater rate of Asian inclusion as compared to black. First, their great "external" advantages allowed Chinese and Japanese immigrants to preserve, at least for several generations, the resilient extended-kinship network of traditional societies (Light 1972; cf. Eisenstadt 1954). Second, the core group's primordial antipathy was, in the end, less intense toward Asians (Lieberson 1980:366-67), whose racial contrast was less dramatic, traditional religion more literate, and national origins more urbanized and generally accessible.

*A Note on the Model's Application
to the Colonial Situation*

Although I have developed this model specifically with reference to relatively modernized Western societies, I would like to comment briefly on its relevance to the colonial situation, both because the notion of "internal colonialism" has been recently applied to these Western societies (Blauner 1972; Hechter 1975; see note 1, below) and because colonial and post-colonial societies have themselves been so vitally affected by the modernization process.

As a form of ethnic domination that usually combines a highly fused external environment with vast primordial disparity, the prototypical colonial situation must be viewed as the polar opposite of solidary inclusion. For this reason, and because colonization has involved the initial and often continual application of force, there has been a strong tendency to perceive colonialization in a theoretically undifferentiated way, as initiating a system of total domination that can end only in secession and revolution. From the perspective developed here, this perception is in error: the colonial situation is subject to the same kind of analytic differentiation and internal variation as any other relationship between core group and subordinate outgroup. Indeed, every core group, whether in the West or in the third world, rests initially upon some form of colonialization. Early Parisians colonized the territorial communities that later composed France, much as later Frenchmen tried to incorporate, much less successfully, the North African Algerian community. Similarly, the difference is only one of degree between the aggressive nation building initially undertaken with the island, now called England, by the English core group; the subsequent domination by the English nation over its neighboring communities in the British Isles; and the later English colonization of the non-British empire.

Resolution of the colonial situation, then, varies according to the same analytic factors as the inclusion or exclusion of outgroups in Western societies does. Although the rigidity of later colonial situations has often produced radicalized nationalist movements for ethnic secession (see the section following), there have been alternative developments. The case of Great Britain is instructive in this regard (for background, see Beckett 1966, Bulpitt 1976, Hanham 1969, Hechter 1975, Mitchison 1970, Norman 1968, Philip 1975, Rose 1970, 1971).

Although Wales, Scotland, and Ireland were all incorporated involuntarily, the nature of the external political factor by which this colonization was accomplished was crucial for later events. The early military domination of Ireland by the still highly traditional English state was far harsher than the later incorporation of Wales and Scotland by an English state much more committed to bureaucratic and, in the case of Scotland, constitutional organization. This initial political variation created a crucial context for the critical primordial relation of religion, helping to determine the relative success of England's attempts to incorporate these colonies into Reformation Protestantism. Scotland and Wales were successfully "reformed"; Ireland was not. In combination with the territorial discontinuity of Ireland, this internal factor created the basis for the much more passionate primordial antipathy that developed between Ireland and England. It also prevented the kind of elite intermingling that helped to further mitigate primordial antagonism between England and the other colonies. On the basis of this primordial religious antagonism, the relatively undifferentiated condition of English church-state relations became crucial to Irish development, producing the fusion of economic, political, and religious position that was unknown to Wales and Scotland. This, in turn, set the stage for the harsh settlement communities that finally transformed the Irish-English relation into the kind of rigid and exploitative situation that is so close to the traditional "colonial" one. Finally, only in this multidimensional historical context can the divergent responses to English industrialization be properly understood. Whereas the vast differentiation of the English economy that occurred in the nineteenth century produced significant leverage for the Welsh and Scots, the Irish were unable to take advantage of this opportunity for inclusion to any comparable degree. Indeed, in Ireland, this industrialization actually helped to create the internal resources for national emancipation.

In such rigid colonial situations, if economic and cultural mobilization do not lead to successful secessionist movements (see below), they may trigger, instead, extraordinary efforts at core group protection. In South Africa, Apartheid was instituted only in 1948, after intensifying economic, political, and cultural modernization threatened to open up various spheres to African participation (Doxey 1961; Van der Horst 1965). In terms of the model proposed here, Apartheid represents an attempt to isolate the "mechanisms" of inclusion—urbanization, geographical and economic mobility, education, communication, intermarriage—from the

underlying processes of differentiation that produced them. Using formally legitimate coercion, Apartheid tries to link each of these mechanisms to the primordial dimension of race. It establishes racial "tracks" for job training, urbanization, education, intermarriage, sexual intercourse, spiritual action, public association, and communication (Kuper 1960). In this strategy of coping with increased differentiation through government-induced and government-legitimated racialism, the Apartheid strategy resembles the Nazi one. Just as Nazism went beyond the merely conservative antidemocratic regimes of an earlier Germany because the latter could no longer manage the strains of a rapidly and unevenly differentiating society, so Apartheid is the kind of radical, violent response to a challenge to core solidarity that occurs only in an industrial society undergoing rapid modernization. In both German Nazism and South African Apartheid, this more radical opposition to change was carried out by the more insecure older social groups, in Germany by segments of the lower middle class, in South Africa by the Afrikaner (not the British) Nationalist party.

If traditional colonization could create such different outcomes depending on the particular content of external and internal relationships, the fate of so-called "internal colonies" in contemporary industrial societies must surely be considered in an equally differentiated way. Only such a sensitivity to analytical variations, for example, can explain the kind of divergent experiences of the descendants of Mexicans, Africans, Indians, Japanese, and Chinese—all of whom have been considered colonized groups—in the United States today.

The Process of Inclusion and Ideological Strategies

Structural dislocations, of course, do not directly imply social mobilization. However, with the single exception of diaspora communities, solitary exclusion will, eventually, provoke mobilization designed to equalize outgroup position vis-à-vis the core. The nature of these struggles and the kind of ideological strategies the outgroups assume will be related closely to the structural bases of their exclusion. Three ideal-typical strategies may be distinguished.

Assimilative Movements and "Equal Opportunity." Assimilation may be defined as the effort to achieve full institutional participation through identification with the primordial qualities of the core group. Significant movement in this antiethnic direction will be a viable strategy only under certain conditions. If inclusion is reasonably to be viewed simply as a matter of closing the "primordial gap," fairly substantial external opportunities must exist. Assimilation is not, of course, a rationally calculated strategy. It emerges rather from the experience of relative commonality and from certain levels of actual sociation in institutional life. In the American case, both Christian and Jewish European immigrants have followed this path, as, more recently, have Asian Americans. In Britain, though there have been strong assimilative tendencies within the Scots and Welsh, these have been intertwined, as we will see, with more primordially sensitive strategies.

The conflicts within assimilative groups are between "traditionalists," who wish to maintain strong ethnic identity and are usually regarded as politically conservative, and "modernists" who seek to adopt the dominant ethnic style and most often are viewed as politically progressive. As for conflicts between assimilationists and the host society, assimilating solidary outgroups produce significant independent social and political movements only in the first generation. After this initial wave, however, they often constitute important cultural forces and widely influential ethnic spokesmen. The self-conscious stratificational principle that such assimilative spokesmen adopt is "equal opportunity" rather than "equality of results." The assimilationists' drive for equality is expressed in the desire for "social rights" like public education. Yet they simultaneously embrace the ideal of individual liberty for every member of the society, justifying their demand for limited egalitarianism on the grounds that it is necessary to sustain the principle of individual, meritocratic competition. This commitment to liberty only reflects their structural experience: for assimilative groups, constitutional, individualizing freedoms have been an effective lever in the inclusion process (Raab 1972, Glazer 1975).

Even in the limiting case of maximal external opportunity and internal complementarity, however, it is unlikely that the primordial gap will ever be completely closed. The failure to do so cannot, moreover, be traced only to the core group's historical advantage. Highly assimilated outgroups themselves often seek to maintain vestiges of primordial definition—what Weber cynically labeled ersatz ethnicity and what contem-

porary Americans admiringly call "roots." Ethnic solidarity, after all, need not have a pejorative connotation; it can contribute to the construction of social identification as such. For this reason, the concept of civil society is a limiting case. Although an assimilating outgroup disproportionately identifies with a core group, the definition of core primordality may itself be subtly changed by the very process of assimilation (cf. Glazer 1975).

Nationalist Movements and Ethnically Conscious Inclusion. In groups that experience stronger primordial divergence and face more difficult structural barriers, assimilative strategies will not predominate. To be sure, assimilation will be one reaction to solidary exclusion, and as long as efforts at inclusion continue it will remain, if only unconsciously, a significant and important strategy in breaking down the barrier of primordial divergence. Yet where solidary groups face significantly fused external structures or possess certain primordial qualities—like race or an autonomous territorial area—that cannot easily be mitigated, they will remain primordially sensitive to a significant degree. When these groups become mobilized, the stratificational principle they advocate shifts from the "balanced" endorsement of equal opportunity to more group-oriented demands for preferential treatment. As equality of results becomes more significant, the individual rights of the dominant core receive increasingly less attention (Hentoff 1964, Prager 1978; Glazer 1975, ignores these basic distinctions in his conflation of the European and non-European aspects of U.S. inclusion). This shift reflects, of course, the *relative* failure of differentiated constitutional principles and civil rights in effecting outgroup inclusion. Such an ideological transition is reflected in the "affirmative action" demands of America's racial minorities and in the demands by groups like the Welsh and Catalanians for linguistic equality in their public education.

Contrary to the assimilationist tendency, these nationalist groups do form independent social movements. In terms of struggles for actual political power, however, they usually express themselves through institutionalized party structures and economic organizations and only sporadically create vehicles that compete for power with these dominant institutions. While primordially sensitive, these movements still seek equal institutional access. Moreover, though self-consciously committed to maintaining ethnic distinctiveness, they continue to undergo a gradual process of primordial homogenization. For example, while there is sig-

nificant support in Wales for linguistic autonomy—social-psychological studies indicate much higher rates of approval for Welsh over English accents (Bourhis et al. 1973)—the actual number of Welsh speakers has greatly declined in recent years. This would seem to have been the inevitable result of meeting the other major Welsh nationalist demands, which have urged inclusion in the English core institutions of culture and economic life (Thompson 1978). Such an unintended consequence will continue to be a source of tension in nationalist movements as long as the primordially sensitive group remains committed to inclusion rather than to secession. Whether these movements continue, indeed, to seek inclusion depends on the relative flexibility of the institutional environment. In the cases of American blacks, the British Scots and Welsh, and the Spanish Catalans, these environments either have continued to be sufficiently flexible or have recently become so. Insofar as they are not, secessionist movements develop (Shils 1975a). In the case of French-Canadian Quebecois, the issue remains unresolved; their situation indicates the independent impact that social mobilization has upon basic structural dislocation.

Nationalist Movements and Ethnic Secession. Whereas efforts at ethnically conscious inclusion are only rarely committed to independent party organization, secessionist movements create political organizations that subordinate not only traditional political disagreements within the out-group but also economic divisions.

Although the line should not be drawn too sharply, two general factors are crucial in facilitating this movement toward secession. The most basic is unusual rigidity, in terms either of internal primordiality or external environment. Among primordial qualities, independent territory seems to be the most significant factor, hence, the radical nationalism so often associated with the ideal-typical colonial case. Shared territory is an "intrinsic," quasi-permanent factor around which shifts in ethnic consciousness can ebb and flow. In points of high primordial consciousness, furthermore, it allows ethnicity to be connected to the political and economic interests of every sector of the excluded group. Territory has clearly been central, for example, in the most recent movement for Scottish secession from England, where the shifting economic opportunities of center and periphery have quickly become the focus of a new, more ethnically conscious political strategy (Thompson 1978). Such factors must

interact, in turn, with external circumstances. In Ireland, for example, the secessionist drive developed much earlier and more intensively because autonomous territory was combined with the kinds of highly rigid external factors described above.

The second crucial factor in moving ethnically conscious groups from inclusive to secessionist strategies is a more idiosyncratic one: the international climate. If secessionist nationalism appears to be "the order of the day" in the mid-twentieth century, and, more recently, in industrial countries, it establishes a normative reference that will inevitably affect perceptions of the actual situation. This "demonstration effect" (Bendix 1976) or cultural diffusion (Smith 1978) is as significant for twentieth-century nationalism as for nineteenth (Kohn 1962:61-126); the anti-colonial nationalism of the postwar world is as important for explaining the timing of the European secessionist movements of the 1960s and 1970s as the upsurge in Italian nationalism was for explaining the Irish "Home Rule" movement in the 1860s. The international context can also have highly important material effects, not just moral ones, when an outside power supplies arms or financial support to national insurgents.

As the analysis in this section begins to indicate, the relation between "structural" position—in an internal and external sense—and ideological outcome is mediated in any historical situation by a series of more specific intervening variables (see Smelser 1962). Thus, although the general relation obtains, any single outgroup in the course of its development will actually experience all three of these movements. American Judaism, for example, continues to have factions that advocate Zionist secession and ethnically conscious inclusion, as well as assimilation. Furthermore, the movement toward a "structurally appropriate" strategy is never chronologically linear. American black consciousness about primordality, for example, actually began to increase during the civil rights drives of the 1960s, when the assimilative standard of "equal opportunity" was dominant and when the legal and political orders were finally becoming differentiated from biological, particularistic standards. The particular time order of ideological strategies depends upon a series of such historically specific factors, and on this more specific level conflict itself becomes an independent variable. One also wants to consider the effects of the distinction between leadership and mass. Since strong and independent political leadership so often emerges only from middle, highly educated strata, certain initial advances toward inclusion—no matter how ulti-

mately ephemeral—will usually occur before secessionist movements can forcefully emerge.

A similar issue concerns the actual motivation of solidary outgroups themselves. Certainly, there are periods when excluded groups do not actively desire inclusion, and a few groups never want it. The degree to which an outgroup experiences the desire for inclusion relates, in part, to the same internal volitional factors that affect core group receptivity to the excluded party; it also depends upon the length of time of mutual exposure and on the degree to which the external environment of the interaction is differentiated. Where the primordial gap is extreme, the external environment rigid, and the period of mutual exposure relatively short, exclusion is less likely to produce demands for solidarity inclusion. Even in this case, however, instrumental self-interest will usually produce demands for equal treatment, if not solidarity, as a strategy to alleviate unsatisfactory external conditions.

Conclusion

Given their rationalist bias, theories of nation building generally ignore the role of solidarity in societal development. Among those theorists who have discussed the integration problem, moreover, an evolutionary bias leads most to underestimate significantly the permanent importance of primordial definitions of the national community. In contrast to these prevailing perspectives, I have argued that because most nations are founded by solidary core groups, and because societal development after this founding is highly uneven, strains toward narrow and exclusive national solidarity remain at the center of even the most "civil" nation-state. Differences in national processes of ethnic inclusion—even in the industrial world—are enormous. To encompass the variation while retaining systematicity, I have proposed a multidimensional model. On the internal axis, inclusion varies according to the degree of primordial complementarity between core group and solidary outgroup. On the external axis, inclusion varies according to the degree of institutional differentiation in the host society. It is in response to variations in these structural conditions that ethnic outgroups develop different incorporative strategies—assimilation, ethnically conscious inclusion, and nationalist secession—as well as different stratificational principles to justify their demands.

Applying this general model primarily to special aspects of the inclusion

process in the United States, I have elaborated it in important ways. Yet this effort still represents only a first approximation; much further work remains before the model could truly become a theory of the middle range. For example, it would eventually have to be specified for different classes of empirical events. Thus, within the general external and internal constraints I have established, inclusion seems to vary systematically according to the different modes of outgroup contact: indentured servitude versus slavery, economic colonization versus military, colonization over groups within contiguous territories versus more territorially distinct occupation, and so forth.* This variation in turn affects the kind of external variable that is most significant in any given situation, whether the state, the economy, religion, or law.† This factor weighting is undoubtedly also affected by the kinds of historically specific "differentiation combinations" encountered in particular national societies, i.e., which institutional sectors lead and which lag. Finally, different kinds of internal combinations might also be specified; for example, a white-Anglo Saxon Catholic core group will differ in predictable ways from the WASP and a white Catholic Southern European core from a Northern European one.

I hope it is clear, however, how such further conceptualization can fruitfully draw upon the hypotheses already set forth. At a minimum, the model proposed here demonstrates not only that fundamental cleavages in developed societies can be nonutilitarian in scope and proceed along nonlinear paths, but also that within a multidimensional framework such complex strains can be conceptualized in a systematic comparative and historical manner.

NOTES

1. In terms of contemporary sociological theory, then, the animus of this chapter is directed in several directions.

While in one sense further developing the functionalist approach to differentiation theory, I am arguing for a much more serious recognition of group interest, differential power, uneven development, and social conflict than has usually characterized this tradition. My "neofunctionalist" argument begins, for example, from the intersection between neo-Marxist and Shilsian center-periphery theory and one aspect of Parsons' system theory, modifying

*For a discussion of independent political effects in the South African case, see Kuper 1965:42-56.

†These are the kinds of variables that Schermerhorn makes the central focus of his analysis, virtually to the exclusion of the factors I have discussed above.

the former and energizing the latter. I also distance myself from the conflation of ideology, model, and empirical explanation that often characterizes Parsons' work.

On the other hand, by stressing the necessity for analytic differentiation and multidimensional causality, I am arguing against Marxist and structuralist analyses, which even when they formally recognize the independence of ethnic phenomena—whose inequality they rightly insist upon—continually try to root it in "last instance" arguments. Thus, even in his sophisticated version of Marxist analysis, John Rex (1970) never accepts religion or ethnicity as truly independent variables, nor, more fundamentally, does he view the problem of solidarity as an independent dimension of social life. Concentrating mainly on the activities of labor and work, ethnic domination *per se* becomes for Rex an extrinsic variable.

Very much the same instrumental theoretical bias reduces the value of Lieberman's (1980) impressive empirical study. In his effort to explain the relative lack of success of postslavery blacks as compared with white immigrants in the United States after 1880, Lieberman tries to conceive of the "heritage of slavery" simply as a structural barrier, i.e., one that affects only the external conditions of the competition between the two groups. In this way, despite his occasional recognition of their importance (e.g., p. 366), the subjective perception of differences experienced by the groups themselves—and by the other ethnic communities involved—becomes a residual category.

I am suggesting a general process that occurs when racial and ethnic groups have an inherent conflict—and certainly competition for jobs, power, position, maintenance of different subcultural systems, and the like are such conflicts. Under the circumstances, there is a tendency for the competitors to focus on differences between themselves. The observers (in this case the sociologists) may then assume that those differences are the sources of conflict. In point of fact, the rhetoric involving such differences may indeed inflame them, but we can be reasonably certain that the conflict would have occurred in their absence. . . . Differences between blacks and whites [for example] enter into the rhetoric of race and ethnic relations, but they are ultimately secondary to the conflict for society's goodies. . . . Much of the antagonism toward blacks was based on racial features, but one should not interpret this as the ultimate cause. Rather the racial emphasis resulted from the use of the most obvious feature(s) of the group to support the intergroup conflict generated by a fear of blacks based on their threat as economic competitors. (pp. 382–83).

Without a multidimensional framework that takes cultural patterns as constraining structures in their own right—see my discussion of "structural analysis" in chapter 1, above—Lieberman is necessarily forced to conceive of subjective "discrimination" as an individualistic variable. Indeed, he links the use of discrimination not only to supposedly "psychological" studies of attitude formation but also to analyses that find inherent racial qualities of the victims themselves to be the cause for their oppression.

Finally, by stressing the strong possibility for social and cultural differentiation in Western societies and the distinction and relative autonomy of the external and internal axes of ethnic conflict, I argue against contemporary "internal colonialist" theory. This approach too often refers to domination in an undifferentiated and diffuse way and, conversely, underemphasizes the variations that characterize the histories of oppressed groups by virtue of their distinctive primordial relations to the core group and their different external environments.

For the relation between the present argument and plural society theory—which still remains relatively unsystematized—see p. 807., above.

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1.2 The Sociology of Social Inclusion

The Sociology of Social Inclusion

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Abstract

This article looks at social inclusion from a sociological perspective. It argues that sociology complements biological and other natural order explanations of social stratification. The article interrogates a variety of forms of social integration, including ostracism within 5th century B.C. Greece, 19th-century solidarism, and Goffman's mid-20th-century work on stigma. It does so to demonstrate how in each of these contexts, social inclusion and exclusion can function as apparatus that problematize people on the margins, and by extension, contribute to their governance and control. The article proposes that sociology provides a valuable orientation from which to consider social inclusion because it illuminates how social integration maintains and manages the ways in which people move about and through their socially stratified worlds.

Keywords

social inclusion, social exclusion, social integration, social stratification, sociology

We live in the state and in society; we belong to a social circle which jostles against its members and is jostled by them; we feel the social pressure from all sides and we react against it with all our might; we experience a restraint to our free activities and we struggle to remove it; we require the services of other [people] which we cannot do without; we pursue our own interests and struggle for the interests of other social groups, which are also our interests. In short, we move in a world which we do not control, but which controls us, which is not directed toward us and adapted to us, but toward which we must direct and adapt ourselves.

Gumpłowicz, 1963, p. 6

This article considers the concept of social inclusion from the perspective of sociology. In doing so, it aims to complement the work of historians, economists, psychologists, and natural scientists to better understand the origins of the social inclusion concept. It argues that action and efforts to include or exclude individuals and social groups are fundamental to society as forces that govern through the oppressive or liberating effects such inclusionary or exclusionary actions promote.

As a discipline from which to consider the social inclusion and exclusion concepts, sociology offers an excellent vantage. Sociology is well oriented to consider facets of social equality and inequality, social integration and stratification, social mobility as it relates to social inclusion and exclusion, and the functional contributions of the periphery relative to the social core. Sociology provides a needed vantage from which to consider social inclusion as it lends itself to extension beyond economic or natural fitness.

In the social world, whether one is welcomed, represented, or provided for by the mainstream, or whether one is

ostracized, ignored, or bemired, the outcome is a collection of social practices. These social practices result from various degrees of intimacy and interactions between friends, strangers, families, colleagues, kinship groups, communities, cultures, and even whole societies—all of which lend themselves to sociological study.

This article begins with a consideration of exclusion and inclusion societies across time and place, including gated communities, closed institutions, and caste systems. The article delves into what is described as the natural order of social inclusion and exclusion. It explores some of the theories and findings that have come out of such an approach, including the evolutionary and sociobiological work in the area. To make its case for a sociology of social inclusion, the article then gazes back in time to three examples: ostracism in 5th-century Athens, solidarism in 19th century France, and contemporary considerations of stigma as influenced by the work of Goffman. Building on this, the article proposes that societies which emphasize differences in social integration are structured by architectures of inclusion that govern and manage how marginal women and men inhabit social space, while functioning to maintain many of the attributes of the status quo.

Exclusion Hierarchies

More than 50 years ago, the anthropologist and sociologist David Pocock (1957) reflected that processes of inclusion and exclusion were features of all hierarchies. Pocock felt

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that in general terms, the discussion of inclusion and exclusion fed into efforts to define what might be called a social ontology, or the way that the existence and social positioning of groups in a hierarchically structured society would be explained. Such a social ontology has been described by Sibley (1995) as a landscape of exclusion; a form of social and philosophical geography that melds ideology with place in an exercise of social, economic, and political power that invariably results in forms of oppression, and in many instances, exploitation (Towers, 2005). Fredericks (2010) suggested that belongingness as experienced in everyday relations constructs the kinds of sentiments on which societies of exclusion (and inclusion) are based. Referencing the work of De Certeau (1984), Fredericks makes the case for the importance of the everydayness of belonging and attachment, and the memory and tradition it reinforces as means of appropriation and territorialization.

One example of such a landscape of exclusion is a gated community (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2002). Grant and Rosen (2009) proposed these communities exist as exclusion societies. They cite Flusty's (2004) argument that the community gates that enclose act to protect those inside from unforeseen and largely unwanted encounters with otherness. Examples given range from urban gated communities where exclusion is legitimized as spatial inequity (Flusty, 2004) to the present security fences undulating across Israel, or separating the United States from Mexico (Kabachnik, 2010).

Herbert (2008) reflected on the ways in which urban spaces in the United States and elsewhere are turned into exclusion societies through the criminalization of public spaces outside the rarefied protected enclaves shielded within gates and walls. Focusing on the disorderly, Herbert describes this exclusion as a form of modern day prohibition that cedes out the homeless, the transient; and those who loiter, panhandle, and display public drunkenness (Douglas, 1966). Herbert found that these practices of creating exclusion societies are not new; that they have and continue to be used as justifications for forms of social cleansing (Cresswell, 2006; Dubber, 2005; Duncan, 1978; Spradley, 1970).

Essentially the physical embodiment of territorial actions, exclusion societies seek to separate and compound the favored from the disfavored, and the hygienic from the dirty (Douglas, 1966; Sibley, 1995). To do this, they collectively create spaces of inclusion and exclusion, even if not all parties cede to such collectivism.

Disability, like gated communities, is another example of the ways societies create cultural spaces structured by exclusion. Kitchin (1998) described the reproductive nature of disablist practices, as assemblies that seek to ensure disabled people are kept in certain places from where they come to understand when they may be out of place. For Kitchin, social relations between the disabled and the able-bodied function to keep disabled people in their place and to signal when they may be stepping beyond this space.

Prisons, like asylums and other places that remove individuals from broader social life are additional if somewhat more extreme forms of exclusion societies. These institutions enclose the daily lives of certain social actors from broader society, replacing wider interaction with complex subcultures (Baer, 2005).

An altogether different type of exclusion society is a caste system, which relies less on geographical separation and more on social distance. A notable example is the caste system of India (Nayar, 2007). At the root of India's exclusion society are the untouchable castes whose marginal social position is owed to their relationship to impurities associated with death and organic pollution (Deliege, 1992).

Berremen (1967, referencing Davis & Moore, 1945; Lenski, 1966; Mills, 1963; Tumin, 1953), held that caste systems—unlike gated communities, inner cities, orphanages, leper colonies, asylums, and prisons—are fundamentally structures through which power and privilege are allocated via interdependent social classifications ordered by stratified and ranked divisions of labor. Mencher (1974) referenced Leach (1960) in suggesting that India's caste classifications facilitate divisions of labor free of the competition and expectations of mobility inherent in other systems.

As exclusion societies, caste systems perpetuate themselves and the positions of privilege provided to those included within them. Yet they are different from other exclusion societies because across many noncaste landscapes of exclusion, mobility is conceivable and emulation of status is possible. However, in caste systems, place within the exclusion or inclusion hierarchy is ascribed at birth (Berremen, 1967, referencing Bailey, 1957; Sinha, 1959, 1962; Srinivas, 1956, 1966). Such exclusion by ascription has an economic dimension also through the way in which untouchables are "denied control of the means of production" (Deliege, 1992, p. 170, referencing Oommen, 1984). This results in forms of deprivation and poverty that enforce dependence, deference, and ultimately acceptance.

Exclusion societies are identifiable at different places in time, space, and geography. Such societies tend to be associated with differential access to social and economic well-being, and differential proximity to illness and disease. Inclusion societies, however, evolve from within such contexts. They are characterized by movements toward greater social justice, equality, and collectivism in response to the kinds of global oppressions exclusion societies embody and perpetuate.

A Natural Order

Mechanisms of social inclusion and exclusion and the effects of these have been thoroughly investigated within the field of psychology and related disciplines. Work in this area has sought to better understand possible evolutionary origins of social inclusion and exclusion, and potential

sociobiological purposes to these different explanations of integration (Kurzban & Leary, 2001).

Eisenberger and Lieberman (2005) and MacDonald and Leary (2005) have approached inclusion and exclusion from a psychosocial and physiological perspective in which they consider how the impacts of these social practices share overlapping characteristics with our physical pain systems. Eisenberger and Lieberman reflected that our social interconnectivity is as fundamental as our most basic human needs for fire, sustenance, and shelter and that the absence of such connectivity is experienced, literally, as pain. They propose that the pain of social exclusion, separation, or rejection share many of the experiential attributes of forms of physical pain. Referencing Baumeister (2000), Eisenberger and Lieberman described how across many centuries and cultures, various forms of storytelling and artistic expression reflect how the interruption, loss, or absence of social bonds can manifest as intense experiences of human pain and suffering. They point out that the pain and suffering associated with the loss of social bonds is recognized by many legal systems also.

To help explain the social, psychological, and physical pain experienced by exclusion, Eisenberger and Lieberman (2004) developed *pain overlap theory*. This theory holds that different kinds of pain utilize elements of shared processing systems. As reflected by MacDonald and Leary (2005), among our less developed ancestors, both physical and social pain were functional in that they steered kin and other social groups from environmental and other threats, reorienting them in the direction of helpful others. As such, the social pain of exclusion was seen to have evolved as a means of responding to danger.

In detailing their *sociometer theory*, Leary, Tambor, Terdal, and Downs, (1995) explained why inclusionary and integrational practices are so fundamentally important to social interactions and how we are designed to detect them. They note that many writers have suggested that the human need to seek inclusion and to avoid exclusion is essential, and furthermore, that as a developmental trait, this orientation likely can be traced to its survival benefit (Ainsworth, 1989; Barash, 1977; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Baumeister & Tice, 1990; Bowlby, 1969; Hogan, 1982; Hogan, Jones, & Cheek, 1985).

For Leary et al. (1995), an individual's sociometer is managed through self-esteem where social inclusion and exclusion are used as mechanisms to monitor the well-being of an individual or group's social relations. These authors use the sociometer to underscore pain overlap theory by suggesting that self-esteem is a kind of inclusion detector that meters changes in the inclusionary or exclusionary positioning of individuals. From this perspective, it would be this need for detection that ultimately drives individuals to maximize their quest for inclusion while minimizing the possibility of exclusion.

Along with the overlapping pain thesis and the sociometer/self-esteem thesis, Baumeister and Leary (1995) have

posited a *belongingness thesis*. This suggests the need to belong is a fundamental human motivation. Here, along with base needs like food and shelter (Bernstein, Sacco, Young, Hugenberg, & Cook, 2010), belongingness is held to be a foundational human need that results in a general pattern whereby social inclusion is used to reward, and social exclusion to punish. The outcome is a gauge that structures both social values and comportment (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).

Whereas a sociological perspective might suggest at the societal level that there exist a series of motivations to *design* inclusive frameworks for the betterment of social life, a natural order perspective would suggest that basic human survival and reproduction benefit from the evolution of cohesive group living; that to an extent, inclusion and exclusion as components of a behavioral repertoire may have helped to ensure evolutionary and reproductive fitness (Leary et al., 1995). This thinking suggests that such fitness at the level of kin networks or community groups may mirror existing physiological traits for responding to physical pain, to also structure responses to social pain. From this perspective, the exclusion/inclusion continuum exists alongside a biologically driven, psychological reaction that leads to the adoption of a generalized dislike of social exclusion and a favoring of the maintenance of adequate inclusion (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2005; MacDonald & Leary, 2005).

Such arguments present another perspective as to why different societies and social groupings across diverse historical periods and geographical locations develop intense drives to create and strengthen social institutions around various aspects of social integration and exclusion. Yet, as the examples of ostracism, solidarism, and stigmatism will reflect, any biological *push* with regards to social stratification is accompanied by a social world *pull*. The examples of ostracism, solidarism, and stigmatism will demonstrate how at different intervals in history, it is not necessarily biological forces but instead social architectures that become employed in the creation and continuance of inclusion societies.

Ostracism

Acts and practices of including or excluding others as aspects of systems of stratification may be as old as much of humanity itself. Certainly, most societies display some degree of taboos and customs concerning forms of both social rejection and social acceptance (Douglas, 1966; Gruter & Masters, 1986; Lévi-Strauss, 1963; Radcliffe-Brown, 1952).

In institutional terms, a very early form of social exclusion is evident in the scholarship of the role of ostracism in Athens, Greece, during the 5th century B.C., when the provision of an official mechanism to institutionalize ostracism was enacted.

Although there is some debate within the works of Aristotle and Androtion as well as subsequent scholars about whether the law of ostracism originated with Cleisthenes

prior to the first official ostracism of Hipparchos, son of Charmos, in 488 B.C. (Kagan, 1961; Raubitschek, 1951; Robinson, 1939, 1945, 1946, 1952), there is consensus that the law appeared sometime in the 20 years surrounding the battle at Marathon. The law of ostracism was instituted as a means to protect young democratic institutions from the resurgence of tyranny (Raubitschek, 1951). It did so through the enactment of an *ostrakophoria* (Goligher, 1910, p. 558, referencing Carcopino, 1909; Reh binder, 1986, p. 323). Thus, ostracism was considered a democratic process in which those who were qualified to vote would “scratch onto a clay shard the name of a party leader to be banned (hence the name *ostrakismos* = shard judgment)” (Reh binder, 1986, p. 323).

As an initial incident in a series of expulsions driven by the desire for political control (Kagan, 1961), the very first political ostracism was followed by the successive exclusion of Magakles in 487-6, Xanthippos in 485-4, and Aristеides in 483-2.

As institutionalized more than 25 centuries ago, ostracism was used almost exclusively as a political weapon against male generals (Raubitschek, 1951), as a means to mitigate the influence of political rivals (Kagan, 1961) and to police and control the well-being of the state. Reh binder (1986) suggested the main aim of ostracism was to “exclude the losing party leader from the state” as “early democracy could not integrate the continuous action of opposition parties into the political process” (p. 321). To address this and to solve party conflicts, a law of ostracism essentially functioned to banish the leader of the opposition.

Importantly, Athenian ostracism was levied against an already elite class who for tyrannical activities or suspicions of tyranny were considered political liabilities or dangers. These acts did not bring shame on the recipient, but rather were prestigious, even honorable—a status reflected in the convention for the ostracized individual to retain his property, and, after his return, to regain his elite personal and social status (Reh binder, 1986).

As Aristotle wrote in *Politics*:

Democratic states institute the rule of ostracism [because] such states are held to aim at equality above anything else; and with that aim in view they used to pass a sentence of ostracism on those whom they regarded as having too much influence owing to their wealth or the number of their connexions or any other form of political strength. (Barker, 1952, p. 135, referenced in Masters, 1986, p. 390)

Ostracism as it came to be enacted in Attic democracy was not an event applied lightly or arbitrarily. It required careful deliberation, a large quorum, and the immunity of an ostracized person’s family. In essence, ostracism acted like a safety valve that ensured a smoother, more peaceful, and less tumultuous running of the state (Kagan, 1961).

As instituted at the time, the law of ostracism was seen to be successful. It so weakened the ability of potentially disruptive subversive groups to wreak havoc on society and its political systems, that in the more than 90 years between 508 and 417 B.C., no more than 20 official ostracisms took place (Ostwald, 1955).

Given that modern industrial societies increasingly tend to frown on the kinds of excluding practices as reflected in the legal practice of ostracism (Reh binder, 1986), it can be challenging to acknowledge that ostracism exists in contemporary societies also, legally through, for example, formal punishments such as imprisonment, or racial prejudice, scapegoating, and xenophobia (Gruter & Masters, 1986). For Kort (1986), ostracism can be considered as coerced or involuntary exit of an individual or individuals from the society in which they live that manifests as a range of exclusions. Thus, a society demonstrating variation in ostracism practices reflects a society with solidaristic strategies for the exclusion of its members from participation and from occupying positions of respect (Kort, 1986, referencing Masters, 1986).

Solidarism

To turn from the ostracism of 5th-century Athens to the solidarism of late-19th-century France, allows for the contrast of an early institutional approach to social exclusion with an equally enlightening historical era of inclusion.

The concept of solidarism evolved in the late-19th-century in France during a period of social, epistemological, and ontological change. It was an age when understandings of autonomy were being reconsidered by “scientism, political ideologies (especially Marxism) and the Roman Catholic Magister,” entities united in their intent to denounce an increasing vanity-like individualism (Vincent, 2001, p. 414).

Although, within this period, the idea of solidarity was not an established ethical reference, French Protestants united around this new form of solidarity known as solidarism. In doing so, the Protestants defined a path forward in their transformed identity as a social minority (Vincent, 2001).

For this underclass, being an excluded minority was not seen as a stance from which to claim social or human rights. Rather, exclusion was seen as igniting the kind of freedoms of thought and associations, which lent themselves to the reconciliation of identity-lending conceptualizations like justice and liberty (Vincent, 2001).

Although French Protestants were bound by religion, their move to solidarism is not seen as being directly related to religious teachings or directives. If anything, French Protestantism of this period was wary of “religious pietism and political liberalism and generally suspicious of any institutional expression of the desire for social justice” (Vincent, 2001, p. 415). As a result, they turned instead to groups not known as religious in connotation, such as trade associations, unions, and left-of-centre political parties.

It has been suggested that the story of solidarism is essentially the story of France's move to the welfare state. In opposing collectivism because it potentially threatened individual liberty, while promoting the empowerment of the working class, the new philosophy of solidarism countered the individualism of laissez-faire liberalism and social Darwinism. In time, solidarism would come to help to dismantle existing resistance to social reform and to usher in this new era of Welfarism (Sheradin, 2000).

Léon Bourgeois's book *Solidarité* (1998), which first appeared in 1896, is held to be a form of manifesto for the solidarism movement. In the decades prior to the First World War, the newly empowered French Radical Party were looking for a philosophy that would help them to maintain central power against the right-leaning individualists and the left-leaning collectivists (Hayward, 1961, 1963). In 1895-1896, during the short-lived Radical government of Bourgeois, he published a pamphlet titled *Solidarité* based on a series of his public letters that had appeared earlier. The main intent of this document was to advocate for a new approach, between "retreating laissez-faire liberalism and ascendant socialism." The aim of the particular piece of writing was to shine a light on "the duties that citizens owed to each other" (Koskeniemi, 2009, p. 285).

Bourgeois's *Solidarité* is seen as representing what has been described as a *belle époque* within the Third Republic (Hayward, 1963). Solidarism became the main social philosophy of his new radical party (Koskeniemi, 2009), orienting it and the nation toward what in time would become a new more inclusive state. As a new political and collective philosophy, solidarism was seen as reflective of a modernization of the revolutionary maxim: *liberty, equality, and fraternity*.

Notably, solidarism's narrative features the influences of democracy and humanism, through its belief in the development and contributions of every individual, and through its assertion of the inherent dignity of all of humanity (Sheradin, 2000).

Solidarism was committed to democracy, to the empowerment of the working class, and to 19th-century understandings of human reliance and interdependence (Sheradin, 2000). In being so committed, one can find a second meaning in this movement, one interwoven with concern over balancing self-interest with the era's philosophical humanistic ideals.

It is not surprising that among the principles of French solidarism was the belief that the liberty of human kind was not freedom absolute, but rather an understanding that free individuals were also in debt to society, to every other citizen, and to future generations (Koskeniemi, 2009).

In time, with the passing of World War I, the French Radical Party fell from favor as many of the working class shifted their allegiance to the Socialists following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 (Hayward, 1963). Ultimately, the harshness of World War I ended much of the utopian inclusivity inherent within the solidarist approach, and by

the 1920s, much of the impact and influence of solidarism had been depleted (Koskeniemi, 2009).

However, for the generation or two of those in France moved by the solidarist approach to social integration, one of the most persuasive elements of the philosophy and one that lent to its fashionableness was what Hayward (1961) described as an *open sesame* inclusive approach to mitigating the social conflicts of the era. The philosophy was meaningful to the time also because as an approach, it was not really radical at all. Rather, it melded elements of community, inclusivity, and social solidarity—all useful mechanisms to help the populace attain security against poverty, illness, unemployment, and war (Hayward, 1961).

The broad solidarism movement was oriented to the reconciliation of individual and social ethics with the belief that all citizens had the free will to interact and develop relationships with others (Vincent, 2001). Solidarism in essence acted as a shared and uniting philosophy—a precondition of the era's new approaches toward social contractuality (Foschi & Ciccioia, 2006)

For Koskeniemi (2009), the influences of these preconditions would be felt at home and abroad, playing a defining role in solaristic evolutions throughout the Spanish Civil War, World War II, the beginning forays across the continent toward the establishment of the European Union (EU), and ultimately, as the sociological lens helps reveal, trickling through Goffman's 1950s work on stigma and France's 1970s social inclusion as promoted by René Lenoir.

Stigmatism

Stigma and the act of stigmatizing is a common and recognizable form of social exclusion, yet, efforts to contend with some of the prejudices and discriminations recognized as components of stigmatization reflect forms of social inclusion.

Inherent within Goffman's (1963) work: *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, is a belief in the universality of stigma and social exclusion. Stigma as a process leads certain individuals to be "systematically excluded from particular sorts of social interactions because they possess a particular characteristic or are a member of a particular group" (Kurzban & Leary, 2001, p. 187). The concept embodies the functionality of "outsiderdom"; and the utility of why humans, as "an inherently social species with a strong need for social acceptance should be so inclined to reject members of its own kind" (Kurzban & Leary, 2001, p. 187). For Goffman and those influenced by him (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Elliott, Ziegler, Altman, & Scott, 1982; Jones et al., 1984; Kleinman et al, 1995; Schneider, 1988), stigmatization occurs when the evaluation of an individual results in that person being discredited (Kurzban & Leary, 2001).

As a sociologist, Goffman's approach was both dramaturgical and oriented toward a symbolic interactionist

perspective. His main interest was in the structure of social interactions and the rules that governed them (Goffman, 1967). For Goffman, social structures provided the context for interactions, as it was social structure that steadied and sustained social hierarchies (Scambler, 2009). Yet some have suggested that Goffman may not have sufficiently attended to political economy, or to elements considered traditionally beyond the foci of symbolic interactionists such as class, power, gender, and ethnicity (Scambler, 2006, 2009).

From a functional perspective, stigma in the natural world reflects certain biological elements. Kurzban and Leary (2001) suggested that this world is structured by a series of interconnected interactions that result in variable costs and benefits (see Whiten & Byrne, 1988, 1997). As reflected earlier, there is a universality to stigma in the sense that it has been observed in most human cultures and even in the animal kingdom (Behringer, Butler, & Shields, 2006; Buchman & Reiner, 2009; Dugatkin, FitzGerald, & Lavoie, 1994; Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2011). Examples of this near universality include territoriality in fish, birds, reptiles, and mammals, and cross-species status hierarchies and social ostracism.

Some like Kurzban and Leary (2001) sought to frame the exclusion of stigma from the perspective of biological determinism. That is, as psychological rather than social systems structured by natural selection to ease some of the challenges of sociality. The proposition is that these systems or exclusionary mechanisms often influence individuals to subconsciously exclude dangerous others from social structures and interactions (Archer, 1985). Thus, from this biologically deterministic perspective, stigma is not so much owing to the kind of negative evaluation as theorized by Goffman and colleagues, but rather to a form of protective disassociation.

Another deterministic approach to stigmatism has considered the exclusion of stigma from the perspective of disease, and specifically as a mechanism of disease avoidance. Here, the basic claim derives from several observations. First, that we tend to evaluate those who are infectious in the same way as we would evaluate other kinds of stigmatized individuals (Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, & Mentzer, 1979). Second, that the most severely stigmatized groups (i.e., those who are most avoided) are individuals who are evidently ill or who demonstrate characteristics of the ill or diseased (Oaten et al., 2011 referencing Bernstein, 1976; Heider, 1958; Kurzban, & Leary, 2001; Schaller, & Duncan, 2007). Leprosy and smallpox are but two examples. For these authors, envisioning stigma as disease-avoidance does not negate other processes that contribute to discriminatory or exclusionary behavior. Rather, it suggests that beneath or antecedent to other processes is an avoidance system that seeks to limit possible contact with infectiousness and disease (Oaten et al., 2011).

Parker and Aggleton (2003) reflected that often stigma goes undefined in academic scholarship or reverts to somewhat of a stereotypical, two-dimensional description of

exclusion. In a series of articles, these authors have argued for the development of a more nuanced conceptual framework that would go beyond the works of Goffman and of biological determinists (Parker, 2012, referencing also Parker & Aggleton, 2003, and Maluwa, Aggleton, & Parker, 2002), to think beyond evolutionary stigma or differentially valued stigma and more directly about stigma as a "social process fundamentally linked to power and domination" (Parker, 2012, pp. 165-166).

Parker (2012, referencing Stuber, Meyer, & Link, 2008) reflected that theory and research has tended to operationalize stigma either as discrimination (as in the work of Goffman, 1963) or as prejudice (as in the work of Allport, 1954). Subsequently, over the second half of the 20th century, the two foci evolved along parallel but distinctly separate directions, with the work on prejudice tending much more to tackle race, ethnicity, and associated social relations.

Yet as Parker (2012), Parker and Aggleton (2003), Link and Phelan (2001), and others have argued, discrimination and prejudice, as components or forms of stigma, share key relations with the production and reproduction of power relations.

It is arguably owing to this revisioning beyond dramaturgical performance and biological determinism that stigma can be envisioned as a somewhat supplanted component of the contemporary discourse of social exclusion and inclusion.

The suggestion that stigma is not (or not only) performed and not (or not only) determined but rather is culturally produced as a social, relational, and powerful artifact is a compelling argument (Buchman & Reiner, 2009). Equally compelling is Scambler's (2009) reflection that stigma can be a very convoluted social process, one for which sociology is well-oriented to imagine as a combination of experience, anticipation, and perception, of the harms of blame and devaluation; the fears and pain of rejection and exclusion; and the hopes and desires for acceptance and inclusion.

Social Inclusion

How cultures and societies stratify and divide; how they account for customs around inclusion, exclusion, belonging, and togetherness; and how the processes that include and exclude are talked about, described, understood, and experienced, all provide some clues as to the role of social integration and stratification within a given society. Indeed, how stratification is conceived and discussed can obscure the very nature of the processes by which such divisions come to be. This is precisely why the discipline of sociology is so useful. Unlike natural order sciences, it does more than identify and posit explanations for social divisions. Sociology, in addition to this, can reflect also on the disciplinary discourses encircling discussions of these social partitions. For example, one of the means by which stratification is conceptualized and discussed could take as a

reflective example, the pre-World War II writings of Sorokin (1998), who in considering stratification differentiated between horizontal and vertical social mobility. Sorokin suggested that horizontal mobility related to changes in occupational position or role, but not to changes within a social hierarchy, whereas vertical mobility did describe changes within the social hierarchy. Sorokin summarized his theory by reflecting that within systems of vertical and horizontal mobility, there could be individual social infiltration as well as collective social movement. Furthermore, that although it was possible to identify forms of mobile and immobile societies within different geographical and historical contexts, it was rare for a society's strata to be closed absolutely, and rare for the vertical mobility of even the most mobile society to be completely free from obstacles.

As proposed by Sorokin, these types of social movements could often vary across time and space, yet even across time, trends—particularly as they might apply to vertical mobility—were unlikely to be writ in stone. Although autocratic societies might be less mobile than democratic societies, the rule was not fixed and could have exceptions (Sorokin, 1998).

While often used to describe low or zero labor market involvement (Foster, 2000), early definitions of social exclusion in time broadened to consider barriers to effective or full participation in society (Du Toit, 2004). These types of barriers were considered to contribute to progressive processes of marginalization that could lead to deprivation and disadvantage (Chakravarty & D'Ambrosio, 2006). As the exclusion concept took on currency, it began to reflect more than a simple material nature and to begin to encompass the experience of individuals or communities who were not benefitting or were unable to benefit relative to others in society (Davies, 2005; Levitas, 1998). In time, the concept would evolve to reflect lapses in social integration and social cohesion that plagued advanced capitalist societies (Chakravarty & D'Ambrosio, 2006). It would evolve also to refer to processes that prevent individuals or groups from full or partial participation in society, as well as the crippling and reifying inability to meaningful participation in economic, social, political, and cultural activities and life (de Haan & Maxwell, 1998; Duffy, 1995, 2001; Horsell, 2006)—a definitional approach that imbues exclusion in terms of neighborhood, individual, spatial, and group dimensions (Burchardt, Le Grand, & Piachaud, 1999, referenced in Percy-Smith, 2000).

March, Oviedo-Joekes, and Romero (2006) suggested that one of the elements that unify the divergent definitional approaches to social exclusion and inclusion is that social exclusion is a process as opposed to a static end state. Further, that inclusion, in addition to being a context-based social and historical product reflective of social and national history, tends to mirror also what Silver (1995) proposed were the very limits of the borders of belonging.

Despite attempts at globally applicable definitions of social exclusion and inclusion, it has been suggested that

there will always be patterns of border shaping that are particular to specific contexts. This is in part because the weight of inclusion versus exclusion is dependent on the particulars of any given society (de Haan & Maxwell, 1998; March et al., 2006; O'Brien, Wilkes, de Haan, & Maxwell, 1997). Such society-specific particulars might take the form of traditional and historic patterns of stratification, or be based on how individual groups and/or characteristics may be valued over others. Less clear, however, is which, if any, elements of a given society or social structure may mitigate the kinds of exclusion/inclusion dynamics that may be held aloft as representative of normative practice. For example, in some social contexts, patterns of inclusion and exclusion may reflect different stages of social and economic development. Alternately, these patterns may vary by type and/or political orientation of governments, or by the religious, ethnic, or cultural makeup of a given society.

Ultimately, however, the use of inclusion and exclusion concepts has evolved to the point where within a number of contexts, they are used as a descriptor for those who represent a particular kind of threat to social harmony (Silver & Miller, 2003). In sum, the terms *social inclusion* and *social exclusion* have been used throughout the social science and humanities literature in a number of different ways—to describe acts of social stratification across human and animal societies, as a principle to reflect the ordering that occurs within societies to determine social position, and as a narrative to explain and at times justify why one or more groups merit access to the core or the periphery, to the benefit or expense of others.

Initial discourses of social inclusion are widely attributed to having first appeared in France in the 1970s when the economically disadvantaged began to be described as *the excluded* (Silver, 1995). The preliminary uses of this new parlance appeared as a means to refer to a variety of disabled and destitute groups. The government of France was among the earliest adapters of exclusion terminology, and it is there that most often the concept is suggested to have found its contemporary meaning (Silver & Miller, 2003).

As a fully documented policy response, the concept of social inclusion to counteract social exclusion emerged toward the end of the 1980s, when the European Community (EC) first used the term social exclusion (Wilson, 2006). The appearance of the term social inclusion in the rhetoric of the EC was in itself a key point of departure, in that exclusion was suddenly held to be a reflection that “poverty was no longer the right word to use to describe the plight of those marginalized from mainstream society” (Williams & White, 2003, p. 91).

Ascertaining the contemporary use of the terms social inclusion and social exclusion involves a study of diffusion of, most importantly, the applications of René Lenoir, France's Secretary of State for Social Welfare in the Chirac government of the 1970s (Davies, 2005, citing Lenoir, 1974; Pierce, 1999; Silver, 1995).

L'Inclusion Sociale

In 1965, a French social commentator, Jean Klanfer, published *L'Exclusion sociale: Étude de la marginalité dans les sociétés occidentales* [Social exclusion: The study of marginality in Western societies] (Béland, 2007). Described as an anthropology of poverty (Cl, 1968), Klanfer's work argued that society rewarded personal responsibility with inclusion and personal irresponsibility with exclusion. If the work of Bourgeois was a primary influence on the solidarism movement almost 100 years earlier, the writings of Klanfer would fuel the imagination of René Lenoir (1974), most notably in his book *Les exclus*.

In his political tome, Lenoir contended social exclusion was a result of France's postwar transition from a largely agricultural society to an urban one (Davies, 2005). While the belief was that these events could lead to poverty, Lenoir argued that they could lead to a brand of social polarization also, which challenged the *Liberté, Égalité, and Fraternité* ideals of the French Republican project.

Many have suggested that if there were a birth of the modern rhetoric of social inclusion, it would be here, in French thought that sought a means to reintegrate the large numbers of ex-industrial workers and a growing number of young people excluded from opportunities to join the labor force in the new economies of the 1970s and beyond.

According to Silver (1995) and Silver and Miller (2003), one of the reasons the inclusion and exclusion concepts resonated so strongly for the French was that in their society, the Anglo-Saxon idea of poverty was seen to essentially insult the equality of citizenry contained within the *Liberté* manifesto—an equality that, as reflected in France's late-20th-century welfare state, operationalized charity as basic social assistance in response to poverty, and as essentially a right of citizenry. Furthermore, what would come to be seen as an inclusive welfare state was held to be the most effective and civilized way to eliminate absolute material deprivation and the risks to well-being such deprivation could cause.

However, as the 1970s progressed, and as unemployment became endemic, the passage of time brought even greater numbers of those considered excluded, and with them ever-increasing reiterations of the new exclusion discourse (Silver, 1995). The result in France was a movement to protect *les exclus*. The movement was so strong that by 1998, the French posited legal codification to prevent and combat social *exclusions* (note the plural) as a means to foster universal access to fundamental human rights.

Within French Republican thought in particular, social exclusion was seen to reflect ruptures in solidarity and the social bond (*lien social*), something essentially tantamount to heresy within the French social contract. Heresy because the French social contract of the time was seen to hold (and some may argue continues to hold) reciprocity, both between the social obligations French citizens have for the French

state and the obligations that society has in return, to provide reasonable livelihoods for its members. Here, though, the accepted exceptions, as in many welfare regimes, were restricted to those who could not work due to older age, disability, or ill health, and did not extend to those whose deliberate actions and/or deliberate tendencies toward illicit pleasure, removed them from broader labor force opportunities or expectations.

In some respects, the mutuality and reciprocity evident in elements of French Republican thought reflected a social contract that favored the already-included in its definition of society. For the positioning of reciprocity within the social contract, such a context has implications for the creation of biases against the failings of the excluded. In particular, against those who vary from society's includable norms. In the place of any such consideration leading to action, appeared a sort of stoic romanticism. Thus, for the French, the excluded came to represent a martyred or punished sector of a society against whom the included had failed to live up to their side of the social contract.

As the concept of exclusion grew to gain broader credence beyond France, the EC and the subsequent EU, it increasingly incorporated target groups who were not simply poor or without sufficient resources. It incorporated those segregated also from the social core through attributes such as ethnicity or race, age, gender, and disability, and whose characteristics could contribute to justify the need for deliberate social inclusion programs (Omidvar & Richmond, 2003). That these attributes tended to be noncriminalized and relatively politically correct, as opposed to criminalized and/or contested, is a feature that should not be lost.

Even though the concepts of citizenship and social integration in the French tradition may present some challenges for Anglo-Saxon manners of thinking, this did not, according to Gore, Figueiredo, and Rodgers (1995), prevent the wider adoption of exclusion frameworks across Western Europe. These authors suggested that in appropriating the concept as integral to modern and meaningful social development, the EC was linking the concept of social exclusion more closely with evolving thoughts around the implications of unrealized social rights.

While EC and EU directives sought to carve out greater social inclusion, other countries, particularly Commonwealth countries—notably the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa—were beginning to roll out their own interpretations of this rhetoric.

In its initial contemporary use, the exclusion terminology adopted in France and subsequently diffused elsewhere, was meant to refer to those individuals who were considered to be on the margins of French society of the 1970s. That is, individuals considered society's social problems, who tended to share a particular social reality, a less than successful material existence compounded with real barriers in accessing benefits provided by the French welfare state (Daly, 2006).

So great were the social problems, that Lenoir, would suggest that a full 10% of the French population were *exclu*, or outcast. According to Davies (2005), “the novel characteristic of les exclus was not that they were poor (although most were), but that they were disconnected from mainstream society in ways that went beyond poverty” (p. 3). This disconnect, it was argued, was facilitated by their relative social positioning and by factors related to poor health and social, economic, and geographical isolation from active engagement in politics. From this perspective, to be socially excluded was paramount to being of the underclass; to be among those people who did not fit into the norms of industrial societies, who were not protected by social insurance and who were essentially considered social misfits. (Silver, 1995; Stegemen & Costongs, 2003). Beliefs about social conformity aside, Silver’s (1995) near definitive list of the socially excluded reads in some regards as a full 50% of the world’s population. In doing, so it lends credence to Labonte’s (2004) assertion that the socially excluded are liable to comprise everyone who is not middle-aged, middle class, and male.

It follows that just naming who is at risk of social exclusion, based on identity, vulnerability, membership, or biology will not suffice without some reflection as to who is naming the excluded, where those who label or define the excluded stand ontologically relative to their own or others’ exclusion, and what if any the influences of personal, political, stereotypical, or xenophobic biases may be. It is an element of the conceptualization of social inclusion and exclusion particularly well-suited to sociology’s contribution.

A Sociological Lens

In many ways, despite the contribution of the psychological and life sciences, and even the contributions of social policy, the concepts of social inclusion and exclusion are profoundly sociological. This is because at the very root of both classic and contemporary sociological thinking are concerns with social stratification, social inequality, and social class—key concepts which the social inclusion literature repeatedly touches upon.

Witcher (2003, referencing Burchardt et al., 1999) reflected that social inclusion and exclusion were concepts that were often poorly defined or theorized. Daly (2006) has suggested that although there is nothing inherent in the inclusion and exclusion concepts that defy or negate theorization, in general, sociology’s attempts at their theorization could be inconsistent or facile.

Horsell (2006) referenced Crowther (2002) in suggesting that the contemporary interest in social exclusion and inclusion were reflective of similar attempts to conceptualize the dual influences of poverty and social deprivation. As such, these concepts signaled that somehow the cumulative impacts of poverty and social deprivation (or the cumulative

effects of social exclusion in the absence of social inclusion) could represent a threat to social order.

Horsell’s (2006) suggestion was that, in purely operational terms, the exclusion/inclusion paradigm acted to reinforce neoliberal ideas about social actors and agency as well as to harness principles of mutual obligation and active participation; that the discourse, broadly speaking, had both symbolic and physical dimensions. In its consideration of the ways in which contemporary social policy analysis treats social position as stratification, deprivation, and inequality, attempts to tease out the causes and consequences of social exclusion relative to inclusion could risk becoming muddled by mixing together attempts to better the lives and living conditions of people living below poverty lines, with the illusion that more were being done than might be. Horsell’s suggestion of illusion hinged on the reflection that those who may ultimately benefit from the application of such inclusion-speak when operationalized as policy could tend to be those who already enjoyed a number of inclusion’s benefits.

Levitas (1996, 1998) has reflected that the overall flavor of the social inclusion rhetoric is strongly Durkheimian. She has stressed that Durkheim and the exclusion/inclusion discursive continuum demonstrate a tendency to repress conflict as well as a tendency toward an approach to inclusion that subversively critiques capitalism in a way that would be lacking from a purely Durkheimian analysis.

Owing in part to this, Levitas (1998) labeled the rhetoric of social inclusion “a new Durkheimian hegemony” (p. 178), given that most contemporary views of inclusion correspond to scholarly interpretations of Durkheim’s sociology, including Durkheim’s emphasis on an alternative attempt to navigate an understanding of society between unacceptable free market capitalism and an unacceptable state socialism.

Such hegemony, according to Bowring (2000), leads us to think of elements of exclusion like deprivation and inequality as phenomena that occur at the very margins of society, and by extension, to ignore social structures that influence the included as well as the excluded. Bowring’s point was that the exclusion/inclusion rhetoric risks being somewhat of a red herring, because exclusion at the societal level could be indicative of systemic deprivation and not just a deprivation experienced or reported by those defined as socially excluded.

For Wilson (2006), it was important to recall that social integration per se was not a focus of Durkheim. For Durkheim, inequality and social stratification were natural results of society, components of a solidary system he divided into mechanical and organic: the former being a fountain of social cohesion and the latter a well of social inclusion. Together, they were envisioned as the kinds of dependencies that social actors within advanced societies share with one another. Wilson’s point was that although Durkheim associated increases in solidarity with social progress, he would not

necessarily associate the same solidarity with social inclusion, since in theory, advanced societies characterized by mutual dependence would exhibit the kinds of mutual and shared bonds that would defy the need for social inclusion in the first place.

The emphasis of these authors, and arguably of a Durkheimian perspective as applied to social inclusion also, is that new or reborn ways are not necessarily different ways. That despite its focus on the socially disenfranchised and their position relative to a status quo, there remains a hollow echo to the rhetoric around social inclusion. A void that is both redolent of discussion of the hollow state (Barnett, 1999; Davies, 2000; Della Sala, 1997; Holliday, 2000; London Edinburgh Weekend Return Group, 1980; Rhodes, 1994; Roberts & Devine, 2003; Skelcher, 2000), as well as a void that references one of Levitas's (2000) and Labonte's (2004) salient points: that it is one thing to promote an inclusionary utopia. However, in the event that such a utopian vision comes to pass, how likely is it that the result will be the kind of social world foreseen? In other words, even if a utopian ideal were within the reach of real-world, applied social policy, what are the odds, as Kenyon (2003) suggested, that attaining an inclusive society would result in the banishment of all inequality.

It was Young's (1999) argument, and Wilson's (2006) reiteration that although much of the West's social inclusion rhetoric may address many things, the root cause of social exclusion is not one of them. In this, the rhetoric fails because to address these causes would require acknowledgment that even within real-world inclusion societies, people frequently continue to experience poverty in a context that envelops them with messages of the meritocracy that surrounds them—a meritocracy that suggests that anyone with desire and ambition can succeed through acceptable behavior and hard work. For these authors, this represents a relative process of deprivation—one that includes an encounter with a form of culture shock where the culture in which the excluded experience their day-to-day existence actively reinforces the notion that they are receiving a much lower standard of living than others.

Here then, one could contend, is reflected the relative deprivation that leads to social exclusion “through a subjective experience of inequality and unfairness as materially deprived people seek to obtain the unobtainable” (Young, 1999, p. 401, cited in Wilson, 2006, p. 342). In a twist on the variations in social inclusion discourses presented earlier, this view holds that social exclusion morphs into “a cultural phenomenon arising from dialectic relationships between identity and social acceptance and the contradiction of a supposed meritocracy in which the poor lack the material means to meet the aspirations they are encouraged to embrace” (Wilson, 2006, p. 343). In other words, exclusion becomes social status contested between a hierarchical valuation of different kinds of social identities (socially hazardous vs. socially accepted) within a social world attempting to remedy

the inherent challenges embedded in an inequitable division of resources within an acquisitive, material world.

Residuous Exclusion

In discussing the problematization of exclusion, the sociologist Nikolas Rose wrote that the mid-19th century wore the mantle of “a succession of figures that seem to condense in their person, their name, their image all that is disorder, danger, threat to civility, the vagrant, the pauper, the degenerate” (Rose, 1999, p. 254). As the 19th century gave way to the 20th, there appeared efforts to create universally shared forms of social citizenship. Yet even within this drive toward universality, there were those who were cast as uncludable, just as there are today. Within the new liberal thinking, universal citizenship did not emulate fully the fact that the notion of *universal* was still a somewhat relative concept and that a boundary between the includable and the excludable would not only continue to exist but would be reinforced also.

From this arose “notions such as ‘the residuum,’ ‘the unemployable’ and ‘the social problem group’” (Rose, 1999, p. 254), that is, states of embodied being, through social roles, social strata, and entire classes that would, in time, become integral to these new forms of liberal thinking. From such vantage, the rhetoric of exclusion/inclusion, and the array of notions and underlying beliefs about the utility of integration, would become parts of the organizing, and traceable mainstays of reform. From older, perhaps simpler conceptualizations of inequality were born new ways of understanding what Rose, citing Levitas (1996), described as a “two-thirds, one-third social order” where a seemingly continually widening gap between the included two thirds and the excluded one third would continue to unfurl (Rose, 1999, p. 258).

Rose (1999) differentiated the new excluded from previous form of unequals. Whereas minorities that arose from the welfare state had claims to unity and solidarity, the new excluded have few of these, and it is perhaps from this lack of unification that the new expertise underlying inclusion's emphasis is born. Challenged from forging identity and right of place based on shared exclusion, this new underclass is “like Marx's peasants, individualized like potatoes in a sack, incapable of forming themselves into a single class on the basis of a consciousness of their shared expropriation” (Rose, 1999, pp. 254-255).

In moving from a welfare to a postwelfare, advanced liberal order, social control is reconfigured into control that moves beyond repressing or containing individual pathology. It becomes both about knowledge and access to the production of knowledge. This is because—to paraphrase Marx—access to the production of knowledge provides for the definition of what is and is not includable (Rose, 1999, referencing Ericson & Haggerty, 1997). Thus, the new labor force of control is no longer one that is either purely reactive or purely punitive. Rather, it takes on a form of administrative function whereby it oversees the *marginalia* comprising the

bounds (and bonds) of inclusion and exclusion, of risk and safety and permissibility (Rose, 1999). It was Rose's vision that for the excluded underclass "a politics of conduct is today more salient than a politics of class" (Rose, 2000, p. 335, citing Mead, 1991, p. 4, and Procacci, 1999, p. 30).

Although Rose's discourse is compelling, one should consider also whether all of the excluded are created equal. Do they all share the same position within the underclass? For example, across the Western world, special interest groups have sprung up since the softening of the welfare state, groups which include not only those that are socially excluded—drug users, sexual deviants, the poorly socialized—but also the physically excluded such as those who are bodily or mentally challenged.

In order for the work of Rose and those who have influenced his arguments regarding the inclusion/exclusion divide to be applicable (these influences include the works of Foucault, 1979a, 1976/1979b, 1985, 1991; Mead, 1991; O'Malley, 1992, 1999, 2004; Valverde, 1998), the work will need, in part, to account for diversity and social stratification within the underclass—that is, to help shed light on how and why certain social hierarchies of the status quo become replicated within the margins, leading to some of the marginal experiencing, in a sense, double marginality. At the same time, even those who achieve core or nonperipheral social status risk facing constraining hierarchies and limits to social mobility that function to either deny or defy full integration.

Extrapolating from the work of Rose, the inclusion society would not be a utopian dream, but rather a development that to varying extents would further institutionalize themes of inclusion, permissible rights, and the breadth of acceptable conduct.

Conclusion

This article has reflected on social inclusion from the vantage of sociology. It has reflected on exclusion and inclusion societies, across time and place and has demonstrated the importance of considering the physical world's exclusion and inclusion societies not only from a natural order perspective but from a social order perspective also.

Many of the considerations explored here have embodied measurable, objective approaches to the sociological conception and consideration of exclusion and inclusion. Du Toit (2004) has suggested current definitions, and their applications within individual country contexts allow social scientists and policy makers to present social exclusion as a single outcome of potentially multiple determinants of deprivation. Yet, this article has considered arguments that position inclusion and exclusion as much more than the fodder of contemporary policy. Indeed, it has demonstrated how human integration and expulsion are both highly historical and deeply sociological; that forms of social deprivation as well as social entitlement span many hundreds of years, if not the full course of human history itself.

For all that is known about social stratification, the tendency, particularly from the perspective of sociology, has been to consider inclusion and exclusion from an observational standpoint. This has occurred through policy analysis, historical analysis, and even consideration of some of the sociobiological correlates of inclusion and exclusion. What is less well known and less well developed are approaches for understanding the subjective experiences of social inclusion and social exclusion. For example, how exclusion and inclusion are experienced socially? How experiences of inclusion and exclusion are produced and reproduced socially? How different social labels impact the experience of inclusion and exclusion, and what the role of stigma may be?

For the reader, understanding the journey from social exclusion to social inclusion sociologically is an undertaking across potentially difficult terrain. Among other things, it requires a critical eye capable of accounting for individual and group participation and lack thereof (Daly, 2006).

And what of poverty? For some writers who have sought to unpack social inclusion and exclusion, these concepts are but alternate ways of recasting the notion of poverty. Others suggest economic poverty need be seen either as only one of an interrelated group of dimensions which work in tandem together to contribute to an individual's inability to successfully access the overall labor market. Such an approach would envision poverty as one factor in a multifaceted approach to understanding the experiences of society's lower strata (Sirovátka & Mare, 2006; Woodward & Kohli, 2001).

As prescribed approaches to policy and practice, efforts to contend with contemporary social exclusion often come to be framed by a rhetoric of reformation, imbued with different traditions in terms of how poverty is framed around either relational or distributional issues (Murie & Musterd, 2004, referencing van Kempen, 2002). It is a vantage that capitalizes on Marshall's (1963) model of postwar social rights, where, rather than focus on forms of postwar poverty, the focus on social exclusion is on redistribution, access, and participation (Murie & Musterd, 2004). Then and now, sociologically speaking, when poverty rather than social structure is held up as the cause and consequence of exclusion, such deprivation is presented as a failure of capabilities as opposed to a manner of being within a social structure or society.

Chakravarty and D'Ambrosio (2006) suggested that an emphasis on the shortfalls of economic thresholds as an explanation for exclusion is not the same as emphasizing structured disabilities to participate. This is because a focus on structural disabilities allows for a more complex, multidimensional understanding of the interplay, overlap, and social distance between money, work, and belonging. As a reconceptualization of social disadvantage, such a perspective provides an important framework for thinking out alternatives to the welfare state. It links poverty, productivity by means of employment and social integration that in turn emphasizes integration and insertion into a labor market, active and personalized participation, and a multicultural national citizenry (Gore et al.,

1995). It broadens also the notion of inclusion beyond biological or economic fitness alone.

In this regard, the suggestion that social inclusion exists not necessarily as a mechanism of sociobiological well-being only but more viscerally as a reflection of outcome of economic empowerment holds much in common with Richard Parker and Peter Aggleton's post-Goffman work on stigma. Although good arguments exist—and many have been presented here—about why integration and ostracism can be interpreted through both natural order and economic lenses, inclusion and exclusion do not represent free-floating views. Like stigma, inclusion and exclusion also exist at “the historically determined nexus between cultural formulations and systems of power and domination” (Parker, 2012, p. 166).

As systems of social power, these formations constitute architectures of inclusion; that is, means and ways that inclusion and exclusion are both enacted and talked about. Such architectures exist as literal and figurative coalitions of action, reaction, governance, control, and power which together comprise how a policy aim like social inclusion is wound, entwined, draped, and displayed for public rendering and consumption.

In what can be described as a political economy of inclusion, the hierarchies embedded in these architectures of inclusion not only ascribe value to who is to be considered includable but also reflect value structures that can lead to forms of ideologically based interpretations about whether inclusion is as good or better than exclusion (Rodgers, 1995) based on variation in social power, the ability to hold rights, and the representation or embodiment of hazard.

As with more traditional, physical forms of architecture, inclusion's architectures function to both limit and facilitate the movement and interaction of people through hierarchies of integration. Enclosed within these architectures are worlds of inclusion and exclusion that push and pull amid new forms of allowance, constraint, and conflict (Gumplowicz, 1963). Parallel yet interconnected worlds in which, are reflected, the socially excluded, reduced, and idealized as somewhat two-dimensional occupiers of social space (Spina, 2005).

Gillies (2005) reflected that societies have a tendency to normalize the sins of the included while penalizing the sins of the excluded. This suggests that even if discourses about social inclusion are effectively rendered as policy and translated into practice, the act of reevaluating the biases society's hold for marginal underclasses of excluded social actors may well remain. This is to say that were society able to find room within its social architectures for its marginal women and men (Park, 1928), the fact of their powerlessness coupled with their comportment could still relegate them to the periphery, occupying colonized spaces stratified on one side by accusations of nonnormative or deviant behavior and on another by power relations.

For the contemporary open thinker trying to grapple with social inclusion and exclusion as a set of potentially complex concepts between those who study and profess a natural, an

economic, or a social order, ideas about power would seem to be of particular importance—be it the power of the elite or the empowerment of those with special needs. Power seems to fuel the wheels of integration. Although power can be shown to have a decisive role in both the natural and the economic orders, it is in the arena of the social where it is perhaps best understood. One only need look at the history of philosophy and social theory for evidence of how power and proximity to it can enable or bar integration. Power allows proximity to the means of inclusion—essentially, to inclusion's apparatus.

Of course, simply thinking openly about social worlds as variations of inclusionary or exclusionary societies does not lead to societies that are more inclusive. It does, however, allow for a more open lens with which to consider the past as well with which to view the present.

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Bio

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1.3 Three Discourses of Social Exclusion

1 Three Discourses of Social Exclusion

The term social exclusion is intrinsically problematic. It represents the primary significant division in society as one between an included majority and an excluded minority. This has implications for how both included and excluded groups are understood, and for the implicit model of society itself. Attention is drawn away from the inequalities and differences among the included. Notably, the very rich are discursively absorbed into the included majority, their power and privilege slipping out of focus if not wholly out of sight. At the same time, the poverty and disadvantage of the so-called excluded are discursively placed outside society. What results is an overly homogeneous and consensual image of society – a rosy view possible because the implicit model is one in which inequality and poverty are pathological and residual, rather than endemic. Exclusion appears as an essentially peripheral problem, existing at the boundary of society, rather than a feature of a society which characteristically delivers massive inequalities across the board and chronic deprivation for a large minority. The solution implied by a discourse of social exclusion is a minimalist one: a transition across the boundary to become an insider rather than an outsider in a society whose structural inequalities remain largely uninterrogated.

In practice, however, ‘social exclusion’ is embedded in different discourses which manifest these problems to varying extent. Three discourses are identified here: a redistributionist discourse (RED) developed in British critical social policy, whose prime concern is with poverty; a moral underclass discourse (MUD) which centres on the moral and behavioural delinquency of the excluded themselves; and a social integrationist discourse (SID) whose central focus is on paid work. They differ in how they characterize the boundary, and thus what defines people as insiders or outsiders, and how inclusion can be brought about. RED broadens out from its concern with poverty into a critique of inequality, and contrasts exclusion with a version of citizenship which calls for substantial redistribution of power and wealth. MUD is a gendered discourse with many forerunners, whose demons are criminally-inclined, unemployable young men and sexually and

socially irresponsible single mothers, for whom paid work is necessary as a means of social discipline, but whose (self-) exclusion, and thus potential inclusion, is moral and cultural. SID focuses more narrowly on unemployment and economic inactivity, pursuing social integration or social cohesion primarily through inclusion in paid work. The three discourses differ quite markedly in how they present the relationship between inclusion/exclusion and inequality, a theme which is central to the overall argument of this book.

The following discussion of RED, MUD, and SID also considers how the valorization of unpaid work plays through the different discourses. In October 1997 the Office of National Statistics (ONS) published the first estimates of the extent and value of unpaid work in the British economy. If a monetary value were put on such work, at 1995 values it would have been at least equivalent to £341 billion, or more than the whole UK manufacturing sector, and perhaps as much as £739 billion, 120 per cent of gross domestic product. Among the reasons for this statistical development was the insensitivity of conventional national accounts to the movement of activities between market and non-market sectors.¹ Yet despite this official endorsement, the dominant public and social-scientific understanding of 'work' remains paid work. Since the ONS figures confirmed that women do much more unpaid work than men, and that although men do more paid work, they also have more leisure, men's work is more acknowledged, as well as more highly rewarded, than women's work.² Following a well-established theme in feminist arguments, Miriam Glucksmann argues that work cannot be elided with those forms which happen to take place in a market setting: work refers to all 'activity necessary for the production and reproduction of economic relations and structures... irrespective of how and where it is carried out'. She describes the 'manner by which all the labour in a particular society is divided up and allocated to different structures, institutions and activities' as the total social organization of labour, and goes on to discuss historical changes in the gendered division of labour within and between household and market – shifts which the new satellite accounts are expressly developed to illuminate.³ Both Glucksmann's perspective and the new official data raise another question. How is the recognition of not just the social but the economic value of currently unpaid work compatible with the distribution of the social product primarily through rewards for paid work? RED, MUD and SID have different capabilities for acknowledging, and thus for potentially addressing, this question.

RED: SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND CRITICAL SOCIAL POLICY

In 1979 Peter Townsend published a major study of poverty, analysing survey data from 1968–9. His purpose was to redefine poverty as an objective condition of relative deprivation. Rather than defining poverty, as earlier studies and official policy had done, in terms of levels of income necessary for subsistence, Townsend argued that the crucial issue was whether people had sufficient resources to participate in the customary life of society and to fulfil what was expected of them as members of it:

Individuals, families and groups can be said to be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or at least are widely encouraged and approved, in the societies to which they belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs and activities.⁴

Expectations across society might differ in many respects, but Townsend claimed there was nevertheless ‘a loosely defined set of customs, material goods and social pleasures at any point in a nation’s history which can be said to represent general amenities, or to which all or most people in that society are agreed to be entitled. Those who have few of these amenities can be said to be deprived’. Inequality might affect the style in which people participated in some social practices – the lavishness of holidays, or celebrations of birthdays and religious festivals. Poverty and deprivation went beyond this. There was a level of resources below which, rather than just a reduction in the scale of participation, there was a sudden withdrawal from the community’s style of living: people ‘drop out or are excluded’.⁵

Townsend was not the first to argue that poverty was a multi-faceted process rather than simply a matter of low income. But his was a sustained argument which widened the perspective from income to resources, and from consumption to participation. The analysis embraced housing, health and environmental pollution. It revealed disability as a particular factor in producing exclusion. It addressed deprivation at work, including hours of work, job security, and the working environment, and looked at the relationship between work, welfare and fringe benefits. The solution proposed was explicitly and broadly redistributive. Townsend recommended a decreased reliance

on means-tested benefits, which he saw as a mechanism of social control as well as a rationing device: benefits should be paid as of right. He acknowledged a conflict between this approach and the principles and requirements of a capitalist market. Nevertheless, he argued that:

National action to remedy poverty – through incomes policy, full employment, less specialization of work roles, higher social security benefits, new forms of allowances and rate support grants and a more redistributive tax structure – is implied.⁶

Poverty in the United Kingdom also included a chapter on one-parent families. This was a relatively new category in social thought. Townsend noted that there was no such term before 1964, when ‘fatherless families’ were collectively identified, and no national collation of statistics until 1967; ‘motherless families’ were incorporated later. Consistent with later trends in social science towards deconstructing rather than constructing categories, Duncan and Edwards have argued that lone-parent families should not be treated as a single group.⁷ But Townsend was concerned about unmarried and separated mothers being pressed into employment despite their entitlement to benefit, and also concerned that lone fathers would continue to be subjected to improper pressure. Fathers only acquired the right to claim benefits as lone parents in 1975. This was one of a number of changes – including linking pension upratings to the higher of earnings or prices – brought in by the Wilson government, with Barbara Castle as Minister for Health and Social Security. Townsend attributed the poverty of one-parent families to a number of factors: the low earning-power of women; the absence of public child care; the practical restrictions that caring for children places on lone parents; attitudes to unmarried parents; the social expectation that women should be the primary carers; and the lack of income rights for women caring for children within marriage or outside it. The restructuring of the benefit system should incorporate larger maintenance allowances for children, allowances for the care of children, and an allowance for the upkeep of the family home in recognition of the unpaid work involved – all paid as of right, rather than means-tested.⁸ These recommendations went some way towards recognizing the unpaid work of parenting.

The whole thrust of Townsend’s argument was that poverty resulted in exclusion from social participation, but he did not use the term ‘social exclusion’. Reflecting on this in 1997, he said that he had resisted the term for some time because he saw discrimination and exclusion as ‘effects rather than causes’, as ‘by-products of... market

manufactured class'; too much emphasis on social exclusion diverted attention from deprivation. However, he said 'I was wrong. . . . "social exclusion" directs attention to the marginalised and excluded and to the potential instruments of their exclusion'.⁹ He argued once again for a redistributive strategy, not just through the tax and benefit systems and public services, but through the reduction of earnings differentials, a minimum wage, a minimum income for those unable to work, and financial recognition of unpaid work through at least a conditional participation income, if not an unconditional citizen's income.

The eighteen years between these statements were also the eighteen years of Conservative government, marked by dramatic increases in inequality, in unemployment, and in the numbers living in poverty, as well as more restrictive conditions for less generous social security benefits. The Tories had a redistributive strategy – but it was redistribution to the rich. Over this period, 'social exclusion' gained currency in critical social policy, especially in the discourse of the research and campaigning organization, Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG). CPAG marked the 1997 election with the publication of *Britain Divided: The growth of social exclusion in the 1980s and 1990s*.¹⁰ Its three sections were subtitled 'creating poverty and social exclusion'; 'dimensions of poverty and social exclusion'; and 'combating poverty and social exclusion' – a formula which leaves open the relationship between the two terms. Walker, however, defined poverty in similar terms to Townsend: it is 'a lack of the material resources, especially income, necessary to participate in British society'. Social exclusion has a broader, more comprehensive, meaning: it 'refers to the dynamic process of being shut out, fully or partially, from any of the social, economic, political and cultural systems which determine the social integration of a person in society'.¹¹

Contributors to the book were variously successful in maintaining this distinction. They emphasized that poverty does not necessarily lead to exclusion – a point made by Townsend in 1979, who noted that although poverty constituted a serious barrier to social participation, nevertheless stability of personal circumstances, length of residence, good health and frequent social contacts mitigated the effects of low material resources. The CPAG volume argued that social exclusion may be a cause, rather than just a result, of poverty. Homelessness, health, unemployment, food, utility disconnections were discussed, as well as (and in relation to) gender, ethnicity, the social security system and the overall distribution of income and wealth. The agenda was one

of radical redistribution – although Townsend was one of a minority, together with Lisa Harker, who mentioned unpaid work. Harker, both here and elsewhere, called for universal child benefit, plus a benefit supporting child rearing.¹² This would be payable in addition to social insurance benefits, and calculated on an individual rather than household basis – thus reducing the personal economic dependency of women on men.

A concept of exclusion which refers to being shut out fully *or partially* is thereby extended to incorporate inequality, and its converse necessarily implies much greater equality. *Britain Divided* concluded on a cautiously optimistic note about the prospects for a redistributive agenda under Labour, citing Gordon Brown's John Smith Memorial Lecture where he argued that equality must be restored to its proper place in the trinity of socialist values, alongside liberty and community, and insisted that Labour would tackle poverty and inequality. Given Brown's later redefinition of equality as equality of opportunity (see Chapter 7 below), the caution may have been more appropriate than the optimism. But in the years of Thatcherite domination, direct defence of equality was difficult. It was assaulted as an immoral, even totalitarian, imposition of uniformity, and a brake on economic growth. Increasingly, the idea of citizenship was deployed in defence of welfare rights and welfare provision. Thus Walker argued that 'social exclusion may... be seen as the denial (or non-realisation) of the civil, political and social rights of citizenship'.¹³ Peter Golding argued that poverty led to a reduction in participation tantamount to partial citizenship, as low income families were excluded from new information technologies, entertainment and leisure pursuits, as well as from financial institutions and from political life.¹⁴ Ruth Lister's *The Exclusive Society* was subtitled 'citizenship and the poor', and traced the development of the broadening view of social exclusion as the antithesis of citizenship.¹⁵

Citizenship is, of course, another word which can embrace many meanings, and whose inflection to the individual or the social may vary considerably. Goodin argues that citizenship is a more egalitarian concept than inclusion.¹⁶ Whereas inclusion focuses on the division between insiders and outsiders, and does not address the relationship between boundary and centre, citizenship focuses on the characteristics which are shared. However, models of citizenship differ in their scope, and thus in what respect citizens are to be deemed equal. The version used as an antonym to social exclusion drew heavily on T. H. Marshall's model, set out in 1950, which incorporated civil, political

and social rights. Marshall too saw citizenship as implicitly egalitarian in relation to the rights and duties attaching to any particular definition. But he also argued that the twentieth century was characterized by the progressive extension of social rights: ‘the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society’.¹⁷ It was this emphasis on social citizenship rights, and the right to share *to the full* in the social heritage, which made this a useful language for egalitarians for it implied, as Marshall said, greater economic equality. On the other hand, he also observed that the move towards greater equality would be limited by the tension between the principle of social justice and the operation of the market. Moreover, citizenship could operate to legitimate inequalities, provided that they did not transgress equality of opportunity, did not cut too deep, and occurred ‘within a population united in a single civilisation’.¹⁸

Marshall’s framework was not adopted uncritically. He had addressed inequalities of class, but not those consequent on ethnicity and gender. Some argued that the concept of citizenship needed radical overhaul to avoid the problem of assimilating women to an essentially male model of the citizen.¹⁹ Nevertheless, it formed the basis of an egalitarian, redistributive, broad understanding of social exclusion, inclusion and citizenship. Although social exclusion was, at the extreme, the product of poverty, citizenship was fundamentally affected by inequality. Lister’s statement sums up the standpoint:

It is not possible to divorce the rights and responsibilities which are supposed to unite citizens from the inequalities of power and resources that divide them. These inequalities – particularly of class, race and gender – run like fault-lines through our society and shape the contours of citizenship in the civil, political and social spheres. Poverty spells exclusion from the full rights of citizenship in each of these spheres and undermines people’s ability to fulfil the private and public obligations of citizenship.²⁰

Between 1979 and 1997, the social-democratic redistributive agenda was recast in this new language of exclusion and citizenship. Social exclusion was more clearly understood as a dynamic process, and a multi-faceted one, than poverty had generally been, and questions of gender and ethnicity had much higher profile; not only poverty, but the whole gamut of social inequalities were brought into the frame. Used in this discourse, RED, social exclusion mobilizes more than the

concern with outcast poverty from which it started. It addresses the exclusionary processes in all areas of society which result in inequality itself. The characteristics of RED can be summarized as follows:

- It emphasizes poverty as a prime cause of social exclusion.
- It implies a reduction of poverty through increases in benefit levels.
- It is potentially able to valorize unpaid work.
- In positing citizenship as the obverse of exclusion, it goes beyond a minimalist model of inclusion.
- In addressing social, political and cultural, as well as economic, citizenship, it broadens out into a critique of inequality, which includes, but is not limited to, material inequality.
- It focuses on the processes which produce that inequality.
- It implies a radical reduction of inequalities, and a redistribution of resources and of power.

If Labour's understanding of social exclusion were consistent with RED, it would imply moving towards a more radically redistributive programme than that set out in the 1997 manifesto. However, other discourses, with different implications, are available.

MUD: THE UNDERCLASS AND THE CULTURE OF DEPENDENCY

The evolution of RED took place in a political context where social citizenship rights were under continued attack from the New Right. Unemployment and the numbers in poverty soared in the early 1980s to levels unprecedented in the post-war years, and social security spending rose with them. The government's response was to tighten eligibility for benefits and reduce their value, deny the existence of poverty, suppress and abolish some of the key indicators of its extent, and blame the poor for their own situation. References to the 'underclass' and to a 'culture of dependency' became embedded in a discourse concerned with social order and moral integration.

The New Right of the 1980s is now widely misunderstood as an exclusively neo-liberal project, aimed at the deregulation of the market and the reduction of state intervention. It was, however, made up of two apparently contradictory, but actually symbiotic, strands of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism. Neo-liberal economics underpinned widespread privatization, and justified growing inequalities in the

name of incentives. But neo-conservatism, which developed alongside neo-liberalism, was concerned with order rather than freedom, with family, nation and morality – and held no brief for a minimal state. This was not the last gasp of old conservatism struggling to survive. The ‘free’ economy needed a strong state to impose and uphold the conditions of its operations, especially in the restrictions on trade union resistance. The state also had to police the effects – most notably in the 1984–5 miners’ strike, protests over the poll tax, and urban unrest, but also on a more routine basis. The strong state in turn relied on the market – and especially the ever-present threat of unemployment – as a potent source of social discipline.²¹

This dual character of the New Right is important to understanding the political realignments of the 1990s. It is also fundamental to understanding the discourses about poverty which RED was intended to rebut. Those reliant on benefit were always separated into the deserving and the undeserving poor – those who really needed help and those who were scroungers exploiting an overgenerous and insufficiently-policed system. At least for the deserving poor, benefits were generally seen as good for the individual recipients, if expensive for society as a whole. Echoing arguments from the United States, this changed. Economic dependence on ‘welfare’ was construed as ‘dependency’, a pathological moral and psychological condition created by the benefit system itself – and fostered by the libertarianism of the 1960s – in which the state was seen as a universal provider, sapping personal initiative, independence and self-respect. Benefits were bad for, rather than good for, their recipients. If this was true of individuals, it was even more true of the poor collectively: welfare spending gave rise to a ‘culture of dependency’. This discourse inexorably took over the public domain. In a television documentary about poverty and unemployment, the political commentator John Cole described the ‘giro culture’ as ‘an endemic culture of no work and reliance on benefits’, characterized by a ‘downward spiral of idleness, crime and erosion of the work ethic’.²² The focus had shifted from the structural basis of poverty to the moral and cultural character of the poor themselves.

The idea of an ‘underclass’ was central to this shift. Townsend had himself used the term without any critical connotation to refer to different groups of the excluded poor: the elderly, disabled, chronically sick, long-term unemployed and one-parent families.

A large, and proportionately increasing, section of the population are neither part of the paid workforce nor members of the households

of that workforce...The ways in which they have been denied access to paid employment, conceded incomes equivalent in value to bare subsistence, attracted specially defined low status as minority groups, and accommodated, as a result, within the social structure as a kind of modern 'underclass', need to be traced.²³

This was a statement about the place of the poor in – and notably not outside – the overall social structure. It was free from claims about the lifestyles of the poor, and free from moral condemnation, except for the social processes which generated poverty.

In 1990, Frank Field's *Losing Out: The Emergence of Britain's Underclass* argued that the extension of citizenship rights heralded by Marshall had been reversed by the effects of Thatcherism, particularly by exclusion from work and increased reliance on means-tested benefits. Exclusion from citizenship was the mark of the underclass, which would not disappear without 'the implementation of a series of policies aimed at re-establishing full citizenship'.²⁴ He was critical of the growing tendency both to describe and to explain poverty in cultural terms and thus effectively blame the poor for their circumstances. He used an article by Ralf Dahrendorf as an example. Dahrendorf, like Field, had written about the underclass in terms of exclusion from citizenship: 'The existence of an underclass casts doubt on the social contract itself. It means that citizenship has become an exclusive rather than an inclusive status. Some are full citizens, some are not'.²⁵ But he also argued that the underclass was characterized by low educational attainment or functional illiteracy, that incomplete families were the norm rather than the exception, and that it was culturally distinct from the rest of society:

It includes a lifestyle of laid-back sloppiness, association in changing groups and gangs, congregation around discos or the like, hostility to middle-class society, particular habits of dress, hairstyle, often drugs or at least alcohol – a style, in other words which has little in common with the values of the work society around.²⁶

Field was at pains to emphasize the structural, rather than cultural, factors leading to the growth of an underclass. Unlike Dahrendorf, he insisted that the underclass remained committed to work, this being the 'cornerstone value of the whole system'; it was 'important not to lose sight of the fact that the main aim of this... group is to win a place back in society by gaining a job'.²⁷ But he did not deny that they were

behaviourally distinct and a problem for the majority: 'the existence of an underclass tends to make our society a less civilised one in which to live', and 'it should come as little surprise that some of those who feel they have no stake in 'official' society should react in a way that demonstrates their exclusion'.²⁸ However, in discussing the characteristics of a system which tended to trap the poor on benefits, he did express concern about the moral consequences of benefit dependency and the erosion of initiative, and referred to the 'personal pathologies of many of the underclass, and the culture induced by poverty'.²⁹ Over the following years, Field moved to a much clearer view that state provision created dependency and eroded incentives to work and to save.³⁰

The characterization of the underclass in cultural terms was consolidated by the intervention of the American commentator, Charles Murray. Murray's tract, *The Emerging British Underclass* was published both in the *Sunday Times*, which financed his visit to Britain in 1989, and by the right-wing think-tank, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA). He argued that an underclass had long existed in the United States, and was now developing in Britain. He described himself as 'a visitor from a plague area come to see if the disease is spreading'. He asked 'how contagious is the disease?'; 'is it going to spread indefinitely or is it self-containing?'. The 'disease' was cultural, spread by 'people... whose values are contaminating the life of entire neighbourhoods' – by rejecting both the work ethic and the family ethic which are central to the dominant culture.³¹ Not all the poor were part of an underclass. Its existence could be diagnosed by three symptoms: 'illegitimacy, crime and drop-out from the labour force': and 'if illegitimate births are the leading indicator of an underclass and violent crime is a proxy measure of its development, the definitive proof that an underclass has arrived is that large numbers of young, healthy, low-income males choose not to take jobs'.³²

These three factors, Murray argued, interact to produce pathological communities in which the socialization of children – especially boys – is inadequate: 'communities need families. Communities need fathers'.³³ Fathers are necessary as role models to civilize the young; but marriage and family responsibilities are necessary to civilize men, who are, without these constraints, driven to prove their masculinity in destructive ways. The benefit system feeds the growth of the underclass, by making it too easy for lone mothers to rear children, and removing the pressure on single mothers to marry. In a later account, Murray's emphasis shifted even further towards demonizing lone

parenthood, and he proposed decreasing economic support for lone mothers and their children, while increasing the stigma attaching to them.³⁴ The policy implications were not the extension of citizenship rights, but their greater conditionality, reduction or removal.

This is, of course, exactly what happened in the United States. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of August 1996 abolished Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), replacing it with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), in which there was no entitlement to benefits. It devolved welfare provision to individual states, but within a highly prescriptive framework underpinned by replacing federal matching funds with cash-limited block grants. Levels of grant would be cut if states failed to get people off welfare and into work: 25 per cent of all claimants should be in work by October 1997, and 50 per cent by 2002; for two-parent families, the targets were 75 per cent by 1997 and 90 per cent by 1999. For the first time since Roosevelt's New Deal, eligible claimants could be refused benefits if the cash ran out. A limit of five years was imposed on the total length of time a family could receive federal TANF funds. State plans were required to include a provision that if a family received benefit for more than two years, at least one adult in the family would have to participate in workfare-type activity. Discretion to waive this rule was permissible only where there were children under the age of one. States were required to refuse benefits to those refusing work or workfare programmes, and were to be penalized for not meeting target participation rates in work-related activities by TANF claimants. Teenage mothers would be ineligible for TANF unless attending school and living with their parents or guardians – thus seeking 'to discourage single parenthood and illegitimate births by denying entitlement to huge swathes of the US welfare system'.³⁵ Wisconsin was among the states which had pioneered experiments in workfare before the 1996 Act, under waiver of the federal rules. Over the ten years from 1987 to 1997, the number of claimants dropped by 60 per cent. In 1997, the Wisconsin Works or W-2 programme went state-wide. All claimants were now required to work – in unsubsidized or subsidized employment or in 'community service' jobs at below the minimum wage. Lone mothers were required to return to work when their youngest child was twelve weeks old. The Governor of Wisconsin, Tommy Thompson, who pioneered the reforms was questioned as to the morality and Christianity of a policy which separated very young babies from their mothers and led to an increased reliance on soup kitchens and emergency shelters. He replied that paying people not to

work, not to get married and to have more children was unchristian, and encouraged irresponsible behaviour.³⁶

Murray's description of the underclass cast it in cultural and moral terms. In the United States, the so-called underclass is largely black, so the discourse has an additional racial element. This is not so immediately present in Britain, where commentators are often at pains to point out that the victim-villains are poorly qualified white working class young people. But like earlier accounts of dangerous classes lurking at the margins of society,³⁷ including Marx's lumpenproletariat, it is a very clearly gendered picture. The delinquency of young men is directly criminal and anti-social, accompanied by wilful idleness and drug abuse. Young women's delinquency manifests itself in their sexual and reproductive behaviour, the imputed irresponsibility of lone parenthood. The two are connected through the assumption that lone parenting is inadequate parenting, with both forms of delinquency attributed to a failure of socialization, especially into the work ethic and a belief in marriage.

By 1992, when John Westergaard took the underclass as the subject of his presidential address to the British Sociological Association, it was clear that there were three different meanings attaching to the term: outcast poverty; the moral turpitude of the poor; and a less specific, rhetorical usage which had become common in the media. Westergaard argued, as Stuart Hall had done five years earlier,³⁸ that the term underclass implied a dichotomous view of society, and served to obscure inequalities among the majority:

What the three have in common is, to start with, a postulate of the recent emergence of a significant minority of the population who are trapped, outside and below 'society at large' either by cultural depravity or economic deprivation, and an inference, whether expressed or implied, that the divide between this underclass and the great majority is increasingly *the* most salient and challenging line of division for the future, by contrast with the older divisions of class now said to be in eclipse.³⁹

Westergaard went on to argue that this was exactly why the concept had such appeal. It allowed the recognition of the increasingly obvious persistence of poverty to co-exist with arguments or assumptions about the attrition of class divisions in society as a whole.

Critical social policy was more concerned to defend structural interpretations of poverty against cultural accounts which blamed the poor. The term 'underclass' became very unpopular because of its

association with Murray's rhetoric of moral inferiority and social contagion. Despite its capacity to capture the ways in which aspects of poverty compound one another, it was rejected on three grounds: its imprecision; the lack of empirical evidence supporting its cultural claims; and its punitive rather than supportive policy implications.⁴⁰ Its ambiguity meant that those who used it as a description of the monstrously divisive consequences for the poor of Thatcherite policies unwittingly opened the door to a quite different discourse about the potential consequences of the poor for the comfortable majority, where redistribution gave way to retribution. The idea of the dependency culture, for whose existence there was little evidence,⁴¹ also facilitated this switch from structural to cultural interpretations. Its central tenet was that groups of people excluded from society as a whole, and especially when dependent on benefit, would develop a distinctive set of morally undesirable attitudes and behaviours, characterized by various forms of parasitism, crime and immorality. Lister argued that 'those who invoke the development of an 'underclass' to make the case for the restoration of full citizenship rights to the poor are playing with fire'.⁴² The contested meaning of the underclass gave way to a strong preference for talking about social exclusion instead: thus in RED, social exclusion is used to actively refuse the moral agenda of the underclass debate.

This has had little impact on the popular usage of the term 'underclass', especially in the media, where it continues to carry both structural and cultural meanings. Adonis and Pollard defend its use. It 'captures the essence of the class predicament for many at the bottom: a complete absence of ladders, whether basic skills, role models, education or a culture of work'.⁴³ It is characterized by 'unemployment and unemployability' as well as single motherhood and educational failure. The cultural interpretation wins out: 'there is no question that upbringing plays a big and probably growing role in transferring poverty and social inadequacy from one generation to the next'.⁴⁴ But as social exclusion entered public political discourse, it did so in conjunction with references to the underclass – with Blair himself repeatedly referring to an underclass excluded from the mainstream. Social exclusion is also an ambiguous term, capable of carrying both structural and cultural meanings. Thus Duffy defines social exclusion as 'a broader concept than poverty, encompassing not only low material means but the inability to participate effectively in economic, social, political and cultural life, and in some characterisations, alienation and distance from the mainstream society'.⁴⁵ Where it is

used in conjunction with the underclass, social exclusion is at risk of co-optation into a highly problematic discourse, MUD, whose main characteristics are these:

- It presents the underclass or socially excluded as culturally distinct from the ‘mainstream’.
- It focuses on the behaviour of the poor rather than the structure of the whole society.
- It implies that benefits are bad, rather than good, for their recipients, and encourage ‘dependency’.
- Inequalities among the rest of society are ignored.
- It is a gendered discourse, about idle, criminal young men and single mothers.
- Unpaid work is not acknowledged.
- Although dependency on the state is regarded as a problem, personal economic dependency – especially of women and children on men – is not. Indeed, it is seen as a civilizing influence on men.

SID: SOCIAL EXCLUSION, SOCIAL INTEGRATION AND EUROPE

The increasing public reference in Britain to social exclusion was not only the result of resistance to the underclass discourse, but the growing importance of the European Union. The origins of the European-wide emphasis on social exclusion lay in France, where the opposite of exclusion was insertion. Silver argues that social exclusion has a specific meaning in the French republican tradition, within a paradigm rooted in both Durkheimian sociology and Catholicism, and concerned with moral integration.⁴⁶ Exclusion is understood as the breakdown of the structural, cultural and moral ties which bind the individual to society, and family instability is a key concern. French discourses of exclusion, themselves contested, broadened out to a consideration of groups marginalized economically, socially, culturally and, in the case of outer suburbs, spatially; and to the fields of education, employment, housing and health. Although insertion, as the obverse of exclusion, acquired a similarly wide brief, a key measure was the introduction in 1988 of a residual benefit, the RMI (*Revenu Minimum d’Insertion*), stressing the reciprocal nature of solidarity. Recipients of RMI were required to sign a ‘*contrat d’insertion*’ – in many cases focused on employment, but in some involving other forms

of social participation negotiated with social workers, and addressing aspects of ‘daily living, behaviour, and family relationships’.⁴⁷

Silver sees moral integration as the distinctive characteristic of what she calls the ‘solidarity’ paradigm. Her reading of Durkheim, however, understates the extent to which he saw social integration as based in work (see Chapter 9). It also understates how far the moral integration of ‘solidarity’ is focused on work – with work itself perceived as having social as well as moral and economic functions. Conversely, she neglects the moral element in liberal underclass discourse (her ‘specialization’), seeing the main source of integration as based in exchange. Spicker argues that although the language surrounding the RMI is more communitarian, the effect is similar to US workfare programmes – and similarly individualizes the problem of unemployment.⁴⁸

As a result of its origins within French social policy, the concept of social exclusion at European level became, as Room put it, a curious amalgam of a liberal, Anglo-Saxon concern with poverty and a more conservative, continental concern with moral integration and social order.⁴⁹ But to suggest that there is a single discourse of social exclusion in Europe would be misleading. The multi-lingual character of the Union necessarily implies a variety of discourses, which will not map precisely on to each other, even when translated from the same documents. However, the differences run deeper than this, leading to a series of overlapping national discourses of exclusion, rather than a pan-European consensus.⁵⁰ Discursive variation is accompanied by national policy differences, as discourses of exclusion are deployed within distinct political settings – although these national policies are increasingly oriented to and implicated in contested interpretations of a European framework.

This book is not a comparative study of discourses of exclusion or of social policy across Europe, but an examination of a single national case. Its focus is the different discourses around exclusion available to New Labour, and the uses made of them. However, among those resources are the concepts of exclusion embedded in the documents and policy instruments of the European Union itself. The discourse of key European policy papers – in their English versions – reveals a much narrower understanding of exclusion than that implied by Silver’s ‘solidarity’ model. This can be typified as a social integrationist discourse, SID, which stresses the integrative function of paid work. SID had a wider currency in British political discourse, and by using European documents as illustrative of it, I am not implying that this was the main source of the discourse, as will be clear from Chapters 3 and 4.

SID can be illustrated by the two European Commission White Papers on social and economic policy issued in 1994 – *European Social Policy and Growth, Competitiveness, Employment*⁵¹ – which are widely supposed to epitomize the social, rather than purely economic, concerns of the Union. Despite the language of solidarity, these policy documents emphasize exclusion as exclusion from paid work rather than a broader view of exclusion from social participation, and prescribe integration through paid work. The terms cohesion, solidarity, integration and exclusion recur. The core concerns of both documents are economic efficiency and social cohesion: ‘we are faced with the immense responsibility... of finding a new synthesis of the aims pursued by society (work as a factor of social integration, equality of opportunity) and the requirements of the economy (competitiveness and job creation)’.⁵² The economic discussion is couched in terms of efficiency, deregulation, and the need for economic growth, while the ‘social’ discourse counterposes solidarity, integration and cohesion to unemployment, poverty and social exclusion. Sometimes exclusion is identified with poverty: ‘with more than 52 million people in the Union living below the poverty line, social exclusion is an endemic phenomenon’;⁵³ while the need for economic and social cohesion calls for ‘solidarity... in the fight against social exclusion’, to combat the ‘poverty... which splits society in two’.⁵⁴ The processes of exclusion are described as ‘dynamic and multi-dimensional’, and linked ‘not only to unemployment and/or low incomes, but also to housing conditions, levels of education and opportunities, health, discrimination, citizenship and integration in the local community’.⁵⁵ Yet although this list might appear to echo the factors identified in RED, it is notable that the terms social exclusion and exclusion from paid work are used virtually interchangeably, while a similar elision occurs between ‘people’ and ‘workers’. A section headed ‘the free movement of persons’ goes on to discuss only the ‘free movement of workers’. ‘Promoting the Social Integration of Disabled People’ discusses only training and assistance to enter the labour market. On the ‘key issue of improved access to means of transport and public buildings’, the Commission will ‘press for the adoption of the proposed Directive on the travel conditions of *workers* with motor disabilities’ (emphasis added).⁵⁶

Since *Growth, Competitiveness, Employment* starts from a concern with unemployment, its focus on paid work is unsurprising. Few, in any case, would dispute that unemployment is a contributory factor to social exclusion, and work a factor in social integration. This, however, is not the same as treating them as synonymous – a slippage which

makes difficult the exploration of their empirical connection. The assumption that social integration and participation in paid work are coterminous is particularly clear in a discussion of education and skills: ‘The basic skills which are essential for *integration into society and working life* include a mastery of basic knowledge (linguistic, scientific and other knowledge), and skills of a highly technical and social nature, that is the ability to develop and act in a complex and highly technological environment, characterized, in particular, by the importance of information technologies’ (emphasis added).⁵⁷ The emphasis on the importance of information technology skills is probably exaggerated even in terms of the skills needed for employment, but as a description of the skills needed for integration into society, it is an odd list. *Growth, Competitiveness, Employment* treats the absence of these skills as the cause of social exclusion – or what *European Social Policy* calls exclusion ‘from the cycle of opportunities’: ‘The failure of education... is an increasingly important and increasingly widespread factor of marginalisation and economic and social exclusion. In the Community, 25 to 30% of young people... leave the education system without the preparation they need to become properly integrated into working life’.⁵⁸

Working life means paid employment. Unpaid work makes only a brief appearance in these documents, and then with a view to bringing it into the market sector to create more jobs. In ruling out *ab initio* the possibility of ‘a generalized reduction in working hours and job sharing’ as economically inefficient, the economic White Paper says we need to ‘think up new individual or collective needs which would provide new job opportunities’.⁵⁹ It proposes meeting old needs in new ways. ‘Women’s full integration in the labour market is expected to create jobs in the provision of services and goods not yet integrated into the market and currently being provided by either women’s unpaid labour or paid informal women’s labour’. Improving existing career opportunities for women will itself generate additional demand for child care. Where jobs are not created spontaneously, member states are exhorted to ‘encourage growth in the employment intensive area of the care sector and of the provision of household services’, and thus to ‘enhance the perceived value, and therefore encourage increased skills in such sectors’.⁶⁰ The assumptions about skill and value embedded here include the view that unpaid work is unskilled. Greater recognition of unpaid work other than through market mechanisms is ruled out. The extent of unpaid work, its necessity to the maintenance of social life and human relationships, and the limits

to potential marketization are underestimated, and the problems of low pay and gender segregation in the labour market ignored.⁶¹

In these documents, markets are not seen as benign. Markets have failings, produce unacceptable inequalities and embody short-termism, and thus require regulation, or at least management: ‘only a properly managed interdependence can guarantee a positive outcome for everybody’, and ‘collective solidarity mechanisms’ are essential to counter adverse effects.⁶² This could be a prescription for a redistributive welfare state, which might therefore acknowledge and reward unpaid work, but it is not. The cost of welfare provision is seen as excessive: ‘current levels of public expenditure, particularly in the social field, have become unsustainable and have used up resources which could have been channelled into productive investment’.⁶³ ‘Solidarity’ is a device for reducing the costs of social provision, not for redistribution. The forms of solidarity invoked are manifold: between those who have jobs and those who do not; between generations; between regions; between ‘those who earn their income from work and those who earn their income from investments’; and between men and women, ‘making it easier to reconcile family life and working life’. Notably, solidarity is not just a policy issue for member states, but a matter for individuals: it is ‘the business of each citizen to practice “neighbourly solidarity”’.⁶⁴ Hutton described *Growth, Competitiveness, Employment* as the last gasp of social Europe before it was suffocated by the monetarist criteria agreed as the foundation of monetary union. But the tension between ‘monetarist’ and ‘social’ Europe, and the dominance of the former, are already apparent in the document itself. Further movement in that direction followed, as austerity measures were brought in by governments across Europe anxious to qualify for entry into the single currency – in many states provoking social unrest in response to cuts in welfare rights.

The emphasis on paid work is endemic in the financial and legal framework of the Union. As the term social exclusion gained currency in Europe, currency, in the form of European funding, attached to projects to combat it. But the rules governing the use of the Community’s Structural Funds reinforce the understanding of social participation as labour market activity. The Social Fund, the main source of cash to combat exclusion, may only properly be used to fund measures directly related to the labour market, either through integration of marginal groups into it or through the promotion of equal opportunities. In practice, since funding goes to projects proposed by member states on the basis of additionality, many projects concerned with the

welfare of marginal groups which are ostensibly directed to improving their labour market integration appear to have a wider brief.

The legal definition of citizenship within Europe is also biased towards paid work. Louise Ackers argues that the general emphasis on ‘workers’ rather than ‘people’ in European law produces a stratified system of citizenship in Europe.⁶⁵ Although the Maastricht Treaty declares nationals of all member states to be European citizens with the right to move and reside freely within the Union, this right does not confer equal access to social rights and benefits in the country of residence. Whereas paid workers, self-employed people and those exercising their right to remain after ending paid employment have full social rights in their country of residence, members of their families have only derivative rights. This applies, of course, to women engaged in unpaid caring – for children or adults – who therefore do not have the same rights as paid workers. If family members and dependants can acquire social citizenship rights by proxy, non-employed persons not attached to a worker – students, disabled adults, retired people, for example – do not acquire them at all. Their right to move and reside freely within the Union is limited by the condition that they do not become a charge on the public purse of the host country. The essential point is that the emphasis on paid work as the primary means of social integration and the privileging of paid work over unpaid work has significant and gendered repercussions for citizenship status itself.

A discourse about social exclusion which focuses on integration through paid work tends to reduce the social to the economic, and simultaneously limits understanding of economic activity to market activity. If inclusion tends to shift the agenda away from equality, the focus on inclusion through paid work exacerbates this. SID thus has a number of features which distinguish it from RED and MUD:

- It narrows the definition of social exclusion/inclusion to participation in paid work.
- It squeezes out the question of why people who are not employed are consigned to poverty. Consequently, it does not, like RED, imply a reduction of poverty by an increase in benefit levels.
- It obscures the inequalities between paid workers.
- Since women are paid significantly less than men, and are far more likely to be in low-paid jobs, it obscures gender, as well as class, inequalities in the labour market.
- It erases from view the inequality between those owning the bulk of productive property and the working population.

- It is unable to address adequately the question of unpaid work in society.
- Because it ignores unpaid work and its gendered distribution, it implies an increase in women's total workload.
- It undermines the legitimacy of non-participation in paid work.

RED, SID and MUD are presented here as distinct discourses. They are, of course, ideal types. All of them posit paid work as a major factor in social integration; and all of them have a moral content. But they differ in what the excluded are seen as lacking. To oversimplify, in RED they have no money, in SID they have no work, in MUD they have no morals. In terms of Walker's broad definition of social exclusion as exclusion from social, economic, political or cultural systems, the discourses emphasize different elements – and posit different causal relationships between them. Thus both SID and MUD are narrower than RED, with SID reducing the social to the economic and substantially ignoring the political and cultural. MUD, on the other hand, emphasizes the cultural, with the economic deriving from this, while the social and political are sidelined. In reality, although there are examples which conform very closely to a particular model, much public discourse slides between them. That, indeed, is one of the reasons why a concept like social exclusion is so powerful. Not only does the multiplicity of meanings which attach to it give it wide acceptance, but it operates as a shifter between the different discourses. Like the 'underclass', 'social exclusion' can, almost unnoticed, mobilize a redistributive argument behind a cultural or integrationist one – or represent cultural or integrationist arguments as redistributive.

But there are also major differences between the discourses in their capacity to recognize, let alone valorize, unpaid work. Part of the point of Glucksmann's model of the total social organization of labour is that work, or economic activity, occurs not only within the market in the conventionally-defined economic sphere, but also outside it. To understand the shifting forms of work and the relationships within which they are embedded, the analysis cannot begin from a standpoint which privileges one particular form or site of work. Many of the problems with which politicians and policy makers now grapple can be seen in terms of the breakdown of a historical organization of labour in which men had primary responsibility for paid work and women primary responsibility for unpaid domestic work, albeit often combining this with some paid employment. SID barely acknowledges non-market work at all, or treats it as a residual form. The unpaid

work of child care, for example, is either to be drawn into the market, or squeezed into the spaces around paid employment. Unpaid work is addressed solely from the standpoint of the market. This is slightly less true of MUD, which, while deploying the idea of ‘dependency’ in its refusal to valorize unpaid work, simultaneously complains of the consequences of inadequate parenting. Yet this contradiction is itself masked by the fact that parenting is not understood as work. In general, the emphasis on paid work as a vehicle of inclusion, and the construction of exclusion as non-employment, inherently privileges market activity: it does not address either work, or social integration, in terms of the total social organization of labour.

In the following chapters, I shall argue that the developing discourse of New Labour shifted it significantly away from RED towards an inconsistent combination of SID and MUD. The impossibility of adequately acknowledging unpaid labour from this standpoint produces deep contradictions between different elements of policy, most especially between the rediscovery of community and the attempt to draw everyone into paid work through the New Deal or welfare to work programmes. This contradiction can be resolved only by a rightward shift to a reformulation of the Thatcherite free economy-strong state dyad in terms of community, or by a leftward shift towards a RED agenda. A central political question for Labour’s first term in office will be how it negotiates between the different available discourses of social exclusion, and how, especially through the Social Exclusion Unit, it translates them into policy. Their performance will be judged not only on whether they deliver ‘social inclusion’, but what kind of inclusion they deliver, for whom, and on what terms. The following chapters outline the emergence of the new political discourse, and their implications for delivering inclusion.

1.4 Social Exclusion and Forms of Social Capital: Czech Evidence on Mutual Links

Social Exclusion and Forms of Social Capital: Czech Evidence on Mutual Links*

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Abstract: In this article the authors investigate the relevance of social capital to the economic and social inclusion of economically disadvantaged people. The analysis is based on data from a survey conducted on a special kind of sample, which is homogenous in one dimension of economic exclusion (income disadvantage), enabling a more in-depth study of how strongly this dimension of exclusion is associated with other dimensions of economic and social exclusion and how various forms and patterns of social capital influence economic and social inclusion (in these dimensions). The results of the analysis confirm that individual forms of social capital often play distinct and mutually independent roles. The analysis also reaffirmed findings that informal social capital is more important in the post-communist Czech Republic than formal capital and that the level of formal social participation and trust is quite low even in this specific population. All forms of social capital (distinguished here in terms of Woolcock's typology) have proven to be substantially associated with a degree of material deprivation; with informal networks showing the strongest correlation. Although these networks provide some protection against social exclusion, they are not a reliable buffer, since people of lower economic and social status have limited access to 'quality' social networks, and other forms of social capital are often absent.

Keywords: formal and informal social capital, general trust, trust in institutions, economic exclusion

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Introduction

Social exclusion is usually defined as a disadvantage and as the impossibility of fully participating in various ways in the life of society: it has an economic, a social, a political and a cultural dimension. These dimensions are generally assumed to be interdependent and mutually reinforcing, thus producing a cumula-

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tive disadvantage. What is believed to be the major cause and the beginning of the chain of social exclusion processes is the inaccessibility of paid employment [cf. Dahrendorf 1988; Berghman 1997; Bauman 1998; Beck 2000, and others], because that has a fatal impact on the material standards of the households of the unemployed, reduces them to poverty and worsens their overall quality of life [Gallie 1999; Gallie and Paugam 2000]. The negative effects of unemployment and poverty then include the narrowing down of social networks to just the immediate family and closest friends, the loss of social capital, which could otherwise help a person to become re-employed [e.g. Granovetter 1973; Fitzpatrick 2001], and a decline in social status [e.g. Gans 1995; Giddens 1998; Bauman 1998]. A social stigma is frequently attached to long-term unemployment and lasting poverty, and these situations often lead to social isolation. However, some research has shown that the unemployed are no less sociable, in the sense of informal social contacts, than employed people; quite the contrary [Gallie, Paugam and Jacobs 2003]. Nevertheless, this stream of research has also shown that, although the frequency of informal contacts sometimes increases with unemployment, these networks provide less support than do the networks of the employed. This finding applies to both the UK and post-communist countries, including the Czech Republic [Gallie, Kostova and Kuchař 2001].

The question then arises as to what extent the unemployed and the economically deprived participate in other forms of social relations, such as voluntary organisations and civic sector initiatives or political institutions. Especially important is the question of what kind of attitude and approach they generally adopt towards the institutions of society at large, particularly those designed to safeguard civil rights and life chances. Another important question is to what extent these various forms of social participation or the related social capital (along with other forms of assistance) help unemployed and income-deprived people overcome the consequences of the economic dimension of social exclusion and help them maintain a certain standard or quality of life in mainstream society.

This article explores the link between the economic dimension of social exclusion (specifically, income disadvantage, material deprivation and unemployment) and the role of various forms of social capital at the individual level. The analysis draws on data from a survey conducted among a sample of people identified as income-disadvantaged on the basis of objective and subjective indicators (see below). Such a sample provides an opportunity to study in detail how strongly this dimension of economic exclusion is associated with other dimensions of economic and social exclusion and how strongly the various forms and patterns of social capital, understood here in terms of Woolcock's typology, influence various dimensions of economic and social exclusion.

We will first specify the relationship between social exclusion and various forms of social capital, and then we will describe the data sample and the methodology applied. The empirical findings are presented in two paragraphs: the first one focuses on the examination of different dimensions of economic exclu-

sion and the second one on the role of different forms of social capital for social inclusion in the economic dimension. The article concludes with a discussion of the main findings.

Social capital and social exclusion/inclusion

Social exclusion is a process (and its outcome), whereby individuals or groups become detached from group or broader social relations. In other words, it is as a rupture of the relationship between the individual and the society at different levels.¹ It involves not only low income/poverty, polarisation, differentiation, and inequality on a vertical social axis, but also the state of being *in* or *out* of a circle [Burchardt, Le Grand and Piachaud 1999: 228], as a consequence of 'mechanisms that act to detach groups of people from the social mainstream' [Giddens 1998: 104]. 'An individual is socially excluded if (a) he or she is geographically resident in a society and (b) he or she does not participate in the normal activities of citizens in that society', where 'normal activities' may refer to the following: consumption activity, savings activity, production activity, political activity, and social activity [ibid: 230–231]. As such, social exclusion is simultaneously regarded as both a property of societies (largely process-oriented) and an attribute of groups and individuals or communities (largely outcome-oriented) [compare Berghman 1995, 1998; Berger-Schmitt 2000; Phillips 2006].

It can be claimed that social inclusion and social participation are usually grounded in some form of social capital. It is also for this reason that definitions of social capital accentuate its function in social participation, social inclusion and social cohesion. Social capital is construed as a quality, as a social resource or a social glue that is the property of a group, a community or a society, and as such it is available to its members. Bourdieu [1986: 249], for instance, defines it as 'the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of a mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership of a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively-owned capital'. Similarly, Coleman [1988] understands social capital, defined by its function, as a resource for action that is available to actors and takes three forms: obligations and expectations, information channels, and social norms.

Woolcock [1998] then distinguishes among bonding social capital (established ties among members of a relatively homogeneous group such as the family or close friends), bridging social capital (ties among more distant friends, colleagues, and people different to oneself) and linking social capital (relationships among members of different social classes).

¹ Social exclusion may be defined as a result of the failure of institutions to integrate individuals; for example, democratic and legal systems, the labour market, the welfare state, the family and community [Berghman 1998: 258–259].

To sum up, social capital in its totality affects social inclusion, an individual's quality of life and personal development, but also economic growth, democratic governance and social cohesion at the macro level [cf. Putnam 1993; Knack and Keefer 1997; World Bank 1998; Fukuyama 1999; Phillips 2006]. All this takes place at multiple levels of social relations and owing to various forms of social capital. These are usually believed to include: a) shared informal social values and norms that enable co-operation [Fukuyama 1999: 16], of which the most important is trust, as 'the expectation that rises within a community of regular, honest and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms' [Fukuyama 1995: 25], b) horizontal, associational networks [Woolcock 1998; Putnam 1993], together with the mutual trust that they produce [Putnam 2000] and possibly also vertical social networks [Woolcock 1998], and c) civic and other social institutions [World Bank 1998; Woolcock 1998; Lockwood 1999; Rothstein 2001].

Knack and Keefer [1997] discuss the mutual links between various forms of social capital and explain that some forms of social capital, like interpersonal trust and civic norms, are positively associated with economic growth and incomes, since higher-trust societies spend less to protect themselves against exploitation during economic transactions and have higher incentives to innovate. This is not the case with the other form of social capital – associations within groups – owing to the contradictory effects of the conflicting interests between groups [Olson 1982], which offset the positive effects of solidarity and cooperative action emphasised by Putnam [2000]. Therefore, high social polarisation (ethnic, political, religious or income differences) increases individual and group rent-seeking activities (either legal or illegal) that undermine trust. Recently, Putnam [2007] argued that social diversity produces distrust, social isolation and anomie rather than conflict (the constrict hypothesis): in the short run, diversity strengthens bonding social capital, while precluding the creation of bridging social capital. On the other hand, wisely designed policies can alter this link if they enable the social deconstruction of the lines of social divide (the US Army being a nice example).

The notions of social inclusion and social capital are tightly intertwined and can even be seen to overlap, and they are difficult individually isolate. It is possible to regard social capital as a certain type of 'capability' that preconditions the process of social inclusion (in the sense of 'functioning' in the existing social structure). In many respects, the process of social inclusion also reinforces the social capital of society. Nevertheless, it is not always possible to clearly differentiate between the initial preconditions and the outcomes of the process of social inclusion, because such outcomes then become the preconditions for further dynamics. Aside from social capital, social inclusion is also naturally determined by other factors and occurs along other dimensions (the importance of the economic dimension has already been mentioned). However, these other dimensions are to some extent also influenced by social capital (see Figure 1).

Neither the individual dimensions of social exclusion nor the individual

Figure 1. Dimensions of social capital and social exclusion/inclusion

Social capital	Social inclusion (participation)
	<i>Economic:</i>
	– labour market – unemployment /employment
	– consumption (material deprivation)
	<i>Social:</i>
Support from informal networks (family, neighbours, friends)	– (non)participation in informal networks
Support from formal networks (associations, civic sector)	– (non)participation in civic society (formal voluntary networks)
Support from institutions (welfare state, etc.)	– (non)access to institutions
Inclusive effect of shared norms and a climate of trust	– (dis)respecting norms, moral (generally acceptable) behaviour
	<i>Political/civic:</i>
	– (non)involvement in the political process (elections and other activities)
	– (non)membership of political groups (parties) and their activities

dimensions/forms of social capital need necessarily be inter-correlated – as a number of analyses have shown [Knack and Keefer 1997; Woolcock 1998; van Oorschot and Arts 2004; Wallace and Pichler 2007, and others] – and therefore, they need to be strictly distinguished from one another, both at the general and the operational, empirical level. As regards social capital, Woolcock [1998] states that particularly two of its dimensions must be distinguished, namely, intra-community ties (integration, bonding) and extra-community ties (linkage, bridging). These can then combine to produce four possible scenarios, including low integration and low linkage (amoral individualism), low integration and high linkage (anomie), high integration and low linkage (sink communities) and high integration and high linkage (social opportunity). These scenarios can be perceived as forms (or degrees) of social inclusion.

The existing research on social capital in post-communist countries has drawn attention to the different patterns and configurations of forms of social capital and the significant effects these differences have on democracy and economic growth. Informal networks (bonding social capital) are recognised as a crucial

form of social capital in post-communist countries² but with little bridging capital between the higher and the lower social strata. At the same time lower level of trust in institutions and general trust was evidenced there [see Rose, Mishler and Haerpfner 1998; Rose 2001]³. Raiser et al. [2002] maintain that in contrast to developed democracies, the strong reliance on friends (informal social capital) does not lead to higher civic participation (formal social capital) in post-communist societies, which means that the pattern of social capital formation is different. Wallace and Pichler [2007] recently distinguished four 'social capital regimes': one of these patterns is the East-Central/Baltic/Balkan pattern, where informal social capital clearly substitutes formal social capital. This contrasts with the other regimes (for example, in the Nordic regime the relationship is complementary, while no very strong link was found in Western Europe or the Southern regime).

The way in which different patterns of social capital are formed is believed to be embedded in the cultural context and influenced by path dependency. Howard [2002], for example, explains the weak civil society in post-communist societies by three main factors: the history of mistrust of communist organisations, the continued existence of friendship networks and close circles of trusted friends and family that were developed under communist times and even during the transition period, and a certain post-communist disappointment arising from the citizens' sense of having been let down or cheated by the new system.⁴

The economic dimension of social exclusion and social capital

We assume that there is a tight bond among all the three considered dimensions/concepts: the economic dimension of social exclusion, its social dimension and social capital (though we cannot determine the direction of causal influence); see Figure 2.


Nevertheless, the individual constituent parts and forms of these concepts/dimensions need to be distinguished, as some are more closely related to each other than others. For instance, both constituent parts of the economic dimension of social exclusion (labour market marginalisation and material deprivation) are probably very closely related. Conversely, various forms of social capital (informal, formal, institutional, and normative) are not necessarily tightly interdependent and mutually reinforcing, they can substitute or even counteract/offset one another. This can then have implications for the process of social inclusion

² For example, in Russia the climate of distrust of institutions and fear of being oppressed by institutions, along with the lacking infrastructure, play a role in the reliance on close networks [Rose 1995].

³ Based on data from the New Europe Barometer Survey.

⁴ Matějů and Vitásková [2006] discuss the negative consequences of the missing social capital in the form of generalised or institutional trust accompanied by a prevalence of informal networks for the process of market transformation and growth.

Figure 2. Relations among economic exclusion/inclusion, social capital and social exclusion/inclusion



and its outcomes. How do the specific forms of social capital and their configurations and combinations relate to social inclusion of economically (and socially) excluded people?

It can be assumed that the social inclusion of people facing the economic dimension of social exclusion, that is, material deprivation and/or exclusion from the labour market, will require far more than just the integration with the help of the bonding social capital represented by informal networks. This is because people prefer to rely on informal social networks, but the function of these networks as a resource is weaker in the case of unemployed, low-skilled, low-status people. In this case, the linkage dimension will also be especially important, as it involves integration into society at large, including access to the institutions that determine life chances and the exercise of civil, political and social rights.

Many factors can come into play in this respect. Access to the institutions of the welfare state (for example, in the form of universal entitlements granted by the welfare state) can be of key importance for creating trust in institutions and general social trust, as argued for instance by Rothstein [2001]. However, contrary to this assumption, people facing the economic dimension of exclusion must largely rely on schemes of social assistance based on means-testing or are even subjected to various practices of workfare. Such arrangements of the welfare state are generally considered stigmatising and seen to undermine social solidarity [Baldwin 1990] or generate socially antagonistic interests [Esping-Andersen 1990]. They also in large measure lead to the non-take-up of social rights [van Oorschot 1994]. All this destroys social capital at the level of access to and trust in institutions, and eventually also at the level of general trust in fellow citizens. Van Oorschot and Arts [2004] provide evidence (at the country level) that welfare state expenditure is positively correlated with overall social capital, but there is no correlation with informal solidarity, and therefore, they reject the 'substitution' ('crowding out') hypothesis.⁵ By contrast, Vanhuyse [2006] has reconfirmed that the welfare state

⁵ The substitution hypothesis suggests that the solidarity organised (and enforced) by the welfare state is crowding out informal solidarity.

destroys social capital: in spite of the increase in poverty, unemployment and social inequalities, the transition from communism to market democracy proceeded peacefully in Central Europe, including the Czech Republic, thanks to the deliberate use the political elites made of social policies designed to prevent massive job losses and/or to isolate highly aggrieved groups of workers in precarious jobs by breaking their social networks and undermining their potential for collective action in the form of strikes (particularly by using early retirement and disability schemes or by tolerating the grey economy). We would argue that it was not the general influence of the welfare state at work but rather a specific model of targeted income- and means-tested or group-specific policies.

Data and methodology

In order to explore in greater depth the question of whether social participation and the various forms of social capital are associated with the various forms of economic exclusion, this analysis draws on data from the survey 'Social Exclusion and Social Policy', conducted at the end of 2004 and the start of 2005. The sampling unit was an individual showing signs of income disadvantage (though the survey also included questions about selected characteristics of the respondent's household). This was a special kind of sample, in that it was homogenous along one dimension of economic exclusion (income disadvantage), allowing us to explore more in depth how strongly this dimension of economic exclusion is associated with other dimensions of economic and social exclusion and how strongly the various forms of social capital influence these dimensions.

The sample contained 2225 individuals of working age (students and pensioners excluded) who either i) stated that they had received social assistance benefits in the course of 2004 owing to insufficient earnings, or ii) stated that they had considered claiming benefits at some point during 2004, since they had subjectively perceived their income situation as comparable (that is as equally difficult) to that of benefits recipients. This latter category of respondents accounted for about one-third of the survey sample.⁶

⁶ The reason for covering the sub-group of respondents who do not exhibit 'objective' evidence of income disadvantage (do not receive repeated social assistance benefits) but rather 'subjective' evidence of it (they perceive their situation to be similar to that of benefits recipients) was to avoid the Type I selection error noted by Halleröd [1995], that is, the error of relying purely on the 'objective' criterion of poverty. There exists circumstantial evidence in the Czech Republic suggesting the non-take-up of benefits to which potential recipients are legitimately entitled (occurring alongside benefits over-use), and the extent of such non-take-up is not negligible [Mareš 2001]. Therefore, it would be a weighty omission if we limited ourselves merely to benefits recipients. This presumption about the existence of the category of poor people, who, despite being entitled to social benefits, do not receive them, was verified in the course of the research. All other factors aside, it is evidenced by the fact that average income per head (calculated on the basis of the so-called

The sample can thus be described as a purposive quota type sample constructed so as to sufficiently represent the main types of respondents according to sex, age and the type of household they live in, in order to enable comparisons, and therefore, it does not correspond to the structure of the overall population of the income disadvantaged. At the time of research around 5–6% of the economically active population was identified as social assistance benefits claimants, 60% of which were unemployed.⁷ The quotas for this sample were defined from an analysis of the structure of recipients of social assistance benefits [Sirovátka et al. 2005] in order to capture the main ‘types’ of income disadvantaged people as identified in this analysis: about 30% are people under the age of 25, about 50% are people aged 25–45, and about 20% are people over the age of 45; equal shares of men and women (50% each), and roughly equal shares of respondents living in households with no children, two-parent households with a child/children, and single-parent households with a child/children (about one-third each).⁸

The economic dimension of social exclusion is measured in this study in terms of marginalisation in the labour market, income disadvantage, and material deprivation. To identify marginalisation in the labour market we used repeated and long-term unemployment (for more than twelve months). The analysis of material deprivation builds on the neutral term ‘income disadvantage’, which (as has already been mentioned) encompasses both an objective and subjective indication. Income was analysed on the basis of the declared incomes in the respondents’ households and calculated per capital household income using the Eurostat [2000] equivalence scale: the respondent’s weight 1.0, the weight of other adults in the household 0.5, and the weight of children 0.3. Then material deprivation was analysed as a multidimensional phenomenon and studied its individual constituent parts: income deprivation, the deprivation of basic needs (food, clothing, and vacations), deprivation related to household utilities, and housing conditions. These indicators are rather well-established and broadly used to measure the scope and structure of poverty, the nature of material deprivation and social exclusion, and have been assessed by experts as relevant for international comparison [Eurostat 2000]. In addition to these primary indicators of deprivation standardly used by Eurostat to monitor poverty and social exclusion, we recorded other indicators of deprivation that we regard as ‘supplementary’ in the sense

equivalence scale) in the category of benefits recipients was in fact comparable to that in the category denoted as merely ‘subjective’ income-disadvantaged people (Czk 4700 and 4830, respectively).

⁷ The authors’ analysis based on statistics provided by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

⁸ The set quotas roughly respect the age structure of income-disadvantaged people in the entire population, but – for the sake of meeting the numbers of respondents in the analysed type groups – they over-represent respondents in two-parent households with children (the share of which among income-deprived people is in reality no more than 20%), and, conversely, under-represent individuals (who account for over one-half of benefits recipients in reality).

that they extend beyond basic life necessities and material deprivation. They are nonetheless important, as they indicate access to life chances, capabilities [Sen 1992], and thus the possibilities of functioning in a certain social structure. The specific concern in this case is the possibility people have to shape the conditions of their own lives and exercise control over their own personal development, future, and the future of their children. It is these circumstances that correspond with the established definition of social exclusion, such as deprivation in terms of access to the institutions that determine life chances, the possibility to live up to the mainstream standard of life, and the opportunity to participate in various areas of social life [Room 1995; Atkinson 1998; Atkinson et al. 2002]. To be even more specific, it is about the ability to get a mortgage and to have health, accident, or supplementary pension insurance, and about being able to send one's children to college or to pursue one's own cultural interests, and so on.

The overall degree of material deprivation and social exclusion was measured through the use of aggregated indicators: we used a cumulative index constructed from a set of twelve selected items that had the best result in the reliability test out of all possibilities that we tested. While the index included items based on 'supplementary' but, from the perspective of the social exclusion concept, significant indicators, it also retained those items relating to material deprivation that have traditionally been considered of key relevance. The value of the cumulative indexes indicates the percentage of items where the respondent is significantly (heavily) deprived out of the total number of items in the index (the values thus range from 0 to 100).

In conformity with Figure 1 the following items are used to measure social capital and social participation:

- the frequency of interpersonal contact with friends, in order to identify the importance of informal social networks;
- a cumulative index of membership of voluntary associations in the non-governmental sector, in order to identify the importance of formal social networks (five items – membership of organisations such as interest or sports groups, or public benefit organisations, or mutual benefit associations and civic initiatives, or parental associations and youth clubs, and membership in unions);⁹
- in order to indicate social capital at the institutional level, trust in institutions is monitored (indicated by dis/agreement with the statement: 'There's no point in turning to institutions, because they are not much interested in the problems of the ordinary person');
- the item used to indicate social participation at the level of access to institutions was: 'The likelihood that our social assistance claims will be rejected is high';¹⁰

⁹ These indications can be interpreted both as proxies for social capital and social participation (inclusion).

¹⁰ Materially deprived persons find this aspect of access to institutions as possibly being of the greatest significance.

- the time used to indicate the level of general social trust and respect for norms as a form of social capital was: ‘Nowadays a person cannot tell on whom to rely.’

While the operationalisation of these items may be open to discussion, we set out from the view that the items need to be understood more as proxies. Given the scope of the questionnaire, we could not, for example, analyse in more detail social capital and social participation at the level of various types of formal and informal networks. However, this is not a fundamental problem in light of the above-mentioned overlap between both concepts.

The findings on economic exclusion and social capital in the Czech Republic

The economic dimension of social exclusion

The economic dimension of social exclusion evidently deserves attention in the Czech Republic. The percentage of socially excluded people and households seems relatively low in the Czech Republic [Večerník 2004; Mareš 2006; Sirovátka and Mareš 2006] and the other ‘primary indicators’ of social exclusion adopted by the EU are also mostly rather low [European Commission 2007], but the unemployment rate of young people is above average, and the proportion of long-term unemployed is high. However, if the at-risk-of-poverty rate measured by Eurostat standards was 10% in 2005, this had a disproportionate effect on specific groups, like the unemployed, single-parent families with children, families with three or more children, and children in general: their at-risk-of-poverty rate was 51%, 41%, 24% and 18%, respectively [ČSÚ 2007].

Generally speaking, a relatively decent degree of consistency can be observed between the two key dimensions of economic exclusion: marginalisation in the labour market and indicators of income disadvantage and material deprivation. A cardinal characteristic of income-disadvantaged people (which applies to practically all the respondents in the sample) is usually some form of marginalisation in the labour market resulting from:

a) the type of current or previous employment: if employed at all, then in just 56% of cases people were employed on the basis of indefinite employment contracts, and in 7% of cases they worked on a self-employed basis, while the remainder had fixed-term employment or occasional work without an employment contract;

b) repeated bouts of unemployment: not only were over one-third of the people/sample unemployed, but most of the unemployed were unemployed in the long term or repeatedly.

c) hidden unemployment: about 11% of the unemployed in the sample were not registered as unemployed; it was possible to identify another 12% of the unemployed who could be referred to as ‘discouraged’ (they would accept a job but

Table 1. Supplementary indicators of material deprivation - by position of the respondent's family members in the labour market (in %)

Respondent (or one of the respondent's family members):	Total	Hous. of fully empl.	Hous. of partially empl.	Hous. of unempl.	CC (sign. .000)
Has a mortgage	25.6	32.6	31.5	14.5	.194
Has supplementary pension insurance	17.5	24.6	17.4	9.8	.174
Has health/accident insurance	37.9	47.3	45.0	23.0	.229
Has the choice of sending children to college (provided they have children)	52.5	61.3	61.0	33.7	.249
Has the choice of going out to see a concert, a theatre performance, etc., at least once a month	40.1	48.3	40.0	31.0	.154

Note: The questions were: 'Do you or anyone in the family have...?'
'Partially employed' households – one of the partners is working.

do not actively search for one), most typically owing to a lack of belief in the idea that they might find one.

d) in households of income-disadvantaged people unemployment tends to accumulate: one-quarter of those living in two-person households had current or previous experience of parallel unemployment.

The differences in income by position in the labour market observed in the sample were rather modest, since income, in the case of unemployed people, is supplemented with social benefits to the level of the subsistence minimum. Nevertheless, we found that (even short-term) employment does alleviate benefits dependency among income-disadvantaged people: 69% (60%) of those with a permanent (temporary) job were not dependent on welfare, while among the unemployed the figure was only about one-fourth ($\text{Eta} = 0.395$, $\text{sign.} = .000$). Moreover, employees with a permanent job less often than unemployed or inactive persons faced subjective income deprivation (13% compared to one-third)¹¹ or overall material deprivation (31% compared to 46%). Conversely, the situation of temporary workers was only a little better than the situation of the unemployed (42% were deprived).¹²

It is precisely the above areas that indicate the possibility of being able to live up to the 'majority life style' and to some extent also the possibility to deter-

¹¹ $\text{Eta} = 0.290$, $\text{sign.} = .000$

¹² $\text{Eta} = 0.228$, $\text{sign.} = .000$

mine one's own destiny or the destiny of one's children, where material deprivation faced by income-disadvantaged people is relatively strong and at the same time differentiated according to their position in the labour market – more so than in the case of some other indicators of material deprivation (see Table 1).

The situation of respondents living in unemployed households, in comparison with those who live in fully or partially employed households (with the latter two types not being significantly different from each other in this regard), is clearly marked by limited possibilities to pursue cultural interests or send children to college (only about one-third of these households declared having such possibilities). Similarly poor is their participation in supplementary pension insurance and the use of mortgage schemes (10% to 15%). In view of this, it is obvious that employment and related income provides the households with some security and disposable income, which they can use with greater confidence at their own discretion and do some financial planning. This can then in fact be considered a part of sharing the mainstream life style. We could therefore regard participation in the labour market as a certain kind of both economic and social capital, because it both guarantees a clear social status and facilitates the ability of people to influence their own destiny and the destiny of their family and to participate in the mainstream life style.

The economic dimension of social exclusion – and social capital

When we review the relationship of various dimensions of social exclusion and social capital to the position of income-disadvantaged people in the labour market and their subjective income and material deprivation, we find that while the sociability of income-disadvantaged people in informal or voluntary formal networks is not, generally speaking, too low, the subjective indicators point in most cases to poorer access to social entitlements, in two-thirds of cases to distrust of institutions, in three-quarters of cases to general distrust, and (in 28% of cases) to a decreased interest in going to the polls; see Table 2.

Using Woolcock's typology we would arrive at only 9.2% of respondents who are not integrated in social networks (they are in contact with friends less frequently than once a month and are not members of any voluntary organisation, and are without a more general social linkage, indicated by a lack of trust in either institutions or more generally in other people), and at 5.2% of respondents who are not integrated in social networks but have some general social linkage (i.e. trust). Finally, we find that half of the respondents (48.9%) are integrated in social networks but lack a more general social linkage (trust), and 36.9% are integrated in social networks and have some social linkage. This finding is of crucial importance in that it confirms the high proportion of the excluded in the economic dimension who have tight relationships with their close circles of friends and family, yet are at the same time exposed to social isolation in the wider society

Table 2. The social capital linked to a person's position in the labour market and material deprivation (ETA coef. and contingency coefficient, significance)

	Frequency in %	Position in the labour market (Eta)	Does not have great difficulties making ends meet (CC)	Index of mate- rial deprivation below median value (CC)
Frequency of contact with friends (on almost a daily basis, more than once a month, less than once a month)	19.5 62.9 17.6	.127 (.000)	.137 (.000)	.146 (.000)
Membership in voluntary organisations (yes, no)	24.1 75.9	.154 (.000)	.116 (.000)	.092 (.000)
Probability of social assistance claims being rejected (is not high, is high)	55.0 45.0	n.sign.	.070 (.003)	.093 (.000)
Distrust of institutions (no, yes)	33.4 66.6	.064 (.000)	.086 (.000)	.093 (.000)
Distrust of people in general (no, yes)	76.6 23.4	n.sign.	.072 (.001)	.074 (.000)
Interest in going to the polls (yes, don't know-no)	28.2 81.8	.097 (.000)	.075 (.000)	.120 (.000)
Chances of poor people to escape poverty (yes-at least a small chance, no chance)	69.1 30.9	.106 (.000)	.265 (.000)	.191 (.000)

and face a lack of trust from people and institutions. Second, what is surprising is that about one-third of economically deprived people possess both dimensions of social capital.

This pattern does not significantly vary in the case of the position in the labour market or the level of income or material deprivation, characteristics such as a worsened position in the labour market and a greater degree of income and material deprivation are associated with only a mild worsening of indications of social capital, and that particularly in terms of the frequency of informal contacts, partially also in terms of involvement in voluntary formal networks and participation in elections; on the other hand, indicators of trust in and access to institutions (social entitlements) and general trust remain constantly low, or possibly worsen only slightly in dependence on the worsening of objective indications. This finding for this specific population is consistent in general terms with the finding by Matějů and Vitásková [2006] for a representative sample of the popula-

tion. The results in fact confirm the already discussed trade-off between informal and formal social capital is strong in the Czech Republic, even in the case of the specific sub-sample of the economically deprived population who are rather rich in informal capital in terms of frequency of social contacts but show relatively higher levels of distrust and low participation in formal civic organisations.

If we examine the correlations of aggregate social capital, as measured by the variable constructed on the basis of Woolcock's classification, it is possible to identify a weak correlation with subjective income deprivation ($ETA = .149$, $sign. = .000$) and material deprivation ($ETA = .148$, $sign. = .000$), whilst correlation with the position in the labour market is insignificant. The analysis also included one supplementary item that expresses a subjective reflection of the overall degree of inclusiveness of society, or more specifically, a subjective assessment of the chances of poor people to escape poverty. This can be considered the most general (aggregate) characteristic of the importance of social capital in relation to the life chances of the income-disadvantaged. As can be seen, this aggregate characteristic correlates only mildly with the respondents' position in the labour market, but moderately strongly with their overall material deprivation, and it correlates strongly with their subjective assessment of their income situation.

The dimensions of social capital and their significance for economic inclusion

The association between the three aforementioned forms of social capital at the individual level is relatively weak. Only with respect to the dimension of trust was a moderately strong association found between trust in institutions and general trust in other people ($ETA = .333$, $sign. = .000$). Similarly, trust in institutions is moderately strongly associated with the subjective perception of access to institutions that guarantee social entitlements (operationalised as the probability of benefits claims being rejected) ($ETA = .227$, $sign. = .000$). The hypothesis about the mutual independence of various forms of social capital is thus confirmed.

The perception of the overall inclusiveness of society, as measured by the assessment of poor people's chances to escape poverty, shows between a weak or moderately strong association with all the three dimensions of social capital and with the institutional dimension of social exclusion (access to social entitlements), the strongest being the association with trust in and access to institutions, but at the same time also the frequency of informal contacts ($ETA = .153$, $sign. = .000$). All the three forms of social capital considered clearly have some relevance for assessing the life chances of income disadvantaged people to escape their income disadvantage. This is also apparent from the association of this variable with the overall proxy of social capital constructed according to Woolcock's typology, which is greater than the association with its individual forms ($ETA = .224$, $sign. = .000$).

Therefore, we next examine the importance of individual forms of social capital – in comparison with individual characteristics of income-disadvantaged

Table 3. Logistic regression – the ratio of probability that the respondent:

a) is employed

b) is facing above-average material deprivation (index value is above median value)

c) sees certain chances of the poor to escape poverty

	Is employed		Is materially deprived		The poor have chances to escape poverty	
	Exp (B)	sign.	Exp (B)	sign.	Exp (B)	sign.
Contact with friends:						
Almost on a daily basis	,671	,004	,336	,000	1,773	,000
More often than once a month	1,032	,773	,557	,000	2,583	,001
Less often than once a month	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Member of a voluntary organisation	1,972	,000	X		1,627	,000
Not a member of a voluntary organisation	Ref.		X		Ref.	
Probability of social benefits claims being rejected is seen as high	x		1,574	,000	,634	,000
Is not seen as high	x		Ref.		Ref.	
Distrusts institutions	1,311	,003	X		,566	,000
Does not distrust institutions	Ref.		X		Ref.	
Distrusts people in general	x		1,522	,001	x	
Does not distrust people in general	X		Ref.		x	
Elementary education	,364	,000	8,866	,000	1,029	,875
Lower secondary educ.	1,045	,703	3,711	,000	2,010	,000
Complete second. educ.	1,064	,642	2,346	,000	2,720	,000
University education	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Has health problems	x		1,462	,003	x	
Does not have health problems	x		Ref.		x	

	Model summary	Model summary	Model summary
Chi square	173.028 (7) sig. .000	767.483 (8) Sig. .000	381.665 (8) sig. .000
-2 Log likelihood	2861.570	1776.368	1958.400
Nagelkerke R Square	.101	.456	.270

Note: x = was not included in the model (not significant).

people, particularly their human capital – both for economic exclusion/inclusion (i.e. position in the labour market, and material deprivation), and for subjective chances of social inclusion in general.

Social and human capital variables best explain the differences in the degree of overall material deprivation, and to some extent also the respondents' assessment of poor people's chances to escape poverty (inclusiveness of society), although the actual financial situation can in fact be very similar (see Table 3). However, they are less relevant for explaining employment chances (see the Nagelkerke R Square figures in the models above).

Access to employment for income-disadvantaged people is significantly lower in the case of people with elementary education (as opposed to people with a university degree), though differences in relation to other educational categories are insignificant. The effect of both human capital and social capital on the employment of income-disadvantaged people is equally ambiguous. Employment is, indeed, markedly higher (with chances being twice as high) in connection with membership in voluntary organisations. However, it is interesting to see that employment chances are lower in the case of people with nearly daily contact with friends (as opposed to those who are in touch with friends less often than once a month)¹³, and, conversely, higher in the case of people who distrust institutions. We could infer from this that weak ties can actually play a greater role when it comes to finding employment than intensive friendship ties narrowed down to just the community of close friends. Distrust of institutions can then act as an incentive to rely more on one's own assets and make a greater effort to find gainful employment.

Unlike employment status, material deprivation is strongly inversely associated with human capital and with informal social ties, general trust in people and access to institutions, that is, with all forms of social capital. What appears to have the most pronounced is completed education, and the respondent's overall health status also plays a role. The leverage of informal social networks in terms

¹³ For a similar conclusion on the unemployed, see Gallie, Kostova and Kuchař [2001]. The authors show that in spite of more frequent informal social contacts, support from these networks is less helpful than in the case of employed people.

of support in the situation of deprivation is considerable (up to threefold differences in the likelihood of material deprivation), and access to institutions and general trust play an undeniable role, too. Although a variety of models were tested, the relevance of membership in formal organisations to the degree of a respondent's material deprivation was not clearly proven in an analysis of social and human capital variables, nor was that of a person's position in the labour market, health status or family type.

The assessment of chances of escaping poverty (an assessment of the inclusiveness of society) is, again, greatly influenced by all three forms of social capital: the chances of escaping poverty are seen to be as much as twice as high in the case of people with more frequent contacts with friends (as opposed to those who have contact with friends less often than once a month), and also in the case of those who have a better outlook on their possibility to exercise their social entitlements in relation to the authorities and those who express trust in institutions. Finally, chances are seen to be almost twice as high in the case of those who are members of voluntary organisations. The impact of education is somewhat surprising: people with secondary education (either complete or incomplete) assess the chances of escaping poverty as being realistic twice as often as people with a university degree. This contradicts the sharper material deprivation among people with lower education and the better employment chances of people with a university degree.¹⁴

In sum, in an analysis of the effects of social capital it is proven to have an important role on material deprivation in particular and also on people's perceptions of their overall chances of escaping poverty.¹⁵ On the whole, the importance of social capital is comparable to that of human capital (particularly education, the effects of which – unlike those of social capital – are in some respects far from unequivocal).

If all the individual dimensions of social capital are merged into one proxy for social capital, using a combination of variables relating to integrative formal or informal networks (ties of friendship and membership in voluntary organisations), together with variables concerning trust in institutions and general trust in other people (a more general linkage with society at large), the outcomes of the analysis are quite similar (see Table 4). The ambiguous effects of social capital (and to some extent also of human capital) on current employment are reconfirmed. Conversely, the impact of social capital, as well as human capital, on the level of material deprivation is strong; what is decisive here are integrative networks and

¹⁴ People with a university degree may associate the idea of escaping poverty with higher aspirations and other visions more than others do. The homogeneity of the sample may also play a role, given the possible intervention of hidden variable(s). Finally, human capital in transformation countries is in many cases indicated by outdated and obsolete skills recognised as formal education, which makes this measure less relevant.

¹⁵ In conformity with Gallie, Kostova and Kuchař [2001], Raiser et al. [2002], Wallace and Pichler [2007], Matějíř and Vitásková [2006].

Table 4. Logistic regression – the ratio of probability that the respondent:

a) is employed

b) is facing above-average material deprivation (index value is above median value)

c) sees certain chances of the poor to escape poverty

by an aggregate indicator of social capital

	Is employed		Is materially deprived		The poor have a chance of escaping poverty	
	Exp (B)	sign.	Exp(B)	sign.	Exp(B)	sign.
Social capital (aggregately-Woolcock)						
Has neither networks, nor trust	1,312	,094	4,248	,000	,337	,000
Does not have networks, but has trust	1,279	,241	1,842	,054	,661	,099
Has networks, does not have trust	1,144	,148	1,168	,206	,677	,001
Has both networks and trust	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Probability of social benefits claims being rejected is seen as high	x	x	1,503	,001	,700	,001
Is not seen as high	x	x	Ref.		Ref.	
Elementary education	,380	,000	5,063	,000	1,799	,000
Lower secondary educ.	1,214	,018	2,335	,000	3,898	,000
Complete second. educ.	1,392	,001	1,565	,001	5,565	,000
University education	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Has health problems	x		1,463	,003	X	
Does not have health problems	x		Ref.		X	
Model summary						
Chi square	113,070 (6)		759,044 (8)		324,066 (7)	
-2 Log likelihood	2914,597		1768,171		2011,840	
Nagelkerke R Square	.067		.454		.233	
	.000		.000		.000	

Note: x = was not included in the model (not significant).

to some extent also access to institutions. Similarly significant are the variations connected with education levels and to some extent also health status. The chances of escaping poverty decrease with decreasing social capital, while integrative networks and a more general linkage with society at large are of roughly equal importance. And again, a role is also played by access to institutions that provide social assistance to people in poverty. The effects of human capital are obviously not as strong and unequivocal: people with lower education have less of a chance of escaping poverty than people with secondary education. However, again, it is people with a university degree that declare the lowest chances (in contrast to their lower material deprivation).

Conclusion

Here we have examined the significance of various forms of social capital for a category of people homogenous in terms of income disadvantage. They differed, however, in terms of their capacity to participate in mainstream life and in the corresponding degree of material deprivation. We analysed the relationship between the economic dimension of social exclusion and individual forms of social capital and confirmed the assumption that the association among various forms/dimensions of social capital is not very strong, which means that individual forms of social capital often play distinct and mutually independent roles. It was found that employment enables participation in the mainstream lifestyle and lessens material deprivation, though it had little effect on the level of income in the sample, which was homogenous in this respect.

A number of analyses have already shown that in post-communist countries (including the Czech Republic) there is generally a poorer level of trust in institutions and in other people, along with other, essentially negligible differences in the individual dimensions of social capital. They have also revealed a lower level of civic involvement [Raiser et al. 2002; van Oorschot and Arts 2004; Halvorsen 2005; Wallace and Pichler 2007]. Our analysis reaffirmed the findings that informal social capital is more important in the post-communist Czech Republic than formal capital, and that the level of formal social participation and trust is generally low. This was revealed, in an extreme form, in the above analysis of income-disadvantaged people; in the case of a great many of them, poor access to institutions is associated with low trust in institutions and in fellow citizens. This deficiency in some forms of social capital can to some extent be compensated for by relatively strong networks of friends or, possibly, by involvement in formal organisations in the civic sector, but, as the data also clearly show, this still leaves considerable limitations with respect to the advancement of the capabilities necessary for inclusion in the labour market and related areas.

The role of informal and formal social participation has been proven to be substantially associated with the degree of material deprivation; with informal

networks showing the strongest correlation – more frequent informal contacts correspond with a lower degree of deprivation. Social capital (as an aggregate of its individual dimensions) has also a moderately strong effect on the perception of the chances of overcoming material deprivation, with all of its forms having some influence (informal networks, involvement in formal organisations, and trust in institutions and other people). Social capital even seems to have a more significant and consistent effect than human capital (which may seem somewhat surprising).

While nearly one-third of income-disadvantaged people are 'rich' in both the formal and informal dimension of social capital, with positive consequences in terms of alleviation of their material deprivation and increased subjective chances to escape poverty, about one-half of them are socially isolated in terms of the dimensions of formal social capital, with inverse negative consequences for their material deprivation and subjective chances to escape poverty. The effects of social capital on material deprivation and the subjective chances of escaping poverty are particularly strong when combined with the effects of human capital. Informal social networks can at times provide some protection against social exclusion, when other forms of social capital are lacking. However, they are not a reliable buffer, since the availability of 'quality' social networks is too often limited in the case of people of lower social status. In the case of the Czech Republic it is mostly the deficiency of general and institutional trust that prevents effective social inclusion. A crucial issue appears to be the trustworthiness of public institutions and the administrative system that delivers benefits to the income disadvantaged and the other institutions closest to them.

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Appendix:

A list of items indicating material deprivation

Index (12 selected items)

alpha = .7423

F =505,8052

(prob. 0000)

Financial deprivation

- makes ends meet with great difficulties
- finds it difficult to pay rent, bills

Deprivation of basic needs

- does not eat meat, chicken, fish every other day
- cannot buy new clothes
- cannot afford a week on vacation away from home
- cannot afford sufficient heating at home
- cannot afford to send children to college
- cannot afford to go to a concert or the theatre or eat out once a week

Housing deprivation

- insufficient space
- damp housing

Deprivation related to the possession of durable consumables

- does not have a telephone
 - does not have a car
-

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2 Social Innovation as a Practical Inclusive Tool

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2.1 Social innovation, a new path



Social Innovation

A Decade of Changes

A BEPA report

August 2014

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Introduction

In recent years, many initiatives and events have been carried out to develop pragmatic and participatory solutions to social and environmental problems that have been made more pressing by the crisis and have been addressed inadequately or not at all by either the market or the state.

Converging analyses indicate that we are (or should be) on course for economic renewal and institutional change. A response based on another way to produce value, with less focus on financial profit and more on real demands or needs is indeed an attractive premise for reconsidering production and redistribution systems.

In this context, social innovations, which are emerging all over the world, are still small in scale, but they are being echoed by changes in thinking and are delivering more and more effective and relevant solutions. The notion has gained ground that social innovation is not only about responding to pressing social needs and addressing the societal challenges of climate change, ageing or poverty, but is also a mechanism for achieving systemic change. It is seen as a way of tackling the underlying causes of social problems rather than just alleviating the symptoms.

Some recent international reports have analysed and explained the emerging role of social innovation vis-à-vis economic and societal challenges from different angles:

- two successive OECD reports¹ have largely linked its emergence to rising inequalities. Furthermore, they argue that the crisis has revealed the weakness of the current economic system of redistribution;
- the 2013 International Labour Organisation report² notes that, in advanced economies, the challenge is to stimulate job creation while addressing macroeconomic imbalances; and
- taking a longer term perspective, the Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations has published a report³ on successes and failures in addressing global challenges over recent decades. The report calls for a radical shake-up in politics and business to embed long-term thinking and provides practical recommendations for action in order to create a more resilient, inclusive and sustainable future.

The European Union itself has reacted promptly to this evolution. A number of policy measures, such as pilot programmes funded by the Structural Funds, have been initiated to empower various actors to address collaboratively the needs of their community.⁴

¹ *Growing unequal?*, 2008; <http://www.oecd.org/social/soc/growingunequalincomedistributionandpovertyinoecdcountries.htm> and *Divided we stand*, 2011; <http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/dividedwestandwhyinequalitykeepsrising.htm>.

² *Repairing the economic and social fabric* (ILO, World of work report 2013).

³ *Now for the Long Term*, 2013; http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/commission/Oxford_Martin_Now_for_the_Long_Term.pdf.

⁴ Local Employment Initiatives, EQUAL, LEADER, URBAN, ...; see in this respect the 25 year anniversary of AIEDL; <http://www.aeidl.eu/en.html>.

In 2009, the Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA) organised a workshop⁵ with experts, civil society organisations, policymakers and social innovators. Following this workshop, President Barroso asked BEPA to investigate the definition and *raison d'être* of social innovation, document the Commission's involvement in this field, identify the barriers to its development and suggest avenues for improvement. At that time, research on this topic had been mainly empirical and the first BEPA report, published in 2010, leveraged examples from the field in order to illustrate the emergence of the social innovation movement and contribute a light conceptual framework with a broad definition of social innovations, which underlined its collaborative process and outcome-oriented nature.⁶

Within a few years, policy support for social innovation has moved towards the centre of the political agenda. Inside the European Commission, the number of services involved has grown and a 'social innovation' culture has spread in support of the Europe 2020 Strategy and its implementation.

Some of these services have developed strong legal and institutional mechanisms aimed primarily at supporting social innovation. This is the case for the internal market services, where the Social Business Initiative (SBI) is supported by a permanent stakeholders group (GECES) and a list of 11 actions to be followed up. This initiative has given birth to many projects and achievements, among which the 'Strasbourg event' of January 2014 (cf. Part I, § 3.4) was a hallmark.

In other policy areas, some services upgraded the policy relevance of social innovation:

- Transport and mobility are now viewed as areas of potential for innovation with a strong social impact. Indeed, these areas use new working methods (such as public taxis for people with disabilities, driven by pensioners) combined with technology (safety sensors in cars and smartphone-based urban transport planners) and social innovation to support the uptake of new services (shared electric vehicle fleets and development of new logistics services);
- At present, innovation in the humanitarian aid sector is almost exclusively focused on technological innovations. However, when looking at long-term risk and the development of prevention and risk reduction, the human factor in social innovation could be a strong lever. The European Commission's contribution to the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 will concentrate more on social innovation; and
- The improvement of knowledge on social innovation through research, platforms, hubs and networks of researchers and transformative tools to open policy perspectives is increasingly supported in various policy areas such as education and culture, health and consumption, communication or technology.

The services that have been most involved in this matter from the beginning (Employment and Social Affairs, Enterprise, Regional Policy, Agriculture, and Research and Innovation) have substantially increased their contributions.

Finally, even internally, the European Commission increasingly uses participatory training courses and events for human resources in a more socially innovative way.


⁵ http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/activities/conferences_workshops/socinnov_jan-2009_en.htm.

⁶ http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/publications_pdf/social_innovation.pdf.

All these developments – changes in the economic and social context, policy developments, particularly in the EU, in the social field, the development of new analytical frameworks – have led BEPA to update the initial report it produced in 2010 with the active participation of all Commission services, reflecting their increasing involvement in supporting social innovation.

The first part of the report discusses the general context in which these policies and programmes have emerged and the developments which they relied upon to grow. It focuses on relevant changes that have occurred – and are still ongoing – since the publication of the first BEPA report. The first part starts by presenting social innovation as a driver for change, before listing some main achievements and lessons learned from a variety of examples from the field. Finally, it suggests some recommendations for future policymakers.

The second part of the report presents factually, and as comprehensively as possible, the leading 2010-20 policy framework, the main programmes and supporting schemes and the initiatives and instruments established by the Commission to support social innovation, based on the contributions of participating services.



PART I

Social innovation,
a new path

In 2009, when for the first time the European Commission organised a workshop on social innovation, it was an attempt to capture a subject that was becoming increasingly topical.

Since then, although most of the contextual elements contained in the first BEPA report have been retained and even expanded, some elements of the landscape have changed significantly. This part of the report intends to point out these changes. It first presents social innovation as a driver for change before focusing on the growing role of the public sector in overcoming the barriers to social innovation, developing some of the achievements made and lessons learned in recent years and concluding with some recommendations to pave the way forward.

*The recent dynamic combination of interests, institutions and ideas for the promotion of social innovation has been embedded in wider **political, technological and economic changes** which have affected and will continue to affect the development of social innovation in the current decade.*

A significant change in the policy background has been the closer political attention paid to redefining the relationship between the social and the economic spheres.⁷ The economic concepts of capital and investment have become social policy instruments and corporate social responsibility is shifting from being a matter of charity to one of inclusion. This change has been conceptually supported in particular by the revival at EU level of the concept of the social market economy, which has shaped the recent exercise to deepen the Single Market and, in so doing, has secured a place for social innovation at the core of EU policies.

The second change that we have identified as significant for the future is linked to the production of social innovations. Mobilising people and resources around a novel idea has never been easy (cf. Henri Dunant creating the Red Cross). This is only the first step of many.⁸ Each step entails a process of co-creation which initiates the next one. Together with the search for a favourable economic, legal, social 'milieu' to generate co-creation, the concept of **ecosystems** has been borrowed from biology through management science to describe the environments where social innovations emerge, grow and thrive. We will explore how this concept can help to defragment mental 'silos', work across boundaries and facilitate the sharing of information and knowledge, and identify the role and interest of public authorities in enabling social innovation ecosystems.

The third change is related to measurement issues, which have become increasingly important as social innovation initiatives have mushroomed. Measuring social innovation should indeed help to achieve some crucial objectives, such as proving that it is an effective and sustainable way to respond to societal needs or showing that social and environmental value creation is central to the human and ecological sustainability of societies.

⁷ *Social innovations, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, edited by T. J. Hamalainen and R. Heiskala, © Sitra, 2007.

⁸ See the six different stages for the production of social innovation identified in the first BEPA report, p. 54, or Ten Practical Steps to Implement Social Innovation in the *Guide to Social Innovation*.

1.1. An evolving context

'We are at the dawn of something new' – emphatic rhetoric or a description of what was filling the room? This remark from the podium during the 'Social entrepreneurs have your say' event in January 2014 in Strasbourg illustrates the state of mind of the hundreds of 'core actors' from all over Europe who attended the meeting. They were not only describing their perceptions but expressing a wish to be part of this 'something new'.

From the stakeholders' workshop held in 2009 with the President of the Commission, developments in policymaking circles – inside and outside the European Commission – are palpable. As already explained in the first BEPA social innovation report, the growing interest in social innovation has come from the continuous and increased need of public authorities, civil society organisations, private corporations and individuals to respond to the new social risks with new and more effective approaches and shrinking budgets. The crisis has enhanced that process. The new participation and sharing ethos of the social networks generation, as well as the renewed necessity for Europe to develop its innovation capabilities and the mounting interest in quality of life, are boosting factors.

Since the beginning of the decade, three major developments have emerged.

- the *players* have evolved: social players have overcome their first negative reaction of seeing social innovation only as a partial privatisation of welfare, which is the state's responsibility. They have now become active participants in the development of social innovations at local, national and European levels.⁹ In all Member States, representatives of the national and local authorities, social entrepreneurs and social economy organisations, the banking and finance sector and the academic and university sector play an active part in the consultative multi-stakeholders group set up by the Commission in 2012¹⁰ and large groups of citizens all over the world are joining what has been called 'a social innovation movement'.¹¹ Traditional economic players have also radically changed their vision as the idea that social innovation is about bringing solutions to some of the complex problems of today is seen as necessary.¹² The financial world at large is also taking a strong interest in the sector by developing ethical investment products, including 'social and environmental impact financing';
- the *institutions* are also changing: public authorities, in particular in the social, health and education fields, are committed both to being innovative inside and promoting new forms of financing, partnerships and alliances outside in order to improve their services to users and involve stakeholders; and
- last but not least, *ideas*, the third corner of the action triangle, have also developed and spread. The amount of research, projects, experiments, debates, documents, books, events produced on social innovation since the beginning of the decade is impressive. A body of literature now exists to frame the various terminology sets in the social innovation galaxy, and new research continues to explore definitions but also

⁹ See social platform position paper on social innovation http://www.socialplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/20131203_SocialPlatform_PositionPaper_social_innovation.pdf.

¹⁰ GECES http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/social_business/expert-group/index_en.htm.

¹¹ Unger Mangabeiro, Harvard Law School; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9c3PppXk1w>.

¹² *The Solution Revolution: How business, government and social enterprises are teaming up to solve society's toughest problems*, William D. Eggers and Paul Macmillan (Harvard Business review press, 2013).

investment models, development and evaluation methodologies from an empirical as well as a conceptual perspective and the underpinnings of social innovation. EU funded research has played a crucial role in this field by funding comparative research on a large scale, encouraging both academic excellence and the practical application of results.

We undoubtedly know more now about this 'volatile' or 'quasi' concept¹³ of social innovation, the governance structures and the role of public authorities, the capacity building, the financing capacities needed to allow social innovations to emerge, grow, scale up and spread. We know more about how social innovations are useful to local welfare systems and services and how they contribute to poverty reduction, combating inequalities and changing lifestyles. We also know more about their conditions for sustainability and the views of stakeholders. Empirical research has helped to identify where change is happening and needs to be encouraged. Conceptual research has achieved milestones in defining and framing what is really at stake. As argued by Geoff Mulgan,¹⁴ *'[s]ocial innovation is an asset to discover the future through action rather than believing it can be discovered solely through analysis'*.

Furthermore, the picture would not be complete if at this point we did not address the emergence of a phenomenon that significantly affects social innovation: the rise of a hyperconnected society.

The rise of the collaborative economy – from AirBnB (the social networking service for bed and breakfast) to car sharing or 'Code4share' to 'Wikipedia' – is indeed a characteristic of the recent period which goes beyond just inventing new business models. Digital social innovation is a new kind of innovation enabled by the network effect of the internet, which is leading to new models of collaborative production and content sharing which radically change the competition and supply and demand equations of traditional business models. On this issue, a study conducted by a consortium of partners¹⁵ is currently building a map of digital social innovation actors and networks.

In this context, there are some challenges for the EU.

- First, in the reconfiguration of the economy which is currently taking place under the influence of network giants, how is Europe to take advantage of open and collaborative possibilities to tackle societal challenges? How is it to leverage the power of the large number of social networks of active citizens and communities who often operate under the radar?¹⁶ The potential of using digital technologies to enable better and more social innovation to engage stakeholders, citizens, geeks and civil society communities in the innovation process cannot be neglected. Considering the distributed nature of digital social innovation and its openness to new players, research based on a bottom-up approach reveals new forms of social innovation and

¹³ This term was coined by Jane Jenson in *Social innovation. Gadget, Concept or Mobilising Idea?*; www.cccg.umontreal.ca. It is defined as 'a hybrid, making use of empirical analysis and thereby deploying scientific methods, but simultaneously having an indeterminate quality, making it adaptable to a variety of situations and flexible enough to follow the twists and turns of policy'. 'It is more than a buzzword, it has a reputable intellectual basis but may be vulnerable to criticism on theoretical, analytical and empirical grounds'.

¹⁴ Quoted in *The world in 2025, contributions of an expert group*, January 2009, p.69.

¹⁵ Study on innovation in the Digital Agenda conducted by Nesta, Waag Society, ESADE, IRI and Future Everything; <http://digitalsocial.eu>.

¹⁶ See study by IPTS; <http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu/publications/pub.cfm?id=4339>.

new organisational forms that can be encouraged, scaled up and incorporated into institutional frameworks; and

- secondly, how to set up the best institutional framework for harnessing the networked collective intelligence of people to tackle major social issues and produce recognised value for Europe in terms of community wellbeing, ecological footprint, and democratic legitimacy?¹⁷

A public private partnership on decentralised, open, privacy-aware architectures for the social good (including open data and public federated identity management)

The internet ecosystem currently faces two major and urgent problems:

In 2011 the Commission launched an initiative to pool a range of European funds to promote evidence-based social innovation, initially concentrating on social assistance schemes. the Commission's initiative includes:

- a handful of non-European companies continue to consolidate their leading positions in data aggregation and capture collective intelligence via lock-ins, monopolistic behaviour and aggressive IP litigation. Most users have accepted their exploitative business models in exchange for free services. This deal not only undermines privacy and weakens data protection, but also commodifies knowledge, identity, and personal data. Unfortunately, most European ICT research is developed to fit into this centralised model, which only aggravates the situation; and
- the European Commission has been funding excellent basic research on the Internet of Things (IoT) and the Future Internet area. However, there is no strategic vision guiding EU research. Projects do not give rise to an alternative playing field since they promote the kind of short-term incremental developments that only reinforce the dominant positions mentioned above. While Europe has an unrivalled density of infrastructure and research potential, the lack of overall coherence in its vision contributes to the consolidation of non-European companies.

An alternative framework is needed to provide an open architecture for the integrated management of online identity, security, data, and collective governance, based on democratic and participatory processes. The only practical response is the development of distributed and decentralised solutions for future critical infrastructures in the three main areas set out below:

1. Distributed architectures: this includes the need for open data distributed repositories, distributed cloud, distributed search and distributed social networking. It can also include the development of new mobile platforms able to ensure some basic services at European level, on top of which a whole new open ecosystem of services and applications could flourish in a participatory innovation model based on open source and open hardware development;
2. Public federated identity management for the entire EU: weave identity management into the EU Digital Infrastructure by applying a federated model to the entire Union. The agency that public or private providers have controls which platforms it talks to and the platform determines which services, products or spin-offs are supported. The aim should be to turn the current passport into an open source mesh-networked device; and
3. New governance modalities for big data (main question around collective ownership of data, data portability and data as knowledge commons): the question is how to ensure user control over personal information in an ocean of commercially valuable big data. Citizens should be aware that technical solutions do not work by themselves, therefore legal and commercial solutions have to be based on technology and integrated with the appropriate policy framework. Defining sensible governance modalities for big data will require substantial collaboration between the public and private sectors, based on a multi-stakeholder model, in order to define the minimum level of sensible regulation allowing fair competition in the emerging areas of big data.

¹⁷ For examples of the impact on democracy, see the 2013 World Forum *Rewiring democracy – connecting institutions and citizens in the digital age*. Further information is available at: <http://www.epsiplatform.eu/content/world-forum-democracy#sthash.iqvUpOPH.dpuf>.

To stimulate thought on this issue, Francesca Bria¹⁸ has described how the EU could take advantage of the shift from closed innovation to collaborative, open innovation. Her contribution is summarised below.

1.2. The social market economy concept

1.2.1. The origins of the concept

The term 'social market economy' emerged in the post-World War II period, when Germany was looking for a new economic, political and social start. It is strongly associated with what has been coined the post-war 'German economic miracle'. At the time, the idea was to find a renewed impetus for a laissez-faire market-based economy, rejecting the centrally planned and state-directed system of the previous period while ensuring a social and political consensus.

Men like Ludwig Erhard, Alfred Müller-Armack and some of their collaborators coined the term 'social market economy' as a new and comprehensive understanding of a free market and socially-orientated economic order. It became the hallmark of their political and social aspirations. It entailed two ideas: first, that a market economy was a better way to improve living standards; secondly, that the market order can serve the aims of social security and protection, as long as it is flanked by the right economic and social policies. In other words, market economics and social security do not exclude each other, but which comes first? Two different schools of thought gave a different meaning to this concept. On the one hand, the *Ordoliberalism* of Eucken, Rüstow and Böhm (also known as the Freiburg School, to which Hayek could be added) acknowledged that protection against poverty, unemployment, illness and old age are important as long as they 'are not pursued in conflict with the rules of the market'. On the other hand, Müller-Armack (later secretary-of-state to Ludwig Erhard) and Wilhelm Röpke had stronger views on the primacy of social aims since they rooted this concept in Christian Democratic ethics.

For historic reasons, most people in Germany strongly supported the concept (and its somewhat contradictory interpretations) provided it was efficient. The social market economy was the conceptual framework for the 'German economic miracle' and deemed critical for ensuring economic 'prosperity for all' and social justice. As a result of growing inequalities and the perceived unfairness of the social protection system, however, some people started to question the efficiency of the iconic model. In 2008, for example, only 31 % of all Germans said they had a 'good opinion' of the social market economy, a figure that had risen to 38 % by the beginning of 2010. While it remains a rallying political concept, the social market economy and the best ways to balance in the future the ideals of freedom, social justice and economic growth are now being revisited.¹⁹

This short history of the term gives some idea of its heuristic but ambiguous meanings from its origins to the present. Today the term which 'blended market capitalism, strong labour protection and union influence, and a generous welfare state' does not

¹⁸ Senior Project Lead, Innovation Lab, EU Project Coordinator D-CENT - DSI.

¹⁹ cf. for instance: http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/bst_engl/hs.xsl/269.htm.

fit the current reforms of the welfare state but, as pointed out by The Economist,²⁰ the 'social market economy' broadly refers to the study of the different social institutions underpinning every market economy and it has been used to describe attempts to make capitalism more caring and to the use of market mechanisms to increase the efficiency of the social functions of the state.

1.2.2. The social market economy in the European arena

The four freedoms (free circulation of goods, services, capital and people) at the heart of the EU's Single Market are commonly seen as economic instruments to favour increased competition, specialisation and economies of scale, improve the efficiency of the allocation of resources and drive economic integration within the EU. The question is: should this driver be geared solely to economic growth or should it serve the goals of social as well as economic cohesion? On this issue, the debates of the European Convention for the Future of Europe (2003-05) were heated. The idea of a powerful Single Market underpinning international competitiveness and the creation of growth and jobs as the ultimate end of the European Union was rather dominant. After the crisis, the European social model and its aim of producing wellbeing for all is more often seen as an important goal of European integration. In contrast with the distinction which appears more obvious today, the term 'social market economy' in the text of the Constitution suited everyone and was embedded in the Treaty²¹ as it seemed to opportunely reflect the views of liberals, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats.²²

1.2.3. A new strategy for the Single Market

'The crisis has induced some critical reconsideration of the functioning of markets. It has also enhanced concerns about the social dimension. The Treaty of Lisbon, soon to enter into force, makes it explicit for the first time ...that "the Union [...] shall work [...] for a highly competitive social market economy. All this calls for a fresh look at how the market and the social dimensions of an integrated European economy can be mutually strengthened.'

This excerpt from the mission letter from the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, inviting former Competition Commissioner, Mario Monti, to prepare a report setting out recommendations for an initiative to relaunch the Single Market clearly sets the new tone. The existing tensions between market integration and social objectives are more vividly exposed now that the Lisbon Treaty has formally introduced the objective of achieving a 'highly competitive social market economy'. 'If the market and the social components do not find an appropriate reconciliation, something has to give in. Following the crisis, with the declining appetite for the market and the increasing concern about inequalities, it is by no means clear that it would be the market, i.e. the

²⁰ <http://www.economist.com/economics-a-to-z/s#node-21529660>.

²¹ Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union states: *'The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment'*.

²² At the time, it was interpreted as a symbolic ideological gain for the European socialists (*The European Convention: bargaining in the Shadow of Rhetoric*, Paul Magonette and Kalypso Nicolaidis – published in: West European Politics, April 2004).

Single Market, to prevail.' In his report,²³ Professor Monti clearly identified public services (or services of general economic interest) as being at the centre of social concerns. This was a window of opportunity to enable bottom-up creativity, particularly in the way services are delivered and matching the needs of users.

The Monti Report raised the need to reinforce the Single Market through a series of concrete measures. This was done in a two-stage approach in April 2011 and October 2012.²⁴ It is interesting to note that, whereas the initial impulse to reinforce the social content of the Single Market had come from a top-down initiative, the idea of developing 'new emerging business models in which social, ethical or environmental objectives are pursued alongside financial profit', submitted for consultation as part of a list of 12 possible initiatives to strengthen neglected aspects of the Single Market, was strongly supported by the public in the answers to this consultation.

This unanimity should not hide underlying ambiguities in overcoming corporatist approaches and acquired interests in the sphere of the social economy, and different understandings in Europe of what constitutes a social enterprise or business. As acknowledged in an OECD report on social entrepreneurship²⁵ '[e]ven if social entrepreneurship as an activity is developing quickly around the world and social innovations are appearing everywhere, these are both relatively recent fields of research and practice and the notions are still ill-defined. A term like social entrepreneurship tends to overlap with terms such as social economy, third sector, non-profit sector, social enterprise and social entrepreneur, some of which are also ill-defined and overlapping. Moreover, definitions are context-sensitive, in the sense that the geographical and cultural contexts matter'. For instance, traditions within Europe vary: the German approach differs from the Italian or British early development of cooperatives or from the successful concept in France of *économie sociale et solidaire*, to name just a few of the contexts where social entrepreneurship linked to social innovations is developing.

Conceptual clarity is needed but cannot be imposed in a top-down approach. It has to be worked out progressively by actors, who are now speaking to each other, taking the best from each tradition, while adapting to a new common post-crisis reality.

Following long discussions on definitions during the preparation of the text of the Social Business Initiative, it was finally agreed that rather than reduce a still-developing idea to an overly narrow definition, social entrepreneurship should be defined on the basis of three main characteristics:

- the social objective was the reason for developing innovative activities;
- profits were mainly invested in achieving this social objective; and
- the organisation and ownership used participatory principles aiming at social justice.

The actual development and content of the SBI are described in detail in the second part of this document. What must be stressed at this stage is that:

- social entrepreneurship should be placed in the main 'engine room' of European integration: the Single Market raised social innovation to a new level of recognition,

²³ http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf.

²⁴ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/smact/index_en.htm.

²⁵ *SMEs, Entrepreneurship and Innovation*, contribution of Antonella Noya (OECD, 2010).

- allowing major instruments such as public procurement directives or competition policy to engage with the development of this 'emerging' sector; and
- the way it has been developed has been participatory²⁶ and all-encompassing,²⁷ i.e. through a systemic change in approach rather than through incremental changes in the institutional infrastructure of the business world.

1.3. Ecosystems for social innovation

1.3.1. An approach to the concept of ecosystem

For some time now, management scholars have recognised the parallels between biological and economic systems. The concept of an ecosystem – which in biology refers to an environment where different, sometimes competing, species can complement each other – has been used in particular by Michael Porter,²⁸ who underlined that the traditional framework of industries made up of competitors, suppliers and customers does not pay enough attention to the many other actors and environments in an industry: the organisations making complementary products, the infrastructure on which the organisation depends, and the various institutions, people, and interest groups that affect the entire industry, including the end users or consumers.

An ecosystem's framework, in contrast, incorporates the broader environment within which organisations operate. It captures the elements of Porter's economic analysis, adds other potentially important actors, and incorporates the non-market forces.

This framework is particularly appropriate for the production of social innovation, as their promoters (social entrepreneurs, intrapreneurs, etc.) must leverage complex systems of interacting players in rapidly evolving political, economic, physical and cultural environments. Moreover, the more innovative the initiative, the more likely it is to come up against the aversion to change of those who have stakes in the system as it is.

Today, ecosystems for social innovation are seen as the way to create an innovation-friendly environment where social innovations can grow and to address not only the apparent cause but also the underlying problems. The shift from social innovation as a charitable solution to a problem that has an immediate but unsustainable impact (e.g. give food to the hungry) to the transformative ambition to create long-lasting changes to solve societal problems (e.g. homelessness, food disorders) that are engrained in behaviours and institutional and cultural context (laws, policies, social norms) has also been a reason to look for a 'friendly milieu' to organise interactions and respond to the needs of social innovations at every stage of their development. Thus, the term 'ecosystem' has spread within the social innovation community as a response to the different

²⁶ It started with a wide consultation and was shaped by three European Commissioners, i.e. the Commissioners responsible for the Single Market (M. Barnier), Employment and Social Affairs (L. Andor) and Enterprise (A. Tajani).

²⁷ The Social Business Initiative was launched with a Communication on corporate social responsibility and a revision of the Transparency Directive as a package to increase trust: 'Social business is a good example of an approach to business that is both responsible and contributes to growth and jobs. But we need to ensure all companies, not just social businesses, take their impact on wider society seriously: that's why I also want big multinationals [...] to be more open about what they are paying to governments across the world' (Michel Barnier).

²⁸ *The Competitive Advantage of Nations*, 1990.

needs to structure, experiment, nurture, network, support, scale up and transfer social innovations at the different stages of their development.

1.3.2. Main components of an ecosystem for social innovation

Supportive policies, adequate governance, innovative finance, a variety of capacity building and recognition tools such as incubators, hubs, forums, prizes and research in methodologies, **benchmarking and impact measurement** are the main components which, together, create the 'natural environment' for social innovation to flourish. While the movement and creative energy in the ecosystem comes from the actors and their connections, the administrative, economic and legal environment has to be enabling.

Where the priority objective is to solve a problem of a social or societal nature, people (in whatever capacity they act) have to pool their resources and work together. Often, a dominant administrative culture or conflicting objectives prevent this. The key to supportive governance is to identify those obstacles and create spaces for cooperation and for thinking outside the box. Promoting a culture of trust and learning from failures is also part of supportive governance. Governments have to set up enabling processes and institutions to encourage the creation of ecosystems which mobilise collective energy and initiative to develop, mostly small-scale but effective solutions to improve quality of life. Social entrepreneurship (or intrapreneurship), the main vector to channel action in this field is often small, can also be larger²⁹ and usually has a transformative agenda. The use of digital tools to reach their goals is already quite widespread amongst social innovators (e.g. Websourd³⁰ uses a call centre to translate job interviews, etc.). Increasingly, however, digital tools are also used as a core element to mobilise collective intelligence for the co-creation of public goods (e.g. Code for America,³¹ Nudge,³² etc.). This gives a radically new dimension to social innovations and the ecosystems which can allow them to grow. Communication technologies create very large and open spaces for the self-organisation and mobilisation of society which enlarge the scope of civil society mobilisation and generate new issues of control and trust (see the Digital Social Innovation project³³ and the Onlife Initiative for rethinking public spaces in the digital transition³⁴).

Access to resources and/or funding is another crucial component, which has to be available in different forms at the right time. From access to public procurement or small experimental grants to investments in large projects likely to bring substantial social benefits in the medium to long term (e.g. investment in the social integration of prisoners to eventually reduce crime). As illustrated in the Malmö example mentioned below, this can even include regrouping investments to achieve the same social objective and involving stakeholders and end users can often double or treble the impact of budgets and or investments.

²⁹ cf. for example SOS (<http://www.groupe-sos.org>).

³⁰ <http://www.websourd.org/>; <http://www.websourd-entreprise.fr/>.

³¹ <http://codeforamerica.org/>.

³² R. Thaler & C. Sunstein, Yale University Press, 2009.

³³ <https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/socialinnovationeurope/directory/switzerland/event/digital-social-innovation-workshop>.

³⁴ <http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/onlife-initiative>.

Any collective endeavour where the mobilisation of energies is the main resource needs catalysing places and instruments where collective work is valued and recognised (or at least not penalised). Incubators to generate the birth and growth as well as tools to exchange, compare and value are other essential components of the social innovation ecosystem.

The fourth ingredient to create a fertile environment for initiating innovative practices of a disruptive nature is to develop evidence of a different nature that is likely to work and yield measurable results, but also to develop methodologies from empirical and theoretical observations to develop or scale up successful experiments. Thus, research is an essential component of the ecosystem.

A striking example of the development above is the study entitled A map of social enterprises and their ecosystems in Europe.³⁵ The European Commission called for this study in April 2013 to establish for the first time an overview of national policies, schemes and actions aimed at promoting social enterprises and supporting the development of a conducive ecosystem where it exists as well as the current state and dynamics of social investments markets. This was only done for 11 Member States.³⁶

It studies the following issues for these countries: the political and legal recognition of the concept of social enterprise; public support schemes; whether marks and labelling schemes are in use, the social investment markets. Finally, it assesses the opportunities and barriers for each country. This first exercise shows wide differences amongst Member States regarding the degree of maturity of the ecosystem. In countries with a long tradition of social economy like Italy and France, a variety of well-established tools have been developed while in newcomers like Latvia or Romania, the recognition and the private and public support systems for social business is still in its infancy but in great demand.

In itself, this study is a resource for policymakers, social entrepreneurs and stakeholders in social business in general as it provides timely information on when, where and how social entrepreneurs can find an understanding and friendly environment to initiate, develop and scale up social enterprises.

1.3.3. Examples of ecosystems for social innovation

As mentioned above, the growing importance of social enterprises in the EU social innovation policy framework emphasises the importance of developing an enabling environment made of specific instruments, a more understanding environment and to develop innovative tools (e.g. European Partnerships) to stimulate interaction between actors in fertile ground. A large number of public or private actors at national and local level can take advantage of this new policy focus.

Two very different case studies can be mentioned to illustrate these issues:

- firstly, Oksigen³⁷ is a dynamic Belgian consortium established on the private initiative of likeminded individuals. It covers every stage of a social innovation's develop-

³⁵ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/social_business/docs/expert-group/20131128-sbi-sector-mapping-study_en.pdf.

³⁶ Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Romania, Latvia, Poland, Italy, Spain, Ireland and Belgium.

³⁷ For more information, please refer to: <http://www.oksigen.eu/> and <http://www.i-propeller.com/>.

ment, including tutoring and mentoring, the search for diverse sources of financing, upscaling and transfer and integrates applied research. It offers a springboard for leveraging the effects of public and private programmes and funds aimed at developing effective solutions to new or unaddressed social or societal needs;

- secondly, a multicultural city like Malmö,³⁸ which is strategically putting in place an ambitious plan of 'ecosystems', is a good example of what can be done in this area. Local authorities together with welfare services and local economic actors have a vested interest in identifying more efficient solutions to address concrete social problems and improve the quality of life in their community. The idea is to fundamentally reassess all the direct and indirect social 'costs' and reallocate them in a dynamic and interactive process to benefit people in the community with a long-term impact. This cannot be done unless you create an ecosystem where administrations working in silos, economic actors willing to serve their community as well as their business interest and those citizens most concerned, are given a common framework where they can interact, design and implement.

1.4. Measurement of social impact

There are at least four reasons for tackling the challenge of measuring social innovation. First, there is a need to prove that social innovation is an effective and sustainable way to respond to societal needs (from this perspective, the belief that after the crisis, social innovation can play a pivotal role in serving as a competitive future advantage for European economies and societies has been underlined in many EU documents.³⁹ The *Guide to Social Innovation*, published in 2013, states in particular 'Europe is ideally placed to take a lead and capture first-mover benefits when it comes to implementing social innovations by proactively and effectively trying to fully (and fairly) realise both economic and societal benefits'). Second, justifying the allocation of public money as well as attracting other sources of public and private financing requires a shared understanding of what the 'positive and measurable social effects'⁴⁰ of social innovations are. Third, evidence-based policies require ex ante evidence of the expected impact of the actions involved. Finally, social innovations (seen as drivers in the current transition⁴¹) could open the way to developing a new competitive advantage for European economies, showing that social and environmental value creation is central to the human and ecological sustainability of societies.

The reasons why social innovations are difficult to measure are of course proportional to their scope (i.e. the smaller the objective, the easier the measurement). This difficulty is also explained by the fact that their success relies on factors which, by their nature, are difficult to quantify, at least in the short to medium term. Indeed, their success relies on how they have been able to act as drivers of social change,⁴² to break with established

³⁸ www.malmo.se/kommission.

³⁹ The Innovation Union flagship initiative introduced social innovation as a driver of a European innovation strategy and this idea has since guided developments in research and innovation policy, enterprise and industry in particular.

⁴⁰ This is the terminology used by EU institutions (Commission, Parliament, Economic and Social Committee) to frame the notion of social impact in the EuSEF (European Social Entrepreneurship Funds) and EaSI (European Programme for Employment and Social Innovation).

⁴¹ See The EU's Fifth Project - *Transitional Governance in the Service of Sustainable Societies* <http://www.uclouvain.be/461789.html>.

⁴² *Social innovations as drivers of social change*, J. Howaldt, R. Kopp & M. Schwarz, 2013.

approaches⁴³ and to engage a process of changing behaviours, 'basic routines, resource and authority flows, or beliefs of the social system' in which they occur.⁴⁴

The benefits of overcoming the challenge of measuring social innovation will allow further developments in different aspects of social innovation at a crucial moment for the post-crisis economy.

Both micro-level measurement (how successfully a social enterprise is contributing to this goal) and macro-level measurement (social enterprises grow in an ecosystem composed of a favourable governance framework, capacity-building tools and learning processes) have become necessary.

Measures of the success/impact of social innovation is the increasingly shared idea that 'economic outcomes have for a long time been the main indicator to measure the development of organisations and countries, but a more holistic perspective considering social, environmental and economic consequences must come to the fore to build a sustainable world'.⁴⁵ Awareness of this has increased in recent years since climate change and inequalities are on the rise. Even before widespread political attention was drawn to this agenda by the *Report on the Measurement of Economic and Social Progress*⁴⁶ (known as the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report), the Commission had already held a large forum on *Beyond GDP*⁴⁷ in 2007. This was followed by a Communication on *GDP and Beyond – Measuring progress in a changing world*,⁴⁸ highlighting the need for new instruments to monitor and measure environmental and social development and establishing a roadmap. A review of progress on GDP and beyond actions was published in 2013.⁴⁹ In addition, other actors have also taken steps to introduce new instruments, e.g. the OECD with its Better Life Index.⁵⁰ Many analysts around the world believe that it is necessary to measure wellbeing or quality of life in order to better respond to the needs of this century. As far as social innovation is concerned, this is likely to kick-start the systemic change mentioned *inter alia* in the first BEPA report, by bringing to the fore the value of non-tradeable goods and services that contribute to wellbeing.

Against this background, we examine below the need for social impact measurement and guidance on how it should be carried out in the specific context of:

- evidence-based policies; and
- funding/financing social innovation; and to
- follow progress so far in the area of indicators and social impact measurement.

⁴³ *Social Innovation: Blurring Boundaries to Reconfigure Markets*, A. Nicholls & A. Murdock; Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

⁴⁴ *Making a Difference - Strategies for Scaling Social Innovation for Greater Impact*, Frances Westley and Nino Antadze (presented at the Social Frontiers social innovation research conference, November 2013).

⁴⁵ EESC report on social impact measurement.

⁴⁶ http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf.

⁴⁷ http://ec.europa.eu/environment/beyond_gdp/index_en.html.

⁴⁸ COM(2009) 433 final.

⁴⁹ http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/pdf/SWD_2013_303.pdf.

⁵⁰ www.betterlifeindex.org.

1.4.1. Evidence-based policies

Public policy development increasingly requires accountability as well as efficiency to ensure the best use of resources. While coarse assessments can in some cases be the way to approximate a cost benefit analysis due to urgent circumstances, scientifically based methods are increasingly used to compare (*ex ante*) the benefits that a community would derive from a specific measure or scheme to a comparable community which did not have this measure or scheme. The principle of social experimentation to test a policy intervention on a small population so as to evaluate its efficacy before deciding whether it should be scaled up is on the agenda of many policymakers wishing to design a potentially policy-relevant intervention as well as measure its actual efficacy.

Existing methods for assessing a project's chances of success and their different costs are detailed in a methodological guide for policymakers,⁵¹ published by the Commission in September 2011 in order to assist policymakers in designing socially innovative projects. This guide sets out basic principles to follow in order to design a potentially policy-relevant intervention. It describes six commonly used methods of evaluation, which are compared from the point of view of the reliability of the results they deliver; and considers the costs associated with each method, and the complexity of implementing them in practice.

The 'gold standard' for these methods goes to randomised experiments. They draw from the principle of randomised controlled trial used in scientific experiment, and in particular clinical trials to test the efficacy or effectiveness of various types of medical interventions in a patient population. The use of randomised trials to test solutions was pioneered by Esther Duflo, professor at MIT and Director of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab,⁵² which has now grown into a global network of professors who use randomised evaluations to answer critical policy questions in the fight against poverty. This network has conducted over 500 randomised evaluations in 57 countries. Some of the policy lessons have led to the scaling up of programmes which have improved the lives of millions of individuals. These include school-based deworming programmes as one of the most effective methods for improving school participation in developing countries or providing free access to chlorine dispensers at water sources to reduce the death of children under five.⁵³

Nevertheless, randomised evaluations of social programmes take time and can be complex to implement.

Many authors in the open literature have discussed the benefits and limitations of randomised social experimentation as a tool for evaluating social programmes.⁵⁴ Other techniques also commonly used are referred to as non-experimental or quasi-experimental methods. They are usually less complex to implement than randomised evaluations, but the results they deliver are also less reliable. It appears that random assignment to the treatment and comparison groups is the best way to ensure that the comparison group is similar in every respect to the treatment group. Non-experimental

⁵¹ Written by J-Pal Europe at the request of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion.

⁵² <http://www.povertyactionlab.org/>.

⁵³ <http://www.povertyactionlab.org/scale-ups/chlorine-dispensers-safe-water>.

⁵⁴ See for example *Randomization and Social Policy Evaluation*, James Heckman, NBER Technical Working Paper No 107, July 1991.

methods must rely on an assumption to justify the claim that the comparison group they use is similar to the treatment group.

In order to test measures aimed at the development of new social practices and/or the reorganisation of existing ones in EU Member States, the PROGRESS programme (2008-12) allocated EUR 10 million to developing social policy experiments. Thirty-six projects focusing on the social and professional inclusion of vulnerable groups were financed. *Hope in stations: HOmeless PEople* in train stations was one of these projects. In the new programme for employment and social innovation, technical assistance for conducting randomised evaluations is made available to administrations undertaking social policy reforms.

Thus, the rapid development of this subject has proven its intrinsic interest. It is to be expected that the wide range of research projects and scientific publications on this topic will lead to enhanced cooperation on the quantification and measurement of social impact and on designing and assessing social policies.

1.4.2. Funding/financing social innovation

A sound technique for measuring the impact of the social innovation is a prerequisite for funding/financing social innovation. The recent period has been characterised by the emergence of a wider diversity of funding sources for innovative ventures with a social objective from the public and private sectors. This proliferation of funding/financing mechanisms has led to the urgent need to further develop methods for measuring the social and economic benefits. Public bodies at every level have worked to increase the offer, from dedicated microfinance funds to public procurement,⁵⁵ but the financial and banking sector are taking a growing interest in 'impact finance' and the public at large responds, where legislation permits, to calls to 'crowdfund' social ventures. This is good news as one of the major barriers to the development of social innovation identified in the first BEPA report was access to finance, but also overdependence on grants from charities, foundations and public support, in particular when growth capital is needed to engage in long-term ventures.

This aspect has raised considerable attention, in particular at EU level, since the launch of the Social Business Initiative. The Commission's Communication on the Single Market Act II⁵⁶ highlighted the need to develop methods for measuring the social and economic benefits generated by social enterprises in the implementation of the EuSEF⁵⁷ and the programme for Employment and Social Innovation (EaSI).⁵⁸ In response, a subgroup of the Commission's consultative multi-stakeholder group on social enterprise (GECES)

⁵⁵ As illustrated in part 2 of this document.

⁵⁶ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/smact/docs/single-market-act2_en.pdf.

⁵⁷ The Regulation on European social entrepreneurship funds (EuSEFs) was published in the Official Journal on 25 April 2013. Together with the Regulation on European venture capital funds (EuVECA) and the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), this Regulation aims to make it easier for AIFMD-exempt venture capitalists and social entrepreneurs to raise funds across Europe without the requirement to comply with the full AIFMD regime. The key elements of the Regulation provide for an EU brand for EuSEFs and the introduction of a European marketing passport. The range of eligible financing tools/investments under the EuSEF Regulation is wider than those available for venture capital funds under the EVCF Regulation.

⁵⁸ The third axis of this programme focuses on microfinance and social entrepreneurship with a fund of EUR 86 million over seven years to provide grants, investments and guarantees to social enterprises which can demonstrate that they have a 'measurable social impact'.

was tasked with providing the Commission with guidelines on how social enterprise can measure their social impact on the community.

The report adopted by the GECES in June 2014 makes a set of recommendations and defines areas where follow-up is required. It underlines the benefit that a standard for social impact measurement, ideally agreed worldwide, would have. However, it recognises that no single set of indicators can be devised in a 'top-down fashion' to measure social impact in all cases.

In order to meet the needs of social enterprises, funders and policymakers to achieve comparability in reporting and monitoring, to limit the costs of the assessment to the size and scope of the venture and to allow an approach that respects the diversity of social enterprises as well as the need to cope with change and improvement, the GECES advocates a process for social impact measurement.

This process involves five stages: 1) identify objectives; 2) identify stakeholders; 3) set relevant measurement; 4) measure, validate and value; 5) report, learn and improve. All stages should involve active stakeholder engagement. In particular, the number and range of indicators should be agreed between the social enterprise, beneficiaries or service users as well as investors, allowing for lighter and cheaper processes for small ventures. The dynamics of involving all stakeholders (from investors to service users) is designed to maintain the balance between the overriding need to deliver measurable social impact and the need for a profitable operation that can meet investor expectations.

The report also includes guidance on reporting standards for social impact measurement and indicators, and examples of case studies illustrating how measurement techniques are used. It represents a very rigorous, participatory and useful exercise to respond to the European Commission's request. Its conclusions stress the need for further action, in particular in raising awareness and facilitating stakeholder engagement. This idea is reinforced by the opinion on social impact measurement of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC).⁵⁹

According to the GECES subgroup, the areas where follow-up is required are:

- guidance to assist social enterprises, funders, fund managers and investors in all EU Member States in complying with the standards proposed;
- the establishment of a knowledge centre on social impact measurement for guidance, exchange of practice and monitoring;
- the development and consolidation of measurement frameworks with stakeholder participation;
- the development of reporting formats; and
- the development of a network or group of experts to act as a reference point for dissemination and development with respect to social impact measurement, integrating EuSEF and EaSI experience.

⁵⁹ <http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.int-opinions.29291>.

1.4.3. Indicators for a socially innovative society

In the wake of demands from stakeholders, the issue of social innovation and its economic, social (and environmental) impact and measurement have become significant priorities on the EU agenda. In EU policymaking, this has recently become apparent in initiatives like the Communication on the social dimension of the EMU,⁶⁰ which proposes social indicators and actions to complement economic reporting. This line of reasoning now appears in many EU documents where the measurement and monitoring of social added value, change and impact is a prerequisite for the implementation of directives and programmes. In line with the idea that we are still in a learning process, analysis and research is being conducted on the measurement of societal (social and environmental) value creation and the development of indicators.⁶¹ On the latter issue, the 2013 report on Employment and Social Development in Europe highlights the need to adapt the way we measure economic and social progress in order to take proper account of inequalities.

In this context, the issue of measurement and financing has made tremendous advances in recent years. New tools are being tested, new sources of finance are appearing (EU funding possibilities, crowdfunding, more access to public procurement, etc.) and the question of social value creation is being widely discussed. However, it is still a work in progress which will continue to require considerable attention in the coming years.

This said, while there are currently no agreed macro or micro level measurement approaches that specifically focus on social innovation, the field of research is fed by indicators to measure innovation in public and private sector organisations (e.g. innovation union scoreboard, public sector innovation index, etc.) and indicators that focus on social normative or environmental dimensions which capture the social and wellbeing aspects (e.g. the European Statistical System (ESS) Sponsorship Group, the European System of Social Indicators, ESS/GESIS/Eurostat sustainable societies or the OECD Better Life Index).

In practice, there are some new and encouraging elements in recent developments.

- First, while the assessment exercises are still straitjacketed in 'one-size-fits-all' public spending control standards, social and environmental policies in particular are increasingly adopting scientifically based methods such as social experimentation to test (and prove) the effectiveness of innovations in their sector before they can be scaled up and replicated;
- Secondly, 'social impact measurement' is an issue, which has stirred up a lively debate in many circles and at many levels. At micro level, impact investing has been on the agenda of large private firms (JP Morgan and the GIIN⁶²) for a few years now. The press has echoed more than usual to the financing of the social economy in general but also to associated financial innovations such as social impact bonds or crowdfunding. As explained in sub-section 1.4.2, several activities have been developed at European level. For example, the Social Business Initiative has launched

⁶⁰ http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/archives/2013/10/pdf/20131002_1-emu_en.pdf.

⁶¹ EU research projects like e-Frame and BRAINPOoL are particularly relevant in this respect. The link with the role of social innovation in this agenda is made in TEPsIE and SIMPACT.

⁶² In November 2010, JP Morgan collaborated with the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN) and the Rockefeller Foundation on one of the first significant (despite the small sample) pieces of research on investments intended to create a positive impact beyond financial returns. The study noted that the rigour of systems to track and manage social performance was the best guarantee against the risks to see exploitation of poor people for the sake of profit and system drifts.

the debate amongst national and local experts, civil society organisations⁶³ and the European institutions. Lately, the Group of European Experts (GECES) has contributed to the discussion about the different approaches to social impact measurement, which is an important step towards the establishment of shared standards; and

- Lastly, the European Commission has launched Horizon 2020, the largest research and innovation programme in the world, with a budget of EUR 80 billion. The programme will run from 2014 to 2020 and has an important social innovation component. It is to be expected that progress will be achieved in the different areas of social innovation, including the development of indicators for social innovation and techniques for social impact measurement.

⁶³ 3M Jonathan Bland, Confrontations Europe.

Social innovation is a bottom-up process with little theoretical conceptualisation and support from methodological developments for the measurement of social impacts. The public sector plays a pivotal role in promoting and facilitating social innovation by providing a common conceptual framework for social innovation activities. Nevertheless the public sector needs to innovate itself in order to meet the increase in public demand and to promote and facilitate social innovation.

There is an urgent need to power innovation within the public sector itself in order to unlock radical productivity improvements and efficiency gains, foster the creation of more public value and a better response to societal challenges. Public authorities need to promote effective instruments (legislation, removal of barriers, and public procurement) linked to social innovation.

This can only happen through a pervasive change of mind-set, with more experimentation, controlled risk taking, and an agile and personalised response to new constituent challenges. This will help unleash the potential of an innovative public sector that can enable social innovation to make the transition from a random, bottom-up approach to a systemic phenomenon.

2.1. The Commission's commitment to supporting public sector innovation

The European Commission has, for a long time, tried to develop new thinking to modernise European economies and their social model to meet societal expectations. Public sector innovation as a positive way to respond to budget constraints has indeed, for many years, been considered a policy lever to improve the quality and efficiency of pub-

lic services. For instance, the impact of new technologies researched and tested through large-scale pilot schemes on e-Government, e-Health, e-Inclusion, e-Participation and social experimentation schemes to improve social inclusion have been on the agenda for more than ten years. The same goes for social innovation schemes to empower people to improve the provision and delivery of services.

In 2012, the Group of Innovation Commissioners spurred renewed interest in this area, following the Innovation Union flagship initiative. It translated into concrete actions, including in particular the ones set out below.

- The inventory of the Commission's initiatives in public sector innovation is a first attempt to map the efforts made under different EU policy headings to support innovation in the public sector. It has so far resulted in a document focusing on processes and organisational changes in public sector organisations that contribute to increasing public welfare and quality of life (cf. 2.2 below).
- The Commission launched a pilot European Public Sector Innovation Scoreboard (EPSIS) with a view to improving its ability to benchmark the innovation performance of the public sector in Europe. The ultimate ambition was to capture and present public sector innovation in a similar way to the innovation performance rating of countries in the Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS)⁶⁴ and thereby encourage and facilitate innovation activity across the public sector. The 2013 pilot EPSIS⁶⁵ was the first EU-wide attempt to better understand and to analyse innovation in the public sector. It was developed based on the experience of earlier national and regional projects, tested widely and discussed with a number of key experts in relevant areas. The EPSIS shows that all EU Member States consider public sector innovation to be a national requirement and a means by which to drive continuous improvement in public service design and delivery. The Scoreboard also shows that Member States may be grouped into two categories: a small number of 'innovation leaders' and a larger number that may be designated as 'innovation followers'. 'Innovation leaders' are more concerned with finding radical new approaches to deliver public services whereas 'innovation followers' are still concerned with making fundamental reforms to public institutions.

2.2. Powering European public sector innovation: towards a new architecture

Under the responsibility of the Commissioner for Research and Innovation, a group of twelve experts was asked to analyse the role of the public sector, barriers to innovation and the current gaps in policies focused on innovation in the public sector. Their report *Powering European Public Sector Innovation: Towards a New Architecture*⁶⁶ suggests that public sector innovation today mostly happens through uncoordinated initiatives rather than as a result of deliberate, strategic efforts. The quest for more and better public sector innovation is hindered by several barriers, which fall into four major categories: weak

⁶⁴ http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/innovation-scoreboard/index_en.htm.

⁶⁵ http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/files/epsis-2013_en.pdf.

⁶⁶ http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/psi_eg.pdf.

enabling factors or unfavourable framework conditions; lack of innovation leadership at all levels; limited knowledge and application of innovation processes and methods; and insufficiently precise and systematic use of measurement and data.

There are efforts underway to address these barriers, both in the European Union (e.g. Joinup,⁶⁷ the common portal for e-Government solutions) and globally (e.g. the OECD's Observatory of Public Sector Innovation⁶⁸), and the expert group has reviewed an extensive amount of scientific literature and best practices. However, a paradigm shift is needed in order to embed and encourage an innovation culture within the public sector, which will also improve its absorptive capacity.

A new innovation paradigm and design principles

In its search for developing concrete recommendations to overcome the barriers to innovation, the expert group has recognised the following four design principles that should be at the heart of the public sector. These principles must be mainstreamed throughout the entire ecosystem of public sector actors for the greatest gains in quality, efficiency, fairness, transparency and accountability.

- Co-design and co-creation of innovative solutions (with other Member States, other parts of government, businesses, the third sector and citizens);
- Adopting new and collaborative service delivery models (across public, private and non-governmental actors, both within and across national borders);
- Embracing creative disruption from technology (the pervasive use of social media, mobility, big data, cloud computing packaged in new digital government offerings);
- Adopting an attitude of experimentation and entrepreneurship (government itself needs to become bolder and more entrepreneurial).

Recommendations for new public sector innovation architecture in Europe

The report identifies several actions that should be taken rapidly (either at EU level or in the Member States, depending on political and financial considerations). The recommendations may be divided into three groups.

- **Leading Innovation:** to establish a programme to empower and network innovative public leaders and to establish an EU Innovation Lab inside the European Commission to support and facilitate innovation in the work of the Commission Services.
- **Enabling Innovation:** to establish a network of Innovation Single Contact Points in all Member States; to establish an Accelerator for Digital Innovation and a Public Sector Angel Fund.
- **Informing Innovation:** to establish a Dynamic Innovation Toolbox targeted at public managers and to establish a European Citizens' Scoreboard for public services.

⁶⁷ <https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/>.

⁶⁸ <http://www.oecd.org/gov/public-innovation/observatory-public-sector-innovation.htm>.

BEPA held a high-level meeting on public sector innovation in July 2013.⁶⁹ The objective of this meeting was to discuss public sector innovation and the need for a more systemic approach in order to create a dynamic and open public sector. The major outcomes of the meeting may be grouped in the following areas:

Evidence-based methodologies for efficient policymaking

- The need to test new policies and programmes: Innovative public programmes addressing important policy issues, which have a potential to be scaled up, should be ‘tested’ before they are implemented on a large scale. One should learn from the experiments, via rigorous evaluation.
- The need to use scientific methodologies to measure and quantify the social impact of policies and programmes: Learning about the impact of a policy is not straightforward. J-Pal,⁷⁰ the poverty action Lab created by Esther Duflo, has developed a scientific methodology based on a randomised control trials approach, which allows meaningful comparisons.

Innovation strategies in the public sector

- The need to highlight innovation pockets at different levels of public administration: copying successful innovations is often the most effective way to innovate and the best ideas are not necessarily the newest. The European Public Sector Innovation Scoreboard can help to understand who is doing better and how we can improve.
- The need for the public sector to invest in innovation: based on collaborative approaches to driving change and to governance.
- The need to foster innovation led by example: the European Commission can provide support by promoting systematic collaboration and rigorous evaluation of the policies adopted, applying the scientific method to the public sector and using sophisticated tools to analyse complex interacting systems.

⁶⁹ http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/expertise/seminars/index_en.htm; <http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/conferences/note-psi-reportweb.pdf>.

⁷⁰ <http://www.povertyactionlab.org/about-j-pal>.

Providing an overall evaluation of social innovations in Europe – including EU policies and their impact on societal challenges – is almost impossible considering the large amount of new and interactive initiatives, but also the broad goals of EU programmes that integrate social innovation. However, while the overall picture is sometimes difficult to capture at a glance, the drive behind social innovation has become firmer and instruments are better defined. This is no mean feat and the attention and budget allocated to promoting social innovation are higher than ever. The backdrop to this firmer drive is the need to improve knowledge of how and where social innovations emerge, scale up and duplicate, and how effective they are in addressing current societal challenges not only for, but also with citizens.

A set of specific examples are taken from the Guide to Social Innovation, published by DG Regional and Urban Policy and DG Employment, Social Affairs in February 2013.⁷¹ Some of them show how support under the Structural Funds will increasingly be sought for the development of instruments to encourage a participatory approach to the resolution of social problems. Others develop thematic issues to deal with the major challenges that migration and ageing; environmental trends; IT solutions to inclusion; urban regeneration and housing; health and wellbeing; and the development of ethical goods and services pose at local level and which many cities or local communities need to address.

While a number of the issues mentioned here would have found their place in other parts of this document, examples of practical developments mainly supported by the EU Structural Funds are meant to emulate new ideas and entrepreneurship.

⁷¹ http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/presenta/social_innovation/social_innovation_2013.pdf.

3.1. Deepening our understanding and knowledge of social innovation

The two major sources of new knowledge developed during the last period are, on the one hand, a factual Europe-wide study on A Map of Social Enterprises and their Eco-systems in Europe, which was launched by the European Commission's Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion in April 2013⁷² and, on the other hand, the large body of research funded by the FP5, FP6 and FP7 Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities Programme on issues related to social innovation, including in the areas of theory building and conceptualisation, local welfare systems and services, poverty reduction, combating inequalities, and changing lifestyles.

3.1.1. The Mapping study

It is composed of five main tasks which are briefly described as follows:

Task 1: Identification of social enterprises – to develop an operational definition that can be used to identify, measure and map social enterprise across Europe and thus provide the basis for carrying out the remaining research tasks;

Task 2: Measurement, characterisation and mapping of social enterprise – to collect (through primary and secondary research) and analyse data on the scale, characteristics and patterns of development of social enterprise in each country studied;

Task 3: Legal and standards mapping – to map (a) legal 'labels' and frameworks designed exclusively for social enterprises where these exist; (b) corporate law aspects of the three legal forms most commonly used by social enterprises in each country studied; (c) legal and regulatory barriers to creation and growth of social enterprise; and (d) marks, labels and certification systems designed for social enterprises;

Task 4: Mapping of public policies and social investment markets – to provide an overview of national policies, schemes and actions aimed at promoting social entrepreneurs and social enterprises and supporting the development of a conducive ecosystem (where these exist); and, the current state and dynamics of social investment markets in Europe; and

Task 5: Developing recommendations for EU action – to develop recommendations for future research and policy action to support the growth of social enterprise in Europe.

This is the very first time that researchers have carried out such a systematic and broad overview of existing traditions and legal, public policy and investment conditions for the development of social enterprises.

⁷² http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/social_business/docs/expert-group/20131128-sbi-sector-mapping-study_en.pdf.

3.1.2. Social innovation research in the European Union

The EU Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities Programme is the second main source of new knowledge from the last period. However, in view of increasing demand from policymakers and practitioners alike for social innovations and the emerging possibilities for new research avenues on social innovation, including in Horizon 2020, a policy review commissioned by the European Commission's DG Research and Innovation from experts in the field⁷³ has produced a systematic overview of research findings from 17 European projects in the area of social innovation. The review⁷⁴ focuses on how these projects address social innovation in terms of theory, methodology, policy areas, actors, and level of analysis in order to bring the results to the attention of policymakers, wider groups of stakeholders and the broader public in a comprehensive way.

The point that comes to the fore is that this report is a stocktaking exercise, undertaken with a view to fostering the engagement of the European research community in a continuous exchange of ideas and best practices for analysing social innovation and in the promotion of networking among researchers.

The report ends by identifying five research fields that did not draw much attention in the projects reviewed and that are areas for further development (social innovation to overcome the inequalities of health and re-pattern the social determinants of health; social innovation in rural areas and societies; social innovation in the financial sector; social innovation and the private sector; and social innovation for managing diversity).

3.2. Instruments to improve the ecosystem

As well established by now, research in social innovation is – by nature – mainly empirical and its primary field of development is the local level, where stakeholders can more easily be mobilised on concrete issues. In order to scan the scope of empirical developments and draw lessons on how social innovations contribute to reform local welfare systems, this part of the report addresses some patterns of innovatory social projects and networks to fight social inequalities and stimulate social cohesion at local level.

3.2.1. The social economy

According to the EU Social Business Initiative, the social economy employs over 11 million people in the EU, accounting for 6 % of total employment. It covers bodies with a specific legal status (cooperatives, foundations, associations, mutual societies).

The social economy can clearly play a role in regional development. For instance, the Emilia Romagna region has published a study on the importance of the social economy

⁷³ Jane Jenson and Dennis Harrison in *Social innovation research in the European Union – Approaches, findings and future directions - Policy Review* http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/social_innovation.pdf.

⁷⁴ Its first results were presented and discussed at the conference *Approaches to Research on Social Innovation: Learning from One Another for the Future*, which was organised by the FP7 project WILCO jointly with the European Commission's DG Research and Innovation on February 2013.

for territorial and social cohesion. Its main conclusions are that public policies are the fruit of the combined contribution of public authorities and social economy organisations in the provision of public utility services, in which the joint participation of both players is an essential requirement to ensure quality; and that public-private partnership is a tool to deliver more effective and efficient primary social services, which have so far been historically provided by the welfare state. At the same time, it helps identify and deliver services in new and additional fields. In so doing, new forms of cooperation are established with civil society and stakeholders.

The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) supports the development of social enterprises as it does for other types of businesses. Financial support can be delivered directly to individual companies, through social enterprise intermediaries, such as social enterprise or cooperative development agencies, and through financial institutions. There are increasing numbers of financial institutions that specialise in investing in social enterprises and many of the new ethical banks specialise in this type of investment.

The European Social Fund (ESF) also supports social enterprises. Firstly, it can strengthen administrative capacities and support structures which promote social enterprises. This can be carried out in particular through education and training, for example, through the integration of social entrepreneurship in the curricula of specific vocations, or the provision of training improving the business skills of social entrepreneurs. Networking and the development of partnerships, as well as the setting up of business development services for social enterprises can be supported too. Secondly, the ESF can mobilise extra funds targeted at the development of the social economy and the promotion of social entrepreneurship and easily accessible for social enterprises.

The social economy has different traditions in different parts and Member States of Europe. Some countries, like France, have a strong tradition of 'économie sociale et solidaire'. They are gearing up with social innovation in its 'newer' meaning and initiatives are sprouting, often linked with the Structural Funds. For example, *Avise*⁷⁵ has launched a call for proposals with the aim to accelerate social innovation in the social economy, and thus help to find new answers to unmet needs in fields like employment, housing, ageing, childcare, etc.

Market access for social enterprises is still restricted (even if the provisions of the new directives on public procurement⁷⁶ adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in early 2014 will noticeably improve the context). Sometimes they are unable to compete for public tenders against other small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) because of interpretations of national rules. Member States and Managing Authorities and other public contracting bodies can use the purchasing power of large and small ERDF projects to stimulate social innovation in employment and inclusion of marginalised groups. The example below from the City of Nantes illustrates how a procurement framework has opened a space for social enterprises to work directly with the private sector in helping disadvantaged people into employment. Similar examples exist in other parts of the EU.

⁷⁵ <http://www.avise.org/>.

⁷⁶ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014L0024>; <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0025>; <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0023>.

Using public procurement in an innovative way: The City of Nantes

The medium-sized city of Nantes (285 000 people) in north-west France has been known for nearly 15 years as a leading innovator in using social clauses in public procurement to provide entry level jobs for the long-term unemployed.

France revised its public procurement rules in 2006 allowing the condition that part of the work must be delivered by a specific target group with a need for professional insertion. Nantes Metropole and surrounding suburban administrations awarded contracts using this clause. Work has included swimming pools, roads, bus routes, and a media centre. The types of trades comprise mason assistants, carpenters, painters, building workers, pavers, green space maintenance staff, plumbers, metal workers, plasterboard, and external cleaners.

The city has also encouraged the development of support structures for individuals. The 'Entreprise d'insertion' trains and prepares them to get jobs that open up in the private sector. In 2008:

- 183 contract operations contained a social clause;
- 483 beneficiaries were able to work under an employment contract;
- 345 000 hours dedicated to insertion (about 200 full-time equivalent jobs), a further 92 000 hours of work for disadvantaged people were produced benefiting 266 employees;
- 133 enterprises were mobilised through these works;
- 75 % of beneficiaries were accompanied by a local insertion company (a type of training and employment social enterprise).

The Nantes example illustrates how public works contracts can deliver a double benefit: the work that needs to be done, such as a road, as well as jobs for excluded people.

3.2.2. Microfinance

Whereas microcredit refers specifically to one type of microfinance – the act of providing loans for business start-up and growth – microfinance is a broader concept in which a range of products are developed to increase financial inclusion. These products may include savings, financial education and literacy, personal loans and insurance.

Microfinance was slow to take off in Europe. ADIE⁷⁷ in France was one of the first to start up in the late 80s (it is now one of largest with around 20 000 borrowers in 2010). There are now over 100 microfinance institutions of which around 80 are members of the European Microfinance Network (EMN), which is supported with EU funds under the PROGRESS initiative.

Although there are variations, in all EU Member States over 95 % of all businesses are micro businesses employing less than ten people. They form the bottom of the enterprise pyramid and are the seeds from which most SMEs and even large companies grow. Microenterprises in Europe employ around one-third of private sector employees and produce about 20 % of output.

As mentioned in another part of this survey, the EU funds and instruments for supporting microfinance are:

⁷⁷ <http://www.adie.org/>.

- JASMINE, which provides technical assistance for microfinance organisations that are close to becoming banks or have high levels of financial sustainability (JASMINE is a joint initiative of the Commission, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and European Investment Fund (it is financed out of the ERDF);
- The ERDF, which provides support for setting up and growing microfinance;
- The EU PROGRESS Microfinance facility – a fund managed by the European Investment Fund with a total fund of EUR 160 million. It invests in microcredit providers, which may be banks or NGOs. It does this either by issuing guarantees, thereby sharing the providers' potential risk of loss, or by providing funding to increase microcredit lending;
- The ESF mostly provides flanking measures for business start-up and business support. Over EUR 2 billion have been allocated to ESF business support measures in the current period. Part goes to micro-businesses – especially at the start-up stage. The German Gründer coaching programme⁷⁸ is a good example of a national coaching scheme for start-ups that is co-financed by the ESF.

In 2011, a European Code of Good Conduct for Microcredit Provision⁷⁹ was developed in partnership with the microfinance sector.

There are also many microfinance organisations in Europe and elsewhere that have developed innovative approaches to lending to specific groups. The Microcredit Foundation Horizonti⁸⁰ in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, for example, has developed an innovative good practice 'Housing Microfinance for Roma and marginalised people'. The initiative started in 2007 with the aim of providing affordable housing to the Roma community.

The Kiút Programme, self-employment and microcredit for Roma in Hungary

Kiút aims to support Roma to work in the formal economy by starting up a business. The microcredit programme provides assistance by lending start-up money for small businesses to generate enough revenue to service the loan and to produce additional income for Roma families.

The clients receive continuous administrative, financial and business advice and assistance. An explicit and important aim of the programme is to encourage the participation of women (with a set target of 50 % female members in each group).

⁷⁸ http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/nrp2014_germany_en.pdf.

⁷⁹ http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/the_funds/instruments/jasmine_cg_en.cfm.

⁸⁰ <http://www.microfinancefocus.com/microcredit-fdtn-hizonti-receives-2011-european-best-practices-award/>.

3.2.3. Incubation

The world of social innovation has a number of incubators and centres which are crucial for testing new ideas and bringing together partnerships.

A Social Innovation Park in the Basque country

Denokinn brings together social enterprises, public authorities and the private sector to scale up successful innovations after they have been piloted. They have launched the first social innovation park in Europe near Bilbao.

Denokinn received EUR 300 000 from the social experimentation part of the EU Progress Fund to develop a social inclusion dimension to their Hiriko electric car concept. The result was a plan to adopt a decentralised assembly in which the cars could be put together in work inclusion social enterprises by those excluded from the labour market.

The Hiriko car was launched by President Barroso on 27 January 2012. He said 'Hiriko is European social innovation at its best ... Firstly, it is a successful example of how to give a new lease of life to traditional industrial sectors by contributing to address major modern societal challenges, in that specific case, urban mobility and pollution. Secondly, it is a great combination of new business types of cooperation and employment opportunities with a strong social dimension. Thirdly, it is an excellent illustration of the finest use that can be made of European social funds'.

3.2.4. Workplace innovation

Workplace innovation focuses on how to improve aspects of work organisation and introduce modern management techniques that involve workers. Workplaces with flatter hierarchies and the possibility for workers to contribute are more creative and ultimately more productive and open to addressing both social and technological challenges. Workplace innovation concerns not only the private sector but also large parts of the social economy such as charities and foundations as well as the public sector. Celebrated examples include Google, which allows employees to spend 20 % of their time on their own projects, and IKEA, which practises stand-up round-table meetings among other innovative practices allowing employees to tackle problems as they arise with minimum management interference.

In the Netherlands and Belgium, workplace innovation is called 'Social Innovation' and has been supported for over a decade by the Structural Funds. The approach as such is strongest in northern Europe, especially Scandinavia.

The ERDF's business support measures can be used to finance such innovations helping both management and employees to explore more productive ways of working.

Results-based entrepreneurship in the Netherlands

Results-based entrepreneurship (RBE) aims at stimulating technological and social innovation within SMEs. Advisers work with management and staff combining strategic advice with social innovation (improving communication, raising personnel involvement, etc.) and so stimulating technological innovation. The improved teamwork promotes a collective ambition for the company's success encouraging new ideas, products and services.

Business support is given through Social Innovation vouchers. Firms can use these vouchers to hire an expert to help them implement the method. The voucher covers 50 % of the cost up to a maximum of EUR 20 000. The minimum voucher is EUR 3 000 (with a grant of EUR 1 500). By buying a voucher, a company receives double the amount of support that it would obtain if it bought the same consultancy on the open market. As companies contribute to the cost, the scheme ensures their support and commitment.

3.2.5. Changes in governance

Governance is one of the key issues when it comes to social innovation. Among the many experiments in this field, the latest include the one led by Santa Casa da Misericórdia (SCM),⁸¹ in Lisbon (Portugal).

The Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa (SCML) and the Banco de Inovação Social (BIS)

The SCML is one of the oldest and most important private charities in Portugal. It was founded in 1498 as the first coherent social care system in Lisbon. In the 18th century, the Queen granted the SCML the right to run the first lottery in Portugal. Since the state granted the concession for lotteries in Portugal to the SCML, which uses its proceeds to finance the SCML's activities, the concession and activity is highly regulated.

The BIS, which also means 'twice' in Portuguese, is an informal, collaborative, and open platform, not an official institution. It seeks to use social innovation as a tool to introduce systemic change in society at all levels: institutions, economy, education, culture.

Portugal has to restore economic growth, employment, and make long-term structural reforms at all levels, but especially at institutional and economic levels (public sector, public services, competition, etc.).

To help address this challenge, and even though its action is limited to Lisbon, the SCML opens up to the world, collects best practices and collaborates with other institutions in the country and abroad to introduce change.

The SCML started its BIS programme about a year ago by inviting 26 other institutions to contribute their assets (knowledge, experience, funds, people, etc.) to the BIS project and bring social innovation to Portugal. The first institutions to be invited were the government itself, municipalities, universities, etc. to address all kinds of societal needs in Portugal.

These new forms of governance (collaborative, informal platforms or programmes) are believed to be the best way to foster social innovation. By bringing people and institutions together and work collaboratively, it will show people in Portugal how to govern in a different way.

To support and promote creativity, a call for ideas has been launched, where ideas can be debated. Many people have already sent ideas to address social needs. Social experimentation was also implemented (a current example is the United at Work project, an innovative way to address senior and junior unemployment through intergenerational entrepreneurship). The BIS also promotes social business by bringing together people who have interests in sustainable business. There is also an ongoing workstream on education, in schools, and a creativity competition was held in about 250 schools.

A social investment fund is being launched, which is necessary and the main current concern for the BIS. A key obstacle is the lack of Portuguese legislation in this area so far, in spite of the EU initiative.

3.3. Specific examples of actions from the field

In this section of the report, real life examples of projects financed by the European Structural Funds are tabled, showing how local initiatives, all of which are different and almost unique, are able to rely on EU funding to develop and achieve their goals.

⁸¹ <http://www.scml.pt/>.

3.3.1. Social inclusion

Large sections of the European population are excluded from the benefits of economic and social progress. The different forms of disadvantage related to educational attainment, gender, age, physical status or ethnic background have been exacerbated by the crisis. Among them, blindness is a disability subject to specific constraints, as explained in the example below.

I-Cane: Mobility solutions for blind and visually impaired people for global use

Today Europe counts approximately 13 million blind and visual impaired people, who rely on 'old fashioned' aids, e.g. the white cane and guide dogs. The traditional solutions do not offer navigation outside the memory constrained zone. This enforces the social and economic isolation of this fast growing population of which the majority is over 50 years of age.

Developing high-tech solutions for a group of people with both limited financial means and also working with a user volume considerably lower than the requirements of high volume electronics manufacturers is not an easy market choice, it needed a particular approach. In 2004 the I-Cane foundation was initiated. Through this foundation funds were raised from charities and the public sector (province of Limburg NL and the EU ERDF fund) to execute a feasibility study and to deliver the proof of principle demonstration. In 2008 I-Cane succeeded in navigating a blind person on an unfamiliar route without hitting obstacles. In this demonstration invented by I-Cane, tactile human-machine interface also demonstrated its value since test persons were still able to listen to the environment parallel to receiving instructions via their fingers, a unique human-machine interface.

From 2008 the social enterprise I-Cane Social Technology BV continued the work of the I-Cane foundation. A development time of 5-8 years must be expected for mobility tools for disabled people but is unattractive for those who seek a quick return on investment. Via support from the Social Economy network in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, the funds were raised to meet the matching requirements of EU ERDF (OP Zuid) and national grant arrangements.

Today this combination of public and private funding has resulted in an Euregion based platform of SMEs, with European-wide knowledge institutes (such as the University of Delft, RWTH, Fraunhofer IPT, IMEC, TNO, ESA/Estec) and end cross-border user organisations, led by I-Cane Social Technology BV and the I-Cane Foundation. In 2012 the first large-scale tests with I-Cane systems started, followed by a market introduction in 2013.

The I-Cane case demonstrates the combination of funding, close user interaction and cooperation between social enterprises and knowledge institutes can deliver world-class break-out solutions.

3.3.2. Migration

In recent years, population movements, especially immigration from non-European areas, have become a more sensitive issue in the EU. Beyond the economic impact this may have, the immigration that European countries have to cope with creates many social issues. Due to their complexity, the human dimension which is still theirs, and their local specificity, some of these situations have to be handled through practices that often involve social innovation.

Public sector innovation – immigration policy in Portugal

Towards the end of the 20th century Portugal's immigrant population doubled within a few years, and most of the new arrivals were not Portuguese speakers and had no historical links with this country. For the first time, public administration experienced considerable difficulty in communicating with the immigrant population and understanding their needs. At the same time, large migrant populations had to cope with the challenge of social integration in an unknown linguistic, cultural and bureaucratic setting.

This major shift catalysed the Portuguese one-stop-shop approach in immigration policy and the National Immigrant Support Centres (CNAI) were opened to the public in 2004. The centres responded to a number of challenges identified by migrant clients by providing various immigration-related services in one space, applying an identical working philosophy, and working in cooperation. Indeed, participation is the core of innovation at the CNAIs in addition to the integrated service delivery. The implementation of the one-stop-shop approach was based on the incorporation of intercultural mediators in public administration service provision, who play a central role in service provision because of cultural and linguistic proximity to the service-users and facilitate interaction between state services and the immigrant population by forming an integral part of the procedures of Office of the High Commissioner for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue (ACIDI). Intercultural mediators usually come from immigrant communities themselves and speak fluent Portuguese as well as at least one other language. Following training and an exam, they are employed by certified immigrant associations, which receive grants from ACIDI. The certified associations participate in the definition of immigration policy, immigration regulation processes and consultative councils. ACIDI invests in the empowerment of immigrant leaders through training for immigrant association leaders, in partnership with universities. The mediators also play a fundamental role as integration outreach workers. Because they are immigrants themselves and normally reside in migrant neighbourhoods, they disseminate information about the rights and duties of immigrants in Portugal even outside the one-stop-shop building, reaching places and persons that the public administration would never reach if it never left its headquarters and operated exclusively through public servants.

3.3.3. Urban regeneration

Most cities in Europe have poor communities living in difficult environments. Over the past 20 years, the ERDF has financed integrated approaches to urban regeneration linking economic, social and environmental aspects. In the 1990s, the Community-led Economic Development priorities in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods of the UK were at the forefront. In the 2000s, Germany was a leading practitioner.

The State of North Rhine-Westphalia 'Socially Integrative City' programme: supporting neighbourhood renewal

Since 1999, the government of North Rhine Westphalia has been developing integrated policies to support 80 neighbourhood regeneration programmes in cities within its State. An Integrated Local Action Plan (LAP) outlines how the development, reorganisation and upgrading of an area is to take place. The approach is decentralised with clear responsibilities for each level.

- 55 Municipalities are responsible for the preparation and implementation of the LAP, applying for funding and ensuring the neighbourhood plan meets the needs of the city as a whole.
- The district governments (regional administration units of the federal State level of NRW) advise the municipalities on funding matters and authorise payments.
- The federal State ministry for urban development arranges and controls the programme and commissions evaluations.
- The EU provides funding through the ESF and ERDF operational programmes.

In addition, there are private housing and retail companies involved as well as foundations, welfare organisations and other stakeholders.

The neighbourhood management offices work on a wide range of tasks which include stimulating networking; promoting a changed image of the neighbourhood; supporting bargaining processes; setting up communication structures; informing the population and administration; organising offers of cultural activities; promoting the local economy; forming a link between the neighbourhood, city and other levels of decision-making; and developing projects.

A disposition fund (form of participatory budgeting) made up of 5 euro contributions per inhabitant finances small-scale projects decided by a local citizens' body. These projects have an immediate impact such as neighbourhood parties, tree-planting in a school yard and outings for children whose parents cannot normally afford them.

3.3.4. Health and ageing

The European Commission has identified active and healthy ageing as a major societal challenge common to all European countries, and an area which presents considerable potential for Europe to lead the world in providing innovative responses to this challenge.

The Innovation Union strategy addresses the health and ageing issue by aiming to enhance European competitiveness and tackle societal challenges through research and innovation.

One way to achieve this is through Innovation Partnerships, fostering an integrated approach. Their unique strength is that they will address weaknesses in the European research and innovation system (notably, under-investment, conditions which are not sufficiently innovation-friendly, and fragmentation and duplication), which considerably complicate the discovery or exploitation of knowledge and, in many cases, ultimately prevent the entry of innovations into the market place.

The European Innovation Partnership on Active and Healthy Ageing pursues a triple win for Europe:

1. enabling EU citizens to lead healthy, active and independent lives while ageing;
2. improving the sustainability and efficiency of social and health care systems;
3. boosting and improving the competitiveness of the markets for innovative products and services, responding to the ageing challenge at both EU and global level, thus creating new opportunities for businesses.

This is to be realised in the three areas of prevention and health promotion, care and cure, and active and the independent living of elderly people. The overarching target of this partnership will be to increase the average healthy lifespan by two years by 2020.

The ERDF is another answer to the challenge of active and healthy ageing, as illustrated by Finland, which has used this fund to co-finance a living lab focused on health and welfare services.

The Living Lab on Wellbeing Services and Technology, a social innovation that produces user-driven innovations

This Living Lab was a finalist of the RegioStars 2013 competition. It is an innovation platform that enables a new way of producing services for elderly people in a functional Public-Private-People partnership. Users participate actively in product development, service design and usability testing processes. The testing of welfare services and technologies takes place in real life contexts, in elderly people's homes and service homes.

The new collaborative structure consists of different stakeholders such as municipalities, suppliers, citizens, the third sector, universities, regional developers, specialists, financiers and regional, national and international networks. The created concept has increased trust between the actors.

The Living Lab Testing Process is a systematic and concrete tool, which contributes to the development of user-driven innovations and enhances cooperation between municipalities and business. The new cooperation Model improves business opportunities for companies and attracts new companies to the area. It enhances innovation and economic development strategies in a concrete way.

3.3.5. Social innovation and the environment

Social innovation can tackle environmental challenges⁸² and is proving popular in this domain. There are a number of environmental drivers that are already instigating social innovations such as waste issues, transport and pollution problems, as well as declines in biodiversity and degradation of ecosystem services, for example, flood protection through wetlands. Although these drivers are environmental, they have social repercussions, such as health problems caused by air pollution, resource depletion due to inefficient waste disposal, exacerbation of flooding from damage to natural defences and food insecurity and agricultural issues exacerbated by poor soil quality or lack of pollination. In other words, societal and environmental issues are often interlinked and mutual solutions are possible. Some examples of forms of environmental social innovation include wood recycling social enterprises, organic gardening cooperatives, low-impact housing developments, farmers' markets, car-sharing schemes, renewable energy cooperatives and community composting schemes.⁸³

In some sectors social innovation can shape technology, as evidenced by the grassroots entrepreneurs and do-it-yourself builders of wind turbines and solar collectors in Denmark and Austria respectively.⁸⁴ These socially innovative groups instigated the commercial development of these technologies and continue to influence their design as they become more mainstream.

The application of local knowledge via community and social action can create adaptive and flexible solutions that are appropriate to solving environmental problems. The SPREAD Sustainable Lifestyles 2050 project⁸⁵ was a European social platform that invited a range of stakeholders to participate in the development of a vision for sustainable lifestyles by 2050. In its research it identified social innovators as one of the gatekeepers that can enable the shift towards more sustainable lifestyles. It proposed that the intentional and voluntary effort of social innovations to change lifestyles is an indispensable bottom-up driver for change, as they often champion new and promising behaviour. As such, it suggested that social innovations should be given the opportunity to test small-scale initiatives, which could be scaled up into large-scale sustainable solutions and participate in planning and decision-making.

The SPREAD project also highlighted the important role of social innovation and the supportive function of policy. It used scenarios and backcasting to outline a number of policy implications and recommendations on facilitating social innovation in this area. More generally the report suggested the need for an open transparent governance system with local participation to create ownership of decisions and ensure implementation.

Policy implications and recommendations on supporting social innovation to achieve sustainable living from the SPREAD project

- Using effective policy instruments, which could include regulation, economic incentives and public participation.
- Acknowledging that one size will not fit all. Instead, allowing for combinations or hybrid models and accepting provisions for dynamic structures that allow for change in order to fit the diversity of contexts across Europe.

⁸² cf. <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/research/newsalert/pdf/IR10.pdf>.

⁸³ cf. Seyfang & Smith, 2007.

⁸⁴ cf. Ornetzeder & Rohracher, 2013.

⁸⁵ <http://www.sustainable-lifestyles.eu/publications/publications.html>.

- Up-scaling promising practices like Transition Towns, cycling cities, local currency systems, car sharing, and neighbourhood gardening. Providing institutional support to those initiatives, as well as to social entrepreneurs.
- Facilitating breakthrough and creative thinking by establishing free thinking 'designLabs' which are physical and intellectual spaces that encourage and facilitate cooperation and the co-creation of meaningful and innovative solutions to complex problems.
- Providing opportunities for societal actors, businesses and policymakers to leave their own 'comfort zone' and experiment and test new solutions in collaborative, open-sourced platforms.
- Creating partnerships with other sectors, such as the health sector, to change environments into those facilitating more active and healthy lifestyles.

Finally, one of the inputs of the SPREAD project was to underline that social innovation can complement technological innovation and policymaking to achieve systemic, long-lasting changes in lifestyles and society to tackle environmental issues. When citizens and communities instigate change themselves and develop the innovation, it is more likely to be successful and endure.

3.3.6. Regional strategies

Regional strategies that incorporate social innovation are only beginning to emerge. Many French regions already integrate social innovation in some form in their strategies for innovation and economic development, as a recent survey from Avise and the ARF⁸⁶ shows. Most of them consider social innovation to be linked to the social economy and/or work organisation, but it also combines various forms of incubation, co-creation with citizens, initiatives in the health and care sector.

Basque Country: Social innovation linked to the regional innovation strategy

The Basque Country is a good example of how a region can use a wide range of approaches to achieve social innovation. Innobasque is a non-profit private company created in 2007 to coordinate and promote innovation across the Basque Country. It acts as a regional innovation partnership. The Board brings together 57 leading actors from the region. It includes the rectors of the three universities, the chief executive of the cooperative group Mondragon, representatives from three ministries as well as chief executives from leading enterprises in the region.

Innobasque works at the policy level on many aspects of technological innovation but also brings in the general public through reflection groups and workshops such as its world café events, which focus on ways to promote societal transformations. The OECD has described Innobasque as leading work on social innovation and fostering collaborative action and joint research in the region. It is also exploring strategies to support the creation of new social firms (work integration social enterprises).

Examples of the achievements of this public-private partnership include:

- Lifelong learning via a participatory process with citizens.
- Social contract for housing: participatory process with public and private agents defining housing policy for the next 15 years.
- City XXI: Engagement on how a 21st century city could be developed, its urban planning and its values.
- Ageing and new in-house services to help people to live in at home as they get older with a good quality of life and services.
- Social contract for immigration involving all organisations and institutions to achieve a social contract for coexistence.

⁸⁶ Association des Régions de France (<http://www.arf.asso.fr/>).

3.3.7. Lessons learned from social innovation achievements

The abovementioned examples illustrate how social innovation works and succeeds in various areas in different European countries. What further lessons can we draw? The answer could be summarised in an important contribution aimed at understanding how social innovations grow at local level and how they contribute to changing local welfare systems. These issues are illustrated by 77 case studies in a 400-page e-book on Social Innovations for social cohesion: Transnational patterns and approaches from 20 European cities, developed as part of the WILCO project.⁸⁷

Summary of the main findings of the WILCO project

Innovations in services to address users

The majority of the social innovations identified in the survey as important and promising are service innovations. The main differences between the service innovations analysed in the WILCO project and services established in the post-war welfare traditions or the more recent managerial culture of public and private services are the following:

- investing in capabilities rather than spotting deficits;
- preference for open approaches, avoiding targeting with stigmatising effects;
- service offers that connect otherwise separated forms of support and access, allowing for personalised bundles of support;
- creating flexible forms of ad hoc support;
- developing offers that meet newly emerging risks, beyond fixed social and participation rights and entitlements; and
- working through 'social contracts' with individuals and groups.

Innovations in modes of working and financing

While this is in itself banal, it represents quite a challenge when it comes to disentangling what is 'innovative' about a project and development and what is just an effect of the deconstruction of or regression in existing welfare models and regulations. The kinds of arrangement for cooperation in social innovations are much more diversified than in the public or business sector, including not only various forms of casual paid cooperation but also many forms of voluntary and civic contributions, ranging from short-term activism to regular unpaid volunteering with a long-term perspective, and from 'hands-on' volunteer work to constant inputs by civic engagement in a board. Therefore, from what is reported on the various social innovations, one gets the impression that working fields are taking shape here that are innovative in two respects. First, they are innovative because they balance very different arrangements for networking, paid work, volunteering and civic engagement. And secondly, it is at least remarkably new to see how much the demarcation lines between those who operate inside the organisation and those that get addressed as co-producers are often blurred (e.g. innovations in housing and neighbourhood revitalisation).

Innovations concerning the entity of (local) welfare systems

One of the aims offset by the EU authorities for the WILCO project was to look at the possible contributions of social innovations to changes and developments in local welfare systems. Speaking about a welfare system usually means including, besides the local welfare state/the municipality, the welfare-related roles and responsibilities of the third sector, the market sector and the community and family sphere. The cases of social innovations studied bear testimony to the mutual relations that exist between all of these four components of a (local) welfare system.

In conclusion, one of the central messages of these case studies on local social innovations is that they are the opposite of quick-fix solutions; using their full potential requires nothing less than a combination of 'the deep strategies of chess masters with the quick tactics of acrobats'. The lifecycles of social innovations (processes of emergence, stabilisation and scaling up) are very conditional and are not available simply at the press of a button.

⁸⁷ <http://www.wilcoproject.eu>.

3.4. Social entrepreneurship to revive the social economy

Beyond the priority measures in its short-term action plan, the Social Business Initiative (SBI) has engendered powerful and sustained momentum for social entrepreneurship.

One of the most iconic stages of this phenomenon was an unprecedented event held jointly by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), the European Commission and the city of Strasbourg⁸⁸ on 16 and 17 January 2014. More than 2000 social entrepreneurs and supporters representing the rich diversity of the social economy came together to affirm that social enterprises must play a bigger role in the future of Europe and to identify new ways of boosting the sector. They called for new, innovative funding sources, business support, networking, and clearer EU-wide regulations.

The event concluded with the Strasbourg Declaration, a milestone that covered a wide range of areas where social entrepreneurs want to see further changes:

'A call to action to realise the potential of social enterprise

Governments and public bodies have started to recognise the power of social entrepreneurship. Steps are being taken in many Member States and regions to encourage the growth of social enterprises. At EU level, the SBI has made a positive start in promoting eco-systems for social enterprises but we must not lose momentum. Therefore,

1. The EU must follow through on all the actions in the SBI. It should develop a second phase of the SBI that broadens its scope, deepens its partnership with Member States, regional and local authorities, civil society organisations and key players in the ecosystem.
2. The European Economic and Social Committee, the next European Commission (with a dedicated inter-service structure) and the next European Parliament must take full ownership and deliver on the actions suggested in Strasbourg.
3. There must be a stronger engagement at EU, national, regional and local levels with the social enterprise community in the co-creation of new policies to support social enterprise, suited to the local context.
4. The Commission must ensure that its commitment to create an ecosystem for social enterprise is mainstreamed in its policies.
5. In partnership with the social enterprise sector, Member States, regional and local authorities must fully support the growth of social enterprises and help them build capacity. For example through legal frameworks, access to finance, business start-up and development support, training and education and public procurement.
6. The European institutions and Member States should reinforce the role of social enterprises in structural reforms to exit the crisis, notably where the social economy is less developed.
7. The Commission, the Member States and regions must boost cooperation between social enterprises across borders and boundaries, to share knowledge and practices. Similarly, all public authorities should cooperate better between themselves and enhance their capacity to support social enterprise growth.
8. Public and private players must develop a full range of suitable financial instruments and intermediaries that support social enterprises throughout their lifecycle.
9. Social enterprise still needs further research and national statistical collection for a better understanding, recognition and visibility of the sector, both among policymakers and the general public.
10. In this new Europe, all players need to look at growth and value creation from a wider perspective, by including social indicators and demonstrating positive social impact when reporting social and economic progress.

⁸⁸ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/conferences/2014/0116-social-entrepreneurs/index_en.htm.

The EESC was committed to the organisation of the Strasbourg event and is actively involved in social entrepreneurship through a substantial number of opinions and the Social Enterprise Project. Pursuing its interest, it has launched Make it happen, a new project designed to keep the Strasbourg Declaration alive by promoting policy directions and concrete actions to be forwarded to the new Commission and Parliament in Autumn 2014. Nine EESC members are directly involved in Make it happen through actions that involve strengthened cooperation with social enterprise supporters, the participation of the project group members in European events, and the consultation and involvement of various social economy stakeholders and supporters of social enterprise.

To further unlock the potential of this sector, the EESC has called for a more supportive environment for social enterprises and for their better integration into all EU policies. It believes that partnerships with regional and local authorities, as well as social entrepreneurs themselves, will play an important role.

The main actions points guiding the Social Enterprise Project are therefore as follows:

1. Co-creation of new policies to support social enterprise
2. Partnership to support social enterprises
3. Development of a second phase of the SBI.

Following an ongoing local strategy, the Social Enterprise Project is also taking part in local events spread around Europe to conduct fact-finding missions, collect best practices and investigate policy ideas and recommendations for the EU institutions.

*'Europe has a head-start. It is ideally placed to take a lead and capture first-mover benefits when it comes to implementing social innovations by pro-actively and effectively trying to fully (and fairly) realise both economic and societal benefits. With its strong legacy in social democracy, solidarity, civic participation, justice and fairness, Europe arguably constitutes especially fertile grounds when it comes to sustainably enabling and growing social innovation.'*⁸⁹

Not only does the EU undoubtedly offer fertile ground for social innovation but, as a good gardener, it has taken good care of it, by nurturing it adequately. In 2010, in the first BEPA report, barriers and challenges to social innovation were identified according to the scope and level of ambition of the innovations: responding to social demands, societal challenges or engaging systemic change. Going systematically through the barriers identified then, it seems that a large number of them have either been or are being addressed effectively through EU policies. Milestones have been reached for instance with respect to the availability of funding for social entrepreneurs (e.g. EuSEF, EaSI, public procurement, crowdfunding). Progress is being made through innovative financial schemes, the interest of a large community of financial actors and a wide-ranging and active debate (within GECES, G8, etc.) on the establishment of a methodology to measure the impact of social enterprises on the creation of socio-economic benefits and their benefit for the community; the development of hubs is securing seed funding to promote and test pilot cases; networks of hubs should facilitate the building of ecosystems and the harnessing of contributions to expansion capital from a variety of sources. The Social Business Initiative has also addressed the question of the status of social enterprises (mapping) and the idea that innovations have 'social' roots is progressing among mainstream innovation corporations and public and private stakeholders. This was particularly clear during the annual EU Innovation Convention 2014.⁹⁰

As a result, the EU landscape for social innovation is less fragmented today; it is generally more visible and the programmes, initiatives and instruments created recently have considerably contributed to setting up aspects of a European-wide ecosystem.

⁸⁹ http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/presenta/social_innovation/social_innovation_2013.pdf.

⁹⁰ http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/ic2014/index_en.cfm.

Nevertheless, as underlined by the OECD, EU policy could gain in coherence: One example lies in the fact that one of the most powerful instruments to address issues related to social innovation, the ERDF and territorial and cohesion policy, makes no direct reference to it. Also, Social entrepreneurs and actors of social innovation who gathered in Strasbourg saw this event as a beginning and not an end. Michel Barnier, the Commissioner responsible for the Single Market, confirmed that this should become a regular event.

Moreover, prospective studies recently published on the future of Europe in the medium term are proving to be valuable lessons on the path that lies ahead for Europe to take full advantage of its actions to promote social innovation.

Europe's Societal Challenges

A major source of inspiration comes from the report prepared by RAND Europe entitled *Europe's Societal Challenges*,⁹¹ and commissioned by ESPAS.⁹² It acknowledges the many challenges facing the EU and suggests ways to mitigate current downward trends.

According to the report, the world in 2030 could be characterised by the following significant changes.

Regarding demographic change

- The world's population will be more urbanised: for the first time in history, more than 50 % of the population will live in urban zones. Specifically, about 80 % of European society will live in cities, which will become increasingly important actors.
- We will also observe further ageing of the world's population. This trend is already apparent in Europe and it will be the region with the highest average age globally. European population ageing will have direct consequences for the working population and social welfare systems, health services and pensions in terms of demand and expenditure.

Regarding immigration patterns

- Immigration patterns will change, becoming more inter-regional (south-south rather than south-north). However, Europe will continue to be a destination region for its neighbouring regions.

Regarding the growing middle class and the empowerment of individuals

- The growing middle class will be a structural change in the world to come. The global middle class will increase from 1.8 billion in 2009 to 5 billion in 2030.
- Gender equality and the empowerment of women will improve as a result of more egalitarian access to education and the role of technology. Greater access to further education is likely to drive and be influenced by increased individual empowerment. This in turn may generate greater support for increasing gender equality and the empowerment of women.
- Poverty will fall globally and so will inequalities and access to wealth among states. However, there is a risk that inequalities among citizens/individuals will increase in terms of revenue, especially in Europe and the United States.
- The internet divide will persist within and between countries – in terms of access to networks and the internet. This means that technological development could potentially accelerate socio-economic inequalities between individuals/countries, since it essentially benefits the highly qualified, the connected and those in the higher income groups.

⁹¹ <http://europa.eu/espas/pdf/espas-report-societal-trends.pdf>.

⁹² European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (<http://europa.eu/espas/>).

Regarding the rise in inequality leading to vulnerability

- Across the spectrum of expected problems is a surge in inequality. While inequalities between European countries are decreasing, within countries they are rising.
- Earnings/gains from productivity growth tend to be heavily concentrated among high-income workers. At the same time, projections suggest a considerable surplus of low-skilled workers, which could lead to long-term and permanent joblessness among young people without secondary training and older workers who cannot retrain to meet requirements for new skills. As a consequence of this skills mismatch, income inequality is projected to expand.

Regarding quick technological development

- The development of new technologies will continue right through to 2030. Innovation will continue to depend on R&D investment, which should continue to increase in advanced economies and to further develop in China. In Europe, however, R&D expenses will decrease notably because of the increase in China, even if the 2020 objectives are met.
- In order to stimulate innovation, more than one source of funding is needed: education, cooperation among universities, business, and financial institutions organised around innovation ecosystems will be important.
- Innovation will also depend on the social and political organisation of society: democracy and open societies seem to favour innovation. There seems to be a circular relationship here, since innovation (particularly the development of technology) will also change the way citizens are organised.

These scenarios, should they materialise, would be accompanied by an undoubted political impact, which may be presented as a complex picture of paradoxes:

- In an increasingly complex world, there is an increasing loss of confidence in the institutions and an increasing aversion to risk. This could translate into a crisis of political action linked to the lack of understanding of global complexities among citizens.
- A steady fall in confidence in public action and in political engagement – be it at national or EU level – which could, once again, be exacerbated by the role of technology and access to unverified information.
- The advance of technology leads to a plethora of actors, just as much as it does to new ways of relating to each other (as groups or as citizens), individualistic tendencies (countering the formation of groups) and the radicalisation of society.
- Arguably, the pressures described above will call for substantial efforts in the field of social innovation. Yet, innovation may be slowed down by a culture of risk aversion.
- The interaction of the widening skills gap, digital divide and unequal benefits of technological innovations could lead to a vicious cycle for vulnerable groups, such as young people, the older poor, low-skilled workers, migrants and their children.

So what future for Europe and which solutions?

RAND Europe suggests four very interesting routes to explore:

- Preparing a new growth paradigm, focused on the wellbeing of citizens while offering opportunities for business to thrive: Europe's economy is expected to continue its decline, and policymakers should focus on a 'new growth paradigm' centred on society, not growth. Instead of focusing efforts on creating wealth, European nations are advised to prioritise the health of societies. The successor of the current Europe

2020 Strategy should aim to invest in human capital and avoid sluggish productivity growth, achieved at the expense of social inclusion, public health, education and skills, security or freedom. This will include improving the innovative capacity of SMEs; bridging the digital divide between Member States; matching migrant skills to the labour market, as well as those of the young unemployed.

- Investing in citizens, including protecting the most vulnerable: Aside from fixing the economy, the report argues that the real challenge for European policymakers will be to break the trend of rising poverty risks, increasing income inequality and long-term unemployment without relying on economic growth as a panacea. Investing in health and education, preferably as early as possible (e.g. through early childhood education and care interventions) will help reduce costs in the long term, avoid exclusion, and equip citizens with the skills that are in demand in the labour market. There is also a need to bridge the gender gap and address inequalities in access to technology.
- Adapting public sector and government institutions to the 21st century: This includes mitigating increasing pressure on the affordability of welfare states, particularly health and pensions.
- Bringing citizens back into the European project: A serious and long-term effort is required from the EU institutions and its Member States to support the development of a European identity from the earliest age – a sense of belonging that would reinforce a sense of solidarity and loyalty to democratic ideals. Several EU policies that deal with employment, education, health and technological development could be used for this purpose. Similarly, more transparency in decision-making processes and structural/institutional reforms that recognise the emergence of new actors/stakeholders on the scene (NGOs, civil society, business associations, etc.) and new forms of communication will be necessary.

What will social enterprise look like in Europe by 2020?

The second of the aforementioned studies is the British Council's 'think piece',⁹³ commissioned to contribute to the previously mentioned Strasbourg event. It provides a basis for discussing what will shape social innovation and the growth of social enterprises in the near future.

How will social enterprise respond to economic conditions, social and environmental challenges, government policies, technology and investment over the next years? Social enterprises are on the rise throughout the EU, with governments and investors increasingly recognising the sector as a valid alternative to both private and public sector business.

*By 2020, associations and charities will be part of the 'social enterprise spectrum', generating most of their income through trading activities. Enterprises from the private sector will have to demonstrate their credentials, and could be better at this than traditional social enterprises. Public, private and social economy organisations will be **encouraged** by investors, funders, and governments **to produce social value results in the long***

⁹³ cf. Mark Richardson, Richard Catherall – *What will social enterprise look like in Europe by 2020?* – British Council, January 2014.
http://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/britishcouncil.uk2/files/what_will_social_enterprise_look_like_in_europe_by_2020_0.pdf.

*term. As a consequence, **social impact** measurement and comparison (covering economic, environmental and social issues) **will become mainstream** in the social economy.*

***From grants to investment:** one of the most important drivers will be the **development of the social finance sector**. The traditional model of foundations will become outdated since more and more enterprises will try to **maximise their social impact while delivering a financial return**. Hybrid models of social investment (Social Investment Bonds, Social Impact Bonds) will emphasise new tools ('investment readiness', 'impact reporting') with two consequences: pressure on investors to consider social impact in investments and growing involvement of social enterprises on financial services delivery. **But** the context will also be constraining: **new national and EU funding priorities could exclude innovative social investments**; innovative social enterprises will have to make an international impact thanks to social franchising.*

*Complex networks: social enterprises will be more concerned with the importance of their impact (through changing government practices and business, through developing effective solutions that work). This consciousness will result in highly networked micro-social enterprises. Social entrepreneurs will be connected with micro-social structures and work with public, charitable, academic and profit-oriented sectors. Thus, this collaborative approach (crowdsourcing, funding, etc.) will be an interesting **alternative to traditional political investment**. Indeed, **effective social enterprises will be considered as models and will spread more rapidly** than classical mechanisms (e.g., social franchising). And European funding will encourage this kind of collaboration across international boundaries.*

The way forward

The European Union is at a decisive moment in its history in terms of the policies it intends to take tomorrow and the future it wants to design. With reference to social innovation, we are not yet in midstream. Over the past five years, we have seen how awareness has grown; how experiments have developed and how policies have begun to assist and foster this trend. With regard to the outcomes, expectations that have emerged and changes that could occur in Europe in the coming years, we need to measure the distance still to go to achieve the major challenge of social innovation and move beyond the expanding myriad of small initiatives and projects with limited results – as successful as they are – to achieve a real systemic change that puts social innovation at the heart of all processes and policies.

From where we stand today, building on the gains that have already been made and in addition to the abovementioned suggestions from RAND Europe, we believe that the following three key areas for reflection, exploration and action should be prioritised and explored.

Improve governance in relation to social innovation

In this field, the levers for improvement and action mainly concern the following three areas: globally speaking, a wider, more permanent support for the role of the public sector (at European, national, regional and local level) in terms of innovation, especially social innovation; fostering the link between social innovation and the private sector, in particular by improving framework conditions to enable the development of enduring partnerships; making corporate social responsibility a systematic and essential element of analysis and operating mode of all businesses.

Clearly, to reach these goals, the European Commission should keep improving synergies between its different services.

Focus on knowledge

Improvements in recent years to impact measurement and mapping have demonstrated their value. Today we should continue in this direction and further enrich knowledge in these two areas of research. Other hitherto unexplored areas deserve to be investigated, especially the interactions between social innovation and health. Research on social innovation must continue to move forward, in order to test new models, focus on best practices or favour bottom-up approaches. Finally, the growing role of information and communication technologies (ICT) in social innovation should be better incorporated in the way we understand and treat this topic.

Support, encourage and improve the business environment

The Single Market Act (I & II) and the Social Business Initiative have already made many improvements for European businesses that want to promote or participate in social innovation. All possibilities for going further in this direction should be explored and exploited: improve regulations in this field, mainly with regard to accessing finance; encouraging partnerships to support social innovation; using public procurements as a genuine social policy instrument; and developing a second phase of the Social Business Initiative.

Ultimately, the addition of these initiatives, the effect of these policies and the gradual (possibly irreversible) evolution in the way we look at social innovation could lead to side effects of unexpected magnitude.

- What is at stake is the ongoing struggle against inequality. We see that it continues to rise and tomorrow it may be even more central to the issues that European policies will have to face and fight.
- What is also at stake is the emergence of a different conception of the economy, a shared economy that is not focused exclusively on growth.
- Finally, empowering the citizen remains at the very heart of social innovation issues. This fundamental issue cannot be ignored by European policies.

3 Inequalities in Education

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3.1 On the test score gap between Roma and non-Roma students in Hungary and its potential causes



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**On the test score gap between
Roma and non-Roma students in Hungary
and its potential causes**

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On the test score gap between Roma and non-Roma students in Hungary and its potential causes

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Abstract

Using unique data from Hungary, we assess the gap in standardized test scores between Roma and non-Roma students and show that this gap is comparable to the size of the Black-White test score gap in the United States in the 1980s. The ethnic test score gap in Hungary is nearly entirely explained by social differences in income, wealth and parental education, while ethnic factors do not play an important role. Using reduced-form regressions, we identify two major mediating mechanisms: first, the home environment of Roma children is less favorable for their cognitive development; second, Roma children face a lower quality educational environment. Comparing children with similar home environments from the same school and class, we find that the ethnic gap in test scores is insignificant. Ethnic differences in the home environment are explained by social differences, and ethnicity seems to play no additional role. While their disadvantage in accessing high-quality education is also strongly related to social differences, Roma students seem to face additional disadvantages as subjects of ethnic segregation. The results suggest that in addition to policies designed to alleviate poverty, well-designed interventions influencing these mechanisms can also improve the skill development of Roma and other disadvantaged children.

Keywords: test score gap, Roma minority, Hungary

JEL classification: I20, J15

A roma és nem roma tanulók teszteredményei közti különbségekről és e különbségek okairól

Kertesi Gábor - Kézdi Gábor

Összefoglaló

Tanulmányunk országosan reprezentatív adatokra támaszkodva, mérhetővé teszi a roma fiatalok készségbeli lemaradásait, és megpróbál számot adni e lemaradások valószínű társadalmi okairól. A nyolcadik évfolyamos roma tanulók lemaradása, a kompetenciamérések olvasás-szövegértési és matematikai teszteredményei alapján tekintélyes; éppen akkora, mint amekkora a hasonló korú fehér és fekete bőrű diákok közti különbség volt az Egyesült Államokban az 1980-as években. A lemaradások mögött nem etnikai sajátosságok, hanem társadalmi összetételbeli (jövedelmi, iskolázottsági és lakóhelyi) különbségek állnak. A roma tanulók társadalmi hátrányai – az egészségi állapot kisebb, de nem elhanyagolható szerepe mellett – döntőrészen két közvetítő mechanizmuson keresztül válnak tanulmányi lemaradásokká: a roma tanulók otthoni környezetükön belül kevésbé jutnak hozzá a készségeik fejlődéséhez fontos erőforrásokhoz, iskolai pályafutásuk pedig rosszabb minőségű oktatási környezetben történik. A családi nevelési környezeti hátrányokat magukat is nagyrészt az életkörülmények alakítják. Az iskolai hátrányok nagyobb részét is az alacsony társadalmi státusz magyarázza, de a roma tanulók esetében erre még további hátrányként ráakódik az etnikai szegregáció hatása is. Az eredmények alapján a szegénység enyhítése mellett megfelelően célzott és szervezett szakpolitikai intézkedések is enyhíthetik szegény sorban élő roma és nem roma gyermekek lemaradását.

Tárgyszavak: teszteredmény-különbségek, roma kisebbség, Magyarország

JEL kódok: I20, J15

The Roma (also known as the Romani people or Gypsies) constitute one of the largest and poorest ethnic minorities in Europe. Nearly 80 percent of Roma live in former communist countries in East Central Europe. A recent study (FRA-UNDP, 2012) indicates that this population faces widespread poverty and multiple disadvantages. The employment rate among Roma aged 20 to 64 years is approximately 30 percent in most East Central European countries (FRA-UNDP, 2012). Using multiple datasets in Hungary, Kertesi and Kézdi (2010) decompose the employment gap between Roma and non-Roma in Hungary and find that the employment gap is largely explained by educational differences. Although no direct evidence is currently available on the role of skills in the employment gap between ethnic groups, skills likely play a significant role in ethnic employment gap between ethnic groups in East Central Europe. Understanding the extent and the origins of the gap in skills between ethnic groups is therefore important for understanding the origins of the disadvantages faced by the Roma minority and developing effective policies to address such disadvantages.

This study quantifies the test score gap between Roma and non-Roma students in Hungary and aims to explain this test score gap through policy-relevant factors. We focus on two major questions: Does the test score gap between Roma and non-Roma students result from ethnic specificities of the Roma or social disadvantages? Moreover, what are the mechanisms behind the emergence of the test score gap? A brief analysis of these questions was published in an earlier study of ours (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2011). In this paper, we place the problem in a wider context, examine the mediating mechanisms in detail and form appropriate policy conclusions.

The existence of a Roma – non-Roma school achievement gap frequently leads researchers to seek an explanation related to characteristic ethnic behavior patterns. If this diagnosis were correct, the appropriate policy response should target such characteristic ethnic behavior patterns to "shape attitudes" and transform the "Roma mentality." If the achievement gap can be almost entirely be explained by well-defined social differences, however, interventions intended to transform the "characteristic mentality" are likely to be ineffective. Answering the second question is equally important: finding that a disadvantaged family background is responsible for skill deficits does not provide a complete explanation. Without understanding the mediating mechanisms between poverty and low achievement, we cannot design effective policies.

This paper shows that the gap in standardized test scores in Hungary is substantial (similar to the Black-White gap in the United States in the early 1980s) and is in large part explained by social differences in income, wealth and parental education but that ethnic factors do not play an important role. We examine three mechanisms in detail and find that two of them are primarily responsible for the achievement gap between Roma and non-Roma students. Differences in

health seem to play a limited role in this achievement gap, but differences in the home environment and school quality appear to be important. The home environment and parenting practices can explain, according to our regression results, one-third to two-thirds of the test score gap. We also show that the gap between Roma and non-Roma students attending the same school in the same classroom is 60 percent smaller than the national gap. When comparing children with similar home environments from the same school and class, we find that the ethnic gap in test scores becomes insignificant. Ethnic differences in the home environment are completely explained by social differences, and ethnicity in itself seems to play no additional role. However, while access to higher quality schools is strongly related to social differences, Roma students, as subjects of ethnic segregation, seem to face additional educational disadvantages.

DATA

Standardized competence test scores and a survey with ethnic identifiers linked to these test score data provide a unique opportunity to analyze the test score gap between Roma and non-Roma students in Hungary. The source of these test score data is the May 2006 National Assessment of Basic Competences (NABC), which is administered to every 8th grade elementary school student. These administrative data cover the entire population of 8th grade students but contain no ethnic markers. Ethnicity, together with a wealth of family background data, is measured in a survey linked to those test scores, the Hungarian Life Course Survey (HLCS) of the Tárki Research Institute of Hungary.

The HLCS is a panel survey that follows 10,000 youths on an annual basis, beginning in the fall of 2006. The survey sampled regular students who participated in the NABC and special needs students who did not participate in the NABC but who completed a simplified version of the reading comprehension test. Students with lower test scores and special needs students are overrepresented in the sample, and we use sampling weights throughout the analysis to restore national representativeness.

The questions in the first wave of the HLCS in 2006 focused on the respondents' family structure, financial situation, early childhood experiences, medical and school history and plans for secondary school. Subsequent waves of the survey primarily concentrated on school careers and the mechanisms underlying student dropout.

In this paper, we consider data collected in the first two waves of the survey. We restricted the sample to individuals who participated in both waves of the survey and who were living with at least one of their biological parents. These sample restrictions were necessitated by the methodology that we employed to identify Roma ethnicity. The parents were asked what nationality or ethnicity they identified with primarily or secondarily in both waves of the survey. These two questions allowed the participants to choose a dual identity. For the purposes of this study, we consider a young person to be Roma if he or she had at least one biological parent who identified primarily or secondarily as Roma in either the 2006 or 2007 survey. Using this definition, Roma youth comprise nearly 8 percent of all 8th grade students; the size of the Roma subsample is 848 students (the fractions are weighted by sampling weights; see Table A1 of the Appendix). The total sample size is 9056 students with reading comprehension test results and 8335 students with mathematics test results. The difference in samples occurred because special needs students only completed the reading comprehension test.¹ Table A2 of the Appendix reports the magnitude of the bias arising from sample selection and the basic data on the students who were eliminated from the sample for various reasons.

THE TEST SCORE GAP BETWEEN ROMA AND NON-ROMA STUDENTS IN HUNGARY

As *Figure 1* shows, the test scores measure skills that have a substantial impact on the choice of secondary school and key events in the secondary school career. The figure depicts the probabilities of completing different types of secondary school by age 21 as a function of 8th grade test scores, using data from the sixth wave of the HLCS. The vertical axis indicates the fraction of respondents with a general high school degree, technical high school degree (these two degrees involve passing a graduation examination² that is also the entry test for college) or vocational school degree, as well as the fraction of respondents without any secondary degree. The horizontal axis depicts 10 equally sized categories created by the reading test scores measured in 8th grade, such that group 1 has the lowest and group 10 the highest scores.

¹ Of all 8th graders, 6 percent (and 12 percent of Roma 8th graders) were special needs students in 2006; the majority were classified as having a mild intellectual disability.

² Called „maturity exam” in Hungary. Comparable to the A-level exams in the United Kingdom.

Figure 1

The likelihood of acquiring different types of secondary school degrees by age 21 as a function of 8th grade reading comprehension test scores




Figure 1 reveals that a strong, skill-based selection mechanism is at work in secondary school. The relationship between the likelihood of lacking a secondary degree and test scores is monotonically negative, and the relationship between the likelihood of earning a vocational degree and test scores is very similar. The likelihood of earning a general high school degree is strongly positively related to test scores. The results presented in Figure 1 imply that selection into secondary school types and subsequent success is strongly related to skills in 8th grade and that the NABC test scores are good measures of those skills. Moreover, labor market prospects are strongly related to the type of secondary school degree. Between 2006 and 2012, the employment rate at age 30 was 50 percent for those with 8 grades of education only, compared to over 75 percent for those with some type of secondary degree. The wages of vocational school graduates were 20 percent higher, the wages of technical high school graduates were 180 percent higher, and the wages of college graduates (the degree obtained by most of the general high school graduates) were over 200 percent higher than the wages of those with only 8 grades of education. Taken together, these results provide strong evidence for the importance of the test score differences.

We now turn to ethnic differences in the test scores. *Table 1* reports the magnitude of the standardized test score gap between Roma and non-Roma students using the data on 8th graders from the 2006 NABC. As a comparison, we provide similar data on the test score gap between 13-year-old and 8th grade Black and White students in the United States. We include the test scores of 13-year-old students from the United States because this is the format of the data from the recent past, at the turn of the 1980s.

Table 1

**The magnitude of the Roma–non-Roma test score gap in Hungary
and the black-white test score gap in the United States**
(measured in standard deviations of the national average of the given test)

Year	Roma–non-Roma gap, 8 th grade, Hungary ^a		Black-White gap, 8 th grade, United States ^b		Black-White gap, 13-year-olds, United States ^c	
	reading	mathematics	reading	mathematics	reading	mathematics
1978/80	–	–	–	–	–0.91	–1.08
1992	–	–	–0.83	–1.10	–0.73	–0.93
2006/8	–0.97	–1.05	–0.78	–0.88	–0.56	–0.81

^a Calculated by the authors. *Source:* the combined data of the 2006 NABC and the HCLS.

^b National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), Main NAEP tables, 1992 and 2007.

^c NAEP, Long-Term Trend tables, reading: 1980, 1992 and 2008, mathematics: 1978, 1992 and 2008.

The difference between Roma and non-Roma students' scores is approximately one standard deviation. This difference matches the size of the gap between Black and White 13-year-old students in the United States in about 1980, which has narrowed significantly since.

While our data only cover 8th graders, we can shed some light on the age pattern of the gap with the use of other, albeit not nationally representative, data (*Table 2*). The coverage of the samples and, in one case, the tests differ from those in our data. As a result, meaningful comparisons across age groups can only be made within each sample.

The first data come from the evaluation of the National Education Integration Network program (Kézdi and Surányi, 2008). These data enable us to compare 2nd and 4th grade students. The study measured the arithmetic and reading skills of approximately 4000 students in 60 schools in two waves (spring 2005 and spring 2007). The tests were developed for the study, and disadvantaged students are highly overrepresented in the sample. The second data allow us to compare 6th and 8th grade students; these data are based on the "Interethnic Relations, 2010" survey. The survey collected data on 8th grade students at 88 schools, and the respondents were linked to their administrative files with their 6th grade test scores from 2008 and the 8th grade test scores from 2010. The tests are the standard NABC tests, and again, disadvantaged students are overrepresented in the sample. The third dataset allows us to compare 8th and 10th graders: sample is the subsample of the HLCS that was matched to the 10th grade test scores of the NABC

data. Owing to imperfections in the matching procedure, this subsample is 50 percent of the original sample, and students of higher status are slightly overrepresented in the sample.

Table 2

The Roma–non-Roma test score gap by grade level
(measured in standard deviations of the national average of the given test)
First dataset: raw gap; data in parentheses: include controls for gender, age,
no mother/father and parental education

Survey/Year	Grade	Test		
		SZTE arithmetic ^d	SZTE reading ^d	NABC reading ^e
NEIN ^a	2 nd	-0.76 (-0.49)	-	-
2005/2007	4 th	-	-0.86 (-0.53)	-
IER-NABC ^b	6 th	-	-	-0.67 (-0.33)
2008/2010	8 th	-	-	-0.68 (-0.35)
HLCS-NABC ^c	8 th	-	-	-0.82 (-0.22)
2006/2008	10 th	-	-	-1.01 (-0.33)

^a The evaluation of the National Education Integration Network (NEIN) program; sample: students in 2nd grade in spring 2005 and 4th grade in spring 2007. See: Kézdi and Surányi, 2008.

^b The sample of the "Inter-Ethnic Relations, 2010" (IER) in Education survey combined with the 2008 NABC 6th grade and the 2010 NABC 8th grade test score data.

^c The sample of the Tárki HLCS is combined with the 2006 NABC 8th grade and 2008 NABC 10th grade test score data. The table only includes data on students from the HLCS if they could be identified as 10th graders in the 2008 NABC.

^d Reading comprehension test for 2nd graders and arithmetic skills test for 4th graders developed by the Institute of Education at the University of Szeged (SZTE). The national mean and standard deviation data are from the longitudinal survey of the Institute of Education, University of Szeged, sample III, 2005: 2nd graders, 2006: 4th graders. (See: Csapo, 2007)

^e NABC reading comprehension tests.

We summarize the results of all measurements in *Table 2*. In addition to the raw test score gap, we include the values of the gap after we corrected for gender, age, household presence and education of the mother/father in parentheses.

The available data indicate the relative stability of the test score gaps measured in grades 5 to 8, but the gap increases between grades 2 and 4 and grades 8 and 10. As the gap in the reading test scores is generally larger, the observation that the reading gap is larger in 4th grade than the math gap in 2nd grade suggests an even larger increase in the gap concerning the scores on each test. Conditioning on parental education leads to substantially smaller gaps, especially in higher grades, and these conditional gaps appear to widen, too.

International surveys (Lee and Burkam, 2002; Neuman, 2006) find that the children of disadvantaged minorities struggle with significant deficits by the time that they reach kindergarten age. The available evidence is scarce but suggests that poor children in Hungary are no exceptions to this rule. The evaluation of the early childhood education program Biztos

Kezdet (Sure Start) in Hungary collected baseline data on 4- to 6-year-old kindergarteners and measured the vocabularies of these children. In this sample, the raw gap between Roma and non-Roma children is 66 percent of a standard deviation, which is reduced to 11 percent once we condition on gender, age, household presence and education of the mother/father.

SOCIAL COMPOSITION AND THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP

What is the magnitude of the ethnic gap compared to the raw test score gap if we account for social and income differences between the Roma and non-Roma student populations? As non-Roma students constitute a much larger percentage of the students (and thus, of the sample), we conduct the following thought experiment: how large would the test score gap between Roma and non-Roma students be if non-Roma students lived in similarly poor conditions to those in which Roma students live?

In our analysis, we used the family background variables presented in Table 3. In conjunction, these variables represent the family's long-term income, wealth and life chances in a broad sense. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table A3 of the Appendix.

Table 3

Family background variables

Variable name	Definition of variable
Biological mother in household	Lives with biological mother: yes/no
Nonbiological mother in household	Lives with nonbiological mother: yes/no
Biological father in household	Lives with biological father: yes/no
Nonbiological father in household	Lives with nonbiological father: yes/no
Mother's education	Mother's (biological/nonbiological) highest completed level of education: 0-8 years of elementary school/vocational school/high school diploma/higher education
Father's education	Father's (biological/nonbiological) highest completed level of education: 0-8 years of elementary school/vocational school/high school diploma/higher education
Mother's current employment	Mother was employed in the fall of 2006: yes/no
Father's current employment	Father was employed in the fall of 2006: yes/no
Mother's long-term employment	Mother: share of years worked while the child was 0-14 years old, %
Father's long-term employment	Father: share of years worked while the child was 0-14 years old, %
ln(monthly income)	The logarithm of the household's monthly income, 2006
ln(number of household members)	The logarithm of the number of household members
Number of unemployed adults	Number of unemployed adult household members
Living space per person, m ²	Surface area of apartment/number of household members, m ² /person
Number of rooms per person	Number of rooms/number of household members
Bathroom	Is there a bathroom in the apartment? yes/no
Poverty1 (income does not cover food)	Was there not enough money for food in the past 12 months? yes/no
Poverty2 (income does not cover heating)	Was there not enough money for heating in the past 12 months? yes/no
Poverty3 (child-care assistance)	The family receives child-care assistance: yes/no
Poverty4 (free school meals)	The child receives free meals at school: yes/no
Poverty5 (free school textbooks)	The child receives free textbooks at school: yes/no
Place of residence: region	Regions of Hungary: Central Hungary/Central Transdanubia/Western Transdanubia/Southern Transdanubia/Northern Hungary/Northern Great Plain
Place of residence: type	Budapest/county seat/other city/village
Place of residence: remote	Access to the place of residence is too expensive or time consuming by car or public transport ^a : yes/no

^a See Köllő, 1997.

We summarize the results of various estimations in *Table 4*. We estimate the role of social background in the achievement gap between Roma and non-Roma students using two methods: linear regression (OLS) and propensity score matching. The OLS results are more standard, but propensity score matching is more flexible, as it allows for nonlinearities and ensures common support. We estimate two types of matching models: nearest neighbor matching and stratified matching.

Table 4

**The magnitude of the ethnic test score gap conditional on social background
Regression and matching estimates**

	Roma parameter (standard error) ^a	Number of observations ^b	R ²
<i>Reading comprehension</i>			
Raw gap	-0.97 (0.05)**	9056	0.06
OLS	-0.23 (0.05)**	9056	0.27
Propensity score matching			
nearest neighbor matching	-0.18 (0.06)*	837/480	–
stratified matching	-0.18 (0.04)*	837/7948	–
<i>Mathematics</i>			
Raw gap	-1.05 (0.05)**	8335	0.07
OLS	-0.32 (0.05)**	8335	0.27
Propensity score matching			
nearest neighbor matching	-0.26 (0.06)*	837/395	–
stratified matching	-0.26 (0.04)*	837/7948	–

^a Standard errors in parentheses.

^b In the case of propensity score matching: number of Roma (treatment)/non-Roma (control) observations

* Significant at 5 %, ** Significant at 1 %.

Note: see detailed results in Table A4 of the Appendix.

Despite the methodological differences, all estimates show that the test score gap between Roma and non-Roma students is to a large extent explained by their adverse long-term socio-economic conditions. The test score gap between the average Roma student and the average non-Roma student is approximately one standard deviation in magnitude. The test score gap between Roma students and non-Roma students of similar social backgrounds is approximately 0.2-0.3 of a standard deviation. One way to interpret these findings is that three-fourths of the raw mathematics gap and four-fifths of the raw reading comprehension gap would disappear if Roma and non-Roma students had similar social backgrounds. Many non-Roma students have similarly disadvantaged backgrounds to those of the average Roma student; however, few Roma


students have backgrounds that are similar to or better than the average non-Roma student. Our results are therefore identified among the bottom of the social background distribution of non-Roma students.

Is there a way to address whether the ethnic test score gap would decline significantly if Roma students lived in conditions that were similarly as good as those of the average or better-than-average non-Roma student? Answering this question requires an extrapolation of the test score gap as a function of social background. We created a one-dimensional synthetic family background index by taking the linear combination of all our family background variables through the use of coefficients obtained from a regression of test scores (the average of the reading and mathematics scores) on the family background variables. We then normalized the resulting values on a range from 0 to 1. Individuals facing worse socio-economic circumstances are thus located closer to 0, while those living in better conditions are closer to 1. Figure A1 in the Appendix plots the distribution of the family background index for the Roma and non-Roma subsamples separately. The overwhelming majority of Roma students live in worse conditions than the average non-Roma student: the Roma subsample is too small to be meaningful over values of 0.6.

We divided the range of the family background index into 10 equal intervals and estimated the mean Roma and non-Roma reading and mathematics test scores for each interval. We restricted the estimates for the Roma students to the 0–0.6 range. The estimates are presented in *Figure 3*. The gray zone indicates the 95 percent confidence intervals (within ± 2 standard errors of the mean).

Figure 3

Reading and mathematics test results as a function of the family background index
(The gray zone indicates the 95 percent confidence intervals)
Continuous lines: Non-Roma. Dashed lines: Roma



Although our method would allow for nonlinear relationships, the relationship between the family background index and expected test scores is nearly linear for both the Roma and the non-Roma samples. The two lines are also very close to one another. In the case of the reading score, the difference is very small and tends to decrease as the family background index values increase; in the case of the mathematics score, the difference is somewhat larger, and it is difficult to determine whether the two lines converge or diverge. Extrapolating beyond the common support, these results suggest that the test scores of Roma students would be similar to, or only slightly worse than, the better-off non-Roma students if their social circumstances were also similar.

We have therefore answered our first question: the test score gap between Roma and non-Roma students in Hungary are, to a large extent, explained by social background, while ethnicity seems to play a very small role, at most, in the test score gap. We now turn to answering our second question: What mediating mechanisms are responsible for the relationship between social background and test scores that lead to the large test score gap between Roma and non-Roma students?

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The literature identifies three major sets of mechanisms that lead to low achievement among disadvantaged students. In general, children's skill accumulation and school performance are weaker if (1) their health is worse than average, (2) they have little access to resources and activities that are important for developing their skills in their home environment and (3) they have limited access to high-quality educational services and a motivating school environment. We review the international evidence on these mechanisms in this section.

1. *Health.* Pain, fatigue and stress associated with poor health and diseases have a direct effect on learning performance. Missed lessons reduce the time spent studying, and parents are often overprotective of more vulnerable children, allowing them to spend less time in the company of their peers and providing them with fewer opportunities for sports and other activities that can help to develop their skills (Currie, 2005; Case, Lubotsky and Paxson, 2002; Almond and Currie 2011). Unfavorable circumstances during pregnancy/birth and chronic disease during early childhood create the conditions for diseases in later stages of childhood and adulthood and have a negative effect on the development of the skills necessary for learning (Barker, 1998; Reichman, 2005; Case, Fertig and Paxson, 2005; Palloni et al., 2009).

The children of less-educated and poor families have a higher than average risk of contracting chronic diseases and suffering accidents and injuries. Parents are also less likely to recognize the symptoms of disease, and such families have more limited access to better health care owing to insufficient information and transportation and other costs. Poor children thus have a more difficult time recovering from diseases. As a result, children of poor families are of systematically worse health on average than their higher-income counterparts, and this difference appears to increase with age (Case, Lubotsky and Paxson, 2002; Currie and Stabile, 2003; Currie 2009).

2. *Home environment/parenting.* The numerous activities, tools and aspects of the material environment and behavioral patterns combine to form the learning environment at home. We focus on two components: (1) the availability of activities, objects, tools and environmental factors that directly or indirectly promote the child's cognitive development and (2) parenting practices that guarantee the child's emotional stability (Linver, Brooks-Gunn and Kohen, 2002). The literature offers two theories to explain the relationship between these mechanisms and

poverty. *Human capital theory*³ asserts that a low level of parental investment is responsible for the negative impact of the parental poverty on children's skills. The effects of poverty on a child's human capital (in a broad sense) are thus mediated by tools, experiences and parental "services" that stimulate the child's development. The *family stress model*⁴ asserts that economic hardship or the loss of a job influences children's development through the parents' mental state. As the parents' mental state affects the parent-child relationship and the parenting methods that are used in the family, it has a major impact on children's development. The two classes of explanations are, to some extent, competing theories, but they complement each other in many respects.

3. *School quality.* Two central factors can make a school a "high-quality" institution: effective teachers and mutually motivating classmates. Although measuring teaching quality is difficult, a number of innovative studies conducted over the past two decades have convincingly demonstrated that teacher performance plays a definitive role in students' school performance. These studies assess teaching quality through the use of a variety of methods: some measure observable features, such as the results of teacher skill tests (Ferguson, 1998), others measure student performance with value added models (Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain, 2005; Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff, 2011), and yet others compare the outcomes of up-to-date and obsolete teaching practices in the classroom (Wenglinsky, 2001; Schacter and Thum, 2004). Their results are clear: high-quality teaching is one of the main catalysts for good student performance.

Peer group composition is positively related to student performance. If any type of social mechanism causes children with learning problems to cluster in one school or classroom, a subculture may develop that is not conducive to learning. The leaders of the peer group may refuse to make an effort and co-operate with the teachers and create their own culture of resistance to school knowledge (Akerlof and Kranton, 2002; Bishop et al., 2003; Fryer and Torelli, 2010). A number of studies indicate that high-performance peer groups enhance while low-performance peer groups inhibit individual learning performance (Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009; Hanushek et al., 2003; Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin, 2009).

Teacher quality and peer group composition may be positively correlated, which may hinder the separation of their respective effects, on the one hand, but may result in mutually reinforcing effects, on the other. Such a positive correlation is more likely in school systems that are characterized by higher levels of segregation and that do not compensate teachers for more

³ Leibowitz, 1974; Becker, 1981a; 1981b; Becker and Tomes 1986; Haveman and Wolfe, 1995; Mayer, 1997; Mulligan, 1997; Kalil and DeLeire, 2004; Guryan, Hurst and Kearney, 2008; Gould and Simhon, 2011; Kaushal, Magnuson and Waldfogel, 2011; Phillips, 2011.

⁴ Elder, 1974; Lempers, Clark-Lempers and Simons, 1989; McLoyd, 1990; Conger et al., 1992; 1993.


difficult tasks associated with teaching more difficult peer groups.⁵ Recent studies show the consequences of the negative selection of teachers to worse performing schools in segregated school systems (Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin, 2004; Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor, 2005; Jackson, 2009).

Figure 5 summarizes our theoretical framework regarding the factors that may contribute to the Roma students' school deficits. For the sake of simplicity, the figure treats the social background of a student as one dimensional, namely, good or bad; similarly, health, home environment and school quality are captured by one-dimensional variables that are also binary. The simple lines (not arrows) connecting the variables designate correlations, the arrows designate causal relationships, and the plus and minus symbols indicate the signs of the relationships.

Social background is treated as a predetermined characteristic that can influence children's health, the home learning environment, access to quality education and test scores; reverse causality is unlikely to be very important in this case. The role of ethnicity is more complex. With respect to the relationship between ethnicity and social background, causality can run in both directions (e.g., social background may affect identity, and ethnic discrimination may affect life chances). Causality may also run in both directions for the relationship between ethnicity and the intervening variables representing the transmission mechanisms (e.g., school environment may affect identity, and ethnic segregation in schools may affect the quality of education).

Figure 5

An illustration of the causal relationships that determine test results



⁵ Well-designed social experiments and additional resources can achieve good results with disadvantaged students in schools that are dominated by disadvantaged students (see, for example: Dobbie and Fryer, 2011 on the Harlem Children's Zone and Angrist et al., 2010 on the Knowledge is Power program).

MEASUREMENT STRATEGY

The lack of exogenous variation in health, home environment, parenting practices and the school environment prevents us from performing a causal analysis. Instead, we use the richness of our data to apply as detailed measures of each factor as possible and conduct a decomposition exercise to assess the potential magnitude of each—conditional on each other. The HLCS data provide us with the following measures.

1. *Student health* is measured by two variables: birth weight and self-reported health. Birth weight is one of the most important indicators that characterize pregnancy conditions and fetal development. Children born with a low birth weight—measured as a birth weight under 2500 g—have a higher risk of physical and nervous system damage; have a higher likelihood of developing learning difficulties, attention deficit problems and special educational needs; are more likely to repeat grades and have lower test scores (Breslau et al., 1994; Hack, Klein and Taylor, 1995; Reichman, 2005). In addition to correlations, several studies show the causal effects of low birth weight on education levels, employment chances and incomes (Currie and Hyson, 1999, Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2004; Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2007; Oreopoulos et al., 2008). The incidence of low birth weight is closely correlated with the income, wealth and education of the population concerned. The poorer and less educated the population of a country or a group within a country is, the greater the statistical probability of low birth weight will be (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2004) owing to various mechanisms, including nutrition, health behavior and access to health care (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982; Hack, Klein and Taylor, 1995; Cramer, 1995; Meara, 2001; Schonkoff and Phillips, 2004, chapter 8; Paul, 2010; Currie, 2011).

The second variable is the self-reported health of the surveyed students. It was measured on a scale from one to four (excellent/good/adequate/poor) a few months after the reading and mathematics tests were taken. This variable, which is widely used in the literature, is strongly correlated with both medically diagnosed chronic conditions (Case, Lubotsky and Paxson, 2002) and parental social status indicators (income and education). Poorer children generally tend to have worse health, which is reflected in their self-evaluations, or, in the case of younger children, in their parents' subjective evaluations (Case, Lubotsky and Paxson, 2002; Currie and Stabile, 2003; Case, Fertig and Paxson, 2005; Currie, 2009, Table 1).

2. In assembling the *parenting/home environment* indicators, we used retrospective questions in the HLCS dating back to kindergarten. We also used a series of questions and observations in the first wave of the HLCS to measure the material and emotional home environment in adolescence.

Early childhood experiences and family interactions related to books and other written texts play an exceptionally important role in children's cognitive development. Regular bedtime storytelling sessions and parent-child interactions centered on browsing children's books together (including picture books) are important ways in which toddlers and kindergarteners acquire such experiences. The number of literacy experiences in early childhood can have an important effect on the child's basic skills prior to school enrollment (Heath, 1983; Réger, 1990; Neuman, 1996; Sénéchal et al., 2001; Dickinson and Tabors, 2001; Raikes et al., 2006). We have two measures of the frequency of bedtime storytelling sessions at kindergarten age in the HLCS, one from the parents and one—in a separate interview—from the children. The HLCS also contains questions on other joint activities, of which hiking or engaging in sports was significantly related to test scores and hence is included in our analysis.

The students' current home environment and parenting practices are measured with the use of the HOME (*Home Observation for Measurement of the Environment*) scale. The HOME index is an instrument that is used to assess the developmentally relevant features of a child's home environment, and our data contain the battery developed for adolescents (Bradley et al., 2000; Mott, 2004). Recent research shows that the home environment and parenting, as measured by the HOME scale, are strongly related to children's school readiness and subsequent school performance (Crane, 1996; Guo and Harris, 2000; Linver, Brooks-Gunn and Kohen, 2002; Brooks-Gunn and Markman, 2005; Todd and Wolpin 2007). The first wave of the HLCS, in 2006, relied on an adapted version of the short form of the adolescent HOME scale (HOME-SF) that was used in the National Longitudinal Study of Youth. The short version is composed of 27 items and assesses two subscales: cognitive stimulation and emotional support. As supplemental measures of the home environment, we also included a key variable of the PISA studies (the number of books in the home) and information on the availability of an internet connection.

We describe the variables that characterize students' health and home environment and parenting in *Table 5*. *Table A5* in the Appendix presents the summary statistics for Roma and non-Roma students for these variables.

Table 5

Intervening variables representing the transmission mechanisms

Variable name	Definition
HEALTH	
Low birth weight	The child was born with a birth weight lower than 2500 g: yes/no
Adequate or poor teenage health	The child's health, based on a fall 2006 <i>self-evaluation</i> , is adequate or poor according to a four-part scale (poor/adequate/good/excellent): yes/no (modal age: 15)
HOME ENVIRONMENT/PARENTING	
Seldom or never told bedtime stories (child's response)	Seldom or never told bedtime stories (once every 6 months or even less frequently) while the child was in kindergarten: yes/no (child's response)
Often told bedtime stories (child's response)	Often told bedtime stories (several times a week) while the child was in kindergarten: yes/no (child's response)
Seldom or never told bedtime stories (parent's response)	Seldom or never told bedtime stories (never or almost never) while the child was in kindergarten: yes/no (parent's response)
Often told bedtime stories (parent's response)	Often told bedtime stories (every day or almost every day) while the child was in kindergarten: yes/no (parent's response)
Seldom went hiking with parents (child's response)	Seldom (once every 6 months or even less frequently) went hiking or engaged in sports together with the parents while the child was in kindergarten: yes/no (child's response)
HOME index, cognitive subscale ^a	The subscale of the HOME index (a synthetic variable characterizing the home environment) for 15-year-olds that measures cognitive stimulation
HOME index, emotional subscale ^a	The subscale of the HOME index (a synthetic variable characterizing the home environment) for 15-year-olds that measures emotional support
Number of books at home	The number of books in the home: under 50/50-150/150-300/300-600/600-1000/over 1000
Internet connection at home	Does the home have an internet connection: yes/no

^a Table A6 of the Appendix presents the items in the HOME index's cognitive and emotional subscales.

3. In contrast to health and home environment, we do not use explicit measures to capture the potential effects of *school quality*. Instead, we compare Roma and non-Roma students who studied in the same school and class with the use of including school and class fixed effects. Note that in general, assignment to classes (groups of 20 to 30 students) is fixed over a student's entire school career, and hence, students in the same class generally share a common school history. Recall that our data are linked to the administrative NABC database, which contains the students' school and class identification numbers in addition to their test scores. The multistage

sampling method and size of the HLCS sample yield a sufficient number of observations for within-class analysis.

When interpreting the results, we can interpret the regression estimates of the “Roma” coefficient in the equations without school and class fixed effects to measure the differences between randomly selected Roma and non-Roma students. The “Roma” coefficient in the equations that include school and class fixed effects measures the gap between randomly selected Roma and non-Roma *classmates*. The difference between the two estimates measures the test score gap between Roma and non-Roma students who are *not classmates*. This residual component incorporates the consequences of the selection of typical Roma students into schools and classes that differ from the schools and classes of typical non-Roma students. This residual component thus captures all the effects of selection and differences in the educational quality of typical Roma and non-Roma students. The estimate is an upward-biased estimate of the effects of school quality because of selection: the non-Roma classmates of most Roma students are likely to differ from the average non-Roma student. We partially control for this bias by including the rich set of family background variables, but the remaining estimates are likely to remain larger than the true effect of school quality.

THE STRENGTH OF THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS

Our first question concerns the relative importance of the three transmission mechanisms as the basic pathways between social background and the ethnic achievement gap. These three mechanisms are strongly interrelated, in part because of unobserved factors. As a result, a multiple regression model that includes all covariates and fixed effects can yield informative results regarding the potential combined effect of the three mechanisms but not regarding their relative magnitudes. Successive inclusion of the variables representing these mechanisms also generates concern, as the order in which the variables enter matters. Therefore, we enter the variables representing health, the home learning environment and school/class fixed effects into the equation in varying order, and finally, we enter the family background variables that characterize the family's socio-economic conditions.

Table 6

The magnitude of the residual ethnic test score gap after accounting for the transmission mechanisms

	Reading			Mathematics		
Roma	-0.97	-0.07	-0.05	-1.05	-0.18	-0.15
	(0.05)**	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)**	(0.07)**	(0.07)*
Health, home environment	–	yes	yes	–	yes	yes
School/class fixed effect	–	yes	yes	–	yes	yes
Family background	–	–	yes	–	–	yes
Sample size	9056	9056	9056	8335	8335	8335
R ²	0.06	0.67	0.68	0.07	0.68	0.69

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level.

* Significant at 5 %, ** Significant at 1 %.

Note: see detailed results in Table A7 of the Appendix.

We first examine the combined effect of the three mechanisms. As Table 6 shows, the bulk of the raw test score gap *disappears* (over 90 percent of the reading and over 80 percent of the mathematics test score gap) if we account for our measures of the three mechanisms. No gap in reading and a small gap in mathematics exist between Roma and non-Roma students who are similar in terms of health, who had the same degree of access to the resources, tools and activities that stimulate skill development in their home environment and who attended the same classes in the same schools. Entering the family background variables does not significantly reduce the Roma coefficient once the mechanism variables are included. If interpreted as causal effects, the results suggest that the skill deficits of Roma students are exclusively due to well-defined social mechanisms related to health, home environment and educational quality.

Our second question concerns the relative strength of the three mechanisms. Table 7 presents our estimates for the potential of each mechanism to explain the test score gap between Roma and non-Roma students. The table reports our lower and upper estimates. The lower estimates correspond to the reduction in the Roma coefficient in the test score regression when the variables of the particular mechanism are entered last (when all correlated effects are absorbed by the *other* mechanisms). Our upper estimate corresponds to the reduction when they are entered first (when all correlated effects are absorbed by the *given* mechanism). Recall that the gap that we aim to explain in reading comprehension is 0.97 and that the gap in mathematics is 1.05.

Table 7

**The relative strength of the transmission mechanisms:
reduction in the size of the Roma coefficient in the test score regressions
due to the variables corresponding to each mechanism**

	Reading		Mathematics	
	lower estimate	upper estimate	lower estimate	upper estimate
Health	0.01	0.10	0.03	0.11
Home environment	0.28	0.76	0.28	0.69
School	0.13	0.60	0.17	0.58

The lower estimate corresponds to the reduction in the Roma coefficient when the variables of the particular mechanism are entered last; the upper estimate corresponds to the reduction when they are entered first.

Although the range of the estimates is rather broad, the home learning environment and the likelihood of accessing to high-quality education appear to be very important. The results are consistent with the causal interpretation that the test scores of Roma students are worse *because* they have limited access to resources and activities that promote their skill development at home and *because* they have limited access to high-quality education services. Health appears to play a less important role in teenage test results; however, childhood health problems may affect later life outcomes⁶ through other channels (Elo and Preston, 1992; Case, Lubotsky and Paxson, 2002; Case, Fertig and Paxson, 2005; Smith, 1999; 2009; Marmot and Wilkinson, 2006; Strauss and Thomas, 2008, chapter 4).

Having established the potential role of each mechanism, our next question is, to what degree do the Roma students' socio-economic disadvantages explain their deficits in home environment and access to educational services, and what is the potential role of ethnicity *per se*?

HOME ENVIRONMENT AND PARENTING

As when we analyzed the determinants of the test score gap, not only in the neighborhood of the average values but also along the entire distribution of the family background scale, we examine the ethnic differences in the home environment, again throughout the distribution of family background. We use the previously introduced synthetic family background index for that purpose. Analogously to the previous analysis, we divide the range of the family background variable (the linear combination of family income, poverty, parental education and parental

⁶ Such outcomes include adult health, mortality, employment and earnings.

employment) into 10 equal intervals and estimate the mean values of the home environment variables for the Roma and non-Roma students. Similar to the previous analysis, we restrict the estimates for the Roma students to the 0–0.6 range, as the subsample is too small to be meaningful over values of 0.6.

We present our results in the following two figures. Social and ethnic differences in the frequency of bedtime storytelling to *kindergarten age* children, the number of books in the home and internet access in the home are reported in *Figure 6*, and the differences in the cognitive and emotional HOME index scores are presented in *Figure 7*. For expositional purposes, we omit the confidence intervals around the HOME index figures (they overlap across Roma and non-Roma, suggesting no significant differences).⁷

⁷ As robustness checks, we estimated linear regressions with the family background variables entered separately. The results, shown in Table A8 in the Appendix, are very similar to the results in the figures below.

Figure 6

The probability of bedtime storytelling, having no or very few books and having an internet connection at home as a function of the family background index
Solid lines: Non-Roma. Dashed lines: Roma. The gray zone indicates the 95 percent confidence intervals





Figure 7

Family background and the cognitive and emotional HOME index

Solid lines: Non-Roma; dashed lines: Roma.

Black lines: cognitive HOME index; gray lines: emotional HOME index



First, *Figures 6 and 7* reveal that most indicators are strongly related to the family background index within both ethnic groups. Only 20-30 percent of the most disadvantaged students were told bedtime stories regularly in early childhood, compared to 70-80 percent of children from the highest social status families. Of the poorest and least educated families, 70 percent have either no or very few books, which is true of none of the highest status families. Fewer than 5 percent of the poorest families had home internet access in 2006, compared to 90 percent of the wealthiest families. The difference in the cognitive HOME index (a comprehensive measure of the cognitive stimuli in the teenage home environment) between the two groups is a staggering 2.5 standard deviations. The exception is the emotional HOME index, which is weakly associated with family background.

Second, the figures reveal small and, in many cases, statistically insignificant ethnic differences in the home environment and parenting indicators between families with comparable family backgrounds. Statistically, no difference is found in storytelling or the cognitive and emotional HOME index graphs between the Roma and non-Roma students. Ethnic differences become small but remain statistically significant in terms of the number of books owned and internet access conditional on the family background index. However, these ethnic differences are smaller at higher levels of the family background index. If one were willing to extrapolate to the upper part of the distribution of family background, one could conclude that Roma students would have similar home environments to non-Roma students if they lived in similarly good circumstances.

The third interesting result is the flat profile of the emotional HOME index with respect to family background. The results indicate that high- and low-income families generally do not substantially differ in their capacity to provide emotional support to their children. This result is surprising, as the bottom third of society faces serious economic difficulties, and unemployment and economic hardship represent a major source of stress for families living in poor socio-economic circumstances. Parents living in poverty are nevertheless able to provide their children with nearly as much emotional support as parents of higher social status. Coupled with the insignificant ethnic differences conditional on family background, this result suggests that typical Roma families provide their children with the same level of emotional support as typical non-Roma families, even though they face much more difficult economic conditions.⁸

We can only speculate about the reasons why children living in adverse circumstances have suboptimal access to the objects, activities and experiences that promote their skill development in their home environment. The most obvious cause is *income poverty*: low-income families are less able to afford the objects, tools and services that promote skill development than wealthier families. The role of income poverty is supported by recent studies from the United States (Duncan and Murnane, 2011b, p. 11; Kaushal, Magnuson and Waldfogel, 2011). Families that differ in parental education—and thus income—also differ in terms of *parental time use*. Less-educated parents are found to spend significantly less time with their children than more educated parents—even though they are less likely to be employed and spend more time at home on average (Sayer, Gauthier and Furstenberg, 2004, p. 1164; Guryan, Hurst and Kearney, 2008, p. 35; Ramey and Ramey, 2010, p. 137). Parental education is also associated with the quantity and quality of *parent-child interactions*. Less-educated parents speak with their children significantly less often, have less developed vocabulary and incorporate less encouragement and more discouragement in their parenting than more educated parents (Réger, 1990; Hoff-Ginsberg, 1991; Hart and Risley, 1995; Huttenlocher et al., 2002; Hoff, 2003; 2006; Phillips, 2011). Finally, disadvantaged children have more limited access to the objects, activities and experiences that promote their development than other children not only in their immediate family environment but also in their residential area (Neuman and Celano, 2001; Neuman, 1999; Neuman et al., 2001; Neuman and Celano, 2004).

⁸ Although emotional support is not strongly related to poverty, it is closely connected to family structure. In our sample, two-parent families are able to provide the highest levels of emotional support, and single mothers the lowest levels of emotional support. The difference between these two family types accounts for 70 percent of the standard deviation of the HOME emotional subscale scores. The comparable difference is much smaller in the case of the HOME cognitive subscale, barely exceeding 20 percent. It is important to note that the distribution of single parenthood and patchwork families is very similar across Roma and non-Roma households. Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.

ACCESS TO ADEQUATE EDUCATION

The second important mechanism behind the test score gap between Roma and non-Roma students is the Roma students' relatively limited access to adequate education. Ethnic inequalities in access are due to in part residential inequalities and in part selection mechanisms irrespective of residence. The majority of Roma students are educated in classrooms in which the sheer quantity of unresolved pedagogical problems makes it very difficult for teachers to teach well. To measure this, we combine the HLCS sample with the full 2006 NABC database. For every student in the HLCS sample, we calculated the percentage of the classmates whose reading test results were inadequate (levels 0 or 1; the maximum is 4; overall, 30 percent perform at this inadequate level). We then characterize the class of each student as *problematic* if the reading test results were inadequate for more than half of the student's classmates. As we argued previously, studying in problematic classes is detrimental to student development because the pedagogical difficulties lead to lower quality teaching. Moreover, these difficulties can adversely affect the quality of teachers through their self-selection, and direct peer effects may further hinder individual development.

We find substantial ethnic differences in the likelihood of studying in problematic classes. Of Roma 8th graders, 58 percent are in problematic classes (in which over half of their classmates can be considered functionally illiterate), compared to 18 percent of non-Roma students. The raw ethnic difference is 40 percentage points. We estimated linear probability models to capture the ethnic difference while controlling for family background and home environment. Table 8 presents the results.

When controlling for the family background variables (which include residential information variables), we find that the ethnic difference declines substantially but remains non-negligible and statistically significant at 14 percentage points (see Table A9 in the Appendix). Thus, Roma children are 14 percentage points more likely to attend problematic classes than non-Roma children of similar family background. When we control for home environment and parenting variables in addition to the family background variables, the ethnic difference remains statistically significant at 12 percentage points. In conjunction, these results suggest that residential inequalities and selection by social disadvantage are responsible for the bulk of the selection; however, ethnic exclusion mechanisms are responsible for the rest.

Table 8

The probability of attending a class that is problematic
(fraction of classmates with inadequate reading skills above 50 percent)

	Linear probability models. Number of observations: 9056			
	0.40	0.14	0.21	0.12
Roma	(0.022)*	(0.026)*	(0.025)*	(0.026)*
Family background	–	yes	–	yes
Home environment	–	–	yes	yes
Number of observations	9056	9056	9056	9056
R ²	0.07	0.18	0.16	0.2

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level.

** Significant at 1 %.

Note: see detailed results in Table A9 of the Appendix.

SUMMARY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Using unique data from Hungary, this study measured the gap in standardized test scores between Roma and non-Roma 8th grade students and demonstrated that this gap is comparable to the size of the Black-White test score gap in the United States in the 1980s. The skills gap emerges at a very early age, before enrollment in elementary school, and that the differences measured at the end of elementary school continue to increase in secondary school.

Social differences (in income, parental education and place of residence) account for a large part of the test score gap. If the non-Roma students lived in socio-economic circumstances similar to those of Roma students, only a fraction of the gap would persist: one-fourth of the mathematics gap and one-fifth of the reading gap. Based on theoretical considerations and empirical results from the international literature, we examined the role of three mediating mechanisms by which these social differences could give rise to the ethnic test score gap: health, home environment and parenting and schools. We found that, together, these mechanisms completely explain the role of social differences in the test score gap and that they in themselves explain the entire gap in reading and 90 percent of the gap in mathematics. Two of these mechanisms were particularly important: (1) home environment and parenting and (2) schools. We then demonstrated that ethnic differences in the home environment and parenting can be almost entirely explained by social differences (with the exception of books), especially in the middle income range (which is the highest end of the income range for Roma families). These factors are very strongly related to social differences, with the surprising exception of emotional support in families. We also found that the Roma students have substantial disadvantages with

respect to access to adequate education. Roma students are 40 percentage points more likely to study in classrooms in which the majority of their peers have inadequate reading skills than non-Roma students. This increased likelihood is in large part due to residential and social disadvantages, but ethnicity remains a significant factor in the school system's selection mechanisms.

We conclude that the test score gap between Roma and non-Roma 8th grade students is primarily due to poverty and associated disadvantages at home and at school. Thus, aside from the phenomenon of school segregation, the causes of the achievement gap call for universal and color-blind policies instead of interventions targeting the Roma minority in particular. Policies that improve the long-run life chances of families with children in extreme poverty can result in substantial improvements in the children's skill development. Policies targeting the causal mechanisms directly are additional candidates.

Perhaps the most promising methods to prevent school failures are to provide children with an environment (objects, tools, activities, services) that facilitates their cognitive and language development and to promote complementary parenting methods (Herczog, 2008; Almond and Currie, 2011; Heckman, 2011). Unequal access to high-quality learning environments due to residential disadvantages and the selection mechanisms of the school system calls for additional policies aiming to improve and modernize the entire school system and incorporate pedagogical innovations to better integrate children from disadvantaged families, reduce school segregation and provide appropriate training and incentives for teachers that work in problematic educational environments

The skill development and school careers of disadvantaged children—including Roma children living in poverty—will largely depend on whether we prove capable of understanding and accepting evidence regarding the mediating mechanisms between poverty and low school achievement. This is what we must build on to shape social policy in a way that uses available resources as efficiently as possible to help these children and their families.

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APPENDIX

Table A1.

Measurement of Roma ethnicity in the Hungarian Life Course Survey

Ethnic identity	Mother	Father	Mother or father
Chose the Roma identity as his/her first choice in wave 1	2.4	2.6	3.0
Chose the Roma identity as his/her second choice in wave 1	3.4	3.6	3.4
Only chose the Roma identity in wave 2, there as his/her first choice	0.5	0.5	0.5
Only chose the Roma identity in wave 2, there as his/her second choice	0.9	0.8	1.0
Did not choose the Roma identity in either case	91.1	74.4	92.2
No parent, or all parental nationality-ethnicity data are missing	1.7	18.2	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table A2.

Sample selection of the Hungarian Life Course Survey for our analysis

	Number of observations	Standardized test score average ^a		Proportion of students whose mother	
		Reading	Mathematics	has completed no more than 8 years of school	has completed higher education
Based on National Assessment of Basic Competencies data on 8 th graders in 2006					
Total students	113,092	-	-	-	-
Students who completed the reading test	109,906	-0.08	-	-	-
Students who completed the mathematics test	104,566	-	-0.06	-	-
Students who completed the reading and mathematics tests	104,533	-0.03	-0.06	-	-
Students with test scores and family background data	88,175	-0.01	-0.04	0.18	0.21
Among them: students whose families have agreed to participate in the Hungarian Life Course Survey	37,027	-0.14	-0.09	0.24	0.19
Based on Hungarian Life Course Survey data					
Sample in the first wave ^b	10,022	-0.11	-0.05	0.21	0.20
Sample in the second wave ^b	9,300	-0.10	-0.04	0.21	0.20
The sample that forms the basis of our estimates ^b	9,056	-0.09	-0.03	0.20	0.20

^a Values standardized for the average and standard deviation of national test scores (theoretical average 0, theoretical standard distribution 1; real averages may differ slightly as not all students' results were used)

^b The statistics drawn from the HLCS are weighted values (using the sampling weights)

Table A3.

**Summary statistics of the family background variables,
Roma and non-Roma subsamples**
(weighted averages and standard deviations)

	Roma subsample		Non-Roma subsample	
	average	standard deviation	average	standard deviation
Biological mother in household	0.96	0.20	0.97	0.18
Non-biological mother in household	0.03	0.17	0.01	0.11
Biological father in household	0.78	0.41	0.72	0.45
Non-biological father in household	0.06	0.24	0.09	0.28
Mother's education: grades 0-8	0.79	0.41	0.15	0.36
Mother's education: vocational school	0.15	0.36	0.25	0.43
Mother's education: high school diploma	0.04	0.20	0.36	0.48
Mother's education: higher education	0.01	0.08	0.22	0.41
Father's education: grades 0-8	0.54	0.50	0.08	0.27
Father's education: vocational school	0.27	0.44	0.37	0.48
Father's education: high school diploma	0.03	0.18	0.21	0.41
Father's education: higher education	0.00	0.06	0.14	0.35
Mother employed	0.24	0.43	0.70	0.00
Father employed	0.35	0.48	0.66	0.47
Proportion of years mother employed while child was age 0-14	0.30	0.35	0.64	0.32
Proportion of years father employed while child was age 0-14	0.52	0.45	0.73	0.43
Logarithm of family income	11.68	0.46	12.03	0.46
Logarithm of household size	1.58	0.35	1.39	0.29
Number of unemployed adults	1.39	0.99	0.67	0.81
Size of apartment, m2 per person	17.55	9.62	23.57	10.16
Number of rooms per person	0.55	0.25	0.79	0.29
Bathroom in apartment	0.75	0.43	0.97	0.17
No money for food	0.23	0.42	0.05	0.21
No money for heating	0.35	0.48	0.12	0.32
Received regularized child-rearing assistance	0.67	0.47	0.22	0.42
Free lunch in 8th grade	0.17	0.38	0.08	0.27
Free textbooks in 8th grade	0.87	0.33	0.56	0.50
Mother's education - data missing	0.02	0.13	0.02	0.14
Father's education - data missing	0.15	0.36	0.20	0.40
Family income - data missing	0.06	0.25	0.10	0.30
Size of apartment - data missing	0.05	0.21	0.01	0.11
Number of rooms - data missing	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.06
Bathroom - data missing	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.04
Poverty indicator - data missing	0.01	0.08	0.01	0.08
Region: Central	0.07	0.26	0.22	0.41
Region: Central Transdanubia	0.06	0.23	0.12	0.33
Region: Western Transdanubia	0.06	0.24	0.13	0.34
Region: Southern Transdanubia	0.25	0.43	0.12	0.32
Region: Northern Hungary	0.31	0.46	0.11	0.32
Region: Northern Great Plain	0.18	0.38	0.16	0.37

Region: Southern Great Plain	0.08	0.27	0.14	0.34
Budapest	0.05	0.21	0.13	0.34
County seat	0.07	0.26	0.17	0.38
Other city	0.32	0.47	0.35	0.48
Settlement	0.56	0.50	0.34	0.47
Remote settlement	0.18	0.39	0.12	0.32
Number of observations	848		8208	

Table A4.

Detailed OLS regression estimates for Table 4
(dependent variables: test scores, independent variables: family background)

	Dependent variable			
	Reading test scores		Mathematics test scores	
Roma	-0.97 (0.053)**	-0.23 (0.055)**	-1.047 (0.048)**	-0.324 (0.050)**
Biological mother in household		0.05 (0.231)		-0.048 (0.253)
Non-biological mother in household		-0.19 (0.240)		-0.218 (0.266)
Biological father in household		0.01 (0.389)		-0.176 (0.217)
Non-biological father in household		-0.03 (0.389)		-0.261 (0.219)
Mother's education: grades 0-8		-0.67 (0.048)**		-0.659 (0.050)**
Mother's education: vocational school		-0.57 (0.038)**		-0.527 (0.042)**
Mother's education: higher education		-0.26 (0.033)**		-0.223 (0.038)**
Father's education: grades 0-8		-0.62 (0.053)**		-0.708 (0.061)**
Father's education: vocational school		-0.43 (0.040)**		-0.54 (0.047)**
Father's education: high school diploma		-0.25 (0.039)**		-0.265 (0.047)**
Mother employed		-0.02 (0.035)		-0.008 (0.037)
Father employed		0.03 (0.041)		-0.007 (0.042)
Proportion of years mother employed while child was age 0-14		-0.01 (0.044)		-0.007 (0.050)
Proportion of years father employed while child was age 0-14		0.19 (0.051)**		0.117 (0.057)*
Logarithm of family income		0.00 (0.028)		0.047 (0.031)
Logarithm of household size		-0.05 (0.055)		-0.02 (0.062)
Number of unemployed adults		-0.03 (0.018)		-0.02 (0.019)
Size of apartment, m ² per person		0.00 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)
Number of rooms per person		0.23 (0.057)**		0.227 (0.065)**
Bathroom in apartment		0.14 (0.062)*		0.133 (0.062)*

No money for food	-0.20 (0.050)**			-0.153 (0.052)**
No money for heating	-0.08 (0.036)*			-0.058 (0.037)
Received regularized child-rearing assistance	0.04 (0.031)			0 (0.032)
Free lunch in 8th grade	-0.16 (0.043)**			-0.098 (0.049)*
Free textbooks in 8th grade	-0.09 (0.026)**			-0.026 (0.029)
Mother's education - data missing	-0.67 (0.220)**			-0.698 (0.240)**
Father's education - data missing	-0.21 (0.389)			-0.594 (0.220)**
Family income - data missing	-0.02 (0.034)			-0.036 (0.036)
Size of apartment - data missing	-0.14 (0.104)			-0.155 (0.104)
Number of rooms - data missing	0.03 (0.162)			0.277 (0.241)
Bathroom - data missing	-0.13 (0.171)			0.19 (0.184)
Poverty indicator - data missing	0.10 (0.116)			0.102 (0.130)
Region: Central	-0.01 (0.056)			-0.077 (0.058)
Region: Central Transdanubia	-0.04 (0.050)			-0.02 (0.062)
Region: Western Transdanubia	-0.01 (0.048)			0.032 (0.058)
Region: Southern Transdanubia	0.02 (0.051)			0.038 (0.060)
Region: Northern Hungary	-0.08 (0.050)			-0.062 (0.056)
Region: Northern Great Plain	-0.07 (0.046)			-0.072 (0.054)
Budapest	0.19 (0.060)**			0.212 (0.061)**
County seat	0.15 (0.038)**			0.165 (0.044)**
Other city	0.04 (0.030)			0.044 (0.034)
Remote settlement	0.04 (0.040)			0.04 (0.043)
Constant	-0.02 (0.017)	0.22 (0.544)	0.044 (0.019)*	0.054 (0.394)
Number of observations	9056	9056	8335	8335
R ²	0.06	0.27	0.07	0.27

Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses

*Significant at 5% level; **Significant at 1% level

Table A5.

**Summary statistics of the health and home environment variables,
Roma and non-Roma subsamples**
(weighted averages and standard deviations)

	Roma subsample		Non-Roma subsample	
	average	standard deviation	average	standard deviation
Low birth weight	0.17	0.38	0.07	0.25
Poor health (self-evaluation)	0.17	0.37	0.09	0.28
Weight - data missing	0.01	0.10	0.00	0.06
Health - data missing	0.01	0.10	0.01	0.09
Seldom or never told bedtime stories (child's response)	0.34	0.48	0.11	0.31
Often told bedtime stories (child's response)	0.35	0.48	0.65	0.48
Seldom or never told bedtime stories (parent's response)	0.18	0.38	0.03	0.16
Often told bedtime stories (parent's response)	0.21	0.41	0.48	0.50
Seldom went hiking with parents (child's response)	0.76	0.43	0.44	0.50
Cognitive HOME index	-1.03	0.98	0.09	0.94
Emotional HOME index	-0.17	0.98	0.02	0.98
Storytelling variable missing	0.05	0.22	0.04	0.20
Cognitive HOME variable missing	0.02	0.13	0.01	0.11
Emotional HOME variable missing	0.04	0.19	0.02	0.15
Number of books less than 50	0.64	0.48	0.09	0.28
Number of books around 50	0.16	0.37	0.11	0.32
Number of books: 50-150	0.11	0.31	0.23	0.42
Number of books: 150-300	0.04	0.20	0.20	0.40
Number of books: 300-600	0.02	0.15	0.17	0.37
Number of books: 600-1000	0.01	0.09	0.09	0.28
Number of books: more than 1000	0.01	0.10	0.11	0.31
Internet connection at home	0.07	0.25	0.51	0.50
Number of books - data missing	0.00	0.07	0.01	0.08
Internet connection - data missing	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.04
Number of observations	848		8208	

Table A6.

Items in the short form of the young adolescent HOME scale (HOME-SF)^a

	Survey question	Interviewer's observation
COGNITIVE SUBSCALE		
Has the child more than 20 books? (y/n)	X	
Is there a musical instrument? (y/n)	X	
Does the family get a daily newspaper? (y/n)	X	
Does the child read every week for enjoyment? (y/n)	X	
Does the family encourage the child to start and keep hobbies? (y/n)	X	
Does the child get special lessons? (y/n)	X	
Has the child been in museum last year with any family member? (y/n)	X	
Has the child been in musical or theatrical performance last year with any family member? (y/n)	X	
When the family watches TV together, do the parents discuss TV program with the child? (y/n)	X	
Is the interior of the home dark and perceptually monotonous? (y/n)		X
Are all visible rooms of the apartment reasonably clean? (y/n)		X
Are all visible rooms of the apartment minimally cluttered? (y/n)		X
Has the building potentially dangerous or health hazards? (y/n)		X
EMOTIONAL SUBSCALE		
How often is the child expected to clean his/her room?	X	
How often is the child expected to pick up after himself/herself?	X	
How often is the child expected to help manage his/her own time (get up on time, be ready for school)?	X	
How often does the whole family get together with relatives or friends?	X	
How often does the child spend time with his/her father?	X	
How often does the child spend time with his/her father in outdoor activities?	X	
How often does the child eat a meal with both mother and father?	X	

Sometimes children get so angry at their parents that they say things like „I hate you” or swear in temper tantrum. In this case would you spank your child? (y/n)	X	
Did you spank your child last week because of bad behaviour? (y/n)	X	
Mother/Guardian encouraged the child to contribute to the conversation with the interviewer. (y/n)		X
Mother/Guardian answered the child’s questions or requests verbally during the interview. (y/n)		X
Mother/Guardian conversed with the child during the interview (excluding scolding or suspicious comments). (y/n)		X
Mother/Guardian introduces the interviewer to the child by name. (y/n)		X
Mother/Guardian’s voice conveyed positive feeling about the child during the interview. (y/n)		X

^a <http://www.bls.gov/nls/y79cyaguide/2002/y79chya2ogac.pdf>, Appendix A.

Table A7.

Detailed OLS regression estimates for Table 6
 (dependent variables: test scores, independent variables: health,
 home environment, school/class fixed effects, family) background

	Dependent variable					
	Reading test scores			Mathematics test scores		
Roma	-0.97 (0.053)**	-0.07 (0.072)	-0.05 (0.072)	-1.05 (0.048)**	-0.18 (0.066)**	-0.15 (0.067)*
Low birth weight		-0.09 (0.053)	-0.08 (0.052)		-0.18 (0.052)**	-0.16 (0.052)**
Poor health (self- evaluation)		-0.14 (0.049)**	-0.12 (0.049)*		-0.19 (0.056)**	-0.17 (0.056)**
Weight - data missing		-0.37 (0.213)	-0.34 (0.208)		-0.24 (0.196)	-0.18 (0.179)
Health - data missing		0.04 (0.136)	0.07 (0.134)		-0.02 (0.152)	0.00 (0.157)
Seldom or never told bedtime stories (child's response)		0.00 (0.054)	0.01 (0.054)		0.02 (0.053)	0.03 (0.054)
Often told bedtime stories (child's response)		0.10 (0.039)*	0.09 (0.038)*		0.06 (0.039)	0.05 (0.039)
Seldom or never told bedtime stories (parent's response)		-0.05 (0.077)	-0.07 (0.076)		-0.05 (0.072)	-0.05 (0.072)
Often told bedtime stories (parent's response)		0.08 (0.033)*	0.06 (0.033)		0.06 (0.036)	0.05 (0.035)
Seldom went hiking with parents (child's response)		0.01 (0.035)	0.02 (0.035)		-0.04 (0.036)	-0.02 (0.036)
Cognitive HOME index		0.18 (0.021)**	0.16 (0.022)**		0.14 (0.022)**	0.10 (0.023)**
Emotional HOME index		-0.03 (0.018)	-0.03 (0.019)		-0.04 (0.020)*	-0.04 (0.022)*
Storytelling variable missing		0.05 (0.082)	0.04 (0.082)		0.04 (0.090)	0.04 (0.088)
Cognitive HOME variable missing		0.00 (0.147)	-0.02 (0.151)		-0.17 (0.132)	-0.17 (0.131)
Emotional HOME variable missing		0.14 (0.118)	0.12 (0.120)		0.02 (0.100)	-0.01 (0.100)
Number of books less than 50		-0.48 (0.073)**	-0.42 (0.076)**		-0.39 (0.087)**	-0.27 (0.087)**
Number of books around 50		-0.36 (0.074)**	-0.29 (0.075)**		-0.34 (0.081)**	-0.21 (0.081)**
Number of books: 50-150		-0.29 (0.061)**	-0.24 (0.063)**		-0.23 (0.072)**	-0.14 (0.072)*
Number of books: 150- 300		-0.16 (0.060)**	-0.11 (0.062)		-0.08 (0.073)	-0.01 (0.073)
Number of books: 300- 600		-0.13 (0.061)*	-0.10 (0.062)		-0.09 (0.069)	-0.05 (0.068)
Number of books: 600- 1000		-0.14 (0.071)*	-0.12 (0.071)		-0.10 (0.080)	-0.09 (0.080)
Internet connection at home		0.18 (0.037)**	0.15 (0.039)**		0.27 (0.039)**	0.23 (0.040)**
Number of books - data missing		-0.24 (0.170)	-0.18 (0.183)		-0.15 (0.242)	-0.10 (0.246)
Internet connection - data missing		-0.11 (0.215)	-0.16 (0.208)		-0.07 (0.222)	-0.27 (0.208)

Biological mother in household	-0.31 (0.335)	-0.05 (0.321)
Non-biological mother in household	-0.37 (0.337)	-0.03 (0.328)
Biological father in household	0.12 (0.482)	-0.58 (0.563)
Non-biological father in household	0.18 (0.482)	-0.59 (0.562)
Mother's education: grades 0-8	-0.12 (0.068)	-0.22 (0.071)**
Mother's education: vocational school	-0.18 (0.060)**	-0.22 (0.062)**
Mother's education: higher education	-0.06 (0.052)	-0.10 (0.055)
Father's education: grades 0-8	-0.21 (0.076)**	-0.27 (0.086)**
Father's education: vocational school	-0.16 (0.059)**	-0.20 (0.068)**
Father's education: high school diploma	-0.10 (0.059)	-0.09 (0.070)
Mother employed	0.01 (0.046)	0.03 (0.048)
Father employed	0.03 (0.052)	-0.04 (0.056)
Proportion of years mother employed while child was age 0-14	-0.11 (0.061)	-0.08 (0.063)
Proportion of years father employed while child was age 0-14	0.10 (0.071)	0.16 (0.074)*
Logarithm of family income	-0.03 (0.040)	0.01 (0.043)
Logarithm of household size	-0.10 (0.082)	-0.11 (0.082)
Number of unemployed adults	-0.03 (0.027)	-0.03 (0.027)
Size of apartment, m ² per person	0.00 (0.002)	0.00 (0.002)
Number of rooms per person	-0.11 (0.080)	-0.07 (0.091)
Bathroom in apartment	-0.05 (0.077)	-0.02 (0.071)
No money for food	-0.03 (0.064)	-0.04 (0.061)
No money for heating	0.00 (0.048)	0.02 (0.050)
Received regularized child-rearing assistance	0.07 (0.044)	0.04 (0.047)
Free lunch in 8th grade	-0.12 (0.064)	-0.13 (0.062)*
Free textbooks in 8th grade	-0.06 (0.036)	0.03 (0.039)
Mother's education - data missing	-0.50 (0.319)	-0.40 (0.310)
Father's education - data missing	0.08 (0.484)	-0.69 (0.564)
Family income - data missing	-0.05 (0.049)	-0.08 (0.057)
Size of apartment - data missing	-0.05 (0.133)	-0.07 (0.119)
Number of rooms - data missing	0.20 (0.190)	0.53 (0.221)*
Bathroom - data missing	-0.25	0.19

Poverty indicator - data missing			(0.272)			(0.228)
			-0.13			0.01
			(0.159)			(0.195)
Region: Central			-0.49			0.24
			(0.351)			(0.171)
Region: Central Transdanubia			0.63			0.67
			(0.586)			(0.430)
Region: Western Transdanubia			-0.64			0.77
			(0.551)			(0.359)*
Region: Southern Transdanubia			-1.35			-0.34
			(0.725)			(0.484)
Region: Northern Hungary			-0.33			-0.05
			(0.514)			(0.741)
Region: Northern Great Plain			-0.32			0.05
			(0.445)			(0.703)
Budapest			-0.01			-0.06
			(0.184)			(0.200)
County seat			0.05			-0.04
			(0.094)			(0.119)
Other city			-0.08			-0.06
			(0.089)			(0.098)
Remote settlement			0.09			0.09
			(0.080)			(0.074)
Constant	-0.02		1.34	0.04		0.78
	(0.017)		(0.854)	(0.019)*		(0.885)
Number of observations	9056	9056	9056	8335	8335	8335
R ²	0.06	0.67	0.68	0.07	0.68	0.69

Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses

*Significant at 5% level; **Significant at 1% level

Table A8.

The raw and corrected ethnic gap in the indicators of the home environment

Dependent variable	Roma coefficient	Standard error	Family background variables	Number of observations	R ²
Seldom or never told bedtime stories (child's response)	0.233	(0.022)**	–	9056	0.03
	0.048	(0.036)	yes	9056	0.48
Often told bedtime stories (child's response)	-0.296	(0.022)**	–	9056	0.03
	-0.023	(0.040)	yes	9056	0.50
Seldom or never told bedtime stories (parent's response)	0.150	(0.019)**	–	9056	0.04
	0.051	(0.025)*	yes	9056	0.47
Often told bedtime stories (parent's response)	-0.271	(0.019)**	–	9056	0.02
	-0.029	(0.039)	yes	9056	0.52
Seldom went hiking with parents (child's response)	0.312	(0.021)**	–	9056	0.03
	0.012	(0.038)	yes	9056	0.57
Cognitive HOME index	-1.118	(0.051)**	–	9056	0.09
	-0.080	(0.070)	yes	9056	0.70
					0

Emotional HOME index	-0.184 0.070	(0.049)** (0.075)	– yes	9056 9056	0.00 0.61
There are few or no books at home	0.552 0.235	(0.024)** (0.040)**	– yes	9056 9056	0.19 0.63
There is an Internet connection at home	-0.438 -0.049	(0.013)** (0.027)	– yes	9056 9056	0.05 0.65

* Significant at 5 %, ** Significant at 1 %.

Table A9.

Detailed OLS regression estimates for Table 8
(dependent variable: probability of attending a problematic class,
independent variables: family background, home environment)

	Dependent variable: probability of being in a class highly segregated by ability			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Roma	0.404 (0.028)**	0.143 (0.029)**	0.207 (0.029)**	0.123 (0.029)**
Biological mother in household		-0.074 (0.112)		-0.077 (0.114)
Non-biological mother in household		-0.061 (0.118)		-0.083 (0.121)
Biological father in household		0.066 (0.151)		0.096 (0.163)
Non-biological father in household		0.093 (0.151)		0.118 (0.163)
Mother's education: grades 0-8		0.166 (0.019)**		0.095 (0.021)**
Mother's education: vocational school		0.081 (0.014)**		0.036 (0.015)*
Mother's education: higher education		0.039 (0.010)**		0.018 (0.010)
Father's education: grades 0-8		0.095 (0.023)**		0.054 (0.023)*
Father's education: vocational school		0.042 (0.014)**		0.019 (0.014)
Father's education: high school diploma		0.002 (0.012)		-0.006 (0.012)
Mother employed		-0.016 (0.016)		-0.012 (0.016)
Father employed		-0.038 (0.019)*		-0.035 (0.018)
Proportion of years mother employed while child was age 0-14		-0.020 (0.021)		-0.017 (0.021)
Proportion of years father employed while child was age 0-14		-0.008 (0.027)		0.003 (0.026)
Logarithm of family income		-0.012 (0.011)		-0.008 (0.011)
Logarithm of household size		0.008 (0.025)		0.015 (0.025)
Number of unemployed adults		-0.001 (0.009)		0.003 (0.009)
Size of apartment, m2 per person		0.000 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)
Number of rooms per person		-0.074		-0.046

	(0.024)**	(0.024)
Bathroom in apartment	-0.105 (0.031)**	-0.077 (0.031)*
No money for food	0.022 (0.024)	0.011 (0.023)
No money for heating	0.029 (0.017)	0.021 (0.017)
Received regularized child-rearing assistance	-0.021 (0.015)	-0.031 (0.015)*
Free lunch in 8th grade	0.055 (0.024)*	0.050 (0.024)*
Free textbooks in 8th grade	0.031 (0.012)**	0.032 (0.012)**
Mother's education - data missing	-0.024 (0.105)	-0.084 (0.108)
Father's education - data missing	0.053 (0.150)	0.070 (0.163)
Family income - data missing	-0.011 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.014)
Size of apartment - data missing	0.118 (0.056)*	0.100 (0.057)
Number of rooms - data missing	-0.093 (0.052)	-0.106 (0.055)
Bathroom - data missing	0.026 (0.095)	0.005 (0.095)
Poverty indicator - data missing	0.019 (0.055)	0.021 (0.056)
Region: Central	0.051 (0.030)	0.063 (0.030)*
Region: Central Transdanubia	0.011 (0.029)	0.024 (0.029)
Region: Western Transdanubia	-0.049 (0.027)	-0.029 (0.026)
Region: Southern Transdanubia	0.069 (0.035)*	0.074 (0.034)*
Region: Northern Hungary	0.107 (0.031)**	0.115 (0.031)**
Region: Northern Great Plain	0.101 (0.029)**	0.095 (0.029)**
Budapest	-0.101 (0.030)**	-0.081 (0.030)**
County seat	-0.084 (0.020)**	-0.068 (0.020)**
Other city	-0.041 (0.020)*	-0.033 (0.020)
Remote settlement	0.016 (0.023)	0.016 (0.023)
Seldom or never told bedtime stories (child's response)		0.043 (0.022)*
Often told bedtime stories (child's response)		0.003 0.001


			(0.012)	(0.012)
Seldom or never told bedtime stories (parent's response)			0.045 (0.033)	0.032 (0.032)
Often told bedtime stories (parent's response)			-0.018 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)
Seldom went hiking with parents (child's response)			0.039 (0.011)**	0.023 (0.011)*
Cognitive HOME index			-0.052 (0.007)**	-0.029 (0.007)**
Emotional HOME index			0.006 (0.006)	0.006 (0.007)
Storytelling variable missing			-0.019 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.021)
Cognitive HOME variable missing			0.080 (0.056)	0.057 (0.052)
Emotional HOME variable missing			-0.044 (0.028)	-0.029 (0.027)
Number of books less than 50			0.156 (0.025)**	0.072 (0.026)**
Number of books around 50			0.089 (0.020)**	0.041 (0.021)
Number of books: 50-150			0.064 (0.015)**	0.037 (0.016)*
Number of books: 150-300			0.030 (0.014)*	0.006 (0.015)
Number of books: 300-600			0.021 (0.013)	0.010 (0.013)
Number of books: 600-1000			-0.006 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)
Internet connection at home			-0.071 (0.012)**	-0.028 (0.011)*
Number of books - data missing			-0.029 (0.048)	-0.064 (0.044)
Internet connection - data missing			0.094 (0.096)	0.111 (0.092)
Constant	0.177 (0.008)**	0.421 (0.173)*	0.154 (0.017)**	0.275 (0.179)
Number of observations	9056	9056	9056	9056
R ²	0.07	0.18	0.16	0.20

Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses

*Significant at 5% level; **Significant at 1% level

Figure A1.

Distribution of Roma and non-Roma students by family background index
Roma distribution: continuous line (average: 0.23);
non-Roma distribution: dashed line (average: 0.57)



3.2 Intricacies of Ethnicity: A Comparative Study of Minority Identity Formation during Adolescence

7

Intricacies of Ethnicity: A Comparative Study of Minority Identity Formation during Adolescence

Mária Neményi and Róza Vajda

Introduction

By relying on the findings of the EDUMIGROM study, this chapter discusses the formation of the ethnic identity of teenagers belonging to various 'visible' minorities across Europe. By analysing their narrative constructions, formulated in face-to-face interviews revolving around relevant experiences within and outside the community, we aim to explore shared characteristics and common features of the identification process. This process is conceptualised here in terms of identity models and identity strategies.

Identity models refer to background conditions, ranging from the characteristics of families and communities to the policy context and the larger political, economic and cultural environment which function as a 'web of meanings' (Geertz 1977) in processes of socialisation and individuation. Hence, by reflecting on the given circumstances, these models include sets of viable life strategies that are allowed or even supported by the internal rules and expectations of the in-group and of the majority society. It was assumed that identity models as mediated by the immediate environment, especially by the parents, can be explored in terms of ethnicity, and vice versa: ethnic identity is related to other social identities that are derived from all sorts of circumstances (gender, religion, social status, migration, political ideology, etc.). Models imply relatively static constructions providing reference points to individuals which together constitute the blueprints of identity strategies.

Identity strategies represent the manifest aspect of identity formation and are the ways in which individuals actually relate to their ethnic belonging and perceive their current and future position in society (Phinney 1992). Because our chapter is concerned with adolescents, it seemed all the more appropriate to study identity in the making as a set of responses to outward

circumstances. We also propose considering the future prospects, visions and aspirations of teenagers which, in turn, reflect their understanding of their present condition. Given their age, the unfinished nature of identities is accentuated. Moreover, the ethnicity of our respondents also exacerbates the emotional charge of their self-images. In trying to grasp identities that are in constant transformation, while underpinned by solidified structures within larger (local and national, social and political) contexts, it was acknowledged that the respondents' self-identifications reflect, in particularly sensitive ways, widespread practices of ethnic (religious, national and racial) labelling that are prevalent in the given country (Verkuyten 2005).

The discussion below focuses on the perceived positive and negative aspects of ethnic belonging, its ascribed or self-ascribed nature and its connection with integration. Our analysis is primarily concerned with the extent to which minority ethnic students think that their culture, customs, behavioural rules and very existence is accepted and respected, or, on the contrary, the degree to which they feel excluded because of the given implications and perceived traits of their 'ethnicity'. By reflecting on the educational, familial and occupational aspirations of minority ethnic students, we examined whether these reinforce ethnic separation – that is, enclosure in or reliance on one's own ethnic community – or rather enhance integration or assimilation into the larger society.

Dimensions of ethnicity: A typology

Amidst the complexity of components, two sets of cross-cutting factors proved to be decisive in the development of identity strategies. The first denotes whether or not separation from the majority is a matter of voluntary choice by the individual or the minority community, or, on the contrary, whether it is a consequence of social pressures and oppression by the majority society. The second kind of distinction refers to the personal drive to express or, contrarily, to suppress ethnic difference. Obviously, these latter predispositions, again, are framed by outside conditions that not only impose constraints on the development of identity but, indeed, invest it with meaning. The combination of positions along the two factors allowed for the classification of identity strategies into four categories, using a two-by-two matrix. The four cells of Table 7.1 represent typical patterns of identity formation – namely, 'ghetto-consciousness', 'responses to slum existence', 'affirmation of ethnic (or religious) pride' and 'striving for assimilation/cosmopolitanism'.

The voluntary as opposed to the involuntary assumption¹ of ethnicity refers to the key instances determining ethnic belonging: individual agency as opposed to outward social and political forces, respectively. Along this dimension, ethnic ghetto and slum dwellers are distinguished from the residents of (mainly lower-middle-class) ethnic neighbourhoods and (usually

Table 7.1 Patterns of identity formation

	Maintenance of difference	Trivialisation of difference
<i>Involuntary assumption of ethnicity</i>	Ghetto consciousness	Responses to slum existence
<i>Voluntary assumption of ethnicity</i>	Affirmation of ethnic (or religious) pride	Striving for assimilation/cosmopolitanism

well-off) families living dispersed among the majority society.² This variation is conditioned mainly by historical and cultural factors, including political tendencies, rather than merely by class or social status. Being born into a ghetto or slum provides few chances of self-determination, even if it does not prevent individual reflections on group belonging. By contrast, taking pride in one's ethnic origin or religious belonging, melting into the majority society, or the adoption of a supra-ethnic ideological stance marking cosmopolitanism all imply some degree of individual will, the emergence and viability of which is, again, determined by the dominant political ideology and the historical and cultural context. Hence preconditions in terms of social and political pressures and opportunities which shape ethnic strategies must always be taken into account. Another way of looking at these preconditions would be to differentiate between compelled as opposed to self-conscious ways of assuming ethnic identity entail that differing degrees of agency.

The other axis – that is, the maintenance as opposed to the trivialisation of ethnic difference – accentuates the fact that ethnicity, whether ascribed or self-ascribed, allows for some variation in identity strategies, especially in terms of expressing or suppressing ethnic identity. Nevertheless, being different is seldom a matter of free will but rather represents, at its best, the outcome of a conditioned choice and, at its worst, an inevitable fate. This situation involves serious struggles for the members of socially excluded minority groups who try to earn social respect and enforce their interests in one way or another. As the management of identities is always a work of both power and will, the conceptual opposition presented here refers to the two extreme poles of a continuum. The categories of our diagram are intended to indicate that ethnic identities are mainly reactive, working upon the given circumstances, yet leaving more or less room for action and self-reflection. Conditioned by the social status and situation of the given minority group within a particular historical and cultural context, and fuelled by individual or collective aspirations that are adjusted to the available patterns of identification, ethnic difference may be maintained and supported or trivialised, refused and even abandoned through the employment of identity strategies.

Ghetto consciousness

Ethnic ghettos are isolated and socially deprived urban neighbourhoods, separated from the majority society. Such segregated residential areas are characteristically populated by extended families in which parents are mostly uneducated and engaged in menial jobs. Due to the limited educational and employment opportunities and the marginalised status of the inhabitants, these places show a high concentration of social problems, such as poverty and unemployment. Life in the ethnic ghetto is characterised by permanence, even immobility, and also has a great deal of instability and insecurity. Amidst these conditions there are hardly any chances to break out. Thus, ghettos have a particular propensity for reproducing the low and excluded social status of the inhabitants, including educational disadvantages.

Among our interviewees the clearest examples of identity strategies as conditioned by ethnic ghettos are provided in the countries of post-socialist transformation and concern the Roma minority. Certain post-colonial minorities, such as Algerians in France or Afro-Caribbeans in the UK, also fit this paradigm, at least when they are relegated to stigmatised urban areas. The consciousness and attitudes of these teenagers is marked by a sense of being born into a closed and isolated community that is despised by the majority society and not valued much by the insiders either. Thus they experience ethnicity as a confinement rather than a source of empowerment, which is imposed on them and does not allow for much variation in terms of future expectations.

Given the general destitution of the area, the local schools attended by those of our interviewees who fall into this category are usually of poor quality, which induces poor school performance and provides strongly limited opportunities for further education. If at all, students continue their studies in nearby vocational schools which typically enforce strong gender distinctions. Thus girls are mostly trained to work in the less-qualified service sector as hairdressers, shop assistants or kitchen employees, while boys usually acquire qualifications in traditional industrial or building trades as mechanics or painters. Such an education ensures that these young people will end up at best in low-paid blue-collar jobs. As expressed by a Czech Roma adolescent, 'If you are Roma and you are a bit brown, you can hardly find a job.' When ethnoracial discrimination has less of a stronghold on individual expectations, the future seems to be utterly unpredictable: 'If I finish school and find a job, then it will be good enough. It might be better, or might be worse... One can't really plan the future,' said a Hungarian Roma teenager.

Given the perceived lack of future opportunities, a kind of resigned passivity and lack of ambition characterise these adolescents. Defeatism originates in the strong stereotypes held against the group which become interiorised as autostereotypes that function as self-fulfilling prophecies.

Since they are bound to fail, they had better not even try doing anything. 'I think non-Roma are different because they want to achieve some goal. Roma do not... they are often lazy, lacking goals,' explained a Czech Roma.

Even if the children from the ghetto, like most youngsters of their age group, freely entertain hopes for a full adult life at an early age, they see how futile such day-dreaming is as soon as they become conscious of their circumstances. Experiences of hostility on the part of the majority society and (fear of) discrimination make them relinquish any hopes for a better future. Their desperation increases when they understand that their fate is tied to that of their community and, subsequently, that they are unable not only to change their own lives but also to influence the future of the community. The acknowledgment of this sad state of affairs is expressed by a 15-year-old Romanian Roma girl:

We live in the landfill. Recycled material, copper, aluminium, beer cans... I think having children in the house only involves problems and trouble. If one day dearth comes, how will you give them what they need? But you do tomorrow the same as you do today, as the wheel spins... When I was little, I wanted to become a doctor. I wanted to change my house, human perspectives, and discrimination against Gypsies. I thought if I had a high position, I could help the poor. If I had where to stay, where to work, I would do better... Obviously, you have three options: to steal, to beg, or to prostitute yourself.

Instead of communal ties, ghetto consciousness is dominated by a lack of belonging. As a result of the deterioration of community life, the valuation of traditions or ethnic consciousness does not thrive here. Hence, conventional ethnic markers such as language, customs or religion have only very limited significance, if any at all. Ghetto communities maintain very scarce inter-ethnic relations and almost no positive connections with the majority. This state of affairs is clearly signalled by residential and educational segregation. The main source of self-differentiation is represented by occasional conflicts with the majority society. Socioethnic division from the surrounding society is reinforced by symbolic barriers too. The other means of feeling unique for those who differ slightly from the in-group is by distancing themselves from fellow ghetto dwellers, manifesting in this way a kind of compensatory self-esteem. This is illustrated by the words of a Hungarian 'Romungro' boy:

We are normal, but the Vlach Gypsies are different from us. They relate to everything differently, they talk differently, they are self-conceited... they cannot have fun without fighting and making a big row. They act as if they were kings. We are not like that, we know how to have fun and

party, we can talk to any people, and we don't care whether the person is Hungarian or not Hungarian.

Another source of compensatory self-esteem is derived from successfully coping with hardship and humiliation. This comprises the seeds of what in more favourable circumstances could become a sort of ethnic pride. Hence, even though they are the product of negative conditions, the locality and its community may become associated with a positive sense of belonging together and even some level of group cohesion can be identified.

The coercions holding the collective together result in weak self-determination that fails to produce positive self-esteem. Still, in the face of an outside threat, the ghetto community, in particular the extended family, may function as a protective shield. The lack of future prospects enhances the importance of family values and expectations so that eventually many young people decide to stay in the familiar environment and continue with the way of life seen in the family. The supportive network of the family and the role models provided by the immediate environment help in coping with difficulties and getting along in life. The lack of any perspectives and entrepreneurial spirit, coupled with the acknowledgement of having to rely on one's 'own kind', inadvertently reinforce community feelings: 'we hold together more', 'Gypsies and Gypsies are more attached... they do not look down on one another,' said a Hungarian Roma.

Affirmation of ethnic (or religious) pride

By contrast, when separation from the majority society occurs on a voluntary basis, perceived differences tend to be filled with positive content. The self-enclosure of the community in such situations is associated with an ethnic or religious consciousness owing to which the group has been able to achieve some degree of social respect or at least tolerance from the majority society. The economic profile of the typically metropolitan neighbourhoods in which one finds individuals belonging to this category is marked by self-reliance, especially in terms of employment. Given the strength of the community, national, ethnic or religious origins are often seen as more significant than citizenship. Solidarity and group cohesion are manifested in a variety of forms, including family enterprises, peer networks, religious congregations and schools managed by the community.

Typical candidates for this category are Muslims in Western European cities, including those in Germany, Denmark or France (in our sample). Besides religion, upward mobility and achieved social status may also reinforce ethnic consciousness and pride. Thus the Gabor Gypsies in Romania as well as a few other Roma families typically living in ethnically mixed neighbourhoods and belonging to the higher ranks of the working-class also belong to this group.

As in the ghetto, extended families are also present here but not because of the lack of family planning; rather as a result of accommodation to

ethnocultural or religious norms which value high fertility. The family not only represents the basic element of community life but also provides a socially desirable model and a resource for the young generation. Being an important economic unit, it may also function as the basis of small enterprises run by the nuclear family or provide a supportive network formed by the extended family. Therefore it is especially due to its practical importance that the family acquires significance in the development of identity: 'I often help my father in the butcher business. All our family helps him. And he gives work to all of us,' reported a Turkish-German boy.

Education has great significance as the source of individual success and upward mobility. Children usually attend schools that are dominated by the majority yet that are sensitive to ethnicity and cultural difference or, when available, enrol in schools run by the minority. Integration into the school system ruled by the majority is generally welcome as a way to social advancement and it is not seen as involving detachment from the original community. The parents – characteristically first- or second-generation immigrants or recently urbanised Roma who have managed to attain higher social standing and better material circumstances – often represent as examples for their children in terms of career choices, further education and lifestyle. The parents' high expectations and, indirectly, the requirements set by the community become interiorised by the children. The overall impact of economic demands and community expectations supports gender distinctions: small enterprises are managed by men while the female members of the family are usually employed as assistants. As a consequence, attitudes towards schooling differ in the case of boys and girls. As girls gain less support and opportunities for self-development, they are especially inclined to adopt a broader perspective of the future that involves some degree of disengagement from the original community.

Incidentally, self-conscious Roma students born into relatively favourable circumstances manifest signs of positive ethnic belonging: 'I am proud to be a Roma... we like traditions while Romanians do not have so many traditions,' a Roma girl from Romania said. However, it is mainly well established immigrants who are likely to develop a strong sense of community. While based on ethnicity and religion, such local identities often express detachment from the country of origin and demonstrate relatively close links with the community and place of residence in the host country. Illustrative examples are provided by Turkish students from Kreuzberg in Berlin: 'In Turkey I am a foreigner. They don't regard me as an ordinary Turkish boy like themselves but as someone from Germany. Therefore they regard me as rich and special.' Or: 'My parents will definitely return to Turkey when I am grown up and have my own family. But I will stay here... Here in Kreuzberg is my home.' Or: 'I never felt discriminated against and I never was called a "Scheiß-Türke" or something like this. Here in Kreuzberg I was always part of the majority and not of a minority.' Longing for the place of birth may also determine future ambitions to return home one day: 'When you think

of how it's like in Morocco – summer all year long –, I sometimes think to myself: I want to go back.' 'We are proud to be Berber, we are proud to be Moroccan,' exclaimed a Moroccan student living in Denmark who, after finishing business high school and working a couple of years as a policewoman, plans to go back to Morocco and open a business of her own, such as a store or a restaurant.

Group cohesion, the adoption of traditions, the determining power of religion and the related cultural practices – all of these factors affect plans regarding future employment, forms of marriage (for example, the acceptance of arranged marriage), the planned type of family, the number of children – in short, the conception of a 'good way of life'. A Turkish boy living in Germany stated: 'It is important to know the Koran very well to educate our children in the right way. It is important to marry within the same religion.' Although the ethnonational background may also be important in informing future aspirations, the cohesive power of religion seems to be especially strong: 'When I get married, it is very important that she has Kurdish background and my parents want that as well. Then we will share everything, religion, culture... I don't want to break that chain,' said a Kurdish boy from Sweden. Or: 'Never ever would I marry someone who isn't Muslim. Never in the world,' affirmed a Moroccan student living in France.

In religiously based communities, shared faith often overrides other types of tie in terms of providing orientation in life and a sense of belonging. A Moroccan boy living in a Parisian neighbourhood explained:

...for us, the Muslim community, religion plays a very important role... If he simply respects religion, it means that between the ages of 10 and 12 he will know the way to the Mosque. So if he knows that way, there won't be any problem. Just with his lessons at the Mosque, leaving the national education aside, we'll see that that child will be well educated compared to a child who doesn't even know about religion... My friends are Muslim like me, an Algerian, a Tunisian, a Mauritanian, it's mixed. That's why I say the country doesn't count.

The proud assumption of ethnic or religious identity often involves active connections with the country of origin. The resulting positive ethnic identity is reinforced when the multicultural environment in the host country allows for complex attachments. A Palestinian girl from Lebanon, now living in Denmark where she is proudly wearing the headscarf, said the following about her multiple ties: 'I live in Denmark and I'm happy for it... but I'm also still happy for where I'm coming from, like, I like the religion, I believe in Islam and the culture we have at home.' Ethnic traditions are also seen as protective: 'A girl from the Comoros has a lot of prohibitions. When you're young, you ask yourself why all these rules but when you really think about it, it's good for us, it preserves us, it keeps us from doing a lot of stupid

things. Our customs are great,' said a Comorian girl living in France. The broader community can provide the same sense of security as the family: 'Sometimes when I meet other Moroccans I feel protected in some way even though I don't really know the person,' explained a Moroccan student living in Denmark.

The growing distrust and hostility affecting Muslims in the West, along with the countermodels provided by the surrounding society, often heighten a sense of difference and group cohesion, and strengthen group solidarity. At the same time, both animosity and modernising influences create divisions within the community. Hence, while acknowledging the essentially voluntary nature of the adoption of group identity and the positive contents that it involves, the coercive momentum should not be dismissed in this category. Positive group identity, at least in part, is produced as a reaction to external pressures, such as anti-immigration policies or hostile anti-minority attitudes. However, in contrast with vulnerable ghetto populations, these generally well-settled minorities are able to utilise communal resources to protect themselves.

It also should be noted that membership of a community not only depends on individual will but, to some extent, it is also prompted by certain collective disciplining mechanisms of the community. Expectations of the family and the larger community exercise pressure on individuals to the extent that group membership comes to be seen as the guarantee for making a decent life in the future. In this sense, beyond representing an attribute of personal identities, 'ethnic pride' may be interpreted as a collective response to a particular situation or group status which may be regarded either as a transitory state in terms of social integration or as a relatively permanent solution reflecting the ideal of a multicultural mosaic society.

Responses to slum existence

Slums, like ghettos, are mostly deteriorated urban neighbourhoods located on the outskirts of cities or in deprived inner-city districts. They are separated from the majority society but separation occurs on social rather than on ethnic grounds. Slums resemble ghettos due to the lack of resources, such as public services, as well as education and employment opportunities. These are also stigmatised places stricken by refusals of the majority along with their assumptions about and aversion to poverty, people's low social status, the prevailing destitute residential conditions and the marginal lifestyle. Because they lack the essential means for individual and collective development, slums become self-reproducing localities due to a downward spiral of social decline.

Examples of identity strategies characterised by slum existence can be found, primarily, in the French, British and, to a lesser extent, Danish and Swedish urban communities of high immigrant concentration. The attitudes of interviewees coming from some mixed Roma and

non-Roma neighbourhoods in deteriorated and economically depressed Central European cities, where residents live in deep poverty and social exclusion, also fit this pattern.

Because of the diversity of the residents' cultural, religious and ethnic backgrounds and the haphazardness of individual lives, a wide variety of family forms fall into this category: mixed families, single-parent households, parents living in polygamous relationships, adoptive parents, relatives taking care of abandoned children and so on. Besides the lack of quality education, it is the unstable background of children that virtually predestines them to poor school performance and very limited opportunities for further education. Yet, because they desperately want to break out of their situation, many students see an important potential in education in terms of social mobility and respect. 'I don't want to work in a supermarket... Why do it if I can get education instead? I want to be something,' said a Kurdish adolescent from Germany. Such ambitions often involve a desire to break away from one's own family and people:

I want to move to another country because I don't think my opportunities are that many here. For instance, my brother is an educated machine engineer but gets no job and has to work in the subway. The same with my father. When I look at my family, I see how it works here, said an Eritrean boy living in Sweden.

Given the lack of common cultural references, weak group cohesion and complex family types, individual identities are shaped to a large extent by experiences of discrimination and marginalisation. Severe socioeconomic disadvantage is coupled with aversion and ethnic prejudices on the part of the majority society: 'Sometimes I think that the others are afraid of Roma people.' And: 'Czech people sometimes slander them [Roma people]. It is because all of them [Czechs] think they [Roma people] are all the same and do the same things, that they steal, that they are criminals,' voiced in a variety of ways by our Roma respondents in the different Central European countries. Due to their multiple exclusion and the lack of any positive collective ties, children are often at a loss as to how to identify themselves. The words of a Somali boy in Denmark reflect the ambiguities and confused feelings associated with ethnic identity:

When the Danes look at me, they see a perker [which translates as 'nigger']. When the perkers look at me... they would call me a Dane... It has a big impact on how I'm looked upon and what expectation I have to live up to. Most people look at me like I'm something else than what I am.

There is a strong awareness of stigmatisation, exclusion and discrimination among young people in this category which induces a sense of shame or

even self-hatred. The resulting identities are unstable, effectively situational and reactive in character, and they are negative in their effects. At the same time, visible traits such as skin colour tend to fix ascribed ethnic identities, implying the impossibility of integration:

I feel like an Eritrean because I look like one. It is very obvious with my dark skin and dark eyes. If I meet someone in the street they don't look at me like a Swede, they think I am an African or an Eritrean. Therefore, I feel like an Eritrean.

Destitution and experiences of rejection by the majority society result in a conflict-ridden life in the slum, marked by distrust and envy, rather than a sense of belonging together. Religion and culture do not play an important role in (self)-identification, though language occasionally becomes a marker of intragroup distinctions. However, inter-ethnic differences are especially conveyed by reference to stereotypes expressing ignorance, social distance and sometimes hostility, and reflecting on them often functions as a source of compensatory self-esteem. This mechanism is aggravated by the schools, where the proportion of minorities is high, while efforts to thematise cultural or ethnic difference are absent or ineffective. A girl with mixed ethnic background in one of the British sites described distinct 'types' in her community:

'He sells drugs, he uses knives and guns, he is not a very nice person, be scared of that person, you will get your phone robbed, he is a woman beater, he is a man slag, he cheats on his girlfriends'. That is the typical Black guy... [A Black girl] is a bitch, she's right hard, she'll bang you, don't mess with her'... [An Asian boy] is a suicide bomber, he's from the Taliban.

Yet, to some extent, inter-ethnic relationships exist within the local communities and make it possible for young people to suspend ethnicity or engage in mocking with it. This is how a Malian boy described the nuances of inter-ethnic connections in a French *banlieue*:

There are girls that we call 'Black guys' chicks', because they only go out with Blacks... they say it's because Blacks are more tender and all that and that Arabs are violent and all... It's true sometimes you hear 'dirty nigger', 'dirty Arab', but that's just making fun, it's just teasing, 'cause we get along. It's just humour. It's the way people laugh together in Saint Denis.

Students in this category hold visions of a future that is full of uncertainties and anxieties, and they tend to resort to a kind of escapism. They develop

great expectations of living in a distant place in the same country, express a nostalgic yearning for the country of origin, or entertain utopian desires to move to a third country. 'Of course, I will have a better job and live in a different area. In a big house where the Swedes live. I would never let my children grow up in this area. I know how the atmosphere can be here,' anticipated a Kurdish boy from Sweden. An Ethiopian girl living in Sweden said: 'I have seen so much in Sweden, I want to get to know another part of the world. But I don't know yet, maybe Ethiopia.' This kind of escapism often expresses a wish to 'act white' – that is, to melt into mainstream society. It may even entail a sense of cosmopolitanism even though the wish to transcend one's narrow social context, in this case, is not so much fuelled by principles and ideologies but rather driven by disillusionment and the awareness of limited opportunities. A Tunisian girl living in France admitted:

Personally I'm not too inspired by my origin. Some call me the corrupted girl... I may have Maghreb origin, but I'm more often with Blacks or people of colour than with Arabs... I noticed that if you get into religion too young you don't live... I would never wear the veil, I'm against that. I'm for putting it in religion but not ahead of it because it would prevent me from doing lots of things.

Striving for assimilation/cosmopolitanism

Neither traditionalism nor poverty determine the lives of minority adolescents whose families have managed to avoid, or break out from, ghettos or slums and to establish a decent working-class or lower-middle-class lifestyle on their own, without having to rely on the extended family network or on the support of the original community. While maintaining a strong ethnic identity is obviously an option in such circumstances, children often wish to break away from the original community and melt into a larger, not necessarily ethnicity-based, one that is represented by the majority population of the given country or by a supranational entity.

This complex category is typically represented by new immigrants from Asia and Africa, on the one hand, and upwardly mobile Roma families in post-socialist countries, on the other. Their drives are certainly intensified by, respectively, the prevailing anti-immigrant rules and attitudes, and the general hostility against Roma.

The parents of the children belonging here are usually significantly better educated than minority adults in the other categories, yet their educational attainments do not suffice to reach middle-class status in the host country. Thus they push their children to achieve even more in life by means of quality education and the adoption of majority values and lifestyles.

Children aspire to become professionals – such as a pilot, an IT specialist, a lawyer or a doctor – and to live in a modern nuclear family. ‘I would just like to have a normal life, where you have a job and a home and feel well... I think the ideal family, as it is completely ordinary, maybe two children, like completely normal,’ said an Afghan student from Denmark. Given their secular views and Westernised perspectives, these families are usually more progressive-minded and liberal in terms of gender roles and other social norms than those succumbing to traditional values (marked by ‘ethnic pride’) or those who suffer from poverty and marginalisation (in slums or ethnic colonies). Nonetheless, as it is usually the father who is the driving force in migration and social mobility, it is boys rather than girls who embody the family’s hopes for further upward mobility.

By living in typically middle-class neighbourhoods, members of this category mingle with the majority population. Children normally attend local schools dominated by majority students and characterised by either colour-blind or multicultural educational policy. These institutions tend to reflect on and also reinforce the aspirations of ‘visible’ minority youths to overcome ethnic barriers, neglect religious ties and loosen community attachments. However, notwithstanding its integrative efforts, the school fails to protect minority students in this category from experiences of prejudice and discrimination from their peers or the outside society.

Such contextual features, combined with young people’s personal characteristics, account for their tendency to ‘act white’. The driving force behind such attitudes is a sense of incompleteness and instability concerning their social status that originates in the often frustrated ‘mobility project’ of the previous generations. Occasionally, it is pragmatic decisions that are responsible for relinquishing the significance of ethnicity. This is the case, for instance, when the demand for occupations associated with the ethnic community is scarce and thus young people are practically forced to step outside their traditional economic niche. Although the voluntarism of assimilation is questionable when other alternatives are rendered unfeasible, individual decisions still matter and reveal particular ways of reflecting on ethnic belonging.

These young people’s future plans regarding education, employment, the choice of a partner and a family reveal a heightened sense of individual autonomy and the adoption of majority values and/or modern ideals. Besides being informed by modernist ways of thinking, the wish to loosen the ties to their ethnic community is generally motivated by a desire for conformity. Refusal of ethnic traditions is typically nourished by a kind of anxiety, reflecting pragmatic considerations regarding social inclusion, which tends to be more articulated than in the case of slum dwellers: ‘I don’t want to live in South Harbour in the future. I want to find an area with many Swedes. It is important that my children learn the Swedish

language well, and people speaking good Swedish are really lacking in South Harbour,' explained an Ethiopian girl whose family had immigrated to Sweden. Rejection of ethnicity as an overly significant marker may be grounded in principles, too. A boy at one of the French sites, who would like to become a psychoanalyst and wishes to travel and live in different countries, expressed his thoughts as follows:

Pride isn't really my thing... Frankly, it's not something I take to heart. I feel neither French, nor Moroccan, nor American. For me, representing a country without having a good reason to do so is stupid. A president, if he represents a country OK, he's a president, it's normal. But a guy who visits his country once a year and says he represents it – it's stupid. They just do that to make trouble and to look down on others, to give themselves some pseudo-superiority.

Downplaying ethnicity helps to break down obstacles and to establish solidarity based on other sorts of values which are more responsive to actual personal experiences and needs. For instance, a teenager planning to continue his studies in a business school said:

[Ethnic background] doesn't matter because we are still like brothers. One is from Iran, the other is from Palestine, and the sixth is from Afghanistan. It doesn't matter because we are not in those places now... You can always have prejudice against someone but then if he's nice to you, if he's your friend, you skip the prejudice,

Students in this category typically have a large number of inter-ethnic relationships as well as anti-prejudice attitudes and display a tendency to understand and reflect upon social problems. Our Swedish respondent coming from Ethiopia remarked about prejudices against white people there: 'I think it has to do with colonisation... even though it happened a long time ago. Prejudices stay. I will live differently than my parents. I can focus more on my individuality, on what I strive for.'

As opposed to guest workers in earlier decades, today it is mainly highly qualified people (usually men) who fuel migration and make efforts to become self-reliant as soon as possible. This requires some level of accommodation to the norms and styles encountered in the host country. Given that we are dealing here largely with the children of highly qualified guest workers and middle-class Roma parents who have acquired a new style, it is no wonder that they are more self-confident than 'visible' minority teenagers belonging to the other categories with regard to their ambition to integrate into society and become recognised as equals. Whether full social inclusion through assimilation or cosmopolitanism will be achieved by the next generations or remain illusionary projects is another question. The answer

depends to a great extent on the direction of larger-scale sociopolitical trends within nation-states and on the international scene.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding significant differences between the four types of identity pattern, ethnic identity is never free from pressures and constraints. This seems to be acknowledged by our interviewees as well who, being aware of their limitations, envision more or less plausible future lives. Although they frequently cherish dreams about earning social respect by excelling within their minority group or by becoming part of mainstream society, it is primarily the viable identity strategies that tend to surface in their narratives. It seems already quite clear to these young members of racialised minorities that, no matter how hard they try, they will probably fail to assimilate, especially if they bear visible identity marks (the 'stigma') and/or come from a multiple-disadvantaged social background. Ethnic minority adolescents appear to be very reflective not only concerning their limitations but also regarding their attachments. National, ethnic, religious and cultural ties have differing significances according to several factors, such as the history and nature of the community in question; the time, reason and form of migration; the economic resources and social accommodation of the community; and the cultural and political atmosphere in the host society. External determinations appear to be more powerful when one is born into a slum or ethnic colony than for those living in non-segregated, ethnically and socially mixed residential areas. This is reflected by the categories of our typology that refer to forms of 'being' as opposed to forms of 'acting'. In the more disadvantaged cases, the assumption and expression of ethnicity is more constrained by historical circumstances defining the group in question that is also characterised by low social status and/or ethnic segregation. In contrast, individual perspectives and ambitions are more decisive when the structural determinations of ethnicity are weaker – that is, when ethnic identity is not so much determined from the outside or imposed by the community itself. This is the case with self-reliant migrant communities that occupy favourable economic niches and are held together mainly by economic interactions, though cohesion is often also reinforced by religious and ethnic belonging. Urbanised, upwardly mobile Roma show similar patterns of identity formation. Interestingly, variation on the scale of ascribed versus self-ascribed identities has less to do with the content of ethnic identity: some may want to do away with a relatively stable and successful identity, while others give up, early on, the idea of overcoming the narrow confines of a 'negative', though vaguely defined, identity. At the individual level, 'ethnic mobility' depends especially on the availability of feasible alternatives as far as the employment of identity strategies defining a positive relation to ethnicity is concerned. The freedom to live

and act out one's ethnicity is thus inversely related to the vulnerability of individuals.

The permanence and character of a community, on the one hand, and of individual membership, on the other, are contingent upon features of the sociopolitical environment and on outsiders' perceptions. These factors may favour or discourage internal cohesion and the inception of individual or collective 'struggles for recognition' (Honneth 1995). As far as ethnic colonies vs. slums are concerned, the expression or suppression of ethnicity is largely determined by the policies and the internal rules governing such places. What these two situations have in common is that they both allow individuals minimal opportunities to break out. Hence residents of such places act out schemes implied in the very nature of their self-enclosed community that are grounded in ethnicity in the case of ghettos and in social status in the case of slums. Endeavours aimed at the exhibition of a positive (and more complex) relation to ethnicity may emerge only when there is a sense in developing ethnic pride. That is to say, if living conditions are utterly miserable and the social environment is totally hostile, claims for respect will hardly be articulated, let alone recognised. When, in turn, the community is strong enough to ward off the stigmatising effects of ethnicity, a sense of ethnic pride may surface as it happens typically in urban ethnic neighbourhoods. Curiously, the viability of assimilation is also heavily contingent on the social acceptance of one's ethnic identity that is about to be abandoned. Moreover, assimilation is a real option only as long as the expected outcome is acknowledged by the society that sets it as a requirement. In contrast, when the very possibility of becoming part of the society is denied to 'visible' minorities on quasi-ontological grounds, such attempts are necessarily doomed to failure. Paradoxically, 'acting white' may bring about rewards even in a repressive society that bans the expression of ethnic differences, while it does not work in a quasi-liberal state if its feasibility is pre-emptively questioned on racialised or racist grounds. Cosmopolitanism, allowing for a virtually unconstrained development and exhibition of individual identities, in turn, may breed only in a truly liberal social environment as the bracketing of ethnic or national origins makes sense only when these can be displayed equally.

Notes

1. Religion and, to a lesser extent, language, common origins or intentional migration represent important elements in the construction of what Ogbu calls 'voluntary minorities', in contrast with 'involuntary minorities' formed by coercive forces, such as discrimination or segregation, or that are produced by the vicissitudes of history (Ogbu 1991). At an individual level or even in an intergenerational comparison (for example, among migrants), it is not always easy to make the distinction, as is suggested, among others, by theories on acculturation (Gordon 1964, Berry 1991, Gundykunst and Kim 2003).

2. We reserved the term 'ghettos' to denote impoverished and neglected, urban or rural residential areas, populated mostly or only by members of an ethnic group (including 'Roma colonies' or 'Roma rows' in Central and Eastern Europe), while ethnic enclaves in inner cities are referred to here as 'ethnic neighbourhoods' (Zhou 2005). 'Ghettos' and 'slums' – the two basic types of 'excluded localities' – are distinguished by the significance of ethnicity, prevalent in the former and dissolved in the latter.

3.3 Inclusive Education for Children of Immigrants: The Turkish Second Generation in Sweden, the Netherlands and Austria

3

Inclusive Education for Children of Immigrants: The Turkish Second Generation in Sweden, the Netherlands and Austria

Philipp Schnell and Maurice Crul

Introduction

The educational attainment of second-generation students in Europe's knowledge-based societies is an important determinant of their subsequent life chances – their occupational and economic attainment as well as their general well-being. School qualifications and university degrees are often regarded as entry tickets to specific positions in the labour market.

Fairly stable patterns have been documented by various studies indicating that children of immigrants whose parents originate from North Africa and Turkey are predominantly found to perform below their respective majority groups (Heath et al. 2008, Alba and Silberman 2009, Crul et al. 2012, Dustmann et al. 2012, Schnell 2012). The children of Turkish immigrants are one of the largest and geographically most dispersed immigrant groups in North-Western Europe. There appears to be a relatively high level of disadvantage experienced by second-generation Turks during compulsory schooling, in combination with a greater tendency to drop out or repeat grades, lower school attainment rates, and, generally, lower levels of access to higher education. Although these patterns are evident in most European countries, recent comparative studies point to remarkable differences in the spreading of these disadvantages among second-generation groups across the various countries (Crul and Vermeulen 2006, Crul et al. 2012).

In this chapter, we continue this line of research by examining more deeply the factors that potentially contribute to cross-national differences in educational attainment among second-generation Turks. More precisely, using the framework proposed by the 'integration context theory' (Crul and Schneider 2010), we examine the actual pathways of members of the Turkish second generation by drawing on comparative data for Austria, the

Netherlands and Sweden. We will focus especially on school trajectories and outcomes because the educational pathways constitute the main driving force behind social mobility. We will concentrate on the opportunities and the hindrances that the respective school systems create for second-generation Turkish youth in the three countries. More precisely, we will look at the interaction between the prevailing institutional arrangements in school and the role that family resources play in education. In the last part of the chapter, we will summarise the findings and focus on the mechanisms that explain cross-national differences in education among young people belonging to the Turkish second generation.

Explaining differences across countries: Theoretical considerations

Over the last two to three decades, structural and sociocultural explanations have been developed to explain educational inequalities between ethnic groups in North-Western Europe. Given the often disadvantaged position of the first generation of immigrants in European labour markets, and their position predominantly in the lower social strata, there has been particular emphasis on the structural approach as a means of explaining the educationally disadvantaged position of second-generation immigrants (Heath and Brinbaum 2007, Phalet et al. 2007, Van de Werfhorst and Van Tubergen 2007, Heath et al. 2008, Crul and Holdaway 2009). Because parental social class has a considerable influence on a child's educational attainment (through the transmission of resources), structural arguments primarily attribute differences in educational attainment and achievement between immigrant and non-minority children to parental socioeconomic status. It follows that parental education is probably the best indicator to explain different outcomes (Kao and Thompson 2003).

This approach has largely been applied to explain differences in educational attainment between children of immigrants and non-immigrants within North-Western European countries. But in these single-country studies, immigrants and their children are confronted with broadly similar socioeconomic conditions, while the opportunity structure of the host country is equitable for all ethnic groups. In these national studies, variations in important institutional elements, such as the education system, are 'held constant' and are only studied in terms of their differing effects on children from a range of ethnic or social origins in the country in question. But this does not tell us the whole story. As Crul and Schneider (2010) recently argued when introducing their 'integration context theory', one also needs to study school outcomes as part of the system's idiosyncrasy which generally comes to the fore only in comparisons across national school systems. Differences in national contexts may contribute to the

explanation of diverse outcomes for the children of immigrants across Europe, given the very different institutional arrangements, in particular regarding their educational systems.

The first important perspective in the integration context theory is therefore its focus on the generic institutional arrangements of an education system. The most relevant aspect by which school systems vary is their degree of differentiation (Kerckhoff 2001, Breen and Buchmann 2002, Crul and Vermeulen 2003, Van de Werfhorst and Mijs 2010), which relates to institutional settings and arrangements in secondary and tertiary education. Recent research has identified a number of differences in the major institutional arrangements among European educational systems. To begin with, a number of studies have documented the effect of early selection on educational inequalities. Most studies show convincingly that early selection and tracking negatively affect children of lower-class background (Breen and Jonsson 2005). The effect of early selection and tracking on children of immigrants is much less well documented (Crul and Vermeulen 2003, Penn and Lambert 2009), although some evidence exists which shows that inequalities are magnified for ethnic minority groups through early selection (Entorf and Lauk 2008). Besides early versus late selection, the age of entry into school, notably the attendance of pre-school, the number of school contact hours in primary school, the permeability of the school system (for instance, between vocational and non-vocational tracks) and the way in which the transition to higher education is organised are additional aspects of differentiation. A number of studies discuss the impact of not attending pre-school, or attending it only for a very short period (Crul and Doornik 2003, Herzog-Punzenberger 2003). They reveal that pre-school attendance is especially important for children of immigrants in school systems characterised by early selection. Yet the countries that apply early selection (for example, Germany and Austria) happen also to be the countries with the lowest number of contact hours in primary school (Crul et al. 2012). At the same time the number of contact hours affects the amount of homework that needs to be done outside school and the level of support that is expected from parents (Schnell 2012). The degree of permeability defines the potential for moving between tracks. If tracks and courses are based in different institutions (for example, in work-based vs. school-based arrangements), stronger boundaries prevent movement between levels (Kerckhoff 2001, Arum et al. 2007). Inversely, high permeability enables second chances through streaming upwards, an option which the Turkish second generation is especially likely to seize (Schnell 2012). On the other hand, it also leaves room for downward streaming, a phenomenon which also affects second-generation youth more strongly than the corresponding group of native parentage. Finally, in some countries the transfer at the transition from upper-secondary school to higher education is organised almost automatically, but in others it involves a conscious choice and the successful

completion of certain tests, in which case the Turkish second generation seems to continue into higher education less often.

The second important perspective in the comparative integration context theory includes the agency of individuals and groups – that is, the ways in which they actively develop options, make choices and challenge given opportunities and structural configurations (Crul and Schneider 2010, p. 1260). In different contexts, individuals' subjective and objective options for gaining access to and for claiming participation in education depend on various individual and group resources (the possession of economic, social and cultural capital). Different school characteristics at each stage of the school career interact with available family resources leading to different outcomes at important selection points in education (Schnell 2012). The spectrum is broad. At worst, the lack of resources includes the difficulty for parents to offer their children practical help with their homework in primary or secondary school, while at best a resourceful state of the home contributes to the strong drive of some parents to push their children ahead through education (Kasinitz et al. 2008, Suárez-Orozco et al. 2008).

The complex puzzle formed by different school trajectories and outcomes of second-generation Turks across the three selected countries will be analysed in the empirical section presented below by considering the factors emphasised by the integration context theory and the interactions between these factors.

Data and methodology

This study makes use of the international study on *The Integration of the European Second Generation* (TIES). This is a collaborative and comparative research project carried out between 2007 and 2008 that looks at the experiences of children of immigrants from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, and Morocco in 15 cities and in 8 Western European countries (Crul and Heering 2008, Crul et al. 2012).

From the pool of available countries participating in the TIES study, Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden have been selected as suitable 'cases' for comparison in this chapter, based on the so-called diverse case study design (Gerring 2007). Sweden has a comprehensive education system with late selection and full-day schooling. By contrast, Austria can be described, in short, as a country with a non-comprehensive system, early selection and half-day schooling. Thus the two countries represent diverse cases in this cross-national comparison, defined by large variations in the broad outlines of their educational systems. Finally, the Netherlands has been selected as a third case for this comparison. Its educational system has a slightly delayed age of selection (age 12) but a high degree of differentiation in secondary school, making the Netherlands an interesting case of contrast.

The empirical analyses are based on a total sample of 2,455 respondents, subdivided into second-generation Turks ($N = 1,209$) and a comparison group ($N = 1,246$) where both parents were born in the given country. The term 'second generation' refers to children of immigrants who have at least one parent born outside the survey country, but who were themselves born in this country and have undergone their entire education there. At the time of the interviews, all respondents were aged between 18 and 35 years.

Educational outcomes at a glance

We start our empirical analysis by examining differences in educational outcomes in order to establish the actual size of attainment differences across Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of educational levels separately for second-generation Turks and the comparison groups across the three countries. Educational levels are defined as a combination of the highest diploma obtained for those who have already left school and the current educational level of those still in school.

Moving on to the results for Austria, we find that the Turkish second generation more frequently left school only with a certificate from compulsory education (primary and/or lower-secondary education) unlike their peers in the comparison group. About one-third of the Turkish second generation obtain an apprenticeship or related certificate as their highest educational level. Moreover, they are significantly over-represented in this vocational track, with a difference of 11 per cent between them and

Table 3.1 Educational level of second-generation Turks and the comparison group, by country (%)

Educational level	Austria		The Netherlands		Sweden	
	Comparison group	Second-generation Turks	Comparison group	Second-generation Turks	Comparison group	Second-generation Turks
Primary school	1.7	3.9	2.0	8.4	0.0	0.0
Lower secondary school	10.1	21.4	8.6	21.0	3.6	9.2
Apprenticeship or vocational track	22.7	33.6	5.7	10.6	–	–
Upper-secondary academic track	30.4	22.5	21.3	31.6	34.4	56.6
Post-upper secondary/tertiary	35.1	18.6	62.5	28.4	62.0	34.3
<i>N</i>	484	458	512	500	250	251

Source: TIES survey 2007–2008.

the comparison group. As far as post-secondary and tertiary education are concerned, the figures indicate that the comparison group is clearly outperforming second-generation Turks.

Somewhat similar achievement differences are observable in the Netherlands with second-generation Turks being over-represented in the lower educational categories. For example, almost 30 per cent of the Turkish second generation in the Dutch education system leave school early and directly after completing compulsory education (primary and lower secondary education). The respective proportion in the comparison group is only 10.6 per cent. Large and significant differences in educational attainment can also be found in higher education: second-generation Turks are half as likely to complete their educational career with a diploma from tertiary education as their peers in the comparison group. It is worth noting, however, that among the Turkish second generation, the proportion of those in the higher echelons of the educational system (those studying beyond upper-secondary level) is almost the same as that of the group of early school leavers (those attending school at lower secondary level at the most).

The last two columns of Table 3.1 show the results for Sweden. Since the Swedish educational system consists of a comprehensive part and a post-secondary and tertiary sector in which job specialisation for the labour market takes place, the great majority of students are situated in the upper end of the education ladder. Nevertheless, there appears to be significant group differences in educational levels. Second-generation Turks are twice as likely to leave Swedish schools after compulsory education as members of the comparison group. Moving to the top of the educational ladder, the gap between the two groups amounts to nearly 30 per cent.

How can these differences in educational outcome between the Turkish second generation and their peers of non-migrant origin be explained? The link between social origin and educational attainment has been identified as the major explanation for the disadvantaged position of the Turkish second generation in education in Europe (Heath et al. 2008, Crul and Holdaway 2009). Previous studies demonstrate that the Turkish second generation in Europe frequently comes from less-advantaged social and educational backgrounds (Penn and Lambert 2009, Dustmann et al. 2012). It is therefore possible that a substantial portion of the differences, reported above between the comparison group and second-generation Turks, can be explained by differences in parents' educational background. In order to hold these possible differences 'constant', Table 3.2 shows the educational outcomes¹ for respondents of the two groups whose parents possess, at the most, low educational credentials.

The first point to note here is that within the three countries, group differences in educational outcome are substantially reduced, indicating that a large part of the educational disadvantage of second-generation Turks is related to the differences in the educational background of the parents. For

Table 3.2 Educational level of second-generation Turks and of the comparison group whose parents hold low educational credentials (%)

Educational level	Austria		The Netherlands		Sweden	
	Comparison group	Second-generation Turks	Comparison group	Second-generation Turks	Comparison group	Second-generation Turks
Lower secondary education at the most	12.2	33.6	22.4	29.1	9.5	8.8
Upper-secondary education	63.0	51.8	37.9	44.2	52.0	62.8
Post-upper secondary/ tertiary education	24.9	14.6	39.7	26.7	38.5	28.4

Source: TIES survey 2007–2008.

instance, the large group differences in post-upper secondary education in Sweden are substantially reduced once we consider students from similarly low-educational family backgrounds. Similar patterns can be observed in Austria and the Netherlands where group differences shrink at the lower end of the educational ladder once we hold parental educational background constant.

These data also show that differences in educational levels among second-generation Turks across countries persist once parents' educational background is held constant. In other words, second-generation Turks in Sweden more often achieve higher educational levels than their counterparts in the two other countries, even if their parents are from similar educational backgrounds. We conducted additional multivariate analysis in order to explore whether the differences in the educational outcomes of second-generation Turks across countries could be explained by compositional differences and immigration-related experiences of the Turkish first generation (beyond parental educational background). We controlled for parents' occupational position, ability to speak the language of their now home country, reasons for migration, region of origin in Turkey and length of residence in the destination country because the Turkish communities in Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden differ slightly according to these factors.

Although the majority of Turkish parents migrated to the three destination countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s for work and family reasons, in Sweden in particular, the Turkish first generation includes some Turkish refugees (mostly Kurdish refugees who migrated in the early 1980s to Sweden) who possess more educationally relevant resources (Schnell 2012). Our multivariate results revealed that second-generation Turks in Sweden are still four times as likely to achieve a higher educational level than the

Turkish second generation in the Netherlands and Austria, and that differences in the educational outcome of the Turkish second generation remain highly significant across countries even after adjusting for compositional and immigration-related factors for the parental generation.

The interplay of institutional arrangements during the early period of schooling

In all countries the most important first selection is that which takes place before or during secondary education and which distinguishes those pupils who are to attend academic tracks from those destined for middle and vocational tracks. This first selection determines to a large extent the paths that young students follow in their educational career. In most countries, the timing of the selection is at the beginning of secondary school.

The first selection in Austria takes place after primary school, at the age of ten. Students are streamed into two distinct types of school: vocational (*Hauptschule*) and academically orientated (*AHS-Unterstufe*) lower-secondary education. *Hauptschule* represents the lower tier and is open to everybody after primary school. On the other hand, the academically orientated track prepares students to continue in upper-secondary schools, leading to the university entrance certificate. Table 3.3 (third column) shows

Table 3.3 Transition rates towards the academic track at the first selection moment in percentage and odds ratios

Country	Group	%	M1: Gross [B]	M2: Net [B]
Austria	Comparison group	58.5	Ref.	Ref.
	Second-generation Turks	33.8	0.30*** (0.04) R2: 0.13	0.64** (0.11) R2: 0.29
The Netherlands	Comparison group	59.5	Ref.	Ref.
	Second-generation Turks	25.6	0.23*** (0.03) R2: 0.16	0.52*** (0.08) R2: 0.27
Sweden	Comparison group	64.5	Ref.	Ref.
	Second-generation Turks	59.6	ns R2: 0.02	ns R2: 0.04

Notes: Results for models M1 and M2 are derived from binomial logistic regression on track placement. Dependent variable: 1 = academic track, 0 = other. M1 controls for age, gender and city of residence (in Austria and the Netherlands). M2 adds controls for parental educational background. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, ns = not significant.

Source: TIES survey 2007–2008.

the percentages of those who enter the more prestigious, academic track after primary school among second-generation Turks and the comparison group. Approximately three out of ten second-generation Turks are streamed into the academic track, while the continuation rate for the comparison group is six out of ten.

In the Netherlands, students are tracked for the first time at the end of primary school, at age 12. On the basis of national examinations and the recommendation of their teacher, they are assigned to different tracks in the secondary-school system. Children with the best recommendation enter the streams preparing for tertiary education, while lower-rated students are streamed into the lower and less attractive streams of secondary education. Our results indicate that only about a quarter of the Turkish second generation make the transition into the academic tracks while the proportion for the comparison group is close to 60 per cent.

In Sweden, the first transition point is after compulsory education (*Grundskolan*), at the age of 15 (before entering upper-secondary education). As shown in Table 3.3, almost 60 per cent of the Turkish second generation moves on to the academic track and thus does not differ significantly at this stage from the comparison group in terms of their continuation rates.

Table 3.3 shows the relative chances of entering the academic track in relation to the comparison group within each country (see columns M1 and M2). These are derived from binomial logistic regression on track placement and are expressed as odds ratios. The results are reported before (M1, gross) and after (M2, net) controlling for parents' educational background. Our findings show that, even after controlling for parents' educational background, second-generation Turks in Austria and the Netherlands are significantly less likely to enter the academic track compared with the comparison group² while group differences in entering the academic track at the first transition point are not significant in Sweden.

To understand the different chances for second-generation Turks of entering the academic track at the first selection moments in the three countries, we consider the interplay between various institutional arrangements. More precisely, we consider how many years have passed between the moment when they entered educational facilities and the time of first selection into different tracks. This time span is significant not only because it determines exposure to the majority language but also because it offers students starting from a disadvantaged position the opportunity to acquire the skills necessary for selection into an academic track. If we take the mean age at which our respondents entered school and the formal selection age in each country (Table 3.4), we find that the percentage of second-generation Turks who make it into an academic track increases with an increase in the number of years of common education prior to selection. Although direct causal effects are hard to prove with the available data, our findings do clearly point in a certain direction.

Table 3.4 Years between the start of education and tracking for second-generation Turks

	Mean age at entering (early childhood) education institution	Age at track selection	Years of education before selection
Austria	5.2	10	4.8
The Netherlands	4.0	12	8.0
Sweden	3.1	15	11.9

Source: TIES survey 2007–2008.

The situation appears most unfavourable in Austria and the Netherlands in which the length of time between entering educational institutions for the first time and the first selection point seems to be too short to overcome difficulties in early schooling.

If we first consider Austria, the combination of institutional arrangements provides a period of an average of five years of common education prior to selection. Pre-primary education in Austria usually takes place in kindergarten. In principle, children can go to kindergarten from the age of three, while the average starting age is four. But as our TIES results for the country indicate, pre-school attendance varies considerably between second-generation Turks and the comparison group. Less than 66 per cent of Turkish second-generation students had their first educational experiences in kindergarten (compared with 84 per cent in the comparison group). The majority of the Turkish second generation started later than age four, which consequently led to a shorter overall stay in kindergarten. Compulsory schooling in Austria begins only at age six with entrance into primary school, so that a considerable number of children have been in an educational institution for only five years before the most important decision about their future school careers is made. This in and of itself is rather short, but, combined with the fact that most schools only offer half-day programmes, the amount of contact hours between teachers and children is, in fact, even more limited. The limited timeframe (late start, relatively small number of contact hours and early selection) significantly reduces the opportunity for second-generation Turkish children in Austria to enter the academic track, as shown in Table 3.3.

Their counterparts in the Netherlands are located precisely in the middle range in terms of years spent in education. The average starting age for enrolling in pre-schooling facilities is four, while primary school continues until the age of 12, at which time pupils are placed into different ability tracks for the first time. Although the average number of years prior to the first selection is longer than in Austria (eight years), very similar proportions of second-generation Turks enter the more prestigious tracks at

the first selection moment (Table 3.3). One reason that contributes to the relatively limited chances for second-generation Turks to enter the academic tracks is their limited participation rate in pre-school. In the Netherlands, only about 30 per cent attend pre-school facilities before entering primary education.

Sweden provides public and full-day care for children through pre-school services. Pupils can enter pre-school as early as age one. The numbers derived from the TIES survey indicate that over 90 per cent of both groups make use of this service while the average starting age is less than three. At the age of six, all pupils enter compulsory education which lasts nine years, and students usually make their first choice about the next stage of their education when they are around 16. Early start combined with late selection amount to almost 12 years of schooling before selection into different ability tracks takes place, a phenomenon which seems to increase the chances of children of Turkish immigrants. More than half of second-generation Turks follow the academic track after passing the first transition. Most importantly, their transition rate into secondary education does not differ significantly from the comparison group, indicating the existence of equal opportunities in education for children from different ethnic and social origins.

Direct and indirect pathways to higher education

Those students who successfully enter the academic tracks at the first selection moment are predominately channelled directly into higher education in all three countries. Thus the higher rate of track placement into the vocational track early in the educational career (as in Austria) explains a large part of the absolute and relative group differences in terms of access to higher education (Table 3.1). An additional feature of institutional arrangements might contribute to explaining why second-generation Turks enter higher education in the Netherlands and Sweden more frequently than in Austria. This concerns the degree of permeability which allows for up-streaming of students who have been streamed downwards earlier in their educational career.

Such a possibility for up-streaming exists in Austria at the end of lower secondary education (at the age of 15). Students who have been streamed into the vocational track (*Hauptschule*) at the age of ten have the opportunity to move upwards towards the academically orientated tracks. But the empirical results for Austria in the TIES survey show that the proportion of upward-movers of Turkish origin at the end of *Hauptschule* is relatively small. The odds seem to be set against obtaining the marks required for the upward move and entering one or the other of the two academic tracks. The Turkish second generation is found to be less upwardly mobile at this transition point (23.2 per cent) than the comparison group (41 per cent) (Schnell 2012).

The picture is somewhat different in the Dutch school system: slightly more than a quarter of the Turkish second generation enter the track with academic orientation in lower secondary education (Table 3.3). But around 28.5 per cent finally end up in higher education, indicating that a substantial proportion of students are not following the direct academic route to higher education.³ One characteristic of the Dutch school system is that it offers indirect routes through vocational tracks and additional qualifications, which allow students to enter higher education through an indirect route. Although it takes students two or three years more, these indirect routes provide a 'second chance' for those who have been streamed downwards earlier in their educational career (Crul et al. 2009). In particular, second-generation Turks from disadvantaged family backgrounds take advantage of this indirect or long route in order to enter higher education (Schnell et al. 2013).

The Swedish educational system does not really provide 'second chances' because the permeability between tracks at the end of each education stage is always, a given, prescribed by general rules. Students in lower- and upper-secondary education can choose tracks without any restrictions, while all upper-secondary tracks provide certificates that permit students to continue in post-secondary/tertiary education. These high levels of permeability lead to greater access rates into higher education for second-generation Turks in Sweden as compared with Austria and the Netherlands.

Interactions between family resources and institutional arrangements

This section broadens the perspective by examining interaction mechanisms between institutional arrangements and family resources in order to understand differences in outcomes for the Turkish second generation in the three investigated countries. 'Interactions' become most evident when looking at how far extra support provided by family members correlates with specific educational pathways and outcomes in the different countries. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show predicted probabilities of leaving school early (after compulsory education) and achieving a post-secondary/tertiary educational level (high achievers) in relation to the parental support provided by Turkish parents. This support index includes information about the frequency and the amount of time parents spend helping with homework, talking with their children about school or meeting with teachers. The results in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are derived from multivariate analysis and are displayed for parents with the same educational background (lower-secondary educational level). Figure 3.1 indicates that in Austria the chances that students will leave school early decline sharply with increasing support from their parents. In contrast, the predicted probability of being an early school-leaver in Sweden is relatively small, independent of the support provided by parents,




Figure 3.1 Predicted probabilities of leaving school early for second-generation Turks according to parental support, by country

Notes: The results are derived from binomial logistic regression on being an early school leaver (1, otherwise 0). Results are controlled for age, gender, parental educational background and city of residence (in Austria and the Netherlands). The parental educational level is set to 'lower-secondary education' while all other independent variables are set to the mean.

Source: TIES 2007–2008.

and it appears almost unrelated to parental involvement. The results concerning the link between the family resources of second-generation Turks in the Netherlands and the risk of leaving school early are weaker compared with Austria, but still significantly correlated with educational success.

As displayed in Figure 3.2, the predicted probability for second-generation Turks in Austria to climb the education ladder to the highest level without any parental support is below 10 per cent. The more support these children get at home, the sharper the increase in their chances of reaching the upper end of the educational ladder. In contrast, a slight 'reverse effect' in terms of the effect of parental support can be seen in Sweden. Second-generation Turks in Sweden have a slightly reduced probability of achieving the highest levels of education when they receive increased levels of parental support. The results displayed in Figure 3.2 indicate that, in the Swedish educational system, Turkish parents provide support when their child is not performing well at school. Finally, and similar to our findings in Figure 3.1, the results regarding the association between parental support and educational




Figure 3.2 Predicted probabilities of achieving a post-secondary/tertiary educational level for second-generation Turks according to parental support, by country

Notes: The results are derived from binomial logistic regression on achieving a post-secondary/tertiary level (1, otherwise 0). The results are controlled for age, gender, parental educational background and city of residence (in Austria and the Netherlands). The parental educational level is set to 'lower-secondary education' while all other independent variables are set to the mean.

Source: TIES 2007–2008.

achievement for second-generation Turks in the Netherlands can be situated between the respective cases in Austria and Sweden.

To test if the patterns identified differ between second-generation Turks and their comparison groups within each country, we conducted additional analyses testing for differential effects among groups. We did not find any significant differential effects for second-generation Turks in Sweden. Thus the limited role played by parental involvement in determining whether children become low or high achievers applies equally to both groups and is therefore the same for the whole student population in Sweden. By contrast, in Austria and the Netherlands, our results indicate that parental involvement is of greater importance for second-generation Turks than for the comparison group. In other words, parental support is positively related to the educational success of students in the Austrian and Dutch educational systems. But second-generation Turks seem even more dependent than the comparison groups on the frequency of support provided and the involvement demonstrated by their parents.

Summary and conclusion

Second-generation Turks achieve very different educational outcomes in Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden. Our empirical investigation of absolute differences between second-generation Turks across the three countries revealed that the size of the group of high achievers (those with post-secondary education or higher) is twice as large in Sweden as it is in Austria. At the same time the highest percentage of early school leavers (those with, at the most, primary and lower-secondary education) among the Turkish second generation was found in Austria. The educational outcomes of second-generation Turks in the Netherlands can be situated between these two countries. The proportion of high achievers is only slightly smaller than in Sweden, while the proportion of students who leave the Dutch education system early is larger than in Austria. The relative comparison between second-generation Turks and the comparison groups across the three countries showed that differences in educational attainment were most pronounced at the lowest and the highest ends of the education ladders in Austria and the Netherlands. In both countries, such comparative attainment differences were higher overall than in Sweden.

Our results showed further that these cross-national differences in educational outcomes among second-generation Turks could hardly be explained by differences in the parental generation. When examining educational outcomes for second-generation Turks originating from families with similar characteristics, such as comparable levels of education, we found that the differences observed persisted across the three countries. In order to explain these remaining differences, we then considered the combination of institutional arrangements within each education system, which together form country-specific institutional constellations.

The main characteristics of the Austrian institutional constellation are the late starting age of pre-school, the early selection into different ability tracks (at the age of ten), a low degree of permeability between education tracks after the early tracking and the half-day schooling arrangement in compulsory education. The impact of this institutional constellation on the early stages of a student's education lends a good deal of importance to family resources. During this early period, parents are therefore important agents in supporting their children's learning and in making school choices. Our outcomes confirm the specific relevance of parents' educational backgrounds for the early selection process and the significance of within-family resources which are also related to the half-day schooling system that persists throughout the years of compulsory education. The responsibility for teaching is transferred to the home and studying is built on students' leisure time, which together makes parental involvement and support, in terms of learning and homework, highly influential for students. Although the relevance of family support can be seen for all students in the Austrian system, family

support is of greater importance for second-generation Turks than for the comparison group.

In the Netherlands, an average pre-school starting age of four, a slightly delayed selection time (at the age of 12) and the possibility of entering higher education through indirect routes are among the main components of the national institutional constellation. Although the first selection into unequally prestigious tracks is postponed until the age of 12, we found that still only a quarter of the Turkish second generation makes it into the academic tracks in secondary education. This low transition rate among second-generation Turks can partially be explained by the lower educational background in the families of origin, which is reinforced by the low participation rates of children in pre-schooling. The lack of preparation time, of second-generation Turks, in pre-school translates into greater downward streaming, at the first transition point after primary school, compared with their peers from a non-migrant background. Nevertheless, the Dutch system can be characterised as having a high permeability between tracks in secondary education, thus allowing for upward transfers. Our results showed that a substantial number of second-generation Turks who had been streamed into the vocational track at the first selection point take advantage of these possibilities in order to enter higher education through indirect paths. This late opportunity for an upward transfer is in a rather weak association with the parents' educational background and family support.

The Swedish combination of institutional arrangements provides full-day schooling from early pre-school through primary education until the end of the integrated track in compulsory education. The prolonged and comprehensive full-day training phase makes family resources less relevant to the educational attainment process of both study groups. Since the transition takes place late in the educational career, family characteristics, such as parents' educational background or their additional educational resources, are not significant factors for managing this transition period successfully. (Such a weak association is clearly shown even at the first transition point, which takes place before entering different academic and vocational tracks in upper-secondary education.) Consequently, second-generation Turks enter academically orientated tracks in similar proportions to the comparison group, irrespective of their family background. Moreover, the high degree of permeability between tracks and the fluid linkages between upper-secondary tracks and post-secondary/tertiary education make individual-level factors less relevant to second-generation Turks who are on their way to achieving their highest educational diploma.

The empirical evidence of our study highlights the fact that cross-national differences in the educational attainment processes of second-generation Turks cannot be due to a single set of explanatory factors. Two parties are involved: on the one hand, the children of Turkish immigrants, who have their own characteristics, efforts and family background; and, on the other

hand, the educational systems of the countries, with their differing institutional arrangements. It is, however, the interaction between the two that determines the direction and ultimate outcome of the educational process. Yet these two are unequal partners. The educational systems' institutional arrangements as well as the way in which such arrangements determine the relevance of family involvement and resources matter more for the outcome of this process. Education systems which provide more favourable institutional arrangements, such as 'preparing practices' through early childhood education, full-day teaching and late selection, render second-generation Turks less dependent on family factors and resources, and ultimately lead to their higher educational attainment.

Notes

1. The five categories of the dependent variable 'educational level' (as shown in Table 3.1) had to be reduced to three categories because of small case numbers and the non-existent apprenticeship track in Sweden.
2. An odds ratio of 1 would express equal opportunities.
3. The proportion is substantial because not all second-generation Turks, who started in the academic track in lower secondary education, continue until reaching the entrance point into higher education.

4 Inclusive Workplace

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4.1 Leading at a Higher Level

Chapter 2

THE POWER OF VISION

Jesse Stoner, Ken Blanchard,
and Drea Zigarmi

When leaders who are leading at a higher level understand the role of the triple bottom line as the right target—to be the provider of choice, employer of choice, and investment of choice—they are ready to focus everyone’s energy on a compelling vision.

The Importance of Vision

Why is it so important for leaders to have clear vision? Because

*Leadership is about going somewhere.
If you and your people don't know
where you are going,
your leadership doesn't matter.*

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Alice learned this lesson in *Alice in Wonderland* when she was searching for a way out of Wonderland and came to a fork in the road. “Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?” she asked the Cheshire Cat. “That depends a good deal on where you want to go,” the cat responded. Alice replied that she really did not much care. The smiling cat told her in no uncertain terms: “Then it doesn’t matter which way you go.”

Jesse Stoner conducted an extensive study that demonstrated the powerful impact of vision and leadership on organizational performance.¹ She collected information from the team members of more than 500 leaders. The results were striking. Leaders who demonstrated strong visionary leadership had the highest-performing teams. Leaders with good management skills but without vision had average team performance. Leaders who were identified as weak in vision and management skills had poor-performing teams.

The biggest impediment blocking most managers from being great leaders is the lack of a clear vision for them to serve. In fewer than 10 percent of the organizations we have visited were members clear about the vision. This lack of shared vision causes people to become inundated with multiple priorities, duplication of efforts, false starts, and wasted energy—none of which supports the triple bottom line.

A vision builds trust, collaboration, interdependence, motivation, and mutual responsibility for success. Vision helps people make smart choices, because their decisions are being made with the end result in mind. As goals are accomplished, the answer to “What next?” becomes clear. Vision allows us to act from a proactive stance, moving toward what we want rather than reactively away from what we don’t want. Vision empowers and excites us to reach for what we truly desire. As the late management guru Peter Drucker said, “The best way to predict your future is to create it.”

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Effective Versus Ineffective Vision Statements

A lot of organizations already have vision statements, but most of them seem irrelevant when you look at the organization and where it's going. The purpose of a vision statement is to create an aligned organization where everyone is working together toward the same desired ends.

*The vision provides guidance for daily decisions
so that people are aiming at the right target,
not working at cross-purposes.*

How do you know if your vision statement works? Here's the test: Is it hidden in a forgotten file or framed on a wall solely for decoration? If so, it's not working. Is it actively used to guide everyday decision making? If the answer is yes, your vision statement is working.

Creating a Vision That Really Works

Why don't more leaders have a vision? We believe it's a lack of knowledge. Many leaders—such as former president George H. W. Bush—say they just don't get the “vision thing.” They acknowledge that vision is desirable, but they're unsure how to create it. To these leaders, vision seems elusive—something that is magically bestowed only on the fortunate few. Intrigued by the possibility of making vision accessible for all leaders, Jesse Stoner teamed up with Drea Zigarmi to identify the key elements of a compelling vision—one that would inspire people and provide direction. In “From Vision to Reality,” Jesse and Drea identified three key elements of a compelling vision:²

- **Significant purpose:** What business are you in?
- **A picture of the future:** What will the future look like if you are successful?

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- **Clear values:** What guides your behavior and decisions on a daily basis?

A vision must include all three elements to be inspiring and enduring. Let's explore these elements with some real-world examples.

Significant Purpose

The first element of a compelling vision is a significant purpose. This higher purpose is your organization's reason for existence. It answers the question "Why?" rather than just explaining what you do. It clarifies, from your customers' viewpoint, what business you are *really* in.

CNN is in the "hard spot news-breaking business." Their customers are busy people who need breaking news on demand. Their business is to provide hard news as it unfolds—not to provide entertainment. According to CNN, the typical family today is too busy to sit in front of the television at 7 p.m. Dad has a second job, Mom is working late, and the kids are involved in activities. Therefore, CNN's purpose is to provide news 24 hours a day. This helps CNN employees answer the questions "What are my priorities?" and "Where should I focus my energy?"

Walt Disney started his theme parks with a clear purpose. He said, "We're in the happiness business." That is very different from being in the theme park business. Clear purpose drives everything the cast members (employees) do with their guests (customers). Being in the happiness business helps cast members understand their primary role in the company.

A wonderful organization in Orlando, Florida, called Give Kids the World, is an implementation operation for the Make-A-Wish Foundation. Dying children who always wanted to go to Disney World, SeaWorld, or other attractions in Orlando can get a chance through Give Kids the World. Over the years, the organization has brought more than 50,000 families to Orlando for a week at no cost to them. The organization thinks having a sick child is a family issue; therefore, the whole family goes to Orlando.

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When you ask the employees what business they are in, they tell you they're in the memory business—they want to create memories for these kids and their families.

On a visit to Give Kids the World, one of our colleagues passed a man who was cutting the grass. Curious about how widely understood the organization's mission was, our colleague asked the man, "What business are you in here at Give Kids the World?"

The man smiled and said, "We make memories."

"How do *you* make memories?" our associate asked. "You just cut the grass."

The man said, "I certainly don't make memories by continuing to cut the grass if a family comes by. You can always tell who the sick kid is, so I ask that youngster whether he or she or a brother or sister wants to help me with my chores."

Isn't that a wonderful attitude? It keeps him focused on servicing the folks who come to Give Kids the World.

Great organizations have a deep and noble sense of purpose—a significant purpose—that inspires excitement and commitment.

When work is meaningful and connected to what we truly desire, we can unleash a productive and creative power we never imagined. But purpose alone is not enough, because it does not tell you where you're going.

A Picture of the Future

The second element of a compelling vision is a picture of the future. This picture of the end result should not be abstract. It should be a mental image you can actually see. The power of imagery has been described by many sports psychologists, including Charles Garfield in *Peak Performance: Mental Training Techniques of the World's Greatest Athletes*. Numerous studies have

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demonstrated that not only does mental imagery enhance performance, but it enhances intrinsic motivation as well.³

CNN's picture of the future is not something vague like being the premier network news station or being "number one." It's a picture you can actually create a mental image of: "To be viewed in every nation on the planet in English and in the language of that region."

Walt Disney's picture of the future was expressed in the charge he gave every cast member: "Keep the same smile on people's faces when they leave the park as when they entered." Disney didn't care whether a guest was in the park two hours or ten hours. He just wanted to keep them smiling. After all, they were in the happiness business. Your picture should focus on the end result, not the process of getting there.

At Give Kids the World, their picture of the future is that in the last week of the lives of youngsters who have been there, they will still be laughing and talking to their families about their time in Orlando.

Some people mistakenly use the Apollo Moon Project as an example of a vision. It is a wonderful example of the power of creating a picture of the future, but it's not an example of a vision. In 1961, when President John F. Kennedy articulated a picture of the future—to place a man on the moon by the end of the 1960s and bring him home safely—the United States had not even invented the technology to accomplish it. To achieve that goal, NASA overcame seemingly insurmountable obstacles, demonstrating the power of articulating a picture of the future. However, once the goal was achieved, NASA never re-created its spectacular achievement, because it was not linked to a significant purpose. There was nothing to answer the question "Why?" Was the purpose to "beat the Russians" or to "begin the Space Defense Initiative" or—in the spirit of *Star Trek*—"to boldly go where no one has gone before"? Because there was no clear purpose, there was no way to guide decision making going forward

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and answer the question “What next?” The second element—a picture of the future—is powerful, but it alone does not create an enduring vision.

Clear Values

The third element of a compelling vision is having clear values. High performing organizations have clear values. Values define leadership and how employees act on a day-to-day basis while doing their work.

Values provide guidelines for how you should proceed as you pursue your purpose and picture of the future. They answer the questions “What do I want to live by?” and “How?” They need to be clearly described so that you know exactly what behaviors demonstrate that the value is being lived. Values need to be consistently acted on, or they are only good intentions. They need to resonate with the personal values of the members of the organization so that people truly choose to live by them.

The values need to support the organization’s purpose. Because CNN is in the journalism business, not the entertainment business, its values are “to provide accurate, responsible journalism and to be responsive to the news needs of people around the world.” These values help reporters and producers make on-the-spot decisions about news coverage and would be quite different if CNN were in the entertainment business.

Robert Johnson founded Johnson & Johnson for the purpose of alleviating pain and disease. The company’s purpose and values, reflected in its credo, continue to guide the company. Using its values to guide its decision making, Johnson & Johnson quickly recalled all Tylenol capsules throughout the United States during a 1982 tampering incident that was localized in the Chicago area. The immediate cost was substantial, but not knowing the extent of the tampering, the company didn’t want to risk anyone’s safety. In the end, Johnson & Johnson’s triple bottom line was served, demonstrated by the company’s long-term gains in reputation and profitability.

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Most organizations that do have values either have too many values or have not rank-ordered them.⁴ Research done by Ken Blanchard and Michael O'Connor shows that people can't focus on more than three or four values that really impact behavior. They also found that values must be rank-ordered to be effective. Why? Because life is about value conflicts. When these conflicts arise, people need to know which value they should focus on.

The Disney theme parks have four rank-ordered values: safety, courtesy, the show, and efficiency. Why is safety the highest-ranked value? Walt Disney knew that if guests were carried out of one of his parks on a stretcher, they would not have the same smiles on their faces leaving the park as they had when they entered.

The second-ranked value, courtesy, is all about the friendly attitude you expect at a Disney park. Why is it important to know that it's the number-two value? Suppose one of the Disney cast members is answering a guest question in a friendly, courteous manner, and he hears a scream that's not coming from a roller coaster. If that cast member wants to act according to the park's rank-ordered values, he will excuse himself as quickly and politely as possible and race toward the scream. Why? Because the number-one value just called. If the values were not rank-ordered and the cast member was enjoying the interaction with the guest, he might say, "They're always yelling in the park," and not move in the direction of the scream. Later somebody could come to that cast member and say, "You were the closest to the scream. Why didn't you move?" The response could be, "I was dealing with our courtesy value." Life is a series of value conflicts. There will be times when you can't act on two values at the same time.

For a vision to endure, you need all three elements—a significant purpose, a picture of the future, and clear values—to guide behavior on a day-by-day basis. Martin Luther King, Jr. outlined his vision in his "I Have a Dream" speech. By describing a world where his children "will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character," he created powerful and specific images arising from the values of brotherhood, respect,

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and freedom for all—values that resonate with the founding values of the United States. King’s vision continues to mobilize and guide people beyond his lifetime because it illuminates a significant purpose, provides a picture of the future, and describes values that resonate with people’s hopes and dreams.

A Compelling Vision Creates a Culture of Greatness

A compelling vision creates a strong culture in which the energy of everyone in the organization is aligned. This results in trust, customer satisfaction, an energized and committed workforce, and profitability. Conversely, when an organization does not live up to its stated values, employee and customer trust and commitment erode, negatively impacting all aspects of the bottom line. For example, Ford lost credibility and market share when its stated value—“Quality Is Job One”—was tested by its hesitation to take responsibility in the recall of the defective Firestone tires on its Explorer sport utility vehicle in 2000.⁵

Vision Is the Place to Start

Research clearly demonstrates the extraordinary impact of a shared vision, or core ideology, on long-term financial performance. The cumulative stock returns of the HPOs researched by Collins and Porras were six times greater than the “successful” companies they examined and 15 times greater than the general market over a 50-year period of time!⁶ For this reason, vision is the place to start if you want to improve your organization’s HPO SCORES and hit the target.

Research has demonstrated time and again that an essential characteristic of great leaders is their ability to mobilize people around a shared vision.⁷

If it’s not in service of a shared vision, leadership can become self-serving. Leaders begin to think their people are there to serve them, instead of the customer. Organizations can become

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self-serving bureaucracies where leaders focus their energies on recognition, power, and status, rather than the organization's larger purpose and goals. The results of this type of behavior have been all too evident recently at Enron, WorldCom, and others.

Once the leader has clarified and shared the vision, he can focus on serving and being responsive to the needs of the people, understanding that the role of leadership is to remove barriers and help people achieve the vision. The greatest leaders mobilize others by coalescing people around a shared vision. Sometimes leaders don't get it at first, but the great ones eventually do.

Louis Gerstner, Jr. is a perfect example. When Gerstner took the helm of IBM in 1993—amidst turmoil and instability as the company's annual net losses reached a record \$8 billion—he was quoted as saying, “The last thing IBM needs is a vision.” A lot of people asked us what we thought about that statement. Our reply was, “It depends on how he defines vision. If he means a ‘pie-in-the-sky’ dream, he's absolutely right. The ship is sinking. But if all he's doing is plugging the holes, the ship isn't going anywhere.” We were amused to read an article in *The New York Times*⁸ two years later. In that article, Gerstner conceded that IBM had lost the war for the desktop operating system, acknowledging that the acquisition of Lotus signified that the company had failed to plan properly for its future. He admitted that he and his management team now “spent a lot of time thinking ahead.” Once Gerstner understood the importance of vision, an incredible turnaround occurred. It became clear that the company's source of strength would be in integrated solutions and resisted pressures to split the company. In 1995, delivering the keynote address at the computer industry trade show, Gerstner articulated IBM's new vision—that network computing would drive the next phase of industry growth and would be the company's overarching strategy. That year, IBM began a series of acquisitions that positioned services to become the company's fastest-growing segment, with growth at more than 20 percent per year. This extraordinary turnaround demonstrated that the *most important thing* IBM needed was a vision—a shared vision.

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If an organization's vision is compelling, the triple bottom line is served. Success goes way beyond mere financial rewards. Vision generates tremendous energy, excitement, and passion, because people feel they are making a difference. They know what they are doing and why. There is a strong sense of trust and respect. Managers don't try to control, but rather let others assume responsibility, because people know they are part of an aligned whole. People assume responsibility for their own actions. They take charge of their future, rather than passively waiting for it to happen. There is room for creativity and risk taking. People can make their contributions in their own way, and those differences are respected, because people know they are in the same boat—all part of a larger whole going "full steam ahead!"

Vision Can Exist Anywhere in an Organization

You don't have to wait for an organizational vision to begin. Vision is the responsibility of every leader at every level of the organization. It's possible for leaders of departments or teams to create shared visions for their departments even when the rest of the organization doesn't have one. Consider our work helping a tax department in a Fortune 500 company. The leader of the department stated:

"We began to understand our own and each others' hopes and dreams and discovered how close they were. We found ways to work together more effectively and began to enjoy work a lot more. We discovered what business we were really in: 'Providing financial information to help leaders make good business decisions.' As a result, we began to partner more effectively with business leaders. Our department gained more credibility in the company, and other departments began asking us what we had done to make such a turnaround. They became interested in creating a vision for their own department. It was contagious."

Too often, leaders complain that they can't have a vision because the larger organization doesn't have one. Again, it's not

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necessary to wait. The power of vision will work for you and your team, regardless of your level in the organization.

Make Your Vision a Reality

In their book *Full Steam Ahead! Unleash the Power of Vision in Your Company and Your Life*, Ken Blanchard and Jesse Stoner define vision as “knowing who you are, where you’re going, and what will guide your journey.”⁹ *Knowing who you are* means having a significant purpose. *Where you’re going* means having a picture of the future. *What will guide your journey* are clear values. However, vision alone is not enough. For a leader to ensure that the vision becomes a reality—a shared vision that mobilizes people—Ken and Jesse identify three important guidelines that people must follow: How the vision is created, how it’s communicated, and how it’s lived.

How It’s Created

The process of creating the vision is as important as what the vision says. Instead of simply taking the top management to a retreat to put the vision together and then announcing it to others, encourage dialogue about the vision. While the initial responsibility for drafting an organizational vision rests with the top management, the organization needs to put in place mechanisms to give others an opportunity to help shape the vision—to put their thumbprint on it.

For a departmental or team vision, it’s possible to craft the vision as a team. Although the leader must have a sense of where he’s going, it’s important that he trusts and utilizes the knowledge and skills of the people on the team to get the best vision.

Regardless of how you initially draft the vision, it’s important that you get input from those it affects before you finalize it. Ask people these questions: “Would you like to work for an organization that has this vision? Can you see where you fit in the vision? Does it help you set priorities? Does it provide guidelines for making decisions? Is it exciting and motivating? Have we left anything

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out? Should we delete anything?” Involving people will deepen their understanding and commitment and create a better vision.

How It's Communicated

Creating a vision—for your organization or department, for your work, and for your life—is a journey, not a one-time activity.

In some organizations, a vision statement may be found framed on the wall, but it provides no guidance or, worse, has nothing to do with the reality of how things actually are. This turns people off. Visioning is an ongoing process; you need to keep it alive. It's important to keep talking about the vision and referring to it as much as possible. Max DePree, the legendary former chairman of Herman Miller and author of *Leadership Is an Art*, said that in his visionary role, he had to be like a third-grade teacher. He had to keep on saying it over and over and over until people got it right, right, right! The more you focus on your vision, the clearer it will become, and the more deeply you will understand it. In fact, aspects of what you thought was the vision may change over time, but its essence will remain.

How It's Lived

The moment you identify your vision, you need to behave as if it were happening right now. Your actions need to be congruent with your vision. As others see you living the vision, they will believe you are serious, and this will help deepen their understanding and commitment. Two strategies will support your efforts to live your vision:

- **Always focus on your vision.** Your vision should be the foundation for your organization. If an obstacle or unforeseen event throws you off-course, you may have to change your short-term goals, but your vision should be long-lasting. Change is bound to happen. Unforeseen events are bound to occur. Find a way to reframe what is happening as a challenge or opportunity on the road to living your vision.

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- **Show the courage of commitment.** True commitment begins when you take action. There will be fears; feel them and move ahead. It takes courage to create a vision, and it takes courage to act on it. In the words of Goethe, “Whatever you can do, or dream you can, begin it. Boldness has genius, power, and magic in it.”

Vision and Leadership

Vision always comes back to leadership. People look to their formal leaders for vision and direction. While leaders should involve people in shaping direction, the ultimate responsibility for ensuring and maintaining a vision remains with the leaders and cannot be delegated to others. Creating a vision is not an activity that can be checked off a list. It’s one of the most critical ongoing roles of a successful leader. It means the difference between high and average performance, whether it’s an entire organization, a department, or a team.

Once a vision is agreed upon, it is up to the leader to ensure that people respond to the vision. The leader’s job is to support people in accomplishing the vision by removing barriers; by ensuring that policies, practices, and systems make it easier for them to act on the vision; and by holding themselves, their peers, and their people accountable for acting consistently with the vision. This way people serve the vision, not the leader.

Vision calls an organization to be truly great, not merely to beat the competition and get big numbers. A magnificent vision articulates people’s hopes and dreams, touches their hearts and spirits, and helps them see how they can contribute. It aims everyone in the right direction.



Visit www.LeadingAtAHigherLevel.com to access the free virtual conference titled *Set Your Sights on the Right Target and Vision*. Use the password “Target” for your FREE access.


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4.2 Takedowns

CHAPTER TAKEDOWNS



Ignore the real world

“That would never work in the real world.” You hear it all the time when you tell people about a fresh idea.

This real world sounds like an awfully depressing place to live. It’s a place where new ideas, unfamiliar approaches, and foreign concepts *always* lose. The only things that win are what people already know and do, even if those things are flawed and inefficient.

Scratch the surface and you’ll find these “real world” inhabitants are filled with pessimism and despair. They expect fresh concepts to fail. They assume society isn’t ready for or capable of change.

Even worse, they want to drag others down into their tomb. If you’re hopeful and ambitious, they’ll try to convince you your ideas are impossible. They’ll say you’re wasting your time.

Don't believe them. That world may be real for them, but it doesn't mean you have to live in it.

We know because our company fails the real-world test in all kinds of ways. In the real world, you can't have more than a dozen employees spread out in eight different cities on two continents. In the real world, you can't attract millions of customers without any salespeople or advertising. In the real world, you can't reveal your formula for success to the rest of the world. But we've done all those things and prospered.

The real world isn't a place, it's an excuse. It's a justification for not trying. It has nothing to do with you.



Learning from mistakes is overrated

In the business world, failure has become an expected rite of passage. You hear all the time how nine out of ten new businesses fail. You hear that your business's chances are slim to none. You hear that failure builds character. People advise, "Fail early and fail often."

With so much failure in the air, you can't help but breathe it in. Don't inhale. Don't get fooled by the stats. Other people's failures are just that: *other* people's failures.

If other people can't market their product, it has nothing to do with you. If other people can't build a team, it has nothing to do with you. If other people can't price their services properly, it has nothing to do with you. If other people can't earn more than they spend ... well, you get it.


Another common misconception: You need to learn from your mistakes. What do you really learn from mistakes? You might learn what *not* to do again, but how valuable is that? You still don't know what you *should* do next.

Contrast that with learning from your successes. Success gives you real ammunition. When something succeeds, you know what worked—and you can do it again. And the next time, you'll probably do it even better.

Failure is not a prerequisite for success. A Harvard Business School study found already-successful entrepreneurs are far more likely to succeed again (the success rate for their future companies is 34 percent). But entrepreneurs whose companies failed the first time had almost the same follow-on success rate as people starting a company for the first time: just 23 percent. People who failed before have the same amount of success as people who have never tried at all.* Success is the experience that actually counts.

That shouldn't be a surprise: It's exactly how nature works. Evolution doesn't linger on past failures, it's always building upon what worked. So should you.

PLANNING IS GUESSING



Planning is guessing

Unless you're a fortune-teller, long-term business planning is a fantasy. There are just too many factors that are out of your hands: market conditions, competitors, customers, the economy, etc. Writing a plan makes you feel in control of things you can't actually control.

Why don't we just call plans what they really are: guesses. Start referring to your business plans as business guesses, your financial plans as financial guesses, and your strategic plans

as strategic guesses. Now you can stop worrying about them as much. They just aren't worth the stress.

When you turn guesses into plans, you enter a danger zone. Plans let the past drive the future. They put blinders on you. "This is where we're going because, well, that's where we said we were going." And that's the problem: Plans are inconsistent with improvisation.

And you have to be able to improvise. You have to be able to pick up opportunities that come along. Sometimes you need to say, "We're going in a new direction because that's what makes sense *today*."


The timing of long-range plans is screwed up too. You have the most information when you're doing something, not *before* you've done it. Yet when do you write a plan? Usually it's before you've even begun. That's the worst time to make a big decision.

Now this isn't to say you shouldn't think about the future or contemplate how you might attack upcoming obstacles. That's a worthwhile exercise. Just don't feel you need to write it down or obsess about it. If you write a big plan, you'll most likely never look at it anyway. Plans more than a few pages long just wind up as fossils in your file cabinet.

Give up on the guesswork. Decide what you're going to do this week, not this year. Figure out the next most important thing and do that. Make decisions right before you do something, not far in advance.

It's OK to wing it. Just get on the plane and go. You can pick up a nicer shirt, shaving cream, and a toothbrush once you get there.

Working without a plan may seem scary. But blindly following a plan that has no relationship with reality is even scarier.



Why grow?

People ask, “How big is your company?” It’s small talk, but they’re not looking for a small answer. The bigger the number, the more impressive, professional, and powerful you sound. “Wow, nice!” they’ll say if you have a hundred-plus employees. If you’re small, you’ll get an “Oh ... that’s nice.” The former is meant as a compliment; the latter is said just to be polite.

Why is that? What is it about growth and business? Why is expansion always the goal? What’s the attraction of big besides ego? (You’ll need a better answer than “economies of scale.”) What’s wrong with finding the right size and staying there?

Do we look at Harvard or Oxford and say, “If they’d only expand and branch out and hire thousands more professors and go global and open other campuses all over the world ... *then* they’d be great schools.” Of course not. That’s not how we measure the value of these institutions. So why is it the way we measure businesses?

Maybe the right size for your company is five people. Maybe it’s forty. Maybe it’s two hundred. Or maybe it’s just you and a laptop. Don’t make assumptions about how big you should be ahead of time. Grow slow and see what feels right—premature hiring is the death of many companies. And avoid huge growth spurts too—they can cause you to skip right

over your appropriate size.

Small is not just a stepping-stone. Small is a great destination in itself.

Have you ever noticed that while small businesses wish they were bigger, big businesses dream about being more agile and flexible? And remember, once you get big, it's really hard to shrink without firing people, damaging morale, and changing the entire way you do business.

Ramping up doesn't have to be your goal. And we're not talking just about the number of employees you have either. It's also true for expenses, rent, IT infrastructure, furniture, etc. These things don't just happen to you. You decide whether or not to take them on. And if you do take them on, you'll be taking on new headaches, too. Lock in lots of expenses and you force yourself into building a complex business—one that's a lot more difficult and stressful to run.

Don't be insecure about aiming to be a small business. Anyone who runs a business that's sustainable and profitable, whether it's big or small, should be proud.



Workaholism

Our culture celebrates the idea of the workaholic. We hear about people burning the midnight oil. They pull all-nighters and sleep at the office. It's considered a badge of honor to kill yourself over a project. No amount of work is too much work.

Not only is this workaholism unnecessary, it's stupid. Working more doesn't mean you care more or get more done. It just means you work more.

Workaholics wind up creating more problems than they solve. First off, working like that just isn't sustainable over time. When the burnout crash comes—and it will—it'll hit that much harder.

Workaholics miss the point, too. They try to fix problems by throwing sheer hours at them. They try to make up for intellectual laziness with brute force. This results in inelegant solutions.

They even create crises. They don't look for ways to be more efficient because they actually *like* working overtime. They enjoy feeling like heroes. They create problems (often unwittingly) just so they can get off on working more.

Workaholics make the people who don't stay late feel inadequate for “merely” working reasonable hours. That leads to guilt and poor morale all around. Plus, it leads to an ass-in-seat mentality—people stay late out of obligation, even if they aren't really being productive.

If all you do is work, you're unlikely to have sound judgments. Your values and decision making wind up skewed. You stop being able to decide what's worth extra effort and what's not. And you wind up just plain tired. No one makes sharp decisions when tired.

In the end, workaholics don't actually accomplish more than nonworkaholics. They may claim to be perfectionists, but that just means they're wasting time fixating on inconsequential details instead of moving on to the next task.

Workaholics aren't heroes. They don't save the day, they just use it up. The real hero is already home because she figured out a faster way to get things done.

BE

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STARTER!

Enough with “entrepreneurs”

Let’s retire the term *entrepreneur*. It’s outdated and loaded with baggage. It smells like a members-only club. Everyone should be encouraged to start his own business, not just some rare breed that self-identifies as entrepreneurs.

There’s a new group of people out there starting businesses. They’re turning profits yet never think of themselves as entrepreneurs. A lot of them don’t even think of themselves as business owners. They are just doing what they love on their own terms and getting paid for it.

So let’s replace the fancy-sounding word with something a bit more down-to-earth. Instead of entrepreneurs, let’s just call them starters. Anyone who creates a new business is a starter. You don’t need an MBA, a certificate, a fancy suit, a briefcase, or an above-average tolerance for risk. You just need an idea, a touch of confidence, and a push to get started.

*Leslie Berlin, “Try, Try Again, or Maybe Not,” *New York Times*, Mar. 21, 2009.


4.3 OMG!

chapter 1 omg!

Team: brrrr!

Why is the word "team" being used so often in the corporate world, or in the world of work at all? Teams compete in sports and in games. Companies, local government departments, or NGOs have rather built little communities and teams do not exist in civilian life at all.

Well, to be precise they do, but only in our heads. This is what makes playing in "teams" reality and this is the line along which people will identify with either the blue or red team (telecommunications company, TV channel, food chainstore). This is the phenomenon the business world has learned to exploit so well. If, let's say, we consider ourselves part of the Monkey Informatics team, then we will get into battle against Donkey Software with much greater vehemence and determination on the battlefield of business. Once we have established team consciousness among the




team members, then they can work 18 instead of 8 hours a day, and are prepared to commit smaller or greater infringements or acts of immorality to the detriment of the other company, motivated purely by a desire to "win".

To win the "competition". But what competition? Is it really a competition? Is there a start and a finish line? Is there a moment when somebody blows the whistle to signal the end of the match and we know whether it's the Monkeys or the Donkeys who have won? In reality the winners are the owners, who take their winnings home at the end of the year in the shape of dividends. They, more often than not, have a share in the Monkey and Donkey company alike.

Training is often used to build a team. This is even though real team building should not be achieved at a place distant from work and not with the involvement of an outside figure, but rather during normal business hours at work.


Team is not built by the training session or the trainer, but by the leader and the



community itself. Team is built on an average busy Thursday, or in the evening when the server suddenly breaks down, but the assignment must be completed by morning the next day the latest. And there is a leader and all the staff members are ready to join hands and without concern for themselves or for the others, they overcome the situation and tackle the problem. They do it for each other. Not out of fear of the upcoming deadline, and not for praise or money; but simply for each other. Now, that is team building. All the rest is maraschino cherry on top of the cake.

If a set of people does not evolve into a real community (all right, let's call it a "team") sooner or later, it is probably due to poor organisational climate. Company culture is shaped and developed by the management.

humanrobot: Is it not food for thought when advisers - for very high hourly rates - have no alternative but to advise the top management of a company of about ten thousand employees that they should - at least once a week - have lunch together with the workers in the company canteen?




Road to training

All training must serve the improvement of the organisation. Training programmes range on a very wide scale, but if training is not part of a consciously thought-out and implemented building/development process, then training has very little to add.

Where do things go astray? Some training sessions just don't work; that's happened to me, too. Also there are bad trainers. But the seed of poor training is always sown during the preliminary ordering phase. This may be a realistic threat when


1. the expectations and responsibilities of the parties are not clarified,
2. training is wanted because there's some money left at the end of the year, or when there is not enough money and the client is seeking to get a bit of a facelift rather than root-level improvement,
3. client has some hidden objective or expectation of training,



4. the to-be participants do not have the faintest clue of what their boss has got in store for them.

When the expectations and responsibilities of the parties are not clarified: the client cannot clearly express what he wants to achieve through training; the developers – in the hope of financial and professional gains – are willing to go into any length to please the client and they do not squeeze out all the required information; the participants only spring to attention when they learn that participation is compulsory; the venue used only provides what is customary but fails in giving custom-tailored services.

When training is wanted because there's some money left at the end of the year: "It doesn't matter what it is..., just do something!", goes the task description. Now, it is up to the trainer to decide if he will take on an assignment like that in exchange for pocket money or the survival of his enterprise, or - on the grounds of protecting his own or the client's business interests - tactfully refuses suggesting that they should be reconsidering



the proposal at the beginning of next year in view of the long-term objectives.


When there is not enough money, but the client is seeking to get a bit of a facelift treatment instead of real improvement:

although people ought to be paid higher or more staff is needed because of increased workload, the company is unable or unwilling to spend more. Well, why don't we just give them a slap on the shoulder? Instead of sending them off for two days to a wellness hotel, the management gets them two trainers to do something with the overworked and underpaid staff.

When the client has some hidden objective or expectation of the training:


there was one school principal who wanted training from me because he feared that the mayor would not make him school principal when his mandate was over unless he had his teachers' support. He thought training would be a form of reward to his staff.

When the to-be participants do not have the faintest clue of what their boss has got in store for them: I have been witness to a




development programme - which, by the way, required many days of preparation - in which participants begged the trainer like school children not to make them do anything.

What it all boils down to is that the decision-maker (leader number one or the HR manager) decides that the organisation needs developing or, alternatively, staff members or teams need skills development or improvement in specific special areas of expertise. Or that development is needed across the entire organisation as they want to introduce an entirely new organisational culture. Of course, culture will not change overnight during training; the most a trainer can do is make people aware of the realisations that are already there lurking inside people's heads.



Most of the time, this is not recognised by the participants. Only felt or sensed.

humanrobot: "Hi there, we've got a little money left over in our budget, which we must either pay the government in taxes or alternatively, we can buy a research project. Could you not do some management programme on the pretext of research for us? You know, the bosses go down to the country each year. Now, this we could link this to a management training programme, a little bit of wine tasting and mini golf at the end", goes the typical rhetoric of the company HR.




What is training definitely not about?

Training - and I must stress this again - is a means of organisation development. If it is wanted by a small market enterprise, the final and sole objective might just be to improve profitability. Nothing else. After all, the company was originally set up to make profit. What else? Of course, the other question is the price the company is paying to achieve the expected return.


Training is not a form of reward. Going sailing or spending one week in Barcelona (often coined incentive training) by the top management is more like a company holiday rather than organisation development. It may well be that the participants will have a good time and can unwind, they may also inevitably get to know each other better; even more so, loyalty to the generous boss will increase, after all, this great guy/girl is paying for the bill. Yet I insist that this has nothing to contribute to company development.

Training is not a form of punishment. "I am here because they put my name on the list,




just now when I have a deadline to meet tomorrow." Too many of my training sessions start out like this. In a better scenario, participants and I reward the sincerity of the comment with roaring laughter. Things are not going right? Well, just enrol them in some effectiveness-booster training. That'll make a difference. Is the staff overconfident? We'll send them off to an overnight survival course. But why?

Training is not the place for the trainer to hold theatrical shows. The trainer is a facilitator who is tasked with eliciting the thoughts and feelings that are already there inside the participants. The trainer is there to encourage people to say certain things, look at various life situations from different angles, express different problems and find the solutions if solutions can in fact be identified. During all this, it is not the task of nor the time for the trainer to make himself popular or likeable. Of course, there are times during training when the trainer is acting, as may be the case with short theoretical type presentations. There are moments when theatrical skills are called for, when the trainer




is driven by empathy. Nonetheless, all these moments must be used to serve the purpose of development and not the acceptance of the trainer, or the satisfaction of the trainer's personal desire to be in the centre of attention.

Training is not designed to pave the way for an unpleasant discussion. "People will feel better and it will be easier for them to take the pill", said one potential client; eventually, I declined the offer. The act of announcing any unpleasant news is an organisation development tool itself: having an open and clear approach, the honest exploration of the troubles and their causes, the ability to identify with the people concerned by the management is the best possible developmental tool that cannot be matched by even the best of trainers.




humanrobot: "Unfortunately, as it turned out, I could not attend the event; I had a foreign delegation to meet", says one director as he invites me for coffee behind the imitation leather padded door of his office. "Nevertheless, I would love you to tell me a few words about the people, who was the best of them all, perhaps the most cooperative and who impeded progress most. You know, I need this info to deal with these people in my everyday work." You would have to be a real tacky diplomat to get out of a tight situation like this one. After all, the client is your client even if he had failed to turn up at the training. He will issue you with your performance certificate, he will pay you, and it is up to him whether you will use this as a reference work, or quietly conceal that you have ever been near the place.



The selling phase

It is always difficult to sell. Especially if you are selling a service, which most people believe they have some understanding of. Now organisation development is just such a service. I tend to feel I am really screwed when I find that my client has some vague knowledge of the subject and they keep wanting to convert the little they know into loose change. (This kind of work presents a real challenge because on the one hand I can utilise the eagerness of my partner but at the same time use a bit of tactfulness and diplomacy to keep my fingers on the steering wheel.

Let's call this group of people sciolists. They will show off their patchwork knowledge already during initial consultation. A typical example for this when they want to show off before their superiors or employees. Or they may want to get a training product from you that they may have heard of before and have grown to like it for some reason, and are most certainly not willing to hear the sad news from



you that this is exactly what they do not actually need.

There is, however, a group of clients that are either highly educated or totally ignorant on the subject. This latter group, recognising their ignorance, are excellent partners hence I put them in the same category with the educated ones. These clients


- 1.** do not see their roles in a relationship of subordination / domination, but focus on identifying shared goals,

- 2.** are ready and willing to learn and understand the entire training process, and

- 3.** are happy to share information - which we, service providers, can also learn a lot from and can offer them custom-tailored programmes,

- 4.** do not disguise problematic organisational components or shun their own responsibility.

Many service providers are irritated if the client wants to be part of the process in a creative way. However this is normally for the better since the client




1. will identify with the project if personally involved,

2. will find participation rewarding and realise their own responsibilities,

3. will be of assistance to you since they will most certainly know more about their organisation than you.

All you have to realise and consequently indicate to them is the border line between their and your responsibility.

humanrobot: We were holding a training session for the teaching staff of a vocational school in a small town. The programme was a great success mostly because the weaving and wood-carving teachers were open to the development methodologies we applied, which - by the way - were very detached from their everyday reality. They were able to laugh at themselves and could even tell us what they believed in, and the things they would not like to make changes to because they were convinced they had been doing well. When we finished, there was an Angel of Silence. Then suddenly, appearing seemingly from nowhere, the school principal asked a young lady teacher to hand out photocopies of a story and asked the teachers to read it and "nod one by one if you think you have understood it".




Boxing and whitewater rafting

An organisation developer company was launching a new business branch and ran boxing training for the managers. According to the concept underlying the programme, world one has to learn to give and take punches in the business. Does it not occur to you that such a programme might , in fact, be organised for the sole reason to make the organisation developer stand out from the rest. At all costs?


The question is: why is any knowledge of boxing required to sell an IT system, build a residential estate, or introduce a new brand of swimming suits? Many think that the business world is like a boxing ring into which one only steps if armed from head to toe.

Whitewater rafting Some like it. And some loathe it. Our likes and dislikes and the way we relate to extreme sports vary, and rightly so. What may seem extreme sport to one person may be daily routine for the other.


Some of the feelings experienced in training courses, the thoughts and arguments of others,



and the mutually worked out solutions may be carried over into the realm of everyday reality. This is the real meaning and purpose of training. There is, however, a limit beyond which scaring or frightening people is expressly hazardous. And also unethical. Just because someone, having a helmet on his head, detests getting into an incessantly swaying rubber dinghy with three other people from the controlling department, it does not mean that they cannot be excellent payroll accountants who never make a mistake in thirty years, especially not at the cost of the company. It is not freezing to death in the icy waters and rolling over rocks that grinds you into a team - this is so even if the water, the boat and progress are fantastic metaphors in the various areas of business.



humanrobot: I've often had participants shyly eyeing the noses of their shoes and coming up to me directly before the training was about to begin to ask me about the type of activities they will be expected to perform. After a significant number of similar cases that showed the same pattern, I came to the realisation that people were worried that they would be subjected to humiliating exercises. In these cases it transpired that the manager responsible for organising the training failed to inform the participants on what they were to expect. In one development programme, an excessively obese lady came up to me, her neck badly covered with moles, and she asked me on a soft tone full of concern what type of activities we would be playing during the day. She told me how much she feared to make any physical contact with anyone because she had the belief that no-one would feel comfortable touching her under any circumstance. She also shared with me some of her former bad experiences. It transpired that a few years before the lady had looked perfectly average; she was a mother and a wife, but recently she had been diagnosed with a tumour, which produced the above symptoms. There were no activities on the cards that involved the touching of each other on this training session.



5 Tackling Prejudice and De-radicalization

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5.1 Dynamic of Conflict Development in Transforming Societies

Conflicts in Transforming Society and the Nongovernmental Sector: The Slovak Example

By DUŠAN ONDRUŠEK and VLADIMÍR LABÁTH

ABSTRACT: This article focuses on the basic conflict of a self-transforming post-Communist society. Two phenomena are described. The first comprises the ways in which people cope with this conflict during the transformation period; the five most frequent reactions are opportunistic, materialistic, defensive, victimlike, and mobilization. The second phenomenon is the more general phenomenon of the development dynamics that characterize the basic conflict. The conflict between the third (nongovernmental) sector and the government in Slovakia is presented as an example of these dynamics.

Dušan Ondrušek is the director of Partners for Democratic Change–Slovakia and an international consultant and trainer in the fields of conflict resolution, collaborative planning, and problem solving. He has a doctorate in psychology and publishes mostly on the topics of development of altruism, mediation, and effectiveness of training.

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THE transformation process taking place since 1989 in Central and Eastern European post-Communist countries provides new insight into the dynamics of social conflict and the management of processes of change. This article analyzes the dynamics of conflict that emerge within the transformation process as society moves from an authoritarian system to a participatory democratic system.

The transformation process itself generates a basic conflict or clash between the methods, strategies, processes, institutions, and psychology of the authoritarian regimes' management of conflict and the demands inherent in a democratic methodology, psychology, and institutional structure for resolving differences. This article provides an analysis from two perspectives: how people manage the conflict that emerges during the process of transformation, and a set of descriptive examples of recent authoritarian and democratic conflict management styles used by the Slovak government and nongovernmental organization (NGO) community, respectively.

The Czech philosopher Václav Bělohradský sees the development of democracy as the development of the legitimacy of laws and the reasonableness of individuals.¹ Reasonableness is evident in the ability to assimilate the knowledge that several truths can exist simultaneously without the claim that only one of them is the correct explanation of reality—the sort of claim that dominated thinking and policy under the

former Communist regimes. More important than this knowledge is the continuous process of dialogue: to translate ideas into a clear language; to engage in discussion and critique; to listen to the ideas of others; and to be prepared to give those ideas up.

Conflict between government and opposition parties in a democratic society does not endanger the functioning of society. The stability of society is, despite these conflicts, secured by rules shared mutually by the parties engaged in the struggle for political power.

For Bělohradský, then, the ideal solution to a conflict assumes that the disputing partners are in favor of cultivating an understanding of how a developing society addresses obstacles and support a democratic approach to resolving differences.

A new set of conflicts emerges, however, when the parties in conflict differ in their understanding of and approach to conflict solving. Bělohradský's definition of conflict management relies on a mutual understanding of the conflict based on the interests of both parties. Opposite of this approach is the authoritarian approach, which can be referred to as "the arrogance of power," in which there is a conviction that the interests of the other party do not need to be considered as it is less powerful. The confrontation of the two parties begins with different conceptions of the conflict itself, which creates a special dynamic and offers sometimes unexpected solutions, especially in transforming societies.

Post-Communist countries that have started the process of democratization and are developing an open

1. Václav Bělohradský, *Kapitalismus a občanské cnosti* (Prague: Ěskoslovenský spisovatel, 1992).

society based on constitutional norms and market economics are decidedly moving away from the authoritative principles and practices of the previous regimes. On the other hand, it is proving difficult to root democratic principles in national politics, in the municipal functioning of the community, and in the everyday lives of citizens. While, in the post-Communist countries, dictatorships are not operating, it is still too early to talk about a functioning democracy. Currently, democratic institutions are too fragile and the opportunity for social initiative remains restricted. In the majority of post-Communist countries, the most descriptive term for this period would be "*democratura*," a Latin American expression used in comparative descriptions of societies in transition.²

Democracy is the continual process of adaptation and the application of consensus solutions through societal forces. In *democratura*, however, we observe what resembles a holographic picture. We see two parallel worlds that seldom cross. In one world are new democratic approaches to problem solving and in the other world, old authoritative approaches to interpreting reality and resolving differences.

An independent type of conflict is made by the confrontation of these two principles: how to interpret and solve conflict. In the transitional so-

2. Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule," in *Prospects for Democracy*, ed. Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

cietal hologram, a special conflict emerges in the interaction of the old and the new principles of conflict management. This special conflict is the basic conflict inherent in transitioning societies. Sometimes responsibility for particular parts of the basic conflict can be assigned to individuals, groups, or institutions, but not always.

Sometimes we can observe the conflict between the old and the new within social groups. Sometimes this clash manifests even on a micro level: in the thinking and behavior of individuals. The basic conflict runs continually at all levels of society. It is not as visible as the revolutionary changes of the years 1989 and 1990, but, in terms of importance, it is comparable. In the process of this conflict, there is a less visible revolution yet consequences of long-lasting proportion.

Slovakia provides a good example of this clash in the transformation between the authoritarian and democratic forms of conflict engagement and management. Slovakia's experience during the transformation process may have relevance to other post-Communist countries in transition.

SLOVAKIA, AN EXAMPLE OF THE BASIC CONFLICT

Slovakia is an interesting, almost textbook, example of how social conflict, despite expectations to the contrary, can help a transitioning society develop its democratic methodologies, psychology, institutions, and power balancing. Slovakia is a Central European country that arose

from the disintegration of the Czech and Slovak Federated Republic in 1992. Citizens of Slovakia who were 80 years old by 1993 had experienced seven state formations and eight constitutions without changing residence. Of five regimes in this period, only two can be considered democratic.

An analysis of post-Communist Slovakia renders a very heterogeneous and ambiguous picture. On the one hand, the country has a rich cultural tradition and relatively well-educated inhabitants. On the other hand, it experiences political deculturation and daily displays by the state of an arrogance of power, which does not elicit critical response from most of the citizens. Moreover, a passive and little-informed electorate living with a fragile rule of law engages daily with a surprisingly active, self-confident, and developed third sector (NGO networks).

HOW PEOPLE COPE WITH THIS CLASH DURING TRANSFORMATION

The clash between authoritarian and democratic principles and practice during a period of transition creates a host of contradictory responses, including

- free media that often offer contradictory data and confuse the onlooker or reader who is used to only one source of information;
- economic differentiation, which causes increases in social tensions; and
- old, understood stereotypes that have lost their meaning in

the face of more adaptive forms of behavior.

In the period since 1989, Slovak citizens have had five different governments. These governments have been so different that social and economic strategies have been changed several times, for example, in the process of privatizing property. The frequency of change has been so high that even specialists in the field have not been able to keep up with them.

In a period of such great flux, opposing political coalitions are not able to conduct mutually constructive discussion even when they do not have a difference of opinion, as happened, for example, concerning social programs. Nationalistic groups refuse to communicate with so-called federalist groups (political parties that were against the disintegration of Czechoslovakia) or political parties based on ethnic minorities.

In this situation, the basic conflict inherent in the Slovak transformation process manifests itself in the reaction of citizens to the unstable societal situations. The five most frequent reactions can be categorized as opportunistic, materialistic, defensive, victimlike, and mobilization.

Opportunistic response

From the opportunistic perspective, the basic conflict is perceived only from a superficial, utilitarian viewpoint: as an unclear, temporary, chaotic environment without established laws and rules that is manipulated for personal gain and benefit. Here the intersection of societal val-

ues is not important; rather, the unclear, unstable situation that accompanies it is important.

Change does not originate from the opportunity to make free decisions within the context of the free market; instead, personal contacts in the unclear environment are manipulated and utilized. People using this approach would react the same way if the transformation were in the direction of totalitarianism instead of an open society. Underlying this behavior is a mistrust of open competition, positive experiences with social manipulation, and a belief in the value of unofficial contacts and shadow structures. For many, the advantage of this approach is directly linked to the social chaos and unanchored rules. Accordingly, for some, the longer this situation lasts, the better, as it is their normative way of working in the authoritarian world. The pathology of this behavior can be seen (in a small but visible part of the population) in the corruption of family and other relationships and the manipulation of information about other people, which might include blackmail.

Conflict solving depends on closed relationships. Cooperation is possible with everybody (including those with an extreme political orientation) who reciprocates on the basis of this opportunistic behavior. The message of the opportunist is, "It is not crucial who governs and how the conflict appears or what it concerns. What is important is how I can take advantage of the conditions that generate the conflict."

Materialistic response

For those operating from a materialistic perspective, the meaning of democracy is narrowed to the outcome of economic transactions and the structures that are created by a free-market system. Interpretations of the conflict arise from this point of view. If the basic conflict within the transition process directly touches market restrictions or economic freedom, conflict is experienced very strongly. If it touches the social, cultural, or abstract value spheres, conflict is not perceived or is not considered significant.

People with a material orientation perceive conflict as a legitimate part of life. They prefer constructive negotiated solutions and stabilized rules of the game, because, from their point of view, they are more economical. The pathology of this response can be a dependency on money and the search for economic advantages resulting in an all-consuming lifestyle and passivity in social functions. Underlying the extreme materialist approach is the value of compensation as a substitute for other needs. The message of the materialistic response is, "In this transitory period, what is really happening is about economic relations. When the living standard becomes high for everyone, all important conflicts will disappear."

Defensive response

In the defensive response, the possible outcome of the basic conflict generated by the transition is seen in

win-lose terms. Conflict is defined only within the framework of power solutions. Change from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one is not perceived as a crucial change in the basic societal rules but only as a replacement of one type of authority with another, albeit one that is less understandable. The basic comprehension of democratic principles is missing, and the loss of the authoritative order is perceived as threatening. Citizens with a defensive orientation are not prepared to carry a freedom they did not fight for but merely attained, nor are they ready to carry the unwanted responsibility that freedom requires. This approach usually generates negative responses to the basic conflict of the transforming society, ranging from attack to the denial of the existence of any conflict. In the background of this response is a frustration that arises from feelings of inferiority, guilt for the past, and personal and sociopolitical immaturity. The defensive response provides an identification with authority, and the loss of freedom is perceived as release.

People with these reactions have a tendency to go back to the past and support authoritarian solutions. A typical feature of this reaction is interpretation of all opinions from a "we-they" polarization of the conflict. The escape from responsibility that is present in this reaction has various but classical forms:

- paternalistic identification with the leader (giving up one's own autonomy in decision making and leaving responsibility to the authority);
- developmental regression (behavior on the level of a dependent child);
- outwardly oriented aggression (to the enemies who threaten the leader, nation, society, or political party);
- xenophobic projection (ascribing one's own negatives, intentions, or motivations to other individuals and groups);
- rationalization of one's passivity and of one's behavior that is intolerant of ethnic groups (acceptance of the pseudo-arguments and low tolerance for populism).

In their pathological form, these projective mechanisms have an extreme character that may even lead to the unrealistic perception of reality. For the defensive reaction, the typical message is, "During the transition from totalitarianism to democracy, it is necessary to have someone with a firm hand who will lead us. Our leaders, not we, must solve problems."

Victimlike response

From a victim-oriented perspective, the basic conflict is perceived as something negative, threatening the person or society. The image associated with conflict is an outcome based on power. Civil immaturity and complete dependency are characteristics of this outlook. All previous experience by citizens supported and validated this attitude, and, with little exercise of personal risk during the transition period, many experience few positive outcomes to disturb their perception of how things now

function. Passivity and helplessness, dimensions of the victimization of the earlier regime, become sustained consequences during the transition.

To the victim, other persons, mostly leaders, are expected to solve social problems, even if such persons are neither trusted nor supported. People expressing this reaction prefer to rely on a strong authoritarian leader even if that results in a restrictive political and societal order, or even one rivaling a Communist system.

Democracy and freedom require citizens to exercise independent decision making and political responsibility. Order without this democratic responsibility is often preferred by many, though it may result in individual and societal suffering under an authoritarian-like regime. Sometimes those taking the victim stance create quite complicated and sophisticated rationalizations of their own passivity based on a mistrust of self and others. The message of the victim reaction is, "Nothing has changed due to the revolution; all the politicians are the same. There is nobody to be trusted. Everybody is thinking only about himself or herself and nobody cares about ordinary people."

Mobilization response

This response is characterized by accepting the basic conflict inherent in the transitional process as a legitimate part of the political reality. The basic conflict in a transforming society is perceived as a natural challenge, with the appeal of looking for solutions. The participating parties understand that the responsibility for the outcome is theirs. Diversity is

perceived as something positively stimulating: a high level of self-confidence enables people with this attitude to become self-assured and have the courage to cope with a greater degree of societal uncertainty, ambiguity, and frustration. Those who are able to mobilize their capacities to resolve the basic conflict demonstrate an informed attitude about their ability as individuals and as a community to solve different aspects of ongoing conflicts. This orientation helps leaders to be patient and to find the most effective place for intervening and resolving conflict.

The main message of this reaction is, "All of us are responsible together for current decisions and we are cocreating the future. Our present activities will affect our rewards and losses in the future."

Summary

It is hard to estimate the distribution or proportions of these different types of responses in society. The proportions very probably change continuously. It is important to consider and understand these different responses to the basic conflict inherent in transitional societies. Management of the basic conflict is shaped by these different responses.

The management of the basic conflict can be seen in the continuous need during the early stages of the transitional process to balance the power of the competing interests and responses struggling for control over the resolution of the basic conflict. This power struggle generates a set of conflict management dynamics, which will be outlined next.

THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT IN
TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES

During the transitional period, there is an ongoing balancing of power between parties in the social conflict. Power balancing, despite all its difficulties, enables a transforming society to progress toward strengthening the practice and development of democracy. Effectiveness by one party in achieving its goals, paradoxically, forces the other party or parties to improve their effectiveness, serving thereby to strengthen the other party or parties and the democratic process. The democratic process serves to heighten and clarify interests to the point where interest-based negotiations become possible.

An example of this democratic process relates to the diversity of responses noted in the first section. It can be seen in the efforts by the current Slovak government to manage NGOs and their independent sector interests in Slovakia over the past few years.

At the end of 1995, after an intensive governmental campaign in the media, three government-supported political parties in Slovakia introduced restrictive legislation against NGOs in part as a reaction to George Soros's public criticism of governmental policies toward the NGO sector and to the growing independence of this sector.

The government had specific goals, including placing the third sector under governmental control; reconstructing a pseudo third-sector model used during the Communist era; and restricting activities of newborn civil society. The response by the

NGO community was a half-year campaign, Third-Sector SOS.

The campaign, supported by hundreds of NGOs, was managed by Gremium, an advocacy group of elected representatives of the third sector. The aims of the campaign were to support a legal process for the approval of the proposed legislation and to begin a public discussion about the existence and function of the third sector in Slovakia. After a half-year struggle between the government and Gremium, the legislation was finally approved, in a form that Gremium did not consider ideal but acceptable. The legislation differs from the original, restrictive proposals by neither abolishing nor restricting the third sector in Slovakia. As a result of the SOS campaign, the public is better informed about the mission, goals, and activities of the third sector in a free society and about the importance of citizens and citizen initiatives in a democracy. The campaign provided Slovak citizens with a better understanding of the role and function of the NGO sector, resulting in a citizenry feeling more powerful (and less inclined to the opportunistic, materialistic, defensive, or victim roles) and becoming more active and responsible in the exercise of their civic rights.

This case offers a few examples of the typical phenomenon that arises from the clash between the old (authoritarian) and the new (more democratic) attitudes toward conflict management. The clash serves to highlight the myths of the authoritarian interpretation of conflict under democratic conditions and makes

more transparent the five responses to an unstable society noted earlier.

The myth that "a fish stinks from the head"

An old Slovak saying, "a fish stinks from the head," is used to express an attitude that to change what is wrong it is necessary to start with the bosses, or the top. During the Communist period, when all the social structures and institutions had a strong hierarchy, central decision making always came from the top to the bottom. To be able to make a decision meant having influence on the authorities, who were situated at the top of powerful structures.

In the SOS campaign, the government officials applying old authoritarian thinking sought consistently to discover who was at the top of nongovernmental structures, who or what group had the greatest power, and whom to frighten, restrict, or discredit. During the Communist regime, the government sought out unfavorable leaders of an organization, village, or factory and punished them with the intent to intimidate their subordinates.

This stereotypical response by the Slovak government against the NGO community failed because the third sector is not organized on hierarchical principles. To the government's surprise, the intimidation of visible leaders and groups did not curtail the SOS campaign.

The "media curse" myth

Applying Stalinist methods, Communist regimes in Slovakia sought to thwart independent thinking

through the use of state-controlled media. The state would promote a series of articles in the newspapers or on television that labeled individuals or certain ideas contrary to the interests of the state and would label those persons or organizations enemies, which served to prepare the ground for social lynchings: hearings in court, being fired from one's job, and so forth. During the time when the media were fully controlled by and dependent on the state and there existed only a small independent political culture, such control proved to be a sufficient tool for conflict management through repression and suppression of thought and action. However, this form of manipulation can work only in a fully controlled media environment.

In order to escalate conflict, the initial means of labeling and blaming a partner as an enemy are used.³ During the SOS campaign, the government, applying an authoritarian frame, repeatedly used the media to brand the campaign as an enemy. Government-oriented members of Parliament published very aggressive articles against the nongovernmental sector. These articles were supposed to play the role of the media curse to mark supporters of the SOS campaign as enemies and to prepare the public ground for approval of the restrictive NGO legislation. Although the electronic media are not independent, the print media have a number of independent publications, which enabled the third sector to state its case and be visible. Press

3. Susan L. Carpenter and W.J.D. Kennedy, *Managing Public Disputes* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988).

monitoring showed that during the half-year SOS campaign, more than 500 articles were published that discussed the legislation and the third sector from the NGOs' point of view. Further, more than 4000 articles were published that positively described the activities of NGOs and their importance. Research conducted in the middle part of 1996 confirmed that the level of information about the goals of nonprofit organizations in the society increased and the population positively responded to the importance and role of the NGOs.⁴

In democratically developing societies, the media curse so effective under an authoritarian regime proved to be counterproductive. The redefining of power and the ability to use power that was created by the media proved very significant.

*The "Solomon trap,"
or the myth of experts*

The "Solomon trap"⁵ refers to the nonproductive management of conflict by using experts in place of participatory processes under the rationale that a fast decision is needed or an expert is preferred. Commonly, this approach leads to an escalation of the conflict instead of resolution. Under Communist rule, "whole-societal dialogue" would be announced, which served to disguise a central decision-making process by power elites that reduced the ability

4. Martin Bútorá et al., *Slovensko 1996: Súhrn správa o stave spoločnosti* (Bratislava: NŠM, 1996).

5. Carpenter and Kennedy, *Managing Public Disputes*.

of the public to participate in decision making.

Democratic changes have brought knowledge of the necessity for the public to participate in decision making; however, not all within the power structures have accepted the concept that citizen participation brings social and political advantages. Accordingly, in transitional democracies, there is a strong tendency to fall into the "Solomon trap." While a democratically oriented public needs information to evaluate options, tools to control executive bodies, and methods to participate in decision making, power elites often prefer decision making by experts, who depend on the elites for their influence and power.

When preparing the legislation on NGOs, the Slovak government for a long time refused to publish the text of the proposal and refused to consider a proposal prepared by the legal representatives of the third sector. The government refused even to meet with the representatives of the third sector. Their rationale: this work by necessity should be left to the governmental experts. This approach, which was effective under past authoritarian regimes, proved to be a disadvantage. In Slovakia, it led to the escalation of the conflict and shifting of the balance of power through the use by the NGO community of foreign diplomacy and experts on NGO legislation.

In an effort to counter the government's use of experts, Gremium involved experts from highly respected institutions, including the International Center for Non-Profit Law, the European Foundation Center, the

British Charities Aid Foundation, and some diplomatic representatives from the European Commission and the U.S. government. All these foreign experts and diplomats expressed their criticism of the government's proposed NGO legislation and the government's procedures for excluding public involvement and response to the proposed law. In their written statements, at conferences, and during the meetings with Slovak governmental representatives, foreign experts and diplomats disclaimed as untrue the government's statements that the proposed legislation merely copied NGO governance procedures common in other democratic countries.

The "Solomon trap" backfired for the government as the NGO community itself utilized experts, which served to intensify and sharpen the conflict between the government and the NGO community. The old-regime tactics of the government became transparent as it sought to use non-democratic methods to resolve a basic conflict emerging from the transitional process itself.

*The myth of "forced union
as a society barbiturate"*

In democratic society, the satisfaction of diverse societal interests often emerges from a sustained social dialogue between those with conflicting opinions. Here an integration of interests and a plurality of options versus a unity of opinion is often the best outcome for all parties.

In the case of the preparation for the Slovak NGO legislation, the government had to solve a dilemma:

whether to reach a peaceful nonconfrontational model, in which the governmental and nongovernmental sectors complement one another, or to engage in a confrontation between the government and the nongovernment sector polarized as enemies.

While the government spoke in terms of cooperation, its actions did not lead to a partnership or integration-of-interests model but, rather, toward an authoritarian model of forced unity where NGOs are controlled by the state authorities. The government's legislative proposal would have created government-organized NGOs. When the government threatened that it would not give financial support to organizations in the SOS campaign, it anticipated that the situation would calm down and it would encourage the NGOs to accept the model of state-controlled cooperation of NGOs. This approach had worked under the Communist regimes.

With the clash between the old and new approaches to managing differences, however, the government's action achieved the opposite effect. It stimulated nongovernmental organizations to lobby and increase their activity against the government. Hundreds of written complaints were sent to the Ministry of Justice, and protests and demonstrations were held, which strongly influenced public opinion. According to public research conducted at the time, most NGOs in Slovakia, which heretofore had seen their mission only in terms of educational, social, or medical services, came to identify with the SOS campaign's definition of NGOs as organizations promoting the values of

civil society. The research concluded that NGO leaders began to understand the importance of advocacy, lobbying, and involvement to secure their legal and political operations.⁶

In an effort to force acceptance of the government's effort to control NGOs and the third sector generally, some ministers issued notices to government employees that they could not take part in educational activities, training programs, or workshops organized by the nongovernmental sector. During the Communist period, such a prohibition usually meant the secret use of services and the postponement of activities. In this case, an opposite reaction set in. With the increase in prestige and status of the NGOs and their ability to deliver quality needed training and educational programs, many state employees continued to take part in NGO-sponsored activities during their holiday time and at their own cost. This was an unforeseen response and one that was the opposite of what the government had anticipated.

6. Dušan Ondrušek, Aleš Bednař, and Zuzana Poláková, *Present Educational Needs of the NGOs in Slovakia* (Bratislava: PDCS, 1996).

CONCLUSION

This article presented how people living in societies in a transition to democracy manage conflict and the dynamics of conflict when the state is organizing its actions from a non-democratic position.

The response of people to managing conflict falls into a set of behavioral conditions based on where they perceive their advantage to be on a continuum from past authoritarianism to present and future democratization. Moreover, these reactions do not appear in a vacuum but correspond to a significant degree to how the state behaves in any particular conflictual situation. If the state employs strategies and methods associated with the old order, then many citizens will manifest a set of previous behaviors.

Much has to do with how the state acts and to what degree it manifests democratic or authoritarian methodologies. Interestingly enough, as the Slovak state, in our example, sought to implement old-regime strategies to manage the NGO community and control conflict, it consistently failed to achieve these objectives and, in the process, heightened the effectiveness and responsiveness of NGOs and the citizenry's understanding of what was at stake.

5.2 Law of Group Polarization

1999

The Law of Group Polarization

Cass R. Sunstein

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
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The Law of Group Polarization

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The Law of Group Polarization

Cass R. Sunstein*

Abstract

In a striking empirical regularity, deliberation tends to move groups, and the individuals who compose them, toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by their own predeliberation judgments. For example, people who are opposed to the minimum wage are likely, after talking to each other, to be still more opposed; people who tend to support gun control are likely, after discussion, to support gun control with considerable enthusiasm; people who believe that global warming is a serious problem are likely, after discussion, to insist on severe measures to prevent global warming. This general phenomenon -- group polarization -- has many implications for economic, political, and legal institutions. It helps to explain extremism, "radicalization," cultural shifts, and the behavior of political parties and religious organizations; it is closely connected to current concerns about the consequences of the Internet; it also helps account for feuds, ethnic antagonism, and tribalism. Group polarization bears on the conduct of government institutions, including juries, legislatures, courts, and regulatory commissions. There are interesting relationships between group polarization and social cascades, both informational and reputational. Normative implications are discussed, with special attention to political and legal institutions.

"The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in [the legislative] department of the government . . . often promote deliberation and circumspection; and serve to check the excesses of the majority."

Alexander Hamilton¹

"In everyday life the exchange of opinion with others checks our partiality and widens our perspective; we are made to see things from the standpoint of others and the limits of our vision are brought home to us. . . . The benefits from discussion lie in the fact that even representative legislators are limited in knowledge and the ability to reason. No one of them knows everything the others know, or can make all the same inferences that they can draw in concert. Discussion is a way of combining information and enlarging the range of arguments."

John Rawls²

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¹ The Federalist No. 70, at 426-37 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).

² John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 358-59 (1971).

“Each person can share what he or she knows with the others, making the whole at least equal to the sum of the parts. Unfortunately, this is often not what happens As polarization gets underway, the group members become more reluctant to bring up items of information they have about the subject that might contradict the emerging group consensus. The result is a biased discussion in which the group has no opportunity to consider all the facts, because the members are not bringing them up. . . . Each item they contributed would thus reinforce the march toward group consensus rather than add complications and fuel debate.”

Patricia Wallace³

Consider the following events:

- Affirmative action is under attack in the state of Texas. A number of professors at a particular branch of the University of Texas, inclined to be supportive of affirmative action, meet to exchange views and to plan further action, if necessary. What are these professors likely to think, and to do, after they talk?
- After a nationally publicized shooting at a high school, a group of people in the community, most of them tentatively in favor of greater gun control, come together to discuss the possibility of imposing new gun control measures. What, if anything, will happen to individual views as a result of this discussion?
- A local group of citizens, all of them Republicans, meet in 1998 to discuss whether President Clinton should be impeached. Before discussion begins, a strong majority is leaning in favor of impeachment, but they are not firmly committed to this view. A minority is entirely undecided. If a group resolution is required, what is it likely to look like?
- A jury is deciding on an appropriate punitive damage award in a case of recklessly negligent behavior by a large company; the behavior resulted in a serious injury to a small child. Before deliberating as a group, the jurors have chosen appropriate awards, leading to an average of \$1.5 million and a median of \$1 million. As a statistical generalization, how will the jury’s ultimate award tend to compare to these figures?
- A group of women are concerned about what they consider to be a mounting “tyranny of feminism.” They believe that women should be able to make their own choices, but they also think that men and women are fundamentally different, and that their differences legitimately lead to different social roles. The group decides to meet every two weeks to focus on common concerns. After a year, is it possible to say what its members are likely to think?
- There is an Internet discussion group, consisting of people concerned about the behavior of certain activities by Americans apparently associated with

³ Patricia Wallace, *The Psychology of the Internet* 81-82 (1999).

China. Over half of the participants are fearful that China might be engaged in spying and that under President Clinton, the Department of Justice has turned a blind eye, in part because of campaign contributions from Americans whose loyalties are suspect. In what directions are these Internet discussions likely to lead?

Every society contains innumerable deliberating groups. Faculties, juries, legislative bodies, political organizations, regulatory commissions, multimember courts, faculties, student organizations, religious sects, Internet discussion groups, and others engage in deliberation. A pervasive question has to do with the likely consequences of the deliberative process. It is a simple social fact that sometimes people enter discussions with one view and leave with another, even on political and moral questions.⁴ Emphasizing this fact, many recent observers have embraced the traditional American aspiration to “deliberative democracy,” an ideal that is designed to combine popular responsiveness with a high degree of reflection and exchange among people with competing views.⁵ But for the most part, the resulting literature has not been empirically informed.⁶ It has not much dealt with the real-world consequences of deliberation, and with whether any generalizations hold in actual deliberative settings.

The standard view of deliberation is that of Hamilton and Rawls, as stated above. Group discussion is likely to lead to better outcomes, if only because competing views are stated and exchanged. Aristotle spoke in similar terms, suggesting that when diverse groups “all come together . . . they may surpass – collectively and as a body, although not individually – the quality of the few best. . . . When there are many who contribute to the process of deliberation, each can bring his share of goodness and moral prudence; . . . some appreciate one part, some another, and all together appreciate all.”⁷ An important question is whether this view is naïve or excessively optimistic. Perhaps economic, psychological, and social mechanisms lead deliberating groups in unexpected and undesirable directions. If so, it would be necessary to rethink current enthusiasm for deliberation as a social phenomenon, and also to reassess and perhaps to restructure institutions that are designed as deliberating bodies.

My principal purpose in this Article is to investigate a striking but thus far almost entirely neglected⁸ empirical regularity – that of **group polarization** -- and to relate this phenomenon to a number of issues in law and political theory. In brief, group polarization arises when **members of a deliberating group move toward a more extreme point in whatever direction is**

⁴ Sometimes it may seem that moral and political arguments are unlikely to have an effect; the evidence discussed here shows that on this proposition is quite wrong as an empirical matter.

⁵ See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement* (1997); *Deliberative Democracy* (Jon Elster ed. 1998); Jürgen Habermas, *Between Law and Norms* (1997).

⁶ Exceptions include James Fearon, *Deliberation As Discussion*, in *Deliberative Democracy*, supra, at 44; Susan Stokes, *Pathologies of Deliberation*, in id. at 123; Lynn Sanders, *Against Deliberation*, *Political Theory*. Of special interest is James Fishkin’s continuing experiments with the “deliberative opinion poll,” in which groups of diverse people are asked to deliberate on public issues. See James Fishkin, *The Voice of the People* (1998); *The Poll With A Human Face* (Maxwell McCombs and Amy Reynolds eds. 1999). Fishkin’s groups do not polarize, at least not systematically; this result is undoubtedly a product of the distinctive setting, in which materials are presented on each issue, with corresponding claims of fact and value. In the experiments discussed here, the relevant arguments are introduced by the participants, not by any third party. See below for discussion of Fishkin.

⁷ Aristotle, *Politics* 123 (E. Barker trans. 1972).

⁸ I have been unable to find any sustained discussions in the relevant literature in law or political theory.

indicated by the members' pre-deliberation tendency. “[L]ike polarized molecules, group members become even more aligned in the direction they were already tending.”⁹ Group polarization is the conventional consequence of group deliberation. Thus, for example, the first deliberating group is likely to become more firmly committed to affirmative action; the second group will probably end up favoring gun control quite enthusiastically; any group resolution from the third group will tend to favor impeachment; the punitive damages jury will likely come up with an award higher than the median and perhaps higher than the mean as well; the group of women concerned about feminism is likely to become very conservative indeed on gender issues; the Internet group is likely to fear something like a conspiracy to cover up the relevant activities.¹⁰

Two principal mechanisms underlie group polarization. The first points to social influences on behavior; the second emphasizes limited “argument pools,” and the directions in which those limited pools lead group members. An understanding of these mechanisms provides many insights into legal and political issues; it illuminates a great deal, for example, about likely processes within multimember courts, juries, political parties, and legislatures – not to mention insulated ethnic groups, extremist organizations, student associations, faculties, workplaces, and families. At the same time, these mechanisms give little reason for confidence that deliberation is making things better than worse; in fact they raise some serious questions about deliberation from the normative point of view.¹¹ If deliberation simply pushes a group toward a more extreme point in the direction of its original tendency, do we have any systematic reason to think that discussion is producing improvements?

As we will see, one of the principal lessons of the group polarization phenomenon is to cast new light on an old point, to the effect that social homogeneity can be quite damaging to good deliberation.¹² When people are hearing echoes of their own voices, the consequence may be far more than support and reinforcement. Another lesson is that particular forms of homogeneity can be breeding grounds for unjustified extremism, even fanaticism. To work well, deliberating groups should be appropriately heterogeneous and should contain a plurality of articulate people with reasonable views – an observation with implications for the design of regulatory commissions, legislative committees, White House working groups, and even multimember courts.¹³ But there is a conceptual problem here: It is difficult to specify appropriate heterogeneity, and the appropriate plurality of views, without making some antecedent judgments about the substantive question at issue. I offer some comments about how to resolve that problem.

This Article is organized as follows. Part II offers some brief notations on the general question of social influences on individual judgments, with particular reference to the

⁹ See John Turner et al., *Rediscovering the Social Group* 142 (1987).

¹⁰ Compare R. Hightower and L. Sayeed, *The Impact of Computer-Mediated Communication Systems on Biased Group Discussion*, 11 *Computers in Human Behavior* 33 (1995).

¹¹ I am speaking here of real-world deliberation, not of deliberation accompanied by preconditions of the sort that have been influenced by those thinking of it in ideal terms. See Jurgen Habermas, *supra*. A particular point to emphasize here is the need for full information. See *id.*

¹² A classic discussion is John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (1859).

¹³ Compare Irving Janis, *Groupthink* (1972) (coming to the same general conclusion, but without discussing polarization).

phenomenon of social cascades. A central point here is that any particular's persons deeds and statements create an informational externality.¹⁴ When a number of people have acted or spoken, observers who lack much private information are highly likely to follow their lead. Part III offers a basic account of group polarization, with particular reference to some new data in the legal context. Part IV discusses the mechanisms that account for group polarization. Part V traces the implications for a number of issues, involving feuds, ethnic strife, juries, commissions, multimember courts, legislatures, and deliberation via the Internet. Part VI shows in what sense group polarization raises doubts about the idea that deliberation is a social good; it traces the implications of the phenomenon for proper structuring of deliberative institutions. Part VII is a brief conclusion.

II. Social Influences and Cascades

A. In General

A great deal of attention has recently been devoted to the topic of social influences on individual behavior.¹⁵ Because many of these influences are at least roughly analogous to what happens in group polarization, and because they have some bearing on deliberation as well, it will be worthwhile to offer some brief notations here.

The simplest point is that people frequently do what they do because of what they think (relevant) others do. Thus, for example, teenage girls who see that other teenagers are having babies are more likely to become pregnant themselves¹⁶; littering and nonlittering behavior appears to be contagious¹⁷; the same is true of violent crime¹⁸; those who know other people who are on welfare are more likely to go on welfare themselves¹⁹; the behavior of proximate others affects the decision whether to recycle²⁰; a good way to increase the incidence of tax compliance is to inform people of high levels of voluntary tax compliance²¹; and students are less likely to engage in binge drinking if they think that most of their fellow students do not engage in binge drinking, so much so that disclosure of this fact is one of the few successful methods of reducing binge drinking on college campuses.²²

¹⁴ See Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, *Miracle on Sixth Avenue: Information Externalities and Search*, 108 *Econ. J.* 60 (1998).

¹⁵ See, e.g., Dan Kahan, *Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence*, *Va L. Rev.* (1998). For extended overviews, see Elliott Aronson, *The Social Animal* (7th ed. 1995); Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett, *The Person and the Situation* (1991); group polarization is a surprising omission from both of these lengthy and highly illuminating treatments.

¹⁶ See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, Janet L. Yellen & Michael L. Katz, *An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the United States*, 111 *Q.J. Econ.* 277 (1996).

¹⁷ See Robert Cialdini et al., *A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places*, 58 *J. Pers. And Soc. Psych.* 1015 (1990).

¹⁸ See *Washington Post* (December 1999).

¹⁹ See Marianne Bertrand, Erzo F.P. Luttmer & Sendhil Millainathan, *Network Effects and Welfare Cultures* (unpublished manuscript, Apr. 9, 1998).

²⁰ See Ardith Spence, *Wants for Waste* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1999).

²¹ See Stephen Coleman, *The Minnesota Income Tax Compliance Experiment State Tax Results* (Minnesota Department of Revenue, April 1996).

²² See H. Wesley Perkins, *College Student Misperceptions of Alcohol and Other Drug Norms Among Peers*, in *Designing Alcohol and Other Drug Prevention Programs in Higher Education* 177-206 (US Dept. of Educ. ed. 1997); Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, *Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation*, 51 *Stan L. Rev.* 683, 767 (1999).

Social influences affect behavior via two different mechanisms.²³ The first is informational. As noted, what other people do, or say, carries an informational externality; if many other people go to a certain movie, or refuse to use drugs, or carry guns, observers are given a signal about what it makes sense to do. The second mechanism is reputational. Even if people do not believe that what other people do provides information about what should be done, they may think that the actions of others provide information about what other people think should be done. Thus each person's expressive actions come with a reputational externality. People care about their reputations, and hence they may do what they think other people think they should do, whether or not they believe that they should do it. Reputational considerations may, for example, lead people to obey or not to obey the law, smoke cigarettes, buy certain cars,²⁴ drive while drunk, help others, or talk about political issues in a certain way. They exert a ubiquitous influence on behavior.²⁵

B. Some Classic Experiments

In the most vivid experiments involving group influences, conducted by Solomon Asch, individuals were willing to abandon the direct evidence of their own senses.²⁶ In the relevant experiments, a certain line was placed on a large white card. The task of the subjects was to "match" that line by choosing, as identical to it in length, one of three other lines, placed on a separate large white card. One of the lines on the second white card was in fact identical in length to the line to be matched to it; the other two were substantially different, with the differential varying from an inch and three quarters to three quarters of an inch. The subject in the experiments was one of eight people asked to engage in the matching. But unbeknownst to the subject, the other people apparently being tested were actually there as part of the experiments.

Asch's experiments unfolded in the following way. In the first two rounds, everyone agreed about the right answer; this seemed to be an extremely dull experiment. But the third round introduced "an unexpected disturbance,"²⁷ Other group members made what was obviously, to the subject and to any reasonable person, a clear error; they matched the line at issue to one that was obviously longer or shorter. In these circumstances the subject had the choice of maintaining his independent judgment or instead yielding to the crowd. A large number of people ended up yielding. In ordinary circumstances subjects erred less than 1 percent of the time; but in rounds in which group pressure supported the incorrect answer, subjects erred 36.8% of the time.²⁸ Indeed, in a series of twelve questions, no less than 70% of subjects went along with the group, and defied the evidence of their own senses, at least once.

²³ See, e.g., Elliott Aronson, *supra* note, at 22; Lee and Ross, *supra* note, at 44-45.

²⁴ See Robert Frank, *Luxury Fever* (1999).

²⁵ Timur Kuran, *Public Truth, Private Lies* (1998), emphasizes this point.

²⁶ See the overview in Solomon Asch, *Opinions and Social Pressure*, in *Readings About the Social Animal* 13 (Elliott Aronson ed. 1995).

²⁷ *Id.* at 15.

²⁸ *Id.* at 16.

Several refinements are important here. Susceptibility to group influence was hardly uniform; some people agreed with the group almost all of the time, whereas others were entirely independent in their judgments. Significantly, the existence of at least one compatriot, or voice of sanity, mattered a great deal. When just one other person made an accurate match, errors were reduced by three-quarters, even if there was a strong majority the other way.²⁹ By contrast, varying the size of the majority mattered only up to a number of three, and increases from that point had little effect. Thus opposition from one person did not increase subjects' errors at all; opposition from two people increased error to 13.6%; and opposition from three people increased error to 31.8%, not substantially different from the level that emerged from further increases in group size.

Both informational and reputational considerations appear to have led people toward these errors. Several people said, in private interviews, that their own opinions must have been wrong. On the other hand, experimenters find greatly reduced error, in the same basic circumstances as Asch's experiments, when the subject is asked to give a purely private answer.³⁰

Asch concluded that his results raised serious questions about the possibility that "the social process is polluted" by the "dominance of conformity."³¹ He added, "That we have found the tendency to conformity in our society so strong that reasonably intelligent and well-meaning young people are willing to call white black is a matter of concern."³² Notably, however, Asch's experiments did not involve deliberation, for people were not exchanging reasons; indeed, we might expect that reason-giving would have severely weakened his results. What reasons could have been given for incorrect matches? But the existence of substantial numbers of mistakes, as a result of mere exposure to the incorrect conclusions of others, raises questions about whether and when deliberation will lead people in the right directions.

C. Cascades

Some of the most interesting recent work on social influence involves the possibility of informational and reputational "cascades"³³; this work has obvious relevance to law and politics.³⁴ Indeed, it is possible to interpret Asch's work as having demonstrated considerable individual susceptibility to cascade effects. What is striking about such effects is that their ripple-like nature, or the quality of contagion. Group polarization is sometimes, but not always, a product of cascade effects; it will be useful to understand the former against the background of the latter.

The question explored in the cascades literature is why individuals and social groups sometimes move quite rapidly in some direction or another. A starting point is that when individuals lack a great deal of private information (and sometimes even when they have

²⁹ Id. at 18.

³⁰ See Aronson, *supra* note, at 23-24.

³¹ Id. at 21.

³² Id.

³³ See Sushil Bikhchandani et al., *Learning from the Behavior of Others*, *J. Econ. Persp.*, Summer 1998, at 151

³⁴ See *id.*; Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, *Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation*, 51 *Stan L Rev* (1999).

such information), they tend to rely on information provided by the statements or actions of others. If A is unaware whether abandoned toxic waste dumps are in fact hazardous, he may be moved in the direction of fear if B seems to think that fear is justified. If A and B believe that fear is justified, C may end up thinking so too, at least if she lacks independent information to the contrary. If A, B, and C believe that abandoned hazardous waste dumps are hazardous, D will have to have a good deal of confidence to reject their shared conclusion. The result of this process can be to produce cascade effects, as large groups of people end up believing something – even if that something is false – simply because other people seem to believe it too. There is a great deal of experimental evidence of informational cascades, which are easy to induce in the laboratory³⁵; real world phenomena also seem to have a great deal to do with cascade effects.³⁶ Notice here that when a cascade is occurring, large numbers of persons end up with a shared view, not simply because of social influence, but via a particular process, in which a rivulet ends up as a flood; this is what makes cascades distinctive.

Though the cascades phenomenon has largely been discussed in connection with factual judgments, the same processes should be at work for political, legal, and moral questions; we can easily imagine political, legal, and moral cascades. Suppose, for example, that A believes that affirmative action is wrong, that B is otherwise in equipoise but shifts upon hearing what A believes, that C is unwilling to persist in his modest approval of affirmative action when A and B disagree; it would be a very confident D who would reject the moral judgments of three (apparently) firmly committed others. Sometimes people are not entirely sure whether capital punishment should be imposed, whether the Constitution protects the right to have an abortion, whether it is wrong to litter or to smoke. Many people, lacking firm convictions of their own, may end up believing what (relevant) others seem to believe. Recent changes in social attitudes toward smoking, recycling, and sexual harassment have a great deal to do with these effects.³⁷ The same process may work for the choice of political candidates, as a fad develops in favor of one or another – a cascade “up” or “down,” with sensational or ruinous consequences. We can easily imagine cascade effects in the direction of certain judgments about the appropriate course of constitutional law; indeed such effects seem to have been at work in the legal culture in the 1960s (with mounting enthusiasm for the Warren Court) and the 1980s (with mounting skepticism about that Court). It is even possible to imagine cascade effects with respect to questions of constitutional method (eg, textualism, originalism).

Thus far the discussion has involved purely informational pressures and informational cascades, where people care about what other people think because they do not know what to think, and they rely on the opinions of others, to show what it is right to think. But there can be reputational pressures and reputational cascades as well.³⁸ Here the basic idea is that people care about their reputations, and they speak out, or remain silent, or even engage in certain expressive activity, partly in order to preserve those reputations, even at the price of failing to say what they really think. Suppose, for example, that A believes that hazardous waste dumps pose a serious

³⁵ See Lisa Anderson and Charles Holt, *Information Cascades in the Laboratory*, 87 *Am Econ Rev* 847 (1997).

³⁶ See Bikhchandani et al., *A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades*, 100 *J Polit Econ* 992 (1992); Kuran and Sunstein, *supra* note.

³⁷ See Spence, *supra* note; Cass R. Sunstein, *Social Norms and Social Roles*, in Cass R. Sunstein, *Free Markets and Social Justice* ch. 2 (1997).

³⁸ See Timur Kuran, *Public Lies, Private Truths* (1996).

environmental problem; suppose too that B is skeptical. B may keep quiet, or (like some of Asch's subjects) even agree with A, simply in order to preserve A's good opinion. C may see that A believes that hazardous waste dumps pose a serious problem, and that B seems to agree with A; C may therefore voice agreement even though privately she is skeptical or ambivalent. It is easy to see how this kind of thing might happen with in political life with, for example, politicians expressing their commitment to capital punishment (even if they are privately skeptical) or their belief in God (even if they are agnostic on the question). Here too the consequence can be cascade effects – large social movements in one direction or another -- when a number of people appear to support a certain course of action simply because others (appear to) do so. What is true for factual beliefs can be true as well for moral, legal, and political judgments. People might say, for example, that affirmative action violates the Constitution simply because of perceived reputational sanctions from saying the opposite; they might support or oppose the death penalty largely in order to avoid the forms of social opprobrium that might come, in the relevant community, from taking the opposing view.

Are social cascades good or bad? No general answer would make sense. Sometimes cascades are quite fragile, precisely because people's commitments are based on little private information; sometimes cascades are rooted in (and greatly fuel) blunders. Sometimes cascade effects will eliminate public torpor, by generating concern about serious problems; but sometimes cascade effects will make people far more worried than they be, or otherwise produce large-scale distortions in private judgments, public policy, and law. The antislavery movement had distinctive cascade-like features, as did the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa; so too with Mao's Cultural Revolution and the rise of Nazism in Germany.³⁹ The serious risk with social cascades, both informational and reputational, is that they can lead to widespread errors, factual or otherwise. Cascades need not involve deliberation; but related problems infect processes of group deliberation, as we will now see.

III. How and Why Groups Polarize

A. The Basic Phenomenon

Group polarization is among the most robust patterns found in deliberating bodies, and it has been found in many diverse tasks. Polarization is said “to occur when an initial tendency of individual group members toward a given direction is enhanced [by] group discussion.”⁴⁰ The result is that groups often make more extreme decisions than would the typical or average individual in the group (where “extreme” is defined internally, by reference to the group's initial dispositions). There is a clear relationship between group polarization and cascade effects; as we will see, the former, like the latter, seems to have a great deal to do with both informational and reputational influences. A key difference is that cascade effects lead people to fall in line with an existing tendency, whereas polarization leads them to a more extreme point in the same direction.

³⁹ See *The Social Life of Nazi Germany* (1999).

⁴⁰ See Isenberg, *supra* note, at 1141.

Notice that group polarization refers not to variance among groups of any kind, but to what happens within a group discussing a case or problem.⁴¹ Consider some examples of the basic phenomenon, which has been found in an array of nations.⁴² (a) A group of moderately profeminist women will become more strongly profeminist after discussion.⁴³ (b) After discussion, citizens of France become more critical of the United States and its intentions with respect to economic aid.⁴⁴ (c) After discussion, whites predisposed to show racial prejudice offer more negative responses to the question whether white racism is responsible for conditions faced by African-Americans in American cities.⁴⁵ (d) After discussion, whites predisposed not to show racial prejudice offer more positive responses to the same question.⁴⁶ As statistical regularities, it should follow, for example, that those moderately critical of an ongoing war effort will, after discussion, sharply oppose the war; that a group moderately predisposed to hire a certain job candidate will, after discussion, support the application with considerable enthusiasm; that people tending to believe in the inferiority of a certain racial group will be entrenched in this belief as a result of discussion.

The phenomenon of group polarization has conspicuous importance to the operation of deliberating bodies of relevance to law and politics, including legislatures, commissions, multimember courts, and juries. I will return to this point shortly; for now notice a few obvious possibilities. Members of a political party, or of the principal political parties, may polarize as a result of internal discussions; party-line voting is sometimes explicable partly on this ground. A set of judges with similar predilections on a three-judge panel may well produce a more extreme ruling than any individual member would write if he were judging on his own. Extremist groups will often become more extreme; as we will soon see, the largest group polarization typically occurs with individuals already inclined toward extremes. With respect to deliberating juries, a recent study⁴⁷ found significant group polarization with respect to “numerical punishment ratings” on a bounded numerical scale. For high punishment ratings, groups tended to generate numbers higher than the median of individual predeliberation judgments; for low punishment ratings, groups tended to generate numbers lower than the median of individual predeliberation judgments. This is precisely the pattern that group polarization would predict.

B. Risky Shifts and Cautious Shifts

Group polarization was first found in a series of experiments involving risk-taking decisions.⁴⁸ Before 1961, conventional wisdom had been that as compared with the individuals who compose it, a group of decision-makers – for example a committee or board – would be

⁴¹ Of course, when different deliberating groups polarize in different directions, the consequence can be great among-group variance.

⁴² These include the United States, Canada, Germany, and France. Of course it is possible that some cultures would show a greater or lesser tendency toward polarization; this would be an extremely interesting area for empirical study.

⁴³ See D.G. Myers, Discussion-Induced Attitude Polarization, 28 *Human Relations* 699 (1975).

⁴⁴ Brown, *Social Psychology* 224 (2d ed. 1983).

⁴⁵ D.G. Myers and G.D. Bishop, The Enhancement of Dominant Attitudes in Group Discussion, 20 *J Personality and Soc. Psych.* 286 (1976),

⁴⁶ See *id.*

⁴⁷ See David Schakde et al., Are Juries More Erratic Than Individuals?, *Colum L Rev* (2000).

⁴⁸ I draw in this and the following paragraph on Brown, *supra* note, at 200-206.

likely to favor a compromise and thus to avoid risks. But the relevant experiments, originally conducted by Stoner, found otherwise; they identified what has become known as the “risky shift.”⁴⁹ Deliberation tended to shift group members in the direction of greater risk-taking; and deliberating groups, asked to reach a unanimous decision, were generally more risk-inclined – sometimes far more risk-inclined – than the mean individual member, predeliberation.

In the original experiments, male graduate students of industrial management were asked a range of questions involving risk: whether someone should choose a safe or risky play in the last seconds of a football game; whether someone should invest money in a low-return, high-security stock or instead a high-return, lower security stock; whether someone should choose a high prestige graduate program in which a number of people fail to graduate or a lower prestige school where everyone graduates. In one problem, for example, people were asked to say whether a person now having a secure, lifetime job should take a new job, with a new company with an uncertain future. People were asked about the lowest probability of “financial soundness” that would justify the person with the secure job from taking the new position. In Stoner’s studies, people first studied the problems – twelve total – and recorded an initial judgment; they were then asked to reach a unanimous decision as a group. People were finally asked to state their private judgments after the group judgment had been made; they were informed that it was acceptable for the private judgment to differ from the group judgment.

For twelve of the thirteen groups, the group decisions showed a repeated pattern toward greater risk-taking -- that is, after discussion, the unanimous outcome tended to assess the necessary likelihood of financial soundness as consistently lower than the median judgment of the group predeliberation. In addition, there was a clear shift toward greater risk-taking in private opinions as well. Only 16% were moved toward greater caution; 45% did not change at all; and a full 39% moved in the direction of greater risk-taking. This shift – the “risky” shift – was promptly duplicated in a number of diverse studies, some involving all men and some involving all women.

We should distinguish at this point between two aspects of these findings, not always separated in the psychological literature and both of relevance to law and policy. The first involves the movement of deliberating groups, for whom a group decision is necessary, toward the group’s extreme end; call this (inelegantly) group polarization toward within-group extremes. This means that if a group decision is required, the group will tend toward an extreme point, given the original distribution of individual views. Undoubtedly the group’s decision rule will matter here; a requirement of unanimity may well, for example, produce a shift toward the most extreme points, at least if those with the most extreme views are least tractable and most confident. The second involves the movement of (even private) individual judgments as a result of group influence; call this individual polarization toward within-group extremes. This means that to the extent that private judgments are moved by discussion, it will be toward a more extreme point in the direction set by the original distribution of views.

⁴⁹ See J.A.F. Stoner, A Comparison of Individual and Group Decisions Including Risk, unpublished master’s thesis, School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.A.F. Stoner, Risky and Cautious Shifts in Group Decisions, 4 J Experimental Social Psych. 442 (1968).

A possible (and contemporaneous) reading of Stoner's early studies would be that group dynamics are such as to move people – both groups and individuals within them -- in the direction of greater risk-taking. But this conclusion would be much too simple. Later studies showed that under certain conditions, it was possible, even easy to induce a “cautious shift” as well. Indeed, certain problems reliably produced cautious shifts. The principal examples involved the decision whether to marry and the decision whether to board a plane despite severe abdominal pain possibly requiring medical attention. In these cases, deliberating groups moved toward caution, as did the members who composed them.

As yet there is no simple account of what kinds of problems will produce what kinds of shifts; but the identification of risky and cautious shifts has helped produce a general account of how much, and in what direction, people will tend to move. In Stoner's original data, subsequent researchers noticed, the largest risky shifts could be found when group members “had a quite extreme risky initial position,” in the sense that the predeliberation votes were weighted toward the risky end, whereas the items “that shifted a little or not at all started out near the middle of the scale.”⁵⁰ Thus the direction of the shift seemed to turn on the location of the original disposition, and the size of the shift depended on the extremeness of that original disposition. A group of very cautious individuals would produce a significant shift toward greater caution; a group of individuals inclined toward risk-taking would produce a significant shift toward greater risk-taking; and groups of individuals in the middle would produce smaller shifts in the direction indicated by their original disposition. In short, “group discussion moves decisions to more extreme points in the direction of the original inclination . . . , which means shift to either risk or caution in the direction of the original disposition, and the size of the shift increases with the degree of the initial polarization.”⁵¹ Similar results have been found in many contexts, involving, for example, questions about economic aid, architecture, political leaders, race, feminism, and judgments of guilt or innocence.⁵² Polarization has been found for questions of obscure fact (eg, how far Sodom on the Dead Sea is below sea level) as well as for evaluative questions, including political and legal issues⁵³ and even the attractiveness of people in slides.⁵⁴

IV. Mechanisms

A. Two Mechanisms

What explains group polarization? It is tempting to think that conformity plays a large role, and as the Asch experiments suggest, individual judgments have been found to be greatly influenced by the desire to conform. Perhaps conformity is sometimes at work, but group polarization is not a matter of conformity; people do not shift to the mean of initial positions. The relevant movement goes to one or another side. Indeed, this is what defines, and what is most interesting about, group polarization.

⁵⁰ Brown at 211.

⁵¹ Brown, *supra*, at 211.

⁵² See *id.*

⁵³ A relatively recent treatment is Russell Spears, Martin Lee, and Stephen Lee, *De-Individuation and Group Polarization in Computer-Mediated Communication*, 29 *British J Soc Psych* 121 (1990)

⁵⁴ Turner et al., *supra*, at 153.

There have been two main explanations for group polarization, both of which have been extensively investigated.⁵⁵ Massive support has been found on behalf of both explanations.⁵⁶

1. Social comparison. The first, involving social comparison, begins with the claim that people want to be perceived favorably by other group members, and also to perceive themselves favorably. Once they hear what others believe, they adjust their positions in the direction of the dominant position. They may want to signal, for example, that they are not cowardly or cautious, and hence they will frame their position so that they do not appear such by comparison to other group members.⁵⁷ With respect to risk-taking activity, people want to occupy a certain position in comparison to others, and before they hear what other people think, they assume that they do in fact occupy that position. But when they hear what other people think, they find, often, that they occupy a somewhat different position, and they shift accordingly. The result is to press the group's position toward one or another extreme, and also to induce shifts in individual members. The same appears to happen in other contexts. People may wish, for example, not to seem too enthusiastic, or too restrained in their enthusiasm for, affirmative action, feminism, or an increase in national defense; hence their views may shift when they see what other group members think. The result will be both group and individual polarization toward within-group extremes.

The dynamic behind the social comparison explanation is that most people may want to take a position of a certain socially preferred sort – in the case of risk-taking, for example, they may want to be perceived (and to perceive themselves) as moderate risk-takers, and their choice of position is partly a product of this desire.⁵⁸ No one can know what such a position would be until the positions of others are revealed.⁵⁹ Thus individuals move their judgments in order to preserve their image to others and their image to themselves. A key claim here is that information alone about the actual positions of others – without discussion -- will produce a shift. Evidence has confirmed this fact; mere exposure induces a substantial risky shift (though it is less substantial than what is produced by discussion – about half as large).⁶⁰ This effect helps explain a shift toward caution (the “cautious shift”) as well.⁶¹ While highly suggestive, the “mere

⁵⁵ Isenberg, *supra*, and Brown, *supra*, review this literature; see also Turner et al., *supra*, at 142-70, for an overview and an attempt to generate a new synthesis.

⁵⁶ Note that conformity does not explain group polarization. People are not attempting to conform, even under the social comparison theory; they are attempting to maintain their relative position, and the revelation of the views of others shifts people's conception of what judgment is necessary to maintain that position. See Myers, *supra* note, at 562, indicating that people “want to perceive themselves as somewhat different from others” and that “people want to differentiate themselves from others, to a small extent and in the right direction.”

⁵⁷ On signalling generally, see Eric Posner, *Symbols, Signals, and the Law* (forthcoming 2000).

⁵⁸ For a quite vivid demonstration of such a process in the enactment of the Clean Air Act, one that does not, however, identify the mechanisms, discussed here, see Bruce Ackerman, John Millian, and Donald Elliott, *Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law*, 1 *J. L. Econ. & Organization* 313 (1985).

⁵⁹ “Once the real locations of the mean was known, should it not be the case, granting that everyone wanted to see himself as reasonably audacious, that those who were really below the mean would be motivated to adopt riskier positions and so change the mean and produce the risky shift?” Brown, *supra*, at 214.

⁶⁰ Teger and Pruitt (1967).

⁶¹ Investigations of social influence have emphasized both one-upmanship and the removal of pluralistic ignorance, that is, ignorance of what other people think (or are willing to say they think). Note that it is implicit in these findings that people seem to want not to conform, but to be different from others in a desirable way. “To be virtuous . . . is to be different from the mean – in the right direction and to the right degree.” Brown, *supra* note, at 469.

exposure” finding does not confirm the social influence account; it is possible that the views of others simply provide an informational signal, quite apart from arguments, and hence that people move not in order to maintain reputation, but to do what is right. (Recall the discussion of informational cascades.)

The social influence explanation invokes factors similar to those that underlie the reputational cascade. A major difference is that the social influence explanation concerns presentation to self as well as presentation to others. Note also that group polarization may or may not be a result of any cascade effect; the question is whether the accumulation of views from others operates in the form of a cascade. Existing work on group polarization does not answer this question.

2. Persuasive arguments. The second explanation, emphasizing the role of persuasive arguments, is based on a common sense intuition: that any individual’s position on an issue is partly a function of which arguments presented within the group seem convincing. The choice therefore moves in the direction of the most persuasive position defended by the group, taken as a collectivity. Because a group whose members are already inclined in a certain direction will have a disproportionate number of arguments supporting that same direction, the result of discussion will be to move individuals further in the direction of their initial inclinations. The key is the existence of a limited argument pool, one that is skewed (speaking purely descriptively) in a particular direction.

The persuasive arguments theory begins with the suggestion that if a group is deliberating about some difficult question with a factual answer (how many countries are there in Africa, for example, or how many people were on the planet in 1900), discussion will typically produce some movement, not toward the mean, but toward the minority view on which one or a few members have accurate information. There is, moreover, empirical evidence that with respect to facts, deliberation produces movements toward accuracy.⁶² Of course many of the questions involving group polarization do not have purely factual answers. But a key aspect of those discussions is that the person with the correct answer is likely to state his view with a high degree of confidence, and also be able to make some argument in favor of that view. Novel arguments, bringing up fresh points, are especially likely to be persuasive. In any case members of a group will have thought of some, but not all, of the arguments that justify their initial inclination; consider the question whether to take risks or to be cautious. In discussion, arguments of a large number of individuals are stated and heard, but the total argument pool will be tilted in one or another direction, depending on the predispositions of the people who compose the group; hence there will be a shift in the direction of the original tilt.⁶³

When people hear arguments that they perceive as valid, or find to be memorable, vivid, new, or weighty simply by virtue of emphasis and repetition, they will shift in the direction suggested by those arguments. If a group of moderately feminist women becomes more feminist, a group moderately opposed to gun control more extremely so, and so forth, one reason is that the argument pool of any such group will contain a preponderance of arguments in the direction

⁶² See James Fishkin and Robert Luskin, *Bringing Deliberation to the Democratic Dialogue*, in *The Poll With A Human Face* 3, 29-31 (Maxwell McCombs and Amy Reynolds eds. 1999).

⁶³ Brown, *supra*, at 219.

suggested. The suggestion is that group polarization will occur when convincing arguments produce a shift in the direction of prediscussion inclinations, revealed in the means of the initial decisions

There is an obvious analogy here to the informational cascade. In fact we can safely assume that group polarization sometimes occurs via a kind of informational cascade, as the statements of particular people begin a cascade process that culminates in extremism. The difference is that for cascade effects, what is crucial is the very fact of the belief, not its grounds, whereas for persuasive arguments to work, what is crucial is that arguments be offered and be found persuasive. It is also unclear whether any particular group polarization involves cascade effects at all; undoubtedly what sometimes happens is not a cascade effect, in which a large number of people successively “fall,” but a simple accumulation of arguments, eventually imposing weight on people whose views are subject to change.

B. Refinements -- and Depolarization

These are statistical regularities, no more. Of course not all groups polarize; some groups end up in the middle, not toward either extreme. Note that in Stoner’s original experiments, one of the twelve deliberating groups showed no polarization at all. Nor is it hard to understand why this might be so. If the people defending the original tendency are particularly unpersuasive, group polarization is unlikely to occur. If the outliers are especially convincing, groups may even shift away from their original tendency and in the direction held by few or even one.⁶⁴ In addition, affective factors appear to be quite important and complementary to persuasive arguments. People are less likely to shift if the direction advocated is being pushed by unfriendly group members; the chance of shift is increased when people perceive fellow members as friendly, likeable, and similar to them.⁶⁵ Physical spacing tends to reduce polarization; a sense of common fate and intragroup similarity tend to increase it, as does the introduction of a rival “outgroup.”⁶⁶ Part of the reason for group polarization appears to be that as a class, extreme positions tend to be less tractable and more confidently held. This point is an important complement to the persuasive arguments theory⁶⁷: The persuasiveness of arguments depends, not surprisingly, not simply on the grounds given, but also on the confidence with which they are

⁶⁴ This is of course the theme of the movie *Twelve Angry Men*, where the single hold-out, played by Henry Fonda, shifts the judgment of the jury.

⁶⁵ See Hans Brandstatter, *Social Emotions in Discussion Groups*, in *Dynamics of Group Decisions* (Hans Brandstatter et al. ed. 1978). Turner et al., *supra* note, at 154-59, attempt to use this evidence as a basis for a new synthesis, one that they call “a self-categorization theory of group polarization,” *id.* at 154. In this account, “persuasion is dependent upon self-categorizations which create a common identity within a group,” and polarization occurs “because group members adjust their opinion in line with their image of the group position (conform) and more extreme, already polarized, prototypical responses determine this image.” *Id.* at 156. The key point here is that when a group is tending in a certain direction, the perceived “prototype” is determined by where the group is leaning, and this is where individuals will shift. *Id.* at 156. As Turner et al. suggest, their account shows “overlap with many aspects of social comparison and persuasive arguments models,” and because of the overlap, I do not discuss it as a separate account here. For possible differences in predictions, and supporting evidence, see *id.* at 158-70. An especially interesting implication, perhaps in some tension with the persuasive arguments theory, is that a group of comparative extremists will show a comparatively greater shift toward extremism. See *id.* at 158.

⁶⁶ See Turner et al., *supra* note, at 153.

⁶⁷ See Maryla Zaleska, *The Stability of Extreme and Moderate Responses in Different Situations*, in *Group Decision Making*, *supra*, at 163, 164.

articulated. (Consider here both juries and multimember courts.) Group polarization can also be fortified through “exit,” as members leave the group because they reject the direction in which things are heading. If exit is pervasive, the tendency to extremism can be greatly aggravated.

Notably, the persuasive arguments theory implies that there will be “depolarization,” or convergence toward the middle, if and when new persuasive arguments are offered that are opposite to the direction initially favored by group members. There is evidence for this phenomenon as well.⁶⁸ Depolarization, rather than polarization, will also be found when the relevant group consists of individuals drawn equally from two extremes (a point to which I will return).⁶⁹ Thus if people who initially favor caution are put together with people who initially favor risk-taking, the group judgment will move toward the middle.

Group members with extreme positions generally change little as a result of discussion or shift to a more moderate position.⁷⁰ Consider a study⁷¹ consisting of six-member groups specifically designed to contain two subgroups (of three persons each) initially committed to opposed extremes; the effect of discussion was to produce movement toward the center. One reason may be the existence of partially shared persuasive arguments in both directions.⁷² Interestingly, this study of opposed subgroups found the greatest depolarization with obscure matters of fact (e.g., the population of the United States in 1900) -- and the least depolarization with highly visible public questions (e.g., whether capital punishment is justified). Matters of personal taste depolarized a moderate amount (e.g., preference for basketball or football, or for colors for painting a room).⁷³

These findings fit well with the persuasive arguments account of polarization. When people have a fixed view of some highly salient public issue, they are likely to have heard a wide range of arguments in various directions, producing a full argument pool, and an additional discussion is not likely to produce movement. Hence “familiar and long-debated issues do not depolarize easily.”⁷⁴ With respect to such issues, people are simply less likely to shift at all.

It also matters whether people think of themselves, antecedently or otherwise, as part of a group, with a degree of solidarity. If they think of themselves in this way, group polarization is all the more likely, and it is likely too to be more extreme.⁷⁵ Thus when people are “de-

⁶⁸ A third possibility is that hearing other similar opinions produces greater confidence in individual positions, opening members to a more extreme judgment in the same direction. raised recently by Heath and Gonzales . See Chip Heath and Richard Gonzales, Interaction With Others Increases Decision Confidence But Not Decision Quality: Evidence Against Information Collection Views Of Interactive Decision Making, 61 *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 305-326 (1997).

⁶⁹ See H. Burnstein, Persuasion As Argument Processing, in *Group Decision Making* (H. Brandstetter, J.H. Davis, and G. Stocker-Kreichgauer eds., 1982).

⁷⁰ Ferguson and Vidmar, Effects of Group Discussion on Estimates of Risk Levels, 20 *J Pers and Social Psych* 436 (1971).

⁷¹ Brown, *supra*, at 225.

⁷² Amiram Vinokur and Eugene Burnstein, The Effects of Partially Shared Persuasive Arguments on Group-Induced Shifts, 29 *J Personality & Social Psych.* 305 (1974).

⁷³ Amiram Vinokur and Eugene Burnstein, *supra*, at 884.

⁷⁴ Brown, *supra*, at 226.

⁷⁵ See Russell Spears, Martin Lee, and Stephen Lee, De-Individuation and Group Polarization in Computer-Mediated Communication, 29 *British J Soc Psych* 121 (1990); Patricia Wallace, *The Psychology of the Net* (1999).

individualized,” in the sense that the context emphasizes each person’s membership in the social group engaging in deliberation, polarization increases.⁷⁶

An especially interesting experiment attempted to investigate this point by manipulating two variables.⁷⁷ First, some subjects were “de-individualized” by having to work on computers in separate rooms, whereas others were asked to work in a single office with desks facing each others (the “individualized” condition). In the de-individualized condition, visual anonymity was increased. Second, some subjects were given instructions in which group membership was made salient (the “group immersion” condition), whereas others were not (the “individual” condition). For example, subjects in the group immersion conditions were told that their group consisted solely of first-year psychology students, and that they were being tested as group members rather than as individuals. All conditions were held constant in one respect: Every subject was told that people like them tended to support one or another view. The relevant issues involved affirmative action, government subsidies for the theatre, privatization of nationalized industries, and phasing out nuclear power plans.

The results were quite striking. There was the least group polarization in the de-individuated-individual condition; group polarization was greatest in the de-individuated/group immersion condition, when group members met relatively anonymously and when group identity was emphasized. Interestingly, there was no significant difference in polarization between the two individuated conditions (with and without emphasis on group immersion). From this experiment, it is reasonable to speculate that polarization is most likely to occur, and to be most extreme, under circumstances in which group membership is made salient and people have a high degree of anonymity. There is obviously a potential lesson here about the effects of group deliberation on the Internet,⁷⁸ a point to which I will return.

These remarks suggest some general, common-sensical conclusions about how and when group discussion will move predeliberation opinions. Views based on a great deal of thought are least likely to shift; depolarization can occur with equal subgroups tending in opposite directions; groups will usually shift in the direction of an accurate factual judgment where one or more members knows the truth; where views are not firmly held, but where there is an initial predisposition, group polarization is the general rule. Undoubtedly generalizations of this sort bear on shifts in individual views among many deliberating bodies.

B. Iterated “Polarization Games”?

The logic of group polarization suggests that if participants engage in repeated discussions – if, for example, they meet each month, express views, and take votes – there should be repeated shifts toward, and past, the defined pole. Thus, for example, if a group of people is thinking about genetic engineering of food, or the minimum wage, or the World Trade Organization the consequence of their discussions, over time, should be to lead in quite extreme directions. In these iterated “polarization games,” deliberation over time should produce a

⁷⁶ Spears et al., *supra*, at 122-124.

⁷⁷ *Id.*

⁷⁸ See Patricia Wallace, *The Psychology of the Internet* 73-79 (1999).

situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of any individual member before the series of deliberations began.

This is only a thought experiment; there appears to be no study of such iterated polarization games. But the hypothesized outcome is less fanciful than it might seem. In the jury study referred to above, deliberating groups frequently came up with punishment ratings, and with dollar awards, as high as or even higher than that of any individual, pre-deliberation.⁷⁹ And it is not difficult to think of real-world groups in which the consequence of deliberation, over time, appears to be to shift both groups and individuals to positions that early on, they could not possibly have accepted.⁸⁰ Iterated polarization games seem to be an important real-world phenomenon. But this raises two questions: Why and when do groups stop polarizing? Why and when do they end up at a certain point, or even shift in the opposite direction? Nothing in the literature on group polarization adequately answers these questions.⁸¹ But it is possible to speculate that polarization often ends or reverses as a result of some external shock – as, for example, when new members add new arguments, or when the simple self-interest of political leaders produces a shift in direction,⁸² or when new circumstances, of fact or value, alter the perspectives and incentives of group members. Social cascades often change direction as a result of such external shocks, as through the release of new information⁸³; the same processes seem to terminate or to reverse group polarization.

C. A Wrinkle: “Rhetorical Asymmetry”

Interestingly – and in a noteworthy qualification of the general literature on group polarization – the previously discussed study of punitive damage awards by juries found a striking pattern for dollar awards.⁸⁴ For any dollar award above zero, the general effect of deliberation was to increase awards above those of the median voter. Dollar awards did not simply polarize; while higher awards increased dramatically, as compared to the median of predeliberation votes, low awards increased as well. Why is this?

Both the original experiment and a follow-up experiment suggest that this result is a product of a “rhetorical asymmetry” that favors, other things being equal and in any contest, the person or persons urging higher awards. Thus the fact of systematic increases in dollar awards in strongly suggested of a general tendency toward upward movement; a subsequent experiment, limited to University of Chicago law students, confirmed this effect, with a substantial majority of subjects agreeing that it was easier, other things being equal, to argue for higher awards than

⁷⁹ David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, and Daniel Kahneman, *Are Juries More Erratic Than Individuals?*, 100 *Colum L Rev* (forthcoming 2000).

⁸⁰ For a relevant discussion of deliberating groups in the 1960s, see James Miller, *Democracy Is In The Streets* (1993); see also Timur Kuran, *Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades*, 27 *J Legal Stud* 623, 648 (1998).

⁸¹ See Turner et al., *supra*, at 152, suggesting that there is no clear answer to the question for “what range of situations” polarization is predicted.

⁸² See the discussion of legislators below; and note, as inevitably noisy real-world examples, the centrist shift of the Democratic Party in 1991-1992, and the apparent centrist shift of the Republican Party in 1999-2000.

⁸³ See David Hirschleifer, *The Blind Leading The Blind*, in *The New Economics Of Human Behavior* (1997).

⁸⁴ See David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, and Daniel Kahneman, *Are Juries More Erratic Than Individuals?*, 100 *Colum L Rev* (forthcoming 2000).

for lower ones.⁸⁵ In our culture, and in light of existing norms, the person favoring the higher amount for punitive damages appears likely to be more convincing than the person favoring the lower amount. It is important to emphasize that this asymmetry operates independently of any facts about the individual case. The reason appears to be that with respect to dollar awards involving a corporate defendant, stronger arguments – “we need to deter this kind of conduct,” “we need to send a powerful signal,” “we need to attract their attention” – tend to have comparatively greater weight.

Undoubtedly there are many other contexts containing rhetorical asymmetry, and undoubtedly the asymmetry can affect outcomes, as it did in the jury study. A great deal of empirical work remains to be done on this question; too little is known to say why and when such an asymmetry is at work. Existing cultural norms are the underlying source of any rhetorical asymmetry, and such norms vary over space and time, producing shifts in rhetorical asymmetry. In any case it is not difficult to generate possible examples. Legislative judgments about criminal punishment may, for example, involve an asymmetry of exactly this kind. In certain settings, those favoring lower taxes, or more aid for scholarship students, or greater funding for environmental protection may have a similar rhetorical advantage. Much remains to be explored. For present purposes the point is that group polarization may be aggravated or attenuated if one or another side has a systematic advantage in rhetoric. Perhaps the most striking implication is that when there is an initial distribution of views in a certain direction, and when a more extreme movement in that direction has a rhetorical advantage, quite extreme shifts can be expected.⁸⁶

D. Is Group Polarization Rational?

In both economics and law, a great deal of attention has recently been paid to the question whether human beings are “rational,” or “quasi-rational,” or subject to irrationality.⁸⁷ There is an obvious question whether the phenomenon of group polarization raises doubts about rational actor models in economics or law. The answer is that for the most part, individual behavior within groups, as described thus far, creates no such doubts. It is certainly rational to make assessments on the basis of arguments offered; if the most numerous and convincing arguments seem to justify a shift, individual shifts are entirely rational.⁸⁸ More difficult questions might seem to be raised by “social influence” accounts of group polarization. But it is certainly rational for people to care about their reputations. If they are changing their assessment because of reputational considerations, what must be said is that maintaining a certain reputation is part of what people care about (and there is nothing irrational about that). If people shift not for reputational reasons but because of a certain self-conception – if, for example, they think of themselves as people who are bold, or committed to a strong national defense, or left of center on

⁸⁵ See *id.* at XX.

⁸⁶ Data from *id.* strongly support this speculation, with many deliberating juries producing dollar awards higher, and sometimes significantly higher, than that of the higher individual pre-deliberation. Data to be added.

⁸⁷ Within economics, see, e.g., Gary Becker, *Accounting For Tastes* (1998); Richard Thaler, *Quasi-Rational Economics* (1993). Within law, see Symposium, *The Legal Implications of Psychology*, 51 *Vand. L. Rev.* 1499 (1998); *Behavioral Law and Economics* (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2000).

⁸⁸ Compare Hirshleifer, *supra* note (emphasizing the rationality of participation in informational cascades).

issues of race – a change in position, after exposure to the views of others, also seems entirely rational.

The problem with group polarization is not that people subject to it suffer from some cognitive or motivational defect. The problem is instead that people may be shifted, as a result of entirely rational processes, in the direction of factual, legal, or moral mistakes.

E. The Relativity of Polarization and Polarization Framing

Notwithstanding the rationality of those subject to polarization, it should be emphasized that in laboratory studies, polarization occurs in terms of a specified issue and a specified scale. The issue for exploration is therefore framed in a certain way, and here there is a potential for manipulation. The same group of individuals, for example, might be inclined to be supportive of greater employment opportunities for women and also inclined to be skeptical about “feminism”; and polarization could drive otherwise identical groups toward more extreme positions on both questions, so much so that, in theory, one group could become very strongly committed to women’s employment opportunities that it embraced feminism, whereas another group could become so skeptical of feminism that it raised questions about greater employment opportunities for women. Here there is a lesson about the pervasive importance of “framing” in generating positions about disputed questions.⁸⁹ But there is a twist on the conventional view: In the presence of polarization, questions can be framed in such a way as to shift groups, and individuals who constitute them, in distinctive and even inconsistent directions.

Now if people attempt to square their various judgments with one another, in an attempt to reach reflective equilibrium,⁹⁰ inconsistent shifts are less likely, and people ought to be less vulnerable to framing effects. In the real world, however, it is likely that polarization occurs around issues as socially framed; cultural movements of various sorts – toward greater ethnic identification, in favor of stronger national defense, on behalf of taxpayer support for the arts – are a likely consequence. Undoubtedly political entrepreneurs, with self-interested or altruistic agendas, are in some sense aware of this fact, and attempt to produce shifts along the scale that has been made salient.

V. Implications and Illustrations

A. Outside the Laboratory

Group polarization should have a large effect on any deliberating group or institution; its effects are hardly limited to the laboratory. Religious organizations tend, for example, to strengthen group members’ religious convictions, simply by virtue of the fact that like-minded people are talking to one another.⁹¹ Indeed religious groups amplify the religious impulse, especially if group members are insulated from other groups; the result can be to lead people in

⁸⁹ See Donald A. Redermeier et al., *Understanding Patients’ Decisions*, 270 JAMA 72, 73 (1993).

⁹⁰ See John Rawls. *A Theory of Justice* (1971).

⁹¹ See David G. Myers, *Polarizing Effects of Social Interaction*, in *Group Decision Making* 125, 137-38 (Hermann Barndstatter et al. eds 1982).

quite bizarre directions.⁹² Survey evidence shows that dramatic social events, like the assassination of Martin Luther King and civil rights disturbances, tend to polarize attitudes, with both positive and negative attitudes increasing within demographic groups.⁹³ A similar process can harden attitudes toward outsiders and social change; thus proposals “for establishment of a halfway house or a correctional facility have typically elicited private apprehensions which, after discussion, become polarized into overt paranoia and hostility.”⁹⁴

B. Outgroups

Group polarization has particular implications for insulated “outgroups.” Recall that polarization increases when the deliberating group is able to define itself by contrast to some other contrasting group⁹⁵; outgroups are in this position – of self-contrast to others – by definition. Excluded by choice or coercion from discussion with others, such groups may become polarized in quite extreme directions, often for no better reason than group polarization. Extremism on the part of such groups (not excluding murders and suicides) is a possible result,⁹⁶ especially if we consider the fact that extreme groups show comparatively greater polarization.⁹⁷ There is also likely to be some rhetorical asymmetry within such groups, so that arguments in a certain directions have the automatic upper hand. Consider, for example, a group of people who tend to believe that academic freedom is threatened by the tendency to “political correctness” in university life; in a debate about how much attention should be paid to (say) gender studies in the curriculum, skeptics are likely to have the upper hand.

The tendency toward polarization among outgroups raises some doubts about the idea that certain group discussion produce “consciousness raising.” It is possible, at least, that the consequence of discussion is not to raise consciousness (an ambiguous term to be sure), but to produce group polarization in one direction or another -- and at the same time to increase confidence in the position that has newly emerged.⁹⁸ This does not mean that consciousness is never raised; undoubtedly group discussion can identify and clarify problems that were previously repressed, or understood as an individual rather than social product. But nothing of this sort is established by the mere fact that views have changed and coalesced, and are held, post-discussion, with a high degree of confidence.⁹⁹

C. Feuds, Ethnic and International Strife, and War

Some of the relevant processes are at work in feuds of all kinds; one of the characteristic features of feuds is that the feuding groups tend to talk only to one another, fueling and

⁹² See Leon Festinger et al., *When Prophecy Fails* (1956).

⁹³ See R.T Riley and T.F. Pettigrew, *Dramatic Events and Attitude Change*, 34 *J Personality and Social Psych* 1004 (1976).

⁹⁴ Myers, *supra*, at 135.

⁹⁵ See Turner et al., *supra* note, at 151.

⁹⁶ Cf. Aronson, *supra* note (discussing mass suicide at Jones Beach).

⁹⁷ See *supra*; Turner et al., *supra*, at 158, 167-70.

⁹⁸ See Chip Heath and Rich Gonzalez, *Interaction With Others Increases Decision Confidence But Not Decision Quality: Evidence Against Information Collection Views of Interactive Decision Making*, 61 *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 305 (1995).

⁹⁹ See *id.*

amplifying their outrage, and solidifying their impression of the relevant events.¹⁰⁰ Informational and reputational forces are very much at work here, producing cascade effects, and group polarization sometimes leads members to increasingly extreme positions. It is not too much of a leap to suggest that these effects are also present within ethnic groups and even nations, notwithstanding the obvious fact that here there is a high degree of heterogeneity, and deliberation cannot occur among all members at the same time.

Timur Kuran, for example, has explored the phenomenon of “ethnification.” Kuran’s basic claim is that in many nations, including Turkey and the former Yugoslavia, ethnic strife is not a reawakening of long-suppressed resentments, but instead a product of reputational cascades. In this process, a failure to engage in ethnically identified activity produces reputational sanctions, which grow in intensity over time, as increasing numbers of people join the cascade. Hence “the fears and antagonisms that accompany high levels of ethnic activity may be a result of ethnification rather than its root cause.”¹⁰¹ Kuran does not refer to group polarization. But an understanding of this phenomenon would much fortify his analysis, by showing how within-group discussion (which is, under conditions of ethnification, an increasingly large percentage of total discussion) can ensure that ethnic groups, and individual members of ethnic groups, end up with a far stronger ethnic identification than the median member, before discussions began. In the extreme case, the result might be war.¹⁰² And when a war begins, group polarization, if it operates at the national level, can help ensure continued hostility and antagonism.

D. The Internet and Mass Deliberation

Many people have expressed concern about processes of social influence on the Internet.¹⁰³ The general problem is said to be one of fragmentation, with certain people hearing more and louder versions of their own preexisting commitments, thus reducing the benefits that come from exposure to competing views and unnoticed problems.¹⁰⁴ But an understanding of group polarization heightens these concerns and raises new ones. A “plausible hypothesis is that the Internet-like setting is most likely to create a strong tendency toward group polarization when the members of the group feel some sense of group identity.”¹⁰⁵ If certain people are deliberating with many like-minded others, views will not be reinforced but instead shifted to more extreme points. This cannot be said to be bad by itself – perhaps the increased extremism is good – but it is certainly troublesome if diverse social groups are led, through predictable mechanisms, toward increasingly opposing and ever more extreme views. It is likely that processes of this general sort have threatened both peace and stability in some nations¹⁰⁶; while dire consequences are unlikely in the United States, both fragmentation and violence are predictable results. As we have seen, group polarization is intensified if people are speaking anonymously and if attention is drawn,

¹⁰⁰ See Jon Elster, *The Cement of Society* (1994).

¹⁰¹ See Timur Kuran, *Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades*, 27 *J Legal Stud* 623, 648 (1998).

¹⁰² See *id.* at 650-51.

¹⁰³ See Lawrence Lessig, *Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace* 186 (1999); Andrew Shapiro, *The Control Revolution* (1999).

¹⁰⁴ See *id.*

¹⁰⁵ See Patricia Wallace, *supra* note, at 73-84.

¹⁰⁶ See Timur Kuran, *supra* note, at 635-650.

through one or another means, to group membership. Many Internet discussion groups have precisely this feature. It is therefore plausible to speculate that the Internet may be serving, for many, as a breeding group for extremism.

Consider in this regard a study not of extremism, but of serious errors within working groups, both face-to-face and online.¹⁰⁷ The purpose of the study was to see how groups might collaborate to make personnel decisions. Resumes for three candidates, applying for a marketing manager position, were placed before the groups; the attributes of the candidates were rigged by the experimenters so that one applicant was best matched for the job described. Packets of information were given to subjects, each containing only a subset of information from the resumes, so that each group member had only part of the relevant information. The groups consisted of three people, some operating face-to-face, some operating on-line. Two results were especially striking: Group polarization was common; and almost none (!) of the deliberating groups made what was conspicuously the right choice, because they failed to share information in a way that would permit the group to make an objective decision. In on-line groups, the level of bias was especially high, in the sense that members tended to share positive information about the winning candidate and negative information about the losers, while also suppressing negative information about the winner and positive information about the losers. These contributions served to “reinforce the march toward group consensus rather than add complications and fuel debate,”¹⁰⁸ This tendency was twice as large within the online groups.

It is much too early to offer a confident account of the consequences of group deliberation via computer and on the Internet. But what has been said thus far should be sufficient to show that group polarization may be especially pronounced under conditions of anonymity, in a way that magnifies mistakes and biases. Though the study just described did not involve political or moral issues, the results are plausibly taken to suggest that one-sidedness, and consequently extremeness, can be heightened when communication occurs via computer.

E. Legal and Political Institutions

With respect to legal and political institutions, there is generally little direct evidence; but it is possible to venture several points.

1. Juries. Group polarization is well-documented on juries; this is the only legal institution for which direct evidence exists. In experimental settings, polarization has been found in numerous settings with respect to guilt and innocence, and indeed this appears to be an uncontradicted finding.¹⁰⁹ Outside of the experimental setting, we know that the predeliberation verdict predicts the final outcome 90% of the time, in cases where juries do not hang; this provides “powerful presumptive evidence that group polarization occurs in real juries.”¹¹⁰

As noted, a more recent study of 300 deliberating juries found massive group polarization with respect to bounded punishment scales; groups whose median pre-deliberation vote was 3 or

¹⁰⁷ See Hightower and Sayeed, *supra* note.

¹⁰⁸ Wallace, *supra* note, at 82.

¹⁰⁹ See Brown, *supra* note, at 227-29 (collecting studies).

¹¹⁰ *Id.* at 239.

less tended to generate verdicts below that of the median voter, whereas groups whose median pre-deliberation vote was above 3 tended to generate verdicts above that of the median voter. Indeed, many such juries ended up with verdicts as low or lower (for the low verdicts) as that of the lowest predeliberation voter, and as high or higher (for the high verdicts) as that of the highest predeliberation voter. I have also noted that with respect to dollars, this study did not find group polarization, at least in any simple form; positive dollar amounts generally increased, because of the rhetorical asymmetry referred to above. On the other hand: As compared to the median of predeliberation judgments, dollar amounts increased far more at the high end, and this effect is broadly consistent with the idea of group polarization.

2. Independent regulatory commissions. The twentieth century has seen the rise of a number of “independent” regulatory commissions, including the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the National Labor Relations Board. These commissions have attracted attention mostly because their members are immune from plenary removal power by the President.¹¹¹ An equally striking but generally overlooked provision of the relevant statutes requires bipartisan membership: The independent commissions must be divided between Republicans and Democrats. A simple and undoubtedly correct explanation of this unusual requirement is that Congress wanted to ensure that no commission would be dominated by any single party. But an understanding of group polarization would strengthen any such concern on Congress’ part. An independent agency – the FCC, the NLRB, the CPSC -- that is all-Democratic, or all-Republican, might polarize toward an extreme position, likely more extreme than that of the median Democrat or Republican, and possibly more extreme than that of any member standing alone. A requirement of bipartisan membership can operate as a check against movements of this kind.

3. Multimember courts. Group polarization should also occur on multimember courts. Notwithstanding platitudes about judicial neutrality, judges often have a great deal of latitude, sometimes in the ultimate outcome, more often in determining the reach of their decision. If a court consists of three or more like-minded judges, it may well end up with a relatively extreme position, more extreme in fact than the position it would occupy if it consisted of two like-minded individuals and one of a different orientation.

There is no direct confirmation of this general proposition. But some support comes from an intriguing study of judicial behavior on the D.C. Circuit.¹¹² Under Chevron v. NRDC,¹¹³ courts are supposed to uphold agency interpretations of law so long as the interpretations are “reasonable.” When do courts obey this stricture? The study strongly suggests that group polarization plays a role. The most important finding is a dramatic difference, on the United States court of appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, between politically diverse panels (with judges appointed by Presidents of more than one party) and “unified” panels (with judges appointed by Presidents of only one party). On divided panels in which a majority of the court might be expected, on broadly speaking political grounds, to be hostile to the agency, the court

¹¹¹ See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig and Cass R. Sunstein, *The President and the Administration*, 94 Colum L Rev 1 (1994).

¹¹² See Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller, *Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine*, 107 Yale LJ 2155 (1998).

¹¹³ See US (1984)

deferred to the agency 62% of the time. But on unified panels in which the court might be expected to be hostile to the agency, the court upheld the agency interpretation only 33% of the time. Note that this was the only asymmetry in the data; when courts were expected to uphold the agency's decision on political controls, they did so over 70% of the time, whether unified (71% of the time) or divided (86% of the time). There is no smoking gun here, but it seems reasonable to speculate that the seemingly bizarre result – a mere 33% validation rate in cases in which the panel was unified – reflects a process of group polarization. A group of like-minded judges may well take the relatively unusual step of rejecting an agency interpretation, whereas as a divided panel, with a check on any tendency toward extreme outcomes, is more likely to take the conventional route.

4. Legislatures. Legislators are likely to be susceptible to group polarization, partly because of the effects of limited argument pools, perhaps above all because of social influence (and the importance of conveying a proper signal to fellow legislators and above all constituents). Imagine, for example, that a group of Republicans and a group of Democrats are thinking about how to vote on a proposed law – perhaps involving military spending, or an increase in the minimum wage, or mandatory parental leave legislation, or greater environmental protection. If Republicans are speaking mostly with Republicans, and if Democrats are speaking mostly with Democrats, we should expect a hardening of views toward the more extreme points. Undoubtedly this is part (certainly not all) of the explanation of party-line voting. And it is easy to imagine similar effects on Congress as a whole.

A result of this general kind has been documented with the original passage of the Clean Air Act.¹¹⁴ In the relevant period, there was a great deal of electoral pressure to enact some kind of clean air legislation. Both President Nixon and Senator Muskie attempted to signal to voters that they cared a great deal about the environment. The difficulty was that both of them found themselves in a kind of “politicians’ dilemma,” in which they had to urge more and more aggressive regulation – more aggressive, in fact, than either of them sought – precisely in order to maintain the preferred relative position vis-a-vis the electorate. Congress itself polarized accordingly, toward a more extreme position than most or even all individuals would have sought beforehand.

There are significant differences between the legislative process and the contexts in which group polarization has been studied, above all because members of Congress are subject to external political sanctions. Even if members are persuaded that a certain course of action makes best sense, they may vote otherwise, simply because of what their constituents want. Hence a limited argument pool, for members of a particular party, may matter much less than a clear signal from people back home. This point may explain occasional defections on both sides; certainly it explains why some members are able to resist both party pressures and the logic of group polarization. Unambiguous electoral signals can be a powerful buffer against that logic (though the signals themselves may be a function of group polarization within the electorate).

The same point bears on the relevance of social influence. Members of the Republican Party are likely to care a great deal what fellow Republicans think of them; but they probably

¹¹⁴ See E. Donald Elliott et al., *supra* note.

care still more about what local voters think of them. To be sure, the two are not independent of one another. If a certain Republican seems like an outlier among Republicans generally – for example, if he seems less sympathetic to the religious right than his colleagues – his electoral prospects might be damaged simply by virtue of this signal. But analytically, the two are different. Here too the votes of constituents may matter more than group deliberations (taking members of the same party as the relevant group).

It is important to underline here the fact that the mechanisms of group polarization may sometimes be at work with constituents as well. We can imagine a society in which Republicans speak mostly with each other; we can imagine a society in which Democrats speak mostly with one another too. If this is the situation, polarization should occur within political camps. We might think that group polarization supplies one of the many factors behind the sharp split between Republicans and Democrats on the impeachment of President Clinton.¹¹⁵

VI. Deliberative Trouble?

A. Doubts

The phenomenon of group polarization, alongside the phenomenon of social cascades, raises severe doubts about the value of deliberation. Note here that deliberation might be justified, as a social practice, on one of two grounds. It may be that on the question at issue, there is a truth of the matter – a correct answer – and deliberation might be justified as the best way of reaching it.¹¹⁶ Group decisions are more likely to be right than decisions made by individuals. Alternatively, we might favor deliberation for the opposite reason; doubting whether there is a truth of the matter, a society might seek a deliberative process on the theory that this is the only reasonable and fair way to reach a decision that will be imposed on the group.¹¹⁷ Group polarization raises no difficulty for the second sort of account; but it poses real problems for the first. If the effect of deliberation is to move people toward a more extreme point in the direction of their original tendency, why is it anything to celebrate? Nor do the mechanisms provide much reason for confidence. If people are shifting their position in order to maintain their reputation and self-conception, is there any reason to think that deliberation is making things better rather than worse? If shifts are occurring as a result of partial and frequently skewed argument pools, the results of deliberative judgments may be far worse than the results of simply taken the median of predeliberation judgments.

To be sure, those who emphasize the ideals associated with deliberative democracy tend to emphasize its preconditions, which include political equality and the goal of “reaching understanding.”¹¹⁸ In real-world deliberations, behavior is often strategic, and equality is often

¹¹⁵ For more detailed discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, *Group Dynamics*, forthcoming in *Aftermath* (2000).

¹¹⁶ This is the tendency in Gutmann and Thompson, *supra* note

¹¹⁷ See the discussion of imperfect procedural justice and pure procedural justice in John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (1971).

¹¹⁸ See Jurgen Habermas, *A Theory of Communicative Action* 99 (1984). Thus Habermas distinguishes between strategic and communicative action and stresses “the cooperatively pursued goal of reaching understanding”; compare the treatment in Gutmann and Thompson, *supra* note, at 52-94, emphasizing the idea of reciprocity, which emphasizes the desire to justify one’s position by reference to reasons.

absent in one or another form. But group polarization is likely to occur even in the face of equality and entirely conscientious efforts at reaching both truth and understanding. The existence of a limited argument pool, strengthening the existing tendency within the group, will operate in favor of group polarization even if no individual behaves strategically. By itself this will produce group polarization whether or not social influence is operating. In any case social influences need not be inconsistent with the effort to produce truth and understanding; when people attempt to position themselves in a way that fits with their best self-conception, or their preferred self-presentation, nothing has gone wrong, even from the standpoint of deliberation's most enthusiastic defenders.¹¹⁹ Perhaps group polarization could be reduced or even eliminated if we emphasized that good deliberation has full information as a precondition; but that requirement is extremely stringent, and if there is already full information, the point of deliberation is greatly reduced.¹²⁰ In any case the group polarization phenomenon suggests that in real-world situations, deliberation is hardly guaranteed to increase the likelihood of arriving at truth.

Of course we cannot say, from the mere fact of polarization, that there has been a movement in the wrong direction. Perhaps the more extreme tendency is better; recall that group polarization is likely to have fueled the antislavery movement and many others that deserve to meet with widespread approval. Extremism need not be a word of opprobrium, and in any case a group of moderates is likely, as noted, to become entrenched in its moderation by virtue of the mechanisms discussed here. In addition, group polarization can be explained partly by reference to the fact that people who are confident are likely to be persuasive; and it seems sensible to say that as a statistical matter, people who are confident are more likely to be right. But when group discussion tends to lead people to more strongly held versions of the same view with which they began, and if social influences and limited argument pools are responsible, there is little reason for great confidence in the effects of deliberation.

B. A Lesson

As a thought experiment, imagine a deliberating body consisting of all citizens in the relevant group; this may mean all citizens in a community, a state, a nation, or the world. By hypothesis, the argument pool would be very large; it would be limited only to the extent that the set of citizen views was also limited. Social influences would undoubtedly remain; hence people might shift because of a desire to maintain their reputation and self-conception, by standing in a certain relation to the rest of the group. But to the extent that deliberation revealed to people that their private position was different, in relation to the group, from what they thought it was, any shift would be in response to an accurate understanding of all relevant citizens, and not a product of a skewed group sample.

This thought experiment does not suggest that the hypothesized deliberating body would be ideal. Perhaps all citizens, presenting all individual views, would offer a skewed picture from the normative point of view. Perhaps weak arguments would be made and repeated and repeated again, while good arguments would be offered infrequently. But at least a deliberating body of

¹¹⁹ See Robert Goodin, *Laundering Preferences*, in *Foundations of Social Choice Theory* 75, 77-90 (Jon Elster and Aanund Hyllund eds. 1986).

¹²⁰ Not eliminated. There remains the question of what to do, given a certain understanding of the facts.

all citizens would remove some of the distortions in the group polarization experiments, where generally like-minded people, not exposed to others, shift in large part because of that limited exposure.

A possible conclusion would return to the need for full information, not only about facts but also about possible options and values, and suggest that in any deliberating body, it is important to ensure a wide mix of views, so as to ensure that a distorted argument pool does not produce unearned or unjustified shift. For a leader of any institution, it makes sense, in any ordinary circumstance, to try to ensure a broad array of views, simply in order to ensure against the predictable entrenchment of private judgments. The idea of a “public sphere” can be understood as an effort to ensure a domain in which multiple views can be heard, and can be heard by people having multiple perspectives.¹²¹ Thus there is reason for caution about any institutional practice that insulates people from competing arguments.¹²² Indeed, an understanding of group polarization suggests that it would be desirable to take steps to reduce the likelihood that panels on federal courts of appeals do not consist solely of appointees of presidents of any single political party.

Of course any argument pool will be limited; no one has time to listen to every point of view. But perhaps the largest lesson involves the need for caution about the effects of deliberation within groups all or most of whose members already have an extreme tendency. Heterogeneous groups are a far better source of good judgments. The principal qualification here is that heterogeneity is by itself neither here nor there; the question is how to ensure appropriate heterogeneity. For example, it would not make sense to say that in a deliberating group attempting to think through issues of affirmative action, it is important to allow exposure to the view that slavery was good and should be restored. The constraints of time and attention call for limits to heterogeneity; and – a separate point -- for good deliberation to take place, some views are properly placed off the table, simply because they are so invidious and implausible. This point might seem to create a conundrum: To know what points of view should be represented in any group deliberation, it is important to have a good sense of the substantive issues involved, indeed a sufficiently good sense as to generate judgments about what points of view must be included and excluded. But if we already know that, why should we not proceed directly to the merits? If we already know that, before deliberation occurs, does deliberation have any point at all?

The answer is that we often do know enough to know which views count as reasonable, without knowing which view counts as right, and this point is sufficient to allow people to construct deliberative processes that should correct for the most serious problems potentially created by group deliberation. What is necessary is not to allow every view to be heard, but to ensue that no single view is so widely heard, and reinforced, that people are unable to engage in critical evaluation of the reasonable competitors. In this way an understanding of group polarization provides no simple view of deliberation as a social process, but does provide an important lesson to those interested in the construction of public spaces or a well-functioning public sphere.

¹²¹ See Jurgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* 231-50 (1991).

¹²² See Lessig, *supra* note, at 186.

Of course the provision of diverse views does not guarantee good deliberation. Among other things, most people are subject to “confirmatory bias,” in accordance with which exposure to competing position will not dislodge and may even strengthen the antecedently held position.¹²³ On questions of morality and fairness, and undoubtedly less as well, those who listen to diverse opinions may well emerge from the experience with an enhanced belief in the soundness of their original commitment.¹²⁴ But this is not a universal phenomenon, and at least an understanding of competing views is likely to weaken the forms of fragmentation and misunderstanding that come from deliberation among the like-minded.

C. The Deliberative Opinion Poll: A Contrast

In an interesting combination of theoretical and empirical work, James Fishkin has pioneered the idea of a “deliberative opinion poll,” in which small groups, consisting of highly diverse individuals, are asked to come together and to deliberate about various issues. Fishkin finds some noteworthy shifts in individual views; but he does not find a systematic tendency toward polarization. In England, for example, deliberation led to reduced interest in using imprisonment as a tool for combating crime.¹²⁵ The percentage believing that “sending more offenders to prison” is an effective way to prevent crime went down from 57% to 38%; the percentage believing that fewer people should be sent to prison increased from 29% to 44%; belief in the effectiveness of “stiffer sentences” was reduced from 78% to 65%.¹²⁶ Similar shifts were shown in the direction of greater enthusiasm for procedural rights of defendants and increased willingness to explore alternatives to prison. These are not the changes that would be predicted by group polarization. The probable reason is that in Fishkin’s studies, participants were presented with a set of written materials that attempted to be balanced but that would likely move people in different directions from those that would be expected by simple group discussion. Indeed, the very effort to produce balance should be expected to shift large majorities into small ones, pressing both sides closer to 50% representation; and this is in fact what was observed.¹²⁷

In other experiments with the deliberative opinion poll, shifts included a mixture of findings, with larger percentages of individuals concluding that legal pressures should be increased on fathers for child support (from 70% to 85%) and that welfare and health care should be turned over to the states (from 56% to 66%).¹²⁸ Indeed, on many particular issues, the effect of deliberation was to create an increase in the intensity with which people held their preexisting convictions.¹²⁹ These findings are consistent with the prediction of group polarization. But this was not a uniform pattern, and on some questions deliberation increased the percentage of people holding a minority position (with, for example, a jump from 36% to 57% of people favoring

¹²³ See Jonathan Baron, *Thinking and Deciding* (1994).

¹²⁴ See *id.*

¹²⁵ Fishkin, *supra* note, at 206-07.

¹²⁶ *Id.*

¹²⁷ See *id.*

¹²⁸ Fishkin and Luskin, *supra* note, at 23.

¹²⁹ See *id.* at 22-23 (showing a jump, on a scale of 1 to 4, from 3.51 to 3.58 in intensity of commitment to reducing the deficit); a jump, on a scale of 1 to 3, from 2.71 to 2.85 in intensity of support for greater spending on education; showing a jump, on a scale of 1 to 3, from 1.95 to 2.16, in commitment to aiding American business interests abroad).

policies making divorce “harder to get”).¹³⁰ Taken as a whole, a great deal of Fishkin’s data seem to support the group polarization hypothesis; what does not is probably a product of some combination of statistical noise, effects of external presentation, and deviations produced by members of the particular groups involved.

Conclusion

In this essay I have attempted to discuss the phenomenon of group polarization and to trace some of its implications for law and political theory. The basic point is that group deliberation can create polarization of both groups and individuals. The underlying mechanisms have a great deal to do with skewed and limited argument pools, and with people’s desire to maintain relative position of a certain kind (perhaps as a heuristic, perhaps for reputational reasons, perhaps because of self-conception). Group polarization can occur on juries, within legislatures, and on multimember courts and commissions. The phenomenon helps explain why many groups go, quite surprisingly, in extreme directions.

In the abstract, and without knowing about the underlying substance, it is impossible to say whether this tendency is good or bad. But the mechanisms that underlie group polarization raise serious questions about any general enthusiasm for deliberative processes. If the argument for deliberation is that it is likely to yield correct answers to social questions, group polarization suggests the need for attention to the background conditions in which this is likely to be the case. Like-minded people, engaged in discussion with one another, may lead each other in the direction of error and falsehood, simply because of the limited argument pool and the operation of social influences. I have suggested that the best response to this problem is to attempt to ensure against social balkanization and fragmentation, through mechanisms providing a “public sphere” that is used, at once, by people with competing perspectives on facts and values. If a general public sphere is unavailable or not feasible, it becomes all the more important to ensure that in the course of deliberation, people are exposed to a range of reasonable competing views.

Of course it might seem hard to know what counts as a reasonable competing view without knowing what is actually right, and if we already know that, there might seem to be little point to deliberation. But short of knowing what is right, it is possible to know something about the range of reasonable candidates, and about who might learn from whom. Perhaps the largest lesson provided by group polarization involves the need to structure processes of deliberation so as to ensure that people are exposed, not to softer or louder echoes of their own voices, but to a range of reasonable alternatives. By itself, that lesson is very far from new; but an understanding of the potential effects of group polarization argues in favor of fresh thinking, and possible reforms, in many contemporary institutions.

¹³⁰ Id. at 23. See also id at 22 (showing an increase , on a scale of 1 to 3, from 1.40 to 1.59 in commitment to spending on foreign aid ; also a decrease, on a scale of 1 to 3, from 2.38 to 2.27 in commitment to spending on social security).

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6.1 Homelessness, Citizenship and Social Exclusion

Homelessness, citizenship and social exclusion

Patricia Kennett

This chapter considers the relationship between homelessness and the concepts of citizenship and social exclusion. The connections are complex and numerous while at the same time nebulous and changing. The meanings of the concepts themselves represent ‘contested terrain’. This chapter will argue, however, that this conceptual framework contributes to an understanding of the multiple connections between the ensembles of social rights, institutional and policy arrangements within and through which homelessness has been understood and through which the boundaries of citizenship and social exclusion have been drawn. The discussion will be located in the context of the contemporary ‘entrepreneurial’ city.

This chapter will begin with a brief discussion of the concepts of citizenship and social exclusion (for fuller discussions see Turner, 1993; Room, 1995; Bulmer and Rees, 1996; Jordan, 1996; Levitas, 1998; Lister, 1998). Developments in the post-war period will then be explored to establish the institutional, ideological and discursive context through which homelessness was constructed and the boundaries of citizenship and inclusionary and exclusionary criteria were established. The chapter will then consider the emergence of the new homelessness within an alternative policy discourse. Particularly from the early 1980s, this discourse was accompanied by the renegotiation of the content and meaning of citizenship rights. The chapter will argue that the current model of social integration and citizenship seems to be one in which there has been a re-evaluation of the notion of civil rights and an increasing emphasis on the ‘privatised’ citizen (Lister, 1990), active in the workfare state of the stakeholder society.

Citizenship and social exclusion

The concept of citizenship has a long history but is most commonly associated with the work of T.H. Marshall (1950) for whom citizenship is based upon rights and entitlements. His central theme was that the rights of citizenship involve national constitutional rights such as civil and political rights, as well as embracing social rights, each of which is closely associated with social and political institutions. The hallmark of advanced industrial democracies is the eventual institutionalisation of all three types of rights and, in particular, social citizenship. For Marshall, the citizenship rights that accrue to members of a political community integrate previously unintegrated segments of the population and serve to mitigate some of the inequalities of class, thus altering the pattern of social inequality. Marshall discusses 'class fusion' which he refers to as the "general enrichment of the concrete substance of civilised life, a general reduction of risk and insecurity, and equalisation between the more or less fortunate at all levels" (Marshall, 1950, p 6). This leads "... towards a fuller measure of equality, an enrichment of the stuff of which the status is made and an increase in the number of those on whom the status is bestowed" (p 29). Marshall's thesis has been criticised for its evolutionary and Anglocentric nature (Giddens, 1982; Mann, 1987), as well as its emphasis on class. As Marsh (1998) points out, general accounts of citizenship often render other social divisions in society, such as gender and ethnicity, invisible. Marshall (1950) also fails to recognise the contingency, flexibility and fragility of the social contract between the state and the individual and that the attainment of citizenship rights and the opportunity to exercise such rights is a process of constant struggle and negotiation. The progression from civil to political and social rights is not the smooth, inevitable process Marshall suggests, but has always been dependent on political struggles between social movements, groups and classes. Retrogression and the erosion of the rights of particular groups are an ever-present possibility.

Byrne (1997) describes the term social exclusion as "currently the most fashionable term" (p 28) for describing social divisions in European capitalist societies. It has been the catalyst for extensive debate regarding the nature of social differentiation (for example, Rodgers, et al, 1995; Room, 1995; Jordan, 1996) and is now widely utilised both in national and international policy arenas (for example, European Commission, 1994; Social Exclusion Unit, 1998). Saraceno (1997) argues that the reconstruction of debates from poverty to social exclusion has involved "an actual conceptual shift, and a change in perspective; from a static to

a dynamic approach, as well as from a distributional to a relational focus” (p 177). Lee and Murie (1997) point out that the term social exclusion is more explicitly concerned with the social rights of citizenship and the ability to exercise such rights, particularly in relation to accessing services such as housing, employment and healthcare. And, according to Abrahamson (1997) “the element that distinguishes social exclusion from poverty and makes it, perhaps, more potent, is ... the affiliation with the issue of citizenship rights” (p 148). So while Room (1991) had defined social exclusion in relation to social rights and the inability of ‘citizens’ to secure these social rights, for Tricard social exclusion refers to:

... processes and situations by which persons or groups tend to be separated or held at a distance from ordinary social exchange or positions which promote or allow integration or ‘insertion’ – that is, from participation in institutions or from access to rights, services or resources which imply full membership of society. (Tricard, 1991, p 2)

The relational dynamics between housing and social exclusion have recently been explored by Lee and Murie (1997) who seek to show “the way in which the housing system forms part of the process through which poverty and deprivation arises and is experienced” (p 4). Somerville (1998), in applying the theory of social exclusion to housing processes, explores the themes of housing production, housing tenure, residential segregation, mobility and processes associated with homelessness and leaving home. He seeks to show “how housing processes cut across the different social levels (labour process, social reproduction and ideology), how they reflect prevailing patterns of social exclusion, and how they can mitigate or reinforce those patterns” (p 761). Anderson (1999), however, argues that debates linking housing and social exclusion have tended to “neglect a significant group of people who have *no* accommodation, or have shelter which is much less secure than council housing – single homeless people” (p 157). Yet, Pleace (1998) argues that the concept of social exclusion offers the opportunity to reconceptualise single homelessness and rough sleeping. He states that “‘homelessness’ does not actually exist as a discrete social problem” (p 50). Single homelessness is best seen as an outcome of processes of social exclusion, particularly “the inability of a section of the socially excluded population to get access to welfare services and social housing” (p 50). He sees the recent policy initiatives around resettlement and inclusion for single homeless people

(for example, the Rough Sleepers Initiative) as a “development of the relationship between the understanding of single homelessness and the concept of ‘social exclusion’” (p 51).

This chapter will argue, however, that while recent policy initiatives have indeed brought the issues of rough sleeping and single homelessness back onto the agenda it has been in the context of the promotion of a ‘productivist’ rather than a redistributive social policy agenda, emphasising the active rather than the passive citizen, with labour market insertion the key to inclusion (Levitas, 1998). These themes are encapsulated in the 1994 White Paper of the European Union, *European social policy – A way forward for the Union*:

... it is clear that there needs to be a move away from more passive income maintenance measures towards active labour market measures designed to ensure the economic and social integration of all people. This means giving a top priority to employment, securing new links between employment and social policies by developing a ‘trampoline’ safety net, and recognising that those who are not in the labour market also have a useful role to play in society.... (European Commission, 1994, p 34-5)

As Esping-Andersen (1996) argues, “the idea is to redirect social policy from its current bias in favour of passive income maintenance towards active labour market programmes that ‘put people back to work’, help households harmonise work and family obligations, and train the population in the kinds of skills that post-industrial society demands” (p 3). The promotion of the active citizen is now said to be an essential element of the enterprise culture and the entrepreneurial, competitive city. It signifies the emergence of an alternative mode of integration to that maintained and supported through the post-war era of Keynesian welfare capitalism. The dimensions of citizenship, social exclusion and homelessness during this period will now be explored to highlight the contingent and temporally specific nature of citizenship, social rights and integration.

Homelessness: a thing of the past

A mode of integration in any phase of capitalist development emerges through the relationship between the state, the family, the individual and the institutional framework. Its sustainability depends on its resonance

with broader public and ontological narratives, that is, narratives which are attached to cultural and institutional formations larger than the single individual, and “personal narratives rooted in experience” (Sommers, 1994, p 619). The narratives encapsulated within the institutions of the post-war welfare state provide an insight into the nature of the webs of relationality within a mode of inclusion and their cultural and temporal specificity. The economic and political context was the promotion of Keynesian welfare capitalism organised around mass production and mass consumption of capital goods, within a largely national context. The welfare consensus emphasised an explicit commitment to state intervention through universal access to direct public provision of welfare benefits. It accepted an extended role for the state in economic and social policy and implicitly guaranteed social rights of citizenship for the whole population as a right. The discourse was that the state would ensure all citizens enjoyed a certain minimum standard of life and economic security as a matter of right. The mass consuming, mass producing, wage-earning society of the Fordist era was supported by a mode of integration encompassing a commitment to Keynesian capitalism, universal citizenship and collectively minimised individual risk, in that the state was seen as the primary guarantor against the vagaries and uncertainties of everyday life. Radical class struggle faded from political discourse and, according to Bowles and Gintis, “the language of liberal democracy, the lexicon of rights, was ... installed as the nearly universal means of political discourse” (Bowles and Gintis, 1982, p 64). The boundaries of social rights, however, were constructed within a specific narrative and that narrative reflected the privileged status of the white, male working class and the “partial citizenship” of women and black men (Kennett, 1998). While the Fordist welfare state linked the interests of capital and labour in a programme of full employment and social welfare it also involved the interplay of forms of social power other than class, such as racism and patriarchy (Williams, 1994). Thus the welfare settlement of the post-war period was a product of the “interrelation between capitalism, patriarchy and imperialism” (Williams, 1994, p 61).

In Britain the ethos of egalitarianism prevailed and the trends were towards decreasing social inequality and the gradual inclusion of previously excluded or marginal populations. On the new housing estates the move was to a more fragmented, home-centred culture as rising working-class living standards started to establish themselves. This was a period in which growing middle-class affluence enabled the further development of home-owning suburbia, while the ‘estate’ provided mass housing for

the 'respectable' working class. The Fordist regime could be characterised in terms of housing as a social right, universalism of subsidies and tax breaks and as an era of mass suburbanisation and direct state housing provision (Florida and Feldman, 1988). Personal disposable incomes rose, the rate of inflation was modest, the scale of unemployment was low and the majority of the population were well-housed. However, for the poor to be incorporated into the home ideal they had to meet certain criteria relating to personal decency and the acceptance of established behavioural norms. Issues relating to class, race, gender and sexuality were major considerations in how home was defined and who was able to gain access. Women and people from ethnic minorities were unlikely to have equal access to the capital through which the suburban home ideal could be achieved, and were likely to be denied access to local authority waiting lists (Rex and Moore, 1967; Castles and Kosack, 1973; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Henderson and Karn, 1987; Smith, 1989).

Nevertheless, the provision of state housing served to justify the institutions of the Keynesian welfare state and support the hegemony of the post-war settlement at the micro level. In Britain in 1960 7.5 million people were living in poverty (Coates and Silburn, 1970) and there were 2,558 households (10,270 by 1976) in temporary accommodation (Burke, 1981). Yet for the majority of individuals the ideological commitment to equality and welfarism was compatible with the 'lived' experience at the micro level. As Byrne points out:

... in the Fordist era, good council housing was the locale in space of an employed working class and movement into it from poor council housing and out of it to the cheaper end of the owner-occupied system was simply an incremental matter. (Byrne, 1997, p 33)

The prevailing ideology was one in which income and housing need had been met and poverty and homelessness involved a small number of people on the margins of society. The homeless population, under the 1948 National Assistance Act, was to be the object of welfare services rather than housing departments. This served to construct and maintain the undeserving status of the homeless and reinforce the individual, pathological model of homelessness. The way in which the homelessness problem was constructed, "which stressed the deviant characteristics of homeless individuals rather than issues such as housing shortage" (Neale, 1997, p 37), contributed to a policy agenda which served to render the

homeless population 'invisible' and perpetuate the logic of the public narrative that this was an era in which poverty and homelessness were a thing of the past.

Redrawing the boundaries of citizenship: risk, insecurity and the active citizen

The last 25 years have been a period of substantial flux and change during which the landscape of capitalism has been reshaped: economic, political, social and cultural activities are said to have created a new set of conditions from the past. According to Jessop selective narratives of past events generate distinctive accounts of current economic, social and political problems, from which emerge "a limited but widely accepted set of diagnoses and prescriptions for the economic and political difficulties now confronting nations, regions, and cities and their populations" (Jessop, 1996, p 3). The redrawing of the boundaries of citizenship can be seen in this context. Allen argues that "discourses of citizenship are shaped not only by the material and political realities which they (selectively) reflect, but also by the way they seek to provide justificatory explanations for, and principles to guide, the social activities which organise that reality" (1998).

As economic conditions deteriorated during the mid-1970s, the post-war consensus began to crumble. The institutional arrangements of the post-war period which had supported specific configurations of citizenship were increasingly perceived as barriers and impediments to the deploying of new methods of production and consumption. In Britain, the erosion of the post-war consensus occurred in the context of rampant inflation in the wake of the oil crisis, and involved the acceptance by the 1976 Labour government of the International Monetary Fund's prescription of income restraint, cuts in social expenditure and, ultimately, the abandonment of Keynesian policy. By the 1980s a major structural reform of the welfare state was underway linked to an alternative economic doctrine, philosophical tradition and an anti-collectivist orthodoxy. Economic individualism and supply-side economics, as advocated by Hayek and Friedman, provided the framework for the policy formulations of monetarism, and the rhetoric for the devaluation of the welfare state portraying it as a barrier to economic recovery and the road to 'serfdom' and economic ruin. Writers such as Nozick (1974) influenced the notions of the minimal state and the atomistic individualism. The critique and devaluation of state intervention incorporated all three elements as

governments sought to reintroduce market processes into the welfare state and public sector. Connotations of a bloated, self-interested and inefficient bureaucracy were introduced and supported by 'public choice' theorists (Niskanen, 1971, 1973) with recommendations for the reduction in the size and power of government agencies and the introduction of competition and market forces into welfare provision. By the end of the 1980s there was an explicit policy emphasis on market-based approaches to the delivery of services, the role of local authorities became more focused on that of enabler rather than provider, and the 'desirability' and increased role for voluntary and private agencies in social policy was enhanced. As Dean argues, "the burden of welfare provision was shifted from the state to the informal, voluntary and commercial sectors and the character of welfare transactions became, if not literally private, more akin to contractual relations in the marketplace" (Dean, 1999, p 218).

These developments were accompanied by the erosion of the relative predictability and certainty of the mass producing, mass consuming Fordist era of welfare capitalism, and a change in the balance of class relations reflecting the changing relative status of different groups and their relationship with the state. The Fordist industrial order of stability in which the life cycle of the "working-class [male] masses was predictable and, mobility wise, generally flat" (Esping-Andersen, 1993, p 227) has come to an end. The decline of Fordism has been accompanied by the rise in both professional and lower-end service occupations, changes in class composition and a recrystallisation of class forces, resulting in a declining overall standard of living for large sections of the population and a reduction in the number and quality of employment opportunities. As discussed in the last chapter, the stable, predictable patterns of the conventional Fordist life cycle, underpinned by the institutions of the welfare state, have given way to greater variety and less predictability. Thus, in contrast to the post-war period, there seems to be increasing insecurity not only in the labour market but in many aspects of day-to-day life. Changes in the structure of employment combined with the reorientation of the welfare state are said to have created an arena of risk, insecurity and uncertainty for the majority of the population, not just the poor (Forrest and Kennett, 1997), in contrast to the previous mode of inclusion.

According to Beck (1992) insecurity has emerged in the context of the increasing individualisation and autonomisation of contemporary society, and Giddens (1991, 1992, 1994) argues that in this era of reflexive modernity "the concept of risk becomes fundamental to the way both lay actors and technical specialists organise the social world" (Giddens,

1991, p 3). Within this risk culture individuals are constantly required to assess their risk status and make decisions regarding potential risk “through contact with expert knowledge ...” (Giddens, 1991, p 5). Life-style choice, life-planning and the reflexivity of the self are central to the construction of an individual’s identity in this risk environment and, in turn, are linked to the notion of ontological (or emotional) security (Giddens, 1991). Increasingly, the social relations of everyday life have come to be associated with complexity and uncertainty, independence and individualism. The ‘collective management’ of uncertainty during the post-war period has given way to what Marris refers to as “the competitive management of uncertainty” (Marris, 1996, p 14) where strategies for containing uncertainty and risks must be developed individually. Thus, there has been a transfer of risk from the state and the employer to the family and the individual and a redrawing of the boundaries of citizenship (Kennett, 1998). This reorientation is an indication that the nature and significance of the social relations of welfare change over time as does the relationship between the individual and the state. This relationship is encapsulated in the institutions and ideology of the welfare state through which the inclusionary/exclusionary boundaries of citizenship are articulated and perpetuated.

This restructuring of relations between state and civil society and the establishment of new forms of intervention were most evident during the Conservative era in Britain when there was the most profound shift towards ‘welfare pluralism’ (Dean, 1999). However, following their election in May 1997, the Blair government has pursued similar strategies indicating according to Marquand (1998) that New Labour “has turned its back on Keynes and Beveridge” (quoted in Dean, 1999, p 221). According to Dean (1999) “New Labour has combined the economic liberalism of the Thatcher/Reagan orthodoxy, with something approaching socially conservative Christian democracy” (p 221). Key policies of New Labour have been Welfare-to-Work and the New Deal. Initially introduced to overcome the problem of unemployment among young people the scope of the New Deal has been extended to include, for example, lone parents and those over 25. According to King and Wickham-Jones:

The policy recast in fundamental fashion Labour’s strategy to tackle poverty: previously, Labour administrations and social democratic thinkers had placed much weight on amelioration of general destitution through State-directed public spending programmes. New Labour, by contrast, emphasised paid work,

seemingly to the exclusion of other approaches. (King and Wickham-Jones, 1999, p 271)

They go on to point out that in contrast to the commitment to universal and unconditional social rights which was central to Marshall's conception of citizenship and to the Labour Party's welfare agenda between 1945 and 1992, conditionality, compulsion and coercion appear to be the hallmarks of the policies of the Blair administration. Sanctions and penalties, such as loss of benefit, will fall on those who either refuse to participate or who are unable to finish the New Deal programmes. The implications of this move towards conditional citizenship are as yet unclear. King and Wickham-Jones (1999) point out the uncertainty in calculating the numbers denied benefit because of Welfare-to-Work. The most recent figure they cite is that of "1,352 individuals who had lost benefit because of their failure to participate" (p 279). Dean (1999) argues that in the context of conditional citizenship one outcome might be that "more citizens will defect from their contract with the State, in the sense that they will 'disappear' into the shadowy world of the informal economy. If welfare reform does not work with the grain of everyday survival strategies the result may be more not less social exclusion" (p 232). And similarly, the emphasis on labour market insertion as the means to social inclusion fails to take account of the nature and content of employment and the fact that low pay and casualisation characterise large sectors of the labour market today.

Drawing on the work of Jessop (1994) Dean argues that "the space between the individual and the State is itself 'hollowed out' as it is subordinated to economic forces and made increasingly conditional on the citizen's individual 'stake' in the economy as a paid worker" (p 225). While recognising the importance of the political and cultural dimensions to inclusion and exclusion Madanipour argues that:

... the main form of inclusion is access to resources, which is normally secured through employment.... Marginalization and long-term exclusion from the labour market lead to an absence of opportunity for production and consumption, which can in turn lead to acute forms of social exclusion. (Madanipour, 1998, p 77)

However, participation in the labour market does not necessarily guarantee inclusion, particularly because of inadequate access to resources and the

nature of employment available. For example, a recent study on the distribution of poor households within the countries of the European Union indicated that 35% of poor households were classified as working poor (EAPN, 1997). As Levitas (1998) argues, labour market insertion as the key to inclusion serves only to obscure the differential access to resources which exists *within* the working population not just between those within the labour market and those outside. This approach obscures the complex interplay of processes which structure opportunities particularly in relation to gender and ethnicity (issues discussed further in Chapters Five and Six of this volume) and which enable people to access and maintain a reasonable standard of life. Evidence suggests that the restructuring of capitalism combined with a renegotiation of the context of citizenship rights has been accompanied by a shift towards increasing inequality, social exclusion and homelessness, particularly among young people, women and people from ethnic minorities who are increasingly likely to enter into the sphere of the state and be reliant on more basic and coercive forms of social assistance.

Homelessness and the entrepreneurial city

Homelessness is not a new or transient phenomenon, but recently has emerged as a problem affecting different kinds of areas from inner cities to rural areas, and has involved a widening spectrum of the population. A recent *Survey of English Housing* (1995/96) reported on people's experiences of homelessness. Six per cent of respondents reported that they had some experience of homelessness in the last 10 years. Of those aged 16–24 20% said that they had been homeless during the same time period and among lone parents with dependent children the figure was 29% (Green et al, 1997). Although the number of statutory homeless has continued to drop from its peak of 178,867 households in 1991, in 1996 it still represented 131,139 households in Great Britain, higher than any year before 1989 (Wilcox, 1997). Nor is homelessness among single women the 'hidden' homelessness of the past. More women can be seen sleeping rough and, particularly among younger women, there is likely to be greater use made of night shelters, with a rise of 70% in 1995 of women under 21 years old using winter shelters.

Hopper (1991) recognises novel elements of the phenomenon in terms of the scale, the heterogeneity of the homeless population in terms of gender, race and age, and the episodic nature of homelessness. While for Marcuse contemporary homelessness is distinguishable as:

... large-scale, permanent and independent of the short-term business cycle, a combination never before existing in an advanced industrial society. It represents the inability of the market and the unwillingness of the state to care for the most basic needs of a significant segment of the population ... and their consequent complete exclusion from or suppression in the spatial fabric of a technologically and economically advanced city. It may thus fairly be called 'advanced homelessness'. (Marcuse, 1993, p 359)

As alternative narratives have converged and combined in the contemporary city, so “economic, political and cultural spaces have been opened up, resulting in a restructuring of relations of inclusion and exclusion, of centrality and marginality” (Mommias, 1996, p 196). For Jessop the “intersection of these diverse economic, political and socio-cultural narratives” (Jessop, 1996, p 4) has crystallised in the context of the ‘entrepreneurial’ city where the processes through which homelessness occurs and the policy context in which it is maintained are most stark. The rhetoric of competitiveness, partnership and cohesion has dominated the discourse at both national and European Union levels. According to Oatley (1998) urban policy in Britain “has shifted from a welfare approach dominated by social expenditure to support deprived groups in depressed areas (1969–1979) to entrepreneurialism aimed at generating wealth and stimulating economic development” (p 203). Oatley lists a range of initiatives introduced during the 1990s, from City Challenge in 1991 to the Single Regeneration Budget which has become the central plank in the government’s regeneration policy, which he claims marked “a paradigm shift”. According to Oatley “These initiatives radically altered the way in which policies aimed at tackling problems of urban decline and social disadvantage were formulated, funded and administered” (1998, p x). While there is nothing new about characterising the city as the site of entrepreneurialism, what has been radically altered is the intensification of competition between urban regions for resources, jobs and capital and the policy agenda which has accompanied this intensification. With the growing importance of international competition in the global marketplace, which had played a fairly minor role in the Fordist 1950s and 1960s, major cities act as centres of economic, social, cultural and structural change as the arena is created in which cities promote innovation and entrepreneurialism in order to secure competitive advantage. The ‘managerialism’ of the 1960s has given way to what Harvey (1989) refers to as ‘entrepreneurial’ urban governance, thus facilitating the

transformation from the rigidity of Fordist production systems supported by Keynesian state welfarism, to a more geographically diverse and flexible form of accumulation. For Harvey, the basis of this new urban entrepreneurialism:

... rests ... on a public private partnership focussing on investment and economic development with the speculative construction of place rather than the amelioration of conditions within a particular territory as its immediate (though by no means exclusive) political and economic goal. (Harvey, 1989, p 16)

In both social and urban policy the emphasis is on reducing public services and stressing the role of agencies alternative to local government, and the need for a mix of private, not-for-profit and voluntary inputs. As larger cities endeavour to become transnationally important financial and control centres, urban initiatives concentrate on establishing special corporations for economic promotion in close cooperation with the private sector, thus incorporating elements of deregulation, privatisation and public-private partnership (Fainstein, 1991; Krätke and Schmoll, 1991). So while in the 1960s urban problems of poverty and inner-city decay were met by welfare initiatives and redevelopment, more recently the emphasis has been on growth based on market-oriented solutions and ‘wealth creation,’ with the consequences that:

... the inner city ... becomes a microcosm for growth strategies based on financial services and property development, on deregulation and on polarised labour markets characterised by divergent skills and growing social inequality. (Hill, 1994, p 166)

The affluent consumer and powerful corporations have become the object of urban policy and have, according to Harvey (1989), been subsidised at the expense of local collective consumption for the working class and the poor. The ‘public interest’ has become subsumed under private interests (Marcuse, 1993), increasing social division as well as reinforcing spatial divisions of consumption. The refurbishment of urban space and emphasis on cultural renewal facilitates gentrification processes and the promotion of consumption palaces, festivals and other leisure and cultural facilities as civic boosterism and place identity have become the “favoured remedies for ailing urban economies” (Harvey, 1989, p 28). As Griffiths (1998) argues “Entrepreneurialism is founded on speculation and risk-taking;

competition by its very nature, throws up winners and losers” (p 43). For the displaced and the poor the ‘image of affluence’ is likely to offer, at best, the opportunity of low paid, insecure employment and, at worst, the prospect of locating a pitch from which to panhandle for a few hours (see Winchester and White, 1988) before returning to the excluded space of the “multiply divided city” (Marcuse, 1993). Zero tolerance and coercion have become the response to destitution and poverty. Prestigious office locations install deterrents such as sprinkler systems to prevent the homeless from sleeping in their doorways, at the same time as major companies enter into a range of partnerships with voluntary organisations in the spirit of “new philanthropy” (*Housing*, 1991) for the young homeless.

Carlen argues that “at the end of the twentieth century in England the management of homelessness is not merely about housing scarcity but has also become a site of struggle over social change” (Carlen, 1996, p 10). Agencies seeking to work with the homeless have themselves become embedded in the entrepreneurialism of the city. With the emphasis on civic boosterism, according to Ruddick (1996), through their involvement with local growth coalitions in the spirit of public–private partnerships, service providers have, to some extent, become the intermediary in the production of a new social urban space in that they “manage the tensions between the visible impoverishment and global cities” (Ruddick, 1996, p 185).

Hopper (1991), Marcuse (1993) and Carlen (1996) have all pointed to the changing role of government and the nature of the homelessness industry who construct and manage the problem within the narratives of the entrepreneurial city. For Carlen “agency-maintained homelessness” occurs through:

... the bureaucratic or professional procedures for the governance of homelessness which *deter* people from defining themselves as homeless; deny that homelessness claims are justifiable under the legislation; or *discipline* the officially-defined homeless into rapidly withdrawing their claims to homeless status. (Carlen, 1996, p 59)

As well as the practices engaged in by local authorities, she highlights the “quality assurance” and “exclusionary categorisation and referral procedures” (p 59) utilised by hostel staff in the selection and management of hostel populations. Hopper (1991) argues that agencies providing services are in fact powerful interest groups in themselves and they

manipulate definitions of the problem and change their policies in ways that are most consistent with their continued existence. In Britain, as the providing state has become the enabling state, so attempts have been made to introduce market-based approaches to the delivery of local services. Thus local authorities have developed a strategic role to facilitate services and provision for the homeless through housing associations and non-profit organisations by distributing funds for which organisations have to compete. As service providers “they are the intermediaries through which flow the resources of relief to the homeless, and the people who outline how we should respond to this social phenomena” (Robertson, 1991, p 142). The ‘professional’ providers, through the bureaucratic process of fund-getting, supply information that appeals to the funding source, encouraging the development of specialised programmes which catalogue the homeless according to a range of individual vulnerabilities. The ‘homeless problem’ thus becomes defined not in terms of structural causes, but as merely an aggregate of social ‘characteristics’ symptomatic of underlying causes. The homeless population is thus reclassified as provision fragments and funding focuses on the pathological and individual characteristics of the homeless (that is, alcoholic, mentally ill) to which specialised professional skills are matched to specialised populations. It is the perceived need which becomes the social problem to which specialised caretakers can respond. Not only do these developments influence the labelling and stigma attached to being homeless, but also affect how the homeless person perceives themselves. In order to negotiate the burgeoning networks of agencies the homeless person must (re)classify her/himself into an appropriate category of perceived need.

These processes are particularly apparent in one major government initiative to combat homelessness which has been the Rough Sleepers Initiative (RSI). First initiated in London it is credited with reducing the numbers of central London rough sleepers from 1,000–2,000 in 1990 to around 270 in May 1995. (DoE, 1995). This was accompanied by the Department of Health’s Homeless Mentally Ill Initiative (HMII). The government committed £96m for the first phase of the RSI (1990–93) to organise direct access accommodation, advice, outreach work and some permanent housing association lettings. However, the 1995 Consultation Paper reported that:

... people continue to sleep out at several main sites, for example, the Strand and the Bullring at Waterloo. Their evident plight is distressing not only for them but also for those who live, work

and visit the centre of the capital, and it is frustrating for those who seek to promote London as a world-class centre for business and tourism. (DoE, 1995, p 4)

The initiative was extended for a further period and a greater emphasis was placed on “those sleeping rough or *with a clear history of sleeping rough*” (DoE, 1995, p 7; emphasis original). By March 1996 £182m had been spent on the initiative.

In 1995 the RSI model was extended outside London and local authorities were required to “quantify the extent of rough sleeping in their area, and if it existed, to examine its causes” (DoE, 1996, p 21). Only Bristol was able to ‘prove’ and document to the satisfaction of the DoE that rough sleeping was a significant problem and they were awarded £7.5m in 1996. More recently the RSI has been extended to Brighton, following their successful bid for capital and revenue funding. It could be argued that the distribution of funds has been based on a local authority’s expertise in formulating a bid rather than real need. In addition, this major focus on RSI has contributed to the perception of homelessness as rooflessness and funding has not been directed towards those people living in insecure and inappropriate condition. The emphasis on ‘rough sleepers’ has been perpetuated by the Social Exclusion Unit, and the Unit has set itself the target of reducing rough sleepers by two thirds by 2002 (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998). However, according to the Homeless Network:

... it is our contention that without either a continuing supply of new accommodation, or a significant reduction in the flow of newly homeless people into London, we are likely to see the numbers of street homeless people increase sharply over the next 18 months. (quoted in Social Exclusion Unit, 1998, p 12)

A recent report has indicated that while for many homeless people (636 or 13%) the resettlement process had had ‘positive outcomes’ in that the individuals involved were in non-RSI housing (Dane, 1998), for others (787 or 16%) the tenancy was considered to have been unsuccessful with the vast majority ending in abandonment. As one ex-tenant states “When I left I’d just had enough. It was just a big relief to walk out that door”. For another:

“... it was like living a shell hermit-like existence. I was lonely, didn’t have the money to travel into the East End I knew, couldn’t

live on my benefits. My referral agency stopped visiting me after six months and my housing association wasn't interested. I knew after six weeks that there was no future in that place for me". (quoted in Dane, 1998, p 15)

Clearly, there could be a number of explanations for these developments. They could be seen as the result of ineffective allocation, management and monitoring strategies adopted by the agencies involved. They could be seen as an example of the contradictions between the images and aspirations of the homeless themselves, and the political and policy narratives instituted by governments, for example, the assertion that "a place in a hostel has to be the start of a process that leads back to the things most of us take for granted" (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998, p 2). They could also be seen as an example of a policy agenda in which the diverse needs, expectations and aspirations of homeless people are subordinated to or subsumed within a strategy of stimulating wealth creation and enhancing competition.

Conclusion

In the context of growing inequality and insecurity, labour market participation has become the panacea for an inclusive society. While the rhetoric of social exclusion has permeated the policy discourse it is not the comprehensive and dynamic approach offered by Berghman (1995), which looks beyond the experiences of work and income which has been adopted. It is a more narrowly applied definition which is encapsulated in the emerging model of citizenship and welfare. There has been a changing balance between rights and responsibilities and between the state and civil society. Work appears to be replacing welfare while social rights focus on contractual relations and coercion.

The policy responses to increasingly visible destitution and homelessness in British cities are an indication of the changes mentioned above. The Social Exclusion Unit has shown little concern with tackling the multifarious processes through which people find themselves homeless. Instead, as cities seek to compete in the international arena, the image of people sleeping in the streets contradicts and undermines the strategies of competitiveness, partnership and cohesion. Thus, it is those sleeping rough who have become the object of a narrowly defined set of policy solutions aimed mainly at restoring legitimacy in the entrepreneurial city. The definition of inclusion perpetuated by the government combined

with the reformulation of welfare and citizenship rights will do little to stem the flow of homeless people, nor to support and maintain those attempting to reconstruct a life off the street. This unidimensional construction of social rights and emphasis on entrepreneurialism and competitiveness may benefit some. However, it is unlikely to be a context for developing a policy and institutional framework through which homeless people can achieve forms of social inclusion which are both appropriate and sustainable. As Power et al (1999) argue, factors perpetuating the homeless life-style might begin with lack of accommodation but there are other interrelated and complex factors, such as marginalisation, insecurity, identification, vulnerability, lack of choice, isolation and lack of income/employment. The narrow interpretation of social exclusion evident in current policy does not connect with the multidimensional nature of contemporary homelessness, nor utilise the existing social networks and (limited) resources which exist among the homeless themselves. Within the current mode of integration there is little likelihood of addressing the homelessness issue and it would appear that at the end of the 20th century the most extreme manifestations of social exclusion – homelessness – will continue to be a feature of British cities.

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6.2 Social Exclusion

3. The meanings of social exclusion

“Exclusion” is not a concept rooted in the social sciences, but an empty box given by the French state to the social sciences in the late 1980s as a subject to study... The empty box has since been filled with a huge number of pages, treatises and pictures, in varying degrees academic, popular, original and valuable’. (Murard, 2002:41)

Given its origins and rapid spread across nation states and global regions, it is perhaps inevitable that the phrase ‘social exclusion’ is used in different ways at different times reflecting different institutional, political, historical and geographic contexts. In this section we describe some of the meanings attaching to the concept of social exclusion and consider the relationship between these meanings and policy and actions aimed at addressing social exclusion.

3.1 Constituent elements of the concept of social exclusion

Definitions of ‘social exclusion’ variously emphasise:

- The *groups* at risk of being excluded: for example, Lenoir (1974) quoted in Silver (1994:532) wrote: ‘the excluded made up one-tenth of the French population: the mentally and the physically handicapped, suicidal people, aged invalids, abused children, drug addicts, delinquents, single parents, multi-problem households, marginal, asocial persons, and other social misfits’
- What people are *excluded from*: for example, Silver (1994: 541) notes that: ‘the literature says people may be excluded from: a livelihood; secure, permanent employment; earnings; property, credit or land; housing; the minimal or prevailing consumption level; education, skills and cultural capital; the benefits provided by the welfare state; citizenship and equality before the law; participation in the democratic process; public goods; the nation or the dominant race; the family and sociability; humane treatment, respect, personal fulfilment, understanding’
- The *problems* associated with social exclusion: for example, England’s Social Exclusion Unit (SEU’s) defined social exclusion as: ‘a shorthand for what can happen when people or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health and family breakdown’(SEU, 1997)
- The *processes* driving exclusion and the *levels* at which they operate: for example, Estivill (2003:19) argues that: ‘Social exclusion must ... be understood as an accumulation of confluent processes with successive ruptures arising from the heart of the economy, politics and society, which gradually distances and places persons, groups, communities and territories in a position of

inferiority in relation to centres of power, resources and prevailing values'

- The *agents* and *actors* involved: for example, Mike Rann, Prime Minister of South Australia commented that: 'social exclusion is created by harsh and unjust economic conditions compounded by difficult social environments and made worse by insensitive government policies and government neglect...' (South Australian Labor Party, 2002).

Importantly, the differing emphasis on one or more of these facets of 'exclusion' has different implications for policy/action to address exclusion. A selection of definitions of social exclusion is provided in Appendix 1. These definitions are drawn from academic literature, reports from governmental and intergovernmental agencies; and from the ILO country case studies. Whilst not exhaustive they do illustrate both recurring elements and subtle differences in the ways in which social exclusion is defined.

Much of the 'common ground' apparent across these definitions can be attributed to Graham Room (1992, 1995), who was instrumental in establishing social exclusion as a multidimensional, dynamic and relational concept. These three constituent elements deliver insights into the nature, consequences and implications of unequal power relationships, and point to the important conceptual contribution that 'social exclusion' can make to understanding and addressing social and health inequalities.

Multidimensional: Room's conceptual shift from poverty, as primarily concerned with income and expenditure, to social exclusion, which he argues implies multidimensional disadvantage, has since been expanded upon in the literature. Definitions now typically refer variously to different dimensions (social, economic, cultural, political) and different levels (micro e.g. individual, household; meso e.g. neighbourhoods; and macro e.g. nation state and global regions) along which a social exclusion/inclusion continuum is seen to operate.

The consensus that social exclusion is a multidimensional phenomenon is present both in the English and the Spanish literature. García Roca (1998) for example, identifies three dimensions to social exclusion: a structural or economic dimension referring to a lack of material resources associated with exclusion from the labour market; a contextual or social dimension, expressed in a lack of integration into family life and the community; and a subjective or personal dimension expressed in an erosion of self worth and increased sense of anomie. Kronauer (1998) argues that the concept of social exclusion derived from France needs to be combined with elements of the concept of the "underclass" as used in the United States of America (USA) and the UK (Murray,1990), to differentiate it from poverty. According to Kronauer, social exclusion arises when a marginal economic position and social isolation combine. In this context he argues social exclusion is a product of people's relationships with: the labour market, consumption, institutions, social relationships, culture and geographical space. Other relevant arguments have been developed by

Gaviria, Laparra and Aguilar (1995), Minujin (1998), Cabrera (2000) and Velásquez (2001), based on Tezanos (1999).

Dynamic: This refers to the changing and interactive nature of social exclusion along different dimensions and at different levels over time. Some, including Room (1995) and Barnes (2005), contend that persistence over time is an integral aspect of social exclusion, while others (Levitas et al., 2007) have argued that judgements about the importance of persistence are neither theoretically nor empirically based. Most definitions recognise that the experience of social exclusion is unequally distributed across socio-economic and ethnic groups and that it is not a static state experienced by the same social groups at all times in all places. The experience and consequences of stigmatising conditions such as HIV/AIDS, for example, differ profoundly between South Africa and the USA and between ethnic groups in the USA. Additionally, rapid structural transformations and in particular the impact of globalisation are altering the contours of exclusion and inclusion within and between nation states and global regions.

In elaborating on the dynamics of social exclusion Castel (1997) argues that the causal relationship between poverty and disadvantage and wider inequalities must be recognised: the linkage between the experience of those at the margins of society and the fundamental working of societies. To do this, he suggests, 'exclusion' should be replaced by 'disaffiliation' because "Exclusion is immobile. It designates a state or, rather, privation states [...] To speak of disaffiliation, on the other hand, is not to confirm a rupture, but to delay a journey. The concept belongs to the same semantic field as dissociation, disqualification or social invalidation. Disaffiliated, dissociated, invalidated, disqualified, with relationship to what? This is in fact the problem. [...] To look for the relationships between the situation in which one is and that from which one comes, not to autonomise the extreme situations but to link what happens in the peripheries and what arrives to the centre' (Castel, 1997:16-17). It is apparent that Castel's argument refers not only to the dynamism of the social exclusion concept but also to its relationality.

Relational: This refers to the critical conceptual shift from the focus on distributional outcomes within a poverty discourse (i.e. the lack of resources at the disposal of individuals, households and/or wider social groups) to a focus on social relationships. However, there are two linked but importantly different strands to this argument.

One focuses on the idea that social exclusion involves the rupture of relationships between people and the society in which they live. This is vividly described by Room who notes that the concept is referring to:

"people who are suffering such a degree of multidimensional disadvantage, of such duration, and reinforced by such material and cultural degradation of the neighbourhoods in which they live that their relational links with the wider society are ruptured to a degree irreversible. This is the core of the concept (..) inadequate social

participation, lack of social protection, lack of social integration and lack of power."

In his writing on social exclusion and capability deprivation Amartya Sen adopts a related perspective arguing that social exclusion focuses attention on to the disadvantages arising from being excluded from shared opportunities enjoyed by others. Looking back to classical Greece, Sen (2000:4) writes: 'In this Aristoteleian perspective, an impoverished life is one without freedom to undertake important activities that a person has reason to choose'. He draws parallels with the eighteenth century writings of Adam Smith, according to whom: "the (in)ability to appear in public without shame" is an important deprivation in itself. Indeed, for Sen, (2000:8):

'the real importance of the idea of social exclusion lies in emphasizing the role of relational features in the deprivation of capability and thus in the experience of poverty'.

A second interpretation of a relational perspective on social exclusion is that it focuses attention on inequalities as the product of social relationships that are defined historically by normative systems that assign social identities and associated power and status to different individuals, groups, classes, and even States. As in Norbert Elías' famous study in the 1960s of the English town given the pseudonym 'Winston Parva', "the exclusion and the stigmatization of those excluded turned out to be powerful weapons that were used by the old-established residents to keep their identity, to reaffirm their superiority, to maintain the outsiders firmly in their place" (Elías, 1998, [1993]:86). This approach to a relational perspective on exclusion demands a group, rather than an individual, analysis, that recognizes human interdependence as its foundation. In Michael Mann's analysis (1986:2), it is to understand the place that human groups occupy in "social power networks".

The exercise of power (economic, political, ideological or military) by human groups in social networks is unequal and it is from here that hierarchies are derived (Mann, 1986: 4). From this relational perspective, social reality viewed through the lens of social exclusion is the product of an unequal balance of power between social groups, nation states and global regions which contributes to an unequal distribution of goods and services. For these writers, without the two ingredients of redistribution and recognition it is not possible to overcome exclusion (Fraser, 1997:18). For this reason, a relational perspective implies an emancipatory dimension (involving new less hierarchical social systems), a political dimension (involving new political actors) and an institutional dimension (involving new public administrations and materiality of the state) (Fleury, 1998: 13-14).

There are other important differences in the way social exclusion is conceptualised. For example, it can be understood as a phenomenon operating in a *continuum* across society, or as affecting a *segment* of the population placed outside mainstream society. Similarly, it may be conceptualised as a *process* - a way of explaining power relationships

underlying and producing inequalities - or as a *state*, a way of describing the most disadvantaged people or social groups, who are assumed to be 'excluded' from social systems and relationships. In most definitions this 'state' is seen to be associated with (extreme) poverty.

There is also a distinction between schools of thought that emphasise *lack of participation* of individuals in society in general and labour markets in particular and those that identify social exclusion as a *lack of access to rights* as a citizen and/or member of particular group, community, society or country (Curran et al., 2007). The participation approach underpins much of the European writing on exclusion/inclusion, whereas the rights-based approach is more strongly associated with the development literature (Gore & Figueiredo, 1997). Curran et al. also suggest that the rights-based approach may be particularly relevant in the context of mental health.

However, Curran et al. (2007:295) have suggested that 'in the face of globalisation and greater international labour mobility, the rights-based and participation approaches become increasingly difficult to separate' (2007:295). The definition offered by Levitas et al. (2007:25) illustrates how both approaches can be integrated: 'Social exclusion is a complex and multi-dimensional process. It involves the lack or denial of resources, rights, goods and services, and the inability to participate in the normal relationships and activities, available to the majority of people in a society, whether in economic, social, cultural or political arenas. It affects both the quality of life of individuals and the equity and cohesion of society as a whole'.

Burchardt et al.'s (1999) definition emphasises participation: 'an individual is socially excluded if he or she does not participate in key activities of the society in which he or she lives'. This type of definition implies that social exclusion is relative, applicable to individuals living in a particular society. It leaves open question of who should decide which activities may be regarded as 'key'. This is not only an empirical question, implying the existence of a measurable inclusion/exclusion threshold according to the degree of participation in a particular activity, but also a normative one, involving the choice of key activities (or dimensions of participation necessary for inclusion) at a specified time and place.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is a strong advocate of a human rights-based approach to address social exclusion. At a recent virtual round table facilitated by the UNDP (UNDP, 2007a), it was argued that translating social exclusion as the UN non discrimination clause enables the concept to be grounded in international law applicable to the majority of states, and allows the necessary relationships between 'duty bearers' and 'claim holders' to be cultivated. From this perspective, social exclusion is understood to involve discrimination on the basis of social attributes and social identity. Marshall (1964) identified three stages in the development of rights: civil rights, political rights, and social rights. Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, a series of legally binding international treaties have established human rights standards which signatories have obligations to respect, protect and fulfil.

Civil rights include the rights to life, liberty and personal security; the right to equality before the law; the right to protection from arbitrary arrest; and the right to religious freedom. Political rights include free speech, expression, assembly and association, and political participation and vote. Economic and social rights include the rights to a family, to education, to health and wellbeing, to social security, to work and fair remuneration, to form trade unions, and to leisure time. Cultural rights include the right to benefits of culture, to the ownership of indigenous lands, rituals and shared practices, and the right to speak one's language and to 'mother tongue' education. Todd Landman (2006), in work commissioned by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), argues that social exclusion is a form of rights violation if systematic disproportionality of treatment of people across social, economic and political spheres can be demonstrated. He further argues that human rights deficits can increase people's vulnerability to exclusion.

Another key conceptual issue in the literature on social exclusion is that of *agency*. This is usually understood as a question of "who is doing the excluding?" (Atkinson, 1998) and is highly contested in the literature with attention having been directed at the causal role of 'agents' ranging from globalisation, multi-nationals and international agencies such as the World Bank and IMF, through nation states and their institutions, to excluded individuals/groups themselves. There appears to have been relatively little empirical research on the potential for agency amongst groups most severely affected by exclusionary processes. However, there is a rich literature from civil society and other sources demonstrating that rather than passive victims such groups can actively mould and/or resist exclusionary processes and their social, economic and health consequences. Importantly, this literature also gives more emphasis to the role of public services in addressing social exclusion and to issues of social justice and social solidarity than is apparent in much of the academic literature (Popay *et al.* 2008).

3.2 Making sense of diverse definitions of social exclusion

The discussion so far suggests that whilst it is possible to identify common constituent elements in the meanings attaching to the concept of social exclusion there are also important differences in emphasis and tone. Frameworks developed by Hilary Silver (1994), Ruth Levitas (1998; 2005) and Jo Beall (2002) have made important contributions to understanding the ideological and political roots of these differences and illuminating the implications for policy/action to address social exclusion.

Hilary Silver's paradigms of social exclusion

Silver argues that social exclusion is 'polysemic, i.e. it has multiple meanings and therefore requires extensive semantic definition' (1994: 536). She identifies three paradigms in which she argues the different meanings and usages of the term social exclusion are embedded. She borrowed Kuhn's definition of a paradigm as 'a constellation of beliefs,

values, techniques and so on shared by the members of a given community' (Kuhn, 1970:175). According to Kuhn (1970:7) such paradigms 'specify not only what sorts of entities the universe does contain but also, by implication, those that it does not'. As Silver notes:

'Each paradigm attributes exclusion to a different cause and is grounded in a different political philosophy: Republicanism, liberalism and social democracy. Each provides an explanation of multiple forms of social disadvantage – economic, social, political and cultural – and thus encompasses theories of citizenship and racial-ethnic inequality as well as poverty and long-term unemployment' (Silver 1994: 539).

The *Solidarity paradigm* is embedded in French Republican political ideology, and views exclusion as the breakdown of a social bond between the individual and society that is cultural and moral, rather than economic. It draws on Durkheimian social theory: 'like deviance or anomie, exclusion both threatens and reinforces social cohesion' (Silver 1994:542). More recent uses incorporate multicultural notions of how the basis of solidarity is reconfigured.

The *Specialization paradigm* typifies Anglo-American liberal thought about exclusion. It perceives social actors primarily as individuals, who are able to move freely across boundaries of horizontal social differentiation and economic divisions of labour. This paradigm holds that exclusion is a form of discrimination. The roots of exclusion are to be found in unenforced rights and market failures. The specialization paradigm emphasises the individual and micro-sociological causes of economic exclusion; however, social liberals are also cognisant of the effects of structural change. According to Silver (1994:560): 'The split between supply-side and demand-side theories parallels the division between classical and social liberalism... In contrast to supply-side theoreticians who attribute poverty or unemployment to individual failings, most sociologists now accept that the new poverty and long-term unemployment have demand-side or structural causes'.

The *Monopoly paradigm*, influential on the European Left, sees exclusion as the result of the formation of group monopolies, restricting access of outsiders to resources. 'Drawing heavily on Weber, and, to a lesser extent, Marx, it views the social order as coercive, imposed through a set of hierarchical power relations. In this social democratic or conflict theory, exclusion arises from the interplay of class, status and political power and serves the political interests of the included... Exclusion is combated through citizenship, and the extension of equal membership and full participation in the community to outsiders' (Silver 1994: 543). In this paradigm, theories of labour market segmentation epitomise the link between social closure and economic exclusion.

Importantly, the focus in Silver's analysis is on the role of political ideology in generating different understandings of the nature and causes of social exclusion, and by implication different approaches to

policy/action to address social exclusion. However, there are limitations to this typology. Each of Silver's paradigms presents exclusion as based in social relationships between two groups: the included and the excluded. Whilst drawing attention to the 'actors' and 'forces' driving exclusionary processes this dichotomous approach fails to take account of the social gradients in access to resources and power evident in all societies. The paradigms also fail to account for the differential emphasis placed in different definitions on the potential for agency by people experiencing exclusionary processes. Finally, and importantly from the perspective of this paper, Silver's paradigms are shaped around advanced Western democracies. Their applicability in the global context remains therefore to be demonstrated, although in later writings, Silver extended the analysis to the Americas (2004, 2005).

Ruth Levitas' discourses of social exclusion

Silver is primarily concerned to illuminate the political ideologies underpinning different definitions of social exclusion. Whilst she raises questions about the significance for policy of these differences she does not consider these in detail. In contrast, Ruth Levitas (2005) is primarily concerned to illuminate how ideological underpinnings for concepts of social exclusion change over time and how these are translated into different policies/action. Her focus is the UK and her work is based on an analysis of political discourse over the past two decades or more. As she notes: 'a discourse constitutes ways of acting in the world, as well as a description of it. It both opens up and closes down possibility for action' (Levitas: 2005:3). Levitas identifies three different social exclusion discourses in the UK. These are described briefly below.

The *redistributionist discourse (RED)*, emphasises poverty as a prime cause of social exclusion. It posits citizenship as the obverse of exclusion: 'poverty spells exclusion from the full rights of citizenship... and undermines people's ability to fulfil the private and public obligations of citizenship' (Lister,1990:68). RED addresses social, political, cultural and economic citizenship, broadening out into a critique of inequality (Levitas, 2005:14).

The *moral underclass discourse (MUD)* emphasises cultural rather than material explanations of poverty, resonating with the work of Charles Murray (1990), whereby the excluded are to blame for their fate. It focuses on the behaviour of the poor and implies welfare benefits are bad as they undermine people's ability to be self sufficient creating dependency. It is a strongly gendered discourse. (Levitas 2005:21).

The *social integrationist discourse (SID)* sees social inclusion and exclusion primarily in terms of labour market attachment. It obscures inequalities between paid workers, particularly gender inequalities (Levitas,2005:26).

Levitas argues that RED, SID and MUD are:

'... ways of thinking about exclusion that imply different strategies for its abolition. In RED, the assumption is that the resources available in cash or kind to the poor need to be increased both relatively and absolutely, implying both improved levels of income maintenance and better access to public and private services. In SID, the solution is increased labour market participation, for paid work is claimed to deliver inclusion both directly and indirectly through the income it provides. In MUD, the emphasis is on changing behaviour through a mix of sticks and carrots – manipulation of welfare benefits, sanctions for non-compliance and intensive social work with individuals' (Levitas,2005:x).

Her analysis is strongly informed by a socialist feminist perspective. In particular she points to the contradictions inherent in policies that valorise unpaid work (e.g. promote good quality parenting as a mechanism to address anti-social behaviour) whilst at the same time linking income maintenance entitlement to formal employment.

Although Levitas's framework focuses on contemporary Britain and is particularly applicable to states with established welfare systems, it has a broader relevance highlighting key issues concerning the nature of public policy responses to multiple social disadvantages. In the context of the UK, for example, she argues that policies to address social exclusion have moved from a concern with distributional equality to focus on ways of:

'lifting the poor over the boundary of a minimum standard – or to be more accurate, inducing those who are sufficiently sound in wind and limb to jump over it – while leaving untouched the overall pattern of inequality, especially the rich' (Levitas, 2005:156).

In a similar vein, Veit-Wilson (1998), differentiates between 'weak and 'strong' political discourses of social exclusion in Europe, noting that power relationships are absent from the 'weak' version:

'In the weak version of this discourse, the solutions lie in altering these excluded people's handicapping characteristics and enhancing their integration into dominant society. Stronger forms of this discourse also emphasise the role of those who are doing the excluding and therefore aim at solutions which reduce the powers of exclusion" (Veit-Wilson, 1998: 45).

Jo Beall's approaches to social exclusion

Jo Beall (2002) has identified three approaches to social exclusion which are described below.

The *neo-liberal* approach views social exclusion as 'an unfortunate but inevitable side effect of global economic realignment' (Beall, 2002:43). As a consequence of the emergence of free trade and a single global market,

workers are now excluded from the benefits of trade barriers and social and employment protection.

A second approach argues that 'social exclusion represents little more than an unhelpful *re-labelling of poverty* or acts to distract attention from inequality generated by the workings of the economic system' (Beall, 2002:44) (emphasis added).

The third, *transformationalist*, approach focuses attention on social relations embedded in formal and informal institutions, and 'signals the use of the social exclusion framework to analyze international processes and institutional relationships associated with rapid social and economic global change and local impacts and responses' (Beall, 2002:44).

Of these three approaches, the neo-liberal and re-labelling of poverty approaches conceptualise social exclusion as a 'state' whereas the transformational approach focuses attention on exclusionary processes. This latter approach is concerned with social interactions and power relationships at different levels – from global to local – and recognises the social, political and cultural, as well as the economic, dimensions of power.

3. 4 Key points: the meanings of social exclusion

The concept of 'social exclusion' is contested, and has multiple meanings. These meanings are being continually redefined over time and have different policy implications.

The term 'social exclusion' has been used to describe: groups at risk of exclusion; what people are excluded from; the states associated with exclusion; the processes involved and levels at which they operate; and the actors involved.

There is some consensus that 'social exclusion' is: (a) *multidimensional*, encompassing social, political, cultural and economic dimensions, and operating at different social levels; (b) *dynamic*, impacting in different ways to differing degrees at different social levels over time; and (c) *relational*. A relational perspective has two dimensions. On the one hand, it focuses on exclusion as the rupture of relationships between people and the society resulting in a lack of social participation, social protection, social integration and power. Alternatively, a relational perspective points to exclusion as the product of unequal social relationships characterised by differential power i.e. the product of the way societies are organised.

Definitions also differ in other fundamental respects. 'Social exclusion' has been conceptualised as a *continuum* across society, or as affecting a *segment* of the population outside mainstream social systems and relationships. Similarly, social exclusion may be defined as the *processes embedded in* unequal power relationships that create inequalities or as a *state* of multiple disadvantage. There is also a distinction between schools of thought that emphasise *lack of participation* of individuals in society and those that identify social exclusion as a *lack of access to citizenship rights* for members of particular group, community, society or country.

In terms of who or what is driving exclusion, attention has been directed at the causal role of diverse 'agents' ranging from globalisation to excluded individuals/groups themselves. Although there has been little research on the agency of groups most affected by exclusionary forces there is ample evidence from other sources that they are rarely passive victims.

Silver (1994), Levitas (1998; 2005) and Beall (2002) have made important contributions to our understanding of the ideological and political roots of different definitions and illuminated the implications for policy/action to address 'social exclusion'. While many definitions of 'social exclusion' incorporate apparently contradictory connotations, the labelling approach distinguishing 'the excluded' from the rest of society, dominates attempts to operationalise and measure 'social exclusion' and policy/action to address it.

4. Exclusionary Processes

'The concept [social exclusion] takes us beyond mere descriptions of deprivation, and focuses attention on social relations and the processes and institutions that underlie and are part and parcel of deprivation' (de Haan, 2001:26).

The previous section explored some of the differences - often implicit - underlying definitions and descriptions of 'social exclusion'. A key theme has been the distinction between social exclusion conceptualised as a 'state', a 'process', or both. As de Haan notes, conceptualised in relational and process terms, social exclusion can help increase understanding of the causes and consequences of deprivation and inequalities. In this section, we focus on some of these exclusionary processes. As Sen (2000) has noted a distinction can be drawn between active exclusionary processes that are the direct and intended result of policy or discriminatory action including, for example, withholding political, economic and social rights from migrant groups or deliberate discrimination on the basis of gender, caste or age; and passive exclusionary processes, which in contrast, arise indirectly, for example when fiscal or trade policies result in an economic downturn leading to increased unemployment. Whether active or passive, exclusionary processes operate at many levels - in households, villages and cities, nation states and global regions - and encompass, for example: institutionalised and informal racism, discrimination and xenophobia; deeply rooted social structures such as patriarchy; political ideologies such as neo-liberalism and the policies that flow from these; and the workings of global, national and local economies. Climate change is creating new powerful exclusionary processes and these will increase in the future whilst conflict, fuelled by competition over land and resources, by hatred and greed has long been a powerful exclusionary force and continues to be so. In a review of this nature we cannot cover the full range of exclusionary processes nor do justice to their complexity instead we have sought to illustrate the complexity, pervasiveness and scale of the processes involved. We focus on the economic, social, political and cultural domains, in particular: the exclusionary processes accompanying globalisation; the potentially exclusionary impacts of public policy; and the stigmatising and exclusionary impacts of certain cultural and symbolic processes. This section ends with a discussion of the distinctive contribution of the social exclusion relational 'lens'.

4.1 Economic transformation and globalisation

The concept of social exclusion emerged from the 1970s onwards during a period of rapid social and economic transformation at national, regional and global levels. As Silver (1994) and others have highlighted these transformations created what were perceived to be new social problems that challenged the assumptions underpinning Western welfare state provision concerning the operation of labour markets, the potential for full

employment, the relationship between paid and unpaid work and the nature of citizenship and entitlement¹.

The economic crisis of the 1970s triggered a rise in the power and influence of neo-liberal ideologies and policies including: industrial restructuring, the opening up of labour markets, moves to reduce workers protection and the retreat of state provided welfare. Production was relocated and decentralised often moving to low wage economies, capital investment in new technologies contributed to growing unemployment in the older established industrial heartlands of Western Europe, North America and Australia, differentially affecting already disadvantaged groups and whole geographic areas. These trends were reinforced by the progressive growth of the tertiary sector of the economy from the 1960s, especially of the financial sector. As the financial sector became more global the monetary sovereignty of the nation state was undermined. These dynamics in the financial sector added to the pressure for greater labour flexibility, expressed in higher unemployment, more precarious employment and loss of the old mechanisms of social protection for many workers (Salama, 2006:64-72; Castel, 2004:75-86).

The nature and impact of globalisation and employment conditions around the world are considered in detail in the final reports of two other WHO Knowledge Networks (Benach, *et al.*,2007; Labonte, *et al.*,2007), including the dramatic impacts of these changes on the distribution of income and wealth and social relationships. Organised labour organisations and informal networks of solidarity have been undermined, individuals, households and entire communities have been put under extreme social and economic pressure, working conditions have deteriorated for millions of people, poverty increased and income inequalities widened. It was in this context that 'social exclusion' was seen to provide greater explanatory power than the concept of poverty: not only does it move beyond the economic domain to highlight the multi-dimensionality of inequalities, but it also illuminates causal processes. Some commentators went further arguing that the concept of social exclusion opened up new ways of investigating and understanding global exclusionary processes. Beall (2002:50) for example, suggests that it provides:

'a way of understanding the relational and institutional dynamics that serve to include some and keep others out in a connected but polarized global economic context. As such, it is an analytical construct compatible with the study of global economic processes and the poverty and inequality to which they increasingly give rise'.

As Castells (1998:162) has noted: 'globalization proceeds selectively, including and excluding segments of economies and societies in and out of networks of information, wealth and power that characterize the new dominant systems'. And whilst the economic and social impact of these transformational forces may have been felt initially in high income

¹ Feminist writers, amongst others had, of course, challenged the assumptions underpinning western welfare states before these macro economic and social changes became prominent.

countries, they have been both global and local in their reach. For example, Beall (2002), using examples from the cities of Faisalabad and Johannesburg, highlights the ways in which exclusionary processes associated with globalization graft themselves onto local dynamics of social exclusion. At the same time it is not just segments of societies that are subject to exclusionary processes but whole nations and regions of the world notably for example Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

Some writers, such as Amartya Sen, caution against a wholesale condemnation of globalisation arguing that it can be both a threat and an opportunity. For example, the positive impact on women's lives of paid employment in the garment industry in Bangladesh despite poor working conditions is described in the final report of the SEKN (Popay, et. al. 2008). For Sen, it is not globalization and markets per se that are problematic. Indeed, in a sense Sen sees markets as value-free, representing the 'basic arrangement through which people can interact with each other, and undertake mutually advantageous activities' (2000: 28). Rather, Sen argues, it is the malfunctioning of markets and the lack of adequate governance of globalizing forces that are the root of the problem. The role of public policy in this regard is considered next.

4.2 Public policy and exclusionary processes

For many writers, broadly positioned on the 'democratic left', exclusionary processes are not simply an unintended consequence of the economic restructuring that has taken place in the past 40 years: rather they are a necessary condition for it in a situation where, as David Byrne has argued (1999:128) 'post-industrial capitalism [is] founded around a flexible labour market and ... a systematic constraining of the organizational powers of workers as collective actors'. For Byrne, 'the excluded' are a reserve army of labour, moving in and out of employment at the bottom end of the labour market, mobilised or demobilised according to fluctuations in the economy. These writers point to the exclusionary processes associated with economic and social policies enacted by many Western states. For example, Navarro and colleagues (Navarro and Shi, 2001; Navarro et al., 2006) have analysed the relationship between political commitment to redistributive policies in high income capitalist countries and levels of income and social and health inequalities, arguing that where this commitment is weakest, in liberal democracies such as the USA, Canada and the UK, income and health inequalities are greatest. Similarly, Townsend (1997) has argued that the principle causes of increased levels of relative poverty in Britain from the 1980s onwards are deregulation; privatisation; unemployment; reduction in public spending; restructured taxes; and the centralising of political control.

The dominance of the international financial sector led to economic and political pressure on many low income countries to repay the debt accumulated in the post-war period. Multilateral banks pressed for structural adjustment policies in the 1980s, which became known in the 1990s as "the Washington Consensus". These 'adjustments' included opening up economies to international competition, increasing labour

flexibility, restricting public social expenditure and the introduction of new 'pro-market' forms of social protection for the poor underpinned by neo-liberal theories (Stewart, 1998: 38-42; Salama, 1999). These involved a shift away from the public funding and provision of essential services (e.g. healthcare) to a focus on subsidising demand for services from private sector providers (Hernández et al., 2002:323-333) and an increasing reliance on conditional cash and/or service transfers primarily to the poor (Popay et al., 2008; Hernández, 2003:352-358; Rodríguez, 2007). However, many commentators argue that these selective programmes have not had the impacts anticipated by their proponents. Instead, it is argued, they have increased social inequalities creating new forms of 'social exclusion'. These critics maintain that social protection systems that are conditional upon people's capacity to pay rather than their citizenship status (as in universal systems) will inevitably be exclusionary as well as being expensive to administer and difficult to target effectively (Hernández, 2002; Lauthier, 2005; Le Bonniec, 2005; Rodríguez, 2005; Mkandawire, 2005; Townsend, 2007).

An alternative view, from the radical left, is that the link between the right to an income and the obligation to earn or use it in ways consistent with the economic and cultural hegemony of capitalism should be broken (Bowring, 2000, in Davies, 2005:5). Bowring argued that redistributionist scholars, by emphasising participation in work, income and commodity relations, implicitly equate exclusion with normative deviation and inclusion with conformity to social convention. He also argued for the assertion of the existence of new, non-commodified, needs, which cannot be satisfied by capitalism and which prefigure a different kind of society (2000:309). Moreover, for Bowring (2000:314) 'assuming people are ashamed of poverty is... a scandalous attribution to make'; and many people living on substandard incomes are reluctant to describe themselves as such.)

4. 3 Discrimination, stigma and human rights

The discussion so far has highlighted exclusionary processes embedded in economic, political and social relationships operating within and between nation states. However, as Estivill (2003) has argued, these processes are overlain and reinforced by cultural and symbolic processes which differentiate and stigmatise particular groups, nations and global regions. Estivill (2003:45) describes three stages in the development of these dominant social values and attitudes. Dominant institutions start by applying negative labels and attributes to define and classify those who do not conform to dominant social 'rules'. The victorious 'social mindset' then uses its categorization to legitimize differences in the treatment of others. The third stage is characterised by strong repression and stigmatisation. This description resonates with Durkheim's (1895) analysis of deviance:

'Imagine a society of saints, a perfect cloister of exemplary individuals. Crimes (or deviance) properly so called, will there be unknown; but faults that appear venial to the layman will create

there the same scandal that the ordinary offence does in ordinary consciousnesses. If, then, this society has the power to judge and punish, it will define these acts as criminal (or deviant) and will treat them as such.'

Public attitudes towards the poor in Britain illustrate the exclusionary potential of these processes. For example, research by Gough and Eisenschitz (2006) suggest that these attitudes are at best indifferent, at worst, hostile, in a context of socio-spatial separation of the poor from the better off. They argued that this hostility is shaped, among others, by popular culture and political ideology propagated by the mass media, competition for jobs and other resources, and fear of poverty. A Fabian Society Report on child poverty (2006) reinforces this picture arguing that there would be little public support for a more progressive tax regime in the UK. However, a more nuanced picture emerges from the Joseph Rowntree Foundation's 2007 report on public attitudes to income inequality, with a majority of people thinking that the gap between high and low incomes is too great although this does not translate directly or simplistically into support for more redistributive policies.

Whilst Durkheim's theories are deterministic – leaving little space for agency on the part of disadvantaged people – more recent theorists have acknowledged that people are not necessarily passive victims. For example, Estivill (2003:14) argues that in the face of powerful exclusionary processes individuals and/or groups 'either try to find a way out through their own networks of relations or, if they so decide, they can fight against the circumstances of their exclusion and criticize society for its lack of recognition'. However, as Gough and Eisenschitz (2006:131) point out: 'In an individualistic society, it is natural to blame social failure on oneself' (Gough and Eisenschitz, 2006:131). They suggest that prevailing negative attitudes can increase the sense of powerlessness felt by people living in poverty and undermine their capacity for collective action. In addition to the lack of realistic opportunities for advancement, the ability of disadvantaged groups to improve their circumstances is further compromised by the social specificity of what Bourdieu (1986) has called 'cultural capital': a composite of social behaviours, accent, physical demeanour, cultural tastes and attitudes acquired in childhood. While higher-class cultural capital is regarded as universal, lower-class capital has limited socio-spatial recognition. Gough and Eisenschitz (2006: 111) contend that despite the mass media, the class gap in cultural capital in the UK is probably not narrowing, and that everyday behaviours still stigmatise and exclude the poor.

Negative social values and attitudes towards the poor and poverty in high income countries also create downward pressure on the level of aid monies going to low income countries. For example, a household survey of public attitudes towards poverty in developing countries commissioned in 2006 by DFID in the UK echoed, at a global level, negative and paternalistic perceptions of recipients of aid (Lader, 2007). On the positive side, over four fifths of respondents were concerned about poverty in developing countries, and 53% thought the UK government's commitment to poverty reduction in developing countries was too little. However, two

fifths of respondents agreed with the statement: 'some people have said that most aid to developing (poor) countries is wasted', generally blaming developing countries themselves for wasting aid, through corruption (76%) and inefficiency (46%). The most popular policy to help countries with corrupt governments was putting strict conditions on how the money was spent.

The impact of cultural and symbolic exclusionary processes is not confined to attitudes towards the poor. Operating through formal legalised and institutionalised systems as well as informally, these processes devalue and undermine the cultures and voices of indigenous peoples around the globe. They are contributing to the displacement of millions, rendering many stateless and condemning them to live in extreme poverty and constant fear with limited if any rights (Popay et al., 2008). Economic, cultural and symbolic exclusionary processes are together fuelling an unprecedented growth in the numbers of people without citizenship. These include refugees in countries with no asylum legislation; the displaced; failures in the birth registration system; and illegal immigrants. 'Non-citizens' implicitly do not exist in the eyes of social institutions and are not in a position to make claims to human rights, social protection or public services. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that at the end of 2005, the number of people with 'official' refugee status or protected or assisted by the UNHCR because they were at risk stood at 21 million. A year later this had increased by 56% to 32.9 million (UNHCR, 2007).

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has made a major contribution to understanding the nature of exclusionary processes in both developed and less economically developed countries (LEDCs) drawing particular attention to the significance of fundamental civil and political rights (Figueiredo and Gore, 1997). In many countries of the South, particularly those still struggling to free themselves from the negative legacies of their colonial past, political exclusion remains a powerful constraint on people's participation in formal institutions. Importantly, the contours of political exclusion are frequently mapped onto and reinforce patterns of cultural discrimination and stigmatisation.

4. 4 Social exclusion and other relational concepts

Social exclusion is one of a number of relational 'lens' used by social scientists to make sense of patterns of social differentiation and inequalities. Notable others include gender, social class, religion, caste and ethnicity and all are complex and contested. Arguably, at the very least there are important overlaps between the social realities these concepts seek to describe; the particular contribution of social exclusion may be to focus attention on to the interaction and impact of multiple exclusionary processes.

Participants at a recent Round Table on social exclusion (UNDP, 2007a), mostly drawn from the UNDP and other UN agencies, highlighted the unequal power relationships underlying poverty, and the experiences of

exclusion of non-citizens, migrant workers and indigenous groups (for example the Janajati in Nepal and the Roma in Eastern Europe) and of stigmatised groups (for example the Dalits in India and Burakumin in Japan). They acknowledged that the concept of 'social inclusion' may be double-edged for ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities and indigenous peoples, with the potential for states to adopt policies of forcible displacement or assimilation that eradicate cultural differences. Minority groups often seek recognition of equal rights, including recognition of diversity². Women and children were identified as being particularly vulnerable to exclusion, due to their weak economic and political power and lack of status in their communities, violence against women, increased HIV/AIDS vulnerability, and their exposure to ritual exclusion (eg women who refuse genital mutilation or rites of widowhood in the Cameroun).

The UNDP round table participants identified failure on the part of states to address exclusion based on caste, ethnicity, gender and geography as one of the causes of conflict. Examples of groups resisting discrimination by violent action include the Maoist people in Nepal, conflict in Sudan, and action by militant youths in the Niger delta, where the poorest and most excluded indigenous groups have had no share in the benefits of natural resources exploited by oil companies and the state (Mathieson et al. 2008). An estimated three-quarters of the world's conflicts have an ethnic or religious dimension, most often linked to exclusion from economic or political opportunities and/or suppression of cultural identity.

The insistence by some commentators to distinguish between causal processes underpinning different axes of social differentiation is linked in part to the earlier discussion of the diverse meanings attaching to social exclusion. Beall (2002), for example, adopting a definition reflecting the European origins of the concept, argues that experiences under apartheid in South Africa are best understood as racial oppression, exploitation and denial of citizenship rights rather than social exclusion. In contrast, she suggests, social exclusion is primarily speaking to class based divisions driven by economic processes and labour market dynamics and hence is more relevant to understanding the genesis of inequalities in post-apartheid urban South Africa where:

'... new forms of capitalist production and changes in employment in Johannesburg, associated with the rise in importance of the service sector, have begun to erode the entrenched correspondence between racial and class divisions that characterized racial economic development and employment patterns during much of the apartheid era. The new socially excluded residents of Johannesburg are not only those who are black but also white who

² Following many years of lobbying by indigenous and non-indigenous people, on 13 September 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which although non-binding, sets out the individual and collective rights of indigenous peoples and prohibits discrimination.

are superfluous to the requirements of the global economy and Johannesburg's place in it' (2002:49).

Concerns about the relationship between different dimensions of social differentiation and inequality and the relative salience of different causal processes are important. The concept of social exclusion has considerable analytical potential to enhance understanding and inform policy/action. It focuses attention simultaneously on the complex causal processes driving poverty and disadvantage and on the multidimensional nature of the experience or outcome of these processes. However, the insights provided by the social exclusion 'lens' cannot replace those provided by the lens of gender, ethnicity, caste, age, disability and so on. Only taken singly and in combination will the understanding provided by these concepts make the maximum contribution to achieving more equitable and cohesive societies and global systems.

4.6 Key points: the processes of exclusion

A relational approach to defining social exclusion that focuses on multidimensional, dynamic, processes embedded in unequal power relationships has 'investigative advantage' in understanding the causes and consequences of poverty and deprivation.

These processes operate and interact across economic, social, political and cultural dimensions, through social relations within and between individuals, communities, institutions, nation states and global regions. A focus on exclusionary processes can:

- Highlight the impacts of economic and social transformation driven by relational and institutional power differentials;
- Reveal linkages between processes associated with globalisation and local exclusionary dynamics;
- Illuminate the active and passive exclusionary processes arising from public policy;
- Expose the role of cultural and symbolic processes as drivers of exclusion stigmatising the poor and other population groups, restricting human, civil, political and cultural rights and constraining capacity for collective action.

In theory the concept of social exclusion has considerable analytical potential. It can focus attention onto the interaction between multiple exclusionary processes operating across systems of social stratification associated with gender, ethnicity, caste, religion, social class etc. However, insights provided by the social exclusion 'lens' are complementary to these other relational lens rather than providing an alternative way of conceptualising these.

5. Alternative and parallel discourses

'...the concept of social exclusion as it originated in Western Europe, seems to have played a role in the re-opening of old debates and discussions... under new terminology' (Saith, 2001:10)

5.1 Which alternative discourses?

As Saith highlights, debates surrounding the concept of social exclusion have echoes in and to some extent have replaced older debates. In the previous section important overlaps with debates about the nature and causes of inequalities associated with major axes of social differentiation notably gender, race/ethnicity, caste, age and ability/disability, were discussed. It was noted that the particular feature of the social exclusion lens is that it focuses attention on the role played by relationships between individuals, groups and whole nations, and particularly differential power embedded in these relationships, in the generation of poverty and inequality. In addition to overlaps with other relational concepts there are therefore important links with more proximal concepts – concepts which may have greater policy/action salience than social exclusion in some parts of the world. Poverty is clearly the most obvious alternative concept from this perspective but there are others: basic needs, sustainable development, social cohesion, social capital, etc. We have chosen to focus here on just two alternative discourses – poverty and social capital - partly because they are the most proximal to social exclusion but also because these discourses and their relationship to social exclusion are arguably the most contentious.

5.2 Poverty, vulnerability, capability and human development

The concept of poverty is fast evolving, and when broadened to incorporate notions of relativity, vulnerability and capability deprivation, it tends to dovetail with thinking about social exclusion. Notwithstanding this common ground, most commentators would argue that the concepts of poverty and social exclusion are not synonymous.

Poverty was long conceptualised in absolute terms typically in terms of a minimum consumption basket to meet an individual's basic needs (Rowntree, 1901). It has more recently been redefined in relative terms, placing emphasis on the distribution of income and wealth in a society. There has been a corresponding move from defining an absolute poverty line - denoting a minimum standard of living that is similar in any country at any time - to a relative poverty line, set for example as a proportion of the national average income at a point in time.

Peter Townsend's landmark work in the UK was instrumental in this re-conceptualisation of poverty, establishing a set of resources, in the form of goods and services, governing standards of living, and moving towards a multidimensional, relative, definition of poverty. He also includes social participation – another relational concept - as a resource necessary to avoid poverty and its consequences.

'Individuals... can be said to be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they belong' (Townsend, 1979:31).

This relative concept of poverty is now prevalent in many countries in South and North America, Western Europe and Australasia. In the UK it was recently reiterated by the newspaper columnist Polly Toynbee: 'To be poor is to fall too far behind what most ordinary people have in your own society' (Toynbee, 2006). And it has gained credence to the right of the political spectrum in the UK: whereas in the past Conservative administrations have tended to dismiss relative poverty as reflecting no more than unavoidable, almost natural, inequalities in society (Beresford et al., 1999), in 2006 the Conservative Party leader David Cameron was quoted as saying: "Even if we are not destitute, we still experience poverty if we cannot afford things that society regards as essential" (Cameron, 2006). Measures of poverty in the UK, the EU and many other countries are consistent with this conceptualisation (for example, in the UK, poverty is assessed against low-income thresholds linked to contemporary median incomes).

As noted in earlier sections whilst some Northern Hemisphere commentators have voiced a concern at the way in which the discourse of social exclusion is decentring poverty discourses, others have focused on the additional benefits of the exclusion 'lens'. From an Anglo-Saxon poverty tradition, Matt Barnes (2005:15) has attempted to draw distinctions between poverty, deprivation and social exclusion. In his schema, and in contrast to poverty and deprivation, the concept of social exclusion 'evokes a multi-dimensional notion of participation in society, involving a combination of physical, material, relational and societal needs, over a period of time' (Barnes, 2005:16). This approach echoes Estivill's suggestion (2003:21) that: 'if poverty is a photograph, exclusion is a film'.

Table 1: Comparison of poverty, deprivation and social exclusion

Poverty	Deprivation	Social exclusion
One-dimensional	Multi-dimensional	Multi-dimensional
Physical needs	Physical needs Material needs	Physical needs Material needs Societal participation
Distributional	Distributional	Distributional Relational
Static	Static	Dynamic
Individual Household	Individual Household	Individual Household Community

Source: Barnes (2005)

However, whilst social exclusion has become the dominant inequality discourse in Europe and Latin America this is not necessarily the case around the globe. In other regions, notably South East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa the discourse of poverty, defined in both absolute and relative terms and extending to include notions of vulnerability, basic needs, capabilities, resource enhancement and sustainable human development and have greater policy/action relevance and salience. This is discussed in other SEKN documents and the SEKN's final report (Popay, et al. 2008; Rispel et al. 2007; Johnston et al. 2008).

Not-with-standing the pioneering work of scholars such as Peter Townsend, euro-centric approaches to defining and measuring poverty and deprivation have been criticised from a development perspective for placing too much emphasis on income disadvantage. For example, Robert Chambers (1997) on the basis of participatory research with people experiencing poverty and disadvantage in Africa, Asia and Latin America, emphasises the notion of *vulnerability*, which he defines as exposure to risk and shocks, and *defencelessness*, or the lack of means to cope without damaging loss. As Chambers (1997:45) argues:

'Deprivation as poor people perceive it has many dimensions, including not only lack of income and wealth, but also social inferiority, physical weakness, disability and sickness, vulnerability, physical and social isolation, powerlessness and humiliation ... In practice, much of this wide spectrum of deprivation and ill-being is covered by the common use of the word poverty... [However] poverty is then defined as low income, or often as low consumption, which is more easily and reliably measured. Surveys are carried out and poverty lines constructed. This limits much of the analysis of poverty to the one dimension that has been measured'.

Castel also focuses on the notion of 'vulnerability' pointing to need for a better understanding of the trajectory of groups and individuals along a '*continuum* of vulnerable situations' (Castel, 1998: 129). In Castel's formulation vulnerability is not understood as an individual weakness, but as a range of situations that human groups share but the resources and capabilities to avoid or escape them is unequally distributed. Minujin similarly proposes a *continuum* from inclusion to exclusion characterised by increasing vulnerability (Minujin, 1998: 176-187).

Of particular relevance at a global level is the notion of *human development*: the process of enlarging people's choice by expanding human capabilities and functioning. This understanding of the common global development challenge regardless of GDP has been promoted by the UNDP, inspired by Amartya Sen's work on *capabilities*:

'At all levels of development the three essential capabilities for human development are for people to lead long and healthy lives, to be knowledgeable and to have a decent standard of living. If these basic capabilities are not achieved, many choices are simply

not available and many opportunities remain inaccessible. But the realm of human development goes further: essential areas of choice, highly valued by people, range from political, economic and social opportunities for being creative and productive to enjoying self-respect, empowerment and a sense of belonging to a community' (UNDP, 2007b).

The UNDP's first Human Development Report published in 1990 introduced the Human Development Index (HDI) which incorporates Sen's three 'essential' capabilities. Since then three other indices have been developed, including a Human Poverty Index (HPI). These are described in section 6.6 below.

In contrast to the UNDP's broad conceptualisation of poverty as deprivation in elements essential for human life, the World Bank uses a reductionist monetary figure of \$US 1 a day to define absolute poverty. This measure is now widely adopted by international agencies although it fails to take account of social needs and local complexity. Indeed, the first of the eight Millennium Development targets is to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than \$US 1 a day, using a 1993 measure of purchasing power parity (PPP) to adjust for differences in prices between countries. In developing countries, measures of poverty generally reflect an absolute approach relying on calculation of the costs of a 'basket' of basic needs.

5.3 Social exclusion and social capital

Social capital, like social exclusion, is a contested concept which has received much attention in recent years. It has been described as a relational concept, concerned with 'identifying the nature and extent of social relationships' (Szreter and Woolcock, 2004:650). Whereas the conceptual literature linking social exclusion to health is limited, social capital has been widely theorised as a mediating link between socio-economic inequality and health, building on Richard Wilkinson's influential book, *Unhealthy Societies* (1996). There has also been extensive empirical research in this area, the interpretation of which is a subject of ongoing debate (see section 8 of this paper).

Robert Putnam, one of the key advocates of the concept, defines social capital as: 'features of social organisation such as networks, norms and trust' (Putnam, 1993). Types of networks range from the informal (family, friends, neighbours) to the formal (sports clubs, civic associations); norms are 'those unstated rules or standards that often govern actions during informal or spontaneous social relations' (Hean et al., 2004); and trust has been defined as 'belief in the goodwill and benign intent of others' (Kawachi et al, 1997).

Putnam (1993, 2000) sees social capital as the social infrastructure ('wires') that enables individuals to gain access to resources. Viewed at a relational level, social capital is thus for Putnam the property of individuals, but only by virtue of group/community membership. In

contrast, network scholars, notably James Coleman (1988), argue that social capital refers to the resources that flow through networks (for example, material resources, willingness of network members to offer assistance, information): i.e. the electricity rather than the wires themselves.

Bourdieu (1986) a French socialist and sociologist writing from a radically different theoretical and political position to Putnam, also defines social capital in terms of networks but emphasises their role in the constitution and maintenance of hierarchical class relations and social and economic inequalities. This is part of his account of different forms of capital (economic, cultural, social and symbolic) and their interrelationships. According to Virginia Morrow (2002:11), 'Bourdieu is primarily concerned with how economic capital underpins these other forms, how forms of capital interact with wider structures to reproduce social inequalities, and how the day-to-day activities of social actors draw upon and reproduce structural features of wider social systems'.

Much of the empirical research on social capital has been underpinned by the Putnam approach to understanding the concept. In this context, the unit of analysis to which the concept can be applied is contentious. While some neo-classical economists see social capital as the property of individuals, others, including the neo-conservative Francis Fukuyama (1995) see it as a characteristic of spatially defined communities ranging from villages to entire societies. It has been suggested that communities possessing high levels of social capital may obtain benefits including faster economic development, better government and improved health. However, most commentators recognise that social capital can be associated with either good or bad outcomes: the purposes for which resources are used being analytically and practically distinct from how they are obtained. Thus high levels of social capital may be associated with criminal and 'terrorist' activity, corruption and nepotism and/or social control, blocking the access of 'out-groups' to 'community' resources.

Conventionally, within the Putnamesque approach, two types of social capital have been identified: 'bonding' social capital, referring to relations between members of a group or network who share a common identity; and 'bridging' social capital, which transcends these divides (for example, of age, ethnicity, class), through participation in associational activity. More recently, a third dimension, 'linking' social capital, has been introduced, defined by Szreter and Woolcock (2004:655) as 'norms of respect and networks of trusting relationships between people who are interacting across explicit, formal or institutionalized power or authority gradients in society'. Linking social capital, according to Szreter and Woolcock (2004:656), is: 'particularly relevant for the effective implementation of measures to assist the ill, poor, and the 'socially excluded'. For example, they argue that without relationships of trust and respect between those involved in delivering public services and 'the poor', these measures are unlikely to succeed. Szreter and Woolcock conclude that a three-dimensional conceptualisation of social capital:

'places great emphasis on both the quality and quantity of relationships between all citizens. It also places emphasis on whether or not these relationships are founded on mutual respect between people, differentiated either horizontally by their varying social identities or vertically by their access to different levels of power and authority' (Szreter and Woolcock, 2004:663).

It has been argued that much empirical research on social capital has suffered from a lack of theoretical clarity (Hean et al., 2004) and attempts at measurement reflect the conceptual debates described above. Criticisms include: a preponderance of indicators that reflect the same 'elasticity' with which the term 'social capital' is used in different disciplines and approaches; a lack of clarity about the choice of unit of analysis or level for measurement (e.g. individual, aggregate, or community); over-reliance on self-reports; a large number of potentially omitted variables; and problems with the transferability and appropriateness of survey instruments to different geographic contexts and disciplinary realms. Blaxter argues that these problems have implications for the study of the putative relationship between social capital and health because:

'...there is a tendency to define as social capital whatever social indicators best predict health status. This becomes tautologous: social capital promotes good health, but is at the same time defined by those things known to be health promoting' (Blaxter, 2004:15).

In part because of these measurement difficulties, there are conflicting views on the relationship between social capital and health outcomes. For example, whilst Szreter and Woolcock, (2004:65) claim that the 'specific research connecting social capital to health outcomes via a social support mechanism is vast', Muntaner (2004:765), argues that 'the health effects of social capital cannot be taken for granted and in spite of some promising findings, the burden of proof is still on the 'social capital' hypothesis'. Morgan and Swann (2004:190), in the conclusion of their secondary analysis of surveys relating to social capital and health conclude that 'the positive relationships that have been found are only true for some indicators of social capital and vary according to the health outcome of interest. Moreover, while some independent effects have been found, social capital has less power to predict health than other more familiar indicators of socio-economic status'.

Swann and Morgan (2002:6) have also reviewed qualitative research on social capital to 'look beneath the surface at the hard-to-measure processes and actions of people's relationships to others, at community structures, and the 'life' of communities and networks'. This review identified a number of barriers to the acquisition and utilisation of 'social capital', including differential power and the experience of disempowerment, social identity, rights and aspects of place. Attempts have also been made to observe community relationships and norms directly.

At a general level, the utility of the Putnam approach to defining the concept of social capital has been criticised because of its foundation in the liberal traditions of utilitarianism and individualism (Skocpol, 1996; Hernández et al., 2001). From this perspective it is the notion of 'capital' available for individual roots - with its root in economics - that is the problem, notwithstanding the focus on personal relationships and voluntary association. These commentators challenge the assumption that "values" related to mutual trust and reciprocity will generate individual wealth and make for successful societies and criticise attempts to create hierarchies of societies based on the level of social capital (Inglehart, 1997). These approaches, it is argued, fail to recognise that conflict and power relationships do not necessarily lead to social failure and that voluntary relationships and the action of voluntary associations are not necessarily freely chosen but may result from potentially invisible pressure from states and institutions (Hernández et al., 2001:21-23).

Recent approaches to using the concept of social capital in research and policy has also been criticised for distracting from more pressing economic and political issues. For example, Muntaner (2004:677) has argued that: 'the political use of social capital outside public health leans towards tolerance for social inequality and against egalitarian social change'. He adds that an emphasis on the measurement of 'social capital', to the detriment of data reflecting political and economic processes, can lead to 'pseudo explanations' where:

'Crime, isolation, drug use, broken windows, sexually transmitted diseases and other diseases are seen as the outcome of some intrinsic deficiency of the community' (Muntaner, 2004: 678).

There are then major controversies surrounding the value of social capital as a conceptual lens through which to understand the nature and consequences of social relationships at micro, meso and macro levels within societies - controversies that mirror those surrounding the concept of 'social exclusion'. A pre-requisite for any analysis of the relationship between these two concepts is clarity of theoretical and ideological position and definition. Thus, for example, Putnam sees social capital as associated with social benefits or social problems - and hence as potentially a focus of social policy. Bourdieu on the other hand uses the concept as part of his social theory of inequality and does not develop it as a single cause of social ills or argue that policy should seek to impact on it specifically as distinct from social inequalities in general. Putnam's neo-Durkheimian perspective on social capital aligns itself most obviously with Levitas' SID discourse, and Silver's 'solidarity' paradigm, described in section 3. Bourdieu's analysis is closer to radical redistributionist interpretations of social exclusion, drawing on conflict theory, as exemplified by Silver's 'monopoly' paradigm and Beall's transformationalist approach. A three-dimensional conceptualisation of social capital goes some way towards exploring links between micro- and macro-sociological phenomena, but falls short of the 'integrated analysis of institutions' that Sen (2000) sees as essential to a relational approach to social exclusion; neither does it take full account of the dynamic structural aspects of global exclusionary processes. In summary, as

Levitas cautions (2006:136): 'the conceptual background and political implications of 'exclusion from social relations' and 'social capital' are not the same', and care should be taken to avoid defining, measuring, and interpreting them interchangeably.

5.3 Key points: alternative and parallel discourses

This section has considered concepts that may act as alternatives to social exclusion as 'lens' through which to understand and act on social inequalities. Poverty and social capital have been selected for attention here as the most proximal concepts and arguably the most contentious. There are other concepts which might have been considered including, for example, human rights, basic needs and sustainable development.

The conceptualisation and measurement of poverty and related notions of vulnerability and capability deprivation, have become increasingly sophisticated in recent decades. It is now widely accepted that poverty is relative (defined in terms of a particular spatial, cultural and temporal context) and multi-dimensional, encompassing lack of social as well as material resources. However, in contrast to the notion of 'social exclusion', contemporary measures of poverty tend to be restricted to distributional (rather than relational) resources, and to focus on the individual and household levels.

Whilst poverty continues to dominate the policy agenda in many low income countries/regions, eurocentric conceptual approaches have been challenged, in particular through Chambers' work on *vulnerability* and Sen's work on *capabilities*. In response to such critiques, since 1990, the UNDP has produced the *Human Development Index*, a composite measure of life expectancy, educational attainment and income, and more recently, a Human Poverty Index which adopts a relative rather than absolute approach. In contrast, the World Bank promotes an absolute measure of poverty and continues to set the extreme poverty line at \$US1/day. Despite criticisms that this level is now out of step with increases in commodity prices/costs of living and should be increased to \$2 per day at a minimum, it is still widely adopted by policy makers focused on international poverty reduction targets e.g. Millennium Development Goals.

Social capital is a relational concept which, like social exclusion, has received much attention in recent years and is highly contested. Leading theories differ as to the nature, role and benefits of social capital. The operationalisation and measurement of social capital reflects these controversies including: a lack of theoretical and definitional clarity; contested choices of indicators and levels of measurement; reliance on self-reports; and limited transferability.

In contrast to social exclusion, the relationship between social capital (defined in terms of relationships of trust and reciprocity) and population health/health inequalities has been widely theorised and is the subject of extensive empirical study. Research linking social capital to health outcomes is controversial whilst qualitative research has highlighted

barriers to the acquisition of social capital in disadvantaged communities. More generally, the concept within the Putnamesque approach is criticised as emanating from the liberal traditions of utilitarianism and individualism, and for distracting attention for the political and economic causes of inequalities.

A pre-requisite for any analysis of the relationship between 'social exclusion' 'poverty' and/or 'social capital' is clarity of ideological and theoretical position and definition. Care should be taken to avoid defining, measuring, and interpreting these concepts interchangeably.

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7.1 Norm Perception as a Vehicle for Social Change

Norm Perception as a Vehicle for Social Change

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How can we change social norms, the standards describing typical or desirable behavior? Because individuals' perceptions of norms guide their personal behavior, influencing these perceptions is one way to create social change. And yet individuals do not form perceptions of typical or desirable behavior in an unbiased manner. Individuals attend to select sources of normative information, and their resulting perceptions rarely match actual rates of behavior in their environment. Thus, changing social norms requires an understanding of how individuals perceive norms in the first place. We describe three sources of information that people use to understand norms—individual behavior, summary information about a group, and institutional signals. Social change interventions have used each source to influence perceived norms and behaviors, including recycling, intimate-partner violence, and peer harassment. We discuss conditions under which influence over perceived norms is likely to be stronger, based on the source of the normative information and individuals' relationship to the source. Finally, we point to future research and suggest when it is most appropriate to use a norm change strategy in the interest of behavior and social change.

Researchers, policymakers, and practitioners do their best to measure actual rates of behaviors in a community, such as the number of people who engage in recycling, domestic violence, voting, or peer harassment. These rates are often discussed as the community's "norm"—e.g., "it is the norm to recycle here; most citizens recycle," or, "domestic violence is not normative in this community; only 2% of residents report that domestic violence is acceptable."

Psychologists focus on measuring a different kind of norm—not the actual norm, but community members' subjective perceptions of the norm. There are two reasons for this focus on subjective perceptions. First, unlike statisticians and policymakers, the average person does not know the actual rates of behaviors or opinions in their community, such as recycling or approval of domestic violence.

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Individuals' subjective perceptions of norms are not derived directly from a comprehensive survey or a census. Instead, individuals have subjective perceptions of norms, based on their unique and local experience. They attend to select sources of normative information, and their resulting perceptions rarely match actual rates of behavior in their environment. Second, subjective perceptions of norms can guide individuals' opinions and behaviors. Thus, when psychologists attempt to change actual norms in a community, they design interventions that target community members' *perceptions* of these norms. In this paper, when we discuss "norms," we will be referring to these subjective perceptions, not to actual norms. Our hope is that a better understanding of the origins, function, and stability of perceived norms will lead to interventions that are able to ultimately change actual norms—that is, actual community-wide patterns of behavior.

This review highlights when and why psychologists view norm *perception* as a vehicle for social change. We review interventions that were designed to influence individuals' perceptions of the norm so as to change their behavior. Most of these interventions were levied at individuals, and outcomes were measured in terms of their individual opinion and behavior change. Few investigators have studied how these kinds of interventions "scale up" to change community-wide perceptions of norms and behavior (Allcott, 2011; Paluck, Shepherd, & Aronow, in press). Researchers have proposed various models for how individual-level interventions might scale to a community level, via a change in a critical proportion of individuals or following a certain degree of change among community members (e.g., Valente, 2005). Evaluating these different models is beyond the scope of this review. We focus on changes in perceived norms and behaviors at the individual level to understand processes that could have implications for the collective level.

A few basic observations about human sociality and psychology remind us why individuals have subjective perceptions of the norms in their community, and cannot directly perceive actual rates of behavior or opinion. Individuals have limited attention and access to information about what others do and think. They may not interact with everyone in their community, nor interact to the same degree, which limits their direct observation of, for example, how many community members recycle. Individuals can only observe what other community members do in public, and they have unreliable information about what others actually think. But even if individuals could observe the behaviors and opinions of all their fellow community members, they may still draw incorrect conclusions about what is common. People are egocentric thinkers (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977): they may extrapolate from their own behavior when thinking about others, and conclude that their community members' recycling behavior is similar to their own. People are also cognitive misers (Fiske & Taylor, 1984): they may use mental shortcuts, and generalize the recycling behavior of a community member who is easy to call to mind to the behavior of all community members.

Despite these limitations on perception, individuals are motivated to understand what is normative in the communities to which they belong. This motivation arises from distinct but related desires to be accurate about social facts, to feel that they belong to their community, and to avoid social rejection from their community for deviating too far from the norm (Blanton & Christie, 2003; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Individuals' subjective perceptions of norms become a reality and a guide for their own behavior, even when the perceptions are inaccurate. Adherence to a perceived norm, therefore, is a more complex psychological phenomenon than simple observational learning (Bandura, 1971) or behavioral mimicry (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).

To change behavior, many psychologists attempt to influence perceptions of norms rather than other precursors to behavior, such as attitudes. Distinguishing attitude change from norm change is critical, because they involve different strategies and have different results. Attitude change campaigns attempt to change how *you* feel about a behavior ("I love recycling"), as opposed to norm change campaigns that attempt to change your perception of *others'* feelings or behaviors ("Recycling is really common in my town" or "The majority of people in my town love recycling"). Psychologists sometimes prioritize normative influence over attitudinal influence because individuals' normative perceptions can be more malleable than their attitudes. An individual's attitudes may have developed over a long time and may be closely linked to personal experience or to other well-developed beliefs, such as religious or political ideology. Attempts to counteract personal experience or longstanding beliefs can be more difficult, and may also take more time and thus expense. Additionally, changed attitudes are not always reliable precursors to changed behaviors (Wicker, 1969).

Rather than attempting to change attitudes, social change interventions can focus on shaping community members' perceptions of the norm. Norm change interventions can make use of the fact that individuals perceive norms using certain types of input from their environment; in particular, other individuals' public behavior, summary information about a group, and institutional signals. Instead of persuading individuals that recycling is important and hoping that they will then recycle, a norm change intervention may, for example, expose people to a popular peer who recycles, provide people with information that most of their peers recycle, or advertise new recycling guidelines from an important and trusted community institution.

For the rest of this review, we describe three key sources of norm perception that norm change interventions target—individual behavior, group summary information, and institutional signals. We discuss interventions that use one of these sources to modify behavior through changes in perceived norms. Characteristics of these three sources of norm perception and individuals' relationship to each source can determine whether norms and behavior will change. As we review these conditions under which norms and behavior are most likely to change, we

offer ideas for modifying normative information in the environment. We focus on individuals, to examine the psychological processes that lead to shifts in their perceptions of norms and in their subsequent behavior. In the interest of goals to scale these normative interventions to reach entire communities, we highlight the social processes that may diffuse perceived norms and behavior throughout a community. There is a great deal that we do not yet know about influencing perceptions of norms, and the outcomes of norm change interventions. We end by suggesting the most important next steps for research, and proposing ideas about when it is most appropriate to use a norm change strategy in the interest of behavior and social change.

The Subjective and Dynamic Perception of Norms

Psychologists have long demonstrated the human tendency to bring our behavior in line with social norms (e.g., Asch, 1952; Sherif, 1936), which are defined as our perceptions of what is typical or desirable in a group or in a situation (Miller & Prentice, 1996). Humans are especially motivated to understand and to follow the norms of groups that we belong to and care about, known as *reference groups*. A reference group's norms may be influential for some behaviors and not others (Miller & Prentice, 1996). For example, when college students decide whether and how much to drink, they are more likely to consider the norms of their peer reference group (their fellow college students) than the norms of their parents (Perkins, 2002), even though they may prioritize their parents' views for other kinds of decisions.

Individuals learn about the norms of their reference groups over time, updating their impressions as they interact with their group or learn about their group through other sources. In other words, norm perception is a dynamic process—norms are not static rules for behavior, learned once and internalized for posterity (Miller & Prentice, 1996; Paluck & Shepherd, 2012). The public behavior of individuals in our reference group (learned by direct personal observation or indirectly by gossip or rumor), summary information about group opinions and behavior (indicated by the group's voting tallies, or other announcements about the group), and institutional systems (indicated by public rules, punishments, and rewards) all update our impressions of what the group typically does or what the group values. For example, when a person notices a group member recycling, reads a trend story in a newspaper about how a growing majority of her peers recycle, or learns about a new rule requiring recycling in her community, she infers that recycling is typical and desirable for her group. When she too recycles or discusses that she favors recycling with other group members, her behavior then serves as information about the norm as well, forming a cyclical pattern in which norms are reproduced over time (Paluck & Shepherd, 2012; see also Markus & Kitayama, 2010).

Because normative perception is a dynamic process, there are many opportunities to shape its course. To influence perceptions about what behaviors are typical and desirable for a reference group, interventions can change certain group members' public behaviors, present new summary information about the group, and issue new signals from institutions that are important to the group.

Sources of Norm Perception

Group Members' Behavior Can Shape Perceptions of Norms

The behavior and expressed opinions of other individuals are a major source of information about norms for a group or situation. Previous research has argued that certain individuals, called *social referents*, are particularly influential over others' perceptions of norms (Paluck et al., in press; Rogers, 1962). Individuals weight social referents' behavior more heavily than others' behavior when they form their impressions of the norms of their reference group. Social referents are psychologically salient—their beliefs and behaviors are simply noticed more than others. They may or may not be high in status and may or may not be leaders. Their salience derives from their personal connections to the perceiver, and their number of connections throughout the group. Our research has specifically identified these influential individuals as being widely known across a group's social network or within a clique inside of the network (Paluck & Shepherd, 2012; Paluck et al., in press; Shepherd & Paluck, 2015).

In a field experiment conducted by Paluck and Shepherd (2012), social referents in an American high school were identified at the start of the school year using social network analysis. Specifically, all students at the school answered the question, "Which students at this school did you choose to spend time with this past week?" Social referents were subsequently identified as students with the highest number of nominations from other students across the network ("widely knowns") or students with high numbers of nominations from a closed cluster of students within the network ("clique leaders"). The investigators randomly assigned a subset of these social referent students to be trained to model antiharassment behaviors during the rest of the school year. For example, the antiharassment social referents were encouraged to speak at a school assembly about the importance of refraining from the cycle of conflict, perform skits to illustrate ways of speaking out against harassment, talk to peers about ways to report harassment, and sell wristbands with an antiharassment message (social referents who were not randomly assigned to the intervention were not encouraged to do anything). Analyses of all students' reported norms and behavior at the end of the year demonstrated that students with more social network ties (i.e., with more face-to-face or online exposure) to the antiharassment social referents were more likely to perceive that harassment was

not considered desirable by other students at their school, and were less likely to be disciplined for peer conflict according to school records.

Ideas about the power of influential individuals to shape social norms have long been discussed in the literature on diffusion of innovations. In this literature, influential individuals are the early adopters of new ideas and practices, adopting them from sources such as the mass media and propagating them throughout their social network via personal endorsements (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955; Rogers, 1962). Many programs, such as interventions promoting healthy behaviors, seek to identify these early adopters through diverse methods such as surveys, nominations from group members, or group observation (e.g., Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, & Jackson, 2014). Diffusion-of-innovation programs provide these individuals with materials to disseminate among their groups to promote new norms and behaviors (Valente & Pumpuang, 2007).

Economists have found that individuals' engagement with new services such as agricultural technology, insurance, and retirement plans can increase their peers' engagement with the service (e.g., BenYishay & Mobarak, 2014; Cai, de Janvry, & Sadoulet, 2015; Duflo & Saez, 2003). However, some studies find the peer influence to be short-lived, or find that peers also learn from seeing the *negative* experiences of individuals who adopt a new service (e.g., Ahuja, Kremer, & Zwane, 2010; Miller & Mobarak, 2014). These studies do not measure the effects of service adoption on peers' perceived norms; in some cases the observed peer influence may be driven more by learning new information from a peer. The studies are consistent, however, with the prediction that early adopters can introduce and diffuse new norms across their social network.

In some cases, individuals become sources of normative information through a position of leadership. While leaders may shift group members' behavior by demanding obedience, they also have the power to shift group behavior by shaping group norms. A body of research on leadership and social identity proposes that leaders influence group norms to the extent that the leader is perceived to be legitimate, fair, and prototypical of the group (Hogg, 2010). To be prototypical of a group is to be considered a good reflection of the group identity, and similar to many group members. Under these conditions, a leader who is "leading by example" is interpreted as reflecting the norms of the group as they are or as they should be (Drouvelis & Nosenzo, 2013; Hogg & Reid, 2006). Having a leadership position may coincide with being a prototypical group member in some cases, but not others. However, both of these qualities are predicted to render an individual important, relevant, and salient to their fellow group members, and thus a source of information about group norms (Hogg, 2010).

In an organizational context, for example, leaders have the potential to influence subordinate employees' behavior via the employees' understanding of workplace norms, without directly asking employees to change their behavior. Observational research has demonstrated that by engaging in proenvironmental

behaviors such as turning off lights that are not in use or printing double-sided, a leader demonstrates to employees that these behaviors are expected and valued (Robertson & Barling, 2013). Similarly, the design firm IDEO seeks to shape leaders' collaborative behavior in order to signal that collaborative help is part of the "culture" of its work environment (Amabile, Fisher, & Pillemer, 2014). During a typical team brainstorming session at IDEO, a leader who is not critical to the meeting is advised to make an appearance to contribute to the brainstorming, thereby demonstrating to the group that helping behavior is desirable at the firm (Amabile et al., 2014).

Social referents can also be fictional. Research from psychology and communication suggests that the behavior of fictional characters in books, movies, and television may inform audience members' ideas about the kinds of behavior that are typical or desirable in their actual communities (Singhal, Cody, Rogers, & Sabido, 2003). Fictional social referents are particularly influential when they resemble people from the audience's actual reference group. Researchers and media practitioners have capitalized on this hypothesis and have purposefully attempted to change norms through fictional narratives. Sometimes termed "edutainment" (educational entertainment), they incorporate characters who model healthy, respectful, or safe behaviors into popular media programs (Singhal & Rogers, 2002). The programs are a form of so-called social norms marketing, because the normative behavior is marketed to a large audience, ideally in a subtle, nonobtrusive manner that parallels the way individuals observe the behavior of social referents in real life (Paluck & Ball, 2010). When a media-based narrative is known to be popular, i.e., to be liked by many other people, its characters are expected to be particularly powerful social referents, in the same way that widely known or prototypical individuals in real life reference groups are influential over perceptions of social norms (Chwe, 2003).

For example, radio soap operas in Rwanda and in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have aimed to reduce conflict by depicting likable characters engaging in behaviors such as starting a youth coalition for peace and developing friendships across group boundaries (Paluck, 2009; Paluck, 2010). In a field experiment in Rwanda, one year of randomly assigned exposure to a reconciliation-themed radio soap opera, relative to a control soap opera about health, changed listeners' perceived norms and behaviors with respect to issues such as open dissent and cooperation (Paluck, 2009).

Social referents and leaders are not the only individuals in the group who can influence norm perception and behavior. Other group members may influence perceived norms, particularly when their public behavior calls attention to existing norms. In this case, the behavior of the observed individual brings the norm into "focus" (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990); their behavior reminds perceivers of the norm and demonstrates that the norm is relevant to the immediate situation or context (see also Krupka & Weber, 2009). This normative reminder and behavioral

influence may happen when an observed individual acts in compliance with the norm or, potentially more powerfully, when the individual punishes another person for deviating from the norm.

In a series of studies, Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren (1990) manipulated whether participants were in an environment where littering was descriptively normative or not, and then manipulated norm salience through an actor's littering behavior. In environments where littering was normative (there was already a great deal of trash on the ground), a stranger who littered in front of the participant increased the participant's own norm-consistent littering behavior. The same effect did not occur when the environment was clean—when littering was counter-normative. Clearly, the norm-consistent behavior cannot be attributed to behavioral mimicry, since participants did not adopt the actor's littering behavior when littering was at odds with the preexisting norm of the situation.

As Cialdini et al.'s (1990) experiments demonstrate, a preexisting norm can be signaled by the physical environment. Broken windows theory posits that physical disarray and petty crime—such as vandalism, broken windows on buildings, and abandoned cars—induce the sense that disorder is common and accepted in a community, which in turn leads to higher rates of crime (Kelling & Wilson, 1982; Zimbardo, 1969). The theory led to policy changes in major American cities, but analysts have characterized the cleanup efforts as peripheral to the cities' lowered rates of crime (Harcourt & Ludwig, 2006; Levitt & Dubner, 2005). However, six field experimental trials in Amsterdam recently demonstrated that street disorder (operationalized as graffiti and abandoned shopping carts) in a normatively tidy environment led to higher rates of other kinds of public norm violations from pedestrians passing by, such as littering and stealing money from an envelope hanging out of a mailbox (Keizer, Lindenberg, & Steg, 2008). Leaving aside the veracity of broken windows theory, these studies combined with Cialdini et al.'s (1990) experiments point to the importance of seeing vivid or face-to-face examples of other individuals' norm-consistent behavior, and to the power of combined sources of normative information from group members and from the physical context (see also Croson & Shang, 2010; Martin & Randal, 2008).

As mentioned above, individuals can also make a norm salient by punishing someone who deviates from it. This punishment can take the form of a social sanction, such as distancing oneself from the deviant individual, or other kinds of physical or material sanctions. Experiments by game theorists show that individuals are willing to use their own money to punish others who go against a norm of cooperation (Sigmund, 2010). Players who observe this punishment are more likely to cooperate and less likely to defect in subsequent rounds. In randomly assigned public buses in Kenya, Habyarimana, and Jack (2011) posted a sign that encouraged passengers to heckle drivers of minibuses who were driving unsafely. Passengers' heckling acted as social punishment to enforce a safe driving norm,

and was successful in reducing insurance claims involving injury or death for minibuses in the treatment group.

Information about Groups Can Shape Perceptions of Norms

In addition to group members' behavior, summary information about the opinions or behaviors of a reference group can influence individuals' perceptions of group norms. This information is often presented or implied through social media statistics, newspaper reports, and marketing campaigns. Even warning signs can imply what group members are doing through a request to *stop* doing something. Psychologists frequently study social norm influence by manipulating summary information about the group.

Presenting summary information about a group is in some ways the most straightforward manipulation of a perceived norm, given that individual norm perception is a psychological representation of summary information, for example: *how many* people recycle, *how often* my group recycles, *how positively* my group feels about recycling, and how many people in my group feel positively about recycling. Some interventions aimed at influencing norms simply present individuals with new summary information about the group, hoping to replace the individual's personal and subjective representation with this summary information. This kind of intervention is a form of social norms marketing. Social norms marketing includes information about the group's behavior or opinions distributed through posters, online or newspaper advertisements, community events, television commercials, flyers, email, or other mass communication materials (e.g., Perkins & Craig, 2006; Turner, Perkins, & Bauerle, 2008).

A long and well-known line of research tests the effects of advertising summary information about a group's environmental behaviors. In one classic study (Cialdini et al., 2006), visitors to Arizona's Petrified Forest National Park were randomly assigned to view one of four different signs on a walking trail, stating that "[m]any past visitors have removed the petrified wood from the park" (p. 8), stating that "the vast majority of past visitors have left the petrified wood in the park" (p. 8), or pleading with them to leave the petrified wood or to refrain from removing it. Visitors who saw the sign that alerted them to the stealing problem ("many past visitors have removed the petrified wood from the park") stole on average more petrified wood souvenirs from the trail compared to visitors who saw the other signs. While the intuition to alert groups to bad behavior in their environment is strong and sensible, the social norms perspective shows that these warnings work to portray the negative behavior as descriptively normative, thereby licensing the norm-compliant negative behavior—in this study, stealing wood. Other examples of negative summary information from the policy world include billboards warning people in postconflict zones that rape is prevalent in their community. According to Cialdini's research, this kind of

summary information would be expected to have the opposite intended effect by the billboard's creators (Paluck & Ball, 2010). Descriptive norms, which describe typical behaviors, are a double-edged sword, as we will discuss later.

By the same token, describing positive behaviors as typical can promote the behaviors that interventionists desire. Goldstein, Cialdini, and Griskevicius (2008) found that a sign providing hotel guests with the descriptive norm that most guests (specifically, "almost 75%") reuse their towels led to greater towel reuse than the same sign providing a standard message stressing the importance of environmental protection (see also van der Linden, 2013). Gerber and Rogers (2009) conducted two "get out the vote" phone-based experiments in New Jersey and California. In one condition, the phone script read by callers notified participants that voter turnout in their state was low and decreasing, and in the other condition, the script conveyed that voter turnout was high and increasing. The script conveying high turnout led to greater reported intention to vote among participants. Likewise, providing college students with summary information about fellow students' high or low endorsement of racial stereotypes changed participants' own endorsement of those stereotypes in the direction of the norm (Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 2001; see Mackie & Smith, 1998). Students who were led to believe that their stereotypes were in line with other students' level of stereotype endorsement were also more resistant to an attempt at changing their own endorsement. Other studies have shown that summary information about peers' accurate and timely tax payments (Behavioural Insights Team, 2012; Coleman, 1996) and peers' organ donation registration (Behavioural Insights Team, 2013) led individuals to bring their behavior in line with the norm.

In Colombia, Tankard, Paluck, and Prentice (2014) are conducting a field experiment to test the effectiveness of normative (vs. individual-oriented) information to encourage low-income women to work toward personal goals by saving their money in a bank account. Women who were offered a savings account were informed during the initial savings account offer and in subsequent SMS reminders that the savings account is common and valued among women like them (normative version), or that it is a valuable individual project for them (individual-oriented version). Differences in savings rates between these two randomly assigned savings-account groups, the normative and the individual-oriented, can reveal whether providing summary information about a reference group increases women's engagement with financial interventions in comparison to individualized encouragement to save. Notably, in this environment savings accounts are not currently common, so this study tests the introduction of a new norm. This intervention is an example of how a norms intervention could target behavior that may trigger desired downstream changes, in this case changes in women's self-efficacy, decision-making power, and experience of intimate-partner violence.

One innovation psychologists have studied is the presentation of personalized information about an individual's own behavior in comparison to the norm (i.e.,

social comparison information). Specifically, these norm change interventions draw a comparison between an individual's behavior and the average behavior of his or her reference group. A number of social comparison interventions have been deployed with the hopes of reducing individuals' energy use (Allcott & Mullainathan, 2010). In these studies, residents are presented with descriptive norms about the recent electricity consumption of their neighbors as compared to their own. A number of large-scale randomized controlled trials find that this normative information motivates individuals to decrease their electricity consumption so as to meet normative standards (Allcott, 2011; Costa & Kahn, 2013; Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007).

It is important to note other potential limitations of social comparison information about norms. Descriptive norm information can backfire if individuals are out-performing the descriptive norm or already perceive the norm to be even further in the desired direction than the newly provided information. For example, individuals in Schultz et al.'s study (2007) actually began to use *more* electricity if they learned that they were using less electricity than the presented norm of their neighbors (see also Bhargava & Manoli, 2015; Fellner, Sausgruber, & Traxler, 2013). Adding evaluative feedback can eliminate this boomerang effect. For example, adding a smiley face image to indicate approval of the individual's high energy-saving performance relative to the presented norm prevented those individuals from using more energy following the personalized norm intervention (Schultz et al., 2007).

Social comparison information has also been used to reduce unhealthy behaviors such as binge drinking and drug use. Adolescents and college students often misperceive binge drinking and drug use as highly valued by their peers (Perkins, Meilman, Leichter, Cashin, & Presley, 1999; Prentice & Miller, 1993). This form of false inference about peer attitudes based on one's perception of the norm is a form of pluralistic ignorance. Pluralistic ignorance is a phenomenon in which individuals comply with a norm but privately reject it, while assuming that other people's public compliance with the norm is indicative of their supportive private attitudes (Miller & McFarland, 1991; Prentice & Miller, 1993).

In a field experimental intervention aimed at deconstructing pluralistic ignorance, Schroeder and Prentice (1998) assigned college students to participate in one of two types of discussion groups about alcohol use. One type of discussion focused on individual decisions about alcohol use, and the other type exposed the pluralistic ignorance phenomenon by focusing on the relation between peer pressure to drink and individual decisions about alcohol use. Four to six months later, students who participated in the pluralistic ignorance (vs. individual-oriented) discussion reported drinking less. This early study paved the way for many subsequent interventions combining personal feedback about a participant's own behavior with information about how others actually behave, to address drinking behavior among college students (Lewis & Neighbors, 2006) and later, to address

other health issues like sun tanning (Reid & Aiken, 2013). These types of social comparison interventions are often delivered through media such as mailings and web-based programs (e.g., Collins, Carey, & Sliwinski, 2002; Doumas, Haustveit, & Coll, 2010).

Thus far we have reviewed interventions that give individuals private feedback comparing their behavior with a group norm. Other interventions rely on public feedback, and specifically on the motivational social pressure that is triggered by the awareness that group members will be alerted to your degree of compliance with an existing norm. For example, Gerber, Green, and Larimer (2008) found that voter turnout in an election was highest among individuals who were told that their participation in an election would be publicized to neighbors, compared to individuals who were told that their household would privately receive their voting record, who were told that their turnout records were being monitored, or who were reminded of their civic duty to vote. This intervention and those that replicated the effect later (Davenport et al., 2010; Mann, 2010; Sinclair, 2012) relied on the existence of a strong prescriptive norm (implying favorable judgment, not just typicality, of the voting behavior). Rather than shaping a new perception of a norm about voting, it assumes that people believe it is shameful to be revealed to others as a nonvoter.

Bursztyn and Jensen (2015) conducted a related study in which U.S. high school students who were enrolled in both honors and nonhonors classes were offered an online SAT preparatory course. If they were offered the course during one of their honors classes, they were more likely to sign up if the decision to do so was public, compared to if the decision was private. Critically, when such students were offered the course during one of their nonhonors classes, they were *less* likely to sign up if the decision to do so was public, compared to private. These effects were larger for students who believed it was important to be popular in their school, supporting the explanation that students' decisions were driven by their desire to act in line with what they perceived to be accepted behavior in the relevant setting. The negative effect of making the behavior public in *nonhonors* classes points to the importance of attaching public feedback to an existing prescriptive norm that is already in the desired direction.

Institutional Signals Can Shape Perceptions of Norms

A third source of normative information in the environment comes from institutions that govern, educate, or organize a reference group and their social interactions, such as governments, schools, and the mass media (Getzels & Guba, 1957; Hodgson, 2006; Silverblatt, 2004). An institution's decisions and innovations can signal which behaviors or opinions are common or desirable in a group. Institutions may change perceptions of norms directly, as when individuals make a direct inference about norms based on an institutional signal. Institutions can also

change perceptions of norms indirectly, as when individuals observe a change in the incidence of a behavior due to an institutional change, and update their understanding of norms accordingly. We categorize this source of normative information as coming from institutions rather than from social referent leaders because many institutional actions are not identifiable with a sole leader, but rather with the institution in general, such as a ruling from a court. Like the other sources of normative information we have discussed, institutions both communicate norms and are affected by norms (Hodgson, 2006; Markus & Kitayama, 2010). For example, because one function of the law is to express social norms, institutions such as legal systems can fruitfully *prescribe* certain social norms in order to move individuals' behavior in a desired noncriminal direction (Sunstein, 1996).

Although theoretical ideas about how institutions can signal new norms are intriguing, empirical support for causal change is currently lacking. Scholars studying institutional influence study changes in individuals' behavior and opinion following institutional change, but have not directly measured perceived norms as part of the change process. The extent to which perceived norms may be involved in this change process is an area for future investigation. For now, we review hypotheses regarding the relationship between institutional signals, individuals' perceptions of norms, and behavior.

Theories of social identity and the law lead us to expect that institutions are particularly effective sources of normative information when the members of the groups that they represent view them as legitimate. Indeed, the hypotheses that we discuss here likely apply only when the institution is perceived to be legitimate. Legitimacy has been defined as the combination of people's authorization of the institution to determine appropriate behavior, and people's trust that the institution will represent the interests of the group (Tyler & Jackson, 2014). Similar to an individual who is prototypical of a group, an institution that is perceived to represent or serve a group well gains credibility as a source of normative information (Hogg, 2010). For example, group members may infer that public support already exists for newer opinions and behaviors advertised by the institution (we discuss some examples below). Similar to the logic of highly connected individual social referents, part of institutional normative influence may also come from individuals' awareness that institutions are highly visible and simultaneously observed by many group members at once (Chwe, 2003).

The mass media is one example of an institutional source of normative information. Part of the perceived legitimacy of the mass media derives from individuals' belief that it is run by a society's elites (Zaller, 1992). Another part of the mass media's influence may stem from individuals' implicit understanding that mainstream media seeks to give the public what they want (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1948; Zaller, 1999). Finally, new kinds of "crowdsourced" media sites like Wikipedia, where members of the public contribute content, may reinforce individuals' belief that the media reflects the beliefs and behaviors of the public

(cf. Hindman, 2009). For these reasons, when mass media airs unorthodox content, such as transgender characters on television, consumers may infer that the content is publicly supported, in this case that transgender people are more numerous or accepted in society (Organ, 2010).

Institutional support for or denouncements of certain behaviors are not necessarily enough to influence perceptions of norms, or indeed to change actual rates of behavior (e.g., Pruckner & Sausgruber, 2013). When the Chinese government first denounced foot-binding in 1902 and 1912, the practice did not decline until other movements sprang up to socially reinforce the law (Appiah, 2010). Scholars debate whether court decisions are effective at bringing about changes in public opinion or behavior, with some suggesting they are not (Rosenberg, 2008) and others suggesting that they are effective when political movements coexist to mobilize individuals following the decision (Schacter, 2009). For example, Schacter finds little support for the idea that public opinion at the point of a court decision can alone determine how the public will respond to the ruling. The *Roe v. Wade* decision striking down abortion laws in 1973 was made during a time of rapid increases in public support for legalized elective abortion. Yet given the existence of antiabortion groups that were prepared to mobilize against a ruling, the court decision helped to fuel the antiabortion movements in the decades that followed (Persily, Egan, & Wallsten, 2006). Notably, these institutional studies have not related court rulings and national laws to perceptions of social norms, which would help to inform our hypotheses about the process by which institutions may inform individuals' ideas about what is typical and desirable in their society.

Some research does suggest that institutions provide normative information through decisions and guidance. Although most citizens are not aware of and do not understand specific laws or rulings (Robinson & Darley, 2003), when institutions are legitimate, citizens may infer that the decisions of lawmakers comply with or drive the direction of the society (Jackson et al., 2012; Tyler & Jackson, 2014). For example, qualitative work has demonstrated that after a university administration introduced a ban on outdoor smoking on campus, students viewed smoking as less common and accepted at the school (Procter-Scherdtel & Collins, 2013). Students may infer directly from the ban that smoking must not be normative and indirectly that smoking is less normative because they observe fewer people smoking on campus. In another domain, individuals perceived Americans to be more supportive of same-sex marriage following a U.S. Supreme Court decision in support of same-sex marriage (Tankard & Paluck, 2015). Additional research directly measuring changes in perceived norms following court decisions is needed.

Another way that institutions may influence perceptions of norms is through default or anchor choices for the group (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). For example, a substantially larger proportion of citizens become organ donors when being an organ donor is presented as the "opt-out" default option rather than an "opt-in"

choice that an individual must actively make (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). When such a behavioral choice is made easily available via suggestion or “anchoring,” or is made automatic via a default, the vast majority of people choose that option because it takes more cognitive processing to adjust away from the choice than to accept it (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). However, anchors and defaults may be powerful for another reason. Individuals may infer that an institution has set the behavior as the anchor or default because it is a typical or desirable behavioral choice for their group (Haggag & Paci, 2014; Johnson & Goldstein, 2003).

Institutions may also change perceived norms through innovation. When an institution introduces a new system or method, group members may infer that a certain level of momentum and support must exist to favor the change. For example, institutions that have recently included “transgender” as an option in addition to “male” and “female” on a form may lead group members to infer that transgender people are more numerous in the group and are more accepted by the group, compared to group members who only see “male” or “female” on a form (Tankard, Wu, & Paluck, 2015). Likewise, reserving political seats for women in India may signal that societal norms about gender roles are changing, although norms have not been directly measured in randomized controlled studies demonstrating that reservations for women do increase approval of female politicians (Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Pande, & Topalova, 2012).

Thus far, we have reviewed three sources of information that inform individuals’ perceptions of norms for a particular group: individual group members’ behavior, summary information about the group, and institutional signals. We now turn to the conditions under which these sources of normative information may be particularly influential, meaning effective for influencing individuals’ perceived norms and behavior and ultimately for leading to broader change across the social group.

When Are Norms and Behaviors Most Likely to Shift?

In this section, we identify five conditions under which interventions to shift norms and behaviors are likely to be more powerful. Not all conditions need to be met for a successful norm change intervention. We note when these various conditions have moderated the impact of interventions from various research projects to shift norms and behaviors.

When Individuals Identify with the Source of Normative Information

In general, an individual, group, or institution will only be an effective source of normative information to the extent that a person feels identified with the source (Festinger, 1954; Kim & Hunter, 1993; Wilder, 1990). For example, theory suggests that feeling a sense of comfort, friendship, and resemblance with characters

in edutainment programs facilitates individuals' acceptance of messages conveyed by the characters (Perse & Rubin, 1989). In Prentice and Miller's (1993) study of pluralistic ignorance regarding drinking behavior at Princeton University, the authors found that male students were more influenced by the campus-wide drinking norms than female students. The authors reasoned that the prototype of Princeton students at the time was masculine, given women's relatively recent presence on campus. For this reason, female students may have felt less identified than male students with the reference group of "Princeton students," for whom drinking was seen as descriptively common and prescriptively approved.

These research findings raise a few key points. Individuals' behavior is not influenced by the norms of reference groups with which they do not feel identified. A recent field experiment provides compelling evidence of this idea. Goode, Balzarini, and Smith (2014) demonstrated that feeling identified with a group affects individuals' intention to bring their behavior in line with group norms. Sorority members who were led to see themselves as more (vs. less) prototypical of their group intended to drink less alcohol and reported drinking less alcohol, after exposure to related group norms. Similarly, when Stangor et al. (2001) examined the effects of group summary information on endorsement of racial stereotypes, changes in endorsement were stronger when the information was about other students at their college (their ingroup) than when it was about students at another college (their outgroup).

Moreover, the reference group may need to be relevant to the specific behavior targeted by an intervention (Goldstein et al., 2008). For example, to promote adoption of a new seed technology, an appropriate reference group would be farmers whose land is of a similar size (BenYishay & Mobarak, 2014), and to promote enrollment in a retirement savings plan, an appropriate reference group would be employees in a similar economic position (Beshears, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, & Milkman, 2015). Beshears et al. (2015) found that providing information about the savings of age-matched coworkers had the opposite intended effect of *decreasing* unionized employees' savings. The researchers concluded that these employees may have perceived they were being compared to the wrong reference group—to peers of higher economic status with a greater capacity to save.

These results imply an important initial process for all designers of a norm change intervention, which is to identify the correct reference group. Identifying the correct reference group is difficult, and requires preparatory quantitative and qualitative research to understand which identities carry particular meaning for the population of interest. More research is needed to test whether the extent of norm and behavior change scales in linear fashion with an individual's degree of identification with the reference group.

After selecting the correct reference group, it is important for individuals to identify with the particular source of the normative information—for example, with the particular social referent. In our work with norm change interventions in

schools, we select social referents who are the leaders of smaller cliques at the school in addition to widely known students who are relatively more prototypical of school identity. In contrast to the widely known social referents, students who are leaders of cliques represent sub-group identities such as the “math geeks” or the “drama kids.” Students from those cliques identify much more strongly with their clique leaders than with the widely known social referents. As predicted, the behavior of these clique leaders was able to change the perceptions of school-wide social norms among students in their respective cliques to the same extent that the widely known leaders changed perceptions of norms among their peers (Paluck & Shepherd, 2012).

Identification with reference groups can shift over time, and one of the ways it may change is across the lifespan. While a friend group may be a highly central identity during adolescence, other groups such as one’s coworkers or neighbors may be more central later in life. Other factors, such as changing geographic locations, may also affect which reference groups are felt to be most relevant and what normative information is easily observable about a group. Identification with a group may not mean being physically close to other group members, but physical proximity can affect the number of opportunities people have to observe how group members behave. All of these observations reinforce the point that research is needed to identify the most meaningful reference group and sources of normative information for a population of interest before designing a norm change intervention.

When New Norms Are Believable Representations of Group Opinions and Behavior

New norms do not have to be accurate (i.e., identical to the true current group opinions and behavior) in order to affect group opinions and behavior, but they must be sufficiently believable in order to do so. New presented norms may by design diverge from actual patterns of attitudes and behavior. For example, a university attempting to create a more racially diverse campus climate may depict “inflated diversity” in their brochures (Pritchep, 2013). In some cases, information about a norm may be too distant from reality to be believable and thus effective in influencing perceptions of the norm and behavior. An extremely high level of racial diversity depicted in a historically White college brochure, for example, may not only appear unrealistic, but also lead individuals to resent this inaccurate representation of the group (Pritchep, 2013). Similarly, passengers in taxi cabs were more likely to refrain altogether from tipping when the default amounts for tips on the credit card screen were a higher range (20% / 25% / 30%) compared to a lower range (15% / 20% / 25%), presumably because they recognized the extremity of the suggested tips compared to their own understanding of normative tipping amounts (Haggag & Paci, 2014). It may be tempting to design an

intervention that introduces a false norm of virtually unanimous support for a new idea, for example by claiming that 99% of students at a school recycle. Researchers presenting inflated or deflated normative information, however, have recognized that normative information should be plausible, whether because it is not far from the status quo or because it difficult for individuals to directly observe and refute (e.g., Fellner et al., 2013; van der Linden, 2013). Another way to present normative information as plausible is to present the norm as *beginning* to change, or as experiencing *momentum* in a particular direction. For example: *more and more people are supporting gay marriage* (Sparkman & Walton, 2015; Tankard & Paluck, 2015). Future research could helpfully explore the psychology of judging distance between a current norm and a change in that norm.

When the Individual's Personal Views Are Closer to the New Normative Information

Just as individuals judge the distance between new information about a norm and their own current perception of the norm, they judge the distance between the new information and their own private opinions. For example, individuals may learn that many more people in their community are recycling compared to what they previously thought, and they may also evaluate this information against their own positive or negative opinions of recycling. A body of work in psychology suggests that individuals' behavior is more easily influenced by norms when the individuals are already personally in favor of those norms, an effect called licensing.

Licensing (norms validate personal opinions). Alignment between a norm and a personal opinion *licenses* a person to behave in the way she already prefers to behave (Miller & Prentice, 2013; Prentice, 2012). Public opinion polls in the United States, for example, show that a plurality of Americans who support same-sex marriage are unaware that public support has now shifted to the majority of Americans (Jones, Cox, & Navarro-Rivera, 2014). Awareness of this public support may license supporters to act on their views in public. Historically, when the practice of hiring discrimination against African-Americans was made illegal in the American South, this new norm was in line with many employers' private preferences, although previously they did not voice their preferences publicly (Lessig, 1995). The legal change gave egalitarian employers a socially acceptable excuse to act in a way they already supported.

Experimentally, a licensing effect was demonstrated in the previously described field experiment on drinking and pluralistic ignorance, in which information that most college students do not drink alcohol excessively corrected students' impression that excessive drinking was typical and desirable on campus (Schroeder & Prentice, 1998). This information reduced individuals' own drinking

by providing them with information that their peers' views and actual alcohol consumption were more similar to their own preferences than they previously believed (Schroeder & Prentice, 1998; see also Lewis & Neighbors, 2006).

Thus, norm change interventions have a high likelihood of success when the population is ready for the message. Whether because tradition or law previously proscribed the behaviors or opinions, or because the behaviors or opinions are not highly visible, people may be unaware that their private attitudes are actually normative. Providing information that their attitudes are normative should change public behaviors with relative ease. A much more difficult context is one in which interventions have the task of motivating compliance with a norm that runs against personal opinion.

Motivating (norms run against personal opinions). Individuals may comply with a norm that runs against their personal opinions when the norm is perceived to be so strong that they will be socially punished for their deviance (Blanton & Christie, 2003; Miller & Prentice, 2013). The requirement of a strong norm to overcome personal opinions presents a challenge for norm change interventions: the normative information must persuade recipients that they might feel socially isolated, awkward, or rejected for deviating from the norm. As we previously reviewed, some interventions motivate compliance with the norm through public announcements of deviance (e.g., Gerber, Green, & Larimer, 2008) or through comparisons of individuals with their group (e.g., Schultz et al., 2007).

An individual's personal opinions may not be aligned with a norm for different reasons. For one, he may actually hold a view that is actively in *opposition* to the norm. Over the past few years, U.S. residents have been exposed to many arguments and social movements regarding same-sex marriage. If they do not agree with the current norm of support for same-sex marriage, it is likely because they hold a view *counter* to the norm. We can also imagine, however, that some individuals have not given much thought to the issue of same-sex marriage, and do not have a strong opinion. Ambivalence may also emerge in reaction to novel behaviors and opinions. When recycling was introduced to the public, some people supported it or did not support it, but others were ambivalent until they had more experience trying to recycle, since it was such a new practice.

It can be difficult to persuade individuals to comply with a norm if they actively oppose it (Costa & Kahn, 2013; Fellner et al., 2013). More research is needed to understand how to use norm change interventions to influence these individuals. If individuals are extremely high in personal opposition to an idea such as same-sex marriage, then learning that a reference group now supports same-sex marriage may simply lead them to distance themselves from that reference group (see also Burks & Krupka, 2012). Prentice (2012) cites the widely known example of pitting one strong norm against another, when norms of gentlemanly duty in the South were invoked to end dueling. In this case, laws failed to end dueling,

revealing the difficulty of deactivating the produeing norm. Changing the penalty for dueling to a ban from public office, which was a high cost for that population, proved more successful to end the practice, because it activated a different norm that was already strong. More strategies like these could be tested experimentally to address intractable norms and behaviors.

When the New Normative Information Is Widely Shared

New information regarding norms is particularly influential if individuals know that the information is widely shared among reference group members. Awareness that others are also receiving the same information serves as further proof that a particular opinion or behavior is widely recognized, enacted, or endorsed by the group (Chwe, 2003). For example, Super Bowl audience members are aware that commercials aired during the game are viewed by hundreds of thousands of other people simultaneously. Opinions aired in Super Bowl commercials are expected to be perceived as more normative, or widely endorsed, compared to when they are aired during regular broadcasting (Chwe, 2003). Similarly, if an individual in a social network is popular, a perceiver may infer that many others are also looking to this popular individual to understand the norm, which is part of the individual's power over perceived norms in the network (Paluck & Shepherd, 2012).

A recent field experiment in Mexico directly tested the effectiveness of widely shared information compared to privately received information in changing attitudes and norms. Arias (2014) manipulated whether a radio soap opera relaying rejection of violence against women was transmitted to participants individually (by listening to a CD-rom) or socially (at a group meeting or from a community loudspeaker). The radio program strengthened perceptions of social norms rejecting violence against women *only* when the method of delivery was social, not when it was individual. Moreover, the results suggested that knowing that others are receiving the same content (in this case, by receiving the content from a loudspeaker) is in itself sufficient to change attitudes and norms, even if there is no direct social interaction with fellow recipients (as in a group meeting).

When Descriptive Norms Are Contextualized

Descriptive norms can be powerful, but as we have already reviewed, they also run a risk of backfiring. When a problematic behavior or viewpoint is prevalent in a context, one intuition about how to intervene is to increase awareness of that problem. For example, posters or mailings might state that four out of five women in a community are abused, or that the average student on a college campus consumes five alcoholic drinks per week. Sharing these statistics, however, can

actually end up making individuals feel that it is normal and okay to abuse women or to drink five drinks per week, since that is what most people do.

How can we share problematic statistics without producing more problematic behaviors, or reproducing problematic norms? One tactic is to give individuals evaluative feedback on their position relative to the norm. In an example covered previously, individuals were given summary information about how much energy they use compared to other people (Schultz et al., 2007). For some individuals, their personal consumption was lower than the group average, which could potentially encourage them to use *more* energy. For these individuals, positive evaluations (smiley faces) accompanied their feedback, encouraging them to continue using less than the norm (see also Pruckner & Sausgruber, 2013). Similarly, if a student tends to drink one alcoholic drink per week and learns that other people tend to drink five, communicating approval of drinking less than the average may be important to discourage them from beginning to drink closer to the average.

Another tactic relies on the fact that norms can be characterized in different ways. A norm is defined by its central tendency, its dispersion (Paluck & Ball, 2010; Prentice, 2012), and the direction in which it is moving. A norm's central tendency represents where the average behavior or opinion is located. Two colleges might both have a norm with a central tendency of drinking five alcoholic drinks per week. The dispersion of the norm, however, refers to the degree to which all group members comply with the norm—their uniformity. At one of the two colleges in question, perhaps all students tend to consume four, five, or six drinks per week. At the other college, it could be that students are heterogeneous: some don't drink at all, while others drink nine or ten drinks per week. When the central tendency of a norm is not favorable, it can be effective to emphasize its dispersion: *many group members do not drink, or only have one or two drinks* (Paluck & Ball, 2010). In other cases, students may focus on the extreme cases when forming their perceptions of the norms, and so emphasizing the central tendency could reshape their perception of a norm of extreme drinking: *on average students only drink five drinks per week, not ten*. Describing a favorable direction in which a norm is moving is another option: *students are starting to drink fewer drinks per week* (Sparkman & Walton, 2015; Tankard & Paluck, 2015).

Recommendations for Policy Applications

Integrating norm change interventions into policy requires determining when targeting norm perception is most appropriate in real-world settings. Norm change interventions are not the only way to influence an individual or collective of individuals. There are times when norm change interventions may be particularly appropriate, when other types of interventions may be a better fit for changing behavior, and when multiple strategies could be combined. Other interventions include attitude persuasion interventions that focus on individuals' personal opinions or beliefs, educational programs, interventions that target behavior in an

entirely different way such as a “nudge” (making a behavior easier to engage in) or “shove” (explicitly banning or requiring a behavior; Kahan, 2000), and material incentives (e.g., Ahuja et al., 2010; Viscusi, Huber, & Bell, 2011; cf. Fehr & Falk, 2002). Effective intervention design requires careful analysis of the problem at hand to figure out exactly which factors are keeping people from acting in a desired way (Datta & Mullainathan, 2012). This behavioral “diagnosis” (Datta & Mullainathan, 2012) may reveal, for example, that people are not yet informed about the importance of a new behavior, that they are already motivated to engage in it but have trouble acting on their intention, or that they are already motivated but feel socially stigmatized if they act on their intention.

Further investigation of the appropriateness of different interventions in different behavioral contexts is a critical area for future study, but the existing literature provides some initial guidance as to the conditions under which using normative influence may and may not be particularly effective. When people are already motivated to do something, such as receive a vaccine, and it is not a stigmatized behavior, it may be appropriate to prioritize removing environmental or psychological obstacles that are preventing people from implementing their intentions. Channel factors are seemingly minor aspects of a situation that can either facilitate or block behaviors (Lewin, 1951), such as whether it is easy or difficult to locate the infirmary where one needs to go to receive a vaccine (Leventhal, Singer, & Jones, 1965). An appropriate channel factor solution in this case may be simply providing a map displaying the route to the infirmary.

When a behavior is not publicly observable, a norms intervention may be a good option. Some behaviors are not typically done socially, such as checking one’s tire pressure, and others are usually discussed in private, such as using birth control or being screened for sexually transmitted infections (STIs). When behaviors are not publicly visible, people’s perceptions of what is normal may be highly skewed, because they lack good information about what others are doing. A norms intervention can provide this information about the fact that other people are checking their tire pressure and being screened for STIs, to encourage members of a particular reference group to do the same. For some extremely personal behaviors and experiences, such as experiencing relationship abuse, individuals may not want to feel that there is an audience of other people involved in potential courses of action (Tankard, Paluck, & Prentice, 2014). In this case, normative information could be adapted so as to avoid the impression that an audience is watching and judging an individual’s response to the situation.

Norm interventions may be highly appropriate when people need social motivation or licensing to engage in a behavior, and when acting in line with a particular reference group is important to them. If individuals do not already support a behavior, normative information is useful to encourage them to support and engage in the behavior. If individuals already support a behavior, normative information is useful to remind them to engage in the behavior.

Norm interventions take many forms. As we have discussed, researchers and practitioners can target different sources of normative information, with some being more appropriate and effective in different contexts. An interpersonal, inherently social behavior such as peer harassment, for example, may require an individual role model to communicate a new norm rather than solely targeting summaries of group behavior or institutional change. In the context of peer harassment, the reputation and social status of each individual in the network is on the line, and seeing an individual model a norm of speaking out against harassment demonstrates firsthand to a perceiver that he or she will not lose social status by speaking up (Paluck & Shepherd, 2012). In other cases, normative information from institutions instead of individuals or groups has its own distinct advantages. It may not be credible to claim that members of a Greek organization do not support hazing, for example. However, if the organization itself discourages hazing, this action could potentially be effective in changing group norms if the institution is respected by group members and seen as at the heart of the group.

Norm change interventions also need to be strategic about fitting norms to the right reference group. We may be attracted to the idea of changing an entire community's norm, when it may be more effective to tailor messages to subgroups within the community that have strong local identities. Norm interventions may be less effective when there is no cohesive identity to describe. If many families all live in the same apartment complex but do not feel a shared sense of identity, for example, then the norms of the building may be meaningless for these families. A larger or smaller reference group may be more appropriate in this case, such as "residents of this city" or "members of the first floor." If identification with a group is not strong or interactions with other group members are infrequent, use of mass media may be an effective way to draw individuals into a shared experience of new norms.

Sometimes, the existing norms of a community are in the opposite direction desired by policymakers or practitioners. As we mentioned, when the central tendency of a norm is not favorable (*average drinking rates are high*), it can be effective to emphasize its dispersion (*some people don't drink*) or a direction of change (*people are starting to drink less*). And when the dispersion draws attention to extreme behaviors in a community, presenting the central tendency as the norm can lead people to believe that extreme behaviors are counter normative. Finally, norms can be used to increase engagement in other kinds of behavior change interventions that are not perceived to be attractive. For example, educational interventions could be portrayed as popular or desirable among a person's group members. Understanding when norm interventions, and different kinds of norm interventions, are a good fit for different social problems is an ongoing process that should continue to be developed as new interventions are evaluated and new problems addressed.

Altering normative information in the environment can be a powerful way to introduce social change. This strategy is critical for policymakers to

understand and employ. Many aspects of this strategy need further research in order to maximize the impact of these methods. We stress the importance of continuing field experiments that examine the effects of real world norm change interventions, as opposed to conducting correlational analysis. Random assignment to control and treatment groups allows investigators to isolate the effects of norm change interventions and the downstream effects of shifted normative perceptions on other outcomes such as behavioral and attitudinal change. Norms are specific to the communities being studied, and thus require background research to design normative messaging that could be expected to be effective.

Measurement of perceived norms should be more consistently incorporated into the evaluation of social interventions, particularly interventions that involve institutional change. In many cases there are reasonable theoretical grounds for hypothesizing that the intervention, such as making organ donation a default behavior, influences behavior change through a shift in perceived norms. Directly measuring norms as an outcome is a way to open up the black box of individual level change, and to test how a change in perceived norms relates to other outcomes.

Institutional change is inherently relevant to any policy change, and further research on this particular topic is important to understand how new laws and programs affect individuals' understanding of social norms. If most citizens in a Colombian community are aware that their government is running a program entitled *Mujeres Ahorradoras* (Women Savers), the program may have a direct effect on the women who save money through the program, but it also may have important effects on perceived norms in the community regarding women's financial involvement and general level of empowerment. For example, citizens may come to perceive that it is common and respected in their community for women to be financially independent. On the other hand, the presence of such a program could spread a perception that women are weak and in need of government help. Without measuring effects on norms within the community at large, we cannot know the full extent of positive and negative effects of highly publicized policy changes and social programs.

Throughout this review, we have indicated where more research would help to advance our understanding of the science of changing norms and behavior. We mention a few more future directions for research here in closing. First, it is essential to collect longer-term follow-up measures of perceived (not just actual) norms in evaluations of policy and behavior change interventions. These measures can test the extent to which the normative change correlates with behavioral change across time and situations. For example, how long will shifts in perceived norms about women in politics persist following the reservation program in India and how many times should this program reserve seats for women in order to produce long-term effects? Is it effective to provide a "booster" to a normative intervention at a later date, building on normative messages that already resonated with participants?

The cost-effectiveness of different normative intervention strategies should also be analyzed as interventions are tested, and compared to the cost-effectiveness of other kinds of interventions (Sunstein, 2013). Normative messaging often has the benefit of reaching many individuals at once, through media programming and signage, which stands in contrast to many one-on-one educational programs aimed at changing attitudes.

Finally, successful normative interventions should be scaled up (see Allcott, 2011), with careful attention to aspects of the intervention that may unintentionally differ when implemented on a larger and more systematic scale. Not all is kept equal when an intervention strategy is translated from a lab setting to a real-world setting or when it is seen as coming from a government or police force as opposed to an NGO or university. It is important to continue evaluating normative interventions' consequences as they are scaled up, conducting experiments to clearly understand their ongoing effects.

Perceived norms are not merely a psychological curiosity. Given the potential of norm perception interventions to have powerful effects in real-world contexts, scholars, practitioners, and policymakers need to join their efforts and expertise to determine how best to implement proven norm interventions on a large scale.

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7.2 Condoning Stereotyping?

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Condoning Stereotyping?: How Awareness of Stereotyping Prevalence Impacts Expression of Stereotypes

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Condoning Stereotyping?: How Awareness of Stereotyping Prevalence Impacts Expression of Stereotypes

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The deleterious effects of stereotyping on individual and group outcomes have prompted a search for solutions. One approach has been to increase awareness of the prevalence of stereotyping in the hope of motivating individuals to resist natural inclinations. However, it could be that this strategy creates a norm for stereotyping, which paradoxically undermines desired effects. The present research demonstrates that individuals who received a high prevalence of stereotyping message expressed more stereotypes than those who received a low prevalence of stereotyping message (Studies 1a, 1b, 1c, and 2) or no message (Study 2). Furthermore, working professionals who received a high prevalence of stereotyping message were less willing to work with an individual who violated stereotypical norms than those who received no message, a low prevalence of stereotyping message, or a high prevalence of counter-stereotyping effort message (Study 3). Also, in a competitive task, individuals who received a high prevalence of stereotyping message treated their opponents in more stereotype-consistent ways than those who received a low prevalence of stereotyping message or those who received a high prevalence of counter-stereotyping effort message (Study 4).

Keywords: stereotypes, bias, diversity, norms, negotiation

Social category differentiation and the attributions assigned to differences sometimes manifest in internalization of promulgated negative stereotypes about certain demographic groups. Such stereotypes in the workplace are often used unfairly, creating negative outcomes for individuals who are the object of these stereotypes. Consequently, this evolving demographic terrain necessitates that managers find ways to mitigate the sometimes detrimental effects of demographic diversity. Part of this effort has involved educating employees about stereotyping and biases and then providing structures that minimize the negative impact of these harmful behaviors on fully leveraging human capital (Burgess, Van Ryn, Dovidio, & Saha, 2007; Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, 2006; Sawyerr, Strauss, & Yan, 2005; Ziegert & Hanges, 2005). To this end, providing coaching and training on interventions that may mitigate the effects of stereotyping on individuals' outcomes has been one pervasive vehicle utilized by organizations. It has been estimated that organizations spend \$8 billion annually on diversity and inclusion training, and in a survey of Fortune 1,000 companies, 88% reported providing diversity and inclusion training on gender alone (Jayne & Dipboye, 2004; Vedantam, 2008). Given the significant amount of time and money being spent on diversity and inclusion training, it is important to ensure that the expected results are being achieved.

Many of the proposed interventions involve explicit mandates about not stereotyping that have often been shown to yield negative backlash (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998). Those initiatives that have proven more successful have been shown only to mitigate the stereotypic expressions of those whose exhibited bias is captured by explicit measures (Dobbins, Cardy, & Truxillo, 1988). Recent research, however, suggests that explicit and implicit biases diverge and that implicit biases may be more predictive of stereotypic action (Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & Colangelo, 2005). Consequently, in naturalistic settings, many more stereotype-driven behaviors may emerge from those who do not exhibit explicit bias. Furthermore, many groundbreaking intervention strategies have been demonstrated in situations in which explicit evaluations are being conducted (Baltes, Bauer, & Frensch, 2007; Bauer & Baltes, 2002; Nieminen et al., 2013; Rudolph, Baltes, Zhdanova, Clark, & Bal, 2012). It is unclear, however, whether these strategies would be equally effective in the more prevalent context in which constant tacit microassessments are continuously being made. In these situations in which impromptu, yet impactful informal assessments are made, the greater social norms of the organization might have a significant impact on stereotyping and biased expression.

One proposed method of reducing unconscious stereotyping is highlighting the pervasiveness of stereotyping and the behaviors associated with it (Banaji, Bazerman, & Chugh, 2003; Blair, Judd, Sadler, & Jenkins, 2002; Burgess et al., 2007). The presumption is that making individuals aware of the automatic nature of stereotype activation, and hence the pervasiveness of stereotyping, may lead to greater willingness to engage in checks on unproductive thoughts that arise from stereotyping; not only will individuals be aware of their susceptibility to biased thoughts, but they will not feel singled out as bigots. However, there is the provocative

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possibility that instead of reducing stereotyping, touting the prevalence of stereotyping (i.e., that the majority of individuals stereotype) may create a social norm for stereotyping and, paradoxically, promote stereotype expression and its detrimental effects because individuals feel less compelled to monitor what they say or do.

In the present research, we tested this assertion by examining how messages about the prevalence of stereotyping influence individuals' social judgments and behaviors. Specifically, we examined the effects of high and low prevalence of stereotyping messages on individuals' stereotype expressions and their judgments of and behavior toward individuals from highly stereotyped groups. We built on and extended extant research examining stereotype reduction in a number of ways. First, we moved beyond structured evaluation processes to more subtle evaluation contexts and focused particularly on stereotyping behaviors that result from biases that operate outside awareness and are therefore not detectable on measures of explicit bias. Moreover, we built upon previous work that has examined methods of diminishing the stereotyping behavior of those who explicitly report being biased (e.g., Sherman, Stroessner, Conrey, & Azam, 2005; Son Hing, Li, & Zanna, 2002) by highlighting how prevalence messages may be used more broadly to mitigate stereotype expression. Furthermore, in past research, counterstereotyping interventions have been narrowly focused, designed to specifically target a particular stereotyped group (e.g., women), but little is known about how such focused strategies affect broad perceptions of other stereotyped groups (e.g., Blacks), for which no specific counterstereotype exists (e.g., Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Ramasubramanian, 2007). Our investigation, however, focused on the utility of *generalized* prevalence messages, which have the potential to broadly reduce the expression of stereotypes.

Stereotyping Prevalence

Stereotypes are beliefs or expectations about the qualities and characteristics of specific social groups (Nelson, Acker, & Manis, 1996). People who endorse negative stereotypes are referred to as being *biased* because the stereotype involves negative evaluative components that may not be grounded in reality. In the past, negative stereotyping and bias were primarily believed to be behaviors in which only bigoted people engaged, and researchers believed that explicit measures were sufficient to capture such tendencies. However, more recently, the study of unconscious bias has proposed an unsettling supposition—most of us use stereotypes all the time without knowing it. Much of the support for these claims has come from subtle measures of stereotypes such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and implicit recall tasks. These are the primary experimental methods used to generate a body of results that demonstrates that many cognitive processes that affect behavior, such as stereotyping, are unconscious in nature and are inaccessible to observation by the actor (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Studies using recall tasks and the IAT have found that there is widespread unconscious bias against stigmatized groups such as older adults, African Americans, women, and the overweight, even among individuals who believe that they are not biased and report little or no explicit bias (Castelli, Zecchini, Deamicis, & Sherman, 2005; Dovidio, 2001; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Green et al., 2007). For example, Teachman and Brownell (2001) showed that health professionals who specialize

in obesity treatment demonstrated implicit anti-fat bias but there was little evidence for explicit anti-fat bias.

This shift in focus from overt or conscious bias to unconscious bias has important implications for organizations. Indeed, although there has been a decline in overtly biased attitudes, bias still continues in evaluation decisions and in perceptions of and interactions with others (Maass, Castelli, & Arcuri, 2000; Sauer, Thomas-Hunt, & Morris, 2010). Individuals may denounce bias in the workplace but may still act in ways that reveal biased perceptions and decision making without conscious awareness of their actions (Dovidio, 2001). Thus, individuals who espouse egalitarianism and are not openly biased may possess underlying feelings that lead them to engage in biased decision making and behaviors (Ziegert & Hanges, 2005). In light of the bias associated with stereotyping, researchers have been examining ways to curb this potentially damaging practice (Baltes et al., 2007; Bauer & Baltes, 2002; Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000; Rudolph, Baltes, Zhdanova, Clark, & Bal, 2012).

Reducing Bias

One of the most successful techniques for reducing bias has been the use of structured recall in the observation and evaluation of professionals' behavior. In instances which individuals exhibited explicit *a priori* bias against a traditionally stereotyped group (i.e., Black male managers or female professors), instructions to first recall observed positive behaviors for 5 min and observed negative behaviors for 5 min diminished the negative impact of stereotypes on subsequent performance ratings relative to situations in which structured recall was not prompted (Baltes et al., 2007; Bauer & Baltes, 2002). It is unclear, however, whether methods demonstrated to mitigate biased evaluations by explicitly biased individuals remain effective in diminishing bias among those with implicit biases.

Considerable effort has been spent in examining mechanisms for mitigating stereotyping, particularly that which is unrecognized. Numerous investigations have presented mounting evidence that individuals are highly motivated not to appear biased (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Plant & Butz, 2006; Plant & Devine, 1998, 2003; Shelton, 2003; Vorauer, Hunter, Main, & Roy, 2000; Vorauer & Kumhyr, 2001; Vorauer, Main, & O'Connell, 1998) and expend considerable effort to suppress biased expression (Richeson & Shelton, 2003). However, whether these motivations are sufficient to successfully translate into reductions in prejudiced attitudes and actions is less clear. We do know that the reduction of prejudice is difficult and takes considerable time (Devine & Monteith, 1993) and that despite organizations' expenditure of large amounts of money on this effort (Hansen, 2003), the effects are mixed.

Part of the mixed success of anti-stereotyping campaigns may be due to a backlash against prescriptions not to stereotype (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994). Specifically, the use of external control motivations (i.e., evoking concerns for what others might think or the inappropriateness of stereotyping) in many of the efforts to reduce the expression of prejudice in organizations may actually be increasing stereotype expression. Across two experiments in which they primed external control and autonomous motivations for reducing prejudice, Legault, Gutsell, and Inzlicht (2011) found that those in the external control condition

demonstrated lower motivation to be nonprejudiced and exhibited more explicit and implicit prejudice than those in the autonomous motivation condition. Consequently, it is not surprising that alternative methods (i.e., those that do not evoke backlash) for diminishing stereotype expression have been publicized more recently.

One approach draws upon research that suggests the important role of attention in general strategies for reducing undesired implicit influences on judgment. The general principle is that attentional focus attenuates automatic influences on judgment. The premise is that it is possible to “overshadow” or suppress initial automatic reactions by inducing people to think in a deliberative fashion (Wilson & Brekke, 1994; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). For example, Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic (2007) demonstrated that teaching or priming people to recognize the discrepancy in giving toward identifiable and unidentifiable victims resulted in elimination of the disparity. Further evidence of the effects of attentional focus on mitigation of implicit influences is derived from research showing that individuals expected to justify their judgments engage in more effortful and self-critical searches (Lerner & Tetlock, 1994; Tetlock, 1983; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boetger, 1989) that have been shown to improve judgment (Ashton, 1992; Cvetkovich, 1978; Doney & Armstrong, 1996; Ford & Weldon, 1981; McAllister, Mitchell, & Beach, 1979; Mero & Motowidlo, 1995; Murphy, 1994; Weldon & Gargano, 1988).

Based on this body of literature focused on the role of attention in weakening the effects of implicit cognition and its intuitively attractive logic, some researchers promote consciousness raising as a strategy for avoiding unintended bias. That is, when a decision maker is aware of the source and nature of bias in judgment, that bias may effectively be anticipated and avoided. Hence, the advice to managers and organizational decision makers (Goto, 2007; Wherry & Bartlett, 1982) as well as doctors (Klein, 2005) and jurors (Jolls & Sunstein, 2006) has been to acknowledge their implicit biases and make a conscious effort to be objective. In fact, work by Son Hing, Bobocel, and Zanna (2002) indicates that heightened self-awareness of *one's own* propensity to engage in stereotype expression decreases an individual's discriminatory behavior. In this investigation, specific feedback about a given individual's propensity to stereotype was provided. In such cases, it is possible that the guilt that emerges from an awareness of one's own prejudice can produce a sufficient amount of motivation to work to mitigate displays of prejudiced attitudes (Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2007). However, such strategies leave open the possibility that individuals may be overcome by feelings of blame and find explanations other than bias to rationalize their behaviors.

Consequently, researchers have proposed that a strategy that leverages the potentially beneficial effects of awareness of stereotyping behavior without eliciting the unproductive behaviors evoked by blame involves making individuals aware of the high incidence of stereotyping and stereotyping behavior (Banaji et al., 2003; Blair et al., 2002; Burgess et al., 2007). The rationale behind this intervention is that making individuals cognizant of the automatic nature of stereotyping may result in greater willingness to engage in checks on their own stereotypic thoughts. Individuals would be aware of their predisposition to stereotype, but they would not feel as though they are alone in being chastised for being biased. Although this strategy may seem intuitively attractive, making people aware that the vast majority of people stereotyping may have some ironic effects. Instead of reducing stereotyp-

ing, as intended, this message may convey a social norm for stereotyping and promote expression, social judgments, and behaviors based on stereotypes, because individuals feel less compelled to monitor what they say or do. Research on compliance to descriptive norms supports this argument (Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008).

There is a body of literature on prejudice reduction based on Sherif and Sherif's (1953) group norm theory (Sechrist & Stangor, 2001; Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 2001). It suggests that individuals' attitudes toward other groups are not based on actual contact with those groups but rather exposure to the attitudes toward the other groups prevailing among those in their own group. In support of this theory, Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, and Vaughan (1994) found that a confederate expressing antiracist views dramatically reduced tolerance for racist acts among experimental participants. Conversely, when the same confederate expressed benign acceptance of racist acts, participants also recommended acceptance (see Monteith, Deneen, & Tooman, 1996, for similar effects on gay-related attitudes).

More broadly, several studies have shown that descriptive norms (i.e., norms regarding how most people behave in a situation), generally influence behaviors (e.g., Goldstein et al., 2008) by providing information about what is likely to be adaptive and effective conduct in a setting. Recently, there has been a surge of programs that have capitalized on the use of normative information to change undesired behaviors. For example, pointing out that behaviors such as alcohol abuse, drug use, disordered eating, gambling, and littering are enacted by the numeric minority has reduced these behaviors (Neighbors, Larimer, & Lewis, 2004; Schultz, 1999).

It is surprising, given the ubiquity and strength of the evidence for compliance to descriptive norms, that individuals with the aim of reducing stereotyping may be misusing this potent form of influence. Their efforts to communicate, “You are not alone in doing this thing that has harmful effects” are undercut by the lurking normative message, “Most people are doing it” (Cialdini, 1998). It is conceivable then that, in trying to alert the public to the widespread nature of stereotyping, organizational researchers and social scientists inadvertently perpetuate stereotype expression because individuals may feel less compelled to censor their stereotypic and biased beliefs and behaviors.

Impact of Stereotyping Prevalence on Perceptions, Decision Making, and Behavior

Both consciously and subconsciously, individuals often use others as reference points to inform them of proper, accepted behavior. If there is a discrepancy between their thoughts and what they determine are appropriate perceptions or actions, the result is often a change in behavior that diminishes or removes the discrepancy (Roberts, 2005). Norms may define the standard associated with stereotyping and bias, and this in turn is likely to influence subsequent perceptions and behaviors.

We suggest that messages that convey information about the social norm of stereotyping may play a role in whether individuals perceive a discrepancy between those thoughts that are most easily accessible and what is actually appropriate. Specifically, when individuals are faced with a target possessing characteristics that make categorical stereotypes readily available, it is easy for ste-

reotypic conceptions to dominate others in salience (Brewer, 1988; Devine, 1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). However, whether people then use these thoughts to guide their perceptions, decisions, and behaviors or instead work against their natural inclinations to rely on these stereotypes may be moderated by social norm messages. In cases where the message conveys the high prevalence of stereotyping (i.e., the vast majority of people stereotype), we anticipated that stereotyping would seem less inappropriate and participants would be less concerned about mitigating stereotyping behaviors and would stereotype more than when a message conveyed the low prevalence of stereotyping (i.e., few people stereotype).

Norms about stereotyping may also have important consequences for the ways in which individuals engage with others. When individuals feel that others stereotype, they may not only allow themselves to express more stereotypes, but such a reduction in self-censorship of stereotypic thoughts may have a number of other consequences beyond expression. One such consequence may be that, for individuals whose stereotypic thoughts are less constrained, others' displays of counterstereotypic behaviors may be more disconcerting. Since stereotypes about groups affect assumptions and expectations about the attributes and behavior of those groups in social and professional settings (Boldry, Wood, & Kashy, 2001; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Heilman, Block, Martell, & Simon, 1989; Rudman & Glick, 2001), deviations from these expectations may be unsettling. A growing body of research, mostly focused on gender stereotype disconfirmation, has demonstrated that expectancy violators suffer social and economic penalties, termed *backlash effects* (Rudman, 1998; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004; Sheldon, Thomas-Hunt, & Proell, 2006). For instance, evaluators conferred lower status on female professionals who expressed anger than on male professionals who expressed anger (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008). Likewise, female job applicants who showed agency were viewed negatively, which led to discrimination in hiring and promotion decisions, negative performance evaluations, and even sabotage (for reviews, see Eagly & Karau, 2002; Rudman & Phelan, 2008). Thus, individuals uncompelled to mitigate stereotypic conceptions may be more aware of expectancy violations and display more unchecked backlash in the presence of a target who violates stereotypic expectations. We hypothesized that being exposed to messages about the high and low prevalence of stereotyping will impact individuals' social judgments of people who engage in counterstereotypic behavior. Specifically, when individuals feel less obliged to mitigate stereotypic conceptions, they may be more critical of a target's stereotype violation and more likely to display unchecked backlash against the target. Therefore, we predicted that individuals exposed to a high prevalence of stereotyping message would rate people who violate stereotypic expectations more harshly than individuals who were told that few people stereotype.

In contrast, a message that highlights individuals' efforts to overcome stereotyping may better leverage the power of social norms than a message that conveys the high prevalence of stereotyping. When a message highlights individuals' efforts to overcome stereotyping (i.e., the vast majority of people try to overcome their stereotypic preconceptions), individuals may be motivated to regulate stereotyping behaviors. Previous studies have demonstrated that messages that convey that most people display positive behaviors motivate others to act positively as well (Cialdini, Kall-

gren, & Reno, 1991). For example, Goldstein and his colleagues (2008) showed that a message saying "the majority of guests reuse their towels" proved superior to a message that focused solely on the importance of environmental protection in motivating hotel guests' participation in an environmental conservation program.

Because people generally do not want to be seen as negatively biased and adjust their behavior to avoid this attribution (Bergsieker, Shelton, & Richeson, 2010; Dovidio, Gaertner, Kawakami, & Hodson, 2002; Norton, Sommers, Apfelbaum, Pura, & Ariely, 2006), circumstances in which stereotyping is not normative should increase individuals' motivation to mitigate their stereotypic thoughts and expressions. Specifically, messages which convey that the vast majority of people try to overcome their stereotypic preconceptions may mitigate stereotypic conceptions more than messages that highlight the fact that the vast majority of people stereotype. Therefore, individuals who are exposed to the high prevalence of stereotyping message may rate people who violate stereotypic expectations more harshly than individuals who are told that most people try to avoid stereotyping; that is, they are exposed to a high prevalence of counterstereotyping message.

Additionally, the dominance behaviors of individuals who indulge stereotypic thoughts may also be affected. Research on stereotype lift reveals that individuals experience a performance boost when the lower ability or worth of members of a distinct social category of which they are not a part is made salient or explicitly called into question (Walton & Cohen, 2003). For instance, despite the pervasive stereotype that women are worse than men at solving difficult math problems, men outperformed women only when it was made salient that historically men have better task performance (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999). Presumably, men exposed to information about women's inferior performance developed a more crystalized stereotype of women, which propelled their own performance. A message conveying the high prevalence of stereotyping might release individuals from dismissing stereotypes and similarly provoke heightened performance. Hence, we expected that individuals who were exposed to a high prevalence of stereotyping message (HPSM) and who were competing against members of a group stereotyped as performing poorly in competitive situations would behave more assertively and perform better than those exposed to a low prevalence of stereotyping message (LPSM) and those exposed to a high prevalence of counterstereotyping effort message (HPCSM).

Overview of Studies

In the present research, we tested these predictions by examining how messages about the prevalence of stereotyping influence individuals' biased expressions, social judgments, and behaviors. In Studies 1a, 1b and 1c, we examined the effects of low and high prevalence of stereotyping messages on individuals' stereotype expressions about the older adults, women, and the overweight, respectively. In Study 2, we examined whether a HPSM exacerbates stereotype expressions relative to situations where no stereotyping prevalence information is provided. In addition, in Study 2 we employed a more nuanced method of assessing stereotype expression that does not prompt respondents with stereotypes and uses an implicit measure of individuals' stereotypical expressions.

The claim of stereotyping infrequency might be externally compromised, given the widespread commentary that people do ste-

reotype. Therefore, in Study 3, we exposed working professionals to a more realistic message that exploits the potency of descriptive norms by conveying the high prevalence of individuals' efforts to overcome their predilection toward stereotyping. Second, we extended our investigation of the effects of stereotyping prevalence on generalized expressions of stereotypes to situations in which individuals were making evaluative judgments based on behavioral observations. Specifically, we considered the ways in which stereotyping prevalence impacts evaluations of those who exhibit counterstereotypical behavior. We investigated not just the proximal outcomes related to stereotyping but also the distal outcomes. Finally, in Study 4, we moved from an investigation of perceptions and social judgment to consideration of the impact of a low and high prevalence of stereotyping message and a high prevalence of counterstereotyping effort message on behavior and outcomes on a competitive task.

Study 1a

The purpose of this study was to determine if information about the prevalence of stereotyping would influence individuals' stereotype expressions about a commonly stereotyped group—older adults (Perry, Kulik, & Bourhis, 1996). We sought to replicate the context of the real world in which people are increasingly told to try not to stereotype by telling participants that they should try to avoid stereotyping. However, recognizing that active suppression of stereotypic thoughts can increase the salience of stereotypes and their influence on thoughts (Macrae et al., 1994; Monteith, Spicer, & Tooman, 1998), we also examined the impact of prevalence messages in the absence of instructions to avoid stereotyping. In doing so, we hoped to be able to isolate the separate effects of prevalence messages.

Method

Participants. Participants were 208 (97 females; mean age = 20.16 years) undergraduate and graduate business school students at a private midwestern university. The racial/ethnic composition of the sample was 68% European Americans, 15% Asians, 5% African Americans, 8% Hispanics, and 4% East Indians.

Design and procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (prevalence message: high prevalence of stereotyping message, or HPSM vs. low prevalence of stereotyping message, or LPSM) \times 2 (caveat: none vs. try to avoid stereotyping) design. They were told that the experimenters were interested in people's perceptions. They were reminded that their responses would be anonymous. Before giving their perceptions of older adults, participants read one of four messages. Those randomly assigned to the HPSM condition were told the following:

A very influential body of psychological research has established that *the vast majority of people* have stereotypical preconceptions and their impressions and evaluations of others are consistently biased by these stereotypic preconceptions. You should actively try to avoid thinking about others in such a manner.

Participants assigned to the LPSM condition read the following message:

A very influential body of psychological research has established that *very few people* have stereotypical preconceptions and their impres-

sions and evaluations of others are consistently biased by these stereotypic preconceptions. You should actively try to avoid thinking about others in such a manner.

Participants assigned to conditions with messages without the "try to avoid stereotyping" caveat were either given the HPSM or the LPSM but were not told that they "should actively try to avoid thinking about others in such a manner." Therefore, participants assigned to the HPSM without the "try to avoid stereotyping" caveat condition were told the following:

A very influential body of psychological research has established that *the vast majority of people* have stereotypical preconceptions and their impressions and evaluations of others are consistently biased by these stereotypic preconceptions.

Likewise, participants assigned to the LPSM without the "try to avoid stereotyping" caveat condition read the following message:

A very influential body of psychological research has established that *very few people* have stereotypical preconceptions and their impressions and evaluations of others are consistently biased by these stereotypic preconceptions.

Dependent measures. Using items adopted from Kawakami et al. (2000), participants rated the older adults on three dimensions on which they are typically stereotyped (i.e., fragile, traditional, and dependent) on a 7-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*), $\alpha = .77$.

Results

Analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant main effect of prevalence message, $F(1, 204) = 13.26, p < .01$. Individuals in the HPSM condition ($M = 5.00, SD = 0.85$) rated older adults more stereotypically than those in the LPSM condition ($M = 4.58, SD = 0.80$).¹ There was no significant main effect for caveat, $F(1, 204) = 0.17, ns$, and there was no significant interaction of prevalence message and caveat, $F(1, 204) = 0.50, ns$ (see Figure 1a).

Discussion

The results revealed that messages about the rarity of stereotyping yielded lower stereotype expressions about older adults than messages that touted the prevalence of stereotyping. Therefore, our prediction was supported. Specifically, when participants were told that few people stereotyped, they rated the older adults less stereotypically than when they were told that the vast majority of people stereotyped. Moreover, the admonition to try not to stereotype did not influence the findings, suggesting that the norm content of the message and not the "try to avoid stereotyping" caveat influenced individuals' expressions. Therefore, the results demonstrate that messages about stereotype prevalence influence stereotype expression. In the next study, we aimed to replicate these findings by examining the perceptions of another frequently stereotyped group—women.

¹ Controlling for age revealed the same pattern of results for all analyses.




Figure 1. a: Effect of prevalence message on individuals' stereotype expressions about older adults. b: Effect of prevalence message on individuals' stereotype expressions about women. c: Effect of prevalence message on individuals' stereotype expressions about the overweight.

Study 1b

Method

Participants. Three hundred and nineteen participants (145 females; mean age = 36.14) were recruited from Amazon's mechanical Turk (mTurk). The racial/ethnic composition of the sample was 65% European Americans, 25% Asians, 5% East Indians, 4% African Americans, and 1% Hispanics.

Design and procedure. The study procedure was the same as that used in Study 1a. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions used in the previous study, 2 (prevalence message: HPSM vs. LPSM) \times 2 (caveat: none vs. try to avoid

stereotyping), and asked to give their perceptions of women anonymously.

Dependent measures. Using dimensions highlighted in the literature that characterize women (Amatea, Cross, Clark, & Bobby, 1986; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2004; Lobel & Clair, 1992), participants rated their stereotypical perceptions of women on three dimensions (i.e., warm, family-oriented, and career-oriented [reverse-coded]) on a 7-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*), $\alpha = .84$.

Results

ANOVA showed a significant main effect of prevalence message, $F(1, 315) = 11.51, p < .01$. Individuals in the HPSM condition ($M = 5.30, SD = 0.76$) rated women more stereotypically than those in the LPSM condition ($M = 4.99, SD = 0.84$).² There was no significant main effect of caveat, $F(1, 315) = 0.28, ns$ and there was no significant interaction between prevalence message and caveat, $F(1, 315) = 0.26, ns$ (see Figure 1b).

Discussion

Consistent with the results from Study 1a, the LPSM yielded less stereotypical expressions about women than the HPSM. Once again, the "try to avoid stereotyping" caveat did not play a significant role in the effects; similar results were found when there was no request to try to avoid stereotyping. These results lend further support to our prediction that messages that convey information about the prevalence of stereotyping impact individuals' expressions of stereotypes. Furthermore, the findings demonstrate that expressions of stereotypes were not limited to out-group members; the pattern of stereotype expressions was similar for men and women.

One might argue that reference to "a very influential body of psychological research" in the messages may influence individuals' expression of stereotypes. In order to eliminate this potential confound, we conducted another study that made no mention of psychological research. Moreover, we expanded our investigation to that of bodyweight-based stereotypes, which have also been shown to affect performance ratings in the workplace (for a summary and qualitative review, see Crandall, Nieman, & Hebl, 2009; for a review of workplace and legal implications, see Roehling, 1999; for a quantitative review of workplace literature, see Baltes et al., 2007; Bauer & Baltes, 2002; Dobbins et al., 1988; Nieminen et al., 2013; Rudolph & Baltes, 2008; Rudolph et al., 2009). Specifically, a meta-analysis conducted by Rudolph, Wells, Weller, and Baltes (2009) showed that in relation to non-overweight individuals in the workplace, overweight individuals were disadvantaged across evaluative workplace outcomes such as hiring, performance, and promotion decisions.

Study 1c

Method

Participants. Participants were 304 (105 females; mean age = 20.35 years) undergraduate students at a private midwestern

² Controlling for gender revealed the same pattern of results for all analyses.

university. The racial/ethnic composition of the sample was 73% European Americans, 12% Asians/Asian Americans, 1% African Americans, 2% Hispanics, and 12% described themselves as “other.”

Design and procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions in a 2 (prevalence message: HPSM vs. LPSM) \times 2 (caveat: none vs. a very influential body of psychological research has established) experimental design.³ Individuals randomly assigned to the HPSM condition without reference to psychological research were told the following:

The vast majority of people have stereotypical preconceptions and their impressions and evaluations of others are consistently biased by these stereotypic preconceptions. You should actively try to avoid thinking about others in such a manner.

Likewise, individuals randomly assigned to the LPSM condition without reference to psychological research received this message:

Very few people have stereotypical preconceptions and their impressions and evaluations of others are consistently biased by these stereotypic preconceptions. You should actively try to avoid thinking about others in such a manner.

The HPSM and LPSM conditions were the same as in the previous studies. As in Studies 1a and 1b, participants were asked to give their perceptions anonymously.

Dependent measures. Participants rated their stereotypes toward overweight individuals in the specific role of “manager” using the eight-item Obese as Managers Scale (OAMS; Randolph, Finkelstein, Zhdanova, Baltes, & Roehling, 2007; e.g., “Obese people possess the drive to be successful leaders”; reverse-coded; 1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*), $\alpha = .82$ (Rudolph et al., 2012; Zhdanova, Baltes, Chakrabarti, Finkelstein, Roehling, & Sheppard, 2007). The OAMS was designed to assess raters’ endorsement of both general negative stereotypes toward overweight individuals in the workplace and more specific stereotypes about overweight individuals in managerial positions within organizations.

Results

Consistent with the previous studies, ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of prevalence message, $F(1, 300) = 228.68$, $p < .01$. Individuals in the HPSM condition ($M = 4.95$, $SD = 0.95$) rated the overweight more stereotypically than those in the LPSM condition ($M = 3.45$, $SD = 0.77$).⁴ There was no significant main effect of caveat, $F(1, 300) = 0.23$, *ns*, and there was no significant interaction between prevalence message and caveat, $F(1, 300) = 1.32$, *ns* (see Figure 1c).

Discussion

Consistent with the results from Studies 1a and 1b, the LPSM yielded less stereotypical expressions about the overweight than the HPSM. The “very influential body of psychological research has established” caveat did not have a significant effect; identical patterns of results occurred when no mention was made of psychological research. These results lend additional support to our prediction that messages that convey information about the prevalence of stereotyping impact individuals’ expressions of stereo-

types. Moreover, these findings extend beyond generalized stereotypes of older adults and women to more specific stereotypes of overweight people within the workplace.

Study 2

Method

Participants and design. Participants were 120 (59 females; mean age = 19.87 years) undergraduate business school students at a university in the United States. The racial/ethnic composition of the sample was 65% European Americans, 25% Asians, 5% East Indians, 4% African Americans, and 1% Hispanics.

Procedure. Participants were told that the experimenter was interested in their ability to construct life-event details from visual information. They were then shown a color photograph of an older man and asked to compose a brief passage describing a typical day in his life (Macrae et al., 1994). Before performing the task, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (HPSM, LPSM, or control). The HPSM and LPSM were the same as those used in previous studies; in the control condition, no message was given.

Dependent measures. The dependent variable was the level of stereotypicality of the constructed passages. To compute this measure, using a 9-point scale (1 = *not at all stereotypical*, 9 = *very stereotypical*), two independent raters blind to the experimental conditions and predictions evaluated the stereotypicality of each passage, whether the passage characterized the person based on preconceived notions, whether the passage had many stereotypes, and whether the passage did not contain biased perceptions (reverse-coded; $\alpha = .93$). In line with Roberson (2006), we used a theoretically derived rating system. We first developed a list of stereotypes of older adults discussed in the literature (Kawakami et al., 2000). We then rated a subset of passages to clarify and refine this coding scheme. Raters were first trained on the rating system and independently rated a small subset of the passages along with the author. The results of this rating process were discussed among all raters to identify areas of disagreement. Finally, the raters were instructed to independently code the passages. Given the high level of agreement in their estimates, $r(87) = 0.82$, the ratings were averaged.

Results

ANOVA revealed a significant effect of condition, $F(2, 117) = 9.62$, $p < .01$. Simple effects tests showed that the HPSM ($M = 6.40$, $SD = 2.60$) yielded more stereotypical content than the LPSM ($M = 3.71$, $SD = 2.75$), $t(78) = 4.50$, $p < .01$, and the no-message condition ($M = 5.12$, $SD = 2.88$), $t(77) = 2.07$, $p <$

³ Study 1c originally included eight conditions; those used in Studies 1a and 1b (HPSM, LPSM, HPSM without the “try to avoid stereotyping” caveat, and LPSM without the “try to avoid stereotyping” caveat) and all the conditions from the previous study without the wording “a very influential body of psychological research has established.” The results were consistent with those of the previous studies and showed only a main effect of prevalence message. All of the conditions have not been included here for the sake of clarity but are available upon request.

⁴ Controlling for participants’ gender and weight revealed the same pattern of results for all analyses.

.05. There was also a difference in the stereotypicality of the narratives written by participants who saw the LPSM and those in the no-message condition, $t(79) = 2.26, p < .05$; the passages of those exposed to the LPSM were rated as less stereotypical than the passages of those exposed to no message (see Figure 2).

Discussion

Consistent with the findings of the previous studies, the results showed that individuals exposed to a HPSM expressed more stereotypes than did individuals receiving an LPSM. Hence, our prediction gained further support. Moreover, individuals receiving an LPSM restricted their stereotypical expressions more than individuals who were not exposed to a message at all. However, because individuals exposed to the control were not given a “no stereotyping” caveat, it is possible that the higher stereotypical expression in the control was driven by the lack of explicit “no stereotyping” instructions. Nevertheless, the absence of difference in stereotype expression across the caveat and no caveat conditions in Studies 1a–1c suggests that it is unlikely that this difference was solely driven by the absence of a caveat. Additionally, instead of reducing stereotypical expression, exposure to an HPSM had the opposite effect. Therefore, messages that may be intended to reduce the use of stereotypes may in fact increase it.

Study 3

In Study 3, we focused specifically on compensation negotiations because of their importance in organizational life and the critical economic implications they have and because they represent a domain in which gender differences are well documented (Barron, 2003; Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007; Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001; Stevens, Bavetta, & Gist, 1993). These differences have been traced to individuals’ expectations of behavior for men and women.

The act of attempting to negotiate for greater personal resources, such as compensation, is perceived to call for a type of dominative masculine behavior that violates the prescriptions of feminine warmth (Bowles et al., 2007); that violation, counterstereotypical behavior, is likely to engender social resistance or backlash (Burgess & Borgida, 1999; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Wade, 2001).

Men, on the other hand, are not constrained by expectations to be warm. Rather, the stereotypic belief is that men are assertive (Prentice & Carranza, 2002), especially in activities such as negotiations (Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002).

We expected that being exposed to messages about the high and low prevalence of stereotyping and about the high prevalence of counterstereotyping effort would affect individuals’ judgments of women who negotiate for higher compensation. If individuals are less compelled to mitigate stereotypic conceptions, they may be more critical of a target’s stereotype violation and more likely to display unchecked backlash against the violator. Therefore, we expected to find that individuals exposed to a message about the high prevalence of stereotyping, HPSM, would rate a female candidate, but not a male candidate, who attempted to negotiate for higher compensation as less warm and be less willing to work with her than individuals who were told that few people stereotype, LPSM, or those who were exposed to a high prevalence of counterstereotyping message (HPCSM).

Method

Participants and design. Participants were 301 (75 females; mean age = 34.32 years) working professionals with an average of 9.92 years of work experience. This population consisted of part-time employees who had master’s degrees in business administration and managers and executives who had been former participants in executive education programs at a southeastern business school. The racial/ethnic composition of the sample was 72% European Americans, 15% Asians/Asian Americans, 5% African Americans, 3% Hispanics and 5% described themselves as “other.” Participants were randomly assigned to a condition in a 4 (prevalence message: HPSM vs. LPSM vs. HPCSM vs. control) \times 2 (candidate gender: male vs. female) design.

Procedure. Participants in each condition received a transcript of a job placement interview adapted from Bowles et al. (2007) and were told that they would be evaluating the candidate after they reviewed the materials. In the transcript, the candidate, Mr./Ms. Harper, engaged in a stereotypically male behavior by asking for more compensation. Specifically, in response to being asked if there was anything else the candidate would like the interviewer to keep in mind as his or her placement was considered, the candidate replied:

I think I should be paid at the top of that range. This is really important to me; I think I deserve it. I also would like to be eligible for an end-of-year bonus. I know performance bonuses are not standard for junior managers, but I would certainly be more motivated if I could look forward to a performance bonus at the end of the year. I am thinking of something in the 25%–50% of salary range. Not doubling my salary or anything. And, listen, I do not care if it’s in cash or stocks—and I promise you, I’ll earn it. So, those are the two things that I am asking with regard to my compensation: one, paying me at the top of the junior manager salary range and, two, providing me with an end of year, 20%–50% of salary performance bonus.

The HPSM, LPSM, and control conditions were the same as in previous studies. For the HPCSM condition, participants were told the following:

A very influential body of psychological research has established that the vast majority of people try to overcome their stereotypic precon-




Figure 2. Effect of prevalence message on level of stereotypicality of passages. HPSM = high prevalence of stereotyping message; LPSM = low prevalence of stereotyping message.

ceptions and try to prevent their impressions and evaluations of others from being consistently biased by these stereotypic preconceptions. You should actively try to avoid thinking about others in a stereotypic manner.

After reviewing the transcript, participants completed a questionnaire.

Dependent measures. Participants rated their willingness to work with the candidate on a three-item scale adopted from Bowles et al. (2007). A sample item is "How much would you enjoy having this person work for you?"; the ratings scale ranged from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*extremely*), $\alpha = .84$. Participants also rated the candidate's warmth on a seven-item scale adopted from Rudman and Glick (1999) (e.g., likeable, warm), $\alpha = .87$.

Results

Willingness to work with the candidate. ANOVA revealed a main effect of prevalence message, $F(3, 293) = 5.62, p < .01$. Evaluators exposed to a HPSM ($M = 3.51, SD = 1.24$) were less willing to work with a candidate than evaluators exposed to a LPSM ($M = 4.26, SD = 1.19$), $t(149) = -3.78, p < .01$; a HPCSM ($M = 4.16, SD = 1.12$), $t(147) = -3.34, p < .01$; and to no message ($M = 4.05, SD = 1.23$), $t(147) = 2.65, p < .01$. There were no significant differences in willingness to work with the candidate when evaluators were exposed to no message and a LPSM, $t(150) = -1.07, ns$; no message and a HPCSM, $t(148) = 0.58, ns$; and a LPSM and a HPCSM, $t(150) = -0.53, ns$. There was also a significant main effect of candidate gender, $F(1, 293) = 4.58, p < .05$, such that evaluators were more willing to work with the male candidate ($M = 4.15, SD = 1.14$) than the female candidate ($M = 3.85, SD = 1.29$).

It should be noted that the main effects were qualified by an interaction between prevalence message and candidate gender, $F(3, 293) = 4.33, p < .01$. Planned contrasts showed that evaluators who were exposed to a HPSM ($M = 3.09, SD = 1.29$) were less willing to work with a female candidate who attempted to negotiate than those exposed to a LPSM ($M = 4.32, SD = 1.07$), $t(76) = 4.55, p < .01$; a HPCSM ($M = 4.30, SD = 1.10$), $t(73) = -3.94, p < .01$; and no message ($M = 3.70, SD = 1.32$), $t(72) = 2.01, p < .05$. Conversely, evaluators who were exposed to a LPSM were more willing to work with a female candidate who attempted to negotiate than those exposed to no message, $t(72) = 2.20, p < .05$. Likewise, evaluators exposed to a HPCSM were more willing to work with a female candidate than those exposed to no message, $t(69) = 2.06, p < .05$. There was no significant difference between the LPSM and HPCSM conditions, $t(73) = -0.08, ns$.

There were no significant differences in willingness to work with a male candidate who attempted to negotiate when evaluators were exposed to a HPSM ($M = 3.98, SD = 1.00$) or a LPSM ($M = 4.20, SD = 1.31$), $t(71) = 0.81, ns$, or a HPCSM ($M = 4.03, SD = 1.14$), $t(72) = 0.21, ns$, or no message ($M = 4.35, SD = 1.08$), $t(73) = 1.53, ns$. There was also no difference between the LPSM and HPCSM conditions, $t(75) = -0.60, ns$, and the no-message condition, $t(71) = 0.81, ns$, and between the HPCSM condition and the no-message condition, $t(72) = 0.21, ns$.

Furthermore, evaluators exposed to a HPSM were less willing to work with a female than a male candidate, $t(72) = -3.28, p < .01$, as were those who saw no message, $t(73) = -2.33, p < .05$. There

was no difference in willingness to work with a female versus male negotiator for the LPSM, $t(75) = 0.42, ns$, and HPCSM, $t(73) = 1.01, ns$ (see Figure 3).

Warmth. ANOVA revealed a main effect of prevalence message, $F(3, 293) = 3.89, p < .01$. Evaluators exposed to a HPSM ($M = 3.49, SD = 1.08$) rated the candidate as significantly less warm than evaluators exposed to a LPSM ($M = 3.95, SD = 0.94$), $t(149) = -2.78, p < .01$, and a HPCSM ($M = 3.87, SD = 0.90$), $t(147) = -2.37, p < .05$, and to no message ($M = 3.80, SD = 0.86$), $t(147) = 1.97, p < .05$. There were no significant differences in ratings of warmth of the candidate when evaluators were exposed to no message and a LPSM, $t(150) = 0.97, ns$, and no message and a HPCSM, $t(148) = 0.48, ns$, or between a LPSM and a HPCSM, $t(150) = -0.49, ns$. There was a main effect of candidate gender, $F(1, 293) = 4.45, p < .01$, such that evaluators were more willing to work with the male candidate ($M = 3.89, SD = 0.93$) than the female candidate ($M = 3.67, SD = 0.98$).

More important, there was also an interaction between prevalence message and candidate gender, $F(3, 293) = 8.74, p < .01$. Evaluators exposed to the HPSM ($M = 3.01, SD = 1.04$) rated a female candidate as less warm than those exposed to the LPSM ($M = 4.10, SD = 1.29$), $t(76) = -5.07, p < .01$, the HPCSM ($M = 4.00, SD = 0.79$), $t(73) = -4.61, p < .01$, and the




Figure 3. Effect of prevalence message and candidate gender on willingness to work with the candidate. HPSM = high prevalence of stereotyping message; LPSM = low prevalence of stereotyping message; HPCSM = high prevalence of counterstereotyping effort message.

no-message condition ($M = 3.57$, $SD = 0.85$), $t(72) = 2.52$, $p < .05$. Evaluators exposed to no-message condition also rated a female candidate as less warm than those exposed to the LPSM, $t(72) = 2.68$, $p < .05$, and the HPCSM, $t(69) = 2.20$, $p < .05$. There was no difference between LPSM and HPCSM conditions, $t(73) = -0.52$, ns . There was no difference in ratings of warmth for a male candidate who negotiated when evaluators were exposed to a HPSM ($M = 4.02$, $SD = 0.86$) or a LPSM ($M = 3.79$, $SD = 1.03$), $t(71) = -1.02$, ns ; a HPSM or a HPCSM ($M = 3.75$, $SD = 0.98$), $t(72) = -1.22$, ns ; and a HPSM or no message ($M = 4.00$, $SD = 0.84$), $t(77) = -0.06$, ns . There was also no difference in ratings of warmth for a male candidate when evaluators were exposed to no message or a LPSM, $t(71) = -1.02$, ns , and no message and a HPCSM, $t(72) = -1.22$, ns . Finally, there was no difference in warmth ratings for a male candidate when evaluators were exposed to a LPSM and a HPCSM, $t(75) = -0.16$, ns .

Furthermore, evaluators exposed to a HPSM rated a female who negotiated as less warm than a male who negotiated, $t(72) = -4.49$, $p < .01$. Evaluators exposed to no message also rated a female who negotiated as less warm than a male who

negotiated, $t(73) = -2.23$, $p < .05$. For the LPSM condition, there was no difference in the ratings of a female and male negotiator, $t(75) = 1.44$, ns . Likewise, there was no difference in the ratings for a female and male negotiator in the HPCSM condition, $t(73) = 1.19$, ns (see Figure 4).

Discussion

Study 3 demonstrated that messages about stereotyping and counterstereotyping effort prevalence impact individuals' evaluation of targets exhibiting counterstereotypical behavior. Specifically, the female candidate who negotiated was rated as less warm and evaluators were less willing to work with her when they had been exposed to a HPSM versus a LPSM or a HPCSM. Moreover, making evaluators aware of the high prevalence of stereotyping increased their backlash against the female candidate; she was rated as less warm and evaluators were less willing to work with her than if they saw no message. The converse was true of evaluators exposed to a LPSM and a HPCSM; evaluators rated the female candidate as warmer, and they were more willing to work with her than if they saw no message at all.

Knowledge that many others hold stereotypical preconceptions may diminish evaluators' motivation to dismiss their own stereotypes. Consequently, a focal individual's exhibition of counterstereotypical behavior stands in stark contrast to evaluators' expectations of stereotype-consistent behavior. The discrepancy between observed counterstereotypical behavior and expected stereotypical behavior may constitute a violation of expectancy that diminishes positive perceptions (i.e., reducing ratings of warmth and willingness to work with a candidate; Sheldon et al., 2006).

Study 4

Women are stereotyped as less effective negotiators than men because the traits that characterize ineffective negotiators are perceived to be feminine (Kray et al., 2001; Williams & Best, 1982). These include being passive and overly accommodating (Lax & Sebenius, 1986). Research on mixed-sex negotiation dyads indicates that stereotype activation benefits male performance at the expense of female performance by enhancing males' expectations (Kray et al., 2001). The presumption in Kray et al.'s studies, although not explicitly investigated, is that males' enhanced expectations increase their assertiveness and their claiming of resources. Therefore, it is likely that a HPSM would support or enhance the assertive behavior of male negotiators who feel less compelled to suppress stereotypes, leading them to perform better against women than those exposed to a LPSM or a HPCSM.

Method

Participants and design. Participants were 66 (33 females; mean age = 20.46 years) undergraduate business school students at a university in the United States who negotiated in mixed-sex dyads. The racial/ethnic composition of the sample was 63% European Americans, 32% Asians, and 5% African Americans. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions, forming the 33 dyads whose outcomes were examined.

Procedure. All participants were assigned to a dyad with a partner of the opposite sex, creating 33 dyads each with one male




Figure 4. Effect of prevalence message and candidate gender on warmth. HPSM = high prevalence of stereotyping message; LPSM = low prevalence of stereotyping message; HPCSM = high prevalence of counterstereotyping effort message.

and one female member. The experiment involved exposing *only* the males in *each* mixed-gender dyad to one of the three conditions in the previous study: HPSM, LPSM, and HPCSM. For all conditions, role assignments (buyer or seller) were counterbalanced across gender. As part of a first class on negotiations, a standard distributive negotiation exercise involving a car sale was used (Paulson, 2006). A distributive is a “win–lose” or “fixed pie” negotiation where one party generally gains at the expense of another party.

Dyads were given up to 30 min to negotiate after reading general instructions and role-specific information (e.g., for the buyer, “Why you want to buy a car and the money you have to spend on the vehicle”; for the seller, “Why you want to sell the car and the money you want to get for the vehicle”). The manipulation was introduced at the end of the general instructions that described the negotiation situation, timing of the task, and the objective to maximize their own profit, with the buyer aiming to minimize the sale price, and the seller aiming to maximize it. No mention was made about stereotypes held about male and female negotiators.

Dependent measures. The measures were female partners’ perceptions of their male counterparts’ behavioral assertiveness adapted from Kray et al. (2001; i.e., “How assertive/dominant/passive/accommodating was your partner?”; 1 = *not at all*, 7 = *extremely*), $\alpha = .81$, and the negotiated sale price. Negotiated sale price is a proxy of negotiation performance and is used extensively in extant negotiations research (e.g., Dimotakis, Conlon, & Ilies, 2012; Flynn & Ames, 2006; Naquin & Paulson, 2003; Zerres, Hüffmeier, Freund, Backhaus, & Hertel, 2013). Given that the negotiation exercise was distributive, the negotiated sale price reflected who did better or worse in the negotiation.

Results

Male behavioral assertiveness. ANOVA revealed a significant effect of prevalence message, $F(2, 30) = 5.77, p < .01$. Female partners rated men who were exposed to a HPSM ($M = 4.41, SD = 0.66$) as more assertive than men who were exposed to a LPSM ($M = 3.19, SD = 0.64$), $t(21) = 4.49, p < .01$, or a HPCSM ($M = 3.54, SD = 1.16$), $t(19) = -2.21, p < .05$. There was no difference in assertiveness for men who were exposed to a LPSM or HPCSM, $t(20) = 0.92, ns$.

Negotiation performance. The unit of analysis for this measure was the dyad. Finding no significant effect of role assignment on sale price, we collapsed across roles by transforming the outcome into a standardized z score in which higher values indicate better performance for the male negotiator (see Kray et al., 2001).

ANOVA revealed a significant effect of prevalence message, such that the standardized price was significantly higher in the HPSM condition ($M = 0.99, SD = 0.91$) than in the LPSM condition ($M = -0.01, SD = 0.99$) and the HPCSM condition ($M = -0.10, SD = 0.91$), $F(2, 30) = 4.63, p < .05$. Male negotiators’ superior performance relative to female negotiators was significant in the HPSM condition, $t(20) = -5.04, p < .01$. However, in the LPSM, $t(22) = 0.18, ns$, and HPCSM conditions, $t(18) = 0.20, ns$, the difference between male and female negotiators did not significantly differ from zero.

Mediation analysis. To assess whether male assertiveness mediated the relationship between prevalence message and negotiation performance, we followed the recommendations of Preacher and Hayes (2004), who suggested using a bootstrapping procedure to compute a confidence interval around the indirect effect (i.e., the path through the mediator). If zero falls outside this interval, mediation can be said to be present. We used the SPSS macros recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2004) for this procedure. Results of mediational analyses revealed a 95% confidence interval ranging from 0.01 to 0.46 for the indirect effect. The fact that zero falls outside this interval indicates a significant mediation effect, $p < .05$ (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; Preacher & Hayes, 2004).

Discussion

Study 4 revealed that messages about the high and low prevalence of stereotyping and the high prevalence of counterstereotyping effort impact men’s behavior and performance on a competitive task. Specifically, the HPSM provoked a greater level of male assertiveness than the LPSM and the HPCSM, which undergirded the relationship between prevalence message and performance. These results lend further support to the assertion that messages about the prevalence of stereotyping and counterstereotyping effort influences individuals’ stereotyping and the reactions and behaviors associated with those stereotypes.

General Discussion

Taken together, the results of our studies elucidate the impact of prevalence of stereotyping and counterstereotyping effort messages on individuals’ social judgments and behaviors and, thereby, build on the significant advances of research that reveal the usefulness of structured recall in mitigating stereotyping in certain contexts (e.g., Baltes et al., 2007). Our findings were based on investigation of three distinct social categories (i.e., older adults, women, and the overweight) and were derived from different measures of stereotyping, both implicit and explicit, which have been used in previous work in this area (e.g., Macrae et al., 1994). Specifically, in Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c, we demonstrated that individuals who received a message indicating that the vast majority of people stereotype expressed more stereotypes than those informed of stereotyping infrequency. Using a more nuanced measure of stereotyping behavior in Study 2, we replicated the results in the previous studies and found that a HPSM actually increased stereotyping, whereas a LPSM decreased it. In Studies 3 and 4, we showed that the messages about stereotyping prevalence have direct organizational implications. Specifically, in Study 3, working professionals who received a HPSM were less willing to work with an individual who violated a dominant stereotype than those who received a LPSM and those who received a HPCSM. Finally, in Study 4, males who received a HPSM dominated their negotiation partner more than those who received a LPSM and those who received a HPCSM.

Theoretical Contributions

Our current findings suggest several theoretical implications for the literature on social norms, stereotype reduction, and gender and

negotiations. First, despite the preponderance of research examining social norms, consideration of the impact of social norms on expression of stereotypic thoughts and stereotyping has largely been absent from investigation. Ironically, the re-emergent literature on compliance to descriptive norms (for an example, see Goldstein et al., 2008) only minimally references that work which investigates the impact of normative appropriateness suppression and expression of prejudice (Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002). Across a seven-study investigation, Crandall et al. (2002) found that the normative appropriateness of prejudice impacted the degree to which individuals were willing to express or suppress prejudice. Whereas their work focused solely on societal norms on expression of prejudiced attitudes, our findings demonstrate that the impact of normative behavior expands beyond just perceptions and beliefs to include actions. Furthermore, our findings suggest that generalized societal norms of appropriateness may be overridden by normative information derived from a more immediate context. These results are consistent with findings that show that specific business justifications provided by organizational superiors are sufficient to override societal norms against bias and lead to actual discrimination against minorities in hiring (Brief, Dietz, Cohen, Pugh, & Vaslow, 2000).

Second, our findings qualify past empirical work that has shown that heightened self-awareness of one's propensity to engage in stereotype expression decreases individuals' discriminatory behavior (Son Hing et al., 2002). Whereas awareness of one's own propensity to stereotype may mitigate stereotyping behavior, our findings suggest that awareness of the general pervasiveness of stereotyping behavior does not mitigate stereotypic expression and, in fact, may have the opposite effect of increasing stereotyping. Nevertheless, stereotyping behavior may be mitigated by heightened awareness of others' efforts to work against stereotyping.

We extended previous research in which stereotype reduction was investigated using structured evaluation processes by utilizing techniques that may be employed in more subtle (i.e., less structured) evaluation contexts. Furthermore, by demonstrating how stereotype prevalence messages may be used to mitigate stereotype expression by a broad array of individuals all of whom may not acknowledge being biased, we also built upon previous work that has explored methods for diminishing the stereotyping behavior of those who explicitly report being biased (e.g., Sherman et al., 2005; Son Hing et al., 2002). Moreover, we focused on messages that have the potential to reduce the expression of stereotypes across a broad array of categories. Past research has been focused on counterstereotyping interventions designed to exclusively target a particular stereotyped group, but these studies do not demonstrate how such focused strategies generalize in impacting perceptions of other stereotyped groups.

Over the past decade, there has been a renewed interest in the factors that cause differential outcomes for females and males in negotiations (Barron, 2003; Bowles et al., 2007; Kray, Reb, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2004; Kray et al., 2001, 2002). In large part, this research has demonstrated that differences in outcomes may be attributed to both differences in the role expectations of males and females and in their negotiation competence. Our findings suggest that the degree to which negotiators are motivated or de-motivated to work against these biased expectations can signif-

icantly impact the negotiation outcomes of negotiators from traditionally stereotyped groups.

Practical Implications

Recent attention to stereotyping behavior has been focused on the compelling evidence of studies using the IAT and other unobtrusive measures, making the supposition that all individuals stereotype widely accepted by academics and the general public. Given this phenomenon and extant research on the role of attention in general strategies for reducing undesired implicit influences on judgment (Small et al., 2007; Wilson & Brekke, 1994; Wilson et al., 2000), the message that everyone stereotypes but that we should be mindful of our biases has been promulgated in many business school classrooms, in the popular press, and hence in organizations. For some, recognition that stereotyping is prevalent has become a means of engaging a broader audience in the dialogue without pointing fingers. The promise of such an approach is that defensive responses associated with blame will subside and individuals will become open to working against natural inclinations. However, this supposition has overlooked the possibility that publicizing the notion that everyone stereotypes might create a descriptive social norm for stereotyping. Therefore, ironically, the very approach purported to reduce stereotyping may backfire and actually increase its occurrence. The results of our studies suggest that to reduce stereotype expression and its effects, it might be more useful to capitalize on social norms by highlighting the pervasiveness of individuals' willingness to exert effort against their unconscious stereotypes. Recent natural experiments such as the case study of gender at Harvard Business School support our finding that the creation of a culture in which the majority is believed to be working hard against stereotyping can have profound impacts on the reduction of discrimination against stereotyped groups (Kantor, 2013).

Here, we have focused on the impact of informing individuals about the prevalence of stereotyping; however, our results may have further reaching implications. Within organizations, management's misuse of normative information may not be contained to the realm of stereotype mitigation. Recently, messages such as "as an organization, we are all spending too much; we need to tighten our belts" or "there is rampant self-interested and unethical behavior; we need to be mindful of our actions" have been used with the hopes of curbing biases, errors in judgment, and undesirable behaviors. However, our research suggests that these admonitions may not only prove ineffective, but they might actually exacerbate unwanted perceptions and behaviors. It may behoove managers to use alternate methods to reduce unwanted behavior.

This work may also shine a light on the subtle, or not so subtle, messages that are conveyed to members of organizations about the norms of stereotyping and bias. For example, the dearth of women and minorities in organizations' top tiers has long been documented and lamented. Researchers, activists, consultants, and practitioners consistently cite figures which show that most organizations are underperforming when it comes to diversifying their highest levels with members of traditionally underrepresented groups (Bird, 2011; Catalyst, 2012). In many cases, these statistics are meant to serve as a reality check and, hence, a catalyst for positive change. Conversely, though, the underlying message to decision makers may be that this issue is not a priority. Given that

their competitors and other organizations are also lagging, they may assume that their organization will not be seen in a negative light if this matter is not addressed. Moreover, the perceived widespread lack of importance conveyed by the statistics may also impact lower level organizational members. Specifically, their perceptions of the significance of diversification and of the social status accorded to traditionally underrepresented groups may be negatively affected. Perhaps the norms inadvertently established by messages about the rampant glass ceiling effect may play a role in what seems to be the sluggish demographic change at the top of many firms.

Limitations and Future Research

Although the present studies yielded highly consistent findings with important implications, there are limitations worth noting. In calling attention to these limitations, we hope to simultaneously suggest additional avenues for future research. First, most of the studies involved an undergraduate student sample, which raises concerns about generalizability. However, Study 3 consisted of a sample of working professionals, and the findings were consistent with the other studies. Regardless, future researchers should examine the influence of stereotyping messages on working adults' perceptions of stereotyped groups and behavior toward these groups.

Second, in our studies, we empirically focused on women, older adults, and the overweight. Our results are consistent across these three categories, which span the degree to which the stereotyped characteristic is, for the most part, *perceived* as immutable (gender and the effects of aging), inevitable (aging), or changeable (weight). Consequently, we believe that the underlying logic is applicable to other categories. Nevertheless, further research should examine the effects of stereotyping prevalence on a broader array of stereotyped groups.

In addition, these findings inform our understanding of immediate stereotype expression and judgment but not of longer term manifestations. Future studies should examine whether exposure to stereotyping prevalence information has lingering effects. Moreover, we used experimental methods, but the use of stereotypes may be more complicated in real-world situations.

In all of the studies, the prevalence of stereotyping or working against stereotyping was conveyed in a message. Given this limitation, future studies should examine different and also more subtle ways of transmitting norm information. For example, researchers could investigate whether individuals stereotype more after reading one of the many newspaper articles that reference individuals' natural inclination to stereotype.

The current research is one of the first, if not the first, to explicitly investigate the effects of messages conveying the prevalence of stereotyping on social judgment and behavior. Therefore, future researchers should examine moderators of and boundary conditions to the demonstrated relationships. For example, in most of the studies, the stereotypes associated with women, older adults, and the overweight were not uniformly positive or negative. However, the valence of the stereotypes may play an important role in influencing the relationship between prevalence message and individuals' judgments and behaviors. There is the possibility that creating a norm for stereotyping may lead to preoccupation with negative stereotypes since stereotyping tends to be perceived as a

negative behavior that ultimately disadvantages the stereotyped group. Hence, in such cases, stereotypes that do not have a strong positive or negative valence may be interpreted negatively. However, for overtly positive stereotypes, there may be less of a disparity between conditions, and valence may represent a boundary condition. On the other hand, those exposed to a high prevalence message may also react more to positive stereotypes and use them in their decision making than those told that few people stereotype or most people try not to stereotype.

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8.1 Strategies for Beinning Research

2

Strategies for Beginning Research

GETTING STARTED: WHERE TO BEGIN?

Getting started is often one of the hardest tasks for beginning researchers. How do you know if you have a good idea for a research project? How can you tell if the research project is doable? Just as important, how can you tell if the research is worth doing? Even experienced researchers sometimes have trouble finding a topic, beginning a new research project, figuring out how to start, choosing a research strategy, or developing a general research plan.

The first step in any research project is deciding on a general topic and then refining the topic. Suppose you are interested in homelessness or in students' alcohol use. Homelessness in general would be far too big a topic—even for someone doing a Ph.D. dissertation—so you would have to find a way to make your research more manageable. You could focus on just one aspect of homelessness, such as the experiences of workers in homeless shelters or the effects of homelessness on children. To narrow down the topic of student alcohol use, you could focus on the role of alcohol at student parties or the effects of alcohol consumption on academic achievement. You also need to think about the different approaches you could take to your research, as reflected in the paradigms discussed in Chapter 1. But what do you do if you don't know what general topic interests you? How do you begin then?

GENERATING IDEAS

How do you generate useful, interesting ideas? It's hard to give sound advice on finding good research topics, for several reasons. One problem is that we don't usually think about where good ideas come from. They seem somehow serendipitous, a stroke of magnificent luck. Suppose you are walking down the street and suddenly notice that most of the streetlights are out on one block but functioning on the next. You also notice that the trash seems to be picked up on that block but not on the first one. This leads you to wonder about how different neighborhoods gain access to city services. Or suppose you read an article in the newspaper or see a program on TV that sparks your curiosity about how homeless people survive in the winter in cold climates. Or maybe you have a long-standing interest in sports or young children, and so research ideas seem to come naturally. These are all legitimate ways to identify a research topic. If you don't have any interests at all, you'll find it difficult to find an interesting research topic. But most of us are interested in at least *something*.

Often, qualitative researchers begin where they are. That is, they look at their own lives to see if they can find anything interesting to study, an unusual angle or puzzling event or phenomenon. Then they try to refine the topic into a more manageable—and researchable—form.

For example, Carol Freedman, a graduate student raising a young child, needed to do a research project for a course on research methods. She had been participating in a mothers' group, and so she decided to study it. The project eventually became her master's thesis, titled "Setting Stay-at-Home Standards: An Ethnographic Study of the Southland Mothers Association" (Freedman 1997).

Elliot Liebow wrote in the preface to his book *Tell Them Who I Am* that he had been diagnosed with cancer and had a limited life expectancy, so he decided to volunteer at a soup kitchen. As he put it, "I did not want to spend my last months on the 12th floor of a government office building, so at 58 I retired on disability from my job of 20-some years as an anthropologist with the National Institute of Mental Health" (1993, p. viii). Because he felt pretty good for a lot longer than he expected, he started volunteering at a homeless shelter as well. He became interested in the lives of the women at the shelter, so he began taking field notes and thinking about the shelters as a site in which to do research. Ultimately, he did an in-depth study of the lives of homeless women.

Other researchers, too, have written about how they developed their research interests. Lynn Davidman (1999) wrote about the experience of losing her mother to cancer when she was 13 and how that shaped her

decision to study what she calls “motherloss.” The point is, if you look around at your own environment, you may find the beginnings of a research topic.*

But should you stop there? What would happen if researchers began only with their own experiences and never considered others’ perspectives? In framing research questions, it’s important to remember that how people select research problems is not a neutral process. Rather, research questions always reflect *someone’s* interests and priorities—either the researcher’s or, if the researcher is getting funding from someone else, the people who are doing the funding. While this is not necessarily a bad thing, you do need to think about the variety of perspectives that different people bring to research projects.

Consider the following example: City officials in a midwestern city became concerned with drug use in a poor section of town. That section contained a low-income public housing complex, populated mainly by poor women and their children, that was in bad condition, with leaky roofs, dilapidated interiors, and crumbling steps. City officials convened a series of meetings at the housing complex to try to deal with the problem. A number of people attended the meetings, including the managers of the housing complex, members of an antidrug task force, various government officials, the police, a legal aid attorney, residents of the housing complex, and a few university researchers.

Over the course of the meetings, it became clear that the women who lived in the complex didn’t see drugs as a major problem in their community. The main problem, from their perspective, was the dilapidated condition of the buildings they lived in. They also felt harassed by the complex security guards, most of whom were off-duty police officers. But the managers of the complex didn’t see things in the same way at all. They felt that if the women could just “pull themselves up by their own bootstraps” and get jobs (or husbands with jobs), they would pay more rent and the buildings would soon be fixed. They felt the security guards were needed to protect the buildings and that if the women hadn’t broken any laws then they had nothing to fear from the police. The legal aid attorney had yet another interpretation of the problem—as a civil rights violation. Finally, one graduate student researcher who was studying the meetings interpreted the dynamics between management, police, government officials, and the tenants in terms of state attempts to control poor women (Masuda 1998).

*If you’re interested in learning more about how researchers come up with their topics, you might want to read some of the stories in *Qualitative Sociology as Everyday Life*, edited by Barry Glassner and Rosanna Hertz.

So whose interpretation of the situation was correct? What was the “real” problem? Was it drugs? Dilapidated housing? Police harassment? Social control? It depends on whose perspective you take. This is what I mean when I say that problems are never neutral. A problem is always a problem *for* someone. Sociologists sometimes refer to this as the “definition of the situation.” In any social setting, people make assumptions about what they think is happening and how to interpret the actors and events. Researchers are also involved in a process of social interaction. They, too, make assumptions about what they think is happening and define the situation in diverse ways. How researchers choose to frame their research questions reflects their sense of what “the” problem is. What if you were going to research this situation? Whose perspective would you take into account? Why?

DECIDING WHAT TO RESEARCH

When you are first deciding what to research, you need to ask yourself a number of questions. First, what do you already know about the topic? And if you don’t know very much, how can you get more information? Going to the library or searching the Internet are good ways to learn more about a topic (and we’ll discuss these further later in the chapter), but they’re not the only ways. You can also talk to other people, such as a professor or another student, who have an interest in the topic. You can visit places to get more information. For example, if you are interested in homeless people, you might volunteer at a shelter or visit the site.

A second question you need to consider is, How do you feel about your potential topic? Do you have very strong feelings about it? If so, your feelings might lead you to focus on one particular area and avoid others or blind you to other perspectives. You may be too biased to do a good job or to understand others’ points of view. It’s important to remain open to a variety of perspectives.

Being a member of the group you are studying can be both positive and negative. People often have strong feelings about the people and groups they are involved with. If you are studying a familiar group, you’ll need to be especially careful to remain open-minded. For example, imagine that you are a member of a campus sorority or fraternity. You know that students who aren’t involved in these groups often have negative opinions about them, and you want to do research to try to counter these stereotypes. Your involvement helps you gain access to members, and that is certainly positive. But you are so invested in showing the positive side that you aren’t able

to see any other points of view. In this case, being a member might hinder your ability to do good research.

As you develop your research project, you need to keep an open mind about the people and events in your research setting and to remain open to multiple definitions of the situation. If you close yourself off to alternative explanations too soon, you may miss important insights into your research setting.

How Do You Turn a Topic into a Question?

Once you've settled on a general topic, it's time to turn it into a research question. In qualitative research, your research question may shift once you begin your investigation. In fact, many scholars argue that a good qualitative researcher must have the ability to remain open to what the field setting or research site has to offer. They believe that the most important thing is simply to go out into the field to see what is out there. I argue that an initial focus is important. Even though your research question may change—and sometimes dramatically—once you begin work, you still need to start somewhere. Otherwise, you may have difficulty figuring out how to begin your research. As your research progresses, however, you need to keep an open mind to other questions that may arise in the course of your research—questions that may be even more important than the ones you initially devised.

As a first step, try brainstorming a list of questions about your topic. Then you can evaluate whether the questions can be answered using the resources you have at hand. Let's say you're interested in the general topic of abortion, but you're not sure how to narrow your topic down. Try asking some questions:

- ◆ What is the experience of abortion like for women?
- ◆ How do activists on both sides of the debate think about abortion? What do they think women's roles should be?
- ◆ How do abortion clinic staff deal with the threats of violence? Does it change the way they think about their work?
- ◆ How have media portrayals of abortion changed over time?

Notice how these questions are all answerable, at some level, with reference to the empirical world (the world of the senses). You could ask women who have had abortions what their experience is like; you could observe the staff in a clinic; you could examine news accounts of abortion to see how they have changed.

Compare those questions with, say, the following:

- ◆ Is abortion a good or a bad thing?
- ◆ Should women be able to choose to have an abortion?

These kinds of questions really can't be answered with reference to the empirical world. While they may be important *ethical* questions, they aren't amenable to social research. Thus, you need to consider whether the research questions you propose can be answered with reference to the "real" world.

You also need to ask yourself what your own assumptions about abortion and the women who have them are. If you have had an abortion yourself or know someone who has had one, that will certainly shape your thinking about the topic. If you have strong feelings pro or con, those will influence your initial question as well. You need to consider whether your own investments in the issue will allow you to investigate it with an open mind.

Is the Topic Interesting?

Next, you need to consider whether your research question is interesting. A good qualitative researcher can make just about any topic interesting. But if you are bored by or indifferent to your project, you probably ought to choose another one. Doing qualitative research can take a long time, and completing a research project—even one that you are interested in—can be difficult. It's tough to keep going when you're bored by your topic. Sometimes, beginning researchers pick questions because they think they will be easy or because their professor or adviser suggested the topic. These are poor reasons to choose a topic, unless, of course, you already have an interest in the topic. No research project is truly easy, and even the easiest research becomes difficult when you don't want to do it.

Whose Perspective Should You Take?

Once you've settled on a tentative research question, you need to think about how you will begin to approach it. At this stage, consider how taking different perspectives will lead you to embark on very different research projects. If your topic is homelessness, for example, you will find yourself moving down a very different path if you decide to study workers in homeless shelters than if you decide to study homeless people themselves. Simi-

larly, you will find yourself doing a very different research project if you choose to conduct your research in a small shelter that houses homeless women and their families rather than a large shelter that provides temporary housing for single men. Try to list as many perspectives as you can before you settle on a tentative focus. But even then, it's important to keep a questioning attitude. And as you continue with your work, you should remain open to as many perspectives as possible.

You also need to consider how different paradigms might shape different approaches to your research. Although you do not need to settle on a paradigm at this early stage, it's helpful to think about how these choices will affect your research. With a social constructionist approach, for example, you would want to pay close attention to how individuals define and create social reality. With a critical approach, you would want to frame your research so that it would be useful in creating social change.

Let's consider the example of education in preschools and kindergartens. A feminist researcher might focus on gender relations in the classroom—perhaps on how boys and girls interact and how gender is produced through that interaction (see, for example, Thorne 1993). A social constructionist might focus on interaction as well. But this researcher might be more interested in exploring how children come to define the classroom as a “school” and how they learn the expectations for behaving in that setting (see, for example, Corsaro and Molinari 2000). A postmodernist might focus on the multiple and fragmented realities within and around the school setting: the realities of children, teachers, administrators, and others. This researcher might explore children's cartoons, commercial culture, and other texts that shape children's realities. A positivist might begin with a theory about education—for example, that children who attend preschool adjust better to kindergarten than those who do not—and focus the research on that question.

Is the Research Feasible?

Once you've settled on a tentative question, you need to ask whether you can actually do the research. For example, if you are interested in studying people in homeless shelters, you need to get permission from the shelter staff (probably the director) and from the residents themselves. Some groups are relatively easy to gain access to (such as other students); others are relatively difficult (such as people who are involved in illegal activities, like drug smugglers). You may also need to gain permission from an institutional review board at your school, which scrutinizes projects for ethical problems.

Once you've determined that you can gain access to the group you are interested in studying, you need to think about what other resources you will need. First, consider *time*. Doing qualitative research can take a great deal of time. If you are trying to study a group to which it may be difficult to gain access or that may be hostile to researchers, be sure you have enough time to develop the kinds of relationships you will need to do the research. For example, suppose you are interested in illegal drug use, as anthropologist Steven Koester is (Koester 1994). Specifically, you are interested in how HIV might be transmitted among street people who inject drugs. It will take a long time before they trust you enough to confide in you, so you need to consider whether you have enough time to gain trust.

Another important resource is *money*. Doing qualitative research can cost money. If you are going to do the research full-time, you still need to support yourself. If you are going to interview people, you need to purchase or have access to a reliable tape recorder and audiotapes. You also might have to hire someone to transcribe interview tapes, unless you plan to do it yourself. You may have to travel somewhere else to get to your research population or to find documents in an archive. You may need to purchase films or other texts to analyze. And there may be other costs as well.

The question of feasibility can be particularly difficult if you are trying to conduct a research project over the course of a semester. You may have great ideas for research projects, but the projects are too ambitious to be carried out over 14 or so weeks. Once you finally gain access to your research population or data, it is the end of the semester and time to wrap things up. Thus, you may find it easier to begin with a setting that you already know or can gain access to. But this means you'll have to be especially careful about the preconceptions and biases you bring to your work.

Is the Research Worth Doing?

A final issue is whether you *should* do a particular project. Just because you are interested and have the resources you need, it doesn't mean you should actually do the research. The key issue is whether the research has any potential uses or benefits. Will your research make a contribution, either to individuals or to a larger group or to our general knowledge base? Does it have the capacity to harm anyone—either yourself or the research participants? Before you begin any research project, you need to consider the potential benefits and risks. (These ethical issues will be considered in detail in Chapter 3.)

Again, let's say you are interested in researching people in homeless shelters. You think the study might have potential benefits because people

might be more sympathetic to the problems of the homeless if they understood what their lives were like. They might be more interested in building affordable housing or having the government spend more money on subsidized homes. While the research might not have an immediate positive impact on the participants' themselves, you think that in the long run your work might help debunk stereotypes about homeless people.

DEVELOPING A RESEARCH STRATEGY

Once you've chosen a topic and framed a research question, you need to develop a research strategy. Specifically, you need to address these questions:

- ◆ How will you gather the data?
- ◆ What kind of population or setting will you study?
- ◆ Will you use in-depth interviews, or do an observational study, or work with "texts" (which can include things like books and magazines but also media such as TV shows, movies, and songs)?
- ◆ How will you begin to analyze and make sense of the data you have collected?

Different research traditions suggest somewhat different strategies. We'll consider these next.

Different Traditions, Different Starting Points

Depending on which research tradition you choose, you will begin your research from very different starting points. Before you get too far in your work, then, you need to consider which tradition(s) makes the most sense to you. According to the positivist paradigm, which we discussed in Chapter 1, the goal of social research is theory testing. Thus, in this tradition, you need to settle on a theory *before* you begin your research. Researchers who work within this tradition usually spend much time researching what others have found about their topic. They then develop *hypotheses*, or statements that can be tested, based on these theories, which often are framed in causal language: "x causes (or affects) y" or "The more of x, the less of y." Then they develop a research design that they can use to test their hypotheses. They use the results of their empirical tests to determine whether their theory is useful.

Let's say you're interested in rational choice theory (Friedman and Hechter 1988), which states that people act according to their best interests. Specifically, you're interested in applying rational choice theory to divorce. You think that, if people feel they will get more out of divorcing than staying in a marriage, they will choose to divorce. You're aware that raising children after a divorce can be hard, so you think that people with children have less to gain from a divorce than those without. Your hypothesis might be this: Couples who have children are less likely to divorce than couples who have no children. You could test this by comparing the divorce rate of couples who have children with that of couples who do not.

Qualitative researchers rarely work within this positivist tradition. That is, they are much less likely to test hypotheses than are quantitative researchers and are much more likely to work within one of the other traditions discussed in Chapter 1. Instead of *beginning* with a theory, qualitative researchers are more likely to begin with an examination of the empirical world. In the naturalistic and constructionist traditions, researchers immerse themselves in the social worlds of their research subjects. Only when they have been in a setting for a long time do they begin to develop theories. Some call this a *grounded theory* perspective (Charmaz 2000; Strauss and Corbin 1998), in which the aim is to develop theory grounded in the empirical world. If you choose this approach, your first step is to decide on a field setting or site for your research. At this stage, although you should do a library search to determine if others have studied the same kinds of sites, you should not try to develop testable hypotheses. Rather, you should focus on how you might gain access to the site and begin building relationships with the people there.

Researchers working within a critical research tradition might decide to do *action research*, in which the objective is to produce some kind of social change. For example, you might work with a coalition that seeks to end homelessness in your community. In this case, you first need to identify the stakeholders—the people who have a stake in eliminating homelessness. Obviously, people without homes do, but who else? Shelter workers? Community agencies? Neighborhood residents? You also need to identify who has the power to effect change and what the people you are working with think needs researching. For example, they might believe that the research should focus on the cost of housing in the community and on people's wages. In action research, rather than begin with a theory, you need to begin with a clear statement of the needs and priorities of the group.

While the discussion of research paradigms in Chapter 1 may have seemed abstract, the choice of a paradigm has real-life implications. The

choices you eventually make will determine whether you turn first to the published research, or to the empirical world. In research that draws on the positivist tradition, you need to have well-developed hypotheses before you begin your research. In research that draws on the naturalistic or constructionist traditions, you need to frame a general research question and choose a site for your research. In research that draws on postmodernist traditions, you might focus on texts. In this approach, although it's a good idea to read at least some of the published literature before you begin (and many researchers, myself included, would insist that you do so), you don't begin with already formed hypotheses. Instead, you develop your theory and an increasingly refined research question as you conduct the research.

Types of Research Strategies

Once you have settled on a research question and research tradition, you need to decide how you will collect your data. Specifically, you need to address these issues:

- ◆ What research strategy will you use?
- ◆ What population or site will you study?
- ◆ What texts will you choose?
- ◆ What will your evidence consist of? Transcripts of interviews? Observational notes? Archival materials, like letters or diaries or an organization's records? Songs or videotapes of TV programs?
- ◆ How will you spend your time? Listening and talking to people? Observing? Going through published materials? Watching audio-tapes?

You can choose from several general research strategies. Which one you settle on depends on your research question, the research tradition you see yourself as working in, and your own individual preferences.

Observational Studies In the naturalistic or constructionist traditions, you might conduct an *observational study*, in which you gather data by observing interaction in a particular site (such as a street corner or homeless shelter). Observational studies are useful when you want to understand how people behave in a particular setting or when you want an in-depth understanding of a particular culture or group. In an observational study, you might choose

to participate. For example, you might volunteer at a homeless shelter, as Elliot Liebow, whom we discussed in Chapter 1, did. Or you might choose simply to observe in a public place (such as a shopping mall or a public park), without participating.

Interviews Many qualitative researchers choose to conduct formal in-depth *interviews* with people. These can be relatively structured or unstructured. Interviews are good research techniques when you want to know what people think or feel about something. Researchers often combine observational techniques with either formal or informal interviews. In formal interviews, the researcher sets a particular time and place for an interview. Informal interviews tend to arise spontaneously in the course of observation. For example, you might decide to formally interview people who volunteer in a homeless shelter in order to understand their experiences, as well as to observe and informally interview shelter residents.

Unobtrusive Measures Not all research involves talking with or observing people. *Unobtrusive research* involves examining human traces, or evidence of human activity. For example, if you want to know which magazines in the library are most popular, you might study which ones seem to have thumbed pages or seem to have been heavily perused. A number of researchers have studied public graffiti. Caroline Cole (1991), for example, analyzed the writing on walls in women's bathrooms, arguing that the graffiti there served as an alternative means of communication. Jeff Ferrell (1995) analyzed hip-hop graffiti in Denver, Colorado, combining participant observation of graffiti writers with visits to graffiti sites in other cities. He argues that hip-hop graffiti reflects young people's efforts to resist social control.

Sometimes, researchers study "texts" such as newspapers, books, organizational records, TV shows, and court transcripts. For example, Sharon Hays wanted to investigate what she called the "cultural contradictions of motherhood" (1996). To do so, she analyzed child-rearing manuals to identify the kinds of social norms for mothering contained in them and conducted in-depth interviews with mothers of small children to determine how they actually viewed their mothering.

Triangulation Each research strategy has particular strengths and weaknesses. For example, in-depth interviews can provide insight into people's thoughts and feelings, but people's behaviors don't always match their words. Analysis of texts can tell you about social ideals for behavior, but the

texts can't tell you how people actually respond to them. For this reason, researchers often use two or more research strategies. This is called *triangulation*. Because different data collection strategies have different strengths and weaknesses, research designs that include multiple research strategies tend to be the strongest ones.

READING THE LITERATURE

Whichever research tradition and strategy you choose, you should visit the library early in the process of designing your research. Although some naturalistic researchers caution against becoming too wedded to a particular theory or viewpoint before immersing yourself in your field setting, I think this concern is a little overstated. By knowing what other researchers have already said about your topic, you are in a better position to come up with a well-thought-out research plan. And at some point during the research process, you will still need to conduct a literature review to help you place your own research in context.

I recommend that you begin any research project by simply browsing. Look through the journals and books that seem most interesting to you, or browse through the databases available at your library. I usually skim through the abstract or the introduction quickly to see if I might want to read the whole article or book. Then I go through those readings that seem most useful in more detail. I recommend looking at as wide a variety of sources as you can. As you do so, be sure to take good notes (including accurate citations) so that you can locate the sources again as needed. There's nothing more frustrating than knowing that you had the perfect source but being unable to use it because you can't find it again.

Every library is different. Some have subscriptions to many journals and excellent on-line searching capabilities; others don't. Each library has its own special way of providing access to the materials. Some libraries have on-line search services, like EBSCOhost or Infotrac, which will deliver whole articles to you on-line. Others have a large selection of books and journals in print that you can browse through. Your librarian or professor will be the best person to help you search in your own library.

Most libraries will have access to Sociological Abstracts, either in print or on-line. One of the most important databases for sociologists, Sociological Abstracts summarizes the articles in the most important journals that sociologists publish in. By searching this index, you should be able to get a good idea of what others have said about your topic. Depending on your

field and topic, you may also want to search databases such as Psychological Abstracts, ERIC, or Criminal Justice Abstracts. Again, I strongly recommend that you check with your professor or librarian to see what resources on your campus might be helpful for you.

Although this book can't help you search your specific library, it can give you some general tips on conducting a useful library search:

1. Try a number of different terms for the same thing. Different databases will often use somewhat different key words, and the same database may yield very different articles if you use just slightly different search terms.
2. If the term you've searched yields too many citations to look through, try narrowing it down. For example, I recently used the on-line version of Sociological Abstracts to search the term "working women." When I did so, I received 3669 "hits"—clearly, too many to look through. When I narrowed the topic to "working women and sexual harassment," I received 49 citations—still a lot to look through, but a much more manageable number.
3. Try a number of different sources, including the book catalogue, the journals (also called serials), and the Internet. Different sources will tend to give you very different kinds of results.
4. Once you've found a useful article or book, see if you can track down some of the sources the author used. They are often helpful.
5. Ask a librarian for help, especially if you're finding very little information about what you think should be a popular topic. But be sure you've already thought about some potential angles for your project. The librarian can't create a research topic for you, but she or he can help you find the right resources, given a specific topic.

EVALUATING WEB SITES

The Internet can provide a wealth of material for research projects. You can get information from a variety of government and private sources, as well as research reports, book reviews, and other useful texts. Many government agencies have Web sites, including the Census Bureau, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the FBI. However, the Internet can also lead you astray. A friend of mine says that the World Wide Web is like a huge catalogue—everyone wants to sell you something. Thus, you need to evaluate Web sites

carefully before relying on them in your research. Here are a few questions to ask in judging the usefulness of various sites:

- ◆ Who sponsored the site? Is it maintained by a commercial enterprise or individuals who stand to gain something? Does it contain advertising? Is it maintained by a government agency or university or research institution? Or is it maintained by an individual? If so, what qualifications does the person have? Is she or he an expert in the field, or someone who is mainly trying to express a personal point of view?
- ◆ Does the site seem obviously biased? Does it use obviously inflammatory language? Is it published by a political or social organization with a particular agenda? Does it have a mission statement or statement of purpose anywhere on the site? What kinds of sites is it linked to?
- ◆ How often is the site updated? If it was published several years ago and hasn't been updated since, it probably is not a particularly reliable source.

As you continue to develop and refine your research project, you will probably need to return to the library a number of times. As your research changes, so will the literature that you find useful. But these tips at least will get you started.

THE RESEARCH PROCESS IN REVIEW

Developing a good research project is an ongoing process. There are a number of steps you need to take when embarking on a research project. Although the steps are listed in one order here, you will probably find that you need to go back and forth between the steps as your research unfolds. You should also realize that your project may shift its focus as you learn more and gather more evidence about your topic. At each of these stages, try to remain open to alternative paths.

1. Choose a general topic and try to refine it into a research question.
2. Evaluate whether your topic is interesting, feasible, and worth doing—and ethical. Chapter 3 discusses ethical issues that may arise in research.

3. Develop a research strategy. Decide on the kinds of data you will collect, and think about how you will try to analyze or make sense of them. Make sure that the strategy is consistent with the research question you pose and the research tradition you are working within.
4. Begin your search of the literature. Although you will probably need to return to the literature at other stages in the research process, you should begin with a good sense of what others who have studied the same topic have found.
5. Begin collecting and organizing your data. Chapters 4–7 examine different methods of collecting data, including observation, interviews, textual analysis, and action research.
6. Begin analyzing (or interpreting) your data. Although qualitative researchers usually move back and forth between analyzing and collecting data, it is sometimes helpful to think of the two as separate steps, at least initially. Chapters 8 and 9 discuss strategies for interpreting data.
7. Write up your research. In qualitative research, it can sometimes seem as if you are writing all the time. Certainly, the process of organizing data entails writing, as does interpretation. Qualitative researchers present their work in many venues: as journal articles or books, as presentations at professional conferences, at training sessions or in-service meetings for professionals, and as presentations for community groups. Chapter 10 focuses on strategies for writing up your research and presenting it to a larger community.

QUESTION FOR THOUGHT

Now is the time to consider where *you* stand in relation to your research question. Think back to the research traditions, or paradigms, outlined in Chapter 1. Which one(s) seem most convincing to you? Do you think researchers should take a critical position? Or does a more traditional orientation appeal to you? What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches? What personal insights do you have into your proposed research topic? What kinds of special knowledge might you have by virtue of your own life experiences? How might these insights shape the kinds of research you might do?

EXERCISES

1. As you go about your daily routine, try to pay particular attention to your surroundings. See if you can develop at least two research questions sparked by what you encounter in your daily life.
2. Evaluate one of your research questions in terms of whether it is interesting, feasible, and worth doing. Consider what kinds of resources you would need to complete the research.
3. Think of a general research topic that you might find interesting. Can you come up with three or four different perspectives on it? Try refining the topic into several different research questions.
4. Go to the library to see what information you can find about the research questions you developed. Locate at least five books or journal articles that you think might be useful.
5. Search the Internet to find at least two different Web sites of interest to you. Evaluate each Web site you've chosen in terms of its potential usefulness or bias.
6. Use several different research strategies to locate information about your topic. Try several different search engines on the Internet, such as Yahoo or Excite, and several academic databases, such as the card catalogue and Sociological Abstracts. (Check with your professor or librarian about the best methods for searching on your campus.) What different kinds of materials do you find using each strategy?

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

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8.2 Designing a Research Proposal

10

Designing a Research Proposal

- ✓ To examine the role of the proposal within research
- ✓ To inform readers of the criteria by which successful proposals are judged
- ✓ To examine an example of a successful research proposal
- ✓ To identify distinctions between quantitative and qualitative proposals
- ✓ To provide a framework structure for a research proposal

- **Introduction**
- **What is a research proposal?**
- **The reviewers' assessment criteria**
- **Quantitative and qualitative research proposals**
- **Is there a formula for writing successful research proposals?**
- **Outline of the proposed research**
- **Summary**
- **Recommended reading**

Introduction

All researchers should be able to prepare a proposal for a research topic to a professional standard. Being able to produce such a proposal is an important skill. Intending doctoral students are required to prepare such a proposal when applying for studentships and seeking formal registration for their project. Such requirements are also common on many university Masters courses.

Outside of the academic arena, there are also many organisations that provide funding for social research. Where this is the case, how do you convince a funding body that may be assessing a large number of competing proposals that your research is worthy of support in preference to the others that it will look at? You may have a great idea that immediately captures the imagination, but are you capable of transforming this idea into a feasible project?

The research proposal is the means by which we are able to demonstrate that we are able to do this. As such, it allows us to spell out what exactly is the research problem that we are intending to investigate, why this is worthy of investigation, and how we intend to carry out the research. In putting such a proposal together we shall not only need to demonstrate our knowledge of the area in which we are interested, but also be required to show that we have the necessary methodological competence and sensitivity to carry out the research.

This chapter covers the essential ground in constructing a high-quality research proposal. Specifically, it considers:

- What is a research proposal?
- What is the value of a research proposal?
- What should be included in a good research proposal?
- How should a research proposal be structured?
- By what standards are research proposals assessed?

What is a research proposal?

The research proposal is an application that is prepared by a research student, university academic, or professional researcher for support prior to embarking upon a research study.

At one level, the objectives of a research proposal may be seen as providing a statement about the purposes of the research, how it is to be carried out, the resource implications of the proposed investigation, as well as the timescale for completion. At another level, however, the research proposal is an argument. Through the document, you are presenting a case, in which the intention is to convince others of the general merits and feasibility of the proposed study.

The research proposal should therefore aim to convey three key aspects of an intended research project:

1. its objectives and scholarly significance;
2. your technical qualifications; and
3. the level of funding required.

The objectives and scholarly significance of the proposed study

The general research issues to be examined, together with the methodological strategy to be pursued, need to be carefully explained to the reviewer. Each must also be fully justified.

The proposal, then, should communicate your specific intentions. This involves a clear overview of the purpose of the proposed study and of its importance,

together with a step-by-step plan for conducting it. The research problem(s) needs to be identified, questions or hypotheses should be stated, and key terms defined. You must specify and justify which target group is to be included in the sample, together with the research design to be adopted, the research instrument(s) to be used, the procedures to be followed, and the methods of analysis to be used.

All of these aspects of the project should be covered, and at least a partial review of previous related literature must be included. This will enable you to 'ground' your project theoretically – to make explicit links between this and existing ideas and debates that are taking place within the wider academic or policy community. The literature review will also enable you to demonstrate the suitability of your proposed research strategy. Your case will be strengthened if you: (a) reference the type of methods used by other authors in the past to conduct similar studies; (b) are then able to demonstrate from this that you have appraised the effectiveness of these approaches in generating data to examine the issues at hand, and therefore justified your own choice of research strategy.

The technical qualifications of the researcher

This will need to be stated, whether you are a student intending to commence with a Masters or doctoral research programme, or a project leader applying for funding support. Your experience and level of expertise should be carefully set out, in terms of both your knowledge of the subject area and your methodological 'qualifications' and skills. (Note that when applying for funding, it should not be assumed that by 'experience', precedence is inevitably given to those who are well published with a long history of research in the field, over new and aspiring researchers. As we shall see, an application is judged on the basis of the applicant's track record to date, which will be measured against the particular stage reached in her or his academic career.)

The level of funding required

It goes without saying that all review committees will need to be convinced that the intended project provides 'value for money'. This, as we shall see, does not necessarily mean that cheapest is always best. Instead, it requires that the researcher provides evidence that she or he has carefully costed the proposed project, and that the level of funding sought is warranted, given both the aims and objectives of the study and the methods to be used to implement it.

If yours is a proposed Masters dissertation or doctoral thesis, and you are not applying directly for financial support, you will nonetheless need to convince the course team that you have access to sufficient resources to complete your study.

The reviewers' assessment criteria

The essential criteria for assessment of the research proposal will be broadly the same, regardless of which body the prospective researcher is targeting. This will be the case, whether or not you are applying for funding from an external agency or a university research committee, or to a postgraduate course team in order to receive its approval to proceed with a postgraduate dissertation. The proposal should contain sufficient information to persuade both specialist and non-specialist members of the review committee that the proposed activity is sound and worthy of support under their criteria for the selection of projects.

Activity 10.1 Review Committee's judgement of a research proposal

What do you think the research review committee will consider most important in assessing a research proposal? Make a list of the areas that you think members of such a committee would focus upon when considering a research proposal.

But what are the key criteria that such bodies use to assess a research proposal?

The criteria most typically used by review committees to measure the potential of your research proposal can be listed as:

- Track record
- Originality
- Feasibility
- Clarity
- Outputs

Activity 10.2 Review committee assessment criteria

Consider the assessment criteria listed above. Which do you think the research review committee will consider most important in assessing a research proposal? How would you rank them in terms of their priority for such a committee? For each, write short notes explaining why you think it is a low- or high-level criterion for review committees.

Clarity

The assessors will be scrutinising a research proposal to ensure that there is an internal coherence to the project:

- Is it clearly thought through in terms of what you have set out to do?
- Is there a clear identification of the research problem that you intend to investigate?

It will be anticipated – indeed expected – by the review committee that the research proposal will not be deficient in these areas. Therefore, clarity is a low-level criterion. Very few research proposals would be expected to fail because they lacked internal coherence.

Feasibility

Can you achieve what you initially set out to do in your proposal (within your budget and your estimated timescale, and using your initial research strategy)?

You should think through your research plans carefully, and try to anticipate all possible issues and detours that you may encounter during your study. But the review committee will be sufficiently experienced in these matters to appreciate that research programmes cannot be precisely mapped out, particularly for emergent qualitative research studies. Certainly, the notion of ‘delivery within budget’ is a red herring.

And there will be issues that arise during the course of your study which may impact upon your initial methodological strategy – issues that you could not realistically have predicted at the outset. Perhaps these will be in terms of access difficulties encountered, or sickness of a key ‘gatekeeper’, or ethical matters that arise additional to those discussed in your research design.

Feasibility is an important issue, and the review committee will use this as one of the criteria upon which they will assess your research proposal. However, risk will take precedence over predictability. Producing a book on time is of course important, but the review committee will ask the question, ‘will the book be read by 5, or 500, or 5,000 people?’ before they ask, ‘will the applicant meet his/her deadline?’ Similarly, If you can demonstrate that your research is innovative, then your proposal is likely to be considered very seriously by the review committee. The exciting, yet expensive, research idea has a greater likelihood of approval than a proposal that is considerably cheaper, but is nonetheless not as inspiring.

Feasibility is an important criterion therefore – more so than clarity – but it is nonetheless a relatively low-level one.

Track record

Understandably, if your research proposal is to be assessed competitively against those submitted by other candidates, the review committee will take into account

the track records of each applicant. But an established track record by itself is certainly no guarantee of success. And review committees will be realistic enough to appreciate that a 'new' researcher can only develop a good track record if bodies like their own provide the researcher with the support to embark upon a research career.

Furthermore, such committees will have different expectations of 'new' and more 'long-standing' applicants. Indeed, a good track record can be achieved even at a relatively early stage for researchers. The expectations held by assessors of what counts as a good track record is relative to the stage of a research career achieved by a particular applicant. New and aspiring researchers should therefore pitch their application for research support appropriately. Typically, the route to be taken is a 'staged' one. It involves the aspiring student applying initially for a university postgraduate course. Paid academic research posts, or practitioner research posts, are likely to follow only after qualification. Such a trajectory may be a long and arduous one, but achieving a good track record comes only with talent and hard work.

Outputs

This is a very important criterion, more so than those already mentioned. The review committee will be particularly interested in supporting project proposals that have the potential for achieving publication, or which may have 'utility' for the wider policy community.

Extract 10.1 provides an example taken from a (successful) research proposal – the *Youth and Politics* project (Henn and Weinstein 2000) – that was awarded a research grant from an external research-funding agency (the Economic and Social Research Council). Here, the applicants were required to demonstrate the relevance of the research for different user groups.

Notice that there are very explicit statements from the funding agency concerning its expectations about:

- the usefulness of the proposed research for this community;
- that there is evidence that such organisations and individuals have had some input into the design of the research;
- that the research is of sufficient interest to practitioners that they may have provided tangible support to the project (perhaps in terms of part-funding or a letter of support).

You may not have been able to achieve this level of external support, but it will significantly add to the robustness and credibility of your research proposal if you can demonstrate that it has importance to the wider practitioner or policy-making communities. This will be the case regardless of whether or not you are applying for external funding for research, or you are preparing a research proposal for a thesis.

EXTRACT 10.1 Youth and Politics project (Henn and Weinstein 2000)

Relevance to 'user' groups

*Please explain below the likely contribution to policy or practice; details of consultation with user groups (such as public, private and voluntary sector practitioners and policy makers) in the development of the research and proposed collaboration/communication with such groups during the research should be included. Details of any potential co-funding or support in kind should also be included here. **Do not** exceed one side.*

1. The proposed research will be of value to policy users and to the wider political community. In previous research, we have dealt with a number of agencies and organisations that have links to youth, including amongst others, the Institute for Citizenship, the Citizenship Team at the Department for Education and Employment, the National Union of Students, various trades unions (notably the GMB), and the party youth sections. Meetings will be held to further progress these links through the research, in terms of: the design of the research and the survey questionnaire; testing out the plausibility and utility of the research findings; the dissemination of the findings through presentations at the end of the research. Together, these organisations will be able to provide invaluable advice and support to the project.
2. Non-technical summaries and briefing papers shall be disseminated to various policy users and other interested groups, including those mentioned in 1. above, but also others such as the British Youth Council, the Young Fabians, as well as all members of the Crick Commission, and think-tanks.
3. Academics will be consulted during the design stage of the research – particularly in terms of discussion of theoretical issues in the development of the questionnaire.
4. Research results will be communicated to the academic community via conferences (the annual meetings of the UK Political Studies Association and the British Sociological Association) and academic journals (papers will be submitted to the 'British Journal of Political Science', and 'Sociology' in the first instance).
5. Earlier research that we have conducted has already been widely disseminated through the national and local media. It is anticipated that the proposed research will lead to similar levels of media exposure, and press releases will be produced for this purpose.

Originality

Members of a review committee who are charged with the task of reviewing your research proposal will recognise that the project's perceived contribution to the

external users, or its potential for publication in an academic journal, or to gain a good pass on a Masters course, will be largely dependent upon its originality. The potential to generate new knowledge is the key to a good research proposal. If you can convince the review committee that you have met this criterion, then and only then will they assess your proposal on the basis of the other criteria mentioned above. By the same token, if you fail to convince these assessors that you have an original idea that you intend to investigate through your proposed project, then the reviewers are unlikely to consider your application further.

But different types of reviewer will have different yardsticks against which to measure 'originality':

1. External funding agencies (higher education funding councils like the ESRC, charitable funding bodies like the Nuffield Foundation) – will assess originality in terms of an expected significant contribution to knowledge likely to follow from the proposed research.
2. Ph.D. review committees – will look for indications that the intended study programme has a significant potential for publication.
3. Masters supervisors – will be concerned that the dissertation proposal will lead to an authentic and independent research project.

So, how will you discover your 'big idea'?

It is likely to develop organically from your own research interests. Most importantly, you must read widely – adopting too narrow a focus in your reading may limit your ability to discover your research question. You must look consciously for it. This will by necessity involve you in one or more of the following:

- Developing an awareness (through reviewing the literature and/or attending conferences) of the research which is currently being developed in your field. As you do so, search for an idea which you consider to be significant by its omission from your field. Try to identify what is conventionally referred to as a research gap in your chosen area.
- Challenging current thinking in your field (to do this requires you to be aware of the key issues and debates in your subject area first of all).
- Applying an existing idea to a new field or a different academic or policy context. This may not involve you in developing a 'new' idea as such, but the way in which you use that existing idea will be innovative. It therefore has the potential to make an original contribution to knowledge. An example might involve you examining a marketing technique that is used widely within the general field of business studies, and researching the extent of its usage by political parties in their campaigning. Through your research, you may gain a greater understanding of the development of modern electioneering methods.

The research proposal is therefore an important document. As such, it will take significant time, effort, and patience to get it right. It will also likely involve the

preparation of several drafts, as well as feedback from colleagues in the field, before it is ready for submission. But such preparation has some important potential benefits for the project. Submitting the research proposal enables an expert review committee to evaluate the merits of your research plans, and in so doing – especially where they may offer suggestions for revision – provides important ‘expert’ insight into how to improve the study.

Quantitative and qualitative research proposals

Prior to the drafting of a research proposal, the nature of the research design to be selected should be set out. Whether one is intending to adopt a broadly qualitative research design, or a strategy that is largely quantitative in nature, is likely to affect the shape and format of the research proposal. Of course, those charged with reviewing proposals would have very clear expectations that certain content will be included in the proposal, regardless of the intended research strategy. However, some elements of a quantitative research proposal will not be included in a qualitative research proposal, and vice versa. Furthermore, quantitative research proposals are likely to be more uniform than those designed for broadly qualitative-based studies. As K.P. Punch (1998, pp.269–70) notes:

It is easier in many respects to suggest proposal guidelines for a quantitative study, since there is greater variety in qualitative studies, and many qualitative studies will be unfolding rather than prestructured. An emerging study cannot be as specific in the proposal about its research questions, or about details of the design. When this is the case, the point needs to be made in the proposal.

In the remainder of this chapter, the core elements of a research proposal will be reviewed. Where appropriate, the specific aspects that are necessary for drafting either a qualitative or a quantitative proposal will be noted.

Is there a formula for writing successful research proposals?

A research proposal, then, is a written plan for a study. It spells out in detail what the researcher intends to do. It permits others to learn about the intended research, and to offer suggestions for improving the study. It helps the researcher to clarify what needs to be done, and aims to avoid unintentional pitfalls or unknown problems.

Before examining what a research proposal might look like, it is important to be aware that what will be suggested in the remainder of this chapter is intended to serve as a general framework, not a definitive set of instructions. The only general rule that must always be adhered to is that the research proposal should be both

succinct and complete. Other than that, each university research committee or external funding agency will have its own expectations about the actual format of the research proposal, and some will be more explicit than others in this respect. Research proposals often vary significantly in terms of length. In some cases, application forms that prescribe precisely what is wanted will need to be completed. In others, the researcher will have more latitude to decide upon the format of the proposal.

However, the onus will be on the researcher to 'bend' to meet the requirements of the university review committee or external funding agency.

Outline of the proposed research

In the absence of any forms or guidelines, there are general themes that you might use to structure your own research proposal, whether this is for a postgraduate dissertation, or an application for external research funding. However, what follows are 'elements' of a proposal – you do not need to have each as a particular heading.

Title page

This should include each of the following: your name, the title of the proposed project, any collaborating agencies which have been involved in the preparation of the proposal, the date of submission, and, if applicable, the funding agency to which you are applying for support.

Abstract

The abstract is a brief synopsis of the planned research investigation. It appears at the front of the proposal, but it is usually the last element to be written. It should include two key areas – the major objectives of the proposed study, and the procedures and general methodological strategy that are to be used in order to meet these objectives. The abstract should be approximately one page or less in length.

The abstract is an important strategic element of the proposal, and therefore should be afforded considerable attention in the drafting of your proposal. It serves three key interlinked purposes:

- The reviewer usually reads it before the full proposal to gain a perspective of the study and of its expected significance.
- The reviewer uses it as a reference to the nature of the study if the project comes up for discussion.

- It will sometimes be the only part of the proposal that is read when making preliminary selections of applicant proposals.

Read through Extract 10.2. As you do so, look carefully at the two aspects of an abstract outlined above, and note how they are covered.

EXTRACT 10.2 Abstract: *Youth and Politics* project (Henn and Weinstein 2000)

Conventional wisdom holds that young people in Britain are alienated from the political process. Moreover, some have suggested that there is an 'historic political disconnection' of youth from formal party politics, with this group more likely to participate in new politics formations. Paradoxically, there is a recognition that formalised youth activities are a potentially significant aspect of party development. They serve the purposes of recruiting the future political elite, raising political awareness among young people, and widening the pool of party activists. The aim of this project is to reveal the level of engagement that young people have with party politics in Britain. Specifically, the research will examine whether there is a crisis of democratic legitimacy in terms of the attitudes of young people toward party politics. It will also investigate differences in this respect, along socio-demographic and spatial lines. Importantly, regional analysis will enable an examination of the efficacy of new political institutions in Wales, Scotland and London for strengthening levels of young people's political engagement. Quantitative data will be collected by means of a national postal survey of young people. This will be the first British nation-wide study to focus exclusively on first-time voters with only limited experience of formal politics.

Activity 10.3

Think about a research project that you intend to conduct. Write an abstract of between 200 and 250 words, setting out (a) the general issues and debates/or policy field that you intend to engage with through your study, (b) your specific aims and objectives, and (c) the research strategy that you propose to follow to meet these objectives.

Research problem to be investigated

There are usually four areas to be addressed in this section of the research proposal: the purpose of the proposed study, a justification for the project, the specific research

questions that you intend to explore, and a definition of the key terms and concepts that you will examine. However, you will write only one section. This must contain all of these four aspects; you will not deal with each under a separate heading.

Purpose of the study

This section expects you to state succinctly what the research proposes to investigate. The purpose should be a concise statement, providing a framework to which details are added later. Generally speaking, any study should seek to clarify some aspect of the field of interest that is considered important, thereby contributing both to the overall knowledge in the field and to current practice.

Justification for the study

The researcher must make clear why this particular study is important to investigate. You must present an argument for the work of the study.

As an example, you might be interested in the general field of organisation studies. If you intend to study a particular method through which a local authority deals with harassment at work, you need to make a case that such a study is important, and that people are or should be concerned with it. Perhaps it is particularly prevalent in a particular department compared to the overall situation within the local authority. You might indicate that previous studies have identified a pattern of harassment that is linked to poor morale within the workplace, increased incidences of people suffering from occupational stress, and high levels of absenteeism. Or perhaps, where the issue is not checked, it may lead to poor industrial relations. The net result either way may lead to an erosion of quality within the particular department, and a decline in public confidence in the service.

Alternatively, you may be interested in conducting a research study which aims to evaluate the effectiveness of 'care in the community' solutions for mental health patients. Existing research may indicate that since the introduction of the current arrangements, there has been a marked increase in the general suicide rate amongst this group, or perhaps an expansion in the rate of homelessness among people with severe learning difficulties.

You must also make clear why you have chosen to investigate the particular method adopted by organisations to tackle such problems. In many such proposals, there is the implication that current methods are not adequate to tackle the problem seriously.

Coley and Scheinberg (1990, p.41) have developed a useful framework for conceptualising issues for research that helps to justify how research may reveal interesting new insights into the problem. The framework may not, in its entirety, be appropriate for all styles of research, but the general method they adopt is a useful way of beginning to think about how you may structure the 'case' for your proposed study:

People with 'A' characteristics and background live in 'B' conditions/environments and have 'C' problems/needs that are caused by 'D'.

People are blocked from solving these problems because of 'E'. This problem is related to other problems 'F', and have 'G' short- and long-term impact if not addressed.

The impact of their needs/problems on the community is 'H'. Others have addressed their needs/problems by doing 'I', the result of their interventions have been 'J'.

The most promising strategy for intervention now is 'K'.

Key questions to ask yourself at this point are:

- Have I identified the specific research problem that I wish to investigate?
- Have I indicated what I intend to do about this problem?
- Have I put forward an argument as to why this problem is worthy of investigation?

The research questions

The particular research questions that you intend to examine should be stated next. These are usually, but not always, a more specific form of the problem in question form. For quantitative researchers, research hypotheses will be set out at this stage for reasons of clarity and as a research strategy. If a researcher has a hypothesis in mind, it should be stated as clearly and as concisely as possible. It is unnecessarily frustrating for a reader to have to infer what a study's hypothesis or hypotheses might be. Examples of the research questions that were to be pursued in the *Youth and Politics* project noted in Extracts 10.1 and 10.2 are included in Extract 10.3.

For qualitative researchers, especially those adopting an emergent research design, the actual research questions and hypotheses will not become clear until the research has begun. Typically, these begin to take shape in the course of data collection and analysis. As K.P. Punch (1998, p.270) notes:

If a tightly structured qualitative study is planned, the proposal can proceed along similar lines to the quantitative proposal. If a more emergent study is planned, where focus and structure will develop as the study proceeds, this point should be made clearly (in the research proposal). In the former case, there will be general and specific questions. In the latter case, there will only be general orienting and guiding research questions.

Key questions to ask yourself at this point are:

- Have I asked the specific research questions that I wish to explore through my research?
- Do I have any hypotheses in mind? If so, have I expressed them clearly and appropriately?
- Do I intend to investigate a relationship between different phenomena or variables? If so, have I indicated the variables that I think may be related?

**EXTRACT 10.3 Key research questions: *Youth and Politics* project
(Henn and Weinstein 2000)**

- Popular understanding of parties.
- Are young people indifferent, or even hostile to political parties?
- What, if anything, do they like about them?
- Do their attitudes towards parties significantly differ from those of other sections of the population (such as their parents' generation)?
- Is there evidence to suggest that young people are now more disaffected from parties than at any time since the introduction of universal suffrage?
- And is there a case for arguing that young people, given their particular socialisation and formal educational experiences, might actually be more predisposed to party appeals?

Activity 10.4

Write down a list of five key questions that you aim to research in your project. As you do, make brief notes to remind yourself why you are asking these questions - what do you aim to achieve in doing so?

Definitions of key terms and concepts

All key terms should be defined. In a quantitative hypothesis-testing study, these are primarily the terms that describe the variables of the study. Your task is to make your definitions as clear as possible. If previous definitions found in the literature are clear to all, that is well and good. Often, however, they need to be modified to fit your proposed study. It is often helpful to formulate *operational definitions* as a way of clarifying terms or phrases. While it is probably impossible to eliminate all ambiguity from definitions, the clearer the terms used in a study are – to both you and others – the fewer difficulties will be encountered in subsequent planning and conducting of the study.

For instance, if you are conducting a study which involves researching harassment at work, you will want to examine different aspects and dimensions of this key concept. One of these may be violence, and you should carefully define this by taking account of the different forms of violence – physical, verbal, and emotional. Now review the section on operationalising concepts in Chapter 3.

In an emergent qualitative-based research study, however, the key concepts that you intend to engage with in your research will not all be clear to you at the outset of your research. The key issues, their dimensions, and how you intend to define

them will only become clear in the course of the actual empirical investigation. Where this is so, you should state this clearly within your proposal.

A key question to ask yourself at this point is:

- Have I defined all key terms clearly and (if possible) operationally?

Review of the literature

In a research proposal, the literature review is a partial summary of previous work related to the focus of the study. You will need to demonstrate to a review committee that you are familiar with the major trends in previous research as well as opinions on the topic, and that you understand their relevance to your planned study. The major weakness of many literature reviews is that they cite references without indicating their relevance or implications for the planned study.

You need to review the literature comprehensively prior to the development of your research proposal – in order for instance to identify a research gap that will serve as a stimulus for your study. However, the space available for you to develop this in your research proposal will be limited. You will therefore need to be concise and succinct in your review.

Cormack (1984) provides a useful overview of the three key uses of a literature review. It will:

- provide you with a wide range of documentary information on facts, opinions, and comments concerning the topic to be investigated;
- help you to discover whether the topic has already been studied, and, if so, to what extent your work will be affected;
- help you to decide which research techniques will be most appropriate for your study.

In the early stages, the literature review will consume much of your time and energies. However, it should be regarded as a continuous process, with new information added as the project proceeds.

You should take a structured approach to your literature search. Ask yourself, what information are you after? If you are going to use word searches on CD-ROMs or the Internet, you should list all the possible keywords and synonyms that you consider to be relevant to your research question(s). You should also be clear about which timescale you intend to cover in your project (only articles since 1991?), and what the geographic boundaries are that you intend to work within (Australian but not Canadian studies?). Finally, you should be flexible about the range of material that you consider for your literature review – especially if your initial searching fails to uncover a sufficient body of literature for your study. For instance, you may consider studies that investigate the sources and impact of occupational stress in the teaching and nursing professions, and how these experiences apply to the fire

service in terms of the implications for safety. Or perhaps in a project focusing on youth engagement with politics, you might find it valuable to consider studies that examine the political participation of ethnic minority groups. For more information about consulting the literature, see Chapter 9.

Key questions to ask yourself at this point are:

- Have I surveyed and described relevant studies that are related to my research problem?
- Have I surveyed existing expert opinion on the problem?
- Have I summarised the existing state of opinion and research on the problem?

Methodology to be used for conducting the research

The methodology section should include a discussion of your intended research design, the sample you will examine, the instruments to be used to conduct the investigation, procedural detail for collecting your empirical evidence, and the data analysis technique(s) to be used.

Research design

The particular research design to be used should be identified, as well as how it applies to the present study. You therefore need to ensure that your choice of approach is *justified* in this section (see Extract 10.4). Typically, the basic design is fairly clear cut, and fits one of the following models:

- Survey research
- Historical research
- Experimental research
- Observational/ethnographic research
- Documentary research

However, you may want to use a variety of approaches. Combining methods and strategies may help to add depth to your study, as well as enable you to identify whether your approach is valid and reliable. See Chapter 3 for a discussion of this mixed method research design.

Emergent qualitative research designs may involve you in approaching your methods more flexibly during the course of the study. As K.P. Punch (1998, p.273) explains, when opting for such a research design: 'There is a need to explain the flexibility the study requires and why, and how decisions will be made as the study unfolds'.

Nonetheless, you should be as explicit as you can be in your proposal about the general research design that you intend to use, and provide as much material about your plans as you are able.

**EXTRACT 10.4 *Youth and Politics* research proposal
(Henn and Weinstein 2000)**

As you read through this extract, notice how the two methods are justified with respect to the project aims and objectives.

Focus on attainers

As a methodological innovation, we will focus exclusively on ‘attainers’ – young people eligible to vote for the first time when the 2001 electoral register comes into force. As far as we are aware, the proposed study would be the first of its kind to focus solely on attainers. Our intention in limiting our study to this age group is twofold. Firstly, in research terms, attainers are a relatively unique target group. Most social and political surveys that examine the views of young people tend to combine their views with older youths. Hence, attainers will typically be analysed as part of an 18–24 (or 18–25) year old group (see, for instance Parry et al. 1992) or included in studies of students (e.g., Denver and Hands 1990), often alongside respondents with an increasingly mature age profile as Higher Education is opened up to new entrants. Secondly, they will have had minimal formal experience of participating in politics in terms of voting, with the possible exception of the 2001 local elections. They are, therefore, relatively inexperienced politically in comparison to older people and are therefore less likely than their older contemporaries to have formed deep-seated views about politics, parties and politicians. As a consequence, attainers provide a fascinating target group for study in terms of their perceptions of political institutions and actors in Britain. The study will form the baseline for understanding future developments in youth attitudes of, and orientation towards, British political parties as these attainers gain experience of engaging with politics. There is potential therefore to track attitudes over time for comparative purposes.

Activity 10.5

Decide what is to be the research design for your intended study.
State clearly why you have chosen that particular approach in terms of the aims and objectives you set out for your project in Activity 10.4.

Sample

In your proposal, you should indicate in considerable detail how you will include participants – the sample – for investigation in your study. You should indicate

what the size of the sample will be, how members will be selected, and what claims you may legitimately make about the representativeness of your sample. For a quantitative research study, you should aim, if at all possible, to adopt a random sampling technique, or, if this is unrealistic, a quota sampling method should be used in an attempt to maximise representativeness.

However, for small-scale projects of the type likely to be undertaken by postgraduate students where your study will be subject to various resource constraints, it may be legitimate to use other less rigorous sampling methods such as the convenience sample. It is more important to complete a project with an unrepresentative sample than abandon the study because it fails to achieve a sample that is representative of your target group. If a convenience sample must be used, relevant demographics (gender, ethnicity, occupation, age, housing, and any other relevant characteristics) of the sample should be described. The legitimate population to which the results of the study may be generalised should be indicated.

For emergent qualitative research designs, you are likely to use theoretical sampling to select your research participants. Where this is the case, you are much more likely to include respondents whose presence is designed to maximise theoretical development than to achieve representativeness. Your reasons for choosing this sampling strategy should be indicated (and justified) within this section of the research proposal, together with an acknowledgement that: (a) the sample has been chosen to generate insights (as opposed to definitive conclusions) about your research area; and (b) the results will be indicative, rather than representative, of the views of the wider population. For a further discussion of this point, see the section on case selection from Chapter 3.

Key questions to ask yourself at this point are:

- Have I described my sampling plan?
- Have I described the relevant characteristics of my sample in detail?
- If you are using a predominantly quantitative research design, have I identified the population to which the results of the study may legitimately be generalised?
- If you are using a predominantly qualitative research design, have I demonstrated that my selection of cases is reasonably typical of what might be expected if I had conducted my research elsewhere?

Instruments to be used

Whenever possible, existing research instruments should be used in your study, since construction of even the most straightforward test or questionnaire (or selection of questions) is often very time consuming and difficult. Furthermore, doing so will enable you to make comparisons between your findings and the results from the earlier study from which the research instrument was borrowed.

However, you cannot justify using an existing research instrument if it is not appropriate for your purpose, even though it may be more convenient. You will therefore need to assess whether existing instruments are suited to your needs.

In the event that appropriate instruments are not available, the procedures to be followed in developing your own research instruments to be used in the study should be described with attention to how validity and reliability will be enhanced. It will be important to indicate within your proposal that you intend to build a *pilot stage* (Extract 10.5) into your project, or, if the research instrument has already been tested for these purposes, include a version within the appendices. For example, if you are conducting a survey, you should include a specimen questionnaire or some questions that you consider to be good illustrations of what you will ask. For a more qualitative research design, you might include an observation schedule, or a topic guide for in-depth interviews.

EXTRACT 10.5 Pilot stage: *Youth and Politics* research proposal (Henn and Weinstein 2000)

As you read through the following extract, you will notice how a pilot study has already been conducted to examine both what sorts of question areas will likely need to be explored for the qualitative part of the project, and how the quantitative aspect will take advantage of an existing research instrument.

Pilot research

A qualitative-based pilot study, using focus groups, has already been completed by the research team in preparation for this full project (Henn, Weinstein and Wring 1999). This preliminary research was designed to help establish which questions should be asked, as well as their structure. We will also hold meetings with various party youth activists and youth organisers, interested user groups, and academics in order to further our understanding of which questions to include in the questionnaire. In addition, the proposed survey will include questions that appear on other national political opinion studies to enable comparative work with other age groups (including amongst others, the British Social Attitudes surveys, the British Election Studies surveys, and the British Election Panel surveys). Considerable attention will be paid to the design and layout of the questionnaire to ensure an attractive presentation of the postal survey. This will draw on previous experience of conducting postal surveys of this particular target group (Wring, Henn and Weinstein 1999; Henn, Weinstein and Wring 2000). A pilot study will be conducted in the Nottingham area in order to test the efficacy of the questions to be used in the postal survey.

Key questions to ask yourself at this point are:

- Have I described the instrument(s) to be used?
- Have I indicated their relevance to the present study?

- Have I stated how I will check the reliability and validity of my data collection instruments?
- Have I built a 'piloting the instrument' stage into the research design?

Procedures and data collection

Outline your proposed method(s) of research. This should be presented in sufficient detail for the reader to know whether the project is realistic, feasible, and worthwhile. You will need to describe how you intend to access your target group, and contact your research participants. Is your target group one that is typically difficult to involve in research studies of your kind? If so, what steps will you take to maximise your response rate, and minimise bias? What method of data collection will you use? For instance, if your proposed study involves the use of a questionnaire, you should indicate whether you intend to use a self-completion version, or implement it in a face-to-face situation, or via the telephone.

It is important to make your procedures of data collection clear so that if another researcher wants to repeat the study in exactly the same way as the original, you have made your procedures as clear as possible so they can be replicated. Certain procedures may change from those previewed in the proposal as the study is carried out, but a proposal should always aim to have this level of clarity as its goal. Explain why you think this is the best method for investigating the research problem.

A key question to ask yourself at this point is:

- Have I fully described the procedures to be followed in the study – what will be done, where, when, and how?

Data analysis

The researcher should indicate how the data to be collected will be organised, interpreted, and analysed. You should explain which statistical procedures and tests you intend to use for quantitative-based studies, and why you are choosing to do so. Similarly, if you intend to conduct a qualitative research study, then you should indicate the methods of analysis you will use to analyse the data. Perhaps you intend to quantify the results obtained from your unstructured interviews? If your project is more emergent in nature, you may be proposing to adopt a grounded theory approach.

Ethical considerations

The review committee will have been alerted to any potential or any actual ethical problems likely to arise from your proposed study while reading the methodology section. The proposal may be reviewed by a committee whose primary objective is to assess the scientific methods of a study, but they will also be aware of ethical issues.

It is important that you anticipate gaining written consent from adults or parents or guardians when members of your target group cannot themselves give

approval. Ethical matters may also be relevant to protecting these research participants from any negative consequences of your study. However, you will also need to demonstrate to the review committee that you have taken adequate steps to ensure that both yourself and others associated with your intended project are protected from harm, particularly if the research situation is one that has the potential to place people in positions of danger.

At some point in the proposal it is necessary to indicate clearly what you regard as the major ethical issues of the project, and to state clearly how these will be handled. Alternatively you may state that the proposal raises no ethical issues. In order to complete this section effectively and convincingly, you should pay close attention to the ethical guidelines that are set out in the codes of conduct that many academic and professional organisations have developed. For a full discussion of ethics, see Chapter 4.

Timescale

The amount of time you need to devote to the study should be set out in the proposal. It may be that this is a proposal for a full-time commitment or for only a few hours in a week. But whichever is the case, the research proposal must specify the amount of time involved (Extract 10.6). The review committee will need to know how long the project will take when considering whether to fund it, or, if yours is a proposal for a Masters dissertation, whether the project can be finished within your deadline.

EXTRACT 10.6 Timetable for the *Youth and Politics* project

Completion of all preparation and design work (3 months); commencement of survey data collection phase of study (3 months); completion of survey data collection phase of study (6 months); commencement of analysis phase of study (6 months); completion of analysis phase of study (14 months); commencement of writing up of the research (12 months); completion of preparation of any new datasets for archiving (14 months); completion of writing up (18 months).

Facilities and resources

Describing particular forms of expertise or backup facilities can strengthen a proposal. Good computer and library facilities fall into this category. Where established networks are integral to a project, or co-operation has been obtained from particular agencies or institutions, some indication of this, like a letter of agreement, may be included as a helpful appendix.

Budget

Preparing a research budget is as much a skill as preparing other parts of the proposal. Part of the skill lies in locating other people who know the price of all appropriate commodities: staff time, tape-recorders, photocopying, travel costs, and so on. Preparing a budget means translating the timescale and plan of work into financial terms.

In preparing a budget, use a checklist to include main headings such as:

- Research salaries
- Data collection costs (purchase of equipment and other materials, printing, travelling expenses)
- Stationery and postage
- Data analysis expenses

Pre-submission

It is likely that a research proposal will go through many drafts. Indeed, there would be major cause for concern if it did not. There are a number of things to be achieved in reviewing a proposal – not least considering its physical presentation. Legibility, lucidity, and clarity of presentation are all important. While readers of a proposal will not be evaluating its presentation, the relatively small amount of time it takes to ensure a layout that is easily followed will be time well spent.

Check carefully that the proposal meets all of the criteria set by the review committee.

Perhaps most importantly, ask colleagues to read and comment upon your proposal, and take any criticisms that they may have of it seriously. As Hessler (1992, p.287) states:

We assume too much, taking for granted the nuances and assumptions of our research, which is tough on readers who do not share this knowledge ... take nothing for granted. If in doubt, spell it out, even to the point of repeating yourself. Redundancy is not the worst sin in grant writing.

SUMMARY

This chapter has reviewed the process of constructing a research proposal, setting out the main points that need to be considered in producing a professional and convincing document. As we have seen, in any proposal it is of paramount importance that the research that is envisaged is clearly articulated and is of value to the body looking to support the research.

In assessing your proposal, a reviewer will also be looking to see that your proposed study is a feasible one. As well as capturing a reviewer's imagination with the subject of your research, you will have to satisfy the reviewer that you are in a position to carry the research out to a high standard. Having a bright idea

is the starting point from which you have to construct a compelling case that your research is not only interesting, but also capable of execution.

In this respect the reviewer will be looking for you to demonstrate your methodological proficiency and sensitivity. For example, have you adequately addressed the complexities of the sampling strategy that will need to be adopted and are you fully aware of any potential issues that may preclude you obtaining access to your intended research participants?

As we have seen, there are different audiences for different sorts of research proposals. If your research is intended to be carried out as part of a Masters course at a university, you may be primarily focused on persuading your tutors that you have located your research in a particular body of specialist literature. On the other hand, if you are applying for funding from an external agency that places a high premium on policy-oriented research then you will need to convince the reviewing panel that your research not only is of academic interest, but also has wider societal value.

Of course, all reviewers will have their own set of criteria by which they will judge the proposals that come before them. Unfortunately, there is no easily applied formula that can be applied to all research proposals that can guarantee success. However, the more consideration that you have been able to give to the research you plan to carry out, reflecting on the outline elements that have been covered in this chapter, the more likely it is that you will have produced a proposal that stands up to keen scrutiny.

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