Sociology Sixth Edition Anthony Giddens Revised and updated with Philip W. Sutton polity Copyright © Anthony Giddens 2009 The right ofAnthony Giddens to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published in 2009 by Polity Press Polity Press 65 Bridge Street Cambridge CB2 IUR, UK Polity Press 350 Main Street Maiden, MA 02148, USA All rights reserved. Except for the quotation ofshort passages for the purpose ofcriticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission afthe publisher. ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-4357-1 ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-4358-8(pbl A catalogue recordfor this book is available from the British Library. 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For further information on Polity, visit our website: www.politybooks.com Contents Detailed contents vi Preface to the sixth edition xix Acknowledgements xx About this book xxi List of figures xxvi List oftables xxix List of boxes xxxi 1 What is Sociology? 3 2 Asking and Answering Sociological Questions 33 3 Theories and Perspectives in Sociology 67 4 Globalization and the Changing World 107 5 The Environment 153 6 Cities and Urban Life 205 7 Social Interaction and Everyday Life 247 8 The Life-Course 281 9 Families and Intimate Relationships 327 10 Health, llIness and Disability 383 11 Stratification and Social Class 429 12 Poverty, Social Exclusion and Welfare 475 13 Global Inequality 521 14 Sexuality and Gender 575 15 Race, Ethnicity and Migration 627 16 Religion 673 17 The Media 721 18 Organizations and Networks 779 19 Education 829 20 Work and Economic Life 883 21 Crime and Deviance 935 22 Politics, Government and Social Movements 985 23 Nations, War and Terrorism 1029 References 1065 Glossary 1111 llIustration credits 1138 Index 1140 Detailed contents Preface to the sixth edition xix Acknowledgements xx About this Book xxi Major themes xxi New features xxii Organization ofthe book xxv List affigures xxvi List aftables xxix List a/boxes xxxi I What is Sociology? 3 The sociological imagination 6 Studying people and society 8 The development of sociological thinking 10 Theories and theoretical perspectives 10 Founders of sociology 11 Modern theoretical approaches 22 Theoretical thinking in sociology 26 Levels of analysis: microsociology and macrosociology 27 Why study sociology? 28 Summary points 30 Further reading 31 Internet links 31 2 Asking and Answering Sociological Questions 33 Human subjects and ethical problems 37 Sociological questions 38 Is sociology scientific? 41 The research process 42 Understanding cause and effect 46 Causation and correlation 46 Research methods 49 Ethnography 50 Surveys 52 Experiments 54 Biographical research 58 Comparative research 58 • Detailed contents Historical analysis 59 Comparative-historical research 59 Sociological research in the real world 59 Restating the obvious? 62 The influence of sociology 62 Summary points 63 Further reading 64 Internet links 65 3 Theories and Perspectives in Sociology 67 Towards sociology 72 Positivism and social evolution 72 Karl Marx - the capitalist revolution 74 Establishing sociology 78 Emile Durkheim: the social level of reality 78 Max Weber: capitalism and religion 83 Theoretical dilemmas 87 Social structure and human action 88 Consensus or conflict? 90 The neglected issue of gender 91 The direction of social change 92 The transformation of societies - and sociology 94 Gender equality and feminist theory 94 Poststructuralism and postmodernity 96 Globalization, risk and the 'revenge' of nature 98 Conclusion: out with the old, in with the new? 103 Summary points Further reading Internet links 104 105 105 4 Globalization and the ChangingWorld 107 Types of society 110 A disappearing world: the fate of pre-modern societies The modern world:the industrialized societies 116 Global development 118 Social change 120 Influences on social change 122 Change in the modern period 125 Globalization 126 Factors contributing to globalization 127 Contesting globalization 137 The impact of globalization 140 110 Conclusion: the need for global governance 148 Summary points Further reading Internet links 149 150 151 • DETAILED CONTENTS 5 The Environment 153 Nature, the environment and sociology 157 Defining nature and the environment 157 Sociology and the environment 158 What are environmental issues? 163 Pollution and waste 163 Resource depletion 169 Genetic modification of food 172 Global warming 177 Sociological theories and ecological sustainability 186 Consumerism and environmental damage 187 Limits to growth and sustainable development 190 Living in the global 'risk society' 193 Ecological modernization 195 Environmental justice and ecological citizenship 197 Conclusion 199 Summary points Further reading Internet links 200 202 203 6 Cities and Urban Life 205 Theorizing urbanism 208 The Chicago School 209 Urbanism and the created environment 213 Evaluation 216 The development of the city 217 Cities in traditional societies 217 Industrialization and urbanization The development of the modern city Urban trends in the developed world Urbanization in the developing world Cities and globalization 235 Global cities 235 Inequality in the global city 236 219 220 221 230 Governing cities in a global age 238 Conclusion: cities and global governance 243 Summary points 244 Further reading 245 Internet links 245 7 Social Interaction and Everyday Life 247 Why study daily life? 251 Non-verbal communication 252 The human face, gestures and emotions 252 Gender and the body 254 Detailed contents Embodiment and identities 255 The social rules of interaction 258 Shared understandings 258 'Interactionai vandalism' 258 Response cries 262 Face, body and speech in interaction 263 Encounters 263 Impression management 264 Personal space 270 Interaction in time and space 271 Clock time 271 The ordering of space and time 272 Everyday life in cultural and historical perspective 272 The social construction of reality: the sociological debate 273 Social interaction in cyberspace 275 Conclusion: the compulsion 01 proximity 276 Summary points 278 Further reading 279 Internet links 279 8 The Life-Course 281 Culture, society and child socialization 284 Theories of child development 284 Agencies of socialization 288 Gender socialization 291 Reactions of parents and adults 291 Gender learning 291 The sociological debate 292 The life-course 295 Childhood 296 The teenager and youth culture 299 Young adulthood 300 Mature adulthood 300 Later life 301 Ageing 302 The greying of human societies 303 How do people age? 305 Growing old: competing sociological explanations 308 Aspects of ageing 309 The politics of ageing 314 Death, dying and bereavement 320 The sociology of death and dying Theorizing death in modern societies Recent developments 321 Summary points 324 Further reading 325 Internet links 325 320 320 DETAILED CONTENTS 9 Families and Intimate Relationships 327 Basic concepts 331 The family in historical context 332 The development of family life 333 The way we never were? Myths of the traditional family 333 Families in global context 335 Families and intimate relationships 338 Development and diversity in family patterns 339 Inequality within the family 341 Intimate violence 346 Divorce and separation 350 Changing attitudes to family life 358 New partnerships, step-families and kin relations 360 Alternatives to traditional marriage and family life 363 Theoretical perspectives on fa~ilies and relationships 369 Functionalism 369 Feminist approaches 369 Theorizing the transformation of love and intimacy 371 Conclusion: the debate about family values 376 Summary points Further reading Internet links 378 380 381 10 Health, Illness and Disability 383 The sociology of the body 386 The sociology of health and illness 389 Sociological perspectives on medicine Medicine and health in a changing world 391 399 HIV and AIDS in global perspective 399 Sociological perspectives on health and illness 402 The social basis of health 407 Class and health 407 Gender and health 411 Ethnicity and health 413 Health and social cohesion 414 The sociology of disability 415 The individual model of disability 416 The social model of disability 416 Disability, law and public policy 420 Disability around the world 423 Summary points 424 Further reading 426 Internet links 427 Detailed contents 11 Stratification and Social Class 429 Systems of stratification 432 Slavery 434 Caste 434 Estates 437 Class 437 Theories of class and stratification 438 Karl Marx's theory of class conflict 438 MaxWeber: class, status and party 440 Erik Olin Wright's theory of class 442 Measuring class 443 Evaluating Goldthorpe's class scheme 443 Contemporary class divisions in the developed world 449 The question ofthe upper class 449 The growing middle class 451 The changing working class 453 . Is there an underc1ass? 454 Class and lifestyles 458 Gender and stratification 460 Social mobility 463 Comparative mobility studies 463 Downward mobility 466 Social mobility in Britain 466 Gender and social mobility 468 A meritocratic Britain? 469 Conclusion: the continuing significance of social class 470 Summary points 470 Further reading 472 Internet links 473 12 Poverty, Social Exclusion andWelfare 475 Poverty 480 What is poverty? 480 Measuring poverty 484 Who are the poor? 491 Explaining poverty 494 Poverty and social mobility 496 Social exclusion 498 What is social exclusion? Examples of social exclusion Crime and social exclusion 498 501 505 The welfare state 507 Theories of the welfare state 507 The welfare state in the UK 509 Poverty and welfare in a changing world 517 Summary points 517 Further reading 518 Internet links 519 DETAILED CONTENTS 13 Global Inequality 521 Global economic inequality 527 High-income countries 529 Middle-income countries 529 Low-income countries 530 Is global economic inequality increasing? 530 Unequal life chances 532 Health 533 Hunger, malnutrition and famine 534 Education, literacy and child labour 537 Can poor countries become rich? 542 Theories of development 548 Evaluating theories of development 555 International organizations and global inequality 556 Global economic inequality in a changing world 559 World population growth and global inequality 564 Population analysis: demography 564 Dynamics of population change 565 The demographic transition 568 The prospects for twenty-first-century equality 568 Summary points Further reading Internet links 571 573 573 14 Sexuality and Gender 575 Human sexuality 578 Biology and sexual behaviour 578 Forms of sexuality 579 Sexual orientation 580 Sexuality, religion and morality 582 Homosexuality 584 Researching sexuality 591 Prostitution and 'sex work' 596 Prostitution 596 Sex work 597 The global sex industry 599 Gender 600 Gender and biology: natural differences? 601 Gender socialization 602 Reproductive technologies 603 The social construction of gender and sex 607 Masculinities and gender relations 608 The gender order 609 Theories of gender inequality 614 Functionalist approaches 614 Feminist approaches 615 Women's movements 621 Detailed contents Gender and globalization 622 Summary points 623 Further reading 624 Internet links 625 15 Race, Ethnicity and Migration 627 Key concepts 631 Race Ethnicity 631 633 Minority groups 635 Prejudice and discrimination 636 What is racism? 637 From 'old' to 'new' forms of racism' 639 Sociological theories of racism 641 Ethnic integration, diversity and conflict 643 Models of ethnic integration 643 . Ethnic diversity 646 Ethnic minorities in labour markets 647 Housing 651 The criminal justice system 652 Ethnic conflict 653 Migration in a global age 654 Migration and the decline of empire: Britain since the 19605 659 Migration and the European Union 663 Migration and ethnic relations 665 Globalization and migration 665 Global diasporas 667 Conclusion 669 Summary points 670 Further reading 671 Internet links 671 16 Religion 673 The sociological study of religion 677 What is religion? 677 Religion in classical sociological theory 679 Religions in the real world 685 Totemism and animism 685 )udaism, Christianity and Islam 685 The religions of the Far East 686 Religious organizations 688 Christianity. gender and sexuality 693 Secularization and religious revival 695 Secularization 695 Religion in Europe 699 Religion in the United States 702 Evaluating the secularization thesis 706 DETAILED CONTENTS Religious fundamentalism 709 Conclusion 716 Summary points 716 Further reading 718 Internet links 719 17 The Media 721 Media in a global age 725 The digital revolution 726 The Internet and the World Wide Web 726 Film 731 Television 732 Music 738 Newspapers 741 Theorizing the media 744 Functionalism 744 Conflict theories 744 Symbolic interactionism 752 Postmodern theory 755 Audiences and media representations 757 Audience studies 757 Representing ciass, gender, ethnicity and disabiliry 759 Controlling the global media 762 Media imperialism? 764 Ownership of media 'supercompanies' 766 Political control 770 Resistance and alternatives to the global media 772 Conclusion 774 Summary points 775 Further reading 776 Internet links 777 18 Organizations and Networks 779 Organizations 783 Organizations as bureaucracies 784 The physical setting of organizations 791 Transnationalorganizations 796 Economic organizations 798 Beyond bureaucracy? 805 Organizational change: the Japanese model 807 Transforming management practices 808 Studying management practices 811 The study of networks 815 Social networks 815 Networks and information technology 816 Social capital: the ties that bind 817 New social ties? 820 Detailed contents Conclusion 823 Summary points 824 Further reading 826 Internet links 827 19 Education 829 Theorizing the significance of education 833 Education as socialization 834 Schooling for capitalism 836 The hidden curriculum 837 Education and cultural reproduction 839 Social divisions and education 848 The IQ debate in education 849 Gender and schooling 853 Ethnicity and education 860 Education in global context 864 Global primary school enrolment Literacy and illiteracy 868 The changing face of education Technology in the classroom E-universities 875 The future of education Conclusion Summary points Further reading Internet links 879 880 881 881 865 870 873 877 20 Work and Economic Life 883 What is work? 886 Transforming the social organization of work 891 Taylorism and Fordism 892 Globalization and post-Fordism 894 The changing nature of work and working 898 Trade-unionism in decline? 899 Gender and the 'feminization of work' 902 Changes in the domestic division of labour 909 Automation and the 'skills' debate 911 The end of the career for life and the rise of the portfolio worker 920 Job insecurity, unemployment and the social significance of work 921 The social significance of work 921 The rise in job insecurity 924 Unemployment 926 Conclusion: the 'corrosion of character'? 931 Summary points 932 Further reading 933 Internet links 933 DETAILED CONTENTS 21 Crime and Deviance 935 The basic concepts 939 Explaining crime and deviance: sociological theories 940 Functionalist theories 941 Interactionist theory 945 Conflict theories and the 'new criminology' 949 Control theories 951 Theoretical conclusions 955 Patterns of crime in the United Kingdom 956 Crime and crime statistics 957 Victims and perpetrators of crime 960 Gender, sexuality and crime 960 Youth and crime 965 White-coUar crime 967 Crime in global context 970 Organized crime 970 Cybercrime 973 Prisons and punishment 974 Conclusion: deviance, crime and social order 979 Summary points 98] Further reading 982 Internet links 983 22 Politics, Government and Social Movements 985 Basic concepts in political sociology 988 Politics, government and the state 988 Power 989 Authoritarianism and democracy 992 The global spread of democracy 995 The faU of communism 995 Democratization and it discontents 998 Old and new party politics 1003 Global governance 1007 Social movements and social change 1010 What are social movements? 1010 Theories of social movements 1011 Globalization and the 'social movement society' 1021 Conclusion 1025 Summary points 1025 Further reading 1027 Internet links 1027 23 Nations, War and Terrorism 1029 Nations and nationalism 1034 Nationalism and modern society 1035 Nations without states 1036 Detailed contents xvii National minorities and the European Union 1040 Nations and nationalism in developing countries 1040 The nation-state, national identities and globalization 1042 Human conflict, war and genocide 1045 Theorizing war and genocide 1045 The changing nature of war 1046 Old and new wars 1049 Terrorism 1055 What is terrorism? 1055 Old and new terrorism 1057 War and terrorism in a global age 1062 Summary points 1063 Further reading 1064 Internet links 1064 References 1065 Glossary 1111 Illustration credits 1138 fndex 1140 Preface to the sixth edition It is now 20 years since the first edition of Sociology was published. In 1989, when the book first came out, some readers ofthe current edition weren't even born. That year was a time of dramatic social change, with the end of the Cold War and the opening up of former Soviet bloc countries. Events such as the Tiananmen Square massacre in China made headlines worldwide. Throughout the 1980s, more and more people in the developed world had acquired luxury goods such as microwaves and video rrcorders. Yet at that time the current pervasiveness ofthe Internet, email and other digital media in everyday life was unimaginable. I dictated much of the first edition onto tape, and it was then typed up on a word processor, a kind of electronic typewriter. Overthe years, consecutive editions have mapped out the myriad changes we have experienced in the social world, as well as sociologists' attempts to understand them. This sixth edition has been carefully revised to make sure it takes account of recent global developments and new ideas in sociology. You'll see that there is now a chapter dedicated to war and terrorism, as well as substantive new material in the chapters on the media, education, theoretical thinking, politics and government. Other revisions have been made throughout. I have all the previous editions of Sociology on my shelves at home, as well as copies in the mUltiple languages into which the book has been translated. What all previous editions of this book have in common is their attempt to help readers see the value of thinking sociologically. I hope this sixth edition will again serve that purpose. Students sometimes find sociological ideas and evidence difficult to understand. In part, I think that's because sociology demands a concerted attempt to set aside personal beliefs and opinions when analysing research findings and theories. In this sense, thinking sociologically involves a profound intellectual challenge. Most people who study sociology are changed by the experience. The reason is that sociology offers a different perspective on the world from that which most people have when they start out in the subject. Sociology helps us look beyond the immediate contexts ofour lives and so helps us understand the causes ofour own actions better. Sociology can also help us change the world for the better. I hope you enjoy the book. xix xx Acknowledgements !WOUld like to thank everyone who has helped in the preparation of this book in all six of its editions. This sixth edition has benefited enormously from the involvement ofPhilip W. Sutton, a sociologist with 17 years' experience of teaching at university level. Philip's contribution to this edition has helped to ensure that the book is fully up to date with the ways in which sociology is currently being taught. His longstanding experience of designing and delivering introductory sociology courses has given this edition a fresh, interactive dimension. This revision also owes much to the research skills of Ann P. Love, who worked tirelessly to collect contemporary materials across the varied sociological subjects. I am greatly indebted to her. I should like to thank all those who read draft chapters and made constructive suggestions for improvement. Thanks are also owed to the worldwide readers of the fifth edition who wrote to tell me about their experiences of using the book. A! Polity, I thank the following in particular: John Thompson, David Held, Gill Motley, Neil de Cort and Breffni O'Connor. Emma Longstaff and Jonathan Skerrett have managed the project from startlo finish and have been marvellous to work with. The book owes much to Emma's clear vision and constructive advice, even - perhaps especially - in occasional periods ofadversity. Finally, as always, I should like to thank Alena Ledeneva for her constant help and encour- agement. AG About this book One of the things that's so exciting about sociology is its constant engagement with the ever-changing social world. Events we find hard to make sense of, or that frighten us - such as climate change or terrorism - are all of interest to sociologists. My aim in this sixth edition, as in the previous five, has been to capture the sense ofexcitement that pervades the very best ofsociology, and to inspire a new generation ofsociologists. The book was written in the firm belief that sociology has a key role to play in modern intellectual culture and a central place in the social sciences. It does not try to introduce overly sophisticated notions nor does it make a virtue of sociological jargon. Nevertheless, findings drawn from the cutting edge of the discipline are incorporated throughout, along with contemporary issues and data. My own work is, of course, included across the book and I have referred to it in the first person so that readers are clearwhen Iam writing about my own contributions to the field. I have also included the views of my critics where necessary. I hope it is not a partisan treatment; as usual I endeavoured to cover the major perspectives in sociology and the major findings of contemporary research in an even-handed, though not indiscriminate, way. Major themes The book is constructed around a number of basic themes, each ofwhich helps to give the work a distinctive character. One central theme is that of social change. Sociology was born of the transformations that wrenched the industrializing social order of the West away from the ways of life characteristic of preceding societies. The world created by these changes is the primary concern of sociological analysis. The pace of social change has continued to accelerate, and it is possihle that we stand on the threshold of transitions as significant as those that occurred in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Sociology has prime responsibility for charting the transformations that have taken place in the past and for grasping the major lines of development taking place today. Asecond, connected, theme ofthe book is the globalizingafsociallife. For too long, sociology has been dominated by the view that societies can be studied as independent entities. But even in the past, societies never really existed in isolation. In the contemporary world, we can see a clear acceleration in processes of global integration. The emphasis on globalization also connects closely with the weight given to the interdependence ofthe industrialized and developing worlds today. The book's first edition, published in 1989, broke new ground in discussing the impact of globalization, an examination of which was only just beginning, even in the more technical areas of the discipline. Since then the xxi ABOUT THIS BOOK xxii debate about globalization has intensified, while globalization itself has advanced much further,as have some ofthe changes in information technology associated with it. Third, the book adopts a strongly comparative stance. Sociology cannot be taught solely by understanding the institutions ofone particular society and the discussions contain a rich variety of materials drawn from across the world.The book continues to cover developing countries as well as the industrialized ones and in this way, it contributes to the globalization of sociology. Given the close connections that now mesh societies across the world with one another, and the virtual disappearance of traditional social systems, sociology and anthropology are becoming increasingly indistinguishable. A fourth theme is the necessity of taking an historical approach to sociology. This involves more than just filling in the historical context within which events occur. One of the most important developments in sociology over the past few years has been an increasing emphasis on historical analysis. This should be understood not solelyas applying a sociolog!cal outlook to the past, but as a way ofcontributing to our understanding of institutions in the present. Recent work in historical sociology is discussed throughout and provides a framework for the interpretations offered within most of the chapters. Fifth, particular attention is given throughout the text to issues ofgender.The study of gender is ordinarily regarded as a specific field within sociology as a whole - and this volume contains one chapter that specifically explores thinking and research on the subject. However, questions about gender relations are so fundamental to sociological analysis today that they cannot simply be considered a subdivision. Thus, many chapters contain sections concerned with issues of gender. Asixth theme is the micro and macro link. In many places in the book, I show that interaction in micro-level contexts affects larger social processes and that such macro-level processes influence our day-to-day lives.Social situations can be better understood by analysing them at both the micro and macro levels. Afinal theme is the relation between the social and the personal. Sociological thinking is a vital help to self-understanding, which in turn can be focused back on an improved understanding of the social world. Studying sociology should be a liberating experience that enlarges our sympathies and imagination, opens up new perspectives on the sources ofour own behaviour and creates an awareness of cultural settings different from our own. In so far as SOCiological ideas challenge dogma, teach the appreciation ofcultural variety and provide insights into the working of social institutions, the practice of SOCiology enhances the possibilities of human freedom. New features The sixth edition incorporates a range of new features, all designed to help make the book more engaging, support students' learning, and to stretch their sociological imaginations. First, throughout the book you'll now find Classic Studies boxes. These are intended to introduce students to some of sociology's most influential research. [ have tried to pick examples which have had a big impact in the field, and which will engage or provoke readers. The selections are not About this book xxiii definitive, exhaustive or comprehensive, but are illustrative of key problems or concerns. The Classic Studies may date from the early days of sociology or be relatively recent, as sheer age does not define them. Instead, the studies are chosen for the deep-seated influence they've had on subsequent research, be it methodologically, theoretically, empirically, or a mixture of these. Above all, I have tried to choose examples that will inspire students, and help them to appreciate the many possibilities opened up by thinking sociologically. Second, the interactivity of the text has been increased to reflect the growing focus in education on student-centred learning. In all the chapters you'll find a series of new boxes labeled Thinking Critically. These can be seen as 'stopping off' points where the reader is encouraged to reflect on what they've been reading, before coming back to pick up the thread. The notion of 'critical' thinking may seem irrelevant to those who see sociology as an inherently critical discipline. However, the questions posed often require the reader to be critical not ortly ofpolitical dogma or social practices, but also ofsociology and sociological debates themselves. In this sense, 'thinking critically' serves as a useful reminder that a constantly critical approach extends to all ideas - including my own and the so-called 'classics' I discussed earlier! I strongly recommend that readers work through these boxes as part and parcel ofgetting the most from the book. Third, many more boxed sections have been included. Numerous lecturers and students have found these very helpful in previous editions and have requested more. To this end, in addition to the Classic Studies already mentioned, the book now features two more styles of box. Global Society boxes reflect the increasingly global frame ofreference within which sociologists work, and will hopefully encourage students to orientate themselves globally when thinking of even the most apparently local or domestic issues. Boxes labelled Using your Sociological Imagination often contain quirky or arresting material, designed to illustrate or expand themes found in the main body of the text.They finish with a series of questions on the material featured, providing another opportunity to stimulate students' critical thinking. In addition, the number of terms in the glossary has been expanded. Terms included in the glossary are highlighted in a different colour in the text. Further readings are annotated for the first time in this edition, so readers can make a more informed choice about what they choose to read. At the end ofeach chapter Summary points bring readers back to the main points of each chapter - a way ofchecking understanding, and to reinforce the key messages ofeach chapter. Internet links have been included again, but this time with explicit guidance on why each site is being recommended. In addition to the Internet links, the book is also designed to be used in conjunction with the extensive material on its own website: www.polity.co.uk/ giddens. Both lecturers and students will find a wealth ofresources to aid further research into the themes explored throughout the book, and to support students' learning. xxiH Anthony Giddens • Sociology 6th edition ~,_ ':S.',~ o About Ordering Sample Chapter lecturer Resources Student Resources 8 10g Home 'M!! want thIS s1le \0 help you make tne most of SOCIOlogy The sue has two main faces You C1in always fine! tflI:> spedally wnt!en student anclleeturef resoon:es UWIQ tne tabs at the top of eem page These ntgh.qIJahty supplementary matena15 have been wnltet'l by !!lIper!ence academICS and IOdude assqnem gooes qUlu~ aoo SUTlmar.es for students, arxllesson plans and teac.nng m81enals lor tecl:urers You can IllSO make use of the $lte 5 M'N InteractM' leahJ(es 5IJdl as the bIog forums anc feeds from olhel' SItes where you can keeo vp-tO-datt'_ WlIFI the I8les\ news and upd.ste5 from a soooIoglC8ll potfl\ cl >r.ew and maKe your own VOIce t1ea(d1 From tme to lime. we'" also have 'ask an expert sesstons where you can leave queStions lor an ~rt In a partlCUarheld of soerology YD,l can Md out more aDOtA: 81 0/ Itlese leatlRs by dtdung me About tab al !he lop ol this page, Of explore for yourself. latest Updated Material Comtntlnl on Mumbal ..ni cks Posted by lhlMblg 0211212008 SI 16.24 I trllll!. It JUst goes to show I1CJrooI mucn leflOOStn has become global because Ihey were foolling for 8f1U$h and Amencan people m the Taj hOtel arv;S 11\0$1 at the tefTOl'lSts wereo I lrom lrQa II'S 6eftmety evidMc.e 10( how nalJonai oorders are !eM and less mportanl Recent Slogs Mumbal attilcks Posted 27111J2008111 10.51 7comme!'lts How will the cuI iflVAT affect Christmas? Posled25o'I1i2008al 1313 2 comment! Welcome to Ihe Gfddens 6 blog and foruml PoSted 2(lI1112OO8 81 10.19 Visit the interactive website that accompanies this book at www.politybooks.com/giddens6 Feeds and recent links Renac. 19bellng and Delllsnce Posted 0)' Sally Raskoff 0411212008 From dglalmeChaalldsooetv com Tt.e People Forme11y Known as Employers Posted by M3'k Deut:e 281100008 where you'll find specially written materials for students and lecturers, including assignment guides, quizzes and useful links, lesson plans and teaching resources, The site also features regularly updated content and blogs, so don't miss out on the opportunity to put across your questions in the 'ask an expert' sessions and to make your voice heard. xxiv Organization of the book There is not much abstract discussion of sociological concepts in the book. Instead, I have sought to illustrate ideas, concepts and theories by means of concrete examples. While these are usually taken from sociological research, I have quite often used material from other sources (such as newspaper reports) for illustrative purposes. I have tried to keep the writing style as simple and direct as possible, whilst also endeavouring to make the book a good read. The overall aim is to create a fairly seamless n, . ~ tt V' Figure 4.2 Civilizations in the ancient world A central feature of industrial societies today is that a large majority of the employed population work in factories. offices or shops rather than in agriculture (as we saw in table 4.2). And over 90 per cent of people live in towns and cities, where most jobs are to be found and new job opportunities are created. The largest cities are vastly greater in size than the urban settlements found in traditional civilizations. In the cities, social life becomes more impersonal and anonymous than before and many of our day-to-day encounters are with strangers rather than with individuals known to us. Large-scale organizations, such as business corporations or government agencies, come to influence the lives ofvirtually everyone. The role of cities in the new global order is discussed in chapter 6, 'Cities and Urban Life'. A further feature of modern societies concerns their political systems. which are more developed and intensive than forms of government in traditional states. In tradii;! ~~ tional civilizations, the political authorities (monarchs and emperors) had little direct influence on the customs and habits ofmost of their subjects, who lived in fairly selfcontained local villages. With industrialization, transportation and communication became much more rapid, making for a more integrated 'national' community. The industrial societies were the first nation-states to come into existence. Nation-states are political communities, divided from each other by clearly delimited borders rather than the vague frontier areas that used to separate traditional states. National governments have extensive powers over many aspects of citizens' lives, framing laws that apply to all those living within their borders. Virtually all societies in the world today are nation-states. The application of industrial technology has by no means been limited to peaceful processes of economic development. From the earliest phases of industrialization, modern production processes have been put to military use and this has radically altered ways of waging war, creating weaponry and modes of military organization much more advanced than those of non-industrial cultures. Together, superior economic strength, political cohesion and military superiority account for the seemingly irresistible spread of Western ways of life across the world over the past two centuries. Once again. as we noted in our discussion of older types of society, we have to acknowledge that the globalization process has very often been characterized by violence and conquest. Issues of war and violence are taken up in chapter 23.'Nations, Waz and Terrorism'. THINKING CRITICALLY Take a few moments to reflect on just how different industrialized, modern societies are from previous types.What three features would you pick out as being the most significant ones that mark them out as very different types, and why? Mane once forecast that the industrialized countries showed to the non-industrialized ones a picture of their own future. In what ways has he been proved right, and how might it be argued that in important respects, he was wrong? Global development From the seventeenth to the early twentieth century, the Western countries established colonies in numerous areas that were previously occupied by traditional societies, using their superior military strength where necessary. Although virtually all of these colonies have now attained their independence, the policy of colonialism was central to shaping the social map ofthe globe as we know it today (colonialism was discussed in chapter I in relation to the coffee trade). In some regions, such as North America, Australia and New Zealand, which were only thinly populated by hunting and gathering communities, Europeans became the majority population. In other areas, including much ofAsia, Africa and South America, local popuiations remained in the majority. Societies of the first of these types, including the United States, have become industrialized and are often referred to as developed societies. Those in the second category are mostly at a much lower level of industrial development and are often referred to as developing societies, or the developing world. Such societies include China, India, most of the African countries (such as Nigeria, Ghana and Algeria) and those in South America (for example, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela). Since many of these societies are situated south of the United States and Europe, they are sometimes referred to collectively as the South and contrasted to the wealthier, industrialized North. This is a generalization, though, and as countries of the global south become industrialized, this simple division of the world becomes less and less accurate. You may often hear developing countries referred to as part of the Third World. The term Third World was originally part of a contrast drawn between three main types of society found in the early twentieth century. First World countries were (and are) the industrialized states of Europe, the United States, Canada, Greenland, Australasia (Australia and New Zealand), South Africa and Japan. Nearly all First World societies have multiparty, parliamentary systems of government. SecondWorld societies meant the communist countries of what was then the Soviet Union (USSR) and Eastern Europe, including, for example, Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany and Hungary. Second World societies had centrally planned economies, which allowed little room for private property or competitive economic enterprise. They were also oneparty states: the Communist Party dominated both the political and economic systems. For some 75 years, world history was affected by a global rivalry known as the Cold War, between the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries on the one Life in Russia has changed dramatically after the fall of commW1ism Older people have sometimes found it chlficult to adapt,which has led to nostalgia for former commW1ist leaders such as Stalin and Lemn. hand and the capitalistic societies of the West and Japan on the other. Today that rivalry is over. With the ending of the Cold War and the disintegration of communism in the former USSR and Eastern Europe, the Second World has effectively disappeared. Even though the Three Worlds model is still sometimes used in sociology textbooks, today it has outlived whatever usefulness it might once have had as a way of describing the countries oftheworld. For one thing, the Second World of socialist and communist countries no longer exists and even exceptions such as China are rapidly adopting capitalist economies. It can also be argued that the ranking of First, Second and Third Worlds always reflected a value judgement, in which 'first' means 'best' and 'third' means 'worst'. It is therefore best avoided. The developing world Many developing societies are in areas that underwent colonial rule in Asia, Africa and South America. A few colonized areas gained independence early, like Haiti, which became the first autonomous black republic in January 1804. The Spanish colonies in South America acquired their freedom in 1810, while Brazil broke away from Portuguese rule in 1822. However, most nations in the developing world have become independent states only since the Second World War, often following bloody anti-colonial struggles. Examples include GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHANGING WORLD India, a range of other Asian countries (like Burma, Malaysia and Singapore) and countries in Africa (including, for example, Kenya, Nigeria, Zaire, Tanzania and Algeria) . While tbey may include peoples living in traditional fashion, developing countries are very different from earlier forms oftraditional societies. Their political systems are modelled on systems that were first established in the societies of the West - that is to say, they are nation-states. While most ofthe population still live in rural areas, many of these societies are experiencing a rapid process of urban development. The growth of cities in the developing world is discussed in chapter 6, 'Cities and Urban Life'. Although agriculture remains the main economic activity, crops are now often produced for sale in world markets rather than for local consumption. Developing countries are not merely societies that have 'lagged behind' the more industrialized areas. They have been in large part created by contact with Western industrialism, which has undermined earlier, more traditional systems. Conditions in some of the most impoverished of these societies have deteriorated rather than improved over more recent years. There are still around one billion people living on the equivalent ofless than one US dollar a day. Global poverty is discussed briefly in chapter 12, 'Poverty, Social Exclusion and Welfare', and in more detail in chapter 13, 'Global Inequality'. The world's poor are concentrated particularly in South and East Asia and in Africa and Latin America, although there are some important differences between these regions. For example, poverty levels in East Asia and the Pacific have declined over the past decade, while they have risen in the nations of sub-Saharan Africa. During the 1990s, the number of people living on less than one dollar per day in this region has grown from 241 million to 315 million (World Bank 2004). There have also been significant increases in poverty in parts of South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. Many of the world's poorest countries also suffer from a serious debt crisis. Payments of interest on loans from foreign lenders can often amount to more than governments' investments in health, welfare and education. Newly industrializing countries While the majority of developing countries are not as economically developed as the societies of the West, some have successfully embarked on a process of industrialization. These countries are sometimes referred to as newly industrializing countries (NICs)' including Brazil and Mexico in LatinAmerica and Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan in East Asia. The rates of economic growth of the most successful NICs, such as those in East Asia, are several times those of the Western industrial economies. No developing country figured among the top 30 exporters in the world in 1968, but 25 years later South Korea was in the top 15. The EastAsian NICs have shown the most sustained levels of economic prosperity. They are investing abroad as well as promoting growth at home. South Korea's production of steel has doubled in the last decade and its shipbuilding and electronics industries are among the world's leaders. Singapore is becoming the major financial and commercial centre of Southeast Asia. Taiwan is an important presence in the manufacturing and electronics industries. All these changes in the NICs have directly affected countries such as the United States, whose share of global steel production, for example, has dropped significantly over the past 30 years.Types ofsociety in the modern world are summarized in table 4.4. Social change We saw at the start of this chapter how the modern world is characterized by modes of Table 4.4 Societies in the modern world Type FirstWorld SecondWorld Developing Newly societies societies societies ('Third industrializing World societies') societies (NICs) Period of Eighteenth Early tvventieth Eighteenth century 1970s to the existence century to the century (Russian (mostly as present. present. Revolution of 1917 colonized areas) to early 1990s). to the present. Characteristics Based on Based on industry, Majority ofthe Former developing industrial but the economic population work societies now production and system is centrally in agriculture, based on generally free planned. using traditional industrial enterprise. Small proportion of methods of production and Majority of the population production, generally free people live in work in Some agricultural enterprise. towns and agriculture; produce sold on Majority ofpeople cities:a few most live in towns world markets. live in towns and work in rural and cities. Some have free cities,a few work agricultural Major class enterprise in agricultural pursuits. inequalities persist. systems, while pursuits. Major class Distinct political others are Major class inequalities, comrmmities or centrally planned. inequalities,more though less nation-states. Distinct political pronounced than pronounced Until 1989, communities or FirstWorld than in composed of the nation-states, societies. traditional Soviet Union and including China, Average per capita states. Eastern Europe, India and most income Distinct political but social and African and South considerably less communities or political changes American nations than FirstWorld nation-states, began to transform societies. including the them into free Include Hong nations ofWest, enterprise Kong,South Japan, Australia economic systems, Korea, Singapore, and New according to the Taiwan, Brazil and Zealand. model of First Mexico. VVorld societies. life and social institutions that are radically different from those of even the recent past. Social change is difficult to define, because there is a sense in which everything changes, all of the time. Every day is a new day; every moment is a new instant in time. The Greek philosopher Heraclitus pointed out that a person cannot step into the sam e river twice. On the second occasion, the river is different, since water has flowed along it and the person has changed in subtle ways too. While this observation is in a sense correct, we do of course normally want to say that it is the same river and the same person stepping into it on the two occasions. There is sufficient continuity in the shape or form of the river and in the physique and personality ofthe person with wet feet to say that each remains 'the same' through the changes that occur. Given this problem, how do sociologists account for the processes of change that have transformed the way humans lived? Identifying significant change involves showing how far there are alterations in the underlying structure of an object or situation over a period oftime. In the case of human societies, to decide how far and in what ways a system is in a process ofchange we have to show to what degree there is any modification of basic institutions during a specific period. All accounts of social change also involve showing what remains stable, as a baseline against which to measure alterations. The nineteenth-century sociologist, Auguste Comte, once described this as the study ofsocial dynamics (change) and social statics (stability). Even in the rapidly moving world of today there are still continuities with the distant past. Major religious systems, for example, such as Christianity or Islam, retain their ties with ideas and practices initiated some 2,000 years ago. Yet most institutions in modern societies clearly change much more rapidly than did institutions of the traditional world. Influences on social change Over the past 200 years, sociologists and other social theorists have tried to develop a grand theory that explains the nature of social change. But no single factor theory could account for the diversity of human social development, from hunting and gathering and pastoral societies to traditional civilizations, and finally to the highly complex social systems of today. We can, however, identify the main factors that have consistently influenced patterns of social change: cultural factors, the physical environmentand political organization. Culturalfactors The first main influence on social change consists of cultural factors, which include the effects of religion, communication systems and leadership. Religion may be either a conservative or an innovative force in social life (see chapter 16, 'Religion'). Some forms of religious belief and practice have acted as a brake on change, emphasizing above all the need to adhere to traditional values and rituals. Yet, as Max Weber emphasized, religious convictions frequently play a mobilizing role in pressures for social change. Aparticularlyimportant cultural influence that affects the character and pace of change is the nature ofcommunication systems. The invention ofwriting, for instance, allowed for the keeping of records, making possible increased control of material resources and the development of large-scale organizations. In addition, writing altered people's perception of the relation between past, present and future. Societies that write keep a record of past events and know themselves to have a history. Understanding history can develop a sense of the overall movement or line of development a society is following and people can then actively seek to promote it further. With the advent of the Internet, communication has become much faster and distance is less of an obstacle. It has also generated a more effective sense of global sociery than previously, which is one important aspect of globalization. Under the general heading of cultural factors, we should also place leadership. Individual leaders have had an enormous influence in world history. We have only to think of great religious figures (like Jesus), political and military leaders (like Juiius Caesar) or innovators in science and philosophy (like Isaac Newton) to see that this is the case. A leader capable of pursuing dynamic policies and generating a mass following or radically altering pre-existing modes of thought can overturn a previously established order. The classical sociologist Max Weber examined the role of charismatic leadership in social change. Weber's conception of leadership is discussed in chapter 16,'Religion', However, individuals can only reach positions of leadership and become effective if favourable social conditions exist. Adolf Hitler rose to power in Germany in the 1930s, for instance, partly as a result of the tensions and crises that beset the country at that time, which prompted people to look Gandhi - shown here on an Indian banknote - fits Weber's concept of a charismatic leader. He helped bring about independence for India from British rule. for simple solutions. Ifthose circumstances had not existed, he would probably have remained an obscure figure within a minor political faction. The same was true at a later date of Mahatma Gandhi, the famous pacifist leader in India during the period after the Second World War. Gandhi was able to be effective in securing his country's independence from Britain because the war and other events had unsettled the existing colonial institutions in India. The physical environment The physical environment has an effect on the development of human social organization. This is clearest in more extreme environmental conditions, where people must organize their ways of life in relation to weather conditions. Inhabitants of polar regions necessarily develop habits and practices different from those living in subtropical areas. People who live in Naska, where the winters are long and cold, tend to follow different patterns of social life from people who live in the much warmer Mediterranean countries. Naskans spend more of their lives indoors and, except for the short summer period, plan outdoor activities very carefully, given the inhospitable environment in which they live. Less extreme physical conditions can also affect society. The native population of Australia has never stopped being hunters and gatherers, since the continent contained hardly any indigenous plants suitable for regular cultivation, or animals that could be domesticated to develop pastoral production. The world's early civilizations mostly originated in areas that contained rich agricultural land - for instance, in river deltas. The ease ofcommunications across land and the availability of sea routes are also important: societies cut off from others by mountain ranges, impassable jungles or deserts Global Society 4.1 Humans and the domestication of fire Over the course of human history, human beings gradually learned how to exert more control over the natural environment and were able to pass on this useful knowledge to geographically distant groups and to their own younger generations. In Fire and CivilIzabon (1992), Dutch sociologist Johan Goudsblom (1932- ) argues that an especially significant development in early human development was the discovery of fire and the invention oftechniques for making, managing and keeping it under control. Human groups that learned how to make and use fire gained dominance over those that did not. Eventually all human societies were able to make and use fire.The domestication of fire also enabled human beings to dominate over other animal species. Goudsblom's developmental history of fire shows something ofthe way that human societies try to manipulate and manage the natural environment to their own advantage. In the process, though,there is also new pressure on societies to change their own social organization. From small domestic fires used for keeping warm and cooking food, all the way to modern central heating systems and large power plants,the gradual expansion of fire-making has necessitated more complex forms of social organization. When early humans learned how to make and manage small fires,they had to organize themselves to keep fires going, to monitor them and,at the same time, to stay safe. Much later, with the introduction of domesticated forms of fire into private homes, societies needed specialists in fire control, fire brigades and fire-prevention advisers. With the advent of large power-generating stations, it has become important to protect these, militarily if necessary, from potential attacks. Today, more people are more dependent on the easy availability and control of fire than ever before. Goudsblom notes one further consequence of the domestication of fire:the changing psychology of individuals. To be able to use fire, people had to overcome their previous fears of it,perhaps borne of seeing naturally occurring bush fires, lightning strikes or volcanoes.This was not an easy task. It meant controlling their fears and emotions long enough to be able to take advantage of the possible benefits of fire use. Such emotional control slowly came to be experienced as 'natural',so that people today hardly ever think about how long it has taken for humans to arrive at such high levels of emotional control over their feelings and deep-seated fears. However, even today, fires still cause harm: destroying homes, families and businesses. Fire is always threatening to escape the control of human societies, however firmly established that control might seem. The sociological lesson we can take from this study is that the relationship between human societies and the natural environment is an unavoidable two-way process: human societies try to exert control over the natural environment, but, as they do so, the natural environment also imposes certain constraints and requirements on them. often remain relativelyunchanged over long periods of time, becoming involved in pastoral or agricul· rural production. Although the natural environment is a physical constraint on socialchange, many human groups thrive and generate wealth even within the most inhospitable areas, This is true, for example, of Alaskans, who have been able to develop oil and mineral resources in spite of the harsh nature of their environment. Conversely, hunting and gathering cultures have frequently lived in highly fe rtile regions without Political organization A third factor that strongly influences social change is the type of political organization. In hunting and gathering societies, this influence is at a minimum, since there are no political authorities capable of mobilizing the community. In all other types of society, however, the existence of distinct political agencies - chiefs, lords, kings and governments - strongly affects the course of development a society takes. Political systems are not, as Marx argued, direct expressions of underlying economic organization; quite different types of political order may exist in societies that have similar production systems. For instance, some societies based on industrial capitalism have had authoritarian political systems (examples are Nazi Germany and South Africa under apartheid), while others are much more democratic (for example, the United States, Britain or Sweden). Military power played a fundamental part in the establishment of most traditional states; it influenced their subsequent survival or expansion in an equally basic way. But the connections between the level of production and military strength are again indirect. A ruler may choose to channel resources into building up the military, for example, even when this impoverishes most of the rest of the population - as has happened in North Korea under the rule of Kim 11 Sung and his son, Kim Jong n. Change in the modern period Why has the period of modernity seen such a tremendous acceleration of social change in the direction of globalization? This is a complex issue, but the key factors can be categorized along lines similar to those that have influenced social change throughout history, except that the impact of the physical environment can be subsumed within the overall importance of economic factors. Cultural influences Among the cultural factors affecting processes ofsocial change in modern times, both the development of science and the secularization of thought have contributed to the critical and innovative character of the modern outlook. We no longer assume that customs or habits are acceptable merely because they have the age-old authority of tradition. On the contrary, our ways of life increasingly require a 'rational' Globalization and the Changing World basis. For instance, a design for a hospital would not be based mainly on traditional tastes, but would consider its capability for serving the purpose of a hospital - effectively caring for the sick. In addition to howwe think, the contentof ideas has also changed. Ideals of self-betterment, freedom, equality and democratic participation are largely creations ofthe past two or three centuries. Such ideals have served to mobilize processes of social and political change, including revolutions. These ideas cannot be tied to tradition, but rather suggest the constant revision of ways of life in the pursuit of human betterment. Although they were initially developed in the West, such ideals have become genuinely universal in their application, promoting change in most regions of the world. Economic influences Of economic influences, the most farreaching is the impact of capitalism. Capitalism differs in a fundamental way from pre-existing production systems, because it involves the constant expansion of production and the ever-increasing accumulation of wealth. In traditional production systems, levels of production were fairly static, as they were geared to habitual, customary needs. Capitalism promotes the constant revision of the technology of production, a process into which science is increasingly drawn. The rate of technological innovation fostered in modern industry is vastly greater than in any previous type of economic order. Consider the current development of information technology. In recent decades, the power ofcomputers has increased many thousands of times over. A large computer in the 19605 was constructed using thousands of handmade connectors; an equivalent device today is not only much smaller, but requires just a handful of elements in an integrated circuit. The impact of science and technology on how we live may largely be driven by economic factors, but it also stretches beyond the economic sphere. Scien ce and technology both influence and are influenced by political and cultural factors. Scientific and technological development, for example, helped create modern forms of communication such as radio and television. As we have seen, such electronic forms of communication have produced changes in politics in recent years. Radio, television and the other electronic media have also come to shape howwe think and feel aboutthe world. Political influences The third major type ofinfluence on change in the modern period consists of political developments. The struggle between nations to expand their power, develop their wealth and triumph militarily over their competitors has been an energizing source of change over the past two or three centuries. Political change in traditional civilizations was normally confined to elites. One aristocratic family, for example, would replace another as rulers, while for the majority of the population life would go on relatively unchanged. This is not true of modern political systems, in which the activities of political leaders and government officials constantly affect the lives of the mass of the population. Both externally and internally, political decision-making promotes and directs social change far more than in previous times. Political development in the past two or three centuries has certainly influenced economic change as much as economic change has influenced politics. Governments now play a major role in stimulating (and sometimes retarding) rates of economic growth and in all industrial societies there is a high level of state intervention in production, the government being far and away the largest employer. Military power and war have also been of far-reaching importance. The military strength of the Western nations from the seventeenth century onwards allowed them to influence all quarters of the world - and provided an essential backing to the global spread ofWestern lifestyles. In the twentieth century, the effects of the two world wars have been profound: the devastation ofmany countries led to processes of rebuilding that brought about major institutional changes, for example in Germany and Japan after the Second World War. Even those states that were the victors - like the UK - experienced major internal changes as a result of the impact of the war on the economy. Globalization The concept of globalization has become widely used in debates in politics, business and the media over recent years. Thirty years ago, the term globalization was relatively unknown, but today it seems to be on the tip of everyone's tongue. Globalization refers to the fact that we all increasingly live in one world, so that individuals, groups and nations become ever more interdependent. As we saw in the chapter introduction, globalization in this sense has been occurring over a very long period of human history and is certainly not restricted to the contemporary world. Nevertheless, current debates are much more focused on the sheer pace and intensity of globalization over the past 30 years or so. It is this central idea of an intensification of the globalization process which marks this short period out as rather different, and it is this sense of the concept that will concern us here. The process of globalization is often portrayed solely as an economic phenomenon. Much is made of the role of transnational corporations whose massive operations now stretch across national borders, influencing global production processes and the international distribution of labour. Others point to the electronic integration of global financial markets and the enormous volume of global capital flows. Still others focus on the unprecedented scope of world trade, involving a much broader range of goods and services than ever before. Global Society 4.2 Sociology and globalization in the sixth edition The concept ofglobalization has had an enormous impact on the social sciences, including sociology Indeed,th'ere is hardly a sociological topic that has not been influenced by the emerging global frame of reference.For this reason,it is not possible to cover the impact ofglobalization on sociology in this single chapter. What we can offer here is a quick reference guide to the presence of global issues and globalization throughout the various chapters that make up the book. Chapter 1 - Introduction to globalization in sociology and illustrative example of coffee. Chapter 5 - The global risk society;global environmental issues (including global warming). Chapter 6 - Global cities and their governance. Chapter 8 - Global life expectancy and issues of ageing societies across the world. Chapter 9 - Families in a global context. Chapter 10 - Globalization and disability; HIV/AIDS in global context. Chapter I 1- Impact of globalization on stratification systems. Chapter 13 - Globalization, inequalities and unequal life chances across the world. Chapter 14 - Globalization and the gender order;the global sex industry Chapter 15 - The 'age of migration' and globalization. Chapter 16 - Religious belief and responses to globalization. Chapter 17 - Global mass media; the role ofnew technologies in processes of globalization. Chapter 18 - International organizations and global social networks. Chapter 19 - Education in global context; globalization and e-universities. Chapter 20 - Globalization,the workplace and employment trends. Chapter 21 - Globalization,organized crime and cybercrime. Chapter 22 - Global spread of democracy; globalization and social movements. Chapter 23 - Terrorism and globalization; old and new wars. Although economic forces are an integral part of globalization, it would be wrong to suggest that they alone produce it. The coming together of political, social, cultural and economic factors creates contemporary globalization. Factors contributing to globalization Intensified globalization has been driven forward above all by the development of information and communication technologies that have intensified the speed and scope ofinteraction between people all over the world. As a simple example, think of the last football World Cup. Because of global television links, some matches are now watched by billions of people across the world. The rise ofinformation and communications technology The explosion in global communications has been facilitated by a number of important advances in technology and the world's telecommunications infrastructure. In the post-SecondWorldWar era, there has been a profound transformation in the scope and intensity of telecommunications flows. Traditional telephonic communication, which depended on analogue signals sent through wires and cables with the help of mechanical crossbar switching, has been replaced by integrated systems in which vast amounts of inform ation are compressed and transferred digitally. Cable technology has become more efficient and less expensive; the development of fibre· optic cables has dramatically expanded the number ofchannels that can be carried. The earliest transatlantic cables laid in the 1950s were capable of carrying fewer than Classic Studies 4.1 Immanuel Wallerstein on the modern world-system The research problem Many students come to sociology to find answers to the big questions of social life. For example, why are some countries rich and others desperately poor? How have some previously poor countries managed to develop to become relatively wealthy; while others have not? Such questions concerning global inequalities and economic development underpin the work ofthe American historical sociologist,Immanuel Wallerstein (1930- ). In addressing these issues,Wallerstein also sought to take forward Marxist theories of social change in a global age. In 1976 he helped to found the Femand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies,Historical Systems and Civilizations at Binghamton University; NewYork, which has become a focus for his world-system research. Wallerstein's explanation Before the 1970s,social scientists had tended to discuss the world's societies in terms of those within the First,Second and Third worlds, based on their levels of capitalist enterprise, industrialization and urbanization (see table 4.4 above).The solution to Third World 'underdevelopment' was therefore thought to be more capitalism, industry or urbanization. Wallerstein rejected this dominant way of Figure 4.3 The modern world-system categorizing societies,arguing instead that there is only one world and that all societies are connected together within it via capitalist economic relationships. He described this complex intertwining of economies as the 'modern world-system',which was a pioneer of globalization theories. His main arguments about how this world-system emerged were outlined in a three-volume work, The Modem World-System (1974; 1980; 1989),which sets out his macrosociological perspective. The origins of the modern world-system lie in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, where colonialism enabled countries like Britain, Holland and France to exploit the resources of the countries they colonized. This allowed them to accumulate capital.which was ploughed back into the economy; thus driving forward production even further.This global division of labour created a group ofrich countries,but also impoverished many others,thus preventing their development. Wallerstein argues that the process produced a world-system made up of a core, a semi-periphery and a periphery (see figure 4.3). And although it is clearly possible for individual countries to move 'up' into the core - as have some newly industrialized societies - or to drop 'down' into the semi-periphery and periphery; the structure of the modern world-system remains constant. /O-~- - The most developed, Industrialized and affluent nations. ...--',Sc!mJti.:JlMl1llil!ill)I - Intermediate in terms of affluence, with a degree of autonomy and economic diversity. ~..f~JIDm: - The most powerless, with narrow economic base in agriculture or minerals. Source of cheap labour for core multinational corporations. .............................................................................................................................................. Wallerstein's theory tries to explain why developing countries have found it so difficult to improve their position,but it also extends Marx's class-based conflict theory to the global leveL In global terms, the world's periphery becomes the working class, while the core forms the exploitative capitalist class.In Marxist theory, this means any future socialist revolution is now more likely to occur in the developing countries, rather than the wealthy core as forecast by Marx.This is one reason why Wallerstein's ideas have been well received by political activists in the anticapitalist and anti-globalization movements (the latter are discussed in chapter 22, 'Politics, Government and Social Movements'). Critical points With its origins in the work ofKarl Marx and Marxism, world-systems theory has faced some similar criticisms. First, world-systems theory tends to emphasize the economic dimension of social life and underplays the role of culture in explanations of social change. It has been argued, for example, that one reason why Australla and New Zealand were able to move out ofthe economic periphery more easily than others was due to their close ties with British industrialization,which enabled an industrial culture to take root more quickly Second, the theory underplays the role of ethnicit'" which is seen as merely a defensive reaction against the globalizing forces of the world-system. Therefore,major differences of religion and language are not seen as particularly important. Finall," it has been argued thatWallerstein uses his world-systems perspective to explain current events but is never prepared to consider that such events may falsify the theory or that alternative theories may provide a better explanation. Contemporary significance Wallerstein's work has been important in alerting sociologists to the interconnected character of the modern capitalist world economy and its globalizing effects. He therefore has to be given credit for early recognition ofthe significance of globalization, even though his emphasis on economic activity is widely seen as somewhat limited.Wallerstein's approach has attracted many scholars, and with an institutional base in the Femand Braudel Center and an academic journal devoted to its extension - The journal of World-Systems Research (since 1995) - worldsystems analysis now seems to be an established research tradition. 100 voice paths, but by 1997 a single transoceanic cable could carry some 600,000 voice paths (Held et a1. 1999). The spread of communications satellites, beginning in the 1960s, has also been significant in expanding international communications. Today, a network of more than 200 satellites is in place to facilitate the transfer of information around the globe. ever developed - some 140 million people worldwide were using the Internet in mid- 1998. More than a billion people were estimated to be using the Internet by 2007 (table 4.5). These forms of technology facilitate the compression of time and space (Harvey 1989): two individuals located on opposite sides ofthe planet- in Tokyo and London, for example - can not only hold a conversation in real time, but can also send documents and images to one another with the help of satellite technology. Widespread use of the Internet and mobile phones is deepening and accelerating processes of globalization; more and more people are becoming interconnected through the use of these technologies and are doing so in places that have previously been isolated or poorly served by The impact of these communications systems has been staggering. In countries with highly developed telecommunications infrastructures, homes and offices now have multiple links to the outside world, including telephones (both landlines and mobile phones), digital, satellite and cable television, electronic mail and the Internet. The Internet has emerged as the fastest-growing communication tool internet access has become more freely available in more public settings,enabliog onlioe access to those without a personal computer at home. traditional communications. Although the telecommunications infrastructure is not evenly developed around the world, a growing number of countries can now access international communications networks in a way that was previously impossible; over the past decade or so, Internet usage has been growing fastest in those areas that previously lagged behind - Africa and the Middle East for example (see table 4.5). Information Flows If, as we have seen, the spread of information technology has expanded the possibilities for contact among people around the globe, it has also facilitated the flow of information about people and events in distant places. Every day, the global media bring news, images and information into people's homes, linking them directly and continuously to the outside world. Some of the most gripping events of the past two or three decades - such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the violent crackdown on democratic protesters in China'sTiananmen Square and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 200l have unfolded through the media before a truly global audience. Such events, along with thousands of less dramatic ones, have resulted in a reorientation in people's thinking from the level of the nation-state to the global stage. Individuals are now more aware of their interconnectedness with others and more likely to identify with global issues and processes than was the case in times past. This shifr to a global outlook has two significant dimensions. First, as members of The global spread ofInternet usage World Regions Population Population (2007 est.) % of world Africa 933,448,292 14.2 Asia 3,712.527,624 56.5 Europe 809,624,686 12.3 Middle East 193.452.727 2.9 North America 334,538,018 5.1 Latin America! 556.606,627 8.5 Caribbean Oceania I Australia 34,468,443 0.5 WORLD TOTAL 6,574,666,417 100.0 Sou!te. wwwmtemetworldstats.com. 2007 a global community, people increasingly perceive that social responsibility does not stop at national borders but instead extends beyond them. Disasters and injustices facing people on the other side of the globe are not simply misfortunes that must be endured but are legitimate grounds for action and intervention. There is a growing assumption that the international community has an obligation to act in crisis situations to protect the physical well-being or human rights of people whose lives are under threat. In the case ofnatural disasters, such interventions take the form of humanitarian relief and technical assistance. In recent years, earthquakes in Turkey and China, the Indian Ocean tsunami, famine in Africa and hurricanes in Central America have all been rallying points for global assis- tance. There have also been stronger calls in recent years for interventions in the case of war, ethnic conflict and the violation of human rights, although such mobilizations are more problematic than in the case of natural disasters. Yet in the case of the first GulfWar in 1991 and the violent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo), military intervention was seen as justified by many people who argued that human Internet % Population Usage % Usage usage, (penetration) % of growth latest data world 2000-7 33,334,800 3.6 3.0 638.4 398.709,065 10.7 35.8 248.8 314,792,225 38.9 28.3 199.5 19,424,700 10.0 1.7 491.4 233,188,086 69.7 20.9 115.7 96,386,009 17.3 8.7 433.4 18,439,541 53.5 1.7 142.0 1,114,274,426 16.9 100.0 208.7 rights and national sovereignty had to be defended. Second, a global outlook m eans that people are increasingly looking to sources other than the nation-state in formulating their own sense of identity. This is a phenomenon that is both produced by and further accelerates processes of globalization. Local cultural identities in various parts ofthe world are experiencing powerful revivals at a time when the traditional hold of the nation-state is undergOing profound transformation. In Europe, for example, inhabitants of Scotland and the Basque region ofSpain might be more likely to identify themselves as Scottish or Basque - or simply as Europeans - rather than as British or Spanish. The nation-state as a source of identity is waning in many areas, as political shifts at the regional and global levels loosen people's orientations towards the states in which they live. Economicfactors Globalization is also being driven forward by the continuing integration of the world economy. In contrast to previous eras. the global economy is no longer primarily agricultural or industrial in its basis. Rather, it is increasingly dominated by activity that is Coca-Cola is a transglobal enterprise, selling its products all over the world. This picture shows Diet Coke on sale inJordan,in the Middle East. weightless and intangible (Quah 1999). This weightless economy is one in which products have their base in information, as is the case with computer software, media and entertainment products and Internet-based services. This new economic context has been described using a variety of terms, which we will discuss in more detail in chapter 20, including 'post-industrial society', 'the information age' and 'the new economy'. The emergence ofthe knowledge society has been linked to the development of a broad base of consumers who are technologically literate and eagerly integrate new advances in computing, entertainment and telecommunications into their everyday lives. The very operation ofthe global economy reflects the changes that have occurred in the information age. Many aspects of the economy now work through networks that cross national boundaries, rather than stopping at them (Castells 1996). In order to be competitive in globalizing conditions, businesses and corporations have restructured themselves to be more flexible and less hierarchical in nature. Production practices and organizational patterns have become more flexible, partnering arrangements with other firms have become commonplace and participation in worldwide distribution networks has become essential for doing business in a rapidly changing global market. Transnational corporations Among the many economic factors that are driving globalization, the role of transnational corporations is particularly important. Transnational corporations are companies that produce goods or market services in more than one country. These Sweden Switzerland Belgium Turkey Poland Norway Saudi Arabia Ireland Finland South Africa Portugal Hong Kong Exxon Mobil Walmart Royal Dutch Shell BP General Motors Chevron Daimler Chrysler Toyota Motor Ford Motor Conoco Philps o 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 Figure 4.4 Revenue of world's biggest companies compared with GDP of selected countnes, 2005-6 Source: Compiled from Fortune magazine's 'Global 500',4 July 2006, and The EconoIllist,2005 may be relatively small firms with one or two factories outside the country in which they are based, or gigantic international ventures whose operations criss-cross the globe, Some of the biggest transnational corporations are companies known all around the world: Coca-Cola, General Motors, Colgate-Palmolive, Kodak, Mitsubishi and many others, Even when transnational corporations have a clear national base, they are oriented towards global markets and global profits. Transnational corporations are at the heart of economic globalization. They account for two-thirds of all world trade, they are instrumental in the diffusion of new technology around the globe and they are major actors in international financial markets. As one observer has noted, they are 'the lynchpins of the contemporary world economy' (Held et al. 1999). Some 500 transnational corporations had annual sales of more than $10 billion in 2001, while only 75 countries could boast gross domestic products of at least that amount. In other words, the world's leading transnational corporations are larger economically than most of the world's countries (see figure 4.4). In fact, the combined sales of the world's largest 500 transnational corporations totalled $14.1 trillion - nearly half of the value ofgoods and services produced by the entire world. Transnational corporations became a global phenomenon in the years following the Second World War. Expansion in the initial post-waryears came from firms based in the United States, but by the 1970s, European and Japanese firms increasingly began to invest abroad. In the late 1980s and 1990s, transnational corporations expanded dramaticallywith the establishment ofthree powerful regional markets: Europe (the Single European Market), Asia-Pacific (the Osaka Declaration guaranteed free and open trade by 2010) and North America (the North American Free Trade Agreement). Since the early 1990s, countries in other areas of the world have also liberalized restrictions on foreign investment. By the turn of the twenty-first century, there were few economies in the world that stood beyond the reach of transnational corporations. Over the past decade, transnational corporations based in industrialized economies have been particularly active in expanding their operations in developing countries and in the societies of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. THINKING CRITICALLY Reflecting on your knowledge of transnational corporations to date, are they really more powerful than national governments? How could national governments increase the possibility of influencing their own nation's development? Which of the sociological theories we introduced in chapter 1 would best explain the rise and increasing power of transnational corporations? The argument that manufacturing is becoming increasingly globalized is often expressed in terms of global commodity chains, the worldwide networks of labour and production processes yielding a finished product. These networks consist of all pivotal production activities that form a tightly interlocked 'chain' that extends from the raw materials needed to create the product to its final consumer (Gereffi 1995; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1996; Appelbaum and Christerson 1997). Manufactures accounted for approximately three-quarters of the world's total economic growth during the period 1990- 8. The sharpest growth has been among middle-income countries: manufactures accounted for only 54 per cent of these countries' exports in 1990, compared with 71 per cent just eight years later. China has moved from the ranks of a low- to a middleincome country, largely because of its role as an exporter of manufactured goods, and partly accounts for this trend. Yet the most profitable activities in the commodity chain - engineering, design and advertising - are likely to be found in the core countries, while the least profitable activities, such as factory production, usually are found in peripheral countries. The use of global commodity chains in the manufacture of the Barbie doll is examined in 'Using your sociological imagination 4.1 '. THINKING CRITICALLY Which social groups, organizations and societies stand to benefit from the operation of global commodity chains? What are the negative consequences of such global economic activity and who stands to lose out? Does the globalizing of economic life primarily help or hinder the progress of the world's developing countries? The electronic economy The 'electronic economy' now underpins economic globalization. Banks, corporations, fund managers and individual investors are able to shift funds internationaUy with the click of a mouse. This new ability to move 'electronic money' instantaneously carries with it great risks, however. Transfers of vast amounts of capital can destabilize economies, triggering international financial crises such as the ones that spread from the Asian 'tiger economies' to Russia and beyond in 1998. As the global economy becomes increasingly integrated, a financial collapse in one part of the world can have an enormous effect on distant economies. The political, economic, social and technological factors described above are joining together to produce a phenomenon that 4.1 'Barbie' and the development of global commodity chains One illustration of the global commodity chain can be found in the manufacture ofthe Barbie doll, the most profitable toy in history The 40something teenage doll sells at a rate of two per second, bringing the Mattel Corporation, based in Los Angeles, USA, well over a billion dollars in annual revenues. Although the doll sells mainly in the United States, Europe and japan, Barbie can also be found in 140 countries around the world. Barbie is a truly global citizen (Tempest 1996).Barbie is global not only in sales, but in terms ofher birthplace as well.Barbie was never made in the United States. The first doll was made in japan in 1959, when that country was still recovering from the SecondWorldWax and wages were low.As wages rose injapan, Barbie moved to other low-wage countries in Asia. Her multiple origins today tell us a great deal about the operation of global commodity chains. Barbie is designed in the United States, where her marketing and advertising strategies are devised and where most ofthe profits are made. But the only physical aspect of Barbie that is 'made in the USA' is her cardboard packaging, along with some of the paints and oils that are used to decorate the doll. Barbie's body and wardrobe span the globe in their origins' Barbie begins her hfe in Saudi ATabia, where oil is extracted and then refined into the ethylene that is used to create her plastic body 2 Taiwan's state-owned oil importer, the Chinese Petroleum Corporation,buys the ethylene and sells it to Taiwan's Formosa Plastic Corporation, the world's largest producer ofpolyvinyl chloride (PVC) plastics, which are used in toys. Formosa Plastics converts the ethylene into the PVC pellets that will be shaped to make Barbie's body 3 The pellets are then shipped to one ofthe four Asian factories that make Barbie - two in southern China,one in Indonesia and one in Malaysia. The plastic mould injection machines that shape her body which are the most expensive part of I ARABIA (oil) 'Global Barbie' Barbie's manufacture, are made in the United States and shipped to the factories. 4 Once Barbie's body is moulded,she gets her nylon hair from japan. Her cotton dresses are made in China,with Chinese cotton - the only raw material in Barbie that actually comes from the country where most Barbies are made. 5 Hong Kong plays a key role in the manufacturing process ofthe Chinese Barbies. Nearly all the material used in her manufacture is shipped into Hong Kong - one ofthe world's largest portsand then trucked to the factories in China. The finished Barbies leave by the same route. Some 23,000 trucks make the daily trip between Hong Kong and southern China's toy factories. So where is Barbie actually from? The cardboard and cellophane box containing the 'My First Tea Party' Barbie is labelled 'Made in China', but, as we have seen, almost none of the materials that go into making her actually originate in that country Out of her $9.99 retail price in the USA (about £5), China gets only about 35 cents, mainly in wages paid to the 11,000 peasant women who assemble her in the two factories. Back in the United States, on the other hand, Mattel makes about $1 in profits. What about the rest of the money that is made when Barbie is sold for $9.99? Only 65 cents is needed to cover the plastics, cloth, nylon and other materials used in her manufacture. Most of the money goes to pay for machinery and equipment, transoceanic shipping and domestic trucking, advertising and merchandising, retail floor space and, of course, the profits ofToys ')I' Us and other retailers. What Barbie production and consumption shows us is the effectiveness of globalization processes in connecting together the world's economies. However, it also demonstrates the unevenness of globalization's impact, which enables some countries to benefit at the expense of others.This means that we cannot assume that global commodity chains will inevitably promote development right across the chain of societies involved. lacks any earlier parallel in terms of its intensity and scope. The consequences of globalization are many and far-reaching, as we shall see later in this chapter. But first we will turn our attention to the main views about globalization that have been expressed in recent years. Political changes Contemporary globalization is also related to political change. There are several aspects to this. First, the collapse of Soviet-style communism that occurred in a series of dramatic revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 and culminated in the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself in 1991. Since the fall of communism, countries in the former Soviet bloc - including Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Baltic states, the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia and many others - have been moving towards Western-style political and economic systems. They are no longer isolated from the global community, but are becoming integrated within it. This development has meant the end to the system that existed during the Cold War, when countries of the First World stood apart from those of the Second World. The collapse of communism has hastened processes of globalization, but should also be seen as a result of globalization itself. The centrally planned communist economies and the ideological and cultural control of communist political authority were ultimately unable to survive in an era of global media and an electronically integrated world economy. A second important political factor leading to intensifying globalization is the growth of international and regional mechanisms of government. The United Nations and the European Union are the two most prominent examples of international organizations that bring together nationstates into a common political forum. While the UN does this as an association of individual nation-states, the EU is a more pioneering form of transnational governance in which a certain degree of national sovereignty is relinquished by its member states. The governments of individual EU states are bound by directives, regulations and court judgements from common EU bodies, but they also reap economic, social and political benefits from their participation in the regional union. Finally, globalization is being driven by international governmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). An IGO is a body that is established by participating governments and given responsibility for regulating or overseeing a particular domain of activity that is transnational in scope. The first such body, the International Telegraph Union, was founded in 1865. Since that time, a great number of similar bodies have been created to regulate issues ranging from civil aviation to broadcasting to the disposal ofhazardous waste. In 1909, there were 37 IGOs in existence to regulate transnational affairs; by 1996, there were 260 (Held et al. 1999). As the name suggests, international nongovernmental organizations differ from IGOs in that they are not affiliated with government institutions. Rather, they are independent organizations that work alongside governmental bodies in making policy Conceptualizing globalization: three tendencies Hyperglobalizers Sceptics Transformationalists (Ohrnae 1990, 1995; (Soyer & Drache 1996; (Sassen 1991; Rosenau Albrow 1997) Hirst 1997; Hirst & 1997) Thompson 1999) What's new? A global age Trading blocs,weaker Historically unprecedented geo-governance than in levels of global interearlier periods connectedness Dominant features? Global capitalism, World less 'Thick' (intensive and glob al governance, interdependent than in extensive) globalization global civil society 1890s Power ofnational Declining or Reinforced or enhanced Reconstituted. restructured governments? eroding Drivmg forces of Capitalism and Governments and Combined forces of globalization? technology markets modernity Pattern of Erosion of old Increased New architecture of world stratification? hierarchies marginalization of South order Dominant motif? McDonald's, National interest Transformation ofpolitical Madorma, etc. community Conceptualization A reordering of the Internationalization and Reordering of interof globalization? framework of hwnan regionalization regional relations and action action at a distance Historical Global civilization Regional blocs I clash Indeterminate:global trajectory? of civilizations. integration and fragmentation. Summary The end ofthe Internationalization Globalization transforrrting argwnent nation-state depends on government government power and acquiescence and world politics. support Source:Adapte d from Held e t al 1999: 1G decisions and addressing international issues. Some of the best-known INGOs such as Greenpeace, Mectecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders), the Red Cross and Amnesty International - are involved in environmental protection and humanitarian efforts. But the activities of thousands of lesser-known groups also link togethercountries and communities. occurring around us, but the extent to which it is valid to explain these as 'globalization' is contested. This is not entirely surprising. As an unpredictabl e and turbulent process, globalization is seen and understood very differently by observers, David Held and colleagues (Held et al. 1999) have surveyed the controversy and divided its participants into three schools of thought: sceptics, hyperglobalizers and transformationalists, These three tendencies within the globalization debate are summarized in table 4.6. Note that the authors cited under each school are selected because their work contains some Contesting globalization In recent years, globalization has become a hotly debated topic, Most people accept that there are important transformations of the key arguments that define that particular school's approach. The sceptics Some analysts argue that the idea of globalization is overstated and that most theories ofglobalization amount to a lot oftalk about something that is not really new. The sceptics in the globalization controversy argue that present levels of economic interdependence are not unprecedented. Pointing to nineteenth-century statistics on world trade and investment, they contend that modern globalization differs from the past only in the intensity of interaction between nations. The sceptics agree that there may now be more contact between countries than in previous eras, but in their eyes the current world economy is not sufficiently integrated to constitute a truly globalized economy. This is because the bulk of trade occurs within three regional groups - Europe, AsiaPacific and North America - rather than a genuinely globalized context. The countries of the European Union, for example, trade predominantly amongst themselves. The same is true of the other regional groups, thereby invalidating the notion of a single global economy (Hirst 1997). Many sceptics focus on processes of regionalization within the world economysuch as the emergence of major financial and trading blocs. To sceptics, the growth of regionalization is evidence that the world economy has become less integrated rather than more so (Boyer and Drache 1996; Hirst and Thompson 1999). Compared with the patterns of trade that prevailed a century ago, it is argued that the world economy is actually less global in its geographical scope and more concentrated on intense pockets of activity. Sceptics also reject the view that globalization is fundamentally undermining the role ofnational governments and producing a world order in which they are less central. According to the sceptics, national governments continue to be key players because of their involvement in regulating and coordinating economic activity. Governments, for example, are the driving force behind many trade agreements and policies of economic liberalization. The hypergloba/izers Hyperglobalizers take an opposing position to that of the sceptics. They argue that globalization is a very real phenomenon whose consequences can be felt everywhere. Globalization is seen as a process that is indifferent to national borders, producing a new global order, swept along by powerful flows of cross-border trade and production. One of the best-known hyperglobalizers, the Japanese writer Kenichi Ohmae (1990, 1995), sees globalization as leading to a 'borderless world' - a world in which market forces are more powerful than national governments. Much of the analysis of globalization offered by hyperglobalizers focuses on the changing role of the nation-state. It is argued that individual countries no longer control their economies because of the vast growth in world trade. National governments and the politicians within them are increasingly unable to exercise control over the issues that cross their borders - such as volatile financial markets and environmental threats. Citizens recognize that politicians are limited in their ability to address these problems and, as a result, lose faith in existing systems of governance. Some hyperglobalizers suggest that the power of national governments is also being challenged from above - by new regional and international institutions, such as the European Union, the World Trade Organization and others. Taken together, these shifrs signal to the hyperglobalizers the dawning of a global age in which national governments decline in importance and influence (A1brow 1997). The transformationalists Transformationalists take a position somewhere between sceptics and hyperglobaliz- ers. They see globalization as the central force behind a broad spectrum of changes that are currently shaping modern societies, but though the global order is being transformed, many of the old patterns remain. National governments, for instance, still retain a good deal of power in spite of the advance of global interdependence. These transformations are not restricted to economics alone, but are equally prominent within the realms of politics, culture and personal life. Transformationalists contend that the current level of globalization is breaking down established bounda.ries between the internal and external, the international and domestic. In trying to adjust to this new order, societies, institutions and individuals are being forced to navigate contexts where previous structures have been shaken up. Unlike hyperglobalizers, transformationalists see globalization as a dynamic and open process that is subject to influence and change. It is developing in a contradictory fashion, encompassing tendencies that frequently operate in opposition to one another. Globalization is, therefore, not a one-way process but a two-way flow of images, information and influences. Global migration, mass media and telecommunications are contributing to the diffusion of cultural iofluences. The world's vibrant 'global cities' such as London, NewYork and Tokyo are thoroughly multicultural, with ethnic groups and cultures intersecting and living side by side (Sassen 1991). According to transformationalists, globalization is a decentred and reflexive process characterized by links and cultural flows that work in a multidirectional way. Because globalization is the product ofnumerous intertwined global networks, it cannot be seen as being driven from one particular part ofthe world. Rather than losing sovereignty, as the hyperglobalizers argue, nation-states are restructuring in response to new forms of economic and social organization that are non-territorial in basis, including corporations, social movements and international Globalization and the ChangingWorld bodies. Transformationalists argue that we are no longer living in a state-centric world; governments are being forced to adopt a more active and outward-loOking stance towards governance under the complex conditions of globalization (Rosenau 1997). Evaluation Which view is best supported by the evidence? Atthis point, probably that of the transformationalists, which suggests that global processes are having a great impact on many aspects oflife across the world, but that this impact is not completely transforming the world's societies. However, we cannot be certain how globalization will progress in the future, as this partly depends on the actions and reactions of those groups, organizations and governments caught up in it, which are difficult to forecast. Sceptics tend to underestimate just how much the world is changing; world finance markets, for example, are organized on a global level much more than they ever were before. It is also the case that the increasing movement of people around the world, alongside more immediately effective forms of communication, are transforming people's everyday experience of the world and their view of it. The sceptical viewpoint tends to underplay this experiential aspect of the process. Hyperglobalizers, on the other hand, focus on economic globalization and tend to see this as a linear, or one-way process with a clearly defined endpoint: a global econ- 0my and, hence, a global society. In reality, the globalization process is more complex than this picture implies and the endpoint cannot be determined from present trends as these may well change. For example, the idea of a 'borderless world' may be an accurate description of the forces at work in economic globalization, but whether or not it becomes reality will depend on political decisions taken at national government level. Indeed, many countries around the world are seeking to tighten their border GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHANGING WORLD controls precisely to prevent that borderless world ever being created in the first place. Held et aI's Cl999) threefold scheme is useful, in so far as it alerts us to some of the main points at issue, but it is not the only way ofthinking about globalization. For example, in this debate, all three positions focus primarily on the modem process of rapid globalization and its consequences for the future. However, it may be beller to set contemporary globalization processes into a longer timefTame. In this chapter we made an early distinction between the global spread of human societies over the very long term and the intensified globalization process ofrecent times. In this way it is possible to see the extended development of human societies as leading towards more global patterns of interdependent relations, while also acknowledging that this was not and is not inevitable. An example will make this point clear. As we noted earlier, historically, globalization has been as much the product of conflicts, wars and invasion as of cooperation and agreement between social groups and societies. Since 1945, the world has lived with the immense destructive potential of nuclear weapons and the prospect of conflict between nudear powers resulting in mutually assured destruction (MAD) for the combatants (and others). Such a conflict would surely halt the current process of rapid globalization and eliminate most of those interdependent relations that some see as inevitably leading to a global society. With nuclear proliferation still a very significant international issue and nuclear power increasingly seen by governments as a solution to global warming (see chapter 5, 'The Environment'), this scenario cannot be completely ruled out even today. Human conflicts have made a major contribution to globalization, but they also have the potential to send it into reverse. Chapter 23, 'Nations,War and Terrorism', contains an extended discussion ofwar and conflict. The impact of globalization In chapter 1, we found that the chief focus of sociology has historically been the study of the industrialized societies. However, as sociologists we must also pay attention to the developing world, rather than leaving this to anthropologists. The industrialized and the developing societies have developed in interconnection with one another and are today more dosely related than ever before. Those of us living in the industrialized societies depend on many raw materials and manufactured products from developing countries to sustain our lives. Conversely, the economies ofmost developing states depend on trading networks that bind them to the industrialized countries. We can only fully understand the industrialized order against the backdrop of societies in the developing world - in which by far the greater proportion of the world's population lives - sometimes described as the 'majority world'. Take a close look at the array of products on display the next time you walk into a local shop or supermarket. The diversity of goods we in the West have come to take for granted as available for anyone with the money to buy them depends on amaZingly complex economic connections stretching across the world. The store products have been made in, or use ingredients or parts from, a hundred different countries. These parts must be regularly transported across the globe, and constant flows ofinformation are necessary to coordinate the millions of daily transactions. As the world rapidly moves towards a single, unified economy, businesses and people move about the globe in increasing numbers in search of new markets and economic opportunities. As a result, the cultural map of the world changes: networks of peoples span national borders and even continents, providing cultural connections between their birthplaces and their adoptive countries (Appadurai 1986). Although there are between 5,000 and 6,000 languages spoken on the planet, around 98 Classic Studies 4.2 Anthony Giddens: riding the juggernaut of modernity The research problem What impact is globalization likely to have on people's everyday lives? How will globalization change the modern world that we all increasingly inhabit? Can anyone just ignore or escape the forces of globalization? In a series of books, articles and lectures since the early 1990s, 1have tried to explore the characteristics ofthe emerging global form of modernity and its consequences for everyday life (1991a, 1991b, 1993, 2001).1n particular, I have been interested in the decline of traditions, our increasing risk awareness and the changing nature of trust within our relationships. Giddens's explanation In The Consequences ofModernity, I outlined my view that the global spread of modernity tends to produce a 'runaway world', in which, it appears, no one and no government is in overall control. While Marx used the image of a monster to describe modernity; I liken it to riding onboard a huge truck or 'juggernaut': Isuggest we should substitute that ofthe juggernaut - a runaway engine of enormous power, which, collectively as human beings, we can drive to some extent but which also threatens to rush out of our control and which could rend itself asunder. The juggernaut crushes those who resist it, and while it sometimes seems to have a steady path, there are times when it veers away erratically in directions we cannot foresee.The ride is by no means unpleasant or unrewarding; it can often be exhilarating and charged with hopeful anticipation.But, as long as the institutions of modernity endure,we shall never be able to control completely either the path or the pace of the journey In turn, we shall never be able to feel entirely secure, because the terrain across which it runs is fraught with risks of high consequence. Feelings of ontological security and existential anxiety will co-exist in ambivalence. (l991b' 139) The globalizing form of modernity is marked by new uncertainties, new risks and changes to people's trust in other individuals and social institutions.In a world of rapid change, traditional forms of trust are dissolved. Our trust in other people used to be based in local communities, but in more globalized societies, our lives are influenced by people we never meet or know, who may live on the far side of the world from us. Such impersonal relationships means we are pushed to 'trust' or have confidence in 'abstract systems', such as food production and environmental regulation agencies or international banking systems. In this way, trust and risk are closely bound together. Thust in authorities is necessary ifwe are to confront the risks around us and react to them in an effective way. But this type of trust is not habitually given, but the subject of reflection and revision. When societies were more reliant on knowledge gained from custom and tradition, people could follow established ways of doing things without too much reflection. For modern people, aspects of life that earlier generations were able to take for granted become matters of open decision-making, producing what I call 'reflexivity' - the continuous reflection on our everyday actions and reformation of these in the light ofnew knowledge. For example, whether to marry (or divorce) is a very personal decision, which may take account of family and friends' advice. But official statistics and sociological research on marriage and divorce also filter into social life, becoming widely known and shared, thus becoming part of an individual's decision- making. For me, these characteristic features of modernity point to the conclusion that global modernity is a form of social life that is discontinuous with previous forms. In many ways, the globalization of modernity marks not the ending of modern societies or a movement beyond them (as in postmodernism - see chapter 3),but a new stage of 'late' or 'high' modernity which takes the tendencies embedded within modern life into a more farreaching global phase. Critical points My critics argue that perhaps I exaggerate the discontinuity between modernity and previous societies and that tradition and habit continues to structure people's everyday activities. The modern period is not so unique, they sa~ and modern people are not so different from those that went before. Others think that my account of globalizing modernity underplays the central sociological question of power; in particular the power of transnational corporations to influence governments and promote a form of globalization that privileges the needs of business at the expense of the world's poor. The concept of 'modernity' essentially masks the power of capitalist corporations. Finally, some have argued that 1see reflexivity as a wholly positive development,reflecting the opening up of social life to more choice. However, such reflexivity could also be leading to heightened levels of 'anornie', as described by Durkheim, and in that sense, reflexivity may be more of a problem to be solved than a welcome element to be promoted. Contemporary significance Because theories of globalization are relatively recent and I continue to develop my theories of modern life,it is very much a 'work in progress'. The ideas I have developed have been taken in fruitful directions by other sociologists and, in that sense, it is satisfying to have provided a theoretical framework and some conceptual tools for younger generations to take forward and develop.As is evident from the contribution of the critics of my work on modernity; reflexivity and trust relationships, this has provoked much sociological debate. I hope that it will continue to do so in the future and readers Will, no doubt, come to their own assessment of it. per cent ofthese are used byjust 10 per cent of the global population, Just a dozen languages have come to dominate the global language system, with more than 100 million speakers each: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, German, Hindi, Japanese, Malay, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish and Swahili. And just one language - English has become 'hypercentrat', as first choice for most second-language speakers. It is these 'bilinguals' who bind together the whole global language system (de Swaan 2001), It is increasingly impossible for discrete cultures to exist as islands. There are few, if any, places on earth so remote as to escape radio, television, air travel - and the throngs of tourists they bring - or the computer. A generation ago, there were stilt tribes whose way 01 life was completely untouched by the rest of the world. Today, these peoples use machetes and other tools made in the United States or Japan. wear T-shirts and shorts manufactured in garment factories in the Dominican Republic or Guatemala, and take medicine manufactured in Germany or Switzerland to combat diseases contracted through contactwith outsiders. These people also have their stories broadcast to people around the world through satellite television and the Internet. Within a generation or two at the most, all the world's once-isolated cultures will be touched and transformed by global culture, despite their persistent efforts to preserve their age-old ways of life. The forces that produce a global culture will be discussed throughout this book. They include: 1 Television, which brings British and American culture (through networks and programmes such as the BBC, MTV or Friends) into homes throughout the world daily, while adapting cultural products from the Netherlands (such as Big Brother) or Sweden (such as Expedition: Robinson, which became Survivor) for British and American audiences. 2 The emergence ofa unified global econamy. with business whose factories, management structures and markets often span continents and countries. 3 'Global citizens', such as managers of large corporations, who may spend as much time criss-crossing the globe as Globalization and the ChangingWorld Global Society 4.3 Globalization and reggae music When those knowledgeable about popular music listen to a song,they can often pick out the stylistic influences that helped shape it. Each musical style, after all, represents a unique way of combining rhythm, melody, harmony and lyrics. And while it does not take a genius to notice the dilIerences between rock, R&B or folk, for example, musicians often combine a nUniber of styles in composing songs,Identifying the components of these combinations can be difficult. But for sociologists, the effort is often rewarding.Different musical styles tend to emerge from dilIerent social groups, and studying how styles combine and fuse is a good way to chart the cultural contacts between groups, Some sociologists have tnrned their attention to reggae music because it exemplifies the process whereby contacts between social groups result in the creation of new musical forms,Reggae's roots can be traced to West Africa.In the seventeenth century, large nUnibers ofWest Africans were enslaved by British colonists and brought by ship to work in the sugar-cane fields ofthe West Indies. Although the British attempted to prevent slaves from playing traditional African music for fear it would serve as a rallying cry to revolt,the slaves managed to keep alive the tradition ofAfrican drumming, sometimes by integrating it with the European musical styles imposed by the slaveowners,In Jamaica, the drumming of one group of slaves, the Burru, was openly tolerated by slaveholders because it helped meter the pace of work. Slavery was finally abolished inJamaica in 1834, but the tradition of Burru drumming continued, even as many Burru men migrated from rural areas to the slums of Kingston. It was in these slums that a new religious cult began to emerge - one that would prove crucial to the development of reggae, In 1930 a man named Haile Selassie was crowned emperor ofthe African country ofEthiopia.While opponents of European colonialism throughout the world cheered Selassie's ascension to the throne, a nUniber of people in the West Indies came to believe that he was a god, sent to earth to lead the oppressed of Africa to freedom One of Selassie's names was 'Prince Ras Tafari' , and the West Indians who worshipped him called themselves 'Rastafarians', The Rastafarian cult soon merged with the Burru, and Rastafarian music came to combine Burru styles of drumming with biblical themes of oppression and liberation. In the 1950s, West Indian musicians began mixing Rastafarian rhythms and lyrics with elements ofAmerican jazz and black rhythm and blues,These combinations eventually developed into 'ska' music, and then, in the late I960s,into reggae, with its relatively slow beat, its emphasis on bass, and its stories of urban deprivation and of the power of collective social consciousness.Many reggae artists, such as Bob Marley, became commercial successes, and by the 1970s people the world over were listening to reggae music,In the 1980s and 1990s, reggae was fused with hip-hop (or rap) to produce new sounds (Hebdige 1997), heard in the work of the groups like The Wu-Tang Clan, Shaggy or Sean Paul. The history of reggae is thus the history of contact between different social groups, and of the meanings - political, spiritual and personal- that those groups expressed through their music. Globalization has increased the intensity ofthese contacts. It is now possible for a young musician in Scandinavia, for example, to grow up listening to music produced by men and women in the basements of Notting Hill in London, and to be deeply influenced as well by, say, a mariachi performance broadcast live via satellite from Mexico City, If the nUniber of contacts between groups is an important determinant ofthe pace of musical evolution, it can be predicted that there will be a veritable profusion of new styles in the coming years as the process of globalization continues to unfold. they do at home, identifying with a global, cosmopolitan culture rather than with that of their own nation. ciations, multinational banks and other global financial institutions, internationallabour and health organizations, and global tariff and trade agreements, that are creating a global political, legal and military framework. 4 A host of international organizations, including United Nations agencies, regional trade and mutual defence asso- Even soo~eties which we might consider as 'untouched' by globalization are not out of the reach of global culture. Many of the goods they use and consume are imported from all over the world. 5 Electronic communications (telephone, fax, electronic mail, the Internet and the World Wide Web), which makes instantaneous communication with almost any part of the planet an integral part of daily life in the business world. Does the Internet promote a global culture? Many have argued that the rapid growth of the Internet around the world will hasten the spread of a global culture - one resembling the cultures of Europe and North America, currently home to more than half the world's Internet users (see table 4.7). Belief in such values as equality between men and women, the right to speak freely, democratic participation in government and the pursuit of pleasure through consumption are readily diffused throughout the world over the Internet. Moreover, Internet technology itself would seem to foster such values: global communication, seemingly unlimited (and uncensored) information, and instant gratification are all characteristics of the new technology. Yet it may be premature to conclude that the Internet will sweep aside traditional cultures, replacing them with radically new cultural values. As the Internet spreads around the world, there is evidence that it is in many ways compatible with traditional cultural values as well, perhaps even a means of strengthening them. To capture this balancing of the consequences of globalization, British sociologist Roland Robertson (1992) coined the term glocalization - a mixture of globalization and localization. This means that local communities are often very active rather than passive in modifying and shaping global processes to fit their own cultures, or that global businesses have to tailor their products and services to take account of local conditions. In the light of such cases, we may find that globalization does not lead inevitably to a uniform, global culture, but instead leads to diversity and multidirectional flows of cultural products across the world's societies. Consider, for example, the Middle Eastern country of Kuwait, a traditional Islamic culture that has recently experienced strong American and European influences. Kuwait, an oil-rich country on the Persian Gulf, has one of the highest average per person incomes in the world. The government provides free public education through the university level. resulting in high rates of literacy and education for both men and women. Kuwaiti television frequently carries American football from the USA for example, although broadcasts are regularly Table 4.7 Global Internet connectivity in 2005: pes, hosts and Internet users PCs Internet Total (1.000s) Per 100 Hosts total Hosts per Users Users per people 10,000 people (1.000s) 100 people Africa 17,726 2.22 424,968 4.92 33,132.8 3.72 Americas 308,078 35.35 205,502,481 2,339.05 304,834.8 34.23 Asia 230,317 6.44 27,986,795 73.95 368,621.8 9.64 Europe 239,833 30.69 29,058,680 ;363.24 259,224.3 32.4 Oceania 16,130 50.46 4,572,838 1.40468 17,383 7 53.21 World 812,084 13.4 267,545,762 420.69 983, 197.4 15.27 PCs numbers ofpersonal computers A host 18 a computer duBctly lmked to the globallnternet network Users refers to estnnates ofpeople accessmg the Internet Source"InlernaUonal Telecommumcatlons Umen 2005 interrupted for the traditional Muslim calls to prayer. Half of Kuwait's approximately 2 million people are under the age of 25, and, like their counterparts in Europe and North America, many surf the Internet for new ideas, information and consumer products. Although Kuwait is in many respects a modern country, cultural norms that treat men and women differently are very strong, Women are generally expected to wear traditional clothing that leaves only the face and hands visible and are forbidden to leave home at night or be seen in public at any time with a man who is not a spouse or relative. Deborah Wheeler (1998) spent a year studying the impact of the Internet on Kuwaiti culture.The Internet is increasingly popular in Kuwait; half of all Internet users in Middle Eastern Arab countries live in this tiny country. Kuwaiti newspapers frequently carry stories about the Internet and the Web, and Kuwait University was the first university in the Arab world to hook its students up to the Internet. Wheeler reports that Kuwaiti teenagers are flocking to Internet cafes, where they spend most of their time in chat rooms or visiting pornographic sites - two activities strongly frowned upon by traditional Islam ic culture. According to Wheeler (1998): 'Many young people told me of encounters theywere havingwith the opposite sex in cyberspace. There are even keyboard symbols for kisses ('), kisses on the lips (:'),and embarrassed giggles (LOLl all those interactions and reactions that make courtship exciting and, in this case, safe: The new communications technologies are clearly enabling men and women to talk with one another in a society where such communications outside marriage are extremely limited, Wheeler also notes that, ironically, men and women are segregated in the Internet cafes. Furthermore, she finds that Kuwaitis are extremely reluctant to voice strong opinions or political views online. With the exception of discussing conservative Islamic religious beliefs, which are freely disseminated over the Internet, Kuwaitis are remarkably inhibited online. Wheeler (1998) attributes this to the cultural belief that giving out too much information about oneselfis dangerous: In Kuwait, information is more ofa potential threat than a means for individual empowerment. It is a weapon to use against your enem ies, a tool for keeping conformity, or a reinforcement ofregulations of daily GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHANGING WORLD life. ... Kuwait's transition to the information age is influenced by these attitudes and the desire to keep one's reputation protected. This keeps the Internet from registering significant political and social impacts, except for the rise in Kuwaiti Islamist discourses on the Internet. . . . In Kuwait, there is an ethos that states that having and/or pronouncing a political opinion publicly is bad. No one wants to talk on the record orto be quoted. The idea makes people scared or nervous. Only those who are elite feel they can speak freely and openly. Wheeler concludes that Kuwaiti culture, which is hundreds ofyears old, is not likely to be easily transformed by simple exposure to different beliefs and values on the Internet. The fact that a few young people are participating in global chat rooms does not mean that Kuwaiti culture is adopting the sexual attitudes of the United States or even the form of everyday relations found between men and women in theWest. The culture that eventually emerges as a result of the new technologies will not be the same as American culture; it will be uniquely Kuwaiti. The rise ofindividualism Although globalization is often associated with changes within big systems - such as the world financial markets, production and trade, and telecommunications - the effects of globalization are felt equally strongly in the private realm. Globalization is not THINKING CRITICALLY What is your initial reaction? Is globalization leading to a homogenous global culture? Now think of some examples where Western products, brands or culture have changed nonWestern cultures. Next, list some examples where Western influence has been significantly altered at the local level. Does such localization really mean that indigenous cultures can defend themselves against the forces of globalization? something that is simply out there, operating on a distant plane and not intersecting with individual affairs. Globalization is an 'in here' phenomenon that is affecting our intimate and personal lives in many diverse ways. Inevitably, our personal lives have been altered as globalizing forces enter into our local contexts, our homes and our communities through impersonal sourcessuch as the media, the Internet and popular culture - as well as through personal contact with individuals from other countries and cultures. Globalization is fundamentally changing the nature of our everyday experiences. As the societies in which we live undergo profound transformations, the established institutions that used to underpin them have become out of place. This is forcing a redefinition of intimate and personal aspects of our lives, such as the family, gender roles, sexuality, personal identity, our interactions with others and our relationships to work. The way we think of ourselves and our connections with other people is being profoundly altered through globalization. In our current age, individuals have much more opportunity to shape their own lives than once was the case. At one time, tradition and custom exercised a very strong influence on the path of people's lives. Factors such as social class, gender, ethnicity and even religious affiliation could close off certain avenues for individuals, or open up others. Being born the eldest son of a tailor, for example, would probably ensure that a young man would learn his father's craft and carry on practising that craft throughout his lifetime. Tradition held that a woman's natural sphere was in the home; herlife and identiry were largely defined by those of her husband or father. In times past, individuals' personal identities were formed in the context of the community into which they were born. The values, lifestyles and ethics prevailing in that community provided relatively fixed guidelines according to which people lived their lives. Under conditions of globalization, however, we are faced with a move towards a new individualism, in which people have actively to construct their own identities. The weight of tradition and established values is retreating, as local communities interact with a new global order. The social codes that formerly guided people's choices and activities have significandy loosened. Today, for example, the eldest son of a tailor could choose any number of paths in constructing his future, women are no longer restricted to the domestic realm and many of the other signposts that shaped Globalization and the Changing World people's lives have disappeared. Traditional frameworks of identity are dissolving and new patterns of identity are emerging. Globalization is forcing people to live in a more open, reflexive way. This means that we are constantly responding and adjusting to the changing environment around us; as individuals, we evolve with and within the larger context in which we live. Even the small choices we make in our daily lives - what we wear, how we spend our leisure time and how we take care of our health and our bodies - are part of an ongoing process of creating and re-creating our self-identities. GLOBALIZATION AND TH E CHANG ING WORLD Conclusion: the need for global governance As globalization progresses, existing politica l structures and models a pp ear unequipped to manage a world full of the challenges that transcend national borders. It is not within the capacity of individual governments to control the spread ofAIDS, to counter the effects of global warming or to regulate volatile financial markets. Many of the processes affecting societies around the world elude the grasp ofcurrent governing mechanisms. In the light of this governing deficit, some have called for new forms of global governance that could address global issues in a global way. As a growing number of challenges operate above the level of individual countries, it is argued that responses to them must also be transnational in scope. Although it may seem unrealistic to speak ofgovernance above the level of the nationstate, some steps have already been taken towards the creation of a global democratic structure, such as the formation of the United Nations and the European Union. The EU in particular can be seen as an innovative response to globalization and could well become a model for similar organizations in other parts of the world where regional ties are strong. New forms ofglobal governance could help to promote a cosmopolitan world order in which transparent rules and standards for international behaviour, such as the defence of human rights, are established and observed. The decade that has passed since the end of the Cold War has been marked by violence, internal conflict and chaotic transformations in many areas ofthe world. While some have taken a pessimistic view, seeing globalization as accelerating crisis and chaos, others see vital opportunities to harness globalizing forces in the pursuit of greater equality, democracy and prosperity. The move towards global governance and more effective regulatory institutions is certainly not misplaced at a time when global interdependence and the rapid pace of change link all of us together more than ever before. It is not beyond our abilities to reassert our will on the social world. Indeed, such a task appears to be both the greatest necessity and the greatest challenge facing human societies in the twenty-first century. We learn more about global governance in chapter 22, 'Politics, Government and Social Movements'. Summary points 1. Several types of pre-modern society can be distinguished. In hunting and gathering societies, people gain their livelihood from gathering plants and hunting animals.Pastoral societies are those that raise domesticated animals as their major source of subsistence. Agrarian societies depend on the cultivation of fixed plots of land. Larger, more developed, urban societies form traditional states or civilizations. 2. The development of industralized societies and the expansion of the West led to the conquest of many parts of the world through the process of coloniaJization,which radically changed long-established societies and cultures. 3. In industrialized societies, industrial production is the main basis of the economy. Industrialized countries include the nations of theWest and Japan,Australia and New Zealand.The developing world, in which a majority of the world's population live, are almost all formerly colonized areas.The majority of the population works in agricultural production, some of which is geared to world markets. 4. Social change may be defined as the transformation, over time, of the institutions and culture of a society. The modern period, although occupying only a small fraction of human history, has seen rapid and major changes and the pace of change is accelerating. 5. The development of social organization and institutions,from hunting and gathering to agrarian to modern industrial societies,is far too diverse to be accounted for by any singlefactor theory of social change. At least three broad categories of influences can be identified. The physical environment includes such factors as climate or the availability of communication routes (rivers, mountain passes); these are important to consider, especially as they affect early economic development. Political organization (especially military power) affects all societies, traditional and modern, with the possible exception of hunting and gathering societies. Cultural factors include religion Globalization and the ChangingWorld (which can act as a brake on change), communication systems (such as the invention of writing) and individual leadership. 6. The most important economic influence on modern social change is industrial capitalism, which depends on and promotes constant innovation in productive technology. Science and technology also affect and are affected by political factors, the most important of which is the emergence of the modern state. Cultural influences include another effect of science and technology: the critical and innovative character of modern thinking, which constantly challenges tradition and cultural habits. 7. Globalization is often portrayed as an economic phenomenon, but this is too simple. Globalization involves political, economic, cultural and social factors. It is driven fOlWard by advances in information and communication technologies that have intensified the speed and scope of interaction between people around the world. 8. Globalization has become a hotly debated topic. Sceptics think it is overrated and that current levels of interconnectedness are not unprecedented. Some sceptics focus instead on processes of regionalization that are intensifying activity within major financial and trade groups. Hyperglobalizers take an opposing position, arguing that globalization is a real and powerful phenomenon that threatens to erode the role of national governments altogether.A third group, the transformationalists, argue that globalization is transforming many aspects of the current global order, but that old patterns still remain. According to this view, globalization is a contradictory process, involving a multidirectional flow of influences that sometimes work in opposition to each other. 9. Globalization is producing challenges that cross national borders and elude the reach of existing political structures. Because individual governments are not equipped to handle these transnational issues, there is a need for new forms of global governance that can address global problems in a global way. Reasserting our will on the rapidly changing social world may be the greatest challenge of the twenty-first century. ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •• Further reading Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave• • Macmillan, 2005) is another possibility. This• • • The subject-matter of this chapter is so book is exactly what it says it is: a critical • • wide-ranging that a single book will not approach to globalization, but also one that •• cover it. In general terms, however, there are is accessible and engaging. Jiirgen• • two types of book you should find useful. Osterhammel and Niels P. Petersson's• • First are those that cover the global human Globalization: A Short History (Princeton, NJ:• • history and development of the human Princeton University Press, 2005) traces the• • • species. Agood place to begin is with Noel history ofglobalization over the past eight • • Cowan's Global History: A Short Overview centuries, giving a longer-term view of the• • (Cambridge: Polity, 2001). This is a well- process.• • written, concise, yet comprehensive• After at least one of these, you would then be• account which assumes no specialist• in a position to move on to more• knowledge. This can be followed with Bruce• comprehensive and detailed accounts of• Mazlish's The New Global History (London:• • globalization, such as David Held and • Routledge, 2006), which traces global • Anthony McGrew's (eds) The Global• history and globalization processes over • Transformations Reader, 2nd edition• the very long term and successfully• (Cambridge: Polity, 2003) or Joseph Stiglitz's• links both historical and sociological• Globalization and its Discontents (London:• approaches.• Alien Lane, 2003).• • Second are those books that deal with• • In addition, a good dictionary of world • current theories and debates on • history is always a useful resource for key• globalization. As you might expect, there are• dates and events, so something suitably large• now many of these. Picking out two short• and reliable like Bruce Lenman and Hilary• introductions, you could try Malcolm• Marsden's (eds) Chambers Dictionary ofWorld• Waters's Globalization, 2nd edition (London:• History, New Edition (London: Harrap, 2005)• Routledge, 2001), which is quite brief, divides• • would fit the bill, as would A Dictionary of • globalization into economic, political and • World History (Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks,• cultural forms, and moves at a brisk pace. • 2000).• Jan Aart Scholte's Globalization: A Critical• •• • • •• • • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Globalization and the ChangingWorld •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •••• • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Internet links BBC World Service on globalization: www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/programmes/ globalisationl The Global Site- social science thinking on globalization: www.theglobalsite.ac.uklglobalizationI 1999 Reith Lectures - Anthony Giddens on 'The runaway world': http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/ events/reith_991 International Forum - an alliance ofactivists, scholars and researchers looking to better understand globalization processes: www.ifg.org/ Tradewatch - US-based activist site against globalization: www.citizen.org/trade/ Centre for Research on Globalization Canadian-based 'think-site' with lots of comment by researchers and academics: www.globalresearch.ca/ World Bank globalization pages: www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/ globalizationI Global Policy Forum - monitors policy-making at the United Nations: www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/ index.ht ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • CHAPTERS ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• The Ellvi..ollnlellt Nature, the environment and sociology 157 Defining nature and the environment 157 Sociology and the environment 158 What are environmental issues? 163 Pollution and waste 163 Resource depletion 169 Genetic modification of food 172 Global warming 177 Sociological theories and ecological sustainahility 186 Consumerism and environmental damage 187 Limits to growth and sustainable development 190 Living in the global 'risk society' 193 Ecological modernization 195 Environmental justice and ecological citizenship 197 Conclusion 199 Summary points 200 Further reading 202 Internet links 203 (opposite) The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake was the third largest ever recorded and caused maSSlve loss of human life. J ust before one o'clock a.m. UTC (Coordinated Universal Time) on 26 December 2004, the largest earthquake in 40 years occurred beneath the Indian Ocean. The earthquake shifted the seabed and displaced hundreds of cubic kilometres of water. A large wave known as a tsunami, caused by the tremor, began moving across the Indian Ocean away from the quake's epicentre at a speed of around 500 miles per hour. As it neared the coast, the tsunami slowed dramatically to just 30 miles per hour and began to increase in height. The tsunami reached the nearest landmass, Aceh in northern Indonesia, just 15 minutes after the initial quake, in many places destroying everything in its path and sweeping debris hundreds ofmetres inland. Thailand was 156 THE ENVIRONMENT hit after 90 minutes, Sri Lanka after two hours, the Maldives after three and a half hours; finally, the wave reached the African coast, thousands of miles from the epicentre of the quake, some seven hours after the earthquake that caused it. The scale of the tragedy was not immediatey apparent. By the end of the day on 26 December it was reported that 12,000 people had been killed. Afew weeks later the United Nations estimated that more than 175,000 people had died. Most deaths were in Indonesia, where it is thought that around 160,000 people lost their lives. Figures for the total number ofpeople killed around the Indian Ocean vary hugely, but the British Red Cross has estimated a death toll closer to the region of a staggering 1 million. In Sri Lanka more than 30,000 people were killed, more than a 1,000 of whom drowned when an 80-tonne train was lifted off its tracks and submerged under water. In India, just fewer than 10,000 people are thought to have died. Travelling west, the wave caused devastation as far away as Africa, killing around 140 people along the continent's east coast. Many millions of people around the Indian Ocean were left homeless. Although much sociological research tends to focus on how human institutions and citizens respond to ecological hazards, the 2004 tsunami reminds us that natural processes can be complex and unpredictable. The natural environment is not simply an inert, passive backdrop to the dramas of social life, but is an active force, which often plays a large part in the shaping of societies. The Asian tsunami also shows that in a globalized world, events thousands of miles away have a great impact on everyone's lives. Although the vast majority of people killed in the tsunami were locals, several thousands were tourists from around the world, many ofwhom had been enjoying an idyllic Christmas break in the region. For instance, the tsunami claimed the lives of 149 people who were British citizens or had close links with the UK: the greatest loss of British lives in anyone incident since the Second World War and far greater than the number of Britons who died in the terrorist attacks in NewYork andWashington in 2001. The high loss of life amongst Westerners reflects the processes ofglobalization. Thailand, where most holiday-makers were killed, has only become a destination for mass tourism in the past two decades or so, as people from the rich world are increasingly prepared to travel further afield for their holidays. The relief effort was also global in scope, as the world's news stations beamed pictures and reports of the suffering around the planet. In rich countries, millions of dollars were donated by the general public and governments, troops and expertise were sent to the region and it was agreed that debt repayments from the worst hit countries should be suspended. In early January 2005, millions ofpeople across Europe stopped what they were doing to take part in a three-minute silence in memory of those killed. Why should sociologists be interested in events such as the Asian tsunami? Surely this was a 'natural disaster', an example of the massive power of nature? Ifso, then isn't it the proper subject for environmental scientists and geologists rather than sociologists? Afrer all, what institutional training do sociologists receive on understanding earthquakes or plate tectonics? For most of the twentieth century, this apparently common-sense division ofacademic labour was taken for granted. Natural scientists investigated the non-human world, while social scientists concentrated on people and their societies. However, by the 1980s and '90s things were changing, as knowledge of global environmental problems emerged and it became much clearer that the fate of the 'natural' and 'social' worlds were inevitably intertwined. In this chapter we look at ideas of nature and environment and what constitutes an environmental issue. before outlining sociological approaches to the study of such issues. From here we discuss some important environmental issues, including pollution, resource depletion, genetic modification and global warming before looking at sociological theories of consumerism and the risk society and proposals aimed at dealing with environmental dilemmas such as sustainable development and ecological modernization. The chapter ends with an evaluation of their prospects for success, looking ahead to the future of society-environment relations. Nature, the environment and sociology Defining nature and the environment The environmental issues noted above all seem to involve nature. But 'nature' is not a simple word with a single meaning. In fact, dictionary definitions usually describe some twelve distinct meanings of the word. Raymond Williams (1987) says that nature is one ofthe most complex and difficult words in the English language because its dominant meaning has changed over time along with the development of societies. 'Nature' can mean something that is essentialto a person or a thing. Why do some birds build their nests at the same time every year, for instance?We may be told that this is instinctive behaviour and an essential part of the 'nature' of birds. In fourteenthcentury Europe, however, a new dominant meaning began to emerge. Nature came to be seen instead as a series of forces that directed the world and ultimately explained why things happen. For example, even today many people consult astrological charts looking for their birth date-based 'star sign' and what guidance it can offer on their life decisions. When they do this, they implicitly draw on the same idea of 'natural forces' - in this case the movement of stars and planets - directing human affairs. By the nineteenth century, the dominant meaning of'nature' had changed again. This time it was seen as the whole material world ofthingsrather than as a series offorces. The natural world was a world full of natural things - animals, fields, mountains and much more. For instance, there was a trend towards looking at 'scenery' as landscapes and pictorials, with nature literally framed for our appreciation and enjoyment. Two major and related causes of this latest change in meaning were industrialization, which shifted people away from working the land in agricultural settings, and urbanization, which led to larger human settlements that generated new living environments largely divorced from natural things (Thomas 1984). Nature was seen as an obstacle that society had to tame and overcome in order to make progress, as the popular ideas of nature 'in the raw' or nature 'red in tooth and claw' suggest. For a minority of people, nature and society were seen as distinct, but nature was not seen as in need of taming. Instead, it was modern industrial society that was the problem, polluting and wasting nature to feed new urban lifestyles. Wild nature needed protection not domestication. Nevertheless, for both the tamers and the protectors, society and nature were seen as separate things. Nature was that which society was not, and vice versa. This meaning remains the dominant one today, though more people would probably now agree with the nature-protectors than did so in earlier periods. Since the 1950s, use of the word, 'nature' has started to give way to another term: the environment. Dictionary definitions of 'environment' suggest that it is the external conditions or surroundings ofpeople, especially those in which they live or work. David Harvey (1993) notes that this definition can apply to a number of situations. For example, we have aworking environment, a business environment and an urban environment. However, none of these environments is what most of us think of when the term is used today. Indeed, this chapter's From the seventeenth century onwards,wealthy social groups began to take pleasure in, and appreciate,landscape scenes such as this one, which also became the focus of the 'tourist gaze' CUrry 1990). title, The Environment, does not refer to any of these 'environments'. Most people today would probably expect this chapter to discuss pollution, climate change, animal welfare and so on, indicating that the environment has taken on a widespread and THINKING CRITICALLY How satisfactory is our working definition of'the environment' above? What things would it include and what would it exclude? Should human beings be considered part of nature? If so, explain why many people see human creations such as cities and urban environments as somehow artificial. special meaning. The environment is assumed to mean all of those non-human, natural surroundings within which human beings exist - sometimes called the 'natural environment' -and in its widest sense this is simply planet Earth as a whole. We will use this as our working definition throughout this chapter. Sociology and the environment In our age of global environmental problems and international environmental movements, sociologists can and must take a direct interest in our relationship to the environment within which we live. But just how can sociology help us to understand environmental issues? First, sociology can help us to understand how environmental problems are distributed. Although the tsunami in Asia killed people from all over the globe, most ofthose who died were native to the coastal regions around the Indian Ocean. If it had occurred in the richer countries of the Pacific Ocean, the Pacific Tsunami Warning System, based in the American state of Hawaii, would quickly have alerted the emergency authorities in the endangered countries where the infrastructure should be in place to move people away from the coast before a wave strikes. In 2005, the United Nations began to plan for an early warning system for the Indian Ocean, with money from Western donors. The distribution of risks from the environment varies with other types ofenvironmental issue too. For example, although global warming - the increase in average temperature across the globe - will affect everyone on the planet, it will do so in different ways. Flooding kills many more people in low-lying, poor countries, such as The Environment 159 Bangladesh, where housing and emergency infrastructures are less able to cope with severe weather than in Europe. for instance. In richer countries, such as the USA, the issues raised by global warming for policymakers are likely to concern indirect effects, such as rising levels of immigration as people try to enter the country from areas more directly affected. Second, sociologists can provide an account of how patterns of human behaviour create pressure on the natural environment (Cylke 1993). Although the 2004 tsunami was not a direct result of human action, many of the environmental challenges discussed in this chapter are. For example, the levels of pollution produced by industrialized countries would cause catastrophe if repeated in the world's poorer, non-industrial nations. If the impoverished regions of the world are to catch up with the richer ones, then citizens of the rich world are going to have to revise their expectations about constant Modern consumerism generates huge amounts of waste,much of which has conventionally been simply dumped in landfill sites. economic growth. Sociological theories of capitalist expansion, globalization or rationalization can all help us to understand how human societies are transforming the environment. Third, sociology can help us to evaluate policies and proposals aimed at providing solutions to environmental problems. For example, some environmental activists and 'green' writers argue that people in the rich countries must tUfn away from conswnerism and return to simpler ways of life living close to the land if global ecological disaster is to be avoided (Devall 1990; Schumacher 1977; Stead and Stead 1996). They argue that rescuing the global environment will thus mean radical social as well as technological change. However, given the enormous global inequalities that currently exist, there is little chance that the poor countties ofthe developing world will sacrifice their own economic growth because of environmental problems created largely by the rich countries. For instance, some governments in developing countries have argued that in relation to global warming there is no parallel between the 'luxury emissions' produced by the developed world and their own 'survival emissions', In this way, sociological accounts of international relations and global inequality can clarify some of the underlying causes of the environmental problems we face today. Sociology's founders - Marx, Durkheim and Weber - paid little attention to what we now call 'environmental issues', Marx analysed capitalism and its exploitative class relationships (see chapter I, 'What is Sociology?' and chapter ll , 'Stratification and Social Class'). Durkheim sought to understand the sources of social solidarity and to establish sociology within academic institutions (see chapter I, 'What is Sociology?' and chapter 3, 'Theories and Perspectives in Sociology'), while Weber investigated the connections between religion, rationality and modern capitalism. The relationship between human societies and the natural environment was not seen as especially problematic by a majority of people in the societies of the time; nor, therefore, was it a central problem for social scientists. Instead, the important social issues occupying scholars were social inequality, poverty and its alleviation, transforming unhealthy urban living conditions and assessing the future direction of industrial development. The natural environment was very much taken for granted, simply as the backdrop to the much more pressing and urgent social problems generated by industrial capitalism. Although there are ideas within theworkof the classical founders of sociology that have been pursued in an environmental direction by later sociologists, the environment was not a central problem of classical sociology. This situation became increasingly difficult once sociologists began to explore the problems identified by environmental campaigners. Could the classical theories provide any insights into human-environment relations? Do we need to abandon them altogether to understand how environmental problems have come about and how they might be solved? Some sociologists have returned to classical sociology, reinterpreting the classics in the light of environmental issues (Dickens 2004; Dunlap et al. 2002; Murphy 1997). However, most have not. Rather, sociological studies of the environment have been characterized by a dispute amongst social constructionist and critical realist approaches over just how environmental issues should be studied sociologically. Social constructionism and critical realism Social constructionism is an approach to studying social problems, including environmental problems. Social constructionists have investigated how some environmental issues come to be seen as Significant while others are seen as less important or are largely ignored (Braun and Castree 1998; Hannigan 2006). Are the environmental problems that are thought to be most important today really the ones which are For more on social constructionism, see chapter 3, 'Theories and Perspectives in Sociology', and chapter 7, 'Social Interaction and Everyday Life'. the most serious and in need of urgent action? Constructionists ask a series of important questions about environmental problems. What is the history ofthe problem and how has it developed? Who is making the claim that it is a problem; do they have any vested interest and stand to benefit from doing so? What do they say about it and does the evidence support this? How do they say it? Do they use scientific,emotional, political or moral arguments and why do they do so? Who opposes the claim and on what grounds? Do opponents stand to lose if the claim is successful and could that, rather than the evidence, explain their opposition? Such questions give sociologists a clearly defined role in the study of environmental issues, which no other discipline performs. They also add something new to our understanding of environmental issues and prob- lems. Social constructionists remind us that all environmental problems are, in part, socially created or 'constructed' by groups of people. Nature never does 'speak for itself', but people do speak on its behalf. This process of construction can be examined, understood and explained. And in doing so, the public should be in a better position to assess whether an environmental problem really is as serious as the c1aimsmakers say it is. For some sociologists though, construetionism is problematic, particularly when studying environmental issues. Social constructionism tends to be 'agnostic' about the central problem at issue (lrwin 2001). For example, a constructionist study ofthe depletion ofthe ozone layer would tell us a lot about how this problem came to be seen as important, what arguments were made about it and who opposed the claim. But on the central question - is the ozone layer rea lly becoming dangerously The Environment 161 depleted? - social constructionism remains agnostic. For environmental activists and those committed to solving environmental problems, this is just not helpful. In short, constructionism tells us a lot about people and social interactions, but nothing about society- environment relations. An alternative approach, known as 'environmental realism' (Bell 2004) or critical realism, attempts to approach environmental issues in a scientific way, which brings together evidence from across the social and natural sciences in order to understand better why environmental problems occur. Critical realism aims to get beneath the surface of the visible evidence to uncover the underlying causes of events and problems (Benton 1994; Dickens 1996, 2004; Martell 1994). In contrast to the agnosticism of social constructionism towards the reality of environmental problems, critical realists are prepared to accept and debate knowledge and evidence from the natural and environmental sciences in its explanations. 'Using your sociological imagination 5.1', on BSE in the UK, illustrates some key points ofthis approach. Realist approaches such as that described above require the findings from a range of academic disciplines: biology, zoology, history, sociology, political science and more. Only in this way can we properly explain how and why BSE and vC)D posed such a problem in the 1980s and '90s. Like social constructionists, realists would agree that cows are social as well as natural creatures. Arguing a constructionist case, Alan lrwin says: 'The modern cow is the product of generations of human-controlled cattlebreeding, feeding and housing' (2001: 80). But unlike constructionists, realists search for causal explanations and are prepared to explore and debate the natural science of environmental issues in ways that social constructionists do not. Critical realism takes into account the objective reality of natural objects and environments, and this means rethinking our sociological theories and concepts with this in mind. 162 THE ENVIR ONMENT 5.1 'Mad cow disease' in the UK In 1996.British government ministers admitted the possibility that at least 10 recent human deaths had been caused by a new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) in humans, which may have developed as a result of people eating beef infected with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) during the I980s. This was a huge shock. Millions of people had eaten beefin this period and, at least theoreticall" could develop the disease. How had this happened? BSE is a fatal neurodegenerative disease of cattle. whose symptoms are similar to those of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (ClD) in human beings.These symptoms include the loss of coordination, nervousness, loss of memory; and aggression (hence 'mad' cows).From the experience of sheep farming, it was thought that BSE could not cross the species barrier into the human population. ClD is a recognized but very rare disease in human beings, but is unrelated to BSE. The UK. BSE Inquiry (1998-2000) identified the cause of BSE in cattle as a gene mutation in a single cow (named Cow 133).But the most widely accepted explanation for the spread of BSE is that cattle were being fed BSE-infected offal (Macnaghten and Urry 1998: 253-65). The Inquiry Report said that the problem was 'the recycling of animal protein in ruminant feed'. The Report also noted that the link between BSE and the human vClD, 'was now clearly established'.As of7 January 2008,the National Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance Unit in Edinburgh reports that 163 people have died from vClD. Meat-rendering practices were changed and new rules brought in to prevent a recurrence, but public confidence in science, politics, regulatory bodies and the meat industry was thoroughly shaken by the episode. On the face of it, this seems like an episode of a naturally occurring disease in animals, unrelated to social processes. However, the transmission and spread of BSE was the product of decisions taken within the animal feed production system. The previous scientific assumption that BSE would not cross the species barrier was shown to be wrong. BSE-infected beef did lead to vClD in humans. Treating cattle as commercial products and denying their herbivorous nature by feeding them dead cattle produced an unexpected outcome that no one had forecast. A critical realist approach would suggest that to understand this event properly (and therefore to put in place the right measures to prevent it from happening again), we need to know what kind of creatures cows are: what are their natural capacities? We also need to understand human beings to know why the disease had such devastating effects on people. What happens when infected foodstuff finds its way into the human body?We also need to know how the food production system operates and what political and economic decisions were made that allowed dead animals to be fed to others. And we need culturally specific knowledge - just why do so many people eat so much beef in the UK.? From this brief sketch of these two approaches, we can say that social constructionism leads in the direction of a THINKING CRITICALLY What advantages are there in sociologists taking an 'agnostic' stance to environmental problems?Why might this not be such a good idea? How would social constructionists investigate the BSE epidemic and its consequences, as outlined above? sociology of the environment that explores environmental issues from a conventional sociological position, using concepts and theories from within the discipline. By contrast, critical realism leads towards an environmental sociology, which demands the revision of existing sociological approaches to take account of the complex intertwining of society and environment (Sutton 2007). However, as we will see during the chapter, many research studies in this field tend to veer between these two polarized alternatives. The Environment 163 Long haul Medium haul Short haul Air Travel ! ! ! Non-fossil electricity High speed train coal-fired electricity !Passenger Trains F------------.: High occupancy Low occupancy city bus High comfort BusesfTrams ! ! Two occupant small car Single occupant light truck Cars/Light trucks ! ! o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 gC per passenger-km Figure 5.1 European carbon emissions (grams ofcarbon per kilometre) by mode of transport, 2007 Source: ATAG h11p://atag.org/flles/PR%20W N-17000ZA.pdf (Slide 6,accessed 18January 2008) What are environmental issues? As we have seen, there are many different environmental issues confronting the contemporary world. Some are local or regional in character, while others have an impact on the global human population. However, what they all share and what makes them specifically environmental issues is that they involve both social relationships and interactions and non-human, natural phenomena. In this sense, they are hybrid issues ofsociety and the environment (lrwin 2001: 26). Keep this point in mind when you read the rest of this section, which covers a range of environmental issues. Pollution and waste Air pollution Air pollution, caused by toxic emissions into the atmosphere, is thought to claim more than 2.7 million lives per year. It is possible to make a distinction between two types of air pollution: 'outdoor pollution', produced mainly by industrial pollutants and automobile emissions, and 'indoor pollution', which is caused by burning fuels in the home for heating and cooking. Traditionally, air pollution has been seen as a problem that amicts industrialized countries, with their greater numbers of factories and motorized vehicles. In recent years, however, attention has been drawn to the dangers of'indoor pollution' in the developing world. It is suggested that more than 90 per cent of deaths linked to air pollution occur in the developing world. This is because many of the fuels that are burned by people in developing countries, such as wood and dung, are not as clean as modern fuels such as kerosene and propane. Until the middle of the twentieth century, air pollution in many countries was caused primarily by the widespread burning of coal - a fossil fuel- which emits sulphur dioxide and thick black smoke into the atmosphere. In many Eastern European countries and the developing world, the practice remains widespread. Coal was used extensively to 164 THE ENVIRONMENT heat homes and as power in factories. In 1956, in an attempt to reduce smog, a Clean Air Act was passed in Britain to regulate emissions from chimneys. Smokeless types of fuels, such as kerosene, propane and natural gas, were promoted and are now widely used in the industrialized countries. Since the 1960s the main source of air pollution has been the growth in the use of motorized vehicles. Vehicle emissions are particularly harmful because they enter the atmosphere at a much lower level than emissions from chimneys. As figure 5.1 shows, the range of emissions that are produced by different types of vehicle is quite large. Cars, which account for some 80 per cent of travel in Europe, have a particularly harmful impact on the environment. A single occupancy car journey can cause the same weight of carbon emissions per kilometre travelled as along-haul flight. For this reason, attempts to reduce air pollution in many industrialized countries have focused on the use of low-emission travel alternatives such as passenger trains, high occupancy buses and the sharingofcar journeys. Air pollution has been linked to a number of health problems among humans, including respiratory difficulties, cancers and lung disease. Although outdoor pollution has long been associated with industrialized countries, it is growing rapidly in the developing world. As countries undergo rapid processes of industrialization, factory emissions increase and the number of vehicles on the roads also grows. In many developing countries, leaded petrol is still in use, although it has been phased out in much of the developed world. Levels of air pollution were particularly high in many areas ofEastern Europe and the (former) Soviet Union, though economic restructuring and the collapse of industrial manufacturing in these areas has reduced this somewhat since the 1990s. Air pollution does not only affect the health of human and animal populations; it also has a damaging impact on other elements of the ecosystem. One harmful consequence of air pollution is acid rain, a phenomenon which occurs when sulphur and nitrogen oxide emissions in one country drift across borders and produce acidic rainfalls in another. Acid rain is harmful to forests, crops and animal life, and leads to the acidification of lakes. Canada, Poland and the Nordic countries have been particularly hard hit by acid rain. In Sweden, for example,20,000 lakes out ofa total of90,000 have been acidified. Like many environmental issues, acid rain is difficult to counteract because it is transnational in its origins and consequences. Much of the acid rain in eastern Canada, for example, has been shown as linked to industrial production in the state of New York, across the US-Canadian border. Other countries suffering from acid rain have similarly found that it is not within their control to tackle the problem, since its origins lie across national borders. In some instances, bilateral or regional agreements have been concluded in an attempt to reduce the severity of acid rain. Yet emissions remain high in some areas and are growing quickly in the developing world. Water pollution Throughout history, people have depended on water to fulfil a host ofimportant needsdrinking, cooking, washing, irrigating crops, fishing and many other pursuits. Although water is one of the most valuable and essential natural resources, it has also suffered enormous abuse at the hands of human beings. For many years, waste products - both human and manufactured were dumped directly into rivers and oceans with barely a second thought. Only in the past halfcentury or so have concerted efforts been made in many countries to protect the quality of water, to preserve the fish and wildlife that depend on it, and ensure access to clean water for the human population. Regardless of these efforts, water pollution remains a serious problem in many parts of the world. Even in lush rainforest where water is abundant, urban settlements, factories and intensive farming practices can make getting access to clean water a difficult task. One of the 'Millennium Development Goals' set by the United Nations in 2000 is to 'reduce by half the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water' by 2015. Water pollution can be understood broadly to refer to the contamination of the water supply by elements such as toxic chemicals and minerals, pesticides or untreated sewage. It poses the greatest threat to people in the developing world. Currently, more than one billion people around the world lack access to safe drinking water and more than two billion lack sanitation. Sanitation systems remain underdeveloped in many of the world's poorest countries and human waste products are often emptied directly into streams, rivers and lakes. The high levels of bacteria that result from untreated sewage lead to a variety of water-borne diseases, such as diarrhoea, dysentery and hepatitis. Some two billion cases of diarrhoea are caused annually by contaminated water; five million people die each year from diarrhoeal diseases. Some progress is being made to improve access to the world's resources of water. During the 1990s, nearly one billion people gained access to safe water and the same number to sanitation, though ensuring safe water supplies remains a problem, particularly in some parts of Africa (UNDP 2002; see also figure 5.2). The problem may actually be worsening as water supplies in developing countries are privatised, raising the cost for customers, whilst the effects of global warming produce more regular droughts (see 'Global Society 5.1'). In industrialized countries. cases of water pollution are often caused by the overuse of fertilizers in agricultural areas. Over a period of years, nitrates ftom chemical pesticides Global Society 5.1 The privatization ofwater Western companies have the know-how - and the financial incentive - to supply water to poor nations. But, as RichardWachman reports, their involvement is already provoking unrest ... Water becomes the new oil as world runs dry The midday sun beats down on a phalanx of riot police facing tliousands ofjeering demonstrators, angry at proposals to put up their water bills by more than a third. Moments later a uniformed officer astride a horse shouts an order and the police charge down the street to embark on a clubwielding melee that leaves dozens ofbloodied protesters with broken limbs. A film clip from the latest offering from Hollywood? Unfortunately not. It's a description of a real-life event in Cochabamba, Bolivia's third largest city, where a subsidiary ofBechtel. the US engineering giant,took over the municipal water utility and increased bills to a level that the poorest could not afford. Welcome to a new world, where war and civil strife loom in the wake of chronic water shortages caused by rising population,drought (exacerbated by global warming) and increased demand from the newly affluent middle classes in the emerging economies ofAsia and Latin America. At a City briefing by an international bank last week, a senior executive said: 'Today everyone is talking about global warming, but my prediction is that in two years water will move to the top of the geopolitical agenda: The question for countries as far apart as China and Argentina is whether to unleash market forces by allowing access to private European and American multinationals that have the technological know-how to help bring water to the masses but at a price that many may be unable, or unwilling, to pay. As Cochabamba illustrates,water is an explosive issue in developing countries, where people have traditionally received supplies for free from local wells and rivers.But in the past 15 years rapid industrialisation, especially in places such as China, has led to widespread pollution and degradation of the local environment. A report out today from accountancy giant Deloitte & Touche says humans seem to have a peculiar talent for making previously abundant resources scarce:'This is especially the case with water',it observes. According to the firm's findings, more than one billion people will lack access to clean water by next year. Paul Lee, research director at Deloitte, and one of the authors ofthe report,says: 'Demand for water is expected to be driven by economic growth and population increases. India's demand for water is expected to exceed supply by 2020: The World Wildlife Fund has forecast that in the Himalayas, the retreat of glaciers could reduce summer water flows by up to two-thirds. In the Ganges area,this would cause a water shortage for 500 million people. Lee says:'The lack ofthe most important form of liquid in the world is therefore a fundamental issue and one that the technology sector can play a major role in addressing: But the crux of the problem remains:according to a report from Credit Suisse, annual world water use has risen sixfold during the past century, more than double the rate of population growth. By 2025, almost two-thirds of the global population will live in countries where water will be a scarce commodity. And that could lead to conflict, as United Nations secretary-general Ban Ki-moon warned last week. Asia looks vulnerable, with China planning to syphon offTibet's water supply to make up for shortages in the parched north. Elsewhere, the Israel-Palestine conflict is at least partly about securing supplies from the River Jordan; similarly, water is a major feature of the strife in Sudan that has left Darfur devastated. When it comes to this most basic ofcommodities,the stakes could hardly be higher. Source: Richard Wachman, Observer,9 December 2007 seep into the groundwater supply; nearly 25 per cent of groundwater in Europe shows levels of contamination higher than that deemed permissible by the European Union (UNDP 1998). Some of the most polluted water can be found near former industrial areas, where traces of mercury, lead and other metals have lodged in the sediments and continue slowly to emit pollutants into the water supply over a period ofyears. THINKING CRITICALLY List all the factors that are contributing to the lack of safe water in some developing countries. If privatizing water supplies leads to a higher cost, this should help to stop people from wasting water unnecessarily and therefore, indirectly, to water conservation. But why might privatization have very different consequences in developed and developing countries? The quality of rivers in most Western industrialized countries has been improving in recent years. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, however, river pollution remains a very real concern. Fourfifths of the water samples taken from 200 rivers in the former Soviet Union revealed levels of contamination that were danger- ouslyhigh. Solid waste Next time you visit a supermarket, toy store or fast-food restaurant, pay attention to the amount of packaging that accompanies the products you see there.There are few things 0 - 6% 7 -17% L:::J 18 - 32% L:::J 33 - 48% [ ! 49 - 63% -64-87% ! i no data The Environment 167 you can buy without packaging in our present age. Although there are clear benefits to packaging in terms of displaying goods attractively and guaranteeing the safety of products, there are enormous drawbacks as well. One of the clearest indicators of increasing consumption is the growing amount of domestic waste - what goes into our rubbish bins - being produced worldwide. Where the developing countries generated 100- 330 kilograms of domestic solid waste per capita in the early 1990s, the figure was 414 kilograms for the European Union and 720 for North America (UNDP 1998). As figure 5.3 illustrates, waste generation is closely tied to the relative prosperity ofcountries as consumption of goods increases; Poland, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, countries that have only recently started to emulate the model of Western consumerism, generate less than half the waste per capita of the USA, Denmark and Australia. There have been increases in both the absolute amount ofwaste produced, and the amount produced per person, in a majority of countries around the world. The industrialized societies have been called 'throw-away societies' because the Figure 5.2 Percentage ofpopulallon with lack of access to safe water. by countr\( 2004 Source: www.theglobaleducallonproject.org/earthlhuman-condillons.php (accessed 17 January 2008) 800 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 600 ------- -------------- ----------------------------------------- 400 --- ---- ----.------ -.- -- 200 - - 0 >- >'" >- c: -t .~ >-uu .S! .S! 0 '" '" u c: '" E u ro ~ c: '" '" ~ E E" u c: :c :c " Q) u ~ c: '" " c: Cl '" ~ " ·c u 0 c: => 'iij c: '" ~ '" c: '" 'x .,., '" '" a. '" .§, ~ '" u c: u; c: '" a..!!! ~ .!!! 0 => => :; c: 0 ro '" ~ => Cl '" ~ '" u E 0 Ea. a. Q) '" '" ..., _ c: t:: § ;: => 0 ~ Cl Ll UJ Q; c: u; o Q) a. ~ ~ ::;; f'" (!) '" u:: 0 u. « c: E => z .!2() N '" a. IUJ () ;;Z Q) !:! Q) .c (!) 0 «.c .,., W Q) .§; ;: ;; x " '" Q) 0 z u => UJQ) > 2 ..J N 0 Z 'c() (Jj :::J Figure 5.3 Municipal waste generation in kilogram per capita, OECD countries, 2003 (or latest year available) Source: OECD 2007 volume of items discarded as a matter of course is so large. In most countries of the industrialized world, waste collection services are almost universal, but it is becoming increasingly difficult to dispose of the enormous amounts of refuse. Landfill sites are quickly filling up, and many urban areas have run out of disposal room for domestic waste. In Scotland for example, around 90 per cent of household waste goes into landfill sites and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency reported that in 2006 household waste was still growing at 2 per cent per annum. The international trade in waste has led to the export of recycling to China where waste is often sorted by hand in poorly regulated working environments that produce environmental degradation. The UK government set a target of recycling 40 per cent of municipal waste by 2005. But in 2001- 2 just 12 per cent of household waste was recycled, compared with 7 per cent in 199&-7. During the same period, the amount of waste produced by each household in England increased by 17 per cent (HMSO 2004). Table 5.1 shows how waste is managed in England. Although this amount of recycling may seem low compared to the overall amount of domes· tic waste that is produced, a large proportion ofwhat is thrown away cannot be easily reprocessed or reused. Many kinds of plas· tics widely employed in food packaging simply become unusable waste; there is no way of recycling it, and it has to be buried in refuse tips where it remains for centuries. Recycling is becoming a huge industry around the world; the formal global recy· cling industry currently employs around 1.5 million people handling some 500 million tonnes of waste, generating an annual turnover of US$200 billion. However, there is still a long way to go to transform the world's 'throw-away societies'. In the developing world, the greatest problem with domestic waste at the present time is the lack of refuse collection services. It has been estimated that 20- 50 per cent of domestic waste in the developing world goes uncollected. Poorly managed waste '" u Nc: '"~UJ u 2 'c :::J Management of municipal waste, England: by method 199617 1998/9 200011 200112 LandfIll 20.631 21.534 22.039 22.317 Incineration with energy 1,446 2.117 2.391 2.459 from waste Recycled/compostedi:l 1.750 2.525 3,446 3.907 Otherb 761 160 182 140 Total 24.588 26.337 28.057 28.823 ~ Includes household and non-household sources collected for recychng or for centralIzed compostll1g,home compostmg estlmates are not mcluded ill tlns total I> Includes mcmeration MthOU! energy from waste and refuse denved fuel manufacture Excludes any processmg pnor to landfillmg and materials sent to materials reclamation facilities (MRFs) Source' HMSO (2004) systems mean that refuse piles up in the streets. contributing to the spread of disease. With the passing of time, it is very likely that the developing world will face problems with waste disposal that are even more acute than the current situation in the industrialized countries. As societies become richer. there is a gradual shift from organic waste, such as food remains, to plastic and synthetic materials. like packaging, that take much longer to decompose. Resource depletion Human societies depend on very many resources from the natural world - for example, water, wood, fish, animals and plant life. These elements are often termed 'renewable resources', because in a healthy ecosystem they replace themselves automatically with the passing of time. Yet if the consumption of renewable resources gets out of balance or is too extreme, there is a danger that they will be depleted altogether. Some evidence suggests that such a process may be occurring. The deterioration of renewable resources is of great concern to many environmentalists. Water You may not think of water as a depletable resource - after all, it constantly replenishes itself through rainfall. If you live in Europe or North America, you probably do not give much thought to your water supply at all, except occasionally when restrictions are put on its use in the summer months. Yet for people in many parts of the world, access to a constant water supply is a more chronic and severe problem. In some densely populated regions, the high demand for water cannot be met by available water resources. In the arid climates of North Africa and the Middle East, for example, the pressure on water supply is acute and shortages have become commonplace. This trend is almost sure to intensify in the years to come. There are several reasons why this is so. The first is that much of the projected world population growth over the next quartercentury is likely to be concentrated in areas that are already experiencing problems with water shortages. Furthermore, much of this growth will occur in urban areas, where the infrastructure will struggle to accommodate the water and sanitation needs of this expanded population. Climate change also has a potential impact on the depletion of the water supply. As temperatures rise, more water will be needed for drinking and irrigation. Yet it is also likely that groundwater may not replenish itself as rapidly as before and that rates of evaporation may also increase. Recycling has become a huge industry worldwide; many people have built the recycling of domestic waste into their everyday routines. Finally, changes in climate patterns which may accompany global warming will be likely to affect existing patterns of precipitation, altering access to water supplies in ways that are quite unpredictable. Soil degradation and desertification According to the 1998 UN Human Development Report, a third of the world's population lives more or less directly from the land - on the food they can grow or gather, and the game they can catch. Because they are largely dependent on the earth, they are particularly vulnerable to changes affecting their ability to live off the land. In many areas of Asia and Africa that are experiencing rapid population growth, the problem of soil degradation threatens to impoverish millions of people. Soil degradation is the process by which the quality of the earth is worsened and its valuable natural elements are stripped away through over-use, drought or inadequate fertilization. THINKING CRITICALLY Is it possible that there is a finite level of basic resources on planet Earth, which may, in time, simply run out. or will there always be enough water, food and land to supply the global human population? If resources are finite, how can we best conserve them? If resources are not finite, why do some countries still not have access to safe water and adequate food supplies? The long-term effects of soil degradation are extremely severe and difficult to reverse. In areas where the soil has been degraded, agricultural productivity declines and there is less arable land available per head. It becomes difficult or impossible to keep cattle or other livestock because ofa lack offodder. In many instances, people are forced to migrate in search of more fertile land. Desertification refers to instances of intense land Global Society 5.2 Soil degradation and economic development in Africa Soil crisis is holding back African recovery The fertility ofAfrica's soil is being depleted at a rate that threatens to W1dermine the continent's attempts at eradicating hunger with sustainable agricultural development. A study has fOW1d three-quarters ofAfrica's farmland is plagued by severe soil degradation caused by wind and soil erosion and the loss of vital mineral nutrients. This degradation can partly explain why agricultural productivity in Africa has remained largely stagnant for 40 years while Asia's productivity has increased threefold, the authors claim. Julio Henao and Carlos Baanante of the nonprofit International Centre for Soil Fertility and Agricultural Development in Muscle Shoals, Alabama, found bad farming practices have damaged soil health on the continent between 1980 and 2004. Farmers in Africa have traditionally relied on clearing land to grow crops then leaving it fallow to regain some ofits fertility 'But population pressure now forces farmers to grow crop after crop, "mimng" or depleting the soil of nutrients while giving nothing back', the report says. 'With little access to fertilisers,the farmers are forced to bring less fertile soils on marginal land into production, at the expense ofAfrica's wildlife and forests: Mr Henao and Mr Baanante fOW1d that during 2002 to 2004 about 85 per cent ofAfrican farmland was haemorrhaging mineral nutrients at an annual rate greater than 30 kg per hectare, and 40 per cent of farmland was losing nutrients at the higher rate of 60 kg per hectare a year. 'The very resources on which African farmers and their families depend for welfare and survival are being undermined by soil degradation caused by nutrient mining and associated factors,such as deforestation,use of marginal lands and poor agricultural practices', the report says. The worst-affected countries in terms of soil depletion are Guinea Bissau, the Democratic Republic of Congo,Angola,Rwanda,Burundi and Uganda.With a population growth of 3 per cent per year,the munber of malnourished people in subSaharan Africa has grown from about 88 million in 1970 to more than 200 million by the end ofthe last century the report says. Source: Steve Connor,Independent,31 March 2006 degradation which result in desert-like conditions over large areas. This phenomenon has already affected territory adding up to the size ofRussia and Indonesia combined, putting more than !l0 countries at risk. and the Caribbean (losing 7.4 million hectares) and sub-Saharan Africa (losing 4.1 million hectares). Although many types of forest are involved in the process of deforestation, the fate of tropical rainforests has attracted the greatest attention. Tropical rainforests, which cover some 7 per cent of the earth's surface, are home to a great number ofplant and animal species that contribute to the earth's biodiversity - the diversity of species of Iife forms. They are also home to many of the plants and oils from which medicines are developed. Tropical rainforests are currently shrinking at a rate of approximately 1per cent a year,and may well disappear altogether by the end of this century if current trends are not halted. In many areas of South America where tropical rainforests are most extensive, rainforests have been burned 10 make room for more land to graze Deforestation Forests are an essential element of the ecosystem: they help 10 regulate water supplies, release oxygen into the atmosphere and prevent soil erosion. They also contribute to many people's livelihoods as sources of fuel, food, wood, oils, dyes, herbs and medicines. Yet despite their crucial importance, more than a third ofthe earth's original forests have now disappeared. Deforestation describes the destruction of forested land, usually through commercial logging. Deforestation claimed 15 million hectares of land in the 1980s, with the largest amounts occurring in Latin America Deforestation threatens significantly to reduce the diversity oflife forms on the planet. cattle. In other areas of the world, such as West Africa and the South Pacific, the international demand for exotic hardwoods has fuelled the destruction ofrainforests. Trends in increasing consumption therefore encourage developing countries to export their natural commodities- a process which results in both environmental destruction and a loss of biodiversity. Deforestation has both human and environmental costs. [n terms of human costs, some poor communities which were previously able to sustain or supplement their livelihoods through forests are no longer able to do so. Deforestation can further impoverish marginalized populations, which rarely share in the enormous revenues generated from the granting of logging rights and the sale of timber. The environmental costs of deforestation include soil erosion and floods: when they are intact, mountainous forests perform the important function of absorbing and recycling much of the water from rainfall. Once the forests are missing, rain cascades off the slopes, causing floods and then droughts. Genetic modification of food As wewiJI see in chapter 13, 'Global Inequality', some 830 million people around the globe go hungry each day and, as we saw above, increasing soil degradation threatens to undermine economic development in Africa. The process of global warming may also contribute to increased desertification and poor harvests, all of which has led to fears that food shortages may become even more widespread. In some of the world's most densely populated areas, people are highly dependent on staple food crops such as rice - whose stocks are dwindling. Many worry that present farming techniques will not be able to produce rice yields sufficient to support the growing population. As with many environmental challenges, the threat of famine is not evenly distributed. The industrialized countries have extensive surpluses of grain. It is the poorer countries, where the population growth is projected to be greatest, that grain shortfalls are likely to be a chronic problem. Some scientists and politicians argue that the key to averting a potential food crisis may lie in recent advances in science and biotechnology. By manipulating the genetic composition ofbasic crops, such as rice, it is now possible to boost a plant's rate of photosynthesis and to produce bigger crop yields. This process is known as genetic modification; plants that are produced in such a way are called genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Genetic modification can be carried out for a variety ofpurposes not only to enhance the crop yield. Scientists have produced GMOs with higher than normal vitamin content, for example; other genetically modified crops are resistant to commonly used agricultural herbicides that are used to kill the weeds round them, as well as insects and fungal and viral pests. Food products that are made from, or contain traces of, GMOs are known as GM foods. GM crops are different from anything that has existed before, because they involve transplanting genes between different organisms. This is amuch more radical intervention into nature than the older methods of cross-breeding that have been used for many years. GMOs are produced by techniques of gene splicing that can be used to transplant genes between animals as well as plants. For instance, in recent experiments human genes have been introduced into farm animals, such as pigs, with a view to eventually providing replacement parts for human transplants. Human genes have even been spliced into plants, although the GM crops that have been marketed so far do not involve this kind of radical bioengineering. Scientists claim that a GM strain of 'super-rice' could boost rice yields by as much as 35 per cent. Another strain called 'golden rice' - which contains added amounts of vitamin A - could reduce vitamin A deficiency in more than 120 million children worldwide. You might think that such advances in biotechnology would be welcomed enthusiastically by people around the world. But in fact, the issue of genetic modification has become one ofthe most controversial issues of our age. For many people, it highlights the fine line that exists between the benefits of technology and scientific innovation, on the one hand, and the risks of environmental destruction, on the other. Controversy over GMfoods The saga ofGM foods began only a few years ago when some ofthe world's leading chemical and agricultural firms decided that new knowledge about the workings of genes could transform the world's food supply. These companies had been making pesticides and herbicides, but wanted to move into what they saw as a major market for the future. The American firm Monsanto was the leader in developing much of the new technology. Monsanto bought up seed companies, sold off its chemical division and devoted much of its energies to bringing the new crops to the market. Led by its then Chief Executive Robert Shapiro, Monsanto launched a gigantic advertising campaign promoting the benefits of its GM crops to farmers and to consumers. The early responses were just as the company had confidently anticipated. By early 1999, 55 per cent ofthe soya beans and 35 per cent of the maize produced in the United States contained genetic alterations. GM crops at that point were already growing on 35 million hectares of land across the world an area one and a half times the size of Britain. In addition to North America, GM crops were also being widely grown in China. Monsanto's sales campaign stressed a number ofpositive virtues of GM foods. The company claimed that GM crops could help feed the world's poor and reduce the use of chemical pollutants, especially the chemicals used in pesticides and herbicides. It is claimed, for example, that GM potatoes Greenpeace has led some of the anti-GM protests in recent years,such as this attack on a field of genetically modified corn in Norfolk. need 40 per cent less chemical insecticide than would be required using traditional farming techniques. Biotechnology, according to Monsanto, will allow us to grow better-quality crops with higher yields, while at the same time sustaining and protecting the environment. Since GM crops are essentially quite new, no one can be certain about what their effects will be once they are introduced into the environment. Many ecological and consumer groups became concerned about the potential risks involved with the adoption of this largely untested technology. Concern about GM foods was especially widespread in Europe (Take 2004). In Britain, hostility to the commercial growing of GM crops was stimulated by the findings of Or Arpad Pusztai, an internationally renowned geneticist working in a government laboratory in Scotland. In his research, Or Pusztai had tested potatoes which had a gene for a particular natural insecticide inserted - a protein known as lectin, extracted from a certain type of flower. The results indicated that rats which ate the GM potatoes experienced significant damage to their immune systems and reduced organ growth. Or Pusztai's findings were criticized by other leading scientists and he was dismissed from his post at the government laboratory after speaking on television about his worries concerning GM foods. By this time, GM foods had become a front-page story in the news almost every day. Numerous TV and radio debates, chat shows and phone-ins were organized to discuss the issue. Many members of the British public registered their antagonism to GM crops; some even engaged in 'direct action', pulling GM crops out of the ground at official trial sites across the country. Similar responses occurred in a range of other European countries. These eventually spread back to the USA, where there had previously been little debate. In the UK, The Environment 175 120 Tr=========~------------------------~ -<>- Total 100 -0- Industrial -fr- Developing 80 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Increase of 13%, 12 million hectares (30 million acres) between 2005 and 2006. Figure S.4 Global area of genetically modified crops, 2006 Source. ISAAA Brief 35, 2006 seven out of the eight major supermarket chains changed their policy on GM foods. Five of them imposed a complete ban on GM ingredients in their own-brand products, which is still in place, and all of them insisted on better labelling in their stores. Two large companies, Unilever and Nestle, announced that they would withdraw their acceptance of genetically modified foodstuffs. Some farmers in the USA who had been engaged in the large-scale cultivation of GM crops changed back to conventional crop production. One survey in 2003 showed that 59 per cent of the UK population strongly agreed that genetically modified foods should be banned (HMSO 2005). The protests of environmentalists and consumer groups had a major impact on the fate of Mansanto, and caused a serious decline in its share value. Robert Shapiro appeared on television to admit that his company had made major mistakes: 'We have probably irritated and antagonized more people than we have persuaded', he said. 'Our confidence in this technology and our enthusiasm for it has, I think, been widely seen - and understandably so - as condescension or indeed arrogance: It was an extraordinary turnaround from the world-beating confidence with which he had spoken only a few months before. Monsanto was forced to drop altogether one of its most controversial plans - the idea of using a gene called 'the terminator'. This gene would have ensured that seeds which Monsanto sold to farmers would be sterile after one generation. The farmers would have had to order seeds each year from the company. Critics of Monsanto claimed that the company was trying to lure farmers into a form of 'bioslavery', and the issue highlights again the inequalities of power between those companies looking to take advantage of globalization processes and those at their sharp end. GM food continues to generate controversy in Europe and large parts of Africa. The European Union refused patents ofnew GM crops between 1998 and 2004. The complete moratorium was raised in 2004 when imports of a further GM maize crop were approved, and a scheme was introduced to label foods containing GM products. However, the EU's actions were too slow for the big GM producers, particularly in the United States, who filed a complaint with theWorld Trade Organization (WTO) in 2003against the EU's failure to authorize the commercialization of GM crops, claiming that the European position had no scientific basis and broke free trade laws. In 2006 the WIO ruled that a series of European countries, including Austria, Germany, Greece, France and Luxembourg, had broken international trade rules by imposing bans on the marketing and growing of GM foods. However, it is hard to imagine that European consumers, who have consistently refused to buy GM foods, will suddenly drop their opposition based purely on such a ruling. In Nrica, GM food aid has also run into trouble. In 2002, Zambia refused to accept American food-aid donations of corn and soya because much of it was genetically modified and reduced the genetic diversity which was essential for long-term sustainable agriculture. Zambia's president, Levy Mwanawasa, called the imports 'poison'. By 2004 Zambia had been joined by Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho and Angola in refusing genetically modified food aid. Evaluating the risks a/GM/aads The issue of GM crops highlights the point we noted at the start of the chapter, namely that environmental issues always involve complex combinations of the natural and the social and it is not realistic to expect them to be easily separated. Despite the assertions ofthe GM producers, no one can say with certainty that genetically modified crops are risk-free. The genetic code is highly complicated - adding new genes into plants or organisms could produce as yet unpredicted diseases or other harmful consequences. Because the technology is so unknown, new findings and discoveries are being uncovered with startling frequency. In May 2000, the British government admitted that thousands of acres of conventional oilseed rape that had been planted by farmers had in fact been 'contaminated' as GM crops pollinated those nearby. German research published just weeks later claimed that a gene commonly used to modify oilseed rape had jumped the species barrier into the guts of bees. In the short period between these two startling revelations, Monsanto itself acknowledged that its modified soybeans - the GMO that has been cultivated most extensively for commercial purposes - contain unexpected gene fragments that had previously gone undetected. Such findings reinforce what many environmental activists have been warning for some time. Although genetic modification may have enormous potential benefits, the risks involved are unpredictable and difficult to calculate. Once released into the environment, GMOs may set off a string ofknock-on effects that will be difficult to monitor and control. In the face of this dilemma, many environmentalists favour what is often termed the precautionary principle. This principle proposes that where there is sufficient doubt about the possible risks of new departures, it is betterto stick to existing practices than to change them. Despite the concerns of environmentalists, the amount of land given over to growing GM crops has continued to increase, particularly in the developing world, where the environmental movement is not as strongly established and laws restricting the growth of GM crops are generally less strict (see figure 5.5). Assessing the debate about GM foods, Matsuura (2004) argues that in the early days the biotechnology industry made two mistakes: first it tried to ignore public concerns and then it attempted to address THINIIING CRITICALLY In what ways can the GM crops/food issue be seen as a specifically environmental issue? What makes it so? How realistic is the 'precautionary principle' - that we should always err on the side of caution and not go ahead with any new technologies that have not been exhaustively tested? What realworld examples of unproven technologies are there which may call this idea into question? Argentina 19% Brazil 10% 7% 4% Others 5% Figure 5.5 GMcrop plantings by country, 2005 Source:Brookes and Barfoot 2005 them through purely rational arguments. Later in this chapter. we will look at a broader approach to the concept of risk, taken by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck. Global warming Based on average global temperature, 1998 and 2005 were the two warmest years on record since reliable measurements began in the late nineteenth century. Many scien· tists have argued that this is a good example of how global warming is now affecting the Earth's climate. The effects of very hot weather can be catastrophic. The Earth Policy Institute, an environmental think· tank, has estinnated that a heat wave in 2003 killed more than 35,000 people in Europe, with France suffering the worst losses. It was estimated that 14,802 people died from causes attributable to the high temperatures - with older people being particularly affected (New Scientist, 10 October 2003). Scientists have recently estimated that global warming kills about 160,000 people every year, with children in developing countries being most at risk. It has also been estimated that the numbers dying from the 'side-effects' of climate change, such as US 55% The Environment 177 malaria and malnutrition, could almost double by 2020 (New Scientist, 1 October 2003). The environmental issue of global warming - a form of climate change - is the clearest example of a genUinely global environmental problem. Its effects will have an impact on every society on the planet, albeit to varying degrees. To understand it we have to see 'the environment' in its widest sense planet Earth as a whole - as the atmosphere shrouds the entire planet rather than one region. The problem of global warming cannot be understood without modern science; sociologists need to engage with debates on the science of climate change if they want to say anything useful about the social causes and consequences of global warming. Our own experience of the environment will change as the climate itself becomes a political issue, as happened after New Orleans in the USA was flooded in 2005, when journalists and commentators blamed the US government for not doing enough to tackle climate change. Global warming also makes us aware of a type of'pollution' (excessive CO,) that few of us ever knew existed. One consequence of this knowledge is that it has speeded up the 178 THE ENVIRONMENT Solar radiation passes through the clear atmosphere Most radiation is absorbed by the earth's surface and warms it Some solar radiation is reflected by the earth and the atmosphere Figure 5.6 The greenhouse effect Some of the infrared radiation passes through the atmosphere, and some is absorbed and re-emitted in alt directions by greenhouse gas molecules.The effect of this is to warm the earth's surface and the lower atmosphere Source: USA Environmental Protection Agency, www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/index.htrnl (accessed 18January 2008) globalization of environmental politics, helping to define 'nature' in planetary terms. Finally, tackling global warming is the foundation for any sustainable future for the human species and it is widely recognized as the most significant long-term environmental problem. There is an increasingly strong argument which suggests that this issue has to be tackled as an urgent priority if other sustainability projects are to have any chance. Clearly, we need to understand what global warming is and why it is happening. What is global warming? Global warming is regarded by many people to be the most serious environmental challenge of our time. If scientific forecasts are correct, then it has the potential to alter irreversibly the functioning ofthe earth's climate and to produce a series of devastating environmental consequences which will be felt worldwide. Global warming refers to the gradual rise in the earth's average temperature due to changes in the chemical composition of the atmosphere. The current scientific consensus is that this is caused in large part by humans, because the gases that have built up and altered the earth's atmosphere are ones that are produced in great quantities by human activities. The process of global warming is closely related to the idea of the greenhouse effect - the build-up of heat-trapping greenhouse gases within the earth's atmosphere. The principle is a simple one. Energy from the sun passes through the atmosphere and The Environment 179 Global Society 5.3 What are greenhouse gases? Some greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide occur naturally and are emitted to the atmosphere tlunugh natural processes and human activities. Other greenhouse gases (e.g., fluorinated gases) are created and emitted solely through human activities. The prmcipal greenhouse gases that enter the atmosphere because ofhuman activities are: the decay of organic waste in municipal solid waste landfills. Nitrous OXIde (N20): Nitrous oxide is emitted during agricultural and industrial activities,as well as during combustion of fossil fuels and solid waste Carbon dioxlde (CO,): Carbon dioxide enters the atmosphere through the burning of fossil fuels (oil, natural gas, and coal), solid waste, trees and wood products, and also as a result of other chemical reactions (e.g., manufacture of cement). Carbon dioxide is also removed from the atmosphere (or 'sequestered') when it is absorbed by plants as part of the biological carbon cycle. Fluorinated gases: Hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulfur hexafluoride are synthetic, powerful greenhouse gases that are emitted from a variety of industrial processes. fluorinated gases are sometimes used as substitutes for ozone-depleting substances (i.e., CfCs, HCfCs and halons). These gases are typically emitted in smaller quantities, but because they are potent greenhouse gases, they are sometimes referred to as High GlobalWarming Potential gases ('High GWP gases'). Methane (CH,) : Methane is emitted during the production and transport of coal,natural gas, and oil. Methane emissions also result from livestock and other agricultural practices and by Source: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): www.epa.goviclimatechangeiemissionsiindex.html #ggo heats the earth's surface, Although most of the solar radiation is absorbed directly by the Earth, some of it is reflected back. The greenhouse gases act as a barrier to this outgoing energy, trapping heat within the Earth's atmosphere much like the glass panels ofa greenhouse (see figure 5.6). This natural greenhouse effect is what keeps the Earth at a reasonably comfortable surface temperature - at about 15.5 degrees Celsius. Ifit were not for the role ofgreenhouse gases in retaining heat, the Earth would be a much colder place, with an average temperature of - 17 degrees Celsius. When concentrations of atmospheric greenhouse gases rise, the greenhouse effect is intensified and much warmer temperatures are produced. Since the start of industrialization, the concentration of greenhouse gases has risen Significantly. Concentrations of carbon dioxide - the main greenhouse gas - have increased by around 30 per cent since 1880, continuing to rise steeply from the 1980s. Methane concentrations have also doubled, nitrous oxide concentrations are up by about 15 per cent and other greenhouse gases that do not occur naturally have been generated by industrial development (see 'Global Society 5.3'). Most scientists now agree that the large increase in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere can be attributed to the burning of fossil fuels and other human activities, such as industrial production, largescale agriculture, deforestation, mining, landfills and vehicle emissions. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007) reports that on the basis of analysis comparing actual observations with a model forecast based only on natural climate changes and second model based on natural changes plus anthropogenic (human-created) climate changes, it is very likely that the increase in observed temperatures during the twentieth century is due to increasing anthropogenic green- 180 THE EN VIRONMENT _ 375 E "- "-;; 365 -t--t- J§ E 355 Q; "~ 345 '"0.. 335 318 :0- "S 314 c: .2 '3 310 ~ . P " !tr!f" 1/ I I I .A •,. jf l- I 600 _ 500 15. S ~ 400 :s ~ 300 ~ '"0.. 200 100 -CFC-12 L! I I- CFC-ll ~r4=1V ' -t I ~ l I I I 1 I' I 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 Nole: Global averages of the concentrations ofthe major. well-mixed. long-lived greenhouse gases - carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, CFC-12 and eFG-Il from the NOAA global fiasksamplmg network since 1978. These gases aCcOlmt for about 97 per cent of the direct radlative forcing by long-lived greenhouse gases since 1750.The remaining 3 per cent 15 contributed by an assortment of 10 minor halogen gases (see text), Methane data prior to 1983 are annual averages from Etheridge et al. (1998), adjusted 10 the NOM calibJation scale (Dlugokencky et a1. 2005). Figure 5.7 Global trends in major greenhouse gases, 1978-2006 Source:Hofman 2007 house gas emissions (see figure 5.7). This is a stronger conclusion than that arrived at just six years earlier. Figure 5.8 shows the upward trend in surface temperatures since (he late nineteenth century, charting them against the average temperature in the period 1961- 90 in central England and globally. The IPCC notes that 11 of the 12 years 1995-2006 are among the 12 warmest years on record since 1850. THINKING CRITICALLY How convincing are the arguments for and evidence of an anthropogenic cause of global warming? Given the enormity of this environmental problem, what might be the social psychological responses of individuals faced with knowledge of it? How has knowledge of global wanning affected you personally? ~ ~ 1.0- E g ; 0.5 - ~ ~ 0.0 - E •~ 1900 Europe E . tril.4j : 0.5 JOObJ~'~~~J!o " ~ ~ ~,"'hA " ~ 1.0 g ;05- ~ , I - iOO[ "I?~ 1! ' . ,1900 ~ t~ 2000 ~~ Global "L '" 1.0- • Global land , The Environment 181 '"00 Year Global Ocean I '1 {1+E ~~ 0 c ,1 : 0.5 ~ 05r5 ~ ;; ~ 0.0 - ~ 0.0 ...E ~If!, , , , , 1950 2000 1900 1950 2000 1900 1950 2000 Year Year Year models using only natural forcings _ Observations models using both natural and anthropogenic forcings Figure 5.8 Global and continental temperature change, comparison of natural forcing with natural plus anthropogenic forcing Source. Figure SPM.4 from the Summary for Policymakers of the Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution ofWorking Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, p. 6 © 2007 IPCC. The potential consequences ofglobal warming The consequences of global warming are likely to be devastating, with some of the potentially harmful effects worldwide including: 1 Rising sea levels. Global warming may cause the polar ice caps to melt and the oceans to warm and expand. As glaciers and other forms of land ice melt, sea levels will rise. Cities that are near the coasts or in low-lying areas will be flooded and become uninhabitable. If sea levels were to rise by one metre, Bangladesh would lose 17 per cent of its total land area, Egypt would lose 12 per cent and the Netherlands would lose 6 per cent (UNDP 1998). The Indian Ocean tsunami, which we discussed at the beginning of this chapter, would have caused considerably more devastation ifsea levels had already been higher. 1 . 0 .---~------------------------------------------------------~ 0.5 +--+-------------------------+----1 - 0.5+---~~~----~--------------------------------------------___1 - 1.0 +---~--._------_,------_r------~------_.-------,------~ 1862 1882 1902 1922 1942 1962 1982 Figure 5.9 Difference in average surface temperature 1861-2002:comparison with 1961-90 average,global and central England (degrees centigrade) Source: www.statistics.gov.uklSTATBASE/ssdataset.asp?vlnk=7279 2 Desertification. Global warming may contribute to large tracts of fertile land becoming desert. Sub·Saharan Africa, the Middle East and South Asia will be further affected by desertification and intense soil erosion. 3 The spread of disease, Global warming may extend the geographical range and the seasonality for organisms, such as mosquitoes, which spread diseases like malaria and yellow fever. If tempera· tures were to rise by 3- 5 degrees Celsius, the number of malaria cases could increase by 50- 80 million per year. 4 Poor harvests, Agricultural yields may raU in many of the poorest areas of the world if global warming progresses. Populations in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America would be likely to be most affected, 5 Changing climate patterns. Climate patterns that have been relatively stable for thousands ofyears may undergo rapid disruptions because of global warming. Forty·six million people currently live in areas that could be destroyed by sea storms, while many others may suffer from floods and hurricanes. 6 Geopolitical instability, A report published for the US Department of Defense warned that, at their most abrupt, the effects of climate change 2002 Low-lying areas are ever more susceptible to flooding as a result of global climate change, though the effects on the lives of people in these regions will vary tremendously The picture on the left shows emergency supplies of food and medicines being delivered to a community in Bangladesh. The picture on the right shows RSPCA officers in England rescuing stranded pets. discussed above could lead to disputes or even wars between nations as they attempt to protect their increasingly limited agricultural, fresh water and energy resources. The report cautions that mass migration could occur as people attempt to move to those regions which posseses the resources to adapt to climate change (Schwartz and Randall 2003). Some trends associated with global warming seem to be moving much faster than scientists originally predicted. In December 1999, for example, a study by satellite showed that the Arctic ice cap is shrinking much more rapidly than scientists previously thought - a process that could have dramatic effects on the world climate in coming years. Similarly, in early 2002 two huge ice shelves - Larsen Band Thwaites glacier tongue - collapsed in Antarctica, shattering into thousands of icebergs within days, It is possible that the reduction in ice is the result of natural changes, but whatever its origins, the ice seems to be melting at an extraordinary pace. Measurements show that the North Pole sea ice has thinned by 40 per cent in recent decades in the summer and autumn, and has decreased by 10-15 per cent since the 1950s in the spring and summer. Global snow cover has shrunk by 10 per cent since the 1960s, and mountain glaCiers have sharply retreated. Responses to the risks ofglobal warming For a long time the thesis and scientific evidence of global warming was disputed. Some scientists doubted whether the claimed effects were real, while others held that changes in the world's climate could be the result of natural trends, rather than the outcome of human intervention. However, there is now a strong consensus behind the view that global warming is indeed occurring and that anthropogenic factors are the main contributor. A2007 IPCC report states that the average surface temperature of the Earth rose by some 0.74 degrees Celsius between 1906 and 2005. But the report also warns that the warming trend between 1955 and 2005 (0.13 degrees Celsius per decade) is almost double that for the 100 years between 1906 and 2005 OPCC 2007). Global warming, it seems, is gathering pace. But where should our efforts be concentrated and which countries need to take the lead in reducing their emissions? As figure 5.10 shows, emissions of carbon dioxide in five of the six largest CO, emitting countries continued to increase between 1990 and 2003, in spite of all of the debates and political promises made by governments. However, when we take population size into account and look at emissions per capita, the picture looks rather different. China and India currently produce much less CO, per capita than the USA, Europe, the Russian Federation and Japan (see figure 5.1I), which shows why some developing countries see their own 'survival' emissions as far less damaging than the 'luxury' emissions of the already rich countries. Clearly, a coordinated global approach to cutting greenhouse gas emissions is made more difficult in the context of such uneven economic development at the national level, which produces as much disagreement as agreement on how to tackle the problem. The industrial countries currently produce far more greenhouse gases than the developing world, with the United States emitting more carbon dioxide than any other single country, both absolutely and per capita. However, emissions from the developing world are increasing rapidly, particularly in countries that are undergoing rapid industrialization, and are expected to be roughiy equal to those of industrialized countries some time around 2035. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was created in 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, where agreement was reached to cut greenhouse gas emissions significantly by 2010 in order to stabilize the situation at levels that do not pose a threat to the global climate. This is a very ambitious aim, which some critics have argued is not realistic. Under the terms of the protocol, industrialized nations committed themselves to a range of targets to reduce emissions to below 1990 levels - the base year - by 2010. World targets range from an average 8 per cent cut for most ofEurope to a maximum 10 per cent increase for Iceland and an 8 per cent increase for Australia. (The USA originally committed itself to a 7 per cent cut, but has never ratified the protocoL) Many scientists claim that this target was too modest, and argue that emissions must be cut by as much as 70 or 80 per cent if serious climatic consequences are to be avoided. Whatever governments do to cut emissions, it will be some time before the effects ofglobal warming are altered as it takes more than a century for carbon dioxide to be removed from the atmosphere through natural processes. In 2001, the US President, George W. Bush, refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, arguing that it would damage the US economy. After some debate, most other nations agreed to go ahead without the United States, in spite of it being the world's largest producer of greenhouse gases. Later the same year, talks in Bonn, Germany and Marrakech, Morocco finally agreed the increasingly complicated fine print of the protocol and signatory nations were urged to ratify the deal in their national legislatures by the end of 2002. In recent years, several of the largest producers of greenhouse gases have successfully cut emissions, including the UK, Germany, China and Russia - although Russia's cuts can largely be explained by the decline in its economy. At the beginning of 2008, 174 countries ~ c £ u ~ E '0 ~ c ~ ill The Environment 185 In 2003, 22 per cent of total world emissions originated in the United States, followed by China, with 16 per cent. Despite the substantial drop during the 19905, the Russian Federation is the fourth largest emitter, followed closely by India and Japan. 6 5 4 3 2 o United States China Europe Russian India Japan EMU Federation Figure 5.10 The six largest emitters of carbon dioxide, 1990 and 2003 Source: World Bank, The Utile Green Data Book,2007. © 2007 byWorld Bank. Reprinted with permission of World Bank in the format Textbook via Copyright Clearance Center. Global representation for the top six carbon dioxide emitters is very different once population is taken into account. 20 0 1990 . 2003 ..m 15 "-rou ~ "~ 10 c £ u ~ 5:;; 0 United China Europe Russian India Japan States EMU Federation Note:Emissions shown in the figures are from cement manufacturing and fossil fuel combustion.The EMU aggregate in the figures includes the members states offue Economic and Monetary Union ofthe European Union fua! have adopted the euro as fueir currency: Austria,Belgium, Finland, France,Germany: Greece, Ireland,Italy: Luxembourg.Netherlands,Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain Figure 5.11 The six largest emitters of carbon dioxide per capita, 1990 and 2003 Source.'World Bank, The UWe Green Data Book, 2007. © 2007 byWorld Bank. Reprinted with permission of World Bank in the format Textbook via Copyright Clearance Center. had ratified the Kyoto Protocol: 37 developed countries and 137 developing countries. Australia, which had previously refused to take part,finaUy did so in December 2007 under the newly elected Labour Federal government. However, it is clear that tackling global warming will be very difficult if the country with the highest national emissions levels - the USA continues to opt out of international attempts to cap greenhouse gas emissions. The Kyoto Protocol was and is controversial and one important issue has been the decision to push for emissions cutbacks in the developed countries, while developing countries are only asked to monitor and report their emissions. This is an acknowledgement that the latter have some 'catching up' to do in terms of economic development, which would be severely hampered by an emissions cap or reduction. In the longer term, though, all countries will have to control and reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. The Kyoto Protocol took 1990 greenhouse emission levels as its starting point. But this was seen by many in the developing world as favouring the industrialized countries, as it fails to take into account their 'historical responsibility' for the problem of global warming and, hence, avoids attributing blame. It is also unclear exactly when developing countries will be asked to reduce their emissions, or by how much. Will it aUow for their inevitably higher emission levels as economic development catches up with the industrialized world? If it does not, then it may be seen as unfair and unworkable (Najam et al. 2003). At the time of writing, a successor to Kyoto has been formally approved by the G8+5 countries (the G8 countries plus China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa) in the so-caUed, 'Washington Declaration' of 2007. This will see the introduction of a global 'cap and trade' system (involving all countries) in which emissions caps will be introduced alongside an emissions trading system (focused on carbon trading) that forces polluters to pay. The system works by rewarding those countries that reduce emissions (and sell credits) and penalizing those which do not (and are forced to pay for carbon credits). However, the overall effect ofthe cap and trade system is to push all countries towards lowering their emissions. As with many new forms of manufactured risk, no one can be sure what the effects of global warming will be. Its causes are so diffuse and its precise consequences are difficult to calculate. Would a 'high' emissions scenario truly result in widespread natural disasters? Will stabilizing the level of carbon dioxide emissions protect most people in the world from the negative effects of climate changes? Is it possible that current processes of global warming have already triggered a series of further climatic disturbances? We cannot answer these questions with any certainty. The Earth's climate is extremely complex and a variety of factors will interact to produce different consequences in individual countries at varying points across the earth. THINKING CRITICALLY 'The industrialized countries are responsible for producing global warming and their populations should be prepared to accept a lower material standard of living in order drastically to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.' What arguments could be advanced to persuade people in the industrialized world to accept a lower material standard of living? Would they be likely to accept such a solution? Sociological theories and ecological sustainability Natural scientists have been at the forefront of debates on environmental issues. As the examples of pollution, resource depletion, genetic modification and global warming above show,environmental issues are different from many other sociological subjects, because they usually involve getting to grips with natural scientific re sea rch and evidence. However, the hybrid character of environmental issues means that natural scientists can never have a monopoly on them.Our brief introduction to the problem ofglobal warming is the most striking example of this. The IPCC scientists acknowledge that twentieth-century global warming has largely been the product of human activities - industrialization, urbanization and globalization processes for example - and the experts in these areas are sociologists and other social scientists. If environmental problems are to be successfully understood, then socialand natural scientists will have to try to understand each other rather better than they have done so far. This must surely be a positive challenge for the whole academic community. The rest of this section will explore some of the main sociological theories linking social development with environmental damage, along with some of the major approaches to solving global environmental problems. Consumerism and environmental damage One important issue surrounding the environment and economic development is that of consumption patterns. Consumption refers to the goods, services, energy and resources that are used up by people, institutions and societies. It is a phenomenon with both positive and negative dimensions. On the one hand, rising levels of consumption around the world mean that people are living under better conditions than in times past. Consumption is linked to economic development - as living standards rise, people are able to afford more food, clothing, personal items, leisure time, holidays, cars and so forth. On the other hand, consumption can have negative impacts as well. Consumption patterns can The Environment 187 damage the environmental resource base and exacerbate patterns of inequality. The trends in world consumption over the course of the twentieth century are startling to observe. In 1900, world consumption levels were just over 1.5 trillion dollars (UNDP 1998); by the end of the century, private and public consumption expenditures amounted to around 24 trillion dollars - twice the level of 1975 and six times that of 1950. Consumption rates have been growing extremely rapidly over the past 30 years or so. In industrialized countries, consumption per head has been growing at a rate of 2.3 per cent annually; in East Asia growth has been even faster - 6.1 per cent annually. By contrast, the average African household consumes 20 per cent less today than it did 30 years ago. There is widespread concern that the consumption explosion has passed by the poorest fifth ofthe world's population. The inequalities in consumption between the world's rich and poor are significant. North America and Western Europe contain only around 12 per cent of the world's population, but their private consumption - the amount spent on goods and services at the household level - is over 60 per cent of the world's total. In contrast, the world's poorest region - sub-Saharan Africa, which contains around 11 per cent of the total global population - has just a 1.2 per cent share of the world's total private consumption. It has been argued that industrial capitalism sets societies on a 'treadmill of production' leading to environmental damage, using up natural resources at a rapid rate and generating high levels of pollution and waste (Schnaiberg 1980). However, in the twenti eth century it was modern consumerism which kept that treadmill running faster in this direction (Bell 2004). Consumption is something that human beings have to engage in to survive, but modern forms of consumption are very different from earlier forms. Mass production must also be accompanied by large -scale consumption. The 188 THE ENVIRO NMENT products of industry have to be bought and consumed, though producing and consuming may well be acted out in geographically distant locations. Products are made wherever it is cheapest to do so and consumed wherever the best price can be gained. In the past 60 years or so, this has led to industrial production moving to developing countries. The rapid transformation of the newly industrializing countries (NICs) such as Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan in the 1970s and recent industrial development in India, China and Malaysia testify to this, which is part ofthe globalization process. Sociologists of consumerism have argued that it is also a way of thinking, a mentality or even an ideology (Corrigan 1997). We can understand this aspect if we ask, 'Why do people continually consume and want to consume?' Perhaps it is simply because consumer goods have 'use-value' for people; they help to save them time and effort. But luxury items fit this explanation less well. They show another side to modern consumerism; its role in the social status competition within society (see chapter 7, 'Social Interaction and Everyday Life'). Differentiated mass consumption allows for complex, fine-grained distinctions to be made according to the styles and fashions of the day. People may be prepared to pay a premium for the latest fashions because these products allow them to say something about themselves, to communicate their status or their aspirations in highly visible ways to others. Even products with a clear use-value, such as clothes, are also fashionable items that are discarded and replaced before their 'use-value' has expired. Large amounts of such fashion-fuelled waste increases pressure on the environment. Over time, consumer products become embedded in the routines of everyday life and are taken for granted. When this happens, it becomes difficult to perceive alternatives to their use. A good example of this is the modern motor vehicle, particularly the car. Many households have one, two or more cars, and people use them even for a short trip to the shops or to visit friends and relatives who may live quite close by. But large-scale car-ownership and use generates large amounts of pollution and waste in both the production and consumption of cars. Why has it proved so difficult to reduce our use ofthe car? A survey of attitudes to car-ownership found a range of types of consumer amongst visitors to National Trust properties in north-west England (Anable 2005). 1 Malcontented Motorists form the largest group. These drivers are unhappy with many aspects of their car use, but feel that public transport has too many constraints to be viable as a genuine alternative, and so they do not switch. 2 Complacent Car Addicts accept that there are alternatives to using the car, but do not feel any pressing moral imperative to changing their pattern of use. 3 AspiringEnvironmentalistshave already reduced their car usage, but feel the car has advantages that force them not to give it up altogether. 4 Die-hard Drivers feel they have a right to drive, enjoy driving and tend to have negative feelings towards other modes of transportation, such as buses and trains. 5 Car-less Crusaders have given up their cars for environmental reasons and see alternative modes of travel positively as a result. 6 Reluctant Riders do use public transport but would prefer to use the car; however, for a variety of reasons, such as health problems, they cannot do this, but will accept lifts from others. The study shows that blanket appeals to people's emerging environmental awareness are likely to fail. Instead, 'the segmentation approach illustrates that policy interventions need to be responsive to the different motivations and constraints of the sub-groups' (Anable 2005: 77). THINKING CRITICALLY Looking at the typology of transport users above,which category best describes you? Think of an appropriate environmental policy aimed at each consumer type that stands the best chance of generating proenvironmental behaviour in that specific group. Are there any universal environmental policies that might have the desired effect on all the groups? Another element of modern consumerism is its pleasurable aspect. But why is it pleasurable? Some sociologists have argued that the pleasure of consumerism does not lie in the use ofproducts but in the anticipation of purchasing them. Colin Campbell (1992) argues that this is the most pleasurable part of the process; the wanting, the longing after, the seeking out and desiring of products, not the use of them. It is a'romantic ethic' of consumption based on desire and longing. Marketing of products and services draws on this anticipatory consumerism 'in seductive ways to create and intensify people's desires. That is why we keep going back for more and are never truly satisfied. From an environmental perspective, the 'romantic ethic' ;of consumerism is disastrous. We constantly demand new products and more of them. That means more production, so the cycle of mass production and mass consumption continues to churn out pollution and wastes natural resources. At the input side of production, natural resources are used up in enormous quantities, and at the output end in consumption, people throwaway useful things not because they are use-less, but because they are no longe~ in fashion or fail to represent their status aspirations. The sociology of consumption shows us that the combination of industrialization, capitalism and consumerism has transformed society-environment relations. Many environmentalists and more than a few social and natural scientists have The Environment 189 concluded that this continual expansion of economies and the continuing promotion of economic growth cannot carry on indefinitely. The resulting pollution might have been ecologically insignificant if it had been restricted to a small part of the global human population. But when industrialization spreads across the planet, when a majority of people live in huge cities, and when capitalist companies become multinational and consumerism seduces people in all countries, then the natural environment's capacity for recovery and resilience becomes severely weakened. Environmentalists argue that current consumption patterns are not only highJy unequal, but they are also having a severe impact on the environment and, in the long term, are not sustainable. For example, the consumption of fresh water has doubled since 1960; the burning offossil fuels, which is the main contributor to global warming discussed below, has almost quintupled in the past 50 years; and the consumption of wood is up by 40 per cent from 25 years ago. Fish stocks are declining, wild species are becoming extinct, water supplies are diminishing and wooded areas are shrinking in size. Patterns of production and consumption are not only depleting existing natural elements, but are also contributing to their degradation through waste products and harmful emissions (UNDP 1998). Finally, although the rich are the world's main consumers, the environmental damage that is caused by growing consumption has the heaviest impact on the poor. As we saw in our discussion ofglobal warming, the wealthy are in a better position to enjoy the many benefits of consumption without having to deal with its negative effects. On a local level, affluent groups can usually afford to move away from problem areas, leaving the poor to bear most of the costs. Chemical plants, power stations, major roads, railways and airports are often sited close to low-income areas. On a global level, we can see a similar process at work: soil degradation, deforestation, water shortages, lead emissions and air pollution are all concentrated within the developing world. Poverty also intensifies these environmental problems. People with few resources have little choice but to maximize the resources that are available to them. As a result, more and more pressures are put on a shrinking resource base as the human population increases. Limits to growth and sustainable development Acentral motivating idea for environmental campaigners has been that of 'sustainability' - ensuring that human activity does not compromise the ecology of planet Earth. In The Ecologist, the UK campaigning magazine, Edward Goldsmith and his colleagues set out the charge against industrial expansion in their 'Blueprint for Survival' (1972: 15): 'The principal defect of the industrial way ofHfe with its ethos of expansion is that it is not sustainable ... we can be certain . . . that sooner or later it will end.' Such doomladen forecasts used to be described as 'catastrophist' and were restricted to the wilder fringes of the environmental movement. However, the idea now has a wider currency amongst the general public and policy-makers, for which the scientific predictions of global warming are largely responsible. Anyone who recycles their plastic, paper and glass, conserves water or tries to use their car less is probably aware that they too are trying to put into practice the idea of sustainabiJity. One important influence on the rise of environmental movements and public concern about environmental problems can be traced back to a famous report first published in the early 1970s, which set out the case that economic growth could not continue indefinitely. The report and its findings are discussed in 'Classic Studies 5.1 '. Classic Studies 5.1 Modelling the limits to economic growth The research problem Global human population has grown enormously since industrialization took hold and the resulting pressure on the environment has led to soil degradation,deforestation and pollution.Are there any limits to this pattern of development? Will food supplies keep up with increasing demand or will the world see mass famine? How many people can the planet support without ruining the environment? These hugely significant questions were asked of a group of scientists by a global think-tank, the Club of Rome, almost 40 years ago.The resulting book was published as The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972). Meadows and colleagues' explanation The Limitsstudy used modern computermodelling techniques to make forecasts about the consequences of continued economic growth, population growth, pollution and the depletion of natural resources. Their computer model- World3 - showed what would happen if the trends that were established between 1900 and 1970 were to continue to the year 2100.The computer projections were then altered to generate a variety of possible consequences, depending on different rates of growth ofthe factors considered. The researchers found that each time they altered one variable,there would eventually be an environmental crisis. Ifthe world's societies failed to change, then growth would end anyway through the depletion of resources, food shortages or industrial collapse, sometime before 2100. The research team used computer modelling to explore five global trends (Meadows et al. 1974: 21): accelerating industrialization across the world rapid population growth widespread malnutrition in some regions depletion ofnon-renewable resources a deteriorating natural environment The program was then run to test 12 alternative scenarios,each one manipulated to resolve some of the identified problems. This allowed the researchers to ask questions about which combinations ofpopulation levels, mdustrial output and natural resources would be sustainable. The conclusion they drew in 1972 was that there was still time to put offthe emerging environmental crisis. But if nothing was done, and even lithe amount of available resources in the model were doubled, pollution were reduced to pre-197Os levels and new technologies were introduced, economic growth would still grind to a halt before 2100. Some campaigners saw this as vindicating the radical environmental argument that industrial societies were just not sustainable over the long term Critical points Many economists, politicians and industrialists roundly condemned the report. arguing that it was unbalanced, irresponsible and, when its predictions failed to materialize, just plain wrong. The modelling was largely devoid ofpolitical and social variables and was therefore just a partial account of reality The researchers later accepted that some of the criticisms were justified. The method used focused on physical limits and assumed existing rates of economic growth and technological innovation, but this did not take account ofthe capacity of human beings to respond to environmental challenges. For example, market forces could be made to work to limit the over-exploitation of resources. If a mineral like magnesium starts to become scarce, its price will rise.As its price rises it will be used less, and producers might even find Sustainable development The Environment 191 alternatives should costs rise too steeply Limits was seen by many as yet another overly pessimistic, catastrophist tract that engaged in unreliable 'futurology' - predicting the future from current trends. Contemporary significance Whatever its limitations, the original report made a significant impact on public debate and environmental activism. It made many more people aware ofthe damagmg consequences of industrial development and technology, as well as warning about the perils of allowing pollution to increase. The report was an important catalyst for the modern environmental movement (for a wider discussion, see chapter 22, 'Politics, Government and Social Movements'). 'J\venty years later, the team published Beyond the Llinits (1992) an even more pessimistic report. castigating the world's politicians for wasting the time, identified as crucial in the first report. arguing that ecological 'overshoot' was already occurring. Then in 2004, their 30 Year Update was released, arguing that although some progress had been made in environmental awareness and technological development, the evidence of global warming,declining fish stocks and much more, showed a world 'overshooting' its natural limits.This conclusion was also that of the UN's Millenniun1 Ecosystem Assessment of 2005, which is tellingly titled, LivingBeyond OurMeans. The basic conclusion from the original Liinils report and its updates continues to resonate in our globalizing world. Rather than calling for economic growth to be reined in, more recent developments turn on the concept of sustainable development. This term was first introduced in a 1987 report commissioned by the United Nations, Our Common Future, This is also known as the Brundtland Report, after the chair of the organizing committee, Gro Harlem Brundtland, then Prime Minister of Norway. The report's authors argued that use of the Earth's resources by the present generation was unsustainable: Over the course of the twentieth century the relationship between the human world and the planet that sustains it has undergone a profound change ... major, unintended changes are occurring in the atmosphere, in soils, in waters, among plants and animals. and in the relationships among all of these... .To keep options open for future generations, the present generation must begin now, and begin together, nationally and internationally. (Brundtland 1987) The Brundtland Commission regarded sustainable development as, 'development 192 THE ENVIRONMENT which meets the needs ofthe present generation, without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs' (ibid.) - a short definition, but one which carries enormous significance. Sustainable development means that economic growth should be carried on in such a way as to recycle physical resources rather than deplete them, and to keep levels ofpollution to a minimum. Following the publication of Our Common Future, the phrase 'sustainable development' came to be widely used by both environmentalists and governments. It was employed at the UN Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and has subsequently appeared in other ecological summit meetings organized by the UN, such as the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002. Sustainable development is also one of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which have been agreed by 191 states around the world as they aim to reduce many forms of poverty in the coming decades. The relevant MDGs include the integration of the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes, the reversal of the loss of environmental resources, the reduction by half of the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and achieving a significant improvement in the lives ofat least 100 million slumdwellers - all by 2020. For more on the Millennium Development Goals, see chapter 13, 'Global Inequality'. The Brundtland Report attracted much criticism, just as the report of the Club of Rome had done some quarter of a century earlier. Critics see the notion of sustainable development as too vague and as neglecting the specific needs of poorer countries. According to the critics, the idea of sustainable development tends to focus attention only on the needs of richer countries; it does not consider the ways in which the high levels of consumption in the more af!Iuent countries are satisfied at the expense of other people. For instance, demands on Indonesia to conserve its rainforests could be seen as unfair, because Indonesia has a greater need than the industrialized countries for the revenue it must forgo by accepting conservation. It can also be argued that linking the concept of ecological sustainability to that of economic development is contradictory. This is a particularly pertinent point where sustalnability and development clash, for example when considering new roads or retail sites it is often the case that the prospect of many new jobs and economic prosperity means sustainability takes second place. This is eve n more pronounced for governments in developing countries, which are badly in need of more economic activity. In recent years, ideas of environmental justice and ecological citizenship have come to the fore (as we see below), partly as a result of the severe problems associated with the concept and practice of sustainable development. It is easy to be sceptical about the future prospects for sustainable development. Its aim of finding ways of balancing human activity with sustaining natural ecosystems may appear impossible. Nonetheless, sustainable development looks to create common ground amongst nation-states and connects the world development movement with the environmental movement in a way that no other project has yet managed THINIUNG CRITICALLY Sustainable development is 'development which meets the needs of the present generation, without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs'. What are the needs of the present generation? How might we find out what the needs of future generations will be? Can sustainable development policies be devised from this definition? to do. It gives radical environmentalists the opportunity to push for full implementation of its widest goals, but, at the same time, moderate campaigners can be involved locally and have an impact. This inC\usivity can be seen as a weakness, but also a potential strength ofthe sustainable development project. Living in the global 'risk society' Humans have always had to face risks ofone kind or another, but today's risks are qualitatively different from those that came in earlier times. Until quite recently, human societies were threatened byexternal risk dangers such as drought, earthquakes, famines and storms that spring from the natural world and are unrelated to the actions of humans. Today, however, we are increasingly confronted with various types ofmanufactured risk - risks that are created by the impact of our own knowledge and technology on the natural world. As we shall see, many environmental and health risks facing contemporary societies are instances of manufactured risk: they are the outcomes of our own interventions into nature. Global Society 5.4 Manufactured risks and the survival of humanity In 2003, Martin Rees,the British Astronomer Royal, published a book provocatively called Our Fma] Century, subtitled with the question: 'Will the human race survive the twenty-first century?' Rees argues that the explosive advances in science and technology, seen for example in bio-,cyber- and nanotechnology and in the exploration of space,do not just offer exhilarating prospects for the future, but also contain what he calls a dark side. Scientific advancement can have unintended consequences,as we have seen, and Rees's book examines the likelihood of catastrophic scenarios where human civilization dies out. He describes some of the apocalyptic risks that could occur with the new science of the twenty-first century:these include nuclear holocaust,caused by terrorists or nations and terrorist use of biological weapons or laboratory errors that create new diseases. Rees's conclusions are sobering. He separates the long term from the short term. In the short term,which he defines as the next 20 years,he is prepared to bet on a major catastrophe killing more than a million people (though he fervently hopes that he will be wrong in his assessment).Returning to the subtitle of his book, Rees argues,over the next 100 years which he calls the long term - he gives humanity a 50/50 chance ofsurviving the twentyfirst century The prognosis may seem desperately pessimistic,but Rees argues that he hopes his book will stimulate discussion on how to guard as far as possible against the worst risks,while deploying new knowledge optimally (or human benefit. Debates on genetically modified foods, global warming and other manufactured risks have presented individuals with new choices and challenges in their everyday lives. Because there is no road map to these new dangers, individuals, countries and transnational organizations must negotiate risks as they make choices about how lives are to be lived. And because there are no definitive answers as to the outcomes of such risks,each individual is forced to make decisions about which risks he or she is prepared to take. This can be a bewildering endeavour. Should we use food and raw materials if their production or consumption might have a negative impact on our own health and on the natural environment? Even seemingly simple decisions about what to eat are now made in the context of conflicting information and opinions about the product's relative merits and drawbacks. Ulrich Beck (1992) has written extensively about risk and globalization,As technological change progresses more and more rapidly, producing new forms of risk, we must constantly respond and adjust to the changes. Risks today involve a series of interrelated changes in contemporary social life: shifting employment patterns, heightened job insecurity, the declining influence of tradition and custom on selfidentity, the erosion of traditional family pattern s and the democratization of personal relationships. Because personal futures are much less fixed than they were in traditional societies, decisions of all kinds present risks for individuals. Getting married, for example, is a more risky endeavour today than it was at a time when marriage was a lifelong institution. Decisions about educational qualifications and career paths can also feel risky: it is difficult to predict what skills will be valuable in an economy that is changing as rapidly as ours. 'Classic Studies 5.2' explores Beck's arguments, specificaUy in relation to environmental risks. Classic Studies 5.2 Ulrich Beck and the global risk society The research problem This chapter has explored some of the environmental consequences of industrial production and high levels of consumption. Taking a long-term view, we can see that the spread of industrialization produces more widespread and potentially serious side-effects in the form of environmental risks. But is modern life really more risky, or are we just more 'risk aware'? Are we worrying urmecessarily about environmental problems? The German sociologist. illrich Beck (1944-), has been the foremost sociological theorist of risk, which he sees as much more significant than sociologists previously thought. Beck's explanation Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth cenhiries, the politics ofmodern societies was dominated by a major conflict of interest between workers and employers - in Mane's terms,between the non-owning working class and the property-owning capitalist class. The conflict centred on issues ofwealth distribution as trades unions and labour parties sought a more equal distribution of the socially produced wealth. Such struggles still continue of course. But illrich Beck (1992, 1999,2002) argues that this distributional conflict is losing its significance as environmental risks rise to prominence.He says that more people are beginning to realize that their fight for a share of the 'wealth cake' is futile ifthe cake itself is be poisoned (Beck 2002: 128) as a result of pollution and environmental damage. Beck argues that: the knowledge is spreading that the sources of wealth are 'polluted' by growing 'hazardous side effects'.This is not at all new, but it has remained unnoticed for a long time in the efforts to overcome poverty ... To put it differently. in the risk society the unknown and unintended consequences come to be a dominant force in history and society (1992: 20--1) Industrial societies are slowly dissolving as environmental problems build up; this is an unintended consequence ofthe rush for economic growth and material prosperity. Beck (1999) argues that we are, in effect. moving into a 'world risk society'- a new type ofsociety in which risk consciousness and risk avoidance are becoming the central feahires - because environmental pollution does not respect national boundaries.No matter where industrial production or consumption takes place, its consequences can be felt in very distant locations. The relatively rich countries are not immune from industrial pollution and global environmental damage.We will remain dependent on science and high technology though,because it is only through these that industrial processes can be safely and effectively managed. Beck wants to show us that the environmental issue is moving from the margins ofpolitical concern towards the centre. Most of the risks we face are the products of human activity; they are not like the purely nahiral disasters of film and television.This means that the environment becomes an issue for political debate and decision-making and we can see the creation of environmental organizations and Green political parties in the 1970s as the first step towards inclusion of environmental issues into mainstream politics. Critical points One of the main criticisms ofBeck's overall thesis is that tliere is not (yet) enough evidence to support his theory of the transition to a 'risk society',even though there is today more awareness of enVIronmental risks (Hajer 1996; Sulton 2004). Similarl" the idea that older forms of class-based politics are losing out to a new politics of risk seems premature. In most countries, Green political parties have not broken through the conventional party system, and globally the issue of wealth creation and distribution still tends to dominate over environmental protection whenever these objectives clash.Finally, it has been argued that the risk thesis fails to take account of cultural variability in definitions of risk (Douglas 1994; Scot! 2000). What some societies define as 'risk', THINllING CRITICALLY How aware are you of risk in your everyday life? What actions do you routinely take to minimize personal others may not,in the same way that what is defined as pollution in wealthy industrial societies is often seen as a sign of healthy economic development in poorer developing countries. Contemporary significance The concept of risk holds a special place in current sociological debates on environmental issues and the dimction of social change. Beck's risk thesis is useful, because it provides part of an explanation for why environmental movement concerns have found such a receptive audience. Once people become sensitized to risks, the arguments of environmentalists begin to make more sense. Beck's Risk Society has taken sociological thinking on modernity and its possible futures in a new and highly original direction, making us re-lltink the sociological tradition, and for this reason it has rightly become a modern classic of social theory innovation and the use of market mechanisms to bring about positive outcomes, transforming production methods and reducing pollution at its source. risk? Do you engage in any 'risk-taking activities' and if so, why do you do it? Is risk always a negative part of modern Ecological modernizers see huge potential in leading European industries to reduce the usage of natural resources without this affecting economic growth. This is an unusual position, but it does have a certain logic. Rather than simply rejecting more economic growth, they argue that an ecological form of growth is theoretically possible. An example is the introduction of catalytic converters and emission controls on motor vehicles, which has been delivered within a short period of time and shows that advanced technologies can make a big differen ce to greenhouse gas emissions. If environmental protection really can be achieved like this, then we can continue to enjoy our high technology lifestyles. life or can you think of any positive aspects? Ecological modernization For environmentalists, both capitalist and communist forms of modernization have signally failed. They have delivered wealth and material success, but at the price of massive environmental damage. In recent years, groups of academic social scientists have tried to develop a theoretical perspective called ecological modernization, which accepts that 'business as usual' is no longer possible, but rejects radical environmentalist solutions involving de-industrialization. Instead they focus on technological Ecological modernizers also argue that if consumers demand environmentallysound production methods and products, then !!'arket mechanisms will be forced to try aita deliver them. The example of opposition to GM food in Europe (discussed above) is a good example of this idea in practice. Supermarkets have not stocked or pushed the supply of GM foods, because large numbers of consumers have made it clear that they will stay on the shelves. The theory of ecological modernization sees that five social and institutional structures need to be ecologically transformed: 1 Science and technology to work towards the invention and delivery of sustainable technologies. 2 Markets and economic agents: to introduce incentives for environmentally benign outcomes. 3 Nation-states: to shape market conditions which allow this to happen. 4 Social movements: to put pressure on business and the state to continue moving in an ecological direction. 5 Ecological ideologies: to assist in persuading more people to get involved in the ecological modernization of society. (Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000) Science and technology have a particularly crucial role in developing preventative solutions, building in ecological considerations at the design stage. This will transform currently polluting production systems. Since the mid-1990s, three new areas of debate had entered the ecological modernization perspective. Firstly, research began to expand to the developing countries ofthe South, Significantly challenging the Eurocentrism of the original perspective. Second, once ecological modernizers started to think beyond the West, the theory of globalization became more relevant and current research seeks to link globalization with ecological modernization (Mol 2001). Third, ecological modernization has started to take account of the sociology of consumption and theories of consumer societies. This has led to some interesting studies exploring the ecological modernization of domestic consumption as well as of production. These studies look at how consumers can play a part in the ecological modernization of society and on how domestic technologies can be improved to reduce energy consumption, save scarce resources (such as water) and contribute to waste reduction through recycling. The possibilities offered by ecological modernization can be illustrated by reference to the waste disposal industry - the industry that gets rid of the tonnes of waste products that industries and consumers generate every day. Until recently, most of this waste was simply processed and buried in landfill sites. Today, the whole industry is being transformed. Technological developments make it much cheaper to produce newsprint from recycled paper than from wood pulp. Hence there are good economic reasons, as well as environmental ones, to use and reuse paper instead of endlessly cutting down trees. Not just individual companies, but whole industries are actively pursuing the goal of 'zero waste' the complete recycling of all waste products for future industrial use. Toyota and Honda have already reached a level of 85 per cent recyclability for the car parts they use. In this context, waste is no longer just the harmful dumping of materials, but a resource for industry and, to some extent, a means of driving further technological innovation. Significantly, some ofthe major contributions to recycling, and therefore to sustainable development, have come from areas with a heavy concentration of information technology industries, such as California's Silicon Valley. Information technology, unlike many older forms of industrial production, is environmentally clean. The more it plays a part in industrial production, the greater the likelihood that harmful environmental effects will be reduced. This consideration could have some bearing on the future development of the world's poorer societies. In some areas of production, at least, it might be possible for them to achieve rapid economic development without the pollution produced by the older industrial economies, because information technology will play a much greater role. Unlike other perspectives, ecological modernization is less concerned with global inequality and more interested in how businesses, individuals and non-state actors can all play a part in transforming society. This makes it different from sustainable development, which begins from the premise that reducing global inequality is a prerequisite for environmental protection. Ecological modernizers also argue that ifthe capitalist economic system can be made to work for environmental protection then it will continue; if not, then something different will have to emerge because the ecological modernization of global society is already well under way. Critics have seen ecological modernization as overly reliant on technological fixes and relatively ignorant of cultural, social and political conflicts. It is probably correct to say that ecological modernization is imbued with technological optimism rather than having a fully worked out theory of how to get from here to a future sustainable society. But the myriad real-world examples they produce, of practical technologies and suggestions for change, could collectively make a big difference, especially ifways can be found to make them financially viable in developing countries. However, these will also need to be introduced alongside the THINKING CRITICALLY Look again at the five social and institutional structures that constitute an ecologically modernist approach to environmental problems. List them in order of current progress - which structure has been transformed the most and which the least? How would you explain this? What obstacles are harder to overcome in transforming the structures of modern societies in environmentally sensitive directions? The Environment 197 kind of international agreements that characterized the Kyoto Protocol, which could then ensure the spread of best practice and knowledge ofwhat works. Environmental justice and ecological citizenship Environmentaljustice If ecological modernization perhaps leans too heavily on technological fixes, one way of balancing this is by promoting the active involvement of people from all social groups and classes in the project of achieving sustainable development. Environmental justice is a term that orig* inated in the USA with the formation of grassroots networks of activists in workingclass communities (Szasz 1994; Bell 2004: ch. 1; Visgilio and Whitelaw 2003). One touchstone campaign was that ofLois Gibbs in Niagara Falls, NewYork in 1978, seeking to relocate the Love Canal community, which she discovered had been built on a 20,000ton toxic chemical dump. The community campaign was ultimately successful when 900 working-class families were relocated away from the leaking dump in 1980 (Gibbs 2002). Environmental justice groups have focused on campaigns against the siting of toxic waste sites and incinerators in urban areas with high working-class and ethnic minority populations. Linking environmental quality to social class inequalities shows that environmentalism is not just a middleclass concern but can be linked to workingclass interests, and takes account of social inequalities and real-world 'risk positions'. In the USA, toxic waste sites have tended to be situated in black and Hispanic communities where citizens' action groups are relatively less powerful, but Gibbs's campaign showed that they are not powerless. Environmental justice groups can be very significant. Their emergence has the potential to broaden the support base of environmental politics to currently underrepresented groups within the wider 198 THE ENVIRONMENT environmental movement. For instance. Friends of the Earth International (amongst others) has expanded its agenda, recognizing the need to tackle social problems if pressures on the natural environment are to be relieved (Rootes 2005). Environmental justice takes us into the urban and inner city areas where most ofthe waste products of modern life end up, and this opens up environmental politics to people who may not have thought about their problems as being at all 'environmental'. Perhaps the most significant consequence of environmental justice groups is that they offer the possibility oflinking environmental politics in the rich countries with that practised in the relatively poorer ones. One important example was the protest against the multinational oil company, Shell's, impact on the environment of the indigenous Ogoni people in Nigeria. The campaign of the Movement for the Survival ofthe Ogoni People (formed in 1990) and the international support it garnered is just one example of the potentially unifying concept of environmental justice. Attempts by the Nigerian government to put down the resistance movement involved torture, ransackingofvillages and, in 1995, the eventual execution of nine members of the movement's leadership, including the writer Ken Saro-Wiwa, in the face of international protest (Watts 1997). Such events reinforce the argnment that the relatively powerless are made to bear the brunt of environmental pollution. Environm ental justice campaigns demonstrate the potential for linking social inequalities and poverty to environmental issues, promising to make environmentalism more than just a naturedefence movement. Ecological citizenship One final development worthy ofnote is the emergence of a type of citizenship linked to the defence of the natural environment. In recent years, some sociologists and political scientists have argued that a new form of citizenship is emerging, something Mark J. Smith (1998) has called ecological citizenship and Dobson and Bell (2006) refer to as environmentaJ citizenship. As discussed in chapter 12, 'Poverty, Social Exclusion and Welfare', the concept of citizenship is not new and can be divided into different types. Civil citizenship emerged with modern property-ownership, which imposed certain mutual obligations on people to respect each other's rights to property. Political citizenship emerged later, during which voting rights expanded, working-class groups and women were brought into the suffrage and rights of association (as in trades unions) and free speech developed. The third stage, social citizenship, saw rights to welfare and responsibilities for collective provision of social benefits. What Smith and others see is that a fourth stage is developing, in which ecological citizenship rights and responsibilities form the centre- piece. Ecological citizenship involves new obligations: to non-human animals, to future generations of human beings and to maintaining the integrity of the natural environment (Sandilands 1999). Obligations to animals means reconsidering human uses of animals that infringe their rights to leading a natural life and expressing their natures. Hence, vivisection, hunting, farming methods, breeding and pet-keeping would all need to be reassessed. Ecological citizenship's new obligation to future generations of people means working towards sustainability over a long time period. If economic development plans threaten the ability of future generations to provide for their own needs, then other forms will need to be designed and planned. Political and economic planning must become futureoriented and take a long-term view rather than adopting a short-term, free market or laissez-faire approach. Finally, all human activity should be considered with reference to its effects on the natural environment and a precautionary principle should be adopted that puts the onus on developers to justify their actions in ecological terms. In essence, then, ecological citizenship introduces a new demand for people to take account of the human 'ecological footprint' - the impact of human activity on the natural environment and natural processes. Clearly ecological citizenship would demand some fundamental changes to modern societies. Perhaps the most radical change would be to people themselves, as ecological citizenship requires a transformed human experience of nature and the self as tightly bound together. In the same way that people had to start to perceive themselves as citizens with rights in order for political citizenship to take hold, so ecological citizenship is unlikely to develop fully unless people's identities also include the experience of having ecological selves. Conclusion At the end of the first decade of a new century, we cannot foresee whether the next 100 years will be marked by peaceful social and economic development or by a multiplication of global problems - perhaps beyond the ability of humanity to solve. Unlike the nineteenth-century sociologists, we see more clearly the dark side of modern industry, technology and science. We know they are by no means wholly beneficial in their consequences. Scientific and technological development have created a world that contains high consequence risks that make possible huge gains and losses. Especially in the developed world, the population is wealthier than ever before, yet the world as a whole is closer to ecological disas- ter. Should we resign ourselves to an attitude of despair? Sociology offers us a profound consciousness of the human authorship or social creation of social institutions. We see the possibility of controlling our destiny and shaping our lives for the better, to an extent unimaginable to previous genera- tions. The ideas of sustainable development, ecological modernization and environmental justice and citizenship are helping to promote some important changes in human- environment relations and the production of ecologically sensitive technologies. Even as late as the 1980s, when the Brundtland Report appeared, it was widely assumed that industrial development and ecological protection were incompatible. However, the central idea of all of these approaches is that this assumption is false. The use of eco-efficient technologies can produce forms of economic development that combine economic growth with positive policies for the environment, while an emerging environmental responsibility could ensure an expanding demand for such developments. Even the strongest advocates of ecological modernization accept that rescuing the global environment will require changes in the levels of inequality that now exist in the world.As we have seen, industrial countries currently account for only about one-fifth of the world's population, yet they are responsible for over 75 per cent of the emissions that serve to pollute the atmosphere and hasten global warming. The average person in the developed world consumes natural resources at ten times the rate ofthe average individual in less developed countries. Poverty is itself a prime contributor to practices that lead to environmental damage in poor countries and people living in conditions of economic hardship have no choice but to make maximum use of the local resources available to them. What will be needed, then, are 'just sustainabilities' (Agyeman et al. 2003; Smith and Pangsapa 2008). Achieving ecological sustainability demands that concerted international efforts are made to taclde global inequalities as a necessary condition for environmental protection. ,I I' 11 I Summary points 1. The environment means all of the nonhuman, natura) surroundings within which human beings exist - sometimes called the 'natural environment' - and in its widest sense this is simply planet Earth as a whole. 2. The classical sociologists paid little direct attention to the environment, though others have tried to rectify that omission. Current environmental debates have been divided between social constructionists and critical realists. The former leads to a sociology of the environment and adopts an agnostic approach to the subject. The latter leads to an environmental sociology that looks for the underlying causes of environmental problems. 3. Environmental issues are hybrids of environment and society. which marks them out as different from many other sociological issues and social problems. This necessitates interdisciplinary understanding and, potentially, collaboration. All societies are now faced by increasingly global environmental problems and international cooperation is needed in order to find workable solutions. 4. Most environmental issues involve manufactured risks, as they have been generated by human activity.Increasingly, issues of pollution and resource depletion are global in scale and developing countries have been particularly badly affected by soil degradation and deforestation. 5. More recent environmental issues, such as genetic modification of crops and global warming, have been subjects of much controversy. GM foods are widely accepted in the USA and are grown in China, Brazil and elsewhere, but European consumers have refused to buy them. Global warming is the most serious environmental issue yet identified and could have severe consequences for human societies, including flooding,the spread of disease, extreme weather and rising sea levels. Scientists generally agree that it has been caused by human activities since the Industrial Revolution which have rapidly increased the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol,which aimed at cutting back on greenhouse gas emissions, has now been ratified by 174 countries, excluding the USA - the world's largest contributor to greenhouse gases. 6. Rising worldwide consumption patterns are linked to industrial production in a 'treadmill of production and consumption', but they also intensify environmental damage and tend to exacerbate global inequality. Energy consumption and the consumption of raw materials are vastly higher in Western countries than in other areas of the world.Yet the environmental damage caused by growing consumption has the most severe impact on the poor. 7. Sustainable development is the dominant framework for environmental policy development. It is defined as 'development which meets the needs of the present generation, without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs'. Sustainable development links economic development to environmental protection and is concerned to equalize global inequalities to help achieve this. 8. Ulrich Beck's theory of an emerging risk society has been very influential in shaping debates on global environmental issues. His argument is that the industrial age is coming to an end as the side-effects of industrialization build up, forcing societies into a new phase which will see the control and management of risk as its central feature. Critics suggest the thesis currently lacks solid supportive empirical evidence. 9. Ecological modernization is a theory of evolutionary social change, which sees an ecological version of modernization emerging in the present period, which marries continuing technological and economic development with environmental solutions. In social science research, ecological modernization represents a body of work that devises small-scale, practical solutions to environmental problems with a view to rolling out solutions that work. Ecological modernization is also interested in modernizing domestic consumption and transforming the practices of everyday life in an ecologically sensitive direction. 10. Taking a long-term view of environmental change suggests that reducing global inequalities will be a necessary step if developing countries are to be fully involved in achieving global sustainable The Environment 201 development. There is some evidence of this in recent environmental justice campaigns, though the spread of ecological citizenship may take rather longer. :02 THE ENVIRONMENT :........................................................................... (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002) is also a fine edited collection ofessays, which covers the classics as well as more recent theories. • • •: Further reading • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • •• • • • • • •• • • • Agood place to start your additional reading is with Philip W. Sutton's The Environment: A Sociological Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), which is a genuinely introductorylevel text covering all the issues discussed in this chapter and more. Michael M. Bell's An Invitation to Environmental Sociology, Second Edition (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2004) is also very well written and uses lots of helpful examples to illustrate key environmental dilemmas. For something more theoretical, you could try John Hannigan's excellent Environmental Sociology: ASocial Constructionist Perspective (London: RoutIedge, 2006), which includes some very effective constructionist case studies. Peter Dickens's Social Theory and the Environment: Changing Nature, Changing Ourselves (Cambridge: Polity, 2004) approaches environmental issues from a critical realist position and explains this with great clarity. Riley E. Dunlap, Frederick H. Buttel, Peter Dickens and August Gijswijt's. Sociological Theory and the Environment: On sustainable development, Susan Baker's Sustainable Development (London: RoutIedge, 2005) is a good introduction. On the risk society, Ulrich Beck's own, World Risk Society (Cambridge: Polity, 1999) is quite accessible in the original. And for ecological modernization, Arthur P. J. Mol's Globalization and Environmental Reform: The Ecological Modernization ofthe Global Economy (Cambridge, MA: The MlT Press, 2003) is a nicely balanced summary and evaluation of the perspective and its achievements to date. For environmental justice and ecological citizenship, you could tryMarkJ. Smith and Piya Pangsapa's Environment and Citizenship: integratingJustice, Responsibility and Civic Engagement (London: Zed Books, 2008) and Andrew Dobson and Derek Bell's edited collection, Environmental Citizenship (Cambridge, MA:The MIT Press, 2006), which contains some thought-provoking essays. • • • • • • • • •• • •• • •• • • •• • •• • • •• • •• • • •• • • •• • • •• • • • • • • • • • •• • • • •• •Classical Foundations, Contemporary lnsights•• • •·..........................................................................: • •• • •• • • • • • • • • •• • • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Internet links UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs: www.defra.gov.uk/Environmentlindex.htm Environment and Society Blog, University of Leeds, UK -lots of interesting stories and weblinks here: https:llelgg.leeds.ac.uk/socenv/weblog/ Environmental Organization Web DirectoryUSA-based repository with lots ofuseful resources: www.webdirectory.com/ European Environment Agency - good resource base with some interesting surveys and other research: www.eea.europa.eu/ Friends ofthe Earth Internationalcampaigning environmental organization: www.foei.org/ Greenpeace International- campaigning environmental organization: www.greenpeace.org/internationali OECD - Environment site with lots of data from OECD countries: www.oecd.org/topic/0,3373,en_2649_37465_1_ 1_1_1_37465,00.html United Nations Development Programmelink to Human Development Reports and the UN Millennium Goals: www.undp.org/ World Bank, Environment & Development Series -lots ofresources, particularly on environment and developing countries: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL ITOPICS/ENVlRONMENT10"menuPK:176751pagePK:149018-piPK:149093- theSitePK: 244381,00.html • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • •• • • • • • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 11 1 11 I~ [i I: !I I I CHAPTER 6 Cities and U..ban Life Theorizing urbanism 208 The Chicago School 209 Urbanism and the created environment 213 Evaluation 216 The development ofthe city 217 Cities in traditional societies 217 Industrialization and urbanization 219 The development of the modern city 220 Urban trends in the developed world 221 Urbanization in the developing world 230 Cities and globalization 235 Global cities 235 Inequality in the global city 236 Governing cities in a global age 238 Conclusion: cities and global governance 243 Summaty points 244 Further reading 245 Internet lillks 245 (opposite) CIties make enormous demands on our mentalllle. Are these people adoptrng a blase athtude and exhibltmg 'urban reserve'? London, NewYork and Tokyo are three of the world's 'global cities', seen as command centres for the world's economy, with influence extending far beyond their own national borders (Sassen 2001). These global cities are the headquarters for large, transnational corporations, as well as a profusion of financial, technological and consulting services. London has a population of more than 7 million people with more than 300 languages between them and a resident workforce of some 3.4 million. It also has an unrivalled cultural and artistic heritage, helping to confirm its place as a vibrant and dynamic capital- almost 30 million tourists come to stay for a night or more each year. High migration levels have resulted in a young population (20-24 year-olds) as young people move to London for work, education, culture and perhaps to escape the conformity and provincialism of rural life. New York houses Wall Street, which, since 1945 has been one of the world's primary economic centres, New York is also a major hub for international diplomacy, being home to the United Nations headquarters. The city has more than 8 million inhabitants and is the most densely populated city in the USA. New York has been influential in the development of some major popular musical trends such as jazz in the 1940s and punk rock in the 1970s. The Bronx area was also the birthplace of new musical genres such as rap music and hip-hop in the 1970s and' '80s. The city is also extremely culturally diverse with more than one-third of the population born outside the USA. Tokyo city has a population of around 8 million and theTokyo urban area is the most populous in the world with around 35 million people. The city also has the highest gross domestic product (GDP) of all the world's cities, as well as the second largest stock exchange (behind New York). Like London and New York, Tokyo is a major cultural centre with many museums, art galleries and festivals, and in recent years it has become a familiar cityscape as the backdrop for numerous globally distributed films - including Kill Bill (2003/4) and Lost in Translation (2003). Yet, despite all the rich opportunities that big cities such as these have to offer, many people actually find them lonely or unfriendly places. Why? One distinctive characteristic of modern urban life is the frequency of interactions between strangers. Even within the same neighbourhood or block of flats, it is unlikely that people will know most of their neighbours. If you live in a town or city, think about the number of times that you interact everyday with people you do not know.The list might include the bus driver, people working in shops, students and even people you exchange 'pleasantries' with in the street. Perhaps this fact alone makes living in cities today a very different proposition from what is on offer elsewhere or during earlier times in history. Indeed, Marshall Berman (1983) sees the experience ofmodern urban life as definitive of the period sociologists call 'modernity' itself (see chapter 1). Social interaction is discussed in detail in chapter 7I 'Social Interaction and Everyday Life'. In this chapter, we shall first consider some of the main theories of urbanism that have been developed to understand cities and urban life. From there, we will study the origins ofcities and the enormous growth in city populations over the twentieth century and some of the important contemporary trends in urbanization around the world. Not surprisingly, rapid globalization is having an enormous impact on city-living and we shall consider this process in the final part ofthe chapter. Theorizing urbanism What is a city? Asimple working definition is: an inhabited central place differentiated from a town or village by its greater size, and by the range ofactivities practised within its boundaries, usuallyreligious. militarypolitical, economic, educational and cultural Collectively, these activities involve the exercise ofpowerover the surrounding countryside. (lary and Jary 1999: 74) We can say, then, that cities are relatively large forms of human settlement, within which a wide range of activities are performed, which enable cities to become centres ofpower in relation to outlying areas and smaller settlements. Thinking back to our introductory example, this definition fits London, NewYork and Tokyo prettywell. Many early sociologists were fascinated by the city and by urban life; Max Weber even wrote a book called The City (published posthumously in 1921), in which he traced the conditions that made modern • • capitalism possible back to the medieval, Western city. Other early sociologists were more concerned with the way in which the development of cities changed the social as well as the physical environment. The work of Ferdinand Tannies and Georg Simmel provided two of the most important early contributions to urban sociology. German sociologist Ferdinand Tannies (1855- 1936) was particularly concerned about the effects of city life on social bonds and solidarity. He argued that the process of urbanization, whi~h occurred with the Industrial Revolution, irredeemably changed social life. He charted with some sadness the gradual loss of what he called Gemeinschaft or community bonds, which he characterized as based on traditional, close-knit ties, personal and steady relationships between neighbours and friends, and a clear understanding of one's social position (Tannies 2001 (1887]). However, Gesellschaft, or 'associational' bonds, were rapidly replacing this type of social bond. These were relatively short-lived, transitory and instrumental in character. And though all societies contain social bonds ofboth types, with industrialization and urbanization the balance of social bonds was shifting decisively away from Gemeinschaftin favour of a more individualistic society. In this society, relationships tend to be specific to a particular setting and purpose, and only take into account a part of the whole person. For example, if we take a bus in the city, our interaction with the driver is likelyto be limited to a briefexchange atthe THINKING CRITICALLY What are your positive experiences of city life? What freedoms, opportunities and experiences do city inhabitants enjoy that are not routinely available to those living in small towns and villages? Do these positive aspects outweigh the possible negative ones outlined by Simmel and T6nnies? Was Simmel right, or have cities radically changed since his time? door ofthe bus as we pay, and our use for him will be limited to his ability to get us to our destination - it is an instrumental exchange. For Tannies, the modern city, unlike older traditional settlements, is a place full of strangers, for good or ill. The early theorists of the city deeply influenced the work of later urban sociologists. Robert Park, for example, a key member ofthe Chicago School of Sociology, studied under Simmel in Germany at the turn ofthe twentieth century, and it is to this that we now turn. The Chicago School A number of sociologists associated with the University of Chicago from the 1920s to the 1940s, especially Robert Park, Ernest Burgess and Louis Wirth, developed ideas which were for many years the chiefbasis of theory and research in urban sociology. Two concepts developed by the Chicago School are worthy of special attention. One is the so-called ecological approach in urban analysis; the other is the characterization of urbanism as a way of life, developed by Wirth (Wirth 1938; Park 1952). Urban ecology Ecology is a term taken from a physical science: the study ofthe adaptation ofplant and animal organisms to their environment. This is the sense in which 'ecology' is used in the context of problems of the natural environment (see chapter 5, 'The Environment', for more on ecology and environment). In the natural world, organisms tend to be distributed in systematic ways over the terrain, such that a balance or equilibrium between different species is achieved. The Chicago School argued that the siting of major urban settlements and the distribution of different types of neighbourhood within them could be understood in terms of similar principles. Cities do not grow up at random, but in response to advantageous features of the environment. For example, large urban areas in modern Classic Studies 6.1 Georg Simmel on the mental life of city-dwellers The research problem Many people saw that large-scale urbanization fundamentally changed societies,but what effects would such a shift have on individuals? How would it alter their attitudes and behaviour? And what exactly is it about city-living that produces such dramatic effects? One of Tbnnies's German contemporaries, Georg Simmel (1858-1918),provided just such a theoretical account of how the city shapes its inhabitants' 'mental life'; his 'The Metropolis and Mental Life' (1950 [1903)),Tbnnies remarked, had managed to capture 'the flavour of the metropolis'. Simmel's explanation Simmel's study would today be described as an early piece of interpretative sociology,seeking to understand and convey something about how city life is actually experienced by people. City life, says Simmel, bombards the mind with images and impressions,sensations and activity This is 'a deep contrast with the slower, more habitual, more smoothly flowing rhythm' of the small town or village. In this context, it is not possible for individuals to respond to every stimulus or activity they come across, so how do they deal with such a bombardment? Simmel argues that city-dwellers protect themselves from 'the unexpectedness of violent stimuli' and the assault of 'changing images' by becoming quite blase and disinterested, adopting a 'seen-it-aIl-before' attitude.They 'tune out' much of the urban buzz that surrounds them,focusing on whatever they need to, just in order to get by The result ofthis blase attitude, thought Simmel, is that although city-dwellers are part of the 'metropolitan crush', they distance themselves from one another emotionally Typically the myriad fleeting contacts with people they do not know result in an 'urban reserve ' in interactions with others, which can be perceived as emotionless and rather cold,leading to widespread feelings of impersonality and even isolation. Simmel points out, though, that city people are not by nature indifferent to others and uncaring.Rather, they are forced to adopt such modes of behaviour in order to preserve their social distance and individual selves in the face of pressures from the densely populated urban environment. Simmel notes that the sheer pace of urban life partly explains the typical urban personality But he also argues that the fact that the city is 'the seat of the money economy' must be taken into account. Many cities are large capitalistic financial centres, which demand punctuality, rational exchange and an instrumental approach to business. This encourages 'relentless' matterof-fact dealings between people,with little room for emotional connection, resulting in 'calculating minds' capable of weighing the benefits and costs of involvement in relationships. Like Tbnnies, then, Simmel's study points up some of the emerging problems of living in the modern, urbanized world. Critical points Critics of Simmel's study have raised a number of objections. His arguments seem to be based on personal observation and insight rather than on any formal or replicable research methods, thus the findings can be seen as somewhat speculative and not rooted in empirical studies. Also,despite Simmel's insistence that he set out merely to understand urban life and not to damn it, many critics have suggested that the overall tone of the study is negative, revealing a value bias against the capitalist city It is certainly true that his work seems to focus on the ways in which individuals can resist being 'levelled down and worn out by a sociotechnological mechanism' (SimmeI1950: 409). In this sense, critics sa}\ Simmel plays down the liberating experience of many people who move to cities to experience greater freedoms and room for individual expression. Finall}\ the study may be guilty of overgeneralizing from a specific type of large city to cities in general. After all, only a minority of cities are financial centres and those that are not may well have less alienating and isolating effects on people than Simmel allows for.Can we really say that all urbanites have the same experiences? Contemporary significance Simmers accoW1t of life in the modern metropolis provides a sociological explanation of some key characteristics of contemporary urbanism. His theoretical study shows how the quality of social interactions can be shaped by pressures arising from the wider social environment ofthe city, an important consequence of which is Simmel's view that the city, 'is not a spatial entity with social consequences, but a sociological entity that is formed spatially'. This has proved a very productive starting point for later urban studies. Simmers influence can also be felt in modern social theory. He argued: '[T]he deepest problems ofmodern life derive from the claim of the individual to preserve the autonomy and individuality of his existence in the face of overwhelming social forces.'There is more than an echo of this perspective in the more recent work ofUlrich Beck,ZygmW1t Bauman and other contemporary theorists of modern individualism. societies tend to develop along the shores of rivers, on fertile plains or at the intersection of trading routes or railways. 'Once set up,' in Park's words, 'a city is, it seems, a great sorting mechanism which ... infallibly selects out of the population as a whole the individuals best suited to live in a particular region or a particular milieu' (1952: 79). Cities become ordered into 'natural areas', through processes of competition, invasion and succession - all of which occur in biological ecology. If we look at the ecology of a lake in the natural environment, we find that competition between various species offish, insects and other organisms operates to reach a fairly stable distribution between them. This balance is disturbed if new species 'invade' - try to make the lake their home, Some of the organisms, which used to proliferate in the central area of the lake, are driven out to suffer a more precarious existence around its fringes. The invading species are their successors in the central sections. Patterns of location, movement and relocation in cities, according to the ecological view, take a similar form. Different neighbourhoods develop through the adjustments made by inhabitants as they struggle to gain their livelihoods. A city can be pictured as a map of areas with distinct and contrasting social characteristics. In the initial stages of the growth of modern cities, industries congregate at sites suitable for the raw materials they need, close to supply lines. Populations cluster around theseworkplaces, which come to be increasingly diversified as the number of the city's inhabitants grows. The amenities thus developed become correspondingly more attractive, and greater competition develops for their acquisition. Land values and property taxes rise, making it difficult for families to carry on living in the central neighbourhood, except in cramped conditions or in decaying housing where rents are still low. The centre becomes dominated bybusinesses and entertainment, with the more affluent private residents moving out to newly forming suburbs around the perimeter. This process follows transport routes, since these minimize the time taken in travelling to work; the areas between these routes develop more slowly. Cities can be seen as formed in concentric rings, broken up into segments, In the centre are the inner-city areas, a mixture of big business prosperity and decaying private houses. Beyond these are longer established neighbourhoods, housing workers employed in stable manual occupations. Further out still are the suburbs in which higher-income groups tend to live, Processes of invasion and succession occur within the segments ofthe concentric rings. Thus, as property decays in a central or near-central area, ethnic minority groups might start to move into it. As they do so, more of the pre-existing population start to leave, precipitating a wholesale flight to neighbourhoods elsewhere in the city or out to the suburbs. Although for a period the urban ecology approach fell into disrepute, it was later revived and elaborated in the writings of a number of authors, particularly Amos Hawley (1950, 1968). Rather than concentrating on competition for scarce resources, as his predecessors had done, Hawley emphasized the interdependenceofdifferent city areas. Differentiation - the specialization ofgroups and occupational roles - is the main way in which human beings adapt to their environment. Groups on which many others depend will have a dominant role, often reflected in their central geographical position. Business groups, for example, like large banks or insurance companies, provide key services for many in a community, and hence are usually to be found in the central areas of settlements. But the zones which develop in urban areas, Hawley points out, arise from relationships not just of space, but also of time. Business dominance, for example, is expressed not only in patterns of land-use, but also in the rhythm of activities in daily life - an illustration being the rush hour. The ordering in time of people's daily lives reflects the hierarchy of neighbourhoods in the city. The ecological approach has been as important for the empirical research it has helped to promote as for its value as a theoretical perspective. Many studies, both of cities and of particular neighbourhoods, have been prompted by ecological thinking, concerned, for example, with the processes of 'invasion' and 'succession' mentioned above. However, various criticisms can justifiably be made. The ecological perspective tends to underemphasize the importance of conscious design and planning in city organization, regarding urban development as a 'natural' process. The models of spatial organization developed by Park, Burgess and their colleagues were drawn from American experience, and fit only some types of city in the USA, let alone cities in Europe, Japan or the developing world. Claude Fischer (1984) has put forward an interpretation of why large-scale urbanism tends actually to promote diverse subcultures, rather than swamp everyone within an anonymous mass. Those who live in cities, he points out, are able to collaborate with others of similar backgrounds or interests to develop local connections; and they can join distinctive religious, ethnic, political and other subcultural groups. A small town or village does not allow the development of such subcultural diversity. Those who form ethnic communities within cities, for instance, might have little or no knowledge of one another in their land of origin. When they arrive, they gravitate to areas where others from a similar linguistic and cultural background are living, and new sub-community structures are formed. An artist might find few others to associate with in a village or small town, but in a large city he or she might become part of a significant artistic and intellectual subculture. A large city is a 'world of strangers', yet it supports and creates personal relationships. This is not paradoxical. We have to separate urban experience between the public sphere of encounters with strangers and the more private world offamily, friends and work colleagues. [t may be difficult to 'meet people' when one first moves to a large city. But anyone moving to a small, established rural community may find the friendliness of the inhabitants largely a matter of public politeness - it may take years to become 'accepted'. This is not so in the city. As Edward Krupat has commented: Yet the overwhelming evidence is that because of the diversity of strangers - each one is a potential friend - and the wide range of lifestyles and interests in the city. people do move from the outside in. And once they are on the inside ofone group or network, the possibilities for expanding their connections multiply greatly. As a result, the evidence indicates that the positive opportunities in the city often seem to outweigh the constraining forces, allowing people to develop and maintain satisfying relationships. (1985: 36) Modern cities do frequently involve impersonal, anonymous social relationships, but they are also sources of diversity - and, sometimes, intimacy. Urbanism and the created environment More recent theories of urbanism have stressed that it is not an autonomous process, but has to be analysed in relation to major patterns of political and economic change. The two leading writers in urban analysis, David Harvey (1982, 1985, 2006) and Manuel Castells (1983, 1991, 1997), have both been strongly influenced by Karl Marx. The restructuring ofspace Drawing on broadly Marxist ideas, David Harvey has argued that urbanism is one aspect of the created environment brought about by the spread ofindustrial capitalism. In traditional societies, city and countryside were clearly differentiated. In the modern world, industry blurs the division between city and countryside. Agriculture becomes mechanized and is run simply according to considerations of price and profit, just like industrial work, and this process lessens the differences in modes of social life between urban and rural people. In modern urbanism, Harvey points out, space is continually restructured. The process is determined by where large firms choose to place their factories, research and development centres and so forth, by the controls asserted by governments over both land and industrial production and by the activities of private investors, buying and selling houses and land. Business firms, for example, are constantly weighing up the relative advantages ofnew locations against existing ones. As production becomes cheaper in one area than in another, or as the firm moves from one product to another, offices and factories will be closed down in one place and opened up elsewhere. Thus at one period, when there are considerable profits to be made, there may be a spate of office block building in the The Lozells area of Birmingham in the UK saw an eruption ofviolence in 2005 between the ethnic communities who make up the majority of its population. Was this the result of ethnic groups leading lives in increasingly s8gTegated communities? Classic Studies 6.2 LouisWirth's 'urbanism as a way of life' The research problem We know from Simmel that the urban environment tends to create particular personality types and that there is a certain pattern to the development of cities. But are such personality types limited to the cities? How do cities relate to and interact with the rest of society? Does urbartism exert any influence outside the city boundary" Louis Wirth (1897-1952) explored the idea that urbartism was. in fact. a whole way of life. not an experience limited to just some areas of society. Wirth's explanation While other members ofthe Chicago School focused on understanding the shape of the city how they came to be internally divided - Wirth was more concerned with urbanisrn as a distinct way oflife.Urbartism, he argued, could not be reduced to or understood simply by measuring the size ofurban populations. Instead, it has to be grasped as a form of social existence. Wirth observed that: The influences which cities exert on the social life ofman are greater than the ratio ofthe urban population would indicate: for the city is not only increasingly the dwelling-place and the workshop of modern man, but it is the initiating and controlling centre ofeconomic. political and cultural life that has drawn the most remote conunturities ofthe world into its orbit and woven diverse areas, peoples and actiVlties into a cosmos. (1938: 342) In cities, large numbers ofpeople live in close proximity to one another. without knowing most of those others personally. This is in fundamental contrast to small. traditional villages and towns. Many contacts between city-dwellers are, as Tbnnies suggested, fleeting and partial,they are means to other ends, rather than being satisfying relationships in themselves. Wirth calls these 'secondary contacts', compared to the 'primary contacts' of familial and strong community relationships.For example,interactions with salespeople in shops, cashiers in banks or ticket collectors on trains are passing encounters, entered into not for their own sake, as in communal relations, but merely as means to other aims. Since those who live in urban areas tend to be highly mobile, moving around to find work and to enjoy leisure and travel. there are relatively weak bonds between them. People are involved in many different activities and situations each day and the 'pace oflife' in cities is much faster than in rural areas. Competition tends to prevail over cooperation, and social relationships can appear as flimsy and brittle. Of course, the Chicago School's ecological approach found that the density of social life in cities leads to the formation of neighbourhoods having distinct characteristics, some ofwhich may preserve some of the characteristics of small communities. In inunigrant areas, for example, traditional types of connections between families are found, with most people knowmg most others on a personal basis.SinuJarly.Young and Wilmott's (1957) FarruJy and KinshJp m East London, found strong connections amongst working class families in the city. However, althoughWirth accepted this, he argued that the more these areas became ~ .. \\ L' fUI'£' tbe l.'f{'U'. It hl'fp$ to yell/lilt! us '''.'11 fu,'re Q /Jilr! IJ(./ /,rrger cO/llnlllllit )'. " absorbed into the wider patterns of city life, the less such community characteristics would survive. The urban way of life weakens bonds of kinship,thus eroding families,communities are dissolved and the traditional bases of social solidarity are rendered ineffective. Wirth was not blind to the benefits of urbanism. He saw that modern cities were centres of freedom, toleration and progress, but he also saw that urbanism spread beyond city boundaries, as the process of suburbanization, with all of its necessary transport systems and infrastructure, shows. And in that sense, modern societies themselves are necessarily shaped by the forces of urbanism. Critical points Critics have pointed out the limitations ofWirth's ideas on urbanism. Like the ecological perspective, with which it has much in common, Wirth's thesis is rooted in the experience of American cities, and cannot be seen as a genera! theory of city life. Urbanism is not the same at all times and all places. Ancient cities were quite different from modern ones, for example and cities in developing countries today are often very different from those in the developed ones. Critics argue that Wirth also exaggerates the extent of impersonality in modern cities. Communities involving close friendship or kinship links are more persistent than he thought Everett Hughes, a colleague of Wirth, said that, 'Louis used to say all those things about how the city is impersonal - while living with a whole clan of kin and friends on a very personal basis' (cited in Kasarda and Janowitz 1974: 338). Similarly; Herbert Gans (1963) argued that 'urban villagers' - such as Italian-Americans living ill inner-city Boston were quite commonly to be found. These critics question Wirth's picture ofmodern cities by showing that city life can lead to the bU11ding of communities rather than always destroying them. Contemporary significance Wirth's ideas have deservedly enjoyed wide currency; The impersonality of many day-to-day contacts in modern cities is undeniable and, to some degree, this is true of social life more generally; His theory is also important for its recognition that urbanism is not just one part of society, but actually expresses and influences the character of the wider social system. Given the expanding process of urbanization in many developing countries and the fact that a majority ofpeople in the developed world already live in urban areas, Wirth's ideas will continue to be a reference point for sociologists looking to understand urbanism as a way oflife. centre of large cities. Once the offices have been built, and the central area 'redeveloped', investors look for potential for further speculative building elsewhere. Often what is profitable in one period will not be so in another, when the financial climate changes. However, it was only made possible, Harvey argues, because of government decisions to provide tax concessions to home-buyers and construction firms, and by the setting up of special credit arrangements by financial organizations. These provided the basis for the building and buying of new homes on the peripheries of cities, and at the same time promoted demand for industrial products such as the motorcar. In recent years, Harvey (2006) has applied his theory of uneven spatial development to global inequalities between the relatively rich countries of the northern hemisphere and the relatively poor developing countries in the south. The turn towards neoliberal ideas, as for example in the USA and UK in The activities of private home-buyers are strongly influenced by how far, and where, business interests buy up land, as well as by rates of loans and taxes fixed by local and central government.After the Second World War, for instance, there was avast expansion of suburban development in major cities in the United States. This was partly due to ethnic discrimination and the tendency of whites to move away from inner-city areas. the 1970s and '80s, has, he argues, laid bare the 'myth' that developing countries just need to 'catch up with the West'. Such a neoliberal political agenda shows that gross inequalities are built into the global capitalist economy_ Urbanism and social movements Like Harvey, Castellsstresses that the spatial form ofa society is closely linked to the overall mechanisms of its development. To understand cities, we have to grasp the processes whereby spatial forms are created and transformed. The layout and architectural features of cities and neighbourhoods express struggles and conflicts between different groups in society. In other words, urban environments represent symbolic and spatial manifestations of broader social forces (Tonkiss 2006). For example, skyscrapers may be built because they are expected to provide profit, but the giant buildings also 'symbolise the power of money over the city through technology and self-confidence and are the cathedrals of the period of rising corporate capitalism' (Castells 1983: !O3). In contrast to the Chicago sociologists, Castells sees the city not only as a distinct location - the urban area - but also as an integral part of processes of collective consumption, which in turn are an inherent aspect of industrial capitalism. Schools, transport services and leisure amenities are ways in which people collectively 'consume' the products of modern industry. The taxation system influences who is able to buy or rent where, and who builds where. Large corporations, banks and insurance compa ~ nies, which provide capital for building projects, have a great deal of power over these processes. But government agencies also directly affect many aspects of city life, by building roads and public housing, planning green belts, on which new development cannot encroach, and so forth. The physical shape of cities is thus a product of both market forces and the power of government. But the nature of the created environment is not just the result of the activities of wealthy and powerful people. Castells stresses the importance of the struggles of underprivileged groups to alter their living conditions. Urban problems stimulate a range of social movements, concerned with improving housing conditions, protesting against air pollution, defending parks and green belts and combating building development that changes the nature of an area. For example, Castells studied the gay movement in San Francisco, which succeeded in restructuring neighbourhoods around its own cultural values - allowing many gay organizations, clubs and bars to flourish and gaining a prominent position in local politics. Cities, Harvey and Castells both emphasize, are almost wholly 'artificial' environments, constructed by people. Even most rural areas do not escape the influence of human intervention and modern technology, for human activity has reshaped and reordered the world ofnature. Food is not produced for local inhabitants, but for national and international markets; and in mechanized farming, land is rigorously subdivided and specialized in its use, ordered into physical patterns, which have little relationship to natural features of the environment. Those who live on farms and in isolated rural areas are economically, politically and culturally tied to the larger society, however different some of their modes of behaviour may be from those of city-dwellers. Evaluation The views of Harvey and Castells have been widely debated, and their work has been important in redirecting urban analysis. In contrast to the ecologists' approach, it puts emphasis not on 'natural' spatial processes, but on how land and the created environment reflect social and economic systems of power. This marks a significant shift of emphasis. Yet the ideas of Harvey and Castells are often stated in a highly abstract way, and have not stimulated such a large variety of research studies compared with the work ofthe Chicago School. In some ways, the views set out by Harvey and Castells and those of the Chicago School usefully complement each other, and can be combined to give a comprehensive picture of urban processes. The contrasts between city areas described in urban ecology do exist, as does the overall impersonality of city life. But these are more variable than the members of the Chicago School thought, and are primarily governed by the social and economic influences analysed by Harvey and Castells. John Logan and Harvey Molotch (1987) suggested an approach that directly connects the perspectives of authors like Harvey and CasteIls with some features of the ecological standpoint. They agree with Harvey and Castells that broad features of economic development, stretching nation· ally and internationally, affect urban life in quite a direct way. But these wide-ranging economic factors, they argue, are focused through local organizations, including neighbourhood businesses, banks and government agencies, together with the activities of individual house-buyers. Places - land and buildings - are bought and sold, according to Logan and Molotch, just like other goods in modern societies, but the markets which structure city environments are influenced by how different groups of people want to use the property they buy and sell. Many tensions and conflicts arise as a result of this process - and these are the key factors structuring city neighbourhoods. For instance, in modern cities, Logan and Molotch point out, large financial and business firms continually try to intensify land-use in specific areas. The more they can do so, the more there are opportunities for land speculation and for the profitable construction of new buildings. These companies have little concern with the social and physical effects of their activities on a given neighbourhood - with whether or not, for example, attractive older residences are destroyed to make room for large new office blocks. The growth processes fostered by big firms involved in property development often go against the interests of local businesses or residents, who may attempt actively to resist them. People come together in neighbourhood groups in order to defend their interests as residents. Such local associations may campaign for the extension of zoning restrictions, block new building encroaching on parks, or press for more favourable rent regulations. The development of the city Although there were great cllles in the ancient world, like Athens and Rome in Europe, city life, as we now know it, is very different from that experienced in previous ages. As early sociologists like Simmel and Tannies showed, the development of the modern city changed the way in which humans felt and thought about the world and the ways in which they interacted with one another. In this section we look at the development of the city from its beginnings in traditional societies to the most recent trends in urban development across the world. Cities in traditional societies The world's first cities appeared around 3500 BCE, in the river valleys of the Nile in Egypt, the Tigris and Euphrates in what is now Iraq, and the Indus in what is today Pakistan. Cities in traditional societies were very small by modern standards. Babylon, for example, one of the largest ancient Near Eastern cities, extended over an area of only 3.2 square miles and at its height, around 2000 BCE, probably numbered no more that 15,000- 20,000 people. Rome under Emperor Augustus in the first century BCE was easily the largest pre-modern city outside China, Cityscape of the modern megalopolis.How does it feel to you - a desolate concrete jungle or the very pinnacle ofhuman achivement? with some 300,000 inhabitants - the size ofa 'small' modern city today. Most cities of the ancient world shared certain common features. High walls, that served as a military defence and emphasized the separation of the urban community from the countryside, usually surrounded them. The central area was usually occupied by a religious temple, a royal palace, government and commercial buildings and a public square.This ceremonial, commercial and political centre was sometimes enclosed within a second, inner wall and was usually too small to hold more than a minority of the citizens. Although it usually contained a market, the centre was different from the business districts found at the core of modern cities, because the main buildings were nearly always religious and political (Sjoberg 1960, 1963; Fox 1964; Wheatley 1971). The dwellings of the ruling class or elite tended to be concentrated near the centre. The less privileged groups lived towards the perimeter of the city or outside the walls, moving inside if the city came under attack. Different ethnic and religious communities were often allocated to separate neighbourhoods, where their members both lived and worked. Sometimes these neighbourhoods were also surrounded by walls. Communications among city-dwellers were erratic. Lacking any form of printing press, public officials had to shout at the tops of their voices to deliver pronouncements. 'Streets' were usually strips of land on which no one had yet built. A few traditional civilizations boasted sophisticated road systems linking various cities, but these existed mainly for military purposes, and transportation for the most part was slow and limited. Merchants and soldiers were the only 100 90 80 70 '" 60C> J!l c 50 '"2 '" 40"- 30 20 10 0 people who regularly travelled over long distances. While cities were the main centres for science, the arts and cosmopolitan culture, their influence over the rest of the country was always weak, No more than a tiny proportion of the population lived in the cities, and the division between cities and countryside was pronounced, By far the majority of people lived in small rural communities and rarely encountered more than the occasional state official or merchant from the towns, Industrialization and urbanization The contrast between the largest modern cities and those of pre-modern civilizations is extraordinary. The most populous cities in the industrialized countries number almost 20 million inhabitants, A conurbation - a cluster ofcities and towns forming a continuous network - may include even larger numbers of people, The peak of urban life - - - - World - - Africa --Asia - - - Europe - - Latin America and the Caribbean ,-- - - Northern America - Oceania '--- ~ ----------------- -------------- today is represented by what is called the megalopolis, the 'city ofcities', The term was originally coined in ancient Greece to refer to a city-state that was planned to be the envy of all civilizations, but in current usage it bears little relation to that utopia, The term was first applied in relation to the north-eastern seaboard of the United States, a conurbation covering some 450 miles from north of Boston to below Washington' DC, In this region, about 40 million people live at a density of more than 700 persons per square mile. Britain was the first society to undergo industrialization, a process that began in the mid-eighteenth century, The process of industrialization generated increasing urbanization - the movement of the population into towns and cities, and away from the land, In 1800, fewer than 20 per cent of the British population lived in towns or cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants, By 1900, this proportion had risen to 74 per cent, The capital city, London, was home to ---------------::: ------ ------ ~------ ~ -~- ----------- - 195019551960196519701975198019851990199520002005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 Figure 6.1 Percentage of the world's population living in urban areas, 1950-2030 (projected) Source: United Nations Urbanization prospects, 2005. Reprinted by permission of the United Nations Population Division. about 1.1 million people in 1800; by the beginning of the twentieth century, it had increased in size to a population of more than 7 million. London was then by far the largest city ever seen in the world. It was a vast manufacturing, commercial and financial centre at the heart of a still-expanding British Empire. The urbanization of most other European countries and the United States took place somewhat later - but in some cases, once under way, accelerated even faster. In lS00, the United States was a more rural society than the leading European countries. Less than 10 per cent of the population lived in communities with populations of more than 2,500 people. Today, well over three-quarters of Americans do so. Between 1800 and 1900, the population of New York leapt from 60,000 people to 4.S million. Urbanization is now a global process, into which developing countries are increasingly being drawn. In 1950, only 30 per cent ofthe world's population were urban-dwellers; by 2000, this had reached 47 per cent - 2.9 billion people - and by 2030 it is forecast to reach 60 per cent - some 5 billion people. In 2007, the number of people living in urban areas overtook the number of people in rural areas. Most urbanization is now taking place in the developing world. The urban population of the less developed regions is expected to rise by more than 2 billion people between 2000 and 2030 from around 2 to 4 billion. As figure 6.1 shows, urbanization in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean has increased particularly rapidly over the last 60 years, whilst the rate of urban population growth within developed regions such as Europe and Oceania has slowed over the same period (United Nations 2005). The development of the modern city Only at the turn ofthe twentieth century did statisticians and social observers begin to distinguish between the town and the city. Cities with large populations were recognized to be usually more cosmopolitan than smaller centres, with their influence extending beyond the national society of which they were a part. The expansion of cities came about because of population increase, plus the migration of outsiders from farms, villages and small towns. This migration was often international, with people moving from peasant backgrounds directly into cities in the other countries. The immigration ofvery large numbers of Europeans from poor farming backgrounds to the United States is the most obvious example. Cross-national immigration into cities was also widespread between countries in Europe itself. Peasants and villagers migrated to the towns (as they are doing on a massive scale in developing countries today) because of lack of opportunities in the rural areas, coupled with the apparent advantages and attractions of cities, where it was rumoured that the streets were 'paved with gold' (jobs, wealth, a wide range of goods and services). Cities, moreover, became concentrated centres of financial and industrial power, entrepreneurs sometimes creating new urban areas almost from scratch. The development of modern cities has had an enormous impact, not only on habits and modes of behaviour, but on patterns of thought and feeling. From the time when large urban agglomerations first formed, in the eighteenth century, views about the effects of cities on social life have been polarized. For many people, cities represent 'civilized virtue' and are the fount of dynamism and cultural creativity; cities maximize opportunities for economic and cultural development, and provide the means ofliving a comfortable and satisfying existence. For others, the city is a smoking inferno thronged with aggressive and mutually distrustful crowds, riddled with crime, violence, corruption and poverty. In the late twentieth century, environmentalists sllch as Murray Bookchin (1986) have come to see cities as huge sprawling, environmentally damaging monsters that devour energy and generate waste at an unsustainable rate. See chapter 5 'The Environment'. for a discussion of environmental issues. As cities mushroomed in size, many people were horrified to see that inequalities and urban poverty seemed to intensify correspondingly. The extent of urban poverty and the vast differences between city neighbourhoods were among the main factors that prompted early sociological analyses of urban life. Unsurprisingly, the first major sociological studies of, and theories about, modern urban conditions originated in Chicago, a US city marked by a phenomenal rate of development - it grew from a virtually uninhabited area in the 1830s to a population of well over 2 million by 1900 - and by very pronounced inequalities. Cities and Urban Life Urban trends in the developed world In this section, we consider some of the main patterns in Western urban development in the post-war era, using Britain and the United States as examples. Attention will focus on the rise of suburban areas, the decline of inner-city areas and strategies aimed at urban renewal. Suburbanization In the USA, the process of suburbanization reached its peak in the 1950s and 1960s.The centres of cities during those decades had a 10 per cent growth rate, while that of the suburban areas was 48 per cent. Most of the early movement to the suburbs involved white families. The enforcement of racial mixing in schools can be seen as a major factor in the decision of many whites to decamp from inner-city areas. Moving to the suburbs was an attractive option for families who wished to put their children in all-white schools. Even today, American suburbs remain mostly white. ManyVictorians saw the newly industrializing cities such as Manchester and Leeds as sewers of degeneration and vice. .................................................................................................................................. However, the white domination of suburbia in the United States is being eroded as more and more members of ethnic minorities move there.An analysis ofdata from the US 2000 Census showed that racial and ethnic minorities make up 27 per cent of suburban populations, up from 19 per cent in 1990. Like the people who began the exodus to suburbia in the 1950s, members of minority ethnic groups who move to the suburbs are mostly middle-class professionals. They move in search of better housing, schools and amenities. According to the chairman ofthe Chicago Housing Authority, 'suburbanization isn't about race now; it's about class. Nobody wants to be around poor people because of all the problems that go along with poor people: poor schools, unsafe streets, gangs' (De Witt 1994). In the UK, many of the suburbs around London grew up between the two world wars, and clustered round new roads and links by underground trains that could bring commuters into the centre. Some 6.1 'Engendering' the city converts to the big city life have looked with disdain on the large expanses of suburbia, with their semi-detached villas and welltended gardens blanketing the fringes of English cities. Others, like the poet John Betjeman (1906-84), celebrated the modest eccentricity of the architecture of the suburbs, and the impulse to combine the employment opportunities ofthe city with a mode of life connected in practical terms with owner-occupation and car-ownership, and in terms of values with traditional family life. In Britain, the migration of the residential population from central city areas to outlying suburbs and dormitory towns (towns outside the city boundaries lived in mainly by people who work in the city) or villages in the 1970s and early 1980s meant that the population of Greater London dropped by about half a million over the period. In the industrial towns of the North, the rapid loss of manufacturing industry during this period also reduced the population of inner-city areas. At the same time, many Writing from a feminist perspective. several authors have examined how the city reflects the unequal gender relations in society,and have looked at ways to overcome this. Jo Beall Cl998) has noted that if social relations,in this case between men and women, are underpinned by power, then cities demonstrate the correlation between power and space in terms of what gets built, where it is built,how and for whom.Beall writes:'Cities are literally concrete manifestations of ideas on how society was, is and how it should be'. grew even more obvious.While the male head of the family commuted into the city on a daily basis, the women (wives) were expected to remain at home to care for the family. Transport links were built for travel between the sulourbs and the city centre, but little thought was given by male designers to transportation within the sulourbs, as a result ofwhich it was more difficult for women to leave home (Greed 1994). ElizabethWilson (2002) has argued that the development ofthe city was not all bad for women. She suggests that some feminist arguments reduce the role of women in the city to that ofpassive victims. In fact,the development of the city provided opportunities that non-urban forms of life could not provide.With the emergence of female white-collar work in the city and later the expansion of service industries, women increasingly entered the workforce.Thus the city offered women an escape from unpaid labour at home that did not exist elsewhere. The growth ofthe city in the nineteenth century i~ associated with gender separation. Public life and space was dominated by men, who were free to travel through the city as they wanted. Women were not expected to be seen in most pulolic places, and those who were, were likely to be regarded as prostitutes or 'street walkers' .As the process of suburbanization began, the gender separation smaller cities and towns grew quickly - for example, Cambridge, Ipswich, Norwich, Oxford and Leicester. The 'flight to the suburbs' has had dramatic implications for the health and vitality of both British and American urban centres, as we shall see. Suburbanization has also affected men and women differently, as 'Using your sociological imagination 6.1' suggests. THINllING CRITICALLY What examples of the 'built environment' of cities can you think of that make getting around more difficult, particularly for women? Are these simply the result of male dominance in the architectural professions or the product of separate roles for men and women? Is Wilson right - have cities become more 'female-friendly' over time? Inner-city decay In the USA, the severe inner-city decay, which has marked all large cities over the past few decades, is a direct consequence of the growth ofthe suburbs.The movement of high-income groups away from the city centres has meant a loss of their local tax revenues. Since those that remain, or replace them, include many who are living in poverty, there is little scope for replacing that lost income. If rates are raised in the central city, wealthier groups and businesses tend to move further out. This situation is worsened by the fact that the building stock in city centres becomes more run-down than in the suburbs, crime rates rise and there is higher unemployment. More must therefore be spent on welfare services, schools, the upkeep of buildings and police and fire services. A cycle of deterioration develops in which the more that suburbia expands, the greater become the problems of the city centres. In many American urban areas the effect has been dramatic, particularly in the older cities, such as New York, Boston and Washington, DC. In some neighbourhoods in these cities, the deterioration of property is probably worse than in large urban areas anywhere else in the industrialized world. Decaying tenement blocks and boarded-up and burnt-out buildings alternate with empty areas ofland covered in rubble. In Britain, inner-city decay has been less marked than in the United States. Yet some inner-city areas are as dilapidated as many neighbourhoods in American cities. An important Church of England report, Faith in the City, described the inner-city areas in bleak terms: Grey walls, littered streets, boarded-up windows, graffiti, demolition and debris are the drearily standard features of the districts and parishes with which we are concerned . .. the dwellings in the inner cities are older than elsewhere. Roughly one-quarter of England's houses were built before 1919, but the proportion in the inner areas ranged from 40 to 60 per cent. (1985: 18) One reason for the decay in Britain's inner cities is the financial crises that have affected many of these areas. From the late 1970s onwards, central government put strong pressure on local authorities to limit their budgets and to cut local services, even in inner-city areas most subject to decay. This led to intense conflicts between government and many of the councils that ran distressed inner-city areas, when they could not meet their set budgets. Anumber of the city councils found themselves with less revenue than before and were compelled to cut back on what were largely regarded as essential services. Inner-city decay in the UK is also related to changes in the global economy. More recently industrialized countries, such as Singapore, Taiwan or Mexico, often have much cheaper labour costs than places like the UK, which can make them an attractive location for manufacturing industry. In Global economic restructuring led to the deterioration ofmany inner-city areas in the 1970s and '80s. response to this, over the past few decades, some already industrialized nations - for example, Japan and (West) Germany shifted their economies to the kinds of activity that require a high level of capital investment and a highly skilled, welleducated workforce. In an important study, Inside the InnerCity, Paul Harrison (1983) examined the impact of these global changes on Hackney, still one of London's poorest boroughs. The 1970s saw a dramatic decline in Hackney's manufacturing sector, paraUeling a national decline. The number of manufacturing jobs in the borough dropped from 45,500 in 1973 to 27,400 in 1981-a fall of 40 per cent, Until the mid-1970s, Hackney's male unemployment rate was roughly level with the nationalaverage; by 1981 it had risen to 17.1 per cent (50 per cent above the average). As the number of people out ofwork increased, so too did the number of people living in poverty. Harrison summarizes the effects of such a concentration of disadvantaged people: [Ljocal government poor in resources and sometimes in the quality of staffing; a poor health service, since doctors cannot find a decent accommodation or much in the way of private practice; a low level of educational attainment due primarily to poor home backgrounds and the low average ability in schools; and, finally, high levels of crime, vandalism and family breakdown, and,wherever communities of divergent cultures live together, conflicts based on religion or race, (1983: 23-4) Sometimes these mUltiple disadvantages overlap to such an extent that they burst forth openly in the form of urban conflict and riots. For more on the problems arising from inner-city decay, see chapter 11, 'Stratification and Social Class', and chapter 12,'Poverty,Social Exclusion and Welfare', Riots and urban unrest In an era of globalization, population movement and rapid change, large cities have become concentrated and intensified expressions ofthe social problems that afflict societyas awhole. All too often, the 'invisible' fault-lines within cities, generally created by unemployment and racial tension, undergo the equivalent of social earthquakes. Simmering tensions flare to the surface. sometimes violently in the form ofriots, looting and widespread destruction. This occurred in the USA in the spring of 1992, when riots engulfed parts of Los Angeles. Similarly, in 2005, some 5,000 people in Sydney, Australia were involved in disturbances (known as the Cronulla Riots) following reports of intimidatory behaviour by 'outsiders', said to be Middle Eastern youths, and the involvement of right-wing groups within the crowds that assembled to protest. While riots are generally relatively disorganized protests involving violence, urban unrest can take other forms, often turning into political protests, and they are certainly not limited to the developed countries. For example, Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China was the scene of protests by students in 1989 calling for political reform, and other activists campaigning against corruption. Between 1,000 and 3,000 people were killed in the military crackdown during and following the ending ofthe protest. Many cities across the world have witnessed urban unrest in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. In an age of globalization, cities have become key sites for symbolic protests, demonstrations and unrest associated with ethnic tensions, which are seen across the world via television and the Internet. Such protests have occurred within a number of European soeieties. For example, ethnic tensions fuelled by decaying infrastructure and housing led to rioting in many French cities in late 2005, reigniting debates across Europe on immigration and relations between ethnic groups. In Britain, neighbourhood riots have taken place in Brixton, South London, in 1981, 1985 and 1995; in Ely, Cardiff in 1991; in Oldham, Burnleyand Lidget Green in Bradford in 2001 and in Birmingham in 2005. The 200I riots in Bradford involved clashes between members ofdifferent cultural and ethnic backgrounds, attacks upon the police and the destruction ofproperty. Following the UK riots in 2001, the government set up a Community Cohesion Review Team, chaired by Ted Cantle, to produce a report into the causes ofthe riots. The report found a deep polarization between different ethnic communities in Britain's urban areas. It argued that many aspects of people's everyday lives compounded this split; for example, having separate educational arrangements, voluntary bodies, employment patterns, places of worship and language. A Muslim of Pakistani origin, interviewed for the report, summed this up, saying: 'When I leave this meeting with you I will go home and not see another white face until I come back here next week.' The report argued: In such a climate, there has been little attempt'to develop clear values which focus on what it means to be a citizen of a modern multi-racial Britain and many still look backwards to some supposedly halcyon days of a mono-cultural society, or alternatively look to their country of origin for some form of identity. The report suggested that greater community cohesion is needed, based upon knowledge of, contact between and respect for the various cultures that make up the UK. To do this, it 'is also essential to establish a greater sense of citizenship, based on (a few) common principles which are shared and observed by all sections of the community. This concept of citizenship would also place a higher value on cultural differences.' To achieve these aims, the report called for a well-resourced national debate, heavily influenced by younger people, and expressed the hope that this debate would lead to a new CITIES AND URBAN LIFE conception of citizenship, creating a more coherent approach to issues like education, housing, regeneration and employment (Cantle 2001). What we can gather from this report is that what are commonly seen as random acts of violence and destruction can arise from serious underlying social and economic causes that just need the trigger of a local event to spark protests. Attempts to tackle these underlying causes have led to programmes of urban renewal. See chapter 15. 'Race, Ethnicity and Migration', for a more detailed discussion of multiculturalisrn and ethnic relations. Urban renewal What kind of approach should local, regional and national governments take in addressing the complex problems crippling inner cities? How can the rapid expansion of outlying suburban areas be checked to prevent the erosion ofgreen areas and countryside? Asuccessful urban renewal policy is particularly challenging because it demands simultaneous action on multiple fronts. In many developed countries, a range of national schemes - involving, for example, grants for the rehabilitation of houses by their owners or tax incentives to attract business - have been introduced to try to revive the fortunes of the inner cities. Over the last few decades a range of government programmes has been launched that pursue different methods of urban regeneration. The UK Conservative government's J\ction for Cities' programme of 1988, for example, looked more to private investment and free market forces to generate improvement than to state intervention. However, the response from business was much weaker than anticipated. Because of the seeming intractabiliry of many of the problems facing the inner cities, there has been a tendency for programmes to be frequently dropped or replaced when results are not quick to arrive. Studies indicate that, apart from the odd showpiece project, providing incentives and expecting private enterprise to do the job is ineffective as a way of tackling the fundamental social problems generated by the central cities. So many oppressive circumstances come together in the inner city that reversing processes of decay once they have got under way is in any case exceedingly difficult. Investigations into inner-city decay, such as the Scarman Report on the 1981 Brixton riots, have noted the lack ofa coordinated approach to innercity problems (Scarman 1982). Without major public expenditure - which is unlikely to be forthcoming from government - the prospects for radical improvement are slender indeed (Macgregor and Pirnlott 1991). The 1997 Labour government launched two main regeneration funds: the new deal for communities and the neighbourhood renewal fund . Other sources of funding focused on specific activities are also important in aiding urban renewal, including money from the National Lottery, funding for action zones in health, employment and education, and HousingCorporation cash for new social housing, 60 per cent of which has to support regeneration schemes. An important difference between current programmes and earlier schemes is that the earlier projects tended to focus on physical aspects of regeneration, particularly hOUSing, whereas later programmes have tried to stimulate both social and economic regeneration. The new deal for communities is the Labour government's flagship regeneration scheme. Launched in 1998, there are currently some 39 communities with projects across the UK. The main goal of the programme is to reduce disadvantages in the poorest areas by focusing on five specific issues: poor job prospects, high levels of crime, educational under-achievement, poor health and problems with housing and the physical environment. The Neighbourhood Renewal Fund, which began in 200!, targets the most deprived urban areas, aiming to narrow the gap between deprived areas and the rest of England (Neighbourhood Renewal Unit 2004). A number of questions remain about the effectiveness of such regeneration schemes. How can top-down government programmes gain the backing and involvement of local people that is usually crucial to their success? Can public cash really stimulate local economies and create jobs? How can regeneration schemes prevent displacing problems from one area to another (Weaver 200!)? Gentrification and 'urban recycling' Urban recycling - the refurbishing or replacement of old buildings and new uses for previously developed land - has become common in large cities. Occasionally this has been attempted as part of planning programmes, but more often it is the result of gentrification - the renovation of buildings in dilapidated city neighbourhoods for ~~[J[ L!==-===?=:I IT use by those in higher income groups, plus the provision of amenities like shops and restaurants to serve them. The gentrification of inner-city areas has occurred in many cities in Britain, the USA and other developed nations, and seems set to continue in years to come. [n the USA, the sociologist Elijah Anderson analysed the impact of gentrification in his book Streetwise: Race, Class, and Change in an Urban Community (1990). While the renovation of a neighbourhood generally increases its value, it rarely improves the living standards of its current low-income residents, who are usually forced to move out. [n the Philadelphia neighbourhood that Anderson studied, many black residences were condemned, forcing more than 1,000 people to leave. Although they were told that their property would be used to build low-cost housing that they would be given the first opportunity to buy, instead large businesses and a high school now stand there. The poor residents who continued to live in the neighbourhood received some benefits in the form of improved schools and police protection, but the resulting increase in taxes and rents finally forced them to leave for a more affordable neighbourhood, most often into areas of greater social exclusion. Black residents interviewed by Anderson expressed resentment at the influx of 'yuppies', whom they held responsible for the changes that drove the poorer people away. The white newcomers had come to the city in search of cheap 'antique' housing, closer access to their city-based jobs, and a trendy urban lifestyle. They professed to be 'open-minded' about racial and ethnic differences; in reality, however, little fraternizing took place between the new and old residents unless they were of the same social class. Since the black residents were mostly poor and the white residents were middle class, class differences were compounded by ethnic ones. While some middle-class blacks lived in the area, most who could afford to do so chose a more suburban lifestyle, fearing that they would otherwise receive from whites the same treatment that was reserved for the black underclass. Over time, the neighbourhood was gradually transformed into a white middle-class enclave. One reason behind gentrification is demographic. Young professional people are choosing to marry and start families later in life; as a result, more housing is needed for individuals and couples, rather than for families. In the UK, the government predicts that an additional 3.8 million households will have formed between 1996 and 2021 (Urban Task Force 1999). Because young people are having families later and their careers often demand long hours in inner-city office buildings, life in suburbia becomes more of an inconvenience than an asset. Affluent childless couples are able to afford expensive housing in refurbished inner-city areas and may even prefer to build lifestyles around the high-quality cultural, culinary and entertainment options available in city centres. Older couples whose children have left home may also be tempted back into inner-city areas for similar reasons. It is important to note that the process of gentrification parallels another trend discussed earlier: the transformation of the urban economy from a manufacturing to a service-industries base. AddreSSing the concerns of the victims of these economic changes is critical for the survival of the cities. In London, Docklands has been a notable example of'urban recycling'. The Docklands area in East London occupies some eight and a halfsquare miles ofterritory adjoining theThames - deprived ofits economic function by dock closures and industrial decline. Docklands is close to the financial district of the City of London, but also adjoins poor, working-class areas on the other side. From the 1960s onwards there were intense battles - which continue today- about what should happen to the area. Many living in or close to Docklands favoured redevelopment by means of community development projects, which would protect the interests of poorer residents. In the event, with the setting up of the Docklands Development Corporation in 1981, the region became a central part of the Conservative government's strategy of encouraging private enterprise to play the prime part in urban regeneration. The constraints of planning requirements and regulations were deliberately relaxed. The area today is covered in modern buildings, often adventurous in design. Warehouses have been converted into luxury flats, and new blocks have been constructed alongside them. A very large office development, visible from many other parts of London, has been constructed at Canary Wharf. Yet amid the glitter there are still dilapidated buildings and empty stretches of wasteland. Office space quite often lies empty, as do some ofthe new dwellings which have proved unsaleable at the prices they were originally projected to fetch. The boroughs of the Docklands have some of the poorest housing in the country, but many people living in such housing argue that they have benefited little from the construction that has gone on around them. In the USA, developers are buying up abandoned industrial warehouses in cities from Milwaukee to Philadelphia and converting them into expensive residential loft and studio apartments. The creation of vibrant public spaces within the blighted urban centres of Baltimore and Pittsburgh has been heralded as a triumph of urban renewal. Yet, it is difficult to conceal the deprivation that remains in neighbourhoods just blocks away from these revitalized city centres. Arguing against developments such as Docklands in his book about the history of the city, The Conscience of the Eye (1993), Richard Sennett argued that attempts should be made by urban planners to preserve, or to return to, what he calls 'the humane city'. The large, impersonal buildings in many cities turn people inwards, Cities with more than 10 million inhabitants, 1975, 2005 and 2015 (projected) Population (thousands) Population (thousands) Population (thousands) Rank Agglomeration Country 1975 Rank Agglomeration Country 2005 Rank Agglomeration Country 2015 Tokyo japan 26615 'lbkyo japan 35197 Tokyo japan 35494 2 NewYork United States 15880 2 Ciudadde MeXIco 19411 2 Mumbai India 21869 ofAmerica Mexico (Bonthay) (MeXICO City) 3 Ciudadde Mexico 10 690 3 NewYork United States 18718 3 Ciudadde Mexico 21568 Mexico ofAmerica Mexico (MeXICO City) (Mexico City) 4 Sao Paulo Brazil 18399 4 Sao Paulo Brazil 20596 5 Mumbai India 18 196 5 NewYork United States 19876 (Bonthay) ofAmerica 6 Delhi India 15048 6 Delhi India 18604 7 Shanghal China 14503 7 Shanghal China 17 225 8 Kolkata (Calcutta) India 14277 8 Kolkata (Calcutta) India 16980 9 Jakarta Indonesia 13215 9 Dhaka Bangladesh 16842 10 Buenos AIres Argentina 12550 10 Jakarta Indonesia 16822 11 Dhaka Bangladesh 12430 II Lagos Nigeria 16 141 12 Los Angeles United States 12298 12 Karaclu Paldstan 15 155 ofAmerica 13 Karacru Pakistan 11608 13 Buenos Aires Argentina 13396 14 Rio deJanerro Brazil II 469 14 Al-Qahirah(Cairo) Egypt 13138 15 Osaka-Kobe Japan 1I 268 15 Los Angeles United States 13095 ofAmerica 16 Al-Qahirah (Cairo) Egypt 11 128 16 Manila Philippines 12917 17 Lagos Nigeria 10 886 17 Beijing China 12850 18 Beijing China 107 17 18 Rio de Janeiro Brazil 12770 19 Manila Philippines 10 686 19 Osaka-Kobe Japan 11309 20 Moskva (Moscow Russian 10 654 20 Istanbul Thrkey II 211 Federation 21 Moskva (Moscow) Russian 11022 Federation 22 Guangzhou, China IQ 420 Guangdong Source: Uruted Nations World Urbanization Prospects, 2005. Reprinted by permission of the United Nations Populanon Division. away from one another. But cities can turn people outwards, putting them into contact with a variety ofcultures and ways oflife. We should seek to create city streets that are not only unthreatening but also 'full of life', in a way that 'traffic arteries, for all their rushing vehicular motion, are not'. The suburban shopping mall with its standardized walkways and shops is just as remote from 'the humane city' as is the traffic highway. Sennett argues that we should instead draw our inspiration from older city areas, like those found in many Italian city centres, which are on a human scale and mix diversity with elegance of design. Urbanization in the developing world The world's urban population could reach almost 5 billion people by 2030 and the United Nations estimates that almost 4 billion of these urban dwellers will be residents of cities in the developing world. As table 6.1 shows, most of the twenty-two cities projected to have more than 10 million residents by 2015 are located in the developing world. Manuel Castelis (1996) refers to megacities as one of the main features of third millennium urbanization. They are not defined by their size alone - although they are vast agglomerations of people - but also by their role as connection points between enormous human populations and the global economy. Megacities are intensely concentrated pockets of activity through which politics, media, communications, finances and production flow. According to Castells, megacities function as magnets for the countries or regions in which they are located. People are drawn towards large urban areas for various reasons; within megacities are those who succeed in tapping into the global system and those who do not. Besides serving as nodes in the global economy, megacities also become 'depositories of all these segments of the population who fight to survive'. For example, Mumbai in India is a burgeoning employment and financial centre and home to the extraordinarily popular Bollywood film industry. It is a thriving and expanding citywith exactly the kind ofmagnetic attraction that Castells talks of (see 'Global Society 6.1'). THINKING CRITICALLY How does Mumbai compare with the megacities of the industrialized world? Are there similarities between Mumbai and, say, Los Angeles (see 'Global Society 6.3' below),London, Tokyo or NewYork? What seem to be the main differences? Does India's current position within the global capitalist economy effectively prevent Mumbai from 'closing the wealth gap'? One of the largest urban settlements in history is currently being formed in Asia in an area of50,000 square kilometres reaching from Hong Kong to mainland China, the Pearl River Delta and Macao. Although the region has no formal name or administrative structure, by 1995 it had already encompassed a population of 50 million people. According to Manuel Castells, it is poised to become one of the most significant industrial, business and cultural centres of the century. Castelis points to several interrelated factors that help to explain the emergence of this enormous conurbation. First, China is undergOing an economic transformation, and Hong Kong is one ofthe most important 'nodal points' linking China into the global economy. Next, Hong Kong's role as a global business and financial centre has been growing as its economic base shifts away from manufacturing towards services. Finally, between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, Hong Kong industrialists initiated a dramatic process of industrialization within the Pearl River Delta. More than 6 million people are employed in 20,000 factories and 10,000 firms. The result of Global Society 6.1 Mumbai - a megacity in the developing world India gained independence from British colonial rule in 1947, at a time when the country was relatively poor and underdeveloped. Since independence,the country has changed quite dramatically and nowhere is this change seen more than in Mumbai, a megacity of some 12 million people in an urban area with more than 21 million inhabitants. Like other such cities across the world, Mumbai is a place of often stark contrasts between rich and poor. The article below, written for the 60th anniversary of independence in 2007, explores Mumbai's present and future. Can India close the wealth gap? Sixty years after India was freed from British colonial rule,the country's economy is booming. But will the wealth be shared more equally in the future? Not enough In Mumbai, India's financial capital,symbols of India's economic success are all around - from flashy billboards advertising the latest perfumes to trendy young women dressed in the latest Thmmy jeans. The India of today is vibrant, confident and ambitious - and not afraid to show it. Take Rishi Rajani for example.The 30something garment tycoon based in Mumbai and Denmark is a self-confessed workaholic who also loves the good life.His latest acquisition is a black Porsche sports car, which he drives through the streets of Mumbai. In the money capital of India, flaunting your wealth is now fashionable. Mr Rajani has always dreamed of owning the mean machine,and now his dream is a reality thanks to the success of the economy and his business. 'I work hard, you know, for my money', he says. 'And I need a reward.This is my reward. 'But it's not enough. My next goal? A yacht. That's when I'll know I've really made it. I'm already working towards it: Extremes ofwealth and poverty exist side-by-side in many cities ofthe developing world. Fast city This is the stuff dreams are made of. Fast life,fast city - money in Mumbai cannot be spent or made quickly enough.And it is this dream that leads millions of migrants to the city every single day. They come here in packs,having heard legendary tales ofMumbai's streets being paved with gold. Travelling thousands of miles by train, they leave behind their families, their friends and their desperate lives. Many end up in the one ofthe city's numerous slums and struggling to survive by doing odd jobs on the street. The city they came to conquer, ends up engulfing them. Demolition job Saunji Kesarwadi is a potter by profession who lives in a 10 x 10-foot flat in Dharavi,Asia's biggest slum.In this box,he works and supports a family of six who live in the attic.Barely eking out an existence,he fears being thrown out ofhis home to make way for development. 'We hear the builders are coming', Mr Kesarwadi says as his two little girls look on. 'But no one has told us anything. They say they'll give us a flat ifwe sell them this land - but how can all of us leave? This is where my work, my life is.It may not be much but it's all Ihave.' But while life in the big city often falls short of expectations. thanks to the growth in the country's economy there are new opportunities in some villages. Rural choice Some 300 kilometres away from India's technology capital.Bangalore,lies Bellary - an industrial town born out of a sleepy village.When you first arrive, all you can see is dusty farmland for miles around. But behind the quiet exterior, there is a dramatic change afoot. Bellary is home to one of India's first rural outsourcing centres, run by Indian steel maker JSW Steel Limited. The organisation has started two • small operations on its Bellary campus,hiring young women from nearby villages to work in their rural processing centres. Here the girls spend their shifts punching in details ofAmerican patients' dental records, typing in a language many of them have only recently learned, using a machine many had never seen or heard of before. Twenty-year-old Savithri Amma has a basic high school diploma. She earns about $80 (£40) a month doing this work - the same as one ofher peers might earn working as a house-help in Mumbai. For that money she has to turn up to work every weekday by 7 a.m.- picked up from her village by a JSW bus at 5 a.m. and taken home when her shift ends at 3 p.m. 'At first,when I started this job, my parents were sceptical',she says shyly. 'Girls here used never to go out - but now we can because our position in life has improved financially and socially thanks to our work here. My father makes a little more than I do every month. I'm proud to contribute to the family finances.' Growth promise In Ms Amma's village,she is looked upon as a role model for many ofher peers.The daily evening prayers at the village temple are a time for her to reflect on her day's work, and give thanks to the ancient Hindu gods for her good fortune.She has much to be thankful for. Ms Amma is one of the lucky ones. she is someone who did not have to leave home to battle the millions in urban India to survive. Growth in India's economy has to make its way off the streets of Mumbai and Delhi and into all of India's villages. Only when it does will it truly be here to stay - and the promise ofindependence will be met. Source: KarishmaVaswani, BBCNews On11fle, 14 August 2007 © bbc.co.uklnews these overlapping processes has been an 'unprecedented urban explosion' (Castells 1996). Why is the rate of urban growth in the world's lesser-developed regions so much higher than elsewhere? Two factors in particularmust be taken into account. First, rates of population growth are higher in developingcountries than they are in industrialized nations. Urban growth is fuelled by high fertility rates among people already living in cities. Second, there is widespread internal migration from rural areas to urban ones as in the case ofthe developing Hong KongGuangdong megacity. People are drawn to cities in the developing world either because their traditional systems of rural production have disintegrated, or because the urban areas offer superior job opportunities. Rural poverty prompts many people to try their hand at city life. They may intend to migrate to the city only for a relatively short time, aiming to return to their villages once they have earned enough money. Some actually do return, but most find themselves forced to stay, having for one reason or another lost their position in their previous communities. See chapter 6, 'The Environment', for a discussion of the consequences of global population growth. Challenges ofurbanization in the developing world Econonllcbnpllcatlons As a growing number of unskilled and agricultural workers migrate to urban centres, the formal economy often struggles to absorb the influx into the workforce. In most cities in the developing world, it is the informal economy that allows those who cannot find formal work to make ends meet. From casual work in manufacturing and construction to small-scale trading activities, the unregulated informal sector offers earning opportunities to poor or unskilled workers. Informal economic opportunities are important in helping thousands of families to survive in urban conditions, but they have problematic aspects as well. The informal economy is untaxed and unregulated. It is also less productive than the formal economy. Countries where economic activity is concentrated in this sector fail to collect much-needed revenue through taxation. The low level of productivity also hurts the general economy - the proportion of the GDP generated by informal economic activity is much lower than the percentage of the population involved in the sector. The OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) estimates that a billion new jobs will be needed by 2025 to sustain the expected population growth in cities in the developing world. It is unlikely that all of these jobs will be created within the formal economy. Some development analysts argue that attention should be paid to formalizing or regulating the large informal economy, where much of the 'excess' workforce is likely to cluster in the years to come. Eovlronmental challenges The rapidly expanding urban areas in developing countries differ dramatically from cities in the industrialized world. Although cities everywhere are faced with environmental problems, those in developing countries are confronted by particularly severe risks. Pollution, housing shortages, inadequate sanitation and unsafe water supplies are chronic problems for cities in less developed countries. Housing is one of the most acute problems in many urban areas. Cities such as Calcutta and Sao Paulo are massively congested; the rate of internal migration is much too high for the provision of permanent housing. Migrants crowd into squatters' zones, which mushroom around the edges of cities. In urban areas in the West, newcomers are most likely to settle close to the central parts of the city, but the reverse tends to happen in developing countries, where migrants populate what has been called the 'septic fringe' of the urban areas. Shanty dwellings made ofsacking or cardboard are set up around the edges of the city wherever there is a little space. In Sao Paulo, it is estimated that there was a 5.4 million shortfall in habitable homes in 1996. Some scholars estimate that the shortage is as high as 20 million, if the definition of 'habitable housing' is interpreted more strictly. Since the 1980s, the chronic deficit of housing in Sao Paulo has produced a wave of unofficial 'occupations' of empty buildings. Groups of unhoused families initiate 'mass squats' in abandoned hotels, offices and government buildings. Many families believe that it is better to share limited kitchen and toilet facilities with hundreds of others than to live on the streets or in [avelas - the makeshift shantytowns on the edges of the city. City and regional governments in less developed countries are hard-pressed to keep up with the spiralling demand for housing. In cities such as Sao Paulo there are disagreements among housing authorities and local governments about how to address the housing problem. Some argue that the most feasible route is to improve conditions within the [avelas - to provide electricity and running water, pave the streets and assign postal addresses. Others fear that makeshift shantytowns are fundamentally uninhabitable and should be demolished to make way for proper housing for poor families. Congestion and over-development in city centres lead to serious environmental problems in many urban areas. Mexico City is a prime example. There, 94 per cent of the city consists of built-up areas, with only 6 per cent of land being open space. The area of 'green spaces' - parks and open stretches of green land - is far below that found in even the most densely populated NorthAmerican or European cities. Pollution is a major problem, coming mostly from the cars, buses and trucks which pack the inadequate roads of the city, the rest deriving from industrial pollutants. It has been estimated that living in Mexico City is equivalent to smoking 40 cigarettes a day. In March 1992, pollution reached one of its highest levels ever. Whereas an ozone level of just under 100 points was deemed 'satisfactory' for health, in that month the level climbed to 398 points. The government had to order factories to close down for a period, schools were shut and 40 per cent of cars were banned from the streets on anyone day. The concept and practices of sustainable development are discussed in more detail in chapter 6, 'The Envirorunent'. Social effects Many urban areas in the developing world are overcrowded and under-resourced. Poverty is widespread and existing social services cannot meet the demands for healthcare, family planning advice, education and training. The unbalanced age distribution in developing countries adds to their social and economic difficulties. Compared to industrialized countries, a much larger proportion ofthe population in the developing world is under the age of fifteen. A youthful population needs support and education, but many developing countries lack the resources to provide universal education. When their families are poor, many children must work full time, and others have to scratch a living as street children, begging for whatever they can. When the street children mature, most become unemployed, homeless or both. The future a/urbanization in the developing world In considering the scope of the challenges facing urban areas in developing countries, it can be difficult to see prospects for change and development. Conditions of life in many of the world's largest cities seem likely to decline even further in the years to come. But the picture is not entirely negative. First, although birth rates remain high in many countries, they are likely to drop in the years to come as urbanization proceeds. This in turn will feed into a gradual decrease in the rate of urbanization itself. In West Africa, for example, the rate of urbanization should drop to 4.2 per cent per year by 2020, Population growth is discussed chapter 4, 'Globalization and the ChangingWorld'. chapter 13, 'Global Inequality', and chapter 5,'The Environment'. I I down from an annual rate of 6.3 per cent growth over the previous three decades. Second, globalization is presenting important opportunities for urban areas in developing countries. With economic integration, cities around the world are able to enter international markets, to promote themselves as locations for investment and development, and to create economic links across the borders of nation-states. Globalization presents one of the most dynamic openings for growing urban centres to become major forces in economic development and innovation. Indeed, many cities in the developing world are already joining the ranks ofthe world's 'global cities', as we shall see shordy. Cities and globalization Before modern times, cities were selfcontained entities that stood apart from the predominantly rural areas in which they were located. Road systems sometimes linked major urban areas, but travel was a specialized affair for merchants, soldiers and others who needed to cross distances with any regularity. Communication between cities was limited. The picture in the first decade of the twenty-first century could hardly be more different. Globalization has had a profound effect on cities by making them more interdependent and encouraging the proliferation of horizontal links between cities across national borders. Physical and virtual ties between cities now abound, and global networks of cities are emerging. Some people have predicted that globalization and new communications technology might lead to the demise of cities as we know them - the Helsinki virtual village profiled in 'Global Society 6.2' provides one possibility. This is because many of the traditional functions of cities can now be carried out in cyberspace rather than in dense and congested urban areas. For example, financial markets have gone electronic, e-commerce reduces the need for both producers and consumers to rely on city centres and fe-commuting' permits a growing number of employees to work from home rather than in an office building. Yet, thus far, such predictions have not been borne out. Rather than undermining cities, globalization is transforming them into vital hubs within the global economy. Urban centres have become criticaJ in coordinating information flows, managing business activities and innovating new services and technologies. There has been a simultaneous dispersion and concentration of activity and power within a set of cities around the globe (Castells 1996). Global cities The role of cities in the new global order has been attracting a great deal of attention from sociologists (Marcuse and van Kempen 2000; Massey 2007). Globalization is often thought of in terms of a duality between the national level and the global, yet it is the largest cities of the world that comprise the main circuits through which globalization occurs (Sassen 1998). The functioning of the new global economy is dependent on a set of central locations with developed informational infrastructures and a 'hyperconcentration' of facilities. It is in such points that the 'work' of globalization is performed and directed. As business, production, advertising and marketing assume a global scale, there is an enormous amount of organizational activity that must be done in order to maintain and develop these global networks. Saskia Sassen has been one of the leading contributors to the debate on cities and globalization. She uses the term global city to refer to urban centres that are home to the headquarters of large, transnational corporations and a superabundance of financial, technological and consulting services. In The Global City (\991), Sassen based her work on the study of the three cities we introduced at the start of this chapter: New York, London and Tokyo. The contemporary development of the world economy, she argued, has created a novel strategic role for major cities. Most such cities have long been centres of international trade, but they now have four new traits: 1 They have developed into 'command posts' - centres of direction and policymaking - for the global economy. 2 Such cities are the key locations for financial and specialized service firms, which have become more important in influencing economic development than in manufacturing. 3 They are the sites of production and innovation in these newly expanded industries. 4 These cities are markets on which the 'products' offinancial and service industries are bought, sold or otherwise disposed of. New York, London and Tokyo have very different histories, yet we can trace comparable changes in their nature over the past two or three decades. Within the highly dispersed world economy of today, cities like these provide for central control of crucial operations. Global cities are much more than simply places of coordination, however; they are also contexts of production. What is important here is not the production of material goods, but the production of the specialized services required by business organizations for administering offices and factories scattered across the world, and the production of financial innovations and markets. Services and financial goods are the 'things' made by the global city. The downtown areas of global cities provide concentrated sites within which whole clusters of 'producers' can work in close interaction, often including personal contact, with one another. In the global city, local firms mingle with national and multinational organizations, including a multiplicity of foreign companies. Thus 350 foreign banks have offices in New York City, plus 2,500 other foreign financial corporations; one out of every four bank employees in the city works for a foreign bank. Global cities compete with one another, but they also constitute an interdependent system, partly separate from the nations in which they are located. Other authors have built on Sassen's work, noting that as globalization progresses, more and more cities are joining NewYork, London and Tokyo in the ranks of the 'global city'. Castells has described the creation of a tiered hierarchy of world cities - with places such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Chicago, Frankfurt, Los Angeles, Milan, Zurich and Osaka serving as major global centres for business and financial services. Beneath these, a new set of'regional centres' is developing as key nodes within the global economy. Cities such as Madrid, Sao Paulo, Moscow,Seoul, Jakarta and Buenos Aires are becoming important hubs for activity within the so-called 'emerging markets'. THINKING CRITICALLY The Helsinki virtual village is described as a 'technological utopia'. List the effects - positive and negative - that mobile phones have already had on our society. Based on the your list,what might be some of the unintended consequences of such extensive mobile phone connectivity? Could such technology help to re-create the kind of Gemeinschaft or 'community' bonds that Tonnies (2001 [1887)) bemoaned the loss of? Or is it more likely that this technology will make people more isolated? How would that be brought about? Inequality in the global city The new global economy is highly problematic in many ways. Nowhere can this be seen more clearly than in the new dynamics of Global Society 6.2 The Helsinki 'virtual village' Jari Mielonen and his colleagues have a motto: ·Sanoista tekoihin', which loosely translates to 'Don't talk - make it happen'.Mielonen is chief technology officer of Sonera, Finland's leading telecommunications company and one of Europe's most aggressive players in the wireless market. 'Everyone's been talking about possibilities', he says. 'Nobody's been saying. "This is it. Touch and feeL Try it:" That's why he and a group of businesspeople, academics and city planners are collaborating to turn a new development on the tussocky shore of the Gulf of Finland into the world's first wireless community It's a simple but intriguing idea:give the workers and residents of a new Helsinki suburb a state-of-the-art wireless infrastructure and the very latest wireless services;to log on,locals won't even need a computer - just a mobile phone.Then stand back and watch how the info-age town ofthe future actually functions. The site, known as Arabianranta (Arabia shore), is a flat,windswept, mostly barren expanse named for the pottery works that once stood there. Even before Mielonen and his colleagues started hatching plans to turn the area into a wireless wonderland,it had been earmarked by the city of Helsinki for development as a tech hub.If all goes as planned,by 2010 the location will be home to about 12,000 residents and 700 IT companies with some 8,000 employees, along with 4,000 students emolled at local universities. It will also be home to a real-world experiment in community networking that will untangle some of the most pressing questions about the social effects of pervasive cormectivity Will the constant availability of wireless connection make communities more cohesive, or more isolated? How will people balance privacy concerns with the obvious advantages of extended wireless reach? And how much cormectivity - once it becomes the status quo - will people really want? Construction has already begun on the first wave of new office buildings and homes. Alongside the concrete and steel pilings, another,less visible, framework is being built here by Sonera and its partners - IBM,local software producer Digia, and the European-based Symbian Alliance, a joint effort involving Ericsson, Motorola,Nokia, Matsushita and Psion. They are creating what they call the Helsinki virtual village,a wireless interactive community for the entire suburb ofArabianranta. HVV will include a local area network and a wide range of services available through broadband fibre-optic cable and wireless links,which will be accessible anytime, anywhere. Users will be able to participate in HVV via any wireless handset, as well as by PC and digital TV For instance, residents could consult their personal calendar wherever they happen to be - in front of a computer at the office,watching TV at home or using a mobile phone on the go. The envisioned menu of offerings will let them create their own social organizations, office networks or mobile commerce opportunities, and a profiling system will let them control and update their personal data minute by minute. Now HVV is throwing mobility into the mix, making communication casual and unobtrusive. IBM Nordic's Kurt Lormqvist,who has watched his children grow up in a mobile-tech world,believes Finnish society has changed forever. Young people can be spontaneous about making social plans, he says. On the streets,they're continually sending a stream of messages back and forth to their friends: 'Where RDO' 'Let's meet.' 'C U at the bar: Lormqvist believes his children have become freer about the way they lead their lives than his generation is. 'They live with mobility every day. It's a way of life: At the Helsinki University ofTechnology, sociologist Timo Kopomaa has tried to track these changes in Finnish society 'Spontaneity is something that is going to stay' ,he says. 'It's a new generation that has grown up with these devices, and their lives are bound up with them: He studied groups of young phone-users and noted several differences in lifestyle. Today's society may be more casual, but that doesn't mean social ties are disappearing. In fact, he found that phones are drawing people together in new ways.Young ·telesurfers' often have larger social circles than non-phone-users. Close friends or relatives are in almost constant contact with each other, tending to share experiences as they happen.For friends, this has brought a new sense of tele-intimacy; for parents, reassurance. Kopomaa believes the new wireless intimacy affects the workplace as well. 'The mobile phone softens the structure ofthe working day', he says. 'Workers don't have to plan so rigidly anymore each day can unfold as meetings are set up when needed: Source: © Shaw 2001 inequality visible within the global city. The juxtaposition between the central business district and impoverished inner-city areas of many global cities should be seen as interrelated phenomena, as Sassen and others remind us. The 'growth sectors' of the new economy - financial services, marketing, high technology - are reaping profits far greater than any found within traditional economic sectors. As the salaries and bonuses of the very affluent continue to climb, the wages of those employed to clean and guard their offices are dropping. This process echoes the analysis of sociologists such as Manuel Castells and geographers like David Harvey, both of whom have argued thatthe city is not just a place or location for social relations, but is itselfthe product of struggles and conflicts amongst social groups. Sassen (2001) argues that we are witnessing the 'valorization' of work located at the forefront ofthe newglobal economy, and the 'devalorization' of work, which occurs behind the scenes. Deprivation and social exclusion are discussed in chapter 12, 'Poverty, Social Exclusion andWelfare', and inequalities in chapter 13, 'Global Inequality'. Disparities in profit-making capabilities are expected in market economies, but the magnitude of the disparities in the new global economy is having a negative effect on many aspects of the social world, from housing to the labour market. Those who work in finance and global services receive high salaries, and the areas where they live become gentrified. At the same time, orthodox manufacturing jobs are lost, and the very process of gentrification creates a vast supply of low-wage jobs - in restaurants, hotels and boutiques. Affordable housing is scarce in gentrified areas, forcing an expansion of low-income neighbourhoods. While central business districts are the recipients of massive influxes of investment in real estate, development and telecommunications, marginalized areas are left with few resources. THINKING CRITICALLY Does Davis's vision of Los Angeles show us the future for all major cities (see Global Society 6.3)?Which aspects of his thesis are familiar from cities that you know? How widespread is the separation of rich neighbourhoods from poorer communities? If poor people are being excluded from large parts of cities, where are they likely to live in the future? What could governments do to tackle these forms of urban social exclusion? Governing cities in a global age Like globalization, urbanization is doubleedged and contradictory. It has both creative and destructive effects on cities. On the one hand, it allows for the concentration of people, goods, services and opportunities. But at the same time, it fragments and weakens the coherence of places, traditions and existing networks. Alongside the new potentials created by centralization and economic growth are the dangerous effects of marginalization. Not only in developing countries, but in industrialized ones as well, many city-dwellers operate on the periphery, outside the realm of formal employment, the rule oflaw and civic culture. Although globalization is aggravating many of the challenges facing cities around the world, it is also making room for cities and local governments to play a revitalized political role. Cities have become more important than ever before as nation-states are increasingly unable to manage global trends. Issues such as ecological risk and volatile financial markets are operating at levels far above that of the nation-state; individual countries - even the most powerful - are too 'small' to counter such forces. Yet nation-states also remain too 'large' to address adequately the rich diversity of needs found within cosmopolitan urban areas. Where the nation-state is lUlable to act effectively, local and city governments Global Society 6.3 Social inequalities in 'cities of quartz' malls are concentrated in the center, street frontage is denuded,public activity is sorted into strictly functional compartments. and circulation is internalized in corridorsunder the gaze of private police.(1990:232) Within modern global cities. a geography of 'centrality and marginality' is taking shape. Alongside resplendent ailluence,there is acute poverty:Yet although these two worlds coexist side by side,the actual contact between them can be surprisingly minimal. As Mike Davis (1990/2006) has noted in his study ofLos Angeles,there has been a 'conscious hardening' ofthe city's surface against the poor - hence the metaphor of rock-hard 'quartz'. Accessible public spaces have been replaced by walied compounds, neighbourhoods are guarded by electronic surveillance.rich residents hire private police to keep street gangs at bay and 'corporate citadels' have been created.In Davis's words: According to Davis, life is made as 'unliveable' as possible for the poorest and most marginalized residents ofLas Angeles. Benches at bus stops are barrel-shaped to prevent people from To reduce contact with lUltollchables, urban redevelopment has converted once vital pedestrian streets into traffic sewers and transformed public parks into temporary receptacles for the homeless and wretched.The American city. . .is being systematically turned inside out - or, rather,outside in. The valorized spaces of the new megastructures and supersleeping on them,the number of public toilets is fewer than in any other North American citl' and sprinkler systems have been instalied in many parks to deter the homeless from living in them. Police and city-planners have attempted to contain the homeless population within certain regions of the city but in periodicaliy sweeping through and confiscating makeshift shelters,they have effectively created a population of'urban bedouins'. may be more 'agile forms for managing the global' (Borja and Castells 1997). For more on social movements, see chapter 22, 'Politics, Government and Social Movements'. Jordi Borja and Manuel Castells (1997) argue that there are three main realms in which local authorities can act effectively to manage global forces. First, cities can contribute to economic productivity and competitiveness by managing the local 'habitat' - the conditions and facilities that form the social base for economic produc· tivity. Economic competitiveness in the new economy depends on a productive qualified workforce; to be productive, that workforce needs a strong educational system for its children, good public transport, adequate and affordable housing, capable law enforcement, effective emergency services and vibrant cultural resources. Second, cities play an important role in ensuring soda-cultural integration within See chapter 21,'Crime and Deviance',for a discussion of situational crime prevention and other recent crime-prevention techniques. diverse multiethnic populations. Global cities bring together individuals fro m dozens of countries, varying religious and linguistic backgrounds, and different socioeconomic levels. If the intense pluralism found within cosmopolitan cities is not countered by forces of integration. then fragmentation and intolerance can result. Especially in cases where the effectiveness of the nation-states for promoting social cohesion is compromised for historic, linguistic or other reasons, individual cities can be positive forces for social integration. Third, cities are important venues for political representation and management. Local authorities have two inherent advantages over the nation-state in managing global issues: they enjoy greater legitimacy with those they represent, and they have more flexibility and room for manoeuvre than national structures. As explored in chapter 22,'Politics, Government and Social Moveme nts', many citizens feel that national political systems do not adequately Shanghai is one of the ten largest cities in the world and China's financial and economic hub. This risks damaging the social coherence ofplace and tradition. However, innovative use of city space can reduce this effect. For example, here women are practising tai chi in the heart of the city represent their interests and concerns. In cases where the nation-state is too distant to represent specific cultural or regional interests, city and local authorities are more accessible forums for political activity. Cities as political, economic and social agents A great many organizations, institutions and groups cross paths within cities. Domestic and international businesses, potential investors, government bodies, civic associations, professional groups, trade unions and others meet and form links in urban areas. These links can lead to collective and joint actions in which cities act as social agents in political, economic, cultural and media spheres. Examples of cities as economic actors have been increasing in recent years. In Europe, beginning with the recession of the 1970s, cities have banded together to promote investment and generate new forms ofemployment. The Eurocities movement, which now encompasses Europe's 50 largest cities, was formed in 1989. Asian cities such as Seoul, Singapore and Bangkok have been particularly effective as economic actors, acknowledging the importance of speed of information about international markets and the need for flexible productive and commercial structures. Some cities construct medium- and longterm strategic plans to address the complex challenges before them. Under such plans, local government authorities, civic groups and private economic agents can work together to refurbish the urban infrastructure, organize a world-class event or shift the employment base away from industrial enterprises to knowledge-based ones. Birmingham, Amsterdam, Lyons, Lisbon, Glasgow and Barcelona are examples of 6.2 Global sport as urban renewal? Jowel! to tell how Olympics funds will be repaid: Proceeds from land sales to replenish lottery.Agreement aims to dispel fears of arts bodies. By Andrew Culf Members of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) were impressed by the importance placed on urban regeneration in London's successful bid for the 2012 Olympic Games.The plan for 2012 focuses on the regeneration of some 500 acres of land in the Stratford area ofEast London, one ofthe most deprived areas in the UI<. However, although advocates hope that this global sporting event will be a catalyst for urban regeneration, critics are concerned about the financing ofthe games and its long-term consequences, discussed in the article below, written inJune 2007. The 2012 London Olympics The government will outline today [27 June 2007] how the national lottery will be repaid the £675m that is to be siphoned off to pay for the rising costs of the 2012 Olympics. A memorandum of understanding between Tessa Jowell, the Olympics minister, and Ken Livingstone, the mayor ofLondon, will explain how the money is to be clawed back from land sales from the Olympic Park at Stratford, east London. The deal, which has taken three months, is an attempt by the government to show that lottery good causes will not lose out as a result of the larger than anticipated £9.3bn bill for the games. Arts, heritage,sports and charity campaigners had expressed dismay that the public sector funding package for London 2012 included an additional £675m diversion from the lottery from 2009.The lottery was originally expected to contribute £1.5bn, but that figure rose to £2.2bn to deal with a black hole in the government's original calculations. They warned the cuts could have a devastating affect on the cultural sector and also jeopardise the aim ofincreasing grassroots participation in sport. Under the terms of the memorandum - which will be deposited in the library ofthe House of Commons - Ms Jowell and Mr Livingstone explain that the £675m will start to be repaid after 2012 once the London Development Agency has recovered the £650m it has spent on acquiring the Olympic Park site. The LDA plans to sell 68 hectares for development and is confident that rising land prices will make such a sell-off lucrative. Continuing land sales will fund the staged payback to the lottery The memorandum says the first phase after the LDA has recovered its costs will be a An artist's impression of the London 2012 Olympic Stadium in Stratford, a deprived area ofLondon's East End.Is this an example of long-term regeneration or just a short-term political fix? repayment of £506m to lottery good causes and £125m to the LDA. expected to react sceptically to the memorandum. They described the old agreement as a 'back of an envelope calculation' cooked up before London really thought it could win the bid. Once those sums have been achieved,in the second phase, the lottery will receive the remaining £169m, while the LDA will get £375m. This means that the bulk of the lottery cash will be repaid faster than previously anticipated. The memorandum replaces the deal between Ms Jowel! and Mr Livingstone in 2003 when agreement was reached on how the cost would be shared between London's council tax payers and the lottery. Last night a Whitehall source said: 'What Tessa Jowel! promised in March has been agreed with the mayor of London. It is only fair that lottery good causes, having contributed a further £625m to the costs of the Olympics,should benefit and see their money coming back and they will: Opposition parties,which have criticized the government over the budget for the games, are European cities that have carried out successful urban renewal projects with the help of strategic plans. The case of Barcelona is particularly noteworthy. Launched in 1988, the Barcelona 2000 Economic and Social Strategic Plan brought together public and private organizations under a shared vision and action plan for transforming the city. The Barcelona municipal government and 10 additional bodies (including the chamber of commerce, the university, the city port authority and trade unions) have been overseeing the implementation of the plan's three main objectives: to connect Barcelona with a network of European cities by improving the communication and transport infrastrucrure, to improve the quality of life of Barcelona's inhabitants and to make the industrial and service sector more competitive, while promoting promising new economic sectors. One of the cornerstones of the Barcelona 2000 plan took place in 1992, when the city hosted the Olympic Games. Staging the Olympics allowed Barcelona to 'internationalize' itself; the city's assets and vision were on display for the whole world to see. In the case ofBarcelona, organizing a worldclass event was crucial on two fronts: it enhanced the profile of the city in the eyes of the world and it generated additional Source: Guardian newspaper, 27 June 2007 enthusiasm within the city for completing the urban transformation (Borja and Castells 1997). Sport, it seems, can now play an important part in urban regeneration (Taylor et al. 1996). THINKING CRITICALLY Can sporting events really lead to lasting urban regeneration? Who will benefit from the 2012 London Olympics? Developers? Government or opposition politicians? The deprived communities of East London? What kinds of beneficial infrastructural developments may be left behind for residents to make use of when the games have finished? The role ofcity mayors As cities assume a new importance in the global system, the role of city mayors is also changing. Major world cities are becoming relatively independent actors in the global system and elected mayors oflarge cities are able to provide a type of personalized leadership that can be crucial in promoting urban agendas and raising a city's international profile. The London-based organization, City Mayors, works to raise the profile of mayors internationally and, since 2004, has awarded the title of'World Mayor' based on the outcome of an online poll. In 2006, the title was won by John So, mayor of Melbourne, Australia with city mayors from Makati City in the Philippines, Dubrovnik in Croatia and Antananarivo in Madagascar in the top 10 places, sho,,~ng the global spread of the mayor role. In several prominent cases in which cities have successfully transformed their image, the role of the city mayor has been decisive. The mayors of Lisbon and Barcelona, for example, were driving forces behind efforts to elevate their cities to the ranks of the world's major urban centres. Likewise, mayors in smaller cities can play a crucial role in making the city known internationally and in attracting new economic investment. In the UK, London's affairs were devolved to an elected mayor, Ken Livingstone, in 2000. He set about pursuing a distinctive set of policies, including investing in public transport, introducing a congestion charge in the city centre and increaSing the stock of affordable housing for 'key workers' such as teachers and nurses. Livingstone also stronglysupported London's successful bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games. However, in 2008 Livingstone lost the mayoral election to Boris Johnson, who opposed plans to extend congestion charging further into the London suburbs. Many commentators saw this as a major reason for Johnson's success. In the United States, city mayors have become a powerful economic and political force in recent decades. As gun-related violence has soared in American cities, more than 20 city mayors have abandoned reliance on federal attempts to pass gun control legislation and have filed lawsuits against the gun manufacturers on behalf of their cities. Former New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani generated a firestorm of controversy - but grudging respect from many - by implementing tough 'law-andorder' policies aimed at lowering crime rates. NewYork's violent crime rate dropped dramatically during the 1990s; strict 'quality oflife' policies aimed at the homeless popuCities and Urban Life lation transformed the face of New York's busy streets. After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, Giuliani's determined leadership set the tone for the world's media, and he was named Time magazine's Person of the Year for 200l. In many cities around the world, mayors are enjoying increased influence as spokespeople for their cities and regions. City mayors are often able to shape the policy agenda for areas that lie outside the city limits by entering into agreements with communities in the general metropolitan area. These types of partnerships can be drawn on in attracting foreign investment, for example, or in bidding to play host to a world-class event. Conclusion: cities and global governance Cooperation between cities is not restricted to the regional level. There is a growing acknowledgement that cities can and should play a Significant role in addressing international political, economic and social issues. Informal and formal networks of cities are emerging as globalizing forces draw disparate parts of the world more closely together. The problems facing the world's largest cities are not isolated ones; they are embedded in the larger context ofa global economy, international migration, new trade patterns and the power of information technology. We have noted elsewhere that the complexities of our changing world are demanding new forms of democratic international governance. Networks of cities should figure prominently among these new mechanisms. One such structure already exists - a World Assembly of Cities and Local Authorities is convened in parallel to the UN's Habitat Conference. Bodies such as the World Assembly promise to allow the gradual integration of city organizations into structures presently composed of national governments. The heightened involvement of cities has the potential to democratize international relations; it may also m ake them more efficient. As the world's urban population continues to grow, more and more policies and reforms will need to be targeted at populations living in urban areas. City governments will be necessary and vital partners in these processes. Summary points 1. Early approaches to urban sociology were dominated by the work of the Chicago School, whose members saw urban processes in terms of ecological models derived from biology. Louis Wirth developed the concept of urbanism as a way of life, arguing that city life breeds impersonality and social distance. These approaches have been challenged, without being discarded altogether. 2. The more recent work of David Harvey and Manuel Castells connects patterns of urhanism to the wider society, rather than treating urban processes as self-contained. The modes of life people develop in cities, as well as the physical lay-out of different neighbourhoods, express broad features of the development of industrial capitalism. 3. In traditional societies, only a small minority of the population lived in urban areas. In the industrialized countries today, between 60 and 90 per cent do so. Urbanism is developing very rapidly in the developing world as well. 4. The expansion of suburbs and dormitory towns has contributed to inner-city decay. Wealthier groups tend to move out of the centre of the city to live in low-rise housing and more homogeneous neighbourhoods. A cycle of deterioration is set under way, so that the more suburbia expands, the greater are the problems faced by those living in the inner cities. Urban recycling - including the refurbishing of old buildings to put them to new uses - has become common in many large cities. 5. Massive processes of urban development are occurring in developing countries. Cities in these societies differ in major respects from those of the West and are often dominated by makeshift illegal housing, where conditions of life are extremely impoverished.The informal economy is pronounced in many cities in the developing world. Governments often cannot meet the growing demands of the population for education,healthcare and family planning. 6. Cities are being strongly influenced by globalization. Global cities are urban centres, such as NewYork, London and Tokyo, that are home to the headquarters of large corporations and a superabundance of financial, technological and consulting services.A set of regional cities, such as Seoul, Moscow and Sao Paulo, are also developing as key nodes of the global economy. 7. As cities become more important within the global economy, their relationship with outlying regions is altered. Cities become disconnected from the region and nation in which they are located and horizontal links with other global cities take on greater significance. Global cities are characterized by high levels of inequality. Great affluence and abject poverty coexist side by side, but contact between the two worlds can be minimal. 8. The role of cities as political and economic agents is increasing. City governments are positioned to manage the effects of some global issues better than national governments. Cities can contribute to economic productivity and competitiveness, promote social and cultural integration, and serve as accessible venues for political activity. Some cities construct strategic plans to promote the city's profile by hosting a world-class event or carrying out urban renewal and economic development programmes. City mayors are becoming important political forces for advancing urban agendas. 9. As globalization progresses, the role of cities in addressing international issues is likely to grow. Regional and international networks of cities are emerging and may become more actively involved in forms of global governance currently composed of nation- states. •• •• •• •• • • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Further reading To get an overview of urban sociology, David Byrne's Understanding the Urban (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) is a good place to begin and Mike Savage, Allan Warde and Kevin Ward's Urban Sociology, Capitalism and Modernity (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) gives a comprehensive account of this field. On cities, Doreen Massey's World City (Cambridge: Polity, 2007) takes London as a case study of a global city, while the UN-Habitat's The State ofthe World's Cities: The Millennium Development Goals and Urban Sustainability (London: Earthscan Publications, 2006) gives much comparative information on cities across the world. It may be a little old now, but Marshall Berman's All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience ofModernity (London: Verso, 1983) remains an inspiring book dealing especially with the experience of urban modernity, and is well worth the effort. Debates on cities and the restructuring of space are well hanclled in Peter Marcuse and Ronald van Kempen's (eds) Globalizing Cities: A New Spatial Order? (Oxford: Blackwell Publications, 2000). Fran Tonkiss's Space, the City and Social Theory: Social Relations and Urban Forms (Cambridge: Polity, 2005) is not an easy read, but it does offer an account of social theories of the city. Finally, Jan Lin's The Urban Sociology Reader (London and NewYork: Routledge, 2005) is an edited collection of urban sociology 'classics' and, as such, is a very helpful resource. •• • • • • • • • • • •• •• • • • • • •• •• • • • •• •• •• • • • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •• •• ••••• •• ••• •••• ••• ••• •• ••• •• ••• ••• •• ••• • •• •• • •• • •• •• • ••• •• ••• •• ••• ••• •••• Internet links AUSA site on sustalnable architecture, building and culture: www.sustainableabc.com/ Centre for Urban History, based at the University ofLeicester, UK: www.le.ac.uk/urbanhist/ UK Government's Neighbourhood Renewal Unit: www.neighbourhood.gov.uk/ City Mayors - a useful resource on the role of mayors across the world: www.citymayors.com/ H-Urban - Adiscussion forum for urban history and urban studies: www.h-net.org/ - urban/'Homepage http: //h-net.msu.edulcgi-bin/logbrowse. pl?trx=lm&list=H-Urban' Discussion logs Radical Urban Theory- 'writings on the modern urban condition': www.radicalurbantheory.com/ Virtual Cities Resource Centre - online cities: www.casa.ucl.ac.uklplanning/virtualcities.html •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• CHAPTER 7 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• SociallDte..actioD aDd Eve..yday Life Why study daily life? 251 Non-verbal communication 252 The human face, gestures and emotions 252 Gender and the body 254 Embodiment and identities 255 The social rules of interaction 258 Shared understandings 258 'Interactional vandalism' 258 Response cries 262 Face, body and speech in interaction 263 Encounters 263 Impression management 264 Personal space 270 Interaction in time and space 271 Clock time 271 The ordering of space and time 272 Everyday life in cultural and historical perspective 272 The social construction of reality: the sociological debate 273 Social interaction in cyberspace 275 Conclusion: the compulsion of proximity? 276 Summary points 278 Further reading 279 Internet links 279 People in close proximity to each other - such as at this gym - engage routinely in 'civil inattention'. S haun is a fitness instructor at an expensive city health club, where he has worked for many years. Over time, he has come to know hundreds of people who exercise at the gym. He worked with some ofthem when they first joined, explaining to them how to use the equipment. He met many others in his role as an instructor of 'spinning' classes Ca group session on exercise bikes). Others he has come to know through casual contact, since many ofthe same people work out at the same time every week. The personal space is limited within the gym, due to the proximity of the exercise equipment. For example, in the weight-training circuit, one section contains a number of machines that are very near to each other. Members 'Leave me alonel ' On public transport,people try to protect their personal space. must work in close proXImIty to others working out, and they constantly cross one another's paths as they move from machine to machine. It is almost impossible for Shaun to walk anywhere in this physical space without making eye contact with someone else he has at least met. He will greet many ofthese patrons the first time he sees them in the day, but afterwards it is usually understood that they will go about their own business without acknowledging one another in the way they did earlier. When passers-by quickly glance at one another and then look away again, they demonstrate what Erving Goffman (1967, 1971) calls the civil inattention we require of one another in many situations. Civil inattentioo is not the same as ignoring another person. Each individual indicates recognition of the other person's presence, but avoids any gesture that might be taken as too intrusive. Civil inattention to others is something we engage in more or less unconsciously, but it is of fundamental importance to the existence of social life, which must proceed efficiently and, sometimes amongst total strangers, without fear. When civil inattention occurs among passing strangers, an individual implies to another person that she has no reason to suspect his intentions, be hostile to him or in any other way specifically avoid him. The best way to see the importance ofthis is by thinking of examples where it does not apply. When a person stares fixedly at another, allowing her face openly to express a particular emotion, it is normally with a lover, family member or close friend . Strangers or chance acquaintances, whether encountered on the street, at work or at a party, virtually never hold the gaze of another in this way. To do so may be taken as an indication of hostile intent; for example, racists have been known to give a 'hate stare' to passers-by from other ethnic groups. Even friends in close conversation need to be careful about how they look at one another. Each individual demonstrates attention and involvement in the conversation by regularly looking at the eyes of the other, but not staring into them. To look too intently might be taken as a sign of mistrust about, or at least failure to understand, what the other is saying. Yet if neither party engages the eyes of the other at all, each is likely to be thought evasive, shifty, or otherwise odd. Why study daily life? Why should we concern ourselves with such seemingly trivial aspects of social behaviour? Passing someone on the street or exchanging a few words with a friend seem minor and uninteresting activities, things we do countless times a day without giving them any thought. In fact, the study of such apparently insignificant forms of social interaction is ofmajor importance in sociology - and, far from being uninteresting, is one of the most absorbing of all areas of sociological investigation. There are three reasons for this. First, our day-ta-day routines, with their almost constant interactions with others, give structure and form to what we do; we can learn a great deal about ourselves as social beings, and about social life itself, from studying them. Our lives are organized around the repetition of similar patterns of behaviour from day to day, week to week, Social Interaction and Everyday Life 251 month to month, and year to year. Think of whatyou did yesterday, for example, and the day before that. If they were both weekdays, in all probability you got up at about the same time each day (an important routine in itself). !fyou are a student, you may have gone offto a class fairly early in the morning, perhaps making the journey from home to campus that you make virtually every weekday. You perhaps met some friends for lunch, returning to classes or private study in the afternoon. Later, you retraced your steps back home, possibly going out in the evening with other friends. Ofcourse, the routines we follow from day to day are not identical, and our patterns of activity at weekends usually contrast with those on weekdays. And if we make a major change in our life, like leaving college to take up a job, alterations in our daily routines are usually necessary; but then we establish a new and fairly regular set of habits again. Second, the study of everyday life reveals to us how humans can act creatively to shape realiry. Although social behaviour is guided to some extent by forces such as roles, norms and shared expectations, individuals perceive reality differently according to their backgrounds, interests and motivations. Because individuals are capable of creative action, they continuously shape reality through the decisions and actions they take. In other words, reality is not fixed or static; it is created through human interactions. This notion of the 'social construction of reality' lies at the heart of the symbolic interactionist perspective and was introduced in chapter 1. Third, studying social interaction in everyday life sheds light on larger social systems and institutions. All large-scale social systems, in fact, depend on the patterns of social interaction that we engage in daily. This is easy to demonstrate. Consider again the case of two strangers passing in the street. Such an event may seem to have little direct relevance to large-scale, more permanent forms of social organization. But when we take into account many such interactions, this is no longer so. In modern societies, most people live in towns and cities and constantly interact with others whom they do not know personally. Civil inattention is one among other mechanisms that give city life, with its bustling crowds and fleeting, impersonal contacts, the character it has. In this chapter, we shall discuss nonverbal communication such as facial expressions and bodily gestures, and explore how our identities are 'embodied'. We will then move on to analyse everyday speech - how we use language to communicate to others the meanings we wish to get across. Finally, we will focus on the ways in which our lives are structured by daily routines, paying particular attention to how we coordinate our actions across space and time. In this chapter we also find that the study of small, everyday practices that sociologists of social interaction investigate are not separate from any ofthe large-scale issues examined in the later chapters ofthis book, such as gender or class; instead, we find that they are intimately linked. We look at two specific examples of the link between micro- and macrosociology in the two 'Using your sociological imagination' boxes in this chapter. Recent theories on the impact of larger social structures on the everyday 'lifeworld' can be found in chapter 3, 'Theories and Perspectives in Sociology'. Non-verbal communication Social interaction requires numerous forms of non-verbal communication - the exchange of information and meaning through facial expressions, gestures and movements of the body. Non-verbal communication is sometimes referred to as 'body language', but this is misleading, because we characteristically use such nonverbal cues to eliminate or expand on what is said with words. The human face, gestures and emotions One major aspect of non-verbal communication is the facial expression of emotion. When we compare the human face with that of other species, it does seem remarkably flexible and capable of manipulation. The German sociologist Norbert Elias (1897-1990) argued that studying the face shows how human beings, like all other species, have naturally evolved over a long period of time, but also that this biological basis has been overlain with cultural features in the process of social development. Compare the human face with that of our closest evolutionary relatives, the apes. The ape face is furry and quite rigid in structure, permitting a limited amount of movement. The human face, in contrast, is naked and very flexible, able to contort into a wide variety of postures. In some parts of the world, 'gurning' competitions are even held to see who can pull the strangest facial expressions - some ofthese are, indeed, very strange. Without this evolved physiological malleability, human communication, as we know it, would be impossible. Therefore, Elias (1987) sees the development of the human face as closely linked to the evolutionary 'survival value' of effective communication systems. Whilst apes do make extensive use of 'whole body' communication, humans can communicate a varied range of emotions on just the 'signalling board' of the face. For Elias, such facial communication of emotions demonstrates that in human beings, the natural and the social are always inextricably intertwined. Paul Ekman and his colleagues developed what they call the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) for describing movements of the facial muscles that give rise to particular expressions (Ekman and Friesen 1978). By this means, they have tried to inject some precision into an area notoriously open to inconsistent or contradictory interpretations - for there is little agreement about how emotions are to be identified and classified. Charles Darwin, the originator of evolutionary theory, claimed that basic modes of emotional expression are the same in all human beings. Although some have disputed the claim, Ekman's research among people from widely different cultural backgrounds seems to confirm this. Ekman and Friesen carried out a study ofan isolated community in New Guinea, whose members had previously had virtually no contact with outsiders. When they were shown pictures of facial expressions expressing six emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear, surprise), the New Guineans were able to identify these emotions. According to Ekman, the results of his own and similar studies of different peoples support the view that the facial expression of emotion and its interpretation are innate in human beings. He acknowledges that his evidence does not conclusively demonstrate this, and it may be that widely shared cultural learning experiences are involved; however, other types ofresearch support his conclusions. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1973) studied six children born deaf and blind to see how far their facial expressions were the same as those of Sighted, hearing individuals in particular emotional situations. He found Social Interaction and Everyday Life 253 that the children smiled when engaged in obviously pleasurable activities, raised their eyebrows in surprise when sniffing at an object with an unaccustomed smell and frowned when repeatedly offered a disliked object. Since they could not have seen other people behaving in these ways, it seems that these responses must have been innately determined. Using the FACS, Ekman and Friesen identified a number of the discrete facial muscle actions in newborn infants that are also found in adult expressions of emotion. Infants seem, for example, to produce facial expressions similar to the adult expression of disgust (pursing the lips and frowning) in response to sour tastes. But although the facial expression of emotion seems to be partly innate, individual and cultural factors influence what exact form facial movements take and the contexts in which they are deemed appropriate. How people smile, for example, the precise movement of the lips and other facial muscles, and how fleeting the smile is all vary between cultures. There are no gestures or bodily postures that have been shown to characterize all, or even most, cultures. In some societies, for instance, people nod when they mean no, the opposite of Anglo-American practice. Paul Ekman's photographs of the facial expressions of a tribesman from a remote community in New Guinea helped to test the idea that basic modes of emotional expression are the same amongst all people.Look carefully at each facial expression. Which of the six emotions used by Ekman above do you think is being conveyed in each one? Check to see if you were right by looking at the 'Thinking Critically' box overleaf. 254 SOCIAL INTERACTION AND EVERYDAY LIFE Gestures that Europeans and Americans tend to use a great deal, such as pointing, seem not to exist among certain peoples (Bull 1983). Similarly, a straightened forefinger placed at the centre of the cheek and rotated is used in parts of Italy as a gesture of praise, but appears to be unknown elsewhere. Like facial expressions, gestures and bodily posture are continually used to fill out utterances, as weU as conveying meanings when nothing is actually said. All three can be used to joke, or show irony or scepticism. The non-verbal impressions that we convey often inadvertently indicate that what we say is not quite what we mean. Blushing is perhaps the most obvious example of how physical indicators can contradict our stated meanings. But there are many more subtle signs that can be picked up by other people. As an example, a trained eye can often detect deceit by studying non-verbal cues. Sweating, fidgeting, staring or shifting eyes, and facial expressions held for a long time (genuine facial expressions tend to evaporate after four or five seconds) could indicate that a person is being deceptive. Thus, we use facial expressions and bodily gestures of other people to add to what they communicate verbally and to check how far they are sincere in what they say and whether we can trust them. Gender and the body Is there a gender dimension to everyday social interaction? There are reasons to believe that there is. Because interactions are shaped by the larger social context, it is not surprising that both verbal and nonverbal communication may be perceived and expressed differently by men and women. Understandings of gender and gender roles are greatly influenced by social factors and are related broadly to issues of power and status in society. For example, the political philosopher Iris Marion Young (1949-2006) explored gendered bodily experience in a famous artiTHINKING CRITICALLY From left to right, Ekrnan's instructions were to show how your face would look if: \ Your friend had come and you were happy. 2 Your child had died and you were sad. 3 You were angry and about to fight. 4 You saw a dead pig that had been lying there a long time: disgust. How many did you get right? Look at the faces again - is it easier to see the different emotions being expressed when you know the context? Have you ever misunderstood how someone is feeling, and if so, why did their facial expression not give away their emotional state? Are there different ways of facially expressing happiness, sadness and so on? c1e, 'Throwing Like a Girl' (1980, 2005). Young argued that the distinctive 'half-hearted' movements - such as throwing a ball or stone - made by women are not biologically determined, but are the product ofdiscourses and practices which encourage girls and young women to experience their bodies as 'objects for others' from an early age. Such bodily training, she suggested, embodies an 'inhibited intentionality', reflecting feminine norms ofrestricted bodily comportment and movement. In short, male-dominated societies produce a majority of women who are 'physically handicapped'. In contrast, men learn to experience their bodies as active and forceful 'objects for themselves', which is reflected in their more aggressive bodily movemen ts, particularly noticeable in sports, for example. For young boys, therefore, to be accused of'throwing like a girl' is a dreadful insult and an attack on their identity asa male. These dynamics are evident even in standard interactions in daily life. Take as an example one of the most common non- verbal expressions: eye contact. Individuals use eye contact in a wide variety of ways, often to catch someone's attention or to begin a social interaction. In societies where men on the whole dominate women in both public and private life, men may feel freer than women to make eye contact with strangers. A particular form of eye contact - staring - illustrates the contrasts in meaning between men and women of identical forms of non ~ verbal communication. A man who stares at a woman can be seen as acting in a 'natural' or 'innocent' way; if the woman is uncomfortable, she can evade the gaze by looking away or choosing not to sustain the interaction. On the other hand, a woman who stares at a man is often regarded as behaving in a suggestive or sexually leading manner. Taken individually, such cases may seem inconsequential; when viewed collectively, they help reinforce patterns ofgender inequality (Burgoon et al. 1996). There are other gender differences in non-verbal communication as well. Men tend to sit in more relaxed ways than women. Men tend to lean back with their legs open, whereas women tend to have a more closed body position, sitting upright, with their hands in their lap and their legs crossed. Women tend to stand closer to the person they are talking to than men; and men make physical contact with women during conversation far more often than the other way around (women are generally expected to view this as normal). Studies have also shown that women tend to show their emotions more obviously (through facial expressions), and that they seek and break eye contact more often than men. Sociologists have argued that these seemingly small-scale micro-level interactions reinforce the wider macro-level inequality in OUI society. Men control more space when standing and sitting than women because they tend to stand further away from the person they are talking to and because they tend to sprawl when sitting, and they demonstrate control through more Social Interaction and Everyday Life frequent physical contact. Women, it has been argued, seek approval through eye contact and facial expression; when men make eye contact, a woman is more likely to look away than another man. Thus, it is argued, micro-level studies of non-verbal forms of communication provide subtle cues, which demonstrate men's power over women in wider society (Young 1990). In Gender Trouble (1990), Judith Butler argued that these expressions of gendered identities illustrate that gender is 'performative'. What does she mean by this? Butlersays that many feminists rejected the idea that gender is biologically or naturally fixed. But, in doing so, they separated gender (culture) from sex (biology), arguing that gendered norms of behaviour were built upon biologically determined male and female bodies. Butler rejects this position, arguing that there are no biologically determined identities lying beneath the cultural expressions of gender. Instead, gender identities are established precisely through their continuous performance. There is simply no essential, natural or biological basis to gender even though the beliefthat there is such a basis is very widespread within many societies and such beliefs shape people's behaviour. Butler's position is that gender identity is not a question of who you are, but of what you do, and it therefore follows that gender identity is much more fluid and unstable than was previously thought. If Butler is right, then there may be much more scope for people to choose how they perform gender and thus to resist the dominant or hegemonic forms of gendered identity. See chapter 14, 'Sexuality and Gender', for R. W Connell's wider theory of hegemony in relation to gender and identity. Embodiment and identities The gendering of bodily experience and movement described above complements theories of gender identity, which are SOCIAL INTERACTION AND EVERYDAY LIFE 7,1 Women and men in public As we saw in chapter I, microsociology, the study of everyday behaviour in situations of face-to-face interaction and macrosociology; the study of the broader features of society like class or gender hierarchies,are inextricably connected (Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel 1981; Giddens 1984). Here, we look at an example of how an event that may seem to be a prime example ofmicrosociology - a woman walking down the sU'eet is verbally harassed by a group of men - is in fact also linked to the bigger issues that make up macrosociology; In her study Passing By: Gender and Public Harassment (1995),Carol Brooks Gardner found that in various settings - most famously; the edge of construction sites - these types of unwanted interaction occur as something women frequently experience as abusive. Although the harassment of a single woman might be analysed in microsociological terms by looking at a single interaction,it is not fruitful to view it so simply; Such harassment is typical of street talk involving men and women who are strangers (Gardner 1995).And these kinds of interaction cannot simply be understood without also looking at the larger background of gender hierarchy in society In this way; we can see how micro- and macroanalysis are connected. For example, Gardner linked the harassment of women by men to the larger system of gender inequality f "So far, so good. Now let's hear your wolf-whistling." represented by male privilege in public spaces, women's physical vulnerability and the omnipresent threat of rape. Without making this link between micro- and macrosociology; we can only have a limited understanding ofthese interactions.It might seem as though these types of interaction are isolated instances or that they could be eliminated by teaching people good manners.Understanding the link between micro and macro helps us see that in order to attack the problem at its root cause, one would need to focus on eliminating the forms of gender inequality that give rise to such interactions. discussed in detail in chapter 8, 'The LifeCourse'. As that chapter shows, both Sigmund Freud and Nancy Chodorow argued - in different ways - that people learn gender roles and gendered behaviour in interaction with significant other people, such as key family members, from a very early age. What we can add to this from the sociological work on bodily experience and non-verbal communication above, is that a person's gender identity is also expressed through experience of their own and other people's bodies and bodily movements. Gender identity is both socially created and 'embodied'. In fact the general concept of identity has become central to many areas ofsociology over recent years, But what is an identity? Richard jenkins (1996) says that identity is, 'our understanding of who we are and of who other people are', and of course this also includes their understanding of themselves and of us too. It follows then, that all human identities must be 'social identities', because they are formed in the continuing processes ofinteraction in social life. Identi- THINKING CRITICALLY It has been suggested that gender relations in modern societies are becoming more equal. If this is so, then there should be signs of such growing equality in the everyday non-verbal behaviour of men and women. Think about some of the routine social situations you have been involved in recently - do you notice any changes in people's behaviour that might suggest a movement towards gender equality? \ What about your own behaviour? Is it noticeably different from that of your parents and grandparents? What social changes would you point to that might explain these generational changes in behaviour? ties are made, not given. Nevertheless, we can see three central parts to identities; they are partly individual or personal; they are partly collective or social; and they are always 'embodied'. As lenkins puts it: Selves without bodies don't make much sense in human terms. Even ghosts or spirits, if we recognise them as human, once had bodies;even the disembodied world ofcyberspace depends, in the notso-tinal-resort, on bodies in front of computer screens. We reach out with our selves and others reach out to us. (1996: 47) A good example of the close linkage between social identity and embodiment is in Goffman's study of 'stigma' (discussed in chapter 10). He shows how disabled people, for example, can be stigmatized on the basis of readily observable physical impairments (discredited stigma), which then make individual identities more difficult to 'manage' than some non-physical impairments, which can be more easily hidden (discrediting stigma). Identities are also multilayered, consisting ofseveral sources. Asimple distinction can be made between primaryand secondaryidentities, which are connected to the processes of Social Interaction and Everyday Life 257 primary and secondary socialization respectively. Primary identities are those that are formed in early life and include gender, race/ethnicity and perhaps also disability/impairment. Secondary identities build on these and would include those associated with social roles and achieved statuses such as occupational roles and social status positions. Clearly, social identities are quite complex and fluid, changing as people gain new roles or leave behind old ones. An important consequence of the discussion so far is that identities mark out similarities and differences in social interactions. Individual or personal identity feels quite unique and different from other people, especially in the individualized modern societies, and is perceived by others as such. Our personal names are one illustration of this individual difference. In many societies today, parents increasingly seek out unique names for their offspring to mark them out as unique and different from the crowd, rather than choosing names that are commonly used. In contrast, collective identities display similarity with others. To identifyyourself (and be identified)as working class, an environmentalist or a professional sociologist can be sources of group solidarity, pride or perhaps even individual shame at being part of a particular group. Whatever the perception we may have of our own social identities, the example THINKING CRITICALLY Think of an occasion when your identity has been challenged - perhaps you were asked to provide ID or some other personal identification. How did the experience make you feel- uneasy, scared, worried? - and how did you react? How did you 'prove' you were who you claimed to be? How might some social roles change people's bodily comportment and movements? Do you think such changes would affect their individual and social identity - in what ways? ~58 SOCIAL INTERACTION AND EVERYDAY LIFE demonstrates that individual and social identities are tightly bound together within the embodied self (Burkitt 1999). The social rules of interaction Although we routinely use non-verbal cues in our own behaviour and in making sense of the behaviour of others, much of our interaction is done through talk - casual verbal exchange - carried on in informal conversations with others. It has always been accepted by sociologists that language is fundamental to social life. Recently, however, an approach has been developed that is specifically concerned with how people use language in the ordinary contexts of everyday life. Ethnomethodology is the study of the 'ethnomethods' - the folk, or lay, methods people use to make sense of what others do, and particularly of what they say. Harold Garfinkel, whose work is discussed below, coined the term 'ethnomethodology'. We all apply these methods, normally without having to give any conscious attention to them. Often we can only make sense ofwhat is said in conversation ifwe know the social context, which does not appear in the words themselves. Take the following conversation (Heritage 1985): A: I have a 14-year-old son. B: Well, that's all right. A: I also have a dog. B: Oh, I'm sorry. What do you think is happening here? What is the relation between the speakers?What if you were told that this is a conversation between a prospective tenant and a landlord? The conversation then becomes sensible: some landlords accept children but do not permit their tenants to keep pets. Yet if we do not know the social context, the responses of individual B seem to bear no relation to the statements of A. Part of the sense is in the words, and part is in the way in which the meaning emerges from the social context. Shared understandings The most inconsequential forms ofdaily talk assume complicated, shared knowledge brought into play by those speaking. In fact, our small talk is so complex that it has so far proved impossible to program even the most sophisticated computers to converse convincingly with human beings for very long. The words used in ordinary talk do not always have precise meanings, and we 'fix' what we want to say through the unstated assumptions that back it up. If Maria asks Tom: 'What did you do yesterday?' there is no obvious answer suggested by the words in the question themselves.Adayis alongtime, and it would be logical forTom to answer: 'Well, at 7.16, Iwoke up. At 7.18, I got out ofbed, went to the bathroom and started to brush my teeth. At 7.19, I turned on the shower. . . :We understand the type ofresponse the question calls for by knowing Maria, what sort ofactivities she andTom consider relevant, and what Tom usually does on a particular day of the week, among other things. 'Interactional vandalism' We have already seen that conversations are one ofthe main ways in which our daily lives are maintained in a stable and coherent manner. We feel most comfortable when the tacit conventions of small talk are adhered to; when they are breached, we can feel threatened, confused and insecure. In most everyday talk, conversants are carefully attuned to the cues being given by others such as changes in intonation, slight pauses or gestures - in order to facilitate conversation smoothly. By being mutually aware, conversants 'cooperate' in opening and closing interactions, and in taking turns to speak. Interactions in which one party is conversationally 'uncooperative', however, can give rise to tensions. Garfinkel's students created tense situations by intentionally undermining conversational rules as part of a sociological experiment. But what about situations in the real world in which people 'make trouble' through their conversational practices? One US study investigated verbal interchanges between pedestrians and street people in NewYork City to understand why such interactions are often seen as problematic by passers-by. The researchers used a technique called conversation analysis to compare a selection ofstreet interchanges with samples of everyday talk. Conversation analysis is a methodology that examines all facets of a conversation for meaning - from the smallest filler words (such as 'urn' and 'ah') to the precise timing of interchanges (including pauses, interruptions and overlaps). The study looked at interactions between black men - many ofwhom were homeless, alcoholic or drug-addicted - and white women who passed by them on the street. The men would often try to initiate conversations with passing women by calling out to them, paying them compliments or asking them questions. But something 'goes wrong' in these conversations, because the women rarely respond as they would in a normal interaction. Even though the men's comments are seldom hostile in tone, the women tend to quicken their step and stare fixedly ahead. The following shows attempts by Mudrick, a black man in his late 50s, to engage women in conversation (Duneier and Molotch 1999): [MudrickJ begins this interaction as a white woman, who looks about 25, approaches at a steady pace: 1 MUDRICK: I love you baby. She crosses her arms and quickens her walk, ignoring the comment. 2 MUDRICK: Marry me. Next, it is two white women, also probably in their mid-twenties: 3 MUDRICK: Hi girls, you all look very nice today. You have some money? Buy some books. Social Interaction and Everyday Life 259 They ignore him. Next, it is a young black woman: 4 MUDRICK: Hey pretty. Hey pretty. She keeps walking without acknowledging him. 5 MUDRICK: 'Scuse me. 'Scuse me. I know you hear me. Then he addresses a white woman in her thirties: 6 MUDRICK: I'm watching you. You look nice, you know. She ignores him. Negotiating smooth 'openings' and 'closings' to conversations is a fundamental requirement for urban civility.These crucial aspects of conversation were highly problematic between the men and women. When the women resisted the men's attempts at opening a conversation, the men ignored the women's resistance and persisted. Similarly, ifthe men succeeded in opening a conversation, they often refused to respond to cues from the women to close the conversation once it had got under way: I MUDRICK: Hey pretty. 2 WOMAN: Hi how you doin'. 3 MUDRICK: You alright? 4 MUDRICK:You look very nice you knOw. I like how you have your hair pinned. 5 MUDRICK: You married? 6 WOMAN: Yeah. 7 MUDRICK: Huh? 8 WOMAN: Yeah. 9 MUDRICK: Where the rings at? 10 WOMAN: I have it home. 11 MUDRICK: Y'have it home? 12 WOMAN: Yeah. 13 MUDRICK: Can I get your name? 14 MUDRICK: My name is Mudrick, what's yours? She does not answer and walks on. (Duneier and Molotch 1999) In this instance, Mudrick made 9 out of the 14 utterances that comprised the interaction to initiate the conversation and to elicit further responses from the woman. From the 260 SOC IAL INTERACTION AND EVERYDAY LIFE Classic Studies 7.1 Harold Garfinkel's ethnomethodological experiments The research problem Misunderstandings are commonplace in social life. Sometimes they go unresolved but at others, they can provoke irritation and frustration. Anyone who has been told, 'listen when I'm talking to you'. or. 'you just don't get it,do you?', will be aware ofjust how quickly apparently trivial misunderstandings can escalate into anger and aggression. But why do people get so upset when the minor conventions of talk are not followed? The founder ofethnomethodology, Harold Garfinkel, investigated this issue with some ofhis students. Garfinkel's explanation For a smooth-running everyday existence, people must be able to take for granted certain aspects of their lives. These 'background expectancies' include the organization of ordinary conversations,such as knowing when to speak and when not to, what we can assume without formally stating it - and so on. Garfinkel (1963) explored such unspoken assumptions with student volunteers who set out to 'breach' the conventions of daily life.The students were asked to engage a friend or relative in conversation and to insist that casual remarks or general comments be actively pursued to make their meaning more precise. So, if someone said, 'Have a nice day',the student was to respond, 'Nice in what sense,exactly?' 'Which part of the day do you mean?' and so on. One of these exchanges ran as follows (E is the student volunteer, S is their friend): s: How are you? E: How am I in regard to what? My health, my finance, my school work, my peace of mind,my ... ? s: [red in the face and sudderJy out of control] :Look' I was just trying to be polite. Frankly. I don't give a damn how you are. Why would a friend get so upset so quickly? Garfinkel's answer is that the stability and meaningfulness of our daily social lives depend on the sharing of unstated cultural assumptions about what is said and why If we were not able to take these for granted,meaningful communication would be impossible. Any question or contribution to a conversation would have to be followed by a massive 'search procedure' of the sort Garfinkel's subjects were told to initiate, and interaction would simply break down. What seem at first sight to be unimportant conventions of talk, therefore, turn out to be fundamental to the very fabric of social life,which is why their breach is so serious. In everyday life, people sometimes deliberately feign ignorance of unstated knowledge. This may be done to rebuff the others. poke fun at them, cause embarrassment or call attention to a double meaning in what was said. Consider,for example, this all too typical exchange between parent (P) and teenager (T): P: \l\There are you going? T: Out. P: What are you going to do? T: Nothing. The responses of the teenager are effectively the opposite ofthose ofthe student volunteers above. Rather than pursuing enquiries where this is not normally done, the teenager provides no appropriate answers at all- essentially saying, 'Mind your own business" The first question might elicit a different response from another person in another context: A ' Where are you going? B: I'm going quietly round the bend. Bdeliberately misreads A's question in order ironically to convey worry or frustration. Comedy and joking thrive on such deliberate misunderstandings of the unstated assumptions involved in talk There is nothing threatening about this so long as the parties concerned recognize that the intent is to provoke laughter. By delving into the everyday world which we all inhabit, Garfinkel shows us that the normal, smooth-running social order that some sociologists simply take for granted is in fact a social process of interaction,which has to be continually reproduced over the course of every day Social order is hard work' However, in his 'breaching experiments',Garfinkel was also able amply to demonstrate just how robust is the fabric of daily life.The students were able to explain and apologize to therr friends and families once the experiment was over, but what might have happened had they carried on behaving in such pedantic and uncooperative ways? Would they have been shunned and thrown out of the family home or referred to a doctor or psychiatrist as suffering from a mental illness? Social reality may be socially constructed, but this is still a very hard construction that is impossible to ignore. Critical points Given that ethnomethodology set out to criticize much mainstream sociology and is usually seen as an alternative to, rather than a school of thought within, sociology it has been the subject of much criticism. However, we need only note the most important ones. First. ethnomethodology seeks to understand the world from the viewpoint of 'ordinary actors'. While thrs may bring about some useful insights,critics argue that it leaves the conclusions from ethnomethodological research open to a charge of subJectivism - that they only apply to the particular subjects being studied - and therefore it is not legitimate to generalize from them. Second,many sociologists argue that the focus on micro-level order and disorder leaves Social Interaction and Everyday Life 261 ethnomethdology remarkably detached from the key structural determinants affecting people's life chances, such as gender, race/ethnicity and social class.Ethnomethodology's aversion to social structural analysis and general theories of society seem to leave its studies cast adrift from crucial questions about the operation ofpower in the structuring of social life. Finally ethnomethodology does not look for the causes of SOClal phenomena, but only to describe how they are experienced and made sense of by people 'on the ground'. Again, many sociologists see this lack ofcausal explanation to be a major problem,which essentially rules out the idea that the study of social life could be 'scientific'. Contemporary significance Ethnomethodology is an important approach to the study of everyday life and social interaction, which is usually seen alongside other microsociologies such as phenomenology and symbolic interactionism. Sociologists who are interested in large-scale social structures, power relations within the international system of nation-states and long-term socio-historical change will always find ethnomethodology disappointing,But taken on its own terms, this theoretical approach has produced much insightful work on the operation ofdaily life and how it is experienced and made sense of by the people who constitute and reproduce it. It therefore remains an influential perspective amongst scholars and students of everyday life. transcript alone, it is quite evident that the woman is not interested in talking, but when conversation analysis is applied to the tape recording, her reluctance becomes even clearer. The woman delays all her responses even when she does give them, while Mudrick replies immediately, his comments sometimes overlapping hers. Timing in conversations is a very precise indicator; delaying a response by even a fraction of a second is adequate in most everyday interactions to signal the desire to change the course of a conversation. By betraying these tacit rules ofsociability, Mudrickwas practising conversation in a way that was 'technically rude'. The woman, in return, was also 'technically rude' in ignoring Mudrick's repeated attempts to engage her in talk. It is the 'technically rude' nature of these street interchanges that make them problematic for passers-by to handle. When standard cues for opening and closing conversations are not adhered to, individuals feel a sense of profound and inexplicable insecurity. The term interactional vandalism describes cases like these, in which a subordinate person breaks the tacit rules of everyday interaction that are ofvalue to the more powerfuL The men on the street often conform to everyday forms of speech in their interactions with one another, local shopkeepers, the police, relatives and acquaintances. But when they choose to, they subvert the tacit conventions for everyday talk in a way that leaves passersby disoriented. Even more than physical assaults or vulgar verbal abuse, interactional vandalism leaves victims unable to articulate what has happened. This study of interactional vandalism provides another example of the two-way links between micro-level interactions and forces that operate on the macro-leveL To the men on the street, the white women who ignore their attempts at conversation appear distant, cold and bereft of sympathy - legitimate 'targets' for such interactions. The women, meanwhile, may often take the men's behaviour as proof that they are indeed dangerous and best avoided. Interactional vandalism is closely tied up with overarching class, gender and racial structures. The fear and anxiety generated in such mundane interactions help to constitute the outside statuses and forces that, in turn, influence the interactions themselves. Interactional vandalism is part of a self-reinforcing system ofmutual suspicion and incivility. Response cries Some kinds of utterance are not talk but consist of muttered exclamations, or what Goffman (1981) has called response cries. Consider Lucy, who exclaims, 'Oops!' after knocking over a glass ofwater. 'Oops!' seems to be merely an uninteresting reflex response to a mishap, rather like blinking your eye when a person moves a hand sharply towards your face. It is not a reflex, however, as shown by the fact that people do not usually make the exclamation when alone. 'Oops!' is normally directed towards others present. The exclamation demonstrates to witnesses that the lapse is only Being approached by a stranger who breaks the tacit rules of 'standard' social interaction can leave people feeling threatened or uncomfortable. minor and momentary, not something that should cast doubt on Lucy's command of her actions. 'Oops!' is used only in situations of minor failure, rather than in major accidents or calamities - which also demonstrates that the exclamation is part of our controlled management of the details of social life. Moreover, the word may be used by someone observing Lucy, rather than by Lucy herself, or it may be used to sound a warning to another. 'Oops!' is normally a curt sound, but the '00' may be prolonged in some situations. Thus, someone might extend the sound to cover acritical moment in performing atask. For instance, aparent may utter an extended 'Oops!' or 'Oopsadaisy!' when playfully tossing a child in the air. The sound covers the brief phase when the child may feel a loss of control, reassuring him and probably at the same time developing his understanding of response cries. This may all sound very contrived and exaggerated. Why should we bother to analyse such an inconsequential utterance in this detail? Surely we do not pay as much attention to what we say as this example suggests? Of course not - on a conscious level. The crucial point, however, is that we take for granted an immensely complicated, continuous control of our appear~ ance and actions. In situations of interaction, we are never expected just to be present on the scene. Others expect, as we expect of them, that we will display what Goffman calls 'controlled alertness'. A fundamental part of being human is continually demonstrating to others our competence in the routines of daily life. Face, body and speech in interaction Let us summarize at this point what we have learned so far. Everyday interaction depends on subtle relationships between what we convey with our faces and bodies and what we express in words. We use the facial expressions and bodily gestures of other people to fill in what they communicate verbally and to check if they are sincere in what they say. Mostly without realizing it, each of us keeps a tight and continuous control over facial expression, bodily posture and movement in the course of our daily interaction with others. Face, bodily management and speech, then, are used to convey certain meanings and to hide others. We also organize our activities in the contexts of social life to achieve the same ends, as we shall now see. Encounters In many social situations, we engage in what Goffman calls unfocused interaction Social Interaction and Everyday Life 263 with others. Unfocused interaction takes place whenever individuals exhibit mutual awareness of one another's presence. This is usually the case anywhere that large numbers of people are assembled together, as on a busy street, in a theatre crowd or at a party. When people are in the presence of others, even if they do not directly talk to them, they continually communicate nonverbally through their posture and facial and physical gestures. Focused interaction occurs when individuals directly attend to what others say or do. Social interaction will often involve both focused and unfocused exchanges. Goffman calls an instance offocused interaction an encounter, and much of our day-to-day life consists ofencounters with other people - family, friends, colleagues - frequently occurring against the background of unfocused interaction with others present on the scene. Small talk, seminar discussions, games and routine face-to-face contacts (with ticket attendants, waiters, shop assistants and so forth) are all examples of encounters. Encounters always need 'openings', which indicate that civil inattention is being discarded. When strangers meet and begin to talk at a party, the moment ofceasing civil inattention is always risky, since misunderstandings can easily occur about the nature of the encounter being established (Goffman 1971). Hence, the making ofeye contact may first be ambiguous and tentative. The person who is looking to make eye contact can then act as though he had made no direct move if the overture is not accepted. In focused interaction, each person communicates as much by facial expression and gesture as by' the words actually exchanged. Goffman distinguishes between the expressions individuals 'give' and those they 'give off'. The first are the words and facial expressions people use to produce certain impressions on others. The second are the clues that others may spot to check their sincerity or truthfulness. For instance, a restaurantowner listens with a polite smile to the state- :64 SOCIAL INTERACTIO N AND EVERYDAY LIFE ments that customers give about how much they enjoyed their meals. At the same time, she is noting the signals the customers give off - how pleased they seemed to be while eating the food, whether a lot was left over, and the tone of voice they use to express their satisfaction, for example. Waiters and other workers in the service industries are, of course, told to smile and be polite in their social interaction with customers. In a famous study of the airline industry, Arlie Hochschild describes this 'emotional labour' (see chapter I). THINKING CRITICALLY In some societies today, surveys show that women and older people believe it to be unsafe for them to walk out after dark. In recent years, young people in the UK who wear 'hoodies' (a type of jacket with large hood) have been seen as 'threatening' by many older groups of people. How might Anderson's study help us to understand such interactions and what do they tell us about the rnacrosociological relationships between younger and older generations? Impression management Goffman and other writers on social interaction often use notions from the theatre in their analyses. The concept of social role, for example, originated in a theatrical setting. Roles are socially defined expectations that a person in a given status, or social position, follows. To be a teacher is to hold a specific position; the teacher's role consists of acting in specified ways towards her pupils. Goffman sees social life as though played out by actors on a stage - or on many stages, because how we act depends on the roles we are playing at a particular time. People are sensitive to how they are seen by others and use many forms of impression management to compel others to react to them in the ways they .'Hmmm...whatshall I weal"toda!:j...?" wish. Although we may sometimes do this in a calculated way, usually it is among the things we do without conscious attention. When Philip attends a business meeting, he wears a suit and tie and is on his best behaviour; that evening, when relaxing with friends at a football game, he wears jeans and a sweatshirt and tells a lot ofjokes.This is impression management. As we noted above, the social roles that we adopt are highly dependent on our social status. A person's social status can be different depending on the social context. For instance, as a 'student', you have a certain status and are expected to act in acertain way when you are around your professors. As a 'son or daughter', you have a different status from a student, and society (especially your parents) has different expectations for you. Likewise, as a 'friend', you have an entirely different position in the social order, and the roles you adopt would change accordingly. Obviously, a person has many statuses at the same time. Sociologists refer to the group of statuses that you occupy as a status set. Sociologists also like to distinguish between ascribed status and achieved status. An ascribed status is one that you 7.2 Street encounters Have you ever crossed to the other side of the street when you felt threatened by someone behind you or someone coming towards you? One sociologist who tried to understand simple interactions of this kind is Elijah Anderson. Anderson began by describing social interaction on the streets of two adjacent urban neighbourhoods in the United States. His book. Streetwise: Race, Class, and Change ill an Urban Community (1990), found that studying everyday life sheds light on how social order is created by the individual building blocks of infinite micro-level interactions. He was particularly interested in understanding interactions when at least one party was viewed as threatening.Anderson showed that the ways many blacks and whites interact on the streets had a great deal to do with the structure of racial stereotypes, which is itselflinked to the economic structure of society. In this way, he showed the link between nticrointeractions and the larger macro-structures of society Social Interaction and Everyday Life 265 Anderson began by recalling Erving Goffman's description of how social roles and statuses come into existence in particular contexts or locations. Goffman (1959) wrote: \lVhen an individual enters the presence of others, they commonly seek to acquire information about him or bring into play infOlmation already possessed. .. Information about the individual helps to define the situation, enabling others to know in advance what he will expect ofthem and they may expect ofhim. Following Goffman's lead, Anderson (1990) asked what types of behavioural cues and signs make up the vocabulary ofpublic interaction? He concluded that: Skin colour, gender, age,companions. clothing, jewellery and the objects people carry help identify them, so that assumptions are formed and communication can occur, Movements (quick or slow,false or sincere, comprehensible or incomprehensible) further refine this public communication. Factors like time of day or an activity that 'explains' a person's presence can also :66 SOCIAL INT ERACTION AND EVERYDAY LIFE affect in what way and how quickly the image of 'stranger' is neutralized. If a stranger cannot pass inspection and be assessed as 'safe'. the image of predator may arise, and fellow pedestrians may try to maintain a distance consistent with that image. Anderson argues that people are 'streetwise' when they develop skills such as 'the art of avoidance' to deal with their felt vulnerability towards violence and crime.According to Anderson, whites who are not streetwise do not recognize the difference between different kinds of black men (such as between middie-class youths and gang members). They may also not know how to alter the number of paces to walk behind a 'suspicious' person or how to bypass 'bad blocks' at various times of day. Anderson showed that the people most likely to pass inspection are those who do not fall into commonly accepted stereotypes of dangerous persons: 'Children readily pass inspection,while women and white men do so more slowl~ black women, black men, and black male teenagers most slowly of all.' In showing that interactional tensions derive from outside statuses such as race, class and gender, Anderson shows that Studies such as this one demonstrate how microsociology is useful in illuminating the broad institutional patterns that are the content of macrosociology Face-ta-face interaction is clearly the main basis of all forms of social organization, no matter how large scale. We could not build up a full account of gender and race in our society from these studies alone, yet we could certainly contribute significantly to understanding these issues better. we cannot develop a full understanding of the situation by looking at the microinteractions themselves.This is how he makes the link between micro-interactions and macro-processes. are 'assigned' based on biological factors such as race, sex or age. Thus, your ascribed statuses could be 'white', 'female' and 'teenager'. An achieved status is one that is earned through an individual's own effort. Your achieved statuses could be 'graduate', 'athlete' or 'employee'.While we may like to believe that it is our achieved statuses that are most important, society may not agree. In any society, some statuses have priority over all other statuses and generally determine a person's overall position in society. Sociologists refer to this as a master status (Hughes 1945; Becker 1963). The most common master statuses are those based on gender and race. Sociologists have shown that in an encounter, one of the first things that people notice about one another is gender and race (ami and Winant 1994). As we shall see shortly, both race and gender strongly shape our social interactions. Adopting roles: intimate examinations For an example of collaboration in impression management that also borrows from the theatre, let us look at one particular study in some detail. James Henslin and Mae Biggs studied a speCific, highly delicate type of encounter: a woman's visit to a gynaecologist (1971, 1997). At the time of the study, most pelvic examinations were carried out by male doctors and the experience was therefore (and sometimes still is) fraught with potential ambiguities and embarrassment for both parties. Men and women in theWest are socialized to think of the genitals as the most private part of the body, and seeing, and particularly touching, the genitals of another person is ordinarily associated with intimate sexual encounters. Some women feel so worried by the prospect ofa pelvic examination that they refuse to visit the doctor, male or female, even when they suspect there is a strong medical reason to do so. Henslin and Biggs analysed material collected by Biggs, a trained nurse, from a large number of gynaecological examinations. They interpreted what they found as having several typical stages. Adopting a dramaturgical metaphor, they suggested that each phase could be treated as a distinct scene, in which the parts played by the actors alter as the episode unfolds. In the prologue, the woman enters the waiting room preparing to assume the role of patient and temporarily discarding her outside identity. Called into the consulting room, she adopts the 'patient' role, and the first scene opens. The doctor assumes a business-like, professional manner and treats the patient as a proper and competent person, maintaining eye contact and listening politely to what she has to say. If he decides an examination is called for, he tells her so and leaves the room; scene one is over. As he leaves, the nurse comes in. She is an important stagehand in the main scene shortly to begin. She soothes any worries that the patient might have, acting as both a confidante - knowing some of the 'things women have to put up with' - and a collaborator in what is to follow. Crucially, the nurse helps alter the patient from a person to a 'non-person' for the vital scene - which features a body, part ofwhich is to be scrutinized, rather than a complete human being. In Henslin and Biggs's study, the nurse not only supervises the patient's undressing, but also takes over aspects that normally the patient would control. Thus, she takes the patient's clothes and folds them. Most women wish their underwear to be out of sight when the doctor returns, and the nurse makes sure that this is so. She guides the patient to the examining table and covers most of her body with a sheet before the physician returns. The central scene now opens, with the nurse as well as the doctor taking part. The presence of the nurse helps ensure that the interaction between the doctor and the patient is free of sexual overtones and also provides a legal witness should the physician be charged with unprofessional conduct. The examination proceeds as though the personality of the patient were absent; the sheet across her separates the genital area from the rest of her body, and In normal social life in Saudi Arabia, interaction between men and women is highly regulated and inhmate contact in public is forbidden. However, in a medical setting,other social rules take precedence, although these are shll carefully managed. her position does not allow her to watch the examination itself. Apart from any specific medical queries, the doctor ignores her, sitting on a low stool, out of her line of vision. The patient collaborates in becoming a temporary non-person, not initiating ~68 SOCIAL INTERACTION AND EVERYDAY LIFE Classic Studies 7,2 Erving Goffman on the drama of everyday life The research problem Very often we watch people in public situations who seem to be 'performing' or 'playing to the crowd'. If we are honest, we would probably admit that we also treat the world a little like a stage at times, putting on a show for the benefit of other people. But why do we do this? And when we do it, is it really us - our 'real selves' doing the performing? If 'all the world's a stage', what happens behind the scenes ofpublic life? And what is the relationship between the front and backstage regions? Erving Goffman (1922-82) studied this issue in several publications and research studies, producing the most detailed accounts of people's 'performances' and backstage behaviour. Goffman's explanation Much of social life, Goffman suggests, can be divided into front regions and back regions. Front regions are social occasions or encounters in which individuals act out formal roles; they are essentially, 'on-stage performances'. Teamworkis often involved in creating front-region performances. 'lINo prominent politicians in the same party may put on an elaborate show of unity and friendship before the television cameras, even though each privately detests the other. A wife and husband may take care to conceal their quarrels from their children, preserving a front of harmony, only to fight bitterly once the children are safely tucked up in bed. The back regions are where people assemble the props and prepare themselves for interaction in the more formal settings. Back regions resemble the backstage of a theatre or the off-camera activities of fiimmaking. When they are safely behind the scenes, people can relax and give vent to feelings and styles of behaviour they keep in check when on stage. Back regions permit 'profanity, open sexual remarks, elaborate griping ... rough informal dress, "sloppy" sitting and standing posture, use of dialect or substandard speech, mumbling and shouting, playful aggressiveness and "kidding," inconsiderateness for the other in minor but potentially sy,mbolic acts, minor self-involvement such as humming, whistling, chewing,nibbling, belching and flatulence' (Goffman 1959).Thus, a waitress may be the soul of quiet courtesy when serving a customer, but become loud and aggressive once behind the swing doors ofthe kitchen. Probably few people would continue to patronize restaurants if they could see all that goes on in the kitchens. American sociologist. Spencer Cahill,led a research team studying social interaction in the public toilets (or 'bathrooms') of shopping centres, college campuses, bars and restaurants (Cahill et al. 1985), Using Goffman's idea offront and back regions, Cahill found that what Goffman (1959) called 'performance teams' would sometimes retreat into public toilets to conceal embarrassment when a collective performance goes wrong. Cahill recounts a conversation between three young women in the bathroom of a student centre on a college campus: A: That was sooo embarrassingl I can't believe that just happened. [general laugh/er] B: He must think we are the biggest bunch of losers. A: I can't believe Ijust screamed loud enough for everyone to hear. c: It really wasn't all that loud, I'm sure he didn't hear you. B: --, we didn't see him right away, and I did try to tell you but you were so busy talking that I , A: I can't believe that just happened.I feel like such an asshole. B: Don't worry 'bout it. At least he knows who you are now. Are you ready? A: I'm so embarrassed,What if he's still out there? B: You're going to have to see him at some point. Such defensive strategies buy individuals and teams the time to gather themselves before going out to face the 'audience' again, Goffman (1959) argued that performance teams routinely use backstage regions for such purposes. They also discuss and rehearse the performance before it actually takes place.At times, backstage discussions will be concerned with morale ofparticular individuals or of the whole team. Social Interaction and Everyday Life 269 The division between front and backstage of social life is vividly depicted here by two doctors relaxing together after a busy day in the hospitaL Goffman's approach is usually described as 'dramaturgical'; that is, it is an approach based on an analogy with the theatre,with its front and backstage regions. However,we have to bear in mind that this is an analogy. Goffman is not suggesting that the social world really 15 a stage. but that, using the dramaturgical analogy we can study certain aspects of it and learn more about why people behave in the ways they do. Critical points Critics of Goffman's approach make some similar points to those levelled at other microsociologies. Perhaps he does not give enough recognition to the role that power plays in shaping social relations, tending to understand interactions from the participants' point ofview. The dramaturgical analogy can also be questioned. This may be a good model for studies of organizations and 'total institutions', but may not be so useful outside elsewhere. Similarly,Goffman's theatrical analogy works best in modernWestern societies which have developed a division between the public and the private realms oflife (front and back stages). But in other societies, this division is either less pronounced or just does not exist in the same form (see discussion ofthe IKung on page 272); Goffrnan's perspective may not have quite the same purchase on life within these societies. Contemporary significance Goffman's work has had a profound influence not orily on sociology as a discipline, but on numerous scholars, who have been inspired to become professional sociologists after reading his works. He is widely acknowledged to have made some of the most thoughtful and stimulating contributions to the discipline. Many sociologists today continue to refer to his original works for examples of how to carry out microsociological work and the concepts he developed (stigma, master status,front and back stage, and so on) ,have become part of the very fabric of sociology in a variety of fields. For example, his work is discussed in many places in this book, including chapter 10, 'Health, Illness and Disability'. chapter 21, 'Crime and Deviance' and chapter 8, 'The Life- Course'. \l0 SOCIAL INTERACTION AND EVERYDAY LI FE conversation and keeping any movements to a minimum. In the interval between this and the final scene, the nurse again plays the role of stagehand, helping the patient to become a full person once more. After the doctor has left the room, the two may again engage in conversation, the patient expressing relief that the examination is over. Having dressed and re-groomed herself, the patient is ready to face the concluding scene. The doctor re-enters the room and, in discussing the results ofthe examination, again treats the patient as a complete and responsible person. Resuming his polite, professional manner, he conveys that his reactions to her are in no way altered by the intimate contact with her body. The epilogue is played out when she leaves the doctor's surgery, taking up again her identiry in the outside world. The patient and the doctor have thus collaborated in such a way as to manage the interaction and the impression each participant forms of the other. Personal space There are cultural differences in the definition of personal space. In Western culture, people usually maintain a distance of at least three feet when engaged in focused interaction with others; when standing side by side, they may stand more closely together. In the Middle East, people often stand closer to one another than is thought acceptable in the West. Westerners visiting that part ofthe world are likely to find themselves disconcerted by this unexpected physical proximity. Edward T. Hall, who has worked extensively on non-verbal communication, distinguishes four zones of personal space. Intimate distance, of up to one and a half feet, is reserved for very few social contacts. Only those involved in relationships in which regular bodily touching is permitted, such as lovers or parents and children, operate within this zone of private space. Personal distance, from one and a half to four feet, is the normal spacing for encounters with friends and close acquaintances. Some intimacy of contact is permitted, but this tends to be strictly limited. Social distance, from four to twelve feet, is the zone usually maintained in formal settings such as interviews. The fourth zone is that of public distance, beyond twelve feet, preserved by those who are performing to an audience. In ordinary interaction, the most fraught zones are those of intimate and personal distance. If these zones are invaded, people try to recapture their space. We may stare at the intruder as if to say, 'Move away!' or elbow him aside. When people are forced into proximity closer than they deem desirable, they might create a kind of physical boundary; a reader at a crowded library desk might physically demarcate a private space by stacking books around its edges (Hall 1969, 1973). Here, gender issues also play a role, in much the same way as in other forms of non-verbal communication. Men have traditionally enjoyed greater fteedom than women in the use ofspace, including movement into the personal space ofwomen who may not necessarily be intimates or even close acquaintances. A man who guides a woman by the arm when they walk together, or who places a hand on her lower back when showing her through a door, may be doing so as a gesture of friendly care or politeness. The reverse phenomenon, however - a woman entering a man's personal space - is often construed as flirtation or asexualadvance. New laws and standards regarding sexual harassment in many Western countries seek to protect people's personal space - both men and women from unwanted touching or contact by others. Interaction in time and space Understanding how activities are distributed in time and space is fundamental to analysing encounters, and also to understanding social life in general. All interaction is situated - it occurs in a particular place and has a specific duration in time. Our actions over the course of a day tend to be 'zoned' in time as well as in space. Thus, for example, most people spend a zone - say, from 9.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. - of their daily time working. Their weekly time is also zoned: they are likely to work on weekdays and spend weekends at home, altering the pattern of their activities on the weekend days. As we move through the temporal zones of the day, we are also often moving across space as well: to get to work, we may take a bus from one area of a city to another, or perhaps commute in from the suburbs. When we analyse the contexts of social interaction, therefore, it is often useful to look at people's movements across time-space. The concept ofregionalization will help us understand how social life is zoned in time-space. Take the example of a private house. Amodern house is regionalized into rooms, hallways and floors if there is more than one storey. These spaces are not just physically separate areas, but are zoned in time as well. The living rooms and kitchen are used most in the daylight hours, the bedrooms at night. The interaction that occurs in these regions is bound by both spatial and temporal divisions. Some areas ofthe house form back regions, with 'performances' taking place in the others. At times, the whole house can become a back region. Once again, this idea is beautifully captured by Goffman: Of a Sunday morning, a whole household can use the wall around its domestic establishment to conceal a relaxing slovenliness in dress and civil endeavour, extending to all rooms the informality that is usuaUy restricted to kitchen and Social Interaction and Everyday Life 271 bedrooms. So, too, in American middleclass neighbourhoods, on afternoons the line between children's playground and home may be defined as backstage by mothers, who pass along it wearing jeans. loafers, and a minimum of make-up. ... And, ofcourse, a region that is thoroughly established as a front region for the regular performance of a particular routine often functions as a back region before and after each performance, for at these times the permanent fixtures may undergo repairs, restoration, and rearrangement, or the performers may hold dress rehearsals. To see this we need only glance into a restaurant, or store, or home, a few minutes before these establishments are opened to us for the day. (1959: 128) Clock time In modern societies, the zoning ofour activities is strongly influenced by clock time. Without clocks and the precise timing of activities, and thereby their coordination across space, industrialized societies could not exist (Mumford 1973). The measuring of time by clocks is today standardized across the globe, making possible the complex international transport systems and communications we now depend on. World standard time was first introduced in 1884 at a conference of nations held in Washington. The globe was then partitioned into 24 time zones, each one hour apart, and an exact beginning of the universal day was fixed. Fourteenth-century monasteries were the first organizations to try to schedule the activities of their inmates precisely across the day and week. Today, there is virtually no group or organization that does not do so the greater the number of people and resources involved, the more precise the scheduling must be. Eviatar Zerubavel (1979, 1982) demonstrated this in his study of the temporal structure of a large modern hospital. A hospital must operate on a 24hour basis, and coordinating the staff and resources is a highly complex matter. For instance, the nurses work for one time 272 SOCIAL INTERACTION AND EVERYDAY LI FE period in ward A, another time period in ward B, and so on, and are also called on to alternate between day- and night-shift work. Nurses, doctors and other staff, plus the resources they need, must be integrated together both in time and in space. The ordering of space and time The Internet is another example of how closely forms ofsociallife are bound up with our control of space and time. The Internet makes it possible for us to interact with people we never see or meet, in any corner of the world. Such technological change 'rearranges' space - we can interact with anyone without moving from our chair. It also alters our experience of time, because communication on the electronic highway is almost immediate. Until about 50 years ago, most communication across space required a duration of time. If you sent a letter to someone abroad, there was a time gap while the letter was carried by ship, train, truck or plane to the person to whom it was written. People still write letters by hand today, of course, but instantaneous communication has become basic to our social world. Our lives would be almost unimaginable without it.We are so used to being able to switch on the TV and watch the news or make a phone call or send an email to a friend in another part of the world that it is hard for us to imagine what life would be like other- wise. Everyday life in cultural and historical perspective Some of the mechanisms of social interaction analysed by Goffman, Garfinkel and others seem to be universal. But much of Goffman's discussion of civil inattention and other kinds of interaction primarily concerns societies in which contact with strangers is commonplace. What about small-scale traditional societies, where there are no strangers and few settings in which more than a handful of people are together at anyone time? To see some of the contrasts between social interaction in modern and traditional societies, let's take as an example one of the least developed cultures in terms of technology remaining in the world: the !Kung (sometimes known as the Bushmen), who live in the Kalahari Desert area of Botswana and Namibia, in southern Africa (Lee 1968, 1969; the exclamation mark refers to a click sound one makes before pronouncing the name). Although their way of life is changing because of outside influences, their traditional patterns of social life are still evident. The !Kung live in groups of some 30 or 40 people, in temporary settlements near water-holes. Food is scarce in their environment, and they must walk far and wide to find it. Such roaming takes up most of the average day. Women and children often stay back in the camp, but equally often the whole group spends the day walking. Members of the community will sometimes fan out over an area of up to a 100 square miles in the course of a day, returning to the camp at night to eat and sleep. The men may be alone or in groups of two or three for much of the day. There is one period of the year, however, when the routines of their daily activities change: the winter rainy season, when water is abundant and food much easier to come by. The everyday life of the !Kung during this period is centred on ritual and ceremonial activities, the preparation for and enactment of which is very time-consuming. The members of most !Kung groups never see anyone they do not know reasonably well. Until contacts with the outside became more common in recent years, they had no word for 'stranger'. While the !Kung, particularly the males, may spend long periods of the day out of contact with others, in the community itself there is little opportunity for privacy. Families sleep in flimsy, open dwellings, with virtually all activities open to public view. No one has studied the !Kung with Goffman's observations on everyday life in mind, but it is easy to see that some aspects ofhis work have limited application to !Kung social life. There are few opportunities, for example, to create front and back regions. The closing off of different gatherings and encounters by the walls of rooms, separate buildings and the various neighbourhoods of cities common in modern societies are remote from the activities of the !Kung. The form ofsocial interaction ofthe !Kung is very different from the interaction that takes place in the modern city. City life forces us to interact almost constantly with strangers. THINIUNG CRITICALLY Think about your recent holidays and note the reasons why you chose those locations. Did you ever consider the impact your visit would have on: the society and people you were visiting - what resources are needed? what kind ofjobs are required to service the tourist's needs? the natural environment - in terms of travel, infrastructure needed, damage to ecosystems. Do the benefits of global tourism outweigh the damage it causes? What are those benefits? A famous account of urban social interaction is that of Georg Simmel, whose work is discussed in chapter 6, 'Cities and Urban Life'. The social construction of reality: the sociological debate Within sociology, many different theoretical frameworks are used to explain social reality. These theories differ in their explanations of social phenomena, yet they share the assumption that social reality exists independently of people's talking about it or living in it. This assumption has been challenged by a broad body of socioSocial Interaction and Everyday Life logical thought known as social construc- tionism. Social constructivists believe that what individuals and society perceive and understand as reality is itself a construction, a creation of the social interaction of individuals and groups. Trying to 'explain' social reality is to overlook and to reify (regard as a given truth) the processes through which such reality is constructed. Therefore, social constructivists argue that sociologists need to document and analyse these processes and not simply be concerned with the concept of social reality they give rise to. Social constructionism has been seen as an important influence on the postmodern school of thought in sociology (see chapter I, 'What is Sociology?'). In their 1966 classic study, The Social Construction of Reality, sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckrnann examined common-sense knowledge - those things that individuals take for granted as real. They emphasized that these 'obvious' facts of social reality may differ among people from different cultures, and even among different people within the same culture. The task becomes an analysis of the processes by which individuals come to perceive what is 'real' to them as real. Social constructivists apply the ideas of Berger and Luckmann to the investigation of social phenomena, to illuminate the ways in which members ofsociety come to know and simultaneously create what is real. While social constructivists have examined such diverse topics as medicine and medical treatment, gender relations and emotions, much of their work has focused on social problems, such as the crime 'problem'. The work of Aaron Cicourel (1968) provides an example of social constructionist research in the area of youth crime. Sometimes, data regarding rates and cases ofyouth crime are taken as given (that is, as real), and theories are created to explain the patterns observed in the data. For example, at first glance arrest and court data would seem to indicate that young people from Global Society 7. I International tourist interactions Have you ever had a face-to-face conversation with someone from another country? Or connected to an overseas website? Have you ever travelled to another part ofthe world? Ifyou answered 'yes' to any of these questions,you have witnessed the effects of globalization on social interaction. Globalization - a relatively recent phenomenon has changed both the frequency and the nature of interactions between people of different nations. The historical sociologist Charles Tilly, in fact, defines globalization in terms of these changes.According to Tilly, 'globalization means an increase in the geographic range of locally consequential social interactions' (Tilly 1995: 1-2). In other words, with globalization, a greater proportion of our interactions come to involve. directly or indirectly, people from other countries. What are the characteristics of social interactions that take place between individuals of different nations? Important contributions to the study ofthis problem have been made by those working in the area of the sociology of tourism. Sociologists of tourism note that globalization has greatly expanded the possibilities for international travel, both by encouraging an interest in other countries and by facilitating the movement of tourists across international borders. Between 1982 and 2002, the number ofvisits to the UK made by overseas residents doubled, and spending on these visits more than tripled.These visitors now pump almost £12 billion a year into the UK economy Britons are also travelling the world in record numbers (ONS 2004b). High levels of international tourism, of course, translate into an increase in the number offace-toface interactions between people of different countries. The sociologist John Urry (1990) argues that the 'tourist gaze' - the expectation on the part ofthe tourist that he or she will have 'exotic' experiences while travelling abroad - shapes many of these interactions. Urry compares the tourist gaze to Foucault's conception of the medical gaze (see chapter 10, 'Health,illness and Disability'). Urry argues that the tourist gaze is just as socially organized by professional experts, systematic in its application and as detached as the medical gaze, but this time it is organized in its search for 'exotic' experiences. These are experiences that violate our everyday expectations about how social interaction and interaction with the physical environment are supposed to proceed. Britons travelling in the United States, for example, may delight in the fact that the Americans drive on the right-hand side ofthe road. At the same time, such behaviour is disconcerting to drivers from the UK. Our rules ofthe road are so ingrained that we experience systematic violations ofthose rules as strange,weird and exotic.Yet, as tourists, we take pleasure in this strangeness. In a sense, it is what we have paid money to see when we go abroad - along with the Empire State Bwlding or the Eiffel Tower. Imagine how disappointed you would be ifyou were to travel to a different country only to find that it was almost exactly the same as the city or town in which you grew up. Yet most tourists do not want their experiences to be too exotic.A popular destination for young, particularly US,travellers in Paris, for example, is a McDonald's restaurant. Some go to see if there is any truth to the line from Quentin Tarantino's movie Pulp Fiction that, because the French use the metric system, McDonald's 'quarter pounder with cheese' hamburgers are called 'Royales with cheese' (it is true, by the way).Britons travelling abroad often cannot resist eating and drinking in British- and Irish-style pubs. Sometimes such diversions are the result of curiosity. but often people enjoy the comfort of eating familiar food in a familiar setting. The contradictory demands for the exotic and the familiar are at the heart ofthe tourist gaze. The tourist gaze may put strains on face-to-face interactions between tourists and locals. Locals who are part ofthe tourist industry may appreciate overseas travellers for the economic benefits they bring to the places they visit. Other locals may resent tourists for their demanding attitudes or for the overdevelopment that often occurs in popular tourist destinations.Tourists may interrogate locals about aspects of their everyday lives, such as their food, work and recreational habits; they may do this either to enhance their understanding of other cultures or to judge negatively those who are different from themselves. As tourism increases with the march of globalization, sociologists will have to watch carefully to see what dominant patterns of interaction emerge between tourists and locals, and to determine, among other things, whether these interactions tend to be friendly or antagonistic. single-parent families are more likely to commit delinquent acts than those from two-parent homes. Some sociologists have therefore developed explanations for this observed relationship: perhaps children from Single-parent homes have less supervision, or perhaps they lack appropriate role models. By contrast, Cicourel observed the processes involved in the arrest and classification of youths suspected of committing crimes; that is, he observed the creation of the 'official' crime data. He discovered that police procedures in the handling of young offenders rely on common-sense understandings of what young offenders are 'really like'. For example, when youths from lowerclass families were arrested, police were more likely to view their offences as results of poor supervision or a lack of proper role models, and would retain the young people in custody. Offenders from upper-class homes, however, were more likely to be released to their parents' care, where police and parents believed the young person could receive proper discipline. Thus, the practices of police serve formally to assign the label of 'young offender' more often to those from lower-class homes than to those from upper-class homes - even when the youths have committed similar offences. This assignment produces the very data, which in turn confirm the relationships held by the common-sense views; for example, that young people from poor families are more likely to engage in crime. Cicourel's study shows that, through interacting with other people in society, we transform our common-sense notions of reality into independent, 'objective' proof of their own validity. Social constructionjsm is not without its critics. Sociologists Steve Woolgar and Dorothy Pawluch (1985) argue that social constructivists aim to show the subjective creation of social reality, yet in doing so selectively view certain features as objective and others as constructed. For example, in Social Interaction and Everyday Life 275 analyses examining which young people become labelled as delinquent, social constructivists often argue that the initial behaviours reported for the young people are identical; therefore, any differences between those labelled as criminals and those avoiding such a label must be due to the construction of the label itself. Critics argue that social constructionism inconsistently presents the initial behaviours as objective, while arguing that the labelling process is subjective (ibid.). Other sociologists have criticized social constructionism for its unwillingness to accept broader social forces as powerful influences on observable social outcomes. For example, some critics have argued that while reality may be a constructed perpetuation of common-sense beliefs, these beliefs themselves may be caused by existing social factors such as capitalism or patriarchy. Ultimately, social constructionism offers a theoretical approach to understanding social reality that radically differs from most other sociological approaches. Rather than assuming that social reality objectively exists, social constructivists work to document and analyse the processes through which social reality is constructed, such that the construction then serves to confirm its own status as social reality. Social interaction in cyberspace In modern societies, in complete contrast to the !Kung, we constantly interact with others whom we may never see or meet. Almost all of our everyday transactions, such as buying groceries or making a bank deposit, bring us into contact - but indirect contact - with people who may live thousands of miles away. Now that email, instant messaging, online communities and chat rooms have become facts of life for many people in industrialized countries, what is the nature of these interactions, and what new complexities are emerging from them? 276 SOCIAL INTERACTION AND EVERYDAY LIFE Sceptics argue that indirect communication through email and the Internet contains a wealth of problems not found in face-to face social interaction. As Katz et al. put it: 'To type is not to be human, to be in cyberspace is not to be real; all is pretence and alienation, a poor substitute for the real thing' (2001: 407). In particular, supporters of this view argue that computer-mediated communication technology is too limited to prevent users hiding behind false identities. This also allows trickery, lechery, manipulation, emotional swindles and so on: The problem lies in the nature of human communication. We think of it as a product ofthe mind, but it's done by bodies: faces move, voices intone, bodies sway, hands gesture.. ,. On the Internet, the mind is present but the body is gone. Recipients get few clues to the personality and mood of the person, can only guess why messagesare sent, what they mean, what responses to make. Trust is virtually out the window. It's a risky business. (Locke and Pascoe 2000) Yet defenders of new technology argue that there are ways in which good or bad reputations can be built and trust can be established, thereby reducing the risks of online communication. Furthermore, Internet enthusiasts argue that online communication has many inherent advantages that cannot be claimed by more traditional forms ofinteraction such as the telephone and face-to-face meetings. The human voice, for example, may be far superior in terms ofexpressing emotion and subtleties of meaning, but it can also convey information about the speaker's age, gender, ethnicity or social position - information that could be used to the speaker's disadvantage. Electronic communication, it is noted, masks all these identifying markers and ensures that attention focuses strictly on the content of the message. This can be a great advantage for women or other traditionally disadvantaged groups whose opinions are sometimes devalued in other settings (Locke and Pascoe 2000). Electronic interaction is often presented as liberating and empowering, since people can create their own online identities and speak more freely than they would elsewhere. Internet sceptics have also argued that indirect, online communication encourages isolation and prevents real friendships from forming, but this does not seem to reflect the realiry. Asurvey of Internet users carried out between 1995 and 2000 showed that, far from increasing social isolation, Internet usage is associated with Significant and increased online and offline social interactions. The survey found that Internet users tend to communicate with others through other media - especially by the telephone - more than non-users do, meet face-to-face with friends more than non-users and interact with others more in general (Katz et al. 2001). THINllING CRITICALLY From your own experience, can the online environment ever match the trust established by relationships in face-to face relationships? Could the wider use of personal webcams increase the trust we have in Internet communications? What can we learn about online trust from the eBay system and experience described in 'Global Society 7.2'? Conclusion: the compulsion of proximity? Despite the rise in indirect communication, however, it seems that humans still value direct contact. People in business, for instance, continue to attend meetings, sometimes flying halfway around the world to do so, when it would seem much cheaper and more efficient to transact business through a conference call or video link. Family members could arrange 'virtual' reunions or holiday gatherings using electronic real-time communications, butwe all recognize that they would lack the warmth and intimacy of face-to-face celebrations. Social Interaction and Everyday Life 277 Global Society 7.2 Building trust in cyberspace? Public debate on Internet security has tended to focus on issues of online banking fraud, the use of false identities and the problems associated with children using chatrooms that may be monitored by predatory paedophiles.Such worries make many people wary and erode trust in the online environment. Sociologists have been interested in the auction website. eBay, which has become a global phenomenon; some 165,000 Americans alone are estimated to be making a living purely from selling via eBay (Epley et al. 2006). Below is a short extract which discusses how eBay has sought to increase levels of trust for buyers and sellers in its services. The 'eBay' feedback system Currently the largest. and one ofthe oldest personto-person Internet auction houses is eBay Launched in 1995, eBay soon attracted more than 100 million people around the world who buy and sell products on the eBay websites. Remarkably, eBay offers no warrantles or guarantees for any of the goods that are auctioned off- buyers and sellers assume all risks for the transaction, with eBay serving as a listing agency It would seem to be a market ripe with the possibility of large-scale fraud and deceit. and yet the default rate for trades conducted through eBay is remarkably small.Both eBay and the participants in its market creclit an institutionalized reputation system at the slte known as the Feedback Forum - for the very hlgh rate of successful trades. After every seller's or bidder's name is a number in parenthesis. In the case of a seller,the information is displayed as follows: Seller name (265) The number is a summary measure of a person's reputation in the eBay market. Registered users are allowed to post positive, negative or neutral comments about users with whom they have traded. Each positive comment is given a score of +1, each negative comment is given a score of-1 , with neuh-al comments not affecting one's score in either clirection. At certain levels,market participants are also awarded a colour star which marks the number of net positive comments they have received. One is able t o contact the person via email by clicking on the name;clicking on the number following someone's name leads to their full feedback profile. There one finds the full list of comments, with emaillinks and ratings numbers for every evaluator as well (thus, one can explore the reputation of the evaluators just as one can for the evaluated). A typical positive comment might be 'Well packaged, fast delivery Highly recommended. AI.' . A high feedback rating is an extremely valuable asset. Many participants report that they are more willing to trade with someone with a high rating,or even that they will only trade with inclividuals with high ratings. In that sense, some traders are able to create a brand identity that increases their volume of sales or even the price at which they are able to sell items.... Even a few negative ratings can seriously damage a reputation, and so frequent traders are very careful about nurturing their rating by provicling swift execution of honest trades. The potential damage of a negative comment is a subject of great concern among frequent participants.... One can choose to make one's entire feedback profile private, but this is a huge clisadvantage in a market which relies on these reputations. Source: Adapted from Kollock (1999) An explanation for this phenomenon comes from Deirdre Boden and Harvey Molotch (l994), who have studied what they call the compulsion of proximity: the need of individuals to meet with one another in situations of co-presence, or face-ta-face interaction. People put themselves out to attend meetings, Boden and Molotch suggest, because situations of co-presence, for reasons documented by Goffman in his studies of interaction, supply much richer information about how other people think and feel, and about their sincerity, than any form of electronic communication. Only by ~78 SO C IAL INTE RACTIO N AN D EVERYDAY LIFE actually being in the presence of people who make decisions affecting us in important ways do we feel able to learn what is going on and feel confident that we can impress them with our own views and OUI own sincerity. 'Co-presence', Boden and Molotch (!994) say, 'affects access to the body part that "never lies", the eyes - the "windows on the soul". Eye contact itself signals a degree of intim acy and trust; copresent interactants continuously monitor the subtle m ovements of this most subtle body part.' Summary points I. Many apparently trivial aspects of our day-today behaviour turn out on close examination to be both complex and important aspects of social interaction.An example is the gaze looking at other people. In most interactions, eye contact is fairly fleeting.To stare at another person could be taken as a sign of hostility - or on some occasions, of love.The study of social interaction is a fundamental area in sociology,illuminating many aspects of social life . 2. Many different expressions are conveyed by the human face. It is widely held that basic aspects of the facial expre ssions of emotion are innate. Cross-cultural studies demonstrate quite close similarities between members of different cultures both in facial expression and in the interpretation of emotions registere d on the human face. 3. The study of ordinary talk and conversation has come to be called 'ethnomethodology', a term first coined by Harold Garfinkel. Ethnomethodology is the analysis of the ways in which we actively - although usually in a taken-for-granted way - make sense of what others mean by what they say and do. 4. We can learn a great deal about the nature of talk by studying response cries (exclamations). S. Unfocused interaction is the mutual awareness individuals have of one another in large gatherings when not directly in conversation together. Focused interaction,which can be divided up into distinct encounters, or episodes of interaction, is when two or more individuals are directly attending to what the other or others are saying and doing. 6. Social interaction can often be illuminatingly studied by applying the dramaturgical model - studying social interaction as if those involved were actors on a stage,having a set and props.As in the the atre, in the various contexts of social life there tend to be clear distinctions between front regions (the stage itself) and back regions,where the actors prepare themselves for the performance and relax afterwards. 7. All social interaction is situated in time and space.We can analyse how our daily lives are 'zoned' in both time and space combined by looking at how activities occur during definite durations and at the same time involve spatial movement. 8. Some mechanisms of social interaction may be universal, but many are not. The !Kung of southern Africa, for exarnple,live in small mobile bands,where there is little privacy and thus little opportunity to create front and back regions. 9. Modern socie ties are characterized largely by indirect interpersonal transactions (such as making bank deposits),which lack any copresence.This leads to what has been called the compulsion of proximity,the tendency to want to meet in person whenever possible, perhaps because this makes it easier to gather information about how others think and feel, and to accomplish impression management. Social Interaction and Everyday Life 279 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • Further reading inequality can then be taken further in Kath •• Woodward's QuestioningIdentity: Gender, Class • •There is no single introductory text covering and Ethnicity (London: Routledge, 2004). •• all of the issues in this chapter, but the main • For something more specific on the work of • themes can be approached in some of the • Garfinkel and others, you could try David • • following. • • Francis and Stephen Hester's An Invitation to •• • • Agood place to start is with the idea of • • Ethnomethodology: Language, Society and • • • • 'everyday life', so Tony Bennett and Diane Interaction (London: Sage, 2004). • • • • Watson's edited Understanding Everyday Life • • Or, if Goffman's ideas are more to your taste, • • (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) contains some •• there is no one better to introduce it then • • worthwhile chapters. Brian Roberts's Micro • • Goffman himself, so see his The Presentation • • Social Theory (Basingstoke: Palgrave • • ofSelfin Everyday Life (Harmondsworth: • • Macmillan, 2006) is a well-written • •Penguin, 1990 [1969]), which is a brilliant • introduction to the development of the • example of what he has to offer sociology. • microsociological tradition. Then, should you want to place Goffman's Following on from the chapter's introduction work into wider context, Phil Manning's to social identities, Richard Jenkins's Social Erving Goffman and Modern Sociology Identity, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2004) is (Cambridge: Polity. 1992) or Greg Smith's very readable and contains many everyday Erving Goffman (London: Routledge, 2006) examples. Issues of identity and social are well worth the effort. •• • •• ••••• ••• •• •• ••••• ••• •• ••• ••••• •••••••• ••••• •• • •• • ••• •• •••••••• •• • •• •• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • • •• •• • • • • • • • • • • • • •• Internet links ComResources OnIine - Online resources for non-verbal communications: www.natcom.org/ctronJine/nonverb.htm An introduction to symbolic interactionism based at Grinnell College, USA: http://web.grinnelJ.edu/courses/soc/sOO/socll 1-011JntroTheories/Symbolic.html Ethno/CA News - online resource for ethnomethodology and conversation analysis: www2.fmg.uva.nl/emca/ Website with information on the life and work of Erving Goffman: http://people.brandeis.edu/-teuber/ goffmanbio.html • • •• • • • • • • • • • • ·.• • • • • • • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••• • Agencies of socialization - .Reactions of parents and adults Genaer learning • Hie teenager ana youtli culture • ~oung adulthood ... ..I ..The greying of human societies . .... . I Growing old: competing sociological explanations Aspects of ageing I ~lie politics of ageing .. . .. ... Tlieorizing aeath in modern societies Recent aevelopments Summary points Internet links A t the start of J. K. Rowling's first Harry Potter adventure, Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone, the shrewd wizard Albus Dumbledore leaves Harry, a newly orphaned infant, at the doorstep of his non-magician Cor 'Muggle') uncle and aunt's house. Harry has already shown himself to have unique powers, but Dumbledore is concerned that if left in the wizard world, Harry will not mature healthily. 'It would be enough to turn any boy's head', he says. 'Famous before he can walk and talk! Famous for something he won't even remember. Can't you see how much better off he'll be, growing up away from all that until he's ready to take it?' CRowling 1998). THE LIFE-COURSE The Harry Potter novels, each of which follows Harry through a single school year, are based on the principle that there is no adventure greater than that of growing up. Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry may be unusual, but it is still a school, which helps young people to develop a set of values for life. We all pass through important life stages, such as the passage from childhood into adolescence and then on to adulthood, and the Harry Potter books also trace these transitions. For example, as the series progresses, Harry feels the onset of sexual urges, to which he responds with an entirely common awkwardness. Sport is an important activity during which children learn about camaraderie and ambition, and Harry plays the wizard sport 'Quidditch'. The function of many classic children's stories is to make the process of growing up understandable, whether they're set in a fairy-tale universe, our own world or - as in the Harry Potter series - both. For sociologists, socialization is the process whereby the helpless human infant gradually becomes a self-'aware, knowledgeable person, skilled in the ways of the culture into which he or she was born. Socialization of the young allows for the more general phenomenon of social reproduction - the process whereby societies have structural continuity over time. During the course of socialization, especially in the early years of life, children learn the ways of their elders, thereby perpetuating their values, norms and social practices. All societies have characteristics that endure over long stretches of time, even though their existing members die and new ones are born. Societies have many distinctive social and cultural aspects that have persisted for generations - not least the different languages spoken by their members. As we will see in this chapter, socialization connects the different generations to one another. The birth of a child alters the lives ofthosewho are responsible for its upbringing - who themselves therefore undergo new learning experiences. Parenting usually ties the activities ofadults to children for the remainder of their lives. Older people still remain parents when they become grandparents, of course, thus forging another set of relationships connecting the different generations with each other. Although the process of cultural learning is much more intense in infancy and early childhood than later, learning and adjustment go on throughout a person's life. The sections that follow deal with the theme of'nature versus nurture', a common debate in SOCiology. We shall first examine the main theoretical interpretations put forward by different writers on how and why children develop as they do, including theories that explain how we develop gender identities. Then we move on to discuss the main groups and social contexts that influence socialization during the course of individuals' lives, from childhood to later life. Finally, we explore some of the most important sociological issues surrounding ageing. Culture, society and child socialization Theories of child development One of the most distinctive features of human beings, compared to other animals, is that humans are self-aware. How should we understand the emergence of a sense of self- the awareness that the individual has a distinct identity separate from others? During the first months ofhis life, the infant possesses little or no understanding of differences between human beings and material objects in his environment, and has no awareness of self. Children do not begin to use concepts like '1', 'me' and 'you' until the age of 2 or later. Only gradually do they then come to understand that others have distinct identities, consciousness and needs separate from their own. J Classic Studies 8.1 George Herbert Mead on the social self The research problem It has often been said that human beings are the only creatures who know that they exist and that they will die. Sociologically, this means that human individuals are self-aware. With a moment's reflection, we may all accept that this is so. But just how do humans gain that selfawareness? Is it innate or learned? Surely this is a research problem for psychology though? Why would sociologists be interested in the individual self? The American sociologist and philosopher, George Herbert Mead, investigated how children learn to use the concepts of T and 'me' to describe themselves. But unusually at the time, Mead insisted that a sociological perspective was necessary if we are to understand how the self emerges and develops. Mead's explanation Since Mead's ideas formed the main basis of a general tradition oftheoretical thinkingsymbolic interactionism - they have had a very broad impact in sociology.Symbolic interactionism emphasizes that interaction between human beings takes place through symbols and the interpretation of meanings (see chapter I). But in addition, Mead's work provides an account of the main phases of child development, giving particular attention to the emergence of a sense of self. According to Mead, infants and young children first of all develop as social beings by imitating the actions ofthose around them. Play is one way in which this takes place, and in their play small children often imitate what adults do. A small child will make mud pies, having seen an adult cooking,or dig with a spoon, having observed someone gardening. Children's play evolves from simple imitation to more complicated games in which a child of 4 or 5 years old will act out an adult role.Mead called this 'taking the role of the other' -learning what it is like to be in the shoes of another person.It is only at this stage that children acquire a developed sense of self. Children achieve an understanding ofthemselves as separate agents Children's play has a serious side,enabling them to start to develop a social self. - as a 'me' - by seeing themselves through the eyes of others. We achieve self·awareness, according to Mead, when we learn to distinguish the 'me' from the T. The T is the unsocialized infant, a bundle of spontaneous wants and desires. The 'me', as Mead used the term, is the social self. Individuals develop self-consciousness,Mead argued. by coming to see themselves as others see them, which allows for an 'internal conversation' between the individual T and the social 'me'. According to Mead's theory, this conversation is what we call 'thinking'. A further stage of child development, according to Mead, occurs when the child is about 8 or 9 years old. This is the age at which children tend to take part in organized games, rather than unsystematic play It is at this period THE LI FE-COURSE that they begin to understand the overall values and morality according to which social life is conducted. To learn organized games, children must understand the rules of play and notions of fairness and equal participation. Children at this stage learn to grasp what Mead termed the generalized other - the general values and moral rules of the culture in which they are developing. Critical points Mead's theory of the social self has been criticized on several grOlmds. First, some argue that it effectively eliminates all biological influences on the development of the self, when it is clear from biology and neuroscience that there is a biological basis to the human self. However, this criticism appears not to recognize that Mead's notion ofthe '1' represents the 'unsocialized infant'. Second, Mead's theory seems to rely on the '1' and the 'me' working cooperatively to ensure the smooth functioning of the self. But critics argue that this downplays the internal tensions and conflicts that people experience deeply and which Freud and Chodorow's theories seem better able to explain (see pages 292-5 for details of Freud and Chodorow's theories).Mead also has little to say about the effects of unbalanced power relationships on the socialization of children. Finally and again unlike FreUd, Mead's explanation has no room for the lillconscious mind as a motive force in human behaviour and consequently lacks the concept of 'repression', which has proved essential to psychoanalytic practice. Contemporary significance Mead's work was very important for the development of sociology His was the first genuinely sociological theory of self formation and development, which insisted that if we are properly to understand ourselves, then we must start with the social process of human interaction. In this way he showed that the selfis not an innate part of our biology nor does it emerge simply with the developing human brain. What Mead demonstrated is that the study ofthe individual's self cannot be divorced from the study of society - and that requires a sociological perspective. Although Freud's approach to the human psyche has perhaps overshadowed Mead's during the twentieth century at least in relation to psychological practice and the treatment of mental disorders, symbolic interactiorllsm continues to produce insightful findings from a perspective rooted in Mead's sociological theories.And in this sense, Mead's ideas still have much to offer new generations of sociological researchers. The problem of the emergence of self is a much-debated one and is viewed rather differently in contrasting theoretical perspectives.To some extent, this is because the most prominent theories about child development emphasize different aspects of socialization. Jean Piaget and the stages ofcognitive development The Swiss student of child behaviour, Jean Piaget, worked on many aspects of child development, but his most well-known writings concern cognition - the ways in which children learn to think about themselves and their environment. Piaget placed great emphasis on the child's active capability to make sense of the world. Children do not passively soak up information, but instead select and interpret what they see, hear and feel in the world around them. Piaget described several distinct stages of cognitive development during which children learn to think about themselves and their environment. Each stage involves the acquisition ofnew skills and depends on the successful completion of the preceding one. Piaget called the first stage, which lasts from birth up to about the age of 2, the sensorimotor stage , because infants learn mainly by touching objects, manipulating them and physically exploring their environment. Until the age of about four months or so, infants cannot differentiate themselves from their environment. For example, a child will not realize that her own movements cause the sides of her crib to rattle. Objects are not differentiated from persons, and the infant is unaware that anything exists outside her range of vision. Infants gradually learn to distinguish people from objects, coming to see that both have an existence independent of their immediate perceptions. The main accomplishment of this stage is that, by its close, children understand their environment to have distinct and stable properties. The next phase, called the preoperational stage, is the one to which Piaget devoted the bulk of his research. This stage lasts from the ages of2 to 7. During the course of it, children acquire a mastery of language and become able to use words to represent objects and images in a symbolic fashion. A 4-year-old might use a sweeping hand, for example, to represent the concept 'aeroplane'. Piaget termed the stage 'preoperational' because children are not yet able to use their developing mental capabilities systematically. Children in this stage are egocentric. As Piaget used it, this concept does not refer to selfishness, but to the tendency of the child to interpret the world exclusively in terms of his own position. A child during this period does not understand, for instance, that others see objects from a different perspective from his own. Holding a book upright, the child may ask about a picture in it, not realizing that the other person sitting opposite can only see the back of the book. Children at the pre-operational stage are not able to hold connected conversations with another. In egocentric speech, what each child says is more or less unrelated to what the other speaker said. Children talk together, but not to one another in the same sense as adults. During this phase ofdevelopment, children have no general understandThe Life-Course ing of categories of thought that adults tend to take for granted: concepts such as causality, speed, weight or number. Even ifthe child sees water poured from a tall, thin container into a shorter, wider one, she will not understand that the volume of water remains the same - and concludes rather that there is less water because the water level is lower. A third period, the concrete operational stage, lasts from the ages of7 to 11. During this phase, children master abstract, logical notions. They are able to handle ideas such as causality without much difficulty. A child at this stage of development will recognize the false reasoning involved in the idea that the wide container holds less water than the thin, narrow one, even though the water levels are different. She becomes capable of carrying out the mathematical operations of multiplying, dividing and subtracting. Children by this stage are much less egocentric. In the pre-operational stage, ifa girl is asked, 'How many sisters do you have?' she may correctly answer 'one'. But if asked, 'How many sisters does your sister have?' she will probably answer 'none', because she cannot see herself from the point of view of her sister. The concrete operational child is able to answer such a question with ease. The years from 11 to 15 cover what Piaget called the formal operational stage. During adolescence, the developing child becomes able to grasp highly abstract and hypothetical ideas. When faced with a problem, children at this stage are able to review all the possible ways of solving it and go through them theoretically in order to reach a solution. The young person at the formal operational stage is able to understand why some questions are trick ones. To the question, 'What creatures are both poodles and dogs?' the individual might not be able to give the correct reply but will understand why the answer 'poodles' is right and appreciate the humour in it. According to Piaget, the first three stages ofdevelopment are universal; but not all adults reach the third, formal operational stage. The development of formal operational thought depends in part on processes of schooling. Adults of limited educational attainment tend to continue to think in more concrete terms and retain large traces of egocentrism. The Russian psychologist, Lev Vygotsky (1986 [1934]) provided a useful critique of Piaget's influential ideas. He argued that the processes oflearning which Piaget describes are dependent on social structures and interactions. Vygotsky saw that the opportunities for learning available to children from various social groups differed considerably, and this strongly influenced children's ability to learn from their engagements with the world outside their self. In short, learning and cognitive development are not immune from the social structures within which they are embedded. Just as these structures constrain some groups and enable others to become wealthy, so they also constrain and enable their cognitive development. THINKING CRITICALLY Reflecting on the processes of socialization, how do these differ from corrunon-sense ideas of 'brainwashing' or 'indoctrination'? What impact might a Jack of early socialization have on the formation of the human infant's selfawareness? Explain your answer with reference to the theories above. Agencies of socialization Sociologists often speak of socialization as occurring in two broad phases, involving a number of different agencies of socialization. Agencies of socialization are groups or social contexts in which significant processes of socialization occur. Primary socialization occurs in infancy and child~ hood and is the most intense period of cultural learning. It is the time when children learn language and basic behavioural patterns that form the foundation for later learning. The family is the main agent of socialization during this phase. Secondary socialization takes place later in childhood and into maturity. In this phase, other agents ofsocialization take over some ofthe responsibility from the family. Schools, peer groups, organizations, the media and, eventually, the workplace become socializing forces for individuals. Social interactions in these contexts help people learn the values, norms and beliefs that make up the patterns of their culture. Thefamily Since family systems vary widely, the range of family contacts that the infant experiences is by no means standard across cultures. The mothe r everywhere is normally the most important individual in the child's early life, but the nature of the relationships established between mothers and their children is influenced by the form and regularity of their contact. This is, in turn, conditioned by the character of family institutions and their relation to other groups in society. In modern societies, most early socialization occurs within a small-scale family context and children spend their early years within a domestic unit containing mother, father and perhaps one or two other children. In many other cultures, by contrast, aunts, uncles and grandparents are often part ofa single household and serve as caretakers even for very young infants. Yet even within modern societies there are many variations in the nature of family contexts. Some children are brought up in singleparent households, some are cared for by two mothering and fathering age nts (divorced parents and step-parents). A high proportion of women with families are now employed outside the home and return to their paid work relatively soon after the births of their children. In spite of these variations, the family normally remains the major agency of socialization from infancy to adolescence and beyond We look at issues concerning families in more detail in chapter 9, 'Families and Intimate Relationships'. , in a sequence of development connecting the generations. Families have varying 'locations' within the overall institutions of a society. In most traditional societies, the family into which a person was born largely determined the individual's social position for the rest of his or her life. In modern societies, social position is not inherited at birth in this way, yet the region and social class ofthe family into which an individual is born affects patterns of socialization quite distinctly. Children pick up ways of behaviour characteristic of their parents or others in their neighbourhood or community. We look at issues of class in more depth in chapter 11,'Stratification and Social Class'. Varying patterns ofchildrearing and discipline, together with contrasting values and expectations, are found in different sectors of large-scale societies. It is easy to understand the influence of different types of family background ifwe think ofwhat life is like, say, for a child growing up in a poor ethnicminority family living in a run-down area ofa city compared to one born into an affluent white family in the suburbs (Kohn 1977). Of course, few if any children simply take over unquestioningly the outlook of their parents. This is especially true in the modern world, in which change is so pervasive. Moreover, the very existence of a range of socializing agencies in modern societies leads to many divergences between the outlooks of children, adolescents and the parental generation. Schools Another important socializing agency is the school. Schooling is a formal process: students pursue a definite curriculum of subjects. Yet schools are agencies of socialization in more subtle respects. Children are expected to be quiet in class, be punctual at lessons and observe rules of school discipline. They are required to accept and respond to the authority of the teaching The Life-Course staff. Reactions of teachers also affect the expectations children have of themselves. These expectations in turn become linked to their job experience when they leave school. Peer groups are often formed at school, and the system of keeping children in classes according to age reinforces their impact. We discuss socialization within education systems in chapter 19,'Education'. Peer relationships Another socializing agency is the peer group. Peer groups consist of children of a similar age. In some cultures, particularly small traditional societies, peer groups are formalized as age-grades (normally confined to males). There are often specific ceremonies or rites that mark the transition of men from one age-grade to another. Those within a particular age-grade generally maintain close and friendly connections throughout their lives. A typical set of age-grades consists of childhood, junior warriorhood, senior warriorhood, junior elderhood and senior elderhood. Men move through these grades not as individuals, but as whole groups. The family's importance in socialization is obvious, since the experience of the infant and young child is shaped more or less exclusively within it. It is less apparent, especially to those of us living inWestern societies, how significant peer groups are.Yet even without formal age-grades, children over the age of 4 or 5 usually spend a great deal of time in the company of friends the same age. With both partners now working, peer relationships amongst young children who play together in day-care centres are likely to become even more important today than they were before (Corsaro 1997; Harris 1998). Peer relations are likely to have a significant impact beyond childhood and adolescence. Informal groups of people of similar ages, at work and in other situations, are usually ofenduring importance in shaping individuals' attitudes and behav- iour. TH E LIFE-COURSE 8.1 Socialization in the school playground In her book GenderPJay (1993), the sociologist Barrie Thome looked at socialization by observing how children interact in the playground. As others had _ before her, she wanted to understand how children come to know what it means to be male and female. Rather than seeing children as passively learning the meaning of gender from their parents and teachers, she looked at the way in which children actively create and recreate the meaning of gender in their interactions with each other.The social activities that schoolchildren do together can be as important as other agents for their socialization. Thome spent two years observing fourth and fifth graders at two schools in Michigan and California, sitting in the classroom with them and observing their activities outside the classroom. She watched games such as 'chase and kiss' - known by names such as 'kisscatch' in the UK - so as to learn how children construct and experience gender meanings in the classroom and on the playground. Thorne found that peer groups have a great influence on gender socialization,particularly as children talk about their changing bodies,a subject ofgreat fascination. The social context created by these children determined whether a child's bodily change was experienced with embarrassment or worn with pride.As Thorne (1993) observed: In school playgrounds, girls tend to play only with other girls and boys with other boys. Why should this be so? Ifthe most popular women started menstmating or wearing bras (even if they didn't need to), then other girls wanted these changes too. But if the popular didn't wear bras and hadn't .. . gotten their periods, then these developments were viewed as less desirable. Thorne's research is a powerful reminder that children are social actors who help create their social world and influence their own socialization. Still,the impact of societal and cultural influences is tremendous,since the activities that children pursue and the values they hold are determined by influences such as their families and the media. The mass media Newspapers, periodicals and journals flourished in the West from the early 1800s onward, but they were confined to a fairly small readership. It was not until a century later that such printed materials became part ofpeople's daily experience. The spread of mass media involving printed documents was soon accompanied byelectronic communication - radio, television, records and videos, bringing with them concerns about undue influence on opinions, attitudes and behaviour. The media plays a large role in shaping our understanding of the world and therefore in socialization. Much early research on the influence ofthe media, especially television, on childhood development has tended to see children as passive and undiscriminating in their reactions to what they see. But Hodge and Tripp (1986) emphasized that children's responses to TV involve interpreting, or 'reading', what J they see, not just registering the content of programmes. Since then, researchers have arrived at a more balanced understanding of the influence of the mass media in socialization processes and now see television, for example, as one important agency of socialization alongside several others. THINIUNG CRITICALLY How do you think the balance of socializing agencies is changing in an age of rapid globalization? Which socialization agencies are becoming more influential and which are becoming less significant? What problems might this produce for the socialization of society's new members? Gender socialization Agencies of socialization play an important role inhowchildren learn genderroles.Let us nowturn to the study ofgender socialization, the learning of gender roles through social factors such as the family and the media. Reactions of parents and adults Many studies have been carried out on the degree to which gender differences are the result of social influences. Studies of mother- infant interaction show differences in the treatment of boys and girls even when parents believe their reactions to both are the same. Adults asked to assess the personality of a baby give different answers according to whether or not they believe the child to be a girl or a boy. In one experiment, five young mothers were observed in interaction with a six-month-old called Beth. They tended to smile at her often and offer her dolls to play with. She was seen as 'sweet', having a 'soft cry'. The reaction of a second group of mothers to a child the same age, named Adam, was noticeably different. The babywas likely to be offered a train or other 'male toys' to playwith. Beth and Adam were actually the same child, dressed in different clothes (Will et al. 1976). The Life-Course Gender learning Gender learning by infants is almost certainJy unconscious. Before children can accurately label themselves as either a boy or a girl, they receive a range ofpre-verbal cues. For instance, male and female adults usually handle infants differently. The cosmetics used by women contain scents different from those the baby might learn to associate with males. Systematic differences in dress, hairstyle and so on provide visual cues for the infant in the learning process. By the age of2, children have a partial understanding of what gender is. Theyknow whether they are a boy or a girl, and they can usually categorize others accurately. Not until the age of 5 or 6, however, does a child know that a person's gender does not change, that everyone has gender and that sex differences between girls and boys are anatomically based. The toys, picture books and television programmes with which young children come into contact all tend to emphasize differences between male and female attributes. Toy stores and mail-order catalogues usually categorize their products by gender. Even some toys that seem neutral in terms of gender are not so in practice. For example, toy kittens and rabbits are recommended for girls, while lions and tigers are seen as more appropriate for boys. Vanda Lucia Zammuner (1986) studied the toy preferences of children aged between 7 and 10 in Italy and Holland. Children's attitudes towards a variety oftoys were analysed; stereotypically masculine and feminine toys, as well as toys presumed not to be gendertyped, were included. Both the children and their parents were asked to assess which toys were suitable for boys and which for girls. There was close agreement between the adults and the children. On average, the Italian children chose gender-differentiated toys to play with more often than the Dutch children - a finding that conformed to expectations, since Italian culture tends to hold a more traditional viewofgenderdivisions than does Dutch society. As in other studies, girls THE LIFE-COURSE 8.2 Children's stories, TV and film More than 30 years ago,LenoreWeitzman and her colleagues (1972) carried out an analysis of gender roles in some ofthe most widely used pre-school children's books and found several clear differences in gender roles. Males played a much larger part in the stories and pictures than females did, outnumbering females by a ratio of II to I.When animals with gender identities were included, the ratio was 95 to I. The activities of males and females also differed. The males engaged in adventurous pursuits and outdoor activities that demanded independence and strength. Where girls did appear, they were portrayed as passive and were confined mostly to indoor activities. Girls cooked and cleaned for the males or awaited their return. Much the same was true ofthe adult men and women represented in the storybooks.Women who were not wives and mothers were imaginary creatures like witches or fairy godmothers. There was not a single woman in all the books analysed who held an occupation outside the home. By contrast, the men were depicted as fighters, policemen, judges,kings and so forth. More recent research suggests that things have changed somewhat but that the large bulk ofchildren's literature nevertheless remains much the same CDavies 1991). Fairy-tales,for example,embody traditional attitudes towards gender and towards the sorts of aims and ambitions that girls and boys are expected to have.'Some day my prince will come': in versions offairy-tales from several centuries ago, this usually implied that a girl from a poor family might dream ofwealth and fortune. Today, its meaning has become more closely tied to the ideals ofromantic love. Some feminists have tried to rewrite some of the most celebrated fairy-tales,reversing their usual emphases:'1really didn't notice that he had a funny nose.And he certainly looked better all dressed up in fancy clothes.He's not nearly as attractive as he seemed the other night. So Ithink I'll just pretend that this glass slipper feels too tight' (Viorst 1986).Like this version of Cinderella, however, these rewrites are found mainly in books directed at adult audiences, and have hardly affected the tales told in innumerable children's books. Analyses oftelevision programmes and films designed for children show that most still conform to the findings about children's books. Studies ofthe most frequently watched cartoons show that most of the leading figures are male and that males dominate the active pursuits. Similar images are found in the commercials that appear throughout the programmes. However,there are some exceptions to this repetitively gendered pattern. The 200I film Shrek (and its sequels) told a fairly conventional fairy-tale story ofprinces, princesses and ogres, whilst also subverting conventional fairy-tale gender and character roles. The film's marketing tagline was: 'The greatest fairytale never told' - 'The Prince isn't charming.The Princess isn't sleeping.The sidekick isn't helping. The ogre is the hero. Fairy-tales will never be the same again.' Shrek (the ugly ogre) is actually the hero ofthe film, while Fiona (the beautiful princess) is an independent woman with martial arts skills who turns into an ogress at night. The 'happy ending' arrives when Shrek kisses Fiona, she turns permanently into an ogress and they get married,thus reversing the traditional story ofthe ogre turning into a handsome young prince, reflectingWestern ideals ofbeauty and bodily perfection. Such representations remain a small minority oftotal output at present, however. from both societies chose gender-neutral or boys' toys to play with far more than boys chose girls' toys. Clearly, gender socialization is very powerful, and challenges to it can be upsetting. Once a gender is 'assigned', society expects individuals to act like 'females' and 'males'. It is in the practices of everyday life that these expectations are fulfilled and reproduced (Bourdieu 1990; Lorber 1994). The sociological debate Sigmund Freud's theory Perhaps the most influential - and controversial - th eory of the emergence of gend er ide ntity is that of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). According to Freud, the learning ofgender differences in infants and THINKING CRITICALLY Why is gender socialization so pervasive? Next time you go shopping, watch a film, watch television soap operas or talk to older and younger relatives, note how often conventional gender assumptions are evident. Also, note down anything that might challenge conventional assumptions. Are such challenges likely to become more widespread in future? young children is centred on the possession or absence of the penis. 'I have a penis' is equivalent to 'I am a boy', while 'I am a girl' is equivalent to" lack a penis'. Freud is careful to say that it is not just the anatomical distinctions that matter here; the possession or absence ofthe penis are symbolic of masculinity and femininity. At around the age of 4 or 5, the theory goes, a boy feels threatened by the discipline and autonomy his father demands of him, fantasizing that the father wishes to remove his penis. Partly conSCiously, but mostly on an unconscious level, the boy recognizes the father as a rival for the affections of his mother. In repressing erotic feelings towards the mother and accepting the father as a superior being, the boy identifies with the father and becomes aware of his male identity. The boy gives up his love for his mother out of an unconscious fear of castration by his father. Girls, on the other hand, supposedly suffer from 'penis envy' because they do not possess the visible organ that distinguishes boys. The mother becomes devalued in the little girl's eyes, because she is also seen to lack a penis and to be unable to provide one. When the girl identifies with the mother, she takes over the submissive attitude involved in the recognition of being 'second best'. Once this phase is over, the child has learned to repress his erotic feelings. The period from about the age of 5 to puberty, according to Freud, is one oflatency- sexual activities tend to be suspended until the The Life-Course biological changes involved in puberty reactivate erotic desires in a direct way. The latency period, covering the early and middle years of school, is the time at which same-gender peer groups are most important in the child's life. Major objections have been raised to Freud's views, particularly by feminists, but also by many other authors (MitcheIl1975; Coward 1984). First, Freud seems to identify gender identity too closely with genital awareness; other more subtle factors are surely involved. Second, the theory seems to depend on the notion that the penis is superior to the vagina, which is thought of as just a lack ofthe male organ. Yet why should the female genitals not be considered superior to those of the male? Third, Freud treats the father as the primary disciplining agent, whereas in many cultures the mother plays the more Significant part in the imposition of discipline. Fourth, Freud argues that gender learning is concentrated at the age of 4 or 5. Most later authors have emphasized the importance of earlier learning, beginning in infancy. Carol Gilligan's theory Carol GiIligan (1982) has further developed Chodorow's analysis (see 'Classic Studies 8.2'). Her work concentrates on the images that adult women and men have of themselves and their attainments. Women, she agrees with Chodorow, define themselves in terms of personal relationships and judge their achievements by reference to the ability to care for others. Women's place in the lives of men is traditionally that ofcaretaker and helpmate. But the qualities developed in these tasks are frequently devalued by men, who see their own emphasis on individual achievement as the only form of 'success'. Concern with relationships on the part of women appears to them as a weakness rather than as the strength that in fact it is. Gilligan carried out intensive interviews with about 200 American women and men ofvarying ages and social backgrounds. She T H E LIFE-COURSE Classic Studies 8.2 Nancy Chodorow on attachment and separation The research problem You may think or have been told that men find it difficult to express their emotions and, instead, tend to 'bottle it up' or 'keep a stiff upper lip'. Conversely, women are apparently more likely to express how they are feeling.But why should this be so? Are women really just naturally better than men at forming close emotional relationships? Such common-sense assumptions formed the basis of Nancy Chodorow's (1978) work on gender identity. Like many others, Chodorow made use of Freud's approach in studying gender development, but modified it in major respects to account for important gender differences. Chodorow's explanation Chodorow (1978, 1988) argues that learning to feel male or female derives from the infant's attachment to his parents from an early age.She places much more emphasis than Freud does on the importance of the mother rather than the father. Children tend to become emotionally involved with the mother, since she is easily the most dominant influence in their early lives. This attachment has at some point to be broken in order for the child to achieve a separate sense of self- the child is required to become less closely dependent. Chodorow argues that the breaking process occurs in a different way for boys and girls. Girls remain closer to the mother - able, for example, to go on hugging and kissing her and imitating what she does. Because there is no sharp break from the mother, the girl, and later the adult woman, develops a sense of self that is more continuous with other people.Her identity is more likely to be merged with or dependent on another's: first her mother,later a man.In Chodorow's view, this tends to produce characteristics of sensitivity and emotional compassion in women. Boys gain a sense of self via a more radical rejection of their original closeness to the mother, forging their understanding of masculinity from what is not feminine. They learn not to be 'sissies' or 'mummy's boys'. As a result, boys are relatively unskilled in relating closely to others: they develop more analytical ways of looking at the world. They take a more active view of their lives, emphasizing achievement, but they have repressed their ability to understand their own feelings and those of others. To some extent, Chodorow reverses Freud's emphasis. Masculinity, rather than femininity,is defined by a loss, the forfeiting of continued close attachment to the mother. Male identity is for.med through separation:thus,men later in liIe unconsciously feel that their identity is endangered if they become involved in close emotional relationships with others. Women,on the other hand, feel that the absence of a close relation to another person threatens their selfesteem These patterns are passed on from generation to generation,because of the primary role women play in the early socialization of children.Women express and define themselves mairily in terms of relationships. Men have repressed these needs and adopt a more manipulative stance towards the world. Critical points Chodorow's work has met with various criticisms. Janet Sayers (1986), for example, has suggested that Chodorow does not explain the struggle of women,particularly in current tinies, to become autonomous, independent beings. Women (and men), she points out, are more contradictory in their psychological make-up than Chodorow's theory suggests. Femininity may conceal feelings of aggressiveness or assertiveness, which are revealed orily obliquely or in certain contexts (Brennan 1988). Chodorow has also been criticized for her narrow conception of the family, one based on a white, ntiddle-class model. What happens, for example, in one-parent households or, as in many Chicano communities, families where children are cared for by more than one adult (Segura and Pierce 1993)? Contemporary significance These legitimate criticisms do not undermine Chodorow's central ideas, which remain important in the study of gender socialization. They teach us a good deal about the nature of femininity and masculinity; and they help us to understand the origins ofwhat has been called 'male inexpressiveness' - the difficulty men have in revealing their feelings to others (Bourdieu 2001). asked all the interviewees a range of questions concerning their moral outlook and conceptions of self. Consistent differences emerged between the views of the women and the men. For instance, the interviewees were asked: 'What does it mean to say something is morally right or wrong?' Whereas the men tended to respond to this question by mentioning abstract ideals of duty, justice and individual freedom, the women persistently raised the theme of helping others. Thus a female college student answered the question in the following way: 'It [moralityl has to do with responsibilities and obligations and values, mainly values. ... In my life situation 1relate morality with interpersonal relationships that have to do with respect for the other person and myself.' The interviewer then asked: 'Why respect other people?' and received the answer: 'Because they have a consciousness or feelings that can be hurt, an awareness that can be hurt' (Gilligan 1982). The women were more tentative in their moral judgements than the men, seeing possible contradictions between following a strict moral code and avoiding harming others. Gilligan suggests that this outlook reflects the traditional situation of women, anchored in caring relationships, more than it does the 'outward-looking' attitudes of men. Women have in the past deferred to the judgements of men, while being aware that they have qualities that most men lack. Their views of themselves are based on successfully fulfilling the needs of others, rather than on pride in individual achievement (Gilligan 1982). The life-course The various transitions through which individuals pass during their lives seem at first to be biologically fixed. This common-sense view of the human life-cycle is widely accepted in society and strongly suggests that there exists a universal and uniform set of stages through which all people pass. For example, everyone who lives to old age has been an infant, a child, a youth and an adult, and everyone dies eventually. However, historically and sociologically, this is not correct. These apparently natural biological stages are part of the human life-course, which is social as well as biological (Viocent 2003). The concept of the life-course rather than life-cycle reflects the acknowledgement by sociologists that there is considerable variation in different societies and over time and therefore variation also across the life-course. Stages of the life-course are influenced by cultural differences and also by the material circumstances of people's lives in given types of society. For example, in modern Western societies, death is usually thought of in relation to elderly people, because most people live to be over 70. In the traditional societies of the past, however, more people died at a younger age than survived to old age, and death therefore carried a different meaning and set of expectations. Other social factors, such as social class, gender and ethnicity,also influence the way that the life-course is experienced. For example, in nineteenth-century Britain and elsewhere, children of the upper classes routinely attended boarding schools and continued their education over an extended period. However, for children THE LIFE-COURSE from working-class families, the expectation was oflabour not education, and it was not unusual for 13-year-old boys to work in coal-mining and other industries, while many girls of the same age went into domestic service. Clearly, the notion ofa set of universal and age-related stages making up the life-course is not borne out by the evidence. The individual life-course is not only structured by the major social divisions of social class, gender and ethnicity, but is also historically situated. One way of thinking about this aspect is to consider the concepts of birth cohorts and generations. Cohorts are simply groups of people with something in common and birth cohorts are therefore groups of people who are born in the same year.Why should this be important? Sociologists argue that such groups tend to be influenced by the same major events and, though they may well respond differently to these, they nonetheless share a common experience. In large measure, their life ~ course experiences have common cultural and political reference points, such as specific governments, conflicts, musical trends and so on. Recent examples would be the terror attacks in New York, Madrid, London and elsewhere, as well as the invasion of Iraq and its aftermath. Although people do have divergent different views about these events, they still share a common currency of experiences which gives shape to the life-course. Finally, the Hungarian-born sociologist Karl Mannheim (1893-1947), made a strong claim regarding the influence of particular generations on life-course experience. Generations can be thought of as groups of people who are born in either the same year or series of years. Mannheim (1972 [1928J:105) said: 'Individuals who belong to the same generation ... are endowed ... with a common location in the historical dimension of the social process.' Mannheim's claim is that generational location can be as influential in shaping people's attitudes and beliefs as their social-class position. Generations tend to experience the world, and their place in it, rather differently. Hence we can speak of a 'generation gap', a 'lost generation [of youthJ , or 'generation X' to describe the historical location of different generations. The assumption behind all such descriptions is that the generation of people in question is very different from that which came before. For example, sociologists and historians have identified the different attitudes and experiences of the 'baby-boom' generation (Gillon 2004) and the 'Beat generation' (Charters 2001), to name but two. The babyboomers are said to be those born after the Second World War, roughly between 1946 and 1964, when many countries experienced large increases in their birth rates, arguably in large measure as a result of postwar economic growth and prosperity. Baby-boomers had many new experiences; television in the home which consolidated a specific generationai experience and identity, a new youth culture, rising income levels and more liberal attitudes to sex and morality. The experiences of baby-boomers were significantly different from those of their parents, and, with the creation of'youth' as a stage of life, so too was their experience of the life-course. Indeed, Mannheim's argument suggests that this generation actually changed society itself. This dual aspect of giving shape to the life-course and for producing social change is one reason why Mannheim sees generations as akin to social classes in their potential impact on individual identities and social life. Childhood To people living in modern societies, childhood is a clear and distinct stage oflife. Children are distinct from babies or toddlers; childhood intervenes between infancy and the teen years. Yet the concept ofchildhood, like so many other aspects of social life today, has only come into being over the past two or three centuries. Until recently, sociologists tended to discuss children and childhood in the The hippy youth culture of the 1960s and '70s was an important generational influence on social identities in the USA and other developed societies. context of primary socialization within the family (see chapter 9). This often gave the impression that childhood is merely a transitory stage leading towards the more sociologically significant period of adulthood when individuals become involved in work, reproduction and building relationships. However, this conception is based on the notion of a stable adulthood, which is increasingly being challenged as permanent 'jobs for life' diminish along with permanent, lifelong relationships in the more fluid or 'liquid modernity' that characterizes the contemporary world (Lee 2001; Bauman 2000). The idea of childhood as mere transition also ignores the social structural position of children within different societies. That is, children should be conceptualized as a distinct social group, in the same way as, for example, social classes and ethnic groups are. As a distinct social group, children tend to experience life through their own culture, with its unique symbols and rituals, and they also have a similar status to some other minority groups, which has often led to them being exploited as a cheap source of labour (james et al. 1998). Childhood has also been shown to be socially constructed; the experience of childhood and its meaning for society are diverse, both in different historical periods and across geographical regions in the same time period (jenks 2005). In many earlier societies, young people moved directly from a lengthy infancy into working roles within the conununity. The French historian Philippe Aries (1965) argued that 'childhood', conceived of as a separate phase of development, did not exist in medieval times. In the paintings of medieval Europe, children are portrayed as little adults, with mature faces and the same style of dress as their elders. Children took part in the same work and play activities as adults, rather than in the childhood games we now take for granted. Into the early twentieth century, in most Western countries, children were put to work at what now seems a very early age.There are countries in the world today, in which young children are engaged in full-time work, sometimes in physically demanding circumstances (such as coal-mines and agriculture). The idea that children have distinctive rights and that the use of child labour is 'obviously' ,morally repugnant are really quite recent developments and are not universally accepted. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) came into force in 1990, setting out the basic rights ofall children across the world, which all UN member states have ratified (except the USA and Somalia). The UNCRC defines a child as anyone under the age of 18, unless nationstates already have an earlier definition. The attempt to universalize the rights of children and definitions of childhood in very different social and economic contexts is a bold one that raises some important issues. Is the UN definition culturally sensitive to different societies, or does it impose Western ideas of children and childhood onto the rest of the world? Can the governments of the developing world really put in place the same safeguards for protecting childrens rights that already largely exist in the developed societies? And if they do, will it restrict economic development and effectively restrict the income-generating capacity of the poorest families? For example, in many developing countries, 'street children' earn money for poor families by selling goods, and if states penalize such practices as 'deviant', then how will such families survive? These are very difficult questions which are currently being worked out in policy and practice across the world. The issue of child labour is discussed in chapter 13, 'Global Inequality'. Because of the long period of childhood that we recognize today, societies are now in some respects more child-centred than traditional ones. But a child-centred society, it must be emphasized, is not one in which all children experience love and care from parents or other adults. The physical and sexual abuse of children is a commonplace feature of family life in present-day society, although the full extent of such abuse has only recently come to light. Child abuse has clear connections with what seems to us today like the frequent mistreatment ofchildren in pre-modern Europe. It seems possible that as a result of changes currently occurring in modern societies, the separate character of childhood is diminishing once more, bringing adult-child relations towards crisis point (Prout 2004). The uncertainties associated with globalization processes and the kind of rapid social changes we explored in chapter 4 are leading to new social constructions of childhood. Prout (2004: 7) suggests: 'These new representations construct children as more active, knowledgeable and socially participative than older discourses allowed. They are more difficult to manage, less biddable and hence are more troublesome and troubling: It seems that relationships between adults and children are in a period of flux and major disturbance. Other observers have suggested that children now grow up so fast that the previously solid boundary between adults and children is rapidly diminishing, leading to the 'disappearance' of childhood in the developed societies (Postman 1995; Buckingham 2000). They point out that even small children may watch the same television programmes as adults, thereby becoming much more familiar early on with the adult world than did preceding generations. Children are becoming consumers at an earlier age and are consuming adult products such as TV programmes, mobile phones and advertising. All of this may mean that the protected period of childhood which characterized the developed countries for most of the twentieth century, may be being eroded today. The teenager and youth culture The idea of the 'teenager', so familiar to us today, also did not exist until recently. The biological changes involved in puberty (the point at which a person becomes capable of adult sexual activity and reproduction) are universal. Yet in many cultures these do not produce the degree of turmoil and uncertainty often found among young people in modern societies. In cultures that foster age-grades, for example, with distinct ceremonials that signal a person's transition to adulthood, the process of psychosexual development generally seems easier to negotiate. Adolescents in such societies have less to 'unlearn', since the pace of change is slower. There is a time when children in Western societies are required to be children no longer: to put away their toys and break with childish pursuits. In traditional cultures, where children are already working alongside adults, this process of unlearning is normally much less jarring. In Western societies, teenagers are betwixt and between: they often try to follow adult ways, but they are treated in law as children. They may wish to go to work, but they are constrained to stay in school. Teenagers in theWestUve in between childhood and adulthood, growing up in a society subject to continuous change. Linked to the idea of the teenager is that ofyouth culture,a general way ofUfe associated with young people, especially in the developed countries. In many other societies' past and present, the concept ofyouth culture in this sense does not exist and children move towards adulthood much earlier without the intermediate stage of'youth'. Sociologists first reported on youth culture in the 1950s and '60s, when older teenagers moving into employment began to benefit from post-war affluence, using their earnings to buy fashionable clothes, pop records and other products in the In modern Western societies young teenagers hover between childhood and adulthood. emerging consumer markets (Savage 2007). A'culture ofyouth' began to coalesce, which looked different from the mainstream, and which constructed new meaningful worlds out of which sprang the spectacular youth subcultures of teddy boys, mods, rockers and skinheads and, later, hippies, punks, rastas, goths and many more. With hindsight, it seems that sociologists gave disproportionate attention to the small but highly visible subcultures - which tended to be male-dominated - and not enough time to understanding the majority of young people and the ways in which they make sense oftheir own lives. For instance, Angela McRobbie and Jenny Garber (1975) identified a widespread and more concealed 'culture of the bedroom' amongst girls, which enabled groups of friends to participate in the culture of youth, but which had been largely ignored in the rush to analyse THE LIFE-COURSE 'deviant' (male) subcultures in the public sphere. Steven Miles (2000) suggests that the concepts ofyouth culture and youth subcultures have misled us into seeing all young people as essentially similar, involved in counter-cultural and deviant activity or experiencing unique social disadvantage. Indeed, historian Geoffrey Pearson (1983) did find deviant youth subcultures back in nineteenth-century Britain, including the original 'hooligans', identified by their aggressive attitudes, peaked caps, neckscarves, bell-bottom trousers and closecropped hairstyle with a fringe over the forehead. However, he argued that, like all subsequent deviant subcultures, such as mods and rockers, hooligans were in part socially created, as more traditional social groups sought out scapegoats to blame for their own 'respectable fears' around social problems.Clearly, the mainstream ofyoung people did not - and still do not - fit such deviant descriptions. Deviant youth subcultures are discussed in chapter 21 ,'Crime and Deviance'. Instead, Miles proposes the concept of youth lifestyles, which suggests a diversity of experience within mainstream youth and focuses on the question, 'How ... do young people interact with and negotiate the social worlds in which they construct their everyday lives?' (Miles 2000: 2). Such a perspective reminds us of both the common, shared experiences of youth in a rapidly changing world and the different responses young people adopt towards it. Young adulthood Sociologists have started to theorize a relatively new phase within the life-course in developed societies, which we can call young adulthood (Goldscheider and Waite 1991), though the systematic study of this stage is not yet as fully developed as that of childhood or later life. Young adulthood seems increasingly to be a specific stage in personal and sexual development in modern societies, which has been described in various ways: as postadolescence, late adolescence and so on. It is said to characterize those people in their 20s and perhaps early 30s who live relatively independent lives, but have not yet married or had children and as a consequence, are still experimenting with their relationships and lifestyles. However, this stage is not seen as being experienced in the same way by all social classes and ethnic groups. It is particularly amongst more affluent groups that people in their early 20s are taking the time to travel, and explore sexual, political and religious affiliations (Heath and Cleaver 2003). Indeed, the importance of this postponement of the responsibilities of full adulthood is likely to grow, given the extended period of education many people now undergo in the developed world. This stage of life is also likely to become much less gendered, as more young women go on to university and forge careers instead of settling into traditional family life at an early age. We can expect scholars studying the life-course to carry out more research on this stage over the next few years. Mature adulthood As we noted above, the sociological study of childhood is a latecomer to the discipline, mainly because childhood itself was seen as simply a transitional period leading to adulthood. Conversely though, the study of adulthood preoccupied sociologists during the twentieth century and most sociological research in many varied fields has simply taken adulthood as an unquestioned assumption underpinning their work. For example, the study of doctorpatient relationships simply assumed mature adult doctors and patients alike, with little or no regard for the different experiences of children or young adults. Hence, much of this book is concerned primarily with the experiences and lives of mature adults and we can only make some very general comments about this here. Most young adults in the modern world today can look forward to a life stretching right through to old age. But in pre-modern times, few could anticipate such a future with much confidence - and nor do young adults in the poorer parts of the developing world today. Death through sickness or injury was much more frequent among all age groups than it is today, and women in particular were at great risk because of the high rate of mortality in childbirth. On the other hand, some of the strains that people experience now were less pronounced in previous times. People usually maintained a closer connection with their parents and other kin than in today's more mobile populations, and the routines of work they followed were much the same as those of their forebears. In current times, major uncertainties must be resolved in marriage, family life and other social contexts. People increasingly have to 'make' their own lives, more so than in the past. Amongst many social groups, the creation of sexual and marital ties now mainly depends on individual initiative and selection rather than being fixed by parents, though this is not, of course, the case in all cultures. Such individual choice can be experienced as a freedom, but the responsibiity to have to choose can also impose its own pressures. Keeping a forward-looking outlook in middle age has taken on a particular importance in modern societies. Most people do not expect to be doing the same thing all their lives, as was the case for the majority in traditional cultures. Individuals who have spent their lives in one career may find the level they have reached in middle age unsatisfying and further opportunities blocked. Women who have spent their early adulthood raising a family and whose children have left home may feel themselves to be without any social value. The phenomenon The Life-Course of a 'mid-life crisis' is very real for many middle-aged people. A person may feel she has thrown away the opportunities that life had to offer, or she wiU never attain goals cherished since childhood. Vet growing older need not lead to resignation or bleak despair; a release from childllOOd dreams can be liberating. Later life In traditional societies, older people were often accorded a great deal of respect. Among cultures that included age-grades, the elders usually had a major - often the final - say over matters of importance to the community. Within families, the authority of both men and women mostly increased with age. In industrialized societies, by contrast, older people tend to lack authority within both the family and the wider social community. Having retired from the labour force, they may be poorer than ever before in their lives. At the same time, there has been a great increase in the proportion of the population over the age of 65, as we see in the next section. Transition to the age-grade of elder in a traditional culture often marked the pinnacle of the status an individual could achieve. In modern societies, retirement may bring the opposite consequences. No longer living with their children and often having retired from paid work, older people may find it difficult to make the final period of their life rewarding. It used to be thought that those who successfully cope with later life do so by turning to their inner resources, becoming less interested in the material rewards that social life has to offer. While this may often be true, it seems likely that in a society in which many are physically healthy in later life, an outwardlooking view will become more and more prevalent. Those in retirement might find renewal in what has been called the 'third age', in which a new phase of education begins (see also the discussion in chapter 19, 'Education'). TH E LIFE -COURS E In the section that follows, we look at the sociological issues surrounding ageing in more detail than the earlier life-course stages. This is for two reasons. First, the study oflater life and ageing (gerontology) is very well established, with a significant body of evidence, which is reflected here. Second, major concerns over the consequences of an ageing world population have been at the centre of important social, political and economic debate since the mid-1970s and these claims will also be considered. Fau]a Singh was still running marathons in his 90s. Ageing Fauja Singh ran his first London marathon in 2000, at the age of 89. It took him 6 hours and 54 minutes. He had last run seriously 53 years earlier. When he recorded a nearidentical marathon time in 2001, he found he had knocked almost an hour off the world record for the over-90s. In 2002 he trimmed his time down to 6 hours and 45 minutes. That year, 407 runners took longer than Singh to complete the London marathon; many were in their 30s. When Singh was that age, he was running crosscountry races in his native India. By the time India gained independence in 1947, new priorities had led Singh to hang up his running shoes at the age of 36. A lifetime later - widowed and living in Ilford, East London - with four children, thirteen grandchildren and five great-grandchildren scattered across three continents, he began looking for new challenges. He started to punctuate his daily walks with bursts of jogging. His legs soon regained their lost strength. Then Singh saw a television programme about the marathon and was inspired. He began to run marathons all over the world and raised thousands of pounds for charity (Askwith 2003), even running a 2007 half-marathon in Jalandhar at the age of94. People, especially in the richer countries, are leading longer, healthier and more productive lives than ever before. When she became monarch in 1952, Queen Elizabeth II sent 273 birthday telegrams to congratulate British centenarians on their 100th birthdays. By the end of the twentieth century, that figure had risen to more than 3,000 per year (Cayron 2002), and in 2007 there were around 9,000 British people over 100 years ofage, 90 times more than in 1911. Growing old can be a fulfilling and rewarding experience; or it can be filled with physical distress and social isolation. For most older people, the experience of ageing lies somewhere in between. _ -50_ SO. c::::J 60 . c==] 70. c=:=J 75+ _ 80. fL lJ~ j Figure 8.1 Global life expectancy (average life expectancy at birth) Source: Created from CIA Factbook 2007 The greying of human societies Throughout the world, 'societies are ageing, but they are not doing so evenly. One exam· pie is the startling national differences in average life expectancy (see figure 8.11. Taking the two extremes, in 2006, average life expectancy at birth for women in Swaziland was 32.62 years and for men just 31.84 years; but in Andorra it was 86.62 for women and 80.62 years for men. Such grossly unequal life chances illustrates in a stark way the very different ageing experiences of people across the world and the various meanings attached to the idea of a 'Iifecourse' in different parts of the world. In the developed world, being 32 years of age does not mean that one is approaching the end of a life but merely indicates the period of young adulthood. As we will see later in this chapter, such wide disparities in average life expectancy also shape the experiences of death, dying and bereavement. So, although most of this section will focus on debates and evidence from the relatively wealthy developed countries, we have to bear inmind that the situation in the developing world is very different and the 'ageing experience' differs accordingly. A1998 report by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA 1998) notes that the population of those aged 65 and older worldwide grew by about 9 million in 1998. By 2010, this population will grow by 14.5 million and by 2050 it will grow by 21 million. The most rapid growth of the 65 and older group will take place in the industrialized nations of the world, where families have fewer children and people live longer than in poorer countries. In the industrialized countries, the percentage of the older population grew from 8 per cent in 1950 to 14 per cent in 1998, and it is projected to reach 25 per cent by 2050. After the middle of the century, the developing nations will follow suit, as they experience their own elder explosion. The populations of most of the world's societies are ageing as the result of a decline in both birth and death rates, although the populations of the developing countries continue to have shorter life spans because of poverty, malnutrition and disease (see chapter 13, 'Globallnequality'l. The world's average life expectancy grew from 46 in 1950 ....,... THE LIFE -C OURS E 30 ~-----------------------'r=~~ 25 20 15 10 5 o Figure 8.2 Proportion of population over the age of 65 by region,2000 and 2050 (projected) Source: UNFPA 2004 to 50 in 1985 and will reach 71 by 2025 (UNFPA 1998).By that time, some800 million people will be over the age of 65, nearly a threefold increase in numbers from 1990 (see figure 8.2). Among the very old (those over 86), whose medical and service needs are the greatest, the number will increase by half in North America, while it will double in China and grow nearly one and a half times in West Africa (Sokolovsky 1990). This grow1h will place increasing demands on the resources of many countries that are already too poor to support their populations adequately. This explosion has enormous implications for social policy. More than 150 nations currently provide public assistance for people who are elderly or disabled, or for their survivors when they die. Older people are especially likely to require costly healthcare services. Their rapid grow1h in numbers threatens to strain the medical systems in many industrial nations, where the cost of providing healthcare to older people is likely to overwhelm government budgets. Looking at the changing demographic statistics, some sociologists and gerontologists now refer to the greying of the population (Peterson 1999). 'Greying' is the result of two long-term trends in industrial societies: the tendency of families to have fewer children (discussed in chapter 9, 'Families and Intimate Relationships'), and the fact that people are living longer. As figure 8.3 shows, a long-term shift in the age structure of developed societies is under way, which means, for example, that around one-third of Europe's population will be over the age of 65 by the year 2050. Over the twentieth century, average life expectancy also increased, and infant mortality decreased. In Britain, for example, average life expectancy at birth will have increased from 45 years for men born in 1900 to 77 years for men born between 2005 and 20lO. For a British woman, life expectancy will have risen from 48 to 81 over the same period. Most of these gains occurred in the first half of the twentieth century and were largely due to the improved chances for survival among the young. In 1921 in the UK, 84 infants in 1,000 live births died before the age of one, but by 2002 the rate was just 4.8 deaths for every 1,000 live births (HMSO 2004). An upward trend in life expectancy is shared across most industrialized and developing societies. 100.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 2004 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 I00-14 . 15-64 065-79 0 80+ I Figure 8.3 Changes in the age slructure of European Union population, 2005 Source: European Union 2005 However, in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, life expectancy has actually reduced since the mid-1980s, mainly because of the enormous and continuing impact of HIVI AIDS. Russia also experienced a lowering of average life expectancy after the mid-1990s, which some analysts ascribe to the effects of increasing poverty and, in particular, widespread alcohol abuse. How do people age? In examining the nature of ageing we will draw on studies of social gerontology, a discipline concerned with the study of the social aspects ofageing. Studying ageing is a bit like examining a moving target. As people grow older, society itself changes at the same time, and so does the very meaning of being 'old' (Riley et al. 1988). For people born into the developed societies in the first quarter of the twentieth century, a secondary education was regarded as more than sufficient for most ofthe available jobs, and the majority ofpeople did not expect to live much past their 50s - and then only at the cost of suffering a variety of disabilities. Today, those very same people find themselves in their 70s and 80s; many are relatively healthy, unwilling to disengage from work and social life, and in need of more schooling than they ever dreamed would be necessary. What does it mean to age? Ageing can be sociologicallydefined as the combination of biological, psychological and social processes that affect people as they grow older (Abeles and Riley 1987; Atchley 2000). These processes suggest the metaphor of three different, although interrelated, developmental 'clocks': first, a biological one, which refers to the physical body; second, a psychological one, which refers to the mind and mental capabilities; and, third, a social one, which refers to cultural norms, values and role expectations having to do with age. There is an enormous range of variation in all three ofthese processes, as will be shown below. Our notions about the meaning of age are rapidly changing, both because recent research is dispelling many myths about ageing, and because advances in nutrition and health have enabled many people to live longer, healthier lives than ever before. THE LIFE-COURSE Biological ageing There are well-established biological effects of ageing, although the exact chronological point at which they occur varies greatly from individual to individual, depending on genetics and lifestyle. In general, for men and women alike, biological ageing typically means: • declining vision, as the eye lens loses its elasticity (small type is the bane of most people over 50); • hearing loss, first of higher-pitched tones, then of lower-pitched ones; • wrinkles, as the skin's underlying structure becomes more and more brittle (millions of pounds invested in skin lotion and increasingly common surgical face-lifts only delay the inevitable); • a decline of muscle mass and an accompanying accumulation of fat, especially around the middle (eating habits that were offset by exercise when you were 25 come back to haunt you when you are 50); and • a drop in cardiovascular efficiency, as less oxygen can be inhaled and utilized during exercise (lifelong runners who ran a six-minute mile at the age of30 are happy to break an eight-minute mile once they turn 60). The normal processes of ageing cannot be avoided, but they can be partly compensated for and offset by good health, proper diet and nutrition,. and a reasonable amount of exercise (John 1988). Lifestyle can make a significant health difference for people of all ages. For many people, the physical changes of ageing do not significantly prevent them from leading active, independent lives well into their 80s. Some scientists have even argued that with a proper lifestyle and advances in medical technology, more and more people will be able to live relatively illness-free lives until they reach their biological maximum, experiencing only a brief period of sickness just before death (Fries 1980). There is a debate about when, or even if, people are genetically programmed to die (Kirkwood 2001). About 90- 100 years seems to be the upper end ofthe genetically determined age distribution for most human beings, although some have argued that it may be as high as 120 (Rusting 1992; Treas 1995). When the world's oldest officially recorded person, the Frenchwoman leanne Calment, died in 1997, she was 122, rode a bicycle until the age of 100 and had met Vincent van Gogh as a child. Other people have claimed to be even older, though their ages cannot be verified. Even though the majority of older people in the developed societies suffer no significant physical impairment and remain physically active, unfortunate stereotypes about the 'weak and frail elderly' continue to exist (Heise 1987). These stereotypes have more to do with the social than the biological meaning of ageing in Western culture, which is increasingly preoccupied with youthfulness and fears of growing old and dying. Traditionally, older people in theWest were seen as knowledgeable, wise and a source of good advice and in some cultures they are still seen this way: as active and valuable members of society. Psychological ageing The psychological effects of ageing are much less well established than the physical effects, although research into the psychology of ageing is continuing at an expanding pace (Diehl and Dark-Freudeman 2006). Even though such things as memory, learning, intelligence, skills and motivation to learn are widely assumed to decline with age, research into the psychology of ageing suggests a much more complicated process (Birren and Schaie 2001). Memory and learning ability, for example, do not decline significantly until very late in life for most people, although the speed with which one recalls or analyses information may slow down somewhat, giving the false impression of mental impairment. For most older people whose lives are stimulating and rich, such mental abilities as motivation to learn, clarity of thought and problem-solving capacity do not appear to decline significantly until very late in life (Baltes and Schaie 1977; Schaie 1979; Atchley 2000). Current research has focused on the extent to which memory loss relates to other variables, such as health, personality and social structures. Scientists and psychologists argue that intellectual decline is not necessarily irreversible, and they are working on ways to identify older people at risk so that medical intervention may be taken which will allow longer maintenance of higher levels of intellectual function (Schaie 1990). Even Alzheimer's disease, the progressive deterioration of brain cells which is the primary cause of dementia in later life, is relatively rare in non-institutionalized persons under 75, although it may afflict as many as half of all people over 85. Recent research, particularly in the controversial area of stem cells, has created the hope that the treatment of Alzheimer's disease may one day be possible. Social ageing Social age consists ofthe norms, values and roles that are culturally associated with a particular chronological age. Ideas about social age differ from one society to another and, at least in modern industrial societies, change over time as well. Societies such as Japan and China have traditionally revered older people, regarding them as a source of historical memory and wisdom. Societies such as the UK and the USA are more likely to dismiss them as non-productive, dependent people who are out of step with the times - both because they are less likely to have the high-tech skills so valued by young people and because of their culture's obsession with youthfulness. Huge amounts are now being spent on prescription drugs, plastic surgery and home remedies that promise eternal youth. These Ij '. , I . I, ,( I ; (I '. '! ' /, I. ~ .~'~i r "'-! ,,fl' "We rarely watch television. Most of our free time is devoted to sex." © The New Yorker CoUecnon 1998 Rober! Weber from cartoonbookcoffi. All Rights Reserved.. include such things as tummy-tucks and face-lifts, anti-baldness pills and lotions, and pills that claim to increase memory and concentration. In the USA, three weeks after it hit the market in 1998, the anti-impotence drug Viagra accounted for a staggering 94 per cent of all prescription drug sales (Hotz 1998). Role expectations are extremely important sources ofone's personal identity. Some of the roles associated with ageing are generally positive: lord and lady, senior adviser, doting grandparent, religious elder, wise spiritual teacher. Other roles may be damaging, leading to lowered self-esteem and isolation. Highly stigmatizing stereotypical roles for older people exist: think of phrases like 'grumpy old', 'silly old', 'boring old' and 'dirty old' man or woman (Kirkwood 2001). In fact, like all people, older people do not simply passively play out assigned social roles; they actively shape and redefine them (Riley et al. 1988). We discuss discrimination against older people below (pp. 317-20). THINKING CRITICALLY Are you concerned about ageing? List which elements of the ageing process are particularly worrying. Would you describe these elements as biological, psychological or social aspects of ageing? Sociologically, how would you explain the fact that many people in modern societies try so hard to delay the inevitable biological ageing process? Growing old: competing sociological explanations Social gerontologists have offered a number of theories regarding the nature of ageing. Some of the earliest theories emphasized individual adaptation to changing social roles as a person grows older. Later theories focused on how social structures shape the lives of older people and on the concept of the life-course. The most recent theories have been more multifaceted, focusing on the ways in which older people actively create their lives within specific institutional contexts. First generation a/theories: functionalism The earliest theories of ageing reflected the functionalist approach that was dominant in sociology during the 1950s and '60s. They emphasized how individuals adjusted to changing social roles as they aged and how those roles were useful to society. The earliest theories often assumed that ageing brings with it physical and psychological decline and that changing social roles have to take this decline into account (Hendricks 1992). The American sociologist Taleott Parsons, one of the most influential functionalist theorists of the 1950s, argued that society needs to find roles for older people consistent with advanced age. He expressed concern that the USA, in particular, with its emphasis on youth and its avoidance of the subject of death, had failed to provide roles that adequately drew on the potential wisdom and maturity of its older citizens. Moreover, given the greying of society that was evident even at that time, Parsons argued that this failure could well lead to older people becoming discouraged and alienated from SOCiety. In order to achieve a 'healthy maturity', Parsons (1960) argued, older people need to adjust psychologically to their changed circumstances, while society needs to redefine the social roles ofolder people. Traditional roles (such as work) have to be abandoned, and new forms of productive activity (such as volunteer service) need to be identified. Parsons's ideas anticipated those of disengagement theory, the notion that it is functional for society to remove people from their traditional roles when they grow older, thereby freeing up space for others (Cumming and Henry 1961; Estes et al. 1992). According to this perspective, given the increasing frailty, illness and dependency of older people, it becomes all the more dysfunctional for them to occupy traditional social roles they are no longer capable of adequately fulfilling. Older people should therefore retire from their jobs, pull back from civic life and eventually withdraw from other activities as well. Disengagement is assumed to be functional for the larger society because it opens up roles that were formerly filled by older people to younger ones, who will presumably carry them out with fresh energy and new skills. Disengagement is also assumed to be functional for older people because it enables them to take on less taxing roles consistent with their advancing age and declining health. A number of studies of older adults do indeed report that the large majority feel good about retiring, which they claim has improved their morale and increased their happiness (Palmore 1985; Howard 1986). While there is obviously some truth to disengagement theory, the idea that older people should completely disengage from the larger society takes for granted the prevailing stereotype that later life necessarily involves fraiJty and dependence. Critics of functionalist theories of ageing argue that they emphasize the need for older people to adapt to existing conditions, but they do not question whether or not the circumstances faced by older people are just. In reaction, another group of theorists arose - those growing out of the social conflict tradition (Hendricks 1992). Second generation oftheories: age stratification theory and life-course theory From the mid-1970s, a new range oftheories was introduced into gerontology (Estes et al. 2003). Two of the most important contributions were age stratification theory and the life-course model. Age stratification theory looks at the role and influence of social structures, such as retirement policy, on the process of individual ageing and on the wider stratification of older people in society. One important aspect of age stratification theory is the concept of structural lag (Riley et al. 1994). This provides an account of how structures do not keep pace with changes in the population and in individuals' lives. For example, in many European countries, when the retirement age was set at 65 soon after the Second World War, life expectancy and quality of life for older people was considerably lower than it is today. Like the age stratification approach, the life-course perspective also moved beyond looking at ageing in terms of individual adjustment. This perspective views ageing as one phase of a lifetime shaped by the historical, social, economic and environmental factors that occurred at earlier ages in the life-course. Thus the life-course model views ageing as a process that continues from birth to death. In this, it contrasts with earlier theories that focus solely on the elderly as a distinctive group. The theory bridges micro- and macrosociology in The Life-Course examInIng the relationships between psychological states, social structures and social processes (Elder 1974). Third generation oftheories: political economy theory One of the most important strands in the study of ageing in recent years has been the political economy perspective pioneered by Carroll Estes. Political economy theory provides an account of the role of the state and capitalism as contributing to systems of domination and marginalization of older people. Political economy theory focuses on the role of economic and political systems in shaping and reproducing the prevailing power arrangements and inequalities in society. Social policy - in income, health or social security, for example - is understood as the result ofsocial struggles, conflicts and the dominant power relations of the time. Policy affecting older people reflects the stratification of society by gender, race and class. As such, the phenomena of ageing and old age are directly related to the larger society in which they are situated and cannot be considered in isolation from the other social forces (Estes and Minkler 1991; Estes et al. 2003). Aspects of ageing Although ageing is a process which presents new possibilities, it is also accompanied by a set ofunfamiliar challenges. As people age, they face a combination of physical, emotional and material problems that can be difficult to negotiate. One challenge that marks a significant transition is retirement. For most people, work does not just pay the bills; it also contributes to their sense of personal identity. In this case, retirement does not only lead to a loss ofincome; it can also lead to a loss of status to which many people find it difficult to adjust. Another Significant transition that many older people face is the loss of a spouse. Widowhood can represent the loss of a partner of 40 or 50 years, and someone who has been the main source of companionship and support. The older population reflects the diversity within societies. Older people are rich, poor and in between; they belong to all ethnic groups; they live alone and in families of various sorts; they vary in their political values and preferences; and they are gay and lesbian as well as heterosexual. Furthermore, like other people, they are diverse with respect to health. These differences can influence the ability ofolder people to maintain their autonomy and overall well-being. As well as the diversity of the older population noted above, 'later life' now covers a wide and increasing age span. A distinction is often drawn between the third and fourth ages of life in modern societies. The third age covers the years from 50 to 74, when people are able to lead active independent Ireland Greece IPortuga Denmark Austria Belgium ill United Kingdom '"'"c "e ""- France Finland Spain Italy Germany Sweden Luxembourg Netherlands EU average ---, ---, ----, o 10 20 30 lives, increasingly free from day-to-day parenting responsibilities and the labour market. Many in this group have the time and money to fund an expanding consumer market and culture. The success of Saga in the UK, a company that aimed its tours and other products solely at the over-50s market, is evidence of the increasing power of the 'grey pound'. [n contrast, the fourth age refers to the years of life when people's independence and ability to care fully for themselves is more seriously challenged. [n this section, we look at the effects of inequality, gender and ethnicity on the experience of ageing. Inequality and older people Overall, older people in developed societies tend to be more materially disadvantaged than other segments of the population (figure 8.4). However, older people's I I 0 Poverty rate • Relative income 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Figure 8.4 Poverty rate' and relative incomeb of people aged 65+: EU comparison, 1998 , Percentage with income below 60per cent ofthe median equivalized income ofthe national population b Median equivalized income ofthose aged 65 and over as apercentage ofthe population aged 0 to 64 Source: HMSO Social Trends 34 (2004),p.7 For some,old age is a time of acute poverty,ill health, depression and loneliness. subjective feelings about their standard of living are not solely based on material factors, but draw on other reference groups to which they compare themselves. Comparisons are possible with their memories of earlier life. In this, they are likely to compare themselves positively with the past in material terms (although not necessarily in moral or social ones) . However, they are also likely to compare themselves with the standard of living that they enjoyed before retirement, which is likely to be materially better than their current position. Older people may also compare themselves with the average living conditions of society as a whole or of other retirees. Thus there is no common subjective experience of inequality amongst older people (Vincent 1999). The inequalities of class, race and gender are often exacerbated when a person stops paid work, so the added inequality of later life means that older women, minorities and manual workers are poorer than peer equivalents in middle age. Retirement can result in a loss of income that may cause a significant drop in an older person's standard of living. The ability to build up a private occupational or personal pension during working life is one of the key determinants of income inequality between pensioners. Consequently, it is older men who were previously employed as professionals or managers who tend to have the highest gross weekly income in later life. We look at poverty amongst older people in more detail in chapter 12, 'Poverty, Social Exclusion and Welfare'. The feminization oflater life Across all the world's societies, women tend to live longer than men. A more detailed exploration of such inequalities can be found in chapter 13, 'Global Inequality'. Because of this, widowhood is the norm for older women. In the UK for example, almost halfofwomen over the age of65, and four-fifths of women aged 85 and over, are widowed. By contrast, more than three· quarters ofmen aged between 65 and 69 are married, falling to 60 per cent by their early 80s (HMSO 2004).This numerical predominance of women has been described as the 'feminization oflater life'in European countries (see figure 8.5). Although there were a disproportionate number of women in the older age group in Europe throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, the proportion ofwomen to men has fluctuated and is now declining somewhat. In many European countries, there are currently more than three times as many women as men over the age of85, but this figure is predicted to fall to just twice as many by 2021. One reason for the change in the proportion of women to men is because so many young men died during the First World War in 1914- 18. The women of this generation began to reach retirement age in 1961, which began a sharp rise in the sex ratio imbalance amongst older people. A second reason for the declining imbalance between older men and women is the more rapid fall in male, rather than female, mortality over the age of 65 during the second half of the twentieth century. Figure 8.6 shows how the sex ratio among older people in the UK has fluctuated from 1951 to the predicted ratio in 2031. 'Feminization' is not without its problems, however. Older women are more likely than their male contemporaries to be poor. % of men/women in each age group 100.0 TTrrrn-rr"rrn-r-rrrrrnrrr:""rn-rr,-,-rrrn-rrTTTTl-rTTTTTrnn-rTTTTT 100.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 EL IRL S E P DK F EU15 UK A NL B L FIN D Key to countries: EL Greece UK United Kingdom O Men Left bar: 65-74 IRL Ireland A Austria • Women Middle bar: 75-84 S Sweden NL Netherlands Right bar: 85 and over E Spain B Belgium P Portugal L Luxembourg I Italy FIN Finland DK Denmark D Germany F France Figure 8.5 Proportions of men and women aged 65+ by age group, 2000 Source: Winqvist, K. (2002) Women and Men Beyond Retirement, Statistics in focus: population and social conditions, No 21 (Luxemburg: Eurastat) .................................................................................................................................. 90.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 Sex ratio: by age, 1951 , 2003 and 2031 United Kingdom Number of men per 100 women 100 --- -- 2031 ---- --- --- ~ ~1951- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- so 60 40 200~. 20 o 50-54 55- 59 60- 64 65-69 70-74 75-79 S0-S4 SS and over Figure 8.6 Sex ratios amongst older people Source: Office for National Statistics, 2005 The ability to build private pension entitlements is one ofthe main causes ofinequalities in wealth between older people. In most countries, women are far less likely to have the same pension entitlements as men because of the gender gap in pay and also the loss oflifetime earnings associated with having children. In 2004, only 43 per cent of older women in the UK had any income from private pensions (including widows' pensions based on their late husbands' private pensions)' compared to 71 per cent of men (HMSO 2004). Studies reveal that, as well as having lower personal incomes than men, older women also suffer inequalities in other resources, such as car-ownership. Only 42 per cent of UK women aged between the ages of75 and 84 have a car, compared to 66 per cent of men. The discrepancy in car-ownership may not seem a major concern, but it can significantly restrict women's overall mobil· ity and their access to healthcare, shopping and contact with others. Finally, with increasing age, women suffer more than men from disability. This means that they require more assistance and support simply to carry out everyday tasks and personal care routines, such as bathing and getting in and out of bed. But the living situations of older men and women also have a gender dimension. As one study of a selection of European countries by Delbes et al. (2006) found, it seems that women grow old alone, but men grow old with a partner (see figure 8.7). Older women were also twice as likely as men to live in an institution, and the authors suggest that perhaps men find it more difficult to deal with their partners' health problems than do women. There are also some differences between Northern and Southern Europe. For instance, 56 per cent of Finnish women and 59 per cent of German women live alone after the age of 75, compared to just 30 per cent of Portuguese women. There are some cultural and policy differ· ences that may explain such findings. South European countries tend to see 'multigenerational co-residence' as the preferred option for keeping older relatives at home, whereas North European states tend to have better-developed welfare services, which perform some of the same functions, but can lead to individuals being able to live alone. It is clear, then, that there are specific gendered patterns ofcare amongst the older population. % Men % Women % 100 100 c- 100 I- - I- I- ~I- :.~- •80 60 80 60 l- i- i- I- it-- - i- t-- i- 80 60 40 - I- I- - I- 40 t-- - i- t-- i- 40 20 - l- t-- t-- t-- 20 t--.- i- - t-- i- 20 o 0 D Lives in institution 0 lives alone • lives with person(s) other than partner 0 lives with partner Figure 8.7 Living arrangements of people aged 75+ in nine European countries. 2000. by gender Source: Delbes. G .Gaymu.J. and Springer.S. (2006) 'Women Grow Old Alone.but Men Grow Old with a Partner.AEuropean Overview'. Population & Societies. 419 Ganuary). Age and ethnicity The income of older people from ethnic minorities also tends to be lower than that of their white counterparts. and reliance on means-tested benefits is greater (Berthoud 1998). Older people from ethnic minorities groups are also disadvantaged in other measures of wealth. such as car-ownership and housing tenure (although certain groups. such as Indian and Chinese groups. have rates of home-ownership comparable to that of white populations). For example. in general. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the UKhave high rates of poverty compared to other groups. and this pattern is continued into later life. Ginn and Arber (2000) examined ethnic and gender differences in the income of individuals amongst the older population in the UK. They found that older Asian women tend to be particularly disadvantaged. Retired ethnic minorities are often unable to supplement their state pension with an occupational or private one. Table 8.1 illustrates this issue: almost threequarters of the white population are in receipt of an occupational pension compared to fewer than half of the Asian/ Asian British and black/black British populations. The lack of a private pension reflects shorter employment records in Britain for the largely migrant older ethnic population. discrimination in the labour market. the limited availability and type of jobs found in the areas where minorities have settled and sometimes a lack of fluency in English. For older women in some specific minority groups, economic disadvantage may also result from cultural norms acting as a barrier to employment earlier in life. Such patterns of structured disadvantage can be found amongst many other ethnic minority populations in Europe and internationally. The politics of ageing The global ageing crisis'? As we saw earlier in the chapter. the proportion ofthe European population over the age of65 is almost 20 per cent. and will continue to grow. This significant shift in age distribution within the population presents specific challenges for all industrialized countries. One way of understanding why, is by thinking about the dependency ratio - the relaM W - All countries Table 8.1 Components of mean gross income of UK pensioner units and the proportion in receipt of income, by ethnic minority group, 2003-6 Ethnic Minority groups All White Asian/Asian British BlackIBJack British Gross income 343 346 256 261 ofwhich Benefit income 154 154 140 149 State Pension 113 114 78 96 Income related benefits 19 19 39 34 Disability benefits 13 13 II 10 Occupational pension 88 89 42 43 Personal pension income 10 10 7 5 Investment income 31 32 21 8 Earnings 56 57 43 53 Other income 3 3 3 3 Proportion of pensioners in receipt of: Benefit income 99% 99% 97% 98% State Pension 97% 97% 80% 92% Income related benefits 31% 31% 46% 46% Disability benefits 23% 23% 21% 19% Occupational pension 72% 73% 45% 42% Personal pension income 60% 61% 31% 44% Investment income 11% 12% 4% 5% Earnings 14% 15% 10% 18% Noles: (1) Data based on the average oflhree years ofresults from 2003/4, 2005/6 FRS data and uprated to 2005/6 pnces Source, UK Department forWork and Penslons 2007 tionship between the number of children and retired people (considered 'dependent') on the one hand, and the number of people o/workingage on the other (see figure 8.8 for the UK). Such trends have several causes. Modern agriculture, improved sanitation systems, better epidemic control and medicines have all contributed to a decline in mortality throughout the world. In most societies today, especially in the developed world, fewer children die in infancy and more adults survive to later life. As the proportion of older people continues to grow, the demands on social services and health systems will increase as well. The growth in life expectancy means that pensions will need to be paid for more years than they are at present. However, the working population funds the programmes that support the older population. As the old-age dependency ratio grows, some argue that increasing strain will be placed on available resources. In the light of demographic projections, governments, interest groups and policy-makers are being forced to look ahead and to develop proposals for meeting the needs of a changing population. Some pension associations are now warning that the current pension payment scheme is not sustainable indefinitely. They have called for an increase in the minimum pension age for both women (now THE LIFE-COURSE 15 ~ Under 16 ----=:::--I--- 10 ./' ~ 65 and over 5 o 1971 1981 a 200 I-based projections. Projectionsa 1991 2011 b Population estimates for 2001 and 2002 include provisional results from the Manchester matching exercise. Figure 8_8 Dependent population by age, UK, 1971-2021 Source: HMSO Social Trends 34 (2004), p.17 60, rising to 65) and men (now 65) to 70, in order to compensate for increased longevity. Some critics argue that all this 'dependency talk' is unnecessarily alarmist and is just not an accurate depiction of the implications of contemporary demographic change. It also risks constructing negative interpretations of older people that stigmatize and stereotype them. In a study of the American pension system, Social Security: The Phony Crisis (1999), Dean Baker and Mark Weisbrot showed that even on highly conservative assumptions about economic growth, the forecaSt insolvency of the social security system in the USA within 30 years is highly unlikely to happen. They argue that much ofthe pressure to privatize the system has come from Wall Street. This is because, if a state-paid system of social security were to be replaced with individual private pensions, America's financial-services industry would stand to gain 130 million new investment accounts. In The imaginary Time Bomb (2002), British sociologist Phil Mullan has argued that those who believe the ageing population is a ticking time bomb about to bring about a series of devastating social problems are falling for a series of myths that he seeks to defuse. For example, on healthcare, Mullan argues that it is a myth that an ageing population will mean an exponential rise in ill health and dependency. He responds that ageing is not an illness, and most elderly people are neither ill nor disabled. One ofthe reasons that people are living longer is the improvement in living conditions over the past century, and he argues that, if this improvement continues, elderly people will be fitter and healthier than their predecessors. Categorizing older people as a 'dependent population' along- 2021 side children constructs this social group as a problem for society at large. However, it can be argued that a new affluence has spread across society and across the lifecourse and although not all older people are uniformly fit and financially secure, later life has changed very much for the better for many people looking forward to retirement (Gilleard and Higgs 2005). Many of the concepts that have conventionally been applied to the position of people in later life - for example, that they are socially disengaged or dependent upon the state - nowadays seem insufficient. For example, the generation ofadults now reaching retirement age grew up in the post-war years of the 1950s and 19605, when youth culture became dominated by 'conspicuous consumption' offashion, music and so on. As older people, maintaining the habits they picked up as younger people, they continue to be important consumers, and enjoy an independent lifestyle. Arber and Ginn (2004) argue that the idea of dependency itself now needs reconsidering. First, the age ranges used to define dependency (under 16 and over 64) no longer reflect the actual patterns of employment in this country. Fewer young people now enter the labour market full time at the age of 16, tending instead to stay in formal education for longer, and most workers leave the labour market some years before the age of 65. At the same time, more women than ever before are in paid employment, off-setting the shorter duration of employment amongst men. Second, activity that benefits the economy is not confined to active participation in the labour market. Evidence from the UK shows that, rather than being a burden, older people make many productive economic and social contributions. Older people are often involved in providing unpaid and informal care to less able partners, drastically reducing the cost to the state of provision of health and personal care. They are also a major source of care provision for grandchildren, allowing daughters and "Hello, we're new age pensioners" daughters-in-law to enter the labour market. Older people are also active in voluntary organizations. Arber and Ginn suggest that older people may also be an important source of financial support for their grown-up children - for example, providing them with loans, educational fees, gifts and help for housing. Many studies have also found that older parents continue to provide emotional support for their adult children, particularly during times of difficulty, such as divorce. THINKING CRITICALLY List some of the financial implications brought about by the 'greying' of the world's population. How could national governments and international bodies deal with these implications and the pressure on pension provision, social welfare and health services? Should older people be required to work longer and retire later? Ageism Activist groups have started to fight against ageism - discrimination against people on the basis of their age - seeking to encourage Global Society 8.1 China's ageing population Every day at 8 a.m., home help Wei Qing arrives at pensioner Ge Qigong's one-roomed apartment and sets about cleaning the cramped but tidy space.Mr Ge is not wealthy Wei Qing's first job is to unlock the bathroom,which is shared by nine families. 'We're just like friends', she said.'I've been 100lGng after him for a year, when I'm done with my chores we sit down and have a chat.' Her wages are paid by the Shanghai government. Mr Ge said he would not be able to afford to pay on his own. 'I didn't get any pension from the pen company I used to work for', he said. 'I have to rely on the government. they give us RMB 460 (£30) a month and they take care of our medical bills.' This level of care - his rent is also paid - is not uncommon in Shanghai. Although China is still a developing country, the city is proud of the way it looks after its many pensioners. But future generations of pensioners may not be so lucky Around 7.5 per cent of the Chinese population is aver 65,but in the next quarter century that number will increase to 30 per cent. It will be one of the greatest demographic changes in history 'The pressure on the worlGng age population will be much bigger than before',said Professor Peng Xizhe, a population expert, at Shanghai's Fudan University 'Ageing is mainly caused by China's population control programmes in the past. At the beginning stage of the one-child potcy ... no one really realized that ageing would be such a serious population or social problem', he added. The drop in fertility caused by the so-called onechild policy is beginning to feed through into the worlGng population.This generation of Chinese pensioners are supported by at least six workers paying taxes. In 30 years' time there will orily be three workers for every Chinese pensioner. China's population, 2006 Male I~ I~ ~ F F= 1I I I I 6040200 Population (millions) Figure 8.9 China's population, 2006 Sow'ce: US Census Bureau Female And, as China develops,people are livrng longer.The average life expectancy for a woman born in Shanghai is now 82 years old,equivalent to many developed countries. With a population that is living longer and a workforce that is getting smaller,the pressure is on China to get rich before it gets old. Source: Adapted from BBC News, 16 October 2006 a positive view of later life and older people. Ageism is an ideology just as sexism and racism are. There are as many false stereotypes of older people as there are in other areas. For instance, it is often believed that older workers are less competent than younger ones, that most people over 65 are in hospitals or homes for the elderly, and that a high proportion are senile. All these beliefs are erroneous. The productivity and attendance records ofworkers over 60 are superior on average to those ofyounger age groups; 95 per cent of people over 65 live in private dwellings; and only about 7 per cent of those between 65 and 80 show pronounced symptoms of senile decay. In the UK, the government has put forward proposals to ban age discrimination, which could cover recruitment, training (including entry to higher education), promotion, pay, job-retention and - importantly - retirement. In one study (Levin 1988), college students were shown a photograph of the same man at ages 25, 52 and 73, and were asked to rate him in terms of a variety of personality characteristics. The ratings were significantly more negative for the man depicted at the age of73.When he looked old in his photograph, the students were more likely to perceive him negatively, even though they knew absolutely nothing about him. The mere fact that he was older was sufficient to trigger a negative cultural stereotype. Widely shared cultural stereotypes of 'grumpy old men' can lead to private opinions that are hurtful to older people. The sociologist Bill Bytheway has provided a theoretical account of ageism that draws on social constructionism (an approach introduced in chapter 7, 'Social Interaction and Everyday Life'). Bytheway (1995) begins by questioning the reality of the terms 'old age' and 'elderly'. He argues that we presume that these terms have some kind of universal reality that they do not in fact have. He demonstrates by asking what we mean by the term 'old age': 'Is it a condition, a period of life, a state of mind, or what?' Is there any scientific evidence that something exists that can be called old age? If it exists, how do people enter it and become elderly? To Bytheway, the categories we use to describe ageing such as 'the elderly' and 'the old' - are themselves ageist. They are socially constructed in order to legitimize the separation and management of people on the basis of their chronological age by dominant groups with something to gain from the inequalities associated with ageism. Countries vary widely in what they are doing to cope with their growing numbers Older people often provide much-needed help to their communities, for example by looking after grandchildren. of older people. As we have seen already, the UK relies primarily on the state pension and the National Health Service to provide a safety net to serve the financial and health needs of older people. Other industrial nations provide a much broader array of services. In Japan, for example, men and women remain active well into later life because the Japanese culture encourages this activity and because business policies often support postretirement work with the same company the person worked for before retirement. A number of national laws in Japan support the employment and training of older workers, and private businesses also support retraining. THE LIFE-COURSE The combination ofgreying and globalization will shape the lives of older people throughout the world well into this century. Traditional patterns of family care will be challenged, as family-based economies continue to give way to labour on the farms and in the offices and factories ofglobal businesses (family patterns are already changing in the West, as we see in the discussion of 'the beanpole family' in chapter 9). Like the industrial nations early in the twentieth century, all societies will be challenged to find roles for their ageing citizens. This challenge will include identifying new means of economicsupport, often financed by government programmes. It will also entail identifying ways to incorporate rather than isolate older people, by drawing on their considerable reserves ofexperience and talents. Death, dying and bereavement The sociology of death and dying Sociologists have only recently become interested in the universal human experiences of dying, death and bereavement.One reason why the study ofdeath and dying has not been more central to sociology, is that death marks the end of an individual's participation in the social world and therefore seems to lie outside sociology's main concerns. Societies continue to develop even though individuals die, and social development, ratherthan individual deaths, has been the focus of sociology. Another reason is that within modern societies themselves, death and dying have long been 'taboo subjects', not a topic for polite conversation. One early research study was Glaser and Strauss's Awareness of Dying (1965), which looked at the experience of death and dying in a US hospital's cancer ward, but this was an exception rather than the norm. Since the 1990s, the neglect of death and dying has been rectified by the development of a new research field - the sociology of death, dying and bereavement (Clark 1993). One of the founders of this field is British sociologist Tony Waiter, whose work has focused on the ways in which societies organize death, dying and mourning (1994, 1999). How do societies care for the hundreds of thousands of dying people? Practically, how do they deal with this number of dead bodies? What support is provided for the many more bereaved relatives? What beliefs are held about the prospects for the dead when their earthly lives are over? The answer to such questions turns out to be quite varied. Anthropologists have long studied cultural differences in death rituals in small-scale societies and within developing countries, but the modern sociology of death has been primarily focused on the developed world. Even here there are cultural differences in the social organization of death. Nonetheless, sociologists have been struck by some key, shared features of modern industrial societies in relation to their handling of death. Theorizing death in modern societies One main feature of modern SOCieties is that, until quite recently, death has tended to be hidden 'behind the scenes' of social life. In previous times and in many nonindustrialized societies today, a majority of people experience the final process of dying while at home, with family and friends in close attendance. But in most modern societies today, death typically occurs in hospitals and nursing homes - relatively impersonal settings that are distanced from the mainstream of social life. On death, bodies are then moved to different parts of the buildings, thereby maintaining a physical distance between living patients, their families and the dead (Aries 1965). In The Loneliness of the Dying (1985) , Norbert Elias connects this modern hiding I away of death and dying to the increasing life expectancy we looked at earlier in this chapter. He argues: The attitude to dying and the image of death in our societies cannot be completely understood without reference to this relative security and predictability of individual life and the correspondingly increased life expectancy. Life grows longer, death is further postponed. The sight of dying and dead people is no longer commonplace. It is easier in the normal course of life to forget death. (1985: 8) However, Elias sees that the modern way of death and dying presents emotional problems for people reaching this stage of their lives. Although hospitals provide the best available nursing care and scientific medicine and use new medical technologies, the patient's contact with family members and friends is usually seen as inconveniencing treatment and care regimes, and is therefore restricted to short, specific times of the day. But this rational management of the patient's treatment may well deny people the essential emotional comfort of being close to their loved ones, which they actually need most in the final period of life. In modern societies, dying can be a very lonely process indeed. Zygmunt Bauman (1992) offers another perspective on the distancing of modern people from death and dying. He argues that modern societies deny and defer death long into the future, by turning the ultimate and inevitable ending of life into a multitude of smaller, 'non-ultimate' and potentially resolvable 'health hazards' and illnesses. Mortality is therefore effectively 'deconstructed', which brings the endless defensive battles against ageing and death right into the centre of daily life. People become used to treating, curing and managing their chronic illnesses, for example. In particular, modern societies place a high value on youthfulness, and the quest to remain 'young' - both physically and emotionally (staying 'young at heart') takes up a large part of many people's lives. As we noted above, there are now huge markets for anti-ageing treatments, vitamin supplements, cosmetic surgery and fitness equipment, as the demand for youthfulness increases. Bauman describes such actions as part of a 'life strategy', though of course, people may not always acknowledge that their attempts to stay young and fit are ultimately futile defensive actions to avoid acknowledging their own mortality. THINKING CRITICALLY Are you concerned about ageing? List which elements of the ageing process are particularly worrying? Would you describe these elements as biological, psychological or social aspects of ageing? Sociologically, how would you explain the fact that many people in modern societies try so hard to delay the inevitable biological ageing process? Recent developments Since the mid-1990s, sociologists have noted some significant changes in the way that death, dying and bereavement are dealt with in modern societies. First, the hospice movement, which started in the 1960s, aims to offer an alternative to the impersonality of hospitals for terminally ill people. The first modern hospice was founded in London in 1967 by Dame Cicely Saunders and many hospices in the UK and USA have a Christian basis. The UK has some 231 hospice (29 for children), which are based on the principle that death and dying are a natural part of life and that the quality of life for dying people should be as positive as possible. Hospices encourage family and friends to continue to play a part in the patient's life, even in the final stages. Saunders actually believed that the pain THE LIFE-COURSE 8.3 An ageless future? In Stories ofAgemg (2000), Mike Hepworth uses literature to encourage his readers to 'explore fiction as an imaginative resource for understanding variations in the meaning ofthe experience of ageing in society'. In the section below, Hepworth discusses how science and technology could radically alter how we understand ageing: For centuries inWestern culture ageing has been imagined as a condition of existence from which human beings can only be rescued by supernatural forces.'!rue, there has always been the quest to prolong active life,but until very recently the search has been a dream rather than a reality And when people have experienced eternal life it has more often than not been a curse rather than a blessing, as in the legend of The WandermgJew and The Flymg Dutchman. [In literature, sometimes] supernatural forces do intervene in the apparently natural order ofthings to arrest the normal processes ofphysical ageing, as happens in the case of Faust (Fielder 1946), who makes a pact with the Devil and sells his own soul, and in Oscar Wilde's novel about moral corruption The Picture ofDonan Gray. Dorian Gray is an aesthete with wondrous good looks whose face and body remain mysteriously unmarked by his excessive indulgence in immoral practices; all external signs ofhis debauchery (in this story a form of premature ageing) are mysteriously transferred to his portrait. When he finally attacks the painting with a knife in an attempt to destroy the evidence ofhis past he succeeds only in destroying himself,so close has the affinity between the portrait and himselfbecome. On his death the portrait reverts back to the original image ofyouth - 'all the wonder of his exquisite youth and beauty' (Wilde 1960: 167) leaving the dead body unrecognisably that of an old man, 'withered, wrinkled, and loathsome of VlSage' (ibid.). Outside the realms oflegend and the romantic imagination there was until very recently only one future of ageing inWestern culture if one was lucky to live long enough to grow old: the Chi'istian vision of the inevitable In 2007, South African paralympian, Oscar Pistorius, was allowed to run against able-bodied athletes while sporting authorities debated whether his carbon-fibre prosthetics gave him an unfair advantage.InJanuary 2008, it was decided that they did and he was not allowed to take part in the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. The idea of the 'cyborg' part human,part technology - may not be as fanciful as itsounds. decline of the human body; death and an afterlife of either Heaven or Hell.The dualistic separation of the body from the soul in Christian thought regards the ageing ofthe body in the temporal world as a brieftesting ground for eternal spiritual life beyond the veil. The corruption ofthe flesh frees the soul or essential self for an other-worldly existence out of time. Heaven is the compensation for graceful or virtuous ageing and not looking for pacts with the Devil to prolong a youthfully active life. But times are rapidly changing and the emergence of modern scientific medicine and technology has offered an alternative promise to release from the ageing body in this world rather ) I The Life-Course than the next (Katz 1996). One of the interesting features ofthis development is that contemporary models of an ageless future have become predominantly biological rather than essentially spiritual (Cole 1992). The prevailing belief now is that it is the science of the biological body, and not the religion of the eternal inunaterial soul,which will arrest the process of ageing and extend the period ofyouthfut life. The prominent social gerontologistJabber F Gubrium (1986) has commented on our reluctance in contemporary society to accept the 'normality' of a biologically limited life span. The widespread faith in the limitless potential of science to solve human problems encourages us to turn expectantly to medical science to transform ageing from the natural termination of the life-course into a disease, which is potentially curable. In this optimistic vision of the future of ageing the biological risks associated with later life will be curable and the human life span extended well beyond the biblical three score years and ten. One of these days ageing will disappear from the human agenda when cures for the illnesses associated with growing older have been found and ailing and malfunctioning body parts can be replaced. One way of defeating the ageing process is for humans to become cyborgs or to assume the 'posthuman' bodies of partly biological and partly technological beings (Featherstone and Renwick 1995). [Unlike Drew Leder's idea of the 'dysappearing body' (1990), which makes its presence felt as pain, disease and dysfunction1, this vision of the future is one where the dys-appearing body literally disappears. Any part of the internal body which causes distress in later life will be removed and replaced with a genetically engineered or transplanted substitute. The story of the ageing body will thus become not a story of how individuals cope or come to terms with its limitations but science fiction come true. The body will be a machine and the meaning of ageing may cease to be a matter of concern. Sow-ce: Hepworth 2000: 124-5 relief regimes within hospi ces made euthanasia unnecessary. The growth of more personalized forms of care for terminally ill people may make the modern experience of dying much less impersonal than Elias had thought. Second, there seem to be some emerging ways of dealing with death and bereavement that are much more informal than those in the past. Some sociologists have described these as 'postmodern' developments (see chapter 3 for a discussion of postmodern social theory) in which more individualistic and therefore, diverse approaches to dealing with death, are emerging (Bauman 1992; WaIter 1994). For example, it is becoming more common for people to personalize their own or their relatives' fun erals: playing pop music, giving their own speeches and inSisting on colourful clothing rather than relying on the traditional rituals of the churches. It is also becoming more commonplace for relatives to mark road-accident deaths with nowers at the scene of a crash as an individual way of remembering the dead, rather than, or in addition to, the ritual of attending a cemetery to tend the grave. Since the 1980s, in many of the developed societies, people have embarked on a quest for new rituals in dying and mourning to replace the older, more formal, religious ones (Wouters 2002). This development may represent an attempt by people to find new public rituals which match their own individual and personal needs, and may signal the movement of death and dying out of its previously hidden location within society. TH E LIF E- COURSE Summary points 1. Socialization is the process whereby the helpless infant gradually becomes a selfaware, knowledgeable human being, skilled in the ways of the given culture and environment. 2. According to G. H. Mead, the child achieves an understanding of being a separate agent by seeing how others behave towards him or her in social contexts. At a later stage, playing organized games and learning the rules of play, the child comes to understand 'the generalized other' - general values and cultural rules. 3. Jean Piaget distinguishes several stages in the development of the child's capability to make sense of the world. Each stage involves the acquisition of new cognitive skills and depends on the successful completion of the preceding one.According to Piaget these stages of cognitive development are universal features of socialization. 4. Agencies of socialization are structured groups or contexts within which significant processes of socialization occur. In all cultures, the family is the principal socializing agency of the child during infancy. Other influences include peer groups, schools and the mass media. Socialization continues throughout the life- cycle. 5. Gender socialization begins virtually as soon as an infant is born.Even parents who believe they treat children equally tend to produce different responses to boys and girls. These differences are reinforced by many other cultural influences. 6. Biological, psychological and social ageing are not the same and may vary considerably within and across cultures. It is important not to confuse a person's social age with their chronological age. Physical ageing is inevitable, but for most people, proper nutrition, diet and exercise can preserve a high level of health well into later life. 7. Because oflow mortality and fertility rates, Western societies are rapidly greying or ageing.The older population constitutes a large and rapidly growing category that is extremely diverse economically, socially and politically.However, it is now possible to divide a third and a fourth age representing the 'young-old' and the 'old-old'. The greying of the population has resulted in a greater 'dependency ratio'.This has led to new debates about the funding of services for older people. 8. Functionalist theories of ageing originally argued that the disengagement of older people from society was desirable. Disengagement theory held that older people should pull back from their traditional social roles as younger people move into them. Activity theory, on the other hand, soon came to emphasize the importance of being engaged and busy as a source of vitality.Conflict theorists of ageing have focused on how the routine operation of social institutions produces various forms of inequality among older people. The most recent theories regard older people as capable of taking control over their own lives and playing an active role in politics and the economy. 9. Older people are more likely to be materially disadvantaged than other groups. Older women are also more likely to suffer from poverty than their male counterparts, and older members of ethnic minorities are more likely to suffer poverty than older white people. 10. Death, dying and bereavement have now become part of life-course studies. Many developed societies have hidden death and dying behind the scenes of social life but some now appear to be undergoing an informalization of mourning as people seek new, less rigid, more individualized public rituals and personalized ways of dealing with death and dying. The Life-Course • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • Further reading Population is Not a Social Problem (London: A. • • • • • • B. Tauris, 2000) makes a critical argument • • • • Two very good texts which follow from some against the idea that the greying ofsocieties • • •• of the key issues on ageing in this chapter is inevitably problematic. Then John A. • • • • are, Chris Gilleard and Paul Higgs's Contexts Vincent, Chris Phillipson and Murna • • • • ofAgeing: Class, Cohort and Community Downs's edited collection of 21 essays, The • • • • (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), which has a Futures ofOld Age (London: Sage •• • • special focus on the 'third age'; and Bill Publications, 2005) takes these issues further • • • • Bytheway's Ageism (Buckingham: Open by looking ahead to both the possibilities • • •• • • University Press, 1999), which is a very and problems facing ageing societies. • • • • accessible account of discrimination against • • A comprehensive and worthwhile - if very •• older people. •• large (770 pages) - book, which can be • • • • From there, you could explore ageing in a approached for particular life-course • • • • European context in John Bond, Shei!a M. subjects, is Malcolm Johnson's edited The • • • • Peace, Freya Dittmann-Kohli and Gerben Cambridge Handbook ofAge and Ageing • • • • •• Westerhof's edited Ageing in Society: European (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, • • • • Perspectives on Gerontology, 3rd edn (London: 2007). • • • • Sage Publications, 2007). Miriam Bernard • • Finally, anyone interested in reading more • • and Thomas Scharf's edited Critical •• about the sociological issues surrounding •• Perspectives on Ageing Societies (Ageing and • • death, dying and bereavement could try • • the Life-course Series) (Bristol: Policy Press, • • Glennys Howarth's Death and Dying: A • • 2007), explores current debates in this field. • • •• Sociological Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, •• • • Looking to the future, Phi! Mullan's The 2007) and/orTonyWalter's The Revival of • • • • Imaginary Time Bomb: Why an Ageing Death (London: Routledge, 1994). • • • • • • •• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •• • • • • •• •• • •• • •• •• • •• •• ••• ••••• •• ••• ••• ••• •• ••••• ••• ••••• ••• ••• •• • •• • ••• •••••••• Internet links The World Heath Organization on Ageing and the Life-course: www.who.intlageing/en/ HelpAge International- a good source ofinformation on ageing across the world: www.helpage.org/Home The Centre for Policy on Ageing (UK): www.cpa.org.uk/index.html OECD- research on ageing, mainly in the developed world: www.oecd.org/topic/O,2686,en_2649_37435_1_ 1_LL37457,OO.html '\ The United Nations Programme on Ageing: www.un.org/esa/socdev/ageing/ The Centre for Death and Society at the University of Bath, UK: www.bath.ac.uk/cdas/ ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• CHAPTER 9 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Fa.nilies and Inti.nate Relationships Basic concepts 331 The family in historical context 332 The development of family life 333 The way we never were? Myths of the traditional family 333 Families in global context 335 Families and intimate relationships 338 Development and diversity in family patterns 339 Inequality within the family 341 Intimate violence 346 Divorce and separation 350 Changing attitudes to family life 358 New partnerships, step-families and kin relations 360 Alternatives to traditional marriage and family life 363 Theoretical perspectives on families and relationships 369 Functionalism 369 Feminist approaches 369 Theorizing the transformation oflove and intimacy 371 Conclusion: the debate about family values 376 Sllmmary points 378 Fllrther reading 380 Internet links 381 Romantic love has not always been at the centre of intimate relationships. Have you ever been in love? Almost certainly you have. Most people from their teens onwards know what being in love is like. Love and romance provide, for manyofus, some ofthe mostintense feelings we everexperience. But whydo people fall inlove?The answeratfirst sight seems obvious. Love expresses a mutual and physical attachment that two individuals feel for one another. These days, we might be sceptical of the idea that love is 'for ever', but falling in love, we tend to think, is an experience arising from universal human emotions. It seems natural for a couple who fall in love also to want personal and sexual fulfilment in their relationship, perhaps by marrying and/or starting a family. Yet this situation, which may just appear 'natural' to most of us today, is in fact very unusual. Beginning a long-term partnership, or starting a family, with someone with whom you have fallen in love is not an experience that most people across the world have. In early modern Europe, royal and aristocratic marriages were very often arranged primarily on political grounds, or for reasons of enhancing or maintaining family status. And although 'arranged marriages' across the world are now less common than once they were, amongst certain South Asian communities, they remain the norm. In all these cases, falling in love is rarely thought of as having any connection to marriage or starting a family. The idea of basing a long-term partnership on romantic love did not become widespread in European societies until fairly recently, and has never existed at all in many other cultures where more material or pragmatic reasons take precedence. Onlyin modern times have love and sexuality come to be seen as closely connected in the Western industrialized societies. John Boswell, a historian ofmedieval Europe, has remarked on the unusual nature of modern ideas about romantic love. In Europe during the Middle Ages, virtually no one married for love; there was even a medieval saying: 'To love one's wife with one's emotions is adultery.' In those days and for centuries afterwards, men and women married mainly in order to keep property in the hands of the family or to raise children for working on the family farm. Once married, they may have become close companions, but this happened after marriage rather than before. People sometimes had sexual affairs outside marriage, but these inspired few of the emotions we currently associate with love. Romantic love was regarded as at best a weakness and at worst a kind of sickness. Modern attitudes today are almost completely the opposite. Boswell quite rightly speaks of the 'virtual obsession of modern industrial culture' with romantic love: Those immersed in this 'sea of love' tend to take it for granted.... Very few premodern or non-industrialized contemporary cultures would agree with the contention - uncontroversial in the West- that 'the purpose of a man is to love a woman, and the purpose of a woman is to love a man.' Most human beings in most times and places would find this a very meagre measure ofhuman value! (BoswellI995: xix) It was only in the late eighteenth century that the concept of romantic love began to make its presence felt. Romantic love - as distinct from the near universal compulsions of passionate love - involved idealizing its object. The' notion of romantic love more or less coincided with the emergence ofthe novel as a literary form and the spread of romantic novels played a vital part in spreading the idea (Radway 1984). For women in particular, romantic love involved telling stories about how the relationship could lead to personal fulfilment. Romantic love, therefore, cannot be understood as a natural part of human life; rather, it has been shaped bybroad social and historical influences. For most people in the industrialized world today, the couple married or unmarried - is at the core ofwhat the family is. The couple came to be at the centre of family life as the economic role of the family dwindled and love, or love and sexual attraction, became the basis of forming marriage ties. However, we will also see later in this chapter that the term 'family' should by no means only be understood as involving a heterosexual couple. and their children. Today, most people in the developed countries believe that a good relationship is based on emotional communication or intimacy. The idea .of intimacy, like so many other familiar notions we have discussed in this book, is arecent one. Marriage was never in the past based on intimacy and emotional communication, and although this was important to a good marriage, it was not the foundation of it. For the modern couple, it is. Communication is the means of establishing a good relationship in the first place, and it is the chief rationale for its continuation. A good relationship is a relationship of equals, in which both parties have equal rights and obligations. In such a relationship, each person has respect, and wants the best, for the other. Talk, or dialogue, is the basis of making the relationship work. Relationships function best if people do not hide too much from each other: there has to be mutual trust. And trust has to be worked at; it cannot just be taken for granted. Finally, a good relationship is one free from arbitrary power, coercion or violence (Giddens 1993). The theme of much of this book has been social change. We Jive in a turbulent, difficult and unfamiliar world today. Whether we like it or not, we all must come to terms with the mixture of opportunity and risk it presents. The discussion of romantic love shows that nowhere is this observation truer than in the domain of personal and emotional life. How do we begin to understand the nature of these changes and their impact on our lives? It is only possible to understand what is going on with intimate relationships and with the family as a social institution today if we know something about how people lived in the past and how people currently live in societies across the world. So in this chapter, we look at the historical development ofmarriage and the family. We then examine families and intimate relationships in Europe, using Britain - the first industrializing society (see chapter 4) - as a reference point for our national comparisons. The final section of the chapter looks at some of the theoretical perspectives that attempt to explain the family and intimate relationships, before concluding by turning to the current debate on 'family values'. Basic concepts We need first of all to define some basic co ncepts, particularly those of family, kinship and marriage. Afamily is a group of persons directly linked by kin connections, Families and Intimate Relationships the adult members ofwhom assume responsibility for caring for children. Kinship ties are connections between individuals. estab· lished either through marriage or through the lines of descent that connect blood relatives (mothers, fathers, siblings, offspring, etc.). Marriage can be defined as a socially acknowledged and approved sexual union between two adult individuals. When two people marry, they become kin to one another; the marriage bond also, however, connects together a wider range of kinspeople. Parents, brothers, sisters and other blood relatives become relatives of the partner through marriage. Family relationships are always recognized within wider kinship groups. In virtually all societies we can identify what sociologists and anthropologists call the nuclear family, two adults living together with their own or adopted children in a household. Households are single individuals or groups of people who share a common housing unit, common living rooms and the essentials for living, such as food. In most traditional societies, the nuclear family was part of a larger kinship network of some type. When close relatives other than a married couple and children live either in the same household or in a close and continuous relationship with one another, we speak of an extended family. An extended family may include grandparents, brothers and their wives, sisters and their husbands, aunts and nephews. In most Western societies, marriage, and therefore the family, are associated with monogamy. It is illegal for a man or woman to be married to more than one spouse at anyone time. This is not the case everywhere, however. In a famous comparison of several hundred societies in the mid-twentieth century, George Peter Murdock (1949) found that polygamy, which allows a husband or wife to have more than one spouse, was permitted in more than 80 per cent of them. There are two types of polygamy: polygyny, in which a man may be married to more than one woman at the FAMILIES AND INTIMATE RELATIO NSH IPS same time, and polyandry, much less common, in which a woman may have two or more husbands simultaneously. In 1998, the Ethnographic Atlas Codebook reported that of 1,231 societies worldwide, 453 had occasional polygyny, 588 had more regular polygyny and just 4 had polyandry - a total of 84 per cent, a similar proportion to that found by Murdock 50 years earlier. The majorityofthese polygamous societies were in parts of Africa and South Asia. The bestknown group to practise polygamy in the West are the Fundamentalist Mormons, based largely in Utah, in the United States, where although the practice is illegal, prosecutions are rare. The practice of having many wives was abandoned by mainstream Mormons a century ago as a condition of Utah becoming part of the United States. It is estimated that 30,000 fundamentalists still practise polygamy in Utah. Many sociologists believe that we cannot speak about 'the family' as ifthere isjust one model of family life that is more or less universal. There are many different family forms: two-parent families, step-families, lone-parent families and so on. The sociolo, gist Diana Gittins (1993) has argued that it seems more appropriate to speak of 'families' rather than 'the family'. Referring to 'families' emphasizes the diversity of family forms. While as a shorthand term we may often speak of 'the family', it is vital to remember what a variety this covers. The family in historical context Sociologists once thought that, prior to the modern period, the predominant form of family in Western Europe was of the extended type. Research has shown this view to be mistaken. The nuclear family, consisting of a father, mother and depend- \ ent children, seems long to have been preeminent. Pre-modern household size was larger than it is today, but the difference is not especially great. In England, for example, throughout the seventeenth,eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the average household size was~5 persons (though An unusual family photograph showing Utah polygamist Thm Green with his five wives and some of his 29 children. this included domestic servants). Today the average household size in the UK is around 2.4 people (HMSO 2004), though this masks some large differences across ethnic groups. For example, white British and black Caribbean households average 2.2 people, while Bangladeshi and Pakistani households average 4.4 and 4.1 persons respectively (HMSO 2007). The UK, Germany, France and the Netherlands lie at the lower end ofthe European spectrum ofhousehold size; Portugal, Spain, Malta and Slovakia are at the higher end, averaging around 3.0 persons per household (Eurostat 2007). The development of family life I Children in pre-modern Europe were often working - helping their parents on the farm - from the age of 7 or 8. Those who did not remain in the family enterprise frequently left the parental household at an early age to do domestic work in the houses of others or to follow apprenticeships. Children who went away to work in other households would rarely see their parents again. Other factors made family groups even more impermanent than they are now, in spite of the currently high rates of divorce. Rates ofmortality (the number ofdeaths per 1,000 of the population in anyone year) for people of all ages were much higher. Aquarter or more of all infants in early modern Europe did not survive beyond the first year of life, in contrast to well under 1 per cent today, and women frequently died in childbirth. The death ofchildren or ofone or both spouses often shattered family relations. The historian John Boswell (mentioned at the start of this chapter) has noted; In premodern Europe marriage usually began as a property arrangement, was in its middle mostly about raising children, and ended about love. Few couples in fact married 'for love', but many grew to love each other in time as they jointly managed their household, reared their offspring, and shared life's experiences. Nearly all surviving epitaphs to spouses evince Families and Intimate Relationships profound affection. By contrast, in most of the modern West, marriage begins about love, in its middle is still mostly about raising children (if there are children), and ends - often - about property, by which point love is absent or a distant memory. (1995: xxi) The way we never were? Myths of the traditional family Many people, generally writing from a conservative point ofview, argue that family life is becoming dangerously undermined. They contrast what they see as the decline of the family with more traditional and stable forms offamily life. But was the family ofthe past as peaceful and harmonious as many people recall it, or is this simply an idealized fiction? In The Way We Never Were (1992), Stephanie Coontz points out that, as with other visions of a previous golden age, the rosy light shed on the 'traditional family' dissolves when we look back to previous times to see what things really were like. Many admire the apparent discipline and stability ofthe nineteenth-centuryVictorian family. However, because families at this time suffered especially high death rates, the average length of marriages was fewer than 12 years, and more than half of all children saw the death of at least one parent by the time they were 21. The admired discipline of the Victorian family was rooted in the.strict authority of parents over their children. The ~ay-inwhIch- this authority was exercised would be considered exceedingly harsh by today's standards. If we consider the Victorian family of the 1850s, the ideal family still eludes us. In this period, some middle-class wives were more or less confined to the home. According to Victorian morality, women were meant to be strictlyvirtuous, while men were sexually licentious: many visited prostitutes and paid regular visits to brothels. In fact, wives and husbands often had little to do with one another, communicating only through their children. Moreover, domesticity was not even an option for poorer social groups of Classic Studies 9.1 Lawrence Stone on the family in Europe The research problem Modern families seem very different from previous families. No one can be unaware that modern family life has undergone much change even within a single generation. But what were families like hundreds ofyears ago? Did people have the same attitudes to sex and marriage? VVhat functions did families perform in earlier societies? In The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England, 1500-1800 (1980), historical sociologist, Lawrence Stone, tried to answer these questions, charting some key changes leading from premodern to modern forms of family life in Europe. In doing so, he distinguished three phases in the development of the family from the 1500s to the 1800s. Stone's explanation In the early 1500s, the main English family form was a type of nuclear family People lived in fairly small households but maintained relationships that were embedded within the communitje including other kin. Families were not so clearly separated from the community as many are today. Stone argues that the family at that time was not a major focus of emotional attachment or dependence for its members. For example, people did not experience, or look for, the emotional closeness that we associate with family life today. Sex within marriage was not regarded as a source ofpleasure, but as a necessity to propagate children.Individual freedom of choice in marriage and other matters offamily life were subordinated to the interests ofparents, other kin or the community Outside aristocratic circles, where it was sometimes actively encouraged, erotic or romantic love was regarded by moralists and theolOgians as a sickness. As Stone puts it, the family during this period 'was an open-ended,low-keyed, unemotional, authoritarian institution. ... It was also very short-lived, being frequently dissolved by the death of the husband or wife or the death or very early departure from the home of the children' (1980: 17). This type of family was succeeded by a 'transitional form' that lasted from the early seventeenth century to the beginning of the eighteenth. This later type was largely confined to the upper reaches of society, but it was very important because from it spread attitudes that have since become almost universal.The nuclear family became a more separate entitje distinct from ties to other kin and to the local community. There was a growing stress on the importance of marital and parental love, although there was also an increase in the authoritarian power of fathers. In the third phase, the type of family we are most familiar with in the West today gradually evolved.This family is a group tied by close emotional bonds, enjoying a high degree of domestic privacy, preoccupied with the rearing of children It is marked by the rise of ~ve I ~~sm - the formation of marriage ties on the basis of personal selection, guided by sexual attraction or romantic love. Sexual aspects of love came to be glorified within marriage instead of in extramarital relationships. The family became geared to consumption rather than production,as a result ofthe increasing number of workplaces that were separate from the home. Women became associated with domesticity and men with being 'breadwinners'. In recent decades, the idea of a male breadwinner 'heading' the family is being increasingly challenged, as more women enter the workplace and family structures continue to diversify. Critical points Stone's three-phase history has been subjected to much critique. First,a series of medieval historians has shown, against his thesis,that love was quite often found in English marriages before the eighteenth century. Second, many have seen Stone's main arguments as rather unoriginal. For instance, describing the demise of extended kin groups and the consequent rise of individualism was a theme in the work of Max Weber and other early social scientists.Third, Stone's linkage of the lack of emotional closeness to harsh material conditions oflife ignores many anthropological studies documenting very loving relationships within family groups in very poor communities (by modern standards). Stone's theory of emotional development then appears much weaker. Contemporary significance The critical reception ofStone's work has led to some significant revisions to his long story of English family history However,social science research often develops through empirical criticism of bold theses such as Stone's, which point out where the theory's generalizations claim more than the evidence will support. No single piece ofresearch in historical sociology will ever tell us the whole truth about a period covering as long as three centuries, but the contemporary value ofStone's work is twofold. First,it stimulated others to try and prove him wrong, to refute the thesis in some way and,in so doing,we gained more accurate knowledge of an earlier period of social life; second, Stone was not afraid to adopt a sociological imagination in his study ofhistorical matenals, looking for patterns in social development. This is an important aspect of sociological work,which can be traced all the way back to the discipline's founders. this period. In factories and workshops, families worked long hours with little time for a home life, Child labour was also very common in these groups. OUI most recent memory draws us to the 1950s as the time of another possible 'ideal family'. This was a period when many women worked in the home, while men were perceived as responsible for earning the 'family wage'. Yet large numbers of women did not actually want to retreat to a purely domestic role, and felt miserable and trapped in it. Many women had held paid jobs during the Second World War as part of the war effort and they lost these jobs when men returned home. Men were still emotionally removed from their wives and often observed a strong sexual double standard, seeking sexual adventures for themselves but setting a strict code for their spouse. The American author Betty Friedan (1921- 2006) wrote a best-selling book, The Feminine Mystique (1963), about women's lives in the 1950s. Friedan struck a chord with many thousands of women within and outside the USA when she spoke of the 'problem with no name'.That is, the ~~ sive nature of a clomeS!i~!!f~ound up with childcare, domestic drud-ger'y -iind a hu,sband who only occ-asi;;-~ally put in an appearance and with whom little emotional communication was possible. Even more severe than an oppressive home life were the ~lcoholism and violence suffered within many--familie~ duri;:;-g ~-iime when society was not fully prepared to conftont these issues. As sociologists, we must be careful not to let people's ideas of how society ought to be affect our reporting of the evidence of society's reality, however disturbing that might be. THINKING CRITICALLY If the traditional family, as described above, is 'a myth', why do so many people still believe in it?What social consequences might follow from people's belief in and commitment to this mythical family form? Families in global context There is a diversity of family forms today in different societies across the world. In some areas, such as more remote regions in Asia, Africa and the Pacific Rim, traditional family systems are little altered. In most developing countries, however, widespread changes are occurring.The origins of these changes are complex, but several factors can be picked out as especially important. Was the nuclear family ever really the norm? One is the s~"d ofWestern culture. ~ste!n ideals of r()mantic love, for example, have spread to societies in which they were previously unknown. Another factor is the development of centralized government in areas p-reviously composed of autonomous smaller societies. People's lives become il1Quenced by ..!.heir involvement in a n~iOE(:l1 jJQlitic_~L system; moreover, governments make active attempts to alter traditional ways of behaviour. Because of the problem of rapidly expanding population growth, for example in China, states frequently introduce programmes that advocate smaller families, the use of contraception, and so forth. A further influence is the large-scale migration from rural to urban areas. Often men go to work in towns or cities, leaving family members in the home village. Alternatively, a nuclear family group will move as a unit to the city. In both cases, traditional family forms and kinship systems may become weakened. Finally, and perhaps most important, employment opportunities away from the land and in such organizations as government bureaucracies, mines, plantations and - where they exist - industrial firms tend to have disruptive consequences for family systems previously centred on landed production in the local community. In general, these changes can be seen as creating a worldwide movement towards the breaking down of extended family systems and household kinship groups, though relations between kinspeople continue to be important sources of social bonds. William J. Goode first documented the decline of extended families in his book World Revolution in Family Patterns (1963), and though the trends he identified were appropriate given the evidence available at the time, it is now clear that, globally, families are developing in a variety of different directions. Asignificant criticism ofGoode's argument is its reliance on structural functionalist theory, as set out by Talcott Parsons (see chapter 3 for a discussion of Parsons's ideas). For example, Goode argued that as the process of modernization spread across the world, it is likely that the 'conjugal [or nuclear) family' would become the dominant form because of its close 'fit' with the needs ofindustrialization and industrial culture. Since the 1960s though, the pace of social change and its impact on families has led to some changes that Goode simply could not have foreseen and, as we will see later in this chapter, families today seem to be more notable for their diverse range of forms than for their uniform character. Recent empirical studies ofthe family in a global perspective have reinforced this conclusion. One important recent study is Swedish sociologist G6ran Therborn's Between Sex and Power (2004), an extensive global history of the family over the entire twentieth century and thus beyond Goode's timeframe. Therborn discusses five major family types that have been shaped by particular religious or philosophical worldviews:sub-Saharan African (Animist); European/North American (Christian); East Asian (Confucian); SouthAsian (Hindu) and WestAsia/North Africa (Islamic).1Wo others - the Southeast Asian and Creole American - are described as 'interstitial systems', combining elements from more than one of the five major types. The institution of the family, Therborn argues, has been structured by three central elements across all these familial types: patriarchy or male dominance, marriage and non-marriage in the regulation of sexual behaviour, and fertility and birtb control measures in tbe production of demograpbic trends. Focusing on tbese three elements allows international comparisons to be made. We can take each element in turn. Patriarchal power within the family bas generally declined over the twentieth Families and Intimate Relationships century. He identifies two key periods of cbange. Tbe first was after the First World War, when women were needed to work for the war effort, and the Russian Revolution, which challenged the patriarchal ideology of women's 'natural' domestic role in favour of egalitarian ideals. The second was between the sexual revolution of the late 1960s and the 1975 'International Women's Year', when second-wave feminism reinforced the shifting position of women in society, gaining legislative measures to enable women formally to participate in public life outside of their domestic role. The second period of change, argues Therborn, was more noticeable in Europe and America, with less pronounced changes in tbe family situations ofSouthAsia, WestAsia and North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. In more recent years, he sees evidence that the economic power of women has been growing in the textile and electronics industries in tbe developing world, which could resbape patriarcbal family relations there too. Marriage and family patterns have cbanged across the world in tbe twentieth century, but Tberborn's studies lead to a different conclusion from that reached in Goode's earlier work. The different family types are notbecoming increasingly similar, conforming to the Western nuclear family model. In most developed countries, intimate relationships have become more open and less bound by tradition, especially since the 1960s. The combination of increasing rates of divorce, high remarriage rates and more people Jiving alone seems to disprove the thesis of a convergence of family structures, even in the West. Therborn also argues that there is no evidence that such change and fluidity in family life is spreading globally. For example, in most of Asia, people remain committed to monogamy within marriage, wbile in sub-Saharan Africa, polygamous relationships continue to be the norm. The nuclear family, so important in functionalist theory, does not look set to dominate in the twenty-first century. FAMILIES AND INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS Finally, Therborn sees possibly the major change of the last century to be a falling global fertility rate, with the significant exception of sub-Saharan Africa. This is the product of more effective birth control methods, rising economic prosperity and the increasing movement ofwomen into the paid workforce, thereby improving their own position within societies. As we discuss in detail in chapter 8, 'The Life-Course', such demographic changes will mean, for most countries, that populations will decline and societies will 'age', with a higher proportion of older people living longer. If diversity is the most notable feature of families across the world, are there any general patterns emerging? Perhaps the most important general changes we can observe at this point are: 1 Clans and other kin-based groups are declining in influence. 2 There is a widespread trend towards the free selection of a spouse. 3 The rights ofwomen are becoming more widely recognized, in respect to both the initiation of marriage and decisionmaking within the family. 4 Higher levels ofsexual freedom, for men and women, are developing in some societies that were previously very restrictive. 5 There is a general trend towards the extension ofchildren's rights. 6 There is an increased acceptance of same-sex partnerships, though this is unevenly distributed across the world's societies. It would be a mistake to exaggerate these trends; many of them are still being fought for and are bitterly contested. For example, the suppression of women's rights in Afghanistan under the Taliban from 1996 to 2001 - discussed in chapter 22, 'Politics, Government and Social Movements' shows that such trends are not uniform. Moreover, there are differences in the speed at which change is occurring, and there are reversals and countertrends that have to be considered too. Families and intimate relationships Given the culturally diverse character of modern societies, there are considerable variations in family and marriage too. Some of the most striking include differences between family patterns of white and nonwhite people, and we need to consider why this is so. We will then move on to examine issues surrounding divorce and remarriage in relation to contemporary patterns of family life. Let us first, however, describe some basic characteristics which nearly all families in Britain, most of Europe and the industrialized world share. Key features of the family in European and other Western countries, include the following: 1 The family is monogamous, monogamy being established in law. Given the high rate of divorce that now exists in the industrialized countries, however, some observers have suggested that this marriage pattern should be called serial monogamy. That is to say, individuals are permitted to have a number of spouses in sequence, although no one may have more than one wife or husband at anyone time. It is misleading, though, to muddle legal monogamy with sexual practice. It is obvious that a high proportion of Europeans engage in sexual relations with individuals other than their spouses. 2 European marriage is based on the idea ofromantic love. Affective individualism has become the major influence. Couples are expected to develop mutual affection, based on personal attraction and compatibility, as a basis for contracting marriage relationships. Romantic love as part of marriage has become 'naturalized' in the developed world; it seems to be a normal part of human existence. rather than a distinctive feature of modern culture. Of course, the reality is divergent from the ideology. The emphasis on personal satisfactio n in marriage has raised expectations which sometimes cannot be met,and this is one factor involved in the increasing rate of divorce. 3 The modern family is patrilineal and neo- Iocal. Patrilineal inheritance involves children taking the surname of the father. In the past it also meant that property would usually pass down the male line, although this is far less common today. (Many societies in the developing world are matrilineal surnames, and often property, pass down the female line.) Aneo-local residence pattern involves a married couple moving into a dwelling away from both their families. Neo-Iocalism, however, is not an absolutely fixed trait of European family life. Many families, particularly in poorer, working-class or South Asian neighbourhoods, are matrilocal - the newly weds settle in an area close to where the bride's parents live (if the couple lives near or with the groom's parents, it is called patrilocal). 4 The modern family is often described as nuclear, consisting ofone or two parents living in a household with their children, although nuclear family units are by no means completely isolated ftom other kin ties. However, the dominance of the nuclear family is being eroded in the industrialized world, as we will see below. Development and diversity in family patterns In the 1980s, Rapoport et al. argued that, 'families in Britain today are in transition from coping in a society in which there was a single overriding norm of what a family should be like to a society in which a plurality of norms are recognised as legitimate Families and Intimate Relationships and, indeed,desirable' (1982: 476). Substantiating this argument, they identified five types of diversity: organizational, cultural, class, life-courseand cohort. We could add to this list sexual diversity. The diversity of family forms that Rapoport et al. identified is even more obvious across European societies today than when they first wrote about Britain in 1982. Socialization and life stages are also discussed in chapter 8, 'The Life- Course', FamiJies organize their respective individual domestic duties and their links with the wider social environment in a variety of ways. The contrast between 'orthodox' families - the woman as 'housewife', the husband as 'breadwinner' - and dual-career or one-parent families illustrates this diversity. Culturally, there is greater diversity of family benefits and values than used to be the case. The presence of ethnic minorities (such as families of South Asian or West Indian origin, which are discussed below) and the influence of movements such as feminism have produced considerable cultural variety in family forms. Persistent class divisions between the poor, the skilled working classes and the various groupings within the middle and upper classes sustain major variations in family structure. Variations in family experience during the lifecourse are fairly obvious. For instance, one individual might come into a family in which both parents had stayed together, and go on to marry and then divorce. Another person might be brought up in a Single-parent family, be multiply married and have children by each marriage. The term cohort refers to generations within fam ilies. Connections between parents and grandparents, for example, have probably now become weaker than they were. On the other hand, more people now live into old age,and three 'ongoing' families might exist in close relation to one another: married grandchildren, their parents and the grandparents. There is also greater sexual diversity in family organizations than ever before. As homosexuality becomes increasingly accepted in manyWestern societies, partnerships and families are formed based on partnerships between homosexual as well as heterosexual couples. Gay marriage and civil partnerships are discussed in chapter 14,'Sexuality and Gender', South Asian families Among the variety offamily types in Europe, there is one pattern distinctively different from most others - that associated with South Asian groups. The South Asian population of the UK numbers more than a million people today. Migration began in the 1950s from three main areas of the Indian subcontinent: Punjab, Gujarat and Bengal. In Britain, these migrants formed commun.ities based on religion, area of origin,caste and, most importantly, kinship. Many migrants found their ideas of honour and family loyalty almost entirely absent among the indigenous British population. They tried to maintain family unity, but housing proved a problem. Large old houses were available in run-down areas; moving up-market usually meant moving into smaller houses and breaking up the extended family. South Asian extended families show strong familial bonds. South Asian children born in Europe today are often exposed to two very different cultures. At home, their parents expect or demand conformity to the norms of cooperation, respect and family loyalty. At school, they are expected to pursue academic success in a competitive and individualistic social environment. Most choose 10 organize their domestic and personal lives in terms of the ethnic subculture, as theyvalue the close relationships associated with traditional family life. Yet involvement with Western culture has brought changes. The Western tradition of marrying 'for love' frequently comes into conflict with the practice of arranged marriages within Asian communities. Such unions, arranged by parents and family members, are predicated on the belief that love comes from within marriage. Young people ofboth sexes are demanding greater consultation in the arrangement oftheir marriages. Statistical findings from the UK Policy Study Institute's fourth national survey of ethnic minorities (Modood et al. 1997) indicate that Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and African-Asians were the ethnic groups most likely to be married. In 2001, among all families with dependent children, 65 per cent of Asian or Asian British one-family households consisted of a married couple, while among whites and AfricanCaribbeans, the percentages were somewhat lower. Cohabitation was proportionately smaller amongst Asian and Asian British couples with children than it was amongst other ethnic groups (see table 9.1). Although there appear to be some signs of change among South Asian families in Britain - such as young people wanting a greater say in marriages and a slight rise in divorces and lone-parent households - on the whole, South Asian ethnic groups in the UK and across Europe continue to have remarkably strong familial bonds. Blackfamilies Families of African-Caribbean ongm in Europe have a different structure again. In Families and Intimate Relationships the UK there are far fewer black women aged between 20 and 44 living with a husband than there are white women in the same age group. Rates of divorce and separation are higher among AfricanCaribbeans than among other eth nic groups in Britain. As a result, lone-parent households are more common among African-Caribbeans than among any other ethnic minority; yet, unlike other groups, single African-Caribbean mothers are more likely to be employed (Modood et al. 1997). The high proportion of lone-parent families (the vast majority of which are headed by the mother) amongst the black or black British population compared to other ethnic groups can be seen in table 9.1. In the UK, the same factors seem to be at work among black families in the poorer neighbourhoods of London and other European cities. Many discussions of black families concentrate on the low rates of formal marriage, but some observers believe that this emphasis is misplaced. The marriage relationship does not necessarily form the structure of the black family as it does for the family in other groups. Extended kinship networks are important in West Indian groups - much more significant, relative to marital ties, than in most white European communities. A mother heading a lone-parent family is likely to have a close and supportive network of relatives to depend on. Siblings also play an important role in many African-Caribbean families by helping to raise younger children (Chamberlain 1999). This contradicts the idea that black single parents and their children necessarily form unstable fami- lies. Inequality within the family Balancing work and care Gender inequalities vary across the world's societies. A 2007 survey by the World Economic Forum found that women had made the most progress towards equal participation in Sweden, with Norway, Table 9.1 British families with dependent children: by ethnic group,a 2001 (%) One family All Other households households Married Cohabiting Lone-parent with couple couple families families White 60 Mixed 38 Asian or Asian British Indian 68 Pakistani 61 BangladeshI 63 Other Asian 66 All Asian or AsIan British 65 Black or black British Black Canbbean 29 BlackAfncan 38 Other Black 24 All black or black British 32 Chinese 69 Other ethruc group 67 All ethnic groups 60 ~ Ofhousehold reference person Source HJvlSO SOCial 'fiends 34 (2004).28 Finland and Iceland making up the top four standings. The UK came ninth. Yemen came in last, with Saudi Arabia, Chad and Pakistan completing the bottom four positions. However, in balancing work and care, one of the major factors affecting women's careers is the male perception that for female employees, work comes second to having children. One study carried out in Britain in the mid-1980s investigated the views of managers interviewing female applicants for positions as technical staff in the health services (Homans 1987). The researchers found that the interviewers always asked the women about whether or not they had, or intended to have, children (in 2004 a 12 I I 2 2 2 3 2 11 7 9 9 3 3 11 families dependent children 22 6 100 39 12 100 10 21 100 13 24 100 12 23 100 12 19 100 II 22 100 48 12 100 36 19 100 52 15 100 43 15 100 15 13 100 18 12 100 22 7 100 European Directive formally prohibited 'discrimination on grounds of pregnancy and maternity'). They virtually never followed this practice with male applicants. When asked why, two themes ran through their answers: women with children may require extra time off for school holidays or if a child falls sick, and responsibility for childcare is a mother's problem rather than a parental one. Some managers thought their questions indicated an attitude of 'caring' towards female employees. But most saw such a line of questioning as part of their task to assess how far a female applicant would prove a reliable colleague. Thus, one manager remarked: There is a high proportion oflone parents amongst the UK's African-Caribbean population. It's a bit ofa personal question, Iappreciate that, but Ithink it's something that has to be considered. tt's something that cannot happen to a man really. but Isuppose in a sense it's unfair - it's not equal opportunity because the man could never find himself having a familyas such. (Homans 1987) While men cannot biologically 'have a family' in the sense ofbearing children, they can be fully involved in and responsible for childcare. Such a possibility was not taken into account by any of the managers studied. The same attitudes were held about the promotion of women. Women were seen as likely to interrupt their careers to care for young children, no matter how senior a position they might have reached. The few women in this study who held senior management positions were all vvithout children, and several of those who planned to have children in the future said they intended to leave their jobs and would perhaps retrain for other positions subsequently. Most managers accepted tlle principle that women should have the same career opportunities as men, but the bias in their attitudes was closely linked to cultural ideas of who is responsible for parenting. In addition, as we saw earlier, the average wage of employed women is well below that of men, although the difference has narrowed somewhat over the past 30 years. In the 25 countries of the European Union, the gender pay gap (the difference between average gross hourly pay of men and women) in 2004 stood at 15 per cent, though this has reduced from 17 per cent in 1998 (Eurastat 2007). Even vvithin the same occupational categories, women on average earn lower salaries than men. In Working Women Don't Have Wives (1994), Terri Apter argues that women find themselves strugglingwith two contradictory forces. They want and need economic independence, but at the same time they want to be mothers to their children. Both goals are reasonable, but while men with wives who take prime responsibility for domestic work can achieve them, women cannot do likewise. Greater flexibility in working life is one partial solution. Much more difficult is getting men to alter their attitudes. THINKING CRITICALLY List all of the factors you can think of as to why men tend not to be as involved in domestic tasks as women.What connections are there between these factors and social stereotypes of men and women? How could such gendered stereotypes be changed? Housework Although there have been revolutionary changes in women's status in recent decades in Europe, incJudingthe entry ofwomen into male-dominated professions, one area of work has lagged far behind: housework. Because of the increase in the number of married women in the workforce, and their resulting change in status, it was presumed that men would contribute more to housework. On the whole, this has not been the case. Although men now do more housework than they did three decades ago and women do slightly less (as can be seen from the data in table 9.2), the balance is still unequal and varies widely across Europe. In Greece, Turkey and Malta the female- male difference in time spent on housework remains more than 70 per cent, a disparity that reduces to below 30 per cent in Sweden and Denmark. The European average gender difference sits at 53 per cent, which indicates that in the area ofhousework, at least, gender equality still has quite a way to go. This conclusion is borne out in many European studies. Surveys in the UK have found that women still do the majority of housework and childcare, on average spending 4 hours 3 minutes per day on these activities compared to 2 hours 17 minutes for men (HMSO 2005). Some sociologists have argued that where women are alreadyworking in the paid sector, this extra work, in effect, amounts to a 'second shift' (Hochschild 1989; Shelton 1992). In the late 1980s, findings like these led Arlie Hochschild to call the state of relations between women and men a 'stalled revolution'. Why does housework remain women's work? This question has been the focus of a good deal of research in recent years. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that it is the result of economic forces: household work is exchanged for economic support. Because women earn, on average,less than men, they are more likely to remain economically dependent on their husbands and thus perform the bulk of the housework. Until the earnings gap is narrowed, women are likely to remain in their dependent position. Hochschild (1989) has suggested thatwomen are thus doubly oppressed by men: once during the 'first shift' and then again during the 'second shift'. But while this dependency model contributes to our understanding of the gendered aspects of housework, it starts to break down when applied to situations where the wife earns more than her husband. For instance, of the husbands studies by Hochschild who earned less than their wives, none ofthem shared in the housework. The problem can be approached from a symbolic interactionist perspective, asking how the performance or non-performance of housework is related to the gender roles created by society. For example, through interviews and participant observation, Hochschild found that the assignment of household tasks falls clearly along gendered lines. Wives do most of the daily chores, such as cooking and routine cleaning, while husbands tend to take on more occasional tasks, such as mowing the lawn or doing home repairs. The major difference between these two types of task is the amount of control the individual has over People doing daily housework in Europe (%) COlUltry Sex respondent Total Female-Male Male Female difference Finland 64 95 79 31 Sweden 65 90 77 25 Romania 60 93 76 33 Derunark 65 86 74 21 HlUlgary 46 93 70 47 Slovakia 47 92 70 45 Luxembourg 44 92 69 48 Belgiwn 44 91 68 47 Estonia 53 84 68 31 Bulgaria 33 95 66 62 Lithuania 44 90 66 46 Netherlands 47 86 66 39 Germany 36 90 64 54 Latvia 43 86 64 42 Portugal 27 96 62 69 France 32 86 61 64 Slovenia 30 96 61 66 Austria 28 89 59 61 Greece 18 94 59 76 UK 36 80 58 44 Italy 26 88 57 62 Turkey 15 91 57 76 Ireland 33 78 56 45 Malta 21 91 54 70 Cyprus 19 80 53 61 European average* 35 88 62 53 * Sample was weighted accordmg to the populatJ.on size of each country Source 'VOlcu,B, BOlCU, M and Strapcova.K (2007) Engendered Housework A Cross EuropeanAnalyslS (IRISS Working Paper. May 2007) FAMILIES AND INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS when they do the work. The jobs done by women in the home are those that tend to bind them to a fixed schedule, whereas men's household tasks are done less regularlyand are more discretionary. In Feeding the Family (1991), the sociologist Marjorie Devault looked at how the caring activities within a household are socially constructed as women's work. She argues that women perform the bulk of the housework because the family 'incorporates a strong and relatively enduring association of caring activity with the woman's position in the household'. Observing the division of responsibility for cooking, Devault remarks that the gendered relations of feeding and eating 'convey the message that giving service is part of being a woman, and receiving it is fundamentally part of being a man'. Even in households where men contribute, an egalitarian division of household labour between spouses is greatly impeded when the couple have children - children require constant attention, and their care schedules are often unpredictable. Mothers overwhelmingly spend more time on childrearing tasks than do their spouses (Shelton 1992). Sociologists argue that underlying this inequitable distribution of tasks is the implicit understanding that men and women are responsible for, and should operate in, different spheres. Men are expected to be providers, while women are expected to tend to their families - even if they are breadwinners as well as mothers. Expectations like this reinforce traditional gender roles learned during childhood socialization. By reproducing these roles in everyday life, men and women 'do gender' and reinforce gender as a means for society to differentiate between men and women. Intimate violence Since family or kin relations form part of everyone's existence, family life encompasses virtually the whole range of emotional experience. Family relationships - between wife and husband, parents and children, brothers and sisters, or distant relatives - can be warm and fulfilling. But they can equally well contain the most pronounced tensions, driving people to despair or filling them with a deep sense of anxiety and guilt. This side of family life belies the rosy images of harmony that are quite often emphasized in TV commercials and elsewhere in the popular media. Domestic violence and the abuse of children are two of the most disturbing aspects. Sexual abuse ofchildren The sexual abuse of children can be defined as the carrying out of sexual acts by adults with children below the age of consent (16 years old in Britain). Incest refers to sexual relations between close kin. Not all incest counts as child sexual abuse. For example, sexual intercourse between brother and sister is incestuous, but does not fit the definition ofabuse. In child sexual abuse, an adult is essentially exploiting an infant or child for sexual purposes. Nevertheless, the most common form of incest is one that is also child sexual abuse - incestuous relations between fathers and young daughters. Incest, and child sexual abuse more generally, are phenomena that have been 'discovered' only in the past few decades. Of course it has long been known that such sexual acts occur, but it was assumed by most social observers that the strong taboos that exist against this behaviour meant that it was extremely uncommon. This is not the case. Child sexual abuse has proved to be disturbingly commonplace. It is probably found more often among poorer families, but exists at all levels of the social hierarchy - as well as in institutions. Although in its more obvious versions its nature is plain, the full extent ofchild sexual abuse is difficult, ifnot impossible, to calculate accurately because of the many forms it can assume. Corrine May-Chahal and Maria Herczog's (2003) 'informed estimate' suggests that 10-20 per cent of children in Europe will be sexually assaulted during Families can be the setting ofviolence and tension as well as affection and support,with children later replicating their experiences in adulthood and parenthood, their childhood, The 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child helped to raise awareness of child sexual abuse and, in a 1999 survey, only 1 per cent of Europeans had never heard ofchild sexual abuse within the family, In the same survey, 97 per cent thought that child sexual ahuse was a form of violence (ibid,), However, no fully agreed definitions of either child abuse in general or child sexual /abuse in particular have been arrived at, either by researchers or in the courts, and this makes cross-national comparisons highly unreliable, In the UK, one section of the Children Act 1989 speaks of 'significant harm' being caused by lack of reasonable care - but what is 'significant' is left quite vague, The National Societyfor the Prevention ofCruelty to Children (NSPCC) defines four categories of abuse: 'neglect', 'physical abuse', 'emotional abuse' and 'sexual abuse', Sexual abuse is defined as 'sexual contact between a child and adult for the purpose of the adult's sexual gratification' (Lyon and de Cruz 1993), Force or the threat ofviolence is involved in many cases of incest. In some instances, children are more or less willing participants, but this seems quite rare, Children are sexual beings, of course, and quite often engage in mild sexual play or exploration with one another. But most of the children subjected to sexual contact with adult family members find the experience repugnant, shameful or disturbing, There is now considerable material to indicate that child sexual abuse may have long-term consequences for its sufferers. Studies of prostitutes, juvenile offenders, adolescent runaways and drug-users show that a high proportion have a history of child sexual abuse. Of course, correlation is not causation. Demonstrating that people in these categories have been sexually abused as children does not show that such abuse was a causal influence over their later behaviour. Probably a range of factors is involved, such as family conflicts, parental neglect and physical violence. Domestic violence We may define domestic violence as physical abuse directed by one member of the family against another or others. Studies show that the prime targets of physical abuse are children, especially small children. In England, the horrific murder of an 8-year-old girl,Victoria Climbi", in February 2000 brought extreme forms of domestic violence against children to the public's attention. Victoria, who had come to Europe from West Africa, died of hypothermia after months of torture and neglect inflicted by her great-aunt, Marie Therese Kouao, and the woman's boyftiend, Carl Manning. Her abusers were jailed for life in November 2000. During their trial, police and health and social services were all criticized for missing opportunities to save the girl. The government ordered an inquiry, chaired by Lord Laming, which examined the role of the professionals and made recommendations to the government on how to prevent such a tragedy from happening again (Laming 2003). Violence by men against their female partners is the second most common type of domestic violence. In the UK, two women each week are killed by their partners.At any one time 10 per cent of women are experiencing domestic violence, and it affects between a third and a quarter of women at some point in their lives. Domestic violence is the most common crime against women, who are at greater risk ofviolence from men in their own families or from close acquaintances than they are from strangers (Rawstorne 2002). On 27 November 2006, the Council of Europe launched a campaign to combat violence against women, including domestic violence. The campaign stated: An overview of figures for the prevalence ofviolence against women suggests that one-fifth to one-quarter ofall women have experienced physical violence at least once during their adult lives, and more than one-tenth have suffered sexual violence involving the use of force. Secondary data analysis supports an estimate that about 12% to 15% of all women have been in a relationship ofdomestic abuse after the age of 16. Many more continue to suffer phYSical and sexual violence from former partners even after the break-up. Levels of domestic violence in Eastern Europe were not really known about until after the break-up ofthe former Soviet Union in 1991, which brought with it a more open exchange of information. Surveys by the Astra Network (Central and Eastern European Women's Network for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights) in 1993 found that 29 per cent ofwomen in Romania, 22 per cent in Russia, 21 per cent in Ukraine and more than 42 per cent of married and cohabiting women in Lithuania, said they had been victims of 'physical or sexual violence or threats of violence by their present partner'. In the same year, some 60 per cent of divorced women in Poland reported having been hit at least once by their former husbands (UNICEF 2000b). Globally, domestic violence is similarly widespread. Astudy by the Commonwealth Fund estimated that almost 4 million women are physically abused each year in the United States, while a 1995 survey by the Beijing Marriage and Family Affairs Research Institute discovered that 23 per cent of husbands admitted to beating their wives. In 1993, some 60 percent of Chilean women involved in a relationship for two years or more were surveyed: 60 per cent said they had been abused by their male partner. The Domestic Violence Research Group in Japan found that 59 percent of the 796 women questioned in 1993 reported having been physically abused by their partner. Finally, in 1992, surveys in Ecuador and Korea found that 60 percent of low-income women in the former and 38 per cent of women in the latter reported having been beaten by their spouse or partner in the previous year (Marin et al. 1998). The issue of domestic violence attracted popular and academic attention during the 1970s as a result of the work undertaken by feminist groups with refuge centres for 'battered women'. Before that time, domestic violence, like child abuse, was a phenomenon that was tactfully ignored as a private matter. Feminist studies of patriarchy and domestic violence drew attention to the ways in which such privatization ofviolence and abuse worked to uphold the dominance of men in patriarchal societies. It was feminist studies which documented the prevalence and severity of violence against women in the home. Most violent episodes between spouses reported to the police involve violence by husbands against their wives. There are far fewer reported cases of women using physical force against their husbands. Feminists have pointed to such statistics to support their claims that domestic violence is a major form of male control over women. For theories and evidence ofpatriarchy, see chapter 14, 'Sexuality and Gender'. In a backlash against feminist arguments, conservative commentators have claimed thatviolence in the family is not about patriarchal male power, as feminists contend, but about 'dysfunctional families'. Violence against women is a reflection ofthe growing crisis of the family and the erosion of standards of morality. They question the finding that violence from wives towards husbands is rare, and suggest that men are less likely to report instances of violence against them from their wives than vice versa (Straus and Gelles 1986). Such assertions have been strongly criticized by feminists and by other scholars who argue that violence by females is in any case more restrained and episodic than that Families and Intimate Relationships ofmen, and much less likely to cause enduring physical harm. They argue that it is not sufficient to look at the 'number' of violent incidents within families. Instead, it is essential to look at the meaning, context and effect of violence. 'Wife battering' - the regular physical brutalizing of wives by husbands - has no real equivalent the other way round. Research found that violence by women against their male partners is often defensive rather than offensive, with women resorting to violence only after suffering repeated attacks over time (Rawstorne 2002). Men who physically abuse children are also much more likely to do so in a consistent way, causing longstanding injuries, than are women. Why is domestic violence relatively commonplace? Several sets of factors are involved. One is the combination of emotional intensity and personal intimacy characteristic of family life. Family ties are normally charged with strong emotions, often mixing love and hate. Quarrels which break out in the domestic setting can unleash antagonisms that would not be felt in the same way in other social contexts. What seems only a minor incident can precipitate full-scale hostilities between partners or between parents and children. A man tolerant towards eccentricities in the behaviour of other women may become furious if his wife talks too much at a dinner party or reveals intimacies he wishes to keep secret. A second influence is the fact that a good deal ofviolence within the family is actually tolerated, and even approved of. Although socially sanctioned family violence is relatively confined in nature, it can easily spill over into more severe forms of assault. Many children in Britain have at some time been slapped or hit, if only in a minor way, by one of their parents. Such actions quite often meet with general approval on the part of others, and they are probably not even thought of as 'violence' - although there is increasing pressure from some groups for the UK to follow many of the other European countries, which have legislation outlawing the physical punishment of children. Social Class While no social class is immune to spousal abuse, several studies indicate that it is more common among low-income couples (Cherlin 1999). More than three decades ago, William Goode (1971) suggested that low-income men may be more prone to violence because they have few other means with which to control their wives, such as a higher income or level of education. In addition, the high levels of stress induced by poverty and unemployment may lead to more violence within families. In support of these assertions, Gelles and Cornell (1990) found that unemployed men are nearly twice as likely as employed men to assault their wives. Divorce and separation The rise ofdivorce For many centuries in the West and other parts of the world, marriage was regarded as virtually indissoluble. A divorce was granted only in very limited cases, such as non-consummation of marriage. Today, however, legal divorce is possible in virtually all of the industrialized and developing societies ofthe world. Only in Malta and the Philippines is divorce still not legally recognized, though Maltese couples can obtain a 'foreign divorce' from another country if one or both partners are 'habitually resident' there. Seen in a global perspective, these are now isolated examples. Most countries have moved rapidly towards making divorce more easily available. The so-called adversarial system used to be characteristic of virtuaily all industrialized countries. For a divorce to be granted, one spouse had to bring charges (for example, cruelty, desertion or adultery) against the other. The first 'no fault' divorce laws were introduced in some countries in the mid-1960s. Since then, many Western states have followed suit, although the details vary. In the UK, the Divorce Reform Act, which made it easier for couples to obtain a divorce and contained 'no fault' provisions, was passed in 1969 and came into effect in 1971. The 'no fault' principle was further consolidated in a new bill passed in 1996. Between 1960 and 1970 the divorce rate in Britain grew by a steady 9 per cent each year, doubling within that decade. By 1972 it had doubled again, partly as a result of the 1969 Act, which made it easier for many in marriages that had long been 'dead' to get a divorce. Since 1980 the divorce rate has stabilized to some degree, but remains at a very high level compared to any previous period. Around two-fifths ofail marriages in the UK now end in divorce. The fall in the number of marriages each year and the rise in the number of divorces are shown in figure 9.1. Similar trends in marriage and divorce can be seen across the European Community, with some national variations. Marriage rates over the decade 1994- 2004 have generally fallen (see figure 9.2), with the notable exception of the Nordic countries: Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Iceland. Taking a longer view of European divorce rates shows that since the 1960s, rates have risen and remained higher in most national contexts (see figure 9.3), though the exceptions this time are some Eastern European countries such as Romania and Croatia where divorce rates have gone down. The patterns of marriage and divorce in the UK then are far from unique, with British trends actually forming part of much larger Europe-wide social trends. Divorce rates are obviously not a direct index of marital unhappiness. For one thing, rates of divorce do not include people who are separated but not legally divorced. Moreover, people who are unhappily married may choose to stay together because they believe in the sanctity of marriage, or worry about the financial or ,I 500 ~ All marriages '"'---' ~irsl marriages' ~ 400 300 200 100 o 1950 Remarriages 1960 , For both partners. '-----. '--.... Divorces2 ::::.--- 1970 1980 1990 2 Includes annulments. Data for 1950 to 1970 for Great Britain only. Divorces was permitted in Northern Ireland from 1969. 3 For one or both partners. 4 Data for 2005 are provisional. Final figures are likely to be higher. Figure 9.1 Marriages and divorces in the UK (thousands) Source: HMSO Social Trends (2007), 18 ~ 8 g 7 co 6 o ~ 5~ , rr- r- - - - I-- - - - - ~ country r- 200020054 o Marriage in 1994 III Marriage in 2004 Figure 9.2 European marriage rates, 1994 and 2004 (selected countnes) Source. Adapted from the EurostatYearbook 2006-07 emotional consequences of a break-up, or wish to remain with one another to give their children a 'family' home. Why is divorce becoming more common? Several factors are involved, to do with wider social changes. Except for a very small proportion of wealthy people, marriage today no longer has much connection with the desire to perpetuate property and status from generation to generation. As women become more economically independent, marriage is less of a necessary economic 4.0 3.5 Q) C. 3.00 Q) I- a. 0 2.50 I- I- I- - o. ~ 2.0~ I- - c-Q) a. "' 1.5Q) r: I- ...~ 0 1.0> - C 0.5 ~ ~ -I cl 10 1960 . 1980 0 1995 02000 . 2003 1 Figure 9.3 Divorce rates in Europe. 1960-2004 (selected countries) Source: EurostatYearbook 2006-07 partnership than it used to be. Greater overall prosperity means that it is easier to establish a separate household. if there is marital disaffection. than used to be the case. The fact that little stigma now attaches to divorce is in some part the result of these developments, but also adds momentum to them. A further important factor is the growing tendency to evaluate marriage in terms of the levels of personal satisfaction it offers. Rising rates of divorce do not seem to indicate a deep dissatisfaction with THINKING CRITICALLY Reflecting on the experience of your family and friends,what reasons do people give for getting divorced? Do such reasons support the thesis that high rates of divorce do not mean that people are rejecting marriage?What sociological evidence is there that marriage remains a highly valued social institution? marriage as such, but an increased determination to make it a rewarding and satisfying relationship. Lone-parent households Lone-parent households have become increasingly common in the developed countries over recent decades, though the pattern is quite varied. Lone parents make up a relatively low percentage of households with dependent children in Greece (6.7 per cent), Spain (7.1 per cent) and Portugal (8.4 per cent), with much higher proportions in Belgium (13.7 per cent), Denmark (18.8 per cent) and Sweden (22 per cent). The USA and New Zealand have even higher proportions of lone parents, at 31 and 29 per cent respectively, but Japan has just 8 per cent (Institute for Child and Family Policy 2004). The UK currently has the highest proportion of lone-parent families in Europe, increasing from 7 per cent in 1971 to 24 per cent in 2006 (HMSO 2007: 16). It is important 9.1 Diane Vaughan on 'uncoupling': the experience of breaking up It is extremely difficult to draw up a balance sheet ofthe social advantages and costs of high levels of divorce.More tolerant attitudes mean that couples can terminate an unrewarding relationship without incwTing social ostracism. On the other hand,the breakup of a marriage is almost always emotionally stressful for both the couple and their children, and may create financial hardship for one or both parties. In Uncoupling: The Turning Points in Intimate ReIationsillps (1990), Diane Vaughan analysed the relationships between partners during the course of separation or divorce. She carried out a series of interviews with more than 100 recently separated or divorced people (mainly from middie-class backgrounds) to chart the transition from living together to living apart. The notion of uncoupling refers to the break-up of a longterm intimate relationship. She found that in many cases, before the physical parting, there had been a social separation - at least one of the partners developed a new pattern of life, becoming interested in new pursuits and making new friends in contexts in which the other was not present. This usually meant keeping secrets from the other - especially: of course,when a relationship with a lover was involved. According to Vaughan's research, uncoupling is often unintentional at first. One individual - whom she called the initiator becomes less satisfied with the relationship than the other, and creates a 'territory' independent of the activities in which the couple engages together.Today: some 90 per cent of initiators are women. For some time before this, the initiator may have been trying unsuccessfully to change the partner, to get him or her to behave in more acceptable ways, foster shared interests and so forth.At some point, the initiator feels that the attempt has failed and that the relationship is fundamentally flawed.From then onwards, he or she becomes preoccupied with the ways in which the relationship or the partner is defective. Vaughan suggests this is the opposite of the process of 'falling in love' at the beginning of a relationship, when an individual focuses on the attractive features of the other, ignoring those that might be less acceptable. Initiators seriously considering a break notably discuss their relationship extensively with others, 'comparing notes'. In doing so, they weigh the costs and benefits of separation. Can I survive on my own? How will friends and parents react? Will the children suffer? Will I be financially solvent? Having thought about these and other problems,some decide to try again to make the relationship work For those who proceed with a separation,these discussions and enquiries help make the break less intimidating, building confidence that they are doing the right thing.Most initiators become convinced that a responsibility for their own selfdevelopment takes priority over commitment to the other. Of course, uncoupling is not always entirely led by one individual.The other partner may also have decided that the relationship cannot be saved. In some situations, an abrupt reversal of roles occurs. The person who previously wanted to save the relationship becomes determined to end it, whilst the erstwhile initiator wishes to carry on. to note that lone parenthood with dependent children is an overwhelmingly female category in the UK (table 9.3) and everywhere else. On average, they are among the poorest groups in contemporary societies. Many lone parents, whether they have ever been married or not, still face social disapproval as well as economic insecurity. Earlier and more judgemental terms such as 'deserted wives', 'fatherless families' and 'broken homes' are tending to disappear, however. The category of lone-parent household is an internally diverse one. For instance, more than half of widowed mothers are owner·occupiers, but the vast majority of UK households, 1971-2006: by type of household and family (%) 1971 1981 1991 2001 2006 One person Under state pension age 6 8 11 14 14 Over state pension age 12 14 16 15 14 One-family households Couplel No children 27 26 28 29 28 1-2 dependent children' 26 25 20 19 18 3 or more dependent children2 9 6 5 4 4 Non-dependent children only 8 8 8 6 7 Lone parent] Dependent children2 3 5 6 7 7 Non-dependent children only 4 4 4 3 3 'I\vo or more unrelated adults 4 5 3 3 3 Multi-family households All households (=100%) (=millions) 18.6 20.2 22.4 23.8 24.2 1 Other mdlVlduals who were nOllamily members may also be lIlcluded 2 May also mclude non-dependent cluldren Sourt:€'o HMSO SOCIal 1fends 37 (2007). 14 never-married lone mothers live in rented accommodation. Lone parenthood tends to be a changing state, and its boundaries are rather blurred: there are mUltiple paths both entering into and exiting from lone parenthood. In the case of a person whose spouse dies, the break is obviously clearcut - although even here a person might have been living on his or her own in practical terms if the partner was in hospital for some while before they died. About 60 per cent of lone-parent households today, however, are brought about by separation or divorce. Amongst the lone-parent families in the UK, the fastest growing category is that of single, never-married mothers. By the late 1990s, they constituted 9 per cent of the total number of families with dependent children. Of these, it is difficult to know how many have deliberately opted to raise children alone. Most people do not wish to be lone parents. The ongoing Millennium Cohort Study, which is currently following the lives of children born in the first few years of this century, has found that younger women are more likely to become solo mothers, and that the more educated the woman, the more likely she is to have a baby within marriage. The research also revealed that for 85 per cent of solo mothers, their pregnancy was unplanned, in contrast to 52 per cent of cohabiting couples and 18 per cent of married women. For the majority of unmarried or never-married mothers, there is also a high correlation between the rate of births outside marriage and indicators of poverty and social deprivation. As we saw earlier, these influences are very important in explaining the high proportion of loneparent households among families ofWest Indian background in the UK. However, a growing minority of women are now Families and Intimate Relationships All families: by type and presence of children, 2004, UK(%) With With nondependent dependent With no children children only children All Married Cohabiting couple Lone mother Lone father Allfarnilies NOles 38 13 38 4 73 27 50 50 43 14 49 100 58 lOO lOO lOO 42 lOO FanuJy a mamed/cohabllIng couple WIth or without cluld(ren). or a lone parent Wlth chtld(ren) Dependent c1u1cken aged under 16. or aged 16--18 ID full-tune educatlon and never marned Non-dependenl cluldren' never marned chlldren aged 16 and over who have no cluldren and are l1vmgWlth their parent(s) (excludes cluldren aged 16-18 ID full-tune education), There is no age 1mu! Source' ONS 2005b choosing to have a child or children without the support of a spouse or partner. 'Single mothers by choice' is an apt description ofsome lone parents, normally those who possess sufficient resources to manage satisfactorily as a single-parent household. In Family Policy, Family Changes, Patricia Morgan (1999) suggested a direct link between differential levels of welfare support for lone parents and the diverse proportions of lone-parent families across Europe. In particular, she argues that the main reason why Sweden and the UK have the largest proportions of lone-parent families compared with, say, Italy, is because Italian family allowances have been very low and the primary source of support for young people has been the family. Morgan argues that, in states where lone parenting is not subsidized, it is less prevalent. However, this may be too simplistic.Crow and Hardey (1992) argue that the great diversity of 'pathways' into and out of loneparent families means that they do not as a whole constitute a uniform or cohesive group. Although lone-parent families may share certain material and social disadvantages in common, they have little collective identity.The plurality of routes means that, for the purposes of social policy, the boundaries of lone parenthood are difficult to define and the needs are difficult to target. Fathering and the 'absentfather' Recent political debates on the role of fathers have been dominated by the idea of the 'absent father', especially during the period from the late 1930s up to the 1970s. During the SecondWorldWar, manyfathers, because ofwar service, only rarely saw their children. In the period following the war, in a high proportion of families women were not in the paid labour force and stayed at home to look after the children. The father was the main breadwinner and, consequently, was out at work all day; he would see his children only in the evenings and at weekends. With rising divorce rates in more recent years, and the increasing number of loneparent households, the theme of the absent father has come to mean something quite different. It has come to refer to fathers who, as a result of separation or divorcel have only infrequent contact with their children or who lose touch with them altogether. In both Britain and the United States, which have among the highest divorce rates in the world, this situation has provoked intense debate, with some proclaiming the 'death of the dad'. One outcome of high divorce rates has been the emergence oforganizations lobbying for the rights of fathers. In the UK, Netherlands and the USA, the pressure group Fathers 4 Justice (F4)) has gained a high profile as a result of well-publicized stunts, protest marches and direct action carried out by activists. In May 2004, F4J activists threw a condom filled with purple flour at the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons and a few months later one campaigner scaled the walls of Buckingham Palace dressed as the comic-book hero, Batman - 'every father is a superhero to his children'. The group claims that the law, which aims to serve 'the best interests' of the child, is actually biased in favour of the mother when couples split up, by making it difficult for fathers to stay in contact with their children. Writing from contrasting perspectives, sociologists and commentators have seized on the increasing proportion of fatherless families as the key to a whole diversity of social problems, from rising crime to mushrooming welfare costs for child support. Some have argued that children will never become effective members of a social group unless they are exposed to constant examples of negotiation, cooperation and compromise between adults in their immediate environment (Dennis and Erdos 1992). Boys who grow up without a father will struggle to be successful parents themselves, according to such arguments. American authors have figured prominently in the debate and have had a great deal of influence over discussions of the issue in Europe, but especially in the UK. In Fatherless America (1995), David Blankenhorn argues that societies with high divorce rates are facing not just the loss of fathers but the very erosion of the idea of fatherhood - with lethal social consequences, because many children are growing up now without an authority figure to turn to in times of need. Marriage and fatherhood in all societies up to the present provided a means of channelling men's sexual and aggressive energies. Without them, these energies are likely to be expressed in criminality and violence. As one reviewer of Blankenhorn's book put it: 'better to have a dad who comes home from a nasty job to drink beer in front of the television than no dad at all' (The Economist 1995). Yet, is it?The issue of absent fathers overlaps with that of the more general question of the effects of divorce on children - and there the implications of the available evidence are far from clear. Some scholars have suggested that the key question is not whether the father is present, but how engaged he is in family life and parenting.ln other words, the make-up of the household may not be as important as the quality of care, attention and support that children receive from its members. Since the 1980s, issues of good parenting and, in particular, good 'fathering' have become more prominent in political debates and academic research (Hobson 2002). As women move into paid employment in increasingly larger numbers, men's contribution to domestic tasks and childcare does not seem to be increasing at the same pace. For example, one American study (Yeung et al. 2002) found that on weekdays, neither the earnings ofa working mother nor her work hours had any effect on her involvement in childcare; for fathers, on the other hand, both earnings and working hours did significantly affect time spent on childcare. This suggests that assumptions of women as primary care-givers remain strong even in dual-earner families. In Europe, two campaigns by the Equal Opportunities Commission have sought ways to promote 'active fatherhood', including increasing paternity-leave entitlement, promoting family-frienclly work- I Across European countries,provisions for paternity leave vary greatly places and changing the long-hours culture of many European countries, such as the UK and Greece. European provision for fathers is very diverse, In Sweden, both parents are entitled to 450 days of paid leave at the birth or adoption ofa child, 13 months at 80 per cent of salary for most parents and the rest at a lower rate, and employees are entitled to go back to their previous job or a similar one when they do return. However, in Greece, Italy and Spain, fathers do not normally take parental leave. In Spain parental leave is unpaid; in Italy it is not a parent's right to take leave; and in Greece, such leave is not guaranteed in companies with fewer then 50 employees (Flouri 2005). These three countries also have the lowest female labour market participation in the European Union, at around 40 per cent, The USA only introduced mate rnity leave in 1993; Australia has no provision for paid maternity or paternity leave and New Zealand introduced paid maternity leave as late as 2002, but still has no provision for paid paternity leave. Nevertheless, in Sweden, the most generous provider for fathers, it is still mothers who take 85 per cent of all parental leave, an overwhelmingmajority.Aiso, many Swedish fathers are reluctant to take their 'papa leave' entitlement for fear of losing out to colleagues for promotion or upsetting employers; in addition, women's wages lag behind those of men and just 2 out of 282 listed companies have female chief executives. We have to be cautious when drawing conclusions about particular national situations, as the introduction of particular policies does not necessarily mean that they will be taken advantage of by the social groups they target. A comparative analysis of European data (Lamb 2002) showed a wide variety of fathers' involvement in childcare. In Swedish dual-earning families, fathers spent, on average, 10.5 hours per workday and 7.5 hours per non-workday with their infants (more than the mothers in such families), the highest such figure in any European country. Earlier studies found that US fathers spent between 15-20 minutes and 3 hours with infants on workdays, while Israeli fathers spent 2.75 hours. German and Italian fathers spend less time with their infants than do fathers in the UK, Israel or Ireland. What can we conclude from such a diverse body of evidence? It seems that there is a growing interest in fathering, and parenting more generally, in the light of wider concerns about youth crime and the effects of 'bad' parenting or the absence of a 'father figure' in the lives of young men. Such interest and concerns have led to new policies aimed at increasing fathers' engagement in childcare and domestic life. However, even where such policies have been introduced, wider social and economic factors and long-standing gendered assumptions about male and female roles continue to play a strong part in determining the extent to which government policy can shape the dynamics of family life. This means that families and households need to be studied in relation to broader social changes and transforma- tions. Changing attitudes to family life There seem to be substantial class differences affecting reactions to the changing character of family life and the existence of high levels of divorce. In Families on the Fault Line (1994), LilIian Rubin interviewed the members of32 working-class families in depth. She concluded that, compared to middle-class families, working-class parents tend to be more traditional. The norms that many middle-class parents have accepted, such as the open expression of pre-marital sex, are more widely disapproved of by working-class people, even where they are not particularly religious. In working-class households, there tends therefore to be more of a conflict between the generations. The young people in Rubin's study agree that their attitudes towards sexual behaviour, marriage and gender divisions are distinct from those oftheir parents. But they insist that they are not just concerned with pleasure-seeking. They simply hold to different values from those of the older generation. Rubin found the young women she interviewed to be much more ambivalent about marriage than were their parents' generation. They were keenly aware of the imperfections of men and spoke of exploring the options available and of living life more fully and openly than was possible for their mothers. The generational shift in men's attitudes was not as great. Rubin's research was carried out in the United States, but her findings accord closely with those of researchers in European countries. Helen Wilkinson and Geoff Mulgan carried out two large-scale studies of men and women aged between 18 and 34 in the UK (Wilkinson 1994; Wilkinson and Mulgan 1995). They found major changes happening in the outlook of young women in particular; and that the values of this age group contrasted in a general way with those ofthe older generations in Britain. Among young women, there is 'a desire for autonomy and self-fulfilment, through work as much as family' and 'the valuing of risk, excitement and change'. In these terms, there is a growing convergence between the traditional values of men and the newer values of women. The values of the younger generation, Wilkinson and Mulgan suggest, have been shaped by their inheritance offreedoms largely unavailable to earlier generations freedom for women to work and control their own reproduction, freedom of mobility for 9.2 Carol Smart and Bren Neale's Family Fragments? Between 1994 and 1996. Carol Smart and Bren Neale carried out two rounds of interviews with a group of 60 parents from WestYorkshire who had either separated or divorced after the passage of the 1989 Children Act. This Act altered the situation facing parents and children on divorce by abolishing the old notions of 'custody' and 'access' so that parents • would no longer feel that they had to fight over ' \ their children. The Act meant that the legal relationship between children and their parents was not changed by divorce; it also encouraged parents to share childrearing and required judges and others to listen more to the views of children. Smart and Neale were interested to know how patterns ofparenting were initially formed after divorce and how they changed over time. In their investigation, they compared parents' expectations about post-divorce parenting at the point of separation with the 'reality' of their circumstances one year later. Smart and Neale found that parenting after divorce involved a process of constant adjustment that many parents had not anticipated and were ill-prepared for. Parenting skills which worked as part of a twoparent team were not necessarily successful in a lone-parent household.Parents were forced to re-evaluate continuously their approaches to parenting, not only in terms of 'big decisions' affecting their children,but also in regard to the everyday aspects of childrearing that were now occurring across two households instead of one. Following a divorce, parents faced two opposing demands - their own needs for separation and distance from their former spouse, and the need to remain connected as part of co-parenting responsibilities. Smart and Neale found that the lived experience of post-divorce parenting was extremely fluid and changed over time. When interviewed a year after their separation, many parents were able to look back at the initial stages of lone parenting and assess the parenting decisions they had made. They often re-evaluated their behaviour and actions in the light of their changing understandings. "Thanks to separations, divorces and remarriages, I've got 20 grandparents." For example, many parents were worried about the harm that their children would suffer as a result of the divorce, but were unsure how to transform their fears and sense of guilt into constructive action. This led some parents to hold on too tightly to their children or to treat them like 'adult' confidants. In other cases it led to alienation, distance and the loss of meartingful cormections. In the media and certain political contexts, according to the authors, there is an implicit - and sometimes explicit- assumption that. after divorce, adults abandon morality and begin to act selfishly and in their own interests. All of a sudden, flexibility. generosity. compromise and sensitivity disappear; the moral framework in which decisions about family and welfare were previously made gets discarded. Smart and Neale's interviews with divorced parents led them to reject this argument. They claim that parents do operate within a moral framework when parenting, but that it is perhaps best understood as a morality of care rather than an unambiguous moral reasoning based on set principles or beliefs. Smart and Neale argue that, as parents care for their children, so decisions emerge about 'the proper thing to do'. These decisions are highly contextual; parents must weigh [cont'd ...] a large number of considerations, including the effects ofthe decision on the children, whether it is the appropriate time to act and what harmful implications it might have on the co-parenting relationship. Consider the following from a lone mother whose ex-husband requested custody of their children· 1said, 'Look ifyou really, really feel that you can look after these kids on a full-time basis, don't you think you ought to give yourself a weekend with them and then just see how it feels and then maybe after a weekend maybe progress to say you're having them for a full week and see how you cope with them: He just absolutely hit the roofbecause he's got this thing in his head that he'd be babysitting for me, so he said 'No: 1said, 'Look,in that case I'm not even prepared to discuss it Vlith you because Ifeel you just don't know how hard it is, you haven't had the children on a full-time basis for three years,1do feel that you're just out ofit a little. [Ifeel you should have them1in a normal everyday routine, bringing them to school, picking tllem up from school, cooking, cleaning, washing and ironing for them, helping them with their homework. if they're sick, nursing them.And then we will rediscuss, reassess the situation: (Smart and Neale 1999) Here the mother was trying to determine the 'right thing to do' while balancing multiple factors.In the context of a difficult relationship with her former spouse and the need to defend the progress she had made in her own self-development. she was still attempting to work constructively with him in the interests ofthe children. Smart and Neale conclude that divorce unleashes changes in circumstances which can rarely be 'put straight' once and for all.Successful post-divorce parenting demands constant negotiation and communication. While the 1989 Children's Act has added necessary flexibility to contemporary post-divorce parenting arrangements, its emphasis on the welfare ofthe child may overlook the crucial role played by the quality ofthe relationship between divorced parents. both sexes and freedom to define their own style of life. Such freedoms lead to greater openness, generosity and tolerance; but they can also produce a narrow, selfish individualism and a lack of trust in others. Of those in the sample, 29 per cent ofwomen and 51 per cent of men wanted to 'delay having children as long as possible'. Of women in the 16--24 age group, 75 per cent believed that single parents can bring up children as well as a couple can. The study found that marriage was losing its appeal for both women and men in this age group. New partnerships, step-families and kin relations their early 20s, neither of them bringing a child to the new relationship. Couples that remarry in their late 20s, their 30s or early 40s might each take one or more children from the first marriage to live with them. Those who remarry at later ages might have adult children who never live in the new homes that the parents establish. There may also be children within the new marriage itself. Either partner of the new couple may previously have been single, divorced or widowed, adding up to eight possible combinations. Generalizations about remarriage therefore have to be made with considerable caution, al though some general points are worth making. Remarriage Remarriage can involve various circumstances. Some remarried couples are in In 1900 about nine-tenths ofall marriages in the United Kingdom were first marriages. Most remarriages involved at least one widowed person.With the rise in the divorce rate, the level of remarriage also began to climb, and an increasing proportion of remarriages began to involve divorced people. In 1971,20 per cent ofUK marriages were remarriages (for at least one partner); by 2001 that number was more than 40 per cent (as figure 9.1 above shows). Odd though it might seem, the best way to maximize the chances ofgetting married,for both sexes, is to have been married before! People who have been married and divorced are more likely to marry again than single people in comparable age groups are to marry for the first time. At all age levels, divorced men are more likely to remarry than divorced women: three in every four divorced women, but five in every six divorced men, remarry. In statistical terms, at least, remarriages are less successful than first marriages. Rates of divorce from second marriages are higher than those from first marriages. This does not show that second marriages are doomed to fail. People who have been divorced may have higher expectations of marriage than those who have not. Hence they may be more ready to dissolve a new marriage than those only married once. It is possible that the second marriages which endure might be more satisfying, on average, than first marriages. Step-families The term 'step-family' refers to a family in which at least one of the adults has children from a previous marriage or relationship. Sociologists often refer to such groups as reconstituted families.There are clearly joys and benefits associated with reconstituted families and with the growth of extended families which results. But certain difficulties also tend to arise. In the first place, there is usually a biological parent living elsewhere whose influence over the child orchildren is likely to remain powerful. Second, cooperative relations between divorced individuals are often strained when one or both remarries. Take the case of a woman with two children who marries a man who also has two children, and they all live together. If the 'outside' parents insist Families and Intimate Relationships that children visit them at the same times as before, the major tensions involved in melding such a newly established family together will be exacerbated. For example, it may prove impossible ever to have the new family together at weekends. Third, reconstituted families merge children from different backgrounds, who may have varying expectations of appropriate behaviour within the family. Since most step-children 'belong' to two households, the likelihood of clashes in habits and outlook is considerable. Here is a stepmother describing her experience, after the problems she faced led to separation: There's a lot ofguilt. You cannot do what you would normally do with your own child, so you feel guilty, but ifyou do have a normal reaction and get angry, you feel guilty about that, too. You are always so afraid you will be unfair. Her [stepdaughter's] father and Idid not agree and he would say Inagged if Idisciplined her. The more he did nothing to structure her, the more I seemed to nag. ... Iwanted to provide something for her, to be an element of her life which was missing, but perhaps Iam not flexible enough. (Smith 1990) There are few established norms which define the relationship between step-parent and step-child. Should a child call a new step-parent by name, or is 'Dad' or 'Mum' more appropriate? Should the step-parent discipline the children as a natural parent would? How should a step-parent treat the new spouse of his or her previous partner when collecting the chlldren? Reconstituted families are developing types of kinship connection, which are quite recent additions to modern Western societies; the difficulties created by remarriage after divorce are also new. Members of these families are developing their own ways of adjusting to the relatively uncharted circumstances in which they find themselves. Some authors today speak of binuclear families, meaning that the two households which form after a divorce still comprise one family system where there are children involved. THINllING CRITICALLY From your own experience, have stepfamilies become equally acceptable in modern societies? What new problems, issues and opportunities can you think of that might arise for the children growing up within step-families? How might governments tackle the new problems facing step-families? Kinship relations As family structures become more fluid and diverse, with high levels of divorce, remarriage and the creation of step-families, soeiologists are increasingly interested in understanding what is happening to the relationships between family members. What does it now mean to be a brother or a sister, for example? What ties exist amongst siblings and how do they perceive their obli- 9.3 Bean-pole families gations towards each other and to parents, grandparents and other family members? Indeed, who counts as kin anyway? In an early study of kinship in the UK, Raymond Firth (1956) made a distinction between 'effective' and 'non*effective' kin, based on the extent of regular contact between family members. Effective kin are those with whom we have active social relationships; non-effective kin are those with whom we do not have regular contact, but who form part of the extended family group. For example, we may be in contact with sisters and brothers almost every day, but only speak to, or come into contact with, certain cousins or uncles and aunts at annual events such as birthdays. Although it is easy to see the distinction between effective and non-effective kin, it remains the case that aU such relationships still faU within conventional family groups assumed to share biological forms of kinship. The family bean-pole Juha Brannen (2003) argues that the UK has entered an age of the 'bean-pole family'.She suggests that the family household is just one part of a network ofkin relations that, increasingl" consists of several generations. This is largely because people are living longer. She notes that at the age of 50.threefifths of the UK population have at least one parent still alive, and just over a third are grandparents. There is also a rise in the number of four-generation families - families that include great-grandchildren. The family tree James Beverley Figure 9.4 The family tree and the family bean-pole Source: Brannen 2003 AB the 'vertical' links between generations of the family are strengthened by increasing life expectanc" so the 'horizontal' links within generations are weakening, as divorce rates rise, fertility rates fall and people have fewer children. Brannen therefore characterizes contemporary families as long and thin 'beanpole structures' (see figure 9.4). Brannen found that grandparents are increasingly providing intergenerational services, particularly informal childcare for their grandchildren. Demand for intergenerational support is particularly high amongst single-parent families,where older generations can also often provide emotional support in times ofneed, such as during a divorce. In turn, the 'pivot generation', sandwiched between older and younger generations, will often become a carer for their parents (as they become elderly), their children and perhaps even grandchildren. However, it is not uncommon for people to describe some non-family members in kinship terms. For example, some close friends may come to be described and known as 'uncle' or 'aunt', despite the fact that they have no other link to the family group than friendship. Anthropologists refer to such relationships as 'fictive kin'.An awareness of these different categories of kinship blurs the boundary between family and non-family members, showing that what people perceive to be 'the family' is, in part, socially constructed. As a result, in recent years, kin relations have come to be discussed in terms of the wider concept of 'relatedness', which allows cross-cultural comparisons to be made without imposing the Western idea (and ideal) of what constitutes a 'normal' type of kinship (Carsten 2000). This shifts the focus of research from the sociologist's categorization of kin relations onto people's own sense of what it means to 'be related' to others and the significance they attribute to their relationships. However, such studies tend to exist alongside existing research on family and kinship. One significant piece of recent research on kin relations is Melanie Mauthner's (2005) study of changing forms of'sistering' - that is, of how women behave as sisters. Mauthner's qualitative study interviewed 37 women from 19 sets ofsisters. She identified four 'discourses ofsistering' that shaped the women's narratives. 'Best friendship' is a discourse which identifies the sibling relationship as a very intimate one that tends to be closer - both in reality and as an ideal than other friendships. This comes close to the common-sense idea of the biological closeness of Siblings. 'Companionship' is a type of relationship that is less actively engaged than best friendships. 'Close' companionship is less intense but still very close. 'Distant' companionship represents those Sibling relations characterized by underlying tensions and problems, leaving sisters' attitudes towards them somewhat ambivalent. 1\vo other discourses - 'posiFamilies and Intimate Relationships tioned' and 'shifring positions' - describe the dynamics of power in sibling relations. Positioned relations are largely shaped by fairly fixed roles defined by families, including older sisters who assume responsibility for younger ones or those who become 'mother substitutes' when required. By contrast, 'shifting positions' applies to the more fluid and egalitarian relations where the exercise of power is negotiated rather than assumed. Mauthner concludes that the practices of sistering are quite varied and are likely to change over the life-course, as the dynamics of power shifts within relationships. Therefore we cannot assume that sibling relations are shaped by fixed biological and familial relations, even though the attitudes and ideals of many women (and men) may be influenced by society-wide discourses suggesting that women are the primary care-givers. In short, sistering implies an active and ongoing attempt to (re)create sibling relations, compared to sisterhood, which can be seen as implying universal role expectations. In the face of such rich and often confusing familial transformations, perhaps the most appropriate conclusion to be drawn is a simple one: although marriages are broken up by divorce, families on the whole are not. Especially where children are involved, many ties persist despite the reconstructed family connections brought into being through remarriage. Alternatives to traditional marriage and family life Cohabitation Cohabitation - when two people live together in a sexual relationship without being married - has become increasingly widespread in many Western societies. If, previously, marriage was the defining basis of a union between two people, it can no longer be regarded as such. Today it may be more appropriate to speak of coupling and uncoupling, as we do when discussing the Marital status of European Union men and women 25-34 years, 2000-1 Country Ever- Nevermarried partnered Sweden 28 13 Denmark 37 14 France 39 15 Finland 43 17 Austria 52 13 Netherlands 47 23 East Germany 46 17 Great Bntain 57 16 Luxembourg 65 11 West Germany 50 19 Ireland 45 32 Belgium 59 20 Spain 44 41 Greece 56 29 Italy 34 55 Portugal 61 32 Tbtal 47 23 Source Kiernan 2004 37 experience of divorce above. A growing number of couples in committed long-term relationships choose not to marry, but to reside together and raise children together (see table 9.5). It is also the case that many older people choose to cohabit following a divorce rather than or in advance of remar- rying. Across Europe until very recently, cohabitation was generally regarded as somewhat scandalous. In the UK, The General Household Survey, the main source of data on British household patterns, included a question on cohabitation for the first time only in 1979. Amongyoungpeople in Britain and Europe, however, attitudes to cohabitation are changing rapidly. Presented with the statement that 'It is alright for a couple to live together without intending to get Urunarned Urunarned Number currently previously in sample COhabIting cohabited 39 20 891 32 17 957 31 15 1.094 30 II 860 22 13 1.013 22 8 954 21 15 718 18 16 992 17 9 512 15 6 905 15 7 913 15 6 964 II 4 984 10 5 929 8 4 964 5 2 753 19 10 14,730 married', 88 per cent of British people aged between 18 and 24 now agree, whereas only 40 per cent ofrespondents aged 65 and over agreed (HMSO 2004). In recent decades, the number of unmarried men and women sharing a household has gone up sharply. Only 4 per cent of UK women born in the 1920s cohabited and 19 per cent of those born in the 1940s did so. But among women born in the 1960s, the percentage is nearly half. By 2001-2, the proportion of cohabiting unmarried women under the age of 60 was 28 per cent; for men the figure was 25 per cent (ibid.).The prevalence ofcohabitation was highest for women aged between 25 and 29 and for men aged between 30 and 34. Although cohabitation has become increasingly popular, research suggests that marriage is still more stable. Unmarried couples who live together are three to four times more likely to split up than those who are married. Cohabitation in many countries seems, for the most part, to be an experimental stage before marriage, although the length of cohabitation prior to marriage is increasing and more and more couples are choosing it as an alternative to marriage. In 2001, for example, 39 per cent of younger adults aged 25- 34 in Sweden were unmarried and cohabiting, 32 per cent in Denmark, 31 per cent in France and 30 per cent in Finland (see table 9.5). Young adults often find themselves living together because they drift into it, rather than make calculated plans to do so. Two people who are already having a sexual relationship spend more and more time together, eventually giving up one or other of their individual homes. Young people living together almost always anticipate getting married at some date, but not necessarily to their current partners. Only a minority of such couples pool their finances. In a 1999 study carried out by researchers at the University ofNottingham, UK, sociologists interviewed a sample of married and cohabiting couples with children aged 11 or under, as well as a sample of their parents who were still married. They were interested in the differences in commitment between older married persons and couples in the younger generation. The researchers found that the younger married and cohabiting couples had more in common with each other than with their parents. While the older generation saw marriage in terms of obligations and duties, the younger generation emphasized freely given commitments. The main difference between the younger respondents was that some of them preferred to have their commitment recognized publicly through marriage (Dyer 1999). Gay and lesbian partnerships Many homosexual men and women now live in stable relationships as couples. But because most countries still do not sanction Families and Intimate Relationships marriage between homosexuals, relationships between gay men and between lesbians have been grounded in personal commitment and mutual trust rather than in law. The term 'families of choice' has sometimes been applied to gay partnerships to reflect the positive and creative forms of everyday life that homosexual couples are increasingly able to pursue together. Many traditional features of heterosexual partnerships - such as mutual support, care and responsibility in illness, the joining of finances, and so forth - are becoming integrated into gay and lesbian families in ways that were not possible earlier. Avery significant recent trend in Western European countries, which has long been campaigned for by lesbian and gay movements, is the introduction of registered or civil partnerships for homosexual couples (see figure 9.5). Lesbian and gay social movements are discussed in chapter 22, 'Politics, Government and Social Movements'. Civil partnerships are legally recognized unions between two people ofthe same sex, though technically they are not 'marriages' in the religious sense. Nonetheless, couples who become 'partnered' generally have the same legal rights as married couples on a range of matters. For example, civil partners can expect equal treatment on financial matters such as inheritance, pensions and child maintenance. They also have rights as 'next of kin', which previously were denied them, and immigration rules take account of civil partnerships in the same way as marriages. Denmarkwas firstto grant same-sex partners the same rights as married couples in 1989, followed in 1996 by Norway, Sweden and Iceland, and in 2000 by Finland. The Netherlands introduced full civil marriage rights in 2001. Belgium and Spain introduced gay marriage rights in 2003 and 2005 respectively, while in Germany and France, the law gives same-sex couples more limited rights. In Britain, new legislation FAMILIES AND INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS _ Same-sex marriage legal Civil unions legal ~~ Unregislered cohabitation legal L-------' Issue under consideration ~~ "-_-1l ll1e9al or unknown Figure 9.S Status of same-sex partnerships in Europe. 2005 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wikillmage:Same_sex_marriage_map_Europe_detailed svg came into force in December 2005, giving same-sex couples in civil partnerships similar rights to married couples. Elsewhere, Argentina (2003), New Zealand (2004) and Canada (2005) have sanctioned same-sex relationships, and in Eastern Europe, both Slovenia and the Czech Republic introduced recognized partnerships in 2006. This trend looks likely to continue and spread, despite opposition from some religious groups, which see legal recognition ofsamesex partnerships as legitimizing 'immoral' relationships. Such opposition is particularly strong in many parts of the USA. Since the 1980s there has been a growing academic interest in gay and lesbian partnerships. Sociologists have seen homosexual relationships as displaying forms of intimacy and equality quite different from those common in heterosexual couples. Because gays and lesbians have been excluded from the institution of marriage, and because traditional gender roles are not easily applicable to same-sex couples, homosexual partnerships must be constructed and negotiated outside the norms and guidelines that govern many heterosexual unions. Some have suggested Same-sex relationships have been sanctioned across much of the world,but the right of gay parents to adopt and bring up children is a more controversial issue. that the AIDS epidemic has been an important factor in the development of a distinctive culture ofcare and commitment among homosexual partners, Weeks et al. (2004) point to three significant patterns within gay and lesbian partnerships. First, there is more opportunity for equality between partners because they are not guided by the cultural and social assumptions that underpin heterosexual relationships. Gay and lesbian couples may choose to shape their relationships deliberately so as to avoid the types of inequalities and power imbalances that are characteristic of many heterosexual couples. Second, homosexual partners negotiate the parameters and inner workings of their relationships. If heterosexual couples are influenced by socially embedded gender roles, samesex couples face fewer expectations about who should do what within the relationship. For example, if women tend to do more of the housework and childcare in heterosexual marriages, there are no such expectations within homosexual partnerships. Everything becomes a matter for negotiation; this may result in a more equal sharing of responsibilities. Third, gay and lesbian partnerships demonstrate a particular form of commitment that lacks an institutional backing. Mutual trust, the willingness to work at difficulties and a shared responsibility for 'emotional labour' seem to be the hallmarks of homosexual partnerships (Weeks et ai, J999). It will be interesting for sociologists to observe how the new civil partnerships and gay marriage rights affect such commitment and mutual trust in the future. A relaxation of previously intolerant attitudes towards homosexuality has been accompanied by a growing willingness by the courts to allocate custody of children to mothers living in lesbian relationships. Techniques of artificial insemination mean that lesbians may have children and become parents without any heterosexual contacts. While virtually every homosexual family with children in Britain involves two women, for a period in the late 1960s and early 1970s social welfare agencies in several cities in the USA placed homeless gay teenage boys in the custody of gay male couples. The practice was discontinued, largely because of adverse public reaction. A number of recent legal victories for homosexual couples indicate that their rights are gradually becoming enshrined in law. In Britain, a landmark 1999 ruling declared that a homosexual couple in a stable relationship could be defined as a family. This classification of homosexual partners as 'members of the family' will affect legal categories such as immigration, social security, taxation, inheritance and child support. New legal rights of homosexual couples are discussed further in chapter 14, 'Sexuality and Gender'. In 1999 a US court upheld the paternal rights of a gay male couple to be named jointly on the birth certificate of their children born to a surrogate mother. One of the men who brought the case said: 'We are celebrating a legal victory. The nuclear family as we know it is evolving. The emphasis should not be on it being a father and a mother but on loving, nurturing parents, whether that be a single mother or a gay couple living in a committed relationship' (Hartley-Brewer 1999). Staying single Recent trends in European household composition raise the question: are we becoming a community of singles? For instance, the proportion of one-person households in the UK increased from 18 per cent in 1971 to 29 per cent in 2003 (HMSO Average age at marriage : England and VVales, 1971-2001 First marriage Males Females 1971 24.6 22.6 1981 25.4 23. 1 1991 27.5 25.5 2001 30.6 28.4 Source' HMSO SOC131 Trends 34 (2004).32 2004). Several factors have combined to increase the numbers ofpeople living alone in modern Western societies. One is a trend towards later marriages - in 2001 people in the UK were marrying on average about six years later than was the case in the early 1970s (as table 9.6 shows) and by 2005 was 32 years old for men and 29 for women. Another, as we have seen, is the rising rate of divorce. Yet another is the growing number of older people in the population whose partners have died (discussed in chapter 6). Nearly half of the one-person households in the UK are one-pensioneronly households. Being single means different things at different periods of the life-course. Alarger proportion ofpeople in their 20s are unmarried than used to be the case. By their mid- 30s, however, only a small minority of men and women have never been married. The majority of single people aged 30- 50 are divorced and 'in between' marriages. Most single people over 50 are widowed. The concept of the life-course is discussed in chapter 8, 'The Life-Course'. More than ever before, young people are leaving home simply to start an independent life rather than to get married (which had been one of the most common paths out ofthe home in the past). Hence it seems that the trend of 'staying single' or living on one's own may be part of the soeietal trend towards valuing independence at the expense offamily life. Still, while independ- ence or 'staying single' may be an increasingly common path out of the parental home, most people do eventually marry. Theoretical perspectives on families and relationships The study of the family and family life has been taken up by sociologists of contrasting theoretical persuasions. Many of the perspectives adopted even a few decades ago now seem much less convincing in the light of recent research and important changes in the social world. Nevertheless, it is valuable to trace briefly the evolution of sociological thinking before turning to contemporary approaches to the study of the family. Functionalism The functionalist perspective sees society as a set of social institutions that perform specific functions to ensure continuity and consensus. According to this perspective, the family performs important tasks that contribute to society's basic needs and helps to perpetuate social order. Sociologists working in the functionalist tradition have regarded the nuclear family as fulfilling certain specialized roles in modern societies. With the advent of industrialization, the family became less important as a unit of economic production and more focused on reproduction,childrearing and socialization. Feminist approaches For many people, the family provides a vital source of solace and comfort, love and companionship. Yet as we saw above, it can also be a locus for exploitation, loneliness and profound inequality. Feminism has had a great impact on sociology by challenging the vision ofthe family as a harmonious and egalitarian realm. During the 1970s and Families and Intimate Relationships 1980s, feminist perspectives dominated most debates and research on the family. If previously the sociology of the family had focused on family structures, the historical development of the nuclear and extended family and the importance of kinship ties, feminism succeeded in directing attention inside families to examine the experiences of women in the domestic sphere. Many feminist writers have questioned the vision that the family is a cooperative unit based on common interests and mutual support. They have sought to show that the presence of unequal power relationships within the family means that certain family members tend to benefit more than others. Feminist writings have emphasized a broad spectrum of topics, but three main themes are ofparticular importance. One of the central concerns - which we will explore in greater depth in chapter 20, 'Work and Economic Life' - is the domestic division of labour. the way in which tasks are allocated between members of a household. Among feminists there are differing opinions about the historical emergence of this division. Socialist feminists see it as an outcome of industrial capitalism, while others claim that it is linked to patriarchy, and thus predates the industrialization process. There is reason to believe that a domestic division oflabour existed prior to industrialization, but it seems clear that capitalist production brought about a much sharper distinction between the domestic and work realms. This process resulted in the crystallization of 'male spheres' and 'female spheres' and power relationships which are felt to this day. Until recently, the male breadwinner model has been widespread in most industrialized societies. Feminist SOCiologists have undertaken studies on the way domestic tasks, such as childcare and housework, are shared between men and women. They have investigated the validity of claims such as that of the 'symmetrical family' (Young and WilImott 1973) - the belief that, over time, families are becoming more egalitarian in Classic Studies 9.2 Talcott Parsons and the functions of the family The research problem Why is the family such an enduring feature within hwnan societies? Do families do things that other social institutions just cannot do? Is the family really necessary for a well-ordered society? These questions have been part of ongoing debates within sociology from the discipline's earliest days,but the answers are still the subject ofheated debate. Parsons's explanation According to the American functionalist sociologist Talcott Parsons, the family's two main hmctions are primary socialization and personality stabilization (Parsons and Bales 1956). Primary socialization is the process by which children learn the cultural norms of the society into which they are born. Because this happens during the early years of childhood, the family is the most important arena for the development of the hwnan personality Personality stabiJizalion refers to the role that the family plays in assisting adult family members emotionally Marriage between adult men and women is the arrangement through which adult personalities are supported and kept healthy In industrial society,the role of the family in stabilizing adult personalities is said to be critical. This is because the nuclear family is often distanced from its extended kin and is unable to draw on larger kinship ties as families could do before industrialization. Parsons regarded the nuclear family as the unit best equipped to handle the demands of industrial society In the 'conventional family' , one adult can work outside the home,while the second adult cares for the home and children.In practical terms, this specialization of roles within the nuclear family involved the husband adopting the 'instrwnental' role as breadwinner, and the wife assuming the 'affective', emotional role in domestic settings. Critical points In our present age, Parsons's view ofthe family comes across as inadequate and outdated. Functionalist theories of the family have come under heavy criticism for justifying the domestic division of labour between men and women as something natural and unproblematic. We can also criticize functionalist argwnents for overemphasizing the role of the family and neglecting the role that other social institutions, such as government, media and schools, play in socializing children. Parsons also had little to say about variations in family forms that do not correspond to the model of the nuclear family Families that did not conform to the white, suburban, middle-class 'ideal' could then be seen as deviant. Finally the 'dark side' offamily life is argualoly underplayed in functionalist accounts and therefore not given the significance it deserves. Contemporary significance Parsons's functionalist theory of the family is undoubtedly out offavour today, and it is true to say that it must be seen as a partial account of the role of families within societies.Yet it does have historical significance. The immediate postwar years did see women returning to their traditional domestic roles and men reassurning positions as sole breadwinners, which was much closer to Parsons's account. Social policy in the UK and USA has also relied on some variant of functionalist theory of the family and its role in tackling social problems. We should also remember that a central tenet of functionalist theory is that, as societies change, social institutions must also change if they are to survive, albeit in new forms. It is possible to see the contemporary diversity of family forms (and marriage) as evidence ofthis adaptation of a key social institution - the family - to a rapidly changing social life. If so, then it may be too early to dismiss completely Parsons's functionalist analysis just yet. the distribution of roles and responsibilities, Findings have shown that women continue to bear the main responsibility for domestic tasks and enjoy less leisure time than men, despite the fact that more women are workingin paid employment outside the home than ever before (Hochschild 1989; Gershuny 1994; Sullivan 1997), Pursuing a related theme, some sociologists have examined the contrasting realms of paid and unpaid work, focusing on the contribution that women's unpaid domestic labour makes to the overall economy (Oakley 1974)_ Others have investigated the way in which resources are distributed among family members and the patterns of access to and control over household finances (PahI1989). Second, feminists have drawn attention to the unequal power relationshipsthat exist within many families. One topic that has received increased attention as a result of this is the phenomenon of domestic violence. 'Wife battering', marital rape, incest and the sexual abuse ofchildren have all received more public attention as a result of feminists' claims that the violent and abusive sides of family life have long been ignored in both academic contexts and legal and policy circles. Feminist sociologists have sought to understand how the family serves as an arena for gender oppression and even physical abuse. The study of caring activities is a third area where feminists have made important contributions. This is a broad realm which encompasses a variety of processes, from attending to a family member who is ill to looking after an elderly relative over a long period of time. Sometimes caring means simply being attuned to someone else's psycho logical well-being - several feminist writers have been interested in 'emotion work' within relationships. Not only do women tend to shoulder concrete tasks such as cleaning and childcare, but they also invest large amounts of emotional labour in maintaining personal relationships (Duncombe and Marsden 1993). While caring activities are grounded in love and deep emotion, they are also a form of work which demands an ability to listen, perceive, negotiate and act creatively. Families and Intimate Relationships Theorizing the transformation of love and intimacy Theoretical and empirical studies conducted from a feminist perspective during the last few decades have generated increased interest in the family and intimate relationships in sociology. Terms such as the 'second shift' - referring to women's dual roles at work and at home - have also entered society's everyday vocabulary. But because they often focused on specific issues within the domestic realm, feminist studies of the family did not always reflect larger trends and influences taking place outside the home. In the past decade, an important body of sociological work on the family has emerged, which draws on feminist perspectives, but is not strictly informed by them. Of primary concern are the larger transformations which are taking place in family forms - the formation and dissolution of families and households, and the evolving expectations within individuals' personal relationships. The rise in divorce and lone parenting, the emergence of 'reconstituted families' and gay families, and the popularity of cohabitation are all subjects of concern. These transformations cannot be understood apart from the larger changes occurring in the contemporary world. The transformation ofintimacy In my own work, particularly The Transformation ofIntimacy (1993), I looked at how intimate relationships are changing in modern societies. The introduction to this chapter shows that marriage in pre-modern society was not generally based on sexual attraction or romantic love; instead, it was more often linked to the economic context in which to create a family or to enable the inheritance of property. For the peasantry, a life characterized by unremitting hard labour was unlikely to be conducive to sexual passion - although opportunities for men to engage in extrarnaritalliaisons were numerous. Romantic love, as distinct from the more or less universal compulsions of passionate love, developed in the late eighteenth century. Despite its promise of an equal relationship based on mutual attraction, romantic love has in practice tended to lead to the dominance of men over women (Evans 2002). For many men, the tensions between the respectability of romantic love and the compulsions of passionate love were dealt with by separating the comfort of the wife and home from the sexuality of the mistress or prostitute. The double standard here was that a woman should remain a virgin until the right man arrives - whereas no such norm applied to the men. I argue that the most recent phase of modernity has seen another transformation in the nature of intimate relationships in the development ofpIastic sexuality. For people in modern societies there is a much greater choice over when, how often and with whom they have sex than ever before (there is a wider discussion of sexuality in chapter 14, 'Sexuality and Gender'). With plastic sexuality, sex can be untied from reproduction. This is partly due to improved methods of contraception, which have largely freed women from the fear of repetitive pregnancies and childbirths, but the development of a sense of the self that could be actively chosen (a social reflexivity) has also contributed to the emergence of plastic sexuality. The emergence of plastic sexuality brings with it a change in the nature of love. I argued that the ideals of romantic love are fragmenting and being replaced by confluent love.Confluent love is active and contingent. It jars with the forever, one-and-only qualities of romantic love.The emergence of confluent love goes some way towards explaining the rise ofseparation and divorce discussed earlier in this chapter. Romantic love meant that once people had married they were usually stuck with one another, no matter how the relationship developed. Now people have more choice: whereas divorce was previously difficult or impossible to obtain, married people are now no longer bound to stay together if the relationship does not work. Rather than basing relationships on romantic passion, people are increasingly pursuing the ideal of the pure relationship, in which couples remain because they choose to do so. The pure relationship is held together by the acceptance of each partner that, 'until further notice', each gains sufficient benefits from the relationship to make its continuance worthwhile. Love is based upon emotional intimacy that generates trust. Love develops depending on how much each partner is prepared to reveal concerns and needs and to be vulnerable to the other. There is a diversity offorms ofpure relationship. Some same-sex relationships, because of their open and negotiated status, come closer to the ideal ofpure relationships than do married heterosexual ones. Some critics have argued that the instability of the pure relationship, which was thought ofas a relationship between adults, contrasts with the complexities of family practices which also include children, and neglects the different experiences which men and women tend to have when a (heterosexual) relationship ends. By focusing on relationships between adults, critics have noted, the idea of a pure relationship reflects the marginalization of children and childhood in sociological thought (Smart and Neale 1999). Perhaps the thesis of the pure relationship does not give enough attention to issues of space and time required for its construction. For example, such relationships may still involve homebuilding and looking after children, both of which can be seen as practical 'joint projects' that also contribute significantly to the maintenance of intimate relationships (Jamieson 1998). The sociology of childhood is discussed in chapter 8,'The Life-Course'. The 'normal chaos'o/love In The Normal Chaos ofLove (1995), Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim exam- Modern relationships often involve dual-income families where mothers are in full-time work. This has led to the re-emergence of some institutions which might be considered 'oldfashioned', such as schools for professional nannies. ine the tumultuous nature of personal relationships, marriages and family patterns against the backdrop of a rapidly changing world. The traditions, rules and guidelines which used to govern personal relationships no longer apply, they argue, and individuals are now confronted with an endless series of choices as part of constructing, adjusting, improving or dissolving the unions they form with others. The fact that marriages are now entered into voluntarily, rather than for economic purposes or at the urging of family, brings both freedoms and new strains. In fact, the authors conclude, they demand a great deal ofhard work and effort. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim see our age as one filled with colliding interests between family, work, love and the freedom to pursue individual goals. This collision is felt acutely within personal relationships, particularly when there are two 'labour market biographies' to juggle instead of one, as more women pursue a career. Previous gendered work patterns are less fixed than they once were; both men and women now place emphasis on their professional and personal needs. Relationships in the modern age are not just about relationships; they are also about work, politics, economics, professions and inequality. It is therefore not surprising that antagonisms between men and women are rising. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim claim that the 'battle between the sexes' is the 'central drama of our times', as evidenced in the growth of the marriage-counselling industry, family courts, marital self-help groups and divorce rates. Even though marriage and family life seem to be more 'flimsy' than ever before, they remain very important to people. Divorce is more common, but rates of remarriage are high. The birth rate may be declining, but there is a huge demand for fertility treatment. Fewer people choose to get married, but the desire to live with someone as part of a couple holds steady. How do we explain such competing tendencies? Beck and Beck-Gernsheim's answer is: love. They claim that today's 'battle of the sexes' is the clearest possible indication of people's 'hunger for love'. People marry for the sake of love, divorce for the sake of love and engage in an endless cycle of hoping, regretting and trying again. While, on the one hand, the tensions between men and women are high, there remains a deep hope and faith in the possibility of finding true love and fulfilment. This may appear too simple an answer for the complexities ofour current age, but Beck and Beck-Gernsheim argue that it is precisely because our world is so overwhelming, impersonal, abstract and rapidly changing that love has become increasingly important. Love is the only place where people can truly find themselves and connect with others: Love is a search for oneself, a craving to really get in contact with me and you, sharing bodies, sharing thoughts, encountering one another with nothing held back, making confessions and being forgiven, understanding, confirming and supporting what was and what is, longing for a home and trust to counteract the doubts and anxieties modern life generates. If nothing seems certain or safe, ifeven breathing is risky in a polluted world, then people chase after the misleading dreams oflove until they suddenly turn into nightmares. (1995: 175- 6) Critics have attacked Beck and BeckGernsheim's exclusive focus on heterosexuality - the battle between the sexes is the 'central drama of our times' - which, critics say, marginalizes homosexual relationships (Smart and Neale 1999). The thesis can also be criticized for its reliance on the notion of 'individualization', which plays down or fails to acknowledge the importance of social class and community in structuring opportunities and shaping personal relationships - by no means do all women enjoy the kinds of lifetime careers outlined by Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, for instance. THINKING CRITICALLY To what extent do you think love is capable of holding together the institution of the family? What problems could arise within families when couples place such a high value on love to hold their own relationship together? Liquid love? In Liquid Love (2003), Zygmunt Bauman argues that, today, relationships are 'the hottest talk of the town and ostensibly the sole game worth playing, despite their notorious risks'. His book is about the 'frailty of human bonds', the feeling of insecurity that this frailty leads to and our responses to it. Bauman writes that the hero of his book is 'the man without bonds' (of, for example, family, class, religion or marriage) or at least the man without fixed, unbreakable ties. Those ties that Bauman's hero does have are loosely knotted, so that they can be released again, with little delay if the circumstances change. To Bauman, the circumstances will change often - he uses the metaphor 'liquid' to describe modern society, which he sees as characterized by constant change and a lack of lasting bonds. Bauman argues that, in a world of rampant 'individualization', relationships are a mixed blessing; they are filled with conflicting desires, which pull in different ways. On the one hand, there is the desire for freedom, for loose bonds that we can escape from ifwe so choose and for individualism. On the other, there is the desire for greater security that is gained by tightening the bonds between our partners and ourselves. As it is, Bauman argues, we swing back and forth between the two polarities of security and freedom. Often we run to , experts - therapists or columnists, for example - for advice on how we can combine the two. To Bauman, this is attempting 'to have the cake and eat it, to cream off the sweet delights of relationship while omitting its better and tougher bits'. The result is a society of 'semi-detached couples' in 'top pocket relationships'. By the phrase 'top pocket relationships', Bauman means something that can be pulled out when needed, but pushed deep inside the pocket the moment it is not. One response to the 'frailty of human bonds' is to replace quality in our relationships for quantity. It is not the depth of our relationships, but the number of contacts that we have which becomes important to us. That is partly why, Bauman argues, we are always talking on mobile phones and sending text messages to one another, and even typing them in truncated sentences to increase the speed at which we can send them. It is not the message itself that is important, but the constant circulation of messages, without which we feel excluded. Bauman notes that people now speak more of connections and networks and less of relationships. To be in a relationship means to be mutually engaged; networks suggest moments of being in touch. In a network, connections can be made on demand and broken at will. What really symbolizes the liquid modern relationship for Bauman is computer-dating. He cites an interviewwith a 28-year-old man who notes the one decisive advantage of electronic relations: 'You can always press delete.' Bauman's ideas are certainly suggestive, but critics see their empirical basis as very weak, leaving them rather speCUlative, rather than grounded in sociological research. For example, too much is perhaps made of magazines and the short-term impact on social relationships ofnewtechnologies such as mobile phones and computers. Like Giddens and Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, Bauman is often accused of being too pessimistic about the contemporary world, especially the transformaFamilies and Intimate Relationships tion of intimate relationships he identifies. But is his assessment realistic? Carol Smart (2007) thinks not. Indeed, she takes issue with all the theories in the 'Recent perspectives' section above, arguing that they all tend to exaggerate the extent of individualization, family fragmentation and the apparent decline of relationship commitment. Instead, Smart suggests that personal life (rather than 'the family' or 'the individual') in modern societies is characterized by strong social and emotional bonds alongside the sharing of memories and experience. She suggests that the concept of personal life encompasses people's pursuit of a 'life project' (as described in the work of Beck and Giddens, for example), but always relates such individual projects to the wider familial and social context within which they make sense. Smart (2007) argues that Beck's work, for instance, often gives the impression that individuals have been 'cut free' from social structures: a very unrealistic notion. Instead, she argues, 'meaningconstitutive traditions' are important here, as well as such structural factors as social class, ethnicity and gender. Smart attributes particular importance to collective memories, transmitted across generations as well as the way that people are embedded within social structures and 'imagined communities'. Studying personal life alerts sociologists to something that Smart sees missing in the theories discussed above - namely, connectedness. By this, Smart means all the ways in which people maintain their social relationships and associations in different times and contexts, along with the memories, feelings and experiences of being connected to others. She argues that studying connectedness rather than fragmentation allows macrosociological theories to reconnect with the large amount of empirical research on families and relationships and thus get closer to - and understand better - people's real-life experiences. The relationship networks emerging within 'liquid modernity' can be sustained 'virtually' via electronic forms of communication. Clearly, these debates and the view we take of recent social change cover some of the big social and political questions of recent times, but what do they mean for the debate about the decline, or otherwise, of family values? Conclusion: the debate about family values 'The family is collapsing!' cry the advocates of family values, surveying the changes of the past few decades - a more liberal and open attitude towards sexuality, steeply climbing divorce rates and a general seeking for personal happiness at the expense of older conceptions of family duty. We must recover a moral sense of family life, they argue. We must reinstate the traditional family, which was much more stable and ordered than the tangled web of relationships in which most ofus find ourselves now (O'Neill2002). These arguments are heard not only in Europe and the United States; changes affecting the personal and emotional spheres go far beyond the borders of any particular country. We find the same issues almost everywhere, differing only in degree and according to the cultural context in which they take place. In China, for example, the state is considering making divorce more difficult to obtain. In the late 1960s, very liberal marriage laws were passed. Marriage is a working contract that can be dissolved 'when husband and wife both desire it'. Even if one partner objects, divorce can be granted when 'mutual affection' has gone from the marriage. Only a two-week wait is required, after which they both pay a few pounds and are henceforth independent. The Chinese divorce rate is still low compared with Western countries, but it is rising rapidly - as is true in the other developing Asian societies. In Chinese cities, not only divorce, but also cohabitation is becoming more frequent. In the vast Chinese countryside, by contrast, everything is different. Marriage and the family are much more traditional - in spite of the official policy of limiting childbirth through a mixture of incentives and punishment. Marriage is an arrangement between two families, fixed by the parents rather than the individuals concerned. Arecent study in the province of Gansu, which has only a low level of economic development, found that 60 per cent ofmarriages are still arranged by parents. As a Chinese saying has it: 'Meet once, nod your head and marry: There is a twist in the story in modernizing China. Many of those currently divorcing in the urban centres were married in the traditional manner in the country. In China, there is much talk of protecting the 'traditional' family. In many Western countries, the debate is even more intense and divisive. Defenders of the traditional family argue that the emphasis on relationships comes at the expense ofthe family as a basic institution of society. Many of these critics now speak of the breakdown of the family. Ifsuch a breakdown is occurring, it is extremely significant. The family is the meeting point of a range of trends affecting society as a whole - increasing equality between the sexes, the widespread entry of women into the labour force, changes in sexual behaviour and expectations, the changing relationship between home and work. Among all the changes going on today, none is more important than those happening in our personal lives - in sexuality, emotional life, marriage and the family. Families and Intimate Relationships There is a global revolution going on in how we think of ourselves and how we form ties and connections with others. It is a revolution advancing unevenly in different parts ofthe world, with much resistance. 'Rubbish!' others reply. The family is not collapsing; it is merely diversifying. They argue that we should actively encourage a variety offamily forms and sexual life, rather than supposing that everyone has to be compressed into the same mould (Hite 1994). THINKING CRITICALLY Using the theories and evidence from this chapter, evaluate the thesis that traditional 'family values' are being eroded. If they are, should we see this as a negative or progressive development for society as a whole? If they are not, then how can we explain why so many people believe they are? Which side is right? We should probably be critical of both views. A return to the traditional family is not a possibility. This is not only because, as we saw above, the traditional family as it is usually thought of never existed, or because there were too many oppressive facets to families in the past to make them a model for today. It is also because the social changes that have transformed earlier forms of marriage and the family are mostly irreversible. Women will not return in large numbers to a domestic situation from which they have painfully managed to extricate themselves. Sexual partnerships and marriage today, for better or worse, cannot be like they used to be. Emotional communication - more precisely, the active creation and sustaining of relationships - has become central to modern lives in the personal and family domain. What will be the result? The divorce rate may have levelled offfrom its previous steep increase, but it is not dropping. All measures of divorce are to some extent estimates, but I I II I , ,, on the basis ofpast trends, we can guess that some 60 per cent ofall marriages contracted now might end in divorce within ten years. Divorce, as we have seen, is not always a reflection of unhappiness. People who may in former times have felt constrained to remain in miserable marriages can make a fresh start. But there can be no doubt that the trends affecting sexuality, marriage and the family create deep anxieties for some people at the same time as they generate new possibilities for satisfaction and selffulfilment for others. live-in relationships no longer face social rejection by their more 'respectable' married friends. Gay couples can set up house together and bring up children without facing the same level of hostility they would have in the past. Those who argue that the great diversity in family forms that exists today is to be welcomed, as freeing us from the limitations and sufferings of the past, surely have a certain amount of right on their side. Men and women can remain single if they wish, without having to face the social disapproval that once came from being a bachelor or, even more, a spinster. Couples in These things having been said, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that we stand at a crossroads. Will the future bring about the further decay of long-term marriages or partnerships? Will we more and more inhabit an emotional and sexual landscape scarred by bitterness and violence? None can say for certain. But such a sociological analysis of marriage and the family as we have just concluded strongly suggests that we will not resolve our problems by looking to the past. We must try to reconcile the individual freedoms most of us have come to value in our personal lives with the need to form stable and lasting relations with other people. Summary points 1. Kinship, family and marriage are closely related terms of key significance for sociology and anthropology. Kinship comprises either genetic ties or ties initiated by marriage. A family is a group of kin having responsibility for the upbringing of children. Marriage is a bond between two people living together in a socially approved sexual relationship. 2. A nuclear family is a household in which a married couple (or single parent) live together with their own or adopted children. Where kin other than a married couple and children live in the same household, or are involved in close and continuous relationships, we speak of an extended family. During the twentieth century, the predominance of the traditional nuclear family in most industrialized societies has given way to a greater diversity of family forms. 3. InWestern societies, marriage - and therefore the family - is associated with monogamy. Many other cultures tolerate or encourage polygamy, in which an individual may be married to two or more spouses at the same time. 4. There is considerable diversity in family forms among ethnic minority groups. In Britain for example, families of South Asian and AfricanCaribbean origin differ from the dominant family types. 5. Divorce rates have been rising since 1945 and the number of first marriages has declined.As a result, a growing proportion of the population live in lone-parent households. 6. Rates of remarriage are quite high. Remarriage can lead to the formation of a reconstituted family - one in which at least one of the adults has children from a previous marriage or relationship. 7. Cohabitation (where a couple lives together in a sexual relationship outside marriage) has become more widespread in many industrial countries. Gay men and lesbians are increasingly able to live together as couples, as attitudes to homosexuality become more relaxed. In some instances, homosexual couples have gained the legal right to be defined as a family. 8. Family life is not always happy and harmonious; sexual abuse and domestic violence sometimes occur within it. Most sexual abuse of children and domestic violence is carried out by males, and seems to connect with other types of violent behaviour in which some men are involved. Families and Intimate Relationships 9. Marriage has ceased to be the condition for regular sexual experience - for either sex and is no longer the basis of economic activity. However, marriage and the family remain firmly established institutions, while undergoing major stresses and strains. on the basis ofpast trends, we can guess that some 60 per cent ofall marriages contracted now might end in divorce within ten years. D ivorce, as we have seen, is not always a reflection of unhappiness. People who may in former times have felt constrained to remain in miserable marriages can make a fresh start. But there can be no doubt that the trends affecting sexuality, marriage and the family create deep anxieties for some people at the same time as they generate new possibilities for satisfaction and selffulfilment for others. live-in relationships no longer face social rejection by their more 'respectable' married friends. Gay couples can set up house together and bring up children without facing the same level of hostility they would have in the past. Those who argue that the great diversity in family forms that exists today is to be welcomed, as freeing us from the limitations and sufferings of the past, surely have a certain amount of right on their side. Men and women can remain single if they wish, without having to face the social disapproval that once came from being a bachelor or, even more, a spinster. Couples in These things having been said, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that we stand at a crossroads. Will the future bring about the further decay of long-term marriages or partnerships'? Will we more and more inhabit an emotional and sexual landscape scarred by bitterness and violence? None can say for certain. But such a sociological analysis of marriage and the family as we have just concluded strongly suggests that we will not resolve our problems by looking to the past. We must try to reconcile the individual freedoms most of us have come to value in OUI personal lives with the need to form stable and lasting relations with other people. Summary points 1. Kinship, family and marriage are closely related terms of key significance for sociology and anthropology. Kinship comprises either genetic ties or ties initiated by marriage.A family is a group of kin having responsibility for the upbringing of children. Marriage is a bond between two people living together in a socially approved sexual relationship. 2. A nuclear family is a household in which a married couple (or single parent) live together with their own or adopted children. Where kin other than a married couple and children live in the same household, or are involved in close and continuous relationships, we speak of an extended family. During the twentieth century, the predominance of the traditional nuclear family in most industrialized societies has given way to a greater diversity of family forms. 3. InWestern societies,marriage - and therefore the family - is associated with monogamy. Many other cultures tolerate or encourage polygamy,in which an individual may be married to two or more spouses at the same time. 4. There is considerable diversity in family forms among ethnic minority groups. In Britain for example, families of South Asian and AfricanCaribbean origin differ from the dominant family types. 5. Divorce rates have been rising since 1945 and the number of first marriages has declined. As a result, a growing proportion of the population live in lone-parent households. 6. Rates of remarriage are qulte high. Remarriage can lead to the formation of a reconstituted family - one in which at least one of the adults has children from a previous marriage or relationship. 7. Cohabitation (where a couple lives together in a sexual relationship outside marriage) has become more widespread in many industrial countries. Gay men and lesbians are increasingly able to live together as couples, as attitudes to homosexuality become more relaxed. In some instances, homosexual couples have gained the legal right to be defined as a family. 8. Family life is not always happy and harmonious; sexual abuse and domestic violence sometimes occur within it. Most sexual abuse of children and domestic violence is carried out by males, and seems to connect with other types of violent behaviour in which some men are involved. Families and Intimate Relationships 9. Marriage has ceased to be the condition for regular sexual experience - for either sexand is no longer the basis of economic activity.However, marriage and the family remain firmly established institutions, while undergoing major stresses and strains. •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • • •• •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• •• • • • • • •• • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • Further reading For newcomers to sociology, a good place to begin reading on families and relationships is with Liz Steel and Warren Kidd's The Family (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), which is a genuinely introductory textbook with lots of guidance. Asimilar approach is taken by David M. Newman and Liz Grauerholz in their Sociology ofFamilies, 2nd edn (London: Sage, 2002), though this is a much larger and more comprehensive book. From here, it is worth trying something a little more sophisticated, such as Graham Allan and Graham Crow's Families, Households and Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), which is an excellent account of recent debates in the light of evidence, mainly from the VK.Awider European perspective on changing family forms and policy responses is available in Linda Hantrais's Family Policy Matters: Responding to Family Change in Europe (Bristol: Policy Press, 2004). Sociological tlleories of the family can be approached via lames M. White and David M. K1ein's Family Theories, 3rd rev. edn (London: Sage,(2007), which also includes perspectives from other disciplines. Then a very comprehensive series of essays covering many of the key issues in this field is Graham Allan's edited collection in The Sociology ofthe Family: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). Finally, you may want to explore more recent arguments suggesting that changing family forms will need new ways of theorizing. Ifso, then you could look at Vlrich Beck and Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim's Reinventing the Family: In Search ofLifestyles (Cambridge: Polity, 2002); and Linda McKie and Sarah Cunningham-Burley's edited collection, Families in Society: Boundaries and Relationships (Bristol: Policy Press, 2005), which explores families, not as 'things' or 'entities', but rather as 'relationship processes'. Finally, Carol Smart's Personal Life: New Directions in Sociological Thinking (Cambridge: Polity, 2007) outlines her thesis of connectedness in people's personal lives. • • • • • • • • • • • •• •• • • •• • • • • • • • • • ••• • •• • • •• • •• ••• •• •• • •• •• • •• •• • •• • •• ••• •• • •• ••• •• •• • •• • ••• •• • • • •• • •• • •• ••• • •• •• • • •• • • •• • • • • • • ••• • • •• • Families and Intimate Relationships ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Internet links The Centre for Research on Families and Relationships (CRFR) is a research centre founded in 2001, based at the University of Edinburgh, UK, focusing on families: www.crfr.ac.uk/index.htm The Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) is a thinktank founded by Margaret Thatcher and Keith Joseph in 1974 to champion a smaller state and foster the family, enterprise and individualism: www.cps.org.uk/ Civitas - Institute for the Study of Civil Societywas founded in 2000 to promote social cohesion through 'a better division of responsibilities between government and civil society': www.civitas.org.uk/ Clearinghouse on International Developments in Child,Youth and Family Policies is based at Columbia University, NewYork; it provides cross-national information on family policies in the industrialized societies: www.childpolicyintl.org/ The Morgan Centre for the Study of Relationships and Personal Life is a research centre founded in 2005 at the University of Manchester, UK; its research is based on the concept of'personallife': www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/ morgancentrel • • • • • • • •• • • • •• • • • •• • • • • • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Look at the two photographs above. The images of a sunken face and an emaciated body are almost identical. The young African girl on the left is dying from a simple lack of food. The young woman on the right is a British teenager, dying because, in a society with a superabundance of food, she chose not to eat or to eat so sparingly that her life was endangered. The social dynamics involved in each case are utterly different. Starvation from lack offood is caused by factors outside people's control and affects only the very poor. The British teenager, living in one of the wealthiest countries in the world, is suffering from anorexia, an illness with no known physical origin. Obsessed with the ideal of achieving a slim body, she has eventually given up 385 HEALTH, ILLNESS AND DISABILITY eating altogether.Anorexia and other eating disorders are illnesses ofthe affluent, not of those who have little or no food. They are unknown in the developing countries where food is scarce. The sociology of the body Throughout much of human history, a few people - saints or mystics, for example - have deliberately chosen to starve themselves for religious reasons. Anorexia, on the other hand, has no specific connection to religious beliefs, and estimates suggest that some 90 per cent of sufferers are women (Lask and Bryant-Waugh 2000). It is an illness of the body, and thus we might think that we would This painting by Rubens, completed around 1613, depictsVenus,the goddess oflove and beauty have to look to biological or physical factors to explain it. But health and illness,like other topics we have studied, are also affected by social and cultural influences, such as the pressure to achieve a slim body. Although it is an illness that expresses itself in physical symptoms, anorexia is closely related to the idea ofbeing on a diet, which in turn is connected with changing views of physical attractiveness, particularly of women, in modern society. In most premodern societies, the ideal female shape was a fleshy one. Thinness was not regarded as desirable at all and - partly because it was associated with lack of food and therefore with poverty - the social status of 'thin' was low. Even in Europe in the 1600s and 1700s, the ideal female shape was well proportioned. Anyone who has seen paintings ofthe period, such as those byRubens (shown in the photograph), will have noticed how curvaceous (even plump) the women depicted in them are. A contemporary example of the high cultural value traditionally attached to plumpness in some cultures can be seen in the BBC report in 'Global Society 10.1'. The notion of slimness as the desirable feminine shape originated among some middle-class groups in the late nineteenth century, but it has become generalized as an ideal for most women only recently. Anorexia thus has its origins in the changing body image of women in the recent history ofmodern societies. It was first identified as a disorder in France in 1874, but it remained obscure until the past 30 or 40 years (Brown and Jasper 1993). Since then, it has become increasingly common among young women. So has bulimia- bingeing on food, followed by self-induced vomiting. Anorexia and bulimia are often found together in the same individual. Someone may become extremely thin through a starvation diet and then enter a phase of eating enormous amounts and purging in order to maintain a normal weight, followed by a period of again becoming very thin. Anorexia and other eating disorders are no longer obscure forms of illness confined Global Society 10.1 Mauritania's 'wife·fattening' farms Obesity is so revered among Mauritania's white Moor Arab population that the young girls are sometimes force-fed to obtain a weight the government has described as "life-threatening". A generation ago,over a third of women in the country were force-fed as children - Mauritania is one of the few African countries where, on average,girls receive more food than boys. Now only around one in 10 girls are treated this way. The treatment has its roots in fat being seen as a sign of wealth - if a girl was thin she was considered poor, and would not be respected. But in rural Mauritania you still see the rotund women that the country is famous for. They walk slowly, dainty hands on the end of dimpled arms, pinching multicoloured swathes of fabric together to keep the biting sand from their faces. "1make them eat lots of dates, lots and lots of couscous and other fattening food," Fatematou, a voluminous woman in her sixties who nms a kind of' 'fat farm" in the northern desert town ofAtar, told BBC World Service's The World 7bday programme. Although she had no clients when I met her, she said she was soon expecting to take charge of some seven-year-olds. "1 make them eat and eat and eat. And then drink lots and lots of water," she explained. "1 make them do this all morning. Then they have a rest. In the afternoon we start again. We do this three times a day - the morning,the afternoon and the evening." Punishment She said the girls could end up weighing between 60 to 100 kilograms, "with lots oflayers of fat." Fatematou said that it was rare for a girl to refuse to eat, and that if they did, she was helped by the child's parents. "They punish the girls and in the end the girls eat;' she said. "If a girl refuses we start nicely, saying 'come on, come on' sweetly, until she agrees to eat." Fatematou admitted that sometimes the girls cried at the treatment. "Of course they cry they scream;' she said. "We grab them and we force them to eat. If they cr.y a lot we leave them sometimes for a day or two and then we come back to start again. They get used to it in the end." She argued that in the end the girls were grateful. "When they are small they don't understand, but when they grow up they are fat and beautiful," she said. "They are proud and show off their good size to make men dribble.Don't you think that's good?" Change However, the view that a fat girl is more desirable is now becoming seen as old-fashioned. A study by the Mauritanian ministry of health has found that force-feeding is dying out. Now only 11% of young girls are force fed."That's not how people think now;' Leila a woman in the ancient desert town of Chinguetti,who herself was fattened as a child - told The World Today. "Traditionally a fat wife was a symbol of wealth. Now we've got another vision, another criteria for beauty.Young people in Mauritania today, we're not interested in being fat as a symbol of beauty. Today to be beautiful is to be natural, just to eat normally." Some men are also much less keen on having a fat wife - a reflection of changes in Mauritanian society "We're fed up of fat women here," said 19year-old shop ownerYusuf "Always fat women! Now we want thin women.In Mauritania if a woman really wants to get married I think she should stay thin. Ifshe gets fat it's not good. "Some girls have asked me whether they should get fat or stay thin. I tell them if you want to find a man, a European or a Mauritanian, stay thin, it's better for you.But some blokes still like them fat: ' Source: Extract from Pascale Harter, BBC World Service, 26 January 2004 © bbc.co.uk/news. HEALTH, ILLNESS AND DISABILITY to the wealthiest modern societies. Eating disorders have been increasing in the Middle East, the Far East, SouthAmerica and A1rica (Nasser et al. 2001). Arecent review of international research found that, since 1990, problems of eating disorders had been identified in Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, China, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Hong Kong, India, Turkey, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (Nasser 2006). In the UK, prevalence rates (the number of cases at any specific time) amongst young adult women have been estimated at around 1-2 per cent for anorexia nervosa and between 1 and 3 per cent for bulimia nervosa. Based on these rates, a best estimate for the total number of British people with a diagnosed or undiagnosed eating disorder is some 1.15 million (Eating Disorders Association 2007). Nor is obsession with slenderness - and the resulting eating disorders - limited to women in Europe and the United States. As Western images of feminine beauty have spread to the rest of the world, so too have their associated illnesses. Eating disorders were first documented in Japan in the 1960s, a consequence of that county's rapid economic growth and incorporation into the global economy. Anorexia is now found among I per cent ofyoung Japanese women, roughly the same percentage as that found in the United States. During the 1980s and 1990s, eating problems surfaced among young, primarily affluent women in Hong Kong and Singapore, as well as in urban areas in Taiwan, China, the Philippines, India and Pakistan (Efran 1997). In a study reported by Medscape's General Medicine (Makino et al. 2004), the prevalence of bulimia nervosa in female subjects in Western countries ranged from 0.3 to 7.3 per cent, compared to 0.46 to '3.2 per cent in the non-Western world. Lee (2001) argues that the spread of eating disorders is rooted in the expanding transnational 'culture of modernity'. Once again, something that may seem to be a purely personal trouble - difficulties with food and despair over one's appearance - turns out to be a public issue. If we include not just life-threatening forms of anorexia but also obsessive concern with dieting and bodily appearance, eating disorders are now part of the lives of millions of people; today they are found in all the industrial countries and are spreading to the developing world too. THINIUNG CRITICALLY From your knowledge of gender roles and status, why do you think eating disorders seem to affect more women than men? Given that women have achieved more equality with men than in previous generations, is this likely to lead to more eating disorder amongst young men? What measures could governments take to stem the increase in eating disorders? The rapid growth of eating disorders is astonishing, and brings home clearly the influence of social factors on our health and capacity for social interaction. The field known as the sociology of the body investigates the ways in which our bodies are affected by these social influences. As human beings, we obviously all possess a body, but this is not something we just have and it is not something physical that exits outside of society. Our bodies are deeply affected by our social experiences, as well as by the norms and values of the groups to which we belong. One major theme in this chapter is the increasing separation of the body from 'nature' - from our surrounding environment and our biological rhythms. Our bodies are being invaded by the influence of science and technology, ranging from machines to diets, and this is creating new dilemmas. The increasing prevalence of forms of plastic surgery, for example, has introduced new options but has also generated intense social controversies. We shall look at one such controversy - plastic surgery for people with facial disfigurements - later in the chapter. The term 'technology' should not be In the relatively wealthy countries, a bewildering array offoods from around the world is now available in every supermarket. understood in too narrow a way here. In its most basic sense, it refers to material technologies such as those involved in modern medicine - for example, the scanning machine that allows a doctor to chart a baby's development prior to birth. But we must take account of what Michel Foucault (1988) called 'social technologies' affecting the body. By this phrase, he means that the body is increasingly something we have to 'create' rather than simply accept. A social technology is any kind of regular intervention we make into the functioning of our bodies in order to alter them in specific ways. An example is dieting, so central to anorexia. In what follows, we will first analyse why eating disorders have become so common. From there, we will study the wider social dimensions of health. Then we turn to the sociology of disability, and look, in particular,at the social and cultural construction of disablement. The sociology of health and illness To understand why eating disorders have become so commonplace in current times, we should think back to the theme of social change analysed elsewhere in the book. Anorexia actually reflects certain kinds of social change, including the impact ofglob- alization. The rise of eating disorders in Western societies coincides directly with the globalization of food production, which has increased greatly in the past three or four decades. The invention of new modes of refrigeration plus the use ofcontainer trans- HEALTH, ILLNESS AND DISABILITY portation have allowed food to be stored for long periods and to be delivered from one side of the world to the other. Since the 1950s, supermarkets have stocked foods from all over the world (for those who can afford it - now the majority of the population in Western societies). Most of them are available all the time, not just, as was true previously, when they are in season locally. Over the past decade or so, many people in developed countries have begun to think more carefully about their diet. This does not mean that everyone is desperately trying to get thin. Rather, when all foods are available more or less all the time, we must decide what to eat- in other words, construct a diet, where 'diet' means the foods we habitually consume. To construct our diet, we have to decide what to eat in relation to the many sorts of new medical information with which science now bombards us - for instance, that cholesterol levels are a factor in causing heart disease. The development of genetically modified (GM) foods presents yet another dilemma for people; in the USA, GM foods are routinely consumed, but in most of Europe, consumers have been anxious about their 'non-natural' (that is, 'man-made') status. Conversely, the recent trend towards organically grown food shows a willingness to 'buy natural' (at least, for those who can afford to do so). In a society where food is abundant and relatively cheap, we are able for the first time to design our bodies in relation to our lifestyle habits (such as jogging, bicycling, swimming and yoga) and what we eat. Eating disorders have their origins in the opportunities, but also the profound strains and tensions, that this situation produces. Why do eating disorders affect women in particular and young women most acutely? To begin with, it should be pointed out that not all those suffering from eating disorders are women; globally, around 10 per cent are men (Nasser 2006). But men do not suffer from anorexia or bulimia as often as women, partly because widely held social norms stress the importance of physical attractiveness more for women than for men and partly because desirable body images of men differ from those of women. Drawing on the diaries ofAmerican girls over the last two centuries, Joan Jacobs Brumberg (1997) argues that nowadays, when adolescent girls in the USA ask themselves the questions 'Who am I?' and 'Who do I want to be?', the answer, far more than it was a century ago, is likely to revolve around the body. Brumberg argues that 'commercial interests' increasingly play on the body angst of young girls. She concludes that the body is now so central to American girls' sense of self that it has become their central project. Anorexia and other eating disorders reflect the current situation in which women play a much larger part in the wider society than they used to but are still judged as much by their appearance as by their attainments. Eating disorders are rooted in feelings ofshame about the body. The individual feels herself to be inadequate and imperfect, and her anxieties about how others perceive her become focused through her feelings about her body. Ideals of slimness at that point become obsessive - shedding weight becomes the means ofmaking everything all right in her world. Once she starts to diet and exercise compulsively, she can become locked into a pattern of refusing food altogether or ofvomiting up what she has eaten. If the pattern is not broken (and some forms of psychotherapy and medical treatment have proved effective here), the sufferer can actually starve herself to death. The spread ofeating disorders reflects the influence of science and technology on our ways oflife today: calorie-counting has only been possible with the advance of technology. But the impact of technology is always conditioned by social factors. We have much more autonomy over the body than ever before, a situation that creates new possibilities of a positive kind as well as new anxieties and problems. What is happening is part of what SOCiologists call the socialization of nature.This phrase refers to the fact that phenomena that used to be 'natural', or given in nature, have now become social they depend on our own social decisions. Sociological perspectives on medicine The rise ofthe biomedical model of health Like many of the ideas we explore in this book, 'health' and 'illness' are terms that are culturally and socially defined. Cultures differ in what they consider to be healthy and normal. All cultures have known concepts of physical health and illness, but most ofwhat we now recognize as medicine is a consequence of developments in Western society over the past three centuries. In pre-modern cultures, the family was the main institution coping with sickness or aflliction. There have always been individuals who specialized as healers, using a mixture of physical and magical remedies, and many of these traditional systems of treatment survive today in non-Western cultures throughout the world. A large number of them belong to the category of alternative medicines discussed below. For apprOJdmately 200 years now, the dominant Western ideas about medicine have been expressed in the biomedical model of health. This understanding of health and illness developed along with the growth of modern societies. In fact, it can be seen as one of the main features of such societies. Its emergence was closely linked to the triumph of science and reason over traditional or religious-based explanations of the world (see the discussion of Max Weber and rationalization in chapter 1). Before looking at the biomedical model in more depth, let us briefly consider the social and historical context in which it arose. Public health We mentioned above how members of traditional societies relied largely on folk remedies, treatments and healing techniques which were passed down from Health, Illness and Disability generation to generation. Illnesses were frequently regarded in magical or religious terms and were attributed to the presence of evil spirits or 'sin'. For peasants and average town-dwellers, there was no outside authority that was concerned with their health in the way that states and public health systems are today. Health was a private matter, not a public concern. The rise of both the nation-state and industrialization brought about drastic changes in this situation, however. The emergence of nation-states with defined territories produced a shift in attitudes towards local people, who were no longer simply inhabitants of the land, but were a population falling under the rule ofa central authority. The human population was seen as a resource to be monitored and regulated as part of the process of maximizing national wealth and power. The state began to take a heightened interest in the health of its popUlation, as the well-being of its members affected the nation's productivity, level of prosperity, defensive capabilities and rate of growth. The study of demography - the size, composition and dynamics of human populations - assumed much greater importance. The Census was introduced in order to record and monitor changes occurring in the population. Statistics of all sorts were collected and calculated: birth rates, mortality rates, average ages of marriage and childbearing, suicide rates, life expectancy, diet, common illnesses, causes of death and so forth. MichelFoucault (1926- 84) made aninfluential contribution to our understanding of the rise of modern medicine by drawing attention to the regulation and disciplining of bodies by European states (1973). He argued that sexuality and sexual behaviour were of central importance to this process. Sex was both the way in which the population could reproduce and grow, and a potential threat to its health and well-being. Sexuality not linked to reproduction was something to be repressed and controlled. This monitoring of sexuality by the state HEALTH, ILLNESS AND DISABILITY occurred in part through the collection of data about marriage, sexual behaviour, legitimacy and illegitimacy, the use of contraception and abortions. This surveillance went hand in hand with the promotion of strong public norms about sexual morality and acceptable sexual activity. For example, sexual 'perversions' such as homosexuality, masturbation and sex outside marriage were all labelled and condemned. See chapter 14,'Sexuality and Gender', for a discussion of different (orms of sexuality. The idea of public health took shape in an attempt to eradicate pathologies from the population - the 'social body'. The state began to assume responsibility for improving the conditions in which the population lived. Sanitation and water systems were developed to protect against disease. Roads were paved and attention was devoted to housing. Regulations were gradually imposed on slaughterhouses and facilities for food processing. Burial practices were monitored to ensure that they did not pose a health threat to the population. A whole series of institutions, such as prisons. asylums, workhouses, schools and hospitals emerged as part of the move towards monitoring,controlling and reforming the people. The biomedical model Medical practices were closely intertwined with the social changes described above. The application of science to medical diagnosis and cure was the major feature of the development of modern healthcare systems. Disease came to be defined objectively, in terms of identifiable objective 'signs' located in the body, as opposed to symptoms experienced by the patient. Formal medical care by trained 'experts' became the accepted way of treating both physical and mental illnesses. Medicine became a tool of reform for behaviours or conditions perceived as 'deviant' - from crime to homosexuality to mental illness. There are three main assumptions on which the biomedical model of health is predicated. First, disease is viewed as a breakdown within the human body that diverts it from its 'normal' state of being. The germ theory of disease, developed in the late 1800s, holds that there is a specific identifiable agent behind every disease. In order to restore the body to health, the cause of the disease must be isolated and treated. Second, the mind and body can be treated separately. The patient represents a sick body - a pathology - rather than a whole individual. The emphasis is on curing the disease, rather than on the individual's well-being. The biomedical model holds that the sick body can be manipulated, investigated and treated in isolation, without considering other factors. Medical specialists adopt a 'medical gaze', a detached approach in viewing and treating the sick patient. The treatment is to be carried out in a neutral, value·free manner, with information collected and compiled, in clinical terms, in a patient's official file. Third, trained medical specialists are considered the only experts in the treatment ofdisease. The medical profession as a body adheres to a recognized code ofethics and is made up ofaccredited individuals who have successfully completed long-term training. There is no room for self-taught healers or 'non-scientific' medical practices. The hospital represents the appropriate environment in which to treat serious illnesses; these treatments often rely on some combination oftechnology, medication or surgery. The main assumptions and critiques of the biomedical model are summarized in table 10.1. Criticisms ofthe biomedical model Over the past few decades, the biomedical model of illness described above has been the object of growing criticism. First, some scholars have claimed that the effectiveness of scientific medicine is 'overrated'. In spite of the prestige that modern medicine According to the biomedical model of health,to the medical profession patients represent only 'sick bodies'. has acquired, improvements in overall health can be attributed far more to social and environmental changes than to medical skill. Effective sanitation, better nutrition and improved sewerage and hygiene were m~Jre influential, particularly in reducing the infant mortality rates and deaths of young children (McKeown 1979). Drugs, advances in surgery, and antibiotics did not significantly decrease death rates until well into the twentieth century. Antibiotics used to treat bacterial infections first became available in the 1930s and 1940s, while immunizations (against diseases such as polio) were developed later. Ivan Illich (1975) has even suggested that modern medicine has done more harm than good because of iatrogenesis, or 'selfcaused' disease. Illich argued that there are three types: clinical, social and cultural iatrogenesis. Clinical iatrogenesis is where medical treatment makes the patient worse or creates new conditions. Social iatrogenesis is where medicine expands into more and more areas, creating an artificial demand for its services. Social iatrogenesis, HEALTH, ILLNESS AND DISABILITY Table 10.1 Assumptions and critiques of the biomedical model AsSlUTIptiOns Disease is a breakdown ofthe human body caused by a specific biological agent. The patient is a passive being whose 'sick body' can be treated separately from Ius or her mind. Medical specialists possess ·expert knowledge· and offer the only valid treatment of disease. The appropriate arena for treatment is the hospital,where medical technology is concentrated and best employed. Illich argued, leads to cultural iatrogenesis, where the ability to cope with the challenges of everyday life is progressively reduced by medical explanations and alternatives. To critics like Illich, the scope of modern medicine should be dramatically reduced. Second, modern medicine has been accused of discounting the opinions and experiences of the patients it seeks to treat. Because medicine is supposedly based on objective, scientific understandings of the causes and cures of specific physical ailments, there is little perceived need to listen to the individual interpretations that patients give to their conditions. Each patient is a 'sick body' to be treated and cured. Critics argue, however, that effective treatment can only take place when the patient is treated as a thinking, capable being with their own valid understandings and interpretations. Third, critics argue that scientific medicine posits itself as superior to anyalternative form ofmedicine or healing. Abeliefhas been perpetuated that anything that is 'unscientific' is necessarily inferior. As we have already seen, the assertion that modern medicine is somehow a more valid form of knowledge is being undermined by the growing popularity of alternative forms Critiques Disease is socially constructed, not something that can be revealed through 'scientific truth', The patient's opinions and experience of illness is cruclal to the treatment. The patient is an active, 'whole' being whose overall well-beingnot just physical health - is important. Medical experts are not the only source of knowledge about health and illness. Alternative forms of knowledge are equally valld. Healing does not need to take place in a hospital. Treatments utilizing teclmology, medication and surgery are not necessarily superior. of medicine, such as homeopathy and acupuncture. In many industrialized societies over the last decade, there has been a surge of interest in the potential of alternative me dicine . THINKING CRITICALLY List as many of the health successes of biomedicine as you can think of. Do these provide solid evidence for the belief that scientific medicine is superior to all other types of medicine? What types of health problems has biomedicine not been very effective in tackling? Why do you think this is the case? THINKING CRITICALLY Have you ever tried complementary or alternative therapies? What led you to do so? How do the assumptions that underlie the biomedical model of health differ from those found in alternative medicines? Why has there been such a rise in alternative medicines and treatments in recent years? The number of alternative medical practitioners is expanding, as are the forms of 10.1 Alternative medicine Earlier in her life Jan Mason enjoyed vibrant health. But when she began experiencing extreme tiredness and depression, she found that her regular doctor was unable to provide her with much relief: Before, I was a very fit person, I could swim, play squash, run,and suddenly 1just keeled over. 1went to the doctor but nobody could tell me what it was. My GP said it was glandular fever and gave me antibiotics which gave me terrible thrush. Then he kept saying that he did not lmow what it was either, . , .Iwent through all the tests. Iwas really very poorly It went on for six months. Iwas still ill and they still did not know what it was. (Quoted in Sharma 1992: 37) Jan's doctor suggested that she try antidepressants, concluding that she was suffering from the effects of stress. Jan knew that anti-depressants were not the answer for her, even though she acknowledged that her undiagnosed condition had become a great stress in her life. After listening to a radio programme, she suspected that her lethargy might be a result ofpost-viral fatigue syndrome. On the advice of a friend, she sought out the assistance of a homeopath - an alternative medical practitioner who assesses the state of the whole body and then, using minuscule doses of substances, treats 'like with like', on the assumption that the symptoms of a Fire-cupping,a method of applying acupressure in traditional Chinese medicine, is just one ofmany alternative or complementary therapies, many of which challenge the conventional biomedical model. disease are part of a body's self-healing process. On froding a homeopath whose approach she was comfortable with, Jan was pleased with the treatment she received (Sharma 1992). Jan is one of a growing number ofpeople who are incorporating non-orthodox medical practices into their health routines. It has been estimated that as many as one in four Britons have consulted an alternative practitioner. The profile of the typical individual who seeks out alternative forms of healing is female, young to middle-aged,and middle class. healing that are available. From herbal remedies to acupuncture. from reflexology and chiropractic to light therapy treatments, modern society is witnessing an explosion of healthcare alternatives which lie outside. or overlap with, the 'official' medical system. that not everyone who uses alternative medicine does so as a substitute for orthodox treatment (although some alternative approaches, such as homeopathy, reject the basis of orthodox medicine entirely). Many people combine elements of both approaches. For this reason, some scholars prefer to call non-orthodox techniques complementary medicine rather than alternative medicine (Saks 1992). Some complementary therapies, such as acupuncture, have become part of many mainstream healthcare systems, and are offered alongside biomedical diagnosis and treatment. Industrialized countries have some of the most well-developed. well-resourced medical facilities in the world. Why, then, are a growing number of people choosing to abandon the healthcare system for 'unscientific' treatments such as aromatherapy and hypnotherapy? First, it is important to stress HEALTH, ILLNESS AND DISABILITY There are a number of reasons why individuals might seek the services of a complementary or alternative practitioner. Some people perceive orthodox medicine as deficient, or incapable of relieving chronic, nagging pains or symptoms of stress and anxiety (as in Jan's case in 'Using your sociological imagination 10.1'). Others are dissatisfied with the way modern healthcare systems function - long waiting lists, referrals through chains of specialists, financial restrictions and so forth . Connected to this are concerns about the harmful side-effects of medication and the intrusiveness of surgery - both techniques favoured by modern healthcare systems. The asymmetrical power relationship between doctors and patients is at the heart of some people's choice to avail themselves of alternative medicine. They feel that the role of the 'passive patient' does not grant them enough input into their own treatment and healing. Finally, some individuals profess religious or philosophical objections to orthodox medicine, which tends to treat the mind and body separately. Tbey believe that the spiritual and psychological dimensions of health and illness are often not taken into account in the practice of orthodox medicine. The growth of alternative medicine presents a number of interesting questions for sociologists to consider. First and foremost, it is a faSCinating reflection of the transformations occurring within modern societies. We are living in an age where more and more information is available - from a variety of sources - to draw on in making choices about our lives. Healthcare is no exception in this regard. Individuals are increasingly becoming 'health consumers' adopting an active stance towards their own health and well-being. Not only are we able to make choices about the type of practitioners to consult, but we are also demanding more involvement in our own care and treatment. In this way, the growth of alternative medicine is linked to the expansion of the self-help movement, which involves support groups, learning circles and self-help books. People are now more likely than ever before to seize control of their lives and actively reshape them, rather than to rely on the instructions or opinions of others. Another issue of interest to sociologists relates to the changing nature of health and illness in the late modern period. Many of the conditions and illnesses for which individuals seek alternative medical treatment seem to be products of the modern age itself. Insomnia, anxiety, stress, depression, fatigue and chronic pain (caused byarthritis, cancer and other diseases) are all on the rise in industrialized societies. While these conditions have long existed, they appear to be causing greater distress and disruption to people's health than ever before. Recent surveys have revealed that stress has now surpassed the common cold as the biggest cause of absence from work. The World Health Organization (2001) says that depression is the leading cause of disability globally, and by 2020 it is forecast to be the second leading contributor to the global burden of disease. Ironically, it seems that these consequences ofliving in the modern world are ones which orthodox medicine has great difficulty in addressing. While alternative medicine is unlikely to overtake 'official' healthcare altogether, indications are that its role will continue to grow. Fourth, some sociologists have argued that the medical profession wields enormous power in defining what does and does not constitute illness. It is able to use its position as the arbiter of 'scientific truth' to bring more and more realms of human life under medical control. Some of the strongest criticisms along these lines have come from women who argue that the processes of pregnancy and childbirth have been appropriated and 'medicalized' by modern medicine. Rather than remaining in the hands of women - with the help of midwives in the home - childbirth now occurs in hospitals under the direction of predominantly male specialists. Pregnancy, 10.2 The medicalization of hyperactivity In the past 15 years,the number of prescriptions written for the drug Ritalin has grown exponentially In the United States, some 2 million prescriptions per month are written for ADHD drugs (mainly Ritalin) for children. Between 3 and 5 per cent ofAmerica's children live withADHD. In Britain,361,832 prescriptions for Ritalin and similar drugs were issued in 2005, most of them for children with diagnosedADHD (Guardian, II February 2006). What is Ritalin and why should sociologists be concerned with it? Ritalin is a drug prescribed to children and adolescents with Attention-Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (ADHD),a psychological disorder which,according to many physicians and psychiatrists, accounts for children's Health, lUness and Disability 397 inattentiveness, difficulty in concentrating and inability to learn in school. Ritalin has been described as 'the magic pill'. It helps children to focus,it calms them down and it helps them to learn more effectively Children who were once disruptive and problematic in the classroom become 'angelic' students,say some teachers, once they begin taking Ritalin. Critics ofRitalin, however, argue that the drug is far from the harmless 'magic pill' which it is often made out to be.Despite the fact that it has been prescribed in growing quantities in the USA and UK over recent years,no comprehensive research has been carried out on its possible long-term effects on children's brains and bodies. Perhaps more worrying is the claim that Ritalin has become a convenient 'solution' to what is in fact not even a physical problem. Opponents ofRitalin argue that the 'symptoms' ofADHD are in fact reflections of the growing pressure and stress on modern children - an increasingly fast pace of life, the overwheiming effect of information technology lack of exercise, high-sugar diets and the fraying of family life. TIrrough the use of Ritalin,it is claimed,the medical profession has succeeded in 'medicalizing' child hyperactivity and inattentiveness, rather than drawing attention to the social causes of the observed symptoms, a common and natural phenomenon, is treated as an 'illness' laden with risks and danger. Feminists argue that women have lost control over this process, as their opinions and knowledge are deemed irrelevant by the 'experts' who now oversee reproductive processes (Oakley 1984). Similar concerns about the medicalization of 'normal' conditions have been raised in relation to hyperactivity in children (see 'Using your sociological imagination 10.2'), unhappiness or mild depression (commonly regulated with the help of medications like Prozac), and tiredness (frequently labelled Chronic Fatigue Syndrome). Many of the assumptions of the biomedical model are being increasingly questioned, as the world in which it developed changes. Fifth, critics have argued that the assumptions underlying the biomedical model of health have lent themselves to gross political manipulation, in particular through eugenics, the attempt to genetically 'improve' the human race through 'good breeding'. Scientific and medical 'experts' in Nazi Germany took these policies to their most extreme, by claiming that they had identified a racially superior, Iightskinned 'Aryan' race, Their eugen ic programmes led to the genocide of millions of people who belonged to groups the Nazis saw as biologically inferior, such as Jews and HEALTH, ILLNESS AND DISABILITY gypsies, as well as the systematic murder of more than 250,000 disabled people (Burleigh 1994). Although Nazi Germany made by far the most murderous use of eugenic policies, it should be remembered that in the twentieth century these techniques - often described as 'population policies' - were also used in several other European countries and the USA against particular sections ofthe population, notably the disabled. These policies mostly took the form of the compulsory sterilization of 'feeble-minded' women. Racism led to black women being grossly over-represented among the 60,000 people forcibly sterilized in several US states between 1907 and 1960. In Scandinavia, political leaders and geneticists adopted policies for compulsory sterilization because they were concerned that the emerging welfare state would encourage the 'unfit' to reproduce and would therefore reduce the qualiry of the 'national stock'. [n Sweden alone, 63,000 people, 90 per cent of them women, were sterilized between 1934 and 1975. Norway, a much smaller country, sterilized 48,000 people in the same period. British and Dutch medical experts and policy-makers, by contrast, adopted voluntary sterilization, together with the mass institutionalization and segregation of the 'feeble-minded' (Rose 2003). Today, the rapid development of medical technology is raising new and difficult questions for critics of the biomedical model. A great deal of scientific endeavour is now being devoted to the expansion of genetic engineering, which makes it possible to intervene in the genetic make-up of the foetus so as to influence its subsequent development. The debate about genetic engineering is often polarized between critics' who see it as fatally corrupted by the history of eugenics in the twentieth century discussed above, and supporters who argue it is separate from these events (Kerr and Shakespeare 2002). According to its supporters, genetic engineering will create enormous opportunities. It is possible, for example, to identify the genetic factors that make some people vulnerable to certain diseases. Genetic reprogramming will ensure that these illnesses are no longer passed on from generation to generation. In 2004 a group of people in the UK with a particular form of inherited bowel cancer were granted the right by the government's Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority to select embryos free from genes that might trigger the disease in future generations. The decision means that only those embryos free of the gene that could cause the cancer will be implanted into the mother's womb. Without the screening process, infants would have a 50 per cent chance ofinheriting the disease (The Times, 1November 2004). The selection ofembryos was previously approved only for childhood or untreatable disorders such as cystic fibrosis and Huntington's disease (The Times, 6 November 2004). On the other hand, the ruling by the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority deepens the controversy over 'designer babies'. It sets a precedent that will allow doctors to 'cherrypick' embryos for a much wider range of traits than at present. It is now scientifically possible, for example, to 'design' bodies before birth in terms of colour of skin, hair and eyes, weight and so forth. Several ofthe criticisms of the biomedical model, discussed above, apply also to the genetic-engineering debate. Many of those with concerns about the biomedical model will question the role of medical experts in exerting their authority over the technology. Will there be unintended consequences of medical intervention? What role will parents-ta-be have in making decisions about the selection of embryos? Is this another case of (traditionally male) medical experts giving authoritative medical advice to (obviously female) future mothers? What safeguards should be present to prevent sexism, racism or disablism in embryo selection? And how are these categories defined? Genetic engineering is unlikely to be cheap. Will this mean that those who can afford to pay will be able to programme out from their children any traits they see as socially undesirable? What will happen to the children of more deprived groups, who will continue to be born naturally? Some sociologists have argued that differential access to genetic engineering might lead to the emergence of a 'biological underclass'. Those who do not have the physical advantages genetic engineering can bring might be subject to prejudice and discrimination by those who do enjoy these advantages. They might have difficulty finding employment and life or health insurance (Duster 1990). For sociologists, the rapid pace in which new medical technologies are advancing raises an increasing number of new and difficult questions. Medicine and health in a changing world There is a growing realization that it is not only medical experts who possess knowledge and understanding about health and illness. All ofus are in a position to interpret and shape our own well-being through our understanding of our bodies, and through choices in our everyday lives about diet, exercise, consumption patterns and general lifestyle. These new directions in popular thinking about health, along with the other criticisms of modern medicine outlined above, are contributing to some profound transformations within healthcare systems in modern societies (see figure 10.1). They also explain the rise in alternative or complementary medicine, discussed above. Yet other factors are relevant here as well: the nature and the scale of disease itself have both been changing. In earlier times, the major illnesses were infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, cholera, malaria and polio. They often took on epidemic proportions and could threaten a whole population. In industrialized countries today, such acute infectious diseases have become a minor cause of death; some of them have Health, Illness and Disability been substantially eradicated. The most common causes of death in industrialized countries are now non-infectious chronic diseases such as cancer, heart disease, diabetes or circulatory diseases. This shift is referred to as the 'health transition'. Whereas in pre-modern societies the highest rates of death were among infants and young children, today death rates rise with increasing age. Because people are living longer and suffering predominantly from chronic degenerative diseases, there is the need for a new approach to health and caring. There is also increased emphasis on 'lifestyle choices' - such as smoking, exercise and diet - which are seen to influence the onset of many chronic illnesses. HIV and AIDS in global perspective A powerful reminder that the general shift from acute to chronic conditions is not, however, absolute came in the early 1980s, with the emergence of a deadly new epidemic - AIDS - which rapidly became a pandemic (a global epidemic), killing millions of adults and young people alike. A person is often said to have 'acquired immunodeficiency syndrome' (AIDS) when the number of immune cells in the body falls below a designated minimum required to fight off infections. Once this point is reached, they are likely to be affected by opportunistic infections which their body is then unable to fight off, leading to very serious, life-threatening diseases such as pneumonia, tuberculosis and skin cancers. AIDS is the result of damage caused by previous infection with a virus known as HN (human immunodeficiency virus) . There is still no cure for either HN infection or AIDS, nor is there a vaccine to prevent infection in the first place. Transmission of HN occurs in four main ways: • from unprotected penetrative sex with an infected person; Disease Health Hospital Community Acute Chronic Cure Prevention Intervention Monitoring Treatment Care Patient Person Figure 10.1 Contemporary transformations in health and medicine Source: Nettleton 2006 • from injection or transfusion ofcontaminated blood or blood products such as skin grafts or organ transplants from infected people; • from infected mothers to their babies either during pregnancy, at birth or through breastfeeding; • sharing unsterilized injection equipment used by an infected person. The United Nationsestimates that some 25 million people died of AIDS-related conditions between 1981 and 2005, making this one of the deadliest pandemics in human history (UNAlDS 2006; see also figure 10.2). The HlV incidence rate is thought to have peaked in the late-1990s, but the number of people living with HlV is rising, partly a result of the effectiveness of anti-retroviral drugs treatments in delaying the onset of AIDS. However, these drugs are expensive and though many people with HIV in the developed world have access to them, this has not been the case in poorer countries, where AIDS has become a major cause of death. A 2006 UN report estimated that 38.6 million people were living with HlV around the world in 2005, the highest prevalence rates being in Southern Africa, where some epidemics were still expanding (see 'Global society 10.2' for a report on AlDS/HIV in South Africa). There was also some evidence ofa resurgent epidemic in the USA, where the disease was first identified in 1981, indicating that there is along way to go before HlVacross the world can be said to be 'under control'. What then are the sociological lessons to be learned from the emergence of AIDS? First, the links made between particular lifestyles and risk of infection initially led to the stigmatizing of gay men. Erving Goffman (1963) argued that stigma is a relationship of devaluation in which one individual is disqualified from full social acceptance. Stigma can take many forms for example, physical (such as visible impairments), biographical (such as the possession of a criminal record) or contextual (for example, 'hanging out with the wrong crowd'). Stigmas are rarely based on valid understandings. They spring from stereotypes or perceptions, which may be false, or only partially correct. Stigmatization often appears in the medical context. Goffman argued that inherent in the process of stigmatization is social control. Stigmatizing groups is one way in which society controls their behaviour. In some cases, the stigma is never removed and the person is never fully accepted into society. Adult prevalence % _ 15.0 - 31.0% c::::J 5.0 - <15.0% c::::::::::J 1.0-<5.0% c:=J 0.5 - <1.0% c=J 0.1 - <0.5% C=:J < 0.1% Health, Illness and Disability 401 Figure 10.2 A global view of adult HN infection by prevalence rates, 2005 Source: UNAIDS 2006 This was true of early AIDS patients and continues in some countries, Sarah Nettleton (2006) notes that because AIDS was first found amongst gay men in the USA, it was originally called GRID - Gay Related Immune Deficiency - and it was suggested that a 'fast lane' gay lifestyle actually caused the disease, which was often referred to in the media as a 'gay plague'. Nettleton points out that research findings discredited such beliefs and that it is not being part ofa particular social group that is especially risky, but specific practices, such as injecting with non-sterilized needles or having unprotected penetrative sex. Nevertheless' epidemiological interpretations of gay men as part of 'high-risk groups' tended to reinforce the division between such groups and the 'heterosexual general public', thus lulling the latter into a false and very dangerous sense of security. Second, AIDS raises important issues in relation to social inequalities. For example, in many countries, heterosexual norms of masculinity tend to reject the use of condoms, favouring unprotected sex as a way of 'being a man'. The consequences of such widespread social norms could hardly be more serious for heterosexual women. As noted above, the gross global inequalities between the developed and developing worlds are also emphasized by the AIDS pandemic, with HIV-infected people in the relatively rich countries having a much greater chance of survival than those in poorer ones. Attempts to make anti-retroviral drugs more widely available in developing countries have had some success in recent years, though the disparity in healthcare provision remains starkly unequal. Global inequality here literally is a matter of life and death. See chapter 13, 'Global Inequality', for a wider discussion of these issues. Third, the concept of 'risk' has become a central one in social scientific debates on lifestyles, health and medicine since the HEALTH, ILLNESS AND DISABI LITY Global Society 10.2 RIVIAIDS in South Africa South Africa is currently experiencing one ofthe most severe AIDS epidemics in the world.Although it can be hard to collect reliable figures,various data sources suggest that 5.7 million people were living with HIV in South Africa by the end of 2007, and almost 1,000 AIDS deaths were occurring every day Almost one in five adults are infected and this has serious consequences not only for the infected individual,but also for their family and communities. A recent survey found that South Africans spent more time at funerals than they did having their hair cut, shopping or having barbecues.Less than half as many people had been to a wedding in the past month than had been to a funeral. Mortality rates are so high that in some parts of the country, cemeteries are running out of space for the dead. Beyond this personal and community level of suffering,the AIDS epidemic has also had a significant effect on the country's general social and economic development. South Africa fell 35 places in the Human Development Index (a worldwide measurement that ranks countries from the most developed down to the least developed) between 1990 and 2003, a period during which the prevalence ofHIV saw a dramatic increase. The average life expectancy is 54 years, an estimated 10 years lower than it would otherwise be without the AIDS epidemic. Economically, the crisis is a huge drain on national resources:in 2006 a leading researcher estimated that HlV-positive patients would soon account for 60-70% of medical expenditure in South African hospitals. The impact on young people is particularly marked. Over half of 15-year-olds are not expected to reach the age of 60. While it is thought that half of all deaths in South Africa are caused by AIDS, this figure is higher amongst young people. Quite apart from many children not being able to attend school because they are ill or need to care for sick relatives, schools have fewer teachers,as an estimated 21% ofteachers in South Africa are living withHIV Antiretroviral drug treatments have been developed which make it possible for HIV-positive people to remain in good health from day to day and to lead relatively normal lives.However, few people in South Africa have access to this treatment hence the devastation AIDS is causing in South Africa.Such a serious crisis affecting a whole nation is due to a number of different factors such as poverty, social instability and a lack of sufficient government action.People trying to alleviate the problem continue to debate which is the most serious issue in order to most effectively combat the epidemic. For more information, see the AVERT website (http://www.avert.org/). late twentieth century, and the emergence ofAIDS has certainly been instrumental in the creation of a more 'risk-aware' population. As discussed in chapter 5, 'The Environment', Ulrich Beck (1999) has even suggested that we are moving into a 'world risk society'; if this is the case, then one global risk that no one can ignore today is that of HIV infection. m edici ne and in people's attitudes towards it. Whether the contemporary transformations in healthcare discussed in this section will result in a new 'health paradigm' to replace the biomedical model, as some scholars have suggested, is unclear. But it is certain that we are witnessing a period of significant and rapid reform in modern Sociological perspectives on health and illness One of the main concerns of sociologists is to examine the experience of illness. Sociologists ask how illness, such as anorexia discussed above, is experienced and interpreted by the sick person and by those with whom she comes into contact. If you have ever been ill, even for a short period of time, you will know that patterns in everyday life are temporarily modified and your interactions with others become transformed.This is because the 'normal' functioning of the body is a vital, but often unnoticed, part of our lives. We depend on our bodies to operate as they should; our very sense of self is predicated on the expectation that our bodies will facilitate, not impede, our social interactions and daily activities. Illness has both personal and public dimensions. When we become ill, not only do we experience pain, discomfort, confusion and other challenges, but others are affected as well. People in close contact with us may extend sympathy, care and support. They may struggle to make sense of the fact of our illness or to find ways to incorporate it into the patterns oftheir own lives. Others with whom we come into contact may also react to illness; these reactions in turn help to shape our own interpretations and can pose challenges to our sense of self. Two ways of understanding the experience ofillness have been particularly influential in sociological thought. The first, associated with the functionalist school, sets forth the norms of behaviour which individuals are thought to adopt when sick. The second view, favoured by symbolic interactionists, is a broader attempt to reveal the interpretations which are ascrihed to illness and how these meanings influence people's actions and behaviour. For more on functionalist theory see chapter 1, 'What is Sociology?', and chapter 3, 'Theories and Perspectives in Sociology'. Functionalist accounts of sick roles and social systems have been influential in shaping sociological studies of health and illness, but we shall now turn to some of the ways that sociologists of the symbolic interactionist school have attempted to understand the experience of illness. Illness as 'lived experience' Symbolic interactionists are interested in the ways people interpret the social world Health, Illness and Disability and the meanings they ascribe to it. Many sociologists have applied this approach to the realm of health and illness in order to understand how people experience being ill or perceive the illness of others. How do people react and adjust to news about a serious illness? How does illness shape individuals' daily lives? How does living with a chronic illness affect an individual's self- identity? As we saw in the discussion of ageing in chapter 8, people in industrialized societies are now living longer, but suffering later in life from chronic illnesses. Medicine is able to relieve the pain and discomfort associated with some of these conditions, but a growing number of people are faced with the prospect ofliving with illness over a long period of time. Sociologists are concerned with how illness in such cases becomes incorporated in an individual's personal 'biography'. One theme that sociologists have explored is how chronically ill individuals learn to cope with the practical and emotional implications of their illness. Certain illnesses demand regular treatments or maintenance which can affect people's daily routines. Dialysis, insulin injections or taking large numbers ofpills all demand that individuals adjust their schedules in response to illness. Other illnesses can have unpredictable effects on the body, such as the sudden loss of bowel or bladder control, or violent nausea. Individuals suffering from such conditions are forced to develop strategies for managing their illness in day-to-day life. These include both practical considerations - such as always noting the location of the toilet when in an unfamiliar place - as well as skills for managing interpersonal relations, both intimate and commonplace. Although the symptoms of the illness can be embarrassing and disruptive, people develop coping strategies to live life as normally as possible (Kelly 1992). At the same time, the experience of illness can pose challenges to and bring about transformations in people's sense of self. Classic Studies 10.1 Talcott Parsons on society's 'sick role ' The research problem Have you ever been ill? When you were feeling unwell, how did other people react to you? Were they sympathetic? Did they try to help you get well again? Did you feel they expected you to get better too quickly? The American functionalist theorist,Talcott Parsons (1952), argued that illness has a clear social as well as an individual dimension. People are not only individually sick; they also have to learn what society expects of them when they are sick, and if they fail to conform to the behavioural norms surrounding illness, they may be stigmatized as engaging in deviant behaviour.Why is this? Parsons's explanation Parsons argued that there exists a sick role - a concept he used to describe the patterns of behaviour which the sick person adopts in order to minimize the disruptive impact of illness to society Functionalism holds that society usually operates in a smooth and consensual manner. Illness is therefore potentially dysfunctional as it could disrupt the smooth functioning of society. A sick person, for example,might not be able to perform all ofhis or her normal responsibilities or might be less reliable and efficient than usual. Because sick people are not able to carry out their normal roles, the lives ofpeople around them are disrupted:work tasks go unfinished causing stress for co-workers, responsibilities at home are not fulfilled, and so on. According to Parsons,people learn the sick role through socialization and enact it - with the cooperation of others - when they fall ill. There are three pillars of the sick role: The sick person is not personally responsible for being sick. Illness is seen as the result of physical causes beyond the individual's control. The onset of illness is unrelated to the individual's behaviour or actions. 2 The sick person is entitled to certain rights and privileges, including a withdrawal from normal responsibilities. Since they bear no responsibility for the illness. they are exempted from certain duties. roles and behaviours which otherwise apply. For example,the sick person might be 'released' "We're running a little behind, so I'd like each o(you to ask yourself. 'Am I really that sick, or would Jjust be wasting the doctor's valuable time?''' from normal duties around the home. Behaviour that is not as polite or thoughtful as usual might be excused.The sick person gains the right to stay in bed or to take time off from work. 3 The sick person must work to regain health by consulting a medical expert and agreeing to become a 'patient',so the sick role is a temporary and 'conditional' one, which is contingent on the sick person actively trying to get well.In order to occupy the sick role, people must receive the sanction of a medical professional who legitimates the person's claim of illness. Confirmation of illness via expert opinion allows those surrounding the sick person to accept the validity of his or her claims. The patient is expected to cooperate in his or her own recovery by following 'doctor's orders'. But a sick person who refuses to consult a doctor, or who does not heed the advice of a medical authority puts his or her sick role status in jeopardy Parsons's sick role has been refined by later sociologists, who suggest that all illnesses are not 'the same' as far as the sick role is concerned. They argue that the experience of the sick role varies with type of illness, since people's reactions to a sick person are influenced by the severity of the illness and their perception ofit. Thus, the added rights and privileges which are part ofthe sick role may not be uniformly experienced.Freidson (1970) identified three versions of the sick role which correspond with different types and degrees of illness. The conditional sick role applies to people suffering from a temporary condition from which they can recover. The sick person is expected to 'get well' and receives some rights and privileges according to the severity of the illness. For example, someone suffering from bronchitis would reap more benefits than the sufferer of a common cold. The unconditionally legitllYlate sick role refers to individuals who are suffering from incurable illnesses. Because the sick person cannot 'do' anything to get well, he or she is automatically entitled to occupy the sick role long term. The unconditionally legitimate role might apply to individuals suffering from alopecia (total hair loss) or severe acne (in both cases there are no special privileges, but. rather, an acknowledgement that the individual is not responsible for the illness), or from cancer or Parkinson's disease, which result in important privileges and the right to abandon many or most duties. The final sick role is the illegitimate role, which occurs when an individual suffers from a disease or condition that is stigmatized by others. In such cases, there is a sense that the individual might somehow bear responsibility for the illness; additional rights and privileges are not necessarily granted.Alcoholism, smoking~ related illness and obesity are possible examples of stigmatized illnesses,which affect a sufferer's right to assume the sick role Critical points Parsons's notion ofthe sick role has been very influential. It reveals clearly how the sick person is an integral part of a larger social context. But there are a number of important criticisms which can be levelled against it. Some writers have argued that the sick role 'formula' is unable to capture the experience of illness.Others point out that it cannot be applied universally For example, it does not account for instances when doctors and patients disagree about a diagnosis, or have opposing interests. Furthermore, taking on the sick role is not always a straightforward process. Some individuals suffer for years from chronic pain or from symptoms that are repeatedly misdiagnosed. They are denied the sick role until a clear diagnosis of their condition is made. In other cases, social factors such as race, class and gender can affect whether, and how readily, the sick role is granted. In sum,the sick role cannot be divorced from the social, cultural and economic influences which surround it and the realities oflife and illness are more complex than the sick role suggests. The increasing emphasis on lifestyle and health in our modern age means that individuals are seen as bearing ever greater responsibility for their own well~being. This contradicts the first premise of the sick role - that individuals are not to blame for their illness. Moreover, in modern societies the shift away from acute infectious disease towards chronic illness has made the sick role less applicable.Whereas the sick role might be useful in understanding acute illness, it is less useful in the case of chronic illness:there is no one formula for chronically ill or disabled people to follow. Living with illness is experienced and interpreted in a multiplicity of ways by sick people - and by those who surround them. Contemporary significance Nonetheless, the concept of a 'sick role' remains valuable as it allows us to link individual illness to wider healthcare systems. Bryan S.Turner (1995) argues that most societies do develop sick roles -learned norms that promote particular types of behaviour in relation to the control of illness but that these differ. In many Western societies, for example, an individualized sick role exists, which means that hospital stays for non~life~ threatenmg conditions are generally quite short, visiting hours are limited and the number ofvisitors strictly controlled. However, in]apan, a more communal sick role is the norm.Patients tend to stay in hospital longer after their medical treatment is completed and the average hospital stay is much longer than in Western societies.Hospital visits are also more informal, with family and friends often eating together and staying for longer periods. Turner suggests that we can still learn much about the social bases of health from such a comparative sociology of sick roles. Winner ofthe 'Miss HN Stigma-Free Beauty Pageant',2007, held in Botswana, Africa. The competition aims to tackle negative stigmatization of HN-positive women and put debates about HN on the public agenda. These develop both through the actual reactions of others to the illness, and through imagined or perceived reactions. For the chronically ill or disabled, social interactions which are routine for many people become tinged with risk or uncertainty. The shared understandings that underpin standard everyday interactions are not always present when illness or disability is a factor, and interpretations of common situations may differ substantially. An ill person may be in need of assistance but not want to appear dependent, for example. An individual may feel sympathy for someone who has been diagnosed with an illness, but be unsure whether to address the subject directly. The changed context of social interactions can precipitate transformations in self-identity. Some sociologists have investigated how chronically ill individuals manage their illnesses within the overall context of their lives (jobling 1988; Williarns 1993). Illness can place enormous demands on people's time, energy, strength and emotional reserves. Corbin and Strauss (1985) studied the regimes of health which the chrortically ill develop in order to organize their daily lives. They identified three types of 'work' contained in people's everyday strategies. Illness work refers to those activities involved in managing their condition, such as treating pain, doing diagnostic tests or undergoing physical therapy. Everyday work pertains to the management of daily life - maintaining relationships with others, running the household affairs and pursuing professional or personal interests. Biographical work involves those activities that the ill person does as part of building or reconstructing their personal narrative. [n other words, it is the process of incorporating the illness into one's life, making sense ofit and developing ways of explaining it to others. Such a process can help people restore meaning and order to their lives after coming to terms with the knowledge of chronic illness. From studying how illness affects the individual, we now turn to examine patterns of illness and health within society, and discuss how health outcomes differ between social groups. The social basis of health The twentieth century witnessed a significant overall rise in life expectancy for the industrialized countries and a general rise in life expectancy for the world's population to 67 years by 2007 (World Bank 2007a). Of course, such blunt averages hide some major inequalities between the developed and developing countries (see chapter 8, 'The Life-Course'). In the industrialized world, diseases such as polio, scarlet fever and tuberculosis have virtually been eradicated.Compared to other parts ofthe world, standards of health and well-being are relatively high. Many of these advances in public health have been attributed to the power of modern medicine. There is a commonly held assumption that medical research has been - and will continue to be - successful in uncovering the biological causes of disease and in developing effective treatments to control them. As medical knowledge and expertise grow, the argument runs, we can expect to see sustained and steady improvements in public health. Although this approach to health and disease has been extremely influential, it is somewhat unsatisfactory for sociologists. This is because it ignores the important role of social and environmental influences on patterns of health and illness. The improvements in overall public health over the past century cannot conceal the fact that health and illness are not distributed evenly throughout the population. Research has Health, Illness and Disability shown that certain groups of people tend to enjoy much better health than others. These health inequalities appear to be tied to larger soda-economic patterns. Sociologists and specialists in social epidemiology - scientists who study the distribution and incidence of disease and illness within the population - have attempted to explain the link between health and variables such as social class, gender, race, age and geography.While most scholars acknowledge the correlation between health and social inequalities, there is no agreement about the nature of the connection or about how health inequalities should be addressed. One ofthe main areas of debate concentrates on the relative importance of individual variables (such as lifestyle, behaviour, diet and cultural patterns) versus environmental or structural factors (such as income distribution and poverty). In this section we will look at variations in health patterns according to social class, gender and ethnicity and review some of the competing explanations for their persistence. Class and health Research on health and class has revealed a clear relationship between patterns of mortality and morbidity (illness) and an individual's social class. In fact, Cockerham argues: 'Social class or socioeconomic status (SES) is the strongest predictor of health, disease causation, and longevity in medical sociology' (2007: 75). In the UK, an influential nationwide study - the Black Report (DHSS 1980) - was important in publicizing the extent ofclass-based health inequalities, which many people found shocking in a wealthy country like Britain. Although there was a trend towards better health in society as a whole, Significant disparities existed between classes, affecting health indicators from birth weight to blood pressure to risk of chronic illness. Individuals from higher soda-economic positions are on average healthier, taller and stronger, and live longer 108 H EALTH , I LLN ESS AND DI SABILI TY Table 10.2 Infant deaths per 1,000 live births, by socio-economic classification (based on father's occupation at death registration), England andWales, 2005 Ratesl Stillbirth Perinatal Neonatal Post-neonatal Infant All' 5.3 7.8 3A lA 4.8 Inside marriage All3 5.0 7.4 3.0 1.3 4.3 1.1 Large employers and higher managerial 3. 1 4.7 2.0 0.7 2.7 1.2 Higher professional 4.6 6.6 2.7 1.1 3.8 2 Lower managerial and professional 4.3 6A 2.6 0.8 3.4 3 Intermediate 5.7 8.6 3.5 l A 5.0 4 Small employers and own-account workers 4.3 6.2 2.6 1.2 3.9 5 Lower supervisory and technical 4.3 6.2 2.3 1.1 3.4 6 Semi-routine 6.3 9.3 4.2 1.9 6.1 7 Routine 6.9 10.1 4.1 1.7 5.8 Other' 9.3 13.0 5. 1 2.6 7.7 Outside marrage joint registration All' 1.I Large employers and higher managerial 5.7 8.6 3.9 1.6 5.5 1.2 Higher professional 4.2 5.7 2.3 0.8 3.1 2 Lower managerial and professlOnal 4.7 7. I 3.0 0.7 3.6 3 Intermediate 4A 6.8 3.1 0.8 3.1 4 Small employers and own-aCCOlll1t workers 5.1 7.7 3.6 1.8 5.4 5 Lower supervisory and technical 4.1 6.0 2.9 1.4 4.3 6 Semi-routine 4.9 7A 3.3 1.0 4.3 7 Routine 6.7 10.6 5.0 1.9 6.8 Other4 7.4 10.7 4.4 1.8 6.2 1StillbIrths and pennatal deaths per 1.000 live brrths and stillbirths.Neonalal, postneonatal and mfanl deaths per 1,000 lIve b~ths 2 Inside marriage and oulslde marnage/Joml TegJStrauon only, mcludmg cases where father's occupallon was not stated J Includes cases where father's occupation was not stated. 4 Students. occupatIons madequately descnbed, occupations not classIfiable for other reasons,never worked and long-term unemployed Source Adapted from Health StallstJcs Quarcerly 32,2005 than those lower down the social scale. An updated survey in 1990 then confirmed the earlier findings. Differences are greatest in respect to infant mortality (children dying in the first year of life) and child death, but poorer people are at greater risk of dying at all ages than more affluent people. Some of the main class-based inequalities in health have been summarized by Browne and Bottrill (1999). They include: 1 Unskilled manual workers in the lowest occupational class are twice as likely to die before retirement age than professional white-collar workers in the top occupational class. 2 More than twice as many babies are stillborn or die within the first week of life in unskilled families than in highermanagerial families. The difference is even more pronounced amongst families of the long-term unemployed (see figure 10.3). 3 An individual born into the highest occupational class (professional whitecollar workers) is likely to live on average seven years longer than someone born into the lowest occupational class (unskilled manual workers). 4 Some 90 per cent of the major causes of death are more common in the two lowest occupational classes than the three higher occupational classes (see figure 10.4 for instances). 5 Working-class people visit their doctors more often and for a wider range of ailments than people in professional occupations; long-standing illness is 50 per cent higher among unskilled manual workers than among professionals. 6 Class-based health inequalities are even more pronounced among the long-term unemployed; people in work tend to live longerthan those who are without work. Studies conducted in other industrialized countries have confirmed that there is aclear class gradient to health. Some scholars have found that the relative health inequality between the richest and poorest members of society is widening. Yet despite a growing amount of research aimed at revealing the link between health inequality and social class, scholars have not been entirely successful in locating the actual mechanisms that connect the two. Several competing explanations have been advanced for the causes behind the correlation. The Black Report concentrated most heavily on materialist explanations of health inequality. Materialist or environHealth, Illness and Disability mental explanations see the cause of health inequalities in large social structures, such as poverty, wealth and income distribution, unemployment, housing, pollution and poor working conditions. The patterns in health inequalities between classes are seen as the result of material deprivation. Reducing inequalities in health can only be done by addressing the root causes of social inequalities in general. While not discounting the possible validity ofother arguments, the Black Report stressed the need for a comprehensive anti-poverty strategy and for improvements in education to combat health inequalities. The Conservative government (1979-90) was dismissive of the findings of the Black Report, arguing that it advocated an unrealistic level of public expenditure. The government was more inclined to focus on cultural and behavioural explanations for health inequalities, emphasizing the importance of individual lifestyles on health. It argued that lower social classes tend to engage in certain activities - such as smoking, poor diet and higher consumption of alcohol - which are detrimental to good health. This argument sees individuals as bearing primary responsibility for poor health, as many lifestyle choices are freely made. Some proponents of this approach claim that such behaviours are embedded within the social class context, rather than under the exclusive control of individuals. Nevertheless, they also identify lifestyle and consumption patterns as the main causes of poor health. Subsequent governments have continued to place emphasis on public health campaigns to influence individuals' lifestyle choices. Antismoking initiatives and healthy eating and exercise programmes afe examples of such efforts to shape public behaviour. Campaigns like these exhortindividuals to take responsibility for their own well-being and they pay less attention to the way social position can constrain people's choices and possibilities. For example, fresh fruit and vegetables, which are central to a good diet, are much more expensive than many foods that are 140 180 - 120 160 r-~ Cl) 100 f-- f--..,c 80 f-- f- '".., '" 60 f-- - f-- f-- ~ 140Cl) .., 120 -c 1- '" 100 -.., 1---c 80 - I-- - c " _r-0 60 - I-- - I--e;- -...J 40 f-- f-- f-- U 40 I-- I-- .,Cl) -.8 '"is ., CCl) 't:J 'u.., ..: - - - 20 - I--- - I--- f- 20 - - - I-- - 0 0 I II IIIN IIIM IV V I II lllN lllM IV Social class Social class 140 140 120 ~ 120 100 r- ; 100 r-1---80 r- I--- I-- I-- 60 I- - f- f- I- I- 't:J C 80Cl) r-e. r--r-r--Cl) 60 r-'t:J 40 - I--- f- I-- I- 20 I- - f- f- I-- I-- 0 '" 40 c- l-- r-- " -n-~ f- I- l- f-e 20 0 I 11 IllN IllM IV V I 11 IIIN lllM IV Social class Social class 450 120 400 350 100 r- r- r- 300 r-f-250 r- 200 I--- I--- " 80 I-- I--- f--Cl) 't:J 'u 60 I-- r-- r-- r-- r-- '5 150 I-- f-- I-- f-- f-- (/) 40 I-- f-- I-- r-- r-- 100 I-- I-- I-- I--- f-- 50 I- l- f- l- f- f- 20 I-- f-- r-- r-- r-- 0 0 I 11 lllN IllM IV V I 11 lllN lllM IV Social class Social class Figure 10.3 UK male mortality by cause of death and social class. selected causes. 1997-2000 Source: White et ai, 2003 V r- V V I- I- ••• 1 Poor diet is just one ofthe factors associated with ill health amongst Britain's most deprived people. high in fat and cholesterol. The highest consumption of healthy food is, unsurprisingly,among high-income groups. The 1997 Labour government acknowledged both cultural and material influences on people's health, and commissioned its own report, chaired by Sir Donald Acheson. The Acheson Report (1998) confirmed that for many aspects of health, inequality has generally worsened in the past few decades. Drawing from such evidence, the government's White Paper, Our Healthier Nation (1999) emphasized the many diverse influences - social, economic, environmental and cultural - which work together to produce ill health (some of these are illustrated in figure 10.4). It also proposed a set of initiatives linking health with, for example, unemployment, substandard housing and education, to address not only the symptoms of poor health, but its causes as well. In practice, it remains less expensive, and therefore easier, for governments to concentrate on health promotion and persuasion of individuals than to introduce systematic programmes to tackle major social-structural problems such as unemployment and poor housing. Gender and health Disparities in health between men and women have also been noted in many research studies. For example, women IlZ HEALTH , ILLNESS AND DISABILITY Figure 10.4 Cultural and material influences on health Source: Browne 2005: 410 generally enjoy a longer life expectancy than men in almost every country in the world (UNDP 2004), while causes of death and patterns of illness show some differences between men and women. In the developed world, although heart disease affects men more than women, it is still the most frequent killer of both men and women under the age of65. Men, however, suffer from higher rates of death as a result of accidents and violence and are also more prone to drug and alcohol depend- ency. Material circumstances appear to influence women's health status, but this has traditionally been a difficult factor to gauge. Many studies have tended to classify women according to the social class of their husbands, thereby producing a distorted picture of women's health (see chapter 11, 'Stratification and Social Class'). We do know, however, that women are more likely to seek medical attention and have higher rates of self-reported illness than men. The gendered pattern is different in South Asian countries like Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan, though, where the life expectancy differential is greatly reduced (Arber andThomas 2005). Explanatory factors here include conflict and wars, nutritional deficiencies, disadvantages related to lower social status and limited access to medical services for women (Cockerham 2007). Women in industrialized countries report twice as much anxiety and depression as men. According to some observers, the multiple roles which women tend to perform - domestic work, childcare, professional responsibilities - may increase the stress on women and contribute to higher rates of illness'. Lesley Doyal (1995) suggested that patterns of women's health and sickness may best be explained in relation to the main 'areas of activities which constitute their lives. Women's lives are inherently different from men's in terms of the roles and tasks that are commonly performed - domestic work, sexual reproduction, childbearing and mothering, regulating fertility tllTough birth control, and so forth. (Although it could be argued that this is decreasingly true as more women enter the workplace.) According to Doyal, 'it is the cumulative effects of these various labours that are the major determinants ofwomen's states of health', Therefore, any analysis of women's health should consider the interaction between social, psychological and biological influences, Heather Graham has studied the effects of stress on the health of white workingclass women, She has highlighted the fact that women at the lower socia-economic end of the spectrum have less access to support networks in times of life crisis than do middle-class women, Working-ciass women, she notes, tend to encounter life crises (such as job loss, divorce, eviction from housing or the death of a child) more often than other groups, but generally have weaker coping skills and fewer outlets for anxiety, Not only is the resulting stress harmful both physically and psychologically, but some of the coping strategies which are turned to - such as smoking - are also damaging, Graham argues that smoking is a way of reducing tension when personal and material resources are stretched to breaking point. Thus it occupies a paradoxical position in women's lives - increasing the health risk for women and their children, while simultaneously allowing them to cope under difficult circumstances (Graham 1987, 1994), Ann Oak/ey and her colleagues (1994) have studied the role ofsocial support in the health of socially disadvantaged women and children in four English cities, She argues that the relationship between stress and health applies both to major life crises and smaller problems, and that it is felt particularly acutely in the lives of workingclass people, Oakley notes that social support - such as counselling services, hotlines or home visits - can act as a 'buffer' against the negative health consequences of stress commonly experienced by women. Other studies have shown that social support is an important factor that can help people in adjusting to disease and illness and that women are more likely to form and maintain self-help communities, recently Health, Illness and Disability 413 including female communities in cyberspace, such as mothers' forums (Ell 1996; Drentea and Moren-Cross 2005), Conversely, researchers have found that men are not as vigilant about their own health and tend to ignore health problems for longer. Young men also engage in more risk-taking behaviour, such as speeding, drug-taking, early-age sexual activity, getting drunk and so on, than do women (Lupton 1999). Ethnicity and health Although health in industrial SOCletles is ethnically patterned, our understanding of the relationship between ethnicity and health is partial at best. An increasing number of sociological studies are being conducted in this area, but the evidence remains inconclusive. In some cases, trends that have been attributed to membership of an ethnic group may have ignored other factors, such as class or gender, which may also be highly significant, Nevertheless, the incidence of certain illnesses is higher among individuals from African-Caribbean and Asian backgrounds. Mortality from liver cancer, tuberculosis and diabetes are higher among these populations than among whites. AfricanCaribbeans suffer from higher-than-average rates of hypertension and sickle-cell anaemia (an inherited disorder affecting red blood cells), while people from the Indian subcontinent experience higher mortality from heart disease. Some scholars have turned to cultural and behavioural accounts to explain ethnic health patterning. In a similar way to cultural explanations of class-based health inequalities, emphasis is placed on individual and group lifestyles which are seen to result in poorer health. These are often seen as linked to religious or cultural beliefs, such as dietary and cooking habits or consanguinity (the practice ofintermarriage within families at the level ofsecond cousins). Critics argue that cultural explanations fail to HEALTH, ILLNESS AND DISABILITY identify the real problems facing ethnic minorities in the industrialized societies: namely, the structural inequalities and the racism and discrimination encountered in healthcare systems. Social-structural explanations for ethnic patterning in health in many European societies focus on the social context in which African-Caribbeans and Asians live. African-Caribbeans and Asians frequently experience multiple disadvantages which can be harmful to their health. These might include poor or overcrowded housing conditions, high rates of unemployment and over-representation in hazardous, lowpaying occupations. Such material factors are then compounded by the effects of racism, either experienced directly in the form of violence, threats or discrimination, or in 'institutionalized' forms. In short:'Ultimately, what makes race important in a causal sense for health is its close association with class circumstances. Subtract affluence or lack thereof from considerations of race and the causal strength of race in health and disease is severely minimized' (Cockerham 2007: 143). Nonetheless. institutional racism has been noted in the provision of healthcare (Alexander 1999). Ethnic groups mayexperience unequal or problematic access to health services. Language barriers can present difficulties if information cannot be relayed effectively; culturally specific understandings of illness and treatment are often not considered by professionals within the health service. The National Health Service has been criticized for not requiring more awareness of cultural and religious beliefs among its staff and for paying less attention to diseases that occur predominantly in the non-white population. Institutional racism is discussed in de tail in chapter 15,'Race, Ethnicity and Migration', There is no consensus on the connection between ethnicity and health inequalities. Indeed, much research still remains to be done. Yet it is clear that the question of ethnicity and health inequalities must be considered in relation to larger social, economic and political factors which affect the experience of ethnic minority groups in the developed societies. Health and social cohesion In trying to unravel the causes of health inequalities, a growing number of sociologists are turning their attention to the role of social support and social cohesion in promoting good health. As you may recall from our discussion of Durkheim in chapter 1, 'What is Sociology?', social solidarity is one ofthe most important concepts in sociology. Durkheim saw the degree and type of solidarity within a culture as one of its most critical features. In his study of suicide, for example, he found that individuals and groups that were well integrated into society were less likely to take their own lives than others. In several articles, and in his book Unhealthy Societies: The Afflictions of Inequality (1996), Richard WiIkinson argues that the healthiest societies in the world are not the richest countries, but those in which income is distributed most evenly and levels of social integration are highest. High levels of national wealth, according to Wilkinson, do not necessarily translate into better health for the population. In surveying empirical data from countries around the world, he notes a clear relationship between mortality rates and patterns of income distribution. Inhabitants of countries such as Japan and Sweden, which are regarded as some of the most egalitarian societies in the world, enjoy better levels of health on average than do citizens of countries where the gap between the rich and the poor is more pronounced, such as the United States. In Wilkinson's view, the widening gap in income distribution undermines social cohesion and makes it more difficult for people to manage risks and challenges. Heightened social isolation and the failure to cope with stress are reflected in health indicators. Wilkinson argues that social factors the strength of social contacts, ties within communities, availability ofsocial support, a seDse ofsecurity- are the main determinants of the relative health of a society. Wilkinson's thesis has provoked energetic responses. Some claim that his work should become required reading for policy-makers and politicians. They agree that too much emphasis has been placed on market relations and the drive towards prosperity. This approach has failed many members of society, they argue; it is time to consider more humane and socially responsible policies to support those who are disadvantaged. Others criticize Wilkinson's study on methodological grounds and argue that he has failed to show a clear causal relationship between income inequality and poor health (Judge 1995). illness, critics contend, could be caused by any number of other mediating factors. They argue that the empirical evidence for Wilkinson's claims remains suggestive at best and that the thesis is not confirmed within all developed societies. Recent evidence also shows that the same pattern does not hold within developing countries either. Evidence against the 'Wilkinson thesis' seems to be mounting, and it has been described as, 'a doctrine in search of data' (Eberstadt and Satel 2004) rather than an accurate hypothesis based on the evidence. THINIUNG CRITICALLY Examine figure 10.3 above. Using your sociological imagination, how might the differences in male disease prevalence across social class groups be explained?Would a concerted attempt to tackle poverty help to reduce such inequalities? Earlier in this chapter we examined some of the assumptions that have historically provided the foundations for the orthodox, biomedical model of health. Many of these Health, Illness and Disability assumptions were also found in the waythat disability has conventionally been understood in the developed countries. Similarly, the recent trends we discussed above as a reaction to the biomedical model ofhealthsuch as scepticism that the medical expert always knows best and the moves to take greater account of the opinions and experiences of patients - have formed part of a more recent rejection of this conventional understanding of disability. It is to a discussion of some of the issues surrounding disability that we now turn. The sociology of disability The poet Simon Brisenden neatly summarizes the sense of exclusion that many disabled people feel from orthodox medicine and medical practitioners in his book Poems for Perfect People, in which he asked: 'The man who cut your skin I and delved within I has he got any scars?' Brisenden was one of many disabled people whose work has led to a re-evaluation of the conventional understanding of disability in the UK and a number of other countries. Much ofthis discussion is taking place in the field of disability studies. In this section, we examine the dominant understanding of disability by discussing what has become known as the 'individual model'. We then turn to look at how this model has been challenged, notably by disabled people themselves, through the development of a 'social model' of disability, and offer a brief evaluation of this challenge. Lastly, we look briefly at the level and background of impairments globally. We begin, however, by discussing the language of disability. Sociologists argue that our awareness and understanding of social issues is, at least partly, shaped by the words we use. In recent decades a critique of the terms which people have historically drawn upon to discuss disability has become increasingly important to those writing in this area. The word 'handicapped', for example, has 416 HEALTH , ILLNESS AND DISABILITY largely fallen out of use because it was thought to be associated with 'cap in hand' i.e., charity and begging. Other terms, originally used to describe certain impairments, are rejected because they are now used mainly as insults - terms such as 'spastic' or 'cripple' are examples. Some metaphors, which are still in everyday use, like 'turning a blind eye' or 'a deaf ear', have been criticized because they imply a sense of exclusion. As we shall see, even the way in which we understand the term 'disability' is subject to much debate. The individual model of disability Historically, in Western societies, an individual model of disability has been dominant. This model contends that individual limitations are the main cause of the problems experienced by disabled people. In the individual model of disability, bodily 'abnormality' is seen as causing some degree of'disability' or functional limitation - an individual 'suffering' from quadriplegia is incapable of walking, for example. This functional limitation is seen as the basis for a wider classification of an individual as 'an invalid'. Underpinning the individual model is a 'personal tragedy approach' to disability. The disabled individual is regarded as an unfortunate victim of a chance event. Medical specialists play a central role in the individual model because it is their job to offer curative and rehabilitative diagnoses to the 'problems' suffered by the disabled individual. For this reason, the individual model is often described as the 'medical model'. It is the power of the medical expert over disabled people's lives that Simon Brisenden attacked in the poem that started this section. In recent decades, this individual model ofdisability has been increasingly questioned, as we find below. The social model of disability An important early challenge to the individual model of disability was a collection edited by Paul Hunt entitled, Stigma: The Experience ofDisability (1966). Hunt argued that 'the problem of disability lies not only in the impairment offunction and its effects on us individually, but also, more importantly, in the area of our relationship with "normal" people'. Hunt was a leading activist in the early years of the disability movement in Britain and became a founding member of the Union of Physically ImpairedAgainst Segregation (UPIAS). In its manifesto, Fundamental Principles of Disability(l976), UPIAS developed a radical alternative to the individual model byarguing that there was a crucial distinction between 'impairment' and 'disability': • Impairment: Lacking part or all ofa limb, or having a defective limb, organ or mechanism ofthe body. • Disability The disadvantage or restriction of activist caused by a contemporary social organization, which takes no or little account of people who have physical impairments and thus excludes them from participation in the mainstream of social activities. UPIAS largely accepted the definition of physical 'impairment' as a biomedical property of individuals (although they subsequently extended it to include nonphysical, sensory and intellectual forms of impairment). 'Disability', however, was defined in social terms. This challenged conventional understandings of the term. Disability was no longer understood as the problem ofan individual, but in terms orthe social barriers that people with impairments faced in participating fully in society. Mike Oliver turns the assumptions in the individual model of disability around by rewriting the questions that the UK Office of Population, Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) used to assess 'disability' in the 1980s. Oliver (1983) was the first theorist to make the distinction between the individual and the social model of disability explicit (these distinctions are summarized in table 10.3). I I I r \ \ Table 10.3 Two models of disability Individual model Personal tragedy model Personal problem Individual treatment Medicalization Professional dominance Expertise Individual identity Prejudice Care Control Policy Individual adjustment Source:Adapted from Ollver 1996 34 The social model of disability was given further academic credibility by the work of Vic Finkelstein (1980, 1981), Colin Barnes (1991) and Oliver himself (1990,1996). Social model theorists need to give an explanation of why the social, cultural or historical barriers against disabled people have developed. Some advocates of the social model, influenced by Marx, have argued that a materialist understanding of disability is needed (see chapter 1, 'What is Sociology?' for more on materialism). Oliver (1996), for example, argues that, historically, barriers were erected against disabled people's full participation in society during the Industrial Revolution, when they were excluded from the labour market as the first capitalist factories began to base employment on individual waged labour. As this historical process developed, Oliver argues, 'so many [disabled people] were unable to keep or retain jobs that they became a social problem for the capitalist state whose initial response to all social problems was harsh deterrence and institutionalization', Even today, disabled people's presence in the workforce is still relatively small. Social model Social oppression theory Social problem Social action Self-help Individual and collective responsibility Experience Collective identity Discrimination Rights Choice Politics Social change Evaluation o/the social model The social model has been enormously influential in shaping the way that we think about disability today. Although it originated in the UK, it has gained global influence, and has been described as 'the big idea' of the British disability movement (Hasler 1993). In focusing on the removal of social barriers to full participation, the social model allows disabled people to focus on a political strategy. This has led some to argue that, in accepting this model, disabled people have formed 'a new social movement' (Oliver and Zarb 1989). New social movements are discussed further in chapter 22, 'Politics, Government and Social Movements'. In replacing the individual model, which identifies the 'invalidity' of the individual as the cause of disability, with a model in which disability is the result of oppression, the social model has been seen as 'liberating' by some disabled people (Beresford and Wallcraft 1997). Since the late 1980s, however, several lines of criticism have been developed Disabled protesters campaigning for their rights. against the social model. First, it is argued that it neglects the often painful or uncomfortable experiences of impairment, which are central to many disabled people's lives. Shakespeare and Watson argue: 'We are not justdisabled people, we are also people with impairments, and to pretend otherwise is to ignore a major part of our biographies' (2002: 11). Against this accusation, defenders of the social model have claimed that rather than denying everyday experiences of impairment, the social model merely seeks to focus attention on the social barriers to full participation in society that are raised against disabled people. Second, many people accept that they have impairments, but do not wish to be labelled as 'disabled'. In a recent survey of people claiming government benefits for disability, fewer than half chose to define themselves as disabled. Many people rejected the term because they saw their health problems related to illness rather than disability or because they did not think that they were ill enough to be so categorized (Department for Work and Pensions 2002). However, Barnes (2003) has pointed out that in a society where disability is too often still associated with abnormality, it is not surprising that some people with impairments chose to reject the label 'disabled'. Lastly, medical sociologists in particular tend to reject the social model by arguing that the division between impairment and disability, on which it rests, is false. These critics argue that the social model separates impairment, which is defined biomedically, from disability, which is defined socially. Medical sociologists have tended to argue that both disability and impairment are socially structured and are closely interre- 10.3 Applying the social model to assumptions in the OPCS questions OPCS question 'Can you tell what is wrong with you?' 'What complaint causes you difficulty in holding, gripping or turning things?' 'Are your difficulties in understanding mainly due to a hearing problem?' 'Do you have a scar, blemish or deformity which limits your daily activities?' 'Have you attended a special school because of a long-term health problem or disability?' 'Does your health problem/disability prevent you from going out as often or as far as you would like?' 'Does your health problem/disability ' make it difficult for you to travel by bus?' 'Does your health problem/disability affect your work in any way at present?' 'Does your health problem/disability mean that you need to live with relatives or someone else who can help or look after you? 'Does your present accommodation have any adaptations because ofyour health problem/disability?' Source: Oliver 1990 Oliver's question 'Can you tell me what is wrong with society?' 'What defects in the design of everyday equipment like jars,bottles and tins causes you difficulty in holding them?' 'Are your difficulties in understanding people mainly due to their inability to communicate with you?' 'Do other people's reactions to any scar, blemish or deformity you may have limit your daily activities?' 'Have you attended a special school because of your education authority's policy of sending people with your health problem/disability to such places?' What is it about the local environment that makes it difficult for you to get about in your neighbourhood?' Are there any transport or financial problems which prevent you from going out as often or as far as you would like?' 'Do you have problems at work because of the physical environment or the attitudes of others?' 'Are community services so poor that you need to rely on relatives or someone else to provide you with the right level ofpersonal assistance?' 'Did the poor design ofyour house mean that you had to have it adapted to suit your needs?' lated. Shakespeare and Watson argue that the division between impairment and disability collapses when one asks, 'Where does impairment end and disability start?' In some cases the division is straightforward - a failure to design suitable wheelchair access in a building clearly creates a socially constructed disabling barrier to wheelchair users. However, there are many more cases where it is impossible to remove all the sources of disability because they are not caused by oppressive conditions in society. Medical sociologists critical of the social model might argue that to be impaired by constant pain or by significant intellectual limitations, for example, disables the individual from full participation in society in a way that cannot be removed by social change.These critics would argue that a full account of disability must take into account disability caused by impairments and not just those caused by society. Supporters of the social model have argued that this last claim is based on a Is this paralympic swimmer disabled? blurring of the distinction between disability and impairment, which they argue is rooted in the biomedical model of thinking that underlies the individual model of disability. They respond that the social model certainly does not deny that an impairment can be the cause of pain or that there are things that an individual might not be able to do solely because of a particular impairment. Indeed, Carol Thomas (1999, 2002), an advocate of the social model of disability, uses the phrase 'impairment effects' to take into account the ensuing psychoemotional implications of impairment for disabled people. Given the contested nature of the term 'disability' and the variety of impairments linked to disability, an account of the numbers of disabled people in the world is difficult. However, it is to these issues that we turn below. THINKING CRITICALLY Are people with facial disfigurements 'disabled'? DoesVicky's story ('Using your sociological imagination 10.2') teH us anything about the distinction between impairment and disability, or not? What do Vicky's experiences teH us about the social model of disability and its implications for society as a whole? Disability, law and public policy As the social model of disability initially emerged in the UK, we shall begin byoutlining the way that British legislation has changed, in part as a result ofthe campaigning activities of the disabled people's movrnent The Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) was passed in 1995, giving disabled people 10.4 'Why I want you to look me in the face' Instead ofpeople looking away, gasping or shuddering,Vicky Lucas wants them to know that her face is integra! to who she is. And, as she explains, she likes who she is. Ihave a rare genetic disorder called Cherubism, which affects my face.I was diagnosed when I was about 4 years old. I was too young to remember what happened, but visiting hospitals became a regular part of my life. Although it was only when I was about 6 that my face started to really change shape, I don't remember a time when I didn't look different. Growing up with a facial disfigurement wasn't easy. When puberty kicked in, it included all the usual developments with a little bit extra - my face became very large and my eyes were more affected too. Double take My teenage years were diliicult. People would sometimes stare or do a double take. Some people would be downright nasty and call me names. Even when people said 'Oh you poor thingl' their pity also hurt me and that hurt would stay with me for a long time. I became very withdrawn, afraid ofhow Iimght be treated if I went out. But over time, Igradually started to develop my self-esteem and self-confidence and Istarted to feel that Ishouldn't waste my life just because of other people's attitudes towards me. At the age of 16 I went to college and studied subjects such as film, media studies and photography. I started to research the representation of disfigured people in the media. When Ilooked at how people with facial disfigurements are portrayed in films, well, no wonder people don't know how to react to us! Freddy Krueger in Nightmare on Elm Street, the Joker in Batman, the various scarred villains in gangster films - the list is endless. Bad assumption With stereotypes like that, it's hardly surprising that people assume that ifyou have a facial difference, there must be something 'different' or 'bad' about you in the inside too. This was a huge turning point for me because I realized that facial disfigurement was not just a medical issue, but a social issue as well. I realized that the reason why Iwas so unhappy was not because of my face, but the way some people would react to it. I decided that it wasn't my face that I wanted to change,but social attitudes. I'm not against plastic surgery. It's just that my personal choice is to not have it. Now, at the age of 24, I'm used to seeing my face reflected back at me in the mirror and I'm okay with it. Though I could quite happily do without the headaches and double vision. I also dislike being physically unable to wink, but I've overcome this particular disability by doing a nice line in fluttering and blinking. But my face is integra! to who I am. The way people treat me and the way I've had to learn to live my life has created the person I am today. Lack ofimagination Ilove the good genuine friends my face has brought me and I appreciate the way it's made me want to be a better person. I also have a boyfriend who thinks Ilook like a cat. I'm not quite sure if I agree with him, but I'm certainly not complainingl [cont'd . . .) Now, whenever a person says I'm ugly, 1just pity them for their lack of imagination. For every person who calls me fat chin, 1think 'Nah! It's just that you've got a really small weak one. Talk about chin envy!' strange guttural sound to a funny looking woman in the street ever again. TWo minutes later,as we were walking home,a homeless man came up to me asking for change. He asked me how 1was. 'Fine', I said and Itold hinl what had just happened. There was a short pause. Then he smiled and said 'I hope you hurt him! 'We all laughed. For every naturally curious stare 1get,1give a friendly smile. And ifthey don't smile back within my 1O-second time limit, 1give them a very effective scowl. It's funny how some strangers can be so cruel and hurtful,and yet others,the ones you'd least expect. the ones you would usually igilore and think nothing of, can be so warm and kind. Last week, walking in the street with my boyfriend,a man walked towards me and went 'Urghhhhhooooooh' ' Confrontation It wasn't so much a word as a strange guttural sound, and the kind that orily funny-looking people could understand the subtext to. I was so angry that 1confronted him. That pretty much sums up my life. 1go from experiencing the worst in people to the very best, and often within the same five minutes' It makes my life more challenging, but also very interesting. 1 wouldn't want to change that for the world. 1won't go into details of what 1did but let's just say it's probably the last time he ever gives a Source: BBCNews Magazine, 6August 2003 © bbc.co.uk/news certain legal protections from discrimination in several areas, including employment and access to goods and services. Further legislation was introduced in 1999 that led to the creation of the Disability Rights Commission (DRC), set up to work towards 'the elimination of discrimination against disabled people', and a new DDA was introduced in 2005, covering more areas and activities. The 1995 DDA defined a disabled person as 'anyone with a physical or mental impairment, which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect upon their ability to carry out normal day-today activities', This definition of disability includes, for example, people with mental health problems as well as people with facial disfigurements, and it avoids the common misconception that disability mainly concerns mobility impairments or is largely congenital. In fact, around 77 per cent of disabled people became disabled after the age of 16 (Employers' Forum on Disability 2003) and the percentage ofthe population who are disabled continues to increase with age (see figure 10,5), Under the DDA definition, in 2003-4 more than ID million people in the UK (over 10 per cent of the population) were disabled, of whom 6,8 million (one in five of the total working population) were ofworking age. Of this latter group, only 3.4 million people (50 per cent) were employed, compared with 81 per cent of non-disabled people (Disability Rights Commission 2005) and just 17 per cent ofpeople with learning disabilities were in paid work. The DRC says that around 1 million disabled people without a job want to work. People with impairments linked to disability still belong to one of the most disadvantaged groups in the UK. They are more likely to be out of work than the ablebodied, and those people who have impairments linked to disability who are in employment tend to earn less. In 2005, the DRC reported that the average gross hourly pay of disabled employees was 10 per cent less than that of non-disabled employees£9.36 per hour compared to £10.39 per hour. Yet disability-related expenditure by governments is high compared to many other areas of spending - the UK government spent more than £19 billion a year on incapacity and disability benefits in 2002 (BBC, 9 April 2002). The wealthiest countries spend at Per cent 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Health, Illness and Disability 423 16--19 20-24 25-34 35-49 50-59/64 All working age' " Statutory pension age Figure 10,5 Disabled people in the UK 2001 ,by age C%of age group) Source: Smith and Twomey 2002 417 least twice as much on disability-related programmes as they do on unemployment compensation (OECD 2005). Disability around the world It is estimated that 10 per cent of the world popUlation, some 650 million people, are disabled, 80 per cent of whom live in developingcountries such as India and China (UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006). The main cause of disability in developed countries is 'chronic disease and long-term impairments', while in developing countries the main causes are poverty, inadequate sanitation, poor diet and bad housing. Injuries, such as broken bones, will often result in long-term impairment in developing countries, which would not occur if treatment and rehabilitation facilities had been available, as they generally are in the developed world. Iron-deficiency, 'anaemia' and chronic infections of the pelvis (sometimes caused by female circumcision) are major causes of impairment that lead to disability in women in many developing countries. It is estimated that around 250,000 children lose their sight each year because their diet lacks Vitamin A, which is found in green vegetables, and that up to half of the world's impairment could be preventable by improving policies to confront poverty, malnutrition, sanitation, drinking water and employment conditions to reduce accidents (Charltan 1998). War and its aftermath (such as uncleared landmines) comprise another major cause of impairments. Furthermore, in poorer countries disabled children are far less likely to receive the same level ofeducation as other children, which exacerbates their poverty later in life. From the evidence, we can see that povertyin the developing world creates impairments and shapes disability in ways that are very different from the experience in the West. In 2006, the UN noted that only a minority of countries - 45 - had already introduced legislation aimed at protecting the rights of disabled people. In a majority of countries, therefore, disabled people did not have equal rights with the rest of the population. For example, UNESCO says that around 90 per cent ofchildren with disabilities in developing countries do not attend school and the global literacy rate for adults with disabilities is as low as 3 per cent, and just 1 per cent for women with disabilities (UNDP 1998). In India, a country with anti- HEALTH, ILLNESS AND DISABILITY discrimination laws, of some 70 million people with disabilities, only about 100,000 have succeeded in obtaining employment in industry and in 2004 just 35 per cent of working-age people with disabilities in the USA were working, compared to 78 per cent of the non-disabled population (UN 2006). Clearly, anti-discriminatory laws and policies are very patchy and uneven across the world; in many cases disabled people continue to be denied citizenship in their own countries. In an attempt to 'level up' provision for disabled people across the world, the UN launched the first human rights treaty of the twenty-first century: the 2006 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The Convention aims to contribute towards a global 'paradigm shift' in attitudes towards disabled people. On the opening day for signatures - 30 March 2007 - some 99 countries signed the new Convention, though the government of the USA said it would not be doing so as it already had extensive provision for disabled people; as we saw above, however, this has not yet guaranteed equal rights in employment. The Convention commits Summary points national governments to 'develop and carry out policies, laws and administrative measures for securing the rights recognized in the Convention and to abolish laws, regulations. customs and practices that constitute discrimination'. It also guarantees that disabled people can enjoy a right to life on an equal basis with others, ensures the equal rights and advancement of women and girls with disabilities and protects children with disabilities. In addition, itsets out, for the first time, a global policy agenda to promote equal rights for disabled people. The very different experiences of impairment and disability encountered by people around the world illustrate a wider idea reflected in this chapter: that our experience ofour own bodies and our interactions with others - whether able-bodied or disabled, sick or healthy- are shaped by the changing social contexts in which we find ourselves. In order to develop a sociological perspective on illness, health and disability, we need to examine the social and technological changes that shape our understanding of these aspects of human life. considers itself superior to alternative forms of healing. 1. Western medicine is based on the biomedical model of health - that disease can be defined in objective tenns and that the sick body can be restored to health through scientifically based medical treatment. The biomedical model emerged with modern societies and was linked to 3. Sociologists are interested in the experience of illness - how being sick, chronically ill or disabled is experienced by the sick person and those nearby. The idea of the sick role, developed by Talcott Parsons, suggests that a sick person adopts certain forms of behaviour in order to minimize the disruptive impact of illness. A sick individual is granted certain privileges, such as the right to withdraw from normal responsibilities, but in return must work actively to regain health by agreeing to follow medical advice. the rise of demographics - the study of the size, composition and dynamics of human populations, and a growing state interest in public health. Modern healthcare systems were greatly influenced by the application of science to medical diagnosis and cure. 2. The biomedical model has come under increasing criticism. It has been argued that scientific medicine is not as effective as it is made out to be, that medical professionals do not value the opinions of the patients being treated, and that the medical profession 4. Symbolic interactionists have investigated how people cope with disease and chronic illness in their daily lives. The experience of illness can provoke changes in self-identity and daily routines. This sociological dimension of the body is becoming increasingly relevant for many societies; people are living longer than ever before and tend to suffer more from chronic debilitating conditions than from acute illnesses. 5. The emergence of HlV/AIDS - a deadly pandemic of world-historical significance showed that modern scientific medicine has not conquered fatal diseases and epidemics once and for all. Many millions of people around the world have died from AlDSrelated diseases and there is still no cure or vaccine for HIV or AIDS.The pandemic also contributed to a growing risk-awareness amongst populations and provoked much sociological research into the social inequalities of health and illness across the world. 6. Sociological research reveals close connections between illness and inequality. Within industrial countries,poorer groups have a shorter average life expectancy and are more susceptible to disease than more affluent strata.Richer countries also have higher average life expectancies than poorer ones. Some researchers argue that classbased health inequalities can be explained by cultural and behavioural factors, such as diet and lifestyle. Others place emphasis on structural influences, such as tmernployment, sub-standard housing and poor working conditions. 7. Patterns of health and illness have gender and racial dimensions as well. On average, women tend to live longer than men in almost every country of the world,yet they Health, Illness and Disability experience a higher incidence of illness than men. Certain illnesses are more common among ethnic minority groups than among the white population. Genetic explanations have been advanced to account for gender and racial differences in health, yet these alone cannot explain the inequalities.While there may be some biological basis to certain health conditions, overall patterns of health and illness must also take into account social factors and differences in material conditions between groups. 8. The individual model of disability holds personal limitations to be the main cause of the problems experienced by disabled people. In the individual model, bodily 'abnormality'is seen as causing some degree of 'disability' or functional limitation. Underpinning the individual model is a 'personal tragedy approach' to disability. 9. The social model of disability locates the causes of disability within society, rather than the individual. It is not the individual's limitations that cause disability,but the barriers that society places in the way of full participation for disabled people. 10. Disabled people make up one of the most socially disadvantaged groups in the developed countries, though the majority of people with impairments actually live in the developing world.The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) aims to promote equal rights for disabled people globally. HEALTH, ILLNESS AND DISABILITY ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •• • •• • • Further reading The sociology of health and illness is a very large and long-established field, so it is best to start with a shorter introduction. Mike Bury's Health and Illness (Cambridge: Polity, 2005) is very good, as isAnne-Marie Barry and Chris Yuill's Understanding Health: A Sociological lntroduction, 2nd edn (London: Sage, 2007), though there are many more. From here, you can then try something that covers key debates and evidence in more detail. For example, Sarah Nettleton's The Sociology of Health and Illness, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Polity, 2006) or Ellen Annandale's The Sociology of Health and Medicine: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 1998) are both engagingly written and well argued. Critical reviews of sociology's recent engagement with the body can be found in Chris Shilling's The Body and Social Theory (London: Sage, 2003) and Alexandra Howson's The Body in Society: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 2004). For disability studies in sociology, see Colin Barnes, Geof Mercer and Tom Shakespeare's Exploring Disability: A Sociological Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 1999) and CarolThomas's Sociologies of Disability and Illness (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Ifyou need a Reference work covering the sociology of health and illness, then Ionathan Gabe, Mike Bury and Mary Ann Elston's Key Concepts in Medical Sociology (London: Sage, 2004) should be helpful. ••••• •• • • • •• ••• •• ••••• •• ••• •• • ••••• ••• •• • •• •• ••• •• • ••••• • •• ••• ••••••••••• • • • • • • •• • •• • • • • • •• • •• • •• • Health, Illness and Disability 427 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • Internet links The Disability Archive at the University of • • • • Leeds, UK: •• • • European Observatory on Health Systems and www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/ • • • • • • Policies: • • The European Disability Forum: • • www.euro.who.intlobservatory • • www.edf-feph.org/en/welcome.htm • • • • Centre for International Public Health Policy: • • The Disability Rights Commission, UK: • • www.health.ed.ac.uk/CIPHP/ • • www.drc-gb.org/ • • • • The World Health Organization: • • United Nations Convention on the Rights of • www.who.int/en/ • • Persons with Disabilities: • • • • Wellcome Library on the History and www.un.org/disabilities/convention/ • • • • Understanding of Medicine, UK: • • • • • • http:/ /library.wellcome.ac.uk/ • •• • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • - . • • • • Max Weoer: class, status and Rarty , , • ,, •• Evaluating GoldthorRe's class sdieme ,Hie question of the uPRcr class The growing middle class Is tnere an underclass? Class and lifestyles Gender and stratification • • , . ComRarative mooility studies I. Social mooility in Britain Gender and social mobility A meritocratic Britain? , I Summary l20illls Fllrther reaaillg Internet links , : (opposite) Prince Charles and Sir Gulam Noon , .................................., ... H ave you ever bought an Indian meal in a supermarket? Ifyou have, there's a strong chance that it was made by Noon Products. The company specializes in supplying Indian food to the big supermarket chains and has an annual turnover of around £90 million. In 2005 it was taken over by Irish food company, Kerry Group. Company founder, Sir GuIam Noon, was estimated to have amassed a fortune of £65 million, according to the 2006 Sunday Times Rich List. Gulam Noon was born in India. His family owned a sweet shop in Bombay: 'Royal Sweets'. They were not particularly well off, but managed to get by until their father's death when Gulam was 7. After that it was a struggle, and, as a young teenager, Gulam would combine school with work in the shop. Having completed school, he joined the family business full time. He soon changed the way the business was marketed, expanded the shop and built a factory. His ambitions, however, were not limited to 'Royal Sweets', and other ventures quickly followed, including printing and construction ventures. Not satisfied with his successes in India, Gulam looked to England to further his experience. He established 'Royal Sweets' in Southall, London, and brought chefs with him from India to get the business going. Within the year there were nine shops, built around the Asian communities of London and Leicester. Today, the 'Royal Sweets' chain has 40 shops and an annual turnover of £9 million. Other commercial ventures followed the success of 'Royal Sweets', and in 1989 Noon Products was established. Gulam spotted a niche in the market: 'All the pre-packaged Indian ready meals available from the supermarkets were insipid and frankly unacceptable. I thought I could do better: The business began with just 11 employees, but soon they were selling authentic Indian foods to the frozen food company Birds Eye, and then to the supermarket chains Waitrose and Sainsbury's. There are now more than lOO different Noon dishes, produced in three plants,operated by 1,100 employees. Between 250,000 and 300,000 meals are made every day. The produce range has been expanded from Indian food to include Thai and Mexican dishes, amongst others. In 2002 Gulam was knighted for his services to the food industry. Reflecting on what has inspired him during his life,SirGulam concludes: 'I'm a self-made man and a quick learner! Nothing comes easily, you've just got to work at it: Few of us can expect the kind of wealth that Sir Gulam now possesses. But his ragsto-riches life history raises interesting questions for sociologists. Is it just an isolated incident, or is his story being repeated elsewhere? How much chance does someone from a poor background have of reaching the top of the economic ladder? For every Gulam Noon in our society, how many people have to work in his businesses, and are they paid their 'fair share' for the success of the company? The issues of wealth and poverty raised by Sir Gulam's life story lead us to broader questions. Why do economic inequalities exist in contemporary societies?What social factors will influence your economic position in society? Are your chances any different if you are a woman? How does the globalization of the economy affect your life chances? These are just a few of the sorts of question that sociologists ask and try to answer, and they are the focus of this chapter. The study of inequalities in society is one of the most important areas of sociology, because our material resources determine a great deal about our lives. Here, we begin by looking at what sociologists mean when they talk about stratification and class. We then look at some of the most influential theories of class, and attempts to measure it, in sociological thought, after which we take a more detailed look at social class in Western society today. We close with a discussion of social mobility and conclude by briefly considering the continuing importance of social class in helping us to understand the world around us. Systems of stratification Sociologists use the concept of social stratification to describe inequalities that exist between individuals and groups within human societies. Often we think of stratification in terms of assets or property, but it can also occur because of other attributes, such as gender, age, religious affiliation or military rank. Individuals and groups enjoy differential (unequal) access to rewards based on their position within the stratification scheme. Thus, stratification can most simply be defined as structured inequalities between different groupings of people. It is useful to think of stratification as rather like the Access to benefits and rewards in society is affected by factors such as gender and ethnicity both ofwhich are forms ofstratification. geological layering of rock in the earth's surface. Societies can be seen as consisting of 'strata' in a hierarchy, with the more favoured at the top and the less privileged nearer the bottom. All socially stratified systems share three basic characteristics: 1 The rankings apply to social categories of people who share a common characteristic without necessarily interacting or identifying with one another. For example, women may be ranked differently from men or wealthy people differently from the poor. This does not mean that individuals from a particular category cannot change their rank; however, it does mean that the category continues to exist even if individuals move out of it and into another category. 2 People's life experiences and opportunities depend heavily on how their social category is ranked. Being male or female, black or white, upper class or working class makes a big difference in terms ofyour life chances - often as big a difference as personal effort or good fortune (such as winning a lottery). 3 The ranks of different social categories tend to change very slowly over time. In the industrialized societies, for example, only recently have women as a whole begun to achieve equality with men. Gender inequalities are discussed more fully in chapter 14,'Sexuality and Gender'. As discussed in chapter 4, stratified societies have changed throughout human history. [n the earliest human societies, which were based on hunting and gathering, there was very little social stratification - mainly because there was very little by way of wealth or other resources to be divided up. The development of agriculture produced considerably more wealth and, as a result, a great increase in stratification. Social stratification in agricultural societies increasingly came to resemble a pyramid, with a large number of people at the bottom and a successively smaller number of people as you move towards the top.Today, industrial and post-industrial societies are extremely complex; their stratification is more likely to resemble a teardrop, with a large number of people in the middle and lower-middle ranks (the so-called middle class), a slightlysmaller number ofpeople at the bottom, and very few people as one moves towards the top. THINKING CRITICALLY Should we assume that stratification is 'natural' and therefore inevitable? If not, how might we explain the persistence of stratification in human societies? In what ways could stratification systems be functional for society as a whole? Historically, four basic systems of stratification can be distinguished: slavery, caste, estates and class. These are sometimes found in conjunction with one another: slavery, for instance, existed alongside classes in ancient Greece and Rome, and in the Southern United States before the Civil War of the 1860s. Slavery Slavery is an extreme form of inequality, in which certain people are owned as property by others. The legal conditions of slaveownership have varied considerably among different societies. Sometimes slaves were deprived of almost all rights by law - as was the case on Southern plantations in the United States- while in other societies, their position was more akin to that of servants. For example, in the ancient Greek city-state of Athens, some slaves occupied positions of great responsibility. They were excluded from political positions and from the military, but were accepted in most other types of occupation. Some were literate and worked as government administrators; many were trained in craft skills. Even so, not all slaves could count on such good luck. For the less fortunate, their days began and ended in hard labour in the mines. Throughout history, slaves have often fought back against their subjection; the slave rebellions in the American South before the Civil War are one example. Because of such resistance, systems of slave labour have tended to be unstable. High productivity could only be achieved through constant supervision and brutal punishment. Slave-labour systems eventually broke down, partly because of the struggles they provoked and partly because economic or other incentives motivate people to produce more effectively than does direct compulsion. Slavery is simply not economiCally efficient. Moreover, from about the eighteenth century on, many people in Europe and America came to see slavery as morally wrong. Today, slavery is illegal in every country of the world, but it still exists in some places. Recent research has documented that people are taken by force and held against their wiU. From enslaved brickmakers in Pakistan to sex slaves in Thailand and domestic slaves in relatively wealthy countries like the UK and France, slavery remains a significant human rights violation in the world today and against many people's assumption, seems to be increasing rather than diminishing (Bales 1999). Caste A caste system is a social system in which one's social position is given for a lifetime. In caste societies, therefore, all individuals must remain at the social level oftheir birth The caste system in India is more than 2,000 years old,but as a form of social organization it has seen significant changes since independence in 1947. throughout life. Everyone's social status is based on personal characteristics - such as perceived race or ethnicity (often based on such physical characteristics as skin colour), parental religion or parental caste that are accidents of birth and are therefore believed to be unchangeable. A person is born into a caste and remains there for life. In a sense, caste societies can be seen as a special type of class society, in which class position is ascribed at birth (Sharma 1999). They have typically been found in agricultural societies that have not yet developed industrial capitalist economies, such as rural India orSouth Africa prior to the end of white rule in 1992. Prior to modern times, caste systems were found throughout the world. In Europe, for example, Jews were frequently treated as a separate caste, forced to live in restricted neighbourhoods and barred from intermarrying (and in some instances even interacting) with non-Jews. The term 'ghetto' is said to derive from the Venetian word for 'foundry', the site ofone ofEurope's first official Jewish ghettos, established by the government ofVenice in 1516. The term eventually came to refer to those sections of European towns where Jews were legally compelled to live, long before it was used to describe minority neighbourhoods in US cities, with their caste-like qualities ofracial and ethnic segregation. In caste systems, intimate contact with members ofother castes is strongly discouraged. Such 'purity' of a caste is often maintained by rules of endogamy, marriage within one's social group as required by custom or law. Caste in India and South Africa The few remaining caste systems in the world are being seriously chaJJenged by globalization. The Indian caste system, for .. Apartheid may be a thing of the past,but the wealth gap between white and black South Africans is still very apparent. These boys live in the rural and impoverished district of Lusikisiki, South Africa. example, reflects Hindu religious beliefs and is more than 2,000 years old, According to Hindu beliefs, there are four major castes, each roughly associated with broad occupational groupings, The four castes consist of the Brahmins (scholars and spiritual leaders) on top, followed by the Ksyarriyas (soldiers and rulers), the Vaisyas (farmers and merchants) and the Shudras (labourers and artisans), Beneath the four castes are those known as the 'untouchables' or Dalits ('oppressed people'), who - as their name suggests - are to be avoided at all costs. Untouchables are limited to the worst jobs in society, such as removing human waste, and they often resort to begging and searching in garbage for their food. In traditional areas of India, some members of higher castes still regard physical contact with untouchables to be so contaminating that a mere touch requires cleansing rituals. India made it illegal to discriminate on the basis of caste in 1949, but aspects ofthe system remain in full force today, particularly in rural areas. As India's modern capitalist economy brings people of different castes together, whether it is in the same workplace, aeroplane or restaurant, it is increasingly difficult to maintain the rigid barriers required to sustain the caste system. As more and more of India is influenced by globalization, it seems reasonable to J I , assume that its caste system will weaken still further. Before its abolition in 1992, the South African caste system, termed apartheid, rigidly separated black Africans, Indians, 'coloureds' (people of mixed races) and Asians from whites. In this case, caste was based entirely on race. Whites, who made up only 15 per cent of the total population, controlled virtually all the country's wealth, owned most ofthe usable land, ran the principal businesses and industries and had a monopoly on political power, since blacks lacked the right to vote. Blacks - who made up three-quarters of the population - were segregated into impoverished bantustans (,homelands') and were allowed out only to work for the white minority. Apartheid, widespread discrimination and oppression created intense conflict between the white minority and the black, mixed-race and Asian majority. Decades of often violent struggle against apartheid finally proved successful in the 1990s. The most powerful black organization, the African National Congress (ANC), mobilized an economically devastating global boycott of South African businesses, forcing South Africa's white leaders to dismantle apartheid, which was abolished by popular vote among South African whites in 1992. In 1994, in the country's first ever multiracial elections, the black majority won control of the government, and Nelson Mandela - the black leader of the ANC, who had spent 27 years imprisoned by the white government - was elected president. Estates Estates were part ofEuropean feudalism, but also existed in many other traditional civilizations. The feudal estates consisted of strata with differing obligations and rights towards each other, some of these differences being established in law. In Europe, the highest estate was composed of the aristocracy and gentry. The clergy formed another estate, having lower status but possessing various distinctive privileges. Those in what came to be called the 'third estate' were the commoners - serfs, free peasants, merchants and artisans. In contrast to castes, a certain degree of intermarriage and mobility was tolerated between the estates. Commoners might be knighted, for example, in payment for special services given to the monarch; merchants could sometimes purchase titles. A remnant of the system persists in Britain, where hereditary titles are still recognized (though since 1999 peers are no longer automatically entitled to vote in the House of Lords), and business leaders, civil servants and others may be honoured with a knighthood for their services. Estates have tended to develop in the past wherever there was a traditional aristocracy based on noble birth. In feudal systems, such as in medieval Europe, estates were closely bound up with the manorial community: they formed a local, rather than a national, system of stratification. In more centralized traditional empires, such as China or Japan, they were organized on a more national basis. Sometimes the differences between the estates were justified by religious beliefs, although rarely in as strict a way as in the Hindu caste system. Class Class systems differ in many respects from slavery, castes or estates. We can define a class as a large-scale grouping of people who share common economic resources, which strongly influence the type oflifestyle they are able to lead. Ownership of wealth and occupation, are the chief bases of class differences. Classes differ from earlier forms of stratification in four main respects: 1 Class systems are fluid. Unlike the other types of strata, classes are not established by legal or religious provisions. The boundaries between classes are never clear-cut. There are no formal restrictions on intermarriage between people from different classes. 2 Class positions are in some partachieved. An individual's class is not simply given at birth, as is the case in the other types of stratification systems. Social mobility - movement upward and downward in the class structure - is more common than in the other types. 3 Class is economically based. Classes depend on econom ic differences between groups of individuals inequalities in the possession of material resources. In the other types of stratification systems, non-economic factors (such as race in the former South African caste system) are generally most important. 4 Class systems are large-scale and impersonal. In the other types of stratification systems, inequalities are expressed primarily in personal relationships of duty or obligation - between slave and master or lower- and higher-caste individuals. Class systems, by contrast, operate mainly through large-scale, impersonal associations. For instance, one major basis of class differences is in inequalities of pay and working conditions. Will caste give way to class? There is some evidence that globalization may hasten the end of legally sanctioned caste systems throughout the world. Most official caste systems have already given way to class-based ones in industrial capitalist societies; South Africa, mentioned earlier, is the most prominent recent example (Berger 19861 . Modern indu strial production requires that people move about freely, work at whatever jobs they are suited or able to do, and change jobs frequently according to economic conditions. The rigid restrictions found in caste systems interfere with this necessary freedom. Furthermore, as the .wo rld increasingly becomes a single economic unit, caste-like relationships will become increasingly vulnerable to economic pressures. Nonetheless, elements of caste persist even in post-industrial societies. For example, some Asian immigrants to the West seek to arrange traditional marriagesfor their children along caste lines. The next section looks at sociological theories, which seek to explain the persistence of social stratification in human societies. Most sociologists who have addressed this question have been strongly influenced by the social class systems of the modern world and the discussion below reflects this. THINKING CRITICALLY What evidence is there from around the world that, in time, social class is likely to become the dominant form of stratification in all the countries of the world? Given what we know about other forms of stratification, on balance, would this be a positive or negative development? Theories of class and stratification The theories developed by Karl Marx and Max Weber form the basis of most sociological analyses of class and stratification. Scholars working in the Marxist tradition have further developed the ideas Marx himselfset out and others have tried to elaborate onWeber's concepts.We shall begin by examining the theories set forth by Marx andWeber before analysing the more recent neo-Marxist ideas of American sociologist, Erik Olin Wright. Chapter 1, 'What is Sociology?', contains an introduction to Marx and Weber's basic ideas and theoretical perspectives. Kar! Marx's theory of class conflict Most of Marx's works were concerned with stratification and, above all, with social class, yet surprisingly he failed to provide a systematic analysis of the concept of class. The manuscript Marx was working on at the time ofhis death (subsequently published as Classic Studies 11. I Karl Marx and the theory of class conflict The research problem Industrialization in Europe in the nineteenth century transformed societies,arguably, for the better. But it also led to protests and revolutionary movements.Why did workers oppose industrialization? Later, as industrial societies developed in the twentieth century, strikes and militant workers' activity continually occurred. Again, why have workers protested even as societies became more wealthy? Karl Marx (1818-83) spent most ofhis adult life investigating modern class-based societies in an attempt to understand how they worked, and his crucial argument was that industrial societies were rooted in capitalist economic relations. Marx was not just a detached academic observer though;he was also a key figure in communist political debates and an activist in workers' movements.For Marx,industrial capitalism, for all its progressive elements, was founded in an exploitative system of class relations that led to the oppression of the majority ofworking people. Marx's explanation For Marx, a social class is a group ofpeople who stand in a common relationship to the means ofproduction - the means by which they gain a livelihood. Before the rise of modern industry, the means of production consisted primarily of land and the instruments used to tend crops or pastoral animals. In pre-industrial societies, therefore,the two main classes consisted of those who owned the land (aristocrats, gentry or slave-holders) and those actively engaged in producing from it (serfs, slaves and free peasantry). In modern industrial societies, factories, offices, machinery and the wealth or capital needed to buy them have become more important. The two main classes consist ofthose who own these new means of production - industrialists or capitalists - and those who earn their living by selling their labour to them - the working class or, in the now somewhat archaic term Marx sometimes favoured, the proletariat. According to Marx, the relationship between classes is an exploitative one. In feudal societies, exploitation often took the form of the direct transfer ofproduce from the peasantry to the aristocracy, Serfs were compelled to give a certain proportion oftheir production to their aristocratic master,or had to work for a number of days each month in his fields to produce crops to be consumed by him and his retinue. In modern capitalist societies, the source of exploitation is less obvious, and Marx devoted much attention to trying to clarify its nature. In the course ofthe working day, Marx reasoned, workers produce more than is actually needed by employers to repay the cost ofhiring them. This surplus value is the source ofprofit,which capitalists are able to put to their own use. A group of workers in a clothing factory, say, might be able to produce 100 suits a day, Selling 75 per cent of the suits provides enough income for the manulacturer to pay the workers' wages and for the cost ofplant and equipment. Income from the sale of the remainder of the garments is taken as profit. Marx was struck by the inequalities created by the capitalist system. Although in earlier times aristocrats lived a life ofluxury, completely different from that ofthe peasantry, agrarian societies were relatively poor.Even if there had been no aristocracy, standards ofliving would inevitably have been meagre. With the development ofmodern industry, however, wealth is produced on a scale far beyond anything seen before,but workers have little access to the wealth that their labour creates. They remain relatively poor,while the wealth accumulated by the propertied class grows. Marx used the term pauperization to describe the process by which the working class grows increasingly impoverished in relation to the capitalist class.Even if workers become more affiuent in absolute terms, the gap separating them from the capitalist class continues to stretch ever wider. These inequalities between the capitalist and the working class were not strictly economic in nature.Marx noted how the development of modern factories and the mechanization of production means that work frequently becomes dull and oppressive in the extreme.The labour that is the source of our wealth is often both physically wearing and mentally tedious - as in the case of a factory hand whose job consists of routine tasks undertaken day in, day out, in an unchanging environment. Critical points Sociological debates on Marx's ideas have been more or less continuous for the past 150 years, and it is quite impossible to do justice to them here. Instead, we can point to several major themes in Marxist criticism. Firstly, Marx's characterization of capitalist society as splitting into 'two main camps' - owners and workers has been seen as too simple.Even within the working class, there are divisions between skilled and unskilled workers, which work to prevent a clear convergence ofclass interests. Such divisions have endured and become more complex,with gender and ethnicity also becoming factors leading to internal competition and conflicts.As a result,critics argue, concerted action by the whole of the working class is very irnlikely. Second, Marx's forecast of a communist revolution led by the industrial working class in the advanced societies has not materialized and this calls into question his analysis of the dynamics ofcapitalism.Some contemporary Marxists continue to see capitalism as a doomed system, which will collapse at some point in the future, but critics (some ofthem former Marxists) see little evidence ofthis.Indeed,the majority of the working class have become increasingly affluent property-owners with more of a stake in the capitalist system than ever. Finally, although Marx saw classconsciousness arising from the increasingly shared experiences of the working class, many critics of Marxism today have found that people identify less rather than more with their social class position.Instead, there are multiple sources ofpeople's social identities, and class identification is not the most important for many people. Without a developing classconsciousness,there can be no concerted class action and,hence, no conununist revolution. Again,critics see the long-ter.m social trends moving away from Marx's theoretical predictions. Contemporary significance Marx's influence on the world has been enormous,and even though his major predictions have not been proved correct,the analysis of capitalism that he pioneered continues to infor.m our understanding of globalization processes.Indeed, it can be argued that the widespread acknowledgement of rapid globalization in the social sciences may give fresh impetus to Marxist studies, particularly with the recent emergence of international anti-capitalist and anti-globalization movements. See chapter 22,'Politics, Government and Social Movements',for a discussion of antiglobalization movements. part of his major work, CapitaQ breaks off just at the point where he posed the question 'What constitutes a class?'. Marx's concept of class has thus to be reconstructed from the body of his writings as a whole. Since the various passages in which he discussed class are not always fully conSistent, there have been many disputes between scholars about 'what Marx really meant'. Nevertheless, his main ideas are fairly clear and are discussed in 'Classic Studies 11.1'. MaxWeber: class, status and party Weber's approach to stratification was built on the analysis developed by Marx, but he modified and elaborated on it. Like Marx, Weber regarded society as characterized by conflicts over power and resources. Yet where Marx saw polarized class relations and economic issues at the heart ofall social conflict, Weber developed a more complex, multidimensional view of society. Social stratification is not simply a matter of class, according to Weber, but is shaped by two further aspects: status and party. These three overlapping elements of stratification produce an enormous number of possible positions within society, rather than the more rigid bipolar model proposed by Marx. Although Weber accepted Marx's view that class is founded on objectively given economic conditions, he saw a greater variety of economic factors as important in class-formation than were recognized by Marx. According to Weber, class divisions derive not only from control or lack of control of the means of production, but from economic differences that have nothing directly to do with property. Such resources include especially the skills and credentials, or qualifications, which affect the types of work people are able to obtain. Weber argued that an individual's market position strongly influences his or her overall life chances. Those in managerial or professional occupations earn more and have more favourable conditions of work, for example, than people in blue-collar jobs. The qualifications they possess, such as degrees, diplomas and the skills they have acquired, make them more 'marketable' than others without such qualifications. At a lower level, among blue-collar workers, skilled craftsmen are able to secure higher wages than the semi- or unskilled. Status in Weber's theory refers to differences between social groups in the social honour or prestige they are accorded by others. In traditional societies, status was often determined on the basis of the firsthand knowledge ofa person gained through multiple interactions in different contexts over a period of years. Yet as societies grew more complex, it became impossible for status always to be accorded in this way. Instead, according to Weber, status came to be expressed through people's styles of life. Markers and symbols of status - such as housing, dress, manner ofspeech and occupation - all help to shape an individual's social standing in the eyes of others. People sharing the same status form a community in which there is a sense of shared identity. While Marx argued that status distinctions are the result of class divisions in society, Weber argued that status often varies independently ofclass divisions. Possession of wealth normally tends to confer high status, but there are many exceptions. The term 'genteel poverty' refers to one example. In Britain, for example, individuals from aristocratic families continue to enjoy considerable social esteem even when their fortunes have been lost. Conversely, 'new money' is often looked on with some scorn by the well-established wealthy. In modern societies, Weber pointed out, party formation is an important aspect of power, and can influence stratification independently of class and status. Party defines a group of individuals who work together because they have common backgrounds, aims or interests. Often a party works in an organized fashion towards a specific goal which is in the interest of the party membership. Marx tended to explain both status differences and party organization in terms of class. Neither, in fact, can be reduced to class divisions, Weber argued, even though each is influenced by them; both can in turn influence the economic circumstances of individuals and groups, thereby affecting class. Parties may appeal to concerns cutting across class differences; for example, parties may be based on religious affiliation or nationalist ideals. A Marxist might attempt to explain the conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland in class terms, since more Catholics than Protestants are in working-class jobs. A follower ofWeber would argue that such an explanation is ineffective, because many Protestants are also from working-class backgrounds. The parties to which people are affiliated express religious as well as class differences. Weber's writings on stratification are important, because they show that other dimensions of stratification besides class strongly influence people's lives.While Marx saw social class as the key social division, Weber drew attention to the complex interplay of class, status and party as separate aspects of social stratification creating a more flexible basis for empirical analyses of stratification. Erik Olin Wright's theory of class The American sociologist Erik Olin Wright has developed an influential theory of class which combines aspects of both Marx's and Weber's approaches (Wright 1978, 1985, 1997). According to Wright, there are three dimensions of control over economic resources in modern capitalist production, and these allow us to identify the major classes that exist: • control over investments or money capi- tal; • control over the physical means of production (land or factories and offices); • control over labour power. Those who belong to the capitalist class have control over each of these dimensions in the production system. Members of the working class have control over none of them. In between these two main classes, however, are the groups whose position is more ambiguous - the managers and white-collar workers mentioned above. These people are in what Wright calls contradictory class locations, because they are able to influence some aspects of production, but are denied control over others. White-collar and professional employees, for example, have to contract their labour power to employers in order to make a living in the same way as manual workers do. But at the same time they have a greater degree of control over the work setting than most people in blue-collar jobs.Wright terms the class position ofsuch workers 'contradictory', because they are neither capitalists nor manual workers, yet they share certain common features with each. Alarge segment of the population - 85 to 90 per cent, according to Wright (1997) falls into the category of those who are forced to sell their labour because they do not control the means of production. Yet within this population there is a great deal of diversity, ranging from the traditional manual working class to white-collar workers. In order to differentiate class locations within this large popUlation, Wright takes two factors into account: the relationship to authority and the possession of skills or expertise. First, Wright argues that many middle-class workers, such as managers and supervisors, enjoy relationships towards authority that are more privileged than those of the working class. Such individuals are called on by capitalists to assist in controlling the working class - for example, by monitoring an employee's work or by conducting personnel reviews and evaluations - and are rewarded for their 'loyalty' by earning higher wages and receiving regular promotions. Yet, at the same time, these individuals remain under the control of the capitalist owners. In other words, they are both exploiters and exploited. The second factor which differentiates class locations within the middle classes is the possession of skills and expertise. According to Wright, middle-class employees possessing skills which are in demand in the labour market are able to exercise a specific form of power in the capitalist system. Given that their expertise is in short supply, they are able to earn a higher wage. The lucrative positions available to information technology specialists in the emerging knowledge economy illustrate this point. Moreover, Wright argues, because employees with knowledge and skills are more difficult to monitor and control, employers are obliged to secure their loyalty and cooperation by rewarding them accordingly. THINKING CRITICALLY Are Marx andWeber's theories of class at odds with each other or complementary? Explain your answer fully. What does Wright's introduction of the idea of 'contradictory class locations'add to our understanding of class relationships? Measuring class Both theoretical and empirical studies have investigated the link between class standing and other dimensions of social life, such as voting patterns, educational attainment and physical health. Yet, as we have seen, the concept of class is far fro m clear-cut. Both in academic circles and in common usage, the term 'class' is understood and used in a wide variety of ways. How, then, can sociologists and researchers measure such an imprecise concept for the purpose of empirical studies? When an abstract concept such as class is transformed into a measurable variable in a study, we say that the concept has been operationalized. This means that it has been defined clearly and concretely enough to be tested through empirical research. Sociologists have operationalized class through a variety of schemes which attempt to map the class structure of society. Suc h schemes provide a theoretical framework by which individuals are allocated to social class categories. A common feature of most class schemes is that they are based on the occupational structure. Sociologists have seen class divisions as corresponding generally with material and social inequalities that are linked to types of employment. The development of capitalism and industrialism has been marked by a growing division of labour and an increasingly complicated occupational structure. Although no longer as true as it once was, occupation is one of the most crit· ical factors in an individual's social standing, life chances and level of material comfort. Stratification and Social Class Social scientists have used occupation extensively as an indicator of social class because of the finding that individuals in the same occupation tend to experience similar degrees ofsocial advantage or disadvantage, maintain comparable lifestyles, and share similar opportunities in life. Class schemes based on the occupational structure take a number of different forms. Some schemes are largely descriptive in nature - they reflect the shape of the occupational and class structure in society without addressing the relations between social classes. Such models have been favoured by scholars who see stratification as unproblematic and part of the natural social order, such as those working in the functionalist tradition. Functionalism was introduced in chapter 1, 'What is Sociology?', and chapter 3, 'Theories and Perspectives in Sociology'. Other schemes are more theoretically informed - often drawing on the ideas of Marx or Weber - and concern themselves with explaining the relations between classes in society. 'Relational' class schemes tend to be favoured by sociologists working within conflict paradigms in order to demonstrate the divisions and tensions within society. Erik Olin Wright's theory of class, discussed above, is an example of a relational class scheme, because it seeks to depict the processes of class exploitation from a Marxist perspective. John Goldthorpe's influential work is an example of a relational scheme originally rooted in Weberian ideas of class (see 'Classic Studies 11.2'). Evaluating Goldthorpe's class scheme As 'Classic Studies 11.2' notes, Goldthorpe's class scheme has been used widely in empirical research. It has been useful in highlighting class-based ineqUalities, such as those related to health and education, as well as reflecting class-based dimensions in 444 STRATIFICATI ON AND SO CIAL CLASS Classic Studies 11.2 John H. Goldthorpe on social class and occupations The research problem What is the connection between the jobs we do our occupations - and our social class position? Is class simply the same thing as occupation? Do we then move between classes when we move occupations? Ifwe retrain, move into higher education or become unemployed, does our class position change as well? As sociologists, how can we best carry out research into social class? Some sociologists have been dissatisfied with descriptive class schemes, claiming that they merely reflect social and material inequalities between classes rather than seeking to explain the class processes which give birth to them. With such concerns in mind, British sociologist John Goldthorpe created a scheme for use in empirical research on social mobility The Goldthorpe class scheme was designed not as a hierarchy but as a representation of the 'relational' nature ofthe contemporary class structill8. Goldthorpe's explanation Goldthorpe's ideas have been highly influential. Although he now underplays any explicit theoretical influence on his scheme (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1993),other sociologists have often pointed to the Goldthorpe classification as an example of a neo-Weberian class scheme. This is because Goldthorpe's original scheme identified class locations on the basis of two main factors:market situation and work situation. An individual's market situation concerns his or her level ofpay job security and prospects for advancement; it emphasizes material rewards and general life chances.The work situation, by contrast, focuses on questions of control, power and authority within the occupation.An individual's work situation is concerned with the degree of autonomy in the workplace and the overall relations of control alfecting an employee. Goldthorpe devised his scheme by evaluating occupations on the basis of their relative market and work situations. In the 1980s and '90s, Goldthorpe's comparative research encompassed a project on social mobility known as the CASMIN project (Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial Societies).The results of this project are significant, as the resulting classification was incorporated into the UK Office of National Statistics' own SocioEconomic Classification (ONS-SEC) and is intended to be the basis for a European-wide scheme (Crompton 2008).The Goldthorpe/CASMIN and UK ONS-SEC schemes are shown in table 11.1, alongside the more conunorily used sociological terms (on the right-hand side). Originally encompassing eleven class locations, reduced to eight in the CASMIN research, Goldthorpe's scheme remains more detailed than many others.Yet in conunon usage, class locations are still compressed into just three main class strata: a 'serviceI class (classes I and 11),an 'intermediate class' (classes 1!I and IV) and a 'working class' (classesv,VI andVII). Goldthorpe also acknowledges the presence of an elite class ofproperty-holders at the very top ofthe scheme, but argues that it is such a small segment of society that it is not meaningfiil as a category in empirical studies. In his more recent writings,Goldthorpe (2000) has emphasized employment relations within his scheme, rather than the notion of 'work situation' described above.By doing this, he draws attention to different types of employment contract. A labour contract supposes an exchange of wages and effort which is specifically defined and delimited,while a service contract has a 'prospective' element. such as the possibility of salary growth or promotion. According to Goldthorpe, the working class is characterized by labour contracts and the service class by service contracts; the intermediate class locations experience intermediate types of employment relations. Critical points An extended evaluation of Goldthorpe's work follows, but here we can note two major criticisms.Although his scheme is clearly a useful one for empirical researchers, it is not so clear that it can tell us much about the position of those social groups, such as students, that fall outside social class boundaries. It has also come under fire for underplaying the significance of the gross disparities in wealth within capitalist societies. In a sense, such criticisms are a reflection ofthe long~standing debate between Marxist and Weberian scholars on social class and its importance. Contemporary Significance Goldthorpe's work has been at the centre of debates on social class and occupations for some time. In spite of some highly pertinent criticisms, his class scheme has been constantly updated and refined, whtle remaining within the broadly Weberian tradition of sociology With the latest version about to become the standard class scheme across the European Union, it would seem that Goldthorpe's ideas are likely to become more rather than less influential in the future. Table 11.1 Goldthorpe/CASMIN and UK ONS-SEC social class schem es alongside more commonly used sociological categories. Goldthorpe/CASMIN NatIonal Statistics Socio- Common schema Economic ClassificatlOn descnptlve term Professional, administrative Higher managenal and Salariat (or serVlce and managerial employees, professional occupatIons class) lugher grade II Professional, administrative 2 Lower managerial and and managerial employees. professional occupations lower grade; teclmicians, lugher grade IlIa Routine non-manual 3 Intermediate occupations Intermediate white employees, lugher grade collar N Small employers and 4 Employers in small Independents (or self-employed workers organizations, own account petty bourgeoisie) workers V Supervisors of manual 5 Lower supervisory and Intermediate workers: technicians, lower technical blue~collar lower grade occupations VI Skilled manual workers 6 Semi-routine occupations Worklng class IIIb Routine non-manual 7 Routine occupations workers, IOVler grade VII Serni~ and unskilled manual workers Source.' Goldlhorpe and McKrught 2004, ID Nunn et al 2007 From Morgan et al MobJ1lty .0:= a. . ~ e 13 =-o.",e 16- Q)Q) E u enQ)~ 14et! .~ Q) wmS .-- ~ -£ .".:::: 12 - Q) "0 '" > ~ ~~g 10 :~ '0 ~ 8u e 0 '" e-Oe '" "0 '" 6E 0 u Q) .c >= ~1? 4 0",_ 0.:2 Q) 2 " 0 '"o.c "~ Q) '" 0en", u . - - . - I I I I .c " Q) 00.0 ",.c Q)Directly Activities money-related Clothes Related to the home Food Consumer durables (; 0 "Figure 12_3 Essential items most commonly lacking, by category Source: Monitoring Poverty and Social Exclusion 2006 by Guy Palmer,Tom Maclnnes and Peter Kenway,published in 2006 by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation.Reproduced by permission of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation Two pairs of all-weather shoes for each child h I o Middle fifth Hobby or leisure activity Friends/family round for drink or meal at least once a month Household contents insurance Money to keep your home in a decent state of decoration Replace or repair broken electrical goods Money to spend each week on yourself, not on your family Replace any worn out furniture Holidays away from home one week a year Make savings of £10 a month or more r------, f---. o 10 20 • Poorest fifth I J I I 30 40 50 60 Proportion 01 households who do not have the item/activity because they cannot afford it (per cent) Figure 12,4 Percentage of UK households which cannot afford selected 'essential items', by average and low-income household Source: Family Resources Survey 2004/05, Department for Work and Pensions,UK. THINIUNG CRITICALLY When society as a whole was becoming wealthier, why did poverty levels increase amongst some groups rather than decrease? Does the concept of 'relative poverty' accurately capture the real-life experiences of people living with disadvantage and deprivation? Can the experience of poverty in the relatively wealthy countries be directly compared with that in the developing world? Who are the poor? The face of poverty is diverse and ever changing, so it is difficult to present a profile of'the poor'. What we do know is that people in some social groups are more likely to be poor than others, including children, older people, women and ethnic minorities. In particular, people who are disadvantaged or discriminated against in other aspects oflife have an increased chance ofbeing poor. For example, recent migrants from outside the European Union face higher poverty rates than indigenous European populations. In Belgium, more than half of non-EU citizens live in poverty, as do 45 per cent of those in France and Luxembourg. Not only are migrants more at risk of poverty, but they also face a higher risk of being exploited at work (Lelkes 2007). Although this section focuses primarily on the UK, these patterns are repeated to varying degrees across the developed societies of the world. Poverty and inequality in the developing societies is discussed in more detail in chapter 13, 'Global Inequality'. Children The proportion of children in the UK living in households with an income below 60 per cent of the national average more than doubled between 1979 and 199617, from 14 to 34 per cent, but after 1998 this figure fell to stand at around 27 per cent in 2004 /5 (Department for Work and Pensions 2006). Poverty, Social Exclusion and Welfare In a variety of ways, children who live in poverty tend to have worse health than those who do not. They are more likely to have a low birth weight, to be injured (and killed) in a road accident (because they are more likely to be pedestrians and less likely to have access to a safe play area or garden), to suffer abuse and self-harm or to attempt suicide. Poorer children are also less likely to do well at school and are far more likely to become poor adults (Lister 2004). As we will see later in the chapter, child poverty is proving to be much more resistant to the social policies of successive governments, with the latest forecasts strongly suggesting that the UK government has missed its own short-term target and is likely to miss the long-term one as well. Women As we see at several points throughout this chapter, women are more likely to be poor than men, although their poverty has often been masked behind studies that focused on 'male-headed households' (Ruspini 2000). The PSE survey carried out by Gordon and his colleagues (2000) found that women comprised 58 per cent of those adults living in poverty. The causes of women's poverty are complex. One important element concerns the gendered division of labour both inside and outside the home. The burden of domestic labour and the responsibility of caring for children and relatives still fall disproportionately on women. This has an important effect on their ambitions and ability to work outside the home. It means that they are far more likely than men to be in part-time, rather than fulltime, paid employment and they earn less as a result. Although more women are entering paid work in the UK than ever before, occupational segregation between 'a man's job' and 'women's work' in the labour force remains entrenched. Women are disproportionately represented in less well-paid industries, which has a negative effect on income from private pensions later in life (Flaherty et al. 2004). POVERTY, SOCIAL EXCLUSIO N AND WELFARE % 90~==========~--------------------------------1 80 70 ~~~~~~----------------~~--~ 60 +--------------------------------------4 50 +-----------------------------,-~-----4 40 +---------------------------~ 30 +-----------1 20 "---r-----c 10 o+-'--- White Indian Black- Caribbean Black- African Pakistani Bangladeshi Figure 12_5 Proportion of each group in UK households below 60 per cent median income,after deducting housing costs Source: From Poverty Among Ethnic Groups: How and Why Does it Differ? by Guy Palmer and Peter Kenway published in 2007 by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Reproduced by permission of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Ethnic minorities Members of ethnic minority groups are also disproportionately represented among the poor. Pakistani and Bangladeshi people, in particular, are far more likely to have an income of less than 60 per cent of the average than individuals of other ethnicities, though income poverty has fallen across all ethnic groups at roughly the same rate over recent years (see figure 12.5). Part of the reason for such ethnic differences in income poverty levels can be found in the high unemployment and low employment rates for all ethnic minorities in the UK. Employment rates differ substantially across ethnic minority groups. In 2006, Indian and Black Caribbean groups have relatively high employment rates of 70.2 and 67.8 per cent respectively, whil e Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups have the lowest employment rates among ethnic minorities; 44.2 and 40.2 per cent respectively. In the same year, the unemployment rate for African and Pakistani/Bangladeshi people, for example, was 11.2 per cent compared to an overall rate of 5.2 per cent, and ethnic minorities are still twice as likely to be unemployed as white people (Ethnic Minority Employment Taskforce 2006). There is also a high degree oflabour market segregation. Pakistani groups are heavily concentrated in the former heavy manufacturing and textile industry areas, such as Yorkshire and Birmingham - industries that fell into recession in the late 1970s and 1980s.BlackCaribbean men are over-represented in manual occupations, particularly within the transport and communications industries. Chinese and Bangladeshis are particularly concentrated in the catering industry. There is some evidence to show that some occupational segregation has occurred because ethnic minorities perceive certain industries or employers as 'white', whereas some employers see ethnic minorities as 'outside their recruitment pool' (Performance and Innovation Unit 2002). Ethnic minorities in the UK are also more likely to have poorly paid jobs, struggle at school, live in deprived areas and in poor quality housing and to suffer health problems (Salway et at. 2007). WHO SAYS ETHNIC MINORITIES CAN'T GET JOBS? THERE ARE OPENINGS EVERYWHERE. lavatory att.ndant. Offic, cl.anlf. Som.body ha. to do at! the tow-paid, m.niel Job•• but why i, it 10 ott.n p.o~t. trom . thnic minoriti.,'! Pr'Judice, racial discrimination and hgrG'l,m.nt art d'oying p,opl. tht choic. at job th.y d...,v•. It'. unjust an" unfai,. Mort than that. ii'. a t.rribl. wart. 01 Briti'h tat.nt. '..."" iMo ..........,!...:.. " .." 1IoI ~·. ...._ ..'I"_......,... ht. 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Ethnic minority people are amongst the poorest inWestern societies,often as a result ofhigh unemployment. Older people Many people who may have been reasonably well paid during their working lives experience a sharp reduction in income (and status) when they retire, especially if they did not, or could not afford to, invest in a private pension while working. The ageing of the population is putting increasing strain on state pension provision. As life expectancy increases, so too does the number of older people in the population. Between 1961 and 2005, the proportion ofpeople in the UKaged 65 and over more than doubled, to make up 16 per cent of the total population. At the age of65, men can now expect to live, on average, to 81.6 years and women to 84.4 years, the highest ever levels (Palmer et al. 2007). In recent years, several studies have shown that poverty amongst pensioners has Global life expectancy is discussed in more detail in chapter 8, 'The Life-Course'. been reducing since 1997. Based on the HBAI measure of 'households below 60 per cent ofaverage income', individual pensioners in poverty decreased from 29.1 per cent (2.9 million) in 1997- 8 to 17 per cent (1.8 million) in 2005-6 (Brewer et al. 2007). The number ofpensioners on a low income does tend to increase with age, though there are divisions within pensioner groups. For example, those with additional private pension provision are less likely to experience poverty and there is a clear gender dimension to this: only 30 per cent of women have an additional private pension, compared to more than 70 per cent of men (Wicks 2004). In recent decades, older POVERTY, SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND WELFARE women and those from ethnic minorities are more likely to experience poverty than other pensioner groups. Explaining poverty Explanations of poverty can be grouped under two main headings: theories that see poor individuals as responsible for their own poverty, and theories that view poverty as produced and reproduced by structural forces in society. These competing approaches are sometimes described as 'blame the victim' and 'blame the system' theories, respectively. We will briefly examine each in turn. There is a long history ofattitudes that hold the poor as responsible for their own disadvantaged positions. Early efforts to address the effects ofpoverty, such as the poorhouses ofthe nineteenth century, were grounded in a belief that poverty was the result of an inadequacy or pathology of individuals. The poor were seen as those who were unable- because of a lack ofskills, moral or physical weakness, absence of motivation, or below average ability- to succeed in society. Social standing was taken as a reflection of a person's talent and effort; those who deserved to succeed did so, while others less capable were doomed to fail. The existence of 'winners' and 'losers' was regarded as a fact oflife. As we see in our discussion of the rise of the welfare state below, accounts of poverty that explain it as primarily an individual failing lost popularity during the midtwentieth century. Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, they then enjoyed a renaissance, as the political emphasis on entrepreneurship and individual ambition rewarded those who 'succeeded' in society, and held those who did not responsible for the circumstances in which they found themselves. Often, explanations for poverty were sought in the lifestyles ofpoor people, along with the attitudes and outlooks they supposed ly espoused. One influential version of this thesis was put forward by the American sociologist Charles Murray. Murray (1984) argues that there is an underclass of individual who must take personal responsibility for their poverty. This group forms part ofa dependency culture. By this term, Murray refers to poor people who rely on government welfare provision rather than entering the labour market. He argues that the growth of the welfare state has created a subculture that undermines personal ambition and the capacity for selfhelp. Rather than looking to the future and striving to achieve a better life, the welfare dependent are content to accept handouts. Welfare, Murray argues, has eroded people's incentive to work. He makes a contrast between those individuals who must take personal responsibility for their poverty and those who are poor through 'no fault oftheir own' - such as widows, orphans or people who are disabled, for example. Murray's work is examined in more detail in chapter 11 ,'Stratification and Social Class'. Murray's views may resonate among sections of the British population. Many people regard the poor as responsible for their own problems and are suspicious of those who live on 'government hand-outs'. Yetthese views are out of line with the reality of poverty for many people. As we have seen, the very oldest and youngest people are often the poorest in society, and are not in a position to work. Many people receiving financial help from the government, such as those receiving tax credits in the UK, are actuallyin work but not earning enough to bring them over the poverty threshold. Ofthe remainder, the majority are children under the age of 14, those aged 65 and over, and the ill or disabled. In spite of popular views about the high level of welfare cheating, fewer than 1 per cent of welfare applications involve fraudulent claims - much lower than is the case for income tax returns, where it is estimated that more than 10 percentoftax is lost through misreporting or evasion. The second approach to explaining poverty emphasizes larger social processes The continuing decline of manufacturing industries in the 1970s and '80s eliminated many wellpaid jobs, restructuring the urban economy and thus leading to increases in poverty levels. which produce conditions ofpoverty that are difficult for individuals to overcome. According to such a view, structural forces within society - factors like class, gender, ethnicity, occupational position, educational attainment and so forth - shape the way in which resources are disttibuted. Writers who advocate structural explanations for poverty argue that the lack of ambition among the poor, which is often taken for the 'dependency culture', is in fact a consequence of their constrained situations, not a cause of it. An early exponent of this type of argument was R H. Tawney (1964 [1931]), who saw poverty as an aspect ofsocial inequality. For Tawney, social inequality led to extremes of both wealth and poverty and both were dehumanizing. Extreme poverty limited life to mere subsistence, while extreme wealth led to a pampering of the rich. Both were reprehensible, butthe key to tackling poverty was therefore to reduce structural social inequality, not simply to blame individuals for their situation (Hickson 2004). Reducing poverty is not simply a matter of changing individual outlooks, but requires policy measures aimed at distributing income and resources more equally throughout society. Childcare subsidies, a minimum hourly wage and guaranteed income levels for families are examples of policy measures that have sought to redress persistent social inequalities. Two research studies from the mid-1990s reached similar conclusions on the reasons for contemporary poverty levels, and both use what we can call an 'economic restructuring' hypothesis. In America, sociologist William )ulius Wilson put forward one important version in his book W7zen Work Disappears: The World a/theNew Urban Poor (1996), and in Britain, Will Hutton's The State We're In (1995), described the emergence of a 'thirty, thirty, forty' society (see below) Wilson argued that persistent urban poverty stems primarily from the POVERTY, SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND WELFARE structural transformation of the inner-city economy. The decline of manufacturing industries, the 'suburbanization' ofemployment and the rise of a low-wage service sector dramatically reduced the number of jobs available to those immediately leaving education that pay wages sufficient to support a family. The high rate of joblessness resulting from economic shifts has led to a shrinking pool of 'marriageable' men those financially able to support a family. Thus, marriage has become less attractive to poor women, the number of children born out of wedlock has increased and femaleheaded families have proliferated. New generations of children are born into poverty, and the vicious cycle is perpetuated. Wilson argues that black Americans suffer disproportionately because of past discrimination and because they are concentrated in locations and occupations particularly affected by economic restructuring. He argued that these economic changes were accompanied by an increase in the spatial concentration of poverty within black neighbourhoods in the USA. In Will Hutton's analysis of the UK, similar processes of economic restructuring during the 1970s and '80s created new divides within the population. Around 30 per cent were disadvantaged. That is, theywere either out of work (but seeking employment), in irregular part-time and short-term jobs, or 'economically inactive' for other reasons, such as those we discussed above in relation to single parents. The disadvantaged groups live in poverty on the margins of society. Another 30 per cent, the margina/ized insecure, had jobs and regular work, but because of economic restructuring, which weakened the trade unions and led to many more fixed-term contracts, their income levels were low and the jobs were relatively insecure. This group includes many women in generally poorly paid, part-time jobs (McGivney 2000).Finally, around 40 per cent - the privileged - are in full-time employment or are self-employed. The majority of this group are not rich, but their employment is more secure and their income tends to be higher; compared to the other two groups, therefore, they are relatively advantaged. Like Wilson in the USA, Hutton suggests that it is much harder for those in the disadvantaged and marginalized insecure groups to hold a marriage together, as parenting becomes more stressful and people have to work long hours in several jobs to earn a living wage. Hutton concludes that economic restructuring and the loss of industrial workplaces and well-paid jobs has served to produce a more divided society and perceptions that 'nothing can be done' to redress the issue of poverty. For both Wilson and Hutton, poverty cannot be explained by reference to individual motivations and personal attitudes. Instead, poverty levels have to be explained with reference to structural changes in society and these do not happen in isolation from developments within the global economy. Evaluation Both explanations of poverty, as outlined above,have enjoyed broad support, and variations of each view are consistently encountered in public debates about poverty. Critics ofthe culture ofpoverty view accuse its advocates of 'individualizing' poverty and blaming the poor for circumstances largely beyond their control. They see the poor as victims, not as freeloaders who are abusing the system. Yet we should be cautious about accepting uncritically the arguments of those who see the causes of poverty as lying exclusively in the structure of society itself. Such an approach implies that the poor simply passively accept the difficult situations in which they find themselves. This is far from the truth, as we shall see below. Poverty and social mobility Most research into poverty in the past has focused on people's entry into poverty and has measured aggregate levels of poverty year by year. Less attention has traditionally been paid to the 'life-cycle' of poverty - people's trajectories out of (and often back into) poverty overtime. Awidely held view of poverty is that it is a permanent condition. Yet being poor does not necessarily mean being mired in poverty. Asubstantial proportion of people in poverty at anyone time have either enjoyed superior conditions of life previously or can be expected to climb out of poverty at some time in the future. Recent research has revealed a significant amount of mobility into and out of poverty: a surprising number of people are successful in escaping poverty, and at the same time a larger number than previously realized live in poverty at some point during their lives. Statistical findings from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) in the decade of the 1990s, showed that just over half of the individuals who were in the bottom fifth (quintile) by income in 1991 were in the same category in 1996.This does not necessarily mean that these people remained consistently in the same position over the five-year period, however. While some of them may have done so, others are likely to have risen out ofthe bottom quintile and returned to it again during that time. In fact, the BHPS longitudinal panel study, which tracks 16,000 individuals across 9,000 households over a long period, has shown significant social mobility. For example, it shows that relatively large proportions of children experience poverty, but most for quite short periods. However, many families that move out of poverty also have a higher risk of re-entering the category later, during periods of economic change. These findings have led to a new understanding of the quite fluid patterns of poverty, which have also been found in other developed societies (Leisering and Leibfried 1999). Using data from the UK's New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset and other sources, Abigail McKnight (2000) analysed trends in earnings mobility in Britain between 1977 and 1997. By tracking groups of low-paid workers, McKnight found a significant amount of persistence in low pay. Her Poverty, Social Exclusion andWelfare 497 survey showed that around a fifth of employees in the lowest earnings quartile (quarter) are still there six years later. She also found that people who are unemplayed, who are amongst the poorest group in Britain, are most likely to gain employment in the lowest-paid sections when they do find work; and that low-paid employees are more likelyto go on to experienceunemployment than are higher-paid employees. Scholars have stressed that we should interpret such findings carefully, as they can easily be used by those who wish to scale back on welfare provisions or avoid categorizing poverty as a political and social issue altogether. John Hills (1998) at the Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion has cautioned against accepting a 'lottery model' view of income determination. By this he means that we should be sceptical of arguments which present poverty as a 'one-off' outcome that is experienced by people more or less randomly as they move through the income hierarchy. This view suggests that the inequalities between the wealthy and poor in society are not terribly critical; everyone has a chance of being a winner or a loser at some point, so the idea of poverty is no longer a cause for serious concern. Some unlucky individuals may end up having low incomes for several years in a row, the argument goes, but, essentially, low income is a random phenomenon. As Hills points out, the BHPS does reveal a fair amount of short-range mobility on the part of those living in poverty. For example, among individuals in the poorest decile (tenth), 46 per cent were still there the following year. This suggests that more than halfof those in the lowest decile managed to escape from poverty. Yet a closer look shows that 67 per cent of the individuals remain within the bottom two deciles; only onethird progress further than this. Among the bottom fifth ofthe population by income, 65 per cent were still in the same position a year later; meanwhile, 85 per cent remained in the bottom two-fifths. Such findings suggest that about one-third of low income 498 POVERTY, SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND WE LFARE is 'transient' in nature, while the other twothirds are not. According to Hills, it is misleading to think that over time the population gradually 'mingles' throughout the income deciles. Rather, many of those who move out of poverty do not advance far, and eventually drift back in again; the 'escape rates' for those who remain at the bottom for more than a year get progressively lower. While climbing out of poverty is surely fraught with challenges and obstacles, research findings indicate that movement into and out of poverty is more fluid than is often thought. Poverty is not simply the result of social forces acting on a passive population. Even individuals in severely disadvantaged positions can seize on opportunities to better their positions; the power of human agency to bring about change should not be underestimated. Social policy can play an important role in maximizing the action potential of disadvantaged individuals and communities. In our discussion of welfare later in this chapter, we will draw attention to policy measures designed to relieve poverty by strengthening the labour market, education and training opportunities, and social cohesion. Social mobility is discussed more fully in chapter 11, 'Stratification and Social Class', and chapter 19,'Education'. Social exclusion What is social exclusion? The idea of social exclusion has been used by politicians in various ways to frame their own social welfare policies. Because of this, the concept has become rather diluted over recent years and its meaning less clear. However, the notion was first introduced by sociologists to refer to new sources of inequality and the concept continues to inform much applied social research, which aims to understand and tackle disadvantage and ineqUality. Social exclusion refers to ways in which individuals may become cut off from full involvement in the wider society. For instance, people who live in a dilapidated housing estate, with poor schools and few employment opportunities in the area, may effectivelybe denied the opportunities for self-betterment that most people in society have. The concept of social exclusion implies its opposite - social inclusionand attempts to foster inclusion of marginalized groups have now become part of the agenda of modern politics, though how this is done differs across societies (Lister 2004). Social exclusion raises the question of personal responsibility. After all, the word 'exclusion' implies that someone or something is being left out. Certainly, there are instances in which individuals are excluded as a result of decisions that lie outside their own control. Banks might refuse to grant a current account or a credit card to individuals living in a certain postcode area; insurance companies might reject an application for a policy on the basis of an applicant's personal history and background; an employee made redundant later in life may be refused further jobs on the basis of his or her age. But social exclusion is not only the result of people being excluded; it can also result from people excluding themselves from aspects of mainstream society. Individuals can choose to drop out ofeducation, to turn down a job opportunity and become economically inactive, or to abstain from voting in political elections. In considering the phenomenon of social exclusion, we must once again be conscious of the interaction between human agency and responsibility, on the one hand, and the role of social forces in shaping people's circumstances on the other. A useful way of thinking about social exclusion is to differentiate between 'weak' and 'strong' versions of the concept (VeitWilson 1998). Weak versions of social exclusion see the central issue simply as one of trying to ensure the inclusion of those who are currently socially excluded. Strong versions also seek social inclusion, but, in addition, try to tackle some ofthe processes through which relatively powerful social groups 'can exercise their capacity to exclude' (Macrae et al. 2003: 90). This is a significant distinction as the version adopted by governments will shape their policies towards social exclusion. For example, in debates on rising levels of school exclusions for bad behaviour, a weak approach would focus on how individual children can be brought back into the mainstream education system, while a strong approach would also look at potential problems of the education system itself and the role of powerful groups within it that have the capacity to exclude. Social exclusion, then, is a broader concept than poverty, though it does encompass it. It focuses attention on a broad range of factors that prevent individuals or groups from having the same opportunities that are open to the majority of the population. Ruth Lister (2004) concludes that the broad concept of social exclusion is a useful one for social scientists, provided that it is not seen as an alternative to the concept of poverty, which, she contends, remains central to our understanding of inequality and disadvantage. The 2000 PSE survey distinguished four dimensions to social exclusion: poverty or exclusion from adequate income or resources (which we have discussed above), labour market exclusion, service exclusion and exclusion from social relations (Gordon et al. 2000). Next, we look at these last three elements in relation to evidence from the UK, although the patterns identified here are, to varying degrees, repeated in other industrialized countries. Labour market exclusion For the individual, work is important not just because it provides an adequate income, but also because involvement in the labour market is an important arena for social interaction. Thus, labour market exclusion can lead to the other forms of social exclusion - poverty, service exclusion and exclusion from social relations. ConsePoverty, Social Exclusion and Welfare 499 quently, increasing the number of people in paid work has been seen by politicians who are concerned about the issue as an important way to reduce social exclusion. To be in a 'jobless household', however, should not necessarily be associated with unemployment.The 2000 PSE survey found that 43 per cent of adults (50 per cent of women and 37 per cent of men) are not in paid work. By far the largest group of those who are not active in the labour market are retired (24 per cent of all adults). Other groups who are inactive in the labour market include people involved in domestic and caring activities, those unable to work, perhaps because of disability, and students. Overall, we should be cautious about claiming that labour market inactivity is a sign of socialexclusion in itself, because ofthe high proportion of the population that this involves, but we can say that exclusion from the labour market significantly increases the risk ofsocial exclusion. Service exclusion An important aspect of social exclusion is lack of access to basic services, whether these are in the home (such as power and water supplies) or outside it (for example, access to transport, shops or financial services). Service exclusion can involve individual exclusion (when an individual cannot use a service because he or she cannot afford to do so) or collective exclusion (when a service is unavailable to the community). The PSE survey found that almost a quarter of people are excluded from two or more basic services and only just over 50 per cent of people had access to the full range of publicly and privately provided services. Table 12.6 shows the levels of collective and individual exclusion from each of the various services. Exclusion from social relations There are many ways in which people can be excluded from social relations. First, this type of exclusion can mean that individuals are unable to participate in common social 500 POVERTY, SOCIAL EXC LUSION AND WELFARE Table 12.6 Public and private services used by respondents (%) Collective exclusion Individual exclusion Use: Use: Don't use: Don't use: Don't use: adequate inadequate unavailable can't afford don't want or lU1suitable or not relevant PublJc serVIces Libraries 55 6 3 0 36 Public sports facilities 39 7 5 48 Museums and galleries 29 4 13 I 52 Evening classes 17 2 5 3 73 Apublic or community village hail 31 3 9 0 56 Ahospital with accident! emergency urut 75 13 2 0 10 Doctor 92 6 0 0 2 Dentist 83 5 0 II Optician 78 3 1 17 Post office 93 4 0 0 2 Private serVices Places ofworship 30 2 0 66 Bus services 38 15 6 0 41 Train or tube station 37 10 10 41 Petrol stations 75 2 2 21 Chemist 93 3 0 3 Corner shop 73 7 8 0 12 Mediumllarge supermarket 92 4 2 0 2 Banks or building societies 87 7 I 0 4 Pub 53 4 2 2 37 Cinema or theatre 45 6 10 5 33 Source fu>m Poverty and SOCial ExclusiOn ill Bntam by DaVld Garden el al. publIshed ill 2000 by the ]oseph Rowntree FoundatJOn Reproduced by pernnsslon of theJoseph Rowntree Foundallon activities, such as visiting friends and family, celebrating special occasions, spending time on hobbies, having friends round for a meal and taking holidays. Second, people are excluded from social relations ifthey are isolated from friends and family - the PSE survey (2000) found that 2 per cent of people had no contact with either a family member or a friend outside their own house even a few times a year. A third aspect of exclusion from social relations involves a lack of practical and emotional support in times of need - someone to help with heavy jobs around the house or in the garden or to talk to when depressed or to get advice from about important life changes. Fourth, people are excluded from social relations through a lack of civic engagement. Civic engagement includes voting, getting involved in local or national politics,writing a letter to a newspaper or campaigning on an issue one feels strongly about. Lastly, some people are excluded from social relations because they are confined to their home, perhaps due to disability, caring responsibilities or because they feel unsafe on the streets. Examples of social exclusion Sociologists have conducted research into the different ways that individuals and communities experience exclusion. Investigations have focused on topics as diverse as housing, education, the labour market, crime, young people and the elderly. We shall now look briefly at three examples of exclusion that have attracted attention in Britain, as well as in other industrialized societies. Housing and neighbourhoods The nature of social exclusion can be seen clearly within the housing sector. While many people in industrialized societies live in comfortable, spacious housing, others reside in dwellings that are overcrowded, inadequately heated or structurally unsound. When entering the housing market, individuals are able to secure housing on the basis of their existing and projected resources. Thus, a dual-earning childless couple will have a greater chance of obtaining a mortgage for a home in an attractive area. In countries where people tend to buy rather than rent their home, in recent decades house prices have risen considerably faster than inflation, ensuring that owner-occupiers realize large profits on their property, while those not already on the housing ladder find it increasingly difficult to buy a first home. By contrast, households whose adults are unemployed or in low-paying jobs may be restricted to less desirable options in the rented or public housing sector. Stratification within the housing market occurs at both the household and the community level. Just as disadvantaged Poverty, Social Exclusion and Welfare 501 individuals are excluded from desirable housing options. so whole communities can be excluded from opportunities and activities that are norms for the rest of society. Exclusion can take on a spatial dimension: neighbourhoods vary greatly in terms of safety, environmental conditions and the availability of services and public facilities. For example, low-demand neighbourhoods tend to have fewer basic services such as banks, food shops and post offices than do more desirable areas. Community spaces such as parks, sports grounds and libraries may also be limited. Yet people living in disadvantaged places are often dependent on what few facilities are available. Unlike residents of more affluent areas, they may not have access to transport (or funds) which would allow them to shop and use services elsewhere. In deprived communities, it can be difficult for people to overcome exclusion and to take steps to engage more fully in society. Social networks may be weak; this reduces the circulation of information about jobs, political activities and community events. High unemployment and lowincome levels place strains on family life; crime and juvenile delinquency undermine the overall quality of life in the neighbourhood. Low-demand housing areas often experience high household turnover rates as many residents seek to move on to more desirable housing, while new, disadvantaged entrants to the housing market continue to arrive. Rural areas Although much attention is paid to social exclusion in urban settings, people living in rural regions can also experience exclusion. Some social workers and caregivers see that the challenges of exclusion in the countryside are as large, if not larger, than those in cities. In small villages and sparsely populated areas, access to goods, services and facilities is not as extensive as in more settled areas. In most industrial societies, proximity to basic services such as doctors, Run-down housing estates can be sites of intense social exclusion, where many factors combine to prevent full social participation. schools and government services is considered a necessity for leading an active, full and healthy life. But rural residents often have limited access to such services and are dependent on the facilities available within their local community. Access to transport is one of the biggest factors affecting rural exclusion.Ifa household owns or has access to a car, it is easier to remain integrated in society. For example, family members can consider taking jobs in other towns, periodic shopping trips can be arranged to areas that have a larger selection ofshops, visits to friends or family in other areas can be organized more readily, and young people can be fetched home from parties. People who do not have access to their own transport, however, are dependent on public transport, and in country areas such services are limited in scope. Some villages might be serviced by a bus only a few times a day or week, with reduced schedules on weekends and holidays, and nothing at all later in the evening. Homelessness Homelessness is one of the most extreme forms of exclusion. People lacking a permanent residence may be shut out of many of the everyday activities that others take for granted, such as going to work, keeping a bank account, entertaining friends and even getting letters in the post. Most homeless people are in some form of temporary accommodation, although there are still many who sleep rough on the street. Some homeless people deliberately choose to roam the streets, sleeping rough, free from the constraints of property and possessions. But the large majority have no such wish at all; they have been pushed over Homelessness is one of the most complicated and often extreme forms of social exclusion. the edge into homelessness by factors beyond their control. Once they find themselves without a permanent dwelling, their lives sometimes deteriorate into a spiral of hardship and deprivation. Who sleeps on the streets in Britain? The answer is very complicated. For example, from the 1960s onwards, people with mental health problems and learning difficulties were discharged from institutions as a result of changes in healthcare policy. Before that, these people would have spent years in what used to be called longstay psychiatric or mental sub-normality hospitals. This process of deinstitutionalization was prompted by several factors. One was the desire of the government to save money - the cost of residential care in mental health institutions is high. Another, more praiseworthy motive was the beliefon the part ofleaders ofthe psychiatric profession that long-term hospitalization often did more harm than good. Anyone who could be cared for on an outpatient basis therefore should be. The results have not borne out the hopes ofthose who saw deinstitutionalization as a positive step. Some hospitals discharged people who had nowhere to go and who perhaps had not lived in the outside world for years. Often, little concrete provision for proper outpatient care was in fact made (Social Exclusion Unit 1998a). Surveys consistently show that about a quarter of people who sleep rough have spent time in mental health institutions, or have had a diagnosis of mental illness. Hence changes in relevant healthcare policy are likely to have a disproportionate effect on the incidence of homelessness. Most people who are homeless, however, have not suffered mental health problems; nor are they alcoholics or regular consumers of illegal drugs. They are people POVERTY, SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND WELFARE who find themselves on the streets because they have experienced personal disasters, often several at a time. Becoming homeless is rarely the outcome of a direct 'causeeffect' sequence. A number of misfortunes may occur in quick succession, resulting in a powerful downward spiral. Awoman may get divorced, for instance, and at the same time lose not only her home but also herjob. A young person may have trouble at home and make forthe big citywithout any means of support. Research has indicated that those who are most vulnerable to homelessness are people from lower working-class backgrounds who have no specific job skills and very low incomes. Long-term joblessness is a major indicator. Family and relationship breakdowns also appear to be key influences. Although the vast majority of people who are homeless manage to sleep in shelters or receive temporary accommodation, those who find themselves sleeping rough are often in danger. Research by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) into homelessness and street crime in London, Glasgow and Swansea provides the first indication of the extent ofvictimization suffered by homeless people on the streets. The British Crime Survey, the leading statistical indicator of crime in Britain, does not include homeless people among its respondents. In Unsafe Streets (1999), the IPPR revealed that four out of five rough sleepers have been the victims of crime at least once. Almost half of them have been assaulted, yet only one-fifth chose to report the crimes to the police. The picture that emerges is one of homeless people who are victims of high levels of violence on the streets, but who are also excluded from the systems of legal and police protection that might possibly offer some assistance. Although making homelessness a top priority has been universally praised, there is little consensus on how to get people off the streets into permanent housing and to lead more stable lives. Advocates for homeless people agree that a more long-term approach - including counselling, mediation services, job training and befriending schemes - is needed. Yet, in the meantime, many charity groups are loath to suspend short-term measures such as delivering soup, sleeping bags and warm clothing to homeless people on the streets. The issue is a controversial one. In trying to shift attention towards the need for permanent solutions, the government's 'homelessness tsar' Louise Casey remarked that 'well-meaning people are spending money servicing the problem on the streets and keeping it there' (quoted in Gillan 1999). Many housing action groups agree. Yet charity and outreach groups such as the Salvation Army take a different approach: as long as there are people living on the streets, they will continue to go to them and offer what assistance they can. Even though it is not the whole answer, most sociologists who have studied the issue agree that the provision of more adequate forms of housing is of key importance in tackling the multiple problems faced by homeless people, whether the housing is directly sponsored by the government or not. As Christopher Jencks concluded in The Homeless (1994): 'Regardless of why people are on the streets, giving them a place to live that offers a modicum of privacy and stability is usually the most important thing we can do to improve their lives. Without stable housing, nothing else is likely to work.' Others disagree, stressing that homelessness is only 20 per cent about 'bricks and mortar' and 80 per cent about social work and outreach to counter the effects offamily breakdown, violence and abuse, drug and alcohol addictions and depression. Mike, a homeless man in his late 50s, concurs: 'I think that for most people the situation is much more complicated than it seems. Often the problem is about their own belief in themselves, their self-worth. A lot of people on the street have low self-esteem. They do not believe they can do anything better' (quoted in Bamforth 1999). Crime and social exclusion Some sociologists have argued that in many industrialized societies, there are strong links between crime and social exclusion. There is a trend in modern societies, they argue, away from inclusive goals (based on citizenship rights) and towards arrangements that accept and even promote the exclusion of some citizens (Young 1998, 1999). Crime rates may be reflecting the fact that a growing number of people do not feel valued by - or feel they have an investment in - the societies in which they live. The American sociologist, Elliott Currie, investigated the connections between social exclusion and crime in the United States, particularly among young people. Cunie (1998) argues that in American society, young people are increasingly growing up on their own without the guidance and support they need from the adult population. Faced by the seductive lure of the market and consumer goods, young people are also confronted by diminishing opportunities in the labour market to sustain a livelihood. In fact, the economic restructuring identified by Hutton and Wilson above has led to feelings ofa profound sense ofrelative deprivation amongst young people, and a willingness to turn to illegitimate means of sustaining a desired lifestyle. The standards of economic status and consumption that are promoted within society cannot be met through legitimate means by the socially excluded population. According to Currie, who echoes Merton's earlier ideas about 'strain' (see chapter 21, 'Crime and Deviance'), one of the most troublesome dimensions to this connection between social exclusion and crime is that legitimate channels for change are bypassed in favour of illegal ones. Crime is favoured over alternative means (Cunie 1998). In a more recent ethnographic study of a deprived community in the North of England, Robert McAuley (2006) investigated the links between social exclusion and Poverty, Social Exclusion and Welfare crime amongst young people. McAuley argues that the dominant explanation for persistent youth crime is that some corn_munities are 'intolerant ofwork'; that is, many arguments suggest that a growing underclass - or the experience of social exclusion - gives rise to poor communities in which many people are turning to crime to get what they want. However, most of the young people McAuley spoke to still valued work, but felt abandoned by the rest of society and 'victimized' both at school and when applying for jobs, because of the stigma attached to the place in which they lived. McAuJey argues that, as Britain's industrial base contracted, service industries provided the main work, and Britain, like many other developed societies, became a consumer society. In fact, says McAuley, it is consumer societies rather than the urban poor that have devalued work, because consumerism promotes the acquisition of material goods rather than a work ethic. Britain's consumer society defines itselfin opposition to the poor estates, whose young people are labelled anti-social and susceptible to crime. These labels follow young people into school and the labour market, thus helping to produce the cheap source of labour on which consumerism depends. Ironically, consumer culture then also uses images of urban gangs and gangsters to sell its global commodities. What McAuley's research points to are some of the consequences for young people growing up in THINKING CRITICALLY What are the main differences between social exclusion at the 'bottom' and at the 'top' of society? What could or should governments do to deal with the problems created by elite forms of social exclusion? Should governments concentrate on tackling social exclusion at the bottom rather than the top of society? 12.1 Social exclusion atthe top? The examples of exclusion that we have considered thus far all concern individuals or groups who, for whatever reason, are unable to participate fully in institutions and activities used by the majority ofthe population.Yet not all cases of exclusion occur among those who are disadvantaged at the bottom of society: In recent years, new dynamics of 'social exclusion at the top' have been emerging.By this. it is meant that a minority of individuals at the very top of society can 'opt out' of participation in mainstream institutions by merit of their afiluence, influence and connections. Such elite exclusion at the top of society can take a number offorms. The wealthy might retreat fully from the realm ofpublic education and healthcare services, preferring to pay for private services and attention. Affluent MEMBERS ONLY residential communities are increasingly closed off from the rest of society - the so-called'gated communities' located behind tall walls and security checkpoints.Thx payments and financial obligations can be drastically reduced through careful management and the help of private financial planners. Particularly in the Urtited States, active political participation among the elite is often replaced by large donations to political candidates who are seen to represent their interests. In a number ofways, the very wealthy are able to escape from their social and financial responsibilities into a closed,private realm largely separate from the rest of society Just as social exclusion at the 'bottom' undermines social solidarity and cohesion, exclusion at the 'top' is similarly detrimental to an integrated society ERS Elite social exclusion can physically separate the rich from the rest of society. deprived communities of that 'thirty, thirty, forty' society described by Will Hutton (1995), described above. But for McAuley, it is not just a period of economic restructuring, but the affluent consumer society itself which effectively 'socially excludes' the poor. The welfare state In most industrialized societies, poverty and social exclusion at the bottom are aUeviated to some degree by the welfare state. Why is it that welfare states have developed in most industrialized countries? How can we explain the variations in the welfare models favoured by different states? The face of welfare is different from country to country, yet industrial societies have on the whole devoted a large share of their resources to addressing public needs. Theories of the welfare state Most industrialized and industrializing countries in the world today are welfare states. By this, it is meant that the state plays a central role in the provision of welfare, which it does through a system that offers services and benefits that meet people's basic needs for things such as healthcare, education, housing and income. An important role of the welfare state involves managing the risks faced by people over the course of their lives: sickness, disability, job loss and old age. The services provided by the welfare state and the levels of spending on it vary from country to country. Some have highly developed welfare systems and devote a large proportion of the national budget to them. In Sweden, for example, tax revenues in 2005 represented 51.1 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP), in Belgium, 45.4 per cent and in Austria, 49.7 per cent. By comparison, other industrialized nations take far less in tax. In the UK, tax revenues are 37.2 per cent of GDp, in Germany, 34.7 per cent and in the USA, just 26.8 per cent (GECD 2006). In this chapter, we have focused on the role of the welfare state in alleviating poverty. However, the role of the welfare state in providing these services and benefits is discussed throughout the book. Chapter 8 looks at the welfare state and the provision of services and benefits for older people, chapter 10 looks at the welfare state and the provision of Poverty, Social Exclusion and Welfare healthcare and chapter 19 looks at the role of the welfare state in providing education. Many theories have been advanced to explain the evolution of the welfare state. Marxists have seen welfare as necessary for sustaining a capitalist system, while functionalist theorists held that welfare systems helped to integrate society in an orderly way under the conditions of advanced industrialization. While these and other views have enjoyed support over the years, the writings of the British sociologist T. H. Marshall (1893- 1981) and Danish sociologist G0sta Esping-Andersen have perhaps been the most influential contributions to theories of the welfare state. Marshall's influential arguments are outlined in 'Classic Studies 12.2', and you should look at this before moving on to later arguments about welfare and citizenship. Costa Esping-Andersen: three worlds ofwelfare G0sta Esping-Andersen's The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990) brings a comparative perspective to the earlier theories of the welfare state. In doing this, Esping-Andersen can be seen to have taken seriously the criticism leveUed at MarshaU's general evolutionary perspective, namely that different national societies foUowed different paths towards citizenship rights and, accordingly, created different 'welfare regimes'. In this important work, EspingAndersen compares Western welfare systems and presents a three-part typology of their welfare regimes. In constructing this typology, EspingAndersen evaluated the level of welfare decommodification - a term which simply means the degree to which welfare services are free from the market. In a system with high decommodification, welfare is provided publicly and is not in any way linked to one's income or economic resources. In a commodified system, welfare services are treated more like commodities - that is, they are sold on the market like any other good or service. By Classic Studies 12.2 T. H. Marshall and the evolution of citizenship in Britain The research problem You may have been described as a 'citizen' of a particular country implying a certain 'belonging' to it. But when did the idea of 'citizenship' emerge and how did it develop? What exactly is citizenship anyway,and what rights and responsibilities does it confer on citizens? How is citizenship related to the state's proviSion of welfare? One important theorist who tackled these questions is Thomas Humphrey Marshall, whose ideas have been very influential in shaping debates on welfare and citizenship rights. Writing from the late 1940s, Marshall saw citizenship as emerging alongside industrialization as a fundamental feature of modern society Marshall's explanation Taking an historical approach, Marshall (1973) traced what he described as the 'evolution' of citizenship in Britain (specifically England) and identified three key stages,each one expanding the meaning of 'citizenship'. The eighteenth century, according to Marshall,was the time when ciV11 rights were obtained.These included important personal liberties such as freedom of speech, thought and religion, the right to own property and the right to fair legal treatment. Building on these rights,in the nineteenth century,political nghts were gained.These included the right to vote,to hold office and to participate in the political process.The third set of rights - social rights- were obtained in the twentieth century. These include the right of citizens to economic and social security through education,healthcare,housing,pensions and other services, all ofwhich became enshrined in the welfare state.The incorporation of social rights into the notion of citizenship meant that everyone was entitled to live a full and active life and had a right to a reasonable income, regardless of their position in society. In this respect,the rights associated with social citizenship greatly advanced the ideal of equality for all, and Marshall's account is often described as an optimistic one,seeing a growing range of rights for all citizens. Critical points One immediate problem with Marshall's explanation is that it is based on a single casestudy - Britain - and critics have shown that his evolutionary approach carmot be applied to other national cases such as Sweden, France or Germany (Thrner 1990).Marshall's 'evolutionary' explanation is also not entirely clear. Is it really just a description of how citizenship actually developed in Britain,rather than a causal explanation of why it did so? Critics argue that Marshall tends to assume the progressive development of types of rights but does not explain the links between them or how, say,civil rights lead inevitably to political and then to social rights. In more recent times, critics have argued that the awareness of globalization makes Marshall's theory- which is based on the influence of the nation-state - rather outdated, as it seems to assume that citizenship develops from the internal dynamics ofnational societies.Today, however, sociologists are much more sensitive to the relationships and influences between and across the world's societies.Finally - as we will see later in the chapter - Marshall's evolutionism is severely challenged by the crisis of 'welfarism' from the 1970s and the attempt to 'roll back' levels of welfare provision in many developed societies, a development which does not appear to fit his historical thesis. Contemporary significance Marshall's views influenced debates about the nature of citizenship and, in recent years, informed political questions and academic research on social inclusion and exclusion. His central idea that rights and responsibilities are tightly intertwined with the notion of citizenship is enjoying renewed popularity in discussions about how to promote an 'active citizenship'. And although his explanation is certainly too statecentred to be entirely satisfactory in a globalizing age, the notion of an evolving expansion of citizenship rights and responsibilities continues to inform our understanding of what citizenship is. For Poverry, Social Exclusion and Welfare 509 example, a relatively new type of citizenship now seems to be emerging - environmental or ecological- based on the rights and responsibilities ofpeople towards the natural environment (Smith 1998; Dobson and Bell 2006). Hence,despite its flaws, Marshall's general approach may have a little more life left yet. comparing policies on pensions, unemployment and income support among countries, Esping-Andersen identified the following three rypes of welfare regime: 1 Social democratic Social democratic welfare regimes are highly decommodified. Welfare services are subsidized by the state and available to all citizens (universal benefits). Most Scandinavian states such as Sweden and Norway are examples of social democratic welfare regimes. 2 Conservative-corporatist In conservative-corporatist states, such as France and Germany, welfare services may be highly decommodified, but they are not necessarily universal. The amount of benefits to which a citizen is entitled depends on their position in sociery. This rype of welfare regime may not be aimed at eliminating inequalities, but at maintaining social stabiliry, strong families and loyalry to the state. 3 Liberal The United States is the best example of a liberal welfare regime. Welfare is highly commodified and sold through the market. Means-tested benefits are available to the very needy, but become highly stigmatized. This is because the majoriry of the population is expected to purchase its own welfare through the market. The United Kingdom does not fall cleanly into any of these three 'ideal types'. Formerly, it was closer to a social democratic model, but welfare reforms since the 1970s have brought it much closer to a liberal welfare regime with higher levels of The concept of environmental citizenship is discussed in more detail in chapter 6, 'The Environment'. commodification, which seem set to continue. This shift from one model to another makes the UK an interesting case study. The welfare state in the UK One of the main differences between welfare models is the availability of benefits to the population. In systems that provide universal benefits, welfare is a right to be enjoyed equally by all, regardless of economic status. An example of this in the UK is the provision of child benefit, which goes to the parents or guardians of children under the age of 16 regardless of their income or savings. Welfare systems predicated on universal benefits are designed to ensure that all citizens' basic welfare needs are met on an ongoing basis. The Swedish system has a higher proportion of universal benefits than that of the UK, which depends more on means-tested benefits. 'Meanstesting' refers to an administrative process by which the state assesses the actual income (or resources) of an applicant for welfare against its standardized rate, and, if there is a shortfall, makes up the difference as a social security benefit, or provides the service. Examples of means-tested benefits in the UK are income support, housing benefit and working tax credit. Examples of means-tested services are those provided by local authoriry social services departments as part of packages of care for older people who are living in care homes or in other accommodation within the community. This distinction between universal and means-tested benefits is expressed at a policy level in two contrasting approaches to 510 POVERTY, SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND WELFARE welfare. Supporters of an institutional view of welfare argue that access to welfare services should be provided as a right for everyone. Those taking a residualist view argue that welfare should only be available to members ofsociety who truly need help and are unable to meet their own welfare needs. The debate between those who support an institutional view of welfare and those who support a residualist view is often presented as a dispute about taxation. Welfare services have to be funded through tax. Advocates of the 'safety-net welfare state' approach stress that only the most in need - to be demonstrated through means-testing - should be the recipients ofwelfare benefits. Supporters of a residual view of welfare see the welfare state as expensive, ineffective and too bureaucratic. On the other hand, some feel that tax levels should be high, because the welfare state needs to be well funded. They argue that the welfare state must be maintained and even expanded in order that the harsh polarizing effects of the market are limited, even though this means a large tax burden. They claim that it is the responsibility of any civilized state to provide for and protect its citizens. This difference of opinion over institutional and residual welfare models is at the heart of current debates over welfare reform. In all industrialized countries, the future of the welfare state is under intense examination. As the face of society changes - through globalization, migration, changes in the family and work, and other fundamental shifts - the nature of welfare must also change.We will briefly trace the history of the welfare state in Britain and recent attempts to reform it. The formation ofthe British welfare state The welfare state in Britain was created during the twentieth century, yet its roots stretch back to the Poor Laws of 1601 and the dissolution of the monasteries. The monasteries had provided for the poor; without this provision, abject poverty and a near complete absence of care for the sick resulted, which led to the creation of the Poor Laws. With the development of industrial capitalism and the transition from an agricultural to an industrial society, traditional forms of informal support within families and communities began to break down. In order to maintain social order and reduce the new inequalities brought about by capitalism, itwas necessary to offer assistance to those members of society who found themselves on the periphery of the market economy. This resulted in 1834 in the Poor Law Amendment Act. Under this Act, workhouses were built, offering a lower standard of living than anything available outside. The idea was that the living conditions in the poorhouses would make people do all they could to avoid poverty. With time, as part ofthe process of nation-building, the state came to play a more central role in administering to the needy. Legislation which established the national administration of education and public health in the late 1800s was a precursor of the more extensive programmes which would come into being in the twentieth century. The welfare state expanded further under the pre-FirstWorld War Liberal government, which introduced, amongst other policies, pensions, health and unemployment insurance. The years following the Second World War witnessed a further powerful drive for the reform and expansion of the welfare system. Rather than concentrating solely on the destitute and ill, the focus ofwelfare was broadened to include all members of society. The war had been an intense and traumatic experience for the entire nation - rich and poor. It produced a sense of solidarity and the realization that misfortune and tragedy were not restricted to the disadvantaged alone. This shift from a selective to a universalist vision of welfare was encapsulated in the Beveridge Report of 1942, often regarded as the blueprint for the modern welfare state. The Beveridge Report was aimed at eradicating the five great evils: Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness. A series of legislative measures under the post-war Labour government began to translate this vision into concrete actioD. Several main acts lay at the core of the new universalist welfare state. The wartime National government had already introduced the Education Act in 1944, which tackled lack ofschooling, while the 1946 National Health Act was concerned with improving the quality of health among the population. 'Want' was addressed through the 1946 Nationallnsurance Act, which set up a scheme to protect against loss of earnings due to unemployment, ill health, retirement or widowhood. The 1948 National Assistance Act provided means-tested support for those who were not covered under the National Insurance Act, and finally abolished the old Poor Laws. Other legislation addressed the needs of families (1945 Family Allowances Act) and the demand for improved housing conditions (1946 New Towns Act). The British welfare state came into being under a set ofspecific conditions and alongside certain prevailing notions about the nature ofsociety.The premises on which the welfare state was built were threefold. First, it equated work with paid labour and was grounded in a belief in the possibility of full employment. The ultimate goal was a society in which paid work played a central role for most people, but where welfare would meet the needs of those who were located outside the market economy through the mischance of unemployment or disability. Connected to this, the vision for the welfare state was predicated on a patriarchal conception offamilies- the male breadwinner was to support the family, while his wife tended to the home. Welfare programmes were designed around this traditional family model, with a second tier of services aimed at those families in which a male breadwinner was absent. Second, the welfare state was seen as promoting national solidarity. It would integrate the nation by involving the entire population in a common set of services. Poverty, Social Exclusion and Welfare Welfare was a way of strengthening the connection between the state and the population. Third, the welfare state was concerned with managing risks that occurred as a natural part of the life-course. In this sense, welfare was viewed as a type of insurance that could be employed against the potential troubles of an unpredictable future. Unemployment, illness and other misfortunes in the country's social and economic life could be managed through the welfare state. These principles underpinned the enormous expansion of the welfare state in the three decades following the war. As the manufacturing economy grew, the welfare state represented a successful class 'bargain' that met the needs of the working class as well as those of the economic elite who depended on a healthy, high-performing workforce. But by the 19708 the splintering of political opinion into institutional and residualist welfare camps became increasingly pronounced. In the 1990s hoth the left and the right aCknowledged that the Beveridge vision for welfare was outmoded and in need of significant reform. Reforming the welfare state: the 19805 The political consensus on welfare broke down in the 1980swhen the administrations of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the USA attempted to 'roll back' the welfare state. Several main criticisms were at the heart of attempts to reduce welfare. The first concerned mounting financial costs. General economic reces ~ sion, growing unemployment and the emergence of enormous welfare bureaucracies meant that expenditure continued to increase steadily- and at a rate greater than that of overall economic expansion. A debate over welfare spending ensued, with advocates of a 'roll-back' pointing to the ballooning financial pressure on the welfare system. Policy-makers emphasized the potentially overwhelming impact of the 'demographic time bomb' on the welfare system: the number of people dependent POVERTY, SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND WELFARE on welfare services was growing as the population aged, yet the number of young people of working age paying into the system was declining. This signalled a potential financial crisis. The 'greying' of the global population is discussed in chapter 8, 'The We·Course'. A second line of criticism was related to the notion of welfare dependency. Critics of existing welfare institutions argued that people become dependent on the very programmes that are supposed to allow them to forge an independent and meaningful life. They become not just materially dependent, but psychologically dependent on the arrival of the welfare payment. Instead of taking an active attitude towards their lives, they tend to adopt a resigned and passive one, looking to the welfare system to support them. The UK Conservative government implemented a number of welfare reforms that began to shift responsibility for public welfare away from the state and towards the private sector, the voluntary sector and local communities. Services, which were formerly provided by the state at highly subsidized rates, were privatized or made subject to more stringent means-testing. One example of this can be seen in the privatization of council housing in the 1980s. The 1980 Housing Act allowed rents for council housing to be raised significantly, laying the groundwork for a largescale sell-off of council housing stock. This move towards residualism in housing provision was particularly harmful to those located just above the means-tested eligibility line for housing benefit, as they could no longer get access to public housing, but could ill-afford to rent accommodation at market rates. Critics argue that the privatization of council housing contributed significantly to the growth of homelessness in the 1980s and 1990s. Another attempt to reduce welfare expenditure and increase its efficiency came through the introduction of market principles in the provision of public services. The Conservative government argued that injecting a degree of competition into welfare services such as healthcare and education would provide the public with greater choice and ensure high-qualityservice. Consumers could, in effect, 'vote with their feet' by choosing among schools or healthcare providers. Institutions providing substandard services would be obliged to improve or be forced to close down, just like a business. This is because funding for an institution would be based on the number ofstudents, or patients, who chose to use its services. Critics charged that 'internal markets' within public services would lead to lower-quality services and a stratified system of service provision, rather than protecting the value of equal service for all citizens. To what extent did the Conservative governments of the 1980s succeed in rolling back the welfare state? In Dismantling the Welfare State? (1994), Christopher Pierson compared the process of welfare 'retrenchmen!' in Britain and the USA and concluded that welfare states emerged from the Conservative era relatively intact. Although both administrations came into office with the express intent ofslashing welfare expenditure, Pierson argued that the obstacles to rolling back welfare were ultimately more than either government could overcome. The reason for this lies in the way in which social policy had unfolded over time: since its inception, the welfare state and its institutions had given rise to specific constituencies - such as trade unions and voluntary agencies like the Child Poverty Action Group - which actively defended benefits against political efforts to reduce them. Pierson saw the welfare state as under severe strain, but rejected the notion that it was 'in crisis'. Social spending stayed fairly constant and all the core components ofthe welfare state remained in place. While not denying the great rise in inequalities as a result of welfare reform in the 1980s, he points out that social policy on the whole was not reformed to the extent that industrial relations or regulatory policy were. The theory underlying the policies of MargaretThatcher's and successive Conservative administrations (1979-97) was that cutting tax rates for individuals and corporations would generate high levels of economic growth, the fruits ofwhich would then 'trickle down' to the poor. Similar policies were implemented in the USA. But the evidence does not support the 'trickledown' thesis. Such an economic policy may generate an acceleration of economic development, but it also tends to expand the differentials between the poor and the wealthy and increase the numbers living in poverty. THINKING CRITICALLY From your reading so far,does a comprehensive welfare state system tend to create a dependency culture? With reference to Esping-Andersen's (1990) three types of welfare regime (discussed above), which countries would you expect to have the highest levels of welfare dependency? What evidence is there that these societies have been damaged by state welfare? Reforming the welfare state: 1997-2008 Welfare reform was a top priority for the Labour government, which came to office in the UK in 1997. Agreeing in some respects with Conservative critics of welfare (and thus breaking with traditional left politics)' Labour argued that new welfare policies were needed to cope with poverty and inequality as well as to improve health and education. It saw the welfare state as often part of the problem, creating dependencies and offering a 'hand-out' instead ofa 'handup'. Instead, Labour wanted to tackle the roots of poverty, arguing that it was pursuing a Third Way, beyond the politics of the Poverty, Social Exclusion and Welfare 'old' left and that of the Thatcher government's 'new' right. In doing so - initially at least - Labour drew on some of my own ideas (Giddens 1994, 1998). aimed at modernizing the politics of the left for a global age. These included: the strengthening of civil society; decentralization of power away from the nation-state, which should embrace cultural diversity in all of its policies; a focus on social exclusion rather than inequality; and use of the private sector to add a dynamic element into public service provision to create a 'social investment state'. Initially rejecting the policies of the old left as outdated in an era of individualism, consumerism and globalization, Labour looked to create a 'new left' political position and programme. For example, the party argued that one ohhe main difficulties with the welfare system was that the conditions under which it had been created no longer existed: it had happened at a time of full employment when many families could rely on men to work and bring in a 'family wage'. However, changes in family structures had, by the 1990s, rendered such a patriarchal view of the male breadwinner inapplicable. An enormous number of women had entered the workforce and the growth of lon e-parent households placed new demands on the welfare state. There has also been a distinct shift in the types of risk that the welfare state needs to contend with. For instance, the welfare state had proved to be an inadequate tool for dealing with the harmful consequences of environmental pollution or lifestyle choices such as smoking. From the outset, Labour focused on a type of 'positive welfare', involving a new 'welfare contract' between the state and citizens based on both rights and responsibilities. It saw the role of the state as helping people into work and thereby a stable income, not just supporting them finan cially through periods ofunemployment. At the same time, it expected citizens to take responsibility for trying to change their own circumstances, rather than waiting for welfare hand-outs. Employment became one of the cornerstones of Labour's social policy, as it was believed that getting people into work was one of the main steps in reducing poverty. Among the most significant welfare reforms introduced under Labour were so-called 'welfare-ta-work' programmes (see 'Using your sociological imagination 12.2'). Women are now much more equal in economic, social and cultural terms than in previous generations and the entry of large numbers of women into higher education and the labour market has meant a growing divide between 'workrich' households, characterized by dual earners, and 'work-poor' households, in which no one is active in the labour market. Women's earnings have become more integral ta household income than they were in earlier times and the impact of their earnings can carry enormous weight. Indeed, the success of dual-earner households, particularly those without children, is one of the most important factors in the shifting pattern of income distribution. The differences between two-earner, oneearner and no-earner households are becoming increaSingly apparent. THINKING CRITICALLY Is it realistic to expect welfare-to-work programmes to succeed in helping all social groups to get employment? Is everyone able to work? Why do you think these programmes fail to help the long-term unemployed to find work? List the obstacles facing those who have been unemployed for more than a year, when they are looking for a job.What can governments do to help remove these obstacles? As well as the welfare-to-work programmes discussed above, Labour has also used welfare measures to raise the income of those in low-paid jobs. A minimum wage was introduced in 1999 and a commitment was made to reduce child poverty by 25 per cent by 2004-5 and to abolish child poverty by 2020. Recent assessments show that the government has had some success in its aim, with child poverty falling by 600,000 by 2006. However, it has also been noted that even if the tenyear target of halving child poverty by 2010 is met, levels will still be higher than in 1979 when Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister (Flaherty et al. 2004). In 2006, government figures on Households Below Average Income (HBAI) showed that in spite of optimistic forecasts by many commentators, Labour had failed to achieve its interim target of reducing child poverty by 25 per cent between 1998/9 and 2004/5. Projections based on current policies suggest that far more radical measures will be needed than those in place at the moment if child poverty is to be further reduced in a largescale way. Even critics accept that some of Labour's welfare policies have had some successes: helping many young people into work, raising levels of funding for public services and helping people like Lisa (featured at the start of this chapter) get into work. However, Labour's approach to welfare has been more harshly judged. The attempt to make welfare benefits dependent on a commitment actively to seek work or attend interviews has been described as a 'creeping conditionality', which erodes the principle of a citizen's 'entitlement' (Dwyer 2004). Labour's work-focused programmes (and others in some European countries) have been promoted through the language of 'social inclusion', as we saw above. However, it is not clear how exclusion relates to underlying problems of social inequality, which, historically, have formed the basis of Labour's policy programmes when in government. In The Inclusive Society, Ruth Levitas (2005) studied three main discourses, or ways of discussing and framing welfare policy, used by Labour since 1997. First, 12.2 Evaluating welfare-to-work programmes Since 1997, the Labour government has put forward a number ofpolicies and targets to move people from welfare into work 'New Deal' programmes have been set up for certain groups such as the disabled, the long· term unemployed, young people and those aged over 50. Similar programmes have existed for some time in the United States, and there has been some opportunity to study their implications. Daniel Friedlander and Gary Burtless (1994) studied four different US government·initiated programmes designed to encourage welfare recipients to find paid work The programmes were roughly similar: they provided financial benefits for welfare recipients who actively searched for jobs,as well as guidance in job-hunting techniques and opportunities for education and training. The target populations were mainly single·parent heads of households who were recipients ofAid to Families with Dependent Children, the largest cash welfare programme in the country Friedlander and Burtless found that the programmes did achieve results, People involved in them were able either to enter employment or to start working sooner than others who did not participate. In all four programmes, the earnings produced were several times greater than the net cost ofthe programme. They were least effective, however, in helping those who needed them the most - those who had been out ofwork for a lengthy period, the long-term unemployed Although welfare·to-work programmes have succeeded in reducing American welfare claims by approximately 40 per cent, some statistics suggest that the outcomes are not wholly positive. In the USA, approximately 20 per cent of those who cease to receive welfare do not work and have no source of independent income; nearly one-third who do get jobs return to claim welfare again within a year. Between a third and a half of welfare leavers who are in work find that their incomes are less than their previous benefit levels. InWisconsin, the US state which was one ofthe first to introduce welfare-to·work programmes, two· thirds ofwelfare leavers live below the poverty line (Evans 2000). Pointing to such findings, critics argue that the apparent success of welfare-ta-work initiatives in reducing the absolute number of welfare cases conceals some troublesome patterns in the actual experiences of those who lose their welfare. Others question the effectiveness oflocal empowerment 'zones' for combating social exclusion. They argue that poverty and deprivation are not concentrated in those designated areas alone, yet the programmes are targeted as if all the poor live together. In the UK the findings of the government's own Social Exclusion Unit back tltis claim: in 1997, when Labour came to power, twothirds of all unemployed people lived in areas outside the 44 most deprived boroughs ofthe country Localized initiatives, sceptics point out, cannot replace a nation-wide anti-poverty strategy because too many people fall outside the boundaries of the designated empowerment zones. Labour adopted a redistributionistdiscourse, which viewed social exclusion as a consequence, not a cause of poverty and social inequalities. Second, she identified a moral discourse on the underclass (as we saw in the discussion of Charles Murray earlier in the chapter), This discourse tends to blame those who are socially excluded, seeing them as responsible for their own situation and, sometimes, as a separate social group with specific characteristics.Third, Levitas notes a social integrationistdiscourse that ties social exclusion and inclusion firmly to employ· ment, encouraging labour market participation as a solution to social exclusion. The main issue for Levitas is that Labour discourse and policy has drifted away from the Labour Party's historically dominant, redistributionist approach to welfare. On this account, Labour's welfare policy has become little different from that of the previous Conservative approach with its The drug-taking antics of celebrities are often a source of entertainment in the media, while the negative aspects of addiction are associated with the poor and socially excluded. focus on making those at the bottom of society's hierarchy responsible for their own position and for getting out of it. The problem is that this has separated social exclusion from social inequality and concentrates on the divide between the excluded and the included rather than that between rich and poor, allowing the rich successfully to evade their own responsibilities to the wider society. Susan MacGregor, for example, argues that Labour has, in practice, dealt mainly with the unacceptable behaviour of the poor - separating out the 'deserving' from the 'undeserving' unemployed and the genuine 'asylum seeker' from the 'economic migrant' and so on. She argues that, 'This concentrates on the bad behaviours among the poor, ignoring the drug taking, infidelities, frauds and deceptions and other human frailties found among the rich, the better off and the notquite-poor' (2003: 72). Finally, despite opposing the Conservatives' privatization of railways and other public sector enterprises while in opposition, Labour has not reversed any of them (with the partial exception of Railtrack, which owns tracks but not the trains themselves). Indeed, in government, Labour has relied heavily on market mechanisms, particularly in the partnerships between public and private sectors, in order to raise the level of investment in public services such as the National Health Service without having to resort to raising tax rates. Poverty and welfare in a changing world Changes in the occupational structure and the globaleconomy have contributed to the trend towards inequality in Britain, the United States and elsewhere. A decline in the manual workforce had an important effect both on patterns of income distribution and oil unemployment. It is often the case that workers in unskilled or semiskilled jobs have found it qifficult to re-enter a rapidly changing labour market where educational qualifications and technological competence are in increasing demand. Although there has been a marked expansion of opportunities in the service sector, much of this has been for positions that are low- paid and with little prospect for advancement. In the twenty-first century, welfare debates are not simply about material prosperity, but about the overall well-being of the population. Social policy is concerned with promoting social cohesion, fostering Summary points Poverty, Social Exclusion and Welfare networks of interdependence and maximizing people's abilities to help themselves. Rights and responsibilities are taking on new importance - not only for those at the bottom attempting to move off welfare and into work, but also for those at the top whose wealth should not entitle them to evade civic, social and tax obligations. Critics say Labour should have done more to tackle spiralling inequalities at the top. This issue is not as distant from attempts to reduce poverty as it may seem at first sight. For if the rich paid higher levels of taxation, not only would they be living up to their social responsibilities, but that extra money could be used to help the poor - for example, to make more impact on reducing child poverty than the government has so far been able to achieve. In academic and political debates as well as policy-making, issues surrounding social exclusion and inclusion, poverty and wealth creation and material provision and well-being look likely to be the key dilemmas for the next few decades. unemployment. The poor comprise a diverse group,but individuals who are disadvantage d or discriminated against in other aspects of life have an increased risk of being poor. 1. There have been two ways of understanding poverty. Absolute poverty refers to a lack of basic resources needed to maintain health and bodily functioning;relative poverty involves assessing the gaps between the living conditions of some groups and those enjoyed by the majority of a population. 2. Many countries have an official measurement of poverty: a poverty line. This is a level below which people are said to live in poverty. Subjective measurements of poverty are based on people's own understandings of what is needed for an acceptable standard of living. 4. Two main approaches have been taken to explain poverty. The 'culture of poverty' and 'dependency culture' arguments claim that the poor are responsible for their own situation. The second approach argues that poverty results from larger social processes,which are both reinforced and influenced by the actions of individuals. 3. Poverty remains widespread in the wealthy countries.In the 1980s and '90s Britain had one of the worst poverty records in the developed world. Inequalities between the rich and poor widened dramatically as a result of government policies, the transfonnation of the occupational structure and large-scale S. Social exclusion refers to processe s by which individuals may become cut off from full involvement in the wider society. Social exclusion is a wider term than poverty, and include s a lack of resources and income and exclusion from the labour market, services and social relations. Homelessness is one of the most extreme forms of social exclusion. Homeless people lacking a permanent residence may be shut out of many everyday activities which most people take for granted. CHAPTER 13 Global Inequality Global economic inequality 527 High-income countries 529 Middle-income countries 529 Low-income countries 530 Is global economic inequality increasing? 530 Unequal life chances 532 Health 533 Hunger, malnutrition and famine 534 Education, literacy and child labour 537 Can poor countries become rich? 542 Theories of development 548 Evaluating theories of development 555 International organizations and global inequality 556 Global economic inequality in a changing world 559 World population growth and global inequality 564 Population analysis: demography 564 Dynamics of population change 565 The demographic transition 568 The prospects for twenty-first-century equality 568 Summary points 571 Further reading 573 Internet links 573 allneq..ality economic inequality ome COUntries 529 ncome COuntries 529 530 5' conomic ineqUality , Increas ite chlllaces 532 533 alnutrition and famine literacy and child I ba our OUllUies heco:rne rich? development 548 IIhe world's trustee of one of alions in the th still means he rds of countries. eories ofdevelopment organ' ,lZatlOns and I b mi ' gOal ars have seen the creation of more billionaires than ever c inequality in a ch ' ti angl ory Ca billionaire is defined as someone with wealth of at a on growth iliad glohal , illion US$), At the start of the twenty-first century there alysis: demography illionaires worldwide _ 308 in the United States, 114 in opulation change 56 , 32 in Latin America, 15 in Canada, 13 in the Middle East, hic transition 568 (Forbes 2000), Their combined assets in mid-2000 were esti(01' fwenty-lirst-cenfurltrillion - greater than the total gross national products of 87 571 enting more than a third of the global world population 573 World Bank 2000-1). 573 Bill Gates, founder of Microsoft Corporation, was finally world's wealthiest individual after holding that status for 523 CHAPTER 13 •••••••••••••• Global Inequality Global economic inequality 527 High-income countries 529 Middle-income countries 529 Low-income countries 530 Is global economic inequality increasing? 530 Unequal life chances 532 Health 533 Hunger. malnutrition and famine 534 Education. literacy and child labour 537 Can poor countries become rich? 542 Theories of development 548 Evaluating theories of development 555 International organizations and global inequality 556 Global economic inequality in a changing world 559 World population growth and global inequality 564 Population analysis: demography 564 Dynamics of population change 565 The demographic transition 568 The prospects for twenty-first-century equality 568 Summary points 571 Further reading 573 Internet links 573 13 ecoDolDie hteqaality countries 529 fUJle-Ulcome countries 529 t-U1come countries 530 economic inequality 532 533 malnutrition and famine ~ation, literacy and child '''.bIDUL -- world's eOUJIb'ies beeome of one of .....••..nsll the ofdevelopment 548 lanrlg theories ofCle1{el()prnerl~ " """""""'" rrational organizations and have seen the creation of more billionaires than ever economic inequality in a (a billionaire is defined as someone with wealth of at popaIatiOD!P'OWth od ",--.,~vu US$). At the start of the twenty-first century there analysis: demography worldwide - 308 in the United States, 114 in ofpopulation change in Latin America, 15 in Canada, 13 in the Middle East, transition 2000). Their combined assets in mid-2000 were esti~llpects fol' - greater than the total gross national products of 87 points 571 reading 573 links 573 more than a third of the global world population Bank 2000-1). Gates, founder of Microsoft Corporation, was finally wealthiest individual after holding that status for 523 CHAPTER 13 Global Inequality Global economic inequality 527 High-income countries 529 Middle-income countries 529 Low-income countries 530 Is global economic inequality increasing? 530 Unequal life chances 532 Health 533 Hunger, malnutrition and famine 534 Education, literacy and child labour 537 Can poor countries become rich? 542 Theories of development 548 Evaluating theories of development 555 International organizations and global inequality 556 Global economic inequality in a changing world 559 World population growth and global inequality 564 Population analysis: demography 564 Dynamics of population change 565 The demographic transition 568 The prospects for twenty-first-century equality 568 SummalY points 571 Further reading 573 Tnternet links 573 Bill Gates numbers amongst the world's wealthiest individuals. He is trustee of one of the largest charitable foundations in the world, but his personal wealth still means he is richer than about two-thirds of countries. T he past 30 years have seen the creation of more billionaires than ever before in history (a billionaire is defined as someone with wealth of at least a thousand million US$). At the start of the twenty-first century there were some 573 billionaires worldwide - 308 in the United States, 114 in Europe, 88 in Asia, 32 in Latin America, 15 in Canada, 13 in the Middle East, and 3 inAustralia (Forbes 2000). Their combined assets in mid-2000 were estimated at US$l.l trillion - greater than the total gross national products of 87 countries representing more than a third of the global world population (calculated from World Bank 2000-1). In May 2008, Bill Gates, founder of Microsoft Corporation, was finally displaced as the world's wealthiest individual after holding that status for 523 GLOBAL INE QUALITY 13 consecutive years. Warren Buffett, an American investor and businessman, was heralded as the world's richest person, with a net personal worth of US$62 billion, primarily based on his stock holding in Berkshire Hathaway, a US-based insurance conglomerate (see table 13.1). Gates's fortune, some U$$58 billion, is based largely on ownership of Microsoft's stock and he seems to personify the entrepreneurial spirit: a computer nerd turned capitalist, whose software provides the operating system for the vast majority of personal computers worldwide. During the late 1990s, Gates had a net worth of around U$$100 billion, but after reaching this peak, the value of Microsoft's stock began to decline, leaving his personal fortune greatly reduced. Nevertheless, he remains one of the wealthiest individuals in the world and his personal fortune dwarfs that of other well-known entrepreneurs like Richard Bra nson (Virgin Group) a nd Rom a n Abramovich (Russian oil industry). Among the world's top forty richest individuals and families in 2007 were 16 from North America, 13 from Europe, 5 from the Middle East, 3 from Hong Kong, 2 from India and I from Mexico (Sunday Times 2007). If Bill Gates typifies the Western, high-tech entrepreneur, then Hong Kong's Li Ka-shing - number 11 on the 2008 list - is the hero in a rags-to-riches story that characterizes the success of many Asian busi· nessmen. Li began his career by making plastic flowers, but by 2007 his US$26.5 Table 13.1 Twenty richest individuals and families in the world, 2008 Rank Name Citizenship Age NetWorth ($bil) Residence I Warren Bu1fett United States 77 62.0 United States 2 Carlos Slim Helu & family Mexico 68 60.0 Mexico 3 William Gates 1JI United States 52 58.0 Uruted States 4 Lakshrni Mittal India 57 45.0 United Kingdom 5 Mukesh Ambaru India 50 43.0 India 6 AruIAmbaru India 48 42.0 India 7 Ingvar Kamprad & family Sweden SI 31.0 SWltzerland S KPSingh India 76 30.0 India 9 Oleg Deripaska Russia 40 2S.0 Russia 10 Karl Albrecht Germany 88 270 Germany II Li Ka-shing Hong Kong 79 26.5 Hong Kong 12 Sheldon Adelson Uruted States 74 26.0 United States 13 Bernard Arnault France 59 25.5 France 14 Lawrence Ellison United States 63 25.0 United States 15 Roman Abramovich Russia 41 23.5 Russia 16 Theo Albrecht Germany 85 23.0 Germany 17 Liliane Bettencourt France 85 22.9 France 18 lUexeiMordashov Russia 42 21.2 Russia 19 Prmce Alwaleed Bin Talal Alsaud Saudi Arabia 51 21.0 Saudi Arabia 20 MIkhail Fndman Russia 43 20.8 Russia Source: Forbes Magazme, 'The World'sBllhonalres' ,3 May 2008 rO'L~·~t:V BY A N"IP. 1'1 You C-'1~~ A "'-RuSr FUND 1C,II:'<:K. NAP. .,.-",EN, u I>lDUL0E IN AN NOt'M""", LUNcH. N"1P },-_-n billion in personal wealth derived from a wide range of real estate and other investments throughout Asia, including family ownership of STAR Tv, a television-transmission satellite whose broadcasts reach half the world. How have a few individuals and families been able to accumulate such enormous wealth? One reason is that globalization the increased economic, political, social and cultural interconnectedness of the world - has produced many more opportunities in many more parts of the world, which have enabled some people vastly to increase their wealth. In the UK, the sixth Duke ofWestminster, Major-General Gerald Cavendish Grosvenor, represents an older, aristocratic form of wealth acquisition and transmission down through families. But fewer people today are rich because ofsuch inherited wealth. The sixth Duke's fortune of some £7 billion -largely consisting of property in fashionable areas of London - does not even make him the richest person in the UK. That title belongs to Indian-born steel magnate, Lakshmi Mittal, whose £27.7 billion makes him the richest person in the UK and fourth richest in the world. Aglance at the list of the wealthiest people around the world shows that most of them could describe their riches as 'new entrepreneurial wealth', rapidly made during the course of a single individual's life. Bill Gates and Lakshmi Mittal exemplify this new entrepreneurial wealth. Both of these multi-billionaires were born into relatively modest backgrounds in their respective countries before gaining fantastic economic success. Both men benefited from globalization: Gates through his involvement with some ofthe new information and communication technologies that drive globalization and Mittal by driving forward the international expansion of his family's India-based steel-making business. At this point you may want to refer to chapter 4, 'Globalization and the ChangingWorld', to refresh your understanding of 'globalization'. Yet the benefits of globalization have been uneven, and are by no means enjoyed by all. Consider, for example, Wirat Tasago, a 24-year-old garment worker in Bangkok, Thailand. Tasago - along with more than a million otherThai garment workers, most of whom are women - labours from 8 a.m. until about 11 p.m. six days a week, earning little more than the equivalent of £2 pounds an hour (Dahlburg 1995). Billions ofworkers such as Tasago are being drawn into the global labour force, many working in oppressive conditions that would be unacceptable, if not unimaginable, under employment laws, such as the minimum wage, which are taken for granted in the developed world. And these are the fortunate ones: although many countries, such as those in Eastern Europe, have found engagement in the global economy socially and economically difficult, especially Millions ofworkers across the world are employed in 'sweatshops',working long hours for little financial reward. Has globalization been beneficial for these workers? initially, the populations of those societies that have remained outside the world economy, such as North Korea, have typically fared far worse. THINKING CRITICALLY Should we celebrate the existence of 573 individual billionaires? Why might some people object to such a concentration of wealth in the hands of a very small number of people? If the desperately poor living and working standards of people like Tasago (above) could be effectively improved, would the fact that there are 573 billionaires in the world then be irrelevant? Social inequality is one of the issues on which the discipline of sociology was founded, though the focus of the classical sociologists was on inequalities of class, status and power within the industrial societies. This generally meant studying the internal processes which produced inequality, disadvantage and exclusion. For example, in chapter 12 we examined poverty, social exclusion and welfare, noting large differences ofincome, wealth, work chances and quality of life, mainly within the industrialized countries. In chapter 11 we looked at types of social stratification, class-based inequality and socialstatus distinctions and why these hierarchical social divisions continue to shape life chances today. Then in chapter 22 we will turn our attention to inequalities ofpower and explore the spread of democracy across the world with a tendency to reduce very steep power gradients as people gain new political rights. However, these same crucial issues of class, status and power exist on an even larger scale in the world as a whole. Just as we can speak ofthe rich and poor, high and low status or powerful and powerless within a single country, so we can talk about these inequalities and their causes within the global system as a whole. In this chapter, we look at global inequality, primarily in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (see chapter 4 for globalization in a longer time-scale). We begin with a brief discussion of what is understood by the term 'global inequality',and how definitions of the term change the way we think about it. We examine what differences in economic standards of living mean for people throughout the world. We then turn to the newly industrializing countries of the world to understand which countries are improving their fortunes and why. This will lead us to a discussion of theories that attempt to explain why global inequality exists and what can be done about it. We conclude this section by speculating on the future of economic inequality in a global world. From an examination of global inequality, we then move to an account of global population growth, a trend occurring at its greatest pace in some of the poorest countries of the world. The central issue here is how population growth impacts on the prospects for improved life chances and equality across the world. Economic inequality is a major source of the world's problems with poverty, hunger and health, and for that reason it forms the central focus ofthis chapter. However, as we noted above, there are also major inequalities ofsocial status and global inequalities of power both within and between nationstates. The latter remains an important source of many entrenched conflicts, some of which are discussed in chapter 23, Global Inequality 'Nations, War and Terrorism'. This chapter will also refer to these forms of inequality where necessary, but for a broader discussion, readers should consult the relevant chapters identified above. Global economic inequality Global economic inequality refers primarily to the systematic differences in wealth, incomes and working conditions that exist between countries. But there are, of course, many differences within countries: even the wealthiest countries today have growing numbers of poor people, while less wealthy nations are producing many of the world's super-rich. Sociology's challenge is not merely to identify such differences, but to explain why they occur - and how they might be overcome. One way to classify countries in terms of global inequality is to compare their economic productivity. One important measure of economic productivity is gross domestic product (GDP). A country's GDP is made up of all the goods and services on record as being produced by a country's economy in a particular year. Income earned abroad by individuals or corporations is not included in GDP. An important alternative measure is gross national income (GNI). (GNI was formerly referred to as gross national product or GNP.) Unlike GDr. GNI includes income earned by individuals or corporations outside the country. Measures of economic activity, such as GDP or GNI, are often given per person; this allows us to compare the wealth of an average inhabitant of a country. Also, in order to compare different countries, we need to use a common currency, and most international institutions, such as the World Bank, use the US dollar. We will use both the US dollar and, on occasion, the UK pound. The World Bank is an international lending organization that provides loans for development projects in poorer countries. It GLOBAL INEQUALITY uses per person GNI to classify countries as high-income, upper-middle-income, lower-middle-income or low-income. This system of classification will help us to understand more easily why there are such vast differences in living standards between countries, though, for the sake of simplicity, we will usually merge the upper-middle and lower middle categories. The World Bank (2003) divides 132 countries, containing nearly 6 billion people, into the three economic classes. There are 74 other economies in the world, encompassing about 178 million people, for whom the World Bank does not provide data, either because it is lacking or because the economies have fewer than 1.5 million people. While 40 per cent of the world's population live in low·income countries. only 15 per cent live in high-income countries. Bear in mind that this classification is based on average income for each country, it therefore masks income inequality within each country. Such differences can be significant, although we do not focus on them in this chapter. For example, the World Bank classifies India as a low-income country, since its perperson GNI in 1999 was just $450. Yet despite widespread poverty, India also boasts a large and growing middle class. China, on the other hand, was reclassified in 1999 from low- to middle-income, since its GNI per capita in that year was $780 (the World Bank's lower limit for a middleincome country is $756). Yet even though its average income now confers middleincome status on China, it nonetheless has hundreds of millions of people living in poverty. Comparing countries on the basis of income alone, however, may be misleading, since GNI includes only goods and services that are produced for cash sale. Many people in low-income countries are farmers or herders who produce for their own families or for barter, involving non-cash transactions. The value of their crops and animals is not taken into account in the statistics. Further, economic output is not a country's whole story. Countries possess unique and widely differing languages and traditions. Poor countries are no less rich in history and culture than their wealthier neighbours, even though the lives of their people may be much harsher. Social and cultural assets such as social solidarity, strong cultural traditions or systems of familial and community assistance do not lend themselves to statistical measurement with quite the same ease as monetary transactions. Many environmental campaigners have argued that GDP and GNI are particularly blunt measures ofquantity that tell us nothing about the quality of life. Even those economic activities that damage the natural environment and human lives the most are simply counted as part of a country's total output and, thus, are seen to contribute to economic well-being. From the perspective of long-term environmental sustainability, this method is completely irrational. If we took account of some of the social and cultural aspects of life noted above, we may arrive at a radically different view of the apparent 'benefits' of continual increases in GDPIGNI. Even ifwe do compare countries solely on the basis of economic statistics, the ones we choose for our comparisons are likely to make a difference to our conclusions. For example, if we choose to study global inequality by comparing levels ofhousehold consumption (of, say, food, medicine or other products) rather than GNl, we might reach a different conclusion on global inequality. We could also choose to take into account other factors. A comparison of the GNI ofseveral countries is all very well, but it does not take into account how much things actuallycost in a country. For example, iftwo countries have a more or less equal GNI, but in the first, an average family meal costs just pennies, whereas in the second it costs several pounds, then we might conclude that it is misleading to argue that the countries are equally wealthy- after all, in the first country one gets considerably more for one's money. Instead, the researcher might choose to compare purchasing power parities (PPP) that eliminate the difference in prices between two countries. The Economist magazine uses a famous measure of PPP with its light-hearted 'Big Mac Index', which compares the cost ofthe hamburger made with identical ingredients - in different countries. In this chapterwe concentrate on comparisons of GNI between countries, but it is important to be aware of the other measures commonly used. THINKING CRITICALLY How useful do you find the World Bank's ranking oflow-, middle- and highincome countries? Which aspects of life within different countries does the 'average income' measure help us to understand? Which aspects of life is this method likely to miss? How else could we compare the living conditions of countries with such different cultures, social structures and economic standards of living? Why might such comparisons be useful to policy-makers? High-income countries The high-income countries are generally those that were first to industrialize, starting with the UK some 250 years ago, spreading to Europe, the United States and Canada. It was only some 30 years ago that Japan joined the ranks of such high-income, industrialized nations, while Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan moved into this category only in the 1980s and 1990s. The reasons for the success of these Asian latecomers are much debated by sociologists and economists and we will look at these debates later in the chapter. High-income countries account for only 15 per cent ofthe world's population (roughly 891 million people) - yet they lay claim to 79 per cent of the world's annual output of Global Inequality wealth (World Bank 2000- 1). High-income countries offer decent housing, adequate food, safe water supplies and other comforts unknown in many other parts of the world. Although these countries often have large numbers ofpoor people, most oftheir inhabitants enjoy a standard of living unimaginable for the majority ofthe world's people. Middle-income countries The middle-income countries are primarily found in East and Southeast Asia, the oil-rich countries of the Middle East and North Africa, the Americas (Mexico, Central America, Cuba and other countries in the Caribbean, and South America) and the once-Communist republics that formerly made up the Soviet Union and its East European allies. Most ofthese countries began to industrialize relatively late in the twentieth century and are therefore not yet as industrially developed (or wealthy) as the highincome countries. The countries that once comprised the Soviet Union, on the other hand, are highly industrialized, although their living standards have been eroded since the collapse of communism and the shift towards capitalist economics. In Russia itself, for example, the wages of ordinary people dropped by nearly a third between 1998 and 1999, while retirement pensions dropped by almost half: millions of people, many of them elderly, suddenly found themselves destitute (CIA 2000). In 1999, middle-income countries included 45 per cent of the world's population (2.7 billion people) but accounted for just 18 per cent of the annual wealth produced. Although many people in these countries are substantially better off than their neighbours in low-income countries, most do not enjoy the high standard ofliving of the high-income countries. The ranks of the world's middle-income countries expanded between 1999 and 2000, according to the World Bank's system of classification, when China - with 1.3 billion people (22 per cent ofthe world's population) - was GLOBAL INEQUALITY reclassified from low- to middle-income because of its rapid economic growth. This reclassification is somewhat misleading, however. China's average per person income of$l, lOO per year in 2003 is quite close to the cut-off for low-income countries (at $766). and a large majority of its popula'tion are in fact within the low-income category by World Bank standards. Low-income countries Finally, the low-income countries include much of eastern, western and sub-Saharan Africa; Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia and some other East Asian countries; India, Nepal. Bangladesh and Pakistan in South Asia; East and Central European countries such as Georgia and Ukraine; and Haiti and Nicaragua in the western hemisphere. These countries mostly have agricultural economies and only recently began to industrialize. In 1999, the low-income countries included 40 per cent of the world's population (2.4 billion people) yet produced only 3 per cent of the world's annual output of wealth. What is more, this inequality is increasing. Fertility is much higher in lowincome countries than elsewhere, as large families provide additional farm labour or otherwise contribute to family income. In wealthy industrial societies, where children are more likely to be in school than on the farm. the economic benefit of large families declines, and so people tend to have fewer children. Because of this, the populations of low-income countries (with the principal exception of India) are growing more than three times as fast as those of high-income countries (World Bank 2003). In many low-income countries, people struggle with poverty, malnutrition and even starvation. Most people live in rural areas, although this is rapidly changing. Hundreds of millions of people are moving to huge, densely populated cities, where they live either in dilapidated housing or on the open streets. See chapter 6, 'Cities and Urban Life', for a wider discussion of urbanization. Is global economic inequality increasing? The question ofwhether global inequality is increasing or diminishing has polarized opinion in recent years. Anti-globalization activists argue that globalization generates more inequality, while defenders argue that it is proving to be a great levelling force between the world's rich and poor. The first dramatic changes in global inequality occurred more than two centuries ago with the Industrial Revolution, as Europe and then other regions underwent rapid economic expansion, leaving the rest of the world far behind in terms of wealth and material goods. Those who see that global inequality is expanding argue that in the past few decades globalization has exacerbated the trend towards inequality that began with industrialization. Globalization's critics cite statistics of the kind used in the UN Human Development Report 2007/08. which noted that the 40 per cent of the human population living on less than US$2 a day account for just 5 per cent of global income, but the wealthiest 20 per cent account for three-quarters of global income. In particular, sub-Saharan Africa will account for a full one-third of world poverty by 2015, up from one-fifth in 1990 (UNDP 2007a: 25). At the global level as well as within many countries, inequality is increasing along with globalization. By contrast, others have pointed out that over the past few decades the overall standard of living in the world as a whole has actually risen. Many indicators measuring the living standards of the world's poorest people show improvements. Illiteracy is reduced. infant death rates and malnutrition are falling. people are living longer, and global poverty - commonly defined as the number ofpeople living on less than one US dollar a day - has reduced (see table 13.2 below). However, there are substantial differences between countries. Many of these gains have been in the high- and middleincome countries, while living standards in many of the poorest countries have declined. Indeed, although the 1990s was a time of economic boom for the world's richest country, the United States, the UN Human Development Report (2003) found that more than 50 countries, located mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, suffered falling living standards during the decade as a result of famine, the global AIDS epidemic, conflicts and failed national economic policies. Atkinson (2003) reminds us that increasing inequality cannot be explained entirely by general reference to rapid globalization, as national taxation and other economic poli ~ cies continue to play an important role. For example, in Scandinavian countries like Sweden, where the welfare state operates in a redistributive way, global trends towards the widening of social inequality have been more effectively prevented than in other countries, such as the UK, which have adopted a more right-of-centre approach to welfare reform. See chapter 12, 'Poverty, Social Exclusion andWelfare', for a discussion of welfare state regimes. As the above dispute shows, the way we chose to measure global inequality makes a big difference to the conclusions that we reach on the issue. The economist, Stanley Fischer, compared two ways of looking at global income inequality: the first simply compares income inequality between countries; the second takes into account the number of people living in those countries as well. The first way of looking at global inequality is shown in the top chart of figure !3.1. This shows the average income of a selection of poor and rich countries between 1980 and 2000, with each country represented on the graph by a uniform dot. The figure shows that during this period the average income of the poorest nations grew much more slowly than the average income Global Inequality of the world's richest nations. Hence, the trend (shown by the black line) shows inequality increasing as the economies of the richer countries on the right ofthe graph grow more quickly than those of the poorer countries (on the left). If the poorest countries had grown faster than the richest, the black trends line would slope down from left to right. The gap between the richest and the poorest of the world's countries therefore appears to be growing. The bottom chart, which takes into account the population size of the countries, presents a rather different view on global inequality. The same chart is shown here, but this time the dots that represent each country have been drawn in proportion to the size of the number of people living in that country. What is particularly noticeable aboutthis graph is that two ofthe world's biggest countries -India and China, which between them account for well over one-third of the world's population - have increased the sizes of their economies considerably since 1980. Because ofthe size of these two countries, a populationweighted line of best fit drawn through the second chart would slope downwards, implying that global inequality is falling, as, on average, the populations of the poorest countries catch up. Once we take account of the fact that China and India have performed so well economically since 1980, and especially since 1990, together with the fact that these two countries account for such a big share of the world's poorest people, global poverty appears to be relatively stable. Those countries that have done best economically in the period since 1980 -like India, China and Vietnam, for example also tend to be those countries that have integrated most successfully into the global economy. The enormous inequality still found within those countries that have grown economically in recent decades means that some critics have asked at what price integration into the global economy comes. GLOBAL INEQUALITY 6 ----~Or-------.=-------------------------------------- •l 4 ue . 0 •~! 4\.... · a i~ :~us1t~glL....::=---G...J.n~.~.~:______·v_S1___a_8_o_0_________•__s~ r-Fl •• 0 ~~ - '0) o · • G 2 cco . 4 ---.--------,---------,---------,---------,---------, o 5 10 15 20 25 GDP per head, 1980,a $'000 o Sub-Saharan Africa 6 • 4 " ~ ~ .a... "* 2 ----"~--""'---~I.a-----------!'~-~W-A • g §' + "'" • A • --...,1. .• . ~ ~ 0 ~ 0:\ ". :U ·0l:----.eJ------------------------ "- '" ~ •• •• D-<:: ~ - 0 3: 0 o · • G 2 ()~--------------------------------------------- 4 ---.--------,---------,---------,--------,,---------, o 5 10 15 20 GDP per head, proportional to population in 1980,· $'000 Figure 13,1 Two ways oflooking at global income inequality '1996 prices Source: The Economist, II March 2004 ©The Economist Newspaper Limited,London Unequal life chances An enormous gulf in living standards separates most people in rich countries from their counterparts in poor ones. Wealth and poverty make life different in a host ofways. For instance, about one-third of the world's poor are undernourished, and almost all are illiterate, lacking access to basic primary schooleducation.While most ofthe world is Urbanization in developing countries is discussed in more detail in chapter 6, 'Cities and Urban Life'. still rural, within a decade there are likely to be more poor people in urban than in rural areas. Many of the global poor come from tribes or racial and ethnic groups that differ from the dominant groups of their countries and 25 Table 13.2 Global quality or lire measures show an improving picture, 1990-2005 Quality oflife inclicator 1990-1 2004-5 World Enrolment in primary education per 100 children ofprimary age (%) Literacy rate of 15-24 year olds (%) 82.5 83.5 88.8 87.4 Mortality rate for under-5s per 1,000 live births 95 76 Infant mortality rate (children under 1) per 1,000 live births Births attended by skilled health personnel C%) 65 47 52 59 Population using an improved drinking water source (%) Developing regions only (%) 78 83 Population living below US$1 a day 31.6 19.2 Poverty gap ratio· 9.3 5.4 Prevalence oflUlderweight children under 5 years of age Urban population living in slums 33.0 46.5 270 36.5 I The poverty gap rauo :::: average percentage shortfall ofpoor mdiVlduaL'l' incomes below the poverty line.TIllS measure assesses the depth ofpoverty rather than Just the percentage of a populatIon whose mcome falls bel<)'.., the poverty lJne. Source. Data taken from Umted Nallons,Mlliellruum Development Goals Report. 2007 their poverty is, at least in part, the result of discrimination. Here we focus on differences between high- and low-income countries in terms of health, starvation and famine, and education and literacy. Health People in high-income countries are far healthier than their counterparts in lowincome countries. Low-income countries generally suffer from inadequate health facilities, and when they do have hospitals or clinics, these seldom serve the poorest people. People living in low-income countries also lack proper sanitation, drink polluted water and run a much greater risk of contracting infectious diseases. They are more likely to suffer malnourishment, starvation and famine. These factors all contribute to physical weakness and poor health, making people in low-income countries susceptible to illness and disease. There is growing evidence that high rates ofHIV1AIDS infection found in manyAfrican countries are due, in part, to the weakened health ofimpoverished people (Stillwagon 2001). Because of poor health conditions, people in low-income countries are more likely to die in infancy and less likely to live to old age than people in high-income countries. Infants are II times more likely to die at birth in low-income countries than they are in high-income countries, and - if they survive birth - they are likely to live on average 18 years fewer. Children often die of illnesses that are readily treated in wealthier countries, such as measles or diarrhoea. In the mid-1990s in some parts of the world, such as sub-Saharan Africa, a child was statistically more likely to die before the age of 5 than to enter secondary school (World Bank 1996). Still, conditions have improved in low- and middle-income countries since then. For example, between 199011 and 2004/5 the global infant mortality rate dropped from 65 (per 1,000 live births) to 52 alongside an increase in the proportion of % of population undernourished _ 35% c::J 20 - 34% c::J 5 - 19% c::J 2.5 -4% _ 2.5% AFRICA Q Hunger in the Developing World c::J no data ..,, TOlal population 4,712,200,000 TOlalund"rnou,i,h"d 797,900,000 % of 101al POpul81,on 16% "", 1500 km, ,600m,1e5 Figure 13.2 Undernourishment ~ a global problem, unevenly distributed Source.World Food Programme, 29 June 2007. © 2007, World Food Programme. births attended by medical personnel from 47 to 59 per cent. Arange of other measures also showed marked improvement (see table 13.2) During the past three decades, many improvements have occurred in most ofthe middle·income countries of the world and in some of the low-income countries as well, Throughout the world, infant mortality has been cut in half, and average life expectancy has increased by ten years or more. The wider availability of modern medical technology, improved sanitation and rising incomes account for most of these changes, Hunger, malnutrition and famine Hunger, malnutrition and famine are major global sources of poor health; they are not new problems, but long·standing issues. What seems to be new is the extent of hunger and undernourishment ~ the fact that so many people in the world today appear to be on the brink of starvation (see figure 13.2).The United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP 2001) estimated that 830 million people go hungry every day, 95 per cent of them in developing countries. The UN defines 'hunger' as a diet of 1,800 or fewer calories per day ~ an amount insufficient to provide adults with the nutrients required for active, healthy lives. According to the World Food Programme study, 200 million of the world's hungry are children under the age of 5, who are underweight because they lack adequate food. Every year hunger kills an estimated 12 million children, As one 10-year-old child from the west African country of Gabon told researchers from the World Bank: When I leave for school in the mornings I don't have any breakfast. At noon there is no lunch, in the evening I get a little supper, and that is not enough. So when I see another child eating, Iwatch him, and ifhe doesn't give me something I think I'm going to die of hunger. (Narayan 1999) Yet more than three-quarters of all malnourished children under the age of5 in the world's low- and middle-income countries live in countries that actually produce a food surplus (Lappe 1998). It has been estimated that the amount the population of the United States spends on pet food each year ($13 billion) would eradicate much of the world's human hunger (Bread for the World Institute 2005). Famine and hunger are the result of a combination of natural and social forces. Drought alone affects an estimated 100 million people in the world today. In countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Tajikistan, the combination of drought and internal warfare has devastated food production, resulting in starvation and death for miJJions of people. In Latin America and the Caribbean at the start of the twenty-first century, 53 miJJion people (11 per cent ofthe population) were malnourished, along with 180 million (33 per cent) in sub-Saharan Africa and 525 million (17 per cent) in Asia (UNWFP 2001). The spread and persistence of HIVIAIDS has also contributed to the problem of food shortages and hunger, killing many working-age adults. A study by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Association (FAO) has predicted that HIVIAIDS-caused deaths in the ten African countries most afflicted by the epidemic will reduce the labour force by 26 per cent by the year 2020. Of the estimated 26 miJJion people worldwide infected with HIY, 95 per cent live in developing countries. According to the FAO, the epidemic can be devastating to nutrition, food security and agricultural production, affecting 'the entire society's ability to maintain and reproduce itself' (UNFAO 2001). Every year, hunger, resulting from both natural and social causes,kills about 12 million children. The countries affected by famine and starvation are, for the most part, too poor to pay for new technologies that would increase their food production. Nor can they afford to purchase sufficient food imports from elsewhere in the world. At the same time, paradoxically, as world hunger grows, food production continues to increase. Between 1965 and 1999, for example, world production of grain doubled. Even allowing for the substantial world population increase over this period, the global production of grain per person was 15 per cent higher in 1999 than it was 34 years earlier. This growth, however, is not evenly distributed around the world. In Global Society 13.1 What does the world eat? What should the world eat? In 2000. photojournalist Peter Menzel and journalist Faith D'Alusio set out to record what a culturally diverse range of families across the world ate in one week. Their 2005 book Hungry Planet: What the World Eats was the result. They visited 30 families in 24 countries looking at food purchases. costs and recipes, and photographing families with their typical weekly food items. 'TWo examples from their book are reproduced here: Republic of Chad: The Aboubakar family of Breidjing Camp Food expenditure for one week: 685 CFA francs,or $1.23 Favourite foods: soup with fresh sheep meat USA: The Revis family of North Carolina Food expenditure for one week: $341.98 Favourite foods:spaghetti, potatoes.sesame chicken , much of Africa, for example, food production per person declined in recent years. Surplus food produced in high-income countries such as the United States is seldom affordable to the countries that need it most. THINKING CRITICALLY From the evidence and photographs shown in 'Global Society 13.1', compare the two family diets on the basis of cost, quantity of food, diversity of food items and fresh versus pre-packaged items. Is it possible to say which diet is healthier or which is more damaging to the natural environment? Explain as fully as possible the reasons for your answers. In what ways do these two diets reflect and illustrate global inequalities embedded within the world's food production systems? What might be the main effects on the natural environment, on human health and on other species if the current global human population of 6.6 billion were all to adopt the USA diet? Education, literacy and child labour Education and literacy are important routes to economic development. Here, again, lower-income countries are disadvantaged, since they can seldom afford high-quality public education systems. As a consequence, children in high-income countries are much more likely to get schooling than are children in low-income countries, and adults in highincome countries are much more likely to be able to read and write (see figure 13.3). While virtually all secondary school-aged males and females are still in full-time education in high-income countries, in 1997 only 71 per cent were in middle-income countries and only 51 per cent in low-income countries. In low-income countries, 30 per cent of male adults and almost half of female adults are Global Inequality unable to read and write. One reason for these differences is a sizeable gap in public expenditures on education: high-income countries spend a much larger percentage of their gross domestic product on education than do low-income countries (World Bank 2001). Education is important for several reasons. First, it contributes to economic growth, since people with advanced schooling provide the skilled work necessary for high-wage industries. Second, education offers the only hope of escaping from the cycle of harsh working conditions and poverty, since poorly educated people are condemned to low-wage, unskilled jobs. Finally, educated people are less likely to have large numbers of children, thus slowing the global population explosion that contributes to global poverty. A further important reason for the relatively low levels of children in primary education in low-income countries is children's involvement in work at the expense of their education. Children are often forced to work because of a combination of family poverty, lack of education provision and traditional indifference to the plight of those who are poor or who belong to ethnic minorities (UNICEF 2000a). Child labour has been legally eliminated in the high-income countries, but still exists in many parts of the world today. According to the United Nations International Labour Organization (ILO) more than 218 million boys and girls between the ages of 5 and 14 are working in developing countries, about one out of every four children in the world. Of these, 126 million are estimated to be working in hazardous conditions (ILO 2004). Child labour is found throughout the developing world, with the highest incidence of children's work in sub-Saharan Africa and the largest number of child workers found in the Asia-Pacific region. Two-thirds of working children (132 million) labour in agriculture, with the rest in manufacturing, wholesale and retail GLOBAL INEQUALITY Total net enrolment ratio in primary education, '1990/1991 , 1998/1999 and 2004/2005 (percentage) Sub-Saharan Africa I 541 571 o 0 1991 I o 0 1999 • • 2005 Oceania I I Western Asia CIS, Europe I I Southern Asia I I South-Eastern Asia I I CIS. Asia I I Eastern Asia I I Northern Africa I I Latin American & the Caribbean 751 81 I 81 I 851 831 ., 941 92 1 89 I 931 871 991 991 I I 941 o 20 40 60 80 .Number of pupils of the theoretical school-age group for primary education, enrolled either in primary or secondary education, expressed as a percentage of the total population in that age group. Figure 13.3 Global inequality in educational enrolrnent, 1991-2005 100 Source: Global Monitoring Report 2007 by World Bank © 2007 by World Bank Reproduced with permission ofWorld Bank in the format Textbook via Copyright Clearance Center. Education plays a crucial role in countries' economic development, but low-income nations' schools are often underfunded, trade, restaurants and hotels and a variety of services, including worldng as servants in wealthy households (ILO 2007). At best, these children work for long hours with little pay and are therefore unable to go to school and develop the skills that might eventually enable them to escape their lives of poverty. However, simply enforcing an immediate ban on all child labour, even if it were possible, might be counterproductive. Child labour is a better alternative to child prostitution or chronic under-nourishment, for example. The challenge is not just to end child labour, but also to move children from work into education, and to ensure that they are properly provided for during their school years. One form of child labour that is close to slavery is 'bonded labour'. In this system, children as young as 8 or 9 are pledged by their parents to factory·owners in exchange for sma!lloans. These children are paid so little that they never manage to reduce the debt, condemning them to a lifetime of bondage. One case of bonded labour that attracted international attention was that ofIqbal Masih, a Pakistani child who, at the age of 4, was sold into slavery by his father in order to borrow 600 rupees (roughly US$ I6) for the wedding of his first-born son. For six years, Iqba! spent most of his time chained to a carpet-weaving loom, tying tiny knots for hours on end. After fleeing the factory at the age of 10, he began speaking to labour organizations and schools about his experience. Iqba! paid a bitter price for his outspokenness: when he was 13, while riding his bicycle in his hometown, he was gunned down by agents believed to be working for the carpet industry (Bobak 1996). Global Society 13.2 Child labour in agriculture An !LO Report published for their World Day Against Child Labour. on 12 June 2007,focused on child labour in agricultural work settings, where the majority of child labourers work. Much agricultural child labour is not seen as formal employment but simply as 'helping the family'. which tends to render it invisible to policy- makers. The following section is from the ILO Report (2007) and it gives an indication of the risks children face in agricultural child labour. Seventy per cent of working children are in agriculture - more than 132 million girls and boys aged 5-14 years old. The vast majority of the world's child labourers are not toiling in factories and sweatshops or working as domestics or street vendors in urban areas;they are working on farms and plantations, often from sun up to sun down, planting and harvesting crops,spraying pesticides, and tending livestock on rural farms and plantations.These children play an important role in crop and livestock production,helping supply some of the food and drink we consume, and the fibres and raw materials we use to make other products. Examples include cocoa/chocolate, coffee,tea,sugar,fruits and vegetables,along with other agricultural products like tobacco and cotton. Alarge,though uncertain, number of the 132 million girls and boys carry out 'hazardous child labour',which is work that can threaten their lives, limbs,health, and general well-being.Irrespective of age, agriculture - along with construction and mining - is one of the three most dangerous sectors ill which to work in terms ofwork-related fatalities, non-fatal accidents and occupational disease. Child labourers are susceptible to all the hazards and risks faced by adult workers when placed in the same situation. They are at even greater risk from these dangers because their bodies are still growing and their minds and personalities still developing,and they lack work experience. So the effects ofpoor to non-existent safety and health protection can often be more devastating and lasting for them. Also. a feature of agriculture that sets it apart from most other forms of child labour is that the children usually live on the farms or plantations where they work. This exposes them to additional risks. Bangladesh is a primarily rural country and for many children working to help grow; harvest. transport or sell farm products is a normal, everyday role from the earliest days of childhood. They are regularly exposed to farm machinery and tools that often result in devastating injuries. About 50 children a day are injured by machines, and three of them are injured so severely that they become permanently disabled. In Zinibabwe. the wheels of a tractor which had been standing overnight had become bogged down in the mud. The following morning,a 12-year-old boy started the tractor, revved up the engine to free the wheels, trying to move in a forward direction (when the safe procedure would have been to try to reverse out). The wheels remained stuck,that is, resisted movement,and the tractor reared up on its front wheels and overturned backwards, fatally crushing the boy beneath it In 2000, an l l-year-old girl, illegally employed on a farm in Ceres, Western Cape. South Africa, fell off a tractor, resulting in the amputation of her left leg. In 1990,a 15-year-old migrant farm worker in the USA was fatally electrocuted when a 30-foot section of aluminium irrigation pipe he was moving came into contact with an overhead power line. 'IWo other child labourers with him sustained serious electrical burns to their hands and feet Source: lLO 2007 Abolishing exploitative child labour will require countries around the world to enact strong laws against the practice and be willing to enforce them. International organizations, such as the UNILO, have outlined a set of standards for such laws to follow. In June 1999, the UNILO adopted Convention 182, calling for the abolition of the 'Worst Forms ofChild Labour'.These are defined as includ- ing: • the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production and traffiCking of drugs as defined in the relevant international treaties; and • work that, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety, or morals of children. (ILO 1999) • all forms ofslavery or practices similar to slavery,such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom, and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; • the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of pornography, or for pornographic performances; Countries must also provide free public education and require that children attend school full time (UNICEF 2000). But part of the responsibility for solving the problem also lies with the global corporations that manufacture goods using child labour, trade unions that organize the workforce, agricultural cooperatives whose values are opposed to child labour and, ultimately, the consumers who buy the goods. THINKING CRITICALLY Were you surprised at the extent of child labour described above? Should all child labour right around the world be banned? What consequences positive and negative - would be likely to follow from such a ban? Can you think of any forms of 'child labour' which are still seen as acceptable in the high-income countries? What makes the l~tter appear to be more acceptable than those discussed above? Can poor countries become rich? By the mid-1970s, a number oflow-income countries in East Asia were undergoing a process of industrialization that appeared to threaten the global economic dominance of the United States and Europe (Amsden 1989; also see chapter 4 for a discussion of these developments). This process began with Japan in the 1950s, but quickly extended to the newly industrializing countries (NICs), that is, the rapidly growing economies of the world, particularly in East Asia but also in Latin America. The East Asian NICs included Hong Kong in the 1960s and Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore in the 1970s and 1980s. Other Asian countries began to follow in the 1980s and the early 1990s, most notably China, but also · Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. Today, most are middle-income, and somesuch as Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore - have moved up to the highincome category. Figure 13.4 compares the average economic growth rates of the low-, middleand high-income countries of the world. Economists have tended to assume that the developing countries, en bloc, would experience higher average rates of economic growth than the developed, high-income ones, as their development starts to catch up. However, until quite recently this was often not the case and only a few developing countries managed to out-perform the average growth rate of the developed economies. This has changed since the mid-1990s, though, as the average growth rates of lowand middle-income countries have been higher than those in the developed world. Indeed, 13 countries have now been reclassified by the World Bank as 'developed economies' as their economic growth rates have propelled them into the ranks of the relatively wealthy countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Babrain, Greece, Guam, Isle of Man, Republic ofKorea, Malta, New Caledonia, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, Saudi Arabia, San Marino and Slovenia (World Bank 2007b). These are all places that were considered to be poor just two generations ago. By 1999, the GDP per person in Singapore was virtually the same as that in the United States, while China, the world's most populous country, has one of the most rapidly growing economies on the planet. At an average annual growth rate of 10 per cent between 1980 and 1999, the Chinese economy doubled in size. Comparing countries on the basis oftheir average income level continues to show a wide divergence, particularly between the developed and developing countries. Comparing the incomes of rich and poor people within a single country shows that, over recent years. some countries have experienced widening income inequality (USA, UK, Brazil), while others have remained fairly stable (France, Canada). However, measuring global inequality at the individual level, regardless of country of residence, shows that since 1970, 'the average global citizen has become richer' and global income distribution has become more equal (Loungani 2003; see figure 13.4). However, this conclusion is heavily influenced by the rapid growth of a small number of large countries, including China, India and Vietnam. Leaving these aside, the 13 countries recategorized by the World Bank as 'developed economies' represent a small minority of all developing countries, Solutions to global inequality? Poverty Most of sub-Saharan Africa is in theWorld Bank's lowest income category ofless than US$765 gross national income (GNJ) per person per year.Ethiopia and Burundi are the worst off with just US$90 GNJ per person.Even middle-income countries like Gabon and Botswana have sizeable sections of the population living in poverty North Africa generally fares better than sub-Saharan Africa. Here, the economies are more stable, trade and tourism are relatively high and AIDS is less prevalent. Development campaigners continue to urge the G8 to reform the rules on debt, aid and trade to help lift more African nations out of poverty ..-2. auw- BIa-.I 3. 0""- 4. SlerrlL_ S. Uberia e.lwryeo.t ,......e.TOOO •.-10. EquMori" Gulnu WORLD BANK CATEGORY SOO"'....CAf LESOTliO LOH INCOME LOWER MIDDLE INCOME UPPER 1ol10DlE mCOME o <$250 • $7e&-$1 SOO • $3 038· SS 000 o $251 SSOO • SI 501-$2 SOO 0 ss 001-S7 500 o $501 S70S • $2,SOI S3 035 $7,501'59385 • No Ivallabl. data Soure. World Sink. World O.w.lop.....nllndlc.lor. dlllb... 2005 Source: http://news.bbc.co.ukll/shared/spllhi/africa/05/ africa_ economylhtmVpoverty.stm © bbc.co.uklnews Debt The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC) was set up in 1996 to reduce the debt of the poorest countries. Poor countries are eligible for the scheme ifthey face unsustainable debt that cannot be reduced by traditional methods.They also have to agree to follow certain policies of good governance as defined by the World Bank and the IMF Once these are established, the country is at 'decision point' and the amount of debt relief is established. Critics of the scheme say the parameters are too strict and more cOillltries should be eligible for HIPC debt relief. This map shows how much 'decision point' HIPC countries spend on repaying debts and interest. Under a new plan drawn up by the G8 finance ministers, 14 African HIPC countries will have their debts totally written off. SERVICING DEBTS Debt serVice .;IS a per«!ntage of government revenue, 2003 M08OCCO 1. GariMa 2. Guinea BlaNu 3. GulnH 4. Sl9rr. L.o". 5. Uberl. 6. Ivory CoMI 7. Gh.n. 8. Togo 9. lMnIn 10. Equfior1. GulnNI o.bC ..mce f Revenue lUNISlA EGYPT ElDTREA SUDAN f,..Ji.~ =~'AFSlAWAHDA BURUNOI COMOAOS I 21MBA8W£ NAMIBIA BOTSWANAl ~~'R I I .MOZAMBlQUE soum AFRICA SWAZlLAND MAURITlUS _ _ ~ _ _ I I 0% 5 ~. 10",- 15"'- 20' 25% 30-.. 4o, • 01"-' H1PC count,1.. ~ dill. • Non HIPC courrtrl•• Sourc. lOA and IMF HIPC InlUatlve updale Apr1l2005 Source: http://news.bbc.co.ukll/shared/spllhi/africa/05/ africa_economylhtmVdebt.stm © bbc.co.uklnews Aid Africa receives about a third ofthe total aid given by governments around the world, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) .Most aid has conditions attached, meaning that governments must implement certain policies to receive the aid or must spend the money on goods and services from the donor country The World Bank, which is reviewing its conditionality policies. argues that aid is far more effective, and less vulnerable to corruption, when coupled with improved governance. There was a sharp drop in rich countries' relative spending on aid in the late 1990s. In 200S, the 'Make Poverty History' campaign sought to persuade the G8 to raise an extra US$SO billion more in aid per year and to enforce earlier pledges for developed countries to give 0.70 per cent oftheir annual GDP in aid. The campaign claims success in gaining 'international acceptance of the principle of 100 per cent multilateral debt cancellation;an undertaking at the G8 summit that developing countries have the right to decide, plan and sequence their economic policies to fit with their own development strategies and international support for (as close as possilole) universal access to treatment for HN and AIDS for all who need it by 20 I0' (www.makepovertyhistoryorg/theyearofl). RELIANCE ON AID Net overseas development aSSIstance relative to GNI· ( 0/0), 2003 MOROCCO llUNlSIA WESTERN SAHARA LIBYA 1. a.nmt. 2. GuJnft 8' - 3. Qui".. 4. Stwra l eone 5. Uboria e. Ivory eo.. 7. Ghana • . Togo ........10. EqufIIGrI. Qui".. NAMIBIA SOUllt AFRICA EGYPT MADAGASCAR LESOTHO ISWAA~MAURITIUS _ _ I_~I _ I I ~ 10~. 20"4 30' 40\0 SO% 15"'" 100 • no avaUnblo data * Gron Notlo". llncomo Sourc. WOfid aank I OEe D Source: http://news.bbc.co.ukI1/sharedlspllhi/africalOS/ africa_economylhtmVaid.stm © bbc.co.ukInews Trade Africa is rich in natural resources such as minerals, timber and oil, but trade with the rest of the world is often difficult. Factors include poor infrastructure, government instability; corruption and the impact ofAIDS on the population ofworking age. Poorer countries and agencies such as Oxfam also argue that international trade rules are urilair and favour the developed world.They say rich countries 'dump' subsidized products on developing nations by undercutting local producers. And they accuse theWorld Trade Organization (WTO) of forcing developing nations to open their markets to the rest of the world but failing to lower rich countries' tanff barriers in return. The WTO responds that lowincome countries receive special treatment, including exemption from some regulations that apply to richer nations. CAPE YERDE . 1. G.mbJ. 2. GWnH Blaaeu 3. GulnM 4. SI.,,. L.on. 5. UtMria 6. Ivory eo... 7. Oh.... 8. l ogo .......10. E....ctt.. Gul,," 0 $0 - 5100 • $201 · $500 • $1001 - $5000 0 $101 - $200 El $501 - $1000 • $5000 + -MerchClndlse and commerCial services, a\ferag~ of exports plus Imports Source: World Trade OrQamOfatlon, 1003 Source: http://news.bbc.co.ukll/sharedlspllhi/africalOS/africa _economylhtmVtrade.strn © bbc.co.ukInews 6 ;;g !!.. 5 0 1985-95 --------------10 1975-85 .c ~ 4e . 1995-2005 Cl '" 3 "c c '"Q) 2 Cl [" Q) > « 0 Low-income Middle-income High-income Figure 13.4 Average economic growth in the low-,middle- and high-income countries, 1975-2005 Source. World Bank 2007b Concept ofincome inequality Cross-country inequality Within-country inequality Global inequality What it measures Inequality of average incomes across countries Differences between incomes of the rich and the poor within a country Differences between incomes of the rich and the poor, ignoring the country to which they belong What the evidence shows Divergence Increasing inequality in many countries (for example, Brazil, China,United States), but low and stable levels ID many others (for example, Canada, France, Japan) Convergence Source:Loungaru 2003 whose combined population totals only around 2 per cent of the global population. Clearly, economic growth rates remain very unevenly distributed. The share of global output over the decade 1995- 2005 did not improve for most developing regions, with the notable exception of East Asia and the Pacific (see figure 13.5), which increased its share by some 6 per cent in the period. The economic expansion in East Asia in particular has not been without its costs. These have included the sometimes violent repression of labour and civil rights, terrible factory conditions, the exploitation of an increasingly female workforce, the exploitation of immigrant workers from impoverished neighbouring countries and widespread environmental degradation. Nonetheless, thanks to the sacrifices of past generations of workers, large numbers of people in these countries are now prospering. How do social scientists account for the rapid economic growth in the East Asian NICs?The answer to this question may hold some crucial lessons for those low-income countries elsewhere that hope to follow in the steps of the NICs. Although the NICs' success is partly due to historically unique 1995 $42.3 trillion High-income 60% East Asia & Latin America & Caribbean 8% Europe & Central Asia 7% Sub-Saharan Africa 2% 2005 $61.3 trillion High-income 54% East Asia & Pacific 19% Latin America & Caribbean 8% Europe & Central Asia 7% North Africa 3% Figure 13.5 Share of global output by region, 1995 and 2005 Source:World Bank,World Development Indicators, 2007. © 2007 byWorld Bank.Reproduced with permission of World Bank in the format Textbook via Copyright Clearance Center. factors, it is also the result of factors that could lead to a rethinking about the causes ofglobal inequality. To understand the rapid development ofthis region, we need to view these countries both historically and within the context of the world economic system today. The economic success of the East Asian NICs, particularly from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, can be attributed to a combination of factors. Some of these are historical, including those that stem from world political and economic shifts. Some are cultural. Still. others have to do with the ways these countries have pursued economic growth. Some of the factors that aided their success are as follows: Historically, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore were once part of colonial situations that, while imposing many hardships, also helped to pave the way for economic growth. Taiwan and Korea were tied to the Japanese Empire; Hong Kong and Singapore were former British colonies. Japan eliminated large landowners who opposed industrialization , and both Britain and Japan encouraged industrial develop ment, constructed roads and other transportation systems, and built relatively efficient governmental bureaucracies in these particular colonies. Britain also actively developed both Hong Kong and Singapore as trading centres (Gold 1986; Cumings 1987). Elsewhere in the world - for example, in Latin America and AJrica - countries that are today poor did not fare so well in their dealings with richer, more powerful nations. 2 The East Asian region benefited from a long period of world economic growth. Between the 1950s and the mid-1970s, the growing economies of Europe and the United States provided a substantial market for the clothing, footwear and electronics that were increasingly being made in East Asia, creating a 'window of opportunity' for economic development Furthermore, periodic economic slowdowns in the United States and Europe forced businesses to cut their labour costs and spurred the relocation of factories to low-wage East Asian countries (Henderson and Appelbaum 1992). One World Bank study (1995) LIVE LIVE8JA From a Weberian perspective,traditions of respect and submission to authority embedded in Japanese culture can be used to explain the country's economic development. found that between 1970 and 1990, wage increases averaged 3 per cent yearly in developing countries where economic growth was led by exports to wealthier countries, while wages failed to increase elsewhere in the developing world. 3 Economic growth in this region took off at the high point of the Cold War, when the United States and its allies, in erecting a defence against communist China, provided generous economic and military aid. Directaid and loans fuelled investment in such new technologies as transistors, semiconductors and other electronics, contributing to the development of local industries. Military assistance frequently favoured strong (often military) governments that were willing to use repression to keep labour costs low (Mirza 1986; Cumings 1987, 1997; Castells 1992). 4 Some sociologists argue that the economic success of Japan and the East Asian NICs is due in part to their cultural traditions, in particular, their shared Confucian philosophy (Berger 1986). A century ago, Max Weber (1976 [1904-5)) argued that the Protestant beliefin thrift, frugality and hard work partly explained the rise of capitalism in Western Europe. His argument has been applied to Asian economic hjstory. Confucianism, it is argued, inculcates respect for one's elders and superiors, education, hard work and proven accomplishments as the key to advancement, as well as a willingness to sacrifice today to earn a GLOBAL INEQUALITY greater reward tomorrow. As a result of these values, the Weberian argument goes, Asian workers and managers are highly loyal to their companies, submissive to authority, hardworking and success-oriented. Workers and capitalists alike are said to be frugal. Instead of living lavishly, they are likely to reinvest their wealth in further economic growth. This explanation has some merit, but it overlooks the fact that businesses are not always revered and respected in Asia. During the late 1950s, pitched battles occurred between workers and capitalists in Japan - as they did in South Korea in the late 1980s. Students and workers throughout the EastAsian NICs have opposed business and governmental policies they felt to be unfair, often at the risk of imprisonment and sometimes even their lives (Deyo 1989; Ho 1990). Furthermore, such central Confucian cultural values as thrift appear to be on the decline in Japan and the NICs, as young people - raised in the booming prosperity of recent years - increasingly value conspicuous consumption over austerity and investment. 5 Many of the East Asian governments followed strong policies that favoured economic growth. Their governments played active roles in keeping labour costs low, encouraged economic development through tax breaks and other .economic policies and offered free public education. We shall discuss the role of East Asian government policies later in this chapter. Whether the growth of these economies will continue is unclear. In 1997- 8, a combination of poor investment decisions, corruption and world economic conditions brought these countries' economic expansion to an abrupt halt. Their stock markets collapsed, their currencies fell and the entire global economy was threatened. The experience ofHong Kongwas typical:after 37 years of continuous growth, the economy stalled and its stock market - the Hang Seng Index lost more than half its value. It remains to be seen whether the 'Asian meltdown', as the newspapers called it in early 1998, will have a long-term effect on the region or is merely a blip in its recent growth. Once their current economic problems are solved, many economists argue, the newly industrializing Asian economies will resume their growth, although perhaps not at the meteoric rates ofthe past. For example, by 2004 economists noted that Hong Kong's economy was again growing and the property market was rising. Theories of development What causes global inequality and how can it be overcome? Can it ever be overcome? In this section, we shall examine different types of theory that have been advanced over the years to explain development: market-oriented theories, dependency and world systems theories and state-centred theories. These theories have strengths and weaknesses. One shortcoming of all of them is that they frequently give short shrift to the role of women in economic development. By putting them together, however, we should be able to answer a key question facing the 85 per cent ofthe world's population living outside high-income countries: how can they move up in the world econ- omy? Market-oriented theories The most influential theories of global inequality advanced by British and American economists and sociologists 40 years ago were market-oriented theories. These assume that the best possible economic consequences will result if individuals are free - uninhibited by any form of governmental constraint - to make their own economic decisions. Unrestricted capitalism, if it is allowed to develop fully, is said to be the avenue to economic growth. Government bureaucracy should not dictate which goods to produce, what prices to charge or how much workers Classic Studies 13.1 Wait Rostow and the stages of economic growth The research problem VVhy have some countries and regions experienced rapid economic development, while others continue to struggle? Is the problem of underdevelopment essentially an internal one (rooted within particular countries), or is it the consequence of external forces? What can we learn about the process of development from the already developed societies? The answers given byWait Rostow (1916-2003) ,an economic adviser to former US President John F Kennedy who became an influential economic theorist, helped to shape US foreign policy towards Latin America during the 1960s. Rostow's explanation Rostow's explanation is a market-oriented approach, which came to be described as modernization theory Modernization theory says that low-income societies can develop economically but only ifthey give up their traditional ways and adopt modern economic institutions, technologies and cultural values, which emphasize savings and productive investment. According to Rostow (1961) ,the traditional cultural values and social institutions of low-income countries impede their economic effectiveness.For example, he argued that many people in low-income countries lack a strong work ethic; they would rather consume today than invest for the future. Large families are also seen as partly responsible for 'economic backwardness' ,since a breadwinner with many mouths to feed can hardly be expected to save TI10ney for investment purposes. But for Rostow and other moderrtization theorists, the problems in low-income countries run much deeper. The cullures of such countries tend to support 'fatalism' - a value system that views hardship and suffering as an unavoidable part of normal life. Acceptance of one's lot in life thus discourages people from working hard and being thrifty in order to overcome their fate. On this view, then, a cOWltry's economic underdevelopment is due largely to the cultural failings of the people themselves. Such failings are reinforced by government policies that set wages and control prices, generally interfering in the operation of the economy. So how can lowincome countries break out of their poverty? Rostow saw economic growth as moving through several stages,which he likened to tlie journey of an aeroplane (see figure 13.6): Take-off • Maturity •....... • •.. ........... • High mass-consumption Britain France USA Germany Sweden Russia Canada Argentina Mexico China India Figure 13.6 Rostow's stages of economic growth for selected countries, 1750-1959 Source: www.agocg.ac.ukIreports/visua1.casestud/ southallitrajecto.htm The traditional stage. This is the stage just described, characterized by low rates of savings, tlie (supposed) lack of a strong work ethic and the 'fatalistic' value system. We could say that this aeroplane is stuck on the r.unway. 2 Take-offto economic growth.Tlie traditional stage, can give way to a second one: economic take-off.This occurs when poor countries begin to jettison their traditional values and institutions, and people start to save and invest money for the future.The role of wealthy countries is to facilitate and support this take-off. They can do this by financing birth control programmes or providing low-cost loans for electrification, road and airport construction, and starting new industries. 3 Drive to technological maturity. According to Rostow, with the help of money and advice from high-income countries, the aeroplane of economic growth would taxi down the runway pick up speed and become airborne.The country would then approach technological maturity In the aeronautical metaphor, the plane would slowly climb to cruising altitude, improving its technology reinvesting its recently acquired wealth in new industries and adopting the institutions and values of the high-income countries. 4 High mass consumption Finally the country would reach the phase of high mass consumption. Now people are able to enjoy the fruits of their labour by achieving a high standard ofliving. The aeroplane (country) cruises along on automatic pilot, having entered the ranks of the high-income countries. Rostow's ideas remain influential. Indeed, neoliberalism, which is perhaps the prevailing view among economists today; is rooted in Rostow's ideas. Neoliberals argue that freemarket forces, achieved by minimizing governmental restrictions on business,provide the only route to economic growth, holding that global free trade will enable all the countries of the world to prosper. Eliminating governmental regulation is seen as necessary for economic growth to occur.Neoliberal economists therefore call for an end to restrictions on trade and often challenge minimum wage and other labour laws, as well as environmental restrictions on business. Critical points Supporters of modernization theory point to the success of the newly industrializing economies of East Asia as proofthat development really is open to all. However, it can be objected that (as we saw above) the reasons for this success is partly accidental, involving ColdWar political expediency and the historical legacy of colonialism. Such a conjunction of conditions is unlikely to apply to other low-income countries in the post-ColdWar world. Indeed, even in the twenty-first century many low-income countries, in spite of external assistance, have not passed through Rostow's stages and remain very far from becoming economically developed. A further criticism is that Rostow saw high-income countries playing a key role in helping lowincome ones to grow But this fails to take proper account of the long-term consequences of colonialism, which benefited the militarily powerful European societies at the expense of those in Asia and Latin America, thus dealing the latter's economic development a devastating early blow. Finally, by pointing to 'fatalistic' cultural values as a causal factor in underdevelopment, Rostow can be seen as etlmocentric,holding up Western values, ideals and models of 'progress' as superior. As chapter 5, 'The Environment',shows, the Western pursuit of untrammelled economic growth has, perhaps irrevocably damaged the global natural environment. leading some to question whether this kind of 'progress' can be sustainable over the long term. Contemporary significance Rostow's theory of 'evolutionary' stages towards self-sustaining economic growth has sulfered in the light of continued global poverty hunger and underdevelopment, leading many to abandon it altogether. Certainly any notion ofinevitable progress through the Rostovian stages finds little support almost half a century later as his 'noncommunist manifesto' has probably attracted as much opposition and criticism as Marx and Engels's (1848) original communist version.But as we have already seen in this chapter, recent global indicators do present a more positive picture of an improving situation for many though by no means all, populations in the low- and middle-income countries of the world.This may show that economic development is not exclusive to the high-income societies and that, as Rostow argued, the process of modernization remains a possibility for all in an era of rapid globalization and the intensification ofinternational trade. should be paid. According to marketoriented theorists, governlnentaJ direction of the economies of low-income countries results in blockages to economic development. In this view, local governments should get out of the way of development (Rostow 1961; Warren 1980; Ranis 1996). THINKING CRITICALLY Karl Marx said that the industrialized countries showed an image of their own future to the less developed countries. What are the main differences between Marx's version of modernization theory and that ofWalt Rostow? Whose version, if any, is best supported by the historical evidence to date? Dependency and world systems theories During the 1960s, a number of theorists questioned market-oriented theories of global inequality such as modernization theory. Many of these critics were sociologists and economists from the low-income countries of Latin America and Africa, who drew on Marxist ideas to reject the idea that their countries' economic underdevelop~ ment was due to their own cultural or institutional faults. Instead, they build on the theories of Karl Marx, who argued that world capitalism would create a class of countries manipulated by more powerful countries, just as capitalism within countries leads to the exploitation of workers. The dependency theorists, as they are called, argue that the poverty oflow-income countries stems from their exploitation by wealthy countries and the multinational corporations that are based in wealthy countries. In their view, global capitalism locked their countries into a downward spiral of exploitation and poverty. According to dependency theories, this exploitation began with colonialism, a political-economic system under which Global Inequality powerful countries established, for their own profit, rule over weaker peoples or countries. Powerful nations have colonized other countries usually to procure the raw materials needed for their factories and to control markets for the products manufactured in those factories. Under colonial rule, for example, the petroleum, copper, iron and food products required by industrial economies are extracted from low-income countries by businesses based in highincome countries. Although colonialism typically involved European countries establishing colonies in North and South America, Africa and Asia, some Asian countries (such as Japan) had colonies as well. Even though colonialism ended throughout most ofthe world after the Second World War, the exploitation did not: transnational corporations continued to reap enormous profits from their branches in low-income countries. According to dependency theory, these global companies, often with the support of the powerful banks and governments of rich countries, established factories in poor countries, using cheap labour and raw materials to maximize production costs without governmental interference. In turn, the low prices set for labour and raw materials prevented poor countries from accumulating the profit necessary to industrialize themselves. Local businesses that might compete with foreign corporations were prevented from doing so. In this view, poor countries are forced to borrow from rich countries, thus inc reasing the ir economic dependency. Low-income countries are thus seen not as underdeveloped, but rather as misdeveloped (Frank 1966; EmmanueI1972). With the exception of a handful of local politicians and businesspeople who serve the interests of the foreign corporations, people fall into poverty. Peasants are forced to choose between starvation and working at nearstarvation wages on foreign-controlled plantations and in foreign-controlled mines and factories. Since dependency theorists argue that such exploitation has kept their Transnational corporations have often been accused of exploiting the poorest and reaping the financial rewards. Some argue this means that dependency culture, whereby the economic growth of poorer nations is held back by developed countries,did not die with colonialism. countries from achieving economic growth, they typically call for revolutionary changes that would push foreign corporations out of their countries altogether (Frank 1969). While market-oriented theorists usually ignore political and military power, dependency theorists regard the exercise of power as central to enforcing unequal economic relationships. According to this theory, whenever local leaders question such unequal arrangements, their voices are quickly suppressed. Unionization is usually outlawed, and labour organizers are jailed and sometimes killed. When people elect a government opposing these policies, that government is likely to be overthrown by the country's military, often backed by the armed forces of the industrialized countries themselves. Dependency theorists point to many examples: the role of the CIA in overthrowing the Marxist governments of Guatemala in 1954 and Chile in 1973 and in undermining support for the leftist government in Nicaragua in the 1980s. In the view of dependency theory, global economic inequality is thus backed up by military force: economic elites in poor countries, backed by their counterparts in wealthy ones, use police and military power to keep the local population under control. Brazilian sociologist, Enrique Fernando Cardoso, once a prominent dependency theorist, argued more than 25 years ago that some degree of dependent development was nonetheless possible - that under certain circumstances, poor countries can still develop economically, although only in ways shaped by their reliance on the wealthier countries (Cardoso and Faletto 1979). In particular, the governments of these countries could play a key role in steering a course between dependency and development (Evans 1979). As President of Brazil from 1995 to 2003, Cardoso changed his thinking, calling for greater integration of Brazil into the global economy. During the last quarter of a century, sociologists have increasingly seen the world as a single (although often conflict-ridden) economic system. Although dependency theories hold that individual countries are economically tied to one another, wor1dsystems theory , which is strongly influenced by dependency theory, argues that the world capitalist economic system is not merely a collection of independent countries engaged in diplomatic and economic relations with one another, but must instead be understood as a single unit. The world-systems approach is most closely identified with the work of Immanuel Wallerstein and his colleagues (Wallerstein 1974,1990 and elsewhere). In chapter 4,'Globalization and the Changing World',see 'Classic Studies 4.1' (or a discussion ofWallerstein's pioneering role in world-systems theory. Wallerstein showed that capitalism has long existed as a global economic system, beginning with the extension of markets and trade in Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The world system is seen as comprising four overlapping elements (Chase-Dunn 1989): • a world market for goods and labour; • the division of the population into different economic classes, particularly capitalists and workers; GLOBAL INEQUALITY • an international system of formal and informal political relations among the most powerful countries, whose competition with one another helps shape the world economy; and • the carving up of the world into three unequal economic zones, with the wealthier zones exploiting the poorer ones. World-systems theorists term these three economic zones 'core', 'periphery' and 'semiperiphery'. All countries in the world system are said to fall into one of the three categories. Core countries are the most advanced industrial countries, taking the lion's share of profits in the world economic system. These include Japan, the United States and the countries of Western Europe. Peripheral countries comprise low-income, largely agricultural countries that are often manipulated by core countries for their own economic advantage. Examples of peripheral countries are found throughout Africa and to a lesser extent in Latin America and Asia. Natural resources, such as agricultural products, minerals and other raw materials, flow from periphery to core - as do the profits. The core, in turn, sells finished goods to the periphery, also at a profit. Worldsystems theorists argue that core countries have made themselves wealthy with this unequal trade, while at the same time limiting the economic development of peripheral countries. Finally, the semi-peripheral countries occupy an intermediate position: these are semi-industrialized, middleincome countries that extract profits from the more peripheral countries and in turn yield profits to the core countries. Examples of semi-peripheral countries include Mexico in North America; Brazil, Argentina and Chile in SouthAmerica; and the newly industrializing economies ofEastAsia. The semi-periphery, though to some degree controlled by the core, is thusalso able to exploit the periphery. Moreover, the greater economic success of the semi-periphery holds out to the periphery the promise of similar development. Although the world system tends to change very slowly, once-powerful countries eventually lose their economic power and others then take their place. For example, some five centuries ago the Italian city-states of Venice and Genoa dominated the world capitalist economy. First the Dutch, then the British and currently the United States superseded them. Today, in the view ofsome world-systems theorists, American dominance is giving way to a more 'multipolar' world where economic power will be shared berween the United States, Europe and Asia (Arrighi 1994). State-centred theories Some of the most recent explanations of successful economic development emphasize the role of state policy in promoting growth. Differing sharply from marketoriented theories, state-centred theories argue that appropriate government policies do not interfere with economic development but rather can play a key role in bringing it about. Alarge body of research now suggests that in some regions of the world, such as East Asia, successful economic development has been state-led. Even the World Bank, long a strong proponent offree-market theories of development, has changed its thinking about the role of the state. In its 1997 report The State in a Changing World, the World Bank concluded that without an effective state, 'sustainable development, both economic and social, is impossible'. Strong governments contributed in various ways to economic growth in the East Asian NICs during the 1980s and 19905 (Appelbaum and Henderson 1992; Amsden et al. 1994; World Bank 1997): 1 East Asian governments have sometimes aggressively acted to ensure political stability, while keeping labour costs low. This has been accomplished by acts of repression, such as outlawing trade unions, banning strikes, jailing labour leaders and, in general, silencing the voices of workers. The governments of Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore in particular have engaged in such prac- tices. 2 East Asian governments have frequently sought to steer economic development in desired directions. For example, state agencies have often provided cheap loans and tax breaks to businesses that invest in industries favoured by the government. Sometimes this strategy has backfired, resulting in bad loans held by the government (one of the causes of the region's economic problems during the late 1990s). Some governments have prevented businesses from investing their profits in other countries, forcing them to invest in economic growth at home. Sometimes governments have owned and therefore controlled key industries. for example, the Japanese government has owned railways, the steel industry and banks; the South Korean government has owned banks; and the government of Singapore has owned airlines and the armaments and ship-repair industries. 3 East Asian governments have ofren been heavily involved in social programmes such as low-cost housing and universal education. The world's largest public housing systems (outside socialist or formerly socialist countries) have been in Hong Kong and Singapore, where government subsidies keep rents extremely low. As a result, workers do not require high wages to pay for their housing, so they can compete more easily with American and European workers in the emerging global labour market. In Singapore, which has an extremely strong central government, well-funded public education and training help to provide workers with the skills they need to compete effectively in the emerging global labour market. The Singaporean government also requires businesses and individual citizen alike to save a large percentage of their income for investment in future growth. Global Inequality Evaluatmg theories of development Each type of theory discussed above has both strengths and weaknesses. But together, they enable us to understand better the causes and cures for global in- equality. Market-oriented theories recommend the adoption of modern capitalist institutions to promote economic development, as the recent example of East Asia attests. They further argue that countries can develop economically only if they open their borders to trade, and they can cite evidence in support of this argument. But market-oriented theories also fail to take into account the various economic ties between poor countries and weaithy onesties that can impede economic growth under some conditions and enhance it under others. They tend to blame lowincome countries themselves for their poverty rather than looking to the influence of outside factors, such as the business operations of more powerful nations. Market-oriented theories also ignore the ways government can work with the private sector to spur economic development. Finally, they fail to explain why some countries manage to take off economically while others remain grounded in poverty and underdevelopment. Dependency theories address the market-oriented theories' neglect in considering poor countries' ties with wealthy countries by focusing on how wealthy nations have economically exploited poor ones. However, although dependency theories help to account for much of the economic backwardness in Latin America and Africa, they are unable to explain the occasional success story among such low-income countries as Brazil, Argentina and Mexico or the rapidly expanding economies of East Asia. In fact, some countries, once in the low-income category, have risen economically even in the presence of multinational corporations. GLOBAL INEQ UALITY Even some former colonies, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, both once dependent on Great Britain, count among the success stories. World-systems theory sought to overcome the shortcomings of dependency theories by analysing the world economy as a whole. Rather than beginning with individual countries, world-systems theorists look at the complex global web of political and economic relationships that influence development and inequality in poor and rich nations alike. State-centred theories stress the governmental role in fostering economic growth. They thus offer a useful alternative to both the prevailing market-oriented theories, with their emphasis on states as economic hindrances, and dependency theories, which view states as allies ofglobal business elites in exploiting poor countries. When combined with the other theories - particularly world-systems theory - state-centred theories can explain the radical changes now transforming the world economy. International organizations and global inequality There are a number of internationalorganizations whose work impacts on global poverty. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank - together known as the Bretton Woods Institutions (named after the place they were set up: Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, USA) were established during the Second World War. They are based in Washington, DC, and their membership is made up of governments from across the world. The IMF is an organization of 184 countries. The main work of the IMF is in maintaining stability in the international financial system - most noticeably when it is called in to sort out a large debt crisis, for example as happened in Argentina from 2001 to 2003. It also works with governments across the world to improve their economic management, but it is precisely that advice which is often criticized as causing some of the problems that poorer countries face (Stiglitz 2002). The IMF 's Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) are essentially sets of conditions aimed at helping countries to balance their economies. These conditions are imposed on governments, primarily in the developing world, in return for new loans or to enable them to make repayments on older loans from commercial banks or from the World Bank. However, although SAPs were meant to target the needs of the specific country, in practice they have focused on the same 'solutions', including privatiza tion programmes, reductions in social welfare spending and free market reforms. Criticsargue that in too many cases, structural adjustment has had negative rather than positive effects on developing countries. Some have even suggested leaving the IMF and setting up an alternative bank, specifically for the developing countries of the Southern hemisphere (see 'Global Society 13.3'). Since 1999, the IMF and World Bank have tried to counter such criticisms by requiring loan recipients to produce Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) outlining countrywide plans to reduce poverty. They hope that this will connect the IMF and World Bank's financial assistance to the Millennium Development Goal of halving 1990 poverty levels by 2015. The World Bank Group's mission is to fight poverty and improve the living standards of people in the developing world.It is a development bank, which provides loans, policy advice, technical assistance and knowledge-sharing services to low- and middle-income countries to reduce poverty. The World Bank is made up of a number of accounts providing relatively cheap finance - mainly loans - for its member governments. Recently, the Bank has also started giving grants to governments for specific programmes. It also provides technical expertise alongside its loans and grants. Both the World Bank and the IMF have been accused of promoting market-driven Global Society 13.3 Why South America wants a new bank Leaders of several South American nations have signed a founding document to create a new body, the Bank ofthe South, as an alternative to multilateral credit organizations such as the International Monetary Fund andWorld Bank. The idea was first put forward byVenezuelan President Hugo Chavez in December 2006 as part of his battle against the influence of the US and the international financial institutions,which he has described as 'tools ofWashington'.Argentina, Brazil,Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela have all joined the initiative. Chile and Peru decided to remain on the sidelines, while Colombia,which had expressed interest, has put its decision on hold following recent disagreements between Colombian President Alvaro Uribe and Mr Chavez. According to Venezuelan finance minister Rodrigo Cabezas,the creation of a new organization is (a demonstration that times have changed'.The Bank of the South, known as Banco del Sur in Spanish and Banco do Sul in Portuguese, he explains, will be funded and run by South American cOlUltries themselves. Analysts believe the Bank of the South initiative reflects the increased unpopularity ofthe IMF and the World Bank among many South American countries. MarkWeisbrot,co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research inWashington, also sees it as one of many signs of a new independence from institutions such as the IMF and its 'unwanted austerity measures'. 'At the beginning of this decade, scepticism in Latin America was sealed when Argentina disregarded IMF advice by defaulting on its debt and then experienced robust economic recovery' , Mr Weisbrot said. Luis Maldonado. a presidential representative to the government body that helps regulate Ecuador's banking sector, argues that 'Latin America has been impoverished and harassed long enough that we have no other choice [but to1start the Bank of the South'.Venezuela has gone so far as to threaten to leave the IMF - although it has not set any date for such a move. 'If the IMF does not abandon its record of implementing tough policies with regards to emerging countries and being totally benevolent to developed countries, as it was in the last US mortgage crisis, it will struggle to regain its credibility', said Mr Cabezas. Pulling out of the IMF would amount to a technical default onVenezuela's bonds and would raise the cost of future borrowing in global markets. Other members of the Bank of the South share many ofVenezuela's concerns about the IMF but have made clear that they do not intend to leave it or other international institutions. Gustavo Guzman, Bolivia's anibassador to Washington, explained to the BBC that the bank would provide a muchneeded'alternative source' of funds.He points out that it has been difficult for Bolivia to get loans from the IMF and international markets since the government's recent moves to renationalise its oil and natural gas industry, Colombian finance minister Oscar Ivan Zuluaga said at a meeting in NewYork that the Banco del Sur was seen as an effort to integrate the countries of South America and 'nothing more than that'. Mixed reactions The Bank of the South proposition has been greeted with caution by most analysts, although they agree that having more options for countries seeking funding is not a bad idea. Michael Shifler, Latin American expert at the Washington-based Inter-American Dialogue, said that while it was 'tempting to dismiss the Banco del Sur because of the political agenda behind it' ,he would advise sceptics to wait and see. 'Chavez's political agenda is undeniable, but so is the money he has at his disposal right now' ,he said. 'Over the longer run, the initiative will have real problems because of politicisation,but in the meantime it would be a mistake to underestimate its possibilities.' Mr Shifler also feels the timing is fortunate. 'Banco del Sur is taking off precisely when traditional multilateral institutions like the InterAmerican Development Bank and World Bank are struggling to redefine their missions and adapt to new circumstances', he said. 'Everything is in flux, so anything can happen: Source: Adapted from Lourdes Heredia, BBC News. 10 December 2007 © bbc.co.ukJnews GLOBAL INEQUALITY reforms to the detriment of poor countries and people, and both have made an effort in recent years to concentrate more on the elimination of poverty. One example of the new approach taken by the World Bank and IMF in recent years has been an initiative known as HlPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries - to grant debt relief to many of the poorest countries (see 'Using your sociological imagination 13.1' above). Some countries had taken on so many loans over a number of decades, which had attracted so much interest, that they could not afford to pay them back. If they were to pay them back in full, it would probably have wiped out the resources that the countries' governments had available for education, health and other basic services. The HIPe initiative was launched in 1996 to give those countries sufficient relief - funded by governments of rich countries that they could deal with their debt burden as well as tackle poverty. A key element of the initiative was the requirement for all countries involved to produce and implement a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. By 2007, 29 countries had taken part in the HIPC process. The United Nations, perhaps the best known of the international organizations, includes a series of funds and programmes, which work across the world to tackle the causes and effects of poverty. Examples include the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Children's Fund, both based in New York, the World Food Programme in Rome and the World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva. All have country offices across the world. Each aims to tackle different aspects of poverty. UNICEF's work is focused on girls' education, protection of children and immunization, as well as provision of clean water and sanitation. UNDP works with governments in poor countries to improve governance, including the rule of law, justice, state provision of basic services and tackling corruption. Add perhaps another ten UN organizations in anyone country and there is likely to be a complicated mix of organizations covering a number of interrelated issues. One key concern is the spread of HIV and its effects on economic, health, institutional capacity, family and social spheres. At least four UN organizations are therefore involved in tackling this problem. UN organizations generally suffer from low levels of core funding compared to their BrettonWoods cousins. Some, like theWHO, are also involved in setting international standards and undertaking research. One member of the UN family that has regularly been in the news headlines in recent years is theWorldTrade Organization (WTO). Based in Geneva, it regulates international trade through negotiations between its 149 member governments and provides a mechanism for resolving trade disputes. The WTO has been the focus for a wave of anti-globalization and anti-capitalist demonstrations since its creation in 1995, replacing the previous General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which had operated since 1948. The protests have involved a varied range of political activists and social movements which view the WTO, along with the World Bank and the IMF, as managing the world economy in the interests of the already wealthy and powerful countries against the interests of the global poor. Chapter 22, 'Politics, Government and Social Movements'. discusses the anti· globalization movement in more detail. The round ofWTO negotiations launched in Doha in Qatar in 2001 is referred to by some as a 'development round'. There is a widespread view that the current international trading system is not fair to poorer countries and is constraining their economic development. A prime aim of these negotiations is to rectify this through, for example, improved access for these countries' goods and services to others' markets. However, the lack of real progress in negotiations led to the Doha Round being suspended on 27 July 2006. In particular, no agreement could be reached on reducing the huge subsidies which farmers in the USA, Europe and Japan receive, or the restrictive import tariffs imposed by emerging economies including China, Brazil and India. Without some movement on these two issues, developing countries continue to be disadvantaged and denied access to 'fair trade' in international markets (see 'Global Society 13.4'). THINKING CRITICALLY Look at the evidence presented in 'Global society 13.4' on world trade. How do the four theoretical perspectives we introduced above fare in the light of this evidence? For instance, does it illustrate Rostow's stages of economic growth? Can dependency theory explain the persistence of such unequal trading relations? Is there evidence here of the threefold typology outlined in Wallerstein's economic world-system theory? What explanatory power do state-centred theories have in relation to international trade and its obvious inequities?What would the WTO need to do in order to give poorer, developing countries more opportunities to trade across the world and improve their share of world trade? How likely do you think it is that the WTO will achieve this? All the organizations described above are said to be multilateral,as they involve many, indeed the majority of, countries. So-called bilateral donors are also involved in the reduction of global poverty. In the UK, the government's Department for International Development (DflD), works with specific poor countries to meet the Millennium Development Goals. These goals were set out by the international community in the late 1990s.They include a series oftargets, of which two of the most important are halving, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than US$1 a Global Inequality day and ensuring that, by 2015, all children will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling. Several of these targets are unlikely to be met. In the UK, the work of DflD includes the provision of grants and expertise in the country, as well as policy and advocacy at the international level to remove some of the structural barriers to the reduction of poverty (for example debt, trade rules and exploitation of resources). Global economic inequality in a changing world Today the social and economic forces leading to a single global capitalist economy appear to be irresistible. The principal challenge to this outcome - socialism/communism - ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The largest remaining socialist country in the world today, the People's Republic of China, is rapidly adopting many capitaHst economic institutions and is the fastest-growing economy in the world. It is too soon to tell how far the future leaders of China will move down the capitalist road. Will they eventually adopt a complete market-oriented economy or some combination of state controls and capitalist institutions? Most China experts agree on one thing: when China, with its 1.3 billion people, fully enters the global capitalist system, its impact will be felt around the world. China has an enormous workforce, much of which is well trained and educated and now receives extremely low wages sometimes less than one-twentieth of what workers earn in comparable jobs in the developed countries. Such a workforce will be extremely competitive in a global economy and will force wages down from Los Angeles to London. What does rapid globalization mean for the future of global inequality? No sociologist knows for certain, but many possible scenarios exist. In one, our world might be dominated by large, global corporations with workers competing against each other for a living wage. Such a scenario might Global Society 13.4 World trade, globalization and the persistence of global inequality, 1950-2002 The growth in world trade has been unevenly spread.Some developing countries - often in Asia - have increased growth by producing more manufactured goods.But others - often in Africa - have fallen further behind. The world's poorest countries - the 49 least developed countries - have not shared in the growth ofworld trade.The 646 million people in the top exporting countries - the US, German" Japan,France and UK - have 100 times more trade than their poor counterparts. Huge agricultural subsidies byWestern countries to their small farm populahons far outweigh the aid given to developing countries.The rich countries have repeatedly pledged to reduce the size oftheir farm supports. So far the amount of such subsidies has changed little in 20 years,while the amount ofaid has declined. Where trade gr.",., the e.onomy follows•••• Western Eu rope 1100 IS7 285 450 East-:rn Europe ==-...__ RUSSIa La tin Ame rica 15001900 109ill• • 1605j9~~0 5 ulh Middle East A "o 600 1166 ]00. East Asia 1000 ]000 '"•• T••d. '"•• GDP 1iiI.flows 1iiI.growth All figuresbillion US $ SOURCE : WTO, WORLD BANK . O' all world trade in 2002••• 37% 0.60/0Top five Least exporting ----, countries Populotion Rest of the world ~ develol?ed countries Populotion IllIlItul tulllllll 1111111111 1111111111 1111111111 11111111It IttuItItI Itlltltltl Iltltltltl Itlltltltl 11I1I1t1t1 Iltltlllll 1111(646m SOURCE: WTO, UNCTAD 648mlllll Su"sldles tilt the ..alan•••••• Subsidies $305 bn Subsidies: The 30 riche st countries' s upport to their own agricultural industries Aid $50.6bn Aid: The 30 ,;chest countries ' deve lopm ent a ssista nce to poo r co untries . SOURCE: O ECD (200 1) Commodity prl••s keep failing ••.• SOURCE; WTO , IMP 250 200 1'-_./_-.... _ Food -Metals 150 100 50 ~~~""~rrrrrrrrrrrrTrTrTTTT~~"""n 19571960 1970 1980 1990 001 Dependence on a single commodity (% of exIPOI·tS) I OIL COFFEE COPPER ANGOLA • BURUNDI ZAMBIA 80% 73% 70% Many poor countries depend on a single primary export like wood,coffee, copper or cotton.But prices for such commodities have been declining. Prices of manufactured goods have, in contrast. risen in relative terms. Source: BBC News Online, 15 August 2007, ''IIade and the poor: will globalization save or destroy the world?' :http://news.bbc.co.ukIllhilin_depthlbusiness/2004/world_trade/default.stm# China is the fastest-growing economy in the world.Despite its communist foundations,the gap between rich and poor is large and arguably widening. GLOBAL INEQUALITY predict faIling wages for large numbers of people in today's high-income countries and rising wages for more in low-income countries. There might be a general levelling out of average income around the world, although at a level much lower than that currently enjoyed in the industrialized nations. In this scenario, the polarization between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' within countries would grow, as the whole world would be increasingly divided into those who benefit from the global economy and those who do not. Such a polarization could fuel conflict between ethnic groups, and even nations, as those suffering from economic globalization would blame others for their plight (Hirst and Thompson 1992; Wagar 1992). On the other hand, a global economy could mean greater opportunity for everyone, as the benefits of modern technology stimulate worldwide economic growth. According to this more optimistic scenario, the more successful East Asian NICs, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore, are a sign ofthings to come. Other NICs such as Malaysia and Thailand will soon follow, along with China, Indonesia, Vietnam and other Asian countries. India, the world's second most populous country, already boasts a middle class of some 200 million people, about a quarter of its total population (although roughly the same number live in poverty) (Kuikarni 1993). A countervailing trend, however, is the technology gap that divides rich and poor countries, which today appears to be widening, making it even more difficult for poor countries to catch up. The global technology gap is a result of the disparity in wealth between nations, but it also reinforces those disparities, widening the gap between rich and poor countries. Poor countries cannot easily afford modern technology - yet, in the absence of it, they face major barriers in overcoming poverty. They are caught in a vicious downward spiral from which it is proving difficult to escape. Jeffrey Sachs, Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University in New York, and a prominent adviser to many East European and developing countries, claims that the world is divided into three classes: technology innovators, technology adopters and the technologically disconnected (Sachs 2000). Technology innovators are those regions that provide nearly all ofthe world's technological inventions; they account for no more than 15 per cent of the world's population. Technology adopters are those regions that are able to adopt technologies invented elsewhere, applying them to production and consumption; they account for 50 per cent of the world's population. Finally, the technologically disconnected are those regions that neither innovate nor adopt technologies developed elsewhere; they account for 35 per cent of the world's population. Note that Sachs speaks of regions rather than countries. In today's increasingly borderless world, technolOgy use does not always respect national frontiers. For example, Sachs notes that technologically disconnected regions include 'southern Mexico and pockets of tropical Central America; the Andean countries; most of tropical Brazil; tropical sub-Saharan Africa; most of the former Soviet Union aside from the areas nearest to European and Asian markets; landlocked parts of Asia such as the Ganges valley states oflndia; landlocked Laos and Cambodia; and the deep-interior states of China' (Sachs 2000). These are impoverished regions that lack access to markets or major ocean trading routes. They are caught in what Sachs terms a 'poverty trap', plagued by 'tropical infectious disease, low agricultural productivity and environmental degradation - all requiring technological solutions beyond their means' (ibid.). Innovation requires a critical mass of ideas and technology to become selfsustaining. 'Silicon Valley', near San Francisco in the United States, provides one example of how technological innovation tends to be concentrated in regions rich in univerSIties and high-tech firms. Silicon Valley grew up around Stanford University and other educational and research institutions located south of San Francisco. Poor countries are ill-equipped to develop such high-tech regions. Sachs calculates that 48 tropical or partly tropical countries, whose combined population totalled 750 million, accounted for only 47 of the 51,000 patents granted in the USA to foreign inventors in 1997. Most poor countries lack even a science adviser to their government. More ~ over, these countries are too poor to import computers, mobile phones, fax machines, computerized factory machinery or other kinds of high technology. Nor can they afford to license technology from the foreign companies that hold the patents. What can be done to overcome the technological abyss that divides rich and poor countries? Sachs calls on wealthy, hightechnology countries to provide much greater financial and technical assistance to poor countries than they now do. For example, lethal infectious diseases such as malaria, measles and diarrhoea claim million of lives each year in poor countries. The modern medical technology necessary to eradicate these illnesses would cost only US$IO billion a year -less than US$15 from every person who lives in a high-income country, if the cost were shared equaUy. Sachs urges the governments of wealthy countries, along with international lending institutions, to provide loans and grants for scientific and technological development. He notes that very little money is available to support research and development in poor countries. The World Bank, a major source offunding for development projects in poor countries, spends only US$60 million a year supporting tropical, agricultural or health research and development. By way of comparison, Merck, the giant pharmaceutical corporation, spends 35 times that much (US$2.1 billion) for research and development for its own products. Even universities in wealthy nations could play a role, establishing overseas Global Inequality research and training institutes that would foster coUaborative research projects. From computers and the Internet to biotechnology, the 'wealth of nations' increasingly depends on modern information technology. As long as major regions of the world remain technologically disconnected, it seems unlikely that global poverty will be eradicated. In the most optimistic view, the republics of the former Soviet Union, as well as the formerly socialist countries of Eastern Europe, will eventually advance into the ranks of the high-income countries. Economic growth will spread to LatinAmerica, Africa and the rest ofthe world. Because capitalism requires that workers be mobile, the remaining caste societies around the world will be replaced by class-based societies. These societies will experience enhanced opporrunities for upward mobil- ity. What is the future of global inequality? It is difficult to be entirely optimistic. Global economic growth has slowed, and many of the once promising economies ofAsia now seem to be in trouble. The Russian economy, in its move from socialism to capitalism, has encountered many problems, leaving many Russians poorer than before. It remains to be seen whether the countries ofthe world will learn from one another and work together to create better lives for their peoples. What is certain is that the past quarter of a century has witnessed a global economic transformation of unprecedented magnitude. The effects of this transformation in the next 25 years will leave few lives on the planet untouched. If global inequality is one of the most important problems facing people today, then a related issue is the dramatic increase in world population. Global poverty and population growth are tied together today, for it is in some of the world's poorest countries that population growth is greatest, and it is to a discussion ofthis phenomenon that we now turn. GLOBAL INEQUALITY World population growth and global inequality It is estimated that the Earth's six-billionth inhabitant was born on 12 October 1999. The world's population is booming - it has more than doubled since 1960. AnAmerican expert on population studies, Paul Ehrlich, calculated in the 1960s that if the rate of population growth at that time were to continue, 900 years from now (not a long period in world history as a whole) there would be 60,000,000,000,000,000 (60 quadrillion) people on the face of the earth. There would be 100 people for every square yard of the Earth's surface, including both land and water. The physicist, J. H. Fremlin, worked out that housing such a population would require a continuous 2,000-storey building covering the entire planet. Even in such a stupendous structure there would only be three or four yards of floor space per person (Fremlin 1964). Such a picture, ofcourse, is nothing more than nightmarish fiction designed to drive home how cataclysmic the consequences of continued population growth would be. The real issue is what will happen over the next 30 or 40 years. Partly because governments and other agencies heeded the warnings of Ehrlich and others, by introducing population control programmes, there are grounds for supposing that world population growth is beginning to trail off (see figure 13.7). Estimates calculated in the 1960s of the likely world population by the year 2000 turned out to be inaccurate. The World Bank estimated the world population to be just over 6 billion in 2000, compared to some earlier estimates of more than 8 billion. Nevertheless, considering that a century ago there were only 1.5 billion people in the world, this still represents growth of staggering proportions. Can this scale of human population be adequately fed and housed, or will large sections of it be condemned to a life of poverty? What would the spread of current Western lifestyles to the world's population mean for the global environment? Can the planetary ecosystem cope with the pollution and waste of global consumerism? These questions are made more urgent when we realize that the factors underlying population growth are by no means entirely predictable. The population in 40 years' time could be even higher than current forecasts suggest. Population analysis: demography The study of population is referred to as demography.The term was invented about a century and a half ago, at a time when nations were beginning to keep official statistics on the nature and distribution of their populations. Demography is concerned with measuring the size ofpopulations and explaining their rise or decline. Population patterns are governed by three factors: births, deaths and migrations. Demography is customarily treated as a branch ofsociology, because the factors that influence the level of births and deaths in a given group or society, as well as migrations of population, are largely social and cultural. Demographic work tends to be statistical. All the developed nations today gather and analyse basic statistics on their populations by carrying out censuses (systematic surveys designed to find out about the whole population ofa given country). Rigorous as the modes of data collection now are, even in these nations demographic statistics are not wholly accurate. In the United Kingdom, there has been a population Census every ten years since 1801. The Census aims to be as accurate as possible, but for various reasons some people might not be registered in the official population statistics - for example illegal immigrants, homeless people, transients and others who for one reason or another avoided registration. In many developing countries, particularly those with recent high rates of population growth, demographic statistics are much more unreliable. 14 Conslanl 12 High 10 Medium "'c: ~ 8 e Low c: .2 ;;; :; 6Cl. 0 CL 4 2 t--------------------+------------------~ o +---.---.---,---,---~--,_--~--~--~--~ 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Figure 13.7 Estimated and projected population ofthe world by projection variant, 1950-2050 Source. UN 2003a Dynamics of population change Rates of population growth or decline are measured by subtracting the number of deaths per 1,000 from the number of births per 1,000 - this is usually calculated annually. Some European countries have negative growth rates - in other words, their populations are declining. Virtually all the industrialized countries have growth rates ofless than 0.5 per cent. Rates of population growth were high in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries but have since levelled off. Many developing countries today have rates ofbetween 2 and3 percent. These may not seem very different from the rates ofthe industrialized countries, but in fact, the consequences are enormous. The reason for this is that growth in population is exponential. There is an ancient Persian myth that helps to illustrate exponential growth. A courtier asked a ruler to reward him for his services by giving him twice as many grains of rice for each service than he had given him the time before, starting with a single grain on the first square of a chess board. Believing that he was onto a good thing, the king commanded grain to be brought up from his storehouse. By the 21st square, the storehouse was empty; the 40th square required ten billion grains of rice (Meadows et al. 1972J.ln other words, starting with one item and doubling it, doubling the result, and so on, rapidly leads to huge figures - 1:2:4:8:16:32:64:128, and so on. In seven operations. the figure has grown by 128 times. Exactly the same principle applies to population growth. We can measure this effect by means of the doubling time, the period of time it takes for the Global Society 13.5 Demography - the key concepts Among the basic concepts used by demographers, the most important are crude birth rates, fertility; fecundity and crude death rates. Crude birth rates are expressed as the number oflive births per year per 1,000 of the population. They are called 'crude' rates because of their very general character. They do not,for example, tell us what proportion of a population is male or female, or what the age distribution of a population is (the relative proportions ofyoung and old people in the population).Where statistics are collected that relate birth or death rates to such categories, demographers speak of 'specific' rather than 'crude' rates.For instance, an age-specific birth rate might specify the number of births per 1,000 women in different age groups. If we wish to understand population patterns in any detail, the information provided by specific birth rates is normally necessary Crude birth rates, however, are useful for making overall comparisons between different groups, societies and regions. Thus, in 2006 the crude birth rate in Australia was 12.4 (per year, per 1,000 population), in Nicaragua 24.9,in Mozambique 39.5 and, highest of all, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo it was 49.6 (UN ESA 2006). The industrialized countries tend to have low rates, while in many other parts of the world, crude birth rates are much higher (figure 13.8). _ 45 + ! 1 40 - 45 c:::::J 35 - 40 ~J 30 - 35 1 I 25 - 30 _ 20 - 25 _ 15 - 20 _ 10 - 15 _ 0 - 10 Figure 13.8 Global crude birth rates Source.' Based on CIA Factbook 2007 Birth rates are an expression of the fertility of women. Fertility refers to how many live-born children the average woman has.A fertility rate is usually calculated as the average number ofbirths per 1,000 women of childbearing age. Fertility is distinguished from fecundity,which means the potential number of children women are biologically capable of bearing.It is physically possible for a normal woman to bear a child every year during the period when she is capable of conception. There are variations in fecundity according to the age at which women reach puberty and menopause,both of wliich differ among countries as well as among individuals. While there may be families in which a woman bears 20 or more children, fertility rates in practice are always much lower than fecundity rates, because social and cultural factors limit breeding. Crude death rates (also called 'mortality rates') are calculated in the same way as birth rates - the number of deaths per thousand ofpopulation per year.Again,there are major variations among countries, but death rates in many societies in the developing world are falling to levels comparable to those in developed nations.The death rate in the United Kingdom in 2002 was 10 per 1,000. In India it was 9 per 1,000; in Ethiopia it was 18 per 1,000. A few countries have much higher death rates. In Sierra Leone, for example, the death rate is 30 per 1,000.Like crude birth rates, crude death rates only provide a very general index of mortality (the number of deaths in a population).Specific death rates give more precise information.Aparticularly important specific death rate is the infant mortality rate:the number of babies per 1,000 births in any year who die before reaching their first birthday One ofthe key factors underlying the population explosion has been reductions in infant mortality rates. Declining rates ofinfant mortality are the most important influence on increasing life expectancy - that is, the number ofyears the average person can expect to live. In 2007, life expectancy at birth for women born in the UK was 81.3 years, compared with 76.23 years for men (CIA 2007). This contrasts with 49 and 45 years respectively at the turn of the twentieth century. This does not mean, however, that most people born in 190I died when they were in their 40s.When there is a high infant mortality rate,as there is in many developing nations, the average life expectancy which is a statistical average - is brought down. Illness, nutrition and the influence of natural disasters are other factors that influence life expectancy. Life expectancy has to be distinguished from life span, which is the maximum number ofyears that an individual could live.While life expectancy has increased in most societies in the world,life span has remained unaltered. Only a small proportion ofpeople live to be 100 or more. population to double. A population growth of 1 per cent will produce a doubling of numbers in 70 years. At 2 per cent growth, a population will double in 35 years, while at 3 per cent it will double in just23 years.It took the whole of human history until 1850 for the global population to reach 1 billion. But during the next 80 years, by 1930, it had doubled to 2 billion. By 1975 - in just 45 years - the population had doubled again to 4 billion and in 2007, it stood at 6.6 billion. Malthusianism In pre-modern societies, birth rates were very high by the standards of the industrialized world today. Nonetheless, population growth remained low until the eighteenth century because there was a rough overall balance between births and deaths. The general trend of numbers was upward, and there were sometimes periods of more marked population increase, but these were followed by increases in death rates. In medieval Europe, for example, when harvests were bad, marriages tended to be postponed and the number of conceptions fell, while deaths increased. These complementary trends reduced the number of mouths to be fed. No pre-industrial society was able to escape from this self-regulating rhythm CWrigley 1968). During the period of the rise of industrialism, many looked forward to a new age in which scarcity would be a phenomenon of the past.The development ofmodern industry, it was widely supposed, would create a new era of abundance. In his celebrated Essay on the Principle of Population (1976 [1798)), Thomas Malthus criticized these ideas and initiated a debate about the connection between population and food resources that continues to this day. At the time he wrote, the population in Europe was growing rapidly. Malthus pointed out that while population increase is exponential, food supply depends on fixed resources that can be expanded only by developing new land for cultivation. Population growth therefore tends to outstrip the means of support available.The inevitable outcome is famine, which, combined with the influence of war and plagues, acts as a natural limit to population increase. Malthus predicted that human beings would always live in circumstances of misery and starvation, unless they practised what he called 'moral restraint'. His cure for excessive population growth was for people strictly to limit their frequency of sexual intercourse. The use of contraception he proclaimed to be a'vice'. For a while, Malthusianism was ignored, since the population development of the GLOBAL INEQUALITY Western countries followed a quite different pattern from that which he had anticipated - as we shall see below. Rates of population growth trailed off in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, in the 1930s there were major worries about population decline in many industrialized countries, including the United Kingdom. The upsurge in world population growth in the twentieth century has again lent some credence to Malthus's views, although few support them in their original version. Population expansion in developing countries seems to be outstripping the resources that those countries can generate to feed their citizens. The demographic transition Demographers often refer to the changes in the ratio of births to deaths in the industrialized countries from the nineteenth century onward as the demographic transition.This thesis was first outlined byWarren S. Thompson, who described a three-stage process in which one type of population stability would be eventually replaced by another, as a society reached an advanced level of economic development (Thompson 1929). The prospects for twentyfirst-century equality Fertility remains high in developing world societies partly because traditional attitudes to family size have been maintained. Having large numbers of children is often still regarded as desirable, providing a source of labour on family-run farms. Some religions are either opposed to birth control or affirm the desirability of having many children. Contraception is opposed by Islamic leaders in several countries and by the Catholic Church, whose influence is especially marked in South and Central America. The motivation to reduce fertility has not always been forthcoming even from political authorities. In 1974, contraceptives were banned in Argentina as part of a programme to double the population of the country as fast as possible; this was seen as a means of developing its economic and military strength. Yet a decline in fertility levels has at last occurred in some large developing countries. An example is China, which currently has a population of about 1.3 billion people - almost a quarter of the world's population as a whole.The Chinese government established one of the most extensive programmes of population control that any country has undertaken, with the object of stabilizing the country's numbers at close to their current level. Incentives were instituted (such as better housing and free healthcare and education) to promote Single-child families, while families with more than one child face special hardships (wages are cut for those who have a third child). In some cases the Chinese government's policy has had horrific unintended consequences. A traditional preference for boys, and a belief that males will look after their parents in their old age, whereas females, once married, 'belong to' someone else, has led to some newborn girls being killed by their families in preference to facing the penalties ofhaving a second child. However, there is evidence that China's antenatal policies, however harsh they may appear, have had a substantial impact on limiting the country's population growth. China's programme demands a degree of centralized government control that is either unacceptable or unavailable in most other developing countries. In India, for instance, many schemes for promoting family planning and the use of contraceptives have been tried, but with only relatively small success. In 1988 India had a population of 789 million. By 2000, its population just topped a billion. And even if its population growth rate does diminish, by 2050 India will be the most populous country in the world, with more than 1.5 billion people. It is claimed that the demographic changes that will occur over the next lOO Classic Studies 13.2 Demographic transition theory The research problem As societies industrialized from the mideighteenth century onwards, their populations increased rapidly: But a century or so later, population growth had slowed, and in the twentyfirst century: many developed societies are barely replacing their population.Why did this happen? Is there a pattern to such a long-term transformation and, if so, is it likely to be repeated across other industrializing cOWltries? What will happen to the size of the global human population in the future? Warren S. Thompson (1887-1973), an American demographer, was the first to identify a pattern to such developments and his work was developed by later demographers who linked demographic trends to industrialization. The Demographic Transition Model Thompson (1929) recognized that although changes to birth and death rates shape population growth and size, there are important transitions in a society's birth and death rates, which have a profoWld impact on their overall population. Later demographers refined and developed his ideas into a model, usually 50 45 0 40 0 o. 35 ~ 30 Q) '§ 25 a: 0 0 20 a: 15 CD 0 10 5 0 referred to as the Demographic Transition Model (DTM) , which identifies a series of stages through which societies pass as they go through industrial development (you may wish to refer to the model illustrated in figure 13.9 as you read the next section). Stage One refers to the conditions characterizing most traditional societies, in which both birth and death rates are high and the infant mortality rate is especially large. Population grows little, if at all, as the high number of births is more or less balanced by the level of deaths. This stage was operative for most of human history as epidemics, disease and natural disasters such as floods and drought kept down human numbers. In Stage Two, which began in most of Europe and the United States in the early part ofthe nineteenth century - with wide regional variations - the death rate fell but fertility remained high.The consequence was a marked phase of long-term population growth. Improvements in food quality and higher crop yields, safe water supplies for drinking and washing, more efficient sewerage and waste disposal; all of these produced a fall in the death (Mature industrial) ; I Year 1- CBR - COR - Total population 1 Figure 13.9 The Demographic Transition Model Source: http://en.wikipedia.orgiwiki/lmage:Stage5.jpg rate and subsequent rise in population. In Stage Three the birth rate also fell,to a level such that the population gradually became fairly stable, though obviously; at a much higher absolute level than in Stage One.Several possible reasons have been put fOlward for this change, including increasing literacy levels (particularly amongst women) leading to the challenging of traditional ideas regarding women's primary role as childbearers;compulsory education which removed children from the workforce; and urbanization, which removed the need (in rural areas) for large families to work on the land. Somewhat later, improved contraceptive technologies also played a major part in enabling people to control their fertility; Some demographers identify a Stage Four, in which populations stabilize, thus completing the demographic transition.However,some countries, including Greece, Italy and Japan,have recently been reproducing below replacement levels and we might speculate about a stage in which population levels in the advanced industrial societies may decline.However, so far this stage remains a theoretical possibility rather than reality; Critical points Although it is generally accepted that the sequence accurately describes a major transformation in the demographic character of modern societies, there are some considerable differences amongst the industrialized countries. When the model is applied to developing countries, critics have pointed out that the emergence ofHN/AlDS in the 1980s has been a major factor in slowing or even halting some countries' progress as death rates and infant mortality rates have risen rather than fallen.SubSaharan Africa has suffered most as a result of the spread ofHNIAlDS (see chapter 10, 'Health, illness and Disability'). The DTM has been widely seen as an antiMalthusian thesis.It suggests that rather than exponential growth leading to mass hunger and widespread famine, human populations are likely to settle into comfortable stability; One objection to the optimism embedded in this view is that the spread ofWestern-style consumerism to even the existing population would seriously damage the global ecosystem, and on present population forecasts, things can only get worse.Some environmentalists argue we should not be so sanguine about high absolute human numbers but should be aiming for a managed reduction in the global population. Contemporary significance The DTM has been perhaps the most influential perspective on long-term population trends ever devised and it continues to inform research in the field of demography; Demographers do not agree about how the sequence of change predicted by the model should be interpreted though, nor how long Stage Three is likely to last Nevertheless, the great virtue of the model is that it encourages us to take a long-term view of human development in a global perspective and provides a point from which to start doing so. years will be greater than any that have taken place in all of human history. It is difficult to predict with any precision the rate at which the world population will rise, but the United Nations has several fertility scenarios. The 'high' scenario places the world's population at more than 25 billion people by 2150. The 'medium' fertility scenario, which the UN deems most likely, assumes that fertility levels will stabilize at just over two children per woman, resulting in a world population of 11.8 billion people by 2150. This overall population increase conceals two distinct trends. First, most developing countries will undergo the process ofdemographic transition described above. This will result in a substantial surge in the population, as death rates fall. India and China are each likely to see their populations reach 1.5 billion people. Areas in Asia, Africa and Latin America will similarly experience rapid growth before the population eventually stabilizes. The second trend concerns the developed countries that have already undergone demographic transition. These societies will experience very slight population growth, if any at all. Instead, a process of ageing will occur in which the number of young people will decline in absolute terms and the older segment of the population will increase markedly. This will have widespread economic and social implications for developed countries: as the dependency ratio increases, pressure will mount on health and social services. Yet, as their numbers grow, older people will also have more political weight and may be able to push for higher expenditures on programmes and services of importance to them. Ageing of the global population is discussed in chapter 8,'The Life-Course'. What will be the consequences of these demographic changes for global inequality? Some observers see the makings of widespread social upheaval- particularly in the developing countries undergOing demographic transition. Changes in the economy and labour markets may prompt widespread internal migration as people in rural areas search for work. The rapid growth of cities is likely to lead to environmental damage, new public health risks, overloaded infrastructures, rising crime and impoverished squatter settlements. Summary points 3. I. The countries of the world can be stratified according to their per-person gross national income.Currently, 40 per cent of the world's population live in low-income countries, compared with only 16 per cent in highincome countries. 2. An estimated 1.3 billion people in the world, or nearly one in four p eople, live in poverty today, an increase since the early 1980s. Many are the victims of discrimination based on Global Inequality Famine and food shortages are another serious concern. As we saw in our discussion of global inequality, there are around 830 million people in the world suffering from hunger or under-nourishment. As the population rises, levels of food output will need to rise accordingly to avoid widespread scarcity. Yet it is difficult to see how this can happen; many of the world's poorest areas are particularly affected by water shortages, shrinking farm land and soil degradation - processes that reduce, rather than enhance, agricultural productivity. It is almost certain that food production will not occur at a level to ensure self-sufficiency. Large amounts of food and grain will need to be imported from areas where there are surpluses. According to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), by 2010 industrialized countries will be producing 1,614 pounds of grain per person, compared to only 507 pounds per head in the developing world. Technological advances in agriculture and industry are unpredictable, so no one can be sure how large a population the world might eventually be able to support. Yet even at current population levels, global resources may already be well below those required to create living standards in the less developed world comparable to those of the industrialized countries. In general,people in high-income countries enjoy a far higher standard of living than their counterparts in low-income countries.They are likely to have more food to eat, less likely to starve or suffer from malnutrition and likely to live longer.They are far more likely to be literate and educated and therefore have higher-skilled, higher-paying jobs. Additionally, they are less likely to have large families, and their children are much less likely to die in infancy of malnutrition or childhood diseases. race, ethnicity or tribal affiliation. 4. Market-oriented theories of global inequality, GLOBAL INEQUALITY such as modernization theory, claim that cultural and institutional barriers to development explain the poverty of lowincome societies.In this view, to eliminate poverty, fatalistic attitudes must be overcome, government meddling in economic affairs ended and a high rate of savings and investment encouraged. Dependency theories claim that global poverty is the result of the exploitation of poor countries by wealthy ones. Even though the economic fate of poor countries is ultimately determined by wealthy ones, some development is possible within dependent capitalistic relations. Worldsystems theory argues that the capitalist world system as a whole must be understood if we hope to make sense of global inequality. It focuses on relationships of the core, peripheral and semi-peripheral countries and on long-term trends in the global economy_ State-centred theories emphasize the role that governments can play in fostering economic development. These theories draw on the experience of the rapidly growing East Asian newly industrializing economies as an example. 5. Population growth is one of the most significant global problems currently faced by humanity. Malthusianism is the idea, first advanced by Thomas Malthus two centuries ago, that population growth tends to outstrip the resources available to support it. Unless people limited their frequency of sexual intercourse, he argued, excessive population growth would ensure a future of misery and starvation. 6. The study of population growth - demography - is primarily statistical, but demographers are also concerned with trying to explain why population patterns take the form they do. The most important concepts in population analysis are birth rates, death rates, fertility and fecundity. 7. Changes in population patterns are usually analysed in terms of stages within the demographic transition. Prior to industrialization, both birth and death rates were high.During the beginning of industrialization, there was population growth, because death rates were reduced while birth rates took longer to decline. Finally, a new equilibrium was reached with low birth rates balancing low death rates. B. World population is projected to grow to more than 10 billion people by 2150. Most of this growth will occur in the developing world, where countries will undergo a demographic transition and experience rapid growth before the population stabilizes. In the developed world, population will grow only slightly. Instead, a process of ageing will occur and the number of young people will decline in absolute terms. These population trends will have far-reaching implications for labour markets, welfare systems, food and water supplies and the natural environment. Global Inequality ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••0 0 0 Further reading Agood account of what 'development' means 0 0 0 0 today and has meant in the past can be found 0 0 0 0 Given the wide-ranging subject matter of this in Katie Willis's Theories and Practices of 0 0 0 • 0 0 chapter, a word ofcaution is in order. None of Development (London and New York: 0 0 0 0 the reading for rhis chapter can legitimately be Routledge, 2005), which also looks at attempts 0 0 0 • labelled 'introductory' and all of it makes to put theory into practice. Alastair Greig, 0 0 0 0 intellectual demands of the reader. This should David Hulme and Mark Turner's Challenging 0 0 0 • be a worthwhile challenge rather than a turn- Global Inequality: Development Theory and 0 0 •0 off though. Practice in the 2ist Century (Basingstoke: 0 0 0 0 Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) presents another 0 0 Perhaps a good place to begin some additional 0 • up-to-date alternative. 0 0 reading is with Vic George and Robert Page's 0 0 •0 edited volume, Global Social Problems Anyone interested in the issues raised in 0 0 0 0 (Cambridge: Polity, 2004) to gain a better view relation to measurement of inequality, could •0 0 0 ofthe range of social problems that demand try Branko Milanovich's Worlds Apart: 0 0 0 0 global solutions. From here, David Held and Measuring International and Global Inequality 0 0 0 0 Ayse Kaya's edited Global inequality: Patterns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 0 0 0 0 and Explanations (Cambridge: Polity, 2006) 2007), which is a stimulating read. 0 0 0 0 0 0 offers exactly what it says: a discussion of 0 0 0 0 patterns of inequality and the explanations and 0 0 0 0 theories which try to account for it. 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ••••• •• •• ••• ••• ••• •• ••••• •• ••• ••• ••• ••••• ••• •• • •• ••• •• ••• ••• •• • ••• •• • ••••• ••o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o •o o o o o o o o o Internet links The Global Site - SCholarly writings on global matters, based at the University ofSussex, Brighton, UK: www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/ International Monetary Fund: www.imf.org/ Make Poverty History campaign - London- based: www.makepovertyhistory.org/ United Nations - multilingual site with enormous amount of information on global issues: www.un.org/ World Bank- globalization pages of the World Bank Group, has lots of briefing papers, research and other data: www.worldbank.org/ •o o o o o o •o o o o o o •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• I, I 11 I 1 I I I Human sexuality Gender and oiology: natural differences? Gender socialization • • Masculinities and genaer relations .- - . Functionalist approacnes . . (opposite) Other high-profile indIviduals to be mvolved ill same-sex clvll partnerships mclude LIssy Groner,a German member ofthe European ParlIament. 'BYthe power vested in me by the state ofMassachusetts as a justice ofthe peace, and most of all by the power of your own love, I now pronounce you married under the laws ofMassachusetts', intoned the city clerk, Margaret Drury, shortly after 9 a.m. on 17 May 2004. 'You may seal this marriage with a kiss.' The couple embraced. Marcia Kadish, who had married her partner of 18 years, was overjoyed: 'I feel all tingly and wonderful', she said. 'So much love. Can't you see it is just bursting out of me?' Her partner said it felt like 'winning the lottery'. Yet the marriage caused great controversy in the United States. 'The documents being issued across Massachusetts may say "marriage licence" at the SEXUALITY AND GENDER top but they are really death certificates for the institution of marriage', said lames Dobson, head ofthe Christian group 'Focus on the Family'. The reason for the controversy was that Marcia Kadish's long-term partner was another woman - Tanya McCloskey. The couple was amongst the first same-sex couples to be married under new laws in the US state of Massachusetts. Throughout the day, one gay couple after another filed out of the local town hall clutching the newly issued papers that would allow them to get married. Outside, thousands of people had gathered to applaud the couples, and to celebrate a right that many of them regarded as self- evident. The state of Massachusetts has often been at the cusp of liberal reforms in the USA. In May 2004, after months of battles in and out of the state Supreme Court and legislature, Massachusetts became the first state to legalize gay marriage. Although increasing numbers of people in the USA do accept that marriages between homosexuals should be recognized as valid by the law, the majority (55 per cent in May 2004) has consistently been against it (Gallup 2004) and an overwhelming majority of states has laws or constitutional amendments barring 'gay marriage'. Massachusetts joined the Netherlands, Belgium and large parts of Canada as one of the few places in the world where gay marriages are legally recognized. The very possibility of legal gay marriage demonstrates how radically ideas about sexuality have changed in recent decades. After all, it was only in 1967 that male homosexuality was legalized in the UK. Gay marriage also raises questions about sexual orientation:to what extent is sexual orientation inborn and to what extent is it learned? Many of the themes that we examine in this chapter overlap with the questions raised in chapter 9, 'Families and Intimate Relationships'. Human sexuality is tied up with our ideas about love and the question of what makes a good relationship. Increasingly, people argue that a good relationship must be one between equals. Gay marriage has only become possible through a struggle against discrimination and inequality that is still continuing. We begin this chapter by discussing human sexuality and examine how sexual behaviour is changing in Western society. We then look more specifically at sexual orientation, and particularly at issues surrounding homosexuality in the West. This leads us to the broader issue of gender, and raises questions of what it means to be a man or a woman in modern society. We close with a discussion of gender inequality and look at how women's equality is increasingly finding a global expression. Human sexuality Ideas about sexuality are undergoing dramatic changes. Over the last few decades in Western countries, important aspects of people's sexual lives have been altered in a fundamental way. In traditional societies, sexuality was tied tightly to the process of reproduction, but in our current age it has been separated from it. Sexuality has become a dimension oflife for each individual to explore and shape. If sexuality once was 'defined' in terms ofheterosexuality and monogamy in the context of marital relations, there is now a growing acceptance of diverse forms ofsexual behaviour and orientations in a broad variety of contexts, as we saw in the discussion of gay marriage above. In this section, we explore some of the issues surrounding human sexual behaviour: the importance of biological versus social influences, how societyshapes sexual activity and the influence of reproductive technology. We then examine some of the recent trends in human sexual behaviour in Western society. Biology and sexual behaviour Sexuality has long been considered a highly personal subject. For this reason it is a challenging area for sociologists to study. Until recently, much ofwhat we have known about sexuality came from biologists, medical researchers and sexologists. Scholars have also looked to the animal world in an attempt to understand more about human sexual behaviour. There is clearly a biological component to sexuality, because female anatomy differs from that of the male. There also exists a biological imperative to reproduce; otherwise, the human species would become extinct. Some sociobiologists, such as David Barash (1979), have argued that there is an evolutionary explanation for why men tend to be more sexually promiscuous than women. His argument is that men produce millions of sperm during a lifetime and therefore can be seen as biologically disposed to impregnate as many women as possible. However, women only produce a few hundred eggs in a lifetime and have to carry the foetus within their body for nine months, which, says Barash, explains why they focus more on emotional commitment and are not so sexually promiscuous. The biological core of males and females drives their sexual behaviour in society. Barash's argument finds some support in other studies of the sexual behaviour of animals, which claim to show that males are normally more promiscuous than females ofthe same species. Many commentators are dismissive of such an evolutionary approach. Steven Rose, for example, argued that, unlike most animals, human behaviour is shaped more by the environment than it is determined by genetically programmed instincts: 'The human infant is born with relatively few of its neural pathways already committed' (Rose et al. 1984). Rose argues that humans have an exceptionally long infancy relative to other animals, which gives them far more time than other species to learn from their experiences. The claims of sociobiologists such as Barash are fiercely contested, especially as regards any implications for human sexual Sexuality and Gender behaviour. One thing clearly distinguishes humans from animals, however. Human sexual behaviour is meaningful - that is, humans use and express their sexuality in a variety of ways. For humans, sexual activity is much more than biological. It is symbolic, reflecting who we are and the emotions we are experiencing. As we shall see, sexuality is far too complicated to be wholly attributable to biological traits. It must be understood in terms ofthe social meanings which humans ascribe to it. Forms of sexuality Most people, in all societies, are heterosexual - they look to the other sex for emotional involvement and sexual pleasure. Heterosexuality in every society has historically been the basis of marriage and family. Yet there are many minority sexual tastes and inclinations too. Judith Lorber (1994) distinguishes as many as ten different sexual identities: straight (heterosexual) woman, straight man, lesbian woman, gay man. bisexual woman, bisexual man, transvestite woman (a woman who regularly dresses as a man), transvestite man (a man who regularly dresses as a woman), transsexual woman (a man who becomes a woman), and transsexual man (a woman who becomes a man). Sexual practices themselves are even more diverse. There are a number of possible sexual practices. For example. a man or woman can have sexual relations with women, with men or with both. This can happen one at a time or with three or more participating. One can have sex with oneself (masturbation) or with no one (celibacy). One can have sexual relations with transsexuals or with people who erotically cross-dress, use pornography or sexual devices, practise sado-masochism (the erotic use of bondage and the inflicting of pain)' have sex with animals, and so on (Lorber 1994). In all societies there are sexual norms that approve of some practices while discouraging or condemning others. Members of a societylearn these norms through socialization. Over the last few decades, for example, sexual norms in Western cultures have been linked to ideas ofromantic love and family relationships. Such norms, however, vary widely between different cultures. Homosexuality is a case in point. Some cultures have either tolerated or actively encouraged homosexuality in certain contexts. Among the ancient Greeks, for instance, the love of men for boys was idealized as the highest form of sexual love. Accepted types of sexual behaviour also vary between cultures, which is one way we know that most sexual responses are learned rather than innate. The most extensive study was carried out nearly 60 years ago by Clellan Ford and Frank Beach (1951), who surveyed anthropological evidence from more than 200 societies. Striking variations were found in what is regarded as 'natural' sexual behaviour and in norms of sexual attractiveness. For example. in some cultures, extended foreplay, perhaps lasting hours, is thought desirable and even necessary prior to intercourse; in others, foreplay is virtually non-existent. In some societies, it is believed that overly frequent intercourse leads to physical debilitation or illness. Among the Seniang of the South Pacific, advice on the desirability of spacing out love-making is given by the elders of the village - who also believe that a person with white hair may legitimately copulate every night. In most cultures, norms of sexual attractiveness (held by both females and males) focus more on physical looks for women than for men, a situation that seems to be gradually changing in the West as women increasingly become active in spheres outside the home. The traits seen as most important in female beauty, however, differ greatly. In the modern West, a slim, small body is admired, while in other cultures a much more generous shape is regarded as most attractive. Sometimes the breasts are not seen as a source of sexual stimulus, whereas in some societies great erotic significance is attached to them. Some societies place great store on the shape of the face, while others emphasize the shape and colour ofthe eyes or the size and form ofthe nose and lips. Sexual orientation Sexual orientation concerns the direction of one's sexual or romantic attraction. The term 'sexual preference', which is sometimes incorrectly used instead of sexual orientation, is misleading and is to be avoided, since it implies that one's sexual or romantic attraction is entirely a matter of personal choice. As you will see below, sexual orientation in all cultures results from a complex interplay of biological and social factors which are not yet fully under- stood. The most commonly found sexual orientation in all cultures is heterosexuality, a sexual or romant.ic attraction for persons of the opposite sex ('hetero' comes from the Greek word meaning 'other' or 'different'). Homosexuality involves the sexual or romantic attraction for persons ofone's own sex. Today, the term gay is used to refer to male homosexuals, lesbian for female homosexuals, and bi as shorthand for bisexuals, people who experience sexual or romantic attraction for persons of either sex. Orientation ofsexual activities or feelings towards others of the same sex exist in all cultures. In some non-Western cultures, homosexual relations are accepted or even encouraged among certain groups. The Batak people of northern Sumatra, for example, permit male homosexual relations before marriage. Boys leave the parental home at puberty and sleep in a dwelling with a dozen or so older males who initiate the newcomers into homosexual practices. In many societies, however, homosexuality is not so openly accepted or practised. [n the Western world, for example, sexuality is linked to individual identity, and the prevailing idea of a homosexual (or heterosexual) is of a person whose sexual orientation lies within themselves and is therefore a very personal matter, not something to be shared with many others. In his studies of sexual ity, Michel Foucault has shown that before the eighteenth century in Europe, the notion of a homosexual person seems barely to have existed (Foucault 1978). The act of sodomy was denounced by Church authorities and by the law; in England and several other European countries, it was punishable by death. However, sodomy was not defined specifically as a homosexual offence. It applied to relations between men and women, men and animals. as well as men among themselves. The term 'homosexuality' was coined in the 1860s, and from then on, homosexuals were increasingly regarded as being a separate type of people with a particular sexual aberration (Weeks 1986). Homosexuality became part of a 'medicalized' discourse; it was spoken of in clinical terms as a psychiatric disorder or a perversion, rather than a religious 'sin', Homosexuals, along with other 'deviants' such as paedophiles and transvestites, were seen as suffering from a biological pathology that threatened the wholesomeness of mainstream society. The death penalty for 'unnatural acts' was abolished in the United States after independence, and in European countries in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Until just a few decades ago, however, homosexuality remained a criminal activity in virtually allWestern countries. The shift of homosexuals from the margins of society to the mainstream is not yet complete, but rapid progress has been seen over recent years, as the discussion of gay marriage that opened this chapter shows. Is sexual orientation inborn or learned? Most sociologists today argue that sexual orientation of all kinds results from a complex interplay between biological factors and social learning. Since heterosex- .-- Which body shape is more appealing? The answer differs across cultures. uality is the norm for most people, a great deal of research has focused on why some people become homosexual. Some scholars argue that biological influences are the most important, predisposing certain people to become homosexual ftom birth (Bell et al. 1981). Biological explanations for homosexuality have included differences in such things as brain characteristics of homosexuals (Maugh and Zamichow 1991) and the impact on foetal development of the mother's in utero hormone production during pregnancy (McFadden and Champlin 2000). Such studies,which are based on small numbers of cases, give highly inconclusive (and highly controversial) results (Healy 2001). It is virtually impossible to separate biological from early social influences in determining a person's sexual orientation. Studies of twins hold some promise for understanding ifthere isany genetic basis for homosexuality, since identical twins share identical genes. In two related studies, Bailey and PilIard (1991; Bailey 1993) examined 167 pairs ofbrothers and 143 pairs ofsisters, with SEXUALITY AND GENDER each pair ofsiblings raised in the same family, in which at least one sibling defined him- or herself as homosexual. Some of these pairs were identical twins (who share all genes), some were fraternal twins (who share some genes) and some were adoptive brothers or sisters (who share no genes). The researchers reasoned that if sexual orientation is determined entirely by biology, then all the identical twins should be homosexual, since their genetic make-up is identical. Among the fraternal twins, some pairs would be homosexual, since some genes are shared. The lowest rates ofhomosexuality were predicted for the adoptive brothers and sisters. The results ofthis study seem to show that homosexuality results from a combination of biological and social factors. Among both the men and the women studied, roughly one out of every rwo identical twins was homosexual, compared with one out of every five fraternal twins, and one out of every ten adoptive brothers and sisters. In other words, a woman or man is five times more likely to be lesbian or gay if her or his identical rwin is lesbian or gay than if his or her Sibling is lesbian orgaybut related only through adoption.These results offer some support for the importance of biological factors, since the higher the percentage of shared genes, the greater the percentage ofcases in which both siblings were homosexual. However, since approximately half the identical twin brothers and sisters of homosexuals were not themselves homosexual, a great deal ofsocial learning must also be involved; otherwise one would expect all identical twin siblings ofhomosexuals to be homosexual as well. It is clear that even studies of identical twins cannot fully isolate biological from social factors. It is often the case that, even in infancy. identical twins are treated more like one another by parents, peers and teachers than are fraternal twins, who in turn are treated more like one another than are adoptive Siblings. Thus, identical twins may have more than genes in common: they may share a higher proportion of similar socializing experiences as well. Sexuality, religion and morality Attitudes towards sexual behaviour are not uniform across the world's societies, and even within a single country they undergo significant changes throughout history. For example, Western attitudes to sexuality were, for nearly 2,000 years, moulded primarily by Christianity. Although different Christian sects and denominations have held divergent views about the proper place of sexuality in life, the dominant view of the Christian Church has been that all sexual behaviour is suspect except what is needed for reproduction. At some periods, this view produced an extreme prudishness in society at large. But at other times, many people ignored or reacted against the teachings of the Church, commonly engaging in practices (such as adultery) forbidden by religious authorities. The idea that sexual fulfilment can and should be sought only through marriage was rare. In the nineteenth century, religious presumptions about sexuality became partly replaced by medical ones. Most of the early writings by doctors about sexual behaviour, however, were as stern as the views of the Church. Some argued that any type of sexual activity unconnected with reproduction causes serious physical harm. Masturbation was said to bring on blindness, insanity, heart disease and other ailments, while oral sex was claimed to cause cancer. In Victorian times, sexual hypocrisy abounded.Virtuous women were believed to be indifferent to sexuality, accepting the attentions of their husbands only as a duty. Yet in the expanding towns and cities, where prostitution was rife and often openly tolerated, 'loose' women were seen in an entirely different category from their respectable sisters. Many Victorian men who were, on the face of things, sober, well-behaved citizens, devoted to their wives, regularly visited prostitutes or kept mistresses. Such behaviour was treated le niently; whereas 'respectable' women who took lovers were InVictorian England, a man could keep a mistress or visit prostitutes with impunity. But the sexuality of 'respectable' women was strictly contained within heterosexual marriage. regarded as scandalous and were shunned in public society if their behaviour came to light. The different attitudes towards the sexual activities of men and women formed a double standard, which has long existed and whose residues still linger on today (Barret-Ducrocq 1992). In current times, traditional attitudes exist alongside much more liberal attitudes towards sexuality, which developed particularly strongly in the 1960s. In films and plays, scenes are shown that previously would have been completely unacceptable, and pornographic material is readily available to most adults who want it. Some people, particularly those influenced by Christian teachings, believe that pre-marital sex is wrong, and generally frown on all forms ofsexual behaviour except heterosexual activitywithin the confines ofmarriage although it is now much more commonly accepted that sexual pleasure is a desirable and important feature. Others, by contrast, condone or actively approve of pre-marital sex and hold tolerant attitudes towards different sexual practices. Sexual attitudes have undoubtedly become more permissive over the past 30 years in most Western countries, though as the survey results given below in figure 14.4 demonstrate, there are some significant differences globally. For example, in the Republic of Ireland and the USA around one-third of the sample still thought sex THINKING CRITICALLY How are your attitudes towards sex and sexuality different from those of your parents and older relations? How do you think such attitudes are related to religious beliefs? Do the changing attitudes of younger generations provide evidence for secularization or are there other ways of explaining these changes? "We're not doing anything fo,- Gay Pride this year. We're here. we're queer, we're used to it. " before marriage was 'always wrong' and in the Philippines 60 per cent did so. But in Sweden the figure was just 4 per cent and in the Czech Republic it was 5 per cent (Widmer et al. 1998). Such cultural differences show that religious beliefs and traditional norms relating to sexuality have not simply been swept aside in the modern age, but continue to exert an influence on people's attitudes and values. Homosexuality Kenneth Plummer (1975), in a classic study, distinguished four types of homosexuality within modern Western culture. Casual homosexuality is a passing encounter that does not substantially structure a person's overall sexual life. Schoolboy crushes and mutual masturbation are examples. Situated activities refer to circumstances in which homosexual acts are regularly carried out but do not become an individual's overriding preference. In settings such as prisons or military camps, where men live without women, homosexual behaviour ofthis kind is common, regarded as a substitute for heterosexual behaviour rather than as preferable. Personalized homosexualityrefers to individuals who have a preference for homosexual activities but who are isolated from groups in which this is easily accepted. Homosexuality here is a furtive activity, hidden away from friends and colleagues. Homosexuality as a way oflife refers to individuals who have 'come out' and have made associations with others of similar sexual tastes a key part of their lives. Such people usually belong to gay subcultures, in which homosexual activities are integrated into a distinct lifestyle. Such communities often provide the possibility of collective political action to advance the rights and interests of homosexuals. The proportion of the population (both male and female) who have had homosexual experiences or experienced strong inclinations towards homosexual sex is probably much larger than those who follow an openly gaylifestyle. The term 'gay' has been used primarily to refer to male homosexu- als, as in the widely used phrase, 'gay and lesbian' people, though it is becoming increasingly used to describe lesbians. Male homosexuality generally receives more attention than lesbianism - homosexual attachment or activities among women. Lesbian groups tend to be less highly organized than male gay subcultures and include a lower proportion of casual relationships. In campaigns for homosexual rights, lesbian activist groups are often treated as if their interests were identical to those of male organizations. But while there is sometimes close cooperation between male gays and lesbians, there are also differences, particularly where lesbians are actively involved in feminism.Some lesbian women came to feel that the gay liberation movement reflected the interests of men, while liberal and radical feminists were concerned exclusively with the concerns of middle-class, heterosexual women. Thus, a distinctive brand of lesbian feminism emerged which promoted the spread of 'female values' and challenged the established, dominant institution of male heterosexuality (Rich 1981). Many gay women view lesbianism less as a sexual orientation and more as a commitment to and form of solidarity with other women politically, socially and personally (Seidman 1997). Attitudes towards homosexuality Attitudes of intolerance towards homosexuality have been so pronounced in the past that it is only during recent years that some of the myths surrounding the subject have been dispelled. Homosexuality has long been stigmatized in the United Kingdom and around the world. Homophobia, a term coined in the late 1960s, refers to an aversion or hatred ofhomosexuals and their lifestyles, along with behaviour based on such aversion. Homophobia is a form ofprejudice that is reflected not only in overt acts of hostility and violence towards lesbians and gays, but also in various forms of verbal abuse. In Britain, for example, terms like 'fag' or 'queer' are used to insult a heterosexual male, as are Sexuality and Gender female-related offensive terms like 'sissy' or 'pansy'. Although homosexuality is becoming more accepted, homophobia remains ingrained in many realms ofWestern society; antagonism towards homosexuals persists in many people's emotional attitudes. Instances of violent assault and murder of homosexuals remain all too common. See also the issues raised in the section 'Crimes against homosexuals',in chapter 21, 'Crime and Deviance'. Some kinds of male gay behaviour might be seen as attempts to alter the usual connections ofmasculinity and power- one reason, perhaps, why the heterosexual community so often finds them threatening. Gay men tend to reject the image of the effeminacy popularly associated with them, and they deviate from this in two ways. One is through cultivating outrageous effeminacy - a 'camp' masculinity that parodies the stereotype. The other is by developing a 'macho' image. This also is not conventionally masculine; men dressed as motorcyclists or cowboys are again parodying masculinity, by exaggerating it - think, for example, of the 1970s band the Village People and their globally recognized anthem YMCA (Bertelson 1986). Some sociologists have investigated the effect of the AIDS epidemic on popular attitudes to homosexuality. They suggest that the epidemic has challenged some of the main ideological foundations of heterosexual masculinity. Sexuality and sexual behaviour, for example, have become topics of public discussion, from safe sex campaigns backed by government funds to media coverage of the spread of the epidemic. The epidemic has threatened the legitimacy of traditional ideas of morality by drawing public attention to the prevalence of premarital sex, extramarital affairs and nonheterosexual relations in society. But most of all, in increasing the visibility of homosexuals, the epidemic has called the 'universality' of heterosexuality into question and has demonstrated that alternatives exist to the The Village People demonstrate a particularly extreme parody of 'macho' forms of masculinity. traditional nuclear family (Redman 1996). The response has sometimes taken hysterical and paranoid forms, however. Homosexuals are depicted as a deviant threat to the moral well-being of 'normal society'. In order to preserve heterosexual masculinity as the 'norm', it becomes necessary to marginalize and vilify the perceived threat (Rutherford and Chapman 1988). In many ways, homosexuality has become more normalized - more of an accepted part of everyday society, with many countries passing legislation to protect the rights of homosexuals. When South Africa adopted its new constitution in 1996, it became one of the only countries in the world, at that time, constitutionally to guarantee the rights of homosexuals. Many countries in Europe, including Denmark, the Netherlands and Spain, now permit homosexual partners to register with the state in a civil ceremony and to claim most of the prerogatives of marriage, including social security and pension benefits, tenancy rights, possible parental responsibility for a partner's children, full recognition for life assurance, responsibility to provide reasonable maintenance fo r partners and children, the same tax treatmen! as married couples and visiting rights in hospitals. The opportunity to make such a public demonstration of personal commitment has been very popular. For example, in the 12 months following introduction of the UK's civil partnership legislation in 2005, 18,059 gay and lesbian couples became civil partners (figure 14.1) Nevertheless, as we saw in this chapter's opening example, public attitudes towards equal marriage rights for lesbian and gay people differ widely within societies as well as across the world. Even within one geographical region such as Europe, a wide divergence of national opinion exists (see figure 14.2).Arecent Eurobarometer survey (European Commission 2006) asked respondents if they agreed with the statement 'Homosexual marriages should be allowed throughout Europe'. Tn the Netherlands, 82 per cent agreed, along with 71 per cent of Swedes, 69 per cent of Danes and 62 per cent of Belgians. However, in most of Eastern Europe, only a minority of people Numbers 2,000 1,500 I-- - 1,000 r- r- r- r- r- 500 r- r- r- r- r- o r- rSexuality and Gender agreed; just 11 per cent in Romania, 15 per cent in Bulgaria and 17 per cent in Poland. In only 8 of the then 25 European Union countries surveyed did 50 per cent or more of those in the survey agree with the statement - an interesting finding in a period when more and more governments are moving in the direction of legally acknowledging homosexual unions. As 'public opinion' on sexuality is really quite diverse, with strong disagreements rooted in religious and political beliefs, legislative change and social policy do not always follow public opinion, but can al so contribute to changingit. More and more gay activists in Europe, the USA and elsewhere are pushing for homosexual marriage to be fully legalized. Why should they care? After all, as we discuss in chapter 9, marriage between heterosexual couples appears to be in decline. Activists care because they want the same status, rights and obligations as anyone else. Marriage in many societies today is, above all, an emotional commitment' but as recognized by the state it also has definite legal implications, conferring I~ Male • Female I-- r- r- r- rr- r- r- r- r- rDec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 2005 2006 Figure 14.1 Number 01 UK civil partnerships,December 2005 - December 2006 Source: Office 01 National Statistics 2006b , ~ ... Ouestion' QA47_11 . Foreach of the following propos itions, lell me if you ....7 Option: Homosexual ma" i ~lIeS should be allowed throughoul Europe Answers: Agr" Co~n"y ,..~ 11$ TfwI Net~.,lond. 8~ S_ 71"0.<>........ _ ~um 62'lO Luxtmbouog ~ - -G.......... 5J'!I, (:nch R. pub!oc 52'IIi. A_na '9". h an \PoIl<'Id m.G~ IllS Cypru. 1'"UM.o 1l"> Ot~., oounl,lts 8ul9on. 15% Rom.... 11'" _ 71%- 100% C=:=l 21%- 30% 51%- 70% c=J 0% - 20% 31%- 50% Figure 14.2 European attitudes to 'homosexual marriage',by country,2006 Source: Eurobaromeler 66,European Commission,2006 upon partners important rights and responsibilities. 'Ceremonies of commitment' - non-legal marriages - have also become popular among both homosexuals and heterosexuals in America, but do not confer these rights and obligations. Conversely, of course, these legal rights and obligations are one reason why many heterosexual couples now decide either to defer marriage or not to get married at all. Opponents of homosexual marriage condemn it as either frivolous or unnatural. They see it as legitimating a sexual orientation which the state should be doing its best to curb. For example, there are pressure groups in America dedicated to getting homosexuals to change their ways and marry people of the opposite sex. Some still see homosexuality as a perversion and are violently opposed to any provisions that might normalize it. In other countries, homosexuality remains illegal and carries severe legal penalties including long terms of imprisonment and even execution. In 2005, two Iranian teenagers were convicted and hanged, allegedly for the rape of a 13year-old boy, though human rights groups argued their crime was having gay sex, with confessions extracted under torture (BBC News, July 2005). Gay and lesbian civil rights Until recently, most homosexuals hid their sexual orientation, for fear that 'coming out of the closet' would cost them their jobs, families and friends, and leave them open to verbal and physical abuse. Yet, since the late 1960s, many homosexuals have acknowledged their homosexuality openly, and, as we saw in the discussion of gay marriage above, in some areas the lives of homosexual men and women have to a large extent been normalized (Seidman 1997). Manchester, New York, San Francisco, Sydney and many other large metropolitan areas around the world have thriving gay and lesbian communities. 'Coming out' may be important not only for the person who does so, but for others in the larger society; previously 'closeted' lesbians and gays come to realize they are not alone, while heterosexuals are forced to recognize that people whom they have admired and respected are homosexual. The current global wave ofgay and lesbian civil rights movements began partly as an outgrowth of the social movements of the 1960s, which emphasized pride in racial and ethnic identity. One pivotal event was the Stonewall Riots in June 1969 in the United States, when NewYork City's gay community - angered by continual police harassment fought the New York Police Department for two days, a public action that for most people (gay or not) was practically unthinkable (Weeks 1977; D'Emilio 1983). The Stonewall Riots became a symbol of gay pride, heralding the 'coming out' ofgays and lesbians, who insisted not only on equal treatment under the law, but also on a complete end to the stigmatization of their lifestyle. In 1994, on the 25th anniversary of the Stonewall Riots, 100,000 people attended the International March on the United Nations to Affirm the Human Rights of Lesbian and Gay People. It is clear that significant strides have been made, although discrimination and outright homophobia remain serious problems for many lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual (LGBT) people. There are enormous differences between countries in the degree to which homosexuality is legally punishable (see figure 14.3). In Africa, for example, male homosexual acts have been legalized in only a handful of Sexuality and Gender countries, while female homosexuality is seldom mentioned in the law at all. In South Africa, the official policy of the former white government was to regard homosexuality as a psychiatric problem that threatened national security. Once it took power, however, the black government legislated full equality. In Asia and the Middle East, the situation is similar: male homosexuality is banned in the vast majority of countries, including all those t1,at are predominantly Islamic. Europe, meanwhile, has some ofthe most liberal laws in the world: homosexuality has been legalized in nearly all countries, and, as we saw above, several countries legally recognize same-sex marriages. Today there is a growing movement around the world for the rights of homosexuals. The International Lesbian and Gay Association (lLGA), which was founded in 1978, today has more than 600 member organizations in some 90 countries on every continent (lLGA 2008). It holds international conferences, supports lesbian and gay social movements around the world, and lobbies international organizations. For example, it convinced the Council ofEurope to require all its member nations to repeal laws banning homosexuality. In general, active lesbian and gay social movements tend to thrive in countries that emphasize individual rights and liberal state policies (Frank and McEneaney 1999). The political campaigning of lesbian and gay movements in many parts of the world brought about new debates on gender identities and led to the problematizing of what previously appeared obvious: the gender differences and sexual differences are the same. Gayle Rubin (1975, 1984) argued that the typical Western gender difference is between men and women, while the key difference in sexuality is that between heterosexual and homosexual. However, sexuality is often expressed through gender distinctions rather than in its own terms. For example, it is common to talk about 'feminine' gay men or 'masculine' lesbians; the implication ofthis discourse is that gay men Cl Constitutional equality '~....,with sexual orientation' discrimination outlawed Some anti-discriminatioo and , Cl anti-vilification legislation based on 5e)(uaJ orientation (may be local rather than national) "'-".Cl Discrimination or not mentioned in law ~ ~ Illegal in some states Cl Imprisonable for up to 10 years . . Life imprisoomenl Countries with no or Cl unclear information 00 sexual oHenses law Countrles with severe r----l discrimination in criminal L.....J law but falling short of total ille alily Illegal and where exact penalties Cl Imprisonable for 10+ years may not be known . . Death penalty for homosexual acts Figure 14.3 Sexual minorities and the law across the world Source: © 2000 by New Internationalist,www.newint.org; reprinted by kind permission of New Internationalist. and lesbians are deviant, because they break the norms of gender. Rubin was one of the first to argue that, theoretically, it is possible toseparate genderfrom sexualityaltogether. This theoretical move is the starting point for queer theory, which marks not only a break with conventional ideas but also from lesbian theory and gay theory, which deal with sexual difference as it relates to female and male gender respectively. Queer theory builds upon the social constructionist approach to sexuality developed by Gagnon and Simon (1973), and has been heavily influenced by poststructuralist thought, particularly that associated with Judith Butler (1990), Michel Foucault and jacques Derrida. In particular, queer theorists challenge the very notion of 'identity' as something that is relatively fixed or assigned to people by socializing agents. Following Foucault, queer theorists argue that gender and sexuality, along with all of the other terms that come with these concepts, constitute a specific discourse of sexuality, rather than referring to something objectively real or 'natural'. For example, in his work on the history of sexuality during the 1970s and '80s, Foucault argued that the male homosexual identity that today is associated with gay men, was not part of the dominant discourse on sexuality in the nineteenth century and before. Therefore, this form of identification just did not exist for people until it became part of, or was created within, the discourses of medicine and psychiatry. Identities can then be seen as pluralistic, quite unstable and subject to change over a lifetime. Queer theorists are also interested in all forms of unconventional sexuality, including prostitution, bisexuality, transgender and so on, many of which are heterosexual rather than, or as well as, homosexual. In this way, queer theory can be viewed as a radical social constructionism that explores the process of identity creation and recreation insofar as this relates to human sexuality and gender. Some queer theorists .- also argue that every major sociological topic (religion, the body, globalization and so on), as well as other subjects, including literature and even lesbian and gay studies, should bring queer voices to the centre to challenge the heterosexual assumptions that underlie much contemporary thinking (Epstein 2002). Critics argue that queer theory tends to study cultural texts (film, novels and so on) and currently lacks empirical support. It may well be that many, maybe most people, do not experience their identity as being as fluid and changing as the theory suggests, but, rather, as something quite firm and fixed (Edwards 1998). Ifso, it may be that the radical constructionism of queer theorists overestimates the degree to which identities are open to change. We can gain an insight into the empirical evidence by looking at how research into sexuality has been conducted and what particular problems can arise when studying this sensitive area of people's lives. Researching sexuality When Alfred Kinsey began his research in the United States in the J940s and J950s, it was the first time a major investigation of actual sexual behaviour had been undertaken, and many people were shocked and surprised at the divergence between public norms and private sexual behaviour his team discovered (see 'Classic Studies 14.1'). We can speak much more confidently about public values concerning sexuality than we can about private practices, which, by their nature, go mostly undocumented. Still, many other areas of personal life, such as that within families and relationships, is similarly personal, yet has been the subject of many research studies. Why should sexuality be particularly difficult to research sociologically? Surveys of sexual behaviour are fraught with difficulties. As we saw above, until quite recently sex was a taboo subject, not something to be discussed in either the Sexuality and Gender public or the private realm. Perhaps more so than in any other areas of life, many, perhaps even most, people see sexual behaviour as a purely personal matter and are unwilling to discuss such an intimate subject with strangers. This may mean that those who are prepared to come forward to be interviewed are essentially a self-selected sample, which is therefore unrepresentative of the general population. The social silence in relation to sexual matters has changed somewhat since the 19608, a time when social movements associated with 'hippy' lifestyles and countercultural ideas of 'free love' challenged the existing order of things, including breaking with existing sexual norms. But we must be careful not to exaggerate their impact. Once the movements of the 1960s had become assimilated into mainstream society, it was clear that some of the older norms relating to sex continued to exert an influence. Some have even argued that a 'new fidelity' may be emerging (Laumann 1994), perhaps partly as a result ofconcerns about the risks associated with the transmission of HNIAIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. For example, a 1998 survey of attitudes towards sexual relations in 24 countries (see figure 14.4) showed (with some exceptions) overwhelming majorities to be against extramarital sex, homosexual sex and sex before the age of 16. The survey also found that only a minority were against sex before marriage (Widmer et al. 1998), suggesting that the traditional linkage between marriage and sexual relations has been broken. In this context, sociological research into sexuality today faces the same problem as earlier studies; we simply do not know how far people tell the truth about their sexual lives when asked by a researcher whom they do not know and perhaps do not trust with their highly personal information. However, we must remember the lesson from Kinsey's studies here: such publicly stated attitudes may simply reflect people's understanding of prevailing public norms Classic Studies 14.1 Alfred Klnsey discovers the diversity of sexual behaviour The research problem Do public norms of sexuality really govern people's sexual behaviour? Are sexually 'deviant' practices limited to a tiny minority of individuals? Is it possible that many more people engage in such practices in private, and that public norms fail to reflect this fact? To address these issues, Alfred Kinsey (1894-1956) and his research team set out to collect evidence from the white population in 1940s America. They faced condemnation from religious organizations and their work was denounced as immoral in the newspapers and even in Congress. But they persisted and eventually obtained sexual life histories from 18,000 people, a reasonably representative sample of the white American population (Kinsey 1948, 1953). Kinsey's findings Kinsey's research findings were surprising to most people and shocking to many, because they did indeed reveal a large diflerence between the public expectations of sexual behaviour prevailing at that time and actual sexual conduct. The research team found that almost 70 per cent of men had visited a prostitute and 84 per cent had had pre-marital sexual experiences.Yet, following the sexual double standard, 40 per cent of men also expected their wives to be virgins at the time of marriage.More than 90 per cent of males had engaged in masturbation and nearly 60 per cent in some form of oral sexual activity. Among women, around 50 per cent had had pre-marital sexual experiences, although mostly with their prospective husbands.Some 60 per cent had masturbated and the same percentage had engaged in oral-genital contact. The study also showed much higher levels of male homosexuality than expected, revealing that many otherwise heterosexual men had experienced homosexual feelings. The gap between publicly accepted attitudes and actual behaviour that Kinsey's findings demonstrated was especially great in that particular period,just after the Second World War. A phase of sexual liberalization had begun rather earlier, in the 1920s, when many younger people felt freed from the strict moral codes that had governed earlier generations.Sexual behaviour probably changed a good deal, but issues concerning sexuality were not openly discussed in the way that has now become familiar.People participating in sexual activities that were still strongly disapproved of on a public level concealed them. not realizing the full extent to which many others were engaging in similar practices. Critical points Kinsey's research was controversial in the USA and was attacked by conservative and religious organizations. For example, one aspect of the studies explored the sexuality of children under 16 years of age. Many critics objected to their involvement as research subjects. Religious leaders also argued that open discussion of sexual behaviour would undermine Christian moral values. Academic critics argued that Kinsey's positivist approach collected much raw data, but failed to grasp the complexity of sexual desire underpinning the diverse behaviour he uncovered, or the meanings people attach to their sexual relationships. Later surveys also found lower levels of homosexual experience than Kinsey, suggesting that his sample may have been less representative than the team first thought. Contemporary significance Kinsey is widely seen as a founder of the scientific study of human sexuality and his findings were instrumental in challenging the widespread view at the time, that homosexuality was a form of mental illness requiring treatment. It was only in the more permissive era ofthe 1960s, which brought openly declared attitudes more into line with the realities of behaviour, that the overall tenor of Kinsey's findings came to be seen as providing a realistic picture of sexual behaviour.Kinsey died in 1956,but the Institute for Sex Research,which he headed,continues its research today and has produced much valuable information about contemporary sexual behaviour. It was renamed the Kinsey Institute for Research in Sex, Gender and Reproduction in 1981 to celebrate his contribution to scientific research in this field. Australia Bulgaria Canada Czech Republic Great Britain Republic of Ireland Japan New Zealand Northern Ireland Philippines Russia Spain Sweden USA Sex before marriage is wrong? 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% ~ 19 1 59 23 _ 11 50 12 • 15 69 5. 20 "" 19 • 14 I 70 35 _ 15 I 42 19 44 I 15 19 • 14 I 62 3' _ 13 48 60 =-:1313 _ '" bf 20 _ 9 I 63 415 1 89 29 _ 18 I 41 ID Always • Almost always D Only sometimes 0 Not wrong at ali i Sex before age 16 is wrong? 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Australia -I===:c=~;:r:==-:::l~~::::I:;::;:;:~ Bulgaria -I===:C::;:::=I=::::;iiIIiIi_':~~~~ Canada Czech Republic ~==~~i~~~~§;;~a~Great Britain l Republic of Ireland t~~~~~~~~~~~!!!~~Japan New Zealand Northern Ireland -I===:C==~==::I=~~=:;;:;;j Philippines Russia Spain Sweden USA IDAlways • Almost always 0 Only sometimes 0 Not wrong at ali i Figure 14.4 Attitudes towards sexual relations, 1998 (selected countries) Source: Wldmer et al. 1998 Extra marital sex is wrong? 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Australia ~~~~~~;~~~~!~~S~~Bulgaria { Canada Czech Republic -I===:s:==::r:;iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiliiiiiii ----,JL----r-o-l Great Britain Republic of Ireland ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~!~~Japan New Zealand -l=====::::;::==~~~ Northern Ireland -I===::r::==::J~==r::==:!"'~~~ Philippines -l==~==::;;;;~;;;;;;;;;;l;::::::::;=::;=~~ Russia -l===I==~~~~~=::;':;;:~:::j Spain ~~~~~~~~~~~!~Sweden ~ USA ~======~========~~ IDAlways • Almost always 0 Only sometimes 0 Not wrong at all I Homosexual sex is wrong? 0% 201 % 40% 60% 80% 100% Australia 1===:±""'~=l=="_~T±~==j Bulgaria -l===:::!==~;:;:;::r:::==;-;;t-~=:::j Canada Czech Republic {:=:;;:i=;;~~~=r;::==~==:::j Great Britain Republic of Ireland -l===:I=:::;:;::J===~:::;~~=;:::::j Japan New Zealand {:==:I:::;;:-:::-=:J==::;F.~~~~=::'j Northern Ireland -l===:I==:::J~==r:::==:!"'~~;;;j Philippines {:==:I:::;~=:J==:::;;~;;;:~~~=1 Russia 1===::r;;::==:J::;;;;;~'I""'~~':t==::j Spain -l===:I:;:;::=:J::::"~:::;;:~::;::=i;;;:=:::j Sweden -l===:I:::::::::::;~==~!:::::;;:~:::;;;:::::j USA ID Always • Almost always 0 Only sometimes 0 Not wrong at ali i Figure 14.4 (Continued) rather than accurately describing their private beliefs and sexual behaviours. The validity ofsurveys ofsexual behaviour has also been the focus of intense debate (Lewontin 1995). Critics have argued that they do not generate reliable information about sexual practices. In one American survey (Rubin 1990), researchers reported that 45 per cent of men aged between 80 and 85 say they have sex with their partner. Critics feel that this is so obviously untrue that it calls into doubt the findings of the whole survey. However, social gerontologists suggest that this criticism may itself be based on negative stereotypes of ageing rather than evidence. They point out that in one study of older men living outside institutions, 74 per cent were indeed sexually active, while others have found that most men even in their 90s sustained an interest in sex. When researching sexuality, sociolo~ gists need to be acutely aware of their own, sometimes unevidenced, assumptions. THINKING CRITICALLY The survey reported in figure 14.4 was carried out over a decade ago. Which countries appear to have the most 'liberal' attitudes towards sexual behaviour? Which seem to be more 'conservative'? Did any of the findings surprise you? Do you think that if the same questions were asked today, the results would be significantly different? If so, in what ways might they differ? Gathering evidence on sexual behaviour Many studies ofsexual behaviourhave taken the form of attitude and behaviour surveys using postal questionnaires or face-ta-face interviews. But evidence in this area can also be collected through the analysis and interpretation of documentary materials such as personal diaries, oral history, magazines, newspapers and other published and unpublished historical materials. These Sexuality and Gender research methods are not mutuallyexclusive ofcourse, and can be combined to produce a richer account of changing forms of sexuality within societies. An example of a large-scale survey is that of Lillian Rubin (1990), who interviewed 1,000 Americans between the ages of 13 and 48 to discover what changes had occurred in sexual behaviour and attitudes since the Kinsey studies. According to her findings, there had been some significant developments. Sexual activity was typically beginning at a younger age than was characteristic of the previous generation and the sexual practices of teenagers tended to be as varied and comprehensive as those of adults. There was still a double standard, but it was not as powerful as it once had been. One of the most important changes was that women had come to expect, and actively pursue, sexual pleasure in relationships. They were expecting to receive, not only to provide, sexual satisfaction. Rubin found that women were more sexually liberated than previously, but most men in the survey found such female assertiveness difficult to accept, often saying they 'felt inadequate', were afraid they could 'never do anything right' and found it 'impossible to satisfy women these days' (Rubin 1990). This finding seems to contradict all that we have come to expect about gender relations. Men continue to dominate in most spheres and they are, in general, much more violent towards women than the other way round. Such violence is substantially aimed at the control and continuing subordination of women. Yet a number of authors have begun to argue that masculinity is a burden as well as a source of rewards, and if men were to stop using sexuality as a means of control, not only women, but men too would be beneficiaries. The use of documentary materials to study changing forms of sexuality is well demonstrated in Dutch sociologist Cas Wouters's Sex and Manners (2004), a comparative study of shifting gender relations and sexuality in England, Germany, the Netherlands and the USA. Wouters studied books on 'good manners' from the end of the nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth, particularly as these pertained to relationships between men and women and 'courting behaviour' - the opportunities for and limitations on meetings and 'dating' between men and women. Manners books provide advice on how such meetings should be conducted, providing codes of manners on how to meet and behave in relations with 'the opposite sex'. For instance, in an English publication from 1902, Etiquette for Women, the advice given is: 'It is the man's place to pay for what refreshments are had, if the ladies do not insist on paying their share; and ifhe invited the ladies with him to go in somewhere and have some, then the case is simple enough.' But by the 1980s, the practice of 'going Dutch' - sharing the cost ofa date - was well established. One manners book from 1989, reflecting on the old practice of the man always paying for the woman, noted that, 'some still do, but women can't dine endlessly without offering a crust in return' (Wouters 2004: 25- 7). This example seems fairly trivial, but in fact it shows how shifting gender relations in the wider society, with more women moving into paid employment and the public sphere more generally (Walby 1990), were also leading to changing behavioural norms between men and women. Wouters's research provides many such examples in relation to sexual behaviour and courtship. By analysing manners books over the course ofa century and relating the advice given in these to sociological theories of social change, Wouters argues that the four countries all exhibit a longterm trend away from very formal and rigid codes of manners, towards much more informal codes that allow for a wider range of acceptable courtship behaviour. Hence, those critics ofthe 'permissiveness' brought about since the 1960s fail to appreciate that such changes are part of a much longer and deeper process of social transformation. The two studies reported here have many similarities. Both are concerned with changes in gender relations, norms of sexual behaviour alongside private and public attitudes towards sexuality. While Rubin's study tells us something of how people today feel about such changes and what impact they are having on contemporary lifestyles, Wouters's analysis of primary documents sets these contemporary findings into historical and comparative perspective. Bringing together the findings from studies using different methods, which also focus on different aspects of changing sexual behaviour, may give sociologists more confidence in their conclusions in this difficult to research area. Prostitution and 'sex work' Prostitution Prostitution can be defined as the granting of sexual favours for monetary gain. The word 'prostitute' began to come into common usage in the late eighteenth century. In the ancient world, most purveyors of sexuality for economic reward were CQurtesans, concubines (kept mistresses) or slaves. Courtesans and concubines often had a high position in traditional societies. A key aspect of modern prostitution is that women and their clients are generally unknown to one another. Although men may become 'regular customers', the relationship is not initially established on the basis of personal acquaintance. This was not true of most forms of the dispensing of sexual favours for material gain in earlier times. Prostitution is directly connected to the break-up of small-scale communities, the development of large impersonal urban areas and the commercializing of social relations. In small-scale traditional communities, sexual relations were controlled by their very visibility. In newly developed urban areas, more anonymous social connections were easily established. A United Nations resolution passed in 1951 condemns those who organize prostitution or profit from the activities of Amsterdam's Red Light District contains many sex clubs, bars and 'prostitution windows' from which sex is sold.In 2006, city officials announced they were shutting down about one-third of the 'windows' in a crackdown on trafficking and pimping in the area. prostitutes, but does not ban prostitution as such. A total of 53 member states have formally accepted the resolution, although their legislation on prostitution varies widely. In some countries, prostitution itself is illegal. Other countries prohibit only certain types, such as streetsoliciting or child prostitution. Some national or local governments license officially recognized brothels or sex parlours - such as the 'Eros centres' in Germany or the sex houses in Amsterdam. In October 1999 the Dutch Parliament turned prostitution into an official profession for the estimated 30,000 women who workin the sex industry. All venues where sex is sold can now be regulated, licensed and inspected by local authorities. However, only a few countries license male prostitutes. Legislation against prostitution rarely punishes clients. Those who purchase sexual services are not arrested or prosecuted, and in court procedures their identities may be kept hidden. There are far fewer studies of clients than of those selling sex, and it is rare for anyone to suggest - as is often stated or implied about prostitutes that the clients are psychologically disturbed.The imbalance in research surely expresses an uncritical acceptance oforthodox stereotypes of sexuality according to which it is 'normal' for men to actively seek a variety of sexual outlets, while those who cater for these needs are condemned. Sex work Today, prostitution is more widely seen by sociologists as just one form of sex work. Sex work can be defined as the provision of sexual services in a financial exchange between consenting adults, though, of course, children (and adults) have historically been - and still are - forced into sex work in both developed and developing countries. Sex workers, like prostitutes, are mostly female, and sex work includes at least all of the following: actors in pornographic films, nude modelling, striptease and lap dancers, live sex show workers, providers of erotic massage, phone sex workers and home-based 'webcam sex' via the Internet, if this involves a financial exchange (Weitzer 2000). The original 1970s concept of the sex worker aimed to destigmatize the working practices of prostitutes and other women working in the sex industry. Provided that sexual services were exchanged berween freely consenting adults, it was argued that such work should be treated like any other type of work and prostitution, in particular, sho uld be decriminalized. Prostitutes around the world today come mainly from poorer social backgrounds, as they did in the past, but they have now been joined by considerable numbers of middle-class women working across the range of sex work described above and many see their work as providing useful and respectable sexual services. As 'Rona', a sex worker with ten years' experience insists: Yes, it is a profession - I believe a perfectly respectable profession, and should be viewed as such in the same way as a teacher, accountant or anyone else. I believe that the first step is to obtain recognition for sex workers as legitimate workers in a legitimate industry and profession. ... Why should the fact that I have chosen to work as a prostitute be considered any different from that of being a nurse, which I once was? There should be no social stigma attached. J work in clean comfortable surroundings, have regular medical check-ups and pay taxes like anyone else. CRona' 2000) The idea of a trade union for sex workers may appear strange, but in the context of ensuring health and safety at work, legal support in disputes over pay and conditions and access to training or retraining (for those who wish to leave the sex industry), these issues lie at the centre of mainstream trade union activity. Sex workers point out that union collectivization may help to root out exploitation and abuse within the sexual services industry. For example, formed in 2000, the International Union of Sex Workers (IUSW), based in London, sees unionization as the first step towards the professionalization ofsexwork and in 2002 it became affiliated to the GMB, a large general trade union in the UK. The IUSW campaigns for: • the decriminalization of all aspects of sex work involving consenting adults; • the right to form and join professional associations or unions; • the right to work on the same basis as other independent contractors and employers and to receive the same benefits; • no taxation without such rights and representation; • zero tolerance of coercion, violence, sexual abuse, child labour, rape and racism; • legal support for sex workers who want to sue those who exploit their labour; • the right to travel across national boundaries; • clean and safe places to work; • the right to choose whether to work on our own or cooperatively • the absolute right to say no; • access to training - ourjobs require very special skills and professional stan- dards; • access to health clinics where we do not feel stigmatized; • retraining programmes for sex workers who want to leave the industry; • an end to social attitudes which stigmatise those who are or have been sex workers. (IUSW: www.iusw.org/startl index.htrnl) Nevertheless, the concept of sex work remains controversial, as many feminists actively campaign against the sex industry, seeing it as degrading to women, strongly linked to sexual abuse and drug addiction, and ultimately rooted in women's subordination to men. More recently, though, sex work has been reappraised by some feminists who argue that many, though by no means all, women sex workers earn a good living, enjoy their work and do not fit the stereotype ofthe poor, sexually abused drug addict forced into prostitution by their circumstances (O'Neill 2000). For these women, sex work provides worthwhile jobs that are relatively well paid. Many sex workers see themselves as independent women who have taken control of their lives, which makes them little different from successful women working in other employment sectors (Chapkis et al. 1997). THINIUNG CRITICALLY Why does prostitution continue to thrive into the twenty-first century? How might functionalist theorists explain its persistence over such a long time period? What would an explanation rooted in Marxism focus on? Could either perspective satisfactorily account for the strongly gendered character of prostitution and expansion of sex work? What would a feminist approach add to our understanding of sex work today? Explaining prostitution and sex work Why do prostitution and other forms of sex work still exist? Certainly, prostitution is an enduring phenomenon, which resists the attempts ofgovernments to eliminate it. It is also almost always a matter of women selling sexual favours to men, rather than the reverse - although there are some instances, as in Hamburg, Germany, where 'houses of pleasure' exist to provide male sexual services to women. And of course, boys or men also sell sex to other men. No single factor can explain the persistSexuality and Gender ence of prostitution or sex work. It might seem that men simply have stronger, or more persistent, sexual needs than women, and therefore require the outlets that the sex industry provides. But this explanation is implausible. Most women seem capable of developing their sexuality in a more intense fashion than men of comparable age. Moreover, if prostitution existed simply to serve sexual needs, there would surely be many male prostitutes catering for women. One possible conclusion to be drawn is that sex work expresses, and to some extent helps perpetuate, the tendency of men to treat women as objects who can be 'used' for sexual purposes. Prostitution expresses in a particular context the inequalities of power between men and women. Of course, many other elements are also involved. Prostitution offers a means of obtaining sexual satisfaction for people who, because of their physical shortcomings or the existence of restrictive moral codes, cannot find other sexual partners. Prostitutes and sex workers often cater for men who are away from home, desire sexual encounters without commitment or have unusual sexual tastes that other women will not accept. Of course, such a 'negative' conclusion ignores the possibility that many female sex workers, like many of the men who also profit from the sex industry, are active social agents who are adept at selling sexual services to men who need and benefit from them. Certainly, that is the way that some sex workers describe themselves and the services they provide. The global sex industry 'Sex tourism' exists in several areas of the world, including Thailand and the Philippines. Sex tourism in the Far East has its origins in the provision of prostitutes for American troops during the Korean and Vietnam wars. 'Rest and recreation' centres were built in Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Korea and Taiwan. Some still remain, particularly in the Philippines, catering to regular shipments of tourists as well as to the military stationed in the region. Today, package tours oriented towards prostitution draw men to these areas from Europe, the United States and Japan, often in search of sex with minors - although these tours are illegal in more than 30 countries including the UK, Australia, Canada, Japan and the USA, under laws dealing with the 'extraterritorial accountability' of their citizens. Enforcement is patchy though, and in 2004 a UN report noted that Japan had made no prosecutions under its legislation, whereas the USA had made at least 20 prosecutions for sex tourism (Svensson 2004). Areport published in 1998 bythe InternationalLabour Organization (lLO) found that prostitution and the sex industry in Southeast Asia have taken on the dimensions of a fully fledged commercial sector, having grown rapidly over recent decades. For example, it is estimated that there are up to 2 million female prostitutes in Thailand alone. Cheaper global travel and the large differential in the exchange rate between Asian and international currencies have made sex tourism more affordable and attractive to foreigners. Furthermore, the sex industry is linked to economic hardship. Some desperate families force their own children into prostitution; other young people are unwittingly lured into the sex trade by responding innocently to advertisements for 'entertainers' or 'dancers', Migration patterns from rural to urban areas are an important factor in the growth of the sex industry, as many women eager to leave their traditional and constraining home towns grasp at any opportunity to do so. Sex tourism has serious implications for the spread ofAlOS and sexually transmitted diseases and is often associated with violence, criminality, the drug trade and violations of human rights (Lim 1998). The trafficking of people, mostly women and girls, across the world has become a much more significant issue in recent years. For example, the trafficking of women into Western Europe to become prostitutes and sex workers is expanding rapidly. Although it is impossible to know exactly how many people become victims of human trafficking, the UN Refugee Agency's (2006) best estimate is that between 100,000 and 500,000 people are trafficked into Europe annually. As EU borders expand with the entry of new countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, more transit routes become available for entry into wealthy Western European countries or the new border countries become final destinations themselves for a growing sex industry. Governments are moving to legislate against trafficking. In the UK, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 made trafficking for prostitution a criminal offence for the first time (extended to trafficking for domestic servitude and forced labour in 2004). Clearly, globalization enables the more rapid movement ofpeople across national boundaries and new patterns ofmovement are emerging. In relation to sex tourism and trafficking for prostitution, these patterns are related to the huge disparities in wealth across the world's countries and to gendered power relations. Relatively rich Westerners make short trips into developing countries to buy sex from relatively poor people, while relatively powerless Eastern European women are being forced into 'sex work' in Western Europe by organized gangs of, mostly male, people traffickers. The lives of many victims of the global sex industry are very far removed from those of the liberated and empowered sex workers described by'Rona' above. Gender 'Sex' is an ambiguous term. It can mean, as in the previous sections, 'sexual activity'. However, it can also refer to the physical characteristics that separate men and women.You might think that being a man or a woman issimplyassociated with the sex of the physical body we are born with. But, like many questions of interest to sociologists, the nature of maleness and femaleness is not so easily classified. This section examines the origins of the differences between men and women. Before we go on, though, we need to make an important distinction, between sex and gender. In general, sociologists use the term 'sex' to refer to the anatomical and physiological differences that define male and female bodies. Gender, by contrast, concerns the psychological, social and cultural differences between males and females. Gender is linked to socially constructed notions of masculinity and femininity; it is not necessarily a direct product of an individual's biological sex. Some people, for example, feel that they have been born into the wrong bodies and seek to 'put things right' by switching gender part way through life, or following the lifestyles or dress of the other sex. The distinction between sex and gender is a fundamental one, since many differences between males and females are not biological in origin. Contrasting approaches have been taken to explain the formation of gender identities and the social roles based on those identities. The debate is really one about how much learning there is; some scholars allow more prominence than others to social influences in analysing gender differences. Sociological interpretations of gender differences and inequalities have taken contrasting positions on this question ofsex and gender. Three broad approaches will be explored below. First we will look at arguments for a biological basis to behavioural differences between men and women. Next, attention will turn to theo ries placing central importance on socialization and the learning of gender roles. Finally, we will consider the ideas of scholars who argue that neither gender nor sex have a biological basis, but are both enti rely socially constructed. Sexuality and Gender Gender and biology: natural differences? How far are differences in the behaviour of women and men the result of sex rather than gender? In other words, how much are they the result of biological differences? As we ·saw above, some authors hold that aspects of human biology - ranging from hormones to chromosomes to brain size to genetics - are responsible for innate differences in behaviour between men and women. These differences, they claim, can be seen in some form across all cultures, implying that natural factors are responsible for the inequalities between genders which characterize most societies. Such researchers are likely to draw attention to the fact, for example, that in almost all cultures, men rather than women take part in hunting and warfare. Surely, they argue, this indicates that men possess biologically based tendencies towards aggression that women lack? Many researchers remain unconvinced by this argument. The level of aggressiveness of males, they say, varies widely between different cultures, and women are expected to be more passive or gentle in some cultures than in others (Elshtain 1987). Critics point out that theories of 'natural difference' are often grounded in data on animal behaviour rather than in anthropological or historical evidence about human behaviour, which reveal variation over time and place. Moreover, they add, because a trait is more or less universal, it does not follow that it is biological in origin; there may be cultural factors of a general kind that produce such characteristics. For instance,in the majority ofcultures, most women spend a significant part of their lives caring for children and could not readily take part in hunting or war. Although the hypothesis that biological factors determine behaviour patterns in men and women cannot be dismissed out of hand, nearly a century of research to identify the physiological origins of such an influence has been unsuccessful. There is no evidence of the mechanisms which would link such biological forces with the complex social behaviour exhibited by human men and women (Connell 1987). Theories that see individuals as complying with some kind of innate predisposition neglect the vital role of social interaction in shaping human behaviour. Gender socialization Another route to take in understanding the origins of gender differences is the study of gender socialization, the learning ofgender roles with the help of social agencies such as the family and the media. Such an approach makes a distinction between biological sex and social gender-an infant is born with the first and develops the second. Through contact with various agencies of socializa· tion, both primary and secondary, children gradually internalize the social norms and expectations which are seen to correspond with their sex. Gender differences are not biologically determined, they are culturally produced. According to this view, gender inequalities result because men and women are socialized into different roles. Theories of gender socialization have been favoured by functionalists who see boys and girls as learning 'sex roles' and the male and female identities - masculinity and femininity - which accompany them. They are gulded in this process by positive and negative sanctions, socially applied forces which reward or restrain behaviour. For example, a small boycould be positively sanctioned in his behaviour ('What a brave boy you are!'), or be the recipient ofnegative sanction (' Boys don't play with dolls'). These positive and negative reinforcements aid boys and girls in learning and conforming to expected sex roles. If an individual develops gender practices which do not correspond to his or her biological sex - that is, they are deviant - the explanation is seen to reside in inadequate or irregular socialization. According to this functionalist view, socializing agencies contribute to the maintenance of social order by overseeing the smooth gender socialization of new generations. This rigid interpretation of sex roles and socialization has been criticized on a number of fronts. Many writers argue that gender socialization is not an inherently smooth process; different 'agencies' such as the family, schools and peer groups may be at odds with one another. Moreover, socialization theories ignore the ability of individuals to reject, or modify, the social expectations surrounding sex roles. As Connell has argued: ~gencies ofsocialization' canTIot produce mechanical effects in a growing person. What they do is invite the child to participate in social practice on given terms. The invitation may be, and often is, coercive - accompanied by heavy pressure to accept and no mention ofan alternative. .. .Yet children do decline, or more exactly start making their own moves on the terrain ofgender. They may refuse heterosexuality ... they may set about blending masculine and feminine elements, for example girls insisting on competitive sport at school. They may start a split in their own lives, for example boys dreSSing in drag when by themselves. They may construct a fantasy life at odds with their actual practice, which is perhaps the commonest move of all. (1987) It is important to remember that humans are not passive objects or unquestioning recipients ofgender lprogramming',as some sociologists have suggested. People are active agents who create and modify roles for themselves. While we should be sceptical of any wholesale adoption of the sex roles approach, many studies have shown that to some degree gender identities are a result ofsocial influences. Social influences on gender identity flow through many diverse channels; even parents committed to raising their children in a 'non-sexist' way find existing patterns of gender learning difficult to combat (Statham 1986). Studies of parent-child Gendered learning does not take place simply through formal instruction but also occurs in many everyday activities. .................................................................................................................................. interactions, for example. have shown distinct differences in the treatment of boys and girls even when the parents believe their reactions to both are the same. The toys, picture books and television programmes experienced by young children all tend to emphasize differences between male and female attributes. Although the situation is changing somewhat, male characters generally outnumber females in most children's books, television programmes and films. Male characters tend to play more active, adventurous roles, while fern 'es are portrayed as passive, expectant and domestically oriented (Weitzman 1972; Zarnmuner 1987; Davies 1991). Fern nist researchers have demonstrated how cultural and media products marketed to young audiences embody traditional attitudes towards gender and towards the sorts of aims and ambitions girls and boys are expected to have. A more detailed discussion of gender socialization is in chapter 8,'The Life- Course', Reproductive technologies For hundreds of years, childbirth and childrearing dominated the lives of most women. In traditional societies, contraception was ineffective or. in some societies, unknown. As late as the eighteenth century in Europe and the United States, it was common for women to experience as many as 20 pregnancies, often involving miscarriages and infant deaths. In many partsofthe developingworld today, it is still commonplace for women to have a large number of pregnancies over a lifetime. For example, the totalfertiliry rate in sub-Saharan Africa is 5.6, which isdouble the global average. When researchers asked what was people's ideal number of children, the average was 4.1 in Kenya and 8.5 in Chad and .,. Contraceptive prevalence (percentage) c=J Less than 20 c=J 20 - 39 c=J 40 - 59 r==J 60 or over c=J no data , 500 1000 1500 2000 km I I I I , , 500 1000 miles NB: 'Contraceptive prevalence' is the percentage of women of reproductive age (15-49), married or in partnerships, currently using contraception. Figure 14.5 Global contraceptive prevalence, October 2005 estimates Source: United Nations Population Division, 2005.Reprinted by permission of the United Nations Population Division. Niger, with men reporting a higher 'ideal number' than women. In many parts of the world, improved methods ofcontraception have changed this situation in a fundamental way. Far from any longer being natural, it is almost unknown in the industrial countries for women to undergo so many pregnancies. Advances in contraceptive technology enable most women and men around the world to control whether and when they choose to have children, though this also depends on social acceptance and whether they are made available. In many African countries, for example, contraceptive prevalence in 2003 (see figure 14.5) was below 20 per cent; a significant factor in the continuing HlVIAIDS epidemic in those countries. See chapter 10, 'Health, Illness and Disability'. for more discussion of HIV/AIDS as a global issue. However, contraception is only one example of a reproductive technology. Some other examples of the social shaping of natural processes are described below. Childbirth Medical science has not always been involved with the major life transitions from birth to death. The medicalization of pregnancy and childbirth developed slowly, as local physicians and midwives were displaced by paediatric specialists. Today in the industrialized societies, most births occur in a hospital with the help ofa specialized medical team, and infant mortality rates are historically low, more than ten times lower than rates in developing countries. However, childbirth is still fraught with danger in many parts of the developing world, where a combination of uneven provision of medical services, a high risk of infection - particularly HlVIAIDS - and very high teenage pregnancy rates make giving birth to new lives a major cause of death for young women as well. Globally, only 10 per cent of all births (13 million per year) are to Sexuality and Gender women under the age of 20, but more than 90 per cent of these births are in the developing world. Hence, complications arising in pregnancy are the leading cause of death in young women aged between 15 and 19 in developing countries (Mayor 2004). Medicalization of the body is discussed in chapter 10, 'Health, Illness and Disability'. In the past, new parents had to wait until the day ofbirth to learn the sex of their baby and whether it would be healthy. Today, prenatal tests such as the sonogram (an image ofthe foetus produced by using ultrasonic waves) and amniocentesis (which draws off some of the amniotic fluid from around the foetus) can be used to discover structural or chromosomal abnormalities before the baby's birth. Such new technology presents couples and modern societies with new ethical and legal decisions. When a disorder is detected, the couple are faced with the decision of whether or not to have the baby, knowing it may be seriously disabled throughout its life. The development of assisted reproductive teChnologies since the late 1970s - particularly in vitro fertilization (M ) techniques have enabled many cases of human infertility to be overcome, though success rates decline rapidly for women over the age of 40 who use their own eggs. M involves egg cells from a woman being fertilized outside the womb in a fluid medium, before being returned to the womb where pregnancy occurs. The first successful M births were known as 'test-tube babies' because of this laboratory fertilization process. IVF as with pre-natal tests, turns what was previously thought to be a natural fate into a social choice. An individual's biology is no longer the absolute determinant of whether they can have children. Instead, social factors such as income levels and the availability and accessibility of specialist M facilities determine whether biological infertility is such an obstacle. • \ Modern medical technologies have helped to transform the experience ofpregnancy and childbIrth for women in the developed world. ........................ ................... ... .................................................................................... Genetic engineering: designer babies? A great deal of scientific endeavour these days is being devoted to the expansion of genetic engineering; that is, intervening in the genetic make-up of the foetus so as to influence its subsequent development. The likely social impact of genetic engineering is startingto provoke debates almost as intense as those that surround the issue ofabortion. According to its supporters, genetic engineering will bring us many benefits. [t is possible, for example, to identify the genetic factors that make some people vulnerable to certain diseases. Genetic reprogramming will ensure that these illnesses are no longer passed on from generation to generation. It will be possible to 'design' bodies before birth in terms ofcolour ofskin, hair and eyes, weight and so on. There could be no better example of the mixture of opportunities and problems that the increasing socialization of nature creates for us than genetic engineering. What choices will parents make if they can design their babies, and what limits should be placed on those choices? Genetic engineering is unlikely to be cheap. Will this mean that those who can afford to pay will be able to programme out from their children any traits they see as socially undesirable? What will happen to the children of more deprived groups, who will continue to be born naturally? Some sociologists have argued that differential access to genetic engineering might lead to the emergence of a 'biological underclass'. Those who do not have the physical advantages that genetic engineering can bring might be subject to prejudice and discrimination by those who do enjoy these advantages. They might have difficulty finding employment and life or health insurance (Duster 1990). The abortion debate Perhaps the most controversial ethical dilemma created by modern reproductive technologies in modern societies is this: under what conditions should abortion be available to women?The abortion debate has become so intense in many countries precisely because it centres on basic ethical issues to which there are no easy solutions. Those who are 'pro-life' believe that abortion is always wrong except in extreme circum· stances, because it is equivalent to murder. For them, ethical issues are above all subject to the value that must be placed on human life.Those who are 'pro-choice' argue that the mother's control over her own body - her own right to live a rewarding life- must be the primary consideration. The debate in the USA has led to numerous episodes of violence; for example, in 2003 an anti-abortion campaigner was executed in Florida following his conviction for the murder oftwo people, one of them a doctor who performed abortions. Can such an emotionally polarized issue ever be resolved? At least one prominent social and legal theorist, Ronald Dworkin (1993), has suggested that it can. The intense divisions between those who are pro-life and those who are pro-choice, he argues, hide deeper sources of agreement between the two sides, and in this there is a source of hope. At previous periods of history, life was often relatively cheap. In current times, however, we have come to place a high value on the sanctity ofhuman life. Each side agrees with this value, but they interpret it differently, the one emphasizing the interests of the child, the other the interests of the mother. If the two sides can be persuaded that they share a common ethical value, Dworkin suggests, a more constructive dialogue may be possible. This youngWodaabe man, from the Gerewol in Niger, is taking part in a formal dance. The kohl on his lips and eyes, and his eye-rolling and grinning are thought to give him extra sex appeal to the young women ofthe Wodaabe. The social construction of gender and sex In recent years, socialization and gender role theories have been criticized by a growing number of sociologists. Rather than seeing sex as biologically determined and gender as culturally learned, they argue that we should view both sex and gender as socially constructed products. Not only is gender a purely social creation that lacks a fixed 'essence', butthe human bodyitselfis subject to social forces which shape and alter it in various ways. We can give our bodies meanings which challenge what is usually thought of as 'natural'. Individuals can choose to construct and reconstruct their bodies as they please - ranging from exercise, dieting, There is a gender dimension to everyday social interaction. Even the way people sit demonstrates gendered socialization.It can be quite disturbing, for example, when men and women break the rules. piercing and personal fashion, to plastic surgery and sex-change operations. Technology is blurring the boundaries of our physical bodies. Thus, the argument goes, the human body and biology are not 'givens', but are subject to human agency and personal choice within different social contexts. For a discussion of the social construction of bodies, see chapter 10, 'Health, Illness and Disability'. According to such a perspective, writers who focus on gender roles and role learning implicitly accept that there is a biological basis to gender differences. In the socialization approach, a biological distinction between the sexes provides a framework which becomes 'culturally elaborated' in society itself. In contrast to this, some strict social constructionist theorists reject any biological basis for gender differences. Gender identities emerge, they argue, in relation to perceived sex differences in society and in turn help to shape those differences. For example, a society in which ideas of masculinity are characterized by physical strength and 'tough' attitudes will encourage men to cultivate a specific body image and set of mannerisms. In other words. gender identities and sex differences are inextricably linked within individual human bodies (Connell 1987; Scot! and Morgan 1993; Butler 1990) Masculinities and gender relations Considering feminists' concern with women's subordination in society, it is perhaps not surprising that most early research on gender concerned itself almost exclUSively with women and concepts of femininity. Men and masculinity were regarded as relatively straightforward and unproblematic. Little effort was made to examine masculinity, the experience of being a man or the formation of male identities. Sociologists were more concerned with understanding men's oppression of women and their role in maintaining patriarchy. Since the late 1980s, however, greater attention has been devoted to critical studies of men and masculinity. The fundamental changes affecting the role of women and family patterns in industrialized societies have raised questions about the nature of masculinity and its changing role in society. Whatdoesitmean to beaman in late modern society? How are the traditional expectations and pressures on men being transformed in a rapidly changing age? Is masculinity in crisis? In recent years, sociologists have become increasingly interested in the positions and experience of men within the larger order that shapes them. This shift within the sociology of gender and sexuality has led to new emphasis on the study ofmen and masculinity within the overarching context of gender relations, the societally patterned interactions between men and women. Sociologists are interested to grasp how male identities are constructed and what impact socially prescribed roles have on men's behaviour. The gender order In Gender and Power (1987), The Men and the Boys (2001) and Masculinities (2005), R. W. Connell sets forth one of the most complete theoretical accounts of gender, which has become something of a 'modern classic' (see 'Classic Studies 14.2'). Her approach has been particularly influential in sociology because she integrates the concepts ofpatriarchy and masculinity into an overarching theory of gender relations. According to Connell, masculinities are a critical part of the gender order and cannot be understood separate from it, or from the femininities which accompany them. Connell is concerned with how the social power held by men creates and sustains gender inequality. She stresses that empirical evidence on gender inequality is not simply a 'shapeless heap ofdata', but reveals the basis of an 'organized field of human practice and social relations' through which women are kept in subordinate positions to men (Connell 1987). In Western capitalist societies, gender relations are still defined by patriarchal power. From the individual to the institutional level, various types of masculinity and femininity are all arranged around a central premise: the dominance of men over women. According to Connell, gender relations are the product ofeveryday interactions and practices. The actions and behaviour of average people in their personal lives are directly linked to collective social arrangements in society. These arrangements are continuously reproduced over lifetimes and generations, but are also subject to change. Connell sets forth three aspects which interact to form a society's gender order patterns of power relations between masculinities and femininities that are widespread throughout society - namely, labour, power and cathexis (personall sexual relationships). These three realms are distinct but interrelated parts of society that work together and change in relation to one other. They represent the main sites in which gender relations are constituted and constrained. Labour refers to the sexual division of labour both within the home (such as domestic responsibilities and childcare) and in the labour market (issues like occupational segregation and unequal pay). Power operates through social relations such as authority, violence and ideology in institutions, the state, the military and domestic life. Cathexis concerns dynamics IArithin intimate, emotional and personal relationships, including marriage, sexuality and childrearing. Gender relations, as they are enacted in these three areas of society, are structured on a societallevel in a particular gender order. Connell uses the term gender regime to refer to the play ofgender relations in smaller settings, such as a specific institution. Thus, a family, a neighbourhood and a state all have their own gender regimes. (The formation of masculinities in one such gender regime is explored by M ·00 .~ '5 <1! '" " '" Q) Q) .11 co ~ u Ig <1! c: ·00 '" "Q) Q) £= 0; 0 :2 ~ c: [!' .", 1ij X '" <1! c: <1! '" C- c: c: c: .2' :i' (.) Q) CD :; cii Q) "0 ~ c: " E ::l '" [!' Q) 0 Z <1! '" f- :2 CL <1! Q; 0:: -, LL (fJ U CL c:- .c: u 1ij (.) '>£= 5 2: 0 (fJ ·c Turkey C> Algeria C> Morocco ~ Tunisia ~ Pakislan ~ Bangladesh G> India C> Other •• Algeria Number of Muslims originating from specified r;: countries (c. 1990) Num:~~Of people ('ODDs) 400 ,: "~J:;::~ • I .~. Figure 16.4 Number of European Muslims originating from specified countries and total Islamic population of European destination countries,c. 1990 Source,'Vertovec and Peach 1997; reproduced in Davie 2000: 128. Reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan ones, and conservative Protestants may soon outnumber moderates as well (Roof and McKinney 1990). The ageing members of the liberal Protestant denominations have not been replaced by new young followers, commitment is low and some current members are switching to other faiths. Black Protestant churches also continue to thrive in the United States, as their members move into the middle class and gain a degree of economic and political prominence (Roof and McKinney 1990; Finke and Stark 1992). The Protestant Church in the USA has also seen a huge rise in evangelicalism, the belief in spiritual rebirth (being 'born again'). Evangelicalism can be seen in part as a response to growing secularism, religious diversity and, in general, the decline of once core Protestant values in American life (Wuthnow 1988). In recent years, there has been an enormous growth in evangelical denominations, paralleled by a decline in the more mainstream Protestant religious affiliations. Many Protestants are clearly seeking the more direct, personal and emotional religious experience promised by evangelical denominations. President George W. Bush is a born-again Christian and has said that his faith helped him to overcome a drink problem earlier in life and to start afresh. Bush's born-again Christianity is reflected in his conservative views on gay marriage and abortion. His evangelical religious values were vital in helping him to win a second term as President in November 2004, when he gained the support of the majority of evangelical Christians in the USA who saw these moral issues as crucial. Evangelical organizations are good at mobilizing resources to help achieve their The USA has witnessed a dramatic growth in evangelicalism. The support of evangelical Christians helped George W Bush into power in 2000 and 2004. religious and political objectives, as the 2004 presidential election demonstrated. In the business-like language used by the religious economists, they have proved to be extremely competitive 'spiritual entrepreneurs' in the 'religious marketplace' (Hatch 1989; also see 'Using your sociologicalimagination 16.1 'I. Radio and television have provided important new marketing technologies, used by some evangelicals to reach a much wider audience than was previously possible. Called 'televangelists' because they conduct their evangelical ministries via television, these ministers depart from many earlier evangelicals by preaching a 'gospel of prosperity': the belief that God wants the faithful to be financially prosperous and satisfied, rather than to sacrifice and suffer. This approach differs considerably from the austere emphasis on hard work and self-denial ordinarily associated with traditional conservative Protestant beliefs (Hadden and Shupe 1987; Eruce 1990). Luxurious houses ofworship, epitomized by Robert H. Schuller's Crystal Cathedral in Garden Grove, California, provide the televised settings for electronic churches, whose congregants are geographically dispersed and are united primarily by means of electronic technology. Theology and fundraising are the staples of televangelism, which must support not only the television ministries themselves, but also schools, universities, theme parks and sometimes the lavish lifestyles of its preachers. The electronic preaching of religion has become particularly prevalent in Latin America, where North American television programmes are shown. As a result, Protestant movements, most ofthem ofthe Pentecostal kind, have made a dramatic impact on such countries as Chile and Brazil, which are predominantly Catholic (Martin 1990). THINKING CRITICALLY The religious economy approach suggests that religion is continually renewed through competition. How could such an approach help us to understand the process of secularization in the industrialized world?What does religious economy tell us, if anything, about the role of spirituality in human affairs? Although some evangelicals combine a thoroughly modern lifestyle with traditional religious beliefs, others strongly reject many contemporary beliefs and practices. Fundamentalists are evangelicals who are antimodern in many of their beliefs, calling for strict codes of morality and conduct. These frequently include taboos against drinking, smoking and other 'worldly evils', a belief in biblical infallibility and a strong emphasis on Christ's impending return to earth (Balmer 1989). Their 'old-time religion' clearly distinguishes good from evil and right from wrong (Roof and McKinney 1990). In the debate on secularization, the United States represents an important exception to the view that religion is generally declining in Western societies. While, on the one hand, the USA is one of the most thoroughly 'modernized' countries, it is, on the other, characterized by some of the highest levels of popular religious belief and membership in the world. How can we account for this American excep- tionalism? Steve Bruce (1996), one of the leading advocates of the secularization thesis, has argued that the persistence ofreligion in the USA can be understood in terms of cultural transition. In cases where societies undergo rapid and profound demographic or economic change, Bruce suggests, religion can play a critical role in helping people adjust to new conditions and survive instability. Industrialization came relatively late to the United States and proceeded very quickly, he argues, among a population that was composed of a great diversity of ethnic groups. In the USA, religion was important in stabilizing people's identities and allowed a smoother cultural transition into the American 'melting pot'. Evaluating the secularization thesis There is little question among sociologists that, considered as a long-term trend, religion in the traditional church has declined in most Western countries - with the notable exception of the USA. The influence of religion has diminished along each of the three dimensions of secularization, much as nineteenth-century sociologists predicted it wo uld. Shou ld we conclude that they and later proponents of the secularization thesis were correct? Has the appeal of religion lost its grasp with the deepening ofmodernity? Such a conclusion would be questionable for a number of reasons. First, the present position of religion in Britain and other Western countries is much more complex than supporters of the secularization thesis suggest. Religious and spiritual belief remain powerful and motivating forces in many people's lives, even if they do not choose to worship formally through the framework of the traditional church. Some scholars have suggested that there has been a move towards 'believing without belonging' (Davie 1994) - as we have seen in our discussion of religious belief in the UK, people maintain a belief in God or a higher force, but practise and develop their faith outside institutionalized forms of religion. 16.1 Competition in the religious economy? One of the most recent and influential approaches to the sociology of religion is tailored to Western societies, and particularly the United States, which offers many different faiths from which to pick and choose. Taking their cue from economic theory, sociologists who favour the religious economy approach argue that religions can be fruitfully understood as organizations in competition with one another for followers (Stark and Bainbridge 1987; Finke and Stark 1988, 1992; Moore 1994). Like contemporary economists who study businesses,these sociologists argue that competition is preferable to monopoly when it comes to ensuring religious vitality This position is exactly opposite to those ofthe classical theorists. Marx, Durkheim andWeber assumed that religion weakens when it is challenged by different religious or secular viewpoints,whereas the religious economists argue that competition increases the overall level ofreligious involvement in modern society Religious economists believe this to be true for two reasons. First, competition makes each religious group try that much harder to win followers. Second, the presence of numerous religions means that there is likely to be something for just about everyone. In culturally diverse societies a single religion will probably appeal to orily a limited range of followers, while the presence of Indian gurus and fundamentalist preachers, in addition to more traditional churches, is likely to encourage a high level ofreligious participation. This analysis is adapted from the business world, in which competition presumably encourages the emergence of highly specialized products that appeal to the very specific markets. In fact, the religious economists borrow the language of business in describing the conditions that lead to the success or failure of a particular religious organization. According to Roger Finke and Rodney Stark (1992), a successful religious group must be well organized for competition, have eloquent preachers who are effective Many 'televangelists' preach a gospel of prosperity rather than austerity, departing from traditional Protestant beliefs.They have proved to be particularly effective businesspeople in selling their religious products. 'sales reps' in spreading the word, offer beliefs and rituals that are packaged as an appealing product, and develop effective marketing techniques. Religion, in this view, is a business much like any other. Thus religious economists such as Finke and Stark do not see competition as undermining religious beliefs and thus contributing to secularization. Rather, they argue that modern religion is constantly renewing itself through active marketing and recruitment. Although there is a growing body of research that supports the notion that competition is good for religion (Stark and Bainbridge 1980, 1985; Finke and Stark 1992), not all research comes to this conclusion (Land et al. 1991). The religious economy approach overestimates the extent to which people rationally pick and choose among different religions, as if they were shopping around for a new car or pair of shoes. Among deeply committed believers, particularly in societies that lack religious pluralism, it is not obvious that religion is a matter of rational choice. In such societies,even when people are allowed to choose among different religions, most are likely to practise their childhood religion without ever questioning whether or not there are more appealing alternatives. Even in the United States, where the religious economy approach originated, sociologists may overlook the spiritual aspects of religion ifthey simply assume that religious buyers are always on spiritual shopping sprees.A study of baby boomers in the USA (the generation born in the two decades after the end ofthe SecondWorld War) found that a third had remained loyal to their childhood faith, while another third had continued to profess their childhood beliefs although they no longer belonged to a religious organization. Thus only a third were actively looking around for a new religion, making the sorts of choice presumed by the religious economy approach (Roof 1993). Second, secularization cannot be meas ~ ured according to membership in mainstream Trinitarian churches alone. To do so discounts the growing role of non-Western faiths and new religious movements, both internationally and within industrialized societies. In Britain, for example, active membership within traditional churches is falling, yet participation among Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Jews, evangelical 'bornagain' believers and Orthodox Christians remains dynamic. Third, there seems to be little evidence of secularization in non-Western societies. In many areas of the Middle East, Asia, Africa and India, a vital and dynamic Islamic fundamentalism challenges Westernization. When the Pope toured South America, millions of Catholics there enthusiastically followed his progress. Eastern Orthodoxy has been enthusiastically re-embraced by Citizens in parts of the former Soviet Union after decades of repression of the Church by the Communist leadership. This enthusiastic support for religion around the globe is, unfortunately, mirrored by religiously inspired conflicts as well. Just as religion can be a source of solace and support, it has also been - and continues to be - at the origin of intense social struggles and conflicts. One can point to evidence both in favour of and against the idea of secularization. It seems clear that, as a concept, it is most useful in explaining changes that are occurring within the traditional churches todayboth in terms of declining power and influence and in regard to internal secularizing processes affecting, for example, the role of women and gays. Modernizing forces in society at large are being felt within many traditional religious institu- tions. THINIUNG CRITICALLY Why do you think many migrant groups display higher levels of religiosity and church attendance than the rest of the population? What factors can you identify which might explain the 'alarming decline in the number of children and young people in church'? What social changes have led to young people not attending churches in large numbers? Above all, however, religion in the late modern world should be evaluated against a backdrop of rapid change, instability and diversity. Even iftraditional forms ofreligion are receding to a degree, religion still remains a critical force in our social world. The appeal of religion, in its traditional and novel forms, is likely to be long-lasting. Religion provides many people with insights into complex questions about life and meaning that cannot be answered satisfactorily with rationalist perspectives. It is not surprising, then, that during these times of rapid change, many people look for - and find - answers and calm in religion. Fundamentalism is perhaps the clearest example of this phenomenon. Yet, increasingly, religious responses to change are occurring in new and unfamiliar forms: new religious movements, ClutS, sects and 'New Age' activities. While these groups may not 'look like' forms of religion on the surface, many critics of the secularization hypothesis argue that they represent transforma- 16.2 Migration and religion The rate of decline in church attendance has been slowed by an unexpected factor - the influx of Christians from Africa and Europe. One ofthe biggest surveys among Britain's 37.000 churches, published today, finds that the growth of immigrant-led churches has partly offset dwindling congregations elsewhere (Brierly 2006]. The news will cheer Church leaders. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr RowanWilliams, said the phenomenon was having a healthy impact on mainstream churches. But the survey also shows that congregations are getting older as young people continue to abandon the pews, which could have a devastating impact in a decade. The 2005 English Church Census, carried out by the independent Christian Research Organization, finds that, between 1998 and 2005,half a million people stopped going to a Christian church on Sunday, The figure is lower than expected because a million left in the previous nine years. The survey finds that black-led Pentecostal churches in immigrant communities gained about 100,000 worshippers since 1998. Although churches of all denominations and sizes have stemmed their losses, most growth has occurred in the larger charismatic and evangelical churches. The research shows that black people now make up 10 per cent of all Sunday churchgoers in England, while other non-white ethnic groups add a further 7 per cent. In inner London,fewer than halfthe worshippers are white, with black Christians accounting for 44 per cent of churchgoers and non-white ethnic groups 14 per cent. The impact of Roman Catholic Croatians and Poles and Orthodox Russians and Greeks has been significant. The findings will give the churches hope that they are pulling out of the decline they have been in for decades. Overall, however, they are losing far more than they are gaining. While 1.000 new people are joining a church each week. 2,500 are leaving.Just 6.3 per cent of the population goes to church on an average Sunday,compared with 7.5 per cent in 1998, although more people are going midweek. DrWilliams, who wrote the foreword to the research, said one of its most striking findings was the number ofthriving churches started by immigrant communities.'This is having a big impact on our major cities, where the black majority churches are growing fast', he said. 'People from ethnic minorities are also bringing new life and energy into churches from established denominations such as the Church of England. This is one of the reasons why the Anglican Diocese of Lcndon. for example,is now growing steadily,' However, the Archbishop acknowledged that the mainstream denominations faced serious problems as the average worshipper was getting older. The research,based on questionnaires from 19,000 churches,finds that 29 per cent of churchgoers are 65 or over compared with 16 per cent of the population. It also finds that 9 per cent of churches have no one under the age of II in their congregations. 'The last English Church Census, carried out in 1998,showed an alarming decline in the number of children and young people in church', said DrWilliams.'These latest results suggest we have yet to reverse this, but at least the rate of change has slowed.' Source: Jonathan Petre,Daily Telegraph, 19 September 2006 tions of religious belief in the face of profound social change. not triumphed in the modern world. The term fundamentalism can be applied in many different contexts to describe strict adherence to a set of principles or beliefs. Religious fundamentalism describes the approach taken by religious groups, which call for the literal interpretation of basic Religious fundamentalism The strength ofreligious fundamentalism is another indication that secularization has I' scriptures or texts and believe that the doctrines which emerge from such readings should be applied to all aspects of social, economic and political life. Religious fundamentalists believe that only one view - their own - of the world is possible, and that this view is the correct one: there is no room for ambiguity or multiple interpretations. Within religious fundamentalist movements, access to the exact meanings ofscriptures is restricted to a set of privileged 'interpreters' - such as priests, clergy or other religious leaders. This gives these leaders a great amount of authority not only in religious matters, but in secular ones as well. Religious fundamentalists have become powerful political figures in opposition movements, within mainstream political parties and as heads of state. Religious fundamentalism is a relatively new phenomenon - it is only in the last two to three decades that the term has entered common usage. lt has arisen largely in response to globalization. As the forces of modernization progressively undermine traditional elements of the social world such as the nuclear family and the domination of women by men - fundamentalism has arisen in defence of traditional beliefs. In a globalizing world which demands rational reasons, fundamentalism insists on faith-based answers and references to ritual truth: fundamentalism is tradition defended in a traditional way. It has more to do with how beliefs are defended and justified than with the content of the beliefs themselves. Although fundamentalism sets itself in opposition to modernity, it also employs modern approaches in asserting its beliefs. Christian fundamentalists in the United States, for example, were among the first to use television as a medium for spreading their doctrines; Islamic fundamentalists fighting Russian forces in Chechnya have developed websites to set forth their views; Hindutva militants in India have used the Internet and email to promote a feeling of 'Hindu identity'. In this section we will examine two of the most prominent forms of religious fundamentalism: Islamic and Christian. In the past 30 years, both have grown in strength, shaping the contours of national and international politics. Islamic fundamentalism Of the early sociological thinkers, only Weber might have suspected that a traditional religious system like Islam could undergo a major revival and become the basis of important political developments in the late twentieth century; yet this is exactly what occurred in the 1980s in Iran. In recent years, Islamic revivalism has spread, with a significant impact on other countries, including Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Algeria, Afghanistan and Nigeria. What explains this large-scale renewal of Islam? To understand the phenomenon, we have to look both to aspects of Islam as a traditional religion and to secular changes that have affected modern states where its influence is pervasive. Islam, like Christianity, is a religion that has continually stimulated activism: the Koran - the Islamic holy scripture - is full of instructions to believers to 'struggle in the way of God'. This struggle is against both unbelievers and those who introduce corruption into the Muslim community. Over the centuries there have been successive generations of Muslim reformers, and Islam has become as internally divided as Christianity. Shiism split from the main body of orthodox Islam early in its history and has remained influential. Shiism has been the official religion of Iran (earlier known as Persia) since the sixteenth century, and was the source of the ideas behind the Iranian revolution. The Shiites trace their beginnings to Imam Ali, a seventh-century religious and political leader who is believed to have shown qualities of personal devotion to God and virtue outstanding among the worldly rulers of the time. Ali's descendants came to be seen as the rightful leaders of Islam, since they were held to belong to the prophet Muhammad's family, unlike the dynasties in power. The Shiites believed that the rule ofMuhammad's rightful heir would eventually be instituted, doing away with the tyrannies and injustices associated with existing regimes. Muhammad's heir would be a leader directly guided by God, governing in accordance with the Koran. There are large Shiite populations in other Middle Eastern countries, including Iraq, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, as well as in India and Pakistan. Islamic leadership in these countries, however, is in the hands of the majority, the Sunni. The Sunni Muslims follow the 'Beaten Path', a series oftraditions deriving from the Koran which tolerate a considerable diversity of opinion, in contrast to the more rigidly defined views of the Shiites. Islam and the West During the Middle Ages, there was a more or less constant struggle between Christian Europe and the Muslim states, which controlled large sections of what became Spain, Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania. Most of the lands conquered by the Muslims were reclaimed by the Europeans, and many of their possessions in North Africa were in fact colonized asWestern power grew in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These reverses were catastrophic for Muslim religion and civilization, which Islamic believers held to be the highest and most advanced possible, transcending all others. In the late nineteenth century, the inability of the Muslim world effectively to resist the spread of Western culture led to reform movements seeking to restore Islam to its original purity and strength. A key idea was that Islam should respond to the Western challenge by affirming the identity of its own beliefs and practices (Sutton and Vertigans 2005). This idea has been developed in various ways in the twentieth century, and formed a backdrop to the Islamic revolution in Iran of 1978-9. The revolution was fuelled initially The three most prominent leaders of the Islamic revolution in Iran - Ayatollah Khomeini (in the foreground), Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the then President Hashemi RafsanJani -look down from a poster over a street in Tehran. by internal opposition to the Shah of Iran, who had accepted and tried to promote forms of modernization modelled on the West - for example, land reform, extending the vote to women and developing secular education. The movement that overthrew the Shah brought together people of diverse interests, by no means all of whom were attached to Islamic fundamentalism, but a dominant figure was the Ayatollah Khomeini, who provided a radical reinterpretation of Shiite ideas. Following the revolution, Khomeini established a government organized according to traditional Islamic law. Religion, as specified in the Koran, became the Was the conflict in the formerYugoslavia in the 1990s an example of 'civilizational conflict' rooted in religious beliefs and cultures? direct basis ofall political and economic life. Under Islamic law - sharia - as it was revived, men and women were kept rigorously segregated, women were obliged to cover their bodies and heads in public, practising homosexuals were sent to the firing squad and adulterers were stoned to death. The strict code is accompanied by a very nationalistic outlook, which sets itself especially against Western influences. The aim of the Islamic Republic in Iran was to Islamicize the state - to organize government and society so that Islamic teachings would become dominant in all spheres. The process was by no means completed, however, and forces emerged to act against it. Zubaida (1996) has distinguished three sets ofgroups now engaged in struggle with one another. The radicals want to carry on with and deepen the Islamic revolution; they also believe that the revolution should be actively exported to other Islamic countries. The conservatives are made up mostly of religious functionaries, who think that the revolution has gone far enough; it has given them a position of power in society which they wish to hold onto. The pragmatists favour market reforms and the opening up of the economy to foreign investment and trade; they oppose the strict imposition of Islamic codes on women, the family and the legal system. The death of the AyatoUah Khomeini in 1989 was a blow to radical and conservative elements in Iran; his successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, retains the loyalty of Iran's powerful mullahs (religious leaders), but is increasingly unpopular with average Iranian citizens, who resent the repressive regime and persistent social ills. The faultlines within Iranian society between pragmatists and others came to the surface quite clearly under the reform-minded presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997- 2005). Khatami's administration was characterized by disputes with conservatives who largely managed to hamper Khatami's attempts at reform of Iranian society. In 2005, the election as President of Tehran's deeply conservative mayor, Mahmond Ahmadinejad, dec reased tensions between the country's religious and political leadership, but increased tensions with theWest. The spread ofIslamic revivalism Although the ideas underlying the Iranian revolution were supposed to unite the whole ofthe Islamic world against theWest, governments ofcountries where the Shiites are in a minority have not aligned themselves closely with the situation in Iran. Yet Islamic fundamentalism has achieved significant popularity in most of these other states, and various forms of Islamic revivalism elsewhere have been stimulated by it. Though Islamic fundamentalist movements have gained influence in many countries in North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia over the past 10- 15 years, they have succeeded in coming to power in only two other states: Sudan has been ruled since 1989 by the National Islamic Front; the fundamentalist Taliban regime consolidated its hold on the fragmented state of Afghanistan in 1996 but was ousted from power at the end of2001 byAfghan opposition forces and the US military. In many other states, Islamic fundamentalist groups have gained influence but have been prevented from rising to power. In Egypt, Turkey and Algeria, for example, Islamic fundamentalist uprisings have been suppressed by the state or the mili- tary. Many have worried that the Islamic world is heading for a confrontation with those Religion parts of the world that do not share its beliefs. The political scientist Samuel Huntington (1996) argued that struggles between Western and Islamic views might become part of a worldwide 'clash of civilizations' with the ending of the Cold War and with increasing globalization. According to Huntington, the nation-state is no longer the main influence in international relations; rivalries and conflicts will therefore OCCUI betvveen larger cultures or civiliza- tions. Possible examples of such conflicts were seen during the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia, in Bosnia and in Kosovo, where the Bosnian Muslims and Albanian Kosovars fought against the Serbs, who represent an Orthodox Christian culture. Such events have heightened awareness of Muslims as a world community; as observers have noted: 'Bosnia has become a rallying point for Muslims throughout the Muslim world... [ItI has created and sharpened the sense of polarization and radicalization in Muslim societies, while at the same time increasing the sense of being a Muslim' (Ahmed and Donnan 1994). The wars in the formerYugoslavia are discussed in more detail in chapter 23. 'Nations,War and Terrorism'. In the same way, the American-led war in Iraq became a rallying point for radical Muslims after the invasion in 2003. As an explanation of the causes of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, the American decision to oust the Islamic regime in Afghanistan and the revival of religious resistance to the US presence in Iraq after 2003, Huntington's thesis gained widespread media attention. However, critics point out that there are many political and cultural divisions within civilizations and the forecast of conflict between entire civilizations is unlikely and alarmist. For example, in 1990 Saddam Hussein's Sunni regime in Iraq invaded Kuwait, which also has a majority Sunni popUlation, and between 1980 and 1988, Iraq and Iran (with a majority Shi'a population) were engaged in armed conflict with each other. The number of 'civilizational conflicts' in the past can also be too easily exaggerated, as many apparently culturally defined conflicts have been more centrally focused on access to scarce resources and the struggles for political power and military dominance (Russett et a1. 2000; Chiozza 2002), In such conflicts, it has been, and still is, much more common to see alliances forming across the borders of Huntington's large~ scale civilizations. At the start of the twenty-first century, Islamic opposition is still building up in states such as Malaysia and Indonesia, several provinces within Nigeria have recently implemented sharia law, and the war in Chechnya has attracted the participation of Islamic militants who support the establishment of an Islamic state in the Caucasus. Members of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist network come from all over the Muslim world. Islamic symbolism and forms of dress have become important markers of identity for the growing number of Muslims living outside the Islamic world. Events such as the GulfWar and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington have provoked variable but intense reactions within the Islamic world, either against or in response to the West. The phenomenon of terrorism is discussed further in chapter 23, 'Nations, War and Terrorism'. Islamic revivalism plainly cannot be understood wholly in religious terms; it represents in part a reaction against the impact of the West and is a movement of national or cultural assertion. Tt is doubtful whether Islamic revivalism, even in its most fundamentalist forms (which remain a small minority of the revival as a whole), should be seen only as a renewal of traditionally held ideas. What has occurred is something more complex. Traditional practices and modes of life have been revived, but they have also been combined with concerns that relate specifically to modern times. Christian fundamentalism The growth ofChristian fundamentalist religious organizations in Europe and, particularly, in the United States, is one of the most notable features of the past few decades. Fundamentalists believe that 'the Bible, quite bluntly, is a workable guidebook for politics, government, business, families, and all of the affairs of mankind' (Capps 1990). The Bible is taken as infallible by fundamentalists - its contents are expressions of the Divine Truth. Fundamentalist Christians believe in the divinity of Christ and in the possibility of the salvation of one's soul through the acceptance of Christ as personal saviour. Fundamentalist Christians are committed to spreading their message and converting those who have not yet adopted the same beliefs. Christian fundamentalism is a reaction against liberal theology and supporters of 'secular humanism' - those who 'favour the emancipation of reason, desires and instincts in opposition to faith and obedience to God's command' (Kepel 1994). Christian fundamentalism sets itself against the 'moral crisis' wrought by modernization - the decline of the traditional family, the threat to individual morality and the weakening relationship between man and God. In the United States, beginning with the Reverend Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority in the 1970s, some fundamentalist groups became increasingly involved in what has been termed the 'New Christian Right' in national politics, particularly in the conservative wing of the Republican Party (Simpson 1985; Woodrum 1988; Kiecolt and Nelson 1991). Falwell noted 'five major problems that have political consequences, that moral Americans should be ready to face: abortion, homosexuality, pornography, humanism, the fractured family' (in Kepel 1994). Taking concrete action, the New Christian Right aimed first at the nation's schools, lobbying law-makers on the content ofschool curricula and trying to overturn the ban on prayer in school, and moved quickly to support Operation Rescue, the militant organization which blockades abortion clinics. Fundamentalist religious organizations are a powerful force in the USA and have helped to shape Republican Party policies and rhetoric during the Reagan and both Bush adminis- trations. Falwell initially blamed the 9/11 terrorist attacks against New York and Washington on 'sinners' in the USA. He commented on live television: I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and the lesbians who are actively tryi ng to make that an alternative lifestyle, the [American Civil Liberties Union/, People For the American Way [both liberal organizations], all of them who have tried to secuJarize America. I point the finger in their face and say 'you helped this happen'. (CNN, 14September 2001) Although he later apologized for these remarks, he caused further controversy by stating that 'Mohammad was a terrorist. I read enough by both Muslims and nonMuslims [to decide] that he was a violent man, a man of war' (BBC, 13 October 2002). Again, he apologized for the remark, but it was too late to stop sectarian rioting between Hindus and Muslims reacting against his claims in Solapur, Western India, which left at least eight people dead. Not surprisingly, his comments led to widespread condemnation from Islamic leaders around the world. Prominent preachers on the New Christian Right have founded a number of universities in the United States to produce a new generation 'counter-elite', schooled in fundamentalist Christian beliefs and able to take up prominent positions in the media, academia, politics and the arts. Liberty University (founded by Jerry Falwell), Oral Religion Roberts University, Bob Jones University and others confer degrees in standard academic disciplines, taught within the framework of biblical infallibility. On campus, strict ethical standards are maintained within students' private lives and sexuality is channelled towards marriage alone. Giles Kepel (1994) says: To anybody who has spent some time on the Liberty campus, it is a striking spectacle. The dormitories arc single-sex, and strict surveillance, a mixture of coercion and self-discipline, is practised. French kissing is forbidden, and any sexual relations between unmarried students are punished by expulsion. (Married couples live in town.) But kissing on the cheek is permitted, and couples are free to hold hands, though not to put an arm round the partner's waist. Students willingly defend this sexual self-discipline when questioned about it by a visiting stranger; they maintain total repression would be bound to lead to deviant practices, in particular to homosexuality, which (they say) is rife in a rival Fundamentalist university in which all flirting is forbidden. On the other hand, the expression of sexual desire would go against the spirit of the educational aims of the university. The Christian fundamentalist movement in the United States draws support from across the country, but there is a strong regional element. The American South has become known as the 'Bible Belt' - a swath of land located below the agricultural 'cattle belt', 'maize belt' and 'cotton belt'. Many of America's best-known and most influential evangelists are based in the southern and mid-western states of Virginia, Oklahoma and North Carolina. The most influential fundamentalist groups in the United States are the Southern Baptist Convention, the Assemblies of God and the Seventh-Day Adventists. THINKING CRITICALLY Religious fundamentalism appears to have increased during a period of rapid globalization. How might these two phenomena be related?What evidence is there that fundamentalist religion will not be temporary, but may become a permanent feature of our increasingly global human society? Conclusion In a globalizing age that is in desperate need of mutual understanding and dialogue, religious fundamentalism can be a destructive force. Fundamentalism is edged with the possibility of violence - in the cases of Islamic and Christian fundamentalism, examples of violence inspired by religious allegiance are not uncommon. There have been a number of violent clashes over the past few years between Islamic and Christian groups in Lebanon, Indonesia and other countries. Yet in an increasingly cosmopolitan world, people of contrasting traditions and beliefs are coming into contact with one another more than ever before (Beck 2006). As the unquestioning acceptance of traditional ideas declines, we must all live in a more open and reflective way - discussion and dialogue are essential between people ofdiffering beliefs. They are the main way in which violence can be controlled or dissolved. Summary points 1. Religion exists in all known societies, although religious beliefs and practices vary from culture to culture.All religions involve a set of symbols, involving feelings of reverence, linked to rituals practised by a community of believers. 2. Sociological approaches to religion have been most influenced by the ideas of the 'classical' thinkers: Marx,Durkheim and Weber.All held that traditional religions would decline, though each viewed the role of religion in society very differently. To Marx, religion contains a strong ideological element: religion provides justification for the inequalities of wealth and power found in society.For Durkheirn, religion is important because of the cohesive functions it serves,especially in ensuring that people meet regularly to affirm common beliefs and values. ForWeber, religion is important because of the role it plays in social change, as seen in the development ofWestern capitalism. 3. Totentism and animism are common types of religion in smaller cultures.In totemism, a species of animal or plant is perceived as possessing supernatural powers.Animism means a belief in spirits or ghosts. populating the same world as human beings, sometimes possessing them. 4. The three most influential monotheistic religions (religions in which there is only one God) in world history are Judaism, Christianity and Islam.Polytheism (belief in several or many gods) is common in other religions such as Hinduism. In other religions,like Confucianism, there are no gods or supernatural beings. 5. Churches are large and established religious bodies,normally with a formal bureaucratic structure and a hierarchy of religious officials. Sects are smaller,less formal groups of believers, usually set up to revive an established church. If a sect survives over a period of time and becomes institutionalized, it is called a denomination. Cults resemble sects, but are more loosely knit groups,which follow similar practices, but not within formal organizations. 6. Secularization refers to the declining influence of religion.Measuring the level of secularization is complicated,because several dimensions of change are involved: level of membership, social status and personal religiosity. Although the influence of religion has definitely declined, religion is certainly not on the verge of disappearing, and continues to unite as well as divide people in the modern world. 7. Rates of regular church attendance in most European countries are low, particularly compared to the United States, where a much higher proportion of the population goes to church regularly. Far more people in Europe and the USA say they believe in God than attend church regularly - they 'believe but do not belong' . 8. Although traditional churches have experienced a decline in membership, many new religious movements have emerged. New religious movements encompass a broad range of religious and spiritual groups, cults and sects. They can be broadiy divided into world-affirming movements, world-rejecting Religion movements and world-accommodating movements. 9. Fundamentalism has become common among some believers in different religious groups across the world. 'Fundamentalists' believe in returning to the fundamentals of their religious doctrines. Islamic fundamentalism has affected many countries in the Middle East following the 1979 revolution in Iran, which set up a religiously inspired government. Christian fundamentalism in the United States is a reaction against secular values and a perceived moral crisis in American society. In their efforts to convert non-believers, fundamentalist Christians have pioneered the 'electronic church' - using television, radio and new technologies to build a following. ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • Further reading presents a staunch argument in support of the• • secularization thesis and for an alternative• • The sociology of religion is a well-established view you could try Peter Berger's Questions of• • • field and there are many good introductions to Faith: A Skeptical Affirmation ofChristianity • • it. AJan AJdridge's Religion in the Contemporary (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003). Given • •• World: A Sociological Introduction. 2nd edition Berger's earlier support for the secularization • • •• (Cambridge: Polity, 2007) is very well written, as thesis (which he now sees as a mistake), this is • • •• is Malcolm Hamilton's The Sociology of an interesting book by a SOCiologist with a • • • • Religion: Theoretical and Comparative religious faith. • • Perspectives (London: Routiedge, 2001), which Finally, two useful, iflarge, edited collections of is also a second edition. Both books cover the main issues discussed in this chapter and take essays by scholars of religion are Richard K. readers deeper into the subject. After these, Fenn's Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Grace Davie's The Sociology ofReligion Religion (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003) and James Beckford and N. Jay Demerath I1I, (London: Sage, 2007) is a very good critical The SAGE Handbook ofthe Sociology ofReligion assessment of the sociology of religion by a (London: Sage, 2007). renowned expert. • Steve Bruce's God is Dead: Secuiarization in the • • West (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002) • • • • • • • •• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Religion :................................................................• •• • • •• • •• • •• • •• • • •• • • • •• • •• • •• • •••• Internet links Academic Info Religion GatewayUS-based site with lots of information on many faiths: www.academicinfo.us/religindex.html Hartford Institutefor Religion Research, Connecticut - US-based Institute that carries out and disseminates research on religions: www.hirr.hartsem.edu/ TheAssociation ofReligion Data Archives-American site aiming to 'democratize access to the best data on religion': www.thearda.com/ Journal for Cltltural and Religious Theory (online) - Peer-reviewed journal with some interesting articles. www.jcrt.org/ BBC, Religion and Ethics- BBC's UK-based site on all things religious, includes message boards: www.bbc.co.uk/religion/ Religious Tolerance- Canadian-based site, which Ipromotes religious freedom, and diversity as positive cultural values': www.religioustolerance.org/ • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ... ..... . .. ~he digital revolution The Internet and the World Wide WeD •• " . ". " Functionalism Conflict theo'ries SYIribolic interactionism Postm"odern tneory Audiences and media representations 1\udience studies Representing class, gender, ethnicity and disability - . ... -. . Media imRerialism? O\:vnership of media 'sllRercomRanies' Political control , Resistance and alternatives to the global Summary' {Joints Further reading Internet links (opposite) Srnce the late runeteenth century, the character of modern communication technology has been raclically transformed,Here,New Yorkers in Times Square watch the terrorist attacks against the World 'frade Center m real tune, I n 1865, the actor John Wilkes Booth assassinated US President Abraham Lincoln in a Washington theatre. It took 12 days before the news reached London. Asmaller boat offthe south coast ofIreland met the ship carrying the message from the United States and the news was telegraphed to London from Cork, beating the ship by three days. It was not until the 1950s that a dedicated trans-oceanic cable existed to carry telegraphs instantly across the Atlantic although long-wave radio transmission between continents became possible in the early twentieth century. On 11 September 2001, terrorists hijacked three planes and used them to attack sites in Washington and New York. When the second plane crashed into the TwinTowers in NewYork, some 20 minutes after the first tower had been struck, it is estimated that a global audience of two billion people watched the attack on television in real time. In the twenty-first century, communication technologies enable information to be shared instantaneously and simultaneously with many millions of people almost anywhere around the world_ Communication - the transfer of information from one individual or group to another, whether in speech or through the mass media in modern times - is crucial to any society. In this chapter, we will study the transformations affecting the mass media of communications as part of globalization. The mass media includes a wide variety of forms, such as television, newspapers, films, radio, video games and the Internet. These are referred to as 'mass' media, because they communicate to a mass audience comprised of very large numbers of people. Canadian media theorist, Marshall McLuhan (1964), argued that different types of media have very different effects on society. His famous dictum is that, 'the medium is the message'. That is to say, society is influenced much more by the type of the media than by its content, or the messages, which are conveyed by it. Asociety in which satellite television plays an important part, for example, is obviously a very different society from one that relies on the printed word carried aboard an ocean liner. Everyday life is experienced differently in a society in which television, relaying news instantaneously from one side of the globe to the other, plays an important role, to one that relies on horses, ships or the telegraph wire. According to McLuhan, the electronic media tends to create a global village in which people throughout the world see major events unfold and hence participate in them together. For billions of people around the world, the images of celebrities like Paris Hilton or Madonna are more instantly recognizable to them than that of their neighbours. We live today in an interconnected world in which people experience the same events from many different places. Thanks to the process of globalization and the power of communications technology to effectively shrink large distances, people from Caracas to Cairo are able to receive the same popular music, news, films and television programmes.1Wenty-four-hour news channels report on stories as they occur and broadcast coverage of unfolding events for the world to watch. Films made in Hollywood or Hong Kong reach audiences around the world, while sporting celebrities such as David Beckham and Maria Sharapova have become household names on every continent. For several decades, we have been witnessing a process of convergence in the production, distribution and consumption of information. Even 30 years ago, ways of communicating, such as print, television and film, were still relatively self-contained spheres, but today they have become intertwined to a remarkable degree.The divisions between forms of communication are no longer as dramatic as they once were: television, radio, newspapers and telephones are undergoing profound transformations as a result of advances in technology and the rapid spread of the Internet. While newspapers remain central to our lives, the way they are organized and deliver their services are changing. Newspapers can be read online, mobile telephone use is exploding, and digital television and satellite broadcasting services allow an unprecedented diversity of choice for viewing audiences. With the expansion of technologies such as voice recognition, broadband transmission, web casting and cable links, the Internet threatens to erase the distinctions between traditional forms of media and to become the primary conduit for the delivery of information, entertainment, advertising and commerce to media audiences. We begin our study by looking at the recent digital revolution in communications, focusing on the Internet and World Wide Web, which are impacting on societies across the world. We then provide a brief account of other important forms of mass media, including film, television, music and newspapers, before considering some of the main theoretical approaches to studying the media and its role in society. Media representations ofdifferent social groups and the effects of mass media on the audience follow, and the chapter ends with a discussion of the ownership and political control of the global media and the resistance to it. Media in a global age For most of human history the main means of communication was speech, with faceto-face communication being the norm. In such oral cultures, information, ideas and knowledge were transmitted across generations by word of mouth and the kind of repositories of useful knowledge we are used to - such as books and libraries - just did not exist. Once speech could be written down and stored, initially on stone, the first writing cultures began to emerge, initially in China around 3,000 years ago. Religions have played a major part in the development of flexible communications by finding ways of producing manuscripts and religious texts for study and transportation, such as on papyrus and parchment, to literally 'spread the word'. An important precursor to the modern mass media was the invention ofthe Gutenberg movable type printing press in the mid-fifteenth century, which enabled texts to be reproduced. Gutenberg made use of existing technologies - paper and woodblock printing - that originated in Asia much earlier. Yet, although technological advances and new uses of older technologies played a crucial part in the development of the mass media, the influence of social, cultural and economic factors must also be taken into account. For instance, mass forms of printed media could only develop in societies with relatively cheap How many of your friends around the world would not know who these people are? access to them, and an educated population that was able to take advantage and use them. In the late twentieth century, new digital technologies, such as the mobile phone, video games, digital television and the Internet, have revolutionized the mass media.We will look first at this 'digital revolution' in communications, and especially the Internet and World Wide Web. We then examine the ways in which globalization impacts on other mass media, taking film, television, music and newspapers as our case studies, noting how the digital revolution is also transforming these older forms. For more on the Internet and mobile phones, see chapter 4, 'Globalization and The ChangingWorld'. :1 The digital revolution In his book Being Digital (1995), the founder ofthe media laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Nicholas Negroponte, analyses the profound importance of digital data in current communications technologies_ Any piece of information, including pictures, moving images and sounds, can be translated through a binary system into 'bits'. Abit can be a 1 or a 0. For instance, the digital representation of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, is 1, 10, 11, 100, 101, etc. Digitization - and speed - is at the origin of the development of multimedia: what used to be different media needing different technologies (such as visuals and sound) can now be combined on a single medium (such as DVDs and PCs). In recent years the processing power ofcomputers has doubled every 18 months and Internet speeds have become much faster, making it possible to watch films and listen to music via the Internet. Digitization also permits the development of interactive media, allowing individuals actively to participate in, or structure, what they see or hear. In this section we examine the profound impact that this digitization process has had on the mass media. One of the most fundamental aspects of the media concerns the very infrastructure through which information is communicated and exchanged. Some important technological advances during the second half of the twentieth century have completely transformed the face of telecorrununications - the communication of information, sounds or images at a distance through a technological medium. New communications technologies stand behind profound changes in the world's money systems and stock markets. Money is no longer gold or the cash in your pocket. More and more, money has become electronic, stored in computers in the world's banks. The value of whatever cash you do happen to have in your pocket is determined by the activities of traders on electronically linked money markets. Such markets have been created only over the last few decades, the product of a marriage between computers and satellite communication technology. Four technological trends have contributed to these developments: first, the constant improvement in the capabilities of computers, together with declining costs; second, digitization ofdata, making possible the integration of computer and telecommunications technologies; third, satellite communications development; and fourth, fibre optics, which allow many different messages to travel down a single small cable. The dramatic communications explosion of recent years shows no signs ofslowing down. Indeed, such a rapid pace of development means that our discussion below of digital technologies and their applications and consequences, may well be starting to date by the time you read this book, as new applications are created and the process of digitization continues. The Internet and the World Wide Web By the early 1990s, it was clear that the future lay not with the individual personal computer (PC) but with a global system of interconnected computers - the Internet. Although many computer users may not have realized it at the time, the PC was quickly to become little more than a point of access to events happening elsewhere events happening on a network stretching across the planet, a network that is not owned by any individual or company. The potential of the Internet for the growth of international pOlitical activism is explored in chapter 22, 'Politics, Government and Social Movements'. The Internet originated during the Cold War period before 1989. The 'Net' developed out of a system used in the Pentagon, the headquarters ofthe American military, from 1969. This system was first of all • Asia o Europe • North America • Latin America o Africa o Middle east o OceanialAustralia Figure 17,1 Global Internet use,by world region,2007 Source. Internet World Stats 2007 named the ARPA net, after the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency. The ARPA sought to allow scientists working on military contracts in different parts of America to pool their resources and to share the expensive equipment they were using. Almost as an afterthought, its originators thought up a way of sending messages too - thus electronic mail, 'email', was born. Until the early 1980s, the Pentagon Internet consisted of 500 computers, all of which were located in military laboratories and university computer science departments. Other people in universities then started catching on, and began using the system for their own purposes. By 1987, the Internet had expanded to include 28,000 host computers, at many different universities and research labs. The spread of commercial Internet service providers (ISPs) which offered dial-up, and later broad band, access through modems has fuelled the growing proportion of households with online capabilities. Online services, electronic bulletin boards, chatrooms and software libraries were put onto the net by a bewildering variety of people, initially mainly situated in the United States, but now all over the world. Corporations also got in on the act. In 1994 companies overtook universities as the dominant users of the network. The best-known use ofthe Internet is the World Wide Web. 'The web' is in effect a global multimedia library. It was invented by a software engineer, Tim Berners-Lee, at a Swiss physics lab in 1990, and the software that popularized it across the world was written by an undergraduate at the University of Illinois. Users generally navigate the web with the help of a 'web browser' - a software program that allows individuals to search for information, locate particular sites or web pages, and mark those pages for future reference. Through the web, it is possible to download a wide variety ofdocuments and programs, from government policy papers to antivirus software to computer games. Websites have grown in sophistication and many are adorned with intricate graphics and photographs, or contain video and audio files. The web also serves as the main interface for 'e-commerce' - business transactions conducted online. With the spread of cheaper home-based personal computers, access to the Internet continues to grow. According to a survey by the UK National Office of Statistics (HMSO 2004), the most common use ofthe Internet among adults who used it during the previous three months was for email (85 per cent) and finding information about goods or services (82 per cent). The most frequent place of access was the person's own home (82 per cent), followed by their workplace (42 per cent). The survey also found that even in an advanced industrial country like the UK, 37 per cent of adults had never used the Internet, a sizeable proportion of the population. How many people are connected to the Internet globally is not known with any accuracy, but the UN estimated around 10 per cent ofthe global population were Internet users in 2000. By 2007, this figure had risen to around 18 per cent and it continues to grow. Although user numbers are rising fast, the evidence above shows that Internet access is geographically very uneven. Just 4 per cent of the population of Africa are Internet users, 10 per cent in the Middle East and 12 per cent in Asia, compared with almost 70 per cent in North America, 54 per cent in Australia/Oceama and 40 per cent in Europe (InternetWorld Stats 2007; see figure 17.2). The impact ofthe Internet In a world of quite stunning technological change, no one can be sure what the future holds. Many see the Internet as exemplifying the new global order emerging at the close of the twentieth century. Exchanges on the Internet take place in the new virtual world of cyberspace. Cyberspace means the space of interaction formed by the global network of computers that compose the Internet. In cyberspace, we cannot know with any certainty details about other people's identity, whether they are male or female, or where in the world they are. Opinions on the effects ofthe Internet on social interaction fall into two broad categories. On the one hand are those observers who see the online world as fostering new forms of electronic relationship that either enhance or supplement existing face-toface interactions. While travelling or working abroad, individuals can use the Internet to communicate regularly with friends and relatives at home. Distance and separation become more tolerable. The Internet also allows the formation of new types of relationship: 'anonymous' online users can meet in 'chatrooms' and discuss topics of mutual interest. These cyber contacts sometimes evolve into fully fledged electronic friendships or even result in face-toface meetings. Many Inter!)et users become part of lively online communities that are qualitatively different from those they inhabit in the physical world. Scholars who see the Internet as a positive addition to human interaction argue that it expands and enriches people's social networks. On the other hand, not everyone takes such an enthusiastic outlook. As people spend more and more time communicating online and handling their daily tasks in cyberspace, it may be that they spend less time interacting with one another in the physical world. Some sociologists fear that the spread of Internet technology will lead to increased social isolation and atomization. They argue that one effect ofincreasing Internet access in households is that people are spending less 'quality time' with their families and friends. The Internet is encroaching on domestic life as the lines between work and home are blurred: many employees continue to work at home after hours - checking emaiI or finishing tasks that they were unable to complete during the day. Human contact is reduced, personal relationships suffer, traditional forms of entertainment such as the theatre and books fall by the wayside, and the fabric of social life is weakened. North America Australia! Oceania Europe Latin America Asia 12% Middle East 10% Africa 4% World Avg. o 10 Figure 17.2 Internet penetration by region. 2007 Source. Internet World Stats 2007 69% 54% 40% 20% 18% 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Penetration Rate (% Population) In The Virtual Community (2000), Howard Rheingold aCknowledges both the positive potential of computer-mediated communications whilst also accepting that its darker side cannot simply be wished away. Rheingold (2000: 5) is particularly interested in virtual communities, which he defines as, 'social aggregations that emerge from the Net when enough people carry on ... public discussions long enough, with sufficient human feeling, to form webs of personal relationships in cyberspace'. Rheingold provides an extended description and analysis of a virtual community - a parenting conference- on theWELL (Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link), a computer conferencing system that enables people across the world to engage in open public discussions and to exchange private emails. Rheingold says that being a part of the WELL is very much like being part ofthe real physical world, but in disembodied form. Members help each other to solve problems, exchange information and, sometimes, disagree and fall out. As Rheingold says: People in virtual communities use words on screens to exchange pleasantries and argue, engage in inteUectual discourse, conduct commerce, exchange knowledge, share emotional support, make plans, brainstorm, gossip, feud, fall in love, find friends and lose them, play games, flirt. create a little high art and a lot of idle talk. People in virtual communities do just about everything people do in feallire. but we leave our bodies behind. You can't kiss anybody and nobody can punch you in the nose, but a lot can happen within those boundaries. To the millions who have been drawn into it, the richness and vitality of computer-linked cultures is attractive, even addictive. [www.rheingold.comlvc/book/intro.html! Nevertheless, he also acknowledges the less palatable potential of the Internet. For example, it is possible that the Internet will come to be dominated bybusiness corporations who see members of virtual communities simply as commodities, gathering and selling their details for profit to anyone who wants it. The Internet also offers new opportunities for intensified surveillance and monitoring of the population, which extends state control over people's lives. This 'nightmare vision' owes something to Foucault's ideas on the eighteenth-century Panopticon, a prison design based on the principle of continuous monitoring of prisoners by guards. Rheingold has no magic solutions, but suggests that such criticisms have to be kept in mind by all Internet enthusiasts, who will have to work hard to create a human-centred virtual world. See chapter 18, 'Organizations and Networks', for a discussion of the Panopticon. Questions about personal identity, new forms of community and possibilities for democratic partiCipation are discussed in chapter 7, 'Social Interaction and Everyday Life'. Very similar fears were expressed as television burst onto the media scene. In The Lonely Crowd (1961), an influential sociological analysis of American society in the 1950s, David Riesman and his colleagues expressed concern about the effects of TV on family and community life. While some of their fears were well placed, television and the mass media have also enriched the social world in many ways. Manuel Castells (2001) argues that the Internet will continue to grow because it allows networks to flourish. For CasteIIs, networks are the defining organizational structure of our age. The inherent flexibility and adaptability of networks give them enormous advantages over older types of rational, hierarchicalorganizations. Castells argues that the Internet gives businesses the capability for global coordination of decentralized and highly complex activities. For individuals, the Internet will enable new combinations of work and self-employment, individual expression, collaboration and sociability, and for political activists it will make it possible for networks ofindividuals to combine and cooperate and spread their message around the world. For example, recent social networking sites such as Bebo, MySpace and Facebook, along with video sharing sites such as YouTube, show just how popular web-based communications are becoming for all age groups. Playing on McLuhan's idea that 'the medium is the message', Castells argues that, now, 'the network is the message'. Castells' work is discussed in more detail in chapter 18, 'Organizations and Networks'. THINKING CRITICALLY How important do you think the Internet is likely to become in the emerging global society? In what ways is it becoming built into the everyday routines of individuals, businesses, workplaces and retailing? On balance, is the Internet a positive development for both individuals and societies? Film The first film to be shown to paying customers was in 1895 in Paris, France, where the Lumiere brothers' Arrival of the Train in La Ciotat Station caused viewers to flee from their seats as the screen slowly filled with an oncoming steam engine heading towards them. While the print media developed slowly over many decades, film and the cinema arrived much faster. The first cinema in the UK opened in 1896 and by 1914 there were more than 500 in London alone. Cinema tickets could be afforded by all classes anF the decline in working hours and rise in uJilemployment in the late 1920s I meant the cinema-goers soon formed a mass audience in developed countries. ~ ~ z...III => • • •• 18.1 Can bureaucracy be defended? As the sociologist Paul du Gay admits, 'These are not the best days for bureaucracy'.As we have seen, since the term 'bureaucracy' was coined, it has been used in a negative way In an influential book, III Praise ofBureaucracy (2000), du Gay resists this attack Whilst recognizing that bureaucracies can and do. of course, have flaws, he seeks to defend bureaucracy against the most common lines of criticism directed against it. First, du Gay argues against the claim that there are ethical problems with the idea of bureaucracy. He singles out the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman's book, Modermty and the Holocaust (1989), as an important account of this view. Bauman believes that it was only with the development of the bureaucratic institutions associated with modem society that horrendous acts like the holocaust in the Second World War became possible. The planned genocide of millions of people by the Nazis in the Final Solution could only , . .... happen once institutions were in place that distanced people from taking moral responsibility for their actions. Rather than being a barbaric explosion of violence, Bauman argues that the holocaust was only possible because rational bureaucratic institutions had emerged that separated discrete tasks from their consequences. German bmeaucrats, and particularly the SS, would focus on carrying out their allotted tasks to the best of their abilities, and on following orders - for example, making sure that a railway line had been built, or that a group of people was moved from one part of the country to another - rather than questioning the whole rationale behind mass murder. As we have seen,Bauman argues that responsibility is diluted in a bureaucracy; but du Gay argues quite the opposite. For the holocaust to happen, du Gay contends, the Nazis had to overcome the legitimate and ethical procedures integral to bureaucracy. One aspect of this was in the promotion of unquestioning allegiance to the Was Auschwitz the ultimate expression of bureaucratic organization? FOOrer, Ado!f Hitler, rather than to the objective codes of bureaucracies. Du Gay argues that bureaucracies have an important ethos, which includes the equal and impartial treatment of all citizens regardless of their values. For du Gay, the holocaust came about when the racist convictions of Nazis overcame the impartial application of rules that is essential to a bureaucracy Du Gay also seeks to defend bureaucracy against a second line of attack, by rejecting what he sees as the current fashionable talk of the need for entrepreneurial reform of bureaucracies, especially public services. He stresses that the ethos of bureaucratic impartiality is being undermined by an increasingly politicized civtl service, which is enthusiastic to get the job done in the way that pleases politicians, rather than to follow a bureaucratic framework that ensures administrative responsibility for the public interest and constitutional legitimacy WE HAVE LOGS OF ALL IT'S AGAINST OUR POLICY TO \<.Ill [/,\PLOYEES AND RE.PLACE THEM WITH LOW-PAID II'IPERSONATORS, eUT I WANTED THE. CO/,\PANY \<.NOW5 EI/ERYTHING ABOUT YOU, WALL"', "'OUR PHONE CALLS, ~ WEe. HITS AND • E-MAlL. WE HAVE'yOUR :, URINE TEST, COLLEGE ~ GRADES, SALARY AND i FI>.I'\!LY ~ CONTACTS ... ~ YOU TO KNOW In, FEMII!>LE.. r--_....J0 downward from superiors to subordinates. In many large companies, corporate heads are so busy coordinating different departments, coping with crises, and analysing budget and forecast figures that they have little time for original thinking. They hand over consideration ofpolicy issues to others below them, whose task is to develop proposals. Many corporate leaders frankly admit that, for the most part, they simply accept the conclusions given to them. The physical setting of organizations Most modern organizations function in specially designed physical settings. A building that houses a particular organization possesses specific features relevant to the organization's activities, but it also shares important architectural characteristics with buildings of other organizations. The architecture of a hospital, for instance, differs in some respects from that of a business firm or a school. The hospital's separate wards, consulting rooms, operating rooms and offices give the overall building a definite layout, while a school may consist of classrooms, laboratories and a gymnasium. Yet there is a general resemblance: both are likely to contain hallways with doors leading off and to use standard decoration and furnishings throughout. Apart from the different dress of the people moving through the corridors, the buildings in which modern organizations are usually housed have a definite sameness to them. And they often look similar from the outside as well as within their interiors. It would not be unusual to ask, on driving past a building, 'Is that a school?' and receive the response, 'No, it's a hospital.' Organizations and the control o/time and space Michel Foucault (1971, 1978) showed that the architecture of an organization is directly involved with its social make-up T T The physical organization of this 1940s typing pool means that the workers are kept illlder close surveillance. In modern organizations, surveillance tends to take new forms. and system of authority. By studying the physical characteristics oforganizations, we can shed new light on the problems analysed byWeber. The offices he discussed abstractly are also architectural settings rooms, separated by corridors. The buildings of large firms are sometimes actually constructed physically as a hierarchy, in which the more elevated one's position in the hierarchy of authority, the nearer to the top of the building one's office is; the phrase 'the top floor' is sometimes used to mean those who hold ultimate power in the organization. In many other ways, the geography of an organization will affect its functioning, especially in cases where systems rely heavily on informal relationships. Physical proximity makes forming groups easier, while physical distance can polarize groups, resulting in a 'them' and 'us' attitude between departments. Surveillance in organizations The arrangement of rooms, hallways and open spaces in an organization's buildings can provide basic clues to how its system of authority operates. In some organizations, groups of people work collectively in open settings. Because of the dull, repetitive nature of certain kinds of industrial work, like assembly-line production, regular supervision is needed to ensure that workers sustain the pace of labour. The same is often true of other types of routine work, such as that carried out by customer service operators in call centres, who often have their calls and activities monitored by their supervisors. Foucault laid great emphasis on how visibility, or lack of it, in the architectural settings of modern organizations influences and expresses patterns of authority. Their level of visibility determines how easily subordinates can be subject to what Foucault calls surveillance, the supervision of activities in organizations. In modern organizations, everyone, even in relatively high positions of authority' is subject to surveillance; but the lowlier a person is, the more his or her behaviour tends to be closely scrutinized. Surveillance takes several forms. One is the direct supervision of the work of subordinates by superiors. Consider the example of a school classroom. Pupils sit at tables or desks, often arranged in rows, all in view of the teacher. Children are supposed to look alert or otherwise be absorbed in their work. Of course, how far this actually happens in practice depends on the abilities of the teacher and the inclinations of the children to conform to what is expected of them. A second type of surveillance is more subtle but equally important. It consists of keeping files, records and case histories about people's work lives. Weber saw the importance of written records (nowadays often computerized) in modern organizations, but did not fully explore how they can be used to regulate behaviour. Employee records usually provide complete work histories, registering personal details and often giving character evaluations. Such records are used to monitor employees' behaviour and assess recommendations for promotion. In many business firms, individuals at each level in the organization prepare annual reports on the performance of those in the levels just below them. School records 'Sensors indicate that No. 2 cubicle has been occupied for eighteen minutes. Do you require assistance?' and college transcripts are also used to monitor individuals' performance as they move through the organization. Records are kept on file for academic staff, too. Lastly, there is self-surveillance, where assumptions about the surveillance by others change ones behaviour and limit what One does. Think of the example used above of the telephone operator in a call centre. The operator will often have no way of knowing whether calls are being monitored, or how often supervisors listen in to phone conversations. Yet, operators are likely to assume that they are under surveillance from management and so keep calls short, efficient and formal, in line with the company guidelines. Organizations cannot operate effectively if employees' work is haphazard. In business THINKING CRITICALLY Reflect on your experience of schools, workplaces and public areas. In what ways are these becoming subject to more surveillance? What type of surveillance is being introduced in each?Why might people welcome an increase in surveillance? What are the positive aspects of increasing surveillance? Classic Studies 18.2 Michel Foucault, the Panopticon and surveillance The research problem We have aheady seen that schools look a bit like hospitals and there is a similarity to the design of many other modern organizations. But why is this? The function of schools is very different to hospitals, so why are their designs not radically different? How did it happen that the physical structures of so many modern organizations came to bear such a strong resemblance to each other? The French social philosopher, Michel Foucault, investigated the origins of modern forms of organization and reached a surprising conclusion - many have their roots in the same underlying principles as prisons. Foucault's explanation Foucault's work covers a wide range of subjects, but he paid a great deal of attention to organizations such as prisons and 'asylums' (institutions for the mentally ill), in which individuals are physically separated for long periods from the outside world,In such A prison built following Bentham's model ofthe Panopticon. ..................................................................... organizations, people are incarcerated - kept hidden away - from the external social environment. A prison illustrates in clear detail the nature of surveillance, because it seeks to maximize control over inmates' behaviour. But controlling behaviour is also a central feature of most other organizations and Foucault asks, 'Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals,which all resemble prisons?' (1975: 228). In DisClpiine and Punish (1975),Foucault argues that the modern prison has its origins in the Panopticon, an organization plarmed according to principles designed around 1787 by the philosopher and social reformerJeremy Bentham. 'Panopticon' was the name Bentham gave to his ideal model of a prison, which he tried to sell to the British government. And though the design never was fully implemented, some of its main principles were incorporated into prisons built in nineteenth-century Europe and the USA. The Panopticon was circular in shape, with the cells built around the outside edge. In the centre was an inspection tower. TWo windows were placed in every cell, one facing the inspection tower and the other facing outside. The aim of the design was to make prisoners visible to guards at all times. The windows in the tower itself were equipped with Venetian blinds,so that while the prison staff could keep the prisoners under constant observation, they themselves could be invisible. Even today, most prisons look remarkably like the Panopticon, with viewing holes in cell doors, for example, ensuring that the principle of prisoners not knowing when they might be seen remains intact. Foucault argues that this compels inmates to behave well all the time, as they never know when they will be observed. For Foucault,such principles of surveillance, observation and correcting unwanted behaviour do not stop at the prison gates. In fact, they are part and parcel of modernity itself. The principles of surveillance and discipline run throughout modern life,into the organization of schools, hospitals and businesses,making for a 'carceral society' - one which effectively incarcerates its members under a managerial gaze. Critical points Foucault's work has been enormously influential in the social sciences, but it has also drawn much criticism.The notion that modern life constitutes incarceration seems exaggerated,particularly compared to previous societies. It is hard to see workers as prisoners,for example.As Marx pointed out,even in the nineteenth century capitalism was based on wage labour not slavery and workers had private lives outside the organization. There is also reason to see even those 'closed' organizations discussed by Foucault as in long-term decline.Since the late 1960s,many societies have witnessed a process of 'decarceration', as institutions for disabled people and 'asylums' have been closed down,in favour of integration into the wider community. Similarly community penalties rather than imprisonment have become routinely used as punishment for some categories of offender. Critics say that Foucault's thesis does not adequately account for such trends. Finally even on his own terms,Foucault's argument that prisons and other organizations were designed for maximum efficiency is open to criticism. Direct supervision may work tolerably well when the people involved, as in prisons,are hostile to those in authority and do not want to be where they are.But in other organizations, where managers need to cooperate with staff in reaching common goals, the situation is different. Too much direct supervision alienates employees, who then feel they are denied opportunities for involvement and may well rebel or do the minimum required (Sabel 1982; Grint 2005).That does not seem to be the most efficient form of organization. People in the wider society are also prone to resist rather than submit to high levels of surveillance. People in the former Soviet-styled communist societies were routinely spied on and governments kept detailed information on citizens to clamp down on possible opposition. The whole society did indeed come almost to resemble a gigantic prison.But this also brought the same discontents, conflicts and opposition that prisons generate, ultimately leading to widespread disenchantment,rebellion and the collapse of Soviet-style communist societies. Contemporary significance Foucault added a new twist to our understanding ofwhat modern life is like. He reminded us that it is not simply about progress,technological invention and increasing material wealth.There is also a dark side to modernity that has always accompanied its progressive face, which can be found in prisons, asylums and disciplinary techniques. In this sense, his work remains significant, because it has made social scientists (and others) more realistic about the balance of benefits and dangers ofmodernization. Foucault's focus on surveillance has become much more important today because of the growing impact ofinformation and communications technologies (ICT). We may not accept that we live in Foucault's carceral society; but some sociologists argue that we do now live in a surveillance society (Lyon 1994).A society in which information about our lives is gathered and shared by different types of organizations, where urban CCTV cameras follow all of our movements and where the technologies we love and feel we cannot do without - such as the Internet and mobile phones - also enable our physical and virtual movements to be tracked more accurately and systematically than ever before. firm s, as Weber pointed out, people are expected to work regular hours. Activities must be consistently coordinated in time and space, something promoted both by the physical settings of organizations and by the precise scheduling of detailed timetables. Timetables regularize activities across time and space - in Foucault's words, they 'efficiently distribute bodies' around the organization. Timetables are a condition of organizational discipline, because they slot the activities of large numbers of people together. If a university did not strictly observe a lecture timetable, for example, it ORGANIZATIONS AND NETWORKS would soon collapse into complete chaos. A timetable makes possible the intensive use of time and space: each can be packed with many people and many activities. Transnational organizations For the first time in history, organizations have become truly global in scale. Information technologies have rendered national borders less meaningful, since they can no longer contain key economic, cultural and environmental activities. As a consequence, international organizations are expected to continue to grow in number and importance, providing a measure of predictability and stability in a world where nations are no longer the all-powerful actors they once were. Sociologists therefore study international organizations in order to understand better how it is possible to create institutions that span national borders and what their effects will be. Some sociologists even argue that global organizations will push the world's countries to become more and more alike (Thomas 1987; Scott and Meyer 1994; McNeely 1995). International organizations are not new, however. For example. organizations concerned with managing trade across borders have existed for centuries. The Hanseatic League, a business alliance among German merchants and cities, was one such organization, dominating trade in the North and Baltic Seas from the middle of the thirteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth century. But it was not until the creation of the short-lived League of Nations in 1919 that truly global organizations, with elaborate bureaucracies and member nations around the world, were formed. The United Nations, created in 1945, is perhaps the most prominent modern example of a global organization. Sociologists have divided international organizations into two principal types: international governmental organizations comprise national governments, while international non-governmental organizations comprise private organizations. We will consider each of these separately. International governmental organizations The first type of global organization is the international governmental organization (IGO), a type of international organization established by treaties between governments for purposes of conducting business between the nation s making up its membership. Such organizations emerge for reasons of national security (both the League of Nations and the United Nations were created after highly destructive world wars), the regulation of trade (for example, by the World Trade Organization), social welfare or human rights or, increasingly, environmental protection. Some of the most powerful IGOs today were created to unify national economies into large and powerful trading blocks. One of the most advanced IGOs is the European Union (EU), whose rules since May 2004 have governed 25 European member states. The EU was formed to create a single European economy, in which businesses could operate freely across borders in search of markets and labour and workers could move freely in search of jobs. EU members have common economic policies and, since 2002,12 ofthem even share a single currency (the euro). Not all Europeans welcome this development, however, arguing that it means that member countries will eventually surrender most of their economic decision-makingto the EU as a whole. IGOs can also wield considerable military power, provided that their member nations are willing to do so.The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UN, for example, used the full weight of their members' combined military might against Iraq during the first Gulf War in 1991, and again in Kosovo, in the former Yugoslavia, in 1999. Yet, since nations ultimately control their own use of military force, there are limits to the authority of even the most powerful military IGOs, whose strength derives from the voluntary participation of their member nations. In the face of violent civil strife in Bosnia and the African countries of Somalia, Rwanda and the Darfur region of Sudan, for example, UN peacekeeping efforts have proved largely ineffective. IGOs often tend to reflect inequalities in power among their member nations. For example, the UN SecurityCouncil is responsible for maintaining international peace and security and is therefore the most powerful organization within the UN. Its five permanent members include Britain, the United States, China, France and Russia, giving tllese countries Significant control over the Security Council's actions. The remaining ten countries are elected by the UN General Assembly for two-year terms and therefore have less ongoing power than the permanent members. At the beginning ofthe twentieth century, there were only about three dozen IGOs in the world, although data for that time are sketchy. By 1981, when consistent reporting criteria were adopted, there were 1,039 and by 2006 there were as many as 7,350 IGOs, though some are no longer active (Union of International Organizations 2007). International non-governmental organizations The second type ofglobal organization is the international non-governmental organization (INGO), which consists of international organizations established by agreements between the individuals or private organizations making up their membership. Examples include the International Sociological Association, the International Council of Women and the environmental group Greenpeace. As with IGOs, the number of INGOs has increased explosively in recent years - from fewer than 200 near the beginning of the twentieth century to about 15,000 in the mid-1990s (Union of International Associations 1996- 7). By 2006 there were around 51,509 INGOs, though more than a third of these were apparently inacOrganizations and Networks live (Union of International Organizations 2006). In general, INGOs are primarily concerned with promoting the global interests of their members, largely through influencing the UN, other INGOs or individual governments. They also engage in research and education and spread information by means of international conferences, meetings and journals. INGOs have succeeded in shaping the policies of powerful nations. One prominent (and highly successful) example of an INGO is the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (lCBL). The campaign, along with its founder lody WilIiams, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 for its success in getting a majority of the world's countries to agree to a treaty banning the devastating use oflandmines. The Nobel Prize committee cornmended the campaign for changing 'a vision to a feasible reality', adding that 'this work has grown into a convincing example of an effective policy for peace that could prove decisive in the international effort for disarmament' (lCBL2001). The ICBL is affiliated with more than 1,000 other INGOs in some 60 countries. Together they have focused public attention on the dangers posed to civilians of the more than 100 million anti-personnel mines that are a deadly legacy of former wars fought in Europe, Asia and Africa. These mines are unlike other weapons. They can remain active for decades after a war, terrorizing and trapping whole populations. In Cambodia, for example, fertile croplands have been mined, threatening with starvation farmers who are not willing to risk action that could reduce them or their families to a shower of scraps. The campaign's efforts resulted in a treaty banning the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. The treaty is supported by 150 countries, and became international law in March 1999. Although they are far more numerous than IGOs and have achieved some successes, INGOs have far less influence, since legal power (including enforcement) ultimately lies with governments. In the effort to ban landmines, for instance, although most of the major powers in the world signed the treaty, the United States, citing security concerns in Korea, refused to do so, as did Russia. Some INGOs, like Amnesty International and Greenpeace, have nonetheless achieved considerable influence. Economic organizations Modern societies are, in Marx's term, capitalistic. Capitalism is a way of organizing economic life that is distinguished by the following important features: private ownership of the means of production; profit as incentive; free competition for markets to sell goods, acquire cheap materials and utilize cheap labour; and restless expansion and investment to accumulate capital. Capitalism, which began to spread with the growth of the Industrial Revolution in the early nineteenth century, is a vastly more dynamic economic system than any other that preceded it in history. While the system has had many critics, like Marx, it is now the most widespread form of economic organization in the world. So far in this chapter, we have been looking at work mostly from the perspective of occupations and employees. We have studied patterns of work and the factors influencing the development of trade unions. Here, we concern ourselves with the nature of the business firms in which the workforce is employed. (It should, however, also be recognized that many people today are employees of government organizations, although we shall not consider these here.) What is happening to business corporations today, and how are they run? Corporations and corporate power Since the turn of the twentieth century, modern capitalist economies have been increasingly influenced by the rise of large business corporations. A recent survey of the world's top 200 corporations showed that between 1983 and 1999 their combined sales grew from the equivalent of25 per cent to 27.5 per cent of world GDP. During the same period, the profits of these corporations grew 362.4 per cent, while the number of people they employ grew by only 14.4 per cent (Anderson and Cavanagh 2000). Of course, there still exist thousands of smaller firms and enterprises within the British economy. In these companies, the image of the entrepreneur - the boss who owns and runs the firm - is by no means obsolete.The large corporations are a different matter. Ever since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means published their celebrated study The Modem Corporation and Private Property in the 1930s, it has been accepted that most of the largest firms are not run by those who own them (Berle and Means 1997 [1932]). In theory, the large corporations are the property of their shareholders, who have the right to make all-important decisions. But Berle and Means argued that since share-ownership is so dispersed, actual control has passed into the hands of the managers who run firms on a day-today basis. Ownership of the corporations is thus separated from their control. Whether run by owners or managers, the power of the major corporations is very extensive. When one or a handful of firms dominate in a given industry, they often cooperate in setting prices rather than freely competing with one another. Thus, the giant oil companies normally follow one another's lead in the price charged for gasoline. When one firm occupies a commanding position in a given industry, it is said to be in a monopoly position. More common is a situation of oIigopoly, in which a small group ofgiant corporations predominate. In situations of oJigopoly, firms are able more or less to dictate the terms on which they buy goods and services from the smaller firms that are their suppliers. Types ofcorporate capitalism There have been three general stages in the development of business corporations, although each overlaps with the others and all continue to coexist today. The first stage, characteristic of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was dominated by family capitalism Large firms were run either by individual entrepreneurs or by members of the same family and then passed on to their descendants. The famous corporate dynasties, such as the Sainsburys in the UK or the Rockefellers in the USA, belong in this category. These individuals and families did not just own a single large corporation, but held a diversity of economic interests and stood at the apex of economic empires. Most of the big firms founded by entrepreneurial families have since become public companies - that is, shares of their stock are traded on the open market - and have passed into managerial control. But important elements of family capitalism remain, even within some of the world's largest corporations, such as the Ford car company, whose Chief Executive is WiIliam Clay Ford, Jr., the great-grandson of Henry Ford who founded the company. Among small firms, such as local shops run by their owners, small plumbing and housepainting businesses and so forth, family capitalism continues to dominate. Some of these firms,such as shops that remain in the hands of the same family for two or more generations, are also dynasties on a minor scale. However, the small business sector is a highly unstable one, and economic failure is very common; the proportion of firms owned by members of the same family for extended periods is minuscule. In the large corporate sector, family capitalism was increaSingly succeeded by managerial capitalism. As managers came to have more and more influence through the growth of very large firms, the entrepreneurial families were displaced. The result has been described as the replacement of the family in the company by the company itself. The corporation emerged as a more defined economic entity. In a study of the 200 largest manufacturing corporations Organizations and Networks in the United States, Michael AlIen (1981) found that in cases where profit showed a decline, family-controlled enterprises were unlikely to replace their chief executive, but manager-controlled firms did so rapidly. There is no question that managerial capitalism has left an indelible imprint on modern society. The large corporation drives not only patterns ofconsumption but also the experience of employment in contemporary society - it is difficult to imagine how different the work lives of many people in the developed societies would be in the absence of large factories or corporate bureaucracies. Sociologists have identified another area in which the large corporation has left a mark on modern institutions. Welfare capitalism refers to a practice that sought to make the corporation - rather than the state or trade unions the primary shelter from the uncertainties of the market in modern industrial life. Beginning at the end of the nineteenth century, large firms began to provide certain services to their employees, including childcare, recreational facilities, profit-sharing plans, paid holidays, unemployment insurance and life insurance. These programmes often had a paternalistic bent, such as that sponsoring 'home visits' for the 'moral education' of employees. Viewed in less benevolent terms, a major objective of welfare capitalism was coercion, as employers deployed all manner of tactics - including violence - to avoid unionization. In his study of the US labour movement, Sanford Jacoby (1997) argues that conventional histories typically suggest that welfare capitalism met its demise in the Depression years of the 1930s, as trade unions achieved unprecedented levels of influence and as President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal administration began to guarantee many of the benefits provided by firms. In contrast to this standard interpretation, Jacoby argues that welfare capitalism did not die, but instead went underground during the apex of the labour movement. In firms that avoided unionization during the period between the 1930s and 1960s - like the US-based companies Kodak, Sears and Thompson Products - welfare capitalism was modernized, shedding blatantly paternalistic aspects and routinizing benefit programmes. When the union movement began to weaken after 1970, these companies offered a model to many other firms, which were now able to press their advantage against flanking unions, reasserting the role of the firm as 'industrial manor'. Despite the overwhelming importance of managerial capitalism in shaping the modern economy, many scholars now see emerging the contours of a third, different phase in the evolution of the corporation. They argue that managerial capitalism has today partly ceded place to institutional capitalism. This term refers to the emergence of a consolidated network ofbusiness leadership, concerned not only with decision-making within single firms, but also with the development of corporate power beyond them. Institutional capitalism is based on the practice of corporations holding shares in other firms. In effect, interlocking boards of directors exercise control over much of the corporate landscape. This reverses the process of increasing managerial control, since the managers' shareholdings are dwarfed by the large blocks of shares owned by other corporations. One of the main reasons for the spread of institutional capitalism is the shift in patterns of investment that has occurred over the past 30 years. Rather than investing directly by buying shares in a business, individuals now invest in money market, trust, insurance and pension funds that are controlled by large financial organizations, which in turn invest these grouped savings in industrial corporations. Transnational corporations With the intensifying of globalization, most large corporations now operate in an international economic context. When they establish branches in two or several countries, they are referred to as multinational or transnational corporations. 'Transnational' is the preferred term, indicating that these companies operate across many different national boundaries. The largest transnationals are gigantic; their wealth outstrips that of many countries. Half of the 100 largest economic units in the world today are nations; the other half are transnational corporations. The scope of these companies' operations is staggering. The 600 largest transnationals account for more than a fifth of the total industrial and agricultural production in the global economy; about 70 are responsible for half of total global sales (Dicken 1992). The revenues of the largest 200 companies rose tenfold between the mid-1970s and the 1990s, reaching $9.5 trillion in 2001. In 2003 it was estimated that the world's top ten pharmaceutical companies controlled over 53 per cent of the global market share. Over the past 20 years, the transnationals' activities have become increasingly global: only three of the world's largest companies in 1950 had manufacturing subsidiaries in more than 20 countries; some 50 do so today. These are still a small minority; most of the transnationals have subsidiaries in two to five countries. Of the top 200 companies in the year 2000, US corporations dominated the list, with 82 slots (41 per cent ofthe total); Japanese firms came second, with 41 slots (Anderson and Cavanagh 2000). However, the proportion of American companies in the top 200 has fallen significantly since 1960, when just five Japanese corporations were included in that list. Contrary to common belief, three-quarters of all foreign direct investment is between the industrialized countries. Nevertheless, the involvement of transnationals in developing countries is extensive, with Brazil, Mexico and India showing the highest levels of foreign investment. The most rapid rate of increase in corporate investment by far has been in the Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs) of Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Malaysia. The reach of the transnationals in recent decades would not have been possible without advances in transport and communications. Air travel now allows people to move around the world at a speed that would have seemed inconceivable even 60 years ago. The development of extremely large oceangoing vessels (superfreighters), together with containers rhat can be shifted directly from one type of carrier to another, makes possible the easy transport of bulk materials. Telecommunications technologies now permit more or less instantaneous communication from one part of the world to another. Satellites have been used for commercial telecommunications since 1965, when rhe first one in use could carry 240 telephone conversations at once. Current satellites can carry at least 12,000 simultaneous conversations. The larger transnationals now have rheir own satellitebased communications systems. The Mitsubishi Corporation, for instance, has a massive network, across which five million words are transmitted to and from its headquarters in Tokyo each day. Types oftransnational corporations The transnationals came to assume an increasingly important place in the world economy over the course of rhe twentieth century. They are of key importance in the international division of labour - the specialization in producing goods for the world market that divides regions into zones of industrial or agricultural production or high- or low-skilled labour (McMichael 1996). Just as national economies have become increas ingly concentrated - dominated by a limited number ofvery large companies -so too has the world economy. In the case ofthe United Kingdom and several of the other leading industrialized countries, the firms that dominate nationally also have a very wideranging international presence. Many sectors of world production (such as agribusiness) are oligopolies- production is Organizations and Networks controlled by three or four corporations that dominate the market. Over the past two or three decades, international oligopolies have developed in the automobile, microprocessor and electronics industries. and in the production of some other goods marketed worldwide. H. V. Perlmutter (1972) divided transnational corporations into three types. One consists of ethnocentric transnationa]s, in which company policy is set and, as far as possible, put into practice from a headquarters in the country oforigin. Companies and plants that the parent corporation owns around the world are cultural extensions of the originating company - its practices are standardized across rhe globe. A second category is rhat ofpolycentric transnationa]s, where overseas subsidiaries are managed by local firms in each country. The headquarters in the country or countries of origin of the main company establish broad guidelines wirhin which local companies manage their own affairs. Finally, there are geocentric transnationals, which are international in their management structure. Managerial systems are integrated on a global basis, and higher managers are very mobile, moving from country to country as needs dictate. Of all transnationals, Japanese companies tend to be the most strongly ethnocentric in Perlmutter's terms. Their worldwide operations are usually controlled tightly from the parent corporation, sometimes with the close involvement of the Japanese government. The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MlTl) plays a much more direct part in the overseeing ofJapanese-based foreign enterprise than Western governments do. MITt has produced a series of development plans coordinating the overseas spread of Japanese firms over rhe past two decades. One distinctive Japanese type of transnational consists of the giant trading companies or sogo shosha. These are colossal conglomerates whose main concern is with the financing and support of trade. They provide Advertising for Pepsi and Coca-Cola in Tripoli,Lebanon. financial, organizational and information services to other companies. About half of Japanese exports and imports are routed through the ten largest sago shosha. Some, like Mitsubishi, also have large manufacturing interests oftheir own. Global-scaleplanning The global corporations have become the first organizations able to plan on a truly world scale. Pepsi and Coca-Cola adverts, for example, reach billions of people across the globe. Afew companies with developed global networks are able to shape the commercial activities of diverse nations. Richard Barnet and John Cavanagh (1994) argue that there are four webs of interconnecting commercial activity in the new world economy: the Global Cultural Bazaar, the Global Shopping Mall, the Global Workplaceand the Global Financial Network. The Global Cultural Bazaar is the newest of the four, but is already the most extensive. Global images and global dreams are diffused through movies, TV programmes, music, videos, games, toys and T-shirts, sold on a worldwide basis. All over the earth, even in the poorest developing world countries, people are using the same electronic devices to see or listen to the same commercially produced songs and shows. The Global Shopping Mall is a 'planetary supermarket with a dazzling spread of things to eat, drink, wear and enjoy'. It is more exclusive than the Cultural Bazaar because the poor do not have the resources to participate - they have the status only of window shoppers. Of the 5.5 billion people who make up the world's population, 3.5 billion lack the cash or credit to purchase any consumer goods. The third global web, the Global Workplace, is the increasingly complex global division of labour that affects all of us. It consists of the massive array of offices, factories, restaurants and millions of other places where goods are produced and consumed or information is exchanged. This web is closely bound up with the Global Financial Network, which it fuels and is financed by. The Global Financial Network consists of billions of bits of information stored in computers and portrayed on computer screens. It entails almost endless currency exchanges, credit card transactions, insurance plans, and the buying and selling of stocks and shares. The transformation oflarge corporations? There are big differences between the large corporation of the first decade of the twenty-first century and its counterpart of the mid-twentieth century. Many of the names are the same - General Motors, Ford and IBM, for example - but these have been joined by other giant firms, largely unknown in the 19505, such as Microsoft and Intel. They all wield great power, and their top executives still inhabit the large buildings that dominate so many city centres. But below the surface of similarities between today and half a century ago, some profound transformations have taken place. The origin of these transformations lies in that process we have encountered often in this book: globalization. Over the past 50 years, the giant corporations have become more and more caught up in global competition; as a result, their internal composition, and in a way their very nature, has altered. Former US Labour Secretary, Robert Reich (1991) wrote: Underneath, all is changing. America's core corporation no longer plans and implements the'production of a large Organizations and Networks volume of goods and services; it no longer invests in a vast array offactories, machinery, laboratories, inventories, and other tangible assets; it no longer employs armies of production workers and middle· level managers. ... In fact, the core corporation is no longer even American. It is, increasingly, a fa<;:ade, behind which teems an array of decentralised groups and subgroups continuously contracting with similarly diffuse working units all over the world. The large corporation is less and less a big business and more an 'enterprise web' - a central organization that links smaller firms together. IBM, for example, which used to be one of the most jealously self-sufficient of all large corporations, in the 1980s and early 1990s joined with dozens of US-based companies and more than 80 foreign-based firms to share strategic planning and cope with production problems. Some corporations remain strongly bureaucratic and are often centred in the country in which they first became established. However, most are no longer so clearly located anywhere. The old transnational corporation used to work mainly from its national headquarters, from where its overseas production plants and subsidiaries were controlled. Now, with the transformation of space and time (discussed in chapter 7, 'Social Interaction and Everyday Life'), groups situated in any region of the world are able, via telecommunications and computers, to work with others. Nations still try to influence flows of information, resources and money across their borders. But modern communications technologies make this increasingly difficult, if not impossible. Knowledge and finances can be transferred across the world as electronic blips moving at the speed of light. The products of the transnational companies similarly have an international character. When is something 'Made in Britain' or any other country and when is it not? There is no longer any clear answer. In chapter 4, 'Human History and Globalization', we "That was a fine report, Barbara. But since the sexes speak different languages, 1 probably didn't understand a word of it. " looked at the example of Barbie, the 'allAmerican' doll, whose packaging says she is 'Made in China'. But as we saw, the origin of her body and wardrobe span the globe, from the Middle to the Far East, before she is eventually sold in the USA or shipped on again for sale elsewhere. Women and the corporation Until three decades or so ago, organizational studies did not devote very much attention to the question ofgender. Weber's theory of bureaucracy and many of the influential responses to it, were written by men and presumed a model of organizations that placed men squarely at the centre. The rise of feminist scholarship in the 1970s, however, led to examinations of gender relations in all the main institutions of society, including organizations and bureaucracy. Feminist sociologists not only focused on the imbalance of gender roles within organizations, they also explored the ways in which modern organizations had developed in a specifically gendered way. Feminists have argued that the emergence of the modern organization and the bureaucratic career was dependent on a particular gender configuration. They point to two main ways in which gender is embedded in the very structure of modern organizations. First, bureaucracies are characterized by occupational gender segregation. As women began to enter the labour market in greater numbers, they tended to be segregated into categories of occupations that were low paying and involved routine work. These positions were subordinate to those occupied by men and did not provide opportunities for women to be promoted. Women were used as a source of cheap, reliable labour, but were not granted the same opportunities as men to build careers. Second, the idea of a bureaucratic career was, in fact, a male career in which women played a crucial supporting role. At the workplace, women performed routine tasks - as clerks, secretaries and office managers thereby freeing up men to advance their careers. Men could concentrate on obtain ~ ing promotions or landing big accounts because the female support staff handled much of the busy work. In the domestic sphere, women also supported the bureaucratic career by caring for the home, the children and the man's day-ta-day wellbeing. Women serviced the needs of the male bureaucrat by allowing him to work long hours, travel and focus solely on his work without concerning himself with personal or domestic issues. As a result of these two tendencies, early feminist writers argued, modern organizations have developed as male-dominated preserves in which women are excluded from power, denied opportunities to advance their careers and victimized on the basis of their gender through sexual harassment and discrimination. Although most early feminist analysis focused on a common set of concerns - unequal pay, discrimination, and the male hold on power - there was no consensus about the best approach to take in working for women's equality. Two of the leading feminist works on women and organizations exemplified the split between liberal and radical feminist perspectives. One early and important liberal perspective was Rosabeth Moss Kanter's Men and Women of the Corporation (1977). Kanter investigated the position of women in corporations and analysed the ways in which they were excluded from gaining power. She focused on 'male homosociability' - the way in which men successfully kept power within a closed circle and allowed access only to those who were part of the same close group. Women and ethnic minorities were effectively denied opportunities for advancement and were shut out of the social networks and personal relationships that were crucial for promotion. Although Kanter was critical of such gender imbalances, she was not entirely pessimistic about the future. She saw the problem as one of power, not gender. Women were in a disadvantaged position, not because they were women, but because they did not wield sufficient power within organizations. As greater numbers of WOmen came to assume powerful roles, the power imbalances would be swept away. An alternative approach was presented by the radical feminist Kathy Ferguson, in her book The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy (1984). Ferguson did not see the gender imbalance within organizations as something that could be resolved simply with the promotion ofmore women to positions of power. In her view, modern organizations were fundamentally tainted by male values and patterns of domination and women would always be relegated to subordinate roles within such structures. The only real solution was for women to build their own organizations on principles very different from those designed by and for men. Ferguson argued that women have a better capacity than men to organize in a way that is more democratic, participatory and cooperative; men are prone to authoritarian tactics, inflexible procedures and an insensitive management style. What impact have feminist ideas on organizations had on studies in this area? The answer appears to be a quite limited Organizations and Networks one. In spite of a large body of scholarship on gender and organizations, for example, a comprehensive Handbook of Organizational Culture and Climate, published in 2000 (Ashkanasy et al.) still contained only a single chapter on gender and organizations, thus restricting 'gender' to one specific issue, rather than seeing the gendered character of organizations as a crucial matter for the whole field of organization studies. This suggests that feminist theories have yet to become part of the mainstream of this subdiscipline. However, the renewal of interest in Marxism and critical theory through Critical Management Studies (CMS) (which we discuss below), may present feminist scholars with new opportunities to transform the current status of debates about conflict, power and gender within organizations in the future (Aaltio and Mills 2002). Gender inequality in the workplace is discussed in more detail in chapter 20, 'Work and Economic Life'. Beyond bureaucracy? Sociologists such as George Ritzer, whose thesis on the McDonaldization ofsociety we looked at at the start of this chapter, argue that bureaucracy and rationalization remain key characteristics of most organizations, particularly in the developed world, where the modern form of bureaucracy has existed longest. However, others argue that although Weber's model of bureaucracy, mirrored by that of Foucault, may once have held good, it is now starting to look rather tired and may be less effective in explaining the changes to organizations of all kinds. Numerous organizations are overhauling themselves to become less, rather than more, hierarchical and, in the process, are becoming more informal and loosely organized. In the 1960s, Burns and Stalkerconcluded that traditional bureaucratic structures can stifle innovation and creativity in cutting· edge industries; in today's electronic Global Society 18.1 The changing face ofthe McDonald's corporation In 2003, the then Chairman and Chief Executive of McDonald's,Jim Cantalupo, said, 'The world has changed.Our customers have changed. We have to change,too', promising investors that the company no longer wanted to be bigger than everybody else,just better. His speech came at a time when McDonald's had announced its first quarterly loss since 1965 and faced increasingly public attacks from environmental activists and health specialists. McDonald's' reputation for good service was also flagging, with the company ranked the worst for customer satisfaction in America,below health insurers and banks. All this resulted in the share price falling from more than US$48 in 1999,to a ten-year low ofUS$12 in 2003. The article below illustrates how McDonald's has had to move away from its founder's original philosophy in order to adapt to local contexts in an age of globalization. Adapt or die The wind of change is blowing through the empire of fast food. The vision of endless growth through new markets across the planet for fast food companies now looks unsustainable when it's not what people want anymore. When fashions, styles and tastes change,it's time to adapt or die. As the fast food companies have expanded around the world,they have had to adapt to local sensitivities. In the old days, no franchise holder could deviate from the 700-page McDonald's operations manual known as 'the Bible'.But that policy maybe changing. In the 34 restaurants in India, the 'Maharaja Mac' is made of mutton,and the vegetarian options contain no meat or eggs. There were disturbances in India when it was learned that McDonald's French fries were precooked in beef fat in the USA, because Hindus revere cows and cannot eat beef. Likewise, McDonald's in Pakistan offers three spicy 'McMaza meals': Chatpata Chicken Roll, Chicken 'n' Chutni Burger and Spicy Chicken Burger. All three are served 'with Aaloo fingers and a regular drink'. In the USA itself,the taste for the food of the Eisenhower-era brightly coloured takeaway has McDonald's has been trying to reinvent itself in recent years, following a fall in sales. This new-look London branch is now virtually indistinguishable from a bar or coffee shop. changed over 50 years too. What the market is meant to offer is more choice, not less.In the heartland ofAmerica, at Evansville, Indiana, there's now a McDonald's With the Diner Inside, where waitresses serve 100 combinations of food, on china. This is not Ray Kroc's vision of stripping out choice to save time and money. One of Ray Kroc's partners once admitted that McDonald's was not really in the food business at all, but in real estate. McDonald's actually makes most of its money from rent, because it owns more retail property than any other company on earth. Land is more valuable than appetite, and the sites are more valuable an asset than what they sell. At the end of 2002, McDonald's began closing 175 outlets in ten countries. Some were branches in cities like London, but the company pulled out altogether from certain countries that were not giving appropriate financial returns. The reasons for these corporate changes may not be just to do with fast food. Will McDonald's mutate into another business entirely; in order to survive? Source. BBCWorldService.com, 'Fast Food Factory': www.bbc.co.ukJworldservice/specials/1616_fast food/page9 .shtml (accessed 28/07/07) economy, few would dispute the importance ofthese findings, Departing from rigid vertical command structures, manyorganizations are turning to 'horizontal', collaborative models in order to become more flexible and responsive to fluctuating markets, In this section, we shall examine some ofthe main forces behind these shifts, including globalization and the growth of information technology, and consider some of the ways in which late modern organizations are reinventing themselves in the light of the changing circumstances. THINKING CRITICALLY What does the recent experience of the McDonald's corporation tell us about the impact of globalization on large companies? Does the changing face of McDonald's invalidate Ritzer's thesis of 'MacDonaldization'? In what ways might Roland Robertson's concept of glocalization (see chapter 4) be the best guide to understanding the reality of global businesses today? Organizational change: the Japanese model Many of the changes now witnessed in organizations around the world were first pioneered amongst some ofthe large Japanese manufacturing corporations, such as Nissan and Panasonic. Although the Japanese economy suffered in the 1990s, it has been phenomenally successful during most of the post-war period. This economic success was often attributed to the distinc~ tive characteristics oflarge Japanese corpo ~ rations - which differed substantially from most business firms in the West. As we shall see, many ofthe organizational characteristics associated with Japanese corporations have been adapted and modified in other countries in recent years. Japanese companies have diverged from the characteristics that Weber associated with bureaucracy in several ways: I Bottom-up decision-making. The big Japanese corporations do not form a pyramid ofauthority asWeber portrayed it,with each level being responsible only to the one above. Rather, workers low down in the organization are consulted about policies being considered by management, and even the top executives regolarly meet them. 2 Less specialization. In Japanese organizations, employees specialize much less than their counterparts in the West. Young workers entering a firm in a management training position will ,I 11 ,I spend the first year learning generally how the various departments of the firm operate. They will then rotate through a variety of positions in both local branches and national headquarters in order to gain experience in the many dimensions of the company's activities. By the time employees reach the peak of their careers, some 30 years after having begun as a trainee, they will have mastered all the important tasks. 3 Job security. The large corporations in Japan are committed to the lifetime employment of those they hire; the employee is guaranteed a job. Pay and responsibility are geared to seniority how many years a worker has been with the firm - rather than to a competitive struggle for promotion. 4 Group-oriented production. At all levels of the corporation, people are involved in small cooperative 'teams', or work groups. The groups, rather than individual members, are evaluated in terms of their performance. Unlike their Western counterparts, the 'organization charts' of Japanese companies - maps of the authority system - show only groups, not individual positions. 5 Merging of work and private lives. In Weber's depiction ofbureaucracy, there is a clear division between the work of people within the organization and their activities outside. This is in fact true of most Western corporations, in which the relation between firm and employee is an economic one. Japanese corporations, by contrast, provide for many of their employees' needs, expecting in return a high level of loyalty to the firm. Workers receive material benefits from the company over and above their salaries. The electrical firm Hitachi, for example, studied by Ronald Dore (1973). provided housing for all unmarried workers and nearly half of its married male employees. Company loans were available for the education of children and to help with the cost ofweddings and funerals. Studies ofJapanese-run plants in Britain and the United States indicate that 'bottomup' decision-making does work outside Japan. Workers seem to respond positively to the greater level of involvement these plants provide (White and Trevor 1983). It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the Japanese model does carry some lessons relevant to theWeberian conception of bureaucracy. Organizations that closely resemble Weber's ideal type are probably much less effective than they appear on paper, because they do not permit lowerlevel employees to develop a sense of involvement and autonomy in relation to their work tasks. Until recently, many British and US business writers looked to the Japanese corporation as a model that Anglo-American companies should follow (Hutton 1995). The slowdown in the Japanese economy during the 1990s has led many experts to question this assumption. The commitment and sense of obligation that many Japanese companies traditionally had towards their staff may have encouraged loyalty, but it has also been criticized as inflexible and uncompetitive. As we have seen, during much ofthe post-war period core workers in Japanese companies could expect to be with the same company their entire working lives, dismissals or redundancies were rare and ambition for promotion was not particularly encouraged. The economic problems facing the country from the early 1990s, which only now appear to be easing, have meant that the future of Japanese business is torn between traditionalists, seeking to preserve the old system, and radical capitalists supporting reform towards a more competitive, individualistic model of business (Freedman 2001). Transforming management practices Most of the components of the 'Japanese model' described above come down to issues ofmanagement. While it is impossible to ignore specific production-level practices developed by the Japanese, a large part ofthe Japanese approach focused on management-worker relations and ensured that employees at all levels felt a personal attachment to the company. The emphasis on teamwork, consensus-building approaches and broad-based employee participation were in stark contrast to traditional Western forms of management that were more hierarchical and authoritarian. In the 1980s, manyWestern organizations introduced new management techniques in order to boost productivity and competitiveness. Two popular branches of management theory - human resource management and the corporate culture approach indicated that the Japanese model had not gone unnoticed in the West. The first of these, human resource management (HRM), is a style of management which regards a company's workforce as vital to economic competitiveness: if the employees are not completelydedicated to the firm and its product, the firm will never be a leader in its field. In order to generate employee enthusiasm and commitment, the entire organizational culture must be retooled so that workers feel they have an investment in the workplace and in the work process. According to HRM, human resources issues should not be the exclusive domain of designated 'personnel officers', but should be a top priority for all members of company management. HRM is based on the assumption that there is no serious conflict within the company between workers and employers and there is therefore little need for trade unions to represent the workforce. Instead, HRM presents the company as an integrated whole, the only rivalry being that with its competitor firms. Instead of dealing with its workers through negotiation with trade unions, companies using the techniques of HRM seek to individualize their workforce by providing individual contracts and performance-related pay. Recent studies have shown that whilst workers may Organizations and Networks comply with the dictates of HRM at work, many are privately cynical about the assumption of corporate unity that underlies it (Thompson and Findlay, 1999). THINKING CRITICALLY Think about workplaces that you have either worked in or seen in action. How widespread was the use of information technology and what, exactly, was it used for? Was management surveillance of employees seen as an issue by workers themselves? Do you think the potential dangers facing workers are real, or is the impact of information technology on their working lives essentially benign? What steps, if any, do you think can be taken to counter these trends? The second management trend - creating a distinctive corporate culture - is closely related to human resource management. In order to promote loyalty to the company and pride in its work, the company's management works with employees to build an organizational culture involving rituals, events or traditions unique to that company alone. These cultural activities are designed to draw together all members of the firm - from the most senior managers to the newest employee - so that they make common cause with each other and strengthen group solidarity. Company picnics or 'fun days', 'casual Fridays' (days on which employees can 'dress down') and company-sponsored community service projects are examples of techniques for building a corporate culture. In recent years, a number of Western companies have been founded according to the management principles described above. Rather than constructing themselves according to a traditional bureaucratic model, companies like the Saturn car company in the United States have organized themselves along these new manageriallines. At Saturn, for example, employees 18.2 Computers versus workers? For businesses competing in the global economy; investment in information teclmology - computer and communications equipment - is a necessity. Firms in the financial sector rely heavily on computers to engage in transactions in international financial markets; manufacturing firms depend on communications equipment to coordinate global production processes; and the customers of conswner services firms demand 24-hour-a-day access to their accounts by telephone or the Internet. In short, information technology has become part ofthe basic infrastructure of business. While some of these technologies have made workers' lives easier, there is reason to think that the new high-tech workplace may erode their power and rights. First. business reliance on information technology may undermine coalitions amongst workers. There is great demand today for employees with high-tech skills, whereas those who finish school or further education with few such skills find themselves eligible only for a limited number ofpositions. Increasingl" there are coming to be two 'classes' of employees in firms:a privileged class with high-tech skills and another class relegated to lower-status work. But when employees negotiate with management over such issues as wages. hours and benefits, employee unity is essential for securing concessions.Will high-tech workers side with lower-skilled employees in work'j)lace disputes, or will they be more likely to side with management? The status of worker rights and benefits in the future may well binge on the answer to this question. Second, in part because new communications teclmologies allow the branch offices and production facilities of multinational firms to communicate easily with one another, a higher proportion of manufactured goods is coming to be produced on a transnational basis - a situation that may make individual workers more easily replaceable. Robert Reich,who served as US Labour Secretary under President Clinton, provides the following example of a global production process: In modern open-plan offices like these, employers can still keep workers under close smveillance. Precision ice-hockey equipment is designed in Sweden, financed 1Il Canada,and assembled in Cleveland and Denmark for distribution in North America and Europe,respectively, out of alloys whose molecular structure was researched and patented in Delaware and fabricated in Japan.An advertising campaign is conceived in Britain; film footage is shot in Canada,dubbed in Britain, and edited in NewYork. (Reich 1991) preVlous times,making it easier for companies to replace 'difficult' workers. Communication technologies may therefore contribute to the process that Marxist scholar Harry Braverman (1974) called, 'the deskilling oflabour'. Although high-tech,high-skilled workers will be needed to carry out many aspects of the production process, these skills may no longer give workers the same bargaining power that skilled craftsmanship carried with it in previous eras.Because the manufacturing process has been broken down into many small components, with each carried out at a different production facility, the number of skills that anyone worker must have is more limited than was the case in Third,the nature of workplace surveillance is likely to change as information technology becomes even more important for business. Employers have always watched their employees closely, monitoring performance, seeking to improve efficiency and checking that they do not steal. But as a greater proportion of work is done using computers, the capacity of managers to scrutinize the behaviour of their employees increases with computerized performance evaluations, scrutiny of emails and enhanced management access to personal employee information.Such an Orwellian scenario becomes ever more likely as the role of information technology in the workplace expands. at all levels have the opportunity to spend time in positions in other areas of the company in order to gain a better sense of the operation of the firm as a whole. Shopfloor workers work alongside the marketing tearn, sharing insights into the way in which the vehicles are made; sales staff rotate th rough the servicing departm ent to become more aware of common maintena nce problems that might co ncern prospective buyers; representatives from both sales and the shop floor are involved in product design teams in order to discuss shortcomings, which the management may not have been aware of in earlier models. A corporate culture focused on friendly and knowledgeable customer service unifies company employees and enhances the sense of company pride. Studying management practices Academic research into management and business today takes place, largely, within multidisciplinary business and management schools. Here, organizations have tended to be analysed as 'systems', containing a series of integrated parts, such as different departments and groups of people. However, theoretical perspectives are also treated with some suspicion as management practices are seen as more-orless rational responses to the changing economic, political and social context that organizations find themselves in. On this view, management is a neutral activity undertaken in the interests of organizations and understanding management practices is a commonsense activity requiring no special theoretical perspectives (Knights and Willmott 2007: 7-8). The recourse to 'common sense' (discussed in chapter 2) tends to rely on overly general 'explanations' that are often found wanting when faced with empirical research findings. This is why, as sociologists, we need theories that connect organizations and management practices to the wider society of which they are part. Since the 1980s, there have been several new approaches to the study of management, with two theoretical perspectives emerging from theoretical perspectives developed within the social sciences and social theory. For this reason, critical management studies (CMS) and actornetwork theory (ANT) are arguably of most interest to sociologists of organizations. Critical managementstudies Critical management studies (CMS) - as the name suggests - adopts a critical approach to mainstream management studies (Alvesson and Willmott 2003) and has risen to prominence since the mid- 1990s. Conventionally, the mainstream of management studies tends to assume that the management of organizations is positive and necessary and that scientific studies of organizations should be of interest primarily to managers, who may then manage more effectively and efficiently. In short, management is seen as a relatively neutral activity, which is good for workers, consumers and society as a whole, while managers perform a socially useful function. In practice, this has meant that management studies has become a site primarily for the training of people who are seeking careers within the management of organizations. CMS questions whether management really is such a neutral activity and takes a more critical approach to the whole subject, drawing on the ideas of Marx and particularly the neo-Marxist critical theory of the Frankfurt School (see chapter 3 for more detail on the Frankfurt School). However, CMS also uses the work of Foucault as well as insights gleaned from feminist theory and postmodernism in its studies of management and organizatiot;ls. Chris Grey and Hugh Willmott (2005) argue that CMS challenges the ingrained assumptions of management studies, that organizational hierarchies are 'natural' or 'normal' and that the evaluation of management has to be in terms ofthe internal goals of the organization itself. Instead, CMS encourages wider reflection on the social impact of managerial strategies and on the way that graduates are trained in management studies itself. In doing so, CMS is alert to the ecological dimensions of organizations - how does their design affect and influence the experience of workers and how does the organization impact on the natural environment? By bringing these types of question into the field of management studies, eMS encourages a constant reflexivity amongst students of management on their own assumptions and practices. But therein lies the main problem facing CMS: how to turn its socialtheoretical arguments into practical measures to transform real organizations and businesses within the context of capitalist economies. After all, existing businesses embody exactly the assumptions that CMS theorists are critical of and they often pay for and certainly employ graduates from management schools. Will they welcome (and be prepared to pay for) a new generation of managers schooled in Marxism and critical theory? If not, then CMS may be restricted to those working on the margins of management studies. Actor-network theory Actor-network theory (orANT) is a theoretical approach to the study of human-nonhuman relationships, with its origins in sociological studies of natural science and scientific research. In particular, the approach has been popularized by the French scholar Bmno Latour (1993, 2005). ANT is notable for (and controversial because of) its insistence on the agency or active involvement of non-human 'things'. For example, in an important early study of the French fishing industry, Michel Callon (1986) argued that the scallops being farmed were, in a real sense, also active agents in the process rather than simply passive recipients of human actions. The fishermen had to adapt their farm management strategies to the behaviour of the scallops, which were, in this sense, independent actors. To understand the whole process of scallop-farming, therefore, we need to How useful is ANT's insistence that all the elements within situations such as this can be thought ofas actors? understand not just the fishermen's managerial policies and strategy, but also the way that scallops behave in their environment. In short, we need to be able to grasp the whole 'actor-network' situation. In the study of organizations, ANT similarly looks to bring 'the missing masses' (Latour 1992) - machines, documents, artefacts and so on - into the picture, so that organizations can be understood in a more coherent and comprehensive way than in previous approaches. Think of a company, for instance: what exactly is it? how is it constituted? ANT would suggest that a business company is not just the sum ofits physical buildings and human workforce. In fact, it is constituted by its buildings, people, textual materials, machinery and much more, all of which are connected as a network of actors (hence 'actor-network' theory). ANT has been used to study a variety of organizational features from general studies of organization (Czamiawska and Hemes 2005) to consultancy work (Legge 2002) and the implementation of information technologies in businesses (Doorewaard and Van Bijsterveld, 2001). What makes ANT controversial is its insistence that all the elements above - people, documents, machines and so on - are 'actors' and none of them has priority over the others. ANT advocates often use the term 'actants' to differentiate their position from the Weberian perspective, which sees only self-conscious human individuals as capable of social action. Conventionally, sociology has seen human intentions as a significant point of difference from the objects studied by natural scientists. People's actions are intentional or 'thought through', while most animals rely on instinct, and inanimate objects, such as machines, surely cannot 'act' in the same way as humans. ANT rejects this basic divide, instead seeing all actors in a network as essentially equal partners, a position known as 'ontological equality'. Which actor is more powerful or influential within a given network is something that has to be determined by research. We cannot assume that human actors will always be dominant or the ones that exercise power over the others. Hence, Durkheim was wrong; social phenomena cannot be explained by reference only to other social phenomena, but must also take into account the technical phenomena that jointly build actor- networks. ANT may well appear strange to students of sociology who are used to dealing only with people. Surely it is human beings that design, build and use machines, so how can machines exercise power over people? A simple example is the moving production line or conveyor belt, introduced by Ford Motors to produce and assemble cars in the early twentieth century (see chapter 20 for a discussion of Fordist production methods). Of course, this was designed, built and used by people, but once in use, the conveyor belt (a simple machine) becomes an actor within the whole actor-network within the factory. Workers 'using' the belt have to become attuned to its speed and rhythm in order for the system to work and, in a real sense, the belt exerts power over the workers who use it. Similarly, when we think of the rules and company policies which exist within organizations, it is clear that these texts have also been designed, written and used by people, but again, once in use as part of a whole actor-network, they exert a certain control over the people who agree to be bound by them. ANT makes us aware of the way that the combination of different actors form organizations, and there are some similarities with Michel Foucault's ideas on the power of physical buildings (such as prisons, schools and hospitals) and discourses (particular ways of thinking and speaking about a subject) to shape people's behaviour (see chapter 3 for more on Foucault's ideas). What ANT suggests, therefore, is that fully to understand contemporary management practices and organizations may require the expertise of a whole series of currently separate academic disciplines, from sociology and psychology to economics, business studies, architecture, environmental sciences and the arts. Arguably, this is necessary because sociologists are not, for instance, trained engineers who understand the workings of machinery, or literary experts who regularly analyse the structural elements oftexts. In this way, although ANT has its roots in social theory, in practice it tends to encourage an interdisciplinary approach to organizational research and has gained some ground in the study of management and organizations. Critics of the ANT approach have been unimpressed with the amount oftheoretical jargon used in ANT studies, which seems to generate unnecessarily complex accounts oforganizations and management practices that would not be recognized by the people being studied. This could be worthwhile if it were to produce genuinely novel theoretical explanations, but critics argue that most ANT-based research studies are largely descriptive rather than explanatory. Many ANT studies of organizations also tend to take a management perspective, which plays down or ignores the sociological issues ofsocial inequalities and power, leading some to see the theory as lacking a critical edge (Whittle and Spicer 2008). So far, the chapter has concentrated on some Significant aspects and recent theories of formal organizations. This is important because, as noted above, organizations have been a central feature of modern societies and many scholars have studied them. However, in recent years, attention has shifted somewhat towards the study of networks and their roles in society. And though all formal organizations quite clearly involve networks, the advent of information technologies seems to be lending loose, relatively informal social networks a greater prominence in the organization of society than previously, facilitating the creation of more effective, global networks of individuals, groups and organizations (LiIley et al. 2004). The study of networks Social networks There is an old saying: 'It's not what you know, it's who you know.' This adage expresses the value of having 'good connections', Sociologists refer to such connections as networks - all the direct and indirect connections that link a person or a group with other people or groups. Your personal networks thus include people you know directly (such as your friends) as well as people you know indirectly (such as your friends' friends). Personal networks often include people of similar race, class, ethnicity and other types of social background, although there are exceptions. For example, if you subscribe to an online mailing list, you are part of a network that consists of all the people on the list, who may be of different racial or ethnic backgrounds and genders. Because groups and organizations can also be networked - for example, all the alumni of a particular university - belonging to such groups can greatly extend your reach and influence. Social groups are an important source for acquiring networks; but not all networks are social groups. Many networks lack the shared expectations and common sense of identity that are the hallmark of social groups. For example, you are not likely to share a sense ofidentity with the subscribers to an online mailing list, nor will you probably even know the neighbours of most of your co-workers at the office, even though they would form part ofyour social network. Networks serve us in many ways. The American sociologist Mark Granovetter Organizations and Networks (1973) demonstrated thatthere can be enormous strength in weak ties, particularly among higher socia-economic groups. Granovetter showed that upper-level professional and managerial employees are likely to hear about new jobs through connections such as distant relatives or remote acquaintances. Such weak ties can be of great benefit because relatives or acquaintances tend to have very different sets of connections from those of closer friends, whose social contacts are likely to be similar to one's own. Among lower socio ~ economic groups, Granovetter argued, weak ties are not necessarily bridges to other networks and so do not really widen opportunities (Marsden and Lin 1982; Wellman et al. 1988; Knoke 1990). After graduation from college, you may rely on a good degree and a strong CV to find a job. But it may prove more beneficial if it happens that your friend at college went to school with the interviewer in the organization where you are seeking work. Most people rely on their personal networks in order to gain advantages, but not everyone has equal access to powerful networks. Some sociologists argue, for example, that women's business and political networks are weaker than men's, so that women's power in these spheres is reduced (Brass 1985). Several of the best-known feepaying schools in England, such as Eton and Harrow, only admit boys, thereby denying women access to powerful connections formed by pupils during their school years. In general, sociologists have found that when women lookfor work, theirjob market networks comprise fewer ties than do men's, meaning that women know fewer people in fewer occupations (Moore 1990). Meagre networks tend to channel women into female-typical jobs, which usually offer less pay and fewer opportunities for advancement (Raos and Reskin 1992; Drentea 1998). Still, as more and more women move up into higher-level positions, the resulting networks can foster further advancement. One study found that women are more likely to be hired or promoted into job levels that already have a high proportion of women (Cohen et al. 1998). Networks confer more than economic advantage. You are likely to rely on your nerworks for a broad range ofcontacts, from obtaining access to your Member of Parliament to finding a date. Similarly, when you visit another country, your friends, school or religious organization may steer you to their overseas connections, which can then help you to find your way around in the unfamiliar environment. When you graduate from school or further education, your a1umni group can further extend your network of social support. Networks and information technology As we have seen, networks are very old forms of human practice. But for the sociologist Manuel Castells, networks, powered by the development of information technology and particularly of the Internet, are the defining organizational structure ofour age. The inherent flexibility and adaptability of networks gives them enormous advantages over older types oforganization. In the past, rational, hierarchical bureaucracies of the kind Weber described proved to be highly successful at using resources to meet the organization's goals. Nerworks, in contrast, were unable to coordinate functions, focus on specific goals or accomplish given tasks as successfully as bureaucracies. To Castells, the enormous advances in computing and technology during the last quarter of the twentieth century, which created what he calls the 'Internet Galaxy' (2001), changed all that. The arrival of the Internet means that data can now be processed instantaneously in almost any part of the world; there is no need for physical proximity between those involved. As a result, the introduction ofnew technology has allowed many companies to 're-engineer' their organizational structure, becoming more decentralized, and reinforcing the tendency towards smalier, more flexible types of enterprises) including homeworking. Traditionally, identifying the boundaries of organizations has been fairly straightforward. Organizations were generally located in defined physical spaces, such as an office building, a suite of rooms or, in the case of a hospital or university, a whole campus. The mission or tasks an organization aimed to fulfil were also usually clear-cut. A central feature of bureaucracies, for example, was adherence to a defined set of responsibilities and procedures for carrying them out. Weber's view of bureaucracy was that of a self-contained unit that intersected with outside entities at limited and designated points. We have already seen how the physical boundaries of organizations are being worn away by the capacity of new information technology to transcend countries and time zones. But the same process is also affecting the work that organizations do and the way in which it is coordinated. Many organizations no longer operate as independent units, as they once did. A growing number are finding that their operations run more effectively when they are linked into a web of complex relationships with other organizations and companies. No longer is there a clear dividing line between the organization and outside groups. Globalization, information technology and trends in occupational patterns all mean that organizational boundaries are more open and fluid than they once were. In The Rise of the Network Society (1996), Castells argues that the 'network enterprise' is the organizational form best suited to a global, information economy. By this, he means that it is increasingly impossible for organizations - be they large corporations or small businesses - to survive if they are not part of a network. What enables the process ofnetworking to occur is the growth of information technology: organizations around the world are able to locate each other, enter readily into contact and coordinate joint activities through an electronic medium. Castells cites several examples of organizational networking and emphasizes that they have originated in diverse cultural and institutional contexts. According to Castells, however, they all represent 'different dimensions of a fundamental process'the disintegration ofthe traditional, rational bureaucracy. Although there are many examples of organizations as networks, let us consider an illustrative case. The sociologist Stewart Clegg studied the clothing retailers Benetton. At first glance, you might not think that Benetton, with its 5,000 outlets around the world, is particularly different from any other global fashion brand. But in fact, Benetton is an example of a particular type of network organization that is made possible by advances in information technology. The Benetton outlets around the world are licensed franchises run by individuals who are not employed by Benetton directly, but who are part of a larger complex devoted to making and selling Benetton products. The entire operation is based on a network principle: the central Benetton firm in Italy subcontracts orders for prodtiets to a variety of manufacturers based on demand from its franchises round the globe. Computers link the various parts of the network, so that, at the touch of a till button at, for example, the Moscow outlet, information is relayed back to the headquarters in Italy about the shipments it needs. Whereas other international fashion retailers introduce identical sets ofproducts into all their shops worldwide, Benetton's structure allows it to customize orders for individual franchises. Rather than entering into regular contracts with suppliers, Benetton can react to the market and call on its loose network of COllaborating partners to provide services when needed (Clegg 1990). Is the combination of information technology with networks taking us completely away from Weber's pessimistic vision of the future of bureaucracy? We should be cautious about such a view. Bureaucratic systems are more internally fluid than Organizations and Networks Weber suggested and are increasingly being challenged by other, less hierarchical, forms of organization. But, as Ritzer shows in his thesis on the McDonaldization of society, they probably will not disappear altogether. In the near future, there is likely to be a continuing push and pull between tendencies towards large size, impersonality and hierarchy in organizations on the one hand, and opposing influences on the other. Social capital: the ties that bind One of the principal reasons people join organizations is to gain connections and increase their influence. The time and energy invested in an organization can bring welcome returns. Parents who belong to a Parent- Teacher Association, for example, are more likely to be able to influence school policy than those who do not belong. The members know who to call, what to say and how to exert pressure on school officials. Sociologists call these fruits of organizational membership social capital, the social knowledge and connections that enable people to accomplish their goals and extend their influence. Although the idea of social capital can be traced back to antiquity, the expression entered mainstream academic discussion in the late 1980s. In Europe, the concept was particularly associated with the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. The last decade has seen an explosion in the use of the term 'social capital', sparked by the influential work of the American political scientist Robert Putnam (1995, 2000). Bourdieu's use of social capital is discussed in chapter 11, 'Stratification and Social Class'. Social capital includes useful social networks, a sense of mutual obligation and trustworthiness, an understanding of the norms that govern effective behaviour and, in general, other social resources that enable people to act effectively. For example, university students often become active What benefits do these members of a Parent- Teacher Association stand to gain? in the student union or newspaper partly because they hope to learn social skills and make connections that will payoff when they graduate. They may, for example, get to interact with lecturers and administrators, who then will support them when they are looking for a job or applying for postgraduate courses. Differences in social capital mirror larger social inequalities. In general, for example, men have more capital than women, whites more than non-whites, the wealthy more than the poor. The social capital gained from being educated at a fee-paying school is an important reason why some parents make this choice for their children. Attendance at such schools can give pupils access to powerful social, political and business resources later in life, helping to extend their wealth and influence. Differences in social capital can also be found among countries. According to the World Bank (2001), countries with high levels of social capital, where business people can effectively develop the 'networks of trust' that foster healthy economies, are more likely to experience economic growth.An example is the rapid growth experienced by many East Asian economies in the 1980s - a growth some sociologists have argued was fuelled by strong business networks. Robert Putnam completed an extensive study of social capital in the United States and distinguished two types of social capital: bridging social capital, which is outward-looking and inclusive, and bonding social capital, which is inward-looking and exclusive. Bridging social capital unifies people across social cleavages. The capacity to unify people can be seen in such examples as the civil rights movement, which brought blacks and whites together in the struggle for racial equality, and interfaith religious organizations. Bonding social capital reinforces exclusive identities and homogeneous groups; it can be found in ethnic fraternal organizations, church -based women's reading groups and fashionable country clubs (Putnam 2000). People who actively belong to organizations are more likelyto feel 'connected'; they feel engaged, able to 'make a difference'. From the standpoint of the larger society, social capital, the bridging form in particular, provides people with a feeling that they are part of a wider community, and one that includes people who are different from themselves. Democracy nourishes when social capital is strong. Indeed, crossnational survey evidence suggests that levels of civic engagement in the United States, where Putnam's research was based, are among the highest in the world (Putnam 1993, 2000). But there is equally strong evidence that during the past 30 or so years, the ties of political involvement, club membership and other forms of social and civic engagement that bind Americans to one another have significantly diminished. Could it be that democracy is being eroded as a result? Bowling alone: an example of declining social capital? Putnam argued that participation in organizations provides many Americans with such social capital as the ability to cooperate with others for mutual benefit, a sense of trust and a feeling of belonging to the larger society. This kind of social capital is essential for effective citizenship. Yet, according to Putnam, these social ties are rapidly lessening in American society. One subtle but significant sign of this decline is seen in American bowling alleys: more and more peo ple are bowling alone these days (Putnam 1995, 2000). Putnam points out that league bowlers consume three times more beer and pizza than solo bowlers, a fact which suggests to him that the former spend more time socializing, perhaps even discussing civic issues. Bowling alone, according to Putnam (2000), is symptomatic ofthe loss of community today: The most whimsical yet discomfiting evidence ofsocial disengagement in contemporary America that I have discovered is lhis: more Americans are bowling today than ever before, but bowling in organized leagues has plummeted in the last decade or so. Between 1980 and 1993 the total number of bowlers in America increased by 10 percent, while league bowling decreased by 40 percent. (Lest this be thought a wholly trivial example, I should note that nearly 80 million Americans went bowling at least once in 1993, nearly a third more than voted in the 1994 CongreSSional elections and roughly the same number as claim to attend church regularly.. . .) ... Without at first noticing, we have been pulled apart from one another and from our communities over the last third of the century. Putnam points out that not only has bowling in organized leagues declined, but Organizations and Networks organizational memberships of all sorts have dropped by as much as 25 per cent since the 1970s. In the USA, parent-teacher associations, the National Federation of Women's Clubs, the League of Women Voters and the Red Cross have all experienced membership declines of roughly 50 per cent since the 1960s. Putnam reports that in 1974, about one in four adults regularly volunteered his or her time to such associations; today, the number is closer to one in five. Along with these organizational declines, fewer people in the USA report that they socialize with their neighbours or feel that most people can be trusted. Such declines in organizational membership, neighbourliness and trust in general have been paralleled by a decline in democratic participation. Voter turnout in presidential and parliamentary elections in tlle USA reil considerably since its peak in the late 1960s, although it rose again during a highly polarized presidential election between George Bush Junior and John Kerry in 2004. There are undoubtedly many reasons for such decline. For one thing, women, who were traditionally active in voluntary organizations, are more likely to hold a job than ever before. For another, people are increasingly disillusioned with government and less likely to think that their vote counts. Furthermore, people now spend more time commuting and so use up time and energy that might have been available for civic activities. But the principal source ofdeclining civic participation, according to Putnam, is simple: television. The many hours people spend at home alone in the USA watching TV has replaced social engagement in the community. Is the rest of the world also suffering the same decline in social capital? David Halpern (2000) found that Sweden, the Netherlands and Japan showstable or rising levels ofsocial capital, whereas for Germany and France the indicators are more mixed. However, Halpern concludes that social capital in the UK, along with Australia and the USA, has declined significantly in the last few decades. Looking at Europe and elsewhere, the evidence for a decline in social capital is far more mixed than in the USA. Similarly, ifvoter turnout really is an indicator of low social capital (and there are many other reasons why voter turnout differs), then some recent elections demonstrate that many developed countries may not be suffering anything like the same decline as in the USA. For example, in the 2007 French presidential elections, a record voter turnout of84 per cent was recorded in both first and second rounds of voting. Indeed, since 1945,Western Europe has had the highest average turnout, at 77 per cent, with Latin America recording the lowest, at 53 per cent (IDEA 20071. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) notes that, globally, voter turnout actually rose steadily between 1945 and 1990, increasing from 61 per cent in the 1940s to 68 per cent in the 1980s with the post-1990 average slipping back to 64 per cent. Nevertheless, this is not a simple picture of continuous decline as Putnam's study suggests. New social ties? Putnam's study raises some important issues about social participation and solidarity, but are its conclusions too negative? In many ways, such studies carry more than an echo ofthe concerns and anxieties raised by late nineteenth -century sociologists such as Ferdinand Tonnies and Em ile Durkheim. Tonnies, in particular, saw industrial culture and urbanization in Germany as destructive of long-lasting social bonds, creating an aggregate ofdislocated individuals with few real connections to each other. And yet, the early modern izing society that so worried Tonnies is now held up as a model ofstrong social solidarity by Putnam when seen in the light of recent social changes. Is Putnam missing something? Some sociologists who have studied the new information communication technologies (ICTs) think he may well be. Thinking critically Based on the survey opposite, why do young people use social networking sites? How would you interpret the evidence from this report? Does it support the 'loss of community' thesis or does it suggest that online conununities are being formed? Can such virtual relationships ever be considered the equivalent of face-to-face friendship relations? The rapid growth of new information technologies is startling (as we saw in chapter 2), and they are becoming built-in to people's everyday routines, both at home and work (Kraut et al. 2006). This is also the conclusion from a 2007 MTV Networksl Nickelodeon survey of 18,000 young people aged 8- 24 years across 16 countries, including China, Japan, the UK, the USA, Canada and Mexico. The survey found that, 'Young people don't see "tech" as a separate entityit's an organic part of their lives.... Talking to them about the role oftechnology in their lifestyle would be like talking to kids in the 1980s about the role the park swing or the telephone played in their social lives - it's invisible' (Reuters 2007). Information technologies are no longer restricted to the relatively rich, developed worid either. For example, mobile phone use topped 3.25 billion in 2007, equivalent to half of the world's population, with demand currently booming in China, India and Africa (www.telecomasia.net - 2007). Indeed, the fastest growing mobile phone market is in Africa (see figure 18.1). From a relatively low base, the 'penetration rate' (the number of phone connections compared to the size of population) in Africa reached 21 per cent in early 2007, with more than 200 million cellular connections. In 2007 alone, the number of cellular connections grew by 38 per cent, a larger annual rise than in the Middle East (33 per cent) Global Society 18,2 The decline or reinvention of 'community'? Researchers working on the Pew Research Center's 'Internet and American Life Project' conducted a telephone survey in October and November 2006, including a random sample of 935 American young people between the ages of 12 and 17 years, asking about their use of social networking websites (SNS) such as MySpace and Facebook - interactive online networking environments. Some ofthe survey's main findings from the report are shown below. MySpace dominates the social networking world Fully 85% ofteens who use social networking sites say the profile they use or update most often is on MySpace, while 7% update a profile on Facebook. Another 1% tend to a primary profile on Xanga. Smaller nwnbers told us they have profiles at places likeYahoo, PiC2Q, Gaiaonline and Tagged.com, VVhile the vast majority of social networking website users update MySpace profiles most often,there are some differences between boys and girls in the sites they choose to use.Young men are more likely than young women to say they use MySpace most often (90% of social networking boys use the site, compared with 81% of social networking girls). Conversely, teen girls are more likely than boys to say they use Facebook most often:just 4% of boys use facebook as their primary aCCOLll1t compared with 9% of girls. Among older social networking girls (age 15-17), the per cent using Facebook rises to 12%. Teens & Friends on Social Networking Sites What are the different ways you use social networkingsites? Do you ever use those sites to . . .? Yes No Stay in touch with friends you see a lot 91% 9% Stay in touch with friends you rarely see in person 82 18 Make plans with your friends 72 28 Make new friends 49 50 Flirt with someone 17 83 Teens say social networking sites help them manage theirfriends 91% of all social networldng teens say they use the sites to stay in touch with friends they see frequently. while 82% use the sites to stay in touch with friends they rarely see in person. 72% of all social netvoJorking teens use the sites to make plans with friends;49% use the sites to make new friends. Older boys who use social networking sites (age 15-17) are more likely than girls of the same age to say that they use social networldng sites to make new friends (60% vs. 46%). Just 17% of all social networking teens use the sites to flirt. Older boys who use social networldng sites are more than twice as likely as older gi.rls to say they use the sites to flirt; 29% report this compared with just 13% of older girls. How Teens Communicate with Friends Using Social Networking The percentage of teen SNS users who. Post messages to a friend's page or wall Send private messages to a friend within the social netvoJorking system Post comments to a friend's blog Send a bulletin or group message to all ofyour friends Wink, poke, give "e-props" or kudos to your friends Source. Pew Internet & American Life Project,January 2007. http.llwww.pewinternet.org/pdfs/pip_Slls_data_memojan_2007 .pdf 84% 82 76 61 33 Facebook only opened its site to users who were not affiliated to a high school,college or employer on 26 September 2006. Previously it was a relatively 'closed' system,which partly explains the dominance of the open access MySpace in this report. However,in July 2007, The EconomJs/ reported that Facebook membership had already risen to at least 31 million members, suggesting that it may be 'the next big thing' in social networking. j "'\, ,,' '\ .'{ '- . .~ ).J .- I \ ff 60% \. {ft . 50% • CJ Northern Africa CJ Western Africa CJ Middle Africa CJ Eastern Africa CJ Southern Africa Figure 18.1 Annual cellular connections growth 2006, by African region Source:© Wireless Intelligence 2007 and Asia-Pacific (29 per cent) regions. What will be the impact of these technologies on the social life ofsocieties? In a recent study of how people make use ofICT such as mobile phones, the Internet, email and social networking websites, Deborah Chambers (2006) investigated the social changes identified by Putnam, from the fairly stable and fixed ties of families, neighbourly relations and communities towards more voluntaristic and fluid ties. Chambers argues that new patterns of association and social ties are emerging based around ideals of 'friendship', some of which are sustained through ICT networks. She also argues that other forms are forged through creating new social identities amongst previously marginalized groups, such as those created within 'queer commu· nities', creating safe spaces for the exploration of 'self'. The creation of 'virtual', online commu· nities and friendship networks via constant mobile phone communication certainly look very different from traditional communities based on face·to·face contact, but does that make them less effective in the building of social ties via 'bridging social capital'? Many environmental protests, for example, are organized and set in motion through information on web· sites, text messaging or email. Many contemporary social movements also engage in direct actions rather than relying on conventional political lobbying through mainstream channels. Perhaps then, what we are witnessing is not the end of democracy, but the emergence of a new type of politics based on the principle of participatory rather than representative democracy. If so, then this may partly explain the low voter turnout that Putnam saw as evidence ofdeclining social capital. Social movement activity and environmentalism are discussed in chapter 22, 'Politics, Government and Social Movements', and chapter 5,'The Environment'. The informality, sheer speed of communication and the geographical distances involved in virtual relationships have led to concerns and anxieties amongst academics and governments, but this new 'collapse of community' thesis may be somewhat exaggerated. Chambers sees the quest for friendship relations as one indicator that people are pursuing new social ties based on equality and mutual respect, rather than giving up on community altogether. Of course, the new ICTs bring with them potentially new social problems. Chambers notes that in spite of the positive aspects of social networking, these forms of social relationship may not provide an adequate basis for ensuring relationships of care and Organizations and Networks caring, most of which do need regular faceto-face contact and long-term commitment. Many schools and parents are also concerned about social networking and mobile phones in relation to fears about the abuse of children by adults as well as the provision of new opportunities for children to bully each other, for instance by text messaging or the filming of attacks to be shown online. Such fears are not completely unfounded. The leading SNS provider, MySpace, admitted in 2007 that it had found more than 29,000 registered sex offenders amongst its 180 million members (MediaGuardian 2007). Although a very small number compared to the overall membership, it is clear that the fast-changing and relatively anonymous online environment does present regulators and police forces with some very different problems, which they could not have foreseen. Researchers will need to analyse these emerging 'communities of friendship' with the detached eye that marks out sociological work from journalism and otherforms of social commentary, if they are to arrive at a better understanding of why Putnam's touchstone activity of bowling is losing out to online social networking as crucibles for building and maintaining friendships and relationships. Friendship and relationships are discussed in more detail in chapter 9, 'Families and Intimate Relationships'. Conclusion The organizations and networks that people belong to exert an enormous influence over their lives. As we have seen in this chapter, conventional groups appear to be losing ground in people's daily lives. For example, today's students are less likely to join civic groups and organizations - or even vote - than were their parents, a decline that may well Signal a lower commitment to their communities. Some sociologists worry that this signals a weakening of society itself, which could bring about social instability. As we have also seen, the global economy and information technology are redefining group life in ways that are now beginning to be felt. For instance, the older generations of workers are likely to spend much of their careers in a relatively small handfulof longlasting, bureaucratic organizations; the younger generation is much more likely to be part of a larger number of networked, 'flexible' ones. Many oftoday's group affiliations will be created through the Internet or through other forms of communication, which continue to develop. It will become increasingly easy to connect with likeminded people anywhere on the planet, Summary points I. Many modern organizations are to some creating geographically dispersed groups around the world, whose members may never meet each other face-to-face. How will these trends affect the quality of social relationships? For nearly all of human history, most people have interacted exclusivelywith others who are close at hand. The Industrial Revolution, which facilitated the rise of large, impersonal bureaucracies where people knew one another poorly if at all, changed the nature of social interaction. Today, the Information Revolution is doing so once again. Tomorrow's groups and organizations could provide a renewed sense of communication and social intimacy, or they could spell fu rther isolation, social distance and social problems. their behaviour because of the assumption that they are under surveillance. 4. Modern organizations have evolved as degree bureaucratic in nature.Bureaucracy gendered institutions.Women have is characterized by a clearly defined traditionally been segregated into certain hierarchy of authority; written rules occupational categories that support the governing the conduct of officials and a ability of men to advance their careers.In separation between the tasks of the official recent years, women have been entering within the organization and life outside it. professional and managerial positions in Members of the organization do not own the greater numbers,but it has been argued that material resources with which they operate. women have to adopt a traditionally male MaxWeber argued that modern management style to succeed at top levels. bureaucracy is a highly effective means of 5. Large organizations have started to organizing large numbers of people, restructure themselves over recent years to ensuring that decisions are made according become less bureaucratic and more flexible. to general criteria. Many firms have adopted aspects ofJapanese 2. Informal networks tend to develop at all management systems: more consultation of levels both within and between organizations. lower-level workers by managerial The study of these informal ties is as executives; pay and responsibility linked to important as the more formal characteristics seniority; and groups,rather than individuals, on whichWeber concentrated his attention. evaluated for their performance . 3. The physical settings of organizations 6. Two important forms of global organization strongly influence their social feature s.The are international governmental organizations architecture of modern organizations is (ICOs) and international non-governmental closely connected to surveillance as a means organizations (INCOs).Both play an of securing obedience to those in authority. increasingly important role in the world Surveillance refers to the supervision of today, and ICOs - particularly the United people's activities, as well as to the keeping Nations - may become key organizational of file s and records about them. Self- actors in the future. surveillance refers to the way people limit 7. The modern economy is dominated by the large corporations.When one firm has a commanding influence in a given industry, it is in a monopoly position.When a cluster of firms wields such influence, a situation of oligopoly exists. The giant corporations have a profound effect on people's lives. Multinational or transnational corporations operate across national boundaries.The largest of them exercise tremendous economic power. Half of the 100 largest economic units are not countries, but privately owned companies. 8. The study of organizations and management practices has been relatively undertheorized. However, critical management studies (CMS) and actor-network theory (ANT) are two recently developed theoretical perspectives that have their roots is social theory and social science and have led to different ways of thinking about management and organization. 9. New information communications technology (ICT) is changing the way that organizations work. Many tasks can now be completed electronically, which allows organizations to transcend time and space. Many organizations now work as loose networks, rather than as self-contained independent units. 10. Social capital refers to the knowledge and connections that enable people to cooperate with one another for mutual benefit and extend their influence. Some social scientists have argued that social capital has declined since the 1970s, a process they worry indicates a decline in commitment to civic engagement. However, scholars of new leTs suggest that these may be giving rise to new forms of sociability and new social relations, which should be analysed on their own terms. ORGANIZATIONS AND NETWORKS • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • • • • • •• • • • •• • • • •• • • • •• • • • • • • • • • ••• • • • • •• • • • • •• • • • •• • • • • • Further reading This chapter covers a diverse range of material, but the following books should provide useful introductions to some key areas. For a guide to the changing meanings and evaluation of bureaucracies, see David Beetham's Bureaucracy, 2nd edn (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1996). This is getting rather old now, but remains a short and reliable introduction to the concept of bureaucracy. Amore up-to-date text covering organizations and management is Stewart Clegg, Martin Kornberger and Tyrone Pitsis's Managing and Organizations: An Introduction to Theory and Practice, 2nd edn (London: Sage, 2008), which is well organized (well, it should be!) and informative. Some of the main arguments and issues in relation to the impact of information technologies can be found in David Lyon's Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Li/e (Cambridge: Polity, 2007). ifyou are feeling adventurous, then you could try Manuel Castells in his own words in his The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). The concept of social capital is explored in John Field's Social Capital (London: Routledge, 2002), which is another quite short, but very well-written book. Then, a useful companion to this would be Yair Arnichai-Hamburger's The Social Net: Human Behaviour in Cyberspace (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2005) - an accessible edited collection of chapters looking at how people behave when using information technologies. Finally Stewart Clegg, Cynthia Hardy, Thomas Lawrence and Walter R. Nord's The Sage Handbook o/Organization Studies (London and New York: Sage, 2006), contains numerous useful pieces for your studies. Be warned, though, it is a large volume. • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••• • • • ••• • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • ••• • • • • • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • Internet links Electronic Journal of Radical Organisational • • • • Theory (EJROT), based at the University of • • • • The Centre for the Sociology of Organisations Waikato, New Zealand: • • • • (CSO), based in Paris, France: www.mngt.waikato.ac.nz/ejrot/ • • • • www.cso.edu/home.asp • • Asite with everything you need to know about • • • • •• Social Science Information System resources Michel Foucault, hosted by Queensland • • • • on organizations - based at the University of University ofTechnology, Brisbane: • • • • Amsterdam, the Netherlands: www.michel-foucault.com/ • • • • www.sociosite.net!topics/organization.php • • A gateway for resources on social capital, • • • • The International Sociological Association's hosted by the Universities ofSiena and Rome, • • • • Research Committee on organizations: Italy: • • • • www.isa-sociology.org/rc17.htm www.socialcapitalgateway.org/ • • • • • • • • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • - . .. .. Education as socialization Ifhe hidden curriculum : Education ana cultural reproduction - . . . .. Ifhe IQ debate in education Genaer anil scnooling Etnnicity anil education . ... •• Global (Jrimary school enrolment Literacy anil illiteracy : .. ifhe cnanging face of education Ifechnology in tne classroom E-universities . -. Summary points Internet links :. •• S akina, who was about 12 years old in 2007 (she is not entirely sure), did not attend primary school at all in the remote village ofTudun Kose in northwest Nigeria. Families in Tudun Kose generally do not send daughters to school and Sakina's reading and writing skills are poor: she can barelywrite her own name. Sakina's life is spent collecting water and making grain for the family meal; her parents are preparing for her to get married soon. Sakina would like to go to secondary school, but her parents cannot afford to send her; anyway, it is a longway from the village. Sakina says that when she is older, she hopes to be able to read the holy Koran. Hawwau, Sakina's younger sister, has had a very different experience. Since 2005 she has been able to attend the village primary school and is proud of her school uniform. She says, 'I feel very happy when I am at school, and when I grow up I want to be a doctor.' Hawwau has benefited from a project created by the charity, ActionAid, which tries to persuade parents in the village that it is worthwhile educating their daughters. The project began in 2004 - too late for Sakina - and by 2007 had seen the primary school attendance of girls increase in every year. According to ActionAid, Nigeria has the highest proportion ofchildren not in education of any country in the world, some eight million in total. Rural families in very poor situations educate boys rather than girls, and the consequence is that some 60 per cent of all young people not in school are girls. David Archer at ActionAid explains: There are a lot of different reasons why parents don't send their girls to school. Some are to do with traditional attitudes, which hold that investing in the education of girls is not worthwhile because they won't be able to bring the economic return to the household that boys will, and also because they're likely to get married and leave the family home. There are also issues around early pregnancy, fears of violence towards girls on the way to and at school, inappropriate teaching and an absence of basic facilities like toilets for girls. It's a gamble sendinga child to school when you are poor and need support in the household, and its often girls who lose out. (independent, 17 October 2007) Sakina and Hawwau's story shows how the value attributed to 'getting a good education' is both culturally and socially variable. What kind of education is appropriate in the context ofagricultural communities and high levels of rural poverty? Should education systems be expected to challenge traditional gender divisions or do they help to reproduce them? In relatively rich industrialized countries like Britain, the situation is very different. In 1998, Shaun had two years left at his primary school in the UK. He was hardworking, poor, white and working class, and had clear ideas about secondary education: 'I'm gonna go to Westbury because my mate Mark's going there and my girlfriend.... Sutton Boys is like one of the worst schools around here; only tramps go there.' A year later though, Shaun was not so certain: 'I might not get into Westbury 'cos it's siblings and how far away you live and I haven't got any siblings there and I live a little way out so I might have to go on a waiting list. ... I might go to Sultan Boys instead 'cos all my mates are going there.' Shaun's headteacher, MrsWhilticker, had told him that Westbury would be far too risky a choice as he lived on the edge of its catchment area, so Shaun and his mother resigned themselves to applying to Sutton Boys. Shaun's mother was bitterly disappointed, but she accepted the advice: 'I could have wept at the thought ofhim going to Sutton, but what choice did we have 'cos Mrs Whitticker said we didn't have any?' Shaun and his mother worried about the reputation of Sultan Boys. As Shaun said: 'Mymum and Ithink the standards might be too low because people just bunk and everything at Sultan.' Over the next few years Shaun faced constant tension between being tough in the playground and working hard in the classroom. He was suspended twice from his primary school for fighting, and had a local reputation for being 'tough', which he saw as vital to sustain ifhe was to survive at Sultan Boys. Yet in order to succeed academically, he deliberately had to set himselfapart from the rest ofhis peer group. At the same time, to avoid being reclassified as a 'geek', he had continually to prove to his peers that he was still really 'a lad'. As a result, on the estate and in the playground, Shaun resurrected his old self, in contrast to his displays ofhard-working, non-conformiry in the classroom. He reclaimed a very different identiry as 'tough' and as 'a skilful footballer', which redeemed - most of the time - his 'geekiness' in the classroom. This brought Shaun into conflict with his mother, who worried about him hanging out with the wrong crowd. Shaun's story was told in a series of interviews with sociologist Diane Reaybetween 1997 and 2001, and his account of the transition from primary to secondary school raises the issue of what links exist between education and wider social structures, such as social class and gender (Reay 2002). The situations of the children discussed above are very different. In rural Nigeria, the crucial issue is whether Sakina and Hawwau will gain access to formal education at all, while in the UK, the problem exercising Shaun and his mother is what kind of schooling he will receive. But despite these very different national contexts, the connection between education and social inequaliry is central to both situations, and has been the subject of much debate in sociology. Education was one ofsociology's founding subjects, seen as important in socialization Education 833 processes for the transmission of society's values and moral rules. Indeed, Emile Durkheim's first professorial post was as a Professor of Education at the Sorbonne in Paris. As one of the oldest sociological subjects, education has a huge body of research and scholarship behind it. We cannot hope to cover this body ofwork here, but this chapter offers an overview ofsome of the most important themes and recurring issues that have helped to shape the field of the sociology of education. The chapter begins with the initial and crucial question: What is education for? The answer to this question is not as simple as it may seem. Is education simply the same thing as formal schooling, for instance'l How is it linked to the economy? Not surprisingly, there have been are several ways to answer these questions and we look at some influential sociological theories of education. We then explore the links between the major social divisions - class, gender and ethniciry- and education systems, and evaluate debates on IQ, which have proved to be highly contentious. The final section examines the impact of globalization on education systems and that ofnew technologies in the classroom. The section covers global literacy levels and suggestions for their improvement as weU as recent developments in higher education that seem set to change the face of education across the world to meet the demands of the global knowledge economy. The chapter concludes with some thoughts on the notion of 'lifelong learning' and its practical feasibility. Theorizing the significance of education Education, like health, is often seen as an unproblematic social good to which everyone is entitled as a right. Who would not be in favour of it? Indeed, most people who have been through an education system and emerged literate, numerate and I II I I reasonably knowledgeable would probably agree that education has been beneficial for them. However, there is a difference between education and schooling. Education can be defined as a social institution, which enables and promotes the acquisition of skills, knowledge and the broadening of personal horizons. Education can take place in many social settings. Schooling on the other hand, refers to the formal process through which certain types of knowledge and skills are delivered, normally via a predesigned curriculum in specialized settings: schools. Schooling in most countries is typically divided into stages such as those in primary and secondary schools, and in many societies is a mandatory requirement for all young people up to a specified age. As we will see in this section, some theorists see education as crucial for individuals to fulfil their potential, but they also argue that education is not confined to or defined by that which is delivered in schools. Mark Twain is reported to have said: 'I never let my schooling get in the way of my education' - the implication being that schools are not the best educators and may even be obstacles to much useful learning, such as that to be gained from wise adults, within families or from personal experience. In this chapter we will deal with both education and schooling and will often refer to the latter as taking place within organized 'education systems', to reflect common usage. Also like health, education is a complex political, economic, social and cultural issue. How should education be delivered and who should pay for it? Should education systems be paid for by the state via taxation and delivered free to all, or should we expect to pay directly for our own family's education? These are important political and economic decisions, which afe matters of continuing public debate. What kind of education should be delivered and how? Should it cover history, politics, astrology or sociology, for example? Should we aim for the same basic education for all, regardless of inequalities of wealth, gender or ethnicity in comprehensive education systems? Or should the wealthy be allowed to buy their children's education outside the state system? These social issues combine with the political and economic in increasingly complex arguments. Should education involve the compulsory teaching of religion? Should faith-based education in separate schools be allowed? What kinds of values should underpin education systems? These cultural issues are ofenormous significance in multicultural societies, and have become contentious matters of political debate. Education has become an important site for a whole range of debates, which are not simply about what happens within schools. They are debates about the direction of society itself and how we can best equip young people for life in the increasingly globalized modern world. Sociologists have been involved in debates about education ever since the work of Emile Durkheim in the late nineteenth century and this is where we begin our review of theories of education. Education as socialization For Emile Durkheim, education plays an important role in the socialization of children because, particularly by learning history, for example, children gain an understanding of the common values in society, uniting a multitude of separate individuals. These common values include religious and moral beliefs and a sense of self-discipline. Durkheim argues that schooling enables children to internalize the social rules that contribute to the functioning of society. Durkheim was particu- 1ary concerned with upholding moral guidelines, because in late nineteenthcentury France, an increasing individualism was developing that threatened social solidarity. Durkheim saw a key role for schools in teaching mutual responsibility and the value of the collective good. As a 'society in miniature', the school also teaches discipline and respect for author- ity. In industrial societies, Durkheim argues (1961 [1925]). education also has another socialization function: it teaches the skills needed to perform roles in increasingly specialized occupations. In traditional societies, occupational skills could be learnt within the family, but as social life became more complex and an extended division of labour emerged in the production of goods, an education system developed that could pass on the skills required to fill the various specialized, occupational roles. Durkheim's functionalist approach to sociology was introduced in chapter 1, 'What is Sociology?', and chapter 3, 'Theories and Perspectives in Sociology'. American sociologist, Talcott Parsons, outlined a somewhat different structural functionalist approach to education. Durkheim was concerned with the way in which nineteenth-century French society was becoming increasingly individualistic and looked for ways to mitigate its possible harmful effects. But, writing somewhat later, in mid-twentieth-century America, Parsons argued that a central function of education was to instil in pupils the value of individual achievement. This value was crucial to the functioning of industrialized societies, but it could not be learned in the family. A child's status in the family is ascribed - that is, fixed from birth. By contrast, a child's status in school is largely achieved, and in schools children are assessed according to universal standards, such as exams. For Parsons, the function of education is to enable children to move from the particularistic standards of the family to the universal standards needed in a modern society. According to Parsons, schools, like the wider society, largely operate on a meritocratic basis: children achieve their status according to merit (or Education systems in developed societies celebrate individual achievement. worth) rather than according to their sex, race or class (Parsons and Bales 1956). However, as we shall see, Parsons's view that schools operate on meritocratic principles has been subject to much criticism. There is little doubt that functionalist theory does tell us something significant about education systems; they do try to provide individuals with the skills and knowledge needed to participate in societies, and schools do teach children some of the values and morals of wider society. However, functionalist theory appears to overstate the case for a set of society~wide values. There are many cultural differences within a single society and the notion of a set ofcentral values that should be taught to all may not be accurate or well received. This highlights a recurring problem within functionalist accounts, namely the concept of 'society' itself. Functionalists see education systems as serving several functions for society as a whole, but the problem is that this assumes that society is relatively homogeneous and that all social groups share similar interests. Is this really true? Critics from the conflict tradition in sociology point out that in a society marked by major social inequalities, an education system that supports that society must reinforce social inequalities. In that sense, schooling works in the interests ofthe ruling groups in societies. The importance of education and peer relations in socialization is discussed further in chapter 8, 'The Life-Course'. Schooling for capitalism In a highly influential study of education in the USA, Bowles and Gintis (1976) argued that schools are involved in socialization, but only because this helps to produce the right kind of workers for capitalist companies. Their Marxist thesis argued that this close connection between the productive sphere and education was not simply a matter of the school curriculum involving the kinds of knowledge and skills, which employers needed. The American education system, they argued, in fact helped to shape whole personalities. The structure ofsocial relations in education not only inures the student to the discipline of the workplace, but also develops the types of personal demeanour, modes of self-presentation, self-image, and social class identifications, which are the crucial ingredients ofjob adequacy. Specifically, the social relationships of education - the relationships between administrators and teachers, teachers and students, and students and students, and students and their work - replicate the hierarchical divisions oflabor. (Bowles and Gintis 1976: 131) Bowles and Gintis argue that the structure of schooling is based on a 'correspondence principle'. That is, the structures of school life correspond to the structures of working life. In both school and work, conformity to rules leads to success, teachers and managers dictate tasks, pupils and workers perform these tasks, school staff are organized hierarchically, as is company management, and this has to be accepted as inevitable: Bowles and Gintis's theory challenged the existing and widespread idea that education could be 'a great leveller', treating people equally and enabling everyone to achieve. Instead, they proposed that education under capitalism was, in fact, a great divider. In some ways this orthodox Marxist theory represents a kind of 'conflict functionalism'. It is clearly a theory based on the idea ofsociety as riven with conflict, but the education system within this society also performs certain functions for the system as a whole. Marxist critics saw the main flaw in the thesis as its correspondence principle, which was too simple and reductionis!. For example, it relied on the social structure shaping and determining individuals and did not give enough significance to the possibility ofactive pupil and student resistance (Giroux 1983; Brown and Lauder 1997). The thesis is also rather too generalized and was not borne of empirical research within schools themselves. Later researchers found a diversity of practice within schools and, in many cases, it may be possible for school heads and teachers to generate an ethos that encourages working-class pupils to be THINIUNG CRITICALLY Thinking of your own experience of schools, what attitudes and behaviour have you acquired and how might these 'fit' the needs of employers? On Bowles and Gintis's account, are successful middle-class children also subject to the 'hierarchical division of labour' in schools? In what ways do you think the 'correspondence principle' works in schools based in middle-class areas? more ambitious than the theory allows for. Nter all, it is the case that in many capitalist countries today, employers complain that schools are failing to produce workers with the skills they need. The hidden curriculum In focusing on the structure of schooling rather than simply its content, Bowles and Gintis showed that a hidden curriculum exists within education systems, through which pupils learn discipline, hierarchy and passive acceptance of the status quo. John Taylor Gatto (2002), a retired schoolteacher with 30 years' experience, reached a similar conclusion from a non-Marxist perspective, arguing that the hidden curriculum in the USA teaches seven basic lessons. The curriculum involves a quite random mix of information on a variety of subjects, which produces confusion rather than genuine knowledge and understanding. Schools teach children to accept the status quo, to know their place within the class hierarchy and to defer to their betters. The rule of the class bell at the start and end of lessons teaches indifference; for example, no lesson is ever so important that it can carry on after the bell sounds. Students are taught to be both emotionally and intellectually dependent on authority figures, in the form of teachers who tell them what to think and how to feel. They also learn that their own self-esteem is provisional, relying on the opinion that officials have of them and that opinion is based on a battery oftests, report cards and grades. The final lesson is that being under constant surveillance is normal. as evidenced by the culture of homework, which effectively transfers school discipline into the home environment. Gatto concludes that the compulsory state school system in the USA (and, by implication, everywhere else) delivers 'compulsory subordination for all' and is 'structurally unreformable'. Instead, he argues for home education where children themselves can take control of their own Education learning, using parents and other adults as 'facilitators', rather than teachers. One of the most controversial and interesting theorists of education to explore the consequences of the hidden curriculum is Austrian anarchist and philosopher, Ivan IIIich (1926-2002). lIlich is noted for his staunch opposition to the culture of industrial capitalism, which he sees as gradually deskilling the population as they come to rely more and more on the products of industry and less and less on their own creativity and knowledge. In the sphere of health, for example, traditional remedies and practices are lost as bureaucratic health systems push people to rely on doctors and hospitals to look after their health needs, and this pattern is repeated in all areas of life, including education. lllich (1971) argued thatthevery notion of compulsory schooling - now accepted throughout the world - should be questioned. Like Bowles and Gintis, he stressed the connection between the development of education and the requirements of the economy for discipline and hierarchy. He argued that schools have developed to cope with four basic tasks: the provision ofcustodial care, the distribution of people within occupational roles, the learning of dominant values and the acquisition of SOCially approved skills and knowledge. Schools, like prisons, have become custodial organizations because attendance is compulsory and young people are therefore 'kept off the streets' between early childhood and their entry into work. Much is learned in school that has nothing to do with the formal content of lessons. Schools tend to inculcate what IIIich called 'passive consumption' - an uncritical acceptance of the existing social order - by the nature of the discipline and regimentation they involve. These lessons are not explicitly taught, but are implicit in school procedures and organization. The hidden curriculum teaches young people that their role in life is 'to know their place and to sit still in it' (ibid.). Does compulsory schooling inculcate passive consumption? Illich advocated what he called the deschooling ofsociety. Compulsory schooling, he pointed out, is a relatively recent invention, and there is no reason why it should be accepted as inevitable. Since schools do not promote equality or the development of individual creative abilities, why not do away with them altogether in their current form? lllich did not mean by this that all forms of educational organization should be abolished. Everyone who wants to learn should be provided with access to available resources- at any time in their lives, not just in their childhood or adolescent years. Such a system should make it possible for knowledge to be widely diffused and shared, not confined to specialists. Learners should not have to submit to a standard curriculum, and they should have personal choice over what they study. What all this means in practical terms is not wholly clear. In place of schools, however, lllich suggested several types of educational framework. Material resources for formal learning would be stored in libraries, rental agencies, laboratories and information storage banks, available to any student. 'Communications networks' would be set up, providing data about the skills possessed by different individuals and whether they would be willing to train others or engage in mutual learning activi· ties. Students would be provided with vouchers, allowing them to use educational services as and when they wished. Are these proposals wholly utopian? Many think so. Yet if, as looks possible, paid work is substantially reduced or restructured in the future, they may appear much more realistic and perhaps even attractive. If paid employment becomes less central to social life, people might instead engage in a wider variety of pursuits. Against this backdrop, some oflUich's ideas make good sense. Education would not be just a form of early training, confined to special institutions, but would become available to whoever wished to take advantage of it. lUich's ideas from the 1970s became interesting again with the rise of new communications technologies and ideas of 'lifelong learning' throughout the life-course. We will return to these recent developments towards the end of this chapter. Education and cultural reproduction As we saw from the individual cases at the start ofthis chapter, education and inequality are clearly related. Shaun came from a poor background, and did not get into the school his mother wanted him to. He then had to struggle to get on in class, when most of his friends were uninterested or even hostile to academic achievement. This section reviews a number of different ways in which sociological theorists have attempted to account for social inequalities in education systems. Basil Bernstein's classic study emphasizes the significance of language (see 'Classic Studies 19.1'), Paul Willis looks at the effects of cultural values in shaping pupil attitudes to education and work, while Pierre Bourdieu examines the relationship between the cultures of school and home. What all of these key studies are concerned with is cultural reproduction the generational transmission of cultural values, norms and experience and the mechanisms and processes through which this is achieved. . Learning to labour - byfailing in school A second classic study in the sociology of education is the discussion of cultural reproduction provided in the report of a fieldwork study carried out by Paul Willis (1977) in a school in the city of Birmingham in the UK. Although this study was conducted more than 30 years ago, it remains a classic of sociological investiga- tiOll. The research problem Willis set out to investigate was how cultural reproduction occurs - or, as he put it, 'how working-class kids get working-class jobs'. It is often thought that, during the process of schooling, young people from lower-class or ethnic minority backgrounds simply come to see that they 'are not clever enough' to expect to get highly paid or high-status jobs in their future work lives. In other words, the experience of academic failure teaches them to recognize their intellectuallimitations and, having accepted their 'inferiority', they move into occupations with limited career prospects. As Willis's explanation pointed out, this interpretation does not conform at all to the reality ofpeople's lives and experiences. The 'street wisdom' of those from poor neighbourhoods may be of little or no relevance to academic success, but involves as subtle, skilful and complexa set ofabilities as any of the intellectual skills taught in school. Few if any young people leave school thinking, 'I'm so stupid that it's fair and proper for me to be stacking boxes in a factory all day.' If children from less privileged hackgrounds accept such manual jobs, but without feeling themselves throughout life to be a failure, there must be other factors involved. Willis concentrated on a particular group of boys in the school, spending a lot of time with them. The memhers of the gang, who called themselves 'the lads', were white, though the school also contained many young people from West Indian and Asian backgrounds. Willis found that the lads had an acute and perceptive understanding of the school's authority system - hut used this to fight that system rather than work with it. They saw the school as an alien environment, but one they could manipulate to their own ends. They derived positive pleasure from the constant conflict - which they kept mostly to minor skirmishes - they Classic Studies 19.1 Basil Bernstein on social class and language codes The research problem It is a well-established finding that working-class children tend not to do as well in school as their middleclass peers. But this is a deceptively bald statement, which demands an answer. Why do working-class children not do so well? Are they, on average, less intelligent? Are they lacking motivation to do well at school? Do they not get enough support from their parents? Or is there something about education systems that prevents working-class children from doing well? Bernstein's explanation British sociologist, Basil Bernstein (1924-2000), was interested in the way in which education reproduces class inequalities in society Drawing on conflict theor~ Bernstein (1975) examined the problem through an analysis of linguistic skills. In the 1970s, Bernstein argued that children from varying backgrounds develop different language codes, or forms of speech, during their early lives, which affect their subsequent school experience.He was not concerned with differences in vocabulary or verbal skills, as these are usually thought of; rather, his interest was in systematic differences in ways of using language, particularly in the contrast between poorer and wealthier children. The speech of working-class children, Bernstein contended, represents a restricted code - a way of using language containing many unstated assumptions that speakers expect others to knOw. A restricted code is a type of speech tied to its own cultural setting.Many working-class people live in a strong familial or neighbourhood culture, in which values and norms are taken for granted and not expressed in language. Parents tend to socialize their children directly by the use of rewards or reprimands to correct their behaviour. Language in a restricted code is more suitable for communication about practical experience than for discussion of more abstract ideas,processes or relationships. Restricted code speech is thus Children who have been given reasons and explanations for their behaviour are more likely to be able to master the elaborate language codes used in school, which is the key to academic success. characteristic of children growing up in lowerclass families, and of the peer groups in which they spend their time. Speech is oriented to the norms of the group, without anyone easily being able to explain why they follow the patterns of behaviour they do. The language development ofmiddle-class children, by contrast, according to Bernstein, involves the acquisition of an elaborated code a style of speaking in which the meanings of words can be individualized to suit the demands of particular situations.The ways in which children from middle-class backgrounds learn to use language are less bound to particular contexts;the child is able more easily to generalize and express abstract ideas. Thus middle-class mothers, when controlling their children, frequently explain the reasons and principles that underlie their reactions to the child's behaviour. While a working-class mother might tell a child off for wanting to eat too many sweets by simply saying 'No more sweets for youl ' , a middle-class mother is more likely to explain that eating too many sweets is bad for one's health and the state of one's teeth. Children who have acquired elaborated codes of speech,Bernstein proposes,are more able to deal with the demands of formal academic education than those confined to restricted codes.This does not imply that working-class children have an 'inferior' type of speech, or that their codes oflanguage are 'deprived'.Rather, the way in which they use speech clashes with the academic culture of the school. Those who have mastered elaborated codes fit much more easily into the school environment. Joan Tough (1976) studied the language of working-class and middle-class children and found some systematic differences which support Bernstein's thesis. She found that working-class children had less experience of having their questions answered at home and were less able to ask questions in classroom situations.A later study by BarbaraTizard and Martin Hughes (1984) came to similar conclusions and it is generally accepted that Bernstein's thesis has been a productive one (Morais et al. 2001). His ideas help us to understand why those from certain socioeconomic backgrounds tend to be 'underachievers' at school. Working-class children find the classroom situation difficult to cope with, especially when middle-class children appear so comfortable with it. The majority of teachers are from middle-class backgrounds and much of what they say is likely to be incomprehensible, as they use language in ways the child is just not accustomed to. The child may attempt to cope with this by translating the teacher's language into something she or he is familiar with - but may then fail to grasp the principles the teacher intends to convey And while working-class children experience little difficulty with rote or 'drill' learning, they may have major difficulties grasping conceptual distinctions involving generalization and abstraction. Critical points Some critics of Bernstein's thesis argue that it is one of several'deficit hypothesis' theories, which see working-class culture as lacking something essential (Boocock 1980;Bennett and LeCompte 1990) - in this case,the elaborated language code which enables middle-class children to express themselves more fully For these critics, Bernstein takes the middle-class code to be superior to that of the working-class code; it can be seen therefore as an elitist theory It is not just that the working class perceives the higher social classes as somehow their betters - as in many theories of ideological dominance; in Bernstein's theory the elaborate code is objectively superior to the restricted code. Finally critics argue that the theory of language codes is not supported by enough empirical research to be accepted and does not tell us enough about what happens inside schools. Contemporary significance Basil Bernstein's theory oflanguage codes has been enormously influential in the soclology of education and many research studies have been conducted which draw heavily on his methods Genkins 1990). More recent studies have also taken his ideas into new areas such as the study of gender and pedagogy and his reputation as an educational theorist has spread internationally (Sadovnik 1995; Arnot 2001). Bernstein's work successfully linked language and speech with education systems and wider power relations in society as a whole and he rejected the critics' assessment of his thesis as 'elitist'. His code theory 'draws attention to the relations between macro power relations and micro practices of transmission, acquisition and evaluation and the positioning and oppositioning to which these practices give rise' (1990: 118-19). By understanding these relations better, he always hoped to find ways of preventing the wastage ofthe educational potential ofworkingclass children and he did succeed in providing a deeper insight into the social processes at work in the production of educational inequalities. I z o... ~... ~... ~...Cl 9o...o o '" ~ ~ Cl is '"= • 19.1 Learning notto labour? More than two decades after PaulWillis conducted his study on 'the lads' in Birmingham, another sociologlst, Milirtin Mac an Ghaill, investigated the experiences of young working-class men at the Parnell School in the West Midlands (1994). Mac an Ghaill was particularly interested in how male students develop specific forms of masculinity in school as part of their passage to manhood. He was intent on understanding how working-class boys in the early 1990s viewed their own transitions to adult life and prospects for the future. Unlike Willis's lads, the boys at the Parnell School were growing up in the shadow of high unemployment, the collapse of the manufacturing base in the reglon and cutbacks in government benefits for young people. Mac an Ghaill found that the transition to adulthood for young men at the Parnell School was much more fragmented than that experienced by Willis's lads 25 years earlier. There was no longer a clear trajectory stretching from school into wage labour. Many of the boys in the school saw the post-school years as characterized by dependency (on family in particular), 'useless' government training schemes and an insecure labour market not favourable to young manual workers.There was widespread confusion among many of the students as to how education was relevant to their futures. This confusion manifested itself in very different responses to schoohng - while some of the male peer groups tried to chart upwardly mobile paths for themselves as academic achievers or 'new enterprisers', others were openly hostile to schoohng altogether. Of the four peer groups Mac an Ghaill identified at the school, the 'macho lads' were the most traditionally working-class group in the school. The macho lads had coalesced as a group by the time they became teenagers; the group's members were in the bottom two academic 'sets' for all subjects. Their attitudes towards education were openly hostile - they shared a common view that the school was part of an authoritarian system that placed meaningless study demands on its captive students. Where Willis's 'lads' had found ways to manipulate the school environment to their advantage, the macho lads were defiant about their role within it The macho lads were seen by the school administration as the most 'dangerous' anti-school peer group at Parnell School. Teachers were encouraged to deal with them using more overtly authoritarian means than they might with other students.The macho lads' symbolic displays of working-class masculinity - such as certain clothing, hairstyles and earrings - were banned by the school administration. Teachers were involved in the 'surveillance' of students. by constantly monitoring them in the hallways, instructing them to 'look at me when I'm tallcing to you' and telling them to 'walk properly down the corridor'. Secondary school for the macho lads was their 'apprenticeship' in learning to be tough. School was not about the 3 R's (reading, writing and arithmetic), but about the 3 F's (fighting, fucking and football). 'Looking after your mates' and 'sticking together'were key values in the macho lads' social world. School became a contested territory, much like the streets.The macho lads regarded teachers in the same way they did lawenforcement (with open disdain) and believed that they were the main source of conflict within the school. They refused to affirm the teachers' authority within the school setting, and were convinced that they were constantly being 'set up' to be punished, disciplined or humiliated. Like Willis's 'lads', the macho lads also associated academic work and achievement with something inferior and effeminate. The students who excelled scholastically were labelled 'dickhead achievers'. Schoolwork was rejected out of hand as inappropriate for men As one macho lad,Leon,commented:'The work you do here is girls' work. It's not real work. It's just for kids.They [the teachers] try to make you write down things about how you feel. It's none of their fucking business' (Mac an Ghaill 1994: 59). Mac an Ghaill's work demonstrates how the 'macho lads', more than other male peer groups, were undergoing a particular'crisis of masculinity'. This is because they were actively developing an 'outdated' working-class masculinity that centred around manual waged labour - at a time when a secure future in manual labour had all but disappeared. According to Mac an Ghaill, the macho lads continued to fantasize about the 'full employment' society which their fathers and uncles had inhabited. Although some of their behaviours came across as hypennasculine and therefore defensive, they were grounded squarely in a working-class world-view which had been inherited from older generations. The changing forms of masculinity are discussed in chapter 14,'Sexuality and Gender', carried on with teachers.They were adept at seeing the weak points of the teachers' claims to authority, as well as where tlhey were vulnerable as individuals. ment, but were impatient for wages. Far from taking the jobs they did - in tyrefitting, carpet-laying, plumbing, painting or decorating - from feelings of inferiority, they held an attitude ofdismissive superiority towards work, as they had towards school. They enjoyed the adult status that came from working, but were not interested in 'making a career' for themselves. As Willis points out, work in blue-collar settings often involves quite similar cultural features to those tlhe lads created in their counterschool culture - banter, quick wit and the skill to subvert the demands of authority figures when necessary. [n class, for instance, the young people were expected to sit still, be quiet and get on with their work. But the lads were forever on the move, except when the teacher's stare might freeze one ofthem momentarily; they would gossip surreptitiously, or pass open remarks that were on tlhe verge of direct insubordination but could be explained away if challenged. The lads recognized that work would be much like school, but they actively looked forward to it. They expected to gain no direct satisfaction from the work environ· In this way, what Willis shows us is that the lads' subculture, created in an active process of engagement with school norms and disciplinary mechanisms, mirrors the shop-floor culture ofthe work they expect to move into. Only later in their lives might they come to see themselves as trapped in arduous, unrewarding labour. By the time they have families, they might perhaps look back on education retrospectively, and see it - hopelessly - as having been the only escape. Yet if they try to pass this view on to their own children, they are likely to have no more success than their own parents did. THINIUNG CRITICIlLLY BothWillis and Mac an Ghaill's studies focused on the experience of workingclass 'lads', but in your experience, are there also girl subcultures? How would you explain the lack of studies dealing with the subcultures of girls? From your own school experience, is it likely that similar processes of exclusion and gang formation could be found amongst girls and young women? Willis's study shows that educational sociological research can be both empirically oriented and at the same time, theoretically informed, and this is one of the main reasons why it has been so influential. However, its focus is quite explicitly on the educational experiences of white, workingclass boys and it is not possible to generalize from this to the experiences of other social classes, girls or ethnic minorities. Ethnicity, aspiration and class in the USA lna 1987 study in the USA - Ain'tNoMakin' It: Aspirations and Attainment in a LowIncome Neighhorhood- Jay MacLeod investigated the attitudes and aspirations of two gangs ofyoung men who lived on the same public housing project: 'Clarendon Heights' in Boston. MacLeod followed this up eight years later, tracking the young people into adulthood to see whether their hopes had materialized. In the original study, MacLeod looked at two subcultural groups from the same housing project. One was a mainly white group ofolder teenagers, called the Hallway Hangers as they spent much time just 'hanging around' in the halls ofthe housing project, and a second, mostly black group, the Brothers. MacLeod found that the Hallway Hangers were overwhelmingly despondent about their prospects for the future. They held anti-school attitudes based on their awareness of older family members who had either failed at school in spite of trying hard, or had actually done well in school but had still failed to move into decent jobs afterwards. By contrast, and perhaps surprisingly, the Brothers tended to express more support for the education system as the means to get a job and move up the social ladder. Such attitudes appeared to be based on widely publicized attempts to improve opportunities for African Americans in the USA. What MacLeod's study seems to show is that although material circumstances are important in shaping attitudes, the latter are also dependent on peoples' subjective assessment of how likely it is that they can succeed through education. MacLeod revisited both groups some eight years later, and a revised edition with three new chapters was published in 1995. What he found was that, in spite of their very different assessments of their likely futures, in fact, neithergroup had done well in school and both were struggling in the labour market. The previously pessimistic Hallway Hangers, having failed in school and facing unemployment and poverty, had turned to the underground economy- what MacLeod call 'cocaine capitalism', and expressed strongly racist and sexist attitudes. The more optimistic Brothers had also become unemployed or were in insecure, low-paid, part-time work. They had been forced to adjust their attitudes towards education and their own aspirations for the future downwards in the light of their real-world experiences. MacLeod's 1995 update shows, therefore, that the material realities of life in poor, inner-city neighbourhoods present very significant structural obstacles, which serve to reproduce social inequalities over generations, in spite of the aspirations and hopes of individuals. Reproducing gender divisions Until the 1970s, the issue of gender was not central to the sociology of education and research on the experience of girls was very limited in scope (Gilligan 1982). This situation was not uncommon, as most other sociological subjects lacked a female perspective, including, for instance, crime and deviance studies (Heidensohn 1985). Sociologists working from a feminist theoretical perspective in the 1970s explored the socialization of girls into feminine norms from very early on in life, including during their school careers, and a series of studies established that schools systematically disadvantaged girls. Angela McRobbie (1991) and Sue Lees (1993) argued that schooling in the UK helped to reproduce 'appropriate' feminine norms amongst girls. Schools saw their task as preparing girls for family life and responsibilities and boys for future employment, thus reinforcing the traditional gender stereotypes within the wider society (Deem 1980). Michelle Stanworth (1983) studied the classroom experiences of a mixed group of children in comprehensive school and discovered that, although comprehensives were intended to provide equal opportunities, girls tended to receive less attention from the teachers than did boys. She concluded that this differential pattern of teaching undermined the girls' confidence in their own abilities and contributed to their under-achievement. This is an example of a typical self-fulfilling prophecy, in which teachers' initial expectations (boys will do better than girls) shape their behaviour towards the pupils, which then brings about the outcome they (perhaps wrongly) assumed at the start. Education The culture of schools has been found to be permeated with a general heterosexual sexism, particularly in the playground, corridors and other spaces outside the classroom (Wood 1984). AsWillis (1977) also found, boys routinely use sex.ist language and refer to girls via derogatory categories. This creates an atmosphere of aggressive masculinity that degrades girls and women while corralling boys' acceptable identities into a very narrow range. One consequence is that homosexuality is made invisible and gay and lesbian young people find that the school environment does not allow them openly to express their emerging identities. If they do, they run the risk of teasing, harassment and physical assault (Burbridge and WaIters 1981; see chapter 14, 'Sexuality and Gender' for a wider discussion of sexuality in society). Feminist scholars have also investigated the content of the school curriculum. For exa mple, Australian sociologist Dale Spender (1982) reported that many subjects were thoroughly imbued with an unwitting sexism, which made them unattractive to girls. Science texts, for example, routinely ignored the achievements of female scientists, making them invisible to students. In this way, science offers girls no positive role models and fails to engage them with the subject. Sue Sharpe (1994) also saw schools steering girls' subject choices towards the more 'feminine' subjects like health studies and the arts and away from the more 'masculine' ones such as mathematics and JeT (information communication technologies). Nonetheless, as we will see later, in recent years there have been some significant changes to such traditional patterns of disadvantage and exclusion, one ofthe most striking being the way that girls and young women now outperform boys and young men in almost every subject area and at every level of education. This development has seen new debates emerging on the problems boys face amidst an apparent 'crisis of masculinity' (Conne1l2005). Education, cultural capital and the formation ofhabitus The most systematic general theory of cultural reproduction to date is, arguably, that of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002)_ Bourdieu (1986, 1988; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977) devised a broad theory of cultural reproduction, which connects economic position, social status and symbolic capital with cultural knowledge and skills. Education is a central feature of this theoretical perspective, but it is necessary to outline Bourdieu's theory of forms of capital in order to grasp the significance of his perspective for educational sociology. The central concept in Bourdieu's theory is capital, which he takes from Marx's ideas on the development ofcapitalism. Marx saw the ownership of the means of production as the crucial division in society, conferring social advantage on capitalists who are able to subordinate the workers. But for Bourdieu, such economic capital is just one of several forms of capital which individuals and socialgroups can use to gain advantage. Bourdieu identifies social capital, cultural capital and symbolic capital in addition to economic capital. Social capital refers to membership of and involvement in elite social networks or moving within social groups which are well connected. Cultural capital is that form which is gained within the family environment and through education, usually leading to certificates such as degrees and other credentials, which are forms of symbolic capital. Symbolic capital refers to the prestige,status and other forms of social honour, which enable those with high status to dominate those with lower status. The important aspect of this scheme is that forms of capital can be exchanged. For example, those with high cultural capital may be able to trade it for economic capital: for example, during interviews for well-paid jobs, their superior knowledge and credentials can give them an advantage over other applicants. Those with high social capital may 'know the right people' or 'move in the right social circles' and be able to effectively exchange this social capital for symbolic capiCal- respect from others and increased social status - which increases their power chances in dealings with other people. The second concept that Bourdieu introduces is that of fields - various social sites or arenas within which the competitive struggles rooted in forms of capital take place. It is through fields that social life is organized and power relationships operate and each field has its own 'rules of the game' that may not be transferred to other fields. For example, in the field of art and aesthetics, cultural capital is most highly prized and those who are able to converse knowledgeably about the history of art or music and so on become powerful within the field - hence the power of the critics in literature or cinema to make or break a book or film with their reviews, for example. But such criteria do not apply in the field of production, where economic capital holds sway. Finally, Bourdieu uses the concept of habitus, which can be described as the learned disposition s such as bodily comportment, ways of speaking or ways of thinking and acting which are adopted by people in relation to the social conditions in which they exist and move through. Examples of aspects of habitus would include Bernstein's language codes and Mac an Ghaill's macho boys' displays of workingclass masculinity. The concept of habitus is important,as it allows us to analyse the links between social structures and individual actions and personalities. The issue for us at this point is: what hasall of this to do with education? Bourdieu's (1986) concept of cultural capital is at the heart of the matter, and he identifies three forms in which it can exist. Cultural capital can exist in an embodied state - that is, we carry it around with us in our ways of thinking, speaking and bodily movement. It can also exist in material form - an objeCCified state- for example in the possession ofworks ofart, books or clothes. Finally, cultural capital is found in institutionalizedforms such as those held in educational qualifications, which are nationally accepted and easily translated into economic capital in the labour market. It is easy to see how the embodied and institutionalized forms are acquired through education, forming resources to be used in the specific fields of social life. In this way, education can be a rich source of cultural capital, which potentially benefit many people. However, as Bernstein, Willis and Mac an Ghaill all saw, the education system itself is not just a neutral field divorced from the wider society. Rather, the culture and standards within the education system reflect that society and, in doing so, schools systematically advantage those who have already acquired cultural capital in their family and through the social networks in which it is embedded (a crucial form of social capital). Middle-class children fit into the culture of schools with ease; they speak correctly, they have the right manners and they do better when it comes to exams. But because the education system is portrayed and widely perceived as being open to all on the basis oftalent, many working-class children come to see themselves as intellectually inferior and accept that they, rather than the system itself, are to blame for their failure. In this way, the education system is able to play a key role in the cultural reproduction of social inequalities. Acquiring cultural capital In an ethnographic study of twelve diverse families in the USA, Annette Lareau (2003) drew on Bourdieu's ideas, particularly the concept of cultural capital. to conduct an 'intensive "naturalistic" observation' of parenting styles in the different cultures of family life of social classes. In the working class and poorer families, as discussed by Bernstein above, parents did not try to reason with children but told them what to do. Children were also expected to find their own forms of recreation and not to rely on parents to create it for them. Lareau says that children from working-class backgrounds did not talk back and accepted that their financial situation imposed limits on their aspirations. Working-class parents saw a clear difference between adults and children and did not see a need to engage with children's feelings and opinions, preferring to facilitate the 'accomplishment of natural growth'. This parenting style, says Lareau, is 'out of synch' with the current standards of social institutions. But working-class parents and children still come into contact with social institutions like schools, and children therefore begin to develop a growing sense of 'distance, distrust and constraint'. On the other hand, the middle-class children in the study were talkative, good at conversation and adept at social mores such as shaking hands and making eye contact when talking. They were also very good at getting other family members, especially parents, to serve their needs, and were comfortable with adults and authority figures, seeing themselves as their equals. Lareau argues that middle-class parents are constantly interested and involved in their children's feelings and opinions and jointly organize their leisure activities, rather than leaving them to make their own. Continual discussion between parents and children marks out the middle-class parenting style, which is based on a concerted cultivation of the child. The result is that the middle-class children had a clear sense of personal entitlement rather than feeling distant and constrained. What Lareau's study shows us are some of the practical ways in which cultural capital is passed on across generations and how styles of parenting are strongly linked to social class. Lareau says that both parenting methods have their advantages, but, interestingly, some of the middle-class families she studied were exhausted by their constant efforts to fulfil their children's demands and the children themselves were more anxious and stressed than the working-class children, whose familyties were closer and who experienced much less sibling rivalry. Lareau's conclusion is that parenting methods tend to vary much more by social class than by ethnicity and that, as several other studies have also found, the middle-class children in the study were much better prepared for success at school than were the children from working-class families. Summary Bourdieu's theory has been very influential in stimulating sociological research into education, inequality and the study of cultural reproduction. However, it has its critics. One criticism is that it appears almost impossible for the working classes to succeed in a middle-class education system, but, of course, a fair number do succeed. In an age ofmass higher education, many more working-class people are finding their way into universities and acquiring the kinds of institutionalized cultural capital that enables them to compete with the middle classes. They do remain in the minority though. We should also not mistake the resigned acceptance by working-class children of their situation with a positive legitimation of schools and their outcomes. After all, there is ample evidence ofresistance and rebellion amongst working-class pupils through truancy, bad behaviour in classrooms and the formation of school gangs which generate alternative standards of success. Nevertheless, Bourdieu's theoretical framework remains the most systematic synthesis yet produced for understanding the role of schooling in the reproduction of social inequality. Bourdieu's view on class and social capital are discussed in more detail in chapter 11, 'Stratification and Social Class'. Evaluation The sociological theories explored in tlus chapter illustrate two important aspects of THINKING CRITICALLY Do you think the public school system (see opposite) is likely to survive in its present form in the age of mass higher education and the opening up of educational opportunities? If not, how might public schools have to change? Drawing on Bourdieu's theory described above,what kinds of cultural capital do the British public schools transmit to their students? education. On the one hand, a good quality education is something that can change people's lives for the better and in many parts of the world, children like Sakina and Hawwau are desperate to gain access to schooling as the route to a better life. In this sense, education is highly sought after and has often had to be fought for against opposition. However, on the other hand, sociological research consistently finds that education systems not only create new opportunities for advancement, but are also experienced differently by a range of social groups. Education systems cannot stand apart from the society within which they are embedded, and when society is riven with inequalities schools also help reproduce them, even against the best intentions ofthe people who work in them. As Bernstein, Wills and Bourdieu's works (amongst others) demonstrate, cultural reproduction in unequal societies leads to patterns of educational inequality. The next section looks at such patterns and how the changes they have undergone in recent times. Social divisions and education Much of our discussion of inequality so far has focused on social class, but in this section, we turn to other inequalities. We begin with an oudine ofa long-standing and highly contentious debate on IQ and human intelligence, before moving on to 19.2 The British public schools The public schools in Britain are an oddity in more ways than one. They are not 'public' at all, but, on the contrary private, fee-paying institutions. The degree of independence they have from the rest of the education system and the key role they play in the society at large marks them out from the systems of other countries.There are some private schools, often linked to religious denominations,in all Western societies, but in no other society are private schools either so exclusive or so important as in the DK The public schools are nominally subject to state supervision, but in fact few major pieces of educational legislation have affected them. They were left untouched by the 1944 Act. as they were by the setting up ofthe comprehensive schools;and the large majority stayed single-sex schools until relatively recently There are about 2,300 fee-paying schools in England, educating some 6 per cent of the population. They include a diversity of different organizations, from prestigious establishments such as Eton, Rugby or Charterhouse, through to so-called minor public schools whose names would be unknown to most people. The term 'public school' is limited by some educationalists to a group of the major feepaying schools. These include those schools that are members of the Headmasters' Conference (HMC) ,originally formed in 1871. Initially there were only 50 schools in the Conference; the number has now expanded to more than 240. Schools like those listed above - Eton, Rugby and the rest - are members. Individuals who have attended HMC schools tend to dominate the higher positions in British society A study by Ivan Reid and others, for example, published in 1991,showed that 84 per cent of judges, 70 per cent of bank Eton College boys in their very traditional school uniform. directors and 49 per cent of top civil servants had attended an HMC school (Reid 1991). Following the 1988 Education Reform Act, all state schools have to follow a standard national curriculum, which involves testing pupils at the ages of7, 11, 14 and 16. Representatives from the fee-paying schools were involved in the creation of the national curriculum.Yet these schools do not have to follow it The fee-paying schools can teach whatever they wish and have no obligation to test children. Most have opted to follow the national curriculum, but some have simply ignored it. look at educational inequalities involving gender and ethnicity. This will help us to see how education systems may be changing as societies themselves undergo significant economic restructuring. The IQ debate in education For manyyears, psychologists have debated whether there exists a single human ability, which can be called intelligence, and, if so, 850 EDUCATION how far it rests on innately determined differences. Intelligence is difficult to define, because it covers many different, often unrelated, qualities. We might suppose, for example, that the 'purest' form ofinteUigence is the ability to solve abstract mathematical puzzles. However, people who are very good at such puzzles sometimes have low ability in other areas, such as grasping the narrative of history or understanding works of art. Since the concept has proved so resistant to a generally accepted definition, some psychologists have proposed (and many educators have by default accepted) that intelligence can simply be regarded as 'what IQ tests measure' (IQ simply means 'intelligence quotient'). The unsatisfactoty nature of this is obvious enough, because the definition of intelligence then becomes wholly circular IQ tests measure intelligence and intelligence is what IQ tests say it is. Most IQ tests consist of a mixture of conceptual and computational problems. You may have taken one yourself. The tests are constructed so that the average score is 100 points: anyone scoring less is labelled as 'below-average intelligence', and anyone scoring above has 'above-average intelligence'. In spite ofthe fundamental difficulty in measuring intelligence, IQ tests are still widely used in research studies, as well as in schools and businesses. 'The bell curve' Scores on IQ tests do in fact correlate well with academic performance, which is not surprising, since the tests were originally developed to predict success in school. They therefore also correlate closely with social, economic and ethnic differences, since these are associated with variations in levels of educational attainment. White students score better, on average, than black students or members ofother disadvantaged minorities. Such results have led some, such as Arthur Jensen (1967, 1979) to suggest thatIQ differences between blacks and whites are, in part, due to genetic variation. Of course, as we have already seen in this chapter, pinning down the reasons for educational under-achievement have to take into account the role of education systems in reproducing social inequalities and we should not consider the latter to be neutral sites where those with the highest intelligence simply do better on account of higher inherited intelligence. More recently, psychologist Richard J. Herrnstein and the sociologist Charles Murray reopened the debate about IQ and education in a controversial way. They argued in their book, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life (1994), that the accumulated evidence linking IQ to genetic inheritance has become overwhelming. The significant differences in intelligence between various racial and ethnic groups, they say, must in part be explained in terms of heredity. According to Herrnstein and Murray, evidence from the USA indicates that some ethnic groups have, on average, a higher IQ than others. Asian Americans, particularly Japanese and Chinese Americans tend to possess a higher IQ than whites, though the difference is not large. The average IQ of Asians and whites, however, is substantially higher than that of blacks. The authors argue that such differences in inherited intelligence contribute in an important way to social divisions in society. The more intelligent an individual is, the greater the chance that she or he will rise in the social scale. Those at the top are there partly because they are more intelligent than the rest of the population - from which it follows that those at the bottom remain there because, on average, they are not so clever. Critics deny that IQ differences between racial and ethnic groups are genetic in origin. They argue that differences in IQ result from social and cultural differences. For example, IQ tests pose questions to do with abstract reasoning that are just more likely to be part of the experience of more affiuent white students than of blacks and ethnic minorities. Scores on IQ tests may also be influenced by factors that have nothing to do with the abilities supposedly being measured, such as whether the testing is experienced as stressful. Some research has demonstrated that African Americans score six points lower on IQ tests when the tester is white than when the tester is black (Kamin 1977). Recent social psychological research studies carried out in the USA show that the 'stereotype threat' - the fear of confirming a negative social stereotype as a self-characteristic - can impair people's performance in intelligence and ability tests (Steele and Aronson 1995; Steele 1997). Steele and Aronson conducted a test involving both white and African American students, in which half of each ethnic group was told that their intelligence was being measured. While the white students' performance was not noticeably affected, African American students who thought their IQ was being tested performed well below their previous achievement level. The researchers concluded that the stereotype threat (that African Americans have a lower IQ than whites) raised students' anxiety levels, leadingto poorer performance on the test. Other research on the effects of gender stereotyping on performance found physiological evidence indicating increased stress and anxiety (such as changes in surface skin temperature and diastolic blood pressure) in a sample of girls who were told that girls did consistently worse than boys on a particular maths test (Osborne 2007). Studies such as these lend support to the argument that social and cultural stereotypes can play a large part in people's performance in test situations, including IQ tests. Observations of deprived ethnic minority groups in other countries - such as the 'untouchables' in India, the Maoris in New Zealand and Burakumin of Japan - also strongly suggest that the variations in IQ between African Americans and whites in the United States result from social and cultural differences. Children in all these groups score an average of 10-15 points below children belonging to the ethnic majority. Similar differences can be seen across generations, with average IQ scores rising substantially over the past half century for whole populations. When old and new versions ofIQ tests are given to the same group of people, they score significantly higher on the old tests. There is no evidence that young people today are innately superior in intelligence to their parents or grandparents; the better scores are therefore more likely to result from increasing prosperity and social advantage. The notion that some entire racial groups are on average more intelligent than others remains unproven and improbable. In The Bell Curve Wars (Fraser 1995), a number of noted scholars explored the ideas of Herrnstein and Murray. The editor described The Bell Curve, as 'the most incendiary piece of social science to appear in the last decade or more'. The claims and assertions in the work 'have generated flash floods of letters to the editor in every major magazine and newspaper, not to mention the over-the-air commentary on scores of radio and television shows' (Fraser 1995: 3). The contributors saw Herrnstein and Murray's work as 'racist pseudoscience' and attacked almost every facet of their argument. For example, biologist Stephen Jay Gould (1941-2002) argued that Herrnstein and Murray are wrong on four major counts. A single IQ score cannot describe intelligence; people cannot be meaningfully ranked along a single intelligence scale; intelligence does not derive substantially from genetic inheritance; and 'intelligence' can be altered and does improve with age. Howard Gardner argued that a century of research has dispelled the notion of'intelligence' as a general category. There are only 'multiple intelligences' - practical, musical, spatial. mathematical and so forth. Gould concluded: We must fight the doctrine of The Bell Curve both because it is wrong and because it will, if activated, cut off all EDUCATIO N possibility of proper nurturance for everyone's intelligence. Of course, we cannot all be rocket scientists or brain surgeons, but those who can't might be rock musicians or professional athletes (and gain far more social prestige and salary thereby). (In Fraser 1995: 22) The new IQ'ism' David Gillborn and Deborah Youdell (2001) argue that although measures of IQ are rarely used explicitly in education today, educationalists now use the term 'ability' in a very similar way. They claim that the use of the term 'ability' systematically disadvantages black and working-class students in schools. The authors carried out surveys in two London schools over two years in the mid- 1990s. They interviewed and observed teachers, and pupils in their third and final years at secondary school. At both schools they surveyed, teaching was heavily shaped around 'the A-to-C economy'. By this phrase, they meant that schools were aiming to get as high a proportion of pupils as possible to obtain five or more A-C grades at GCSE level (exams taken at 16 years of age). This is because the proportion of pupils meeting this benchmark is one key criterion on which schools are rated in the government's annually published official league tables. As the headmaster of one school noted in a memo to staff: 'The best thing we can do is to get the greatest possible proportion achieving the five high-grade benchmark.' Although this seems a legitimate aim, Gillborn andYoudell found that it putteachefS under pressure to spend more time on those pupils they think are able to achieve five or more GCSEs at grade Cor above.The effect of this was that 'both schools are increasingly rationing the time and effort they expend on different groups of pupils'. Teachers had to make a choice over which pupils have the ability to get the five good GCSE grades - and they gave these pupils most attention. In both schools teachers' notions of a pupil's 'ability' determined whether they saw that pupil as a likely candidate to gain five or more GCSEs. From their interviews and observations, Gil1born and Youdell found that 'ability' was viewed by teachers as something fixed, which determined the potential ofdifferent pupils. As one headteacher remarked: 'You can't give someone ability can you? You can't achieve more than you're capable of, can you?' It was also found that teachers often believed that ability could be measured objectively.At one school, pupils were given a 'cognitive ability' test when they arrived, which teachers took as a good indication of GCSE performance later on. Not surprisingly, given the findings of Bernstein, Wills and Bourdieu discussed above, pupils with highest 'ability' tended to be white and middle class. The authors also noted that they 'observed many occasions when black pupils seemed to be dealt with more harshly or to face lower expectations than their peers of other ethnic backgrounds'. These beliefs about which pupils had ability constituted an unwitting discrimination against black and working-class children. The consequence ofthis 'new IQ'ism' was that fewer black and working-class pupils gained five GCSEs above grade C, thus reinforcing the teacher's assessment of their 'fixed ability'. In one school, 16 per cent of black pupils attained five or more GCSEs above C level, compared to 35 per cent of white pupils. These results are typical of the UK national pattern, which sees black and working-class pupils doing worse academically than the average. Gillborn and Youdell's conclusion is that, although most educationalists would disagree strongly with the idea that intelligence is inherited, 'in one sense at least, the hereditarians have won. Without any genuine debate, the British education system is increasingly returning to policy and practice that takes for granted the assumptions proposed by IQ'ists like Herrnstein and Murray.' To GiUborn and Youdell, the familiar social divisions (espeCially those of race and class) are reappearing through language that appears to stress the individual 'ability' of pupils, but actually relies on unstated prejudices about group identities. THINKING CRITICALLY Critics of IQ tests say that they do not really measure 'intelligence' .If this is true, what are they actually measuring and why do they get such diverse results? Are IQ theorists who carry out research into possible racial differences in intelligence behaving in a racist manner? Emotional intelligence Since the 1990s, there have been many popular books and psychological studies that have sought to include emotional awareness and competence in our general understanding ofwhat 'intelligence' means. The idea was popularized bythe best-selling book, Emotional Intelligence (1996) by Daniel Goleman. Goleman argued that emotional intelligence can be at least as important as IQ in determining people's life cbances. Emotional intelligence (or El) refers to bow people use their emotions, and is thought of as the ability or skill to recognize emotions, evaluate them when they arise and manage them both in themselves and in others. Unlike IQ theorists though, El qualities are not inherited, and the more that children can be taught them, the more chance they have of making use of their intellectual capabilities. According to Galeman, 'The brightest among us can founder on shoals of unbridled passion and unruly impulses; people with high lQs can be stunningly poor pilots of their private lives' (1996: 34). Theories of emotional intelligence have become more popular amongst educationalists through the idea of 'emotional literacy', which, as the term implies, is something that can be taught in schools as a way THINKING CRITICALLY On reflection, do you recognize emotional intelligence in yourself and other people? How convincing is the idea that we possess or can learn emotional intelligence? If one element of being emotionally intelligent is the ability to manage our own emotions and those of others, does this mean that emotions can be brought completely under rational control? Or are human emotions essentially spontaneous and uncontrollable? to build resilience and give pupils the emotional resources to cope with a range of emotional pressures (see 'Using your sociological imagination 19.3'). To the extent that other forms of 'intelligence' such as emotional intelligence or interpersonal intelligence are brought into our underw standing of people's abilities, then we will have to revise our ideas to include the diverse range of factors that contribute towards success in life. Similarly, schooling is becoming more than just a stage preparing people for work. As society and technologies change, the necessary skills also change, and even ifeducation is seen from a purely vocational point of view - as providing skills relevant to work - most observers agree that access to education throughout the life-course will be needed in the future. Gender and schooling As we saw earlier, in the past, education and the formal school curriculum in the developed societies were differentiated along gendered lines. For example, in late nineteenth-century Britain, girls were taught the skills to prepare them for domesticity, while boys took basic mathematics and were expected to gain the skills needed for work. Women's entry into higher education was very slow and they were not able to gain degree level qualifications until 1878. Even so, the number of women studying for degrees remained low; a situation that only 19.3 Emotional literacy in schools? 'Emotional literacy' to be taught 'Emotional literacy' is to be taught in secondary schools in England. Apilot scheme, involving about 50 schools, is expected to test the benefits of lessons helping pupils to talk about their feelings. This could involve introducing ideas such as 'worry boxes' in which pupils could send letters expressing any particular concerns. confrontations and classroom aggression. There have been ongoing concerns about bullying in schools - and violence between pupils - and such lessons will encourage children to talk about their anxieties.In primary schools, this has involved approaches such as 'circle time',where children cliscuss worries or clisagreements that might be troubling or upsetting them. Among the areas that might be covered will be self-awareness, friendships, empathy and selfmotivation.'Social,emotional and behavioural skills need to be regularly reinforced and practised and also developed as children grow older", said a spokesperson for the Department for Education and Skills. 'These skills are vital to continuing to promote positive behaviour and they are also vital skills for learning, both ofwhich continue to be of key importance: Such lessons promoting emotional intelligence have already been running in primary schools. These lessons for younger children are seen by the government as having been a success and it is now expected that they will be extended into secondary schools. I Anger management' Teaching 'emotional literacy' is intended to help pupils' behaviour - with lessons in subjects such as anger management to defuse Source: BBC News, 28 November 2005 began to change significantly in the 1960s and '70s, As we will see later, this state of affairs has been utterly transformed in the present period. Today, the secondary school curriculum no longer distinguishes between boys and girls in any systematic way (apart from participation in sports). However, there are various other 'points of entry' for the development of gender differences in education. These include teacher expectations, school rituals and other aspects of the hidden curriculum. Nthough rules are gradually loosening, regulations which compel girls to wear dresses or skirts in school form one of the most obvious ways in which gendertyping occurs.The consequences go beyond mere appearance. As a result of the clothes she wears, a girl lacks the freedom to sit casually, to join in rough-and-tumble games or sometimes to run as fast as she is able. Nthough this is changing, school textbooks also help to perpetuate gender images. Until recently, it was common for storybooks in primary schools to portray boys as showing initiative and independence, while girls, iftheyappeared at all, were more passive and watched their brothers. Stories written especially for girls often have an element of adventure in them, but this usually takes the form of intrigues or mysteries in a domestic or school setting. Boys' adventure stories are more wide-ranging, having heroes who travel off to distant places or who are sturdily independent in other ways. At the secondary level, females have tended to be 'invisible' in most science and maths textbooks, perpetuating the view that these are 'male subjects'. Gender differences in education are also very obvious when one looks at subject choice in schools. The view that some subjects are more suited to boys or to girls is a common one. Sociologist Becky Francis (2000) has argued that girls are more likely to be encouraged into less academically prestigious subjects than boys. There is 700 600 500 "'"0 400c '""'~ 0 300 '"f- 200 100 0 1970/1 1980/1 1990/1 2001/2 Education 855 --+-- Male: Full-time undergraduate _____ Male: Part-time undergraduate ~ Female: Full-time undergraduate --)E- Female: ParHime undergraduate Figure 19.1 Sludents in higher education: by sex, 1970/1-200 1I2 Source: HMSO Social Trends 2004, 44 certainly a marked difference in the subjects they choose to pursue. [n 2001/2, around 75 per cent of young people aged 16-18 who entered for an A-level or equivalent (the standard entry qualification for a university degree) in physics and in computer studies in the UK, and 60 per cent of those entered for maths, were male. By comparison, around 70 per cent ofentries for social studies and English literature, and 95 per cent of entries for home economics, were female (figure 19.1). Nonetheless, the achievement of girls in many education systems around the world has now surpassed that of boys at all levels. Gender and achievement Throughout the twentieth century, girls tended to outperform boys in terms of school results until they reached the middle years of secondary education. They then fell behind and by the ages of 16 and 18, as well as at university, boys did much better. For example, in the UK until the late 1980s, girls were less likely than boys to attain the three Alevels necessary for admission to university and were entering higher education in smaller numbers than boys. Concerned about such unequal outcomes, feminist researchers conducted a number of important studies into how gender influences the learning process. They found that school curricula were often male-dominated and that teachers were devoting more attention to boys than to girls in the classroom. In recent years though, the debate around gender in schools has undergone a dramatic and unexpected reversal. 'Under-achieving boys' are now one of the main subjects of conversation amongst educators and policy-makers. Since the early 1990s, girls began consistently to outperform boys in all subject areas (including science and mathematics) and at all levels ofthe British educational system (see table 19.1 for figures for England). Similar findings have been reported in America and elsewhere. Young women in the USA are more likely than young men to go further in school, get a college education and go on to do a postgraduate degree (as figure 19.2 shows). The problem of 'failing boys' has been seized on, as it is seen to be linked to a host of social problems such as crime, unemployment, drug abuse and lone parenthood. In combination, these factors have Girls are outperforming boys at every level of education,and in most subjects. amounted to what has been described as a 'crisis in masculinity' (discussed in chapter 14, 'Sexuality and Gender') that was explored above by Mairtin Mac an Ghaill. Boys who leave school early or with poor educational results are less likely to find good jobs and create stable fami lies, because, in the post-industrial economies of the developed world, fewer unskilled manual jobs are available for young men with weak educational backgrounds. Meanwhile, a large proportion - up to 70 per cent - ofjobs that are being created in the rapidly growing service sector are now being filled by women. However, Mac an Ghaill (1996) also points out that although many women are entering into employment, the jobs they are moving into are by no means all professional careers. In fact, women still make up the overwhelming majority of part-time workers and the service-based work they do is often relatively poorly paid and low in status. Explaining the gendergap A variety of explanations have been advanced to account for the dramatic turnaround in gender performance in schools. One factor that must be taken into account in explaining girls' achievement is the influence of the women's movement on their self-esteem and expectations. Many girls presently in school have grown up surrounded by examples ofworking women - indeed, many of their own mothers work outside the home. Exposure to these positive role models increases girls' awareness of career opportunities and challenges traditional stereotypes of women as housewives. Another result of feminism is that teachers and educationalists have become more aware ofgender discrimination within Table 19.1 Students reaching or exceeding expected standards in England, teacher assessment by key stage and sex, 1996 and 2006 England Boys Key Stage 1 English Reading 73 Writing 71 Mathematics 80 Science 83 Key Stage 2 English 53 Mathematics 58 Science 64 Key Stage 3 English 51 Mathematics 50 Science 59 SOI.l."Ce Department for Educatlon and Slalls 100.0 90.0 .??" -.- W 80.0 70.0 60.0 .. K J>.-/ I" 50.0 40.0 30.0 - / /' 20.0 10.0 0.0 1996 Girls 83 82 83 85 68 62 67 70 64 61 ""----+--+ " .. Percentages 2006 Boys 80 76 89 88 72 78 83 64 74 70 -+-- High School or more: Male ___ High School or more: Female ---.- Some College or more: Male Girls 89 87 92 91 82 78 85 78 77 73 Some College or more: Female ~ Bachelor's Degree or higher: Male ~ Bachelor's Degree or higher: Female Figure 19.2 Percentage of 25-29-year-olds by level of education completed in the USA by gender, selected years, 1971-2003 Source. Child Trends: www.childtrendsdatabankorg/pdV5]DFpdf .58 EDUCATION the educational system. In recent years, many schools have taken steps to avoid gender stereotyping in the classroom, to encourage girls to explore traditionally 'male' subjects and to promote educational materials that are free ofgender bias. Some theories centre on the difference in learning styles between boys and girls. Girls are often regarded as more effectively organized and motivated than boys; they are also seen as maturing earlier. One manifestation of this is that girls tend to relate to one another by talking and using their verbal skills - one aspect of emotional intelligence perhaps. Boys, on the other hand, socialize in a more active manner through sport, computer games and hanging out in the school playground - and tend to be more disruptive in the classroom. These broad patterns of behaviour seem to be reaffirmed by teachers in the classroom, who may have lower expectations for boys than for girls, and indulge boys' disruptions by paying more attention to them. Another line of reasoning focuses on 'Iaddism' - a set of attitudes and outlooks shared by many boys that is anti-education and anti-learning. The research ofWillis and Mac an Ghaill provides some evidence for these theories. Many see high rates of exclusion and truancy among boys as rooted in their beliefthat learning is not 'cool'. Other scholars question the enormous amount of attention and resources being directed at under-achieving boys. They argue that the gender gap in language skills is one that can be found the world over. Differences that used to be ascribed to boys' 'healthy idleness' are now provoking a firestorm of controversy and frantic attempts to improve boys' results. As national performance targets, league tables and international literacy comparisons proliferate - drawing differences out into the open for all to see - 'equal outcomes' in education have become a top priority. All the attention give to boys, critics argue, serves to hide other forms ofinequality within education. Although girls have forged ahead in many areas, they are still less likely than boys to choose subjects in school leading to careers in technology, science or engineering. Boys pull ahead in science by about the age of 11 and continue to outperform girls through to universiry: in subjects such as chemistry and computer science, which are central to economic growth in the present economy, they continue to dominate. Although women may be entering higher education in greater numbers, they continue to be disadvantaged in the job market in comparison with men who hold the same levels of qualification (Epstein 1998). More than gender, factors such as class and ethnicity produce the greatest inequalities within the educational system. For example, UK comparisons in achievement by pupils across social classes reveal that 70 per cent of children from the top professional class receive five or more pass grades, compared with only 14 per cent from working-class backgrounds. Concentrating upon 'failing boys' is misleading, critics contend, since men continue to dominate positions of power in society.The under-achievement of working-class boys, they argue, may have less to do with their gender than with the disadvantages of their social class. Gender and higher education One Significant aspect of the expansion in higher education is the increase in the number of female students. For example, since the 1970s, UK higher education has seen much faster growth rates for women entering further and higher education than for men (table 19.2). By 1990/1, there were more women than men in further education and by 2005/5, the same was true of higher education. This is a reversal of the position in the 1970s, when there were far more male than female students. By 2004/5 there were seven tjmes as many female students in further and higher education than there had been in 1970/1, but only around two and a half times as many male students. However, evidence from the USA suggests that choice Education 859 Table 19.2 UK students in further and higher education, by type of course and sex, 1970-2005 Men 1970171 1980/81 1990/91 2004/05 Further education Full-time 116 154 219 532 Part-time 891 697 768 1.534 All further 1.007 851 986 2.066 education Higher education Undergraduate Full-time 241 277 345 549 Part-time 127 176 148 267 Postgraduate Full-time 33 41 50 113 Part-time 15 32 46 139 All higher 416 526 588 1.068 education Source.' HMSO SOCial 'frends 37 2007 of subjects is still marked by conventional gender norms. The previous pattern of subject choice in American higher education, as in many other developed countries, saw women pursuing degrees in education and the health professions, )which led into somewhat lower-paid careers·than those following from computer science and engineering subjects, whidh wef~ dOnllina,ted by male students. Women hq-ye made some inroads into these latter supJects, but they remam male-dominated t~day. Tliis is rthe case at I postgraduate levels tolo. On' th'i' other hand, many degree subjects that were previously dominated by mem, ipc!uding those in the social sciences, history, life sciences and business management, have seen a broad gender parity achieved (Freeman 2004). What does not appear to be happening is a move by men into the university subjects that were previously female dominated. Women's organizations have often attacked sex discrimination in school and Thousands Women 1970171 1980/81 1990/91 2004/05 95 196 261 551 630 624 986 2.429 725 820 1.247 2.981 173 196 319 680 19 7l 106 458 10 21 34 114 3 13 33 172 205 301 491 1,426 higher education. Women still find themselves heavily under-represented among the teaching staff in colleges and universities, especially in senior posts. In 2002/3, for example, although women made up 39 per cent ofacademic staff in the UK, only 26 per cent of senior lecturers and researchers were women and there were 1,860 women professors, accounting for just over 14 per cent of the totaL However, there is a trend towards greater gender equality in higher education. The figures quoted here mark a 5.7 per cent rise in the number of female academics and a lOA per cent leap in the number of female professors over the preceding year (HESA 2004). With men occupying more of the senior positions in higher education institutions, women, on average, are paid significantly less. A recent survey found that average pay for women is lower than for men at every university in the UK. Across the university sector as a whole, women earn on average more than £5,000 less than men, and the gender difference in pay is significantly larger at some institutions (THES, 3 September 2004). What we may conclude from this brief survey is that girls and women have made significant headway within education systems over the past 40 years. In terms of sheer numbers, they now outperform boys both in qualifications gained and attendance at higher education institutions. But there remain significant inequalities once highly educated women move into the workforce, with men maintaining their traditionally better rates of pay and improved promotional prospects. It is unclear whether such gendered advantages will survive long into the twenty-first century. THINllING CRITICALLY List all of the reasons you can think of as to why the achievement of boys in the developed countries is now falling behind that of girls.What social consequences might there be for communities in future and should we really be concerned? If we should, what can be done to change the situation? Ethnicity and education Sociologists have carried out a good deal of research into the educational fortunes of ethnic minorities. Governments have also sponsored their own investigations, such as Educationfor All in the UK, the report ofthe 1985 Swann Committee. The Swann report found Significant differences in average levels of educational success between groups from different ethnic backgrounds. Children from black Caribbean families tended to fare worst in school, as measured by formal academic attainments. They had improved from ten years earlier, however. Asian children did as well as white children, in spite of the fact that, on average, the families from which they came were economically worse off than white families (Swann Committee 1985). Subsequent research indicates that the picture has changed somewhat. Trevor jones carried out research in the UK, which indicated that young people from all minority group backgrounds were more likely than white children to continue into fulltime education from the age of 15-19. Only 37 per cent of white children stayed on in education in 1988- 90, compared to 43 per cent from West Indian backgrounds, 50 per cent of South Asians and 77 per cent of Chinese. In spite of this apparently improvingpicture for minority ethnic groups, jones suggested something of a negative explanation for it. Many members of ethnic minority groups may be staying on in education because oftheir particular problems in finding a decent job. (jones 1993) On the whole, members of ethnic minority groups are not under-represented in British higher education. People from Indian and Chinese backgrounds are, on average, significantly more likely to have a degree qualification or higher than those from other ethnic backgrounds. However, men who defined themselves as 'mixed race' and women who defined themselves as 'black/black British' and 'Asian/Asian British' were slightly less likely to have gained a degree or higher qualification than the national average (HMSO 2004). School exclusions and ethnicity Social exclusion has become a topic of great interest for sociologists over the past decade. One specific area of concern has been the growing number of young people outside the formal education system, many of whom are children from minority ethnic groups. Within the sociology of education, connections are often drawn between the exclusion ofstudents from school and other phenomena such as truancy, delinquency, poverty, limited parental supervision and a weak commitment to education. See chapter 12,'Poverty,Social Exclusion and Welfare', for a wider discussion of social exclusion. ) I Rates per t 0,000 pupils White British White Irish Other White White and Black Caribbean White and Black African White and Asian Other mixed Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi Other Asian Black Caribbean Black African Other Black Chinese Other ethnic group ~ I ==:J ~ ::::J o I I I I I I I I 10 20 30 40 50 Figure 19.3 Permanent exclusion rates ill England by ethnic group, 2004- 5 Source,' HMSO Social Trends 37, 2007 School exclusion rates have been increasing in recent years in many developed countries, though in England rates have actually fallen by 23 per cent since 1997/8 to 12 per 10,000 pupils in 2004/5. Some 12,300 pupils were permanently excluded from school in 1997/8, but this was down to 9,440 in 200~/5 (HMSO 2007: 29) when the number of boys permanently excluded outnumbered girls by nearly four to one. Exclusion rates also differ according to ethnicity (see figure 19.3). In 2004/5 the highest permanent exclusion rates in England were among pupils of mIxed white and black Caribbean origin, while black African pupils were far less likely to be permanently excluded. Rates were lowest for Chinese pupils, with just two in every 10,000 being permanently excluded. Findings from American schools reflect a similar disparity in exclusion rates between black pupils and students from other ethnic backgrounds. Following a series of school shootings in the USA, more than 80 per cent of American schools have adopted 'zero tolerance' policies towards disruptive students. A nationwide investigation revealed that black students are being excluded from schools at rates disproportionate to their representation within student populations and at a rate unlikely to be due simply to disruptiveness in school. For example, in San Francisco, black students accounted for 52 per cent of exclu- .62 EDUCATION sions, yet made up only 16 per cent ofschool enrolment. In Phoenix, where the black population was 4 per cent, black students made up 21 per cent of exclusions. How can the high rate of exclusions among black male pupils be explained? A number of factors are likely to be involved, but it is possible that stricter exclusion policies are being applied in a racially discriminatory way. It is important also to consider how rates of school exclusion may reflect much broader patterns of exclusion and disadvantage within society. As we have seen elsewhere, many young people are growing up under very challenging conditions, with a relative lack of adult guidance and support. Traditional notions of masculinity are under threat and there is no stable vision ofthe future. For young people growing up against this turbulent backdrop particularly boys and young men from disadvantaged groups - schools may appear irrelevant or too authoritative, rather than a site for opportunity and advancement. ASignificant aspect ofeducation systems and school exclusions which has to be considered is the potential for institutional racism within them (Rattansi 1992). In education systems, the concept is used to refer to the way that school life is structured, the dress codes deemed to be appropriate and the curriculum adopted. Therefore, teachers may often interpret the behaviour and dress styles of black pupils as evidence of their 'disruptive' behaviour, leading to more temporary and permanent exclusions. It has to be borne in mind, though, that some non-white ethnic groups have relatively low rates of school exclusion and the concept of ethnocentrism - a concern with one's own culture and a The concept of institutional racism was introduced in chapter 15. 'Race, Ethnicity and Migration', in relation to the UK Metropolitan Police Service's inadequate handling of the racist murder ofStephen Lawrence (Macpherson 1999). consequent lack of interest in others - may be a more accurate description of the roots of much discrimination in schools (Mason 2000). However, racism within schools may be a contributory factor in the high rates of exclusion found specifically amongst black pupils. In a research study carried out in the UK, which explored race relations in primary schools, Cecile Wright (1992) studied relationships within four inner-city primary schools over a three-year period. She found that teachers tended to assume that African Caribbean boys were disruptive, and they were quick to reprimand and control their behaviour. Asian pupils were perceived as likely to struggle with language skills but were perceived as willing to learn and compliant with the teachers' instructions. Social stereotypes were leading to a certain level of fear amongst staff, which then fed into the reinforcement of stereotypes. Even so, Wright aCknowledged that the teachers were committed to equal treatment for all, but were caught up in wider social processes that led to discrimination. Such processes were present in relations amongst the pupils too. Racial harassment was part of the daily experience of black pupils and Asian pupils were very often victimized by white children. The staff's failure to deal with these issues led to problems between staff and parents and a marked lack of satisfaction amongst black children's' parents compared with those of the white pupils. This often led to parental complaints of injustice, which staff interpreted as attempts to play down their children's' bad behaviour. Wright's research showed that the processes leading to racism and discrimination in the wider society were also found within schools and, she explains, 'staff, like most other people, do treat people differently on the basis of perceived "racial" characteristics. Further, many nursery and primary staff are still reluctant to accept that younger children can hold incipient racist attitudes and , ~ 1 l L \ \ Social stereotypes may impact in the way teachers treat children from different ethnic groups. For example, African Caribbean children are often assumed to be disruptive. exhibit hostility towards members of other groups' (1992: 103). Findings such as these have led some to advocate multicultural forms of education, which would need curriculum changes to bring currently ignored national histories, religions and cultures into schools. This has happened to a limited extent, for example within religious education where pupils .are introduced to the diversity of religious beliefs and practices. There are some problems with such multicultural initiatives however. For example, historical facts can never speak for themselves and history still has to be interpreted. How should the history of colonialism and imperial expansion be taught, for instance, and where should the emphasis of interpretation lie? Would a multiculturalist approach to education threaten to dilute national identities? Wright's finding of racism at work even within primary schools seems to indicate that some form of anti-racist education may be more effective. Ant-racist education would involve multicultural teaching but would also go further, to challenge inequalities by helping both staff (during staff training) and young people to understand how racist attitudes and stereotypes develop and how they can deal with them when they arise. Anti-racism in schools would not ignore or play down racism within the school, but would attempt to actively identify and challenge discriminatory language, actions and policies. The main issue raised by critics is the potential for such teaching to reinforce divisions and to contribute to the B64 EDUCATION 'racialization' of conflicts within the school community. Whilst multiculturalist and anti·racist approaches are in many ways quite different, it has been suggested that a 'critical multiculturalist' approach may offer the best way to preserve the best of each (May 1999). THINIIING CRITICALLY Thinking about your own school experience, is there any evidence that schools are institutionally racist or is it more accurate to say that there is racism within schools? Did your school(s) have an anti-racist curriculum? If it did,how did this help to combat racism? If it did not, should it develop one? Evaluation Inequalities within education systems have proved remarkably persistent, particularly in relation to social class divisions. However, as we have seen in relation to gender inequalities, there can also be quite radical changes. The educational opportunities for women have opened up considerably over the latter half of the twentieth century, though these do take time to become firmly established. Economic restructuring- which has reduced the need for heavy, manual work and workers in favour of post-industrial employment in the service sector - has been a major structural factor favouring a better trained and educated female workforce. Nonetheless, differences in the educational experiences of ethnic groups also show us that inequality of education is strongly linked to cultural factors as much as to economic ones. Education in global context Until around a century and a half ago, and even more recently in some regions, the children of the wealthy were educated by private tutors. Some still are. Most people had no formal schooling whatsoever until the first few decades of the nineteenth century, when in European countries and the United States, systems of primary schools began to be constructed. The process of industrialization and the expansion of cities served to increase the demand for specialized schooling. People worked in many different occupations, and work skills could no longer be passed on directly from parents to children. The acquisition of knowledge became increasingly based on abstract learning in subjects like maths, science, history, literature and so on, rather than on the practical transmission of specific skills. In modern societies, people have to be furnished with basic skills, such as reading, writing and calculating, as well as a general knowledge of their physical, social and economic environment. It is also important that they know how to learn, so they are able to master new and often very technical, forms of information. Most modern educational systems first took shape in most Western societies in the early part of the nineteenth century, though England was more reluctant than most other countries to establish an integrated national system. By the mid-lBDOs, Holland, Switzerland and the German states had achieved more or less universal enrolment in elementary schools, but England and Wales fell far short of such a target; education in Scotland was somewhat more developed at an earlier stage. The USA, by contrast, already had around 50 per cent of its 5- 19 year olds in education by IB50. When we look at education today in our increasingly global context, what is striking is the diversity of educational provision across the world. As we saw through the individual examples ofSakina, Hawwau and Shaun in the chapter introduction, many people in the developing world struggle to gain access to education and illiteracy remains widespread, while in developed countries, issues of choice and consumerism are more likely to exercise parents and governments. If inequalities within countries are proving difficult to tackle, then the global inequalities between the countries ofthe developed and developing worlds are even more of a challenge. One way ofcomparing the world's nationally based education systems is to look at government spending on education. Given the diversity of local currencies, this is not a simple task. In order to compare cost per student and the size of national education budgets, local currencies have to be converted into one standard measure, usually the US dollar at the market exchange rate. However, according to UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2008), 'purchasing power parities' (PPP$) better reflect the real value of educational investments by governments and families. PPPs are rates of currency conversion that eliminate differences in price levels among countries. So, a given sum of money, when converted into US dollars at PPP rates, will buy the same basket of goods and services in all countries. Table 19.3 uses PPPs in its comparison of world regions. The table shows that the governments of the world spent 4.4 per cent of global GDP on education in 2004. The highest levels ofeducation spending were in North America and Western Europe, with 5.6 per cent of their regional GDP. The Arab States (4.9 per cent), sub-Saharan Africa (4.5 per cent) and Latin America and the Caribbean (4.4 per cent) also spend at or above the global average. But the lowest levels ofspending by far were in Central Asia (2.8 per cent) and East Asia and the Pacific (2.8 per cent), though the latter is based on estimates for China and may therefore not be so reliable. Within these broad regions are some large national differences. For example, the United Arab Emirates spends Education 865 1.3 per cent, Indonesia 0.9 per cent and Equatorial New Guinea just 0.6 per cent. Conversely, the USA, which has only 4 per cent ofglobal population, spends more than one-quarter of the global public education budget (28 per cent). North America and Western Europe, with just 8 per cent of global population, spends 55 per cent of global public education expenditure. THINKING CRITICIlLLY Education spending seems to be directly linked to literacy levels and educational achievement. In such a grossly unequal world situation, what can be done to raise the level of educational spending in the poorest countries? How might it be argued that today's wealthy countries benefit from the high illiteracy rates of the poor countries? Global primary school enrolment An important aspect of global education is the number ofchildren ofprimaryschoolage actually in some form of primary education (see figure 19.5). A useful measure of this is primary school enrolments. Between 1999 and 2004, primary school enrolment increased globaliy to around 86 per cent, with the largest increases in sub-Saharan Africa (27 per cent) and South and West Asia (19 per cent), the two regions that were furthest away from universal provision (UNESCO 2008). However, in 2004 therewere still 77 million primary age children not in any form of primary education, three-quarters ofthese in sub-Saharan Africa and South and West Asia. This is inevitably an underestimate however, as not all those who are enrolled actually attend regularly or at all, as Michael Bruneforth's (2006) analysis in figure 19.6 shows in relation to some of the countries facing the biggest challenge in 2004. An analysis of factors contributing to being out of school revealed that slightly more boys than girls were out of school, but Table 19.3 Public education expenditure by world region, 2004 Education expenditure Region as%ofGDP PPP$ (in billions) Total Primary level Tbtal Arab States 4.9 1.7 77.8 Central and Eastern Europe 4.2 1.1 164.0 Central Asia 2.8 0.6 7.7 East Asia and the Pacific 2.8 1.0 441.7 LatinAmerica and 5.6 1.5 1,355.6 Western Europe South and West Asia 3.6 1.2 169.1 Sub-Saharan Africa 4.5 2.1 59.9 WORLD 4.4 1.3 2,462.2 Source."© UNESCO Instltute for StatlStlCS (VIS), more data are ava1lable at. www.uis.illlescoorg - ~~ ro ., E "c 0 -0 ~ Cl CL c '"-0 2 'c ::J >'" c '" -0:c '6 '" c '" "- E ~ -"§ '" 0 ::J-, Q) C!l O.3J! 'n Primary level 27.0 41.2 1.8 149.8 372.3 54.6 27.9 741.1 M6r'1l 6 r 7~ Figure 19.4 Global distribution of public education expenditure, GDP and population aged 5-85,by selected countries and world reglOns Source: © UNESCO Institute for Statistics CUIS); more data are available at www.uis.unesco.org % ofregional Total 3.2 6.7 0.3 17.9 55.1 6.9 2.4 100.0 55.1 f-- " -0 .g W