THE METHODOLOGY
OF THE
Social
Sciences
MAX WEBER
Translated and Edited by
EDWARD A. SHUS and HENRY A. FINCH
With a Foreword by EDWARD A. SHILS
THE FREE PRESS, GLENCOE, ILLINOIS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
With an Analytical Summa,y
by
HENRY A FINCH
FOREWORD by EDWARD A. SUlLS
PAGE
iii
I THE MEANING OF ~'ETHICAL NEUTRAUTY
u
IN SOCIOLOGY
AND EcONOMICS • 1
P 1-3. Meaning of uvalue-Judgment"- role of ''value-Judgment''
witlun SClence a dUferent issue from dUl.1'ablhty of espou~nng
''value-judgments'' 10 teaching~rlt:lque of two pOLnu of view
on the latter issue---Weber', own View; P 3.5, Wamng of belief
that ultunatdy only one point of VIew on practical problems 11
correct-lmphcations thereof fOT ""profeuorial prophetsn-what
the student should obtam today from the unIVersIty, l' 6. "Cult
of personality'" and pseudo ethical neu.trahty rejected J P 6-8, Duficultle1
in Idea that unLVenlty should be a forum for dIScussion of
value problenLl lrom all standpoints, P 9-10, The difficulties involved
in rc.~cting the distInction between empirIcal statements
of fact and Itvalue-Judgmenu"--dangen of pseudo-ethlcal neutrallty-ll1ution
of &Clenb6c warrant {or tcuth of via media. P 10-~ '2.
The mistaken objectIons to the dLStJnctlOn between empincal
statements of fact and uvalue.Judgmenu"-the real Issue concerns
the separatIon of the investigator's own pracbcal valuatiotU
from the establishment of empulcal facu-ambigultles 01 takmg
goals 3! (acts, P 12-fS, HIstorical an~ \ndlVl.duai vanallons in
evaluanom does not prove the neceuary subJCCtlVlty of ethicsdeceptIve
self..evidence of WIdely accepted "value-Judgments"
---SCIence as a cribc of lIeif-evidence-ceallstlc "sclence of ethic,"
cannot determine what should happen, P 14, Empirical-psycho--
(ogl.c.al. and ~t analYlUi of evaluations lead' only to uunder·
standtng expIanatlonlJ
, but It IS not negltgwle--lts defuu.te use in
regard to causal analysis and clarIficatIon, P. 16, SchmoUer wrong
In contentIon that ethical neutrality implies acknowledgment of
only lonna) ethical rules-ethlca1 unperit1.veA not identical WIth
cultural values--normative ethICS per se cannot affer unambiguous
dtreCtlVel for the BOlutlon of certaln social-poutlcal prob--
lems---example of indetenDlnale unphcatioDs of postulate of
xu TABLE OF CONTENTS
lustlCC----IpeClfic ethical problems., personal and lOCiaI, whIch
ethics cannot settle by Itself, P 16~18, So-called strICtly "formal"
etlucal maxIIllJ do have suhstanuve roeamog-an illwtrationboth
empirical and non-empmcal value-analysIs of the IllustratIon
madequate to solve the crUCial Issue Involved-human bfe
a series of ultnnate deClll10ns by wluch the soul uchooses Its own
fate" J P 18·9, Three things can be contributed by an empll'lcaJ
duclplme to the solutIon of policy Issues-what It cannot supply
-the dlStlnctlOD between normative and SClentlfic problems stated
In terms of a senes of contrasted questions, P 20-1, Three functiOns
of the diSCUSSion of "value-Judgmenu"---such dISCUSSIon IS
emphatically not meanIngless, P 21·2, SelectIon of probleIll5
m SOCial SCience a matter of value·relevancc--<:ultural mterests
and dU'eCbon of scienufic work-the evaluative mterests giVing
direction to sCientific work can be clarified and differentiated by
analysu of "va!ue.Judgmenu"---dlstinCtIOn between evaluation
and valueemterpretatton, P 22-5, "Value-judgmenu'" cannot be
derived from factual trends-l11wtratlOD of the SyndICal13tethical
and polItlcai hnutatlons of polley of Oladaptatlon to the
possible". P 25-6, Two meamngs of uadaptahon"---dlSpemublllty
of the term when It IS used ev&1uattvely and not m ItS blo)oglcal
meaning) P 26-27) Conflict In SOCIal hle cannot be excludedIts
forms may vary-meanmg of ''peace''--evaluauon of any type
of social order must be preceded by empmcal studt of Its modes
of social selection, but the evaluation IS dlsUnct from the study,
P 27-8, The problem of the meantng of "progress"- whether
mental and psychological "progressive dIfferentIatIOn" IS progress
In sense of "lOner richness" not sCientifically detemnnable-howe
ever the cost of such "progress" can be studied emplrlcallyP
28-30, Applicability of "progress" In the empmcal hIStory of
art-in thIS use the concept of "progress" means "rational",
"technical" progres5-ll1wtratlon of GothiC arclutecture, P 31-2,
Another Illustration (rom tbe hutorlc development of musIc In
Europe) P 32, Techmcal progress In art does not necessarily
lDlplv aesthebc Improvement. although changes In techniQue are
causally speaking. the most important factors ID the development
of art, P 32-3, HIStorians are apt to confuse causal analys1S and
uvalue-judgments"---causal analysLll, aesthetic valuation and value
interpretation are all dlStmct procedures) P 33-5, The meamng
of "rational progress"-tbree senses thereof which are generally
confused-distinctfon between subjectivefy "rationaf' action and
rationally "correct" action-where techmcal progress exiStsconditions
for legitimate use of tenn "economIC progress")
P 36~7, An Illustration of debatable presuppOSItion. of an action
claimed to be "objectively evaluated" as "econOmIcally correct" J
P 37-8, Meanmg of techmcal evaluations of pure eCOnOIDlC9they
are unambiguous only when economiC and aoclal context are
gIven-when technIcal evaluations are made thIS does not settle
quesUons of ulumate evaluatiOns J P 39-40, The nonnaUve valid.
Ity of objects of empirIcal Investigation IS disregarded during the
empirical lDvestlgatlon--example from mathematics-but thIS
dlSregard does not affect the normatlVe valIdIty of nozmatlVe]y
vahd truths as an a pnon basu of all empirical SCience-and yet
uundentandlng1l
of human conduct 18 not In terms o{ that which
15 normatively correct as an a priori condItion of all SCientIfic
ANALYTICAL SUMMARY
lnveeugauohs-the uunderstandmg" knowledge of human conduct
and culture Involves conventional rather than nortnaUve vahdlty J
P 4-1-2, The truth value of Ideas IS the guldmg value m 'he
Wfltmg of lOteUeetuaJ hIStory-an illustratIon feom mIlitary history
of the posslble atudy of causal effects of erroneous thoughts
and calculation-Ideal types even of mcorrect and sclf-defeatmg
thought necesaary for the detemunlng of c.aUlat1O-n or empU'lcal
events J P 43, The nonnatIve correctness of the Ideal type not
neceuary for Ita use--the func.bon of Ideal-types vu-a-vts emP1l1cal
reality, P 43·6, Nature pf pure C(.ononuc theory-lu ldeal.tyPiCal
character - It 1! apohucal, asserts no moral evaluatlODs
but IS indupenslble for analys1S-~ntJque of theses of opponents of
pUIe eCQ(l(ltt1lC&--telattOMlup of mean.-end P.~Qp.oatttana to cause·
effect proposItIons whIch economic sCIence can supply--other
probletnll of econonucs, P 46, Factual unportance of the state m
the modem SOCial 8-cene does not establish the state as an
ulttmate value--the View that the state 11 a meana to value IS
defensIble
XUI
II "OBJECTIVITy" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL POLlCY 50
P 50, Introductory note on the responsiblhty for and content
of the essay, P 50~1. Problem of relauonslup of practIcal IOClal
critiCism to SCientific SOCial research I P 51-2, Pomts of view
hampenng logIcal (onnulatlOn of dUference between "exu.tenllal"
and "normative" knowledge In soclal-econolD.lc science. P. 52,
Re)cctlon of view that empirical SCIence prOVides norms and
Jdeals--however, criticism vu-a-vlS "value-Judgments" IS not to be
luspended, P 52-3, Appropriateness of means to, and chance o(
achIeVIng, a gIven end are acce5SJble to SCIentIfic analysu, P 53,
SClentlfic analys1I can predlct "costs" of umntended or inCidental
consequences of actIon, P 5:3-4, SCIentliic treatment of "valueJudgment"
can reveal uldeas" and ideals underlymg concrete
ends, P 55, The Judgment of the vahdity of values IS a matter
for falth or possIbly for specuJatlve philosophy, but not WIthIn
province of empll'ical scIence-the datmctlOn between empLCJcal
and normative not obliterated by the fact of cultural change.
P 55-7, Illusory self·evidence of consensus on certam goalsproblems
of SOCJal pohcy are not merely technical-naIVe bellef In
the scientIfic dedUCibility of normatively desirable cultural
values--cultural values are ethIcal lUlperatives only for dog.
maticalIy bound rellgtous sects, P 57.8, The vIa media of the
practical pohtician or syncretic re1auVlsm 18 not warranted as
(oerect by SCIence, P 58, The mexpugnable difference between
arguments appealmg to (1) enthusuum and feeling (2) ethIcal
conscience (3) capacIty as a sCientIfic knower. P 58-9,.5clentlfic:ally
valid SOCial sCience analysiS can stnve for supra-cultural
valid1.ty I P 59-60, Reasons for expreSSing r'value~judgments" If
they are dearly formulated as such and dlstmgwshed from ,clentlfic
statements I P 61-2, The r&ogmtion of SOCIal problefll8 IS
value·oriented--eharacter of the ArchlU In the past, In the future.
P 63, What I.!l the meanmg oloblectlvell valId truth in the SOCial
SCIences, P 63-4, Scarcity of means IS the basIC characterIstic of
SOClo-economlC subject matter-what a SOCIal sCience problem
lSI P 64-6, DlstmctlOn between "economic", "economically rele~
XlV TABLE OF CONTENTS
vane" and ueconomIcally condItIOned" phenomens; P 66, Condl"
tion for the ex.tstence of soclal-economIc problems--extent of the
range of SOCIal-economics, P 66-7, Put concerns and central
present aIm of the Archlv, P 67, Study of society from the econOnuc
POint of View "one-slded" but mtentlonally so-the
"5OClaf' as subJect of Btudy needs specification, P 68·71. Cultural
phenomena not dedUCIble from materIal m'tereets-<hfference
betwet:n crude montstlc matenalIstlc conception of hiStory
and useful critIcal use of the economic pomt of View-analogous
dogmatiC excesses On the part of other SCiences, P 72, "OneSlded"
vIewpoInts n~ce!sary to realIze cogniUve goal of empmcal
SOCIal sCience mqulJ'ing mto selected segments of concrete realIty.
P 72-3, CrItena of hIStorian's se1ectlon not solely from requuemenU
of dIacovery of laws or ultlIllale psycholOgIcal factorsthese
aJ"e at most prebmmary to the desued type of knowledgecharacterIZation
of the latter, P 75-6, Four tasks of the deSired
type of SOCial sCienCe knowledge. P 76. The deCISive feature of
the method of the cultural sCiences-the SIgnIficance of cultural
configurations rooted m value-condltIoned Interest. P 77, Two
types of analysIS are logically dlstmct, In tenns of laws and general
concepts and In tenmr. of value-rooted mean1ng~analYSls of
generic general features of phenomena a prellll'unary task to
analysIs of cultural slgmficance of concrete hIStOTlCal fact. P 78-9,
The "hlStOTlCal" 19 "the SignIficant m Its IndIVldualIty"-lmpos.
slbl1lty of causal analySls of culture Without selection of "essential"
features-in the study or "hlstOClcal mdlvlduals" It IS a
questIon of concrete causal relatIOnshIpS. not laws. P 80, But
causal lDlputatlon of concrete causal effects to concrete cultural
causes pre9upposes knowledge of recurrent causal sequences, 1 e
of Uadequlilte" causes-meaning thereof----certainty of unputatlOn
a function of comprehenSiveness of general knowledge-why It
IS a meanmgless Ideal for SOCial sCience to seek the reduction of
empIrIcal realtty to laws, P 81, Non-equlvalence of cultural slgmficance
With pOSItive cultural value, P 82. Why th~ VIew persISts
that evaluative Ide3.3 are derivable from the "facts themselves"the
personal element ID research) P 82, The neceSSIty of ··subJectlve"
evaluatIve Ideas does not mean causal knowledge IS absent
ID cultural sCIence-nor can causal knowledge be supplanted by
"teleology" J P 83~4, EvaluatIVe Ideas are "subJective)" but
the results of research are not subjective 10 the sense of belDg
valId for one person and not for others, P 84··5, Meaninglessness
of the 1dea of a closed system of concepts from which realIty is
deduclble---shlfts and movements In cultural problems. P 85) A
bIu/C question, the roJe of theory In tae knowledge of cultural
reality J P 85. Effect of natural lawt rationalIStic Weltanschauung.
natural·sclence conceptualIZation on practIcal "arts" and on
economlcs-seemmg trIumph of laW-Oriented anal)'Sls in hutoncal
study under the mfluence of evolutIonary biology-the
present confWled 5JtuatJOn and Jts orlgm~ P 87-88) Meaning and
contentiOn! of Uabstract" theoretical method 10 economicsfrUItlessness
of debate concernIng these conlentloJ:ls----5oclal m.
stltutlons not deduCJ.ble froIll psychologtcal laws, P 89·90, A hod
of concept constructIOn peculIar to and) to a certam extent, mdlSpensIble
to the cultural SClences--a.n JIlustrahon, P 90, The ideal·
typical concept dlstmgulShed from an hypotheSIS) a descnpnoD,
ANALYTICAL SUMMARY
an average:-It 19 u!!;eful for both heuristic and expository purposes.)
P. 90.1, IUustrattons~ P 91~2~ "Ideal" In logtcal sense to
be dIStmgulShed from "Ideal" In ethical sense, P 92~3J The sale
cntenoD JUlltdymg the use of the Ideal tyPe-illustratIons of
Idea-type concepts-they a.re not tC) be found aCCQrdmg to a
scheme of genus proxzmum, dtDerlnlta spectfica-eharactel'utlcs
of ideal-type concepu-thelr relatlonshlp to category of obJective
poasmlhty> P 93-4, Elaboration of Ideal~type concepts of
"church" and "seet"--cultural slgtuficance and Ideal-type concepts.
P 94-6, Three naturalistIc muconceptIOos concernmg
ideal-typical concepts-the Ideal-tyPical concept of an epoch's
features and the Ideas actually governmg men-the latter IS
indeed Itself to be dearly formulated only In an tdeal-type-an
dlustratlon, P 96-7, VarYing relatJonshlp between Ideal-type of
ideas of an epoch and empirical re~lty, P 98, Ideal-types often
used not 10 a IOgtcal but m an evaluatIve senSe-an I1lustrattonthese
senses frequently confused In historical wrltmg, P 99, Ideal
typical concept of the state dIScussed, P 100~1, The Ideal-typIcal
concept In It! relattonshlp to clan, generiC or average l'.oncepu,
P 101-3, Dl9tlnctIon between hLStory and Ideal-typical cowtrucu
of developmental scquences--why It JS d1fficult to mamtwn thlS
dlstInctionj P J03, MarxIan "laws" are Ideal~typJcal. P J03. A
Iut of mental and conceptual construct! Indicatmg raImficahons
of methodologIcal problems 10 the cultural SCIences, P 104-5,
Sense 10 which maturmg SOCial sCienCe transcends Its Ideal-typesthe
tensIOn between the POSSlblhty of neW knowledge and old
lDtegraUons the source of progress 10 the cultural SCiences, P 105,
mterdependence of concept construction, problem setdng and
content of culture. P 106, IncoIi1pattblhty of goal of SOCial
SCiences WI Viewed by the Historical School and modern. Kantlan
theory of knowledge-the function of concepts 15 not the reproductton
of realltYJ P 107-110, Dangers of neglect of clear cut
concept construction-two IIlwtratJot'ls, P 110-11J Recapitulation
of the argument, P 112J "SubJect matter speclall'U," "lOterpretlve
specialists", their excesses-genuine artistry of the research
which avoJds these excesses-and yet change of evaluatIVe Viewpomt
occurs even m an age of necessary speculauon
III CRITICAL STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL
SCIENCES
I A cnllque of Eduard Meyer's methodological views
P 1J3-4J Vall¥: of Meyer's book WI a focus of dlscuS!lon,
P 115-6, The Tole of methooology 1n the advance of "cu~ncemethodolOgical
mterest of present SltuatlOn In hIStOry, P 116-7J
List of theses concerning history attacked by Meyer, P ] 17-9,
Meyer's anaJyals of "chance" and Its relatIOnshIp to "frce wul";
P ]19. Meyer on "freedom)} and "NeC6Stty'·. P 119, ExaIDinatlon
of Meyer's conception of "Cree WJJ]"-hls tendency to Iwe
ethical and causal analYSIs, P 122-4. Meyer's error 10 blurring
the dIStinctIon between lwitoncal k.nowledge and ethiCS, and In
equating freedom with irrationality of actIon J P 124-5. RatIonalit)'
and freedom, P 126-7, ContradIctions In Meyer's conception
of hlstoflcal causahty-Meyer's dlscuulon of llfreedom" and
xv
113
xv, TABLE OF CONTENTS
"necessity" In their relatIon to "general", ··partIcular", "IndIVldual",
"collectlvity"-confuSlon therem, P 129-30, What 18 luJtorlcally
ngmficant cannot be reached by subtractIng the common
from unique traIts, P. 130-1, Meyer's fight InsUnct but poor
formulanon concernmg the role of the general, 1 e rules and concepts
In butory-tbe logical problems of the ordenng of bhtoncal
phenomena by concepts-the meanmg of the category of pOSSIb.1llty,
P. 13J -2, Meyer's denmuon of "hlStorlcal"-what determmes
the h15torlan'l selection of events, P. 132-3, Instances of
confusion of ratio essendt Wlth ratio cognoscendl In lustortcal
study P 134-6. Two dIStInct logIcal uses of data of cultural
reahty-Illustratlons, P 136, Meyer's confUSIon of heuristIc devIce
With fact-hIS narrow View of the mterest governIng the hIstorIan',
selectIOn. P 197-8. What II the meanlng of the effectiveness
of cultures or thelI' components, P 138-42, Meanmg of
the "SIgnIficant" and Its relationship to hIStorical effectivenessthe
J.11ustratlon of Goethe"s letters, P 143. A type of SIgnIficance
wmch IS neither heunstlc nor causal-the object of mterpretatlon-two
kmds of mterpretatlon, P 143..5. Meanmg of "value·
mterpretatlOn-ltS dlStmctlOn from hnguIsttc-textual analystswmch
"value-interpretatIOns" can clann to be sCIentIfic. P 145-7.
How value interpretatIon 11 dealt wlth by Heyer. P 147.9. The
relatlonshlp of facts of value analYSis to facts of mstory-analyslS
of Illustrative cases-Goethe's letters and Marx's Ka/Jatal-rele"anee
of hIStOrical facts for value-Interpretations. P. 149-152,
Nature of value analYSis, P 152-6. DIfficulties 10 Meyer's dIScussIon
of the hIStorIcal mterest goverOlng wstorlan's selection
-role of the contemporaneIty of the mterest--confuslon of hutoncal
mdlvldual and hlStoncal cause, P 156-8, HlStoncal mterest
determmed by values, not by objective cawal relationships
-confUSion of "valuable'" With "causally lnlportant"'. P 158.
Why the present IS no subject matter lor hiStory, P 158-160,
Summary statement on Meyer's Inadequate equating of "effec_
nve" With ·'hlstoncal"--su.mmary on meaning of mterpretatlon,
P 160. RelatIonships between the philosophy of hIStory. valueanalysIs
and mstoncal work, P 161, Why historians are often
rwt a,,'are al the \'alue-a:naJ)'SLf anp}u:1t m theu- worJc-Aleyer'a
correct recognItion of the dIfference between hIStorical work and
value·.,mterpretatlon-problem of meanmg of "systematics" In
hutorlcal, cultural SCIence, P 161-3, An J.11wtraoon-three value
oriented pomts of Vlew from which the c1a.uICal culture of antlqUlty
can be treated
II Objective poSSIbility and adequate causatIon in historical
explanation
P 164-66. No Ldle question (or hIStory to mqUire Into what con·
sequences wen: to be expected II certain condltJons had. been
other than they were-lnlportance of such questlons In detennm·
mg hIStorIcal slgmficance. P 166-9. Sources for theory of
"objective" POSSlblhty---ongins m JurIStic theory-lustory does
not share JUrisprudence's ethical interest lD the theory J P 169,
Causallustorlcal explanation deals with selected aspects of eventl
ha\t1ng signIficance ftora general standpOints. P 111J A suffiCIent
condItion estabh!hmg causal Irrelevance of gIven CIrcumstances
ANALYTICAL SUMMARY
for an individual effect, P. 111.2, Account, Wlth an illwuaben,
of lOgICal operatloJlJ wluch establah hutoCJcal causal re1atlODJ,
P 172.3, HtstonalUl ought not to be reluctant to adnut objective
pOSll:Ibility, P 173-4, Isolaholl5 and generall2atlom reqwred to secure
"Judgment of POliSlluhty"--eate.KQt)' of oblCCt1.ve POSllbl.hty
not an expressIon of Ignorance or lDcomplete knowledge--such
Judgmentll presuppose known empirical ruleA-Instance of the
Battle of the Marathon, P. 175, Meaning of Uadequate cawes" J
P 175, The aunplest historical Judgment 1J not l11IDple regutraaon
of somethIng found and 6.nu,hed, rather does It presuppose the \lie
of a Jiornnng category and a whole body of empll'lcal knowledge J
P 175-77. Psychological processes of lustorlcal discovery not to
be confused wuh Its logicalltructuUj P 177-80, The causal analysLS
of personal actions must also dIStinguISh between categorically
formed constructs and unmedlate expenence, P 180, Recogn1tJon
of powbl1Jty In cawaJ mquuy does not unply arbJtrary
lustorlography, for category of obJcclive po8l1lbulty enables the
assessment of the causal significance of a hatoncal fact, P 181J
The certainty of Judgments of objective pos.51blhty roay vary In
degree--obJcctlve lustorlcal posslblhty IS an a.tlalogueJ wlth Important
dtfferencesJ of the kmd of probability that IS deternuncd
(rom observed frequencies, P 184~5, DefinItIon of "adequate
cau.sanon"-applIcauoD to Battle of Marathon, the March Revo·
lunoD, the unificanon of Gennany-relteratloJ). of construcnve
nature of hlstonan's conceptuabzatIon, P 186-7, Bmdmg's "an·
thropomorphlc" mlsunderstandIDg of obJecnve posSlbulty-real
meanIDg of "favoring" and "obstructmg" conditIons-the IIpeclal
character of causality when adequacy of cawatlon 1.1 concerned
needs further Iludy
"Objectivity" in Social Science
and Social Policy
Wherever asSQTttOns are expl~cHly made m tke name of the edItor
or when ta,ks are set faT the Arcm" '" the course of S«I,on [ of Ihe
forego1.ng essay.. the personal VleWS of the author aTe not muolved
Each of the pomts lh questlOff has the express agreement of the CO~
ed,toTs The author alone bears the responstb,ltty for the form and
content 0/ Sect,on 11.
The lact that the (Jomls of VIew, not only of the contnhutors but
0/ the edItors as well.. are not zdentlcal even on methodologteal
ISsues, slands as a guarantee that the Archl" w,ll not fall prey 10
any sectartan outlook. On the other hand, agreement as to cettmn
fundamenlal issues ts a presuPpositIOn of the lo"'t assumpl'on of
edilonal re<pons<otltty ThIS agreement refers parttcularly to the
value of theoutlcal knowledge from Uone-nded" potnts of VtCW, the
construcbon of prec).sdy defined ~oncepts. and the mSlJtence Ott the
ngoTous dtShndwn between emplfical knowledge and value.Judg~
ments as here understood. Naturally we do not clcnm to present
anythmg new therewIth
The extensiueness 01 the dtScumon (Secl,on l/J and Ihe frequent
repetttlon. 01 the same thought are tnlended only 10 maX",...e
the general und=tanding of our argument 10 wider circles. For th.
sake of thIS "'Ienlion, much -lei us hope not too much - precmon
in exprestion has been sacn{iced. For the same reason, We, have
omItted Ihe presentatton of a systematic analysIS In fauor of the presenl
listing of a few methodo!ogtcal vlewpo.nts A 'jlstematte tllqUtry
would haue requtTed the treatment of a laTge number of eplStemo.
logical questions whICh are 'ar deeper than those raISed here. We are
not interested here in the furtherance of logical analysis per se. W.
are attempting only to apply Ihe well·known results 01 modern logIC
49
50 "OBJECTIVITY' IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
to our own problems NOT aTe we solVing problems here, we are
trymg only to make theIr szgmficance apparent to non-speczaltSts
Those who know the work of the modern loglaans -1 cIte only
Wzndelband, SImmel, and for our purposes partIcularly Heznrzch
R.ckert - WIll ImmedIately notice that everythzng of Importance In
thIS essay is bound up wIth the" work.
W HEN A SOCIAL SCIENCE journal which also at lllnes
concerns ltself WIth a SOCIal polIcy, appears for the first tIme or passes
Into the hands of a new edltorIal board, It IS customary to ask about
Its ClIme." We, too, must seek to answer this questIon and follOWIng
up the remarks In our UIntroductory Note" we wIll enter mto the
question in a more fundamental theoretical way Even though or
perhaps because, we are concerned with "self-evIdent truths," thiS
occaSlOn pTovldes the opportunity to cast some hght on the nature
of the IIsoclal sciences" as we understand them, in such a manner
that it can be useful, if not to the specialist, then to the reader who 15
more remote from actual scientific work.
In addItion to the extensIon of our knowledge of the "social
condiDons of all countnes," 1 e, the facts of SOCial hfe, the express
purpose of the Archw ever smce Its cstablishment has been the educatIon
of judgment about practlcal social problems - and in the
very modest way in which such a goal can be furthered by pnvate
scholars - the critICIsm of practIcal social policy, extending even as
far as legislatIOn In sPite of thl5, the Archi" has firmly adhered,
from the very begmmng, to Its intention to be an exclUSIvely SCIentific
Journal and to proceed only with the methods of scientIfic research
Hence arises the questIOn of whether the purpose stated
above IS compatible in pnncip!e wlth self-confinement to the latter
method What has been the meanmg of the value-Judgments found
in the pages of the Archzv regardmg legIslatIve and admmistratI"e
measures, or practlca! recommendations for such measures? What
are the standards governing these Judgments~ What IS the valtdlty
of the value-judgments whIch are uttered by the cntlc, for inc;tance,
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 51
or on wluch a wnter recommendIng a policy founds his arguments
for that polley> In ..hat sense, If the criterion of sCIentific knowledge
IS to be found in the "obJective" vahdity of its results, has he re·
mained Wltlun the sphere of sClenttfic discussion> We WIll first present
our own attitude on this. question m order later to deal with the
broader ODe-: m what sen'5e are there in general "objectively vahd
truths" in those disciphnes concerned with social and cultural
phenomena';t This question, in VIew of the continuous changes and
bitter conflict about the appareutly most elementary problems of our
disclplme, Its methods, the formulatIOn and valIdIty of its concepts,
cannot be avoided We do not attempt to offer solutIons but rather
to disclose problems - problems of the type to which our journal,
if it is to meet its past and future re!.ponsibihues, must turn its
attentIon.
I
We all know that OUf SClence, as IS the case WIth every
science treating the institutions and events of human culture,
(wIth the po"lble exceptIon of pohtlcal history) first arose m connection
with praclrcal conSIderations. lu most immedIate and often
SQle purpose was the attamment of value-Judgments concernmg
measures of State economic policy It was a "techniquell
10 the
same sense as, for instance, the clinIcal disciphnes m the medfcal
sciences are It has now become known how this situation was
gradually modified. This modIfication was not, however, accompanied
by a formulatiOn of the lOgIcal (pnnz,p1611e) diStinction between
Hexistential knowledge," i.e, knowledge of what "is," and "norma_
tIve knowledge," ie, knowledge of what "should be" The formulabon
of thiS distinctIon was hampered, first, by the view that
immutably invariant natural laws, -later, by the view that an
unambIguous evolutionary pnnclple - governed economic life and
that accordlngly, what was normQt1.vely nght was identical- in the
former case - with the immutably eXIStent - and in the latterIThlS
essay was pubhshed when the edltoTship of the Archav fur So.ttalwuunschalt
und Socralpoluck was transferred to Edgar Jaffe. Werner Sombart and
Max Weber Its {onn was Influenced by the OCCaslOD for which It was written
and the content should be comidered m th1.!l lJght (MarIanne Weber)
52 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
with the inevitably emergent. With the awakenmg of the Iustorical
sense, a combmatlon of ethIcal evolutionism and hlstorical relativism
became the predominant attitude in our sCIence. This attltude
sought to deprive ethical norms of their formal character and through
the incorporallon of the totality of cultural values into the "ethical"
(S>tthchen) sphere tried to glVe a substantive content to ethical
norms It was hoped thereby to raise economics to the status of an
Uethical science" with empirical foundatIons To the extent that
an "ethical" label was given to all possible cultural ideals, the particular
autonomy of the ethical imperallve was obliterated, without however
increasmg the "obJective" validity of those Ideals Nonetheless
we can and must forego a discusSlon of the principles at issue We
merely point out that even today the confused opiruon that econOIll1CS
does and should denve value-judgments from a speclfically "econOIll1C
pomt of view" has not dISappeared but is especIally current, quite
understandably, among men of practical affairs
Our Journal as the representative of an empmcal speCIalized disciplme
must, as we WIsh to show shortly, reject tIus VIew in principle
It must do so because, m our opinion, it can never be the task of
an empirical science to provide binding norms and ideals from which
directives for immedIate practical actlVlty can be denved.
What is the implIcation of thIS proposition? It IS certainly not
that value-Judgments are to be withdrawn from scientific WSCUSSlon
in general SImply because in the last analysIS they rest on certain
Ideals and are therefore "subJective" In origin Practical actlon and
the alms of our Journal would always reject such a proposition
Criticism is not to be suspended in the presence of value-Judgments.
The problem is rather· what is the meaning and purpose of the
scientific critIcism of ideals and value~Judgments? This reqUIres a
somewhat more detailed analysis
All serious reflection about the ulbmate elements of meaningful
human conduct is oriented primarily in tenns of the categories "end"
and "means." We desue something concretety either "for its own
sake" or as a means of achievmg somethmg else whIch is more hIghly
desired The question of the appropriateness of the means for achieving
a given end IS undoubtedly accessible to scientific analysIS Inasmuch
as we are able to determine (within the present lunits of our
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOClAL SCIENCE 53
knowledge) which means for the achievement of a proposed end
are appropriate or inappropriate, we can in this way estimate the
chances of attaining a certain end by certain available means In
this way we can indIrectly criticize the setting of the end itself as
practically meaningful (on the basis of the existing historical situation)
or as meaningless with reference to exIsting condiuons Furthermore,
when the possibil,ty of attaining a proposed end appears
to exJst, we can determine (naturally within the limits of our existing
knowledge) the consequences which the application of the means
to be used will produce in addItion to the eventual attainment of
the proposed end, as a result of the Interdependence of all events
We Can then provide the acting person with the ability to weigh
and compare the undesirable as over against the demable consequences
of \us action. Thus, we can answer the question: what will
the attamment of a desired end "cost" m terms of the predictable
loss of other values? Since, in the vast majority of cases, every goal
that is striven for does "cost" or can "cost" something in this sense,
the weIghing of the goal in tenns of the incidental consequences of
the acUon which realiwdt cannot be omitted from the deliberation
of persons who act with a sense of responsibility One of the most
Important funcuons of the techmcal cnhcum which we have been
discussing thus far is to make this sort of analysis possible To apply
the results of this analysis in the making of a decision, however, is
not a task wruch science can undertake, It is rather the task of the
acting, wilhng penon' he weighs and chooses from among the values
involved according to his own conscience and Ius personal view of
the world Science can make him :realize:: that all action and natur"
ally, according to the circumstances, maction imply in their consequences
the espousal of certain values - and herewith - what is
today so willmgly overlooked - the rejection of certain others. The
act of choice Itself is his own respons,biJity.
We can also offer the penon, who makes a chOlce, insight into
the sigmficance of the desired object. We can teach him to think
m terms of the context and the meaning of the ends he desires,
and among which he chooses We do this through making explicit
and developing in a lOgIcally consistent manner the "ideas" which
actually do or which can underlie the concrete end It is self-evident
54 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
that one of the most Important tasks of every SCIence of cultural hfe
IS to arrIve at a rational understandIng of these "ideas" for whIch
men either really or allegedly struggle Tlus does not overstep the
boundaries of a SClence which stnves for an ~~ana]yhcal ordenng of
cmplncal reahty," although the methods whlch are u,ed In thIS interpretatlon
of cultural (getshger) values are not "inductions" In the
usual Sense At any rate, this task falls at least partly beyond the
hmrts of economICS as defined accordIng to the conventional dIvision
of labor It belongs among the tasks of sOClal phIlosophy. However,
the historical influence of ideas m the development of social
life has been and sull is so great that our Joumal cannot renOunce
thIS task It shall rather regard the lUvestlgatlOn of this phenomenon
as one of its most important obligattons.
But the scientIfic treatment of value-judgments may not only
understand and empathlcally analyze (na,herleben) the desired ends
and the ideals which underhe them, it can also "ludge" them criticany
Tlus critICIsm can of course have only a d1a1et1cal character,
Ie, It can be no more than a formal logIcal Judgment of hlStoflcally
ghen value-Judgments and Ideas, a testIng of the ideals accordIng
to the postulate of the Internal, onSlstemy of the demed end It can,
Insofar 15 It sets itself thIS goal, aId the acting WIllmg person in attammg
se1f~clanficatlOn concerning the final axioms from whIch his
deSIred ends aTe denved It can assist him in becommg aware of the
ultImate standards of value wh,ch he does not make exphcit to himself
or, which he must presuppose In order to be logical The e1evatton
of these ultlmate standards, which are manIfested in concrete valUf'Judgments,
to the level of explicItness is the utmost that the SCIentIfic
treatment of value-Judgments can do without entermg mto the realm
of speculatlon As to whether the person expressmg these valueJudgments
should adhere to these ultImate standards 15 hiS personal
affair; It involves WIll and conscience, not empIrical knowledge
An empirical SClence cannot tell anyone what he shOlfld do - but
rather what he can do - and under certam circumstances - what
he WIshes to do It IS true that In OUf SCIences, personal value-Judg-f
ments have tended to Influence SCientific arguments without being
exphcitly admllted They have brought about continual confusion
and have caused various interpretations to be placed on scientIfic
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 55
arguments even in the sphere of the detenninalton of simple casual
mterconnecbons among facts according to whether the results increased
or decreased the chances of reahzing one's personal ideals,
I e., the posSIbIlity of desiring a certam thing. Even the edItors and
the collaborators of our journal will regard "nothing human as alien"
to them in this respect But it IS a long way from this acknowledgement
of human frallty to the belief In an "ethical" SCIence of economics,
which would denve ideals from its subject matter and produce
concrete norms by applying general ethical imperatives. It is true
that we regard as obJectwely valuable those innermost elements of
the "personalIty," those highest and most ultimate value-Judgments
wluch determine our conduct and give meaning and SIgnificance to
our life We can indeed espouse these values only when they appear
to us as valid, as derived from our highest values and when they are
developed in the struggle against the chfficulties which life presents.
Certamly, the dignity of the "personality" lies 10 the fact that for It
there exIst values about wruch It organizes its hfe; - even 1£ these
values are m certam cases concentrated exclusively WIthin the sphere
of the person's "individuality," then "self-realization" in those interests
for which it claIms validIty as values, IS the Idea WIth respect to
which its whole existence is onented Only on the asswnptlOn of
belief in the validity of values is the attempt to espouse value-judgments
meamngful However, to Judge the validity of such values IS
a matter of faIth. It may perhaps be a task for the speculative mterpretation
of l,fe and the universe 10 quest of their meaning. But It
certainly does not fall within the province of an empincal science 10
the sense in which it IS to be practISed here The empirically demonstrable
fact that these ultimate ends undergo hIStorical changes and
are debatable does not affect this distinclLon between empirical science
and value-judgments, contrary to what is often thought. For even
the knowledge of the most certain proposition of our theoretical
sCIences - e g J the exact natural sciences or mathematics, is, hke the
cultivation and refinement of the conscience, a product of culture
However, when we call to mind the practical problems of economic
and social policy (in the usual sense), we see that there are many,
mdeed countless, practIcal questIOns in the dISCUSSIon of which there
seems to be general agreement about the self-evident character of
56 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
certain goals. Among th",e ",e may mention emergency credit, the
concrete problems of social hyglene, poor rehef, factory inspection,
industrial courts, employment exchanges, large sections of protective
labor legIslanon - In short, all those ISsues in which, at least in appearance,
only the means for the attamment of the goal are at issue
But even if we were to mistake the illusion of self-evidence for truth
- which science can never do WIthout damaglng itself - and wished
to view the conflicts immediately arising {wm attempts at pracucal
realizatIOn as purely techmcal questions of expediency - wluch would
very aften be incorrect - even in this case we would have to recognIze
that this lUusion of the self-evidence of nonnative standards of
value is disSIpated as soon as we pass from the concrete problems of
plulanthropic and protective social and economic selVlces to problems
of economIC and social pohcy The distinctive characteristic
C)f a problem of social pohey .. indeed the fact that it cannC)t he
resolved merely on the bas.. of purely techmcal conSIderations which
assume already settled ends Normanve standards of value Can and
must be the objects of dupute In a discussion of a problem of rocial
pollcy becallSe the problem hes in the domam of general cultural
values And the confu.ct occurs not merely, as we are too easily
inclined to believe today, between "class mterests" but between gena
eral views on life and the univene as weU. Tlus latter point, how-'
ever, does not lessen the truth that the particular ull1mate valuejudg>nent
wluch the individuaJ espouses is decided among other factors
and certamly to a quite significant degree by the degree of affinity
between It and his class interests - acceptmg for the lime being tlus
only superfiaally unambiguous tenn One thing is certain under all •
circumstances, namely, the more "general" the problem involved, ie,
in this case, the broader its cultural slgmficance, the less subject it is
to a single unambiguous anSWer on the ba.is of the data of empirical
sciences and the greater the role played by value-ideas (Wertideen)
and the ultunate and highest penonal 3JQOlllS of belief. It is simply
naIve to believe, although there are many specialists who even now
occasionalI~ do, that it is poSSIble to establish and to demonstrate as
scientifically valId Ita principle" for practIcal SOClaI SCIence from
which the nonns for the .olullon of practical problem. can be unam·
biguou.ly derived. However much the social sciences need the dis.
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 57
cllS.tion of practical problems in terms of fundamental principles, ie,
the reduction of unreflective value-judgments to the premises from
which they are lOgIcally derived and however much our Journal
intends to devote itself specially to them - certainly the creation of
a lowest commOn denominator for our problems in the form of generally
valid ultimale value-Judgmenls cannol be its lask or in general
the task of any empmcal SCIence Such a thmg would nol only be
Impracncable; it would be entirely meaningless as well Whatever
the inlerprelallOn of the ba,JS and the nature of the validIty of the
ethical imperatives, It is certam that from them, as from the norms
for the concT'etely condItIOned conduct of the mdzv!dual, cultural
values cannot be unambiguously derived as bemg normatively desirable;
It can do so the less, the more mclusive are the values concerned
Only pos.tlve religions - or more precisely expressed: dOgIUatically
bound secls - are able to confer on the content of cullura! values the
status of unconditionally valid ethICal lmperat.ves Outside these
sects, cultural ideals which Ihe mdlVlduai w.shes to realize and ethical
obligations which he should fulfil do nol, m principle, share the same
stalus The fate of an epoch which has ealen of the tree of knowledge
is that it must know that we cannot learn the rneanmg of the
world from the results of Its analysis, be it ever so perfect, it must
rather be m a position to create thts meaning itself. It must recogmze
that general Views of lIfe and the unIverse can never be the
products of mcreasing empirIcal knowledge, and that the Jughest
Ideals, which move us most forcefully, are always formed only m the
struggle with other Ideals whlch are just as sacred to others as ours
are to US.I
Only an opttmisttc synC'retlsUl, such as is, at urnes, the product
of evolutionary-histoncal relallvlsm, can theoretically delude itself
about the profound senoU>ness of thIS sItuation or practically shirk
Its consequences It can, to be sure, be Just as oblIgatory subjectIvely
for the practIcal pohtICIan, in the IndIVIdual case, to medIate between
antagonistic points of v.ew as to take SIdes with one of them But
tIns has nothing whatsoever to do WIth scientific "objectivity"
SCIentIfically the um!ddle coursen lS not truer even by a halT's breadth,
than the most extreme party ,deals of the right or left Nowhere are
the interests of sc.enee more poorly served in the long ron than m
58 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
those situatIons where one refuses to see uncomfortable facts and the
realities of hfe in all their starkness The ATChzv WIll struggle relentlessly
against the severe self.decepl1on winch asserts that through
the synthesls of several party pomts of Vlew, or by following a line
between them, practical nonns of sczenttfic valzdtty can be amved at
It is necessary to do this because, since this plece of self.deception
tnes to mask its own standards of value ill re1ahvistlc terms.) 1t is
more dangerous to the freedom of research than the former naIve
fa,th of parties in the sCientific "demonstrability" of thelr dogmas
The capaclty to distinguish between empirical knowledge and valuejudgments,
and the fulfillment of the scientific duty to see the factual
truth as well as the practlcal duty to stand up for our own ideals
constItute the program to wluch we wish to adhere WIth ever lncreasmg
firmness
There is and always will be - and this is the reason that it
concerns us - an unbrIdgeable dIStmction among (I) those argu·
ments which appeal to our capacity to become enthusiast,c about
and our feelmg for concrete pracl1cal aims or cultural forms and
values, (2) those arguments in whIch, once it is a question of the
validlty of ethical norms, the appeal is dlrected to our conscience,
and finally (3) those arguments which appeal to our capacity and
need for analyhcally ordering empmcal realIty in a manner which
lays claim to valid.ty as empmcal truth Tins proposition remains
correct, despIte, as we shall see, the fact that those highest "values"
underlymg the practical interest are and always WIll be decisively
significant in deternuning the focus of attention of analytical act.vlt)
(oTdnende Taligktlt des Denkens) in the sph.re of the cultural sciences
It has been and remains true that a systematIcally correct
scientdic proof in the ~oclal sciences, if it IS to achieve its purpose,
must be acknowledged as correct even by a Chines.e - or - more
precisely stat.d - it mUst constantly slnoe to attain this goal, which
perhaps may not be completely attainable due to faulty data Furthermore,
the successful log.cal analysis of the content of an ideal
and its ulumate axioms and the dIScovery of the consequences which
arise from pursumg it, logically and practically, must also be val.d
for the Chinese At the same time, our Chinese can lack a "sense"
for our ethical imperative and he can and certainly often will deny
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 59
the ldeal itself and the concrete value-judgments derived from ,t
NeJther of these two latter attltudes can affect the scientific value of
the analysIs III any way Quite certaInly our Journal WIll not Ignore
the ever and tnevitably recurrent attempts to gIve an unambIguous
mterpretation to culture. On the contrary, these attempts themselves
rank wIth the most Important products of tlus cultural hie and,
under certam cIrcumstances, among Its dynanllc forces We Wlll
therefore constantly strIve to follow WIth care the course of these
dIScussIons of "SOCIal phIlosophy" (as here understood) We are fur~
thermore completely free of the prejudlce whlch a"erts that reflecnons
on culture whlch go beyond the analyslS of empincal data m
order to interpret the "orld metaphYSlcally can, because of theu
metaphysIcal character fulfil no useful cogninve tasks. Just what
these cogn,tive tasks are IS primanly an epistemologIcal questIon, the
answer to whIch we must and can, m VIew of our purpose. dIsregard
at thIS pomt There 15 one tenet to whIch we adhere most finnly in
our work, namely, that a social science Journal, ill our sense, to the
extent that It IS SClentzfic should be a place where those truths are
sought, whIch - to remain WIth our Illustration - can claIm, even
for a Chinese, the validIty appropriate to an analysIS of empirical
reahty
Of course, the edltors cannot once and for all deny to themselves
or therr contnbutors the POSS,blhty of expressmg m value-judgments
the ideals which motivate them However two important duties
arise in connectIOn with this First, to keep the readers and themselves
sharply aware at every moment of the standards by whIch they
Judge realIty and from whlch the value-Judgment 15 denved, instead
of, as happens too often, decelVmg themselves m the conflIct of
ideals by a value melange of values of the most ddferent orders
and types, and seeking to offer somethmg to everybody If this obllgation
15 ngorously heeded, the practIcal evaluatIve attitude can be
not only hannless to SCIentific interests but even dIrectly useful, and
mdeed mandatory In the scientlfic critlclSm of leglSlatlVe and other
practIcal recommendatIons, the motives of the legIslator and the Ideals
of the cntlc m all thelr scope often can not he c1anfied and analyzed
in a tangIble and mtellIglble form m any other way than through
the confrontation of the standards of value underlying the ldeas criti-
60 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
cized with others, preferably the cntic's own. Every meaningful
value-judgment about someone else's aspir4hons must be a criticism
from the standpoint of one's own Weltanschauung; it must be a struggle
agam.t anothe", ,deals from the standpoint of one's own If m a
particular concrete case, the u]tlmate value-axioms wruch underhe
practlcal actlvity are not only to be designated and sc,entUically
analyzed but are also to be shown In their relationship to other valueaxioms,
flpositiveU
criticism by means of a systematic exposltIon of
the latter IS unavOIdable
In the pages of this journal, especially m the discussion of legislallon,
there wlll inevItably be found social polICY, ie, the statement
of Ideals, in addition to social SClence, 1 e, the analysis of facts But
we do not by any means intend to present such discussions as "science"
and we will guard as best we can ag:unst allowing these two to be
confused with each other. In such dISCUSSions, terence no longer has
the floor For that reason, the second fundamental inlperative of
SCIentific freedom 15 that in such cases it should be constantly made
dear to the readers (and- agam we say it - above all to one's self!)
exactly at which point the scientd;c investigator becomes SIlent and
the evaluating and acllng person begin. to speak. In other words,
It should be made exphcit Just where the arguments are addressed
to the analytical understandmg and where to the sentlmenrs The
constant confuSJon of the scientific discussion of facts and the1r evalua·
tion is still one of the most Wldespread and also one of the most
damaging traIts of work in our field The foregomg arguments are
directed against this confUSIOn, and not agamst the clear-cut 1ntroduction
of one's own ideals into the discussion An attttude of moral
mdtfJerence has no connectlOn with sctentr,jic "objectiVlty" The
Archrv, at least in its mtentions, has never been and should never be
a place where poJenucs against certain currents in pohtics or social
policy are earned on, nor should It be a place where struggles are
waged for or agamst Ideals in pohbcs or soclal-pohcy There are
other journals for these purposes The pecuhar charactenstic of the
Journal has rather been from the very begtnning and, msofar as it 15
in the power of the edItOrs, shall continue to be that politIcal antagonists
can meet in 1t to carry on scientIfic work It has not been a
IISOClaJ1lit" organ hitherto and In thel future it shall not be "bourgeois 1)
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 61
It excludes no one from its r:rrcle of contnbutors who is wIllmg to
place himself Wlthin the framework of scientific discussIOn. It cannot
be an arena for "objecttons," replIes and rebuttals, but in its
pages no one will be protected, neither Its contributors nor its editors,
from being subjected to the sharpe't factual, scientific cntIcism
Whoever cannot bear thIS or who takes the viewpoint that he does
not wish to work, in the service of SCIentIfic knowledge, Wlth persons
whose other ideals are different (rom hIS own) lS frf.>e not to parhciM
pate.
However, we should not deceIve ourselves about it - this last
sentence means much more in practice than it seems to do at first
glance. In the first place, there are p'ychotogtcal lImIts everywhere
and especially In Germany to the possibility of coming together
freely with one's political opponents in a neutral forum, be it social
or intellectual Tlus obstacle which should be relentle"ly combatted
as a sign of narrow-minded party fanaticism and backward political
culture, is reenforced for a journaJ like oUrs through the fact that
~in SOCIal sciences the stimulus to the posing of sclentUic problems is
in actuality always given by practical "questions" Hence the very
recognition of the CXIstence of a scientlnc problem COInCIdes, personallv.
with the possCSSJon of specI1ically oriented mouves and values
A Joumal wluch has come into existence under the Influence of a
general interest in a concrete problem, will always include among ItS
contributors persons who are personally Interested In these problems
because certam concrete sltuabons seem to be incompanble with, or
seem to threaten. the realizatIOn of certain ideal values In which they
belIeve A bond of similar ideals will hold this circle of contrIbutors
together and it WlJl be the basis of a further recrmlmfnt This 10
turn wtll tend to gIVe the Journal, at least in its treatment of questions
of practical SOCIal poluy, a certain rlcharacter" which of course
inevitably accompanies every collaboratIOn of vigorously sensitive
persons whose evaluatIve standpoint regarding the problems cannot
be entIrely expressed even In purely theoretical analvslS; in the criticISm
of practIcal recommendations and measures it quite legitimately
finds expression - under the particular conditIOns above discussed
The ArchtU first appeared at a tIme in which certain practical aspect<
of the "labor problem" (as traditIonally understood) stood In the
62 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
forefront of socIal SCIence dIScusSions. Those persons for whom the
problems wluch the Archw Wlshed to treat were bound up wIth
ultunate and decisIve value-Judgments and who on that account became
Its most regular contributors also espoused at the same time
the view of eulture wluch was strongly mfluenced by these valueJudgments.
We all know that though tbs Journal, through Its expltot
self-restnctlOD to "scientIfic" dISCUSSIons and through the express mv!tatlon
to the "adherents of all pohncd,l standpoInts," defiled that It
would pursue a certam "tendency," It nonetheless possessed a "character"
m"the above sense This "character" was created by the group
of its regular contributors In general they were men who, what~
ever may have been other dIvergences In theu points of VIew, set as
their goal the protectIOn of the phySIcal wcll-bemg of the labonng
masses and the increase of the latters' ~hare of the matenal and intellectual
values of our culture As a means, they employed the combinatIon
of state interventIOn Into the arena of matenal mterests
WIth the freer shaping of the eXIstIng polItical and legal order
Whatever may have been their opmIOn as to the form of the social
order 1Il the more remote future - for tlie present, they accepted the
emergent trends of the capitalist system, not because they seemed better
than the older fonns of sOCIal organizatIOn but because they seemed
to be practIcally mevltable and because the attempt to wage a fundamental
struggle agaInst It appeared to hmder and not aid the cultur~l
rise of the workmg class In the situatIOn which exIsts In Gennany
today - we need not be more specIfic- at thlS pomt - thIS was not
and is not to be avoided. Indeed, it bore duect fnnt m the success~
ful many-sldedness of the partIcipation in the sClentlfic dISCUSSIon and
It constituted a SOUrce of strength for the journal; under the given
circumstances It was perhaps even one of Its c1alIDS to the lUstlfi..
cahon for Jts exJStence.
There can be no doubt that the development of a IIcharacter/'
In this senseI In a SCIentific Journal can constItute a threat to the
freedom of sCIentIfIc analySIS, It really does amount to that when
the selection of conwbutors IS purposely one-SIded. In this case the
cultlvatlon of a lIcharacter" in a Journal is practically eqUivalent to
the existence of a Iltendency" The editors are aware of the responslbIhty
whIch this SItuation Imposes upon them They propose neIther
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 63
the dehberate transfonnation of the character of the Archw nor its
amficIal preservation by means of a careful restrictIOn of the contnbutors
to scholars of certam defirute party loyalties They accept
it as gIven and awaIt r15 further "development." The fann which it
takes m the future and the modIfications wlucb It may undergo as a
result of the ineVltable broadening of its cucle of contnbutors w:tll
depend primarily on the character of those persons who, seeking to
serve the cause of SCIence, enter the CIrcle and become or remain
frequent contributors. It will be further affected by the broadenmg
of the problems, the advancement of wluch lS a goal of the journal.
With these remarks we come to the questIon on which we have
not yet touched, namely, the factual delimitation of our field of
operations No answer can, however, be given Wlthout raising the
question as to the goal of soCtal SClence knowledge m general When
we distinguished in prinCIple between "value-Judgments" and "em_
pirical knowledge," we presupposed the eXistence of an unconditlOn~
ally valid type of knowledge m the SOCIal sciences, ie, the analytical
ordering of empincal SOCIal reality ThlS presuppOSll1on now becomes
our problem in the sense that we must dISCUSS the meaning
of objectIvely uvahdu
truth m the social SCIences The genuineness
of the problem is apparent to anyone who IS aware of the confuct
about methods, "fundamental concepts" and presupposItions, the
incessant shift of "viewpOInts," and the continuous redefinition of
uconcepts" and who sees that the theoretical and lustoncal modes of
analysis are still separated by an apparently unbridgeable gap. It
Coositutes, as a despaInng VIennese exammee once sorrowfully complained,
Cltwo SCIences of economics" What is the meanmg of "obJectlVlty"
in this context? The followmg dlScussion WIll be devoted
to this questIon
III
This Journal has from the beginning treated SOCIal-economic data
as ItS subject-matter Although there lS httle point in entering here
mto the defirul10n of terms and the delineation of the proper boundaries
of the varIOUS sciences, we must nonetheless state bnefly what
we mean by this.
Mo.t roughly expressed, the basIC element in all those phenomena
64 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
which we call, in the widest sense, "social-economic" is constItuted
by the fact that our physical eXIStence and the satisfacllon of our most
ideal needs are everywhere confronted with the quantitatIve lllmls
and the quahtative madequ'lcy of the necessary external means, so
that their satISfaction reqwres planful provision and work, struggle
with nature and the assoCJal1on of human bemgs The quality of an
event as a "socIal·economic" event is not something wIDch It possesses
"obJectively" It is rather conditioned by the onentation of
our cognitive interest, as It arIses from the specIfic cultural signIficance
which we attribute to the partIcular event In a given case.
Wherever those aspects of a cultural event wluch constItute Its spe·
cHic significance for us are connected with a socIal-economic event
either dIrectly or most mdirectly, they involve, or at least to the ex-
)
tent that this connection exists, can involve a problem for -the social
sciences By a sodal science problem, we mean a task for a discipline
the object of which is to throw light on the ramllicatlOns of
that fundamental social-economic phenomenon the scarcity of means
Withm the total range of SOCIal-economIc problems, we are now
able to dIstinguISh events and constellations of nonns, lnStitutlODS,
etc J the economic aspect of wluch constitutes their pnmary cultural
SIgnificance for us. Such are, for example, the phenomena of the
stock exchange and the banking world, which, in the malO, mterest
us only m thIS respect This w1l1 be the case regularly (but not exclusively)
when mstitutions are involved which were deliberately
created or used for economic ends. Such objects of our knowledge
we may ca]] "economic" events (or insutuuons, as the case may be)
There are other phenomena, for mstance, relIgious ones, which do
not interest us, or at least do not pnmanly mterest us- with respect
to their economic SIgnificance but whIch, however, under certain circumstances
do acqUIre signIficance In this regard because they have
consequences whIch are of mterest from the economIC point of view
These we shall call "economically relevant" phenomena Fmally
there are phenomena which are not "economIc" in our sense and the
econOIlllC effects of which are of no, or at best shght, interest to us
(e g, the developments of the artistIc taste of a period) but wh'ch
m individual instances are In their tum mOre or less strongly mfluenced
m certain important aspects by economic factors such as,
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 65
for lDstance, the social stratification of the artistically interested public,
We shall call utese "cconOlmcally condllioned phenomena," The constellation
of human relationships, norms, and normatively determined
conduct which we call the "state" is for example in its fiscal aspects,
an ueconomic" phenomenonJ msofar as it influences economic life
through legislabon or otherwise (and even where other than economic
consIderations deliberately guide Its behavior), it is "economically
relevant." To the extent that its behavior in non-ueconoroic" affairs
is partly influenced by economic motives, It is CleconoIDJcaJJy conditIOned,"
After what has been said, it 18 self-evIdent that firstly) ,'the
boundary lines of ueconomicu phenomena are vague and not ea..sJ.1y
defined; secondly), the "economic" aspect of a phenomenon is by
no means only "econonucaUy conditioned" or only "economically
reJevantU
; thirdly), a phenomenon is ueconomic" only insofar as and
only as long as OUr mleresl is exclUSIvely focused on Its consbtubve
significance in the material struggle for existence
Like the SCIence of sociaI..econOlIDcs since Marx and Roscher, our
joumal is concerned not only with economIC phenomena but also
with those wtuch are "economlcally relevant" and 'teconomically
conditioned" The domain of such subjects extends naturally - and
varyingly lD accordance with the focus of our interest at the moment
- through the totality of cultural hfe SpeCIfically economic motives
- i e., motIves which, U1 their aspect most significant to us, are
rooted in the above-mentioned fundamental fact - operate wherever
the satisfaction of even the most inlmaterial need or desire IS bound
up with the application of scarce mateflal means TheIr force has
everywhere on that account condItioned and transformed not only
the mode in wluch cultural wants or preferences are sabsfied, but
theIr content as well, even In theIr most subjective aspects. The indIrect
influence of SOClai relaUons, institutions and groups governed
by "material interests" extends (often unconscIously) into all spheres
of culture WIthout exception, even into the finest nuances' of resthetic
and religious feeling The events of everyday life no less than the
~'historical" events of the higher reaches of pohlical life, collective
~and mass phenomena as well as the "indiVIduated" conduct of statesmen
and indiVIdual hterary and artistic aduevements are influenced
by it, They are "economically conditioned" On the other hand,
66 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
all the activities and situallons conslltullng an lustOrIcally gIven culture
affect the formation of the matenal wants, the mode of thClr
satlS(acllon, the mtegratlon of interest-groups and the types of power
whIch they exercIse They thereby affect the course of "economIc
development" and are accorchngly "econoIIllcally relevant" To the
extent that our SClence nnputes partIcular causes - be they eCOnOIDl(.
Dr non~econormc - to tconomu; cultural phenomena, it seeks "histoncar'
knowledge. Insofar as it traces a specific element of cultural
hfe (the economiC element rn Its cultural significance) through the
most dIverse cultural contexts, It IS makmg an historical mterpretatIon
from a specific pomt of view, and offering a parbal pIcture, a
prelIminary contnbutIon to a more complete historical knowledge of
culture
Social economIC problems do not eXist everywhere that an economic
event plays a role as cause or effect - since problem'S arne
onl~ where the Slgmficance of those factors is problematreal and can
be precISely determmed only through the applicallon of the methods
of social-economics. But despIte thisJ the range of social-economlc~
IS almost overwhelming.
After due consideration our Journal has generally excluded hitheIto
the treatment of a whole series of highly unportant special field.
in our discipline, such as desc.riptlve econonncs, econonuc rustory .in
v
the narrower sense, and statIstIcs It has lIkewise left to other Jour.
nals, the dIscussion of technical fiscal questlOns and the technical.
economic problems of prices and markets In the modem exchange
economy Its sphere of operatIOns has been the present signIficance
and the hlstorical development of certain conflIcts and constellatIons
of mterests which have arisen through the dominant role of mvest.
rnent-seekmg capItal m modern SOCIetIes It has not thereby restricted
Itself to those practical and hIStoncal problClDs which are designated
by the term Hthe SOCIal question" in Its narrower sense, 1 e, the place
of the modern working class in the present SOCial order Of course,
the SCIentific elaboratlon of the lnterest In this speCIal question which
became WIdespread in Gennany 1D the '80's, has had to be one of its
mam task,; The more the practIcal treatment of labor conditions
became a pennanent object of legislation and public discussion in
Gennany, the ,more ,the aCcent of SCIentIfic work had to be shIfted
: D "'"
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 67
to the analysis of the more universal dimensions of the problem It
had thereby to culminate in the, anal~sis of all the cultural problems
which have arisen from the pecuhar nature of the econonuc bases of
oUr culture and which are, m that ,ense, speCifically modern The
Journal soon began to deal historically, statisccally and theorellcally
with the most diverse., partly "econoIIllully relevant/' and partly
~'economically condiuoned" condit1.Qn9. of the. othe-r ~ea.t wcia,\ das.~~
of modem states and their interrelations We are only drawing the
conclusions of this policy when we state that the scienllfic investigation
of the general cultural Slgmficance of the soc!al-economic structure
of the human community and lis Iustoncal forms of organizacon
" tne central aim of our lournal This is what we mean when we
call our Journal the Archw fur Sozialwwenschaft The title lS Intended
to indicate the historical and theoretical treatment of the
same problems, the practical solutlon of which con'utut'" "social
policy" in the widest sense of this word. We thereby utilize the right
to apply the word "social" in the meaning which concrete presentday
problems give to it. If one wishes to call those disciplines wluch
treat the events of human life witn respect to their cultural Slgnificance
"cultural 'AC\en~;' then oocial sclence in our sense belongs in
that category, We shall soon see what are the logical unplicatlOns
of this
Undoubtedly the selection of the sOClal-economtc aspect of cultural
hfe signifies a very definite delimitatlOn of our theme It will
be said that tne economic, or as it has been inaccurately called, the
fCmatenalistic" point of view, from which culture is here bewg con·
sidered, is uone-sided U This is true and the one-sidedness 1S intentIonal
The belief that it is the task 01 sClentllic work to cure the
"one-sidedness" of the economic approach by broadenmg it into a
general social science suffers primanly from the weakness that the
usocia1'~ criterion (i.e J the reJatJonsbjps among persons) acquires
the specificity necessary for the delimitation of scientific problems,
only when it is accompanied by some substantive predlcate Otherwise,
a, the subject matter of a science, it would naturally comprehend
philology, for example, as well as church history and particularly
all those disciplines which concern themselves with the state which
IS the most important form of the normative regulation of cultural
68 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
life. The fact that soclal-economlcs concerns Itself with "social" relatIOns
is no more justificatIOn for regardmg it as the necessary precursor
of a "general social sCIence" than Its concern wIth vital phenomena
makes it a part of bIology, or its preoccupatlon wIth events on one
of the planets makes It a part of an extended and Improved astronomy
of the future. It is not the "actual" interconnectIOns of "thmgs"
but the conceptual interconnectIOns of problems which define the
Scope of the various sciences A new "science" emerges where new
problems are pursued by new methods and truths are thereby dlScovered
which open up SIgnIficant new pomts of view
It is now no accident that the teon "SOCIal" which seems to have
a qUIte general mednmg, turns out to have, as soon as one carefully
exarmnes its apphcation, a parlicular speCifically colored though often
indefinite I!leamng Its "generahty" rests on nothing but its ambIguity
It provides, when taken In Its lCgeneral" meaning, no specIfic
POint of view, from which the SIgnificance of gIven elements of culture
can be analyzed
Liberated as we are from the antiquated notion that all cultural
phenomena can be. deduced a. a product or function of the co".tcllation
of "mdtenal" interests, we belIeve nevertheless that the analysIS
of social and cultural phenomena w!lh speCial reference to their economic
condItIonmg and ranufications was a SCIentific pnnclple of
creative fruitfulness and with careful apphcalion and freedom from
dogmatIc restrictions, wLlI remam such for a very long time to cornell"
The so-called "matenalistic conceptlOn of hIstory" as a Weltanschauung
or as a fomlUla for the casual explanation of histoncal realIty IS
to be rejected most emphatically The advancement of the economIc
mterpretatlOn of history is one of the most important alms of our
journal Ths requIres further explanation
The so-called "materialistic conception of history" WIth the crude
elements of genius of the early form whIch appeared, for Instance,
m the Commumst Mamfesto sill! prevaIls only m the mmds of laymen
and ddettantes In these CIrcles one sliU finds the peculiar condItion
that their need for a casual explanatlOn of an rustoncal event
is never s~tIsfied until somewhere or somehow economic causes are
shown (or seem) to be operative. Where thIS however IS the case,
they content themselves with the most threadbare hypotheses and
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 69
the most general phrases smce they have then satisfied their dogmatic
need to beheve that the economic "facIor" is the ureal"· one, the
only u true" one, and the one which "in the last instance is everywhere
decisive" This phenomenon is by no means unique. Almost
all the sciences, from plulology to hiology have occasionally claimed
to be Ithe sources not only of speciali2ed sCIenufic knowledge but of
rrWeltnnschauungen'"' as well. Under the unpresSlon of the profound
cultural slgmficance of modern econOIIllC transfonnations and espeCIally
of the far-reaching ranufications of the "labor question," the
inevitable monistic tendency of every type of thought which is not
self-critical naturally follows this path
The same tendency IS now appearing in anthropology where the
political and commercial struggles of naUons for world dominance
are being fought with increasmg acuteness. There 15 a widespread
belief that "in the last analysis" all historical events are results of the
interplay of innate "racial qualities" In place of uncnucal descripbons
of .Inational characters," there emerges the even more uncritical
concoction of u social theones" based on the "natural sciencefJ," We
shall carefully follow the development of anthropolOgIcal research in
our Journal insofar as it is SIgnificant from our point of view. It is
to be hoped that the situation in which the casual explanation of
cultural events by the invocation of "racial characteristics" testifies
to our Ignorance - Just as the reference to the "milieu" Of, earher,
to rhe "conditions of the age" - Wlll be gradually overcome by reseanh
which is the fruit of systematic training If there IS anything
that has Iundered this type of research, it is the fact that eager dIlettantes
have thought that they could contnbute somethmg different
and better to our knowledge of culture than the broadening of the
posSlbihty of the sure imputation of indiVIdual concrete cultural
events occumng In hlstoncal reahty to concrete, hzstoncally given
causes through the study of preCIse empirical data which have been
selected from speCIfic points of view. Only to the extent that they
are able to do tlus, are their results of mterest to us ~nd only then
does "racial biology" become something more than a product of the
modem passion fOf foundmg new sCiences
The problem of. the significance of the economic interpretation
of Iustory IS the same If, followmg a penod of boundless over-
70 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
estimatIon, the danger now exists that its sCIentific value will be
underestimated, this IS the result of the unexampled naivete wIth
whIch the economic InterpretatIOn of reality was applIed as a lIuni_
versal" canon which explained all cultural phenomena - i e., all
those whIch are meamngful to us - as, In the last analysis, economic..
ally condItwned Its present logIcal form lS·not entrrely unambIguous
Wherever the stflCtly economIC explanation encounters difficultIes,
various devices are avaIlable for mamtaming Its general valIdIty as the
deCISIVe casual factor Sometimes every histoncal event which is not
explIcable by the invocatIon of economIC motIves IS regarded fOT that
veTy reason as a scientIfically msignificant "accIdent" At others, the
definitton of "econoffilc" is stretched beyond recogmtIon so that all
human mterests whIch are related In any way whatsoever to the use
of materIal means are mcluded in the defimtwn If it IS hIStorIcally
undeniable that dIfferent responses occur in two sItuations whIch are
economically IdentIcal - due to pohncal, rehgIous, clImatIc and
tountless other non-economic detenmnants - then in order to ma1Otain
the pnmacy of the economIC all these factors are reduced to
lustorically aCCIdental "condItIons" upon which the economic factor
operates as a "cause" It IS ObVIOUS however that all those factors
which are HacCldental" accordIng to the economIC mterpretatton of
hIstory follow theIr ov.n laws In the same sense as the economIC
factor From a point of view wluch traces the specific meamng of
these non-economIC factors, the eXIstrng economtc "conditJ.ons" are
"hlStorically acudental" In quite the same sense A favonte att'empt
. \
to preserve the supreme SIgnIficance of the economIC factor despIte
thIS conSISts 10 the interpretahon of the constant mteraction of the
mdIvidual elements of cultural bfe as a casual or functIOnal dependence
of one on the other, or rather of aU the others on one, namely,
the economIC element When a certain non-econoinic InstItution has
functroned for the benefit of certain economic class interests, as, for
example, where certam religious Institutions allowed themselves to
be and actually were used as "black police," the whole institutIOn is
conceived eIther as havmg been created lor this functIOn or - quite
metapbysically - as bemg impelled by a "developmental tendency"
emanating from the economic factor
It IS unnecessary nowadays to go mto detaIl to prove to the spe-
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 71
Clahst that this mterpretatIOn of the purpose of the economic analySIs
of culture 15 In part the expressIon of a certam historical constella~
tion which turned Its sCIentIfic interest towards certain econonlically
condIt!Oned ClilturaJ problems, and In part the rahid chauvimsm of
a specialized <iepartment of sCIence It IS clear that today it 1S anti.
quated at best. The explanatIon of everything by economic causes
alone IS never exhaustIve in any sense whatsoever in any sphere of
cultural phenCl'lllena, not even in the "economic" sphere Itself. In
pnncipJe, a bankmg history of a natLOn wluch adduces only economic
motives for e"planatory purposes is naturally just as unacceptable
as an explanal10n of the Sistine Madonna as a consequence of the
sOCIal-econolI1lc b""is of the culture of the epoch In which it was
created It IS no way more complete than, for instance, the explana~
tlon of capitahsm by reference to certain slufts in the content of the
relIgious ideas "'mch played a role In the genesis of the capitalistIc
attitude; nor Is It more exhaustIve than the explanatIon of a pohtical
structure from Its geograplucaJ' background In all of these cases,
the degrce of "gndicance which we are to attribute to economic fac_
tors is deCIded by the class of causes to which we are to impute
those specific elements of the phenomenon in question to wmch we
attach signIficance In gIven cases and III which we are mterested..
The justIfication of the one-SIded analysis of cultural reality from
speClfic Hpomts of VIew" - in our case WIth respect to Its econoIIDc
conditiornng - eJnerges purely as a technIcal expedient from the
fact that trainIng m the observation of the effects of qualItatIvely
sImilar categones of causes and the repeated utilizatton of the same
scheme of concepts and hypotheses (begTlffhch-methodlSchen Apparates)
offers all the advantages of the dIVIsion of labor It is f",e
from the charge of arbitrariness to the extent that It is successful In
producing inSights into mterconnectiOns WhlCh have been shown to
be valuable for the casual explanation of concrete historical events.
However - the "one-Sidedness" and the unreality of the purely economic
interpretatIon of hIStory is m general only a special case of a
prmciple which Is generally valid for the scientific knowledge of cultural
realIty The mam task of the dIScussion to follow IS to make
expliCIt the logical foundatlODS and the general methodological implIcatLOns
of tIus principle
72 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
There IS no absolutely '~obJectIve" sCIentIfic analysIs of cultureor
put perhaps more narrowly but certamly not essentially dIfferently
for our purposes - of "socIal phenomena" mdependent of speCial and
"one-sIded" viewpoints accordmg to whIch ~ expressly or taCItly, con..
sClOusly or unconsciously - they are selected, analyzed and orgaD.ized
for expOSItory purposes The reasonS for thIS he In the character
of the cognItive goal of all research In SOCial SCIence whIch seeks to
transcend the purely formal treatment of the legal or convenllonal
nonns regulating socIal hfe
The type of SOCial SCIence in which we are interested is an empIrical
sczence of concrete realIty (Wzrkltchkettswlssenschaft) Ol}r aIm IS the
understandmg of the charactenstIc uniqueness of the reahty in whIch
we move We wish to understand on the one hand the relatIOnshIps
and the cultural sigmficance of mdividual events in theIr contemporary
manIfestatIons and on the other the causes of theIr bemg
histoncally so and not otherWIse Now, as sOOn as we attempt to
reflect about the way In whIch hfe confronts us In ImmedIate concrete
Situations, It presents an mfimte mulllpllClty of successively and
coexlstently emergmg and dlsappeanng events, both IIWIthm" and
"outside" ourselves The absolute infimtude of thIS multIphcIty is
seen to remam UndImID1shed even when our attentIOn 15 focused on
a single "object," for mstance, a concrete act of exchange, as soon as
we senously attempt an exhaustive descnptlon of all the mdlvidual
components of this "mdIVldual phenomena," to say nothmg of explaming
It casually All the analysIS of mfimte reahty which th~
finite human mmd can conduct rests on the taCIt assumption that
only a fimte portion of thIS reahty constItutes the object of sCIentific
investIgation, and that only it is "Important" in the sense of bemg
"worthy of bemg known." But what are the critena by whIch thIS
segment is selected? It has often been thought that the deCISIve
cnterion in the cultural SCIences, too, was in the last analysIS, the
"regular" recurrence of certaIn casual relationships The ulaws"
whIch we are able to perceIve In the mfinitely mamfold stream of
e"ents must - accordmg to thIS conceptIon - contam the scientifically
~'essentIal" aspect of realIty As soon as we have shown some
causal reltaionship to be a l'law," Ie, If we have shown it to be uni~
versally vahd by means of comprehensive histoflcal InductlOn or have
_"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
made it immediately and tangibly plausible according to our subJective
expenence, a great number of sinular cases order themselves
under the formula thus attained Those elements 10 each indlVldual
event which are left unaccounted for by the selectIon of their elements
subsumable under the "law" are considered as sClcntlfically umntegrated
residues which will be taken cale of in the further perfection
of the system of "laws" Alternatively they will be Vlewed as "accidental"
and therefore scientdically unimportant because they do not
fit into the structure of the "law"; 10 other words, they are not typical
of the event and hence can only be the objects of u1dle curiOSity II
Accordmgly, even among the followers of the HlStoncal School we
contmually find the attitude which declares that the ideal which all
the sciencesJ includIng the cultural sciences, serve and towards which
they should strive even in the remote future is a system of propositions
from wruch reality can be "deduced" As IS well known, a leading
natural scientist beheved that he could deSignate the (factually
unattainable) ideal goal of such a treatment of cultural reality as a
sort of U astronomteal" knowledge.
Let US not, for our part, spare ourselves the trouble of examining
these matters more closely - however often they have already been
discussed The first thmg that impresses one 18 that the "astronomical"
knowledge which was referred to is not a system of laws at all
On the contrary, the laws which it presupposes have been taken from
other disciplines like mechanics But it too concerns itself with the
question of the indwidual consequence wruch the working of these
laws in an unique configurahon produces, since it is these individual
configurations wruch are signzficant for us Every indiVldual constellation
wruch it "explams" or predicts is causally exphcable only as
the consequence of another equallyindividual constellation which has
preceded it As far hack as we may go into the grey mist of the faroff
past, the reahty to which the laws apply always remams equally
Indw.dual, equally undeduc.ble from laws A cosmic "primeval
state" which had no individual character or less indIvidual character
than the cosmic reahty of the present would naturally be a meaningJess
notion But is there not some trace of SimIlar ideas m our field
in those propositions sometnnes derived from natural law and sometimes
verified by the observatiOn of "primitives," concerning an
74- "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
economic-social "primeval state" free from hIstorical uacc1dents," and
characterized by phenomena such as "pnmltIve agranan communism,"
sexual "promiscUlty," etc, from which IndIvIdual hIstorical development
emerges by a sort of fall from grace into concreteness?
The socIal-scientIfic interest has Its pomt of departure, of course,
in the real.. i e., concrete, indivIdually-structured configuratIOn of our
cultural life In 115 universal relationships whIch are themselves no
less indIvidually-structured, and In Its development out of other SOCIal
cultural conditIOns, which themselves are ObVIOusly hkewise IndIVIdually
structured It is clear here that the sItuatIon which we dlustrated
by reference to astronomy as a hmitmg case (whIch IS regularly
drawn on by logicians for the same purpose) appears in a more
accentuated fonn Whereas in astronomy, the heavenly bpd1es are
of interest to us onl~ In theIr quanlltalw. and exact aspects, the
qualztatwc aspect of phenomena concerns us In the social sciences
To this should be added that m the SOCIal sciences we are concerned
with psychological and intellectual (geUltg) phenomena the empatluc
understanding of which is naturally a problem of a specifically different
type from those which the schemes of the exact natural SCIences
in general can or seek to solve Despite that, this dIstInctIOn in
.itself is not a distinction in principle} as It seems at first glance
Aside from pure mechanics, even the exact natural sciences do not
proceed without qualitative categones Furthennore, In our own
field we encounter the idea (whIch IS obviously distorted) that at
least the phenomena characteristIc of a money~economy - whICh are
baSIC to our culture - are quantifiable and on that account subject
to fonnulation as "laws" Fmally It depends on the hreadth or narrowness
of one's definition of "lawn as to whether one will also
include regulanlles which because they are not quantifiable are not
subject to numerical analysis Especially insofar as the mfluence of
psychological and intellectual (geshg.) factors is concerned, It does
not in any case exclude the establishment of rules govemmg rational
conduct Above all, the pomt of view stIll persIsts whIch clamIS that
the task of psychology is to play a role comparable to mathematics
for the Getsteswissenschaften in the sense that it analyzes the complicated
phenomena of social life into their psychic condillons and
effects, reduces them to their most elementary poSSIble psychIc factors
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 75
and then analyzes their functional interdependences Thereby, a sort
of "chemistryl1 If not "mechamcs" of the psyc.hic foundations of SOCIal
life would be created Whether such mvesllgatlOns can produce
valuable and-what IS somethmg else-useful results for the cultural
SCIences, we cannot decIde here But thIS would be Irrelevant
to the question as to whether the aun of social-econo11llc knowledge
m OUf sense, 1 e, knowledge of realtty WIth respect to Its cultural
Slgmficance and its casual relationships can be attamed through the
quest for recurrent sequences. Let us assume that we have succeeded
by means of psychology- or otherwhe in analyzing all the observed
and ~agtnable relatlOnshlps of social phenomena mto some ultImate
elementary "factors/' that we have made an exhaustIve analysis and
classificatIOn of them and then formulated rigorously exact laws covering
thelT behavlOr-What would be the sigmficance of these results
for our knowledge of the hlStoncally given culture or any indIVIdual
phase thereof, such as capitalism, in its development and
cultural SIgnIficance? As an .analytical tool, It would be as useful
as a textbook of organic chemical combmatlOns would be for our
knowledge of the biogenetic aspect of the animal and plant world.
In each case, certamly an =portant and useful prelunmary step
would have been taken In neither case can concrete reality be dedUled
from "laws" and "factors" This is not because some higher
mysterious powers reside m living phenomena (such as "dommants)"
lIente1echies/' or whatever they might be called) ThIS, however,
a problem in Its own right The real reason is that the analysis
of realIty is concerned \1<,th the configuratIOn mto which those (hypothetical
l ) "factors" are arranged to fonn a cultural phenomenon
which lS hlstoncaliy sigmficant to us Furthermore, If we WISh
to "explam" this indlvIdual configuratIon "causally" we must invoke
other equally mdiVldual configuration~ on the baSIS of which
we WIll explam it With the aid of those (hypothetIcal!) "laws"
The detennination of those (hypothetIcal) 1C1aw~" and "factors"
would in any case only be the first of the many operatIOns which
would lead us to the deSIred type of knowledge. The analysis of the
hIstorically gIven IndIVIdual configuratIOn of those cefactors" and their
slgll1{icant concrete_interaction) condltioned by thelI m'E.tQncal conte"t
and espeCially the rendenng zntell.g.ble of the basis and type of
76 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
,
tlus significance would be the next task to be achieved. This task
must be achieved, It IS true, by the utilization of the preliminary
analysis but it is nonetheless an entirely new and dr.stinct task. The
tracing as far mto the past as pOSSible of the individual features of
these historically evolved configurations which are contemporaneously
SIgnificant, and their histoncal explanation by antecedent and equally
mdlvidual configurations would be the tlurd task Finally the predIction
of possible future constellations would be a conceivable fourth
task.
For all these purpose" clear concepts and the knowledge of
those (hypothellcal) "laws" are obviously of great value as heuristic
means - but only as such Indeed they are quite indispensable for
this purpose But even :m thIS function theIr hmitabQns become evident
at a decisive point In statmg this, we arrive at the decisive
feature of the method of the cultural sciences We have designated
as "cultural sCiences" those disciplmes which analyze the phenomena
of life in terms of their cultural significance The SIgnificance of a
configurallon of cultural phenomena and the basis of tlus significance
cannot however be derived and rendered intelhgIble by a system of
analytical laws (GesetzesbegTlften), however perfect It may be, SInce
the signIficance of cultural events presupposes a value·onentatlon
towards these ,events The concept of culture IS a value-concept
EmpIrical reality becomes "culture" to us because and Insofar as we
relate it to value ideas It mcludes those segments and only those
segments of reality which have become SIgnificant to us because of
thIS value-relevance Only a small portion of existing concrete
reality IS colored by our value-conditioned interest and it alone is
significant to us It 15 significant because it reveals relationships
whIch are important to us due to their connection with our values
Only because and to the extent that this is the case is it worthwhile
for us to know It In its mdIvidual features We cannot discover,
however, what is meaningful to us by means of a "presuppositionless"
investigation of empincal data Rather perception of its meaningfulness
to us is the presupposition of its becoming an object of investigation
Meamngfulness naturally does not coincide with-laWll as
such, and the more general the law the less the coincidence. For the
specific meamng which a phenomenon has for us is naturally not to
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 77
be found in those relatlonships which it shares WIth many other
phenomena.
The focus of attention on reahty under the guidance of values
wluch lend it significance and the selection and ordering of the phenomena
wluch are thus affected in the light of their cultural sigmficanee
IS entirely different from the analysis of reality In terms of
laws and general concepts Neither of these two types of the analySIS
of reality has any necessary log.cal relationship With the other They
can coincide in individual Instances but It would be most dISastrous
if their occasional coinCidence caused us to dunk that they were not
distinct tn pnnclple The cultural ngmficance of a phenomenon,
e g., the sigmficance of exchange in a money economy, can be the
fact that It exISts on a Ihass scale as a fundamental component of
modem culture.' But the historical fact that it plays thiS role must
be causally explamed m order to render Its cultural significance
understandable The analysIS of the general aspects 01 exchange and
the technique of the warket IS a - highly !!Dpomnt and indispensable
- prel.minary task. For not only does thIS type of analysis leave
unanswered the question as to how exchange historically acquired its
fundamental Significance in the modern world, but above all else,
the fact With wluch we are prhnardy concerned, namely, the cultdral
slgmficance of the money..economy, for the sake of which we are
interested In the descriptlon of exchange teChnique and for the sake
of wluch alone a SCIence elmts wh.ch deals Wlth that technique - is
not derivable frOID any "law II The genenc features of exchange,
purchase, etc, interest the Jurist -but we are concerned WIth the
analysis of the cultural SIgnificance of the concrete hlStoncal fact that
today exchange exIsts on a ma"" scale When we reqUIre an explanation,
when we wish to understand what distmgUlshes the socialeconolDIC
aspects of our culture for It\Stance from that of antiquity in
which exchange showed precisely the same genenc traIts as It does
today and when we raise the question as to where the Slgmficance
of "money economy" hes, logIcal principles of qUIte heterogeneous
denvation enter into the lnvesllgatlon We will apply those concepts
with which we are proVided by the investlgation of the general features
of economIC mass pheno:rnena - Indeed, msofar as they are
relevant to the meaningful aspects of our culture, we shaH use them
78 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
as means of exposition. The gaal of our investIgation is not reached
. through the exposition of those laws and concepts, precise as it may
be. The queshon as to what should be the object of uruven;al conceptualization
cannot be deCIded "presupposltlonlessly" but only with
reference to the sIgmficance whIch certain segments of that infinite
multiphcIty which we caU ucornmerce" have for culture We seek
knowledge of an histoncal phenomenon, meanmg by historical: significant
in Its mdlVIduality (Elgenart). And the declSlve element m
this is that only through the presupposItIon that a finite part alone
of the mfinite varIety of phenomena IS sigmficant, does the knowledge
of an individual phenomenon become lOgically meaningful Even
wIth the WIdest unagmable knowledge of "laws," we are helpless m
the face of the question how IS the causal explanatwn of an mdwtd.
ual fact possible - SIDce a descnptwn of even the smallest slice of
rea1lty can never be exhaustive? The number and type of causes
which have influenced any gIVen event are always mfinite and there IS
nothing in the thmgs themselves to set some of them apart as alone
meriting attention A chaos of HeXlstential Judgments" about countless
indlVldual events would be the only result of a serIOUS attempt to
analyze reality "WJthout preSUppOSItIons n And even this result is
only seemIngly possIble, smce every smgle perceptIon dIscloses on
closer examination an infinite number of constituent perceptions
which can never be exhaustively expressed in a judgement. Order
is brought mto this chaos only on the condItion that in every case
only a part of concrete reahty 15 lnterestmg and sigmficant to us, because
only It IS related to the cultural values WIth which we approach
reality Only certam sides of the infimtely complex concrete phenomenon,
namely those to wrnch we attrIbute a general cultural SIgnIficance
- are therefore worthwhile knowmg They alone are objects
of causaJ expJanatIon And even thlS causal explanation evinces the
same character, an exhaustwe causal mvestigation of any concrete
phenomena in Its full reality is not only practIcally unposSlble - it is
SImply nonsense. We select only those causes to wrnch are to be
imputed in the mvidlUal case" the uessentlal" feature of an event
Where the indiViduality of a phenomenon IS concerned, the question
of causality is not a question of laws but of concrete causal relationshf.ps~
jt is not a questiOl1. of the subsumpuon of the event under some
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 79
general rubric as a representative case but of its imputation as a
consequence of some constellation It is in brief a question of imputation
Wherever the causal explanation of a "cultural phenomenon
- an "historical mdlvidual" (2) IS under consideration, the
knowledge of cau,al laws is not the end of the investigation but only
a means It facilitates and rende", possIble the causal Imputation
to theIr concrete causes of those components of a phenomenon the
indiVIduality of which IS culturally significant. So far and only so
far as it achIeves thIs, IS It valuable for our knowledge of concrete
relatIonships And the more '<general/, 1 e, the more abstract the
laws, the less they can contribute to the causal ImputatIOn of mdtvldual
phenomena and, more ,ndirectly, to the understanding of the
significance of cultural events .
What is the consequence of all tIDS?
Naturally, it does not Imply that the knowledge of unwersal
propositions, the construction of abstract c.oncepts, the knowledge of
regulantles and the attempt to fonnulate "laws" have no scientific
justificatIOn in the cultural SCIences QUIte the contrary, If the causal
)mowledge of the IDstorians wnsi,ts of the imputation of concrete
effects to roncrete causes, a valzd imputatIOn of any indlVldual effect
WIthout the applicatIon of unomologtcal" knowledge: -1 e J the knowl~
edge of recurrent causal seqUEnces - would in general be impossible
Whether a sl:r..gle individual component of a relatIonship is, in a con~
crete case, to be assigned causal responsibility for an effect, the causal
explanation of which is at issue, can 10 doubtful cases be de.tennme.d
only by estImating the effects which we generally expect from It and
from the -other components of the same complex which are relevant
to the explanation In other words, the ttadequaten effects of the
causal elements involved must be r;:onsidered in arriving at an)' suc.h
concluSIon The o<tent to which the hIStonan (io the widest sense
of the word) can perfonn this Imputlttlon 10 a reasonably certam ,
manner WIth hiS imagwatlon sharpened by pe",onal experience and
trained in analytic methods and the extent to whIch he must have
recourse to the aid of speCIal dIsciplines which make it possible, varies
(2)We wtll use the tertn WhLCh IS already occaJJonally used 10 the methodology
of our dtlC1.phne and wluch I.S now becomIng wLdespread m a more preCiSe
forumlabon in logic
80 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
wIth the mdivIdual case. Everywhere, however, and hence also in
the sphere of complicated economic processes, the more certain and
the more comprehensive our general knowledge. the greater is the
certamty of imputatlon This propoSItIon is not 10 the least affected
by the fact that even 10 the case of all so-called "economic laws"
\Yithout exception, we are concerned here not Mth uJaws" m the
narrower exact natural SClence sense, but Wlth adequate causal relationships
expressed in rules and with the application of the category
of "objectIve pOSSIbility" The establJshment of such regulantles i.
not the end but rather the means of knowledge It i. entirely a question
of expediency, to be settled separately for each indIvidual case,
whether a regularly recurrent causal relatlOnship of everyday experience
should be fonnuJated mto a "law," Laws are important and
valuable in the exact natural sciences~ in the measure that those
sCIences are unwersally valid For the knowledge of historical phenomena
in their concreteness, the most general laws, because they
are most devoid of content are also the least valuable The more
comprehensive the validIty, - or scope ~ of a tenn, the more It leads
us away from the richness of realIty Smce m order to include the
common elements of the largest possible number of phenomena, it
must necessarily be as abstract as possible and hence deVOId of content
In the cultural SCIences, the knowledge of the umversal or
general IS never valuable in itself.
The conclusion which follows from the above is that an "objectlve"
analysis of cultural events, whIch proceeds accordmg to the
thesIS that the ideal of sCIence is the reduction of empIrical rcallty
of "laws," IS meanmgless It is not meaningless, as is often maina
tamed, because cultural or psychiC events for instance are "obJeclIvely"
less governed by laws It is meaningless for a number of
other reasons FIrstly, because the knowledge of social laws is not
knowledge of social reality but is rather one of the various aids used
by our minds for attaming tlus end; secondly, because knowledge of
cultural events IS inconceivable e~cept on a basIS of the szgntficance
whIch the concrete con,tellations of reallty have for us m certam
mdWEdual concrete situations In WhlCh sense and 1fi whIch situabons
this is the case is not revealed 10 us by any law, it is decided a~cord.
109 to the value-ideas in the lIght of which we view "culture" 10 each
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 8\
mdividual case "Culture" is a fimte segment of the meamngless mfimty
of the world process, a segment on whIch human bemgs confer
meanmg and slgmficance ThIS is true even for the human being
who Vle1;lj"S a pal ttGular culture as a mortal enemy and who <;eeks to
"return to nature" He can attam thIS pomt of VIew only after viewing
the culture in wh,ch he hves from the standpomt of his values,
and findmg It "too soft" This IS the purely 10gIcal-fonnal fact wh,ch
lS m....ol..ed when Yoe speak of the logiCally necessary rootedness
of aU mstoncal entitIes (hzslonsche Indivzduen) m lIevaluatlve Ideas»
The transcendental presuppOSItIOn of eV2ry cultural selena lies not
III our findmg a certam culture or any "culture" in general to
be valuable but rather m the fact that we are cultural beings, endo"
ed wlth the capaclty and the will to take a delIberate attitude
towards the world and to lend It Slgmficance Whatever tlus signifi·
cance may be, It wdl lead us to Judge certam phenomena of human
existence In. ,ts 1Ight and to respond to them as being (posItively
or negatively) meamngful Whatever may be the content of
th,s attitude - these phenomena have cultural .ignificance for us
and on this sIgnificance alone rests its SCIentific mterest Thus when
we 'peak here of the condItioning of cultural knowledge through
evaluatIVe ideas (Wert.deen) (following the terminology of modem
logic), it is done m the hope that we will n.ot be subject to crude
InIsunderstandmgs such as the opmion that cultural significance
should be attnbuted only to valuable phenomena Prostitution is a
cultural phenomenon Just as much as rehgion or money AIl three
are fuhural phenomena only because and only Insofar as their exist~
mec and the form whIch they hIStOrIcally assume touch dIrectly or
mdlrectly on our cufturaf mterests and arouse our striving for knawl~
edge concerrung problems brought mto focus by the evalu~tlVe Ideas
which givc Slgmficance to the fragment of realIty analyzed by those
loncepts ,
All knowledge of cultural realtty, as may be seen, is always knowledge
from paTtlcular pomts of Vlf'W When we reqUIre from the hiStOrIan
and social research worker as an elementary presupposItion
that they dIStIngUIsh the Important from the tnvlal and that he
'1hould ha\lc the necessary ~lpomt of view" for thiS dIstinctIon, We
mean that they must understand how to relate the e, ents of the real
82 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
world consciously or unconsCIously to universal "cultural values" and
to select out those relationships wluch are sIgmficant for us If the
notion that those standpomts can be denved from the "facts themselves"
contInually recurs, it is due to the naIve self~deeeptlOn of the
specialIst who IS unaware that It 15 due to the evaluatIve Ideas with
wh,ch he unconsciously approaches hIS subject matter, that he has
selected from an absolute infimty a tmy portIon wIth the study of
wluch he concerns lumself In connectIon with thiS selectIon of mdIVIdual
speCIal Uaspects" of the event which always and everywhere
occurs, conscIOusly or unconscIOusly, there also occurs that element
of cultural-SCIentIfic work wluch is referred to by the often-heard
assertion that the "personal" element of a scientific work 15 what IS
really valuable 10 It, and that personahty must be expressed ill every
work If It CXlstence IS to be JustIfied To be sure, Without the mvestigator's
evaluatIve Ideas, there would be no prinCIple of selection of
subject-matter and no meamngful knowledge of the concrete realIty.
Just as without the mvestigator's conviction regarding the slgmficance
of particular cultural facts, every attempt to analyze concrete reality
is absolutely meamngless, so the dltection of Ius personal belief, the
refraction of values 10 the prISm of his mind, glves dltectIOn to his
work. And the values to wh,ch the scientIfic geruus relates the object
of lus inquiry may detennine, 1 e , decide the "conception" of a whole
epoch, not only concernIng what 15 regarded as "vaJuable" but also
concerning what IS SignIficant or insignIficant, "unportant" or Clun_
important" in the phenomena
Accordmgly, cultural science In our sense mvolves "subJectIve"
presuppositions Insofar as It concerns Itself only With those components
of reahty wluch have some relationship, however indtrect, to
events to whIch we attach cultural szgmficance Nonetheless, It IS
entIrely causal knowledge exactly 10 the same sense as the knowledge
of SIgnificant concrete (mdzV!dueller) natural events WhIch have a
quahtatlve character Among the many confUSions which the overreachmg
tendency of a fonnal-Jumbc outlook has brought about ill
the cultural SCIences, there has recently appeared the attempt to
ureIute" the "materIalIstIC conceptJOn of hlsto.ry" by a series of clever
but fallacious arguments wluch state that smce all econorruc lIfe must
take place 10 legally or conventIOnally regulated forms, all economic
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOClAL SCIENCE 83
"developmertt" mllst take the (onn of stflvmg for the creation of new
legal fonns Hence, It is said to be intelligIble only through etlucal
maxIms and is on this account essentiall)' dtfferent from every twe
01 "natural" development Accordingly the knowledge 01 econOlnlC
development IS saId to be Uteleological" in character WIthout WIShing
to dISCUSS the meaning of the ambiguous tenn "development," or
the logically no less ambiguous tenn "teleology" In the socIal SCIences,
It should be stated that such knowledge need not be "teleologIcal" In
the sense assumed by tlus point 01 view. The cultural significance
of nonnallvely regulated legal relatzans and even nonns themselves
can undergo fundamental revolutionary changes even under condItions
of the lonnal Identity of the prevailing legal nonns. Indeed,
uone WIShes to Jose one's self for a moment in phantaSIes about the
future, one IUlght theoretically unagine, let us say, the "soClahzation
of the means of producuon" unaccompanied by any conSCIoUS "stnving"
towards thIS result, and without even the disappearance or addItJOn
of a single palagraph of cur legal code, the statistical frequency
01 certam legally regulated relationships might be changed lundamentally,
and in many cases, even disappear entIrely; a great number
01 legal norms mIght become practtcally meaningless and their whole
cultural Slgmficance changed beyond idenllficallon. De lege ferenda
dtSCUSSlOns may be justlfiably dIsregarded by the "matenahstlc conception
of history" !!lince its central proposition IS the indeed mevitable
change m the Slgmflcance of legal institutlons. Those who view the
parnstaking labor of causally understandmg histoneal realit)' as of
secondary lffiportance can dIsregard it, but It is impoSSlble to supplant
it by any type of "teleology" From our vlewpOlnt, llpurpose"
15 the conception of an effect which becomes a cause of an actlOD
Smce we take into account every cause which produces or can pro~
duce a significant elfect, we also consider tlus one Its specific slgmficance
consists only in the fact that we not only observe human conduct
but can and desire to understand It.
Undoubtedly, all evaluative Ideas are "subJectIve" Between the
"histOrIcal" interest in a family chronicle and that in the develop..
ment of the greatest cOIlceIvable cultural phenomena whIch were
and are common to a natIon or to mankind over long epochs, there
exists an infinite gradatIOn of '~significancen arranged into an order
84 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
which differs for each of us And they are, naturally, histOrically
vanable m accordance With the character of the culture and the
Ideas which rule men's mmds But It obVIously does not follow from
this that research In the cultural sciences can only have results whIch
are usub]ective" in the sense that they are valid for one pernon and
not for others Only the degree to which they mterest different persons
vaneS In other words, the choice of the object of mvestlgatlOn
and the extent or depth to which tIllS investigatIon attempts to penetrate
mto the infimte causal web, are detenmned by the evaluatIve
Ideas which dominate the mvestlgator and his age In the method
of Investigation, the gUldmg "pomt of view" is of great Importance
for the const1uchon of the conceptual scheme whIch wIll be used In
the mvestigation In the mode of their UJ8, however, the investJgator
IS obViously bound by the nonns of our thought Just as much here
as elsewhere For scientIfic truth is precISely what IS valid for all who
seek the truth.
However, there emerges from this the meanmglessness of the
idea whIch prevails occasionally even among hIstOrIans, narnely,
that the goal of the cultural sciences, however far It may be from
realization, is to construct a closed system of concepts, In which
reahty IS syntheslzed in some sort of permanently and unwersally
vahd clasSification and from which It can agam be deduced The
stream of Immeasurable events flows unendmgly towards eternity
The cultural problems whIch move men form themselves ever anew
and in different colors, and the boundarie; of that area m the mfinite
stream of concrete events whIch acquires meaning and signIficance
for us, ) e, wluch becomes an "hlStoncal IndIVIdual," are constantly
subject to change The mtellectual contexts from which It is viewed
and sCientifically analyzed shift The points of departure of the cultural
sciences remam changeable throughout the lirmtless future as
long as a Chinese oSSIfication of mtellectual life does not render mankmd
mcapable of settmg new questIons to the eternally mexhaUStlble
flow of life A systematic science of culture, even only in the sense
of a defimtive, obJeCtlvely valid, systematic fixatIOn of the problems
which It should treat, would be senseless in Itself Such an attempt
could only produce a collectIOn of numerous, specifically particularized,
heterogeneous and disparate viewpoints m the I1ght of which
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 85
reality becomes "culture" through being significant in its unique
character.
Having now completed this lengthy dIScussIOn, we can finally
tum to the questIOn whIch IS methodolog,cally relevant 10 the consIderation
of the "obJectIvIty" of cultural knowledge The questIon
is' what is the log>cal function and structure of the concepts wluch
our science, like all others, uses;> Restated with specIal reference to
the decisIve problem, the question IS what IS the Significance of
theory and thoorebcal conceptuahzatlon (theorehsche Begnf]slnldung)
for our knowledge of cultural reabty?
Economics was ongmally - as we have already seen - a "teeh~
nique," at least in the central focus of its attention By this we
mean that 1t '"ewed reahty from an at le""l ()';ten"bly unambl'guoU'l
and stable practIcal evaluatIve standpOint namely, the mcrease of
the "wealth" of the populatIOn It was on the other hand, from the
very beg1Onmg, more than a "technique" smce It was integrated into
the great scheme of the natural law and ratIOnalIstic Weltanschauung
of the eighteenth century. The nature of that Wel'anschauung with
its optImistic faIth In the theoretIcal and practical rationalizability
of reality had an =portant consequence insofar as It obstructed the
dIScovery of the problemallC character of that standpomt which had
been assumed as self-evIdent As the rational analysIS of socIety
arose in dose connection With the modem development of natural
science, so it remamed related to it in its whole method of approach
In the natural SCiences, the practlc~l evaluative attitude toward what
was immediately and technicalIy useful w~s closely associated from
the very first WIth the hope, taken over as a heritage of anhqUlty and
further elaborated, of attaining a purely lIobjel-tive" (I.e, independent
of all 10dlvldual cont1Ogencies) momsbc knowledge of the total·
ity of reahty HI a conceptual system of metaphYSIcal valtd,ty and math·
emabcal form. It was thought that thIS hope could be realIzed by
the method of generalizing abstraction and the fonnulation of laws
based on empincal analysIS. The natural sciences whIch were bound
to evaluatIve standpomts, such as clmical medicme and even more
what is conventionally called "technology" became purely practical
"arts" The values for which they strove, e g, the health of the
patlent, the technical perfectIon of a concrete productive process,
86 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
etc., were fixed for the time being for all of them The methods
which they used could only consist in the apphcation of the laws
formulated by the theoretical dIsciplines Every theoretical advance
In the construction of these laws was or could also be an advance
for the practical disciplines. With the end gIVcn, the progressive
reduction of concrete practical questIons (e g, a case of Illness, a
technical problem, etc.) to special cases of generally valId laws,
meant that extensIOn of theoretIcal knowledge was closely assoCIated
and Identical WIth the extenSIon of techmcal-practical pos-
SIbilities
When modern biology subsumed those aspects of reality whIch
mterest us hzstoTlcally, ie, In all their concreteness, under a umversally
valid evolutionary principle, whicb at least had tbe appearance
- but not the actuahty - of embracing everythmg essential about
tbe subject 'in a scheme of unhersally valid laws, this seemed to be
the final tWIlIght of all evaluatIve standpoints in all the sciences For
smce the so-called historical event was a segment of the totality of
reality, SInce the prInCIple of causahty which was the presupposition
of all scientific work, seemed to require the analYSIS of all events into
generally valid "laws," and In view of the overwhelming success of
the natural sciences which took tlus idea senously, It appeared as If
there was m general no conceIvable meamng of sdentific work other
than the discovery of the laws of events. Only those aspects of phenomena
which were involved in the "laws" could be essential from
the scientIfic pomt of view, and concrete "lOdlvidual" events could
be considered only as "types," 1 e, as representative illustratIOns of
laws. An interest in such events 10 themselves did not seem to be
a "scientific" interest
It is impoSSIble to trace here the Important repercuSSIons of this
will-to-believe of naturalIStic mOnIsm in econOmIcs. When socialist
criticism and the ,",ork of the bistorians were beginning to transform
the original evaluatlve standpoints, the vigorous development of ZOO~
logical research on one hand and the influence of Hegehan paniogIsm
on the other prevented econOmICS from attaming a clear and full
understanding of the relationship between concept and reality. The
result, to the extent that we are interested in it, 15 that despite the
powerful reSIstance to the mfiltration of naturalisuc dogma due to
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 87
German idealism since Fichte and the achievement of the German
Historical School m law and economiCS and partly because of the
very work of the HlStoncai School, the naturahstlc viewpomt in certain
decisive problems has not yet been overcome. Among these
problems we find the relationship between "theory" and "history,"
which is shll problemahc in our dlSclplme
The "abstract"-theoretical method even today shows unmediated
and ostensibly irreconcl1able cleavage from emp'rical-histoncal re~earch
The proponents of thIS method recognize in a thoroughly
correct way the methodological ImposSlblhty of supplanting the hiStorIcal
knowledge of reahty by the formulation of laws Of, VIce versa,
of constructmg "laws" in the ngorous sense through the mere JuxtapOSItIon
of hIStorical observations Now in order to arnve at these
laws - for they are certam that SCIence should be dIrected towards
these as Its highest goal- they take it to be a fact that we always
have a dIrect awareness of the structure of human actIOns m aU theIr
reahty Hence - so they thmk - SCIence can make human behavior
directly intelligible with axiomal1c eVldentness and accordingly reveal
Its laws The only e"act form of knowledge - the formulation of
ImmedIately and mtuitIvely er.ndent laws - is however at the same
time the only one wluch offers access to events which have not been
directly observed Hence, at least as regards the fundamen tal phenomena
of economIc lIfe, the constructIOn of a system of abstract and
therefore purely formal propo5ItIons analogous to those of the exact
natural sciences, IS the only means of analyzing and inteBectually mastering
the com~lexityof social hie In s~ite of the fundamental meth•
odologlCal dIStinctiOn between hIStOrical knowledge and the knowledge
of "laws" which the creator of the theory drew as the first and only
one, he now dalms empirIcal valtdtty, m the sense of the deduclbtltty
of reahty from "laws," for the proposItions of abstract theory It is
true that thIS IS not meant m the sense of empirical vahdlty of the abstract
economic laws as such, but in the sense that when equally "ex_
act" theories have been constrocted for aU the other relevant factors,
all these abstract theories together must contam the true reality of the
object -1 e, whiJ,tever IS worthwhile knowing about it Exact economIC
theory deals wIth the operation of one psychiC motive, the
88 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
other theories have as their task the fonnulation of the behavior of
all the other motives into sinular sorts of propositlOns enjoying hypothetical
valldlty. Accordingly, the fantastic claim has occasionally
been made for economic theories - e g, the abstract theories of price,
interest, rent, etc, - that they can, by ostenslbly following the analogy
of physical science propOSltlOns, be vahdly applied to the derivation
of quantitatIVely stated conclusions from gIven real premises, since
given the ends, economic behavior with respect to means is unambiguously
"detennmed" This claim falls to observe that in order to be
able to reach tlus result even in the simplest case, the totality of the
existmg historical reality including every one of its causal relationshIps
must be assumed as "given" and presupposed as known But
if this type of knowledge were accesSlble to the finite mind of man,
abstract theory would have no cogmtlve value whatsoever The
naturalistIc prejudice that every concept in the cultural sciences
should be similar to those in the exact natural sciences has led in
consequence to the misunderstanding of the meaning of thIS theoretlcal
construction (theoretlSche Cedankengeb,lde) It has been believed
that 18 is a matter of the psychologlCaI isolation of a specific
"impulse," the acquiSItive impulse, or of the isolated study of a specific
maxim of human conduct, the so-called economic principle. Abstract
theory purported to be based on psychological axIOms and as a result
hIStorians have called for an emplTlcal psychology in order to show
the invahdity of those axlOms and to denve the course of economic
events from psychological pnnciples We do not wish at this pomt
to enter into a detailed critici.m of the belief in the significance of
a -still to be created - systematic science of "social psychology" as
the future foundation of the cultural SCiences, and particularly of
SOCIal economIcs. Indeed, the partly brilliant attempts whIch have'
been made hitherto to mterpret economic phenomena p.ychologlcally,
show in any case that the procedure does not begm WIth the analysis
of psycholOgIcal qUalIties, movmg then to the analysis of social InstitutIons,
but that, on the contrary, Insight into the p.ychological precondItions
and consequences of InstitutIons presupposes a precIse
knowledge of the latter and the scientific analysis of theU" structure
In concrete cases, psychologIcal analySIS can contribute then an extremely
valuable deepening of the knowledge of the historical cultural
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 89
condltlonmg and cultural Slgmficance of mstJtutions The interesting
aspect of the psychic attltude of a pers~n m a social situatIOn IS specuically
partIcularized in each case, accordmg to the SpeClal cultural
sIgmficance of the situation in questton. It 1S a question of an ex~
tremely heterogeneous and hIghly concrete structure of psychic
motJves and influences Social-psychological research involves the
study of various very dIsparate zndIVldual types of cultural elements
with reference to their interpretabihty by our empatluc understandmg.
Through social-psychological research, with the knowledge of indIvidual
insbtutlons ao; a POInt of departure, we wIll learn Increasmgly
how to understand institutions m a psychologlcal way. We wl1] not
however deduce the institutIons from psychologIcal laws or explam
thero by eleroentllry psychological phenomena.
Thus, the far-flung polemic, which centered on the questIOn of
the psychological justification of abstract theoretical propo'itions, on
the stope of the "acquisItive impulse" and the "econ0I111C pnnClple,"
etc, turns out to have been fruitless
In the establishment of the proposItions of abstract theory, it 15
only apparently a matter of "deductions" from fundamental psycholOgical
motives Actually, the fonner are a specia1 case of a kmd of
concept-constructlOn whIch IS peculIar and to a certain e,ctent, indispensable,
to the cultural sciences It IS worthwhIle at this point
to descnbo .t m further detail since we can thereby approach more
closely the fundamental question of the sigmficance of theory in the
social SCIences Therewith we leave undlScussed, once and for aU,
whether the particular analytical concepts which we cite or to whIch
we allude as illu,tratlons, correspond to the purposes they are to serve,
Ie, whether m fact they are well-adaptod The question as to how
farJ for example, contemporary "abstract theory" should be further
elaborated, is ultimately also a question of the strategy of science,
which must, however concern itself with other problems as wen Even
the Htheory of margmal utIhty" is subsumable under a "law of roarginal
utlhty."
We have in abstract economic theory an IllustratIon of those synthetic
constructs wmch have been designated as ((Ideas" of lustoncal
phenomeI)a It offers us an ideal pIcture of event, on the commodltymarket
under conditIOns of a society organized on the prinCIples of
90 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
an exchange economy, free competition and rigorously rational conduct
ThIs conceptual pattern brings together certam relationships
and events of histoncal hfe into a complex, wluch is concClved as an
mternally conslStent system Substantively, this construct m itself is
like a utopia which has been arrived at by the analytIcal accentuabon
of certain elements of reahty. Its relationslup to the empincal data
conSlSts solely in the fact that where market-cond.l1oned relatIOnslups
of the type referred to by the abstract construct are dIScovered or
suspected to exist in reahty to some extent, we can make the charactemlle
features of this relationship pragmatically clear and understandabfe
by reference to an .deal-type This procedure can be
indISpensable for heuristic as well as expoSltory purposes. The ideal
typical concept w.lI help to develop our sk.lI 10 .mputation lo research'
.t IS no "hypothesis"'but it offers guIdance to the construction
of hypotheses It is not a descnpt.on of reahty hut it a.ms to give
unambiguous means of expression to such a descnption. It is thus
the "ldea" of the hutoncally given modern society, based on an exchange
economy, wh.ch is developed for us by qUlte the same logical
prinCIples as are used m constructing the Idea of the medieval "city
economy" as a "geneticU
concept When we do this, we construct
the concept IIClty economy" not as an average of the economIC struc..
tures actually exISt10g m all the cities observed but as an Ideaf-type.
An ideal type is forrnrd by the one-sided accentuatIon of one or more
pomts of v.ew and by the synthesIS of a great many dIffuse, discrete,
more or less present and occasIonally absent concrete mdzv~dual phe.
nomena~ whIch are arranged according to those one-SIdedly emphaSIzed
v.ewpomts lOto a unified analytICal comtruc! (Gedankenblld).
In its conceptual PUrity, this mental construct (Gedankenbild) cannot
be found emp.rically anywhere lo reahly It is a utopUJ. HlStorical
research faces the task of detennining ill each lOd.vidual case,
the extent to which thIS Ideal-construct approxlInates to or dIVerges
from realIty, to what extent for example, the econormc structure of
a certain Clty is to be classl'fied as a Uctty·economy n When carefully
apphed, those concepts areiparticularly useful m research and expositIOn
In very much the' same way one can work the "Idea" of
Ilhandicraft" 1Oto a utopia by arrangmg certalll traits, actually found
in an unclear, confused state in the mdustrial enterpnses of the most
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 91
dlverse epochs and countnes, mto a consIstent Ideal-construct by an
accentuation of thelr essential tendenc'es Th,S Ideal-type lS then
related to the idea (GedankenausdTuck) which one finds expressed
there. One can further delmeate a society in whtch all branches of
economic and even intellectual actlVlty are governed by maxiOlS
whtch appear to be apphcations of the same pnnciple which charactnzes
the Ideal-typIcal "handicraft" system. Furthennore, one can
juxtapose alongs'de the 'deal typical "hand,craft" system the antithesis
of a correspondmgly Ideal-typlcal capltahsllc produCllve system, whIch
has been abstracted out of certaIn features of modem large scale mdu~try
On the basIS of thIs, one can delIneate the utopia of a ucapi..
talishc" culture, 1 e , one in whIch the governmg pnnClple is the in..
vestment of private capItal This procedure would accentuate certaIn
indIvidual concretely wverse traits of modem matenal and in,ellectual
culture in Its unique aspects mto an Ideal construct whIch {rom
our point of view would be completely self-conslStent This would
then be the delmeatlOD of an UideaU
of cap~tahstic cultu7"e We must
dISregard for the moment whether and how thIs proceduf< could
be carried out It is possible, or rather, it mmt be accepted as
certain that numerous, indeed a very great many, utopias of this
sort can be worked out, of wmch none IS like another, and none of
wh'ch can be observed m empincal real,ty as an actually eXISting
economic system, but each of which however clalms that l.t 1S a representatIon
of the "ldea" of cap1tahstIc culture Each of these can claim
to be a representation of the "idea" of capItalIstiC culture to the extent
that ,t has really taken certam traIts, meanmgful In their essential
features, from the empmcal reahty of our culture and brought them
together mto a umfied ,deal-construct For those phenomena whlcb
Interest us as cultural phenomena are mterestIng to us WIth respect
to very d,fferent kmds of evaluative ideas to wh'ch we relate them.
Inasmuch as the "pomts of VIew" from whIch they can become slgmfi~
cant for us are very rnverse, the most varied criteria can be apphed
to the selectIon of the tralts WhlCh are to enter mto the constructlon
of an ideal-typical v,ew of a particular culture.
What IS the SIgnIficance of such Ideal-typIcal constructs for an
empIrical science, as we wish to consti~ute It? Before gomg eUly further,
we should emphaSIZe that the Idea of an ethical ImpeTatwe, of
92 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
a "model" of what "ought" to exist 15 to be carefully distmgmshed
from the analytlCal construct, which 15 ",deal" m the strictly lOgIcal
sense of the term It IS a matter here of constructIng relationships
winch our Imagmallon accepts as plauSIbly mollvated and hence as
'Iobjectively possible" and which appear as adequate from the nomolOgIcal
standpoint
Whoever accepts the proposillon that the knowledge of hIStorical
realIty can or should be a l'presuppositlOnless" copy of "obJectIve"
facts, W111 deny the value of the Ideal-type Even those who recognize
that there IS no "presupPoslbonlessness" In the logical sense and
that even the sunplest excerpt from a statute or from a documental)"
source can have SClentlfic meaning only With reference to llslgmfi_
canee" and ultrmately to evaluative Ideas, wIll more or less regard
the constructIOn of any such hl!~tor1cal Hutopias" as an eXpOSItory
device which endangers the autonomy of hIStOrical research and winch
is, in any case, a vam sport And, In fact, whether we are deahng
SImply with a conceptual game or wIth a scientifically fruitful method
of conceptuahzatIOn and theory-constructIon can never be decIded a
pnori Here,. too,. there is only one cntenon, namely, that of sue·
cess in reveahng concrete cultural phenomena In theIr mterdependellce,
their causal condltiollS and theIr J.gmfican&e. The construction
of abstract Ideal-types recommends itself not as an end but as a
metlns Every conscientious exanunatlOn of the conceptual elements
of historical exposition shows however that the rustonan as soon as
he attempts to go beyond the bare estabhslunent of concrete relationshIps
and to detennme the cultural signIficance of even the simplest
mdivIdual event In order to 4
1
characterize" It, must use concepts which
are precisely and unambiguously definable only in the fonn of Ideal
types Or are concepts such as "Individuahsm," "Impenahsm:' "feqdahsm,"
"mercantilism," uconventIonal," etc, and innumerable COn·
cepts of hke character by means of which we seek analyllcally and
empathically to understand reality constructed substanllvely by thc
"presuppositionless" descTtptzon of some concrete phenomenon or
through the abstract synthesIs of those traits wluch are common to
numerous concrete phenomena' Hundreds of words 10 the histonan's
vocabulary are ambiguous constructs created to meet the unCon·
sciously felt need for adequate e"pression and the meamng of which
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 93
is only concretely felt but not clearly thought out In a great many
cases, particularly 10 the field of descriptive political history, th",r
ambiguity has not been prejudicial to the clarity of the presentatIOn
It IS suffiCIent that in each case the reader should teel what the historian
had m IDlnd, Of, one can content one's self with the Idea that
the author used a partICular meaning of the concept with special
reference to the concrete case at hand. The greater the need however
for a sharp appreCIation of the slgmficance of a cultural phenomenon,
the more unperatlve IS the need to operate with unambiguous
concepts which are not only particularly but also systematically
defined A "definition" of such synthetic hIStorical terms according
to the scheme of genus prox,mum and dIfferentia speClfica is naturally
nonsense. But let us consider it. Such a form of the establIShment
of the meanings of words 15 to be found only in axiomallc disciplines
which use syllogisms A simple "descriptive analysis" of these concepts
mto therr components either does not exist or else CXlSts only
Jllusorily, for the question arises. as to which of these components
should be regarded as essenllal When a genetic definition of the
content of the concept IS sought, there remains orJIy the Ideal-type
in the sense explained above It is a conceptual construct (Gedankenbdd)
wmch is neIther historical reahty nor even the "true" reality
It 's even less fitted to serve as a schema under which a real situallon
or action is to be subsumed as one mstance It has the significance
of a purely ideal lim,ting concept with which the real situation or
action is compared and surveyed for the exphcation of certain of Its
significant components Such concepts are constructs ill tenns of
which we formulate relationships by the application of the category
of objective possibJlity. By means of this category, the adequacy of
our imaginatlon, onented and disciplined by reality, IS Judged.
In this function especially, the ideal-type is an attempt to analyze
historically umque configurations or their individual components by
means of genetic concepts Let us take for mstance the concepts
"church" and Usect" They may be broken down purely classificatonly
into complexes of characteristiCS whereby not only the distlnctlOn
between them but also the content of the concept must constantly
remain flUId If however I WIsh to fonnulate the concept of "sect"
genetically, e g., with reference to certain important cultural signifi-
94 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
cances which the "sectarian spirit" has had for modern culture, certam
characteristlcs of both become essenl,al because they stand m an
adequate causal relationshIp to those mfluences However, the concepts
thereupon become ideal-typical lin the sense that they appear
in full conceptual mtegnty either not at all or only in mdl\'ldual
Instances Here as elsewhere every concept which is not purely
cla••Ificatory diverges from reahty. But the dIScursIve nature of our
knowledge, ie, the fact that we comprehend reality only through a
chain of intellectual modlficatlons po.tulates such a conceptual shorthand
Our imagination can often di.pen.e With exphcit conc~ptual
fonnqlations as a means of tnveshgahon But as regards expositiOn,
to the extent that It wishes to be unambIguous, the use of precise
fonnulations m the .phere of cultural analysIS is m many cases absolutely
necessary Whoever dlSregards It entirely must confine hlffi.elf
to the fonnal a.pect of cultural phenomena, e g, to legal hIStory
The umverse of legal norms is naturally clearly definable and i. vahd
(in the legal .ensel ) for hi.torical reahty. But .oclal .aence in our
sense is concerned WIth practIcal stgmficance ThIs significance how..
ever can very often be brought unarnbtgUou.ly to mmd only by relating
the empirical data to an ideal linuting case If the histonan (ill
the WIdest .en.e of the word) rejects an attempt to con.truct .uch
Ideal types as a "theoretical construction," 1 e, as useless or dispensable
fOT hls concrete heuristIc purposes, the meVltabJe consequence is
either that he consciously or unconieJOusly uses other sinular concepts
without fo",\ulating them verbally and elaborating them logically or
that he remams stuck ill the realm of the vaguely "felt."
Notlung, however, is more dangerous than the confUSIOn of theory
and hi.tory .temming from naturalIStIC prejudICes. ThIS confUSIOn
expresses itself firstly ill the belIef that the "true" content and the
e..ence of historical reality IS portrayed in .uch theoretical con.truct.
or secondly, In the use of these constructs as a procrustean bed IDto
which hi.tory is to be forced or thirdly, m the hypostatlzatlon of .uch
uideas" as real uforcesu and as a "true" reality wluch operates behind
the passage of events and which works itself out in history
This latter danger is especially grea! .ince we are also, indeed
prirnanly, accustomed to understand by the uideas" of an epoch the
thought. or ideal. which dominated the rna" or at least an hIStorically
_ "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 95
decisive number of the persons living in that epoch 'tself, and who
were therefore sIgmficant as components of Its culture Now there
are two aspects to thIs: m the first place, there are certain relationshIps
between the Clidea" In the sense of a tendency of practical or
theoretical thought and the ",dea" m the sense of the ideal-typical
portrayal of an epoch constructed as a heUrIStic deVIce An ,deal type
of certain situations, wluch can be abstracted from certain characterIStiC
social phenomena of an epoch, might - and this is indeed quite
often the case - have also been present m the mmds of the person.
living m that epoch as an ideal to be stnven for m practical lIfe or
as a maxim for the regulation of certam SOCial relationships This is
true of the "idea" of "provision" (NahTungsschutz) and many other
Canonist doctrines, espeCIally those of Thomas Aqumas, m relatIons!up
to the modern ideal type of med,eval "CIty economy" wh'ch we
dIScussed above The same is also true of the much talked of "basic
concept" of economics. economic "value" From Scholasticism to
Manasm... the Idea of an objectively "valId" value, i e., of an ethtcal
zmpeTatwe was amalgamated WJth an abstractJon drawn from the
empirical process of pnce fonnatlon The notion that the uvalue" of
commodities should be regulated by certain pnneiples of natural law,
has had and sttll has tmmeasurable sigu'ficance for the development
of culture - and not merely the culture of the M,ddle Ages It has
also mfluenced actual price fonnatlOn very markedly But what was
meant and what can be meant by that theoretical concept can be
made unambIguously clear only through precISe, Ideal-typIcal constructs
Those who are so contemptuous of the "Robmsonades" of
classical theory should restram themselves ,f they are unable to
replace them with better concepts, which in this context means
clearer concepts.
Thus the causal relationshIp between the hIStorically detenmnabJe
Idea which governs the conduct of men and those components 01
historical reahty from w!uch theIr correspondmg ,deal-type may be
abstracted, can naturally take on a consIderable number of dIfferent
forms The main point to be observed is that In pTlnciple they are
both fundamentally dIfferent things There lS sttll another aspect:
those "Ideas" which govern the behaVIOr of the population of a certain
epoch ie, which are concretely Influential In detenruning their
96 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
conduct, can, if a somewhat comphcated construct 15 involved, be
formulated precisely only in the form of an Ideal type, smce empincally
it exlsts in the minds of an mdefimte and constantly changmg
mass of mdividuals and assumes m their minds the most multifanous
nuances of form and content, clarity and meanmg. Those elements of
the spiritual life of the indiViduals liVIng 10 a certam epoch of the
MIddle Ages, for example, w/uch we may desIgnate as the "Chmuanity"
of those individuals, would, if they could be completely portrayed,
naturally constitute a chaos of mfinitely differentiated and
highly contradictory complexes of ideas and feehngs This is true
despite the fact that the medieval church was certainly able to bnng
about a unity of behef and conduct to a particularly /ugh degree If
we raise the questIOn as to what in thIS chaos was the "Chnstlanlty"
of the Middle Ages (w/uch we must nonetheless use as a stable concept)
and wherein lay those "Chrishanu
elements which we find In
the insututions of the MIddle Ages, we see that here too in every
mdlvidual case, we are applymg a purely analytical construct
created by ourselves It is a combinatIon of articles of faIth, nonns
from church law and custom, maxlms of conduct, and countless concrete
m!errelationsrnps whIch we have fused into an "Idea" It is a
synthesis which we could not succeed in attaming WIth consIStency
Without the apphcation of ideal-type concepts
The relations/up between the logical structure of the conceptual
system in which we present such "ideas" and what is immediately
gIVen ill ernpmcal reality naturally vanes considerably It is relatIvely
simple in cases m whIch one or a few easIly formulated
theoreucal main prinClples as for instance CalVIn's doctrine of pre·
destmation or clearly definable ethical postulates govern human
conduct and produce Iustorical effects, so that we can analyze the
"Idea" into a hierarchy of ideas w/uch can be logically derived frorn
those theses. It is of course easily overlooked that however Important
the Significance even of the purely logIcally persuasive force of Ideas
- Manusm is an outstanding example of thIS type of force - nonetheless
empll'1cal-lustoncal events occurnng in men's minds must be
understood as primanly psychologtcally and not logrcally conditioned.
The ideal-typical character of such syntheses of Iustorically effective
Ideas is revealed still more clearly when those fundamental main
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 97
pnnclples and postulates no longer survive m the minds of those
mdividuals who are sull dommated by Ideas whIch were logically or
associatively derived from them because the "Idea" wmch was mstoncally
and origmally-fundamental has eIther died out or has in
general achIeved wIde diffUSIOn only for ItS broadest ImphcatlOns The
basic fact that the synthesis IS an "Idea" wmch we have created
emerges even more markedly when those fundamental mam principles
have eIther only very imperfectly or not at all been raIsed to the
level of explicit consciousness or at least have not taken the form
of exphcitly elaborated complexes of Ideas When we adopt tlus
procedure, as It very often happens and must happen, we are con~
cerned ill these Ideas, e g, the "hberahsm" of a c.ertain penod or
"Methodism" or some intellectually unelaborated variety of "social_
Ism," with a pure Ideal type of much the same character as the
synthetic "prInCIples" of economIC epochs in which we had our pomt
of departure The more mclusive the relationships to be presented,
and ·the more many-Sided their cultural srgmficance has been, the
moTe theIr comprehenSIve systematic expoSItIon in a conceptual
system apprOXImates the character of an ideal type, and the Jess IS it
poSSIble to operate with one such concept In such SItuatiOns the
frequently repeated attempts to dIscover ever new aspects of sigmficance
by the construction of new Ideal-typIcal concepts is all the
more natural and unavoidable All expositions for example of the
"essence" of Chnsuamty are Ideal types enjoying only a necessanly
very relattve and problematic vahdity when they are intended to be
regarded as the histoncal portrayal of empmcally existing facts
On the other hand, such presentations are of great value for research
and of hIgh systemauc value for expOSItory purposes when they are
used as conceptual instruments for compartson with and the measurement
of reality They are mdlspensable for this purpose.
There 1S sull ana-ther even more complicated Slgnificance implicit in
such ldeal-typical presentations. They regularly seek to be, or arc
unconscIOusly, Ideal~types not only In the logzcal sense but also In the
practical sense, Ie, they are model types which - in our illustrationcontam
what, from the pomt of view of the expOSItor, should be and
what to hzm IS "essential" in Chrisuamty because zt ts endurrngly
valuable If thIS is consciously or - as it is more frequently - un-
98 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
consciously the case, they contain .deals to wluch the expositor
evaluatwely relates Chnstiamty These ideals are tasks and ends
towards which he orients his "Idea" of ChristianIty and which naturally
can and indeed.. doubtless always w,ll differ greatly from the
values which other persons, for mstance, the early Chnstians, connected
with Christianity In this sense, however, the "ideas" are
naturally no longer purely logzeal auxIliary devices, no longer concepts
with wluch reahty is compared, but ideals by wluch .t IS
evaluatively Judged Here it .s no longer a matter of the purely
theoretical procedure of treating empirical real.ty with respect to
values but of value-Judgments which are integrated into the concept
of "ChrlSt,antty" Because the .deal type claims empirical va1td,ty
here, it penetrates into the realm of the evaluative mterpretation of
Christianity. The sphere of emp.rical science has heen left belund and
we are confronted WIth a profeSSIOn of faith, not an .deal-typical
construct As fundamental as thIS disbnction is in pnnciple, the con..
fUSIon of these two basically dIfferent meanings of the term "Idea"
appears with extraordinary frequency In hIStorical writings It is
always close at hand whenever the descriptive historian begins to
develop his Clconception" of a personality or an epoch In contrast
with the lixed ethical standards wluch Schlosser applied in the spirit
of rationalIsm, the modern relatIVlstIcally educated hIstorian who on
the one hand seeks to "understand" the epoch of which he speaks
"in its own tenns," and on the other stilI seeks to "Judge" it, feels the
need to derive the standards for h.. Judgment from the subject-matter
itself, ie, to allow the "Idea" in the sense of the "deal to emerge from'
the "idea" in the sense of the "Ideal-type" The esthetic satisfactIon
produced by such a procedure constantly tempts him to dISregard the
line where these two Ideal types dIverge - an error which on the one
hand hampers the value-Judgment and on the other, strives to free
itself from the responsibility for .ts own Judgment In contrast w.th
this, the elementary duty of sczenhlic self-control and the only way
to avoid serious and foolish blunders requires a sharp, precise distip.ction
between the logically comparatwe analysis of reahly by idealtypes
in the lOgIcal sense and the value-Judgment of reahty on the
basts of Ideals An "Ideal type" in our sense, to repeat once more,
has no connection at all with value-Judgments, and it has nothing to
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 99
do with any type of perfecbon other than a purely logICal one There
are Ideal types of brothels as well as of rehgions, there are also Ideal
types of those kmds of brothels wluch are techmcally "expedIent"
from the point of view of police ethics as well as those of wluch the
exact opposite is the case.
I t IS necessary for us to forego here a detailed dIscussion of the
case which is by far the most complicated and most interestmg, namely,
the problem of the logical structure of the concept of the state Thc
followmg however should be noted when we mqUIre as to what corresponds
to the idea of the "state" in empmcal realIty, we find an
mfinity of diffuse and discrete human aclIOns, both active and passive,
factually and legally regulated relationslups, partly umque and
partly recurrent m character, all bound together by an Idea, namel) ,
the behef in the actual or normative validity of rules and of the authorIty-relationships
of some human beings towards others Tlus behef is m
par conscIOusly, m part dimly felt, and m part pasSiVely accepted by
persons who, should they think about the "Idea" in a really clearly
defined manner, would not first need a "general theory of the state"
wluch aImS to arnculate the idea The scienbfic conception of the
state, however It IS fonnulated, 15 naturally always a synthesis whIch
we construct for certa.J.n heuristic purposes But on the other hand, It
IS also abstracted from the unclear syntheses wluch are found m the
minds of human beings. The concrete content, however, which the
historical "state" assumes in those syntheses In the mmds of those
who make up the state, can in its tum only be made expliCIt through
the use of ideal-typical concepts Nor, furthermore, can there be the
least doubt that the manner m whIch those syntheses are made
(always in a logically imperfect form) by the members of a state, or
in other word.!i, the "ideas" which they construct for themselves about
the state - as for example, the German "organIc" metaphysics of
the state In contrast WIth the American "business" conception, is of
great practical signIficance In other words, here too the praCtlcal
idea which should be valid or IS belteved to be valId and the heuristtcally
mtended, theoretically ideal type approach each other very
closely and constantly tend to merge with each other.
We have purposely conSIdered the ideal type essentIally -If not
100 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
exclusively - as a mental construct for the scrutiny and systematic
characterization of indiVldual concrete patterns wluch are Slgnificant
in their uniqueness, such as Chnstianlty, capitahsm, etc We
did this in order to aVOId the common notion that in the sphere
of cultural phenomena, the abstract type is Idenucal WIth the abstract
kmd (Gattungsmassigen). ThIS IS not the case W,thout being able
to make here a full logIcal analysIS of the wIdely discussed concept
of the fftyplcal" whIch has been dlSCredJted through misuse, we can
state on the basis of our preVlous dlSC'USSlon that the construction of
tvpe.concepts in the sense of the exclusIOn of the "accidental" also
has a place m the analySl' of histoncally mOlVloual phenomena
N'aturaly, however, those generIc concepts whIch we constantly en~
- counted as elements of hIstorIcal analysis and of concrete histoflcal
concepts, can also be formed as Ideal-types by abstractmg and accentuating
certain conceptually essenbal elements Pracbcally, this
IS indeed a particularly frequent and Important mstance of the
application of ideal-typIcal concepts Every indwldual Ideal type
comprises both generic and Ideal-typically constructed conceptual
elements In tlus case too, we see the specIfically logtcal function
of ideal-typIcal concepts The concept of "exchange" IS for
Instance a simple class concept (Gattungsbegrtff) in the sense of a
complex of tratts which are common to many phenomena, as long
a3 we d1Sregard the meomng of the cDmponent parts of the concept,
and simply analyze the term m Its everyday usage If however we
relate this concept to the concept of Umargmal utIlIty" for instance,
and construct the concept of Heconomie exchange" as an economic..
ally rahonal event, thIS then contams as every concept of "econonuc
exchange" does which is fully elaborated logically, a Judgment concerning
the "typIcal" conditzons of exchange It assUlnes a genettc
character and becomes therewith Ideal-typical In the lOgIcal sense,
ie, it removes itself from empincal reality whIch can only be com~
pared or related to it The same is true of all the so-called "fundamental
concepts" of economICS they can be developed in genetic
form only as' Ideal types The dlshnctlOn between Simple class or
generic concepts (Gattungsbegr,ffe) whIch merely <ununanze the
conunon features of certain empirical phenomena and the qUasI·
generic (GaltungsmiisStgen) Ideal type - as for instance and Ideal-
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 101
typIcal concept of the "nature" of "handlcraff' - varies naturally
WIth each concrete case But no class or genenc concept as such has
a "typICal" character and there is no purely genenc "average"
type Wherever we speak of typical magnitudes - as for example, in
statistics - we speak of something more than a mere average The
more it lS a matter of the simple classIfication of events winch appear
in reality as mass phenomena, the more it is a matter of class concepts
On the other hand, the greater the event to which we
conceptualIze complicated historical patterns with respect to those
components in which their specific cultural sigmficance is contamed,
the greater the extent to which the concept- or system of concepts
- will be ideal-typical in character. The goal of ideal-typIcal concept-construction
is always to make clearly explicit not the class or
average character but rather the ulllque individual character of
cultural phenomena.
The fact that ideal types, even classificatory ones, can be and are
applied, first acquires methodological significance in connection witb
another fact
Thus far we have been dealing with ideal-types only as abstract
concepts of relationslups which are conceIved by us as stable m the
nux of events, as historically individual complexes in winch developments
are reahzed There emerges however a complication, which
remtroduces with the aid of the concept of "type" the naturalistic
prejUdICe that the goal of the SOCIal SCIences must be the reduction of
reality to ulaw.f." Developmental sequences too can be constructed
Into ideal types and these constructs can have quite considerable heu~
mhc value But tlus quite particularly gives rise to the danger that
the Ideal type and reahly wl1l be confused Wlth one another One
can, for example, arnve at the theoretical conclUSIon that In a society
whIch is organized on stnet ''handicraft'' principles, the only source
of capital accumulation can be ground rent From this perhaps, one
can - for the correctness of the construct is not in question hereconstruct
a pure ideal pIcture of the shift, condItioned by certam
specific factors - e g,. hmited land, increasmg populatIon, mflux of
precIOUS metals, ratIOnalisation of the conduct of hfe - from a
handicraft to a capItalistic economic organization Whether the
empIrical-hIstorical course of development was actually Identical with
102 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
the constructGd one, can be investIgated only by usmg this construct
as a heuristic device for the comparison of the Ideal type and the
Ufacts." If the ideal type were "correctly" constructed and the actual
course of events did not correspond to that predIcted by the ideal
type, the hypothesis that medieval soc,ety was not in certain respects a
stnotly "handicraft" type of SOCIety would be proved. And if the
ideal type were constructed in a heurishcally n,deal" way - whether
and in what way this could occur 1D our example will be entirely
dISregarded here- it wuZ guide the investigation into a path leadIng
to a more precise understandmg of the non-handicraft components
of medieval society in their pecuhar characteristics and their historical
sIgtlificance If ,t leads to this result, it fulfils its logical purpose,
even though, in doing so, it demonstrates its dIVergence from reality.
It was - in thIS case - the test of an hypothesis. ThIS procedure
gIves rise to no methodologIcal doubts so long as we clearly keep in
mind that ideal-typical developmental constructs and hIStory are to
be shazp!y distinguished from each other, and that the construct heIe
is no more than the means for explICItly and v:,lIdly ImpUtIng an histoncal
event to its real causes wh,le elinunatmg those which On the
basis of our present knowledge seem possible.
The mamtenance of thIS dIStinction m all ,t, rigor often becomes
uncommonly dIfficult m practIce due to a certain CIrcumstance In
the Interest of the concrete demonstratlOn of an ldeal type or of an
,deal-typical developmental sequence, one seeks to make ,t clear by
the use of concrete IllustratIve materIal drawn from empirical-hIstOrIcal
reality The danger of this procedure winch in ,tself IS entlrely
legitimate hes m the fact that hlStoncal knowledge here appears as a
serl/ant of theory instead of the opposIte role 1t IS a great temptatIon
for the theorIst to regard thIS relatIOnship either as the normal
one or, far worse. to nux theory wlth rostory and mdeed to confuse
them with each other Tins occurs in an extreme way when an ideal
construct of a developmental sequence and a conceptual clasSlfication
of the ideal-types of certam cultural structures (e g, the fonus of
mdustrial productIon denYIng lrorn the "closed domestic economy"
or the religious concepts beginnmg WIth the "gods of the moment")
are integrated mto a genetIc claSSIficatIon The senes of types which
results from the selected conceptual criteria appears then as an
::OBJEGTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 103
Iustoncal sequence unrolling w.th the necesstty of a law The logical
classIficatIOn of analyt.cal concepts on the one hand and the empuical
arrangements of the events thus conceptuahzed In space, time,
and causal relationshIp, on the other, appear to be so bound up
together that there IS an almost irreslSllble temptation to do violence
to realIty m order to prove the real vahdlty of the construct
We have mtentlOnally aVOided a demonstratl.on with respect to that
Ideal-typIcal construct which is the most important One from our pomt
of view, namely, the Marxian theory ThIs was done in order not to
comphcate the eXposItIOn any further through the introducllon of an
interpretatIOn of Marx and in order not to anticipate the dIsCUSSIons
10 our journal which win make a regular practice of presenting cntica\
analyses of the hterature concerning and following the great t1unker
We will only point out here that naturally all specifically Marxian
H]aws" and developmental constructs - insofar as they are theoretically
sound - are ideal types The emment, indeed unIque, heUftst,c
S1gmficance of these ideal types when they are used for the assessment
of reality lS known to everyone who has ever employed Marxian
concepts and hypotheses Similarly, their perniciousness, as soon as
they are thought of as empmcally vahd or as real (I e, truly metaphysIcal)
"effective forces," "tendencies,i, etc IS likewise known to
those who have used them
Class or generic concepts (GattungsbegnfJe) - ideal typeslldeal-typ.cal
generic concepts - .deas in the sense of thought-patterns
whIch actually eXIst in the mmds of human beings - Ideal types of
,uch Idea, - ideals which govern human beings - Ideal types of
such Ideals - ideals w.th which the Iustorian approaches historical
facts - theoretlcal constructs using empirical data Illustrativelyhutorlcal
invesugations wmch utilize theoretical concepts as ideal
hmlbng cases - the various pOSSIble combinatIOns of these which
could only be hmtM at here, they are pure mental constructs, the relationsmps
of which to the empIrical reahty of the inunediately given
IS problematical in every indiVIdual case This list of possibIlities only
reveals the mfinite ramifications of the conceptual-methodologIcal
problems which face us in the sphere of the cultural sciences We
must renounce the serious diSCUSSion of the practical methodological
issues the problems of which were only to be ex1ubited, as well as
104 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
the detalled treatment of the reJatlOnshlps of Ideal types to "laws,"
of ideal-typIcal concepts to collective concepts, etc...
The histOrIan Wlll shU insist, even after all these dlSCussmnsl that
the prevalence of ,deal-typIcal concepts and constructs are characteristic
symptoms of the adolescence of a disClphne. And in a certain
sense thIS must be conceded, but with other conclusions than he could
draw from It Let us take a few illustrations from other diSCiplines.
I t is certamly true that the harned fourth-form boy as well as the
prImItIve philologIst first conceives of a language Uorganlcally," 1e ,
as a meta-empincal totahty regulated by norms, but the task of 1mgulStlC
sCience IS to establish which grammatical rules should be valid
The logIcal elaboratIOns of the written language;, 1e, the reduction
of rts content to rules, as W8'i done for In.stance by the Accademta della
Crusca, IS normally the first task wluch "pIuJology" sets itself When,
m contrast with tlus, a leadmg phIlologist today declares that the
subject-matter of phJlology is the "speech of every mdwldual," even
the formulation of such a program is poSSlble only after there is a
relatlVely clear Ideal type of the written language, which the otherwise
entirely orientatlonless and unbounded investIgation of the in·
finite variety of speech can,uuhze (at least tacitly) The constructs
of the natural law and the orgamc theones of the state have exactly
the same func:uon and, to recall an Ideal type In OUT sense, so does
Benjamin Constant's theory of the ancIent state It serves as a harbor
untIl one has leamed to navigate safdy in the vast sea of empIrlcal
facts The coming of age of science in fact always lffiphes the transeendance
of the Ideal-type, Insofar as 1t was thought of as possessing
empincal >ahdit} or as a class concept (Gattungsbeg"ff) However,
it is sull legJtimate today to use the bnlliant Constant hypothesiS to
demonstrate certam aspects and hlstOTlcally umque features of aIlClent
pohucal life, as long as one carefully bears 10 mmd itS ideal-typical
character Moreover, there are sciences to whlch eternal youth is
granted, and the mstoncal disciplines are among them - all those to
which the etemally onward flowmg stream of culture perpetually
brings new problems At the very heart of their task lies not only the
transcwncy of all Ideal types but also at.the same time the inevItabIhty
of new ones
The attempb) to detennine the Ureal" and the "true" meaning o[
"()BJE!?TIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 105
historical concepts always reappear and never succeed m reaching
their goal Accordmgly the synthet'c concepts used by lustorians are
e,ther nnperfectly defined or, as soon as the e1lI1U1lation of amblgUity
J,!, sought for, the concept becomes an abstract ideal type and reveals
}tself therewIth as a theoretical and hence "one-sIded" VIewpoint
winch ulummates the aspect of reality WIth wh,ch ,t can be related
But these concepts are shown to be obviously mappropriate as schema
mto which reaht} could be completely tntegrated. For none of
those systems of ,deas, which are absolutely mdiSpensable m the
understanding of those segments of reahty wh,ch are meamngful at
a part,cular moment, can exhaust lts mfimte nchness They are all
dttempts, on the baSiS of the present state of our knowledge and the
avauable conceptual patterns, t? bnng order mto the chaos of those
facts wluch we have drawn mto the field crrcumscnbed by our tnterest.
The mtellectual apparatus whIch the past has developed through the
analysIS, or more truthfully, the analytIcal rearrangement of the mune~
d,ately g,ven reahty, and through the latter's mtegrabon by concepts
wh,ch correspond to the state of lts knowledge and the focus of ,ts
interest, IS m constant tensIon WIth the new knowledge which we can
and deSlre to wrest from reaht} The progress of cultural "Soence
occurs through this conflict Its result lS the perpetual reconstruction
of those concepts through wluch we seek to comprehend reality The
history of the SOCIal sciences 18 and remaIns a continuous process
passmg from the attempt to order real,ty analytiCally through the
constructIon of concepts - the dISsolutIon of the analytical constructs
so constructed through the expanslOn and shift of the scientIfic
hOTlwn - and the reformulanon anew of concepts on the foundations
thus transformed It is not the error of the attempt to construct
conceptual systerm In general whlch is shown by tlus processevery
sc..ience, even simple descnptive history, operates with 'the conceptual
stock-,n-trade of its tune Rather, thiS process shows that
in the cultural sciences concept-constructIOn depends on the setting
of the problem, and the latter vanes w,th the content of culbrre
ltlliL The telationshlp between concept and reality m the cultural
sciences involves the trans,toriness of all such syntheses The great
attempts at theory-eonstrucuon in our science were always useful for
revealing the limits of the significimce of those points of v'ew which
106 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
provided their foundations. The greatest advances in the sphere of
the social sciences are substantIvely tIed up Wlth the shift In ?ractlca!
cultural prohlems and take the guise of a cntique of concept-construction
Adherence to the purpose of thIS cntique and therewith
the investIgation of the prinCiples of syntheses m the social sciences
shall be among the prinlary tasks of our Journal
In the conclusions whIch are to be drawn [rom what has been
said, we come to a point where perhaps our Views diverge here and
there from those of many, and even the most outstanding, representatives
of the HlStorical School, among whose offspring we too are to
be numbered. The latter sttll hold in many ways, expressly or taCltly,
to the opinion that it is the end and the goal of every science to order
its data into a system of concepts, the content of which is to be
acquired and slowly perfected thtough the observation of empirical
regulanties, the construction of hypotheses, and their verification,
until finally a ucompleted" and hence deductive science emerges
For tllls goal, the hiStorical-mducttve work of the present-day is a
prellIninary task neces..tated by the imperfections of our dISCipline
Nothmg can be more suspect, from thiS pomt of view, that the constructIon
and applIcatIOn of clear-cut concepts SInce this seems to
he an over-hasty antIcipatIon of the remote future.
Tlus conceptton was, in prmclple, impregnable within the framework
of the classical-scholastic epiStemology wluch "as still fundamentally
assumed by the majOrity of the research-workers identified
wlth the Historical School The functlOn of concepts was assumed
to be the reproductl0n of "obJective" reahty In the analyst's imagmation
Hence the recurrent references to the unreallt'Y of aU dear-cut
concepts If one perceives the implicatiOns of the fundamental ideas
of modern epistemology v.hich Ull1malely derives from Kant, namely,
that concepts are primanly analytical Instruments for the mtellectual
mastery of empirical data and can be only that, the fact that precise
genetJc concepts are necessanly ldeal types w~ll not cause him to
desist from constructIng them The relationship between concept and
hiStorical research is reversed for those who appreciate this, the goal
of the Historical School then appears as logically impoSSIble, the
concepts are not ends but are means to the end of understanding
phenomena which .are sigmficant from concrete indiVIdual viewpoints.
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 107
Indeed, it 15 Just because the content of historical concepts is necessanly
subject to change that they must be fonnulated precisely and
clearly on all occasions In their application, their character as ideal
analytIcal constructs should be carefuUy kept in uund, and the .dealtype
and Iustoncal reahty should not be confused w.th each other. It
should be understDod that since really definItive hlStorical concepts
are not In general to be thought of as an ultimate end ill view of the
mevitable shift of the guidmg value-ideas, the construct,on of sharp
anc.: unambiguous concepts relevant to the concrete mdwldual viewpoint
which directs our interest at any given time, affords the posSlbIl,ty
of dearly real.zing the ltmtts of their validity
It will be pointed out and we ourse!.es have already admitted, that
In a partIcular instance the course of a concrete historical event can
be made VIVIdly clear wIthout Its bemg analyzed In tenns of ex~
phcitly defined concepts And it WIll accordmgly be claimed for the
historians m our /ield, that they may, as IulS been said of the pohtical
historians, speak the "language of hfe Itself" Certainly' But it should
be added that in this procedure, the attainment of a level of e"Plicit
awareness of the viewpoint from which the events in question get
then sIgnificance remains htghly accidental We are in general not in
the favorable position of the political historian for whom the cultural
"iews to which he onents his presentatIon are usuall~ unambiguousor
seem to be so Every type of purely d;rect concrete description
bears the mark of ortlstlc portrayal uEach sees what is in his own
hean" Valid judgments always presuppose the logIcal analySIS of
,,,hat is concretely and imrnedlatf'ly perceIved, i e the use of concepts
It 18 mdeed pOSSIble and often aesthetlcally satlsfymg to keep these
111 petto but It always endangers the security of the reader's orientation.
and oftm that of the author hImself concerning the content and
,eope of hlS Judgments.
The neglect of clear-ent concept-constructlon m practical discu<stons
of practlcalJ economic and social policy can, however, become
particularl~ dangerous. It lS really unbehevable to an outsider what
confusion has been fostered, for instance, by the use of the term
"valuen - that unfortunate chIld of misery of OUf' science, which can
be gIVen an unambIguous meanIng only as an ideal type - or terms.
like "productive," "Irom an economic viewpomt," etcetera, which in
lOB "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
general wIll not stand up under a conceptually precise analyslS
CollectlUe concepts taken from the language of everyday Me have partIcularly
unwholesome effects In order to have an ILlustrattan easy
for the layman to understand, let us take the concept of "agncultnre"'
especially as It appears 10 the term "the mtnests of agnculrorc."
If we begin with Hthc Interests of agriculture" as the empir~
icaUy detenninable, more or less dear subJectwe Ideas of concrete
economIcally actIve mdlVlduals about theIr own interests and disregard
entIrely the countless conflicts of interest taking place among
the cattle breeders, the cattle growers, grain growers, com conswn~
ers, corn-usmg, whiskey-dlStillmg fanners, perhaps not all laymen,
but certainly every specIalIst will know the great whirlpool of antagom,tlc
and contradictory foans of value-relation,hip (WcrtbeZlehung)
whl(h are vaguely thought of under that heading, We wIiI
enumerate only a few of them here the interests of farmers, who
wi,h to sell their property and who are therefore mterested 10 a
rapId rise of the pnce of land; the dlamettlcally opposed interest of
tho'e who wISh to buy, rent or lease, the interest of tho,. who WISh to
retarn a certam propert} ttl the socIal advantage 01 tht=ir descendant'i
and who are therefore IOterested 10 the 'tability of landed propert} ,
the antagomstlc interests of those who, in their o~n or theIr chtl~
drens' mterests, wish to see tbe land go to the most enterprising
farmer - or what rS not exactly the same - to the purchaser with
the most capital; the purely economic interest in eCOnomIC freedom
of movement of the most "competent fanner" In the business- sense,
the antagorustic interests of certain dommating classes in the rnain~
tenance of the traditIOnal social and politIcal position of their own
Hc1ass" and thereby of their descendants, the mt~re!it of the ljOCIally
subordinated strata of farmers in the dedin~ 01 the strata which are
above them and which oppress them; in occaslOnaJ contraditlOn to thrs
the mterest of this stratum in having the Jeadershlp of those above
them to protect theIr economzc interdts This lISt could he tremendously
lncreased, WIthout coming to an end although we have been as
summary and ImpreCISe a.\ possIble
We WIll pa" over the fact that most diverse purely Ideal values are
mIxed and associated WIth, hmdcl:" and dIvert the more ~~e~Olst1CU ihtrrest,
in order to remmd ourselves, above all, that when we speal of the
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 109
Hinterests of agricultUre" we thmk not on'y (If those rnatenal and ideal
values to which the fanne", themselves at a gIven time relate their
interests, but ratner those partly quue heterogeneous value-Ideas
winch u.e can relate With. agriculture. As instances of these valueideas
related to agriculture we may Clte the interests ,n production
demed from the mterests m cheap and qualitauveIy good food,
....hich two interests are themselves not always congruous and in
connection Wlth which many clashes between the interests of city
~nd country can be found, ;md In WhlCh the mterests of the present
generation need not by any means always be identical wlth the interests
of coming generatJons, mterests In a numerous populatl0fl~ particularly
in a large rural population, derived either from the fOTClgn or
domestic interests of the "State," or from other ideal mterests of the
most dIVerse sort, e g, the expected influence of a large rural popu~
lation on the charaaer of the natlon's culture These "populatlon~
interests~) can dash WIth the most dIverse economl(, interests of all
sections of the rural population, and indeed WIth all the present
mterest, of the mass of rural ,nhabitants Another mstance lS the
Interest in a c.r:.rtain type of SOCIal s.tratificabon of the rural PDpulation,
because of the type of pohtieal or cultural mfluence which will be
produced therefrom i thiS interest call, depending on its orientation,
conflict With every conceivable (even the most urgent present and
future) interests of the individual farmers as well as those "of the
State." To thiS is added a further r.omplieation the "s.tate," to the
"interests" of which we tend to relate such and numerous other
siIIDfar wdivtdual interests, is often only a blanket term. for an
extremely mtricate tangle of evaluative-ideas, to which It in its turn
IS related in mdlvidual cases, e g, purely military seconty from
e"'<:ternal dangers, secunty of the dominant position of a dynasty or a
certam class at home, interest in the maintenance and expansion of
the fonnal-Juridicial unity of the natIon for its own sake or In the
interest of maintalmng certain objective cultural values which 10
their turn again are very dIfferentiated and which we as a politicalh
UnIfied people bP.heve we represent J the reconstruction of the social
aspects of the state according to certam once more diverse cultural
Jdeas It would lead us too far even merely to mention what is
contamed under the general label Ustate~interest.s1J to which we can
110 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
relate lIagnculture" The Illustrations which we have chosen and
our even briefer analyses are crude and slIDphfied The non-speCIalIst
may now analyze smuJarly (and more thorougWy) for instance "the
class interests of the worker" in order to see what contradictory ele~
ments, composed partly of the workers' interests and Ideals, and
partly of the Ideals with which we Vlew the workers, enter mto this
concept It IS unpossible to Overcome the slogans of the conflict of
mterests through a purely empirical emphasIs on their "relative"
character. The clear-cut, sharply defined analysIS of the vanous
possIble standpomts IS the only path which WIll lead us out of verbal
confusion The "free trade argument" as a Weltanschauung or as a
valId norm is ridIculous but - and thIs is equally true whichever
Ideals of commercial polley the individual accepts - our underestimatIOn
of the heunstie value of the WISdom of the world's greatest merchants
as expressed In such Ideal-typIcal fonnuI~ has caused serious
damage to our dISCUSSIons of commercIal policy Only through
Ideal-typ;cal concept-construcllon do the viewpoints wIth which we
are concerned 10 mdlvidual cases become exphcIt Therr peculIar
character is brought out by the confrontation of empmcal reality
with the Ideal-type The use of the undifferentIated collectIVe concepts
of everyday speech is always a cloak for confUSIOn of thought
and action It is, indeed, very often an Instrument of specious and
fraudulent procedures It IS, In bnef, always a means of obstructmg
the proper formulation of the problem
We are now at the end of this dIscussion, the only purpose of
whIch was to trace the course of the han-hne which separates SCIence
from faith and to make exphcIt the meamng of the quest for SOCIal
and economic knowledge The objectwe vahdity of all empirical
knowledge rests exclUSively upon the ordering of the given reahty
accordIng to categones ",mch are subjective In a speCIfic sense, namely,
10 that they present the presupponttons of our knowledge and are
based on the presuppositIOn of the value of those truths wluch emplfical
knowledge alone i> able to give us The means avaIlable to our
SCIence offer nothIng to those persons to whom thIS truth IS of no
value It should be remembered that the behef in the value of
scientIfic truth is the product of certam cultures and IS not a product
of man''3. origmal nature Those for whom scientIfic truth is of no
"OBJECT! VITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE ill
value will seek in vain for some other truth to take the place of
science in Just those respects In whIch it is unique, namely, in the
proVISion of concepts and Judgments which are neltherl
empincal
reahty nor reproductIOns of it but which facilitate Its analytical ordermg
In a valid manner In the empIrical social sciences, as we have
seen, the possibility of meaningful knowledge of what is essential for
us m the infinite richness of events IS bound up With the unrenuttmg
apphcation of viewpoints of a specifically particularized character,
whIch, 10 the last analysIS, are onented on the baSIS of evaluative
Ideas These evaluative Ideas are for their part empincally dIscoverable
and analyzable as elements of meaningful human conduct, but
their validity can not be deduced from empmcal data as such The
"obJectivity" of the social sCiences depends rather on the fact that
the empirical data are always related to those evaluative Ideas whIch
alone make them worth knowing and the significance of the empIrical
data is derived from these evaluatIve ideas. But these data can
never become the foundation for the empincally impossible proof
of the validity of the evaluative ideas. The belief winch we, all have
In some form or other, in the meta-empIrical vahdity of ultImate and
final values, in which the meaning of our existence " rooted, IS not
mcompatible with the incessant changefulness of the concrete viewpoints,
from which empIrical reahty gets its significance Both these
VIews are, on the contrary, in harmony WIth each other Life WIth
Its irratlOnal reality and its store of possIble meanings IS inexhaustible
'The concrete fonn In which value-relevance occurs rema.J.os perpetually
in flux, ever subject to change in the dunly seen future of human
culture The hght which emanates from those highest evaluative
Ideas always falls on an ever changmg fimte segment of the vast
chaotIc stream of events, which flows away through time
Now all this should not be misunderstood to mean that the proper
task of the SOCIal sci.ences should be the contmual chase for new Vlewpomts
and new analytical constructs On the contrary nothmg
should be more sharply emphasized than the propOSitIon that the
knowledge of the cultural szgmficance of concrete hisloTlcal events
and patterns is exclUSively and solely the final end whIch, among
other means, concept-construction and the criticlSm of constructs
also seek to serve
112 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
There are, to use the words of F Th. VlScher, "subject matter
specialists" and "mterpretanve speCIallSts" The fact-greedy gullet
of the former can be filled only with legal documents, statistical worksheets
and questionnaIres, but he IS Insensitive to the refinement of a
new idea. The gourmandlSe of the latter dulls hlS taste for facts by
ever new mtdlectual subtlhbes That genume artistry which, among
the histOrIans, Ranke possessed in such a grand measure, manifests
itsdf through its abllIty to produce new knowledge by interpreting
already known facts according to known viewpoints.
All research m the cultural sciences in an age of special.zation,
once It is onented towards a given subject matter through partIcular
settings of problems and has establIShed .ts methodological prinCiples,
will tonsider the analysIS of the data as an end in itsdf. It will
discontinue asseSSIng the value of the mdiVldual facts in terms of
their relationships to ultimate value-ideas. Indeed, it will lose its
awareness of its ultimate rootedness In the value-ideas in general.
And .t is well that should be so But there comes a moment when
the atmosphere changes The signIficance of the unreflectivdy utilized
viewpomts becomes uncert"am and the road is lost in the twiI1ght
The hght of the great cultural problems moves On Then
science too prepares to change .ts standpomt and its analytical apparatus
and to view the streams of events from the heights of thought
It follows those stars which alone are able to give meamng and
direction to Its labors: /
" der neue Trieh envacht,
Ich eile fort, Ihr ewiges Licht Zl1 trinken,
Vor mir den Tag und unter mir die Nacht,
Den Himmel uber mIT und unter mir dIe Wellen "3
SFaust Act I, Scene II (Translated by Bayard-Taylor)
IThe newborn LUlpulae fires my mmd.
I hasten on, hu beams eternal drlnkmg,
The Day before me and the Night behmd,
Above me Heaven unfurled, the floor of wavel beneath me n