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NATIONALISM, COSMOPOLITANISM, AND GEOGRAPHICAL IMAGINATIONS

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ABSTRACT. In this article I set nationalism and cosmopolitanism into sharp contrast with one another as inherently incompatible geographical imaginations. I begin by briefly denaturalizing nationalism and the nation-state. I then turn to the philosophy and political agenda of cosmopolitanism, an ideology simultaneously very old and new, which offers a more inclusive and empathetic alternative to nationalist xenophobia. In the third section I argue that contemporary globalization has laid the ontological foundations of a cosmopolitan world order. Next, I explicate nationalism's and cosmopolitanism's competing visions of the definition and meaning of "community." I summarize major objections to cosmopolitanism and offer a defense of it. In the following section I focus on the implications of cosmopolitanism for contemporary geography, including relational spatialities of empathy and caring. Finally, I suggest that contemporary globalization is gradually putting into place the legal and institutional apparatus for cosmopolitan global governance and democracy. *Keywords:* *cosmopolitanism, empathy, global governance, globalization, nationalism.*

For most of the last 400 years the world-system has exhibited two distinct but intertwined tendencies. On one hand, it has witnessed a proliferation of national states with well-defined borders; on the other, it has simultaneously seen unprecedented growth in interconnectedness, of flows of capital, goods, people, and information across those borders, a phenomenon we may loosely label "globalization." Such processes speak to the endless tension of capitalism between fixity and motion, which assumes economic, political, cultural forms. These two trends are also manifest within the domain of ideology, in the forms of exclusionary nationalism and inclusive cosmopolitanism, the former frequently predicated upon ostensible self-reliance and xenophobic depictions of Others and the latter seeking to forge linkages among groups, noting their mutual reliance and interdependence. Although their interactions cannot be reduced to a simple dichotomy, nationalism and cosmopolitanism offer starkly contrasting views of identity, community, and humanity, with geographical imaginations sharply at odds with one another. In this article I explore the relationship between these two worldviews and their implications for geography.

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Although it has a lengthy intellectual history, cosmopolitanism is relatively new to academic discourse and to world politics. Of course, within this intellectual tradition are multiple strains that vary by academic discipline and political emphasis. Briefly, “cosmopolitanism” may be defined as an ethical, moral, and political philosophy that seeks to uncouple ethics from distance, arguing that each person is bound up with, and obligated to, humanity as a whole. Cosmopolitans are moral universalists and insist on the inherent worthiness and dignity of all individuals, irrespective of their place of birth. In this view, no legitimate grounds exist for maintaining that some people—fellow nationals, community members, coreligionists—are more worthy than other people are; that is, those who live far away are culturally different or are not constitutive elements of one’s self-defined community. The accident of where one is born is just that—an accident. As Peter Singer put it, “Geographical proximity is not in itself of any moral significance” (2004, 166). For Daniel Archibugi, “Cosmopolitans may be defined as those who know the world and feel at ease anywhere in it” (2008, 143). Pheng Cheah argued that it is “a universal humanism that transcends regional particularism” (1998, 22). Martha Nussbaum called it “a set of loyalties to humanity as a whole” (1994, 3).

My agenda in this article is ambitious. First, I briefly review the rise of the nation-state and nationalism in order to stress their contingent, malleable nature, attempting to denaturalize what is so often reified in popular culture and consciousness. Second, I offer a historical sketch of cosmopolitanism, its tenets, and its varieties. Third, I dwell on the intersections of current forms of globalization and cosmopolitanism, arguing that the contemporary world-system has steadily undermined national states and national borders, opening a space for enacting a cosmopolitan political agenda. Fourth, I explore cosmopolitanism’s challenge to, and intersections with, nationalism and their competing visions of the meaning of community. Fifth, I summarize three major objections to cosmopolitanism and offer a defense. Sixth, I point to the implications of cosmopolitanism for contemporary geography, including relational spatialities of empathy and caring. Finally, I argue the case for cosmopolitan global governance and democracy and hint at why such a system may be gradually coming into being.

NATIONALISM: AN UNSYMPATHETIC CRITIQUE

The 1648 Peace of Westphalia marked a pivotal moment in the emergence of the modern world economy. By ending the Thirty Years’ War and guaranteeing the independence of the Netherlands and Portugal, it signaled the breakup of the vast religious empires that long dominated medieval Europe. Perhaps most important, it elevated the autonomous territorial state into the world’s preeminent form of political organization, decisively shifting the scale at which territorial politics was constituted from the city-states and the feudal empire to the nation-state. However, even the notion that the Peace of Westphalia marked the rise of the nation-state to primacy has been challenged; other observers, for example, point

to the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815 (Osiander 2001; Teschke 2003). Moreover, the treaty marked the beginning of an era in which states were expected to respect one another's sovereignty and to abide by noninterference in one another's internal affairs. National borders became clear, sacrosanct entities that defined the limits of control and governance. The Westphalian ideal was always exactly that—an ideal. Total noninterference has rarely been practiced, of course; borders have always exhibited some degree of porosity, and states have always shaped, and been shaped by, events inside their neighbors' states.

The Enlightenment political order yoked the boundaries of the state to those of ostensibly “natural” nations, inserting a hyphen that has slowly become undone in an age of mounting globalization. The legitimacy of the national state had profound implications for those within its borders as well as for the structure of the world-system. Internally, in a world of discrete states, governments have long been considered free to control “their” populations however they wish: Sovereignty includes the authority to admit and exclude citizens and often involves little concern for the well-being of the politically disenfranchised. At the scale of the world-system, negative externalities that are difficult or impossible for individual states to control, such as the destruction of ecosystems or the global environment, are simply ignored and, consequently, spiral out of control.

The ideological counterpart of the nation-state is, of course, nationalism. Eric Hobsbawm held that nationalism was originally a means for elites to exert control over the diverse, increasingly mobile, and often democratically inclined populations within their respective territories (1990). As the nation-state became the primary locus of sovereignty in the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, it also became increasingly important for ruling elites to construct a narrative that provided the often culturally heterogeneous populations that inhabited the state territory with a single identity, a narrative often defined by its opposition to Otherness. Nationalism is possible only when one is aware of the nation as one entity among many. Nations thus only exist in the plural. As long as the category of “national” has existed, the category of “transnational” has simultaneously existed; that is, the two are inseparable partners.

Multiple processes fomented nationalism over time: national political parties; rising levels of literacy; national postal systems and newspapers; national currencies; and the military draft, which socialized young men from diverse local backgrounds (Giddens 1985). Ever since the Peace of Westphalia sovereign national states have become not only deeply ingrained in the world's multiple legal and economic systems, and the basis of international relations, but also in our ways of thinking. National social systems are so deeply equated with “society” in the minds of most people that they consider the national borders on world maps as natural as mountain ranges or rivers. Anthony Giddens noted that the common definition of the term “society” is held to be so deeply equivalent to the nation-state that few people can imagine a society that does not share the boundaries of its country (1985). Benedict Anderson's famous account of nationalism as an “imagined com-

munity” pointed to the nation-state as the taken-for-granted horizon of belonging: The nation, he held, is sutured together by institutions that replicate those of face-to-face ties (1983). In the process, nationalism came to celebrate the nation-state as given, not produced, and viewed national communities in deeply hierarchical terms that entrenched differences between self and Other. Precisely because the nation-state is not “natural,” precisely because it must be repeatedly and forcefully injected into the minds of its inhabitants, nationalism’s primary role is to reify the nation-state through multiple practices, rituals, and symbols in everyday life: for example, in schools, public ceremonies, sporting events, the media, and other channels of ideological manipulation. In much of the developing world, however, national identities are simply products of colonial cartography, and nationalism remains a tenuous force at best, often in sharp competition with religious, tribal, or other forms of nonnational identities.

Many kinds of nationalism, including ethnic and civil forms, exist, of course, and the forms and power of nationalism vary over time and space. In the early nineteenth century nationalism frequently took the form of a progressive celebration of national and ethnic heritage and helped undo the last of the feudal monarchies that held sway in Eastern Europe. In post-Napoleonic Europe, for example, the Greek independence movement became a cause célèbre among intellectuals and activists throughout Europe, among them Lord Byron, who died in the effort to free that country from the Ottomans. Nationalism also played a progressive role in the anticolonial struggles in the developing world and the disintegration of colonial empires following World War II.

By the twentieth century, however, and culminating in the horrors of Nazi Germany, nationalism became increasingly exclusionary and xenophobic, often with racist overtones. Today it is almost impossible to identify a nationalism that is not predicated on xenophobia, on a sharp distinction between self and Others; progressive, emancipatory nationalism that does not denigrate foreigners is rare (perhaps Tibet offers an example). Although nationalism is ostensibly associated with love of country, in fact it has typically degenerated into an uncritical celebration of self and an uncompromising fear or hatred or, at the least, casual dismissal of the Other. Nationalist discourses almost invariably consist of empty jingoism and vapid symbolism, typically coupled today with uninformed opinions about other peoples’ ethnicity based on simplistic and erroneous stereotypes.

All nationalist ideologies, to one degree or another, view community as synonymous with the nation-state, not with all of humanity. “No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind. The most messianic nationalists do not dream of a day when all members of the human race will join their nation in the way that it was possible, in certain epochs, for, say, Christians to dream of a wholly Christian planet” (Anderson 1983, 7). In the discourse of nationalism, people outside our boundaries are too strange and too distant to matter, or if they do matter, they matter less than those “at home” do. Yet justifying one’s nation a priori as more important, more worthy, more significant, or more natural than other nations is

highly questionable on intellectual grounds. As the Canadian observer Will Ferguson pointed out, “that’s the problem with nationalism. It’s like body odor and beer farts; everyone else’s always seems much worse than your own. Nationalism is . . . fundamentally irrational. Nationalism asks you to believe that the country you happen to live in, by amazing coincidence, also happens to be the greatest country in the world. What luck!” (1997, 14).

Nationalist ideology is frequently coupled with a worship of the sanctity of the Westphalian system of national borders. Consider, for example, the obscenely homicidal nationalism of the Bosnia Serbs and the pogroms of ethnic cleansing; European nationalists who blame immigrants in Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany; or the retrograde xenophobia of American nationalists such as the Minutemen movement along the United States–Mexico border. Immigrants, refugees, and diasporic communities are often blamed for ills such as unemployment, stagnant wages, crime, government deficits, and, in the fevered imagination of the right, diseases such as leprosy. For too many people the “circle of compassion” stops at the borders of their nation-state, as exemplified in common popular maxims such as “charity begins at home,” on the assumption that the nation-state is some extended version of one’s kin or friends and that national borders have some innate moral weight. For example, the tragedy of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center killed 3,000 people and received enormous worldwide attention, but on the same day—and, I emphasize, every day thereafter—30,000 children throughout the world died of disease or malnutrition and received no attention whatsoever: no headlines, no candlelight vigils (Singer 2004). Such a view inescapably privileges the life of a person nearby over those who live far away: It is the worst kind of spatial fetishism imaginable. What does this discrepancy say about our current value system, except that the lives of the distant poor and weak are so disposable that we should not even deign to note their passing?

Finally, the intimate connections between nationalism and militarism are worth noting. In a Westphalian world-system, interstate struggles are ultimately settled through military competition. Not surprisingly, therefore, nationalism tends to be deeply intertwined with militarism and frequently glorifies war and “national sacrifice” as admirable and necessary. Nationalist militarism produces moral geographies of similarity and difference designed to dehumanize the Other, to legitimate military conquest, and to excuse the most horrific of human-rights violations in the name of national defense. Nationalists typically hold the military, whether in Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, World War II Japan, or the contemporary United States, to be sacrosanct. Love of the military often pervades popular culture and shapes government spending priorities: Nothing stirs national pride and hatred of Others like a good war. The United States, which, with 5 percent of the world’s population, spends almost 50 percent of the world’s military expenditures, well exemplifies this tragic pattern (Olson 2010). One need only think of the intimate ties between nationalism and militarism over the last fifty years: To win Congress’s approval of highway funding, President Dwight Eisenhower proposed the Na-

tional *Defense* Highways Act in 1956. Even today, global warming often receives the most serious attention among policymakers only when it is couched in national security terms.

Fortunately, grounds exist for believing that nationalism is today on the retreat, a topic to which I return below. Equally important, viable alternatives to nationalism allow us to circumvent its most dehumanizing qualities. Numerous transnational ideologies, including various forms of religious ecumenes and Marxism, obviously exist. An increasingly important one, however, is the philosophy and ideology of cosmopolitanism, which has enjoyed a significant resurgence in popularity since the 1990s.

COSMOPOLITANISM: A HISTORICAL SKETCH

The origins of cosmopolitanism are often traced to classical Greece, particularly to Diogenes the Cynic, who, when asked where he was from, famously replied, “I am a citizen of the world” (*kosmou polite*, or citizen of the cosmos), thus rejecting his local origins and defying the then-prevalent source of identity construction, the *polis* or city-state, in favor of the *cosmopolis*. (Diogenes Laërtius [1925] 1972, 2: 63). Similarly, the Stoics suggested that we think of ourselves as surrounded by a series of concentric circles of compassion in which each individual is located in progressively larger webs of mutual obligation extending from the self and family to community to region to the world as a whole, with declining obligations to those farthest removed from ourselves. Cosmopolitanism advocates extending the innermost circles outward, to encompass ever-larger domains of humanity. In the same vein, Plutarch held that “we should regard all human beings as our fellow citizens and neighbors” (quoted in Nussbaum 1994, 13). Cosmopolitanism thus long predates the nation-state and nationalism. Others find elements of this notion in the Bahá’í faith, whose founder, the Persian Bahá’u’lláh, proclaimed, “The Earth is but one country, and mankind its citizens” (1983, 250).

During the Renaissance and Enlightenment, cosmopolitanism found new voices among the Western intelligentsia. Global circumnavigation initiated a gradual understanding of the world as a unified entity. Mary Louise Pratt argued that European colonial conquests led to an incipient “planetary consciousness,” an understanding of the world as a unified entity in which localities were always enmeshed and intertwined (1992). Occasionally this process led to a politics of empathy: The sixteenth-century Dominican friar and activist Bartolomé de las Casas, for example, advocated on behalf of Native Americans and against the Spanish genocide then under way. Similarly, in 1788 the German philosopher Christoph Martin Wieland wrote that all the peoples of the earth are members of a single family and should be treated as such (Appiah 2006).

Immanuel Kant is generally regarded as the foremost Enlightenment thinker of cosmopolitanism. Although much of his geography was filled with embarrassing inaccuracies and racist diatribes, as David Harvey has reminded us (2000, 2009), Kant nonetheless articulated a clear and coherent vision for a peaceful

world order. One of the Enlightenment's earliest liberal theorists of international relations, he predicted that the chronic warfare generated by the state-based system would one day entice the world "to enter into a cosmopolitan order," a peaceful federation of republican states founded on international rights ([1793] 1991, 90). Following his famous categorical imperative, Kant's 1795 essay, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," one of the most popular of his works, offered the principle that the optimal means for avoiding war was to treat all human beings as equals. Thus he argued that "the peoples of the earth have entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it is developed to the point where a violation of laws in *one* part of the world is felt *everywhere*" ([1795] 1991, 107–108; italics in the original). Kant did not propose a world state; rather, he argued that a voluntary federation of states would allow disputes to be worked out through nonmilitary channels, ultimately rendering war meaningless and useless.

Kant's cosmopolitanism marked a turning point where morality could be formulated beyond the state. In this view, cosmopolitanism follows reason, and national loyalty follows sentiment (Rorty 1998). For Kant, cosmopolitanism is the domain in which humanity can free itself from given primeval, irrational passions such as nationalism and redirect consciousness toward rational, transcendental purposes. Ultimately, Kant's cosmopolitanism metamorphosed into internationalism, in which he "envisioned a world in which an enlarged ethic of hospitality would diminish the significance of the bordered world" (Shapiro 1998, 701). His cosmopolitan ideal was never approximated in practice, however: Over time, "the shining idea of world citizenship was reduced to a grudging concession that we ought always to allow foreigners to travel among us unmolested" (Rée 1998, 78).

Karl Marx, too, was something of a cosmopolitan, as exemplified from the famous quotation in the *Manifesto*, "The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country" ([1848] 1973, 71). Thus, for Marx, cosmopolitanism was much more than an empty promise of global republicanism; it was an existing condition that reflected the extension of capitalist forces and relationships of production on a global scale. In this light, Marx regarded nationalism as akin to religion; namely, false bourgeois consciousness. Whereas Kant's cosmopolitanism was prenatal, Marx's was decidedly postnational in character. In the twentieth century Albert Einstein, advocate of world government, famously described nationalism in 1929 as "an infantile sickness. It is the measles of the human race" (quoted in Dukas and Hoffman 1979, 38).

Many species of cosmopolitanism exist, of course: Kantian, Christian, Muslim, Marxist, neoliberal, liberal humanitarian (Beck 2006). Languishing in Benito Mussolini's jails, Antonio Gramsci wrote about the dangers of Christian cosmopolitanism, with its distraction from the concerns of this world (1971). For Muslim fundamentalism, a cosmopolitan vision based on the Koran unites activists from Morocco to Indonesia. "Neoliberal cosmopolitanism"—a term some theorists view

as an oxymoron but other analysts, such as David Harvey, see as closely related—seeks to unite the planet under the reign of the commodity. The liberal and humanitarian dimensions of cosmopolitanism, however, are what concern me here.

Cosmopolitanism takes as its explicit ethical point of departure all human beings rather than, say, tribes, nations, or religious communities (Pogge 1992). The cosmopolitan geographical imagination is hence not limited territorially; adherents of cosmopolitanism take as their “imagined community” not the nation or nation-state but the world. Cosmopolitanism encourages a reflective distance from one’s own culture and cultivates belief in a common humanity, striving for a sense of responsibility not only of the world, but also for the world (Waldron 2000). Morally, therefore, national and cultural boundaries are irrelevant and meaningless or, worse, distractions from the important task of caring for Others in light of their shared humanity. Compassion knows no borders, for cosmopolitans recognize humanity wherever it occurs: The value of a human life does not vary across space. In this way, legal and moral cosmopolitanisms are inseparably fused: The ideal global order is one in which all persons are held as moral equals with equivalent rights and duties.

COSMOPOLITANISM AND GLOBALIZATION

The possibilities of a contemporary cosmopolitanism must be seen in light of the massive rounds of globalization and time-space compression unleashed by contemporary capitalism and how they have steadily made issues of national origin and citizenship problematic. Historically, cosmopolitanism has surfaced during periods of rapid cultural and economic integration, when the world appeared to expand suddenly; examples include the Stoics who emerged during the Roman Empire, Kantian thought during the Enlightenment era of colonial conquest, and contemporary cosmopolitanism in the epoch of digital, globalized capitalism. In the current historical moment, globalization represents a vast acceleration in the scope, volume, and velocity of international flows, exchanges, networks, and interactions, including foreign investment, transnational firms, and international trade, which makes 40 percent of the world’s total output reliant on production and consumption by foreigners (Dicken 2007). Robert Jessop’s notion of the hollowing out of the nation-state, or the shifting of governance to many nonstate actors such as nongovernmental organizations, points directly to the ways in which globalization challenges the legitimacy of Westphalian borders in an age of mounting global interconnections (2002). He showed, for example, how national economies have been steadily displaced by global city networks and cross-national alliances among local metropolitan and regional states.

Another facet of globalization is the gradual emergence of a global civil society, one of the contemporary world’s understudied phenomena (Norris 2000). Countless entities such as the World Social Forum, international church networks, professional associations, charities and nonprofits, innumerable nongovernmental organizations, environmental groups, human-rights advocates, and cross-border

trade-union activists have gradually gained clout and respectability as some of globalization's most tenacious opponents (Teivainen 2002; Hawken 2007). There is, of course, nothing new about transnational solidarities. The abolitionist movement in the nineteenth century, for example, encompassed activists in Britain, Canada, the United States, and elsewhere. Many social movements today struggle against neoliberalism on several fronts, such as the World Social Forum or People's Global Action, often using the Internet to link diverse groups with widely varying agendas together in a strategy that Harvey labeled "militant particularism," in which local solidarities find common ground with one another (1996).

Globalization has also made national conceptions of citizenship problematic. Many individuals, such as many corporate chief executive officers, professionals in producer services, rock stars, and sports figures, whom AnnaLee Saxenian labels "new argonauts" (2006), have become symbols of nonterritorial citizenship (Hutchings and Dannreuther 1999; Carter 2001). Craig Jeffrey and Colin McFarlane similarly chart the emergence of ordinary cosmopolitanism (2008). The experience of the European Union illustrates that the possibility of complementing existing state forms of citizenship with a viable form of transnational citizenship, and more than ninety countries allow dual or multiple citizenship (Sejersen 2008). In 2006 more than forty countries allowed noncitizen voting (Song 2009).

Postnationalism has become popular well beyond the confines of global production and now includes consumption and culture. Economically, we participate in a global community whenever we go to work or to the grocery store. International travel, including the 15 percent of the world's inhabitants who cross national borders annually as tourists, as well as diasporic communities, refugee and immigration flows, and remittance economies, are part of vast web of activities that transcend national borders with mounting ease (Appadurai 1993). Globalization has forced an increasingly widespread recognition that we are all connected to a variety of places worldwide, even if we have never traveled to them. More people are inclusive in the cuisine, movies, music, novels, and fashions they consume and are more attentive to global events than ever before. The technologies and institutions that can generate transnational feelings of belonging increasingly play out on a transnational scale, particularly in the age of digital capitalism. Indeed, 32.7 percent of the planet's population now uses the Internet (IWS 2011), and although enormous social and spatial discrepancies in access to it exist, more people can learn about the rest of the planet more rapidly today than ever before. Contemporary everyday life has acquired a global level of extensibility that is historically unprecedented:

In conditions of late modernity, we live "in the world" in a different sense from previous eras of history. Everyone still continues to lead a local life, and the constraints of the body ensure that all individuals, at every moment, are contextually situated in time and space. Yet the transformations of place, and the intrusion of distance into local activities, combined with the centrality of mediated experience, radically change what "the world" actually is. This is so both on the level of the "phenomenal world" of the

individual and the general universe of social activity within which collective social life is enacted. Although everyone lives a local life, phenomenal worlds for the most part are truly global. (Giddens 1990, 187)

Although the argument that the nation-state is disappearing has occasionally been advanced in exaggerated and simplistic terms (Ohmae 1990; Gergen 1991), little doubt exists that contemporary globalization has fundamentally undermined the territorial order of distinct, mutually exclusive, sovereign states that has underpinned the international system since the Peace of Westphalia. The gradual decline of the nation-state has been fueled by, among other things, the increasing significance of global problems (for example, global warming), the threat posed by transnational ideologies (Muslim fundamentalism, for instance), and mounting international trade and integrated financial markets. In this light the nation-state is being eroded simultaneously “from above”—that is, by the growing power of transnational public and private institutions—and “from below”—that is, regional authorities and local movements seeking to attract foreign capital or participate in global processes by circumventing their respective national states. This transformation makes the simple difference between “inside” and “outside” increasingly problematic, rendering borders ever more porous. Numerous observers have suggested that the postmodern world order is becoming “unbundled” or “plurilateral” (Gilpin 1987; Ruggie 1993); that is to say, it is being displaced by a new territorial configuration that does not take the nation-state as its point of departure.

In short, just as industrial capitalism induced a “scalar shift” in social processes and identity formation from the local city-state to the nation-state (Giddens 1985), contemporary globalization is fostering a similar scalar transformation from the national to the global. In a globalized world the inhabitants of the planet inescapably share one atmosphere, one economy, and, increasingly, one set of common political and ethical concerns (Singer 2004). In such a context, the moral community to which each person owes an obligation is, by definition, worldwide, generating an obligation to “care at a distance,” in which the concerns of distant strangers are held to be as important as those of people nearby. Such ethical concerns nonetheless confront the reality of a deeply entrenched, hegemonic nationalism.

COSMOPOLITANISM AND NATIONALISM

The relationships between nationalism and cosmopolitanism are complex, frequently uneasy, and often marked by acrimony. From the point of view of many cosmopolitans, the nation-state and nationalism—two inextricably bound entities—are moral abominations (Brennan 2001). In this view, nationalism is a political and moral sin on a par with sexism, racism, and Eurocentrism, but one that receives far less condemnation. In this sense, cosmopolitanism is explicitly and vehemently antinationalist and antipatriotic, viewing nation-states as artificial—but nonetheless very real—constructions; that is, as historical constructions, as made and not given, and therefore as mutable and plastic. Nationalism—with its empha-

sis on the moral geographies of inclusion and exclusion, its parochial narrowing of community to ethnic or national communities, its fetishization of arbitrary borders, its pervasive xenophobia, and its frequent sanctification of military violence against Others—inherently privileges some groups over other groups, a violation of the norm of universality. Indeed, without this sanctification of difference, nationalism deprives itself of the legitimacy of war, which is one of its central purposes. In short, from the perspective of cosmopolitanism, the sovereign state is no longer morally defensible in an age when global webs of interconnectedness and obligation spill easily across national borders. The logical moral step is to conscientiously reject the Westphalian system of national borders as artificial and destructive constructs.

Nationalism and cosmopolitanism also jostle at the level of affect. If the primary emotions associated with nationalism are pride and fear, the primary emotions associated with cosmopolitanism are empathy and respect. Nationalism promotes a sense of community, a geography of belonging, centered on ostensibly—and often mythologized—common origins, values, concerns, and expectations, all of which are held to end at the border. Cosmopolitanism, in contrast, seeks to overcome the dichotomous fixation on “we” and “them,” citizens and immigrants, the local and the global. As Nussbaum asked, “Why should we think of people from China as our fellows the minute they dwell in a certain place, namely the United States, but not when they dwell in a certain other place, namely China? What is it about the national boundary that magically converts people toward whom our education is both incurious and indifferent into people to whom we have duties of mutual respect?” (1996, 14). In this view, no “illegal immigrant” can exist, for no human being can be “illegal.” Of course, as Yi-Fu Tuan stated in 1996, translating the sentiment and attachment to the local is not easily replicable at broader scales, particularly those beyond the nation-state.

Some observers hold that cosmopolitanism and nationalism are not mutually exclusive, that they reflect all sorts of entanglements, that it is possible to be both. Robbins held that, “for better or worse, there is a growing consensus that cosmopolitanism sometimes works together with nationalism rather than in opposition to it” (1998b, 2). Rather than a blunt dichotomy, this version of cosmopolitanism seeks to resolve the tensions between nationalism and universal liberal ideals, viewing the two ideologies as complements rather than substitutes. Kwame Appiah, for example, advocates a “cosmopolitan patriotism” that acknowledges the common sentimental attachment to the local but disavows nationalist xenophobia and discrimination against Others (2006). The difficulty with such a stance is that nationalism has become irredeemably corrupted by xenophobia, so that a constructive reconciliation with cosmopolitanism is effectively impossible.

Although the material bases of cosmopolitanism exist, corresponding global popular consciousness lags far behind; “a sense of belonging to the world must be produced in everyday life” (Schueth and O’Loughlin 2008, 929). Unlike nationalism, cosmopolitanism lacks a mass social base. Nonetheless, worldwide, a signifi-




FIG. 1—Responses to the 2000 World Values Survey question, “To which geographic group do you belong?” Source: Modified from Schueth and O’Loughlin 2008.

cant percentage of the world’s people no longer conceive of their identity as primarily corresponding to that of their national state (Furia 2005). Using data from the World Values Survey in 2000, Samuel Schueth and John O’Loughlin demonstrate that, although the bulk of the world’s people still base their primary source of identity on the nation-state, 11 percent identify the world as a whole, and another 11 percent identify the world as their second most important source (2008) (Figure 1). Thus, more than one-fifth of humanity self-identifies with the “global community.”

Cosmopolitanism’s challenges to nationalism also extend into the domain of political ethics. The highly influential notion of justice that John Rawls outlined in his 1971 *A Theory of Justice* has become the mainstay for most conceptions of this topic today. Rawls’s framework centers on the question of what form of social

organization people would choose if they could not know what position within it they would occupy—that is, if they had to decide behind a “veil of ignorance”—and concludes that they would seek to improve the circumstances of the worst-off members. Favoring those members with more resources, therefore, is morally acceptable only if it simultaneously favors those with fewer resources. But Rawls’s conception thus takes the nation-state for granted, limiting his concerns for the “worst off” to his fellow national citizens (Singer 2004). A conscientiously global, Rawlsian conception of justice, therefore, must assume that people are ignorant of their citizenship as well as of their position in hierarchies of class and power when deciding on the rules of social life that they live by. Indeed, the cosmopolitan critique of Rawls—which can be generalized to liberal humanism in general—is that it is overly preoccupied with morality within the nation-state and insufficiently concerned with the global scale in which all human beings are inevitably enmeshed.

CRITICISMS OF COSMOPOLITANISM, AND A DEFENSE

Cosmopolitans suffer three principal forms of criticism: They are ineffectual, politically disengaged elitists; they disdain their local contexts; and they are unwitting servants of neoliberalism. Upon closer scrutiny, none of these objections holds merit.

First, critics of cosmopolitan citizenship often paint it as an elitist intellectual pipe dream of those few lucky enough to enjoy frequent international travel and networks (Smith 1995). Cosmopolitans can “wallow in a privileged and irresponsible detachment” (Robbins 1998b, 4); that is, as spectators of the making of history and geography rather than active participants. As Robbins put it, cosmopolitanism “evokes the image of a privileged person: someone who can claim to be a ‘citizen of the world’ by virtue of independent means, expensive tastes, and a globe-trotting lifestyle” (1998a, 248). To critics, cosmopolitans are either self-aggrandizing opportunists hiding behind a veil of empathy or arrogant observers claiming to speak for all humanity. Accusations against liberal universalisms of all types typically hold that they are innately Eurocentric and overlook local differences, smothering them in a blanket of homogeneity in which the values of a Western elite masquerade as the universal good. Enlightenment notions of equality, for example, can be ridiculed as Western imperialism (Harvey 2000). How can an ostensibly universal ethic such as cosmopolitanism be reconciled with the vast diversity of the world’s cultures, the growing respect for difference that permeates postmodern sensitivities, and the sensitivity to place and uniqueness?

This criticism holds that cosmopolitanism relies on abstract, decontextualized notion of the individual without offering a viable sense of belonging (Calhoun 2003). Equating cosmopolitanism with the deracinated individual, however, ignores its linkages to geographies of identity formation. As a burgeoning literature on identity and space has demonstrated, people’s perceptions of themselves and Others are never fixed, but consist of fluid, hybrid, multiscalar constructions (Sibley

1995; Natter and Jones 1997), a relational view central to the cosmopolitan interpretation of identity (Mitchell 2007).

Second, critics of cosmopolitanism argue that cosmopolitans despise the local as inherently morally inferior and less interesting than the global. Nationalists often deride cosmopolitans as rootless, unattached and uncommitted to the interests, and unconstrained by the restraints of their fellow citizens (Kofman 2005). Obviously all forms of belonging inevitably involve local ties as well as nonlocal ones, and no one, of course, can actually be cosmopolitan in the sense of belonging nowhere or everywhere. However, loyalty to humanity need not deprive us of the capacity to care for those who live nearby. "To express solidarity for distant groups of persons does not mean denying it to those who live in our own neighborhood" (Archibugi 2008, 141). Indeed, in the cosmopolitan geographical imagination the local matters every bit as much as distant places, for cosmopolitans refuse to attach more significance to some people than to other people. In this reading, cosmopolitanism advocates for a continuum of sociospatial attachments, extending the intimate bonds of the family to humanity as a whole, as the Stoics argued two millennia ago.

Third, some critics of cosmopolitanism paint it as an excuse for the injustices perpetuated by neoliberalism; namely, that it is a neoliberal facade for Western corporate interests posing as universal values (Harvey 2000). In this reading, cosmopolitanism is a flimsy veneer for transnational corporations suturing the world's places into a seamless whole. Robbins countered that "capital may be cosmopolitan, but that does not make cosmopolitanism an excuse for capitalism" (1998b, 8). Equating cosmopolitanism with neoliberalism fails to engage with its moral critique, its hostility to injustice and inequality. Whereas neoliberalism celebrates the ostensibly free market, cosmopolitanism as a political philosophy focuses on questions of effective and progressive governance that cater to the subaltern, not those who enjoy wealth and political advantage. Thus, in the spirit of Rawls, defenders of cosmopolitanism call for global mechanisms to protect the world's underprivileged, such as refugees and immigrants.

COSMOPOLITAN GEOGRAPHIES

Cosmopolitanism has a long and complicated history of intersections with geography: "Some form of geographical knowledge is presumed in every form of cosmopolitanism" (Harvey 2000, 557). Harvey proposes a reformulated cosmopolitanism, one that takes seriously place, space, and the biophysical realm, in short, one that foregrounds the geographical politics of difference and engages conscientiously with the phrase he uses in his title: "the banality of geographical evils" (2009). He thus seeks to "remove the mask that so conveniently and effectively conceals and protects the particularities of the class or ethnic nationalist power hiding behind the noble universal principles" (p. 107). Harvey is adamant that an emancipatory politics takes place and space with the utmost seriousness and respects geographical diversity in all its messy complexity: "The foundational

point is that there can be no universal politics without an adequate place-based politics” (p. 196). Rather, a reformulated cosmopolitanism requires three foundations: a relational as well as absolute sense of space; an adequate understanding of place as it is intertwined with daily life and lived experience; and an account of “nature”—that is, the biophysical world that is produced by human beings and in turn produces them. None of these dimensions is more important than the others; they simply constitute different ways looking at the world and thus must be held in a dialectical tension with one another. Only such a synthesis will allow us to “confront the innumerable ruses of geographical reason that from Kant onward have permitted noble universal principles to be paralleled by devilishly distressing geographical details and disruptions” (p. 249).

By refocusing the geographical gaze on the scale of the global rather than the national, cosmopolitanism allows us to avoid a line of thought that led to what John Agnew and Peter Taylor call the “territorial trap” of embedded, state-centered thinking—the assumption the state is the privileged place where governance happens and that the national scale of politics overrides all others—that is, of assuming that a narrow focus on national spaces adequately explains events within a state’s boundaries (Agnew 1994; Taylor 1994, 1996, 2000). If the territorial trap involves the reification of the national scale at the expense of other forms of social and spatial organization, then cosmopolitanism fomented geographical imaginations that gleefully cross national borders. For example, rather than essentialize culture along nationalist lines, cosmopolitanism adopts the position of hybridity, in which cultures are seen as polycentric, indeterminate, and in constant flux.

Becky Mansfield emphasized that the national scale is but one of many levels at which processes unfold, leading us to redefine what is within and outside the state as various forms of global social and environmental governance emerge (2005). As geographers have come to view scale as socially constructed, fluid, malleable, and relational in nature, the very notion of scale has come into question. “We can talk about the existence of a given site only insofar as we can follow interactive practices through their localized connection” (Marston, Jones, and Woodward 2005, 425), to which one might add that, as practices become increasing globalized, place takes on meaning only as a site within worldwide webs of interaction. Denis Cosgrove tells us that “places and landscapes are no longer thought of by geographers simply as bounded containers, but as constellations of connections that form, reform and disperse in space and over time” (2008, 47). In this vein, cosmopolitanism advocates for a relational ontology of space, one in which spatiality is defined through lines of power and feelings of belonging and responsibility (Massey 2009). Such a view is in keeping with the emerging literature on geographies of care and the ethics of responsibility (Lawson 2007), particularly in the face of the neoliberal assault on state-funded interventions in the sphere of reproduction and the associated growth of discourses of individual, rather than collective, responsibility.

Harvey has called for a cosmopolitanism that interprets contemporary time-space compression, and the relational geographies it generates, in terms that enhance democratic possibilities everywhere (2000, 2009). Substantive cosmopolitanism must come to terms with the dynamics of uneven development—such as between the world's developed and underdeveloped countries—the brutality of corporate exploitation, the ceaseless production of new spatialities, and the manner in which new forms of community and belonging are constantly coming into being. Thus cosmopolitanism must confront the problem of uneven development straightforwardly: “Doing justice to the Third World would require exporting capital and jobs until everything is leveled out—until an honest day's work, in a ditch or at a computer, earns no higher a wage in Cincinnati or Paris than in a small town in Botswana” (Rorty 1998, 46). A cosmopolitanism that seeks to confront uneven development and injustice must walk a fine line between endless—and politically disempowering—relativism on one hand and the insensitive imposition of a single conception of justice on the other that denies the rootedness of people in myriad local social, economic, ideological, and ecological networks. Cosmopolitanism that ignores local differences will lead to unsavory, if unintended, consequences, usually via the arrogant assumption that only liberal Western culture holds the keys for social and spatial equality. “Cosmopolitanism, in short, is empty without its cosmos” (Harvey 2000, 554). Of course, reconciling the universal and the particular, the abstract and the concrete, is a topic of long-standing interest among geographers and echoed in contemporary accounts of glocalization, a vision of spatial hybridity that sees the global and local as mutually formative and transformative (Swyngedouw 2004).

COSMOPOLITANISM AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Josée Johnston and Gordon Laxer asserted that “cosmopolitan perspectives tend to involve more normative assertions than empirical answers” (2003, 44). To be a politically pragmatic doctrine, cosmopolitanism requires an effective vision of governance in a world in which national borders are steadily declining in importance. The changing nature of governance, in turn, is closely tied to the massive scalar shift now being unleashed by capitalism. Just as national laws and regulations were adopted during the Progressive era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to curb the excesses of capitalism on a national scale, so too are international laws and regulations necessary to curb the excess of capitalism on a global scale, including, among other things, human rights, spatial inequality, and rampant environmental destruction.

To be legitimate, any supranational form of governance must legitimate itself through an appeal to democracy, which in the twentieth century—particularly after the end of the cold war—became the minimal standard for international respectability, including decisions made by a majority, universal suffrage, constitutional guarantees for civil and minority rights, and mechanisms for peaceful resolution of disputes (Archibugi 2008). Despite occasional claims that democra-

cies are incompatible with certain traditional value systems or poverty, democracy has, more or less, in one form or another, steadily triumphed over most forms of despotism over a vast if uneven swath of the planet. Such an observation should not be taken to mean that democracy is a panacea for the world's ills, for democracy has also been singularly unsuccessful in preventing wars or eliminating poverty. Democracy is thus a necessary but not sufficient condition for cosmopolitan governance.

The cosmopolitan version of global democracy considers "sovereignty a dogma that must be superseded" (Archibugi 2008, 98; see also Pogge 1992). Constructing alternatives to national political systems is a daunting task, however. Confederal models of governance limit citizens' participation to that of their respective states. The biggest critics of cosmopolitan governance, not surprisingly, come from so-called realists, who dourly assert the everlasting primacy of the state as the central principle around which global politics can and must be constituted (Chandler 2003). Typically, such objections rest on fears of power concentrated in a few hands worldwide (Dexter 2008). Such criticisms mistake a cosmopolitan notion of global democratic governance based on a voluntary, transnational set of unions for an unfettered world government. Cosmopolitan governance, in contrast, asserts that political power should be vertically distributed throughout a variety of governance units of varying sizes, in which no single stratum would be dominant (Pogge 1992). Power and control in such a system would be constrained through a variety of checks and balances, and struggles over borders would become much less meaningful. Such a world is not simply some empty daydream: The European Union and other empirical examples of such federalist regimes show that they can be quite feasible.

Of all of the existing institutions that could remotely resemble Kant's notion of a global federation of states, the United Nations, the largest and most ambitious international organization ever formed, comes the closest. For all of its numerous flaws, the United Nations is the only established, actually existing worldwide forum for resolving political disputes peacefully. Western powers may protest the lack of democracy within the United Nations, but they have repeatedly thwarted reforms in that direction, including restructuring or abolition of the Security Council, which violates the organization's charter principle of equality among members (Archibugi 2008). Indeed, the one vote–one country rule in the General Assembly itself greatly exaggerates the influence of small states and reduces that of larger ones; half of the world's population, for example, is represented by only seven states (China, India, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, and Bangladesh). Ideally, from a cosmopolitan view, a restructured United Nations would be complemented or substituted by a directly elected World Parliament, perhaps modeled on the European Parliament, whose primary purpose would be to protect human rights and punish those who violate them.

Even without an effective existing model of global governance, nonetheless sound cosmopolitan reasons exist for suspecting that some of the worst abuses

committed in the name of the nation-state may gradually face curtailment. Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than in the domain of human rights, an issue central to cosmopolitan ethics and geographies (Cheah 2007). The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, drafted in the wake of Nazi atrocities exposed at the Nuremberg trials, extended the Nuremberg principles on a global basis, thus enshrining the Enlightenment ideal of a singular humanity under the umbrella of universal reason: Human rights were held to be an innate property of everyone regardless of social or spatial position. Contemporary manifestations of this view include the United Nations' International Court of Justice, which is concerned only with disputes among states, not accusations against individuals. However, the International Criminal Court (icc), the world's first court with global jurisdiction, which was founded in 1998 and began operations in 2002 in The Hague, does, for the first time, offer the world a permanent international body for the enforcement of international criminal laws, despite U.S. attempts to exempt its soldiers and officials from the icc's authority. In many ways the icc extends the principles of the Nuremberg trials to a global basis, judging unpunished breaches of the law within the world's states. The icc's foremost charge is with "crimes against humanity," including murder, enslavement, forcible deportation, torture, and persecution based on ethnicity, religion, or gender. In a rapidly expanding, globalized geography of justice, human-rights violations in one place are crimes against everyone, everywhere. As a result, many authoritarian governments find it increasingly difficult to isolate their citizens from the world at large. For example, the icc has indicted dictators and mass murderers from Sudan, Congo, Uganda, and, most recently, Liberia's Charles Taylor. Even national courts have become more aggressive in prosecuting international crimes, such as in the well-known case of Chile's General Augusto Pinochet, who was indicted in London on 10 October 1998 by a Spanish magistrate (Byers 2000; Tan 2004).

Another example of a rising global justice system is the use of humanitarian interventions, whose aim, by definition, is always to protect groups suffering extreme human-rights violations. Cosmopolitan humanitarian interventions pose a particularly sticky ethical dilemma and can be justified only in a just moral cause, a legitimate authority to intervene, when it is clearly impossible to resolve an issue with nonmilitary means and when the intervention can reasonably be expected to be successful at preventing a serious violation of fundamental rights for an entire group (Farer 2005). Clear examples include: India's intervention in then-East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, in 1971; Tanzania's deposal of Uganda's Idi Amin in 1979; Vietnam's overthrow of the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia in 1979; the Security Council's measures to protect the Kurdish population of Iraq; the restoration to power of Haiti's democratically elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide; and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's toppling of Libya's Muammar Kaddafi. However, such forays may not be popular at home. Typically, "The more remote the peoples to be rescued—geographically and culturally—the less willing a given community will be to put its soldiers in harm's way" (Archibugi 2008, 201).

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Although the nation-state is commonly portrayed and celebrated as “natural,” nothing about it is inevitable. Its birth at the Peace of Westphalia reveals it to be a relatively recent historical product, and the function of nationalism as an ideology has been to reinforce this naturalness, to reify what is produced and not given. Unfortunately, nationalism almost everywhere has degenerated into an uncritical celebration of self and a dehumanizing, often militarized disparagement of Others. Given the dynamics of capitalism, its ceaseless creative destruction and reconstruction of spatial scales, the nation-state in historical retrospective will likely turn out to be a short-lived phenomenon; and as the nation-state goes, so too will nationalism.

Cosmopolitanism celebrates the commonalities that underlie human life, offering an “imagined community” that extends everywhere. In this respect cosmopolitanism is not simply antiracist, antisexist, and antinationalist but also at odds with much of the postmodern celebration of difference. Difference and diversity, to be sure, must be respected, but its exaggerated emphasis can also undermine the possibilities for collective action that crosses national, cultural, and ideological boundaries. One of the central political projects of various postpositivist philosophies has been to uncouple difference from power. Thus feminists attempt not to deny gender differences but to eradicate the power differentials between men and women, which typically foster male advantages and female disadvantages. Similarly, cosmopolitans seek to overcome the power differences that accompany the accident of birthplace and national origin.

Cosmopolitanism invites a reconfiguration of geographical imaginations, of horizons of belonging. Just as nationalism is a spatial ordering that hinges on borders, Othering, and difference, cosmopolitanism a geographical discourse that foregrounds human commonalities and worldwide concerns. We are left, then, with two contending geographical imaginations, one that continues to celebrate the nation-state, and is hence inherently backward looking, and another, forward-looking one that celebrates the entirety of humankind. By refocusing our scalar gaze, as Isaac Asimov once noted, all the world’s issues “will become as intimate as to be one’s own” (1970, 19).

The political manifestation of such an argument is global systems of governance that enhance democracy in all places, not in some countries at the expense of other countries. From a Rawlsian perspective, only a democratic system of global governance can attend to the needs of the planet’s worst-off members. Thus, “empowering the citizen of the world means to build up at the global level those checks and balances that have nurtured the evolution of democracy” (Archibugi 2008, 284). A reformed and empowered United Nations would be one such step in this process. Other mechanisms have gradually limited the worst atrocities committed by national governments against their own peoples or by one ethnic group against another.

As global capital relentlessly remakes the world in its image, uprooting and destroying communities, cultures, and environments in the name of the commodity, strategies to envision commonalities across national borders become all the more important. Progressive global politics requires a moral vision suited to the age of contemporary globalization: Cosmopolitanism, in confronting the geographies of inequality, offers a route around debilitating nationalism, a means of generating a collective sense of responsibility based on relational ontologies of care and responsibility. Such a move represents a shift from the politics of the polis, with its well-defined boundaries, to the cosmopolis, a world founded on the ethics of inclusion without national borders. In an age of rampant neoliberalism, building a cosmopolitan community has become a necessity, not a luxury.

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