166 Energy Policy of the European Union 2012 Communication, the Commission criticized the member states as being 'slow in adjusting their national legislation' and often pursuing 'inward-looking or nationally inspired policies1, both of which hampered the effectiveness of the adopted policy measures (European Commission 2012d). Nevertheless, the European Council decided to set 2014 as the deadline for the full completion of the internal gas and electricity markets (European Council 2011). In February 2014, the Commission announced an important milestone in that pursuit when electricity grid operators and power exchanges from 14 KU member stares (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Austria, UK, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden) joined Norway in inaugurating a pilot project for one-day-ahead market coupling (European Commission 2014e) and, as of May 2014, the Commission was working on a regulation to make the practice of market coupling binding for all member states. Such efforts notwithstanding, the EU in mid 2014 still lacked the fully integrated electricity and gas markets that it deems vital to a functioning internal energy marker; and it remains to be seen whether those markets will deliver the expected results when they ultimately come to fruition. Chapter 6 Climate Change, Energy Efficiency, and the Quest to Expand the Use of Renewable Energy Sources In recent years, the Commission increasingly emphasized the importance of finding 'cost-efficient ways to make the European economy more climate-friendly and less energy-consuming' (European Commission 2015a). To that end, responsibility for all climate-related topics previously held by the DG for Environment was assigned in February 2010 to a DG for Climate Action. In 2014, Connie Hedegaard, then Commissioner for Climate Action, noted that the ambition of the EU member states in realizing these rargets should serve as a motivation for other countries ro similarly aim for environment-friendly economic growth (Hedegaard 2014). Hedegaard's comments are indicative of how climate actions stand at the crossroads of internal and external policymaking. It is internal insofar as it relates to the regularion of energy efficiency standards and the promotion of renewable energy forms in the EU. The externa! dimension applies ro the EU's international obligations and its claim to fame as a united political force on the world stage. The EU's external climate policy agenda was clearly driven by the entry into force of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in March 1994 (Oberthiir and Palie-maerts 2010). The Convention 'sets an overall framework for intergovernmental efforts to tackle the challenge posed by climate change' (UNFCCC 1994) and has since been ratified by 195 countries (UNFCCC 2015). We identified climate change policies as multidimensional (see Chapter 1) precisely because the goals set within its context are unachievable without specific internal regulations, particularly increases in efficiency, reducrions in rhe use of carbon-intensive fuels, and international reciprocity. 167 168 Energy Policy of the European Union Although there existed a general consensus in the EU on the need for action to mitigate global warming during the early days of the EU's climate policy, the policy process was dominated by differences between the EU member states on the appropriate instruments. These differences resulted in the member states' inability to adopt binding targets for the participating countries: 'The lack of clear mitigation commitments in the UNFCCC resulted in the failure to establish effective GHG mitigation policies at the EU level [...]' (Oberthiir and Pallemaerts 2010: 53). Today, the EU understands itself very much as an international agenda-setter in the area. According to the DG for Climate Action (European Commission 2014o), the EU has been a 'driving force in international negotiations on climate change' and has made a major contribution towards a new global climate agreement. It has since changed that description, now placing itself 'at the forefront of international negotiations for a new global climate agreement' (European Commission 2015b). Despite this slight change, opposing voices, especially among scientists, emphasize that the EU is losing its impact in global climate change negotiations. Indeed, there has been a notable lack of progress since the United Nations Climate Change Conference met in Bali in 2007 and adopted measures aimed at reaching a binding agreement to succeed the Kyoto Protocol by its Copenhagen Summit meeting in late 2009 {known as the Bali Roadmap; UNDP 2008, UNFCCC 2007). Progress has since been slow and convoluted. The Copenhagen Summit failed to deliver on its promise. The resulting Copenhagen Accord produced neither a legal treaty nor a target year for peaking emissions, illustrating 'a worrying trend' (Fernandez Martin 2012: 193) that the EU was losing its status as an environmental champion. This chapter provides a state-of-the-art snapshot of current EU climate policies and future goals by examining the EU's measures to increase the share of its renewable energy sources, to strengthen energy efficiency, and to introduce new technologies and materials such as carbon capture and storage (CCS), nuclear fusion, large-scale wind, and concentrated solar power (CSP) plants. Increasing the share of renewable energy sources One of the first initiatives concerning the promotion of the share of renewable energy sources was the Commission's White Paper Energy for the Euture: Reneivahle Sources of Energy issued in r Quest to Expand the Use of Renewable Energy Sources 169 November 1997 (European Commission 1997). This initiative was based on three arguments. First, replacing fossil energy sources should contribute to reducing carbon dioxide emissions resulting from the use of oil, natural gas, and coal. Second, increasing the share of renewable energy was expected to reduce (he Community's dependence on energy imports from other countries by utilizing domestically available sources of energy for electricity generation. Third, by promoting renewable energy sources, I lie demand for innovation should be increased, strengthening the regional economy and providing new employment opportunities (Howes 2010) (i.e. introduce a new industrial age commonly referred to either as a green or low-carbon economy). According to the Commission, renewable energy sources were 'unevenly and insufficiently exploited in the European Union' (European Commission 1997). Therefore, the White Paper set the goal of doubling the share of energy provided by renewable sources to 12% by 2010. In so doing, the Commission laid the groundwork tor a cause-effect policy model (increased use renewables equates ro reduced GHG output) that would serve as the basis for its ruture climate change policies and lead to multiple rounds of increasing renewable targets (European Commission 2008a, b, 20Ha-c,2013f). In March 2006, the European Council pointed to the need of assigning the EU a leading role in combating climate change and asked the Commission to develop an action plan on how to promote renewable energies in the long term. In so doing, climate change was used as a political tool to centralize energy-related issues traditionally restricted to the sole authority of the individual member states. This is also reflected in the Renewable Energy Road Map (European Commission 2007m), which emphasized the value of renewable energy sources for a sustainable future: 'They [renewable energy sources] are largely indigenous, they do not rely on uncertain projections on the furure availability of fuels, and their predominantly decentralised nature makes our societies less vulnerable' (European Commission 2007m). Based on these assumptions, the Commission proposed in January 2008 its 20-20-20 targets (European Commission 2008a, b), which included: (a) increasing the share of renewable energy in total EU energy consumption to 20%, and the share of biofuels in transport to a binding minimum target of 10%; (b) cutting greenhouse gas 170 Energy Policy of the European Union emissions by at least 20% (below 1990 levels); and (c) reducing energy consumption by 20%. In order to achieve the overall 20% target in the renewables sector, Directive 2009/28/EC of 23 April 'on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources' (EP/Council 2009d) required the member states to adopt national action plans indicating the measures intended to realize the Commission's goals. However, in a clear indication of the perennial problem of harmonizing member-state interests, particularly in relation to their national energy, the individual targets each member state had to fulfil varied substantially, ranging from 10% in Malta to 49% in Sweden (EP/Council 2009d: Annex 1). Figure 6.1 lists the national overall targets for the share of energy from renewable sources in gross final consumption of energy for 2020, and compares these to the share of renewables in consumption in 2004 and 2013. As the data shows, substantial changes are still required in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, three of Europe's most important industrial economies. In order to increase the share of renewable energy in energy consumption, the Commission consistently draws special attention to the transport sector. The Renewable Energy Road Map (European Commission 2007m) called for not only a general increase in renewables hut also an overall reduction in annual fossil fuel consumption, by over 250 Mtoc, by 2020. Touching upon all three dimensions of the energy policy typology, it described the advantages of replacing fossil fuels in terms of, for example, a reduced dependence on imports from non-EU countries (external), new investment opportunities in the renewable energy sector (internal), decreased CO, emissions, and improved air quality (multidimensional). However, especially with regard to the Commissions goal to increase the amount of biofuels in transport, conflicting interests between a wide range of actors, including scientists and politicians, prevented sustained success. The central scientific critique (e.g. IEA 2008, OFJD 2009) emphasized that the production of biofuels negatively affects other industry sectors, such as agriculrure, private consumption, and health. Another argument raised against biofuels is that they were not necessarily more environment-friendly than fossil fuels, because of the huge amount of energy necessary to produce them, which could, and probably does, potentially increase CO, emissions rather than reduce them (Howarth et al. 2009, Pimentel and Pimentel 2007: 269). Quest to Expand the Use of Renewable Energy Sources I 71 Figure 6.1 National targets for the share of energy from renewable sources in gross final consumption of energy in 2004, 2013, ami 2020 00 10 20 30 40 Sources: EP/Council (2009d: Annex I), Eurostat <20]5g-h) 172 Energy Policy of the European Union Quest to Expand the Use of Renewable Energy Sources 1 73 In response to these critiques, the EU passed Directive 2009/28/ EC (EP/Council 2009d) 'to ensure | only J the use of sustainable biofuels' that 'generate a clear and net GHG saving without negative impact on biodiversity and land use' (Eurostat 2015e). Thus, it raised the target for the share of renewable energy in transport from 5.75% by 2010 (EP/Council 2003a) to a minimum of 10% in every member state by 2020. In contrast to the overall Union-wide target for the share of renewable energy sources, which led to individual targets in each member state, the share of biofuels in the transport sector was uniformly set for all member states, [he C nmmission justified this by the fact that biofuels, although unevenly produced across the Union, could be acquired easily from those so endowed 0.1% 0.5 - Biomass 4.5% 149.4 - Solar 2.2% 71.0 Nuclear 26.8% 882.4 Conventional thermal 49.0% 1,614.1 - Solid Fuels 27.4% 901.S - Cases 18.7% 614.7 - Petroleum 2.2% 72.5 - Non-RES Wastes + others 0.7% 25.1 Total 100.0% 3,295.2 The total figure for renewables of 798.7 is that quoted in the EU report. However, the actual sum of the individual totals is actually 798.9. Source: European Commission (2014J: 91) Cyprus 95.8%) rely almost exclusively on oil-fired power stations for their electricity. Part of the problem in achieving the ambitious targets adopted in Brussels stems from the fact that the Commission can neither mandate the actual energy mix of resources used in the production of electricity in its member states nor can it manage the exploration and development of its own energy resources. Unlike the world's other major energy producers and consumers, the EU has no centrally managed public lands upon which it can coordinate offshore drilling or mining - a fact that greatly complicates the 178 Energy Policy of the European Union Quest to Expand the Use of Renewable Energy Sources 179 Figure 6.4 Breakdown of electricity generation by source, 2013 (in %) France Sweden ■ Slovakia ■ Slovenia ■ Croatia ■ Austria ■ Belgium Romania ■ Spain ■ Portugal ■ Hungary ■ FrnlctmJ ■ Bulgaria ■ EU2S ■ Latvia ■ Lux ■ CZ ■ Lithuania ■ Denmark ■ Italy ■ Germany ■ UK ■ Greece ■ Ireland ■ NL Cyprus Poland 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90»/o 100% | Conventional thermal | Nuclear n Hydro | Wind [J other Source: Based on F.urostat (2014b, d, c) data coordination of policies, particularly with respect to increasing or reducing domestic fossil fuel production. Yet even if the EU could centrally control national energy mixes, mining, and exploration activities, there is no guarantee that it could overcome all the other obstacles associated with those activities, or prevail over the complex set of political and economic interests of the many actors (see Chapter 4) involved the EU's energy sector. Hence, despite the progress in some areas, the overall trends in the renewable sector have to be assessed cautiously. Based on a conservative evaluation, the share of renewable energy sources is projected to decline in comparison to other energy sources because economic crises, administrative and infrastructural barriers, policy shifts, and support-scheme disruptions repeatedly hamper investment in the sector (ECOFYS et al. 2012). For example, production capacities in the biofuels market have been insufficiently exploited in recent years, reducing the impetus for further investment. As one related report notes, in 2012, biofuel production in the EU was operating at 40% of capacity (bioethanol hovered between S0% and 60%), adding that the 'unused capacity' indicates 'that i here is sufficient conversion capacity available for several years to come' (ECOFYS et al. 2012: iv). One reason for the failure to substantively increase the share of biofuels in the European transport market is that while the EU leadership sets targets for biofuels and legislates fuel-blend percentages in the consumer market, it simply cannot control how much the member states will invest in the requisite infrastructures. Despite all its achievements, the EU remains constrained by its own design. So how does the EU plan to meet its ambitious goals? How will ii ensure policy coherence across the member states? The Commission certainly is aware of the challenges responsible for the insuffi- ient growth ol tin.' renewables sector and plans to compensate for [hem through increased investment in research and development and the distribution of revenues from the trade of emissions allowances (European Commission 2013d: 7). Some obstacles, however, will remain insurmountable without the full cooperation and i ommitment of the member states, which retain sole responsibility over key decisions about investments, licensing, and resource mixes. According to the Commission, progress in removing these barriers has been mediocre at best, and some member states have not even addressed the way in which they intend to make the necessary reforms. In the event that EU law continues not be implemented correctly, the Commission can be expected to launch infringement proceedings against the respective member states, which it did in 2013 towards Belgium and Estonia (MEMO/13/470) and Italy and Spain \ 11 \H )/1 5/8201. each ol u Inch u as requested to ensure lull comp liance with Directive 2009/28/FC. Likewise, the Commission referred Poland and Cyprus to the European Court of Justice for not correctly enacting the Renewable Energy Directive (IP/1 3/259). The onus, however, cannot entirely be placed upon the member states. It would he remiss not to critically discuss the efforts initialed at the political level to increase the share of renewable energy sources in EU's overall energy mix. Renewables are expected to reduce import dependence and mitigate the risk of future oil price shocks. However, they simply are not predictable as an electricity source, at least in comparison to any fossil fuel. As one distinguished energy economist describes it, the costs resulting from this insecurity are immense (Helm 2012). 7273 1 80 Energy Policy of the European Union The EU's efforts to strengthen energy efficiency Increasing energy efficiency as a means to reduce growth in consumption, particularly, but not exclusively, in terms of electricity, is a fundamental component of EU energy policy. At the macro scale, energy efficiency is measured as energy intensity, which measures the energy consumption of an economy by dividing the gross inland energy consumption (coal, electricity, oil, natural gas, and renewable energv muimm b\ gross domestic product (CiDP). Energy intensity (EI) relates inversely to energy efficiency: the lower the intensity, the more efficient is an economy's consumption of energy. [bra! energy intensity decreased in all EU28 countries between 1995 and 2012 (Figure 6.5). Yet, while the EU as a whole reduced the energy intensity of its economy by an average of 1.65% per year, individual member states' performances varied significantly. Energy intensity declined annually for most member states (Figure 6.6), on average between 1% and 4% (e.g. UK (-2.6%), Germany (-1.7%), and France (-1.1%)), but hardly declined at all in a few (e.g. Austria (-0.7%) and Italy (0.58%)), and two, Romania and Lithuania, saw substantial reductions. Averaging figures in this manner also conceals occasional annual increases in energy intensity. Such was the case for many member states that saw their EI increase in 2010 from the previous year, a phenomenon linked to the economic crisis of the preceding years and the subsequent recovery (Bosseboeuf et al. 2013). The Commission regards the increase of energy efficiency as a central mechanism to realize its overall energy policy goal of comprehensive energy security (sustainability, energy supply security, and competitiveness). This has been quite explicitly reflected in the Commission's proposals of the last decade. Already in 2000, the Commission had published an action plan to reduce the amount of energy consumed in the Community (European Commission 2000b) and in June 2005, the Commission published the Green Paper on Energy Efficiency {European Commission 2005). According to that plan, the EU could reduce energy consumption by 20%, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and dependence on energy imports, and create jobs in the renewable energy sector. The Commission then asked stakeholders interested in participating in the policy process to submit their positions in the course of an open consultation. In so doing, the Commission hoped to identify how it Quest to Expand the Use of Renewable Energy Sources 18 I Figure 6.5 Energy intensity (El) of the economy 2000 vs. 2012. (Base 7V95 = 100; gross inland consumption of energy divided by CDP (kg of oil equivalent per 1,000 EUR)) EU28 Belgium Bulgaria Czech Republic Denmark Germany Estonia Ireland Greece Spain France Croatia Italy Cyprus Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg | Hungary \ Malta | Netherlands ) Austria | Poland \ Portugal L Romania ( Slovenia , Slovakia . Finland Sweden t United Kingdom t 20 40 □ 2000 Z3 _ : GO SO I 2012 TOO Source: Rased on Eurostar. (20141, g) (lata 99 182 Energy Policy of the European Union Quest to Expand the Use of Renewable Energy Sources I S3 Figure 6.6 Energy intensity, average annual change (1995-2012) Source: Based on F.urnstat (2014f, g) data could overcome existing obstacles in order to maximize savings, and sought recommendations on how efficiency improvements could be made in a cost-effective manner. The Commission envisaged huge potential in the buildings sector, where it expected to save energy by introducing energy performance certificates for all buildings exceeding 50 m2 at their time of construction, sale, or rent, and even considered applying those measures to buildings under major renovation (European Commission 2005: 2 Iff). A second measure that concerned lighting worked on the premise that energy-saving light bulbs would use significantly less energy than standard ones (ibid: 22), a view that was supported in two meetings held by the Fcodesign Regulatory Committee in 2008. The latter resulted in calls for a draft regulation on how to improve energy efficiency in households and led the Commission to adopt two additional regulations requiring the eventual, total phase-out of the incandescent light bulb in Europe and replacing it with energy-saving alternatives by the end of 2012 (European l commission 2009b, c; see Chapter 4). The Commission also proposed certain requirements for heating, cooling, and electric motors in households. Finally, referring to the growth in the number of private cars and motorcycles on European roads (a by-product of I mi rope's economic success), it identified one of its most important goals moving ahead was to achieve substantial savings in the fuel consumption of vehicles, hence reducing overall energy consump-iion and CO, emissions in the transport sector (European Commission 2005: 23). The action plan of 2006 (European Commission 2006b) identified further areas in which to save energy. In addition to reducing consumption in the construction and the transport sectors, the Commission proposed: • to generally develop guidelines on improving energy end-use efficiency in all sectors; • to better inform consumers on efficiency standards in order to transform the market; • to offer economic incentives for energy efficiency investments, especially for small and medium enterprises; • to review the modes of energy taxation currently applied; • and to establish international partnerships in order to raise awareness of the issue worldwide and promote the use of energy-efficient technologies outside the ELI. These suggestions were reflected in the Commission s Communication on Energy Energy 2020 - A Strategy for Competitive, Sustainable and Secure Energy (Furopean Commission 2010a), which detailed the ways in which the Commission planned to transition to 184 Energy Policy of the European Union a resource-efficient economy. The communication identified the need to streamline efforts to address inadequate progress in key energy policy areas such as the fragmentation of the internal energy market, insufficient security of internal energy supplies, and the disappointing nature of the member states' National Energy Efficiency Action Plans (NEEAPs). The Commission further highlighted four priority areas that, if managed and implemented correctly, could result in €1,000 of annual energy savings per European household (European Commission 2010a: 8). These included efficiency enhancements in the buildings and transport sector, industrial energy management, overall energy supplies, and an annual review mechanism for the aforementioned NEEAPs. The biggest energy-saving potential was foreseen in the buildings and transport sectors, while the mam thrust of improvements in the industrial and services sector were to be made through the strict implementation of eco-design requirements for energy-intensive goods. Measures to improve transport sustainability and reduce the dependence on crude oil wore described .it length in an .nltlirion.il C ommission White Paper entitled, Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area - Toivards a Competitive and Resource Efficient Transport System (European Commission 2011c), which outlined 40 initiatives expected to lead to a 'reduction of at least 60% of GHGs by 2050 with respect to 1990' in the transport sector alone (European Commission 201 lc: 3). The Commission expected further progress on its Energy Efficiency Plan 2011 (European Commission 201 Id), which was formulated in line with the EU's target of a 20% improvement in energy efficiency and the 2020 Energy Strategy (European Commission 2010a). Therefore, it proposed a new directive on energy efficiency in June 2011 (European Commission 201 le). While the Commissioner for Climate Action, Connie Hedegaard, emphasized the directive's importance for tackling climate change (EurActiv 201 1), a wave of criticism arose from environmentalists over the possibility for member states to opt out of the efficiency measures. Article 6(1) of the proposal dealt with the energy-efficiency obligation schemes and allowed the member states to set up their own schemes that should 'ensure that either all energy distrihurors or all retail energy sales companies operating' in the respective country's territory 'achieve annual energy savings equal to 1.5% of their energy sales, bv volume' in relation to the previous year. Nevertheless, energy used in transport was excluded from the proposal Quest to Expand the Use of Renewable Energy Sources I 85 iEuropean Commission 201 Id: 20), and member states were .mowed 'to take other measures to achieve energy savings among final customers* (ibid: 21). Environmentalists were outraged. Organisations such as Friends of ilie Earth and the Climate Action Network argued that the directive was 'set up to fail' (EurActiv 20 I 1) because the measures proposed were not designed to enable the FL! to meet its 20% energy-efficiency target. Ultimately, the Energy Efficiency F)irective, as it became known, was adopted and entered into force on 4 F)ecember 2012 (IP/Council 2012). The member states had to implement most of i he provisions decided upon by 5 June 2014 and submit their National Energy Efficiency Action Plans (NEEAPs) by 30 April 2014. Despite the widespread criticism from environmentalists, the option to apply individual measures to realize energy-saving targets remained in the directive, but as consolation, the Commission expressed its intention to propose further legislation in the event ih.it the Ell failed to realize clear-cut reductions in energy consump lion (EurActiv 2012). In April 201 I, the Commission proposed to overhaul existing legislation on the taxation of energy products (European Council 2003) in order to 'promote energy efficiency and consumption of more environmentally friendly products and to avoid distortions of competition in the Single Market' (European Commission 20 1 If, k: I). The 201 I proposal included concrete minimum taxation levels (Table 6.2), which would have become applicable at the start of January 2013. When the proposal's text was adopted by the FP during its first reading in April 2012, and Fable 6.2 Proposed minimum levels of energy taxation applicable front I January 20/3 For the purposes of motor fuels CO, related General consumption (C'/GJ) Applicable: I January I Jaiuian I |anuar\ I [anuarv 2013 (C/tCO,) 2013 2015 2018 Petrol (las oil 20 20 9.6 8.2 9.6 8.8 9.6 9.6 I 86 Energy Policy of the European Union Kerosene 20 8.6 9.2 9.6 LPG 20 1.5 5.5 9.6 Natural gas 20 1.5 5.5 9.6 For the purposes of: agricultural, horticultural, or pisckuitural works, and in forestry; stationary motors; plant and machinery used in construction, civil engineering, ami public works; and vehicles intended for use off the public roadway or which have not been granted authorization for use mainly on the public roadway CO, related (€7t CO,) General energy consumption (t'/GJ) Gas oil 20 0.15 Kerosene 211 0.15 Ll'G 20 0.15 Nattiral gas 20 0.15 Applicable to heating fuels CO, related (C/t CO,) Genera! energy consumption (C/GJ) Gas oil 20 0.15 Heavy fuel oil 20 0.15 Kerosene 20 0.15 LPCi 20 0.15 Nattiral gas 20 0.1 5 Coal and coke 2d 0.15 Applicable to electricity General energy consumption (€/(i.|) Electricity 0.15 Source: European Commission (20J If), European Council (2003) Quest to Expand the Use of Renewable Energy Sources 187 before it came under debate in the Council, there was good reason for optimism that the rules could be reformed. When the < Council began to debate the proposal in June 2012, though, it became clear that the road to any energy tax reform would be slow at best. Noting that further work was needed on a number of issues, including, among others, minimum tax rates on products and electricity (and those used in agriculture), ETS applicable installations, and how to tax biofuels, the Council merely invited the incoming Irish Presidency to continue the debate. The Council continued to debate the legislation (in June 2013 and again in June 2014), but because directives related to energy taxation require unanimity in the Council, the new measures did nor survive. The Commission withdrew its proposal in March 2015 (European Parliament 2015), and it remains to be seen whether an overhaul of the energy taxation directive will ever be adopted. In addition to the legislation on energy taxation, the Commission supports access to other means of financing energy efficiency. Both i he European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development offer relevant financial schemes, as do the Cohesion Policy bunds (2014-2020), the EU Framework Programme for Research, Innovation Horizon 2020 (2014-2020), and the European Energy Efficiency Fund. Despite the obvious advantages of reducing energy consumption lor the environment, some critics claim that the introduction of energy-efficiency standards might, paradoxically, lead to an increase in industrial emissions. They argue that such measures ultimately lead to an increase in emissions (Breakthrough Institute 20 I 1). The logic behind their reasoning is that the use of energy-efficient appliances increases consumers' disposable income by lowering the amount and cost of energy consumed. Consequently, consumers can and do use their additional disposable income to buy other goods and services, thus boosting rather than reducing demand. The subsequent increase in the production of goods needed to meet that higher demand then leads to an increase in emissions. All things being equal, this logic helps explain why automobile use increases .15 etticienc\ standards become stricter over time, lo balance this argument (and its obvious negative implications for the environment), the Commission believes that it is necessary to change its citizens' (energy) consumption habits, which in turn explains why the EU puts so much effort into public awareness campaigns. 188 Energy Policy of the European Union Case study: The EU emissions trading regime Almost a decade before the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) presented irrefutable evidence that human economic activity was directly linked to increased concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (IPCC 2007), the EU was aspiring to lead the fight against global warming. As early as 1998, the Commission outlined unilateral steps to fully implement its obligations under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (European Commission 1999). In 2001, after consulting a broad range of stakeholders (European Commission 2000a), it proposed to establish an emissions trading scheme (European Commission 2001a), which sparked almost two years of contentious debate over whether to make the system mandatory or voluntary, which emissions to include, and whether and how to auction allowances, finally agreeing on a voluntary auction system with the optional inclusion of other sectors and greenhouse gases (EP/Council 2003d, 2004). Under these new rules, the EU 15 sought to decrease emissions by 8% from 1990 levels by the planned second trading period (2008-2012), and member states were also required to submit National Action Plans (NAPs) identifying the necessary quantity of free allocations to be granted to national energy and industrial sectors. Unfortunately, those NAPs proved to be substantially wide of the mark, resulting in a collapse of the market in 2007. The EU tweaked the system through a series of consultations and subsequent reforms, before and after the second trading period, including replacing narional registries with a single Union Registry tracking verified emissions, ownership, and purchases and sales of allowances (European Commission 2013m; see also European Commission 2010). The single registry did not solve the problem of overestimating the number of annual national allocations required and, thus, by the beginning of the third trading period, the EU market was flooded with allowances that depressed prices and reduced the effectiveness of the trading scheme. While overestimating emissions requirements proved to be a thorn in the side of the Commission's plans to establish an efficiently functioning carbon market, the original exclusion of the transportation sector, which according to the International Energy Agency produced circa 22% of worldwide emissions in Quest to Expand the Use of Renewable Energy Sources 189 .'010 (IEA 2012: 9), proved to be an open wound. It was not as i hough the EU wasn't already using its internal-market powers to reel in emissions from automobiles (circa 12% of total EU emissions in 2009). It did in fact establish mandatory automobile emissions targets in 2009 (EP/Council 2009e), and would later 120 13) add rules to monitor emissions from new passenger cars (European Commission 2013a). However, the real challenge was tackling air travel, foremost because of the politically contentious nature of incorporating treasured national airlines into the I.U-ETS. As far as the Commission was concerned, the aviation sector was insufficiently reducing emissions to offset increases in commercial air traffic (European Commission 2006c, IPCC 1999) and merited inclusion in the EU-ETS. Thus, beginning in 2005, ihe Commission initiated stakeholder consultations on when and how it could fit the aviation sector into its emissions trading scheme. The level of response, including inputs from 198 organizations and more than 5,000 individuals (European Commission 2.005a), as well as the intensity of the debate that ensued, highlights the wide-ranging effect of the EU's internal-market mechanisms. Logically, F.uropean airline associations worried about their bottom line and strongly opposed the measure (AEA 2006), and member stares could hardly ignore the industry's and their employees' interests. Some 3,000 enterprises operating in Europe's aviation industry employed circa 400,000 people and generated €30 billion of added value in 2006 (Eurostat 2009). By December 2006, the Commission had heard enough to formally bring aviation under the EU-ETS umbrella (European Commission 2006c). After two years of difficult negotiations, the EP and Council finally agreed to a directive (2008/101/EC) to include the sector, starting in 2012, and auction 15% of the permits (EP/ Council 2008). European airlines criticized the move as unafford-able (EurActiv 2008), but they were not the only ones affected. The new rules also applied to non-European airlines flying to or from the EU. Once the CJEU subsequently rejected demands for exclusion by US airlines (Court of Justice of the European Union 2011, 2012a), on the grounds that inclusion of international aviation in the EU-ETS was compatible with international law, the EU-ETS crossed over from the internal to external energy policy dimension. This seemingly unintended turn of events 1 90 Energy Policy of the European Union resulted in the Commission temporarily deviating from the ETS Directive in November 2012 in order to seek a global agreement on the regularion of aviation emissions (European Commission 2012a). Altogether, it took a little over a decade, but the EU developed a carbon market that covers a substantial proportion of the Union's GHG emissions, albeit a dysfunctional one that continues to be beset by oversupply. Allocated emissions' derivatives actively trade in London and Frankfurt. The glaring weakness of an oversupply of emissions allowances in the EU-ETS depressing prices and reducing some of the environmental impact hoped for by its most ardent proponents, must be balanced by the fact that the majority of EU member states successfully reduced their emissions between 2003 and 2011 (see Figure 6.7). Finally, it must be noted that the emissions trading scheme is not the only game in town. The EU allows its industry to use a bundle of measures to reduce overall emissions, including national measures such as the Joint Implementation Mechanism (JIM) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (see, e.g. Freestone and Streck 2005). This multi-vector approach allows EU companies to avoid expensive short-term investments while concurrently strengthening the competitiveness of domestic branches, and thereby avoid negatively affecting the international competitiveness of its own emission-intensive sectors (Kreutler 2014). The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) is a demonstration of how the Commission has applied internal-market mechanisms to balance sustainability and security of supply. It directly affects the bottom line of power generators, the industrial sector, and the aviation sector. As a case, it has additional added value because its existence is central to EU plans to address climate change (the multidimensional realm) and enhance energy sustainability. By raising the cost of burning fossil fuels, the market serves a similar purpose as a carbon tax - a long sought after, but yet unfulfilled, goal of the Commission (see Chapter 3). Importantly, however, the EU-ETS is not a tax, but rather a market that provides a profit-based incentive for affected companies to reduce their carbon. In other words, heavy fossil-burning companies now pay for the right to pollute. A single allowance equals the right to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide (CO,) or the equivalent amount of the two more dangerous GHGs, nitrous oxide (NO,) and perfluorocarbons I Quest to Expand the Use of Renewable Energy Sources 191 figure 6.7 'Total greenhouse gas emissions (in CO, equivalent) indexed to 1990 Austria ^^^^^■HH^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^W-1 Belgium ^—+—A Bulgaria L^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ♦ Cyprus* ^^^^^■HH^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H ( /t'Ch Republic ^—1 ♦ Denmark ^- i Estonia ^^^^^^^^^ZjjZ^^^^ 4. EU-T5 - Finland - France ^-f Germany * 1 Greece ^ Hungary ^-P + Ireland ^—+—:—1 Italy ^^—g^^^^^^^^'n-1 Latvia ^h^^h^^^^^^j + Lithuania ^^^^^^^^^^^^ + Luxembourg ^^^^^^^■^^^^^^^^^■^fe^^^^^^J Malta" tMBM^H^^^^^^^HIIH^M^^^H^^^^^^^^M Netherlands —r-* Poland ^H^^BIII^^H^^^^^^^^^^^ * Portugal ^—"♦--1 Romania -^ ♦ Slovakia ^-1 Slovenia L^^^^^—ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ^ZZZZ] Spain ----J Sweden ^-1 + uk ^m^—4 0 20 40 60 80 TOO 120 140 It □ 2003 ■ 201 J ♦ Kyoto Protocol targets 2008-2012 Source: Based on Eurostat (2015f) data. Council of the European Union (2002a), and UWCCC (1998). 'No targets under tlie Kyoto Protocol 0788887122021 192 Energy Policy of the European Union < htest to Expand the Use of Renewable Energy Sources 19.3 (PFCs). If a company uses fewer allowances than it owns, it can either save the remainder for future use or sell them to others (via well-established markets). This allows for a supply-demand-driven reduction of emissions. It awards those who modernize and allow* heavy polluters to buy their way out of refurbishing their facilities, However, it also provides an important item in the EU's supran.i tional policy toolbox, whereby heavy fines can be imposed on those who do not surrender enough allowances to cover their emissions, the EU-ETS. Now in its third permutation, the EU-ETS has faced serious obstacles since its inception, the most important of which was the lack of harmonized standards across the Union that led to miscal dilations, price volatility, and a marker collapse. Introduced in 2003 (and entering into force in 2005), with the objective to support the member states in meeting their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU-ETS began by allocating a set of free emissions allowances based on National Action Plans (NAPs) submitted by the member states. Ostensibly erring on the side of caution, those NAPs substantially overestimated the allowances required by their respective national energy and industrial sectors. As a result, between 2005 and 2007, the market collapsed, with the price per allocation falling from 30 Euros per tonne to almost zero (European Environment Agency 2008: 8). Despite demanding stricter rules for the second trading period (2008-2012), the Commission received widely variant NAPs by the member states in 2008. It responded in 2009 with some substantial changes to the system. It began requiring that: some of the allocations be auctioned rather than allocated, beginning 2012, (40% of all allowances in 2013, with the goal of completely phasing out free allocation by 2027), adding a reinvestment requirement of at least 50% of the proceeds into climate protection measures, such as renewables, energy efficiency, and carbon capture and storage technologies (European Commission 2008), and revising the ETS Directive to establish a single Union-wide registry of affected companies (European Commission 2013m). Despite the fixes, however, legal uncertainties continued to challenge the Commission's authority and its legitimacy to unilaterally allocate allowances. For example, the CJEU ruled in 2009 (and rejected a subsequent appeal) that the Commission exceeded its competences when it unilaterally reduced the amount of allowances for Estonia and Poland, arguing that past emissions data did not in.iil\ ihe requested amount (Court of Justice of the European n.ii.mi 2012). I .Mtwithstanding its success in reforming the EU-ETS market, ili. project remains a work in progress. The first phase (2005-'ix i ! was well understood as a trial phase designed to develop ii.. necessary infrastructure for successful trading (Ellerman and |...| nw 2008), and thus the market collapse may be understood as i in. essary medicine. The second phase (2008-2012) introduced ■ in, important, yet incomplete corrections. The third phase i 'HI i-2020), currently underway, appears to be a substantially ......c mature market, at least in terms of volume and trading. In ''M the EU set its Union-wide emissions' cap (plus the three I I \ EFTA states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway) at just .,m i two billion allowances. The EU plans to further reduce emis- i.uis by annually reducing the general allowances allocated by I l"i> (based on the average of allowances issued between 2008 in.I 2012), or 38,2