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The West and Contemporary Peace Operations*

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In recent years, senior UN officials have raised concerns about the decline of Western contributions to UN peace operations. Although this is a worrying trend for supporters of the UN, it does not mean that the West is playing a smaller role in peace operations per se. Instead, the West has increased its contribution to 'hybrid' peace operations and missions that take place outside of the UN system. This article examines the West's contribution to both UN and non-UN peace operations since the Brahimi Report and assesses whether its contribution has markedly changed and what impact any changes have had on international peace and security. It proceeds in three sections. The first provides a historical overview of the West's ambivalent relationship with UN peace operations since 1948. The second analyses the West's contribution to UN, hybrid and non-UN peace operations. The final section explores what Western policies mean for international peace and security by assessing their impact on the UN's authority, the extent to which they save lives and their contribution to building stable peace. The article concludes that while in the short term the West's willingness to participate in hybrid operations displays a commitment to finding pragmatic solutions to some difficult problems, over the longer term this approach may weaken the UN's ability to maintain international peace and security.

Introduction

Since the publication of the Brahimi Report (2000), the proportion of Western personnel in UN peace operations has decreased. For Kofi Annan, this was worrying because UN missions remain hampered by a lack of specialized military capacities, generally available from the military forces of developed countries. 'Unfortunately', he lamented, 'these countries today make only limited contributions of troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations' (S.PV/4970, 17 May 2004: 5). Similarly, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, head of the UN's Department

for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), has suggested that Western personnel contributions to UN peace operations are 'inadequate. We need a lot more. If UN Blue Helmets only come from a certain part in the world, our position weakens because it does not give a strong political signal. ... We are glad that NATO participates in peacekeeping. But that should not mean that the involvement to the UN decreases' (*NRC Handelsblad*, 2004).

This reduced Western contribution is sometimes seen as symptomatic of the great powers' ambivalence to problems in the global periphery (Marten, 2004). However, the decline of personnel contributions to UN missions has not meant that the West's commitment to other types of peace operations

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has similarly reduced or that its overall contribution to international peace and security has declined. Rather, the proliferation of operations mandated and conducted by other international organizations and coalitions of the willing, the provision of unilateral support to missions conducted by the UN and regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), and the increased complexity of funding for UN and non-UN missions suggest that the West's engagement with peace operations is becoming more diverse and complex.

This article examines the West's contribution to peace operations since the Brahimi Report and explores whether the nature of the West's contribution has markedly changed and what impact any changes have had on international peace and security. The first section provides an overview of the West's ambivalent relationship with UN peace operations since 1948. The second evaluates the West's contribution to UN and non-UN peace operations. In the final section, we analyse what these patterns mean for international peace and security by assessing their impact on the UN's authority, the extent to which they saved lives, and their contribution to building stable peace. Our focus here is not to provide definitive judgments about individual missions or comparisons across missions. Rather, it is to explore the overall impact that the changes we outline have had on international peace and security. Such a broad-brush analysis involves a degree of generalization, but this is necessary in order to identify broad long-term trends.

The West and UN Peace Operations: A Historical Overview

In this article, the West refers to the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), those states openly aspiring to

membership of these organizations, and their core allies such as Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Historically, the West's relationship with UN peace operations has been Janus-faced. On the one hand, Western great powers recognized the utility of peace operations for, among other things, fulfilling the policing function envisaged by President Roosevelt, assisting withdrawal from empire and preventing the escalation of regional conflicts. But they were reluctant to actively contribute to missions where they had few direct interests. This ambivalent relationship was forged by mutual agreement with wider international society and the UN secretariat, which typically believed that the principle of neutrality required that great powers do not participate in UN peacekeeping operations (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006: 12). On the other hand, Western 'internationalist' middle powers, such as Canada, Ireland and the Scandinavian states, played pivotal roles in the conceptualization and operationalization of UN peacekeeping. Although some commentators have argued that this internationalism was rooted in self-interest (e.g. Maloney, 2001), the balance of evidence suggests that these states were primarily guided by the internationalist idea that UN peace operations could play an important role in the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflict (e.g. Dorn, 2005). For Western internationalists, their role as peacekeepers became a predominant feature of their self-identity. Ireland, for example, thought peacekeeping played a critical role in establishing an independent foreign policy and asserting its separation from the UK on the international stage (MacQueen, 2006: 16–17). Therefore, this section maps the evolution of the Western great powers' and 'internationalists' in relation to peace operations and asks whether the distinction remains as relevant in the post-9/11 world.

The idea that the great powers have special responsibilities for the maintenance of

of international order, and hence special rights, was formalized in the UN Charter via the permanent members of the Security Council. The idea that privileges brought special responsibilities was clearly expressed by both great and lesser powers during the debates that produced the UN Charter. Franklin Roosevelt, for instance, proposed that the world's most powerful states take on the role of the 'four policemen', while Mexico argued that permanent Security Council seats should be allocated on the principle that 'more extended rights [should be] ... granted to those states which have the heaviest obligations' (Russell, 1958: 146, 650; Borgwardt, 2005: 165). However, for the next 45 years, tensions between the communist and capitalist blocs, and the post-colonial world and 'first world' over the UN's appropriate role in relation to international peace and security severely circumscribed the extent to which the 'four policemen' were able and willing to act in concert.

In practice, the UN's peace and security mechanisms were self-consciously developed as a *via media* between East and West (Urquhart, 1994: 175–185). This contributed to the West's great powers developing an ambivalent attitude to peace operations. In one sense, UN peace operations were a useful mechanism for limiting interstate war, furthering regional interests and sharing the costs of decolonization. The United States, for example, advocated the creation of UNEF in order to facilitate the British and French withdrawal from Suez (James, 1969: 99–100). In the 1960s, the United States supported and funded the UN mission in Congo (ONUC) to support the central government in Kinshasa, a key US ally in the region (Lefever, 1965: 106). For its part, Britain led moves to establish UNTSO (1947) thereby transferring responsibility for containing the Arab–Israeli war to the UN and, after initial hesitation, again deferred to the UN to share the costs of

maintaining order and protecting British interests in Cyprus (1964) (Briscoe, 2003: 26–27, 189). In France's case, despite supplying some observers for UNTSO, a combination of concerns about Security Council control and a reluctance to transfer authority to the global body in cases involving significant interests meant that it did not make a significant contribution to UN peacekeeping until the mission to southern Lebanon in 1978 (Smouts, 1998: 7–39).

But at different times during the Cold War, each of the P3 states (France, UK, United States) also exhibited concerns about the appropriateness of UN peace operations, especially where the UN acted in ways inimical to their perceived national interests. After intervening in the Dominican Republic in 1965, first unilaterally and later under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS), the United States argued vociferously against the primacy of the UN, insisting that it was legitimate for regional organizations to act within their sphere of influence without UN authorization (Eide, 1966: 129). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, British officials bemoaned UN activism. In the Suez and Cyprus cases, British officials insisted that it was not the UN secretariat's place to pursue an independent policy detrimental to British interests (Foreign Office, 1957: para. 12). In short, Britain viewed UN peace operations as a tool for satisfying its interests but remained deeply reluctant to endorse the emergence of an independent role for the global body (Briscoe, 2003). France shared this view and was concerned that the important roles played by the UN Secretary-General and the General Assembly might undermine the Security Council's primacy and hence weaken France's ability to control the direction of peacekeeping through its permanent seat on the Security Council (Smouts, 1998: 8–15).

In contrast, 'internationalist' Western governments supported the strengthening of

the UN's capacity to act as a relatively independent and impartial arbiter of international disputes. Canada, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian states, for instance, even earmarked military forces to be set aside for participation in UN missions (James, 1969: 430). These states also made significant contributions to almost all UN peace operations during the Cold War (see Jakobsen, 2006: 381; Heaslip, 2006). Not only were these states well suited to such operations (they had professional forces, were not tied to the Security Council and were widely seen as neutral in the Cold War struggle), but they shared Hammarskjöld's vision of the UN as a third force in world politics (Goulding, 2002: 34).

Not surprisingly, these two groups often drew different conclusions regarding troop contributions. In both UNEF and ONUC, the UN General Assembly and secretariat placed important limits on the nature of Western contributions. UNEF was not to contain troops from the P5, principally because two of them (France and the UK) were parties to the conflict, and partly to prevent the force becoming a hostage to Cold War politics (UNGA Resolution 1000, 5 November 1956; see A/3943, 21 June 1957, para. 44). In addition, it was thought prudent to draw on non-aligned states and vital to secure Egyptian consent (Egypt rejected troop offers from Canada and New Zealand). Similar considerations shaped ONUC's composition with Hammarskjöld reaffirming the principle that the P5 should not contribute forces (S/4398 and Add.1-6, 29 July 1960). The question of P5 participation in UN peacekeeping came to the fore over Cyprus. Initially, neither the UK nor the United States wanted to relinquish control of the mission to the UN, because this might undermine their regional interests (Briscoe, 2003: 156-161; Humphrey & Miller, 2004: 443-444, 447-455). They were persuaded to accept a UN force on the condition that

caused (in the case of Somalia) and were partly caused by (in the case of Rwanda) a retreat from UN peacekeeping as dramatic as the transformation that began between 1988 and 1992. At one point during 1993, there were over 80,000 UN peacekeepers deployed around the world. By 1996, however, there were fewer than 20,000. The most significant reductions during this period were among the Western great powers. The contributions of the United States to UN missions fell from a peak of around 28,000 under UNTAF to around 4,500 under UNOSOM II and a mere handful thereafter. The British contribution to UN missions dropped from approximately 9,000 in 1995 (including 8,000 in Bosnia) to 594 in December 2000. Likewise, the French contribution decreased from over 8,000 in 1995 to 498 at the end of 2000.¹ Western 'internationalists' also reduced their involvement. By December 2000, for instance, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Ireland contributed a combined total of 2,038 troops to UN missions (or 5.4% of the total). This is much lower than the approximately 25% figure during the Cold War. By December 2001, that contribution had fallen to 748 (or 1.6% of the total), indicating a sharp decline in contributions to UN missions in line with the great powers. However, at the same time as Western states were reducing their contributions to UN operations, some 40,000 peacekeepers were deployed under the auspices of organizations such as NATO, the OSCE and coalitions of the willing (such as the Italian-led operation in Albania in 1997).

It was into this context that the Brahimi Report was released in 2000. It reflected many of the ideas that key Western states had been articulating to explain the retreat from

UN peace operations in the mid-1990s. In the wake of its Bosnia operations, the British government, for example, developed the concept of 'peace support operations', variants of which were adopted by other NATO members, including France (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2004: 165-185; Gregoire, 2002). This insisted that peacekeepers needed 'robust' capabilities and mandates in order to protect civilians, maintain law and order, and create a context conducive to reconstruction and democratization. Likewise, the Brahimi Report concluded that the military component of a peacekeeping mission should have 'robust' capabilities and mandates, a point that drew criticism from India and Kenya among others (see Mackinlay, 2000; White, 2001: 134).

This convergence between the West and the UN secretariat on the most appropriate doctrine for UN peace operations was accompanied by an increase in the number of missions authorized, although the West's participation in those missions was patchy. After a relatively slow period between 1995 and 1999, since 2000, the UN has established seven new missions and the operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Lebanon have expanded. In only two of those missions, however, have Western states made pivotal troop contributions: in UNMISSET, approximately half the troops came from Australia, Portugal and Japan, while 8,504 of the 13,085 troops authorised for the expanded UNIFIL came from Western states.

The relationship between the West and UN peace operations has thus remained ambivalent. The West's great powers have moved from seeing peace operations as a means of furthering their interests in specific crises to seeing them (and non-UN peace operations) as a vehicle for policing international order and alleviating human suffering. Western internationalists have behaved in increasingly similar ways - reducing their

¹ December 2000 figures taken from the UN DPKO records: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/dec.htm>. Figures for contributions in 1995 are based on estimates drawn from contributions to UNPROFOR, UNTAF, UNOSOM II and UNAMIR.

general commitment to UN operations. The paradox is that this reduced commitment has occurred at precisely the moment when the UN endorsed a primarily Western vision of what peace operations were for.

Types of Western Contributions to Contemporary Peace Operations

This section maps the West's contribution to contemporary peace operations, which has come in three forms:

- (1) Contributions to UN missions (both in terms of troops and funds).
- (2) Contributions to so-called 'hybrid missions' involving the UN but where the Western troop contribution sits outside UN command and control structures (see Jones with Cherif, 2004).
- (3) Contributions outside the UN system altogether, including unauthorized peace operations conducted with or without the consent of the host state, and support for peace operations conducted by non-Western regional organizations such as the AU and ECOWAS.

Western Contributions to UN Peace Operations

The West's contribution of troops, police and civilian personnel to UN peace operations has declined steadily since 2001, but recovered slightly in 2006 as a result of the European contribution to the renewed UNIFIL mission (see Table I).

Irrespective of whether the West is defined broadly or narrowly, its contribution of personnel to UN peace operations has more than halved since 2001 in both relative and absolute terms. There appears to be no significant difference between the West's great powers and its internationalists, confirming the idea that the distinction between the two has lost some of its relevance since the end of the Cold War. If anything, the internationalist

contribution to UN operations has declined more than that of the great powers. Within this, most Western states focus their attention on a few missions which they regard as key. Since 2001, for example, the UK's contribution has focused almost exclusively on the missions in Cyprus, Bosnia and Kosovo (Williams, 2005: 176–177). Of the UK's 394 personnel in UN missions in August 2005, 282 (71.5%) were deployed in Cyprus and 76 (19%) in Kosovo. Likewise, France's 594 members were concentrated in Lebanon (2004), Côte d'Ivoire (194), Haiti (82) and Kosovo (57). In August 2005, 79% of the US personnel contribution was deployed in Kosovo, with the only other instance of more than 15 personnel being to MINUSTAH in Haiti. Australia's commitment to UN operations (1,623 people in 2001, 43 in 2005) was almost entirely absorbed by Timor-Leste. This pattern has been sustained with the European contribution to the renewed UNIFIL mission. As of March 2007, UNIFIL accounts for 81.5% of France's contribution to UN operations, 98% of Italy's, 93% of Spain's and 76% of Germany's.

A further point is that nowadays, Western great powers and traditional internationalists alike make more than token contributions to UN missions only in places where either they have core interests or other Western states are acting in concert. The P3 actively contribute to operations in Kosovo, the object of NATO's Operation Allied Force in 1999. Their other main deployments are either in geographically proximate areas (Haiti, Lebanon) and/or regions of former colonial interest (Cyprus, Côte d'Ivoire). The Western internationalists are not noticeably different. On average, in 2006, the West's great powers contributed personnel to 8.2 UN missions, compared with 9.3 for the traditional internationalists. For four of the six traditional internationalists (Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland), the only

Table I. Western Troop Contributions to UN Peace Operations, 2001–06*

| | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 |
|-----------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Total UN peacekeepers | 47,151 | 44,260 | 36,948 | 60,745 | 67,468 | 74,841 |
| West (broad)** | 11,231 | 10,113 | 7,530 | 6,147 | 5,948 | 6,242 |
| West (broad) % of total UN | 23.8% | 22.85% | 20.3% | 10.2% | 8.8% | 8.34% |
| West (major powers)*** | 3,137 | 2,881 | 2,004 | 2,078 | 1,315 | 1,925 |
| West (major powers) % of total UN | 6.65% | 6.5% | 5.4% | 3.4% | 1.9% | 2.57% |
| P3**** | 2,103 | 1,832 | 1,371 | 1,556 | 1,533 | 1,501 |
| P3 % of total UN | 4.45% | 4.1% | 3.7% | 2.5% | 1.97% | 2% |

* DPKO figures (based on August each year) which include all troop, police and civilian contributions.

** Australia, Portugal, Poland, USA, UK, New Zealand, Ireland, France, Slovakia, Austria, Germany, Finland, Canada, Italy, Spain, Hungary, Turkey, Sweden, Bulgaria, Romania, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Switzerland, Japan, Belgium, Slovenia, Greece, Croatia, Bosnia, Lithuania, Iceland, Estonia, Albania, Serbia and Montenegro.

*** USA, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Japan.

**** USA, UK, France.

significant contribution was to UNIFIL. Indeed, in March 2007, UNIFIL accounted for 86% of Finland's contribution to UN operations, 65% of Norway's and 41% of Sweden's. The two exceptions were Canada (whose largest contribution, of 77, was to MINUSTAH, comprising 55% of Canada's total contribution to UN operations) and Ireland (whose main contribution, of 336 people, was to UNMIL – making Ireland possibly the last of the traditional internationalists).

Western governments, great powers and internationalists alike, have justified these comparatively small contributions in at least three ways:

- (1) Problems associated with the International Criminal Court (ICC): Since 2002, Washington has argued that its personnel in overseas missions could be the target of politicized prosecutions by the ICC (Holt & Dallas, 2006). In 2002, the United States reduced the number of military observers in Timor-Leste and vetoed the extension of the UN mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) after it failed to secure bilateral agreements granting immunity to US personnel. The so-called
- (2) The West's capacity for rapid deployment and robust capabilities: Britain argued that since it is one of the few states that can provide troops capable of conducting robust, 'first-in' expeditionary missions in challenging circumstances, it would expect to play a lesser part in enduring operations where many other countries can contribute, such as UN operations (UK Ministry of Defence, 2003: 3).
- (3) Western contributions to non-UN missions: Some Western governments refuse to distinguish between UN and non-UN operations when calculating their contribution to peace operations. Germany and Canada, for example, gloss over this distinction claiming that their contribution to NATO-led missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan make them one of the largest contributors to peace operations (German Mission to UN, 2006; Kilgour, 2004).

The French government also publicly argues that it contributes 13,000 troops to peacekeeping through its contribution to NATO-led missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan, its unilateral deployments in Côte d'Ivoire, Chad and the Central African Republic and its logistical support to the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS) (French Embassy, 2005). Similarly, the US General Auditing Office (GAO) chooses not to distinguish between UN and subcontracted operations despite criticism from both the State and Defense Departments, which argued that it was misleading to conflate UN and non-UN operations. The GAO's reply was that excluding non-UN operations would provide only a partial picture of the United States' contribution to UN peacekeeping because it characterizes the NATO missions in Bosnia and Kosovo as supporting wider UN activities (US GAO, 2002: 8–10). Western states thus regularly suggest that their contribution to non-UN peace operations and their indirect assistance to UN missions should be included when calculating their contribution to peacekeeping.

The West's rate of contribution to the regular funding of UN peace operations has also gradually decreased. Financing UN peacekeeping is based on the scale of assessments for the UN's Regular Budget, first informally adopted in 1973. The P5, however, pay an additional charge towards UN peacekeeping of about 22% on top of their regular UN

Table III. Western Arrears to UN Peacekeeping Budget (US\$m)

| | Aus | Can | Fra | Ger | Ita | Jap | Neth | Spain | RoK | UK | USA | Total |
|-----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-------|-----|----|-----|-------|
| Dec. 2005 | 18 | 33 | 100 | 103 | 107 | 845 | 19 | 91 | 107 | 88 | 843 | 2,354 |
| Dec. 2006 | 1 | 0 | 53 | 0 | 2 | 572 | 6 | 73 | 85 | 3 | 678 | 1,473 |

Source: <http://www.globalpolicy.org>

Table IV. P3 Troops Deployed to Non-UN Financed Peace Operations, 2000–06

| | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 |
|--------|--------|--------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| France | 8,467 | 8,180 | 5,989 | 8,885 ⁺ | 7,280 ⁺ | 7,460 ⁺ | 8,573 ⁺ |
| UK | 7,654 | 6,015 | 3,450 [*] | 3,265 | 2,815 | 4,900 | 6,990 |
| USA | 16,858 | 15,225 | 6,510 [#] | 5,580 | 2,966 | 2,995 | 14,573 |

Sources: Shimizu & Sandler (2002: 661). For 2001–06, authors' calculations from IISS (2002–07). UK and US figures 2003–06 exclude troops deployed in Iraq (and Kuwait) and those engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (and Pakistan).

⁺ Includes 3,800 troops stationed in Côte d'Ivoire outside of UNOCI.

^{*} Excludes 11,000 troops officially engaged in peace support operations in Iraq.

[#] Excludes troops deployed in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

Organizationally, a distinction should be made between 'tightly-coupled' and 'loosely-coupled' hybrid missions.² In 'tightly-coupled' hybrid missions, such as KFOR/UNMIK in Kosovo, the UN and non-UN components are jointly mandated and share some common command or political decisionmaking structure. 'Loosely-coupled' hybrids, in contrast, are ad hoc and the different components do not share formal legal or institutional structures, though the UN and non-UN components may cooperate very closely, as in the British operation in Sierra Leone (2000–05) that ran parallel to UNAMSIL.

Hybrid missions should also be distinguished by reference to the *purpose* of the Western component. Four different types of contribution can be identified:

- (1) 'spear-head/vanguard' operations, where Western troops prepare the security environment on the ground in order to hand over to a UN or other international peace operation;

² This terminology is borrowed from Adler & Barnett (1998: 30).

- (2) 'stabilization' operations, where Western troops work alongside UN and/or other international peace operations to provide military security;

- (3) 'fire-fighting' operations, where western troops provide in-theatre support to beleaguered UN or other missions already in the field;

- (4) 'over-the-horizon' operations, where Western troops are despatched to within striking distance of the theatre in question to perform a deterrent and perhaps later an enforcement role in support of a beleaguered operation.

'Spear-head/vanguard' operations tend to be quite loosely-coupled, especially because they involve non-UN actors paving the way for follow-on missions. Perhaps the most tightly-coupled example of this type of operation is IFOR, designed to help implement the Dayton Accord in Bosnia (1995). Examples of more loosely-coupled operations include the Australian-led INTERFET force that stabilized Timor-Leste prior to UNTAET (1999), the French Operation Licorne that played an interposition role between the belligerents in Côte d'Ivoire's

Table II. Western Assessments for UN Regular Budget (%)

| | Aus | Can | Fra | Ger | Ita | Jap | Neth | Spain | RoK | UK | USA | Total |
|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|--------|
| 2001 | 1.636 | 2.573 | 6.503 | 9.825 | 5.094 | 19.629 | 1.748 | 2.534 | 1.728 | 5.568 | 22* | 78.838 |
| 2005 | 1.592 | 2.831 | 6.030 | 8.662 | 4.885 | 19.468 | 1.690 | 2.520 | 1.796 | 6.127 | 22 | 77.601 |

Sources: UN Secretariat Documents (ST/ADM/SER.B/568, 26 December 2000) and (ST/ADM/SER.B/638, 23 December 2004).

*The US contribution to the regular UN budget was reduced from 25% to 22% in 2000.

civil war before the arrival of ECOFORCE and then MINUCI (2002-03), and the Multinational Interim Force deployed to Haiti that paved the way for MINUSTAH (2004). Arguably, this sort of operation supports Britain's claim that Western troops are best used in these difficult, first-in missions. But contemporary peace operations are usually about more than just suspending armed conflict. Consequently, the West's proclivity for quickly handing over the peacekeeping baton to other actors may make it harder to build sustainable peace in the long term, resulting in renewed demands for 'fire-fighting' operations further down the road, as happened in Timor-Leste in 2006.

Once the violence has abated, 'stabilization' operations have been undertaken in a variety of settings, including tightly-coupled operations such as NATO-led SFOR in Bosnia (1996), the KFOR, which supported UNMIK in Kosovo in the aftermath of Operation Allied Force (1999), and the more loosely-coupled ISAF in Afghanistan, which paralleled the UN's own 'light footprint' political mission. Unlike ISAF, which has gradually expanded its size, remit and area of operations, the two Balkan forces (SFOR and KFOR) have been downsized as the situation on the ground stabilized. It is worth reiterating the point that since 2000, there has been a significant reduction in the number of peacekeepers deployed on these Balkan missions and, simultaneously, the burden was spread across more than 40 contributing states. In other words, the decline of Western contributions to UN peacekeeping has gone hand in hand with a reduction of the number of forces required for this type of hybrid operation.

Although it is unusual to associate 'fire-fighting' with peace operations, Western forces have been deployed to conduct limited enforcement activities alongside ongoing UN operations. Western 'fire-fighting' operations include NATO's Operation Deliberate Force

coast of Liberia and despatched a small protection force to the US embassy in Monrovia in support of ECOMIL and later UNMIL forces. Another case is the EU's 'reserve deployment' (Eufor RD) in support of the 2006 elections in the DRC. Mandated by the UN Security Council, Eufor RD comprised a modest-sized 'advanced deployment' of approximately 400-500 peacekeepers to Kinshasa and a larger 'battalion size' (around 1,500 troops) deployment on standby outside the DRC in Gabon ('over-the-horizon') that could be called upon if necessary. After the first round of voting, in late October 2006, an additional 300 troops from the standby force were deployed. Although there was limited violence in the aftermath of the second round of voting, most observers agree that Eufor RD made an important contribution to stability (Boshoff, 2006; Ehrhart, 2007).

Western Contributions to Non-UN

Peace Operations

The third form of Western engagement has been in non-UN peace operations, that is, operations not authorized by the UN Security Council or operations wholly conducted by international organizations other than the UN, such as the AU and ECOWAS. Only rarely have Western states deployed forces in wholly non-UN peace operations. Important examples have been NATO's Operation Allied Force in Kosovo/Serbia (1999) and the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI, 2003) and Operation Astute in Timor-Leste (2006). This type of operation might run the risk of undermining the UN's authority in relation to international peace and security. To date, however, only the Kosovo operation has gravitated towards being not only 'non-UN' but also potentially 'anti-UN'. The Australian-led cases did not raise these issues because they were conducted with the consent of the host government.

The West has more commonly provided logistical support and financial assistance to non-UN peace operations, by helping to fund, equip and train the peacekeepers of regional organizations in Africa, for example (Berhan, 2003). In the case of the AU's mission in Burundi (2003-04), for instance, NATO and EU states provided funds and technical assistance for the contingents from Mozambique and Ethiopia. More recently, from late 2004, Western states have provided funds and logistical support to the AU's Mission in Sudan (AMIS). In particular, NATO helped transport Rwandan and Nigerian contingents into the theatre of operations, while the EU provided AMIS with a 'Supporting Action' which involved civilian and military components, including finance, military advice and training, and police advisers. In addition, in 2004, the G8 pledged to support the training of some 75,000 peacekeepers worldwide under the Global Peace Operations Initiative.

To summarize, a sophisticated understanding of the West's contribution to peace operations requires an examination of its contributions to UN operations (personnel and funding), hybrid missions and operations conducted outside of the UN system. Arguably, the most notable trend has been the increase in hybrid missions, which, although individually unique, share a number of characteristics.

First, Western forces in hybrid missions are commanded outside of UN command structures, either by national commands or by exclusively Western commands related either to a pivotal state or an organization such as the EU or NATO. Such forces might be only tangentially involved in joint planning with UN missions and may pursue subtly different mandates and goals, even within tightly-coupled hybrids. Although the UN and non-UN elements have generally been complementary, the status of the non-UN elements in relation to the UN

force has sometimes been a source of friction within the overall mission. For example, one of the reasons cited for India's withdrawal from the UNAMSIL mission in Sierra Leone in 2000 was the claim that British and US elements acting outside the UN framework refused to cooperate with Indian plans to forcibly recover peacekeepers who had been taken hostage (*The Tribune*, 2000).

Second, hybrid operations permit Western states to limit the scale, scope and timing of their contribution to peace operations. In so doing, Western hybridization epitomizes the idea of 'risk transfer' war (Shaw, 2005), albeit by transferring the risks to other elements of the hybrid operation rather than enemy non-combatants. Be they advance vanguards, 'fire-fighters' or 'over-the-horizon' elements, Western contributions to hybrid missions are often tightly constrained. With the exception of the SFOR and KFOR missions to the Balkans, the Western component of hybrid operations tends to be relatively small (consisting, at most, of a few thousand soldiers), deployed for only a short period of time and confined to limited geographical areas. These factors limit the potential impact of Western operations. For instance, using time frames rather than facts on the ground as guides for exit strategies is highly problematic, not least because it encourages spoilers to temporarily withdraw and reorganize rather than engage in a genuine process of conflict resolution.

Finally, hybrid operations have tended to emphasize the military aspects of peace operations at the expense of the social, political and economic dimensions. Although some hybrid operations are now paying greater attention to the crucial role of civilian police contingents, Western contributions have usually been dominated by military personnel and tasked with providing stability and civilian protection. While sometimes necessary, military power is not sufficient to achieve the multidimensional mandates set

by contemporary peace operations, many of which require peacebuilding and a degree of reconciliation between the belligerents.

These characteristics raise the question of whether the changes to Western contributions to peace operations have had a positive or negative impact overall on international peace and security. The final section therefore sets out a way to answer it.

The West's Contribution to International Peace and Security

Are the changes in the West's contribution to peace operations enhancing collective efforts to promote international peace and security or constraining and undermining those efforts? Obviously the answer depends on the criteria used to measure success and failure. Nevertheless, it is plausible that recent Western policies have enhanced international peace and security, because in the same period of time, the overall incidence and lethality of war has decreased (Human Security Centre, 2006). This fact alone, however, does not establish a causal relationship between Western policies and reduced levels of armed conflict. Alternatively, given that deploying UN peace operations significantly reduces the likelihood of violence reigniting in the medium term, the West's reluctance to make standing commitments to them risks reducing their ability to achieve this effect (Fortna, 2004). Given such interpretative difficulties, we set out a loose framework of analysis that uses three indicators to assess the overall impact of Western policies on peace operations:

- (1) the authority of the UN in providing 'collective legitimization' (Claude, 1966) for peace initiatives;
- (2) the extent to which missions have succeeded in saving lives (Seybolt, 2007: 30);
- (3) the contribution of peace operations to building stable peace, what Annan

(2000: 2) called 'the ultimate purpose of a peace operation'.

We briefly address each of these elements, focusing on the hybrid missions that form the bulk of the West's contribution, before assessing what this means for international peace and security more generally. Our aim is not to pass judgement on individual operations, but to ascertain – in broad and necessarily preliminary terms – the effects of the developments outlined earlier.

Authority and Collective Legitimization

How have developments in Western policies impacted upon the UN's status as the principal source of authority for the deployment of armed peace operations? This is important not just because the legitimacy of the UN system as a whole is closely related to its authority on the use of military force (Coicaud, 2001: 266) but also because there is broad agreement that the UN system has made an important contribution to reducing violent conflict (Reus-Smit, 2005; Human Security Centre, 2006). Consequently, behaviour that erodes the UN's authority and collective legitimization function can be reasonably expected to lower its ability to limit violent conflict.

As indicated earlier, most hybrid operations are best characterized as non-UN rather than anti-UN. With only one notable example (NATO's intervention in Kosovo, 1999), Western contributions to hybrid operations have been legitimized by reference to normative principles embedded within the UN system. In most cases, non-UN contributions are explicitly authorized by the Security Council, welcomed either before or after the fact by the Council, or conducted with the consent of the host state. Rather than undermining the UN's authority on matters related to international peace and security, these operations reinforce the Security Council's standing as the premier

source of legitimization and, where they derive legitimacy from host state consent, the principle of exclusive sovereign jurisdiction.

Nevertheless, concerns have been raised which suggest that although most hybrid operations fall squarely within the UN framework themselves, taken together their increase potentially constitutes an assault on the UN's authority. Some see the West's proclivity for using non-UN mechanisms as a direct product of concerns about both the Security Council's inability to reach consensus and the UN's incapacity to manage complex and difficult operations (see Pugh & Sidhu, 2003). This, it is argued, makes the UN unable to respond rapidly to new crises, forcing concerned states to act outside the UN framework. Such concerns were evident in the UK's decision to deploy Operation Palliser outside of the UNAMSIL framework, France's decision to lead Operation Artemis as a temporary supplement to MONUC rather than providing personnel to permanently reinforce the UN mission, and Australia's decision to act outside the UN in response to the collapse of order in Timor-Leste in 2006. A tension therefore exists between the P3 powers authorizing a recent surge in large and multidimensional UN peace operations but expecting other states to provide the necessary personnel. In addition, it is important to recall that the hybridization of peace operations has not occurred in a political vacuum. Rather, it has been encouraged by Western policies that have chosen to deploy their personnel outside of UN command and control structures. This is *not* because the UN Charter framework is incapable of meeting the demands of contemporary peace operations (it can deal with a range of threats preventatively, pre-emptively or after the fact) but because Western states have responded to threats by making reference to norms embedded within the UN system but utilizing non-UN command and control structures. Whether the West's

unwillingness to work through UN peace operations will undermine the latter's authority and effectiveness in the long term remains to be seen, but it is difficult to see how such practices can help the UN develop the experience and doctrine it so badly needs.

In addition, although the use of regional mechanisms does not necessarily undermine the primacy and authority of the UN, there are notable examples of coalitions of Western states acting without UN authorization and explicitly calling the UN's authority into question. In 1999, for example, some NATO members claimed Operation Allied Force was upholding past Security Council resolutions while some key figures associated with the Clinton administration argued that NATO did not need UN authorization, thereby direct challenging UN authority (Wheeler, 2000: 275–81). Similarly, during the RAMSI operation in the Solomon Islands in 2003, Australia's Foreign Minister argued that 'it would be too difficult to solve the problem by working through the UN' (cited in Ponzio, 2005: 178). Although the exception rather than the rule, these types of arguments constitute a direct challenge to the UN's primacy and raise fears as to whether hybridization is simply the start of a more pronounced transformation whereby Western states act outside both the bureaucratic and normative structures of the UN system. According to Jean-Marie Guehenno, this would 'send the wrong message' by creating two types of international operations: UN operations with small or non-existent Western contributors and largely Western non-UN operations in areas of particular interest to the West (*Spiegel Magazine*, 2007).

Saving Lives

To what extent has the Western contribution to peace operations saved lives? In one sense, since 2000, Western troops have been very successful in making limited contributions

that have helped to prevent or limit killing. Large-scale violence was halted in the Balkans; British operations turned the tide of Sierra Leone's civil war; the UN mission in Liberia was successfully deployed and helped usher in democratic reforms; peace (of a sort) was established by the Australian-led missions in Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands; the Taliban was swept from power and kept out of Kabul; the French-led force in Bunia curtailed militia violence; French forces in Côte d'Ivoire prevented spoilers from harming civilians and unravelling UNOCI; and Eufor RD helped prevent violence in post-election Kinshasa. In their role as 'vanguards/stabilizers' and 'fire-fighters', Western contributions to peace operations have thus clearly had some positive effects. In this sense, the hybridization of peace operations has afforded new and flexible ways to deploy robust forces to tackle specific problems. It is significant in this regard that in relation to Darfur, Guehenno advised the P5 that the best option for the immediate relief of endangered civilians would be the deployment of a UN-authorized, non-UN emergency force (Traub, 2006).

The problem, however, is that the limited nature of hybrid missions and the selectivity that they afford Western governments means that Western peacekeepers might be saving fewer lives than they might as permanent members of UN operations. Of course, this is an exercise in counterfactual reasoning and therefore inherently problematic, but when done carefully it can yield useful insights, as Seybolt (2007: 32–38) recently demonstrated. The issue here is whether it is likely that more, less or the same number of people would have died had Western troop contributions to hybrid operations taken the form of more permanent deployments to the UN component or had non-UN missions not been constrained by geographical and temporal limits? Applying this type of analysis to a series of recent cases produces decidedly

mixed results. Of 14 missions considered in this way, 6 are cases where Western involvement resulted in more lives being saved than would otherwise have been the case: IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia; KFOR in Kosovo; UNIFIL II deployed to Lebanon in 2006; MINUSTAH in Haiti; Operation Licorne in Côte d'Ivoire; and the logistical support provided to AMIS in Darfur.

There are four cases, however, where there are clear signs that the nature of Western engagement resulted in fewer saved lives than there might have been: in the DRC, both Operation Artemis and Eufor RD fall into this category; France's Operation Turquoise in Rwanda in 1994; and NATO's hybrid activities alongside UNPROFOR (1992–95). The latter two cases are well documented, as are the effects of Western engagement (Seybolt, 2007: 68–80; Wheeler, 2000: 208–284). In relation to Operation Artemis, even the French Ministry of Defence predicted that the operation would have a 'negligible' impact on violence in Ituri, and François Grignon from the International Crisis Group described the operation as 'totally insufficient' (Astell, 2003). In the case of Eufor RD, commentators have pointed to several instances where the mission's limitations resulted in Western troops not being used to save lives (see Oxfam, 2007: 11).

The final category of missions is those where it is too difficult to determine whether more lives might have been saved had the West's engagement not been carefully limited. As noted earlier, a connection was drawn between the West's early departure from Timor-Leste and the government's inability to cope with the crisis that erupted in 2006, which resulted in dozens of civilian casualties. On the other hand, the rapid response of Australia and Portugal, in particular, to the disorder undoubtedly helped stabilize the situation and saved lives (*International Herald Tribune*, 2006). Likewise, ISAF in Afghanistan was initially

strictly limited to Kabul and its environs. Britain's participation was initially limited to three months, and its tasks were clearly stated and narrowly defined. For its first three years, therefore, ISAF had little effect outside Kabul, contributing – at least in part – to the West's inability to stem the rise of the Taliban in 2005–06 and reducing the overall number of lives saved.

The transformation of the West's contribution to peace operations has thus had a mixed impact on saving local lives. In some cases, it is clear that the deployment of Western forces on a short-term basis did save local lives (at least in the short term), providing credence to Britain's argument about the best way to employ expensive and specialized Western forces. However, there are also grounds for thinking that hybridization enables greater selectivity and that in several cases, this has resulted in fewer lives being saved than might have been possible with more consistent and sustained commitment. The clearest recent example of this is the French-led operation in Ituri, DRC.

Stable Peace

According to Annan (2000: 2), the 'ultimate purpose' of peace operations is 'sustainable peace'. Although expectations may change and the level and nature of international commitment is only one of three factors contributing to the creation of stable peace (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006: 69), it is possible to draw tentative, longer-term insights into a mission's broader contribution to stable peace. First, one can ascertain whether levels of violence in both the respective theatre of operations and the wider region have increased or decreased over time (Downs & Stedman, 2002: 50). This requires analysis of some period of time before and after the operation. On its own, however, this method cannot establish whether the correlation between the operation and any reduction in violence is causal or coincidental. Second,

because success and failure are subjective terms, we need to interpret the relevant intersubjective understandings of whether a particular mission has been successful, at the local, regional and global levels. Using intersubjective understandings rather than external criteria as the benchmark accommodates the problem of shifting expectations and contextualizes success.

Given the recent or ongoing nature of these missions, it is difficult to draw definitive judgements but, just as with regular UN operations, there is no uniform pattern of long-term success or failure in Western non-UN or hybrid missions. Certainly, there have been some successes, including hybrid and non-UN operations in the Balkans, Sierra Leone and the Solomon Islands. Here, Western forces acting outside the UN had a significant and positive impact in creating the conditions for stable peace. Yet, even in many of these relative success stories, it is often acknowledged that peace remains fragile rather than stable (Paris, 2004). Elsewhere, the long-term impact of Western policies is more debatable. In Afghanistan and the DRC, for instance, the limits placed on Western peacekeepers have made it difficult for stable peace to take root. For example, large parts of Afghanistan remain firmly in the grip of warlords and poppy dealers, and the Taliban has been permitted to stage a resurgence. In sum, while it is still too early to draw definitive judgements about these hybrid operations, they have generally failed to leave behind regions of stable peace, as most of the recipients continue to be among the world's most weak and failing states (Fund for Peace, 2006).

Overall, the Western contribution to peace operations is broadly positive when it comes to the 'fire-fighting' role and saving lives that are immediately endangered. However, hybridization has tended to result in the West shouldering less of the personnel burden for establishing long-term peace. It is

important, however, to balance this insight with two further considerations. First, the UN itself recognizes the problems associated with building stable peace and sought to address these through the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission. It remains too early to tell from the Commission's first two initiatives (Burundi and Sierra Leone) whether it will be able to resolve the issues described above. Second, the West's tendency to take a short-term view of peacebuilding casts doubt over whether it is the right entity to lead international attempts to establish stable peace (Paris, 2004). Again, this might support the British government's rationale for hybridization discussed earlier.

Finally, the West's tendency to operate outside the UN has, at times, brought the world body's authority into question. If left unchecked, this is likely to reduce the UN's ability to further reduce the incidence and lethality of war. In the aftermath of Iraq, this tendency is likely to make it harder for states to reach consensus about how best to respond to humanitarian emergencies (see Evans, 2004). Indeed, it has already impacted upon the international response to Darfur (Bellamy, 2005).

Conclusion

The West's financial and material contribution to UN peace operations has declined since the Brahimi Report. As part of this trend, the key Cold War distinction between Western 'internationalists' and 'great powers' has eroded. This is particularly ironic, because in many ways the Brahimi Report helped entrench Western, especially NATO, preferences on peace operations doctrine within the wider UN approach to peacekeeping. Although this is a worrying trend for supporters of the UN, it does not mean that the West is playing a smaller role in peace operations per se. Instead, the West has increased its contribution to hybrid peace operations

and missions that take place outside of the UN system. Viewed in a positive light, the West's willingness to participate in hybrid operations represents a commitment to finding pragmatic solutions to some admittedly difficult problems at a time when the West's faith in UN capacity and command and control mechanisms is relatively low. Viewed in a negative light and over the longer term, however, the West's reluctance to invest significant resources in making the UN's peace operations the best they could be may have more detrimental effects.

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