SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 25 (2014) 145-151
BRILL
N IJH O F F
SECURITY AND
HUM AN RIGHTS
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OSCE Chronicle
osce Revitalized by the Ukraine Crisis
ArieBloed
Editor-in-Chief
l The osce and Ukraine
The osce has reconfirmed its reputation as an international security organization
‘of last resort’ in the wake of the crisis which erupted in Ukraine
after the flight of the former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich to
Russia. Although the organization struggled for years in order to find a
proper place in the European security architecture in light of the expanding
eu and NATO, it now became clear again that the consensus-based organization
is a unique forum for dialogue and conflict prevention. The prominent
role of the osce in this conflict became even clearer after the
catastrophe with the Malaysian airliner MH17 which was shot down on the
17th of July, reportedly by separatists who are clearly supported by the
Russian authorities. Even the missile launcher seems to have been sent to
the region from Russia. This dramatic event turned the region-based conflict
into a global issue which demonstrated the danger emanating from the conflict
in the eastern parts of Ukraine.
Atthe same time it has to be acknowledged that the fundamental principles
on which the organization is supposed to operate have been seriously violated
by one of the main partners in the organization, in particular the violation of
the principle of the inviolability of borders by the Russian Federation which
annexed the Crimea, a territory that belongs to Ukraine. This makes the future
of the osce a highly open question.
© NHC, 2016 | DOI 10.1163/18750230-02501004
146 BLOED
The o sc e has been and is involved in the Ukrainian crisis in a number of
ways which will be briefly listed here:
a The most visible activity of the o s c e in Ukraine is undoubtedly the
Special Monitoring Mission to the Ukraine (s s m ) which was established
by the o s c e Permanent Council on the 21st of March for an initial
period of six months. The mission has gradually expanded to over
400 members, seconded by a large number of o s c e participating states
including Russia. Although it is officially an o s c e mission, also
approved by Russia, its costs are not covered by its regular budget, but
by voluntary contributions which are mainly coming from Western
countries. The ssm mandate is to reduce tensions and foster stability,
peace and security by promoting dialogue and to identify ways and
means to promote confidence and understanding, in particular also in
view of the separatists who are active in the southeastern part of
Ukraine. The SSM was the main body after the airline catastrophe to
arrange access to the crash site for investigators from the Netherlands
(which lost 196 citizens in the tragedy) and other countries by negotiating
with the separatists and Ukrainian government officials. The crash
site was in the middle of the territory where there is heavy fighting
between the separatists and the Ukrainian army, which seriously hindered
the crash investigation. In particular in relation to this tragedy
the role of the o s c e became highly visible in the world press. On a few
occasions rebels took mission members hostage for prolonged periods
of time. At first the ssm was temporarily headed by Adam Kobieracki,
the head of the Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna. After an outstanding
Norwegian candidate declined the position, the Chairman-inOffice
appointed Ertrogriil Apakan, a Turkish ambassador, as the
permanent head of mission.
b The ssm had been preceded by a mission of 35unarmed military personnel
which had been invited by Ukraine on the basis of the Vienna
Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Ukraine
invoked one of the little known mechanisms from this document which
aims at fostering confidence in cases of crisis, in this case the mechanism
on unusual military activities.1The Russian troop movements at the
Ukrainian border and the rebel activities in places like Luhansk and
Donets constituted the background for this initiative which does not
1 See paragraph 18 of the 2011Vienna Document on csbms.
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OSCE REVITALIZED BY THE UKRAINE CRISIS 147
require the consensus of the organization. This mission also attracted
world attention, as rebels in the east kidnapped a number of mission
members and kept them hostage forweeks. The mission does not seem to
have achieved its aim of promoting confidence, but its establishmentwas
a clear sign that Ukraine tried to use all crisis prevention mechanisms
from the o s c e ’s tool box. This mechanism has only been used very rarely.
c At the end of July a new monitoring mission started its work, aimed at
monitoring the border between Russia and Ukraine in the area where the
rebels are in control on the Ukrainian side. The two border crossings concerned
are Donetsk and Gukovo and the mission consists of 16 civilian
monitors. Although Russia invited the mission which resulted in a p c
decision, its mandate is only to monitor the border crossings, not the
whole border between Ukraine and Russia that is in the hands of the rebels.
There are, therefore, serious doubts as to whether this new 3-month
mission will be able to do anything of value. Although the Russians took
this initiative to prove their repeated controversial statements that they
are not supplying the rebels with (heavy) arms and ammunition, the
monitors are clearly not allowed to monitor the border where crossings
do take place. It will not change the overwhelming evidence of Russian
military involvement in the southeast of the Ukraine.
d The Swiss Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE has been extremely active in
trying to bring the parties to the negotiation table and to reduce tensions
as much as possible. That Switzerland is this year’s chair of the organization
is a lucky coincidence, as one could not have imagined what would
have happened if the crisis had erupted a little earlier, when Ukraine
itselfwas the chair of the organization in 2013. Since Switzerland is a neutral
and financially powerful state, it could perform a major task in this
regard. This went so far that a Swiss think tank even started advocating a
permanent Swiss chairmanship of the o s c e , although this idea was
immediately heavily criticized as being illogical, undemocratic and
unrealistic.2
e Of all o s c e institutions the Representative on Freedom of the Media
(r f m ), Dunja Mijatovic, has probably been the most active of all. She has
repeatedly warned against serious violations of the freedom of the media
by almost all parties to the conflict. As a matter offact it has to be observed
that part of the conflict is an open media war where parties do not have
2 See: http://www.shrblog.org/blog/A_permanent_Swiss_Chairmanship_for_the_OSCE____ a
_viable_suggestion_,html?id=479.
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148 BLOED
many moral or ethical restraints in dispersing wildly exaggerated and
often outright erroneous information. This has become a major feature of
this conflict. The world as seen from the media in Moscow is a totally different
world as seen in most other countries in the world. Hate speech,
harassment and the killing of independent journalists, discrimination
and lies have unfortunately become daily events in the media world at
the moment.3 Instead ofmedia freedom, the media are nowbeing abused
by the parties to serve their interests, irrespective of whether the information
is right or wrong. During the airline crash the Russian media, for
instance, were mainly paying attention to unfounded reports that a
Ukrainian military jet had been spotted close to the Malaysian airliner.
And the Russian media continue to label the new authorities in Kiev as
‘fascists’and ‘murderers’.Only the very fewindependent news media that
still exist in Moscow continue to struggle to bring a more balanced view
of the world. This culminated in an edition of Novaia Gazeta, the main
independent news outlet in Moscow, which had a large front page with
the title: “Netherlands, forgive us”,both in Dutch and Russian. The activities
of the rfm are, therefore, more needed than ever. Even though it
might have only a limited impact, the groups targeted will certainly not
be pleased by the continuous reminders of their misbehaviour,
f The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (odihr) has
also been deeply involved in the crisis. For the presidential elections in
May 2 014 it fielded one of its biggest ever election observation missions,
encompassing over 1,000 observers from a large number of osce participating
states. But it was also involved in other ways. Together with the
High Commissioner on National Minorities (hcnm) it was involved in
developing a human rights assessment report at the request of the (new)
Ukrainian authorities. This mission visited many places all overthe country,
including the eastern region and the Crimea,just before the Russian
annexation of the Crimea in March this year. The report4 described
numerous findings which implicated the Russian Federation, specifically
its support for rebel groups in the Crimea and the eastern provinces of
the Ukraine. It also described in detail the dire consequences of the
Russian annexation of the Crimea for the Crimean Tatars on the
peninsula.
3 See e.g. http://www.examiner.com/list/mssia-s-top-ioo-lies-about-ukraine. See also Paul
Goble,Lies,DamnedLies, andRussian Disinformation, Hot Issue oftheJamestown Foundation
ofAugust13,2014.
4 See http://www.osce.org/odihr/118476 for the text ofthe report.
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OSCE REVITALIZED BY THE UKRAINE CRISIS 149
g At the beginning of the crisis in February, March and April the h c n m was
also deeply involved in the unfolding crisis with some visits to the region.
This is obvious as the crisis involves quite a few issues of a complicated
ethnic nature. The hurried annexation of the Crimea by the Russians
caused the Tatars to suddenly wake up in a totally new country, whereas
the Ukrainian people living in the Crimea were suddenly transformed
into a new national minority with all the consequences thereof. There is,
therefore, indeed an important role for the h c n m which will continue in
the time to come. After the spring period, however, not much h c n m
activity can be publicly noticed.
2 New Director of o d i h r ; Secretary-General reappointed
As of the ist ofJuly o d i h r appointed a new director in the person of Michael
Georg Link from Germany. He succeeded Ambassador Janez Lenarcic from
Slovenia who had been in the position for the last six years. It is the first time
that a non-diplomat has been appointed to this highly delicate position
within the o s c e which so far had always been occupied by experienced
diplomats.
Michael Linkwas a member of the German Bundestag from 2005 to 2013. He
gained some experience with the o s c e in 2012 and 2013 when he was serving
as the Minister of State at the German Foreign Ministry in charge of Germany’s
co-operation with international organizations. Also as a parliamentarian he
has been dealing with o s c e issues. Since election observation is one of the
o d i h r ’s key functions so far, Link’s parliamentary background may be an
asset.
On the same date Ambassador Lamberto Zamier from Italy started his second
three-year term as Secretary-General of the organization. He is witnessing
most interesting times for the organization in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis
which also resulted in a greater visibility of the sg in the media.
3 Heating up of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
The situation around Nagorno-Karabakh, one of the so-called protracted conflicts
in the o s c e area, has seriously deteriorated recently with the outbreak of
an increasing number of hostilities on the front line between Armenia and
Azerbaijan at the end ofJuly and the beginning ofAugust. Although skirmishes
are not uncommon at the line of contact, this time the number of casualties is
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higher than it has been since 2008 with deaths on both sides. As usual both
sides blamed each other for breaking the 20 year-long cease-fire.
Some observers pointed at Armenia as the party which initiated the
increased skirmishes. The reason could be that Armenia is increasingly
concerned about Russia’s stance towards its claim on the Nagorno-Karabakh
territory: it not only recognizes the officially recognized Azerbaijani borders, but
it is also in the process of major weapon deliveries to Azerbaijan. Moreover, the
Armenian leadership could benefit from the fighting because of domestic politicalinstability,
in particularbecause ofeconomic reasons. Besides, the Azerbaijani
Minister of Defence had to urgently return from vacation due to the hostilities
which is not an indication that Baku was behind the growing tensions.5
Although the o s c e Minsk Group under the co-chairmanship of Russia, the
u s a and France would be expected to mediate between the parties, on this occasion
it was the Russian President Putin who took the initiative to bring the parties
together in the Russian coastal town of Sochi at the beginning of August.
4 Study on visa requirements
For the first time in the o s c e ’s history the o d i h r has published an interesting
study on how visa requirements affect freedom of movement within the o s c e
area. Although it is a well-known problem within the region, so far the organization
has not carried out a systematic investigation into this obstacle to interpersonal
contacts across the borders of all o s c e participating states.
The Baseline Study on Cross-Border Mobility in the OSCE Region6 focuses on
good practices in operating visa regimes to facilitate cross-border travel for
legitimate purposes, while responding to illegal immigration, and was launched
in Vienna at a two-day expert roundtable conference on cross-border mobility
and visa facilitation in May.
“The Baseline Study is intended to help policymakers, civil society organizations
and think tanks in o s c e participating States better understand the current
situation with regard to movement across borders in the region,” said
AmbassadorJanez Lenarcic, Director of o d i h r . “We hope this will help them
identify good practices in the implementation of OSCE commitments on freedom
of movement and human contacts.”
The roundtable conference gathered official representatives and visa policy
experts from o s c e participating States, as well as representatives of the
5 See Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. n, issue 145.
6 http://www.osce.org/odihr/118506.
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European Commission, the World Tourism Organization and the European
Stability Initiative.
Good practices in national and regional visa facilitation policies discussed
at the meeting included different approaches to processing visa applications,
such as the use of online tools and other information technology solutions.7
7 http://www.osce.org/odihr/118613.
SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 25 (2014) 145-151
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