

# IRE107: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

**Maya Hadar**

*Salus populi suprema lex esto*

*The safety of the people must be supreme law.*

*Roman proverb*

# National Security I

2

- **National Security**
  - Defining national security
  - Realism and national security
  - Security studies and national security
- **Deterrence**
- **Failed/Fragile States**
  - Definition
  - Why state fail?
  - Aid and fragile states
  - Fragile States, development and Global Security



# Defining National Security

- Crucial concept for foreign policy but no universal definition
- **Traditional meaning** => protecting and securing the physical survival of the state from external (military) threats
  - Protecting territory from foreign invasion
- **US** => **National security** is a corporate term covering both **national** defense and **foreign relations** of the US
  - Refers to the protection of a nation from attack or other danger by holding adequate armed forces and guarding state secrets


# Defining National Security

- Security redefined (e.g. Wolfers, Buzan), expanded from only the military as to include health, economics, environment, etc.
- **Threats to national security** are derived from:
  - External sources (outside the boundaries of sovereign state)
  - Internal (inside the state: poverty, environmental degradation and domestic repression of essential human rights)
- **Integrative approaches** combine internal + external factors into a comprehensive national security policy (Leffler)

# Defining National Security

## National Security system (NSS):

- Arrangements of a state for dealing with national security issues
- All the means and resources designed for national security missions/tasks, adequately organized, maintained, and prepared for those missions/tasks



New Zealand's Domestic & External Security Coordination system => National Security System

# Realism and National Security

Realists => the fundamental **national interest** of all states *is national security*:

- **Statism**: states as central actors; security is a basic element of foreign policy
- **Survival**: central goal of foreign policy; force is a legitimate instrument of statecraft
- **Self-help**: take appropriate steps to ensure survival, balance of power as enduring structural feature
- The security dilemma - efforts to build defensive capabilities in one state can be perceived as threatening to others => makes them build their own defenses => can be threatening to the original state



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PRIVACY**

**VS**



**NATIONAL  
SECURITY**

# Security Studies & National Security

- **Security studies** => the study of the nature, causes, effects, and prevention of war
- The concept of **national security** rose to prominence during the Cold War, monopolized by Realists
- The concept of **human security** arose in the early 1990s
  - Placed individuals at the center of security strategies



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


# Security Studies & National Security

**NATIONAL  
SECURITY**

- **Grand strategy** is a crucial component of a state's foreign policy
  - The overall vision of a state's national security goals +
  - Determination of the most appropriate means by which to achieve these goals
  
- Entails a **3-step** process:
  1. Determine the state's vital security goals
  2. Identify the main source of threats to these goals, internal and external
  3. Ascertain the key political, economic and military resources that can be employed as foreign policy options to realize national security goals

# 21<sup>st</sup> century National Security Environment




- Increasingly **difficult** to discuss 21<sup>st</sup> century security challenges + environment in the **traditional** categories of:
  - Internal–external
  - Closer- extended
  - National–international

# 21<sup>st</sup> century National Security Environment

**Trend:** Traditional => Global

- Sociosphere
- Technosphere
- Biosphere
- National Defense remains an essential National Security domain
- **Holistic approach** => not only violent conflicts but human & structural security issues addressed when developing national security environment & Strategy



# 21<sup>st</sup> century National Security Environment

<b>NSSR 2012 HOLISTIC APPROACH</b>								
<b>NATIONAL SECURITY DOMAINS</b>								
<b>DEFENCE</b> <i>(external/intra-state violence)</i>			<b>PROTECTION</b> <i>(hard homeland security)</i> <i>(internal violence, large-scale catastrophes)</i>			<b>ECONOMY AND CULTURE</b> <i>(soft homeland security + conflict transformation)</i> <i>(„human“ &amp; „structural violence“)</i>		
<b>SECURITY SECTORS</b>								
Foreign Aff.	Mili- tary	Intellig- ence	Counter- intell.	Public security & order	Civil Emerg.	Financial Energy	Political Legal	Cultural Educational
<b>CROSS-SECTOR SECURITY AREAS</b>								
Terrorism								
Cyber crime								
Drug trafficking								
Human trafficking								

# Deterrence


- **Deterrence** is the effort by one actor to persuade another actor to refrain from some action by convincing the opponent that the costs will exceed the rewards of the act
- To make deterrence credible =>
  - The capabilities to complete the threat must be present, and
  - The will/intent to do so must exist



# Deterrence

- Not only should a deterrent be credible, it needs to be stable:
  - A deterrent threat should not provoke the other side to act
- Deterrence relies on the assumption of “rational behavior” on the part of the opponent
- Deterrence is heavily context-dependent

## Prerequisite of Successful Deterrence



# Deterrence

- Hard to design a deterrent threat that will deter all options available to the attacker
- Deterrence is often a time-buying strategy
- **Extended Deterrence**  $\Rightarrow$  when a deterrent threat is extended to cover an ally
- **Extended immediate deterrence**  $\Rightarrow$  an ally is threatened by immediate action on the part of the attacker and failure to act will result in an immediate attack on the ally state

# Brinkmanship

- The art/practice of pursuing a dangerous policy to the limits of safety before stopping
  - Push the other side to see who backs down
  - “Until the other side blinks” (Cuban missile crisis 1963)
- If both states’ level of resolve is known  $\Rightarrow$  no crisis
- Uncertainty makes Brinkmanship possible
- Pushing a state to the brink of war – situation from which war might be difficult to stop





# The Deterrence sequence

1. Determine apparent threat
2. Assess own interests and capabilities
3. Assess opponents interests and capabilities
4. Make implicit or explicit threat to impose costs if event occurs
5. Follow up deterrent threat if required
  - Otherwise credibility becomes lower in later deterrent situations

# Coercive Diplomacy

- A combination of diplomatic action and military force which occurs to force the other side to back down
  - Difficult to implement
- Example of success => Cuban Missile Crisis

1962 => US President JFK was able to bring about a peaceful resolution to the Cuban Missile Crisis and avert possible warfare between the US and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union attempted to deploy over 50 missiles into Cuba, JFK established naval blockade and threatened an invasion of Cuba to forcibly remove the missiles already there.

The giant naval blockade + massive build up of US military forces was a message to the soviets: the US is able and willing to use force to remove the missile threat from Cuba.

# Coercive Diplomacy

- Example of failures => Persian Gulf/Iraq First Gulf War
  - Iraq was not deterred from attacking Kuwait and was compelled to leave by the coalition
- Sometimes constitutes a 'try-and-see' strategy

1990–91 => Coercive diplomacy failed to persuade Saddam Hussein to remove military forces from Kuwait. Whereas deterrence effectively convinced Hussein that he could not invade further south into Saudi Arabia, it did little to expel him from Kuwait.

The Bush administration + UN issued sanctions (embargo on Iraq's imports and exports) to pressure Iraq to withdraw troops in Kuwait. A deadline was set, came and passed without Hussein's compliance, military force was used to remove Iraq's forces from Kuwait (Operation Desert Storm).

# Mutually Assured Destruction

- In the age of MAD, the possession of a protected first strike capability means that one can always inflict unacceptable harm
  - Both constraining and an asset
  - Essentially, power can be manipulated by tricking the opponent that you are crazy enough to commit to a drastic decision – Mutual Assured Destruction
- Flexible response buttresses up nuclear deterrence by allowing “low-level nuclear exchanges”
- Such low-level exchanges carry the risk of further escalation

# Does Deterrence Still Matter? (2002)

**NATIONAL  
SECURITY**

superiority of the United States.

- Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action.

the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.

The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.

# Does Deterrence Still Matter?

- War is more costly than deterrence
- Deterrence is as part of U.S. defense and national security strategy:
  - National Defense Strategy, October 2018

This National Strategy for Counterterrorism sets forth a new approach. We will protect our homeland, our interests overseas, and our allies and partners. We will defeat radical Islamist terrorists such as ISIS and al-Qa'ida, expand our agile counterterrorism toolkit to prevent future terrorist threats, deter emerging threats, roll back Iran's global terrorist network, and ensure our country's continued safety. Now, and in the future, we will secure our Nation and prevail against terrorism.

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism recognizes the full range of terrorist threats that the United States confronts within and beyond our borders, and emphasizes the use of all elements of national power to combat terrorism and terrorist ideologies. It enhances our emphasis on targeting terrorist networks that threaten the United States and our allies and on disrupting and denying their ability to mobilize, finance, travel, communicate, and inspire new followers. We will deny terrorists the freedom to travel and communicate across international borders, and we will take action to limit their ability to recruit and radicalize online. We will combat the violent, extreme, and twisted ideologies that purport to justify the murder of innocent victims. We will also ensure that America's critical infrastructure is protected, in order to deter and prevent attacks, and is resilient so that we can quickly recover should it come under attack.

## NATIONAL STRATEGY for COUNTERTERRORISM of the United States of America

OCTOBER 2018



# Does Deterrence Still Matter?


- Deterrence is as part of U.S. defense and national security strategy
  - *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*

The Department of Defense's enduring mission is to provide combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our nation. Should deterrence fail, the Joint Force is prepared to win. Reinforcing America's traditional tools of diplomacy, the Department provides military options to ensure the President and our diplomats negotiate from a position of strength.

Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the Department, and require both increased and sustained investment, because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity today, and the potential for those threats to increase in the future. Concurrently, the Department will sustain its efforts to deter and counter rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran, defeat terrorist threats to the United States, and consolidate our gains

Defense objectives include:

- Defending the homeland from in Iraq and Afghanistan while moving to a more resource-sustainable approach.
- Sustaining Joint Force military advantages, both globally and in key regions;
- Deterring adversaries from aggression against our vital interests;
- Enabling U.S. interagency counterparts to advance U.S. influence and interests;
- Maintaining favorable regional balances of power in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere;
- Defending allies from military aggression and bolstering partners against coercion, and fairly sharing responsibilities for common defense;
- Dissuading, preventing, or deterring state adversaries and non-state actors from acquiring, proliferating, or using weapons of mass destruction;
- Preventing terrorists from directing or supporting external operations against the United States homeland and our citizens, allies, and partners overseas;
- Forming common defense arrangements and...



This unclassified synopsis of the classified 2018 *National Defense Strategy* articulates our strategy to compete, deter, and win in this environment. The reemergence of long-term strategic competition, rapid dispersion of technologies, and new concepts of warfare and competition that span the entire spectrum of conflict require a Joint Force structured to match this reality.

# Failed/Fragile States





# Definitions



- **State** => An authoritative political institution, sovereign over a recognized territory
  - Internal/external Sovereignty
- **Fragile/Failed States** => States which are 'unable or unwilling to harness domestic and international resources effectively for poverty reduction' (Torres and Anderson, 2004)

# What are Fragile/Failed States?



- “The collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis of governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and chaos
- Not only are the functions of government suspended, but its assets are destroyed or looted and experienced officials are killed or flee the country”

--*Boutros Boutros-Ghali*





# What are Fragile/Failed States?

- Government cannot/will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people => Inability to provide reasonable public services (*Fund for Peace*)
- State authority - state lacks clear international sovereign status, cannot control its borders; one or more groups subjected to violence or not provided security (Sudan)





# What are Fragile/Failed States?

- Effective political power - power of the executive not subject to controls (Zimbabwe); no effective channels for political participation (Burma)
- Economic management - weak or partial financial management tools; no transparency in the public management of natural resource extraction (Angola, Lao PDR)





# What are Fragile/Failed States?

- Administrative capacity to deliver services - the state levies less than 15% of GDP in tax; access to public services for specific regions of the country deliberately limited
- Loss of physical control of territory/monopoly on the legitimate use of force
- Erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions





# What are Fragile/Failed States?


- Two sources of “failure” => Internal/Internal
- **External:**
  - State is unable to meet its obligations as a member of the system of states
- **Internal:**
  - The state is unable to meet the needs of its citizens => Unable to provide basic, social, economic, legal, political services and safe-guards to the public at large
  - Internal disintegration of a state => economic devastation, societal fragmentation,
  - Governmental collapse => lost minimal capacity and therefore right to rule

# The Failed States Index



- Developed by “Fund for Peace”, Published by “Foreign Policy”
- Facets
  - Twelve indicators (social, economic, political, cohesion)
  - Zero (most stable) to 10 (least stable) scale
  - Final score is sum of all twelve indicator scores
- WB Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) divides low-income countries into 5 categories -> the lowest two are proxies for state fragility

# FRAGILE STATES INDEX







# 2018 “Winners”

- 1) South Sudan
- 2) Somalia
- 3) Yemen
- 4) Syria
- 5) Central African Republic
- 6) Democratic Republic of the Congo
- 7) Sudan
- 8) Chad
- 9) Afghanistan
- 10) Zimbabwe

*Failed state's index, 2018*

## POLITICAL

### INDICATORS



P1: State Legitimacy

P2: Public Services

P3: Human Rights and Rule of Law

## SOCIAL

### AND CROSS-CUTTING INDICATORS



S1: Demographic Pressures

S2: Refugees and IDPs

X1: External Intervention

## COHESION

### INDICATORS



C1: Security Apparatus

C2: Factionalized Elites

C3: Group Grievance

## ECONOMIC

### INDICATORS



E1: Economic Decline

E2: Uneven Economic Development

E3: Human Flight and Brain Drain

# Where's the problem?




- Failed states => civil war, Costs of late response to crisis are high (average costs of a civil war 54 billion USD - including military expenditure and lives losts and economic growth forgone)
- Collapsed states cause regional instability =>
  - Domino effect/spillover to neighboring states: 'Neighbourhood costs': instability, refugee flows, growth reduced by 0,4% if a neighbour is fragile (Afganistan, DR Congo, Economic stress, Political instability, Rebel safe zones/terrorist havens)
- Fragile states and poverty intertwined: breakdown of public health, infrastructure => famine, epidemics => Abuses of human rights

# Understanding fragile states



- The reasons for state failure are found in history, power relations, political economy
- Phenomenon of 'donor/aid orphans' (Central African Republic)



The geographical gaps in aid distribution, commonly known as 'aid orphans', are consequences of the complexity of the current global development co-operation system, which is characterized by allocation practices which are, to a large extent, un-coordinated.


# Why States Fail?



## Identity-based Conflict

- 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> => century conflicts involved nation-states
- 21<sup>st</sup> century => Emergence of sub-national, supra-national identities
- Samuel Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations” (1993)
  - Civilization: “highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species.”
  - 8 civilizations
  - Criticism: Selective evidence; simplistic; self-fulfilling?

# Huntington's World




# Why States Fail?



## Colonial Legacies

- Artificial borders
- Low levels of development
- Seeking self-determination or Premature independence: without state institutions
- Failed attempts to build national identity
- Incompetent governance



# Why States Fail?



- Corruption of state leaders
  - Barre in Somalia
  - Eyadéma in Togo
  - Mobutu in Zaire
  - Mugabe in Zimbabwe
- Autocracy, Patronage (buying support)
- Extreme poverty and debt
- Greed and grievance



# Why States Fail?



## The Cold War

- Preserved some newly independent and other Third World states
- States propped up by the US
- States propped up by the USSR

## International influence (bad)

- Natural resources
- Neighboring civil wars
- Neighboring instability
- Neighbor's refugees







# Examples of Failed States

- Somalia:
  - Ruled by warlords
  - Divided into autonomous zones
- Rwanda:
  - Massacres and genocide
  - Failure of social contract
- Liberia and Sierra Leone:
  - Small-scale conflicts
  - Unable to hold territory together during civil war
- Cambodia:
  - Twenty-year conflict between warring parties

# Examples of Failed States



- Lebanon:
  - Civil wars in 1980s
  - Continued sectarian politics
  - Continued meddling by states in internal government business
  
- Congo:
  - Essentially ungovernable since independence in 1960
  - Resource rich
  - Rain forest separates east from west
  - East and West are separate ethnicities

# The UN and Failed States



- Failure of UN intervention in the past
  - Short-term solutions
  - Failure of humanitarian aid
- Actions taken by the Security Council
  - Resolution 794 concerning Somalia
  - Authorized use of force
  - Protecting humanitarian operations
  - Peacekeeping in refugee camps
  - Peacekeeping along international borders



# Human Rights => International Concern

- Growing consensus: human rights are an international concern
- Widespread violation of human rights seen as a *de facto* threat to peace => international humanitarian law
  - Problems with implementation



# Aid & fragile states



- Failure to protect people and property => increased security of the person and property => improved policing of security (Albania), increased access to justice; providing safe operating environment for service delivery (Nepal - Basic Operational Guidelines); DDR
- Failure to deliver basic services => substantial increase in infrastructure, primary education and health services to the poor => working with both state and non-state service providers and ensure protection of service providers

# Aid and Fragile States



- Decreasing livelihood security => social protection for vulnerable households => humanitarian assistance in conflict-affected areas; social protection programmes including employment, food security
- Weak public financial management => improved management of natural resource revenue and capacity to manage shocks => increased political commitment to transparent use of countries' assets, international accountability arrangements; early warning systems and capacity to predict and manage shocks



# Aid and Fragile States

- Externally driven state-building =>
  - Long--term commitment
  - Intelligent planning
  - Deep understanding of society and culture
  - International cooperation
  - Money
- Governance reform
- Foreign aid, debt relief
- Containment
- Collective action problem => everyone waits for everyone else to act

# Saving a Failed State



- Two models that have been used in the past:
  - Top-Down
    - Establishment of Leviathan
  - Bottom-Up
    - People build from ground up





# Failed States as Security Threats



- Failed states usually do not constitute a direct national security threat to non neighbors
- The threat is indirectly, through the results of failure
  - State not in control of its territory  $\Rightarrow$  terrorism



# Next Session...

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- **National Security II**
  - Terrorism
  - Counter terrorism
  - Counter-insurgency

**Thank You For Your Attention!**

**Questions???**