Nuclear Arms Proliferation
and Control
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
• 1st Nuclear Age – 1945 – 1989
• Vertical proliferation
• 2nd Nuclear Age – 1990 – present
• Horizontal proliferation
Motives for NW Proliferation
• USA 1945
• USSR 1949
• Belarus
• Ukraine
• Kazakhstan
• Great Britain 1952
• France 1960
• China 1964
• Israel 1966
• India 1974
• South Africa 1979
• Pakistan 1998
• North Korea 2006
Choksy, C. B. E. and Choksy, J. K. (2013). WMD Proliferation Threatens the World.
(http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/wmd-proliferation-threatens-world)
Nuclear Stockpiles of the USA and USSR 1945-1989
USA USSR
1945 6 0
1950 369 5
1955 3057 200
1960 20 434 1605
1965 31 642 6129
1970 26 119 11 643
1975 27 052 19 055
1980 23 764 30 062
1985 23 135 39 197
1989 22 174 35 805
Arms Control
• „The excercise of restraint in the acquisition, deployment
and use of military capabilities“
• „Measures that enable actors to conduct themselves in a
more restrained way (through developing techniques of
crisis management)“ (Evans, Nenham 1998:33)
• „All the forms of military cooperation between potential
enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war,
its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and
economic costs of being prepared for it.“ (Schellin &
Halperin 1985: 2)
Disarmament
• A process – reduction, removal, elimination of
identified weapon systems
• A state – establishment of a disarmed world and
the prevention of a rearmament thereafter
Structural & Operational Arms Control
• Structural – qualitative and quantitative aspects
of weapons of a given class. The goal is to
achieve or keep arsenals in balance and thus
establish or keep parity and stability
• Operational – attempts to keep adversaries as
restrained as possible when resort to arms is
concerned. The aim is to prevent an outbreak or
further escalation of a conflict
Croft’s Typology
1. Arms control at the conclusion of major conflicts
2. Arms control to strengthen strategic stability
3. Arms control to create norms of behavior
4. Arms control managing proliferation of weapons
5. Arms control by international organization
Arms Control & Disarmament
• What arms control and disarmament treaties do
you know?
Operational Arms Control
• The U.S. – the USSR Hot Line Agreement (1963)
• Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT – 1963)
• Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT – 1968)
• Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT – 1974)
• Comprehensive test Ban Treaty (CTBT – 1996)
• Outer Space Treaty (1967)
• Seabed Treaty (1971)
• CSBMs
Structural Arms Control
• SALT I and ABM Treaty (1972)
• SALT II (1979)
• INF (1987)
• START I (1991)
• START II (1993)
• SORT (Moscow Treaty)
• New START (2010)
SALT I
ICBMs SLBMs SSBNs with
SLBMs
USA May 1972 1054 656 41
SALT I Limit 1054 710 44
SSSR May
1972
1618 740 56
SALT I Limit 1618 950 62
The INF Treaty
• Intermediate-Range Forces
Treaty
• 1987 U.S.-Soviet Treaty
• Global withdrawal and
elimination of U.S. and Soviet
land based MRBMs (500-1000
km) and IRBMs (1,000-5,500 km)
• Very robust on-site inspection
and verification measures for
production and deployment
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INF Treaty
• USA
• Pershing 2 - 234
• GLCM – 443
• Pershing IA - 169
• Aggregate n. - 846
• USSR
• SS-20 - 654
• SS-23 - 239
• SS-4 – 149
• SS-5 – 6
• SS-12 – 718
• SSC-X-4 - 80
• Aggregate n. - 1846
Central Problem: Russian Violation
 Russian test 2 Sept. 2015 was
first launch of GLCM with
potential INF range, 500-
5,500km, and is a Treaty
violation
• Test of a ground-launched cruise
missile, the R-500, or SSC-X-8,
this is a version of Kalibr used to
attack targets in Syria
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Multilateralization of the Treaty
• It saves the INF Regime, Aids U.S., Russian, and Global Security
• Who Should Join? China is the key actor due to Russian
concerns
• China’s accession to the Treaty would have a substantial stabilizing effect
in the light of the proliferation of Chinese IRBMs and growing Russian
concerns.
• Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, Russian Arms Control Experts:
“China must be taken into consideration when discussing subsequent
U.S.-Russian initiatives on arms limitations and reductions.”
• Were China to join, Russia would still have an incentive to remain
within the Treaty, as IRBMs would remain banned
19
This is a Complex Problem
• One of the most challenging arms control negotiations
• Dangerous security situation in Asia
• Particularly tension between China and Japan, and China and India
• To move forward, it is necessary for Russia and the United
States to approach and engage China directly on this issue
• This step would recognize Beijing’s special status and importance as a
growing force in international politics.
• Likely strong resistance such a proposal would meet from
other regional players, such as India and Pakistan
• China has the diplomatic, economic, and military means to
further its goals and ambitions without its land based IRBMs
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Why China should join the INF
Treaty (2 of 3)
• Benefits for Asia (reduces security dilemma)
• Given present tensions in Asia. New Delhi, Hanoi, Manila, and Tokyo are suspicious of
China’s possible territorial ambitions in the East and South China Seas, and along the
Sino-Indian border
• There is a strong legacy of mistrust, and the possibility of arms races, crises, and
intense security competition is significant
• Benefits for China: It is a Status Quo Power Interested in Strategic
Stability
• Beijing shows it accepts the value of arms control and seeks confidence-building
measures
• Demonstrates that China is a status quo power in the Asia-Pacific
• Strengthens the ballistic missile non-proliferation regime
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What China Will Gain
• Russia is prevented from
reintroduction of their land based INF
systems in Asia
• The U.S. is prevented from potential
deployment in East Asia and Pacific
• As Moscow and Washington operate
under the New START Treaty, China
could have confidence that their
strategic force will not increase
• Other states might be inspired to join
the treaty
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Strategic Weapons
START Treaties
• START I - Limit 1600 strategic carriers (ICBMs,
SLBMs, strategic bombers)
• 6000 nuclear warheads
• START II - Limit 3500 warheads
• Ban on MIRVed ICBMs
• Ban on „heavy“ missiles
START Treaties
• SORT (2002)
• 1700-2200 warheads
• New START (2010)
• 1550 warheads
• 700 operational launchers
Current Nuclear Arsenals
• USA 2080 (7100)
• Russia 4500 (7500)
• France 300
• China (260)
• Great Britain (215)
• Pakistan (130)
• India (120)
• Israel (80)
• North Korea (15+)