

Understanding Global Security

Peter Hough

 **Routledge**
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

Criminal threats to security

Global crime in historical context	217
Webs of deceit – the rise in prominence of transnational crime	219
Global policemen? The rise of international political action on crime	225
Key points	229
Recommended reading	230
Useful web links	230

No one country can effectively fight transnational organized crime within or outside its borders. Therefore, I submit, countries must relinquish some of their procedural or substantive sovereignty in order for the purpose for which sovereignty exists in the first place to remain intact.

Ronald Noble, Secretary General of Interpol 2003 (Noble 2003)

Crime has always represented a threat to the security of ordinary people in all countries and, occasionally, to state institutions also. In recent years, however, this threat has become greater and changed in nature, undermining the capacity of governments to protect both their citizens and themselves. The use of legitimate sovereign force to uphold domestic law and order is universal and has a long history. In some countries state security has traditionally been as much a domestic political issue as an international one. In Italy during the Cold War, for example, the domestic threat posed by political violence (most notably the Red Brigade) and criminal violence (most notably the mafia) dominated state security policy to much the same extent as the Soviet threat preoccupying the rest of Western Europe. This fact manifests itself in the existence and prominence in Italy of the paramilitary police force, the *Carabinieri*, in contrast to its modest military presence. More and more democratic countries have turned to paramilitary policing in recent years as a blurring of the distinction between internal and external security has prompted a commensurate blurring of the traditional roles of the military and the police.

Statistics are inevitably sketchy when dealing with an issue which is illegal, transnational and something many governments would prefer to downplay, but crime has undoubtedly grown worldwide over the last 15 years. The IMF estimates that the amount of criminally acquired money in the world grew from \$85 billion to \$5000 billion between 1988 and 1998 (Kendall 1998: 269). Over half a million people per year are now murdered (WHO 2002c, Reza *et al.* 2001) and one in five of all people fall victim to serious contact crime (robbery, sexual crimes or assaults) (Newman 1999: Chapter 1). One of the most comprehensive and reliable studies of international crime, by the Council of Europe, showed that the number of convictions for completed homicide rose from 1.5 per 100,000 people in 1990 to 2.9 in 1996 (Council of Europe 1999: Table 3.B.1.2). The World Health Organization estimates that 63 per cent of all homicides are carried out with firearms and it is the rise in the private ownership of guns which goes a long way in explaining the rise of this form of violence (WHO 2001: 4). In Japan, where gun ownership is extremely low, homicide by firearms is at 0.1 per 100,000. In Colombia, where gun ownership is endemic, the figure is 50 per 100,000 (WHO 2001: 5).

Colombia epitomizes the security threats posed by crime. As well as providing a major human security threat to ordinary Colombian and foreign citizens, criminal organizations (in tandem with violent political organizations) have seriously undermined the capacity of the government to rule the country. Foreign troops have been employed to fight drugs barons while a large tract of Colombian territory was, for a number of years, conceded to 'narco-terrorists'. Colombia is an extreme case, but in many countries throughout the world governments are increasingly threatened or undermined by armed groups terrifying their citizens, damaging their economy and corrupting their institutions. (See Box 10.1.)

Box 10.1 Pablo Escobar

The technologically advanced and international military operation mounted to assassinate Colombian drugs magnate Pablo Escobar in 1993 illustrates how crime had entered into the realms of 'national security' in the post Cold War years. Escobar was finally killed after US special troops the Delta Force and various crime-fighters from the USA were brought in to help by an exasperated and under-pressure Colombian government. His cover was blown when a telephone call was traced by surveillance equipment, bringing to an end the most lucrative and destructive criminal career in history.

Escobar was born in 1949 during the decade-long Colombian civil war. He followed a typical criminal career path, starting with schoolboy scams before becoming involved in the thriving cocaine industry in the 1970s. By the end of the 1980s he was head of a cartel controlling over half of the cocaine entering the USA from South America and was estimated to be among the ten richest people in the world. Although a thoroughly ruthless gangster, Escobar successfully courted popular support among poor Colombians by playing the role of a contemporary 'Robin Hood'. He funded various public schemes and social programmes and even gained a seat in the Colombian parliament. With growing US pressure being mounted on Colombian authorities from the late 1980s to extradite him as part of their war on drugs, Escobar focused his attentions on getting Colombia's extradition treaty with the USA closed down. A campaign of terror to secure himself within Colombia saw him authorize the bombing of a passenger plane in 1989 in the hope of killing Presidential candidate Cesar Gaviria. Gaviria was not on the plane but 110 other, unconnected people including two Americans, were. This triggered the US into action and led eventually to Escobar's downfall. The trade in cocaine, of course, has yet to be curtailed (Bowden 2001).

Global crime in historical context

Despite its recent rise to prominence and traditionally marginal role in international relations, global crime has a long history.

Narcotic drugs

The use, production and sale of narcotic drugs can be traced back to ancient history. Opiates were common in Ancient Greece (their use is referred to by Homer), marijuana was in use in China before the birth of Christ and coca was as much an integral part of life in the Inca civilization as it is in some parts of Andean South America today. The trading of opiates occurred within Asia for many centuries and from the mid-eighteenth century extended into Europe. This was at the time an entirely legal form of commerce since the use of opiates was not distinguished from the use of medicinal drugs or foodstuffs and was common among societal elites.

When Imperial China did take steps to restrict the legality of opium in the mid-nineteenth century, Great Britain twice took up arms against them (the Opium Wars of 1839–42 and 1856–58) in order to protect their flow of imports from China and exports to China from their colony, India.

The shift in positions of western governments from fighting wars *for* drugs to the contemporary fighting of wars *against* drugs began in the latter part of the nineteenth century. By this time the use of opiates in Western Europe and the USA had begun to spread beyond that of literary and political elite social circles and had come to be associated with working class sloth and crime, prompting moves towards domestic prohibition. An international conference in 1909, held ironically in the Chinese city of Shanghai, initiated attempts to control the trade in opiates, which became codified in the 1912 International Opium Convention. The League of Nations made reference to the problem of narcotics in its charter and in 1920 established the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs (Bentham 1998: 90–92).

Piracy

The menace caused to international commerce by the actions of pirates has, of course, a long and well-documented history and illustrates that threats to security from armed non-state actors are not a new phenomenon. Piracy is recorded as being of concern as early as the fourth century AD in the China Seas and gradually spread and grew through the centuries, becoming particularly rife in the Mediterranean from the sixteenth to eighteenth century (Chalk 2000: 57).

The motivation for pirates to conduct robberies at sea rather than on land was that it made it harder for states to act against them. As such piracy represents a classic concern of international law which, traditionally, is focused on tackling problems which do not fall under the direct jurisdiction of states. A series of international conventions were signed from the nineteenth century outlawing robbery on the high seas, culminating in the 1958 Geneva Convention which permits any state to try the perpetrators of such crimes regardless of the nationality of the criminal. The success of these conventions has produced an unusual twist for international relations, with the uncharacteristic effectiveness of international law enforcement diverting the criminals to take on domestic law enforcers instead. Modern day pirates tend not to operate on the high seas, where they run the risk of encountering the full might of great naval powers, and prefer to challenge the sovereign authorities of less powerful states in ransacking ships in territorial seas, in anchorage or in harbour (Chalk 2000: 57–60).

Slavery

International action against the age-old practice of slavery represents the first manifestation of human rights in international relations, with states acting to outlaw a crime through moral outrage rather than for economic reasons or for the safety of their citizens. The rise of outrage in nineteenth-century Western Europe at the

barbarism of using forced human labour, and of profiting from the trade in human cargo, translated itself into the diplomacy of the *Concert of Europe*. The 1815 Congress of Vienna saw the great powers of Europe acknowledge an obligation to make the international trade in slaves contrary to international law. This obligation became official at the 1885 Treaty of Berlin and was codified in the 1890 Brussels Convention, producing the world's first piece of human rights legislation. Great Britain, on a number of occasions, took the step of enforcing this law by intercepting Arab slave ships off the coast of East Africa and freeing the captives (Robertson 2000: 14). As discussed elsewhere in this volume, humanitarian interventions of this kind are still rare and highly contentious today. The act of slavery itself was made illegal under international law by the 1926 Slavery Convention which put slavers in the same category as pirates, subject to the jurisdiction of any state, regardless of where the crime took place.

Webs of deceit – the rise in prominence of transnational crime

Although it is clear that crime on an international scale or with international repercussions is by no means a new phenomenon, the 1990s witnessed a significant rise in the scale of and political attention given to transnational organized crime. The ending of the Cold War and the onset of greater economic globalization can, in many ways, be seen to have created the conditions for a growing 'global underworld'.

The end of the Cold War can be understood to have facilitated the rise in significance of and priority given to crime in three main ways.

1 The rise of 'failed states'

Since the 1990s the term 'failed states' has come to be attributed to those countries where a single government could not be said to be in effective political control within its own borders, beyond what could be understood as any sort of period of transition or temporary civil strife. In effect, such territories can be seen to be in a permanent state of insurgency or general lawlessness. The preponderance of failed states increased after the ending of the Cold War partly because many such countries lost the patronage of either superpower in a New World Order where they ceased to hold such a strong military security attraction.

The classic case of the failed state is that of Afghanistan. Invaded by the USSR in 1979 Afghanistan became the focal point of the second Cold War, with the USA providing substantial financial and military backing to the *mujaheddin* resistance fighters. The thawing of relations between the USA and the USSR saw Soviet Premier Gorbachev announce the withdrawal of troops from the bloody and intractable conflict in 1988. This ended the proxy war between the two superpowers but did not end the conflict in Afghanistan, where rival factions continued to fight out a civil war in the power vacuum created by the sudden disinterest of the world's two most powerful states. The political legacy of this for the USA in terms of the rise of anti-American terrorist groups from the *mujaheddin* is well documented, but Afghanistan

also rose again as a crucial haven for the global heroin industry. The Taliban regime, who took control of Kabul in 1996, exploited the country's bountiful supplies of opium poppies in trying to boost the economy of a country which had sunk to the status of a 'fourth world' state in the face of 20 years of political turmoil.

Failed states are significant in International Relations because they stand in contradiction to conventional notions of the sovereign state system. Sovereignty is traditionally viewed as the cement that holds together the state system and maintains international order. The crucial component of the multi-faceted concept of sovereignty, enshrined in international law in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, is that a sovereign state has a government in 'effective control'. The rise in cases where countries cannot be said to have a sovereign government in effective control is, of course, a recipe for increased lawlessness in the world.

2 An end to 'turning a blind eye' to crime

On the other side of the coin to the failed states argument it is, of course, naïve to suppose that transnational crime, and narcotics trading in particular, did not occur during the Cold War years. As well as increasing in incidence in the 1990s, narcotics trading was able to be given greater priority by governments with the shadow of the Cold War no longer obscuring other political issues. It is incontrovertible that the superpowers were prepared to tolerate corrupt governments being involved with or even directing criminal operations if they were in charge of important military allies or client states.

The clearest illustration of a U-turn in tolerating crooked regimes can be seen with the US invasion of Panama in the dying days of the Cold War in 1989. One of the principal reasons for the breakdown in relations between the two countries, which led to the overthrow of the Panamanian government, was the refusal of President Noriega to yield to US demands to act to curb the flow of cocaine passing through his country to their cities. Noriega's connections to the drugs underworld were known throughout the 1980s, as a military general until 1987 and as the President thereafter. At that time this was not viewed in such a negative light since he had aided the US in anti-leftist operations in Central America (Tatham and McCleary 1992). The USA's security for the most part of the 1980s was construed almost entirely in terms of the Communist threat, which Noriega stood as a bulwark against, rather than the threat posed by cocaine addiction and related crime in US cities. By 1989 this was beginning to change.

Similarly, the Soviet Union, while no supporter of narcotics, backed the fiercely conservative Communist regime of Eric Honneker in East Germany, despite surely being aware of the leader's personal involvement in importing and selling cocaine.

3 The rise of mafiocracies

One of the most prominent features of the post Cold War political landscape has been the process of transition of many former Communist countries towards the western

model state, with a partially free market economy and democratic political system. Welcomed by most western governments and analysts as reducing the likelihood of military conflict in the world and even signalling 'the end of history', this wave of democratization can also, however, be construed as bringing with it new security threats.

Transition from a one-party state to a multi-party democracy, and from a centrally planned economy to a more diverse mixed economy with private industries and shareholders, is a very difficult process. With help from the West, such as with the EU's PHARE programme, some former Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe such as Poland, Czechoslovakia (which split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993), Hungary and some parts of the former Soviet Union like Estonia, have come through initial economic difficulties to establish fairly stable political systems and successfully orientate themselves with the West. A long-standing desire to be free of Russian influence (whether Czarist, Soviet or democratic) can be seen as a crucial factor in such countries being prepared to tolerate the inevitable economic and social difficulties experienced in undertaking the shock treatment of slashing state support for old industries and encountering mass unemployment for the first time in living memory. Poverty and social upheaval are always favourable conditions in which crime can thrive and even the successful transition states have witnessed increased problems with black marketeers and illegal traders of various kinds. EU states have helped alleviate this by providing policing advice and training to their eastern neighbours through PHARE and EU accession preparations.

It is in the former Communist countries further east, which have had the greatest difficulty in making the transition to capitalism and democracy, however, where crime has become most prevalent and of greatest concern to the rest of the world. Rapid, wholesale privatization programmes in countries without experienced businessmen, shareholders and private bankers inevitably run the risk of leaving key industries in the hands of black marketeers and inscrutable individuals. Godson and Williams use the term *mafio-cracies* to encapsulate the problem of criminal syndicates buying into crucial aspects of state apparatus and winning political influence (Godson and Williams 2000: 113). The ownership of most of Russia's economy by a small group of 'businessmen', able to act as a cartel and exercise leverage over members of the Duma (parliament) protected by law from criminal prosecution prompted the politician Yavlinsky to describe the fledgling political system of his country as a 'quasi-democratic oligarchy with corporatist-criminal characteristics' (Yavlinsky 1998: 67).

Between a quarter and a third of Russia's economy is black and the murder rate has rocketed since the fall of Communism. Criminal gangs or *mafia* are a prominent feature of Russian life, with extortion rackets rife in most cities. Their influence has also extended into operations in many parts of Europe and elsewhere in the world. Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost* (openness) in the late 1980s, which facilitated the sudden influx of *videocassettes* (which officially became a Russian word), is sometimes believed to have influenced the development of criminal gangs, owing to the popularity of Hollywood gangster films such as *The Godfather*.

Perhaps the clearest illustration of a new security threat emerging in international politics with the ending of the Cold War, and souring the toasts being made to global peace, is the rise in black market trading in weapon-grade nuclear material.

Nearly 700 incidences of such operations were documented in the 1990s, principally focused in the successor states of the Soviet Union (Williams and Woessner 2000). Here, President Yeltsin had assumed control from Gorbachev of a country shorn not only of 14 of its 15 republics and six colonies but also a large chunk of its huge nuclear arsenal.

The rise of criminal gangs in the former Soviet Union and their diffusion into the western world encapsulates the dark side of three generally positive developments in international relations in the 1990s: the fall of the Iron Curtain, democratization and globalization. Globalization, denoting the increased level of cross-border economic activity and increasingly global political framing of such change, can be seen to have influenced the rise in prominence of global crime in a number of ways.

The increased volume of traded goods

The opportunities for trading in legal commodities are much greater than ever before in terms of costs, speed and the existence of global regulations favouring free trade over state protectionism. Such opportunities are also, however, present for the trading in illegal commodities. It is easier and cheaper for criminals to operate internationally and the sheer volume of traded goods makes it difficult for state authorities to detect the movement of drugs, arms shipments and other illicit cargoes.

A 2002 report by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) illustrates how drugs traffickers have come to make effective use of that very symbol of globalization, the internet, to boost their operations (INCB 2002). Gangs are known to have used encrypted websites to communicate and share information on their activities, while employing information technology experts as hackers to alter information held on customs databases and create phantom websites to put state officials off the scent of the real sites. A simple illustration of how modern technological aids to commerce can serve murkier purposes also comes with evidence that Australian drug traffickers have brazenly used the web service offered by legitimate couriers that allows customers to track the location of the goods they are having delivered (INCB 2002: 2).

The growth of cross-border financial transactions

Ever-increasing cross-border financial flows can present opportunities to international criminals as much as to international businessmen. Large-scale criminal activity is usually accompanied by money laundering as crime groups seek to protect their ill-gotten gains from state authorities by moving the money around or investing it in legitimate businesses. This process is becoming increasingly globalized as criminal organizations learn to exploit the inadequacies of the sovereign state system by moving money from country to country. Investing the proceeds of crime into legitimate businesses in a state other than where the crime took place illustrates the nature of criminal globalization's challenge to the state system. A crucial aspect of a crime may not be construed as criminal in the country where it occurs and may even be considered to be a beneficial overseas investment.

Urbanization

The global trend towards urban living is a factor behind the rise of crime since city dwellers are statistically far more violent and lawless than their rural counterparts. The homicide rate in Amsterdam is 4.09 per 100,000 people, while the rate for the whole of the Netherlands is 1.4 (Council of Europe 1999). This pattern is much more pronounced in LDCs, where far larger sections of the cities' populations live in poverty than in wealthy Amsterdam. Poverty, of course, is a key cause of crime and it is in these areas that world population growth is focused.

The growth of 'global crime'

A key factor in the globalization of crime is the increased tendency for organized criminal groups to follow the lead of transnational corporations and set up operations in a number of other countries. Cheaper international travel costs favour criminals as much as they do other profit-seeking individuals. Godson and Williams describe how transnational criminal organizations can come to utilize a *home state* from where they direct operations, a *host state* where they carry out crimes or sell their produce, a *transportation state* where criminal activities will seek to ensure an unhindered passage of goods to the host state and a *service state* in countries where favourably secretive banking laws allow for profits to be secured (Godson and Williams 2000: 115). Hence, a genuinely transnational operation can be established where, for example, a Colombian-based narcotics gang could secure access to markets in the USA by bribing Mexican officials to permit the transit of the drugs and then invest the proceeds in a Cayman Islands offshore bank account.

The growth of global criminal alliances

At the 1994 United Nations Conference on Internationally Organized Crime, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali referred to an 'empire of criminals' to highlight the problem of globally operating criminal gangs and also to illustrate the fact that many of these organized gangs were cooperating with other, likeminded groups to extend the reach of their operations. There is a long history of criminal gangs extending their influence into other countries but this, traditionally, had been in line with patterns of migration. Hence the mafia's influence in the USA from the 1930s followed large-scale Italian migration and, to a far lesser extent, Jamaican *yardies* and Hong Kong *triads* extended operations to the UK from the 1980s. The 1990s, however, witnessed the increased formation of strategic alliances between transnational criminal organizations exploiting changing political rather than demographic circumstances. Phil Williams, the world authority on transnational crime, illustrates this development clearly:

Colombian–Sicilian networks brought together Colombian cocaine suppliers with Sicilian groups possessing local knowledge, well-established heroin distribution networks, extensive bribery and corruption networks, and a

fully-fledged capability for money laundering. Italian and Russian criminal networks have also forged cooperative relationships, while Colombian and Russian criminals have been meeting in various Caribbean islands to engage in guns-for-drugs deals.

(Williams 2001: 75–76)

Criminal exploitation of political integration

Globalization not only provides criminals with the opportunities to widen their operations, it can also sometimes create new opportunities for crime. Political integration is a by-product of an increasingly interdependent world where states recognize the limitations on independent action in the global economy and work towards ‘pooling’ their sovereignty by creating new, wider economic and political communities with nearby states. By far the most extensive case of such political integration is in Europe with the European Union (where the desire to create a *security community* must also be seen as a crucial spur). The EU is very much a leap of faith since no comparable project has been attempted before and, as a result, merging together the economic activities of 15 states has had some unintended side-effects.

Organized crime groups, for example, are known to have exploited the complexity of the EU’s costly and highly bureaucratic Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The payment of subsidies to olive producers inadvertently has helped finance the mafia who have long had an ‘influence’ on that industry in Sicily. Similarly, it has been alleged that among the criminal activities favoured by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) for fundraising has been the tactic of moving cattle across the UK–Irish border at night to claim EU subsidies for cattle farmers twice. The opening up of borders between the member states of the EU since the late 1980s has provided a further boost to the mafia by making the service of giving safe passage across the Adriatic to illegal immigrants from East Europe to Southern Italy attractive since migrants can more easily head north to wealthier parts of the Union.

The EU has taken steps to tackle transnational crime through initiatives to improve the ‘policing’ of particular policies (such as satellite surveillance of farms) and the broader recognition of the need to develop a Justice and Home Affairs ‘pillar’ to accompany measures furthering economic integration.

The increased significance of crime occurring in other countries

In International Relations globalization is characterized not only by the *deepening* of politics, whereby greater links between states and other actors are being developed, but also by a *widening* of politics, whereby events in one state come increasingly to have political significance in other states. Rosenau has referred to this as ‘turbulence’ (Rosenau 1990), which can be seen to have parallels with the maxim of chaos theory in natural science that ‘if a butterfly bats its wings in one part of the world its effects can be felt on the other side of the world’. In the contemporary world

criminal activities in countries other than your own, and not functionally connected to your own country in the ways previously described, may increasingly have repercussions for you. Russia's struggles with organized crime have contributed to its economic difficulties, and this, in turn, has hampered the economic transition from Communism of neighbouring countries and key trading partners like Moldova and Belarus. All countries in the global economy are also affected, to some extent, by the crippling of a potentially wealthy state. Crime, wherever it occurs, is increasingly everyone's problem.

The growth of morality in international relations

In addition to people increasingly feeling (whether rightly or wrongly) that crime in other countries affects them, greater moral concern about such crimes can also be seen as a factor which serves to elevate the significance of crime in international politics. Greater public awareness of events in other countries and the rise of international human rights law has raised the profile of crimes such as the infanticide of girls in China and the systematic murder of the homeless in Brazil.

Global policemen? The rise of international political action on crime

Interpol

Established in 1923, Interpol is undoubtedly the best known global institutional response to the problem of transnational crime. Its membership is impressively universal with 179 member states. Each member state is represented by delegates at the organization's headquarters in Lyon, France and each hosts a National Crime Bureau (NCB) which serves as one of the nodes in an information network to aid state police forces and promote cooperation among them. The 179 NCBs are linked by a computerized database which contains pooled information resources on known criminals and stolen goods, such as cars, to aid in the detection of transnational criminals and speed up the process of their extradition (although the process of extradition is still a bilateral matter between the governments concerned). In addition to this chief function of facilitating the exchange of information, Interpol also seeks to promote greater regional cooperation between police forces (as, for example with the Mercosur countries: Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay) and to act as a 'value-added service provider' giving advice to governments on how to develop extradition agreements and to state police forces on updating their information technology resources.

Interpol as an intergovernmental organization has a conventional decision-making structure. Each member state is represented by a government-appointed delegate at an annual General Assembly, which votes by simple majority on the adoption of new procedures. The General Assembly also elects an Executive Committee of 13 member state delegates, which meets three times a year and prepares the agenda for the General Assemblies, as well as managing the implementation

of decisions. Day-to-day administration is carried out by a permanent secretariat at Lyon headed by the Secretary-General, elected for a five year term of office by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly.

Despite proclaiming among its objectives that it aims to act 'in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' (Interpol Constitution Article 2) Interpol has always sought to play a non-political role. Article 3 of its constitution makes this clear: 'It is strictly forbidden for the organisation to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.' This somewhat contradicts the previous Article, since racial and religious persecution are among the crimes renounced in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights but it would, of course, be impossible for an organization of this nature to maintain its broad membership without such a precondition.

Another limitation to the work of Interpol is its modest budget, derived from member state contributions calculated on the basis of population and GDP. This point is clearly expressed by current Secretary-General Ronald Noble: 'we have a multi-billion dollar problem being tackled by an organization running on just 30 million euros' (Interpol 2002). Interpol is clearly a valuable resource to police forces around the world in arresting transnational criminals but, in its present guise, could only be a limited player in the development of global policies to arrest the rise of transnational crime.

Europol

The rise in cross-border crime in the European Union, referred to earlier in this chapter, prompted the organization in the early 1990s to instigate an Interpol-style institution of its own to coordinate the work of its member state police forces. Europol was agreed on at the 1992 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) in line with the creation of a 'Justice and Home Affairs' dimension to the EU's political integration process. It came into being in January 1994. Similarly to Interpol, Europol has a central database, The Europol Computer Systems (TECS), serving a system of offices in the member states. Still in the early stages of evolution Europol has already outgrown its global 'parent'. Its budget for 2001 was 35.4 million euros and, in addition to a permanent secretariat in the Hague, Europol employs 44 'Europol Liaison Officers' (ELOs) in the 15 member states, principally made up of experienced policemen and customs officers (Europol 2003).

The birth and subsequent growth of Europol represent a classic case of *spillover*, a concept associated with the neo-functionalist theory of political integration and often applied to the development of the European Union. The crux of the concept is that political cooperation in one area inevitably leads to the need and desire to cooperate in other functionally related areas. The chief spur to the creation of Europol was concern at the increased opportunities for the transboundary movement of narcotics within the EU in the light of the relaxing of border controls between the member states. There were two dimensions to this problem: drugs originating from within the EU could exploit a wider market, and drugs from outside the EU could also exploit this wider market if successfully smuggled into one of the member states (exploiting a weak spot in a now very large border). The first of these two dimensions

of the problem was exacerbated by the fact that one EU member state, the Netherlands, had notably more liberal laws with regard to the use of cannabis than its neighbours, so opening up the possibility of an unregulated flow of that drug out of its borders.

Hence the first manifestation of Europol in 1994 was the creation of the Europol Drugs Unit. Other units have subsequently been created and Europol's role has expanded rapidly. Article 30 of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, a follow-up legal package seeking to expand on the developments agreed on at Maastricht, authorized the extension of Europol authority and it now has the sort of political clout not possessed by Interpol. At the 1999 European Council Summit in Tampere, Finland, it was agreed that member states should be obliged to initiate investigations in a case if requested to do so by Europol.

A further way in which Europol has moved beyond the role of facilitating the exchange of information between police forces is in the promotion of judicial cooperation. The European Judicial Network was set up in 1998 as an information exchange service for lawyers in the 15 member states. In 2001 this development was augmented by the creation of Eurojust, a sister organization to Europol made up of representatives of the legal professions, such as magistrates and prosecution services. Again this is spillover in practice, with the drive to improve the detection of transboundary crime being accompanied by a desire to achieve a commensurate improvement in the capacity to arrest transboundary criminals.

Europol is very much part of the EU political system. Its five-person Directorate and budget are controlled by the chief legislative organ of the EU, the Council of Ministers. As of yet the voting in the Justice and Home Affairs Council of Ministers (made up of the relevant minister of each of the 15 member states) requires unanimity but the possibility remains of decisions eventually being taken by *qualified majority* as is now the case in most other policy areas. In such ways we can expect the informational, legal and political roles of the EU in fighting crime to continue to evolve.

United Nations

As with the European Union, the role of the UN with regard to transnational crime originated in efforts to coordinate action against the trade in narcotics before evolving into activities dealing with other realms of global criminal activity. The UN took over the management of the League of Nations' work on tackling the narcotics trade, as it did with many functional agencies established by its forerunner. The League's well-documented failures with regard to military security should not obscure its pioneering work in developing global responses to other great threats to humanity. The League's Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs was transformed into the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) but the UN soon expanded its role and the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs created a sister organization to the CND, the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). This signalled an attempt by the UN to deepen the global response to an increasingly politically contentious issue, but the further creation of various groups and programmes over the next three decades served to confuse the picture and prompt a

rationalization, in line with other structural changes to the UN, at the close of the Cold War.

A special session of the UN General Assembly in 1990 recognized the growing threat posed by narcotics and instigated the creation of a single programme to replace the 'alphabet soup' of small UN groups that had developed in this policy area. The UN International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) started operations in 1991 to coordinate, UN policy with the CND and INCB taken under its wings as committees. A further rationalization of UN operations occurred in 1997 when the UNDCP married its operations to a new body, the UN Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP) as sub-sections of the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP). This step marked a recognition by the UN of the growing significance of a range of transnational criminal operations first evident in the sponsorship of a major conference in Naples in 1994 attended by government ministers from 136 states.

The CICP did not appear from nowhere but it represented a greatly souped-up version of its predecessor, the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division (CPCJD). The CICP is very much the junior partner within the UNODCCP, with a permanent staff of 15 compared with over 300 in the UNDCP. It is, however, assisted by a separate 40-strong body, the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ), which is a subsidiary of the Economic and Social Council, the UN's chief steering mechanism for developing global policy on non-military issues. The CCPCJ cooperates with pressure groups, academics and politicians in organizing congresses which produce draft resolutions that direct the CICP in its work of defining 'internationally recognized principles for criminal justice'.

In a culmination of the work of these congresses and a Global Action Plan initiated by the 1994 Naples Conference, a UN International Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime was adopted by the General Assembly in November 2000 and opened for signature by governments at Palermo a month later.

Article 1 of the Convention succinctly describes its purpose as 'to promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized crime more effectively' (UN 2000: 1). Subsequent Articles of the Convention deal with a wide range of issues relating to transnational organized crime. These are summarized in Table 10.1.

Three protocols accompany the Convention, dealing with human trafficking (essentially modern slavery), the smuggling of migrants and the trade in illegal firearms.

Conclusions

The UN Convention marks a watershed in global policy on crime but, at the same time, represents only a tiny first step towards effectively tackling the problem. Transnational crime, more starkly than any of the issues of global security politics bar political non-state violence, illustrates the limitations of the Westphalian system of sovereign states in protecting citizens' lives and livelihoods. Lives lost to wars, disasters, disease, poverty and organized discrimination will almost certainly be far fewer in the present century than the last and there is some scope for optimism that environmental Armageddon can be averted. These are problems that would be better

Table 10.1 UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime

Articles 2–4	Definitions and scope of the convention
Article 5	Criminalizing the participation in an organized crime group
Articles 8–10	Corruption
Articles 11 and 12	Punishment
Articles 13 and 14	International cooperation on confiscation
Article 15	Jurisdiction
Articles 16 and 17	Extradition
Articles 18–22	Mutual legal assistance and investigative cooperation
Article 23	Criminalizing the obstruction of justice
Article 24	Witness protection
Article 25	Victim protection
Article 26	Encouraging public notification of crime
Article 27	Law enforcement cooperation
Article 28	Sharing information
Article 29	Law enforcement training programmes (initiation or improvement)
Article 30	Assistance to LDCs in implementing the convention
Article 31	Prevention of organized crime at the domestic level
Articles 32–41	Implementation

addressed by a more globalized polity, but could be significantly reduced in their significance by greater political will within an inter-governmental framework. Global crime, in contrast, is a security problem that is getting worse and does not look likely to recede in the face merely of greater cooperation between sovereign states.

States have become almost outmoded organizations: in effect, we are attempting to deal with a twenty-first century phenomenon using structures, mechanisms and instruments that are still rooted in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century concepts and organizational forms.

(Godson and Williams 1998: 324)

The use of special military forces in the 1990s by the UK and USA to take on South American drugs cartels marked a recognition of the securitization of international crime, but the ever-increasing flow of cocaine into those countries also showed the limitations of such an approach. Criminals used to exploit the lack of holism in domestic law enforcement by operating across (US) state boundaries or even (UK) county borders until such inappropriate decentralization was addressed politically. That situation has now arisen globally.

Key points

- Internationally operating criminal groups are not new but have become an increased threat to both human and state security by utilizing the opportunities offered by globalization and post Cold War socio-political change.

- International political action to combat transnational crime has increased in recent years but remains insufficient in tackling a problem now beyond control by conventional inter-state politics.

Recommended reading

- Chalk, P. (2000) *Non-military Security and Global Order*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Godson, R. and Williams, P. (2000) 'Strengthening Cooperation against Transsovereign Crime', in M. Cusimano (ed.) *Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda*, Boston: St Martins: 111–146.
- Newman, G. (ed.) (1999) *Global Report on Crime and Justice*, United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Williams, P. (2001) 'Transnational Criminal Networks', in J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt (eds) *Networks and Netwars: the Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy* Santa Monica: RAND: 61–97.

Useful web links

- Europol: <http://www.europol.net/>
- Interpol: <http://www.interpol.int/>
- United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime: <http://www.uncjin.org>
- United Nations Crime and Justice Information Network: <http://www.uncjin.org/>