

Understanding Global Security

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Military threats to security from states

Prelude to the present order	22
A new world order?	28
New world disorder?	40
An end to 'high politics'?	50
Key points	58
Notes	59
Recommended reading	59
Useful web links	59

Once the expenditure of effort [in war] exceeds the value of the political object the object must be renounced and peace must follow.

Carl von Clausewitz in *On War* (Clausewitz 1976: 92) (See Box 2.1.)

War between states has always been central to the study of International Relations and widely accepted as an inevitable feature of state to state relations. This is understandable given that this form of conflict, historically, has been so prominent and so costly in lives. The Realist model of powerful states vying for supremacy, restrained only by the countervailing power of other states, is borne out by considering the scale and nature of the major wars in history. Most of the conflicts listed in Table 2.1 were ‘clashes of the Titans’ involving the world’s premier military powers. The four biggest clashes had a catalytic effect on international relations beyond their direct human and governmental impact in the states directly involved. These wars were infernos in which new international orders, normatively altering state relations, were forged. The Korean and Vietnamese wars, however, were only indirect clashes of the Titans and, in fact, great power collisions have not been seen since the ultimate of such clashes in 1939–45. That the potential ‘mother of all’ clashes of the Titans, the Cold War, should end with a peaceful transition to a new order, rather than military victory, served to challenge the ascendancy of Realism in the study of military security. Incidences of inter-state war, in general, have also receded over recent decades. The spectre of this sort of war, however, still looms large over much of the conduct of government foreign policies.

Prelude to the present order

Two issues, very much global in their scope, dominated international relations in the latter part of the twentieth century: the Cold War and the process of decolonization.

Table 2.1 The ten bloodiest inter-state wars in history

	<i>War</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Deaths</i>
1	Second World War	1939–45	20 000 000
2	First World War	1914–18	8 500 000
3	Thirty Years War	1618–48	2 071 000
4	Napoleonic War	1803–15	1 869 000
5	War of the Spanish Succession	1701–13	1 324 300
6	Korean War	1950–53	1 200 000
7	Vietnam War	1965–73	1 200 000
8	The Crusades	1095–1272	1 000 000
9	Iran–Iraq War	1980–88	850 000
10	Seven Years War	1755–63	500 000

Source: White (2001).

Box 2.1 Carl von Clausewitz

Clausewitz's *On War* remains the most revered book on military strategy ever written and a standard text on contemporary reading lists for Security Studies students and military officer trainees, despite being written in the 1830s and never finished by the author. Clausewitz wrote the book while serving as the head of a Prussian military academy in Berlin. He had previously served as an officer in the Prussian army after joining as a cadet at the age of 12 and had seen action from a young age in the Napoleonic War. Clausewitz died in the cholera epidemic that swept Europe in 1831 before completing the book, but it was published posthumously by his widow in 1832.

As a result of this, *On War* contains a number of gaps and has frequently been misinterpreted. In particular, Clausewitz's insistence on seeing war as a facet of politics has often wrongly been understood as the glorification of war. Clausewitz shared Machiavelli's pessimism about human cynicism in politics but, as the quote that opens this chapter indicates, advocated war only when absolutely necessary and justifiable. The uncertainties inherent in battle, or the 'fog of war', make any decision to initiate conflict a gamble which should only be undertaken when the odds are stacked in your favour.

Over a hundred years after his death Clausewitz's rational approach saw him lauded by International Relations Realists as 'one of their own' but, such is his insight, other approaches have come to claim inspiration from his work. Wyn Jones, a Constructivist critic of Realism, comments: 'I doubt very much that Clausewitz, with his speculative bent and his interest in Hegelian dialectics, would have ever made the grade in traditional security studies' (Wyn Jones 1999: Chapter 5).

Both issues were largely resolved by the early 1990, but their legacy lives on in many aspects of the contemporary global political system and in the conceptualizing of their military security by states. The biggest Cold War alliance still exists, some Cold War conflicts still persist and the extraordinarily deadly means of prosecuting wars devised in this period continues to threaten the security of the whole world. Decolonization extended the state system to the whole world for the first time, transforming the make up of that once exclusive club of sovereign states into the diverse membership that characterizes it today while legitimizing independence struggles, many of which continue to resonate.

The Cold War

The term 'Cold War' entered popular parlance in the USA in 1946–47 to describe the tense hostility that had set in in relations with their recent wartime allies the USSR. The politician Bernard Baruch, writer Walter Lipman and journalist H.B. Swope have each been credited with coining the phrase but its origins are, in fact, far older. The Spanish writer Don Juan Manuel first used the expression in the fourteenth century to describe a state of relations between countries that is not characterized by actual

war but which is, nonetheless, extremely hostile. Manuel was describing relations between Spain and the Moslem world but the ideological confrontation between the Communist world, led by the USSR and the USA-led capitalist world, which was being played out in the late 1940s, fitted the description well.

The period of hostility and rivalry between the two coalitions of states, led by the USA and USSR from the end of the Second World War in 1945 to 1990, was unlike any other phase of history. The two sides avoided outright military conflict with each other but fought out many *proxy* wars, whereby one side would fight an enemy sponsored by the other side (such as with the US war in Vietnam or the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan) or both sides would sponsor rivals in a conflict whilst cheering on from the sidelines (as for example with the Arab-Israeli dispute). Whilst this era cannot be said to be one of peace when it contained two of the bloodiest wars in history, in Korea and Vietnam, direct war between the major protagonists was avoided by the maintenance of a *balance of terror*, whereby both sides were deterred from such action by the massive scale of each others military capabilities. The key variable that made this such a distinct phase of history was, of course, the advent of atomic/nuclear weapons which served to make war something that threatens not only hostile states but the entire population of the Earth.

Why the wartime allies came to divide into two such antagonistic opponents so shortly after the Second World War is hotly disputed by historians of the period. Three broad schools of thought have emerged: the Traditionalists, the Revisionists and the Post-Revisionists.

Traditionalists lay the blame for the Cold War on the USSR. Writers such as Feis and Schlesinger argue that the confrontation occurred because, shortly after the ending of the Second World War, the USSR behaved in a manner which suggested they wanted to expand their influence over Europe and, at the same time, rebuffed American gestures of support and cooperation (Feis 1970, Schlesinger 1967). The USSR was slow to withdraw troops from East Europe and Northern Iran after victory had been achieved in the Second World War, turned down the offer of American economic aid (the Marshall Plan) and also rejected their offer to scrap their own arsenal of atomic weapons in exchange for a UN inspection system to prevent any state procuring such weapons (the Baruch Plan). From this perspective the USA were entitled to interpret Soviet intentions as being hostile and respond accordingly.

Revisionists take the opposite viewpoint, with writers, such as the Kolkos and LaFeber, pinning the blame for the Cold War on US aggression towards the USSR (Kolko and Kolko 1972, LaFeber 1991). The hostility of western capitalist states to Communism can be dated back as far as the Russian Civil War when a number of states, including the USA, actively supported the Monarchists against the Bolsheviks, who had assumed power following the 1917 revolution. In light of this, cooperation in the Second World War was merely a marriage of convenience and the decision of the USA to detonate atomic weapons in Japan in 1945 was as much a show of strength towards the USSR as a means of ending Japanese resistance, it is claimed. Revisionists argue that the USSR's dominance of the 'Eastern Bloc' after 1945 was merely a defensive measure to create a buffer against American dominance of Europe and ideological hostility to Communism. Hence the revisionist view is that US rather than Soviet hostility prompted the Cold War.

Post-Revisionists emerged in the 1970s and 1980s with a different take on the causes of the Cold War. Writers such as John Lewis Gaddis, instead of blaming either side for initiating hostilities, take a more detached, Realist view which argues that both sides acted expansively in an inevitable process of filling the power vacuum that had been created in Europe (Gaddis 1997). The decline in power of Germany, France and the UK after the Second World War transformed the political landscape of the world with two superpowers outside the European heartland now ruling the roost. Those two superpowers, acting in accord with the logic of power politics, competed for the mastery of Europe. The USSR did so in a traditional manner, by colonizing neighbouring countries in Eastern Europe. The USA did so in a more subtle manner, by linking themselves to the countries of Western and Southeastern Europe, militarily through NATO and economically through the Marshall Plan and other agreements. Hence, from this perspective, the Cold War was a classic balance of power struggle like many others throughout history, only this time conducted on a bilateral rather than multilateral basis

Whichever perspective on the Cold War is taken, it is clear that American foreign policy underwent a profound shift in the late 1940s. The isolationist stance that had characterized US policy from the 1920s, entering the Second World War only after being invaded, was swept aside by a new approach to become known as the *Truman Doctrine*. President Harry Truman announced in 1947 that 'it must be the policy of The United States to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures'. The 'armed minorities' referred to were Marxist revolutionaries and 'outside pressures' was code for the USSR. This represented a shift from the previous president Franklin Roosevelt (who died in 1945), who had been more tolerant of the USSR and consented to the principle of a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe at the Moscow Conference of 1944 (although he was not present at the meeting). The Moscow Conference confirmed an earlier, unofficial agreement made over dinner in London between UK Prime Minister Churchill and USSR leader Stalin when the two famously carved up Eastern Europe on a map sketched on a napkin.

The change in US strategy can be explained in part by a change in president, but also by the coming to light of apparent evidence of Soviet expansionist intentions. Truman's declaration was greatly influenced by the so-called 'long telegram' of 1946 sent to the White House from Moscow by the US deputy-ambassador to the USSR, George Kennan. Kennan had closely analysed speeches of Stalin and concluded that Communist expansion was more than the Marxist rhetoric others assumed it to be and was a real threat to the capitalist world. Kennan was switched to a job as head of a State Department policy-planning unit and elaborated on his views for the future direction of US foreign policy; 'the main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies' (Kennan 1947: 575).

Most now consider that talk of Communist world revolution was more Soviet rhetoric than reality but the threat was taken seriously and the USA's response was certainly more than rhetorical. American containment was put into practice with the signing of a series of bilateral and multilateral military alliances in the late 1940s and 1950s between the USA and countries of Asia and Europe located close to the USSR. The support for 'free peoples' heralded by Truman was put into practice in 1950 with

the armed intervention by the USA and a number of allies in South Korea to aid their resistance struggle against invasion by Communist North Korea.

The Cold War went through distinct phases where hostility between East and West became more or less intense. Writers differ in the precise dating of these periods of a thawing or freezing in Cold War relations but there is broad agreement on three main phases (see Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 Phases of the Cold War

<i>First Cold War 1945–69</i>		
1945–49	Onset	The Cold War could be said to have begun with the declaration of the Truman doctrine in 1947 but hostilities in US–USSR relations can be traced back to the closing stages of the Second World War and even before.
1949–53	Confrontation	In 1949 the USSR developed the atom bomb and NATO was formed, setting the parameters for two armed camps and a massive arms build up. The Berlin blockade brought the two sides near to war when the USSR challenged the US–UK–French control of West Berlin. China underwent Communist revolution in 1949 and the following year fought with the North Koreans against the USA and her allies.
1953–62	Slight thaw	The death of Stalin and ending of the Korean War (in stalemate) in 1953 heralded a lessening of tension. The 1955 Geneva Summit was the first attempt at Arms Control talks between the USA and USSR. An acceptance of spheres of influence by both sides was again evident; the USA did not come to the aid of Hungary when the USSR intervened in 1956 and the USSR did not assist Communist Cuba in resisting a US-sponsored intervention in 1960. Confrontation was not ended however; the Warsaw Pact was formed in 1955 by the USSR as an East European military alliance to rival NATO and the USA and USSR came as close as they ever did to war in 1962 with the Cuban Missile Crisis when the USSR attempted to station warheads on the island.
1963–69	Coexistence	The Cuban missile crisis was resolved with a deal whereby the USA removed missiles from Turkey in exchange for USSR not stationing weapons on Cuba. The very real possibility of nuclear war in 1962 prompted improved dialogue between the two superpowers. Arms Control agreements were initiated and the logic of deterrence set in to US–Soviet relations, with both sides recognizing the other’s right to parity in military terms as a means of guaranteeing peace through the <i>balance of terror</i> . There was still military conflict in the Cold War, however, as evidenced by the US role in the Vietnam War from 1961 to 1975 supporting South Vietnam against Communist North Vietnam.

Table 2.2 (continued)

		<i>Détente 1969–79</i>
1969–79	Détente	A major improvement in relations between the USA and USSR occurred after the accession of Nixon as US president. Extensive Bilateral Arms Control deals were agreed and the 1975 Helsinki Accords saw the East and West blocs agree on various forms of political cooperation. The USA recognized Communist China for the first time in 1979. Some tensions remained, such as in the support for opposing sides in the Arab–Israeli disputes from 1973, but there was optimism that the Cold War might be coming to an end.
		<i>Second Cold War 1979–90</i>
1979–85	Confrontation	The USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 ended détente. The USA did not consider this a tolerable incursion into a country in the Soviet sphere of influence and a period of renewed intense antagonism between East and West occurred. President Reagan increased military expenditure, abandoned arms control agreements and cut many economic links with what he termed ‘the evil empire’.
1985–90	Ending of the Cold War	Reagan’s aggression succeeded in upping the ante to a point the USSR could not match, particularly with the ‘Star Wars’ Space Defence Initiative (SDI). Gorbachev came to power in the USSR in 1985 and, in order to save his country from economic ruin, embarked on a policy of rapprochement with the West, pulling out of Afghanistan and signalling a withdrawal from Eastern Europe. Gorbachev and US President Bush declared the Cold War to be over at the 1989 Malta Summit as Communist governments fell in the six countries of the Eastern Bloc. A 1990 Paris Treaty officially ended the 45-year power struggle.

Decolonization

At around the same time as the Cold War was coming to an end, another prolonged global struggle, erupting in periodic bursts of violence, was receiving its curtain call on the world stage. In 1990 Namibia finally achieved independence from a colonial power, South Africa, in the throes of democratic revolution. Although this was not the world’s last colonial struggle, the end of the 24-year armed campaign was

important symbolically because it left the African continent free of European and European settler rule. In 1945 there were only three independent states in Africa: South Africa (independent from the UK since 1910), Ethiopia (liberated from Italian rule in 1941) and Liberia (the only African state never to be colonized). Revolutions rarely happen in isolation and the process whereby Africa and large swathes of Asia threw off colonial rule can be viewed as a global phenomenon.

That this wave of decolonization (a previous wave had swept Latin America in the nineteenth century) should occur at the same time as the Cold War is not merely a quirk of history. The same balance of power shift that saw Western European powers fall behind the USA and USSR in the global pecking order and contributed to the Cold War, gave the colonies of France, the UK and other states the opportunity to turn the pre-1945 order on its head. This was most explicitly demonstrated in Vietnam, where anti-colonial war against France was directly succeeded by Communist war against a new external foe, the USA. In addition, Marxist ideology saw colonialism as a symptom of capitalism and hence the struggle against colonizers as something to be encouraged. This appeared to be confirmed in 1961 when Soviet President Khrushchev announced that the USSR would support 'wars of national liberation' throughout the world. This perception of Soviet and Chinese influence prompted US involvement in Vietnam. In general, however, it was post-colonial power struggles rather than the overthrow of European rule, which tended to be transformed into Cold War conflict. In Angola the USSR, along with Cuba, gave backing to leftist guerillas, while the USA supported the anti-Communist faction. That China should find themselves on the same side as the Americans in this conflict, however, gives some credence to the post-revisionist assessment of the Cold War as more of a plain power struggle than an ideological confrontation.

Indeed, decolonization was applauded not only by governments of the left. The USA used its position of mastery over the old powers of Europe to assert its moral support for the principle of self-rule for colonies. One of the few things the two new superpowers could agree on in the late 1940s and early 1950s was that the age of colonialism was a part of the old European order which should be swept away. This was, of course, a somewhat hypocritical view given the USSR's recent acquisition of six satellite states in Eastern Europe and the USA's colonial rule of Puerto Rico and suzerainty over South Korea, South Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippines, but it was clear that the world had entered a new phase of international relations in 1945 in more ways than one.

A new world order?

President George Bush (senior) is generally credited with having popularized contemporary usage of the term 'New World Order' in a series of speeches in 1990 and 1991 to signify that the UN-backed and US-led allied force sent to Kuwait to drive out invading Iraqi forces was indicative of a very different world than that seen up until the end of the Cold War. 'What is at stake is more than one small country, it is a big idea – a new world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law' (Bush 1991). With the dark shadow of Cold War lifted there was optimism

that the USA, Russia, China and other great military powers could free the UN Security Council from its Cold War straitjacket and cooperate to punish aggression, such as that exerted by Iraq, in a way not seen in the twentieth century or, to any real extent, at any previous time in history.

Such optimism for a brighter future while basking in the afterglow of a triumphant victory is nothing new in international relations. The defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1815 at Waterloo was achieved by a coalition of European powers ending 12 years of conflict and followed up by the Congress of Vienna which heralded a period of great power cooperation known as the 'Concert of Europe'. For a period of nearly 40 years there was peace in Europe assisted by a loose system of diplomatic co-management of the continent between five countries: Britain, Prussia, Russia, Austria-Hungary and, novelly, their defeated but not estranged enemy France. The outbreak of the Crimean War of 1854, when Britain and France fought together with Turkey against Russia, ended the Concert and Europe eschewed any attempt at collective policing until after the next epoch-making conflict, the First World War.

The 1919–20 Paris Peace Settlement following the First World War ushered in a new attempt to construct a better world order, led by the *Idealists*, most clearly articulated with the creation of the League of Nations. Idealist is a term that came to be applied to statesmen of the age, such as US President Woodrow Wilson, and academics, such as the UK's first professor of International Relations Alfred Zimmern, who advocated that states should forgo the selfish pursuit of national interest and conduct their foreign affairs with a greater emphasis on international cooperation, morality and diplomatic openness. The world had been plunged into a war far more devastating than anything seen previously because states had aggressively pursued their own interests to the disregard of other states, bar those they had aligned themselves with in secretive military alliances. Hence the League of Nations sought to provide an arena whereby states could resolve disputes openly in conference or through the rulings of an international court (the Permanent Court of International Justice) and where protection for states could come from a global guarantee (collective security) rather than through constructing covert military pacts.

As with the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations ultimately collapsed amid a new great power collision. Idealism came to be derided by a new generation of statesmen and scholars, the *Realists*, as being dangerously naïve and utopian. The Realists advocated a return to the order of the Concert of Europe on a global scale, with peace maintained by the great powers while respecting a balance of power between them. In this view the Crimean War only occurred because Russia had upset the balance and the Concert should have been restored after they had been defeated. Balance had been noticeably lacking in international relations for the first half of the twentieth century, with the great powers generally divided into two armed camps and their expansions of power left unchecked. Idealism was not destroyed by the Realist backlash, however, and the construction of a new world following the Second World War did not abandon its ideas so much as temper them with a heavy dose of Realism.

The 1945–90 world order, in character, in many ways can be said to have been a hybrid of both the Concert and the League systems. The League of Nations was revamped in the guise of the United Nations and open diplomacy and international cooperation again encouraged. At the same time, however, a Realist version of

collective security was devised to be at the heart of the UN with a 'concert' of five great powers entrusted to manage the system. These great powers, the USA, UK, USSR, China and France, enjoyed the spoils of being on the winning side in the Second World War but the new system learned the lesson of the Concert that was ignored by the League and sought to keep the vanquished on board. Germany and Japan thus became key players in the new system (albeit economically rather than militarily) rather than being dangerously ostracized. Japan had been on the winning side in the First World War but felt excluded by the other victors at the Paris peace settlement when the spoils were shared out, while Germany's harsh treatment is widely acknowledged as a factor behind the rise of Nazism.

The optimism of 1945 was shorter lived than in either 1815 or 1920, as a new conflict cast its shadow over the world almost immediately after the worst conflict in human history came to an end. However, 1990 saw reawakened optimism, particularly since the Cold War had ended with the leading protagonists on good terms and seeming to share a common vision for the future of the world.

Democratization

The most profound suggestion of what the ending of the Cold War meant for international affairs and global security was the widely cited view of US academic Fukuyama that the West's victory marked the 'end of history' (Fukuyama 1992). Fukuyama reasoned that the ideological triumph of Liberalism over Communism was an ultimate victory that had set the world on a course for a new future, in which like-minded Liberal democratic states conducted their relations in peace. This thesis reversed the Hegelian dialectic of Marxist theory and married it to the long established liberal principle that 'democracies don't go to war with each other'. Kant proposed this as far back as 1795 in his magnum opus 'Perpetual Peace' (Kant 1970) and it has been a consistent normative and empirical claim of Pluralist International Relations scholars over the last half-century. Most notably, Deutsch in the 1950s developed the idea of regional 'security communities' which develop as a result of greater cross-border social communication as people discover their common interests (Deutsch 1957).

It is important to remember that the Cold War was more of a struggle between Communism and 'non-communism' than totalitarianism and democracy. The western alliance were happy to prop up numerous dictatorships in the cause of deterring Communism and the US even assisted in snuffing out democracy in Chile (1973) and Guatemala (1954) when elections delivered leftist governments on their doorstep. The West's victory over the Soviet Union and its 'allies' did, though, serve to accelerate the progress of democratization on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Although power politics can be seen to have played a significant part in 'breaking' the Soviet empire, the West's victory undoubtedly had an ideational dimension. The 1989 revolutions which swept away the six 'Eastern Bloc' Soviet satellite states, and effectively brought the Cold War to an end, occurred because ordinary East Europeans wanted to live like West Europeans. The USSR's subsequent transformation has been less complete but all but one of its 15 successor states (Belarus) have, at least partially, embraced democracy. Western democracies have assisted

the new states through the painful process of social, economic and political transition and, freed from Cold War constraints, their tolerance of intolerance has receded. The USA in the 1990s switched from the Truman Doctrine to the 'Clinton Doctrine' in which promoting the spread of democracy became an explicit foreign policy aim. NATO has followed suit in insisting to the lengthy queue of prospective new members to its victors club, that only states with impeccable democratic and human rights credentials be allowed in. This had not been a precondition in earlier times when Greece, Turkey and Portugal had been recruited without such stipulations.

The proposition that democracies do not go to war with each other is well-supported empirically, so the fact that more and more states in the world have embraced democracy in recent years has given scope for optimism in the realization of Kant's vision. Kant, in fact, proposed that it was the trinity of democracy, trade and international cooperation were the basis for a peaceful world and these three factors are all more prominent today than at any point previously in history. Over two centuries after its promulgation, the Kantian peace proposition has been rigorously tested by Pluralists for its applicability to the contemporary global political system. Russett and Oneal's *Triangulating Peace*, for example, draws on over a decade of statistical analysis with each of these three corners of the 'peace triangle' examined in turn to show how they mutually reinforce each other over time in 'virtuous circles' (Russett and Oneal 2001). Democracies trade with each other more and form common organizations more, both of which are phenomena also demonstrably contributing to pacific relations. Democracies in dealing with other democracies more easily find non-military means to resolve inevitable clashes of interest that arise in their relations and increasingly realize that their interests are not served by violent confrontations. Democratic peace is a political theory with uncharacteristically solid empirical foundations if we consider that: '[e]stablished democracies fought no wars against each other during the entire twentieth century' (Russett and Starr 1996: 173). If we also consider that the number of democratic states in the world increased from 66 (out of 164) in 1987 to 121 (out of 192) in 2002 (Freedom House 2002) the future prospects for perpetual peace look good also. Both of these sets of figures are challengeable, but the overall trends they indicate are not.

[T]hrough careful statistical analysis, the chance that any two countries will get into a serious military dispute can be estimated if one knows what kinds of governments they have, how economically interdependent they are, and how well connected by a web of international organizations.

(Russett and Oneal 2001: 9)

Collective security

As referred to in the section on the prelude to the present order, the optimism generated by the end of the Cold War soon appeared to have some foundation when the two former chief protagonists were able to agree to sanction UN-sponsored military action against Iraq for the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In reaching this agreement the world's two premier powers were activating a long-cherished Idealist dream which had not only seemed impossible during the Cold War but had never in

history been realized. Pierre Dubois, writing in the early fourteenth century, advocated the idea of the international community cooperating to keep the peace and the Liberal philosophers Kant and Bentham revived the notion, as an alternative to the balance of power, in the nineteenth century. The idea is also mentioned in the Holy Qur'an (49:9). Under this system acts of aggression prompt collective responses against the aggressors by the whole international community, rather than just by the attacked state and its allies or other states who consider their interests to be affected by the action. It was not until the League of Nations, however, that a system was put in place to make this idea a reality. The League enshrined collective security in its covenant, stating in Article 16 that a state waging war declared unjust by its member states would be, in effect, waging war against the organization itself. A 15-member Council of the League of Nations would make such judgements on behalf of the wider membership.

As already discussed, the League's peacekeeping mechanism failed and collective security was never activated. The outbreak of the Second World War was, of course, the clearest indication of this failure but by this time the League was an irrelevance anyway, having failed to act against blatant acts of aggression by its member states on a number of occasions throughout the 1930s. The 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria, 1935 Italian invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and German military re-occupation of the Saar prompted some condemnations, but no military response. Soviet, German and Italian interventions in the 1936–39 Spanish Civil War were similarly ignored and although the USSR were expelled from the League in 1939 for the invasion of Finland, this was too little too late.

The League failed to implement collective security for two key reasons.

- 1 *It did not represent the whole international community:* The League of Nations was handicapped from the start by not being a truly 'global' organization. The emerging superpower, the USA, never took up membership despite the fact that its President Woodrow Wilson had at the Paris Peace settlement been its chief advocate. The USA, instead, retreated into its shell after the First World War, not to emerge until 1940 when the world had become a very different place. The other emerging superpower, the USSR, only joined the League in 1934, while Germany, Japan and Italy withdrew their memberships in annoyance at the token criticism they had received for their military adventurism. Collective security rests on a genuinely collective commitment to upholding the peace and this is unlikely to be found if militarily powerful states are unwilling to contribute to this process or act against it.
- 2 *Its decision-making procedure was unworkable:* Shorn of any involvement by the USA and any real commitment to peace from Germany, Japan, Italy and the USSR, the League was left dominated by just two of the powerful states of the day, France and Great Britain. These two countries held permanent seats in the Council (as did the USSR during their membership) and represented the only serious military antidote to violations of the League's covenant. The French and British however, having recently emerged from the bloodiest war in their histories and now embroiled in economic depression, did not have the stomach to become 'world policemen'. The two governments' policies towards aggression from other great powers was at the time one of 'appeasement' rather

than confrontation, with the hope that granting some concessions to their rivals may be the best means of averting another catastrophic war. Hence the British and French governments went out of their way to ensure that condemnations of Japan for the horrific Manchurian invasion were not too severe and that economic sanctions levied against Italy for the seemingly motiveless annexation of Abyssinia were cosmetic. The Council's voting system rested on unanimity which meant that Britain and France could always dictate the system, as could any of the other 13 temporary member states during their stay in the spotlight. Unanimity in an international organization, even among a sub-group of 15, is hard to find at the best of times and the 1930s was far from the best of times.

UN collective security

The United Nations, in taking over the mantle of global peacekeeping from the League, did not abandon collective security but sought to learn from its predecessor in devising a new more realistic and *Realistic* system. The UN from the start set about ensuring that its membership was as universal as possible, in spite of a deep division in the international community from the global conflict just passing and the new one beginning to emerge. It maintained the idea of a 15-member sub-group to decide on peacekeeping strategy but was more explicit in granting privileges to the most powerful states. Unanimity was replaced with a voting system in which only five of the UN's Security Council Members would have the power to veto agreements (UK, France, USA, USSR and China). Those same five states would enjoy permanent membership of the Council with the other ten members periodically elected from the rest of the UN membership and denied the power of veto.¹ These five states from the winning side in the Second World War were considered the great powers of the future and would, therefore, be essential in the implementation of collective security since there would be no standing UN army for such operations.

For the Security Council to act against threats to peace, whether to implement collective security or a lesser joint response, nine 'yes' votes are needed from the 15 government representatives present at its venue in New York. Those nine affirmative votes, however, must include the assent of the 'permanent five'. Hence even 14 against one would not be enough to secure agreement for an action if the 'one' is a permanent member. Those five countries, in effect, represent a sub-system within a sub-system, since their agreement is a precondition for action on behalf of the near-universal UN membership. Security Council members can elect to abstain rather than vote for or against a resolution which, for the permanent five, does not represent a veto and would permit action if nine other votes are accrued. China chose this option in voting on the 1990 Resolution triggering the Gulf War (Resolution 678), in order to distance itself from military action against Iraq but not be seen to block the will of the other Security Council members and the international community at large.

The Gulf War stands as one of only three occasions when collective security has been enacted. The first occasion was during the 'hottest' of the Cold War proxy conflicts, the Korean War. In 1950 the UN Security Council authorized international

military action against North Korea for the invasion of South Korea. This first ever realization of a centuries-old Liberal dream was, however, very much a fluke event never likely to be repeated during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and China did not use their vetoes to avert action against their Communist ally because neither of them were present in the Security Council when the vote was taken. Communist China had not been able to take up their seat in the UN, and with it their permanent place in the Security Council, because the USA had refused to grant diplomatic recognition to the new regime following the 1949 revolution. In protest at this the USSR boycotted a session of the Security Council allowing the USA to opportunistically push through a resolution that would otherwise certainly have been vetoed.

The USSR never repeated this form of protest and the Security Council remained paralysed until 1990 by the fact that the permanent five (including Communist China from 1979) were unable to find unanimity to sanction any full military action against acts of aggression violating the UN Charter. The veto had been envisaged as a rare option of last resort for the permanent five, necessary to keep them on board for the maintenance of international peace, but became a routinely used tactic to protect Cold War allies. In the first Cold War it was the USSR that made most use of the veto and in the second, when the changing UN membership began to deprive them of guaranteed support, it was the USA. This placed out of bounds any action against both countries' own military adventurism in Vietnam and Afghanistan or in response to the interventions of their 'client states' such as Israel (in the Lebanon) and Cuba (in Angola).

Collective security, covered by Article 7 of the UN Charter, is not the only peacekeeping option open to the Security Council and other, lesser, measures aiming to keep the peace were utilized during the Cold War. Article 6, which calls on states to resolve disputes peacefully where possible, has been used as the basis for many Council resolutions sending in multilateral teams of UN monitoring troops to uphold ceasefire lines while diplomatic solutions are sought. Such UN forces were sent into Kashmir and Palestine in 1948 to assist in resolving the Arab–Israeli and Indo-Pakistani territorial disputes. The fact that both these conflicts are still far from resolved today gives an indication of the limitations to this UN peacekeeping strategy.

The realization that UN-assisted mediation was a limited means of restoring peace and that collective security was hamstrung by Cold War politics, prompted efforts outside the Security Council in the 1950s to try another approach to peacekeeping. UN Secretary General of the time, Dag Hammarskjöld and the General Assembly, in which all UN members are represented equally, were central to this process. The 1950 'Uniting for Peace' General Assembly resolution, sponsored by the USA, aimed to pre-empt the inevitable presence of a veto-wielding USSR in a future scenario similar to the Korean War. Uniting for Peace gave the General Assembly a role in security issues, previously considered the exclusive domain of the Council. A special session of the Assembly could be called and be able to recommend international action in the absence of a Security Council agreement. There are no vetoes to be wielded at the General Assembly and every UN member is present, so the required two-thirds majority for a Resolution is far more likely than at the Security Council. Hammarskjöld put this new power into practice when he became a far more active Secretary General than his predecessor on taking over the job in 1953. A UN Emergency Force was sent in to supervise the withdrawal of British, French and

Israeli troops from Egypt during the 1956 Suez Crisis, despite the fact that the UK and France had prevented the Security Council authorizing any response to their invasion. Hammarskjöld, as well as seeking to circumvent Security Council paralysis, pioneered the idea of 'preventive diplomacy' based on a more proactive deployment of UN peacekeeping forces than the manning of ceasefire lines. Preventive diplomacy went beyond the 'pacific settlement of disputes' confines of Article 6 but was less contentious, and hence less likely to invoke a veto, than the collective security of Article 7. Hence Hammarskjöld referred to such measures as 'Article six and a half' of the Charter.

Preventive diplomacy was first clearly put into practice in 1960 when a brutal civil war in the Congo, following its independence from Belgium, prompted a rare display of solidarity between the Cold War protagonists on the Security Council. A UN force, made up of troops from a number of impartial countries, was sent in to the Congo not just to keep warring factions apart but to create the conditions for peace, using force where necessary. Some temporary calm was achieved by the UN intervention but optimism was punctured by the public decapitation of some Irish soldiers and the USSR's loss of appetite for such an extended UN role as the conflict unfolded. Hammarskjöld died in an aeroplane crash over the Congo in 1961, prompting numerous conspiracy theories, and the idea of preventive diplomacy appeared to have died with him. The USA from the 1960s became far less enthusiastic about finding ways to get around the problem of Security Council vetoes since it was an option they increasingly wished to utilize. Hence, UN forces that were dispatched to trouble spots over the next 30 years confined themselves more to forming 'thin blue lines' of largely inactive troops stationed between the protagonists.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali revived the spirit of Hammarskjöld in the 1990s when it became clear that even the post-Cold War world would feature a frequently immobilized Security Council. The increased number of civil wars was making both Articles 6 and 7 insufficient for the job and prompting the threat of Chinese and Russian vetoes, not now in support of ideological brothers in arms but for the principle of sovereignty. Boutros-Ghali revamped preventive diplomacy in his 'Agenda for Peace' initiative, paving the way for the Security Council sanctioning expansive operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia in the early 1990s. As with the Congo, however, these operations were not major successes. The failure of UN troops to protect Bosnian Moslem citizens from Serb nationalist violence forced them, humiliatingly and symbolically, to hand over the mantle of peacekeeping to NATO. In Somalia there were strong echoes of the Congo, when a US force sent in to bring stability to a complex civil war pulled out amid accusations of having exacerbated the conflict and with televised images of their dead troops being dragged through the streets being beamed around the world.

Such images were still fresh in the minds of public and political opinion when an even fiercer internal conflict in Rwanda erupted in 1994 and, this time, there was no preventive diplomacy. When, five years later, violence erupted again in Yugoslavia it appeared as though the Security Council was still operating in the 'old world order' when Russian and Chinese vetoes proscribed collective security in spite of the obvious lesson from up the road in Bosnia that preventive diplomacy was not enough. Again NATO stepped in to fill the global void but this time with a full-scale and successful military operation. Although UN collective security was invoked for a third

time to legitimize the US war against Afghanistan in 2001–2 this was more of an act of symbolism since the world’s most powerful state did not need military support to defeat one of the world’s weakest. When the USA and UK then acted without either UN (or NATO) authorization in going to war with Iraq in 2003, collective security appeared to becoming, once again, a distant dream.

Just war

One of the chief sources of optimism that marked the onset of the ‘New World Order’ was that the ending of the Cold War might also bring to an end the era of total war, which so characterized the twentieth century. The Gulf War, as well as recapturing the seemingly lost dream of collective security, witnessed a revival of another old doctrine of international affairs thought consigned to history during the three world wars, ‘just war’. Just war doctrine dates back as far as the fourth century when Christian theologians, led by St Augustine, sought to move away from absolute pacifism and accommodate the idea that war might be morally acceptable in certain circumstances. In the seventeenth century the undisputed ‘father of international law’, Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, gave the doctrine a secular and legalistic footing amid the backdrop of the Christian in-fighting of the Thirty Years War tearing Europe apart (Grotius 1853). Grotius set out to codify universally applicable principles by which it could be judged that going to war was morally acceptable, *Jus ad bellum*, and accompanying principles for judging the moral prosecution of a war, *Jus in bello*. The separate doctrines emphasize the key point that a war deemed just at the outset can become unjust if prosecuted in an immoral way. Precise interpretations of just war vary but, by the late twentieth century with writers such as Ramsey (1968) and Walzer (1978) re-packaging Grotius’ work, the key principles of the twin doctrines could be distilled down to the following:

- *Jus ad bellum* (justice in going to war):
 - a must be waged by a sovereign authority;
 - b must be a just cause for the war; self-defence or the enforcement of human rights;
 - c peaceful means of resolving the dispute must have been exhausted;
 - d must be likely to succeed.

- *Jus in bello* (justice in the conduct of war):
 - a means used should be proportionate to the wrong being rectified;
 - b unavoidable killing of non-combatants should be avoided;
 - c wounded troops and prisoners of war should not be killed.

Aspects of *Jus in bello* became codified in the laws of war, particularly in the numerous Geneva and Hague Conventions, which evolved through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. *Jus ad bellum* during this period, however, tended not to amount to much more than principle (a) as the Westphalian notion of sovereignty

crystallized into a form that legitimized whatever the state felt was necessary for its security or aggrandizement. Wars of colonial expansion presented perhaps the clearest departure from the notion of justice but justifications for such campaigns were made on the basis that the vanquished peoples would benefit from being 'civilized'. Perhaps the most extreme articulation of this came from Gentili, who declared the genocidal Spanish campaign against native Americans in the sixteenth century to be a just war since the victims were cannibals (Gentili 1933).

The concept of total war in the twentieth century did most to set back the just war tradition. The idea that the whole of society was directly involved during war, rather than just the professional apparatus of government, had developed from the nineteenth century, with the growth of military conscription and state-promoted nationalism, but became fully realized in the era of the World Wars. From the perspective of any of its participants, the First World War exceeded any notion of proportionality and was entered into without much regard to diplomatic alternatives to fighting. The Second World War, from the perspective of the allied forces, satisfied the conditions of *Jus ad bellum* but possibly not principle (a) and most certainly not principle (b) of *Jus in bello*. The arguments offered by the governments of the UK, USSR and USA in defence of ignoring non-combatant immunity in the war against Germany and Japan seemed to illustrate that the moral judgements facing governments in the twentieth century were far starker than in previous ages. The British blanket bombing of German cities brought criticism from some clerics in the Church of England, but was generally deemed acceptable, since the enemy had done the same thing, and necessary, since the just defeat of Germany required not only military victories but the diminution of their war-making capacity. Soviet violence against German invaders in driving them back to where they came from was horrific but generally viewed in the same way since it was not disproportionate to what they had suffered. The US atomic strikes on Japan were indiscriminate but maybe ultimately saved lives since they finally brought to its knees an enemy apparently determined to fight on well beyond any realistic hope of winning the war. In an age when the means of waging war were so much greater than before it appeared that moral niceties had become subsumed by necessity.

The Cold War institutionalized this amoral necessity into everyday international politics. Nuclear deterrence rested on the notion that whole societies were legitimate and realistic military targets which, in itself, must negate any notion of proportionality as well as non-combatant discrimination. The rectification of what sort of wrong could justify the annihilation of the whole population of a country, or even the world?

The recession of such a scale of nuclear threat in the 1990s saw a concerted effort to recapture all aspects of the just war tradition in the western-led wars of the New World Order. During the Gulf War the US-led coalition limited itself to the realization of its UN-authorized aims and did not seek to topple the Iraqi regime, despite military and political pressure to do so. Saddam Hussein was forced out of Kuwait but not out of office. The war was also conducted along lines which sought to minimize civilian casualties through the use of 'smart' weaponry better able to target military and official state sites than in bombing campaigns of earlier eras. Similar sorts of campaigns were waged by NATO against Yugoslavia in 1999 and by the USA and UK against Afghanistan in 2001–2 and Iraq in 2003. The 1999 Kosovan

War, in particular, marked a revival of morality in military conduct since it was in aim, principally, a humanitarian intervention.

Grey areas still remain in terms of deeming when a war is 'just'. Cynics have contended that the 'smart' bombing-led wars of recent years are as much a device for sanitizing war for domestic public consumption as showing compassion for civilians. Bombing from afar saves the lives of the bombers more than it does the civilians living near targeted sites. Few would contend that the US and their allies deliberately struck civilian targets in any of the four above-mentioned wars but civilian deaths did occur in all conflicts. Just war doctrine acknowledges that accidental 'collateral damage' does not de-legitimize a war, but were the civilian deaths in Iraq, Yugoslavia and Afghanistan avoidable? It has been suggested that a ground campaign against Yugoslavia, rather than an almost entirely aerial battle, would have endangered fewer Yugoslav civilians since ground troops are better equipped with their own eyes to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants than aircrew kitted out with even the 'smartest' of computerized sightings (Mandelbaum 1999, Robertson 2000: 414–417). This argument is believed to have been aired within NATO ranks but US reluctance to be embroiled in 'another Somalia' favoured the option eventually taken.

Further ambiguities remain with putting non-combatant discrimination into practice. The dilemma ignored in the Second World War and the Cold War about who is and who is not a legitimate target in the modern era is still there. Large proportions of non-military personnel contribute to the war effort of a country in some way. Munitions workers might be an obvious extension from servicemen, but what about other sections of society supporting a targeted government? The Kosovan and Iraq (2003) wars saw journalists supporting the enemy deliberately targeted. In both of these cases it was state-run television companies, which were government propagandist machines, that were openly struck but non-Iraqi journalists also died in the latter conflict. 'Al Jazeera', an influential Arab nationalist satellite television service based in Qatar, had their Baghdad offices bombed in a strike officially described as a mistake but which raised suspicions beyond the Arab world. Another 'mistake' which aroused great suspicion occurred in 2002 when an Israeli jet released a one tonne bomb on a Palestinian residential bloc in Gaza killing 15 civilians, including nine children. One Hamas leader and known Israeli target inhabited the bloc.

The New World Order wars also raised questions of proportionality. Did NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia prompt Serb nationalists to step up the campaign against Kosovar Albanians, leading to more suffering than would have occurred if no military action had been taken? Did more Afghani citizens die (albeit accidentally) in US strikes than the 3000 New York and Washington residents killed in the 2001 al-Qa'ida strikes which prompted the response? An even more problematic moral quantification emerged in 2003. Was the 2003 Iraq War justified on the basis that it pre-empted future threats from that country?

Straight answers to these questions are difficult to find. As with much of humanitarian international law and custom, just war is grey area in which inconsistent interpretation and application is inevitable. Owing to what Clausewitz called the 'friction' of war it is impossible to be entirely accurate in predicting the outcome of a military campaign or to fight a perfect battle free of mistakes. Should, though, the response to an imperfect system of rules be to have none at all? The questions

posed about the recent wars could also be countered by clearer international legal guidelines. Yugoslavia and NATO could simultaneously point to UN Charter articles to support their positions that the other side was at fault in the 1999 war. A retreat from total war and the strengthening of a legal and ethical framework for fighting future wars in the human interest is surely something to be welcomed. The International Criminal Court provides some evidence that this is the way the international community is evolving (see Chapter 5).

Conflict resolution

A central feature of the New World Order was an increased commitment by the international community to work towards resolving violent conflicts. There was scope for optimism in the 1990s that the open sores that were the late twentieth century's 'proxy wars' could be allowed to heal now that the superpower interest in their maintenance was removed. Additionally, it was hoped that the 'peace dividend' of the East–West thaw could now be allocated to restoring order to militarized disputes unrelated to the Cold War. The results of this have been quite impressive. Research suggests that twice as many conflicts based on self-determination (both inter-state and civil) were resolved in the 1990s than in the whole Cold War era, with 14 such conflicts being 'contained' and 17 'settled' in the New World Order era as opposed to six and nine, respectively, between 1945 and 1990 (Gurr *et al.* 2001: 17). A more proactive UN and the determination of the USA to utilize their power in order to play the world policeman role in a diplomatic context have been key factors. US presidents played pivotal roles in the negotiation of settlements for the resolution of the Yugoslav wars of secession (in 1995 at Dayton), Northern Ireland 'troubles' (in 1998 at Belfast) and the ultimately unsuccessful Oslo Accords (1993) aiming to resolve the Palestinian–Israeli conflict.

Post-1990 conflict resolution has not, however, just been about a revival of collective security and superpower policing – less powerful actors and more subtle techniques have been an additional feature. Less powerful states have played arbitration roles, such as the government of Norway, which has played a role in encouraging peace in the inter-state conflicts between Israel and the Arab states, India and Pakistan and civil wars in the Philippines and, most notably, Sri Lanka. Humanitarian pressure groups have become an increased factor in promoting negotiation and compromise. International Alert have been prominent in instigating peace processes in many conflict areas and the Norwegian government have developed partnerships with groups such as the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs to lend assistance to the resolution of persistent armed conflicts such as in the Congo. Pressure groups cannot bring force to resolve disputes but stand a better chance than governments of being considered as impartial by those embroiled in conflict and can use their expertise to suggest innovative solutions to complex disputes.

Post-Cold War conflict resolution has been marked by the use of strategies going beyond straight mutual compromise. 'Conflict transformation', in which common ground is found among warring parties by encouraging them to redefine their interests, is an increasingly prominent strategy, promoted by the UN and

pressure groups such as the Alliance for Conflict Transformation. The Caucasus region, for example, where conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan and ethnic civil unrest in Georgia marked the early 1990s, has been stabilized partly by concerted governmental and non-governmental action stressing the incentives inherent to all sides in pursuing peaceful relations. The US and Russian governments have given promises of increased trade links and aid as a carrot while the general benefits of increased tourism and trade within the region have been stressed by NGOs.

New world disorder?

Realist caution against optimism that the passing into history of the Cold War would herald a new, uniquely pacific era of international relations could be considered borne out by certain developments since 1990 which have not enhanced the military security of the world's states or people.

Is it really over? The persistence of Cold War disputes

In a 1998 article in a Russian academic journal, the prominent foreign policy analyst Sergei Kortunov asked 'Is the Cold War really over?' (Kortunov 1998). Similarly British academic Prins has posited: 'Is the end of the Cold War, therefore, only the end of Part I, just as *Star Wars*, the movie, promises?' (Prins 2002: 46). That the Cold War has not ended might initially appear an absurd suggestion when we cast our minds back to the momentous changes that occurred at the end of the 1980s. The images of the Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain being dismantled while the leaders of the two Cold War superpowers publicly declared the conflict to be over portrayed peace in as explicit terms as ever seen in history, but consider the evidence.

Korea

The Korean peninsular remains firmly frozen in the Cold War era, divided into two ideologically defined states precisely as it was at the point of East–West stalemate after the war in 1953. Communist North Korea's relations with the West remain practically non-existent while it maintains political links with its war ally, China.

US–Chinese relations

Relations between the USA, and most other western states, with their second major Cold War foe have remained frosty in the years since 1990. Economic cooperation has blossomed through mutual interest but diplomatic and military tensions remain. No equivalent to the 1989 Malta Summit or 1990 Paris Treaty occurred in Sino-American relations and a number of issues remain wholly unresolved. Most prominently, the status of Taiwan remains a source of tension and the island remains in a non-sovereign limbo, being claimed by China but still assured by the USA of its independence. Tensions boiled over again in 2001, in a clash which had all the

hallmarks of the Cold War, when a US spy plane near the south coast of China was downed in a confrontation with Chinese fighter planes.

US–Cuban relations

All forms of political relations between the USA and Cuba since 1990 have remained as hostile as they were in the previous three decades. The US have maintained an economic boycott of its leftist island neighbour which has had far more impact in the post-Cold War years since Cuba has lost the economic support of the USSR.

US–Russian relations

While undoubtedly more cordial than during the Cold War and smoother than with those countries who have not abandoned Communism, US–Russian relations since the 1991 collapse of the USSR have not been exactly harmonious. The Kosovan War of 1999 was a bitter humiliation for Russia since to them it appeared to demonstrate western contempt for their long-cherished foreign policy goal of ‘pan-Slavism’, in which Eastern Europe was understood as part of their sphere of influence.² Having stopped the UN from taking action against Yugoslavia, the Russian government failed to dissuade NATO from acting in its place. A desperate attempt to claw out some role in Kosovo saw Russian troops unilaterally dispatched to Pristina, where NATO forces were gathering in a post-war peacekeeping force. A desperate scramble ensued as Russian troops secured Pristina airport in advance of the British in an incident which came close to producing a direct skirmish between the two sides not seen during the Cold War.³ Russia secured a role in the peacekeeping process but, in a sign of how things had changed, were unable to maintain sole control of the airport since support troops were blocked from flying over former allies Hungary or Romania due to western pressure on *their* new allies.

The persistence of NATO

The encroachment of the US and their allies into their backyard in Russian eyes was confirmed, when in the same year as the Kosovan War, NATO expanded its membership to recruit three of their former Warsaw Pact allies; Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Far from exiting the stage after 1990, a Cold War alliance had not only played on but extended its role and moved closer to its original object of containment. NATO have repeatedly assured Russia that their containment is not its game anymore and, while expanding eastwards, gave them a guarantee that no east-facing missiles would be sited in the territories of the new member states. The fact remained, however, that this was an alliance set up to counter Russian (Soviet) power and it was still there.

Re-working the famous explanation of its first Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, 50 years earlier, as to what the purpose of the organization was, Schweller in 2001 stated that ‘NATO essentially serves the same purposes today that it always has: to

keep America in, Germany down and Russia out' (Schweller 2001: 182). Despite momentous changes in the international environment some of that logic still persists. The 1999 expansion extended NATO's reach into Russia's traditional sphere of influence and, in the eyes of those countries, guaranteed that they would be free from the shadow of the 'bear'.

The even more complete westward integration of East Germany, through German reunification, brought fear to the British and French governments over the effect on their power in Western Europe. A bilateral meeting between the heads of the British and French governments, Thatcher and Mitterand, was held in 1989, prior to reunification, after which the former commented; 'we both had the will to check the German juggernaut' (Benjamin 2000). It is often forgotten that it was the fear of Germany rather than the USSR that sowed the seeds of NATO. France, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg in 1948 founded the 'Brussels Pact', which was a defence community centred on a 'trigger clause' in which each state guaranteed to support the others in the event of an armed attack. The prospect of a revival in German nationalism that prompted this agreement, however, was overtaken by events as the more apparent threat posed by former ally the USSR became the focus for a similar, but much larger and more powerful, defence community. West Germany was soon brought into the NATO fold, contained not through deterrence but through the friendly restraint of new allies.

Franco-British fears in 1989 were political and economic rather than military but most certainly present, and prompted distinct foreign policy approaches. The French response was to reactivate their enthusiasm for deeper European Community integration to 'tie down Gulliver', re-adopting their pro-federalist line of the 1950s formulated for much the same reasons. This included reviving the idea of European defence cooperation for the first time since that era when their initiative had been scuppered by British indifference and the rise of NATO. For the UK, and other 'Atlanticists' like Denmark, the response to German reunification was to take strides to ensure that, with the receding of the Russian threat the other two components of Lord Ismay's maxim were not forgotten. The British, aware that the USA could conceivably revert to pre-Cold War form and keep out of European military affairs unless absolutely necessary, redoubled their commitment to the 'special relationship', unconvinced that the newly revamped European Union offered a credible alternative source of military security. Significant voices in the USA advocated a return to isolationism but, mindful of the recent historical consequences of distortions in the European balance of power, the desire to project their influence rather than hold it back for emergencies held sway.

Well, is it?

The Cold War 'hangover' offers a vindication of the post-revisionist view that the conflict was, in essence, just another balance of power struggle. The balance has tilted but elements of the struggle remain. Clark, in 2001, argued that the Cold War had not yet been fully resolved because the *process* of peacemaking (as opposed to an event such as the Malta Summit or Paris Treaty) had not been completed (Clark 2001: 6–11). The lack of a systematic attempt to mould a genuinely New World Order

in the 1990s can be explained in a number of ways, Clark posits. First, the fact that this was a cold rather than ‘hot’ war served as a disincentive to the protagonists to encourage a thaw. ‘Since the Cold War was not a proper war it is fitting that it should be brought to an end by a peace that is not a proper peace’ (Clark 201: 4). The originator of the term Cold War, Don Juan Manuel, noted this problematic phenomenon half a millennium earlier. ‘War that is very strong and very hot ends either with death or peace, whereas cold war neither brings peace nor gives honour to the one who makes it’ (Halliday 1986: 2). Second, the Cold War was also an unusual war in that it was resolved through negotiation and a voluntary, rather than imposed, climb down by one side. The fact that fruitful negotiations between warring parties preceded rather than proceeded the conflict served to make them appear superfluous later on. Third, even ‘normal’ multilateral wars are rarely ended at a stroke. Complete harmony is unlikely to succeed the hostility and certain unresolved issues are likely to live on. Prins’ own answer to his question on whether the Cold War could be replayed is that a sequel is indeed possible, but is ‘unlikely to be cast with the same team of actors’ (Prins 2002: 48). Clark makes a convincing case that there is often a certain ‘time lag’ following major multilateral conflict before real peace is achieved but could it be that the Cold War will not so much fade away as metamorphose into another global conflict?

This view was most notably articulated by the US Realist Huntington in his influential ‘Clash of the Civilizations’ thesis (Huntington 1993). Huntington contends that transnational cultural conflict is now where the logic of the security dilemma can best be applied, rather than inter-state rivalry. Major antagonism between democracy and Communism may be over but there is no ‘end of history’ and the civilization of Liberal democracy faces other challenges to its hegemony, particularly from the ‘civilization’ of Islam. The notion of a ‘green peril’ replacing the ‘red peril’ attracted great interest in both the ‘civilizations’ cited as irreconcilable, particularly with the rise of anti-western Islamic fundamentalism led by al-Qa’ida and ‘Islamaphobia’ in some western countries.

Democratic war?

While the idea of cultural conflict has risen in prominence, a corollary to this is that not everyone is convinced that democratization is the route to ‘perpetual peace’. Although it may be true that democracies do not fight each other, they are equally prone to be embroiled in war as non-democracies and have a propensity to fight autocracies. The restraint shown by democracies in resolving disputes with states with similar political systems is frequently not exhibited in resolving disputes with non-democracies. Indeed evidence can be found to suggest that some democracies are predisposed towards violent resolutions of disputes when dealing with dictatorships. Supportive cases include the 1956 Suez dispute, when France, Israel and the UK invaded Egypt, Israeli incursions into the Lebanon and the twenty-first century US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Democratic peace evangelists Russett and Oneal admit that two autocracies are more likely to have peaceful relations than one democracy and one autocracy (Oneal and Russett 1997: 283). In addition, democratizing states have been shown to be more prone to conflict than stable autocracies

due to the nationalistic zeal which typically accompanies revolution (Snyder 2000, Zakaria 1997). Social Constructivists have highlighted the phenomenon of ‘warlike democracies’ to demonstrate how ideas and perception undermine the logic of democratic peace. ‘[D]emocracies to a large degree create their enemies and their friends – “them” and “us” – by inferring either aggressive or defensive motives from the domestic structures of their counterparts’ (Risse 1999: 19–20). Risse does, however, concede that democracies are overwhelmingly peaceful in their relations with other democracies. Perpetual peace, then, might only become a reality when there are only ‘us’ and no ‘them’ in the world. This ‘end of history’ is not yet with us.

From balance to an imbalance of power

The chief cause of Realist caution or fear for the ‘New World Order’ was that it threatened a central tenet of their recipe for world order, the balance of power. The unipolar world that has emerged, according to orthodox Realist logic, should prove unsustainable and prompt other states to topple the USA’s pole position. This has not happened, of course, but the fear persists among some statesmen and Realist commentators that American preponderance is bound to breed resentment and be a source of general global instability. Some western governments have voiced concern over the implications of US freedom to manoeuvre on the world stage with French statesmen and commentators, in particular, making reference to the dangers inherent in there being a world ‘hyperpower’. Kagan, an American academic with strong political connections to the State Department, has articulated the concern that a hyperpower is reflexively drawn to an aggressive foreign policy.

A man armed only with a knife may decide that a bear prowling the forest is a tolerable danger, because hunting it with a knife is riskier than lying low and hoping it never attacks. The same man armed with a rifle, however, will likely make a different calculation.

(Kagan 2003: 2)

This becomes problematic when the man takes to shooting at targets just in case they turn out to be a bear. These concerns came to greatest prominence in 2003 when the USA sidestepped both the UN and NATO in prosecuting war against Iraq. Other states, in no way aligned to the USA, have been more vitriolic than the French in their criticism of their foreign policy. President Bush’s assertion in the aftermath of the Afghanistan war in 2002, and lead-up to the Iraqi war, that Iran was part of an ‘axis of evil’ prompted Iranian Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharazi, to state that ‘[t]he world will not accept US hegemony’ (Theodoulou 2002). US preponderance is such that their hegemony looks unchallengeable but there is little doubt that it has bred resentment in some parts of the world that threatens to puncture the idea of post Cold War peace.

Back to the drawing board: arms control

The clearest manifestation of the dangers considered by many to be inherent in the breakdown of the Cold War bipolar balance of power has been the strain put on global arms control agreements by the new alignment. The balance of power has been explicitly recognized in multilateral treaties among the great military powers going back to the 1920s, but was most institutionalized into the relations of the two Cold War nuclear superpowers, despite the level of hostility that existed between them. Post-First World War Idealism spawned an attempt to outlaw the recourse to war altogether in the 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Kellogg-Briand Pact) but this period also witnessed the birth of more Realist-minded arms control agreements between the great powers. The Washington Conference of 1922 sought to avoid the sort of tension created by the spiralling of the 'naval race' between Great Britain and Germany which contributed to the Great War by setting legal parameters for the legitimate build-up of naval power. Explicit recognition of the importance of the balance of power, even in an age of apparent collective security, was evident in the terms of the conference which limited the world's main naval powers not in absolute terms but relative to each other. The five major naval powers (Germany was by now severely militarily restrained by the terms of the Versailles Treaty) agreed to limit their military naval development relative to each other according to the following numerical ratios UK (5), USA (5), France (3), Japan (1.75) and Italy (1.75).

The remarkable rise in military power of Germany and the USSR in the 1930s made the Washington Conference an irrelevance but, when the Second World War ended, the notion of giving legal rigour to the balance of power logic was revisited. A combination of bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements involving much of the international community contributed to the bipolar 'balance of power' that marked the Cold War and have persisted since its declared end, despite the onset of unipolarity. The Cold War balance was only achieved from the 1960s when the USSR's nuclear arsenal began to match that of the USA's and paved the way for agreements reminiscent of the Washington Conference, based on the cold logic of the nuclear 'balance of terror'. Nuclear weapons by then had come to serve a different role in superpower strategy and diplomacy than they had in the 1940s and 1950s. The fact that the USSR had caught up meant that the USA could no longer use its superiority for diplomatic 'compellance' and that these unprecedented power capabilities would be deployed in a more defensive manner, to deter the Soviet Union.

Deterrence, like arms control, was not new to the Cold War period but took on an added dimension to displays of 'gun boat diplomacy' in earlier ages, because of the sheer scale of the threat now being projected. Both superpowers had the capability to annihilate the other state and its people, necessitating the added ingredient of 'Mutually Assured Destruction' (MAD) to keep the balance. MAD, which did indeed appear mad to many at the time, nevertheless gave meaning to nuclear deterrence. Both superpowers to be deterred from attacking the other needed to know that initiating war would be futile since they, as well as their enemy, would face annihilation. For the logic of MAD to operate, both the USA and USSR needed to have a 'second strike capability', to be able to respond to any attack by the other. In other words, both sides needed to be in a position where they could not only obliterate the other in a first strike but also do so in response to the other

side initiating hostilities. Hence, in spite of improved Soviet–US relations in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the gradual acceptance of military parity by both sides, the development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems accelerated until the end of the decade. By the 1970s, however, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) of 1972 and 1979 established the first meaningful bilateral arms control agreements with ceilings placed on the production of a range of weaponry.

As well as maintaining an equilibrium between the superpowers, the balance of terror rested on keeping the balance bipolar, since MAD logic would be lost in a multipolar system. Hence multilateral arms control agreements keeping the ‘nuclear weapons club’ an exclusive one formed an equally important dimension of Cold War military security diplomacy. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibited the over-ground testing of nuclear weapons by the then three nuclear powers, USA, USSR and UK. By the signing of the 1968 Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) two other nuclear powers, France and China, had joined the club and agreed to the NPT’s key rule constraining its members, like magicians in the ‘Magic Circle’, from revealing their secrets to outsiders. The same five states that made up the disharmonious concert of permanent members in the Security Council found it far easier to reach accord in nuclear diplomacy since, like magicians, they may be in competition with each other but could all lose out from openly showing how anyone could pull a rabbit out of their hat.

The end of the Cold War permitted the two principal protagonists to greatly scale down their armaments in bilateral accords: the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), a decade after SALT II had been abandoned by the USA in the final phase of the conflict. Both sides, persuaded that they no longer had the need for a second strike capability against the other, agreed to massive cuts in their arsenals safe in the knowledge that they would still have enough firepower to deter any other military threats that existed in the world.

While bilateral arms control initially prospered in the post-Cold War afterglow, the multilateral regimes became strained by the new military power configurations of the 1990s. Non-proliferation had been one thing the five official nuclear powers could agree on during the Cold War, but now their commitment began to waiver. Chinese state officials, by now focusing their concerns on the Asian rather than global balance of power, are widely suspected of having assisted the Pakistani government in developing nuclear weapons to counter India’s unofficial though well-known nuclear capability. Throughout the 1990s the nuclear club became far less exclusive. Pakistan and India openly tested their new weapons and, in doing so, the latter denounced the ‘nuclear apartheid’ of the NPT in privileging the ‘big five’ (Singh 1998). The break-up of the USSR saw some of its nuclear arsenal apparently go missing when a recount was taken after 15 new states had succeeded the superpower. A protocol to START tidied this up by giving incentives to get Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan to agree not to be nuclear states but the nightmare scenario emerged that some Soviet nuclear material could have got onto the global black market (see Chapter 10).

By the 1990s it was also apparent that Israel and North Korea, too, were nuclear powers and that Iraq and Iran were on the way to following suit. The NPT offers the incentive to non-nuclear states of aid for peaceful nuclear power production in

exchange for not developing military uses for this resource. This, however, was not an incentive for India or Pakistan to sign up, and joining the nuclear club was widely greeted with jubilation among the peoples of the sub-continent. Not all western military strategists were alarmed at this particular breach of the magicians' code. The cause for greater reflection in the recourse to nuclear rather than conventional weapons might bring some stability to Indo-Pakistani relations, many reasoned. More worryingly for the old order was that North Korea and Iraq, who were signatory to the NPT, had managed to evade detection and gone down the road of developing the weapons unbeknown to the world. The Koreans trumpeted their achievement in an exercise of mini-compellance aimed at securing aid concessions from an alarmed West, and Iraq's progress was stumbled across by invaders during the Gulf War.

These developments showed up a central problem of the NPT, and of arms control in general, that of implementing and verifying agreements. Counting naval destroyers in the 1920s was relatively straightforward but modern Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are more easily kept out of sight even in an age of satellite observation. The NPT limps on with some successes, such as South Africa's unilateral disarmament of 1991, but other contemporary multilateral regimes look increasingly irrelevant. The USA has failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the successor to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and it has yet to come into force. Other non-nuclear WMD regimes are limited in their effectiveness. The Biological Weapons Convention came into force in 1975 but has no formal verification system and looks unlikely ever to achieve any effective verification since biological weapons are far harder to detect than the nuclear weapons which evaded detection in North Korea and Iraq. Chemical weaponry arms control dates back to the 1925 Geneva Protocol which, in the aftermath of its use in the First World War, prohibited the military application of poison gas. Today, international legal force is centred on the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention which bans all forms of military chemical applications and commits ratifying countries who stockpile such weapons to destroy them. The regime does feature an inspection system but has been patchily implemented by the key parties and main chemical weapons holders, the USA and Russia, and not ratified at all by the possible chemical weapons states of North Korea, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Egypt and Syria.

The world's sole superpower has, in recent years, embarked on a far more unilateralist WMD strategy, in line with its preponderance of military power. As well as snubbing the CTBT and showing limited interest in developing the biological and chemical weapons regimes, the USA has also changed direction in bilateral agreements with its former Cold War foe. START II in 1993 was due to deepen the cuts of Russian and US nuclear weapons but was abandoned by the Americans and eventually replaced with a lesser agreement, the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), in 2002. SORT marked a mutual acceptance of the gulf in military power between the two former rivals and abandoned the notion of parity with Russia accepting the notion of US 'flexibility', in which bilateral ceilings can be exceeded by bringing weapons out of storage in an emergency (this power is also open to Russia but is of much more value to the US since they will have far more weapons in storage).

US nuclear strategy has moved into a new era with hopes based on the potential for physical defence rather than on psychological deterrence in the form of a missile shield. The idea of deploying satellite-based interceptors to protect the US (and

potentially its allies) from attack was first mooted in the 1980s with SDI and did much to break the USSR in the arms race, even though the capability was not really there at the time. US pursuance of missile defence has divided opinion across the world. Many statesmen and commentators are horrified at the prospect of effectively abandoning 40 years of carefully constructed, if imperfect, agreements limiting the spread of deadly weapons. In a prescient lead article just days before the September 11th 2001 al-Qa'ida strikes on the USA, the normally pro-American *Economist* newspaper voiced its concerns over missile defence:

concentrating on the possibility of future missile threats seems to be blinding the Bush team to other dangers. There are plenty of other ways to deliver a nuclear, chemical or bug bomb. . . . What folly for America to spend billions on missile defences, while unraveling the rules which limit the weapons that may someday get through or around them.

(The Economist 2001)

US proponents of missile defence have argued that the Cold War logic underpinning existing arms control agreements has no application in the contemporary system and thus offers little basis for enhancing international security. Enthusiasm for the US initiative does not come only from American unilateralists, the avowedly multilateral British Liberal politician, Paddy Ashdown, has added his support; 'the world is no longer bi-polar. It is a disobedient, fractured and splintering place. And it is the fractures and splinters, not the giants, who now threaten the peace' (Ashdown 2001).

Some are sceptical as to whether there really was a superpower consensus on MAD during the Cold War and others have suggested that, even if there was, it was as much by luck as design that a peace of sorts was maintained for 45 years. The USSR, while talking in terms of parity and agreeing ceilings on established weaponry, developed new forms of missile in the late 1970s and continued to consider that superiority was possible through technological innovation. The fact that the Warsaw Pact countries put far more emphasis on conventional forces and central European battle preparations than NATO implies that the Soviet government was less convinced than their US counterparts by the logic of deterrence. Within the US too there were significant dissenting opinions on the applicability of MAD. The USSR's weapons developments of the late 1970s and invasion of Afghanistan prompted a new strand of thinking in military security circles that began to speak of 'Nuclear Utilization Theory', which envisaged pre-emptive limited nuclear strikes to stop inevitable Soviet aggression (Kennan 1984). Additionally, historical research on the Cold War has uncovered evidence that the world was brought closer than anyone even imagined to the brink of global nuclear war. In 2002 it emerged that a Soviet nuclear submarine sailing near Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis had a depth charge dropped on it by a US destroyer, which did not realize the vessel's capability. A decision on whether to launch a nuclear strike in response required the consensus of all commanders on a submarine and, in the vote which followed the American action, one of the three Soviet commanders on board vetoed such a strike (Rennie 2002). Did Commander Arkhipov save the world? Similarly, even in the absence of a 'real' crisis as a backdrop the 1983 NATO military exercise 'Able Archer' nearly

provoked a nuclear response when it was initially interpreted by the Kremlin as a genuine attack (Prins 2002: 32–34).

People make mistakes and it is in this context that the rationality of deterrence maybe breaks down. With the proliferation of balances of terror around the world (India versus Pakistan over Kashmir, Israel versus Iran or Syria over Palestine, China versus USA over Taiwan, North Korea versus USA over South Korea) the possibility of accidental war has multiplied, even if one were to accept the logic of nuclear deterrence and posit that deliberate war is less likely. The logic of deterrence is shakier still if the potential threat of WMD held by non-state actors is taken into consideration. The suicide bombers who inflicted the gravest external military strike on mainland USA in its history in 2001 could not have been deterred or stopped by a missile shield and they possessed only pocket knives and ingenuity. At the same time, though apparently unconnected, anthrax was being distributed throughout the USA by a domestic letterbomber and conventional notions of military security appeared to be crashing down.

Where do you draw the line? The persistence of territorial disputes

In considering the optimism generated by the decline in number of conflicts since 1990, it is worth bearing in mind that this is a relative decline from an all-time high of over 150 conflicts a year at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s (Gurr *et al.* 2001). Border disputes remain very much a feature of today's world. As already referred to, some explicitly Cold War disputes linger on more than a decade after the apparent end of that conflict, while other disputes subsumed by the global struggle persist in spite of changes in the global political backdrop. Arab–Israeli peace remains far from certain and the conflict retains a one-sided proxy element to it with continued US support for Israel, even in the absence of a Cold War dimension.

Some conflicts have emerged or worsened *because of* rather than in spite of improved Russo-American relations. The rise in the 1990s of the phenomenon of 'failed states', where domestic sovereign control breaks down indefinitely, provides the clearest cases of this. In some parts of the world superpower competition for influence was succeeded from the end of the 1980s by disinterest. The fate of Afghanistan epitomized this with a 1980s proxy war transformed into an ignored 1990s civil war, only to be internationalized again in 2001 when superpower interest for non-Afghani reasons was re-ignited. War between Ethiopia and Eritrea and internal strife in Somalia and Sudan, although less explicitly post-Cold War conflicts, also bore the hallmarks of 'New World Order' global indifference.

A particular source of instability in the contemporary world is the seeming intractability of some conflicts. The longer a war persists the more difficult peace-making becomes and 'perpetual war' seems a more apt description for some parts of the globe than the onset of perpetual peace. Indo-Pakistani rivalry over the status of Kashmir is as old as both countries and the conflict is now more insoluble than ever given that it has now taken the form of a 'Cold War-esque' nuclear rivalry. The internationalized civil war in the Congo shows no sign of abating over 40 years

after the end of appalling colonial rule by Belgium and a brief but fruitless display of Cold War internationalism left behind, perhaps, the world's first 'failed state'.

Virulent nationalism has enjoyed something of a revival in Europe since 1990, prompting the view that the Cold War might actually have kept the lid on a number of conflicts now free to boil over. '[T]he Cold War period might be seen as an aberration from a story that is now, in some respects being resumed' (Clark 2001: 24). The Yugoslav secessionist wars of the 1990s in many ways did appear to be a revival of the Balkan Wars which preceded the First World War and the civil war, which occurred alongside the Second World War. Similarly, old scores left unsettled by their grandparents were taken up by nationalists as ethnic strife re-emerged in Chechenya, Moldova, Romania and Georgia and between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The more things change the more they stay the same. (See Table 2.3.)

An end to 'high politics'?

Military threats to security have certainly not gone away in the years since the demise of East European Communism. However, although it persists in a number of forms, the Cold War's ultimate security threat of global nuclear Armageddon has receded and this has transformed defence policy in many states of the world. Whereas it could be said to be 'business as usual' in much of Asia and Latin America and 'a change for the worse' in much of Africa, military security policies have changed in the states most affected by the Cold War, those of Europe and North America. In Eastern Europe the former Communist states have either switched to the winning side or become preoccupied with new internal threats from secessionists. The western Cold War allies' response to the successful avoidance of that war has been to show a far greater preparedness to get embroiled in new wars essentially of their choosing. These 'New World Order Wars' and lesser military incursions have been prompted

Table 2.3 Indicators of contemporary state military power

(a) Proportion of GDP spent on defence (2000) (%)

<i>Top ranked</i>	<i>Selected others</i>	<i>Bottom ranked</i>
Eritrea (22.9)	Pakistan (4.5)	Luxembourg, Kazakhstan,
Angola (21.2)	Russia (4)	Ireland, El Salvador (0.7)
Saudi Arabia (11.6)	USA (3.1)	Zambia (0.6)
Oman (9.7)	France (2.6)	Honduras (0.6)
Jordan (9.5)	United Kingdom (2.5)	Mexico (0.5)
Ethiopia (9.4)	India (2.4)	Moldova (0.4)
Kuwait (8.2)	China (2.1)	Gabon (0.3)
Israel (8)	Germany (1.5)	Mauritius (0.2)
Brunei (7.6)	Canada (1.2)	Costa Rica (0)
Syria (5.5)	Japan (1)	Iceland (0)

Source: UNDP (2002).

(b) Size of full-time armed forces (2000)

<i>Top ranked</i>	<i>Selected others</i>	<i>Bottom ranked</i>
China (2.81 million)	France (0.29 million)	Antigua & Barbuda, Solomon Islands,
Russia (1.52 million)	Brazil (0.29 million)	Comoros, Costa Rica, Dominica,
USA (1.37 million)	Japan (0.24 million)	Grenada, Haiti, Iceland, Mauritius,
India (1.30 million)	Germany (0.22 million)	Maldives, Vanuatu, Panama, St Kitts &
South Korea (0.68 million)	UK (0.21 million)	Nevis, Seychelles, Saint Lucia,
Pakistan (0.61 million)	Saudi Arabia (0.20 million)	Sao Tome and Principe, Saint Vincent
Turkey (0.61 million)	Eritrea (0.2 million)	& the Grenadines, Swaziland
Iran (0.51 million)	Israel (0.17 million)	(below 1000)
Vietnam (0.48 million)	Canada (59,000)	
Egypt (0.45 million)	Ireland (12,000)	

Source: IISS (2001).

(c) Size of nuclear arsenal

	<i>State</i>	<i>No. of weapons</i>
1	USA	10 640
2	Russia	8 600
3	China	400
4	France	350
5	UK	200
6	Israel	100 (approx.)
7	India	30 (approx.)
8	Pakistan	24 (approx.)
9	North Korea	?

Source: NRDC (2002).

not by national interest, but justice and the maintenance of regional order. At least for part of the world, the idea that war is an option of last resort and all-subsuming of other concerns is eroding. For many states the resort to force is not being eliminated from foreign policy, it is becoming a more pragmatic, mainstream part of it, in line with Clausewitzian thinking.

From deterrence to the management of security?

As Rasmussen has persuasively argued, the changing nature of military threats is resulting in the means–ends rationality of traditional state security policy in some countries being gradually replaced by a ‘reflexive rationality’. ‘Risk is becoming the operative concept of Western security’ (Rasmussen 2001: 285). Deterring or being

ready to respond to massive military threats is no longer a sufficient basis for the construction of many states' defence policy. As the Cold War has receded into history a more subtle strategy has been both necessary and possible for governments operating in relative peace. The management of security entails seeking to limit the risks likely to be encountered in the future as well as tackling imminent problems.

NATO's transformation since 1990 exemplifies this approach. As Forster and Wallace comment: 'NATO is becoming more of a European-wide security organization, less of an alliance' (Forster and Wallace 2001: 107). The enlargement of NATO, and its wider extension through the Partnership for Peace programme with non-members, has not been inspired by the organization's desire to become even more powerful, it is about the 'management of the future' and stabilizing Eastern Europe (Rasmussen 2001: 289). NATO has also become increasingly involved in non-military security activities, such as facilitating relief in cases of natural disasters (see Chapter 8). It is, indeed, increasingly doubtful whether NATO is much of a military alliance at all. The first and only time the organization's collective defence 'trigger clause', Article 5, was enacted was in 2001 in response to the September 11th al-Qa'ida strikes in the USA. This was purely a symbolic act of solidarity as the USA made it clear that the organization was not needed in the subsequent war in Afghanistan. When NATO could not agree on a collective response against Iraq in 2003 it was sidestepped by the USA and UK in much the same way as NATO had sidestepped the UN in the 1999 Kosovan War. The Kosovan War stands as the only military engagement by NATO but the solidarity was, again, more symbolic and diplomatic than a case of military necessity. The USA, and their erstwhile ally in the informal 'alliance of English speaking nations' the UK, do not need NATO in a military security sense but the organization still serves their interests as a means of institutionalizing a wider security community in Europe.

The 'alliance of English speaking nations' (including Australia)'s invasion of Iraq itself represented a dramatic attempt at managing the future, risking the antagonism of some of their partners in the European security community, and their own casualties, in order to pre-empt bigger future risks from arising. Iraq did not present a 'clear and present danger' to any of the three invading states but it was reasoned by them that, if military action was avoided, the country *could* pose a major security threat through the development of weapons of mass destruction. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein was also seen as a means to stabilize the Middle East and contribute long term to the mitigation of risks associated with anti-western sentiment in the region. The US missile shield project and the rise of non-military 'national security' initiatives from the State Department (for example tackling AIDS and transnational crime) in recent years, too, suggest that a longer game of state security is increasingly being played.

Not all states enjoy the luxury of being able to attempt to manage their and their people's security but it is an observable trend in some parts of the world. NATO, from the outset, sought to keep members like Greece and Turkey from fighting each other but this became more pressing once the Cold War was over and such countries were stripped of a common enemy. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) sought to build bridges between NATO and the Warsaw Pact states in the era of détente and looked, briefly, as if it might take on the mantle of keeping order in Europe at the end of the Cold War, before NATO revamped itself.

The European Union was forged by the need to manage the future of German relations with her European neighbours and its expansions have sought to stabilize the continent, though it too has been superseded in this regard by NATO.

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has cooperative peacekeeping mechanisms predating the end of the Cold War but, like NATO, sought to both deepen and widen security cooperation in the 1990s. The ASEAN Regional Forum and Councils for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific were developed to build bridges with China, maintain US interest, and generally reduce future uncertainty in the region. US troops have taken part in the 'Cobra Gold' joint military exercises with Thailand and Singapore, with Chinese officials present as observers, and cooperation on non-military security issues such as piracy and environmental pollution has been developed (Simon 2002). In Africa the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has sought to fill the void of Northern indifference prompted by the end of the Cold War by enhancing regional stability through the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security established in 1999.

Military conflict should no longer automatically be seen as 'high politics' and something resorted to when 'national security' is threatened. Humanitarian interventions and missions to maintain general order without 'national interests' being obviously at stake, such as in Kosovo and East Timor, are becoming more common (see Chapter 5). Wars are increasingly fought for other, less fundamental foreign policy aims. This was most clearly illustrated by the 2003 Iraq War, prosecuted ostensibly on the war aim of better implementing an arms control agreement. The Iraq War also served to show how wars have become 'routinized'. Despite months of diplomatic build-up to the conflict and in-depth media coverage, it was not clear when the war had actually started. Since the UK and USA had been bombing Iraq for 12 years, and attracting relatively little political interest in doing so, the boundaries between war and diplomacy were barely evident.

Other states have decided to spend the post-Cold War peace dividend on non-military concerns. Most European states' military expenditure has reduced and at such a rate in countries like Belgium and Germany that concerns have been raised within NATO about a 'free-rider' problem developing, with countries enjoying the security provided by collective defence without contributing much to it themselves. Iceland has not possessed its own armed forces either during or since the Cold War, allowing the US to simultaneously protect and utilize the island for its geopolitical value. Costa Rica abandoned its armed forces after a civil war in 1949 (save for some state paramilitaries used for border controls and internal security) and has managed to remain an oasis of peace in an otherwise volatile region. Other states have resorted to calling up private, freelance military forces in time of emergency rather than incur the costs of building up and constantly modernizing their own armed forces. Some of the Arab Gulf states adopted such a strategy in the 1990s to improve defences against potential Iraqi aggression, while the governments of Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Papua New Guinea have recruited from specially designed firms such as 'Sandline International' and 'Executive Outcomes' to help them deal with civil insurgencies (Singer 2001).

There are few states in the world where the military security agenda is dominated by a major, imminent threat posed by another state's military forces.

Maintaining internal order against the threat of insurgency and/or contributing to regional or global order or justice is more the order of the day.

Is war inevitable?

The question as to whether human beings are inherently aggressive and war, therefore, an inevitable manifestation of this, has dogged philosophers, psychologists and ethologists (scholars of animal behaviour) for centuries. The paradigms of International Relations are similarly divided.

Realists

Notwithstanding some improvement in the last decade, wars have become more frequent and more deadly as time has proceeded, contradicting the idea that humankind has become less savage as it has evolved. From this Realists conclude that violent conflict is an inevitable feature of international politics. They laud Clausewitz for his famous dictum that war is 'a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means' (Clausewitz 1976: 605) and argue that it should not be treated as an aberration but as a rational foreign policy option. This position is not necessarily, as it is sometimes painted, that of the warmonger. The glorification of warfare on the grounds of its usefulness for 'nation building', or even for humanity as a whole by a twisted application of the Darwinian notion of 'survival of the fittest', has permeated Fascism and virulent strains of nationalism but this is not Clausewitzian Realism. The conviction of the Realists is that war is a last resort but still very much a resort. According to this view, war is sometimes necessary and its occurrence cannot be wished away. War, according to Betts, should be viewed as a 'rational instrument of policy rather than mindless murder' (Betts 1997: 8). It should only be resorted to judiciously, and managed through respect for the balance of power system. When, then, for Realists is war a rational foreign policy option? Aside from self-defence, Wight famously suggests that the rational basis for initiating war can be distilled down to three basic motivations: gain, doctrine and fear (Wight 1978: 136-143).

Gain is the most obvious root cause of war. Territorial expansion and conquest initiated the Second World War, the Napoleonic War and contemporary wars such as the Gulf War. In these instances, of course, the aggressor overstepped the mark and, ultimately, did not gain. A war which enhanced the power of the state initiating the conflict, without upsetting the balance of power to a dangerous extent, would better fit the bill as a Realist war of gain. Clausewitz's legacy no doubt influenced his successors in the Prussian military to prosecute successful wars against France, Denmark and Austria-Hungary in the 1860s and 1870s, which created a powerful German state but did not antagonize Britain or the other great powers of the day. The wars of European imperial expansion also clearly come into this category.

Doctrine

Doctrine, rather than the explicit acquisition of land, resources or other power capabilities, is a secondary explanation offered for the initiation of a rational war. The Cold War, and more particularly its subsidiary conflicts fought by the superpowers, provides a clear example of this, viewed from either the traditional or revisionist perspective (post-revisionists would classify it as gain). The religiously inspired Crusades between the Islamic world and Christendom represent a pre-Westphalian example. Believers in the war of the civilizations thesis consider this sort of intangible, idealistic conflict to be with us today. Aside from clashes of ideology and faith, humanitarian interventions, such as the 1999 Kosovan War, represent another form of war of doctrine, fought for moral principles rather than material gain.

Fear is considered by Wight to be a third and distinct cause of war. This is a fear not of imminent invasion but of the longer-term consequences for the power of the state in *not* resorting to armed conflict. Wight uses the example of Japan's provocation of the USA in the Pearl Harbor attack of 1941 to illustrate this. The Japanese government wanted war with the USA, not to conquer Hawaii but because they feared being marginalized and economically dominated by them if they remained outside the Second World War. More recently, the 2003 Iraq War provided a new instance of war provoked by 'a rational apprehension of future evil' (Wight 1978: 139). The governments of the USA, the UK and Australia concluded that the best way to disarm the Saddam Hussein regime and diminish its capacity for future evil was to remove it by force.

Marxists

For Marxists the 2003 Iraq War was initiated for rational reasons but for gain rather than fear. The idea that it was the economic spoils to be had from implementing 'regime change' in one of the world's most significant oil producing countries that prompted the war was, in fact, cited as an explanation by many beyond the confines of the far left. Unlike Realism, however, the Marxist/Structuralist approach considers economic gain to be the underlying cause of most wars. Lenin famously argued that the First World War was a war of imperialism with the rival factions from Europe and the USA seeking to achieve mastery of each other's colonial possessions. In this view it is the inherent expansionist tendency of capitalism that prompted European imperial expansion and then US-led anti-Communist aggression and economic 'neo-imperialism' in the twentieth century. Contemporary neo-Marxists put particular emphasis on the influence of the military-industrial complex in pushing states towards the use of force to secure economic gains. Wars can be a profitable exercise and it is in the interests of the armed forces and arms industry, two highly influential government lobbies, that war remains a foreign policy option. Hence, in this analysis there were twin economic motivations behind the 2003 Iraq War. Unexpected support for this proposition can be found in the words of US Republican President Eisenhower at the height of the Cold War:

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

(Eisenhower 1961)

Pluralists

Pluralists dispute the Marxist proposition that war is an inevitable feature of international politics in a capitalist world, and the Realist proposition that war is an inevitable feature of international politics in any sort of world. The brutishness of human nature in the Realist analysis or the irrelevance of human nature in the Marxist analysis is rejected and a more optimistic assessment made on the likelihood of war to remain a central feature of political life in the future. Just as many people lead blameless lives, so many states avoid violent conflicts (for example Switzerland and Sweden) and, although conflict is sometimes unavoidable for the preservation of justice in the world, it could be consigned to the history books given political change. To Pluralists the lack of progress of humanity in curbing the resort to war is more nurture than nature. The arbitrary division of the world into competitive units has seen the populations of these states dragged into wars by self-interested governments, particularly non-democratic ones. This serves to exacerbate disputes beyond what is necessary or rational and leads to wars being prompted by misperception of an adversary and/or the likely gains to accrue from attacking them. If war were truly rational every state that initiated conflict would win which, of course, has not been the case. Hence, for Pluralists, a cure exists to rid humanity of the cancer of war: the removal of its root cause through the erosion of state sovereignty. Interdependence and, to a greater extent, integration serve to diminish war by revealing that the mutual gains inherent in cooperation outweigh the spoils of individual gain and reduce the likelihood of misperception causing unnecessary wars. The improbability of a new Franco-German confrontation, after three major wars in the course of a human lifespan, is the classic case used to uphold this view.

Conclusions

The 'ending' of the Cold War has not changed the military security threats to the states or peoples of many states, including those still affected by it (for example Korea or Cuba) or to those for whom it was never the principal concern (for example India or Israel). However, the lifting of the over-arching threat posed by that conflict and the nature in which it (at least partially) ended has brought into question a number of long-held assumptions about the study and conduct of military security policy.

Most in need of reappraisal is that most well established and still influential Realist theory, the balance of power. There is a strong case to be made that the preservation or restoration of a balance of power did maintain order in previous phases of history, but this is not sufficient reason to believe that a contemporary

imbalance will lead to global disorder. Many of the states just down the military pecking order have no interest or desire to topple the USA, since that country does not threaten them and they share many of its general aspirations for the world. Even those among that 'second tier' of military powers not as closely aligned to the USA as the UK, such as France and Russia, enjoy sufficiently strong ties to render war unthinkable. US military hegemony has prompted adventurism that alarms much of the world, such as in the 2003 war against Iraq, but George Bush Junior, for all his faults, is not Napoleon or Hitler. The balance of power theory does still have some applicability at the regional level, such as in the stand-off between India and Pakistan, but when applied to the global political stage, is falsified by the much harder evidence provided by the Kantian peace thesis.

Kantian peace also stands up well to the recent advance of the 'Clash of the Civilizations' thesis. Russett and Oneal, for example, convincingly dismantle Huntington's theory by clearly demonstrating that no correlation can be shown between recent conflicts and the apparent civilizational setting of the states concerned (Russett and Oneal 2001: 239–270). Islamic and western states, on past evidence, are no more likely to resort to war than any other combination of countries. Huntington could contend that his thesis was a prediction for the future that can not be falsified by empirical analysis of the past, but the speculative and sensationalist nature of his writing stands in stark contrast to these Pluralists' more rigorous, reasoned and optimistic view of the way in which the world is likely to evolve.

The three peace prescriptions of Kant, and his proteges like Russett, appear to have passed a number of trials but should not, however, be mistaken for panaceas. Kantian peace does appear to account for the demise of inter-state war but its logic does not explain the persistence of a number of civil wars. Democracy, trade and common political institutions have not deterred Basque, Corse, Sikh or some Irish nationalists from pursuing conflict to achieve their aims. In addition it is democracies, including those not predisposed to fight themselves, who do much to fuel conflicts in the undemocratic world through the lucrative trade in arms, usually justified on the national interest grounds of economic expediency. In noting this, however, neither can we conclude that Marxist economic determinism is the catch-all explanation it purports to be, even for explicitly imperial wars. In invading the Falkland Islands in 1982 the Argentinian junta were seeking to acquire a British possession which had long been an economic burden to its colonial ruler. It was symbolism which prompted the invasion and principle which prompted the campaign to recapture the islands.

Theories need to change when they are no longer supported by the facts. The balance of power has largely lost its applicability on the global stage. The clash of the civilizations thesis has never had any since its proclamation. Even theories largely supported by the facts need to be taken with a pinch of the Social Constructivist's salt. The 'struggle for power' shorthand of Realist analysis is not redundant, as evidenced by the continued use of the 'national interest' justification of the unjust by many governments, but it is in need of increasing qualification as time goes on. War is still often considered a rational foreign policy choice for some governments but it is not resorted to by others, even if there are tangible gains to be had from them doing so. Germany has not risen again in a quest for military supremacy as much because its government and people have never wished to as because of its containment. The

recognition that ideas and culture inform decision making when it comes to the ultimate decision usually to face a government predates the rise of the Social Constructivists in the post-Cold War era. Mueller, in arguing for 'the obsolescence of major war', demonstrated that the historical pattern of cyclical war between the great powers was not being maintained. The nuclear revolution was clearly a factor in this, making such wars irrational, but Mueller posited that an added (and related) dimension to this was a normative change towards seeing war as an unacceptable means of pursuing gain. Slavery had been a profitable venture for many states for a number of centuries but was eventually consigned to history because compassion triumphed over economic gain (Mueller 1989). Might war similarly pass into history as a major political phenomenon?

War waged by states has not disappeared but it has become less frequent and, at the same time, a more 'mainstream' political option for some. Other options for resolving disputes are increasingly open to governments but limited tactical wars are also an increasing option for some states. Clausewitz was right to say that war was a form of politics, but this affirmation need not cause us to conclude that armed attacks are as inevitable as the differences of opinion that constitute politics.

Assessment of the risks of war is not in the end a matter of predicting the inevitable or recognizing the fated, but rather of re-emphasizing the fundamental link between war and politics: politics, which cause war, can equally be used to prevent it.

(Halliday 2001: 58)

Key points

- The twin global issues of the Cold War and decolonization dominated the conduct of international relations in the latter half of the twentieth century and help explain the preoccupation of states today with externally focused military security.
- The 'resolution' of the Cold War and decolonization in the early 1990s brought optimism that a 'New World Order' would usher in more peaceful inter-state relations and a greater commitment to globally coordinated peacekeeping.
- Not all analysts shared the optimism generated by the apparent New World Order. The legacies of the Cold War and decolonization remain prominent and many neo-Realists contend that the disappearance of the Cold War balance of power brought with it new, and more destabilizing, military threats.
- Realists consider that war is an inevitable feature of international relations, containable by respect for the balance of power between states. Marxists consider war to be inevitable so long as the world remains predominantly capitalist. Pluralists contend that the spread of democracy and interdependence, hastened in the post-Cold War world, offer hope for the eradication of inter-state war, which is becoming less common.

Notes

- 1 The other ten Security Council members are elected for two years, by General Assembly vote subject to Security Council approval, on the basis of geographical quotas. Five are chosen from Africa and Asia combined, two from Latin America, one from Eastern Europe and two from 'Western Europe/others'.
- 2 Russian pan-Slavism predates the Cold War and can be seen as a common theme of Russian foreign policy dating back to the Czarist era of the nineteenth century when support for Serb nationalism was demonstrated.
- 3 Reports suggest that NATO Secretary General Wesley Clark wanted British troops to confront the Russians but was ignored by General Michael Jackson, leading the British contingent (Tran 1999).

Recommended reading

- Clark, I. (2001) *The Post Cold War Order. The Spoils of Peace*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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- Fukuyama, F. (1992) *The End of History and the Last Man*, London: Hamish Hamilton.
- Gaddis, J. (1997) *We Now Know – Rethinking Cold War History*, Oxford: Clarendon.
- Halliday, F. (2001) *The World at 2000. Perils and Promises*, New York: Palgrave.
- Huntington, S. (1993) 'The Clash of the Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs* 72(3): 22–49.
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- Rasmussen, M. (2001) 'Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society', *Millennium Journal of International Studies* 30(2): 285–309.
- Russett, B. and Oneal, J. (2001) *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organisations*, New York: Norton.
- Stern, G. (2000) *The Structure of International Society*, 2nd edn, London: Pinter (Chapter 13).
- Walzer, M. (1978) *Just and Unjust Wars*, London: Allen Lane.
- Wight, M. (1978) Edited by H. Bull and C. Holbraad, *Power Politics*, Leicester: Leicester University Press.

Useful web links

- White, M. (2001) 'Wars of the Twentieth Century', *Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century*:
<http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/war-list.htm>
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): <http://www.sipri.se/>
- United Nations 'Peace and Security': <http://www.un.org/peace/index.html>
- NATO: <http://www.nato.int/>