Political Culture
in Germany
Edited by
Dirk Berg-Schlosser
Professor ofPolitical Science
Philipps University, Marburg
and
Ralf Rytlewski
Professor ofPolitical Science
Freie Universitdt Berlin
Palgrave Macmillan UK
18 Attitudes towards
European Integration
Karl-Rudolf Korte
Europe now has a new chance for unification. The political situation of
the world is in a state of flux, and Europe is one of its main foci. In all
the Eastern European states people are summing up the events of 1989/
90 in the phrase 'return to Europe' (Ash 1990). From a Western
European viewpoint, it is rather the 'return ofEurope' (Schulze 1990);
with the old contours of Europe (unity in diversity) once more
becoming visible, we can now rediscover a European normality long
regarded as extinct (see Weidenfeld 1990). This 'return to Europe'
involves the wish for constitutions based on the idea of liberty and
human rights, and structured according to the principles of conciliation,
compromise and democracy.
A new epoch, not merely a new phase, has now begun. The
difficulties in determining attitudes towards European integration are
further exacerbated by the coexistence of both new and old elements.
As regards the new elements, for the first time in its history Germany
is uniting not against the wishes, but with the explicit agreement, of its
neighbours, and is firmly integrated in Western systems of alliances.
Germany has now assumed European normality since, as with
Germany's neighbours, state and nation are identical (see Weidenfeld
and Korte 1991a).
As regards the old, Europe can again put its own house in order.
Since the Second World War, the partition of Europe has formed a
completely new element in European history (Gasteyger 1990). It is
only now that Europe's old structure is re-emerging; Europe can
choose unity or diversity. The pictures from Eastern Europe have
helped to bring old experiences and old settings back into Europe's
awareness. Europeans in both East and West are beginning to think
once more in historical and regional categories of life, not merely in
terms of political alliance structures. The partition has thus ceased to
be the sole possibility for a European existence.
No matter whether it is a return to or a return of Europe, whether it
is new or old components in Europe's political content which are
295
296 Attitudes towards European Integration
involved, these attitudes are always traceable to pictures inside our
heads (see Korte 1987). Such national or European images (how we
perceive ourselves and are perceived by others) exert a determining
influence on the community both in social and political terms (see
Korte 1990a passim). People think and act in such images (Dreitze1
1962; Berger and Luclcmann 1969; Dux 1982). Their behaviour is
largely determined by such perceptions, since our consciousness in tum
is determined by a linguistically composed picture of the world and of
ourselves (see Frei 1985, p.12).
What picture do the Germans have of Europe, in concrete terms,
today? Have the recent upheavals changed these attitudes? What are
the differences and similarities between East and West Germans in this
regard? What causal connection between European integration and
German unity determines the Germans' attitudes in the process of political
unification? (See Weidenfeld and Korte 199la for further details.)
In order to arrive at a meaningful assessment of these questions, it is
essential to comprehend that the Germans' attitude towards Europe is
just one facet of complex collective alignments. The Germans' political
and national consciousness receives its specific expression against the
background of regional, European and global attitudes. It is precisely
this differentiated multiplicity of their complex collective identity with
its regional and transnational ties which is the best safeguard against
susceptibilities towards any resurgent and aggressive nationalism. The
weights within the collective perception will presumably change in
Germany from 1990 onwards; unity will be taken for granted by West
and East Germans alike. The questions regarding identity in the
common European home will not be silenced by the mere fact of
German unity, but these questions will most probably have a European
quality about them; they will no longer be governed by the Iron
Curtain as their determinant reality. The complicated history of
Germany makes it unlikely that once unification has been achieved
Germans will cease to be acutely aware of these developments. It is
against this background that the Germans' attitudes towards Europe
have to be fitted into the complex matrix of loyalties involved in home
and society, state and nation.
EUROPEAN ORIENTATION
West Germans in general are favourably disposed towards Europe.
Between 1973 and 1988 an average 77 per cent of respondents in
general population surveys answered that they were in favour of a
Karl-Rudolf Korte 297
united Europe. In the autumn of 1988, this had decreased to 68 per cent
(Unless otherwise quoted, all data are taken from the regular
Eurobarometer surveys carried out on behalf of the EC Commission
in Brussels). It was not until1989 that interest in European integration
began to increase once more: in spite ofthe rather lukewarm interest in
the elections for the European Parliament in the rest of the EC, the
population's positive attitude towards European integration showed an
upturn during 1989. In summarizing central indicators from EC
surveys in October/November 1989, the Eurobarometer concluded that
the population's interest in EC politics had shown a significant
increase. Four out offive persons asked thought that the Community's
affairs were important for their country's future. Total support for the
EC continues to increase.
The question ascertaining just how far the Germans regard their
country's membership in the EC as beneficial reads as follows:
'Generally speaking, is membership a good thing, a bad thing, or
neither good nor bad?' In the autumn of 1989, 63 per cent of West
German respondents thought the Federal Republic's membership was
a 'good thing', and only 7 per cent opted for a 'bad thing'.
In May 1990, 76 per cent of East Germans thought EC membership
ofa united Germany was a 'good thing', with only 1.5 per cent giving it
a 'bad' rating. The rating ofa 'good thing' rose to as high as 87 per cent
during the course of 1990; in no other EC country is there such a high
proportion in favour ofthe EC as in the former GDR. Almost nine out
of ten people are 'in favour of efforts to achieve a united Western
Europe' (88 per cent). The West Germans (like the population of the
EC as a whole) are a little more cautious in their enthusiasm: in the
autumn of 1990, 81 per cent were in favour of efforts to unite Western
Europe, and 69 per cent thought EC membership was a good thing.
About 78 per cent of the population of East Germany are of the
opinion that membership in the EC will have advantages for the former
GDR, and 72 per cent would personally very much regret it if the EC
were to collapse; among West Germans, these percentages are 56 per
cent and 53 per cent respectively. It is interesting to note that the
proportion of East Germans in favour of the EC actually increased
during the process of unification.
INTERESTS AND KNOWLEDGE
The Eurobarometer survey carried out in the autumn of 1990 also
shows that the East Germans are very interested in the EC, and would
298 Attitudes towards European Integration
like to know more about it. No less than 67 per cent of the population
in what used to e the GDR stated that they were 'very interested' or
'pretty interested' in matters involving the EC. In contradistinction,
only 51 per cent ofWest Germans are interested in the EC, and among
the entire EC population this figure amounts to only 47 per cent . The
East Germans' desire for information continues to e very high; only
one in ten feels that he or she 'knows enough about the EC and what it
does', while almost 80 per cent would like to know more about it. By
comparison, 28 per cent of West Germans feel they are sufficiently
informed, while 54 per cent would like to know more.
FUTURE PROFILES
Asked in 1990 about their aims for the future, over 70 per cent of
Germans (76 per cent of East Germans, 70 per cent ofWest Germans)
stated that they wish to see a United States of Europe in the 1990s
(Deutschland 2000 1990, p.47). Approximately 40 per cent do not care
which country the first pan-European head of government may come
from. Around 49 per cent of East Germans (but only 40 per cent of
West Germans) want to see a German at the head of Europe
(Deutschland 2000 1990, p.48). This could be an indicator that
national pride in East Germany is more marked than in the West
(Korte 1990b). On the other hand, significantly more (60 per cent) East
Germans than West Germans (43 per cent) are at the same time against
a united Germany assuming a dominant position in Europe (Spiegel
Spezia/1991, p.48).
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND GERMAN UNITY
The Germans' interest in EC politics and European integration, and
the attitude towards a united Europe, have (as the data quoted above
show) begun to increase again as from 1989, whereas up to 1988 there
had been a continuous deterioration (Noelle-Neumann and Herdegen
1989). It is possible that the upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe
have contributed to this phenomenon.
In concrete terms, West Germans' awareness of Europe has in no
way weakened as a result of the unification process. In this context
there are various questions requiring interpretation: 'What political
objective is currently most urgent for you, what is more important for
you: the unification of the two German states, or the single European
Karl-Rudolf Korte 299
market from 1993?' In early 1990, a total of 53 per cent of West
Germans gave preference to unification, and only 20 per cent thought
the single European market was more important (Noelle-Neumann
and Herdegen 1990, p.282). But, parallel to this, the mood in West
Germany concerning the single market improved during the course of
1990; while attitudes towards the single-market project had worsened
since late 1988, this trend would appear to have come to a halt with
prospects of German unification. This line of interpretation becomes
even more meaningful when the question is posed as to whether the
drive towards European unification should be slowed down in the
present situation or not: early in 1990 SS per cent of West Germans
answered that European integration should not be slowed down. The
objective of a united Europe has not, for the majority, been rendered
obsolete by German unification, but rather the contrary (NoelleNeumann
and Herdegen 1990, p.284).
EASTERN EUROPE
As far back as 1979 the question was asked: 'Should in your opinion
only Western European countries belong to a united Europe, or
should a united Europe include Russia and the countries of Eastern
Europe?' (Noelle-Neumann and Herdegen 1984, p.315). Even then, as
many as one-quarter of West Germans answered that Russia and
Eastern European countries should belong to a united Europe. In
1984 (still before Gorbachev took office) this proportion had already
risen to one-third. The friendlier attitudes towards the Soviet Union
must not, however, be interpreted as a turning away from the West;
70 per cent of West Germans are still in favour of NATO
membership. The Soviet Union's image is gradually coming to
approximate that of the USA; by 1990 Moscow and Washington
are rated almost equally by the Germans, with 68 per cent of West
Germans and 65 per cent of East Germans having a good opinion of
the Soviet Union (Spiegel Spezia/1991, p.25), and 79 per cent of West
Germans and 60 per cent of East Germans having a good opinion of
the United States.
SUMMARY
For the West Germans, Europe means more than just the EC; although
this continues to be a central factor of their European awareness, their
300 Attitudes towards European Integration
thinking (especially in the younger generation) additionally encompasses
Eastern Europe as well, including the Soviet Union.
The feeling ofbeing a European is very marked, and at the same time
perceived with approval. This does not entail any losses in the strength
of national identification patterns; these are still more marked and
more intensive by comparison.
The Germans' attitudes towards the Soviet Union have undergone a
far-reaching and significant change since the introduction of
Gorbachev's reform policies; this has not impaired Germans' attitudes
towards the FRG's ties with the West. It can, however, be assumed that
this trend will have a beneficial effect on relationships with the other
countries of Eastern Europe.
The European ideal is firmly anchored in the minds ofWest and East
Germans alike, with the integration process in the EC generally
approved; the majority of respondents continue to favour efforts to
achieve the unification of Western Europe, and would regret a breakup
of the EC. A majority likewise regard the EC as a good thing, with
Germany profiting from its membership. Approval of the EC is
significantly higher in the five new Lander than in the rest of the
community.
Only a small proportion of persons asked express clear disapproval;
instead of a diffuse enthusiasm for Europe, however, a more
differentiated set of attitudes is becoming apparent, especially with
regard to the consequences of the 1992 single market.
The subject of German unification has in the short term supplanted
the questions of European integration in West Germans' minds. But
the data show unequivocally how both objectives are linked to each
other. The majority of West Germans, particularly in the current
situation of ongoing German unification, also wish to see the process
of European integration accelerated.
The return of or return to Europe offers new opportunities for the
Germans. 'The state of the nation' (Dahrendorf 1990; see also Korte
1988; Weidenfeld and Korte 199lb) is a current topic once more. The
upheavals in Eastern Europe have lent the nation states a new weight.
Global interdependence has been too abstract a concept so far to
satisfy identificatory needs motivated by socio-psychological factors.
The nation state will be retained as a framework for identification, for
even if the nation states in Europe today have similar goals in their
foreign, security and economic policies, and their concept of civilized
values are becoming increasingly convergent, the states will nonetheless
long remain as large-scale receptacles for feelings ofcultural and social
Karl-Rudolf Korte 301
identity. European integration, however, will on the whole reduce the
role ofeach individual nation state. The level of national identification
may nevertheless grow with the increase in the political and economic
integration ofEurope and its internally competitive politics. The nation
states will also continue to represent a protection against hegemonial
aspirations. With partition ended and the German nation becoming
part of everyday reality, 'normality' will now return. In the long term,
the Germans' marked European orientation will most probably settle
down to a lower level more consonant with the European average.