Dm • a • pmocratization Christian W. Haerpfer Patrick Bernhagen Ronald F. Inglehart Christian Welzel OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Theories of Democratization Christian Welzel • Introduction • The Nature and Origin of Democracy • Social Divisions, Distributional Equality, and Democratization • Colonial Legacies, Religious Traditions, and Democracy • Modernization and Democratization • International Conflicts, Regime Alliances, and Democratization • Elite Pacts, Mass Mobilization, and Democratization ■ State Repression and Democratizing Mass Pressures • Institutional Configurations and Democracy • The Human Empowerment Path to Democracy • A Typology of Democratization Processes • Conclusion 74 75 78 80 80 81 B2 83 86 36 87 as Overview This chapter provides an overview of the factors that have been proposed as determinants when, where, and why democratization happens. Several of these factors are synthesized into a broader framework that describes human empowerment as an evolutionary force channelling the intentions and strategies of actors towards democratic outcomes. Introduction The question: which political regime prevails in which society, and why, has been at the heart of political science since Aristotle's first treatment of the problem. And so is the question as to when and why societies democratize. Democratization can be understood in three different ways. For one, it is the introduction of democracy in a non-democratic regime. Next, democratization can be understood as the deepening of the democratic qualities of given democracies. Finally, democratization involves the question of the survival of democracy. Technically speaking, the emergence, the deepening, and the survival of democracy are strictly distinct aspects of democratization. But they merge in the question of sustainable democratization, that is, the emergence of democracies that develop and endure. Democratization is sustainable to the extent to which it advances in response to pressures from within a society. 75 There are many different explanations of democratization processes. Provided, a grain of truth is in most of these explanations, researchers have too often tried to take sides, favouring one particular factor over all others. But the real challenge is to theorize about how different factors interplay in the making of democracy. This is what this chapter aims to achieve. The Nature and Origin of Democracy Before one can think about the causes of democratization one has to have an understanding of what democracy means—for one needs to have an idea of the nature of the phenomenon one wants to explain. In its literal meaning, 'government by the people', " democracy is about the institutionalization of people power. DemocratizstiDH is the process by which this happens. People power is institutionalized through civic freedoms that entitle people to govern their lives, allowing them to follow their personal preferences in governing their private lives and to make their political preferences count in governing public life. In the history of states, the institutionalization of people power has been an unlikely achievement. As power maximizing actors, power elites have a ; natural tendency to give as little power away as : possible. There is a natural resistance among elites - to grant civic freedoms to the wider public because such freedoms limit elite power (Vanhanen 2003). To acquire civic freedoms, ordinary people had usually to overcome elite resistance and to struggle for their cause (Foweraker and Landman 1997). This is no easy achievement. It requires wider parts of the public to be both capable and willing to mount pressures on power elites. Quite logically then, the conditions under which democracy becomes likely must somehow affect the power balance between elites and masses, placing control over resources of power in the hands of the people. Only when some control over resources of power Is distributed over wider parts of the public, are ordinary people capable to coordinate their actions and to iPln forces into social movements that are capable to mount pressure on elites (Tarrow 1998). Under these conditions, bargaining power is vested in wider parts of the public as elites cannot access people's resources without consent. And if elites try to extract resources from people, they have to make concessions in the form of civic freedoms. Such was the case when the principle of 'no taxation without representation' was established during pre-industrial capitalism in North America and Western Europe (Downing 1992). To be sure, no democracy in pre-industrial history would qualify as a democracy under today's standards because one defining element of mature democracies, universal suffrage, was unknown. All pre-industrial democracies were nascent democracies that restricted entitlements to the propertied classes. But nascent democracy was necessary to create mature democracy, encouraging yet disempowered groups to also push for civic freedoms, until universal suffrage created mature democracies early in the twentieth century in parts of the Western world (Markoff 1996). Since then people's struggles for empowerment have continued and expanded. Within established democracies, civil rights and equal opportunity movements did and do fight to deepen democracy's empowering qualities. Beyond established democracies, people power movements did and do pressure to replace authoritarian rule with democracy. It is impossible to understand the driving forces of democratization without understanding why and where democracy first emerged. So we must have a closer look at the origin of nascent democracy in pre-industrial times and the factors giving rise to it. Without exception, all nascent democracies are found in agrarian economies of the freeholder type. Most 77 freeholder societies organized defence in the form of a militia, the citizen-army (Finer 1999). In a freeholder-militia system, all men owning a slot of land provide military service and, In return, are entitled with civic freedoms. In pre-industrial times, a citizen army could only be sustained in a freeholder system. Only the yeoman who could sustain a family on his own could afford the armoury necessary for military service. In a freeholder-militia system citizens had bargaining power against central authorities—for citizens could boycott taxes and military service. Without a standing army at their exclusive disposal, rulers lacked the means to end such boycotts, disabling them to deny or abrogate civic freedoms (McNeill 1968). Nascent democracy limited participation to the propertied classes. Still, compared to other pre-industrial regimes, nascent democracy is characterized by relatively inclusive civic freedoms. This constellation reflects relatively widespread access to basic resources, such as water, land, and armoury, and lack of central control over these resources. These conditions vest action capacities and bargaining power into the wider society and limit the state's repressive potential. The absence versus presence of democracy is about the absence versus presence of centralized control over resources of power (Dahl 1971). Democracy and resource distribution Freeholder systems not only gave rise to nascent democracy but also to pre-industrial capitalism. The combination of freeholdership, pre-industrial capitalism, and nascent democracy is hardly the result of an ingenious act of social engineering, such that some wise men decided at one point in history to create freeholdership, capitalism, and democracy. Instead, this constellation evolved in a cumulative process that was favoured by certain natural endowments. Freeholder systems only emerged where there was lack of centralized control over the resource that makes land valuable: water (Jones 1985). This was the case only where continuous rainfall over the seasons made water so generally available that a centrally coordinated irrigation system was unnecessary (Midlarsky 1997). Continuous rainfall over the seasons is only found in certain climatic zones, especially in North-West Europe, North America, and parts of Australia/New Zealand (Midlarsky 1997). These are the areas wic i we find the threefold constellation of freeholders!! p pre-industrial capitalism, and nascent democracy. ~ Besides the continuity of rainfall, another natural endowment was conducive to nascent democracy. This condition, too, favours democracy by limiting centralized control over resources—in this case not over water but armoury. When a territory is, by mears of its topography, shielded from the continuous threat of land war, there is no necessity to sustain a stanc n.; army at the exclusive disposal of a monarch (Down ing 1992). With no standing army at hand, a rule, i control over coercion is limited. Hence, the propoi tion of sea borders (an island position in the optimal case) has been found to be positively related with the occurrence of nascent democracy (Midlarsky 1997), Iceland, the UK, and Scandinavia are examples. A functional equivalent of the shielding effect of sea borders are mountains. Shielded by the Alps from war with mi;!! -bours, Switzerland never needed a standing army, it sustained a freeholder-militia system, and is hence among the prime examples of nascent democracy. Since democracy is about people power, it originates in conditions that place resources of power in the hands of wider parts of the populace, such that authorities cannot access these resources without ma.; ing concessions to their beholders. But when rulers gain access to a source of revenue they can bring under their control without anyone's consent, they have the means to finance tools of coercion. This is the basis of absolutism, despotism, and autocracy—the opposite of democracy. The sixteenth-century Spanish monarchy turned more absolute after the crown gained co:i:r-:-l over the silver mines in South America. From then on, the Spanish Habsburgs did not have to ask for consent in the cartes to finance military operations (Landes 1998). This is a pre-modern example of what is today known as the 'resource curse'. It is a curse for democracy when a country is endowed with immobile natural resources that are easily brought under central control, giving rulers a source of revenue that requires no i n's consent (Boix 2003). These revenues allow rulers to invest into the infrastructure of their power. Thus, 'oil hinders democracy' as Michael Ross (2001) put it. So, we find both prosperity and democracy to be associated with climate. The more temperate the climate of a country, the more likely it is both to be rich and democratic (Landes 1998). According to Acemoglu arid Robinson (2006), the geographic pattern of both ■ 5pCrity and democracy simply reflects that white guropeans embarked early on a path of both capitalist and democratic development. They brought with them Hie institutions of capitalism and democracy wj,erever they could settle in larger numbers, that is, 'wherever they found a European-like climate. And when they settled in hotter climates, such as the Southern states of the USA or Brazil, they brought slavery and other exploitative institutions with them and resisted democracy. In this view, the global geographic distribution of capitalism and democracy Simply reflects where climate 'required' European settlers to introduce slavery and exploitative plantation economies. But why did Europeans embark on a path of capitalist-democratic development? Simply viewing this as a smart historic choice of Europeans is unsatisfactory. Following Jared Diamond (1997), the more likely reason why Europeans embarked on a course of capitalist-democratic development is that some unique natural endowments made this a more likely 'choice' In Europe than elsewhere. Capitalism, industrialization, and democracy One of the reasons why the duo of pre-industrial capitalism and nascent democracy emerged in Europe, Is that, among the major pre-industrial civilizations, Europe was the only one that sustained rainfed freeholder societies on a larger scale (Jones 1985). But within Europe, this feature varies on a geographical gradient, becoming ever more pronounced as one moves north-westward, culminating in the Netherlands and England. As one approaches Europe's north-west, the continuity of rainfall increases as a result of the Influence of the Gulf Stream. In late medieval times, this led to an increasing agrarian surplus towards the north-west (Jones 1985). From this followed an entire chain of consequences, as shown in Figure 6.1: a larger urban population, a denser network of cities, a more commercialized economy, more advanced capitalism, and bigger and economically more powerful middle classes. Capitalism vested bargaining power in the wider society. In the liberal revolutions and the liberation wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the middle classes used this bargaining power against monarchs to establish the principle 'no taxation without representation' (Tilly 1997). This is the birth of nascent democracy, and capitalism preceded it. However, two qualifications of the claim that capitalism led to democracy are due (see also Ch. 9). First, capitalism led to democracy only where propertied groups, such as rural freeman and urban merchants, represented broad middle classes—not tiny minorities (Moore 1966). This condition was limited to the hubs of the pre-industrial capitalist world economy, centring on North-West Europe and its overseas colonial offshoots in North America (Wallerstein 1974). Colonies that were unsuited for large-scale European settlement were kept under an exploitative regime. Democracy was not imported by Europeans where the colonial interest was focused on extraction rather than settlement (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Second, pre-industrial capitalism only established nascent democracy, limiting civic freedoms to the propertied classes. The establishment of mature democracy with universal (male) suffrage was a product of industrialization and the working class's struggle for political inclusion (Huber, Stephens, and Rueschemeyer 1992). Yet, industrialization did not always lead to mature democracy, at least not to enduring mature democracy. Mature democracy in a stable form followed industrialization only where royal absolutism was prevented or abandoned and where nascent democracy was established already in pre-industrial times (Huntington 1968). There is no uniform connection between industrialization and democracy. In fact, the fierce class struggles connected with the rising industrial working class often operated against democracy. Of course, industrialization almost always led to the symbolic integration of the working class by granting universal suffrage. But universal suffrage was as often organized in authoritarian ways as in democratic ones. Communist, fascist, and other forms of dictatorship all adopted universal suffrage in the industrial age. And while the working class almost always fought for universal suffrage, it often sided with populist, fascist, and communist parties that aborted the civic freedoms that define democracy (Lipset 1960). Achieving mature democracy in a stable form at an early stage was neither the achievement of the middle 79 7ß Fig 6.! Factors explaining the northern Atlantic origins of capitalism and democracy classes nor tire working class alone. It appeared when the middle classes did not take sides against the working class (Collier 1999). This in turn only happened when the middle classes' victory over to aristocracy and royal absolutism was so decisive that neither an alliance with the aristocracy, nor reliance on state repression was an option in dealing »rth the working class. Partly for reasons originating m natural endowments, these conditions were hiJorl rally unique to North-West Europe and its ow^H offshoots (Moore 1966). Social Divisions, Distributional Equality, and Democratization Except under conditions found in North-West Europe and its overseas offshoots, the social class struggles associated with industrialization did not generally work in favour of democracy. This can De turned into a more general point. When class cleavages and group distinctions turn nxo^i political camps fight for the monopohzationo power in order to become capable of repress,np claims of rival groups. This pattern works .! democracy (Dahl 1971). Class cleavages turn easily into enmities when classes are segregated into separated milieus, when rtbliticn! parties are single-class parties, and when llie distribution of economic resources between Classes is extremely unequal. Under such circumstances, class coalitions and compromises are unlikely- Rivalry and enmity between groups will prevail (Lipset 1960). In European countries with a tradition of royal absolutism and continued privileges of the aristocracy, industrialization regularly produced such class divisions, polarizing an impoverished rural and urban working class against a privilege0' class of land owners, industrialists, bankers nnd office holders in the state apparatus and the army (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Outside Europe, Industrialization had the same effect in areas the Europeans colonized out of 'extractive interests' "■rather than for reasons of settlement (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Wherever industrialization produced class polarization of dlis kind, the privileged classes would fear working class parties to be voted into office. Once in office, these parties might use their power to enforce land reforms and other redistributive measures that deprive the privileged classes of their privileges. Thus, the privileged classes would rely on state repres-uj'i to prevent working class parties from gaining po'ver, Confronted with state repression, working as activists would, in turn, radicalize and embrace xw utlonary goals, aimed at a total reversion of the exis-ing social order (Collier 1999). This is pretty mirn the pattern that explains Latin America's long lasting capture between right-wing military regimes ind leftist guerrilla warfare (see Ch. 19). Democratic countries in the 'centre' of world capi-l.hsm would often support the repression of working cUss interests in the 'periphery' in order to be iijle to., outsource labour into cheap-wage regions n:!u -ri:order to prevent communism from taking countries in the capitalist periphery. During the C:ild War, and before the Washington consensus, Hie jitallst world system favoured democracy in hhc centres of capitalism, but authoritarian rule in & periphery (Wallerstein 1974). In any case, it can ksiiuthat extreme social polarization is detrimen-.!aJ 1? democracy because group polarization turns MSiU into violent fights for the monopolization of the state (Dahl 1971). Peaceful power transfers from one group to another, as democracy foresees them, are not accepted under these conditions. Instead, military coups and civil wars that end up in the dictatorship of one group over others are the regular result of polarized societal cleavage structures (Huntington 1968). The logic of group enmity does not only apply to social class. Societies can also be segregated into hostile groups on the basis of religion, language, and ethnicity, and the chances for this to happen increase with a country's religious, linguistic, and ethnic frac-tionalization, especially when fractionalization goes together with spatial group segregation (Rokkan 1983). Spatial segregation facilitates the stabilization of group identities, and this is an important precondition for the development of group hostilities. Sub-Saharan Africa, as the region with the highest ethnic fractionalization, exemplifies the latter type of group enmity and its negative effect on the chances of democracy to flourish (see Ch. 22). These insights can be turned into positive conditions far the emergence and survival of democracy. The presence of a large middle class, in whom economic differences do not go beyond a certain range, is a condition that eases group enmity, which in turn increases the acceptance of democratic power transfers between groups. Seen in this light, the transition of industrial to post-industrial societies is a positive development because it overcomes the sharp division between the working class and the privileged classes that characterized the industrial age (Bell 1973). When resources are more equally distributed across socioeconomic, religious, ethnic, and other groups, this can diminish existential hostilities, making groups more inclined to accept each other as legitimate contenders for political power. If there is less at stake in the power game, all groups can be more relaxed about others winning the game for just one electoral round. Relative equality in the distribution of resources has thus a diminishing effect on hostilities for all sorts of groupings, be they class-related or ethnicity-related. In models explaining democratization, measures of income distribution are often used and have many times been found to significantly increase the chances of democracy to emerge and survive (Muller 1995; Vanhanen 2003). 81 Colonial Legacies, Religious Traditions, and Democracy In its northern Atlantic origins, democracy is intimately connected to two traditions: Protestant religion and British descent (Lipset 1959). But this does not mean that Protestantism and British descent per se favoured democracy. They did so insofar as they were situated in the northern Atlantic centre of pre-industrial capitalism (Bollen and Jackman 1985). Neither Protestantism nor Britishness created pre-industrial capitalism. Countries such as the Netherlands, Iceland, and Denmark, were located at the northern Atlantic and so they embraced pre-industrial capitalism and nascent democracy, despite the Fact that they were not British. Vice versa, Protestant Prussia was far off the northern Atlantic, so it neither embraced pre-industrial capitalism nor nascent democracy (Tilly 1997). Belgium, by contrast, was mainly Catholic but it is located at the northern Atlantic, so it adopted pre-industrial capitalism and nascent democracy. Contrary to Max Weber (1958 [1904]), who claimed that Protestantism created capitalism, it is just as plausible to argue that societies that were already capitalist adopted Protestantism as the religion granting the most legitimacy to the capitalist system (Landes 1998). The relationship between Protestantism and capitalist democracy is as easily misunderstood as the fact that many of the early democracies are still monarchies today (e.g. UK, The Netherlands, Scandinavian countries). Monarchies survived until today in some of the oldest democracies because these monarchies did not insist on royal absolutism. Instead, they negotiated social contracts by which civic freedoms have been granted, creating constitutional monar chies that are anchored in society rather than being absolute from it (Lipset 1960). Similarly misunderstood is the relationship between Islam and democracy. It has often been said that Islamic traditions are unfavourable to democratization (Huntington 1996). And indeed, thebelt of Islamic countries" from North-West Africa to South-East Asia is still the least democratized region in the world. However, this might not reflect a negative influence of Islam per so Instead, for reasons of natural endowments, an unusual proportion of Islamic societies have based their! economies on the export of oil. This places revenues in the hands of rulers without requiring anyone's consent, which is what explains the absence of democ-; racy. As Michael Ross (2001; 2008) argues, Islam has. little negative effect of its own on democracy, onre one controls for oil exports. The same logic that, explains why the capitalist development of Protestant i societies favoured democracy explains why oil exports in the Islamic societies hinders democracy. Capitalist development tends to spread control over resources of power among wider parts of the society. Oil exports,' by contrast, tend to concentrate control over resources of power in the hands of dynasties (see also Chs 8 and 21). On a more general note, explaining certain countries' affinity or aversion to democracy by criteria that simply group them into 'cultural zones,' 'civilizations', or 'families of nation' is inherently unsatisfactory as long as one cannot specify what exactly it Is about these grouping criteria that creates these affinities and aversions. Modernization and Democratization Because of democracy's obvious link to capitalist development, 'modernization' has been most often championed as the decisive driver of democratization (Lerner 1958; Lipset 1959; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994). The thesis that modernization favours democratization has been repeatedly challenged, but time and again it has been re-established against these challenges. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi ,.qqy)f for instance, thought to demonstrate that (flDdernizati011 only helps existing democracies to sur-yjye but does not help democracy to emerge. Howev-jf Calles Boix and Susan Stokes (2003) used the same [iafii to show that modernization operates in favour 0f both the emergence and the survival of democracy. ^ of today, the fact that modernization operates in favour of democracy is beyond serious doubts. fThe reasons as to exactly what it is about modernization that operates in favour of democracy are jess clear. Modernization constitutes a whole bundle of intertwined processes, including productivity ■growth, urbanization, occupational specialization, social diversification, rising levels of income and prosperity, rising literacy rates and levels of education, more widely accessible information, more Intellectually demanding professions, technological : advancement in people's equipment and available infrastructure, including means of communication and transportation, and so on. Which of these processes does exactly what to increase the chances of a country to become and remain democratic is an unresolved problem, and most likely these effects are not : isolable. Perhaps, it is precisely the fact that they are so closely intertwined that makes them so powerful. One tiling, however, seems clear that all these processes do together. They enhance tile resources availa-: ble to ordinary people, and this increases the masses' : capabilities to launch and sustain collective actions for common demands, mounting effective pressures on state authorities to respond. Given that state authorities, by the nature of their positional interest, aim to preserve as much autonomy from mass pressures as possible, democratization is an unlikely result, unless the masses become capable to overcome the authorities' resistance to empower them (Vanhanen 2003). The major effect of modernization, then, is that it shifts the power balance between elites and the masses to the mass side. Democracy certifies this process institutionally. Box 6.1 Key points • Social divisions that foster group enmities hinder peaceful power transfers that are necessary for democracy to function. • Democracy is anchored in social conditions in which resources of power are widely distributed among the population so that central authority cannot access these resources without their beholder's consent. • Certain natural conditions have been favourable to a more widespread control over resources but modernization can happen everywhere and it is important because it tends to distribute the control over resources in the ways that favour democracy. International Conflicts, Regime Alliances, and Democratization The fact that scores of countries have democratized in distinctive international waves suggests that processes of democratization cannot be considered as isolated domestic events (see Chs. 4 and 7). They are influenced by international factors, especially the outcome of confrontations between opposing regime alliances. Therbom (1977) noticed that countries democratize as much as a consequence of wars as of modernization. Whether, and when, countries democratize has often been decided by the outcome of international confrontations between the enduring alliance of Western democracies and shifting counter-alliances of antidemocratic empires. Thus, regime changes towards and away from democracy are not only a matter of power struggles between pro-democratic and antidemocratic forces within countries. Instead, power struggles between opposing regime forces take also place on the international stage, in confrontations between democratic and antidemocratic regime alliances. Indeed, three waves of democratization followed precisely such confrontations. Western 82 CKRiSTIAfJ ü-f-Licl. democracies defeated the alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire in World War I; this led to a (later reversed) wave of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe. Western democracies again, together with the Soviet Union, defeated the fascist axis powers in World War II and this led to another wave of democratization, including, for the first time, countries outside the West, such as India and Japan. Finally, Western democracies triumphed over communism in the Cold War, leading to the most recent and massive wave of democratization throughout Eastern Europe and parts of Africa and Asia (Huntington 1991, McFaul 2002). Part of the explanation as to why democracy has been spreading is the technological and military superiority of democracies, and their tendency to Join forces against antidemocratic empires. Together, these two factors have enabled democracies to free societies from the tyranny of antidemocratic empires—when necessary, Western democracies have used their power to install democracy by military intervention, as in Grenada or Iraq. Since the 1980s, they have also used their economic power to press countries depending on Western credits to adopt electoral democracy. This was a dramatic paradigm shift. During the Cold War, the capitalist world system was favourable to democracy in the centres of capitalism and to authoritarian rule at its periphery. But since the Washington consensus, Western countries promoted electoral democracy throughout the globe. Installing a system of electoral accountability seemed to be a better safeguard of investment security than the arbiträr)' rule of eccentric dictators, especially after communism and socialism lost their appeal. In addition, rich Western democracies dominate the global entertainment industry and images of the living conditions in Western countries spread around the planet. Consequently, people associate everywhere democracy with the freedom and prosperity of the West. And insol jr " people find freedom and prosperity attractive, dem^, racy has become the preferred type of regime in in™! populations of the world (Fulcuyama 1990; Klinm mann 1999; Inglehart 2003). The economic, technological, and media domi nance of Western democracies are important ex |j-atory factors in the recent spread of demorracv Democratization is hence, to some extent, an e \t.. nally triggered phenomenon. But whether externals triggered democratization leads to viable and i f tj. tive democracy still depends on domestic canditiols within a country. External influences can open impbr.j tant opportunities for democratic forces in countries where such forces exist. But external influences cj i. not create democratic forces where they do notexiy And without democratic forces growing strong inside a country, democracy will not be socially embeddii It remains a socially aloof, and hence, hollow phe. ■ nomenon. Even if most people in a country associate positive things with the term democracy, this does not necessarily mean that people understand the freedoms that define democracy nor that they have the meai, and the will to straggle for these freedoms. Externally triggered democratization has led to a spread of electoral democracy, but not necessanly effective democracy (Welzel and Inglehart 2008). Many new democracies have successfully installed campetUta electoral regimes but their elites are corrupt and lack a commitment to the rule of law that is needed to enfoi u. the civic freedoms that define democracy (O'Donnell 2004). These deficiencies render democracy ineffective. The installation of electoral democracy can be triggered by external forces and incentives. But whether electoral democracy becomes effective in respecting and protecting people's civic freedoms depends l-ii domestic factors. Democracies have become effectn--only where the masses put the elites under pressure to respect their freedoms (Welzel 2007). Elite Pacts, Mass Mobilization, and Democratization Besides mass-level factors, actor constellations at the elite level are widely considered decisive for democratization processes. Considering transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy, scholars distinguish two opposing sets of actors: the regime elite and the regime opposition. The regime elite is usually nr: fjblitMc bloc but a coalition of farces that can ' under certain circumstances into an orthodox ^ us qu0 camP anci 3 'ii:)eral teiorm camp. The ''""nie opposition, too, is often divided into a mod-.bargainingcamp and a radical revolution camp !^,ErandTaylorl996). TrP early transition literature argued that a regime •isition in an authoritarian system cannot achieve - wnsiücm to democracy unless a split in the regime Vie occurs and a liberal reform camp becomes visible lOncrinell etal. 1986; Higley and Burton 2006). Such i|^,|itIs likely to occur after a major economic crisis, .jlost war or other critical events that undermine the legitimacy of the regime. Such critical events lead to flfe formation of a liberal reform camp that aims to regain legitimacy by initiating a liberalization process. If In such a situation the regime opposition is dominated by a moderate camp whose proponents are willing t° bargain with the reform camp in the regime elite, a negotiated transition to democracy becomes 83 possible. This interpretation sees negotiated transitions via elite pacts as the ideal path to democracy. Mass anti-regime mobilization is not only unnecessary for democratic regime transitions from this point of view; it even endangers their success by prompting the regime elite to close its ranks and tempting it to issue repressive measures (Casper and Taylor 1996). The recent democratization literature has altered these views rather decisively, emphasizing the positive role of non-violent mass opposition in knocking over authoritarian regimes and establishing democracy (Karatnyckl and Ackerman 2005; Ulfelder 2005; Welzel 2007). These studies show that democracy is in most cases achieved when ordinary people struggle for it against reluctant elites. Democratization processes of recent decades have been most far-reaching and most successful where the masses were mobilized into democracy movements in such numbers and so ubiquitously that state authorities could not suppress them easily. State Repression and Democratizing Mass Pressures Recent studies on the positive role of mass opposition have altered our view on the survival of authoritarian regimes. Usually It was held that authoritarian regimes can use repression to silence opposition and that this allows them to endure, even if the masses find their regime preferences 'falsified' (Kuran 1991). However, most authoritarian regimes did not survive because of their ability to repress mass opposition (Wintrobe 1998). In fact, most authoritarian regimes J'tl not have to deal with widespread mass opposi-Hon;most of the time (Francisco 2005). This might partlybe so because a credible threat of repression alone can keep people from opposing a regime. Yet, for the credibility of repression to become the key factor in stabilizing authoritarian rule, there must be a.wldespread belief in the illegitimacy of authoritarian rule in the first place. And this does not always Seetn to be the case. In fact, as Samuel Huntington (1991:143) notes, most of the authoritarian regimes that were swept away by mass opposition movements late in the twentieth century, were initially 'almost always popular and widely supported'. It is only when people come to find appeal in the freedoms that define democracy that they begin to consider dictatorial powers as illegitimate. Only then does the threat of repression become a relevant stabilization factor of authoritarian rule. And yet, there is ample evidence from the non-violent, pro-democratic mass upheavals of recent decades that when a population begins to long for freedoms, mass opposition does emerge—in spite of repressive threats (Karatnycki and Ackerman 2005; Schock 2005; Welzel 2007). Once opposition becomes manifest, the success of attempts at repression does not only depend on the extent of coercion used; it depends as much on the size and scope of the mass opposition itself. Indeed, mass opposition can grow so wide that repression becomes too costly, overwhelming the power holders' repressive capacities. In such cases power holders are forced to open the way to a regime change. This happened quite often during the last three decades. Huge mass opposition swept away authoritarian regimes in scores of countries, including some strongly coercive regimes. The point here is that the desire for 84 democratic freedoms and the corresponding belief in the illegitimacy of dictatorial powers are variables, not constants. When these variables grow strong, they provide a powerful motivational force for the mobilization of mass opposition in authoritarian regimes as soon as opportunities occur (Oberschall 1996). And no regime has the power to foreclose the rise of opportunities. Repression cannot isolate authoritarian regimes from the destabilizing effect of eroding legitimacy and rising mass demands for democracy. Mass beliefs and democratization Socioeconomic modernization and the emergence of mass democracy movements are not necessarily contradictory explanations of democratization. They are simply located at different stages in the causal sequence. By enhancing ordinary people's available resources, modernization increases collective action capacities on the part of the masses and thus makes mass democracy movements possible, be it to achieve democracy when it is denied, to defend it when it is challenged, or to advance it when it stagnates. But even If we link modernization with democracy movements, there is still something missing. As social movement research has shown, powerful mass movements do not simply emerge from growing resources among the population. Social movements must be inspiredby a common cause that motivates their supporters to take costly and risky actions (McAdam 1986). This requires ideological 'frames' that create meaning and grant legitimacy to a common cause so that people follow it with inner conviction (Snow and Benford 1988). Successful frames are not arbitrary social constructions and not every frame is equally appealing in every population. Instead, frames must resonate with ordinary people's prevailing values to generate widespread and passionate support. This is why values are important. To advance democracy, people have not only to be capable to struggle for its advancement; they also have to be willing to do so. And for this to happen, they must value the freedoms that define democracy. This is not always a given, and is subject to changes in the process of value transformation. Structural approaches implicitly assume that the masses do always anyways want democracy, so this is a stable and constant factor that does not vary across ' populations (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). ftut ' ample evidence from the major cross-national sun programmes shows that the extent to which afd[_ nary people value democratic freedoms varies widely ' across populations (Dalton, Shin and Jou 2007; Sh r and Tusalem 2007). Hence, to make plausible thar modernization favours democracy, one has not only to show that it increases people's capability to strug. gle for democratic freedoms but also that it increz ^ their willingness to do so. This seems unlikely from the perspective of msti tutiona] learning theory. Dankwart Rustow's (19Tu( 'habituation model', for instance, maintains that p ca pie learn to appreciate democracy's freedoms onlv i[ they have gathered experience with the practice q; these freedoms. This requires democratic institutians to be in place for democratic values to emerge. In -115 view, people's valuation of democratic freedoms is endogenous to the presence of democratic institutions and does not cause them. Since an intrinsic valuj..nn of democratic freedoms among the populace can only occur under enduring democratic institutions, modernization cannot give rise to pro-democratic values, unless it advances under democratic institutions By contrast, Christian Welzel and Ronald Ingleharl (2008) argue that people's valuation of democratic freedoms reflects how much utility they see in these freedoms. And perceived utility is not only depend ing on first-hand-experience with the practice of these freedoms. It depends primarily on the resources;; that people command, for the more resources people have, the more they need freedoms to make use ol them (Rostow 1961). Hence, growing and spreading;; resources increase the utility of democratic freedoms;: in ways that are easily becoming obvious. Accord inly, Figure 9.3 in Chapter 9 demonstrates that, under; mutual controls, the endurance of democracy his r.i-effect on people's valuation of democratic freedoms; while modernization has. Emphasis on democratic freedoms is more driven by the utility of these fre<-dc-iu than by the experience of them. This makes it ri'isi-ble that an intrinsic desire for democracy emei^'"> m authoritarian regimes and that pro-democracy i cti\-ists can create civic rights frames that resonate with people's emerging valuation of freedoms. People's valuation of democratic freedoms becomes manifest in emancipative beliefs that emphasize the ■ .Met, freedom, agency, equality and trustworthi-lei^of ordinary people (Welzel and Inglehart 2008). j/nese values emerge, they motivate elite-challeng-, i collective actions (Welzel 2007). In fact, eman-ciTjtlve beliefs motivate elite-challenging collective 10nS on every level of democracy (or lack thereof). Iiid'bn all levels of democracy, emancipative mass '.-} ons operate in favour of democracy, helping to iciieve democracy when it was absent and to sustain It when it is present. Cniinter-intuitively, at first glance, the type of mass beliefs tapping public support for democracy in a -•most direct way is irrelevant to democracy, both to its wnival and its emergence (Inglehart 2003). The per-CLi-tiige of people in a country who say they support ae l.ocracy strongly and reject authoritarian alternant r- to democracy strictly, has no effect whatsoever „ , 1'ibscquent measures of democracy, once one controls for the dependence of these attitudes on prior democracy (Welzel 2007). What matters is not whether people support democracy but for what reasons they do SO (Schedler and Sarsfield 2006). Only when people support democracy for the freedoms that define it, are they ready to mount pressures on elites to introduce -.''these freedoms when they are denied, to defend them 'When they are challenged, or to advance them when they stagnate. Thus, people's explicit support for democracy advances democracy if—and only if—this support is motivated by emancipative values. Devoid of these values, support for democracy has no effect. Elite-conceded versus mass-pressured democratization Two recent approaches link modernization to actor constellations and by doing so claim to have found the reason why modernization favours democratization. The two approaches are in direct contradiction to each other. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) interpret democracy as the result of a struggle over economic redistribution between propertied elites and impoverished masses. In this view, democracy is a struggle for universal suffrage in which both sides are motivated by conflicting interests in economic redistribution. The masses want democracy because universal suffrage Would enable them to redistribute income from the 85 elites, and the elites oppose it for precisely the same reason. Consequently, the elites will only concede universal suffrage if they have reason to believe it will not lead to extensive redistribution—otherwise, they will suppress mass demands for suffrage. The reason why modernization is important in this model is that it is assumed to close the income gap between the elites and the masses, tampering the masses' interest in extensive redistribution and the elites' fear of it. Suppressing the masses' demands for democracy becomes then more costly than conceding democracy and so the elites concede democracy. An additional reason why elites have less to fear from conceding democracy is when their capital is so mobile that they can move it out of the reach of taxation into other countries (Bofx 2003). Several strong assumptions underlie this model (these assumptions are not always made explicit but without them the model would not work). First, variation in mass demands for democracy cannot account for the emergence and survival of democracy, since the model assumes that the masses are always in favour of democracy. Second, the decision to democratize is always fully in the hands of the elites; they decide whether to repress mass demands for democracy.or whether to concede democracy. Third, modernization increases the chances to democratize by changes in income equality and capital mobility that make universal suffrage more acceptable to the elites. The human empowerment approach of Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel (2005) favours the exact opposite assumptions. First, these authors find a great deal of variation in the degree to which given publics desire democratic freedoms. Second, the decision to expand democratic freedoms Box 6,2 Key point • The global diffusion Qf democracy resulted partly from the military defeat of anti-democratic empires by allied democratic powers. • Mass-pressured democratization is the more frequent and more successful type of democratization as compared to merely elite-conceded democratization. 86 -CHRISTIAN Ifi/ELicL remains exclusively an elite choice only as long as ordinary people's action resources are meagre. But this is precisely what modernization changes. It greatly increases ordinary people's action resources, enabling them to mount more powerful collective actions, putting increasingly effective pressure on elites. Third, the survival of authoritarian regimes Is not simply a question of whether elites choose to repress the masses—it reflects the balance of forces between elites and masses, which tends to shift to Beside socioeconomic modernization, social divisions, international regime alliances, elite constellations, social movements and mass beliefs, institutional factors have been claimed to influence democratization. Barbara Geddes (1999) argues that the type of authoritarian regime shapes the chances of democracy to emerge. She differentiates three types of authoritarian regimes: personalistic regimes, military regimes, and single-parry regimes. By means of their institutional variation, these regimes are supposed to be vulnerable to different degrees to democratizing forces, as they offer different opportunities for regime opponents and command different resources to restrict their radius. Indeed, these three types of authoritarianism are vulnerable in different degrees to mass regime opposition (Ulfelder 2005). But the point is that all three of them are more likely to break down and to transit to democracy under the pressure of anti-regime mobilization. The level at which regime type and other institutional variables operate is what is commonly called 'political opportunity structure' (Tarrow 199S). Any authoritarian regime, even the most powerful one, has some sort of a control deficit, depending on institutional structures. Depending on the nature and extent of these control deficits, authoritarian regimes offer democratic forces different opportunities to merge into a democratic mass movement. But one should not for-' get that opportunity structures do not by themselves create these mass movements and that no authoritarian regime has the power to foreclose opportunities ' forever. Once the resources and values that make people capable and willing to struggle for freedoms have emerged, people will find and create opportunities to Join forces in mass democracy movements. Provided r such movements grow strong enough, no authoritarian regime can resist them forever, regardless what institutional type of authoritarian regime it is. Institutional variation plays also a role when it; comes to existing democracy's malfunctions, which;: can be an important factor of their stability and survival. There is a large literature on the deficiencies of presidential democracies, as opposed to parliamentary democracies, and it is widely believed that presiden- ■■ rial democracies are more vulnerable to antidemocratic challenges (Linz and Valenzuela 1994; M airovaring • and Shugart 1997; Lijphart 1999). Again, the ;rji-ment is about opportunity structures. By means of. their institutional structures, presidential democracies might offer antidemocratic challengers better opportunities to operate. But institutional opportunities do not create these challengers. Other, more deeply rooted societal factors are responsible for this. 3y iicreasing people's action resources, moderniza-li-n increases the utility of democratic freedoms and i rliies so in ways that are easily made perceptible through frames, so that people's valuation of these "ireetloms grows. This gives rise to emancipative values, ma Wng Pub"cs more willing to struggle for democratic freedoms. . popular struggles for democracy become manifest In social movements whose activists frame democratic goals and mobilize the masses in support of these goals in campaigns that sustain elite-challenging actions (Foweraker and Landman 1997). If elites do not voluntarily give in, in anticipation of these mass pressures, these pressures can grow too 'strong to resist, forcing elites to give in, either by introducing democracy when they have denied it or by advancing it when they were to bloc its further advancement. This sequence is what Welzel and Inglehart (2008) call the 'human empowerment' path to democracy, as shown in Figure 6.2. It follows a-sequence such that (1) growing action resources empower people materially by making them more capable to struggle for freedoms, (2) rising emancipative beliefs empower them mentally by making them more willing to struggle for freedoms, and (3) democracy empowers them legally by allowing people to practice freedoms. The more human empowerment has advanced in its material and mental dimensions, making people capable and willing to practice democratic freedoms, the more sustainable the legal component of human empowerment—democracy—becomes. The human empowerment path to democracy is not the only path to democracy. But it is arguably the only path producing socially embedded and hence sustainable democracy. Putnam's (1993) social capital theory of democracy represents a specific aspect of the general human empowerment framework (see also Ch. 11). As human empowerment advances in its material and mental dimensions, it makes people more capable and more willing to initiate and sustain collective action. In doing so, human empowerment creates social capital as a by-product. democratization, and imposed democratization. In each of these types, the power elites' vested interest in monopolizing power is overcome by reasons other than mass pressures. In each of these types this leads to socially detached rather than embedded democracy, the latter of which can only result from mass responsive democratization. One of the reasons why power elites might overcome their natural resistance to democratize is The Human Empowerment Path to Democracy Synthesizingthe above discussion, we can nowidentify a 'master sequence' towards sustainable democratization. Modernization enhances the action resources of ordinary people, making them more capable to struggle for democratic freedoms in launching popular movements that sustain elite-challenging activities The human empowerment path to democracy is responsive to mass pressures for democracy. This path constitutes responsive democratization. This has been the dominant type of democratization in the emergence of nascent democracies and in the global Wave of democratization of recent times. But there are other types of democratization processes that do not respond to mass pressures. These types can be Classified as enlightened democratization, opportunistic A Typology of Democratization Processes the mass side with ongoing modernization, 'n, ' recent waves of democratization were, in large p,-." a story of effective mass mobilization, motivated 1 ' strong emancipative beliefs among people who had become increasingly skilled and ambitious at or^ar izing social movements. In this view, the major elfect' of modernization is not that it makes democ ii v more acceptable to elites. It is that modernizan0nt increases ordinary people's capabilities and will nn. ness to struggle for democratic freedoms. Institutional Configurations and Democracy 87 MATERIAL EMPOWERMENT: Crowing action resources empower tapability-wrse, enabEing peopfe to practice freedoms. MENTAL EMPOWERMENT: Rising emancipative values empower ambillon-wlse, motivating people to practice freedoms. LEGAL EMPOWERMENT: Expanding civic freedoms empower entitlement.-wise, allowing people to practice freedoms. v7 V V HUMAN EMPOWERMENT (people being capable, willing, and entitled to practice freedoms) f|n 6i2 The human empowerment path towards democratization 88 CHRISTIAN WELZE when negative historical experiences have discredited alternative forms of government. The adoption of democracy in post-World War II Germany, Italy, and Japan partly fall into this category. This type of enlightened democratization is the only type in which elites effectively respect democratic standards even in absence of mass pressures to do so. But this model is very rare in history as it is at odds with power elites' natural tendency to resist democratization. Another reason why elites concede democracy even in the absence of mass pressures is when these elites depend on the will of external powers and when these powers are pushing for democracy. This case of imposed democratization is again typical of post-war democracies such as West Germany, Austria, Italy, and Japan after World War II. The US-led attempts to install democracy in post-war Afghanistan and Iraq fall into the same category of externally imposed democratization, though it is far from clear whether the latter cases will be successful. Conclusion Some approaches to understand democratization focus on societal conditions, such as modernization or distributional equality. Other approaches emphasize the role of collective actions, including elite pacts or mass mobilization. Conditions and actions are often portrayed as contradictory explanations of democratization when in fact a full understanding of democratization needs to highlight the interplay between conditions and actions. It is self-evident that democratization is not an automatism that guides itself without agents. Instead, it is the outcome of intentional collective actions, involving strategies of power elites, campaigns of social movement activists, and mass participation. Thus, any explanation of democratization intending to illuminate the role of social conditions must make plausible how these conditions shape actor constellations. On the other hand, it is just as self-evident that actions leading to democratic outcomes are the result of choices that are socially conditioned. Thus, it is the task of action-centred approaches to illuminate how concrete actions respond to social conditions. Still another and increasingly widespread case uj which elites concede democracy in the absence of i p . pressures is when they believe they can easily corrupt democratic standards in practice and when the prete-of democracy is perceived as a useful means to open the doors to tile international community, espeu-1 i donor organizations. This case of opportunistic demr^-j. tization has become more likely since the Washington consensus, as a result of which western credits i.,-vc been tied to conditions of 'good governance.' In the enlightened, imposed, and opportun sli types of democratization, elites concede demo^r. z; despite absent mass pressures to do so. Among these three types, elites respect democratic freedoms tff.[-. tively only in the enlightened type but this type i< i ,i-c In the imposed and opportunistic types of democu tization, elites do not effectively respect democratic freedoms. Responsive democratization is the o-,|y type of democratization in which democracy bee -p-a socially embedded and hence socially sustainable. Figure 6.3 suggests motivational mass fenrfrariti as the intervening force that helps translate objective social conditions into intentional collective ticn.im Motivational tendencies are based on shared beliefs and values. They are shaped, on one hand, by social conditions because what people believe and value ■■ not a context-free given but reflects objective circumstances. On the other hand, motivational tendencies direct intentions towards goals that inspire actim*. The path in Figure 6.3 focuses on mass response? democratization because this is the socially mosl sustainable type of democratization process. For this type of democratization to become possible, people must have the resources that enable them to < c: jointly for democratic freedoms, and this is where social conditions become relevant. Socioeconum " modernization, for instance, places more resources into the hands of ordinary people, enhancing their capacity for collective action. But in order to take the risks and costs to act jointly for democratic freed i"r people must passionately believe in these freedoms. This is where emancipative values become important. Where these values develop, they provide s 89 Grievance: Denied, deficient or challenged democratic freedoms. 5X International or domestic trigger event. Crll*1r, and spread of rBOUrcB making wider . is of society [□Wand sustain collective e||tfr<:hal!enging ^action. Widespread resources extend ordinary people's action repertoire, thus increasing the utility at democratic freedoms. Objective Soda! Conditions Emergence and Social movement diffusion activists find of values the resources p re disposi Honing to mobilize mass wider parts of support, and society in can frame favour of democratic goals* democratic that resonate with freedoms. people's values. Motivational Mass Tendencies Social movement activists mobilize elite-challenging mass actions pressuring for democratic goals'. Elite measures realizing democratic goals". Intentional Collective Actions MASS RESPONSIVE DEMOCRATIZATION •Geo 1 aiming at the introduction, deepening or defence of democratic freedoms. Fig 63 Causal path toward mass-pressured democratization Tii-vational force that predispositions people ]n favour of democratic freedoms. If people have required both the capability and the willingness to (Din forces in struggling for democratic freedoms, and if there is reason for grievance because these ■ freedoms are denied, deficient or challenged, at some "point a critical event will prompt people to actually act together for these freedoms, be it to establish, to ■'deepen or to defend them. Provided these actions grow strong enough, power elites will be forced to ■ give In to their demands. When this happens we witness mass responsive democratization. Mass responsive democratization is the joint result □f objective social conditions, motivational mass tendencies, and intentional collective actions, triggered by critical events, in the context of enduring "grievances. The role of objective social conditions in QUESTIONS this causal interplay is that they determine a society's capabilities for collective action. The role of motivational mass tendencies is that they shape the intentions that inspire collective actions. The role of grievances is that they provide a reason to become active for the sake of given goals. The role of critical events is that they provide a trigger for collective actions. And the role of collective actions is that they constitute a challenge that, when becoming strong enough, leads to a political change. Again, mass responsive democratization is not the only path to democracy. For democracy can be imposed by foreign powers or adopted by unilateral elite actions. But mass responsive democratization is the only path to democracy that creates socially embedded democracy. And only socially embedded democracy is sustainable democracy. 1. What is nascent democracy? 2. Which structural factors favour democratization? 3. Which structural factors impede democratization? 4. Why did democracy and capitalism co-evolve in Western Europe and North America? 5. Why did industrialization not always favour democratization? 6. What is the role of mass motivational tendencies in democratization? Visit the Online Resource Centre that accompanies this book for additional question to accompany each chapter, and a range of other resources: . FURTHER READING Acemoglu, D, and Robinson, J. A. (2006), Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy \\r „ York, NY: Cambridge University Press), Encompassing account of the origins of democfür from a political economy perspective. Casper, G. and Taylor, M. M. (1996), Negotiating Democracy (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press). This book is the best on actor strategies, comparing failed and sucl^iiClI cases of democratization. Dahl, R. A. (1971), Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press). This classic provides the theoretically most comprehensive account of demoi iun until today. Foweraker, J. and Landman, T. (1997), Citizenship Rights and Social Movements (Oxford: Oxford University Press). One of the best books on democratization from a social movement perspective. Huntington, S. P. (1991), The Third Wave (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press). Tin classic on waves of democratization and what causes them. Inglehart, R. and Welze!, C. (2005), Modernization, Cultural Change, andDemocraq' (Canbridgc Cambridge University Press). Perhaps the most comprehensive account of democratlzatiuii in a political culture perspective. 'art Two Causes and Dimensions of Democratization IMPORTANT WEBSITES This website links to downloadable publications of tin; Center for the Study of Democracy at UC Irvine. This is the website of the Comparative Democratization project oF Stanford University, directed by Larry Diamond. This is the website of the journal of Democracy. Some articles are free for download. This is the website of the Taylor & Francis academic journal Democratization. Article abstracts can be read online.