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Childhood and Adult Political Development

If the study of history revolves centrally around time as an independent variable, the study of childhood and adult development revolves most centrally around life history, the study of time within the human life span. "Taking time seriously," as Alwin (1995) puts it. This chapter examines political orientations as they evolve through the life history from early childhood through old age.

Why should we care about the life histories of social and political orientations? At the most basic level, it is because the constant tension between continuity and change is played out throughout an individual's life span. This is a piece of the broader question for psychological theory about the lasting effects of formative early experiences on adult behavior. This historical emphasis contrasts markedly with that of the more ahistorical rational choice theories drawn from the field of economics, or even the more psychological behavioral decision theories. Both emphasize the appraisal of available information at decision points in adulthood, even if they less obtrusively also incorporate provisions for "preferences" with unexamined origins and inertial power in adult decision-making. A second motive is also theoretical but more political, to understand the origins of orientations that are politically consequential among adults, whether concerning politics specifically (see chapters 13 and 14) or intergroup relations (see chapters 15 and 16). Perhaps understanding the trajectory of party identification or prejudice or basic values through the life course will give us leverage on understanding their antecedents and consequences. A third motive has been more purely political, often stemming from liberal social scientists' idealistic hopes that social and political evils might be prevented by better early socialization experiences. They have thought that tolerance and good citizenship, if taught early, might dampen ethnocentrism (see chapter 15) and prejudice (see chapter 16), so mass oppression and even genocide (see chapter 20) might thereby be reduced or even avoided.

▲ Thinking about Time and the Political Life History

From a psychological point of view, there are three general ways of thinking about time and the political life history. The first concerns the persisting effects of early experiences. Early theories about political socialization saw those effects as lasting indeed, with research on the origins of racial preju-

dice, national identity, and hostility toward other countries in children (Harding, Proshansky, Kutner, & Chein, 1969; Lambert & Klineberg, 1967), on the lasting stigma associated with minority identity among black children (Clark & Clark, 1939), and on the youthful origins of party identification and ideology (Hyman, 1959) or diffuse support for a democratic political system (Easton & Dennis, 1969; Greenstein, 1965). The lasting influence of such early attitudes was largely assumed rather than tested directly, perhaps sustained by the then-widespread conviction, derived from psychoanalytic and learning theories, that "great oaks from little acorns grow." This assumption soon encountered robust criticism, however (e.g., Marsh, 1971; Searing, Schwartz, & Lind, 1973; Searing, Wright, & Rabinowitz, 1976; Vaillancourt, 1973), along with considerable research (e.g., Jennings & Markus, 1984; for reviews see D. Sears, 1975, 1990).

A contrasting focus is on "the times." They may change or stay the same, and with them, individuals' orientations. What happens within individuals' life histories is inextricably connected to what happens in the broader environment, which is a product of "the times." American children reported considerable increases in anxiety during the last half of the twentieth century (Twenge, 2000). Support for Jim Crow racism dropped precipitously during the same period (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997). Political systems change with time, and within them party systems change as well (Converse, 1969), as has been shown most dramatically by the abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union and more subtly by the partisan realignment of the white South and the Mountain states in the United States since the 1960s (Carmines & Stimson, 1989; Marchant-Shapiro & Patterson, 1995).

A third general approach looks for politically distinctive features of different life stages. Young children may have difficulty interlinking various aspects of events (Newcombe, Drummey, Fox, Lie, & Ottinger-Alberts, 2000); the concreteness of their thinking may delay their appreciation of abstract concepts such as Congress or the Supreme Court (Hess & Torney, 1967); and their thinking about moral choices may progress in turn through hedonic, authoritarian, and more principled stages (Adelson, 1972; Tapp & Kohlberg, 1971). Adolescents may be especially vulnerable to "storm and stress" (Arnett, 1999), and drawn to unconventional behavior (Watts, 1999) and political rebellion (Feuer, 1969). Young adults may be especially concerned about their own independent identity (Erikson, 1968) and somewhat unmoored in society (Arnett, 2000; Carlsson & Karlsson, 1970) and so more open to influence. The elderly may flag in mental and physical energy, with consequences for the consistency and stability of their attitudes (Sears, 1981).

Early research on the political life history also grew out of all the major theories of political behavior, though sometimes only implicitly (Merelman, 1986). Systems theory gave rise to a concern with how people become attached to their political system and developed trust in political authority,

especially in mature democracies (Easton & Dennis, 1969; Greenstein, 1965). Hegemonic or Marxist theories gave rise to an interest in how schools and the media produce a compliant citizenry, especially in the lower and working classes (Hochschild, 1981). Theories of democratic pluralism assumed that stable democracies are built on a foundation of public attachments to political parties, a sense of citizen duty, support for "the rules of the game," and political tolerance (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1982). Sociological conflict theories focus on class and other versions of group consciousness (Miller, Gurin, Gurin, & Malanchuk, 1981).

Review essays in the previous handbooks of political psychology have been titled "political socialization" and have focused largely on the childhood acquisition of specifically political orientations (Merelman, 1986; Niemi, 1973). We broaden our scope to the full life span and to a broader array of political and social orientations. We begin with a discussion of the acquisition of basic dispositions in preadult life, with particular focus on moral and cognitive development, ethnic and racial identity, ethnic and racial prejudices, and basic partisanship. We then consider the later life history of such dispositions, with particular attention to their persistence, as well as susceptibility to change in an "impressionable" period lasting up through early adulthood. Finally we take up applications of these ideas to the question of political generations and to the case of immigrants to another country.

Preadult Acquisition

Moral and Cognitive Development

Children construct principles of morality through interactions with parents, teachers, siblings, and peers. Researchers have conceptualized morality in terms of justice ("Do unto others as you would have them do unto you"), fairness, rights, and interpersonal reciprocity ("Love thy neighbor as thyself"; see Gilligan, 1982; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984). Two predominant orientations to the study of moral judgment and moral decision-making by developmental psychologists have generated most of the empirical research over the past four decades. The first model was reflected by the pioneering stage models of moral development, first formulated by Piaget (1932/1965) and then elaborated by American psychologists, most notably by Kohlberg (1969, 1984; see also Damon, 1977; Selman, 1980). The stage approach characterized children's moral understanding as a series of progressively more advanced stages of moral thinking and behavior. The second model, referred to as a social-cognitive domain model, was first formulated by Turiel (1983, 1998) and expanded on by his colleagues (for reviews, see Smetana, 1995; Tisak, 1995; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987). The domain model

characterized moral reasoning as one of several domains of knowledge that emerge in early social development. We will first discuss the stage model, which set the foundation for a structural-developmental approach to moral thinking, and then describe more current work, which has made use of the domain-specific model of social knowledge.

Stage Theories

Piaget (1932/1965) proposed a two-stage model of moral development in which children move from heteronomy, or relying entirely on externally imposed rules, in early childhood to a more autonomous and flexible moral orientation in middle childhood. Elaborating on Piaget's model, Kohlberg (1969, 1976) offered a three-stage model of development from early to middle childhood, extending the model with three additional stages to account for moral reasoning into adolescence and adulthood (also see Kohlberg, 1984, and Tapp & Kohlberg's 1971 model of legal reasoning). Like Piaget, Kohlberg suggested that children in early and middle childhood moved from a heteronomous orientation to one more flexible, although Kohlberg outlined rules or goals governing the "flexibility" of the moral principles (e.g., avoid punishment, gain approval). The later stages proposed by Kohlberg stressed moving from a focus on the utility of laws for societal functioning to a recognition that universal ethical principles transcend and may contradict laws. Kohlberg's methodology for studying moral reasoning was novel, as he asked children about moral dilemmas that were concrete, dramatic, and engaging, which addressed abstract moral issues (e.g., whether a husband should steal the medication he cannot afford to save his dying wife). Studies show that some children regress in their development or skip a stage (e.g., Kuhn, 1976; Kurtines & Grief, 1974) and few adolescents achieve the final stages (Colby & Kohlberg, 1984; Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983). Kohlberg's theory has been criticized for its inability to demonstrate relations between hypothetical reasoning about moral dilemmas and actual moral behavior (Rest, 1983), for being male-centered (Gilligan 1977, 1982), and for being culture-specific (e.g., Schweder, 1982).

In contrast to Kohlberg's approach, which characterized all forms of moral reasoning as decisions about the value of human life, Damon (1975, 1977, 1980) proposed a stage theory of positive justice, which delineates children's decisions to divide resources or distribute rewards fairly. In studies in the United States, Israel, Puerto Rico, and Europe, Damon (1983) found that children's positive justice reasoning, demonstrated through their choices of allocations, progressed through six stages in which choices were first based on wishes and desires (age 4–5), then on equality and reciprocity of actions (age 5–9), and finally on demands of persons and situations (age 8 and older). Subsequent research showed that even children as young as 6 years old can weigh relevant person and situation factors when the judgment context is familiar to them (Thorkildsen, 1989). Addressing a criticism of

Kohlberg's theory, Damon (1977) showed that children's hypothetical reasoning related to their behavior in a real situation (e.g., dividing rewards on the basis of their performance in an activity).

Also departing from Kohlberg's focus on reasoning about law violations, Adelson and colleagues (Adelson, Green, & O'Neil, 1969; Adelson & O'Neil, 1966) studied children's thoughts about rule development. Consistent with cognitive-developmental stage theories, Adelson and colleagues showed that children and adolescents progress from understanding society in terms of concrete people and events to an understanding based on abstract principles (also see Tapp & Levine, 1972). They examined reasoning about laws in situations that involved conflicts between individual autonomy and community benefits. This work showed that, with age, children move from thinking about laws as social control (deciding to increase punishment for laws that are not working) to an increased awareness of the social benefits of law (suggesting that if a law is not working, the law itself should be altered).

Contemporary Models of Morality

Contemporary work has departed from the aforementioned work in two ways. First, contemporary researchers have shown that even very young children are capable of making moral judgments about fairness (unlike Piaget's and Kohlberg's theories, which found that young children reasoned in terms of authority or avoiding punishment) and, second, that children's reasoning varies with the context, referred to as a domain-specificity approach. In the domain model, moral reasoning is distinct from, but coordinated with, social-conventional reasoning and personal reasoning (Nucci, 1981; Turiel, 1983, 1998; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987).

Contrary to Piaget's theorizing, researchers found that young children do not merely show a heteronomous orientation toward authority; rather, their reasoning is complex and context-specific; children consider variables such as status, experience, and knowledge as important for determining when to obey someone (Laupa, 1991, Laupa, Turiel, & Cowan, 1995). In addition, contrary to Kohlberg's theorizing (Tapp & Kohlberg, 1971), researchers found that young children believe law violation is acceptable under certain circumstances. For example, Helwig and Jasiobedzka (2001) presented Canadian children (age 6–11) with real and fictitious laws that either had social benefits (mandatory vaccinations), but could infringe on personal rights, or were unjust (discriminatory) and clearly infringed on personal rights. Children were provided with examples of law violations and their reasons (e.g., religion dictates familial control over education). Rather than mandating a strict adherence to laws, or even only allowing exceptions in extreme (e.g., life threatening) circumstances, even young children recognized that minor infringements on people's rights (e.g., being forced to stand on a bus because of age) sometimes justified breaking the law. In

another study, Helwig and Prencipe (1999) asked Canadian children 6 to 11 years old to evaluate several vignettes concerning flag burning. Younger children were more likely to focus on the functional, as opposed to symbolic, importance of the flag (e.g., marking the location of the country as opposed to representing shared values) and also to be less responsive to social context changes that might alter the meaning of the burning (e.g., the country has unfair practices). However, young children were sensitive to the intentions of the burner and to the potential consequences of the acts, as they disapproved of accidental and private transgressions than symbolic and public burning.

Turiel and colleagues' social-cognitive domain model has been a highly influential developmental model of reasoning (e.g., Nucci & Lee, 1993; Smetana, 1995; Turiel, 1983, 1998; Turiel & Davidson, 1986; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987). By age 3–4, children can differentiate moral rules and social conventions (Turiel, 1983). By middle childhood, children can make explicit judgments about the importance of different kinds of rules (Nucci & Killen, 1991). Turiel and colleagues' model specifies that children conceptualize their world in three structured domains or subsystems: (1) social conventions (e.g., traditions, customs, and rituals; alterable and non-generalizable acts); (2) morality (e.g., fairness, rights, and equal treatment; unalterable and generalizable acts); and (3) psychological factors (e.g., autonomy, personal goals, and personal prerogatives; acts of personal choice). Evidence for reasoning in these three domains comes from studies in different cultures (e.g., Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Nigeria, Turkey), different settings (urban, rural), and different socioeconomic status levels (high, low; see Killen, McGlothlin, & Lee-Kim, 2002, for a recent review).

To investigate children's underlying reasoning and judgment, these researchers have used individually administered interviews, similar to Piaget's and Kohlberg's, but have improved them by adding closed-ended formats and more straightforward vignettes (e.g., Helwig, 1998). They have examined numerous multifaceted and controversial issues (e.g., abortion, incest, pornography, drug use; see Killen, Leviton, & Cahill, 1991; Turiel, Hildebrandt, & Wainryb, 1985). Recently, Killen and her colleagues (Killen et al., 2002) have used the social-cognitive domain model to examine children's evaluations of intergroup inclusion and exclusion in the context of situations that involve stereotypes and fairness considerations. In one study, Killen and Stangor (2001) evaluated children' and adolescents' (age 7–13) decisions whether to exclude an individual from a race-typed after-school peer club (e.g., "white" math club, "black" basketball team) on the basis of the individual's race, as well as on exclusion from a gender-typed after-school peer club (e.g., ballet for girls, baseball for boys) on the basis of gender. When the scenario was a straightforward exclusion scenario (e.g., decide whether to include child), the vast majority of participants (all grade levels) felt that it was morally wrong to exclude the basis of race. Children

also were presented with more complex scenarios in which two children wanted to join a group with one opening. When presented with equally qualified children, fourth- and seventh-graders picked the child who did not fit the stereotype, providing equal treatment reasons. When qualifications differed (e.g., the black child had more experience in playing basketball than the white child), seventh-graders tended to pick the better-qualified (stereotypic) child, giving group functioning reasons, whereas fourth-graders continued to choose the nonstereotypical child. More research is needed to understand the prodiversity selections of the children, how group functioning, opposed to individual merit, justifications are weighed, and how members of traditionally excluded groups respond to such dilemmas (see Killen et al., 2002).

Future Directions

Future work is needed to investigate how children's reasoning relates to their actual behavior. For example, contemporary theorizing could be enriched by a greater focus on on-line behavior (e.g., unobtrusive observations of children's moral-relevant behavior on the playground) in addition to the current focus on reports of retrospective and intended behavior. In addition, we anticipate that social-cognitive domain researchers will increasingly put their growing body of findings into action by developing reasoning-based interventions that improve social relations and tolerance (Aboud & Levy, 2000; Helwig & Jasiobedzka, 2001).

Development of Ethnic and Racial Identity

In a diverse society, ethnicity and race are important components of people's identities and greatly influence social and academic opportunities. In this section, we consider the development of racial and ethnic identification among different groups and how this identification relates to the attitudes children and adolescents develop toward themselves, their group, and other groups. Although there are distinctions between race and ethnicity (e.g., see Ocampo, Bernal, & Knight, 1993; Quintana, 1998), racial and ethnic identities appear to have similar implications; thus we will discuss the findings of research on racial and ethnic identities together.

Racial/ethnic identity and its consequences were brought to public attention by the work of Clark and Clark (1939, 1940), who found that young U.S. black children preferred white dolls to black dolls (e.g., wanting to play with them and liking them), suggesting that identification with a low-status ethnic group could reduce one's self-esteem. Preference for the race-majority group was replicated in studies with Native Americans (Annis & Corenblum, 1987) and Bantu in South Africa (Gregor & McPherson, 1966). Subsequent research showed that preference for the majority group does not necessarily translate into low self-esteem (Cross, 1991; Spencer,

1984). Work by Beuf (1977) with Native American children, for example, suggests that minority children's preferences for the majority group may have more to do with desiring the majority group's wealth and power and less to do with having a negative self-concept.

Contemporary Research

Children's ethnic cognitions seem to begin with an understanding of race, or the physical features that differentiate groups (Aboud, 1987). Racial awareness then leads to ethnic identity (Rotheram & Phinney, 1987). Children's understanding of ethnicity and race also is thought to derive from their families (Knight, Bernal, Garza, Cota, & Ocampo, 1993), naïve theories of biology (e.g., Hirschfeld, 1995), and the linguistic negative connotation of "black" and positive connotation of "white" (e.g., Williams & Morland, 1976). Recently, Quintana (1994, 1998) proposed a five-stage model of ethnic development and found support for it by studying Mexican-American, African-American, white, Latino, and Quiche and Ladion Guatemalan children. Quintana's early childhood stages (stages 0 and 1) integrate findings from other researchers and thus serve as an excellent organizational framework in which to broadly summarize findings in the field. In level 0, "integration of affective and perceptual understandings of ethnicity" (age 3–6), children's awareness of race is based on observable, biological features; thus children learn and use terms that are both descriptive and racial (e.g., white, black) before terms that only have racial or ethnic meaning (e.g., African-American, Hispanic; see Alejandro-Wright, 1985; Quintana, 1994). Also during this stage, children's affective differentiation of races tends to be promainstream culture (e.g., prowhite), probably because early understanding of race derives from mainstream culture, where the majority is represented more often and more positively (e.g., Aboud, 1988). In level 1, "literal understanding of ethnicity" (age 6–10), children understand more subtle aspects of ethnicity (language, customs, food preferences; Alejandro-Wright, 1985; Bernal et al., 1990).

To understand children's identity development from middle childhood to adolescence, we turn to Phinney's (1989) and Cross's (1978) classic three-stage models of ethnic identity, which are similar to each other and to Quintana's later stages and derive from work on ego-identity theory (Erikson, 1968; Marcia, 1980). In the first stage, "unexamined ethnic identity" (Phinney) or "preencounter" (Cross), children have not explored their ethnic identity. Phinney (1989) found that about one half of Asian-American, black, and Hispanic tenth-graders were in stage 1. Children who have not examined their ethnic identity might have negative feelings toward their own group (Cross, 1978; see Phinney, 1989). In the second stage, "ethnic identity search" (Phinney) or "encounter and immersion," young persons seek out information about their group (e.g., reading books on ethnicity, visiting ethnic museums). This stage is considered a turning point

akin to an "identity crisis" (Erikson, 1968). Active identity exploration often begins in high school or college but may begin in middle school or even younger as children express identity through joining ethnicity-based peer groups (Rotheram-Borus, 1993). Phinney (1989) found that over one fifth of Asian-American, black, and Hispanic tenth-graders were in stage 2. During this stage, minority-ethnic and immigrant youth often grapple with contradictory norms of mainstream and nonmainstream cultures as well as with the mainstream's ethnic group stereotypes (Berry, 1980; Phinney, 1990). In fieldwork in central California, Matute-Bianchi (1986) found that Mexican-descent students seemed to identify more with their ethnic heritage than Japanese-descent students, presumably because collective group identity helped combat the relatively negative stereotypes about their group in that environment. However, even though in the United States there is seemingly a positive stereotype of Asian Americans as the "model minority," Asian Americans also strongly identify with their ethnic group for protection from mainstream racism (Chan & Hune, 1995). Clashes between one's native ethnicity and mainstream culture can, alternatively, instigate immersion in the mainstream culture. For example, in research with Cambodian adolescent girls in the United States, Lee (1999) found that some embraced the mainstream culture to avoid their native group's limiting gender roles.

In stage 3, "achieved ethnic identity (Phinney) or "internalization" (Cross), adolescents have developed positive self-concepts as members of their group. Phinney (1989) found that about one-fourth of the Asian-American, black, and Hispanic tenth-graders were in stage 3. With acceptance of one's own ethnicity, adolescents may develop a greater acceptance of and respect for other groups. That is, contrary to traditional views, contemporary researchers suggest that having a secure ethnic identity can undermine prejudice (Aboud & Doyle, 1993; Gonzales & Cauce, 1995).

Social context is an important variable in children's acquisition of racial and ethnic identities. "Enculturation refers to the cultural teaching that parents, families, peers, and the rest of the ethnic community provide to children during the childhood years" (Bernal & Knight, 1993, p. 3). Parents were identified as an important variable, beginning with the followup studies of Clark and Clark's classic doll study (Beuf, 1977; Spencer & Horowitz, 1973). Beuf (1977) found, for example, that Native American children whose parents were more active in cultural and civil rights were more likely to prefer a Native American doll to a white doll. Large-scale sociocultural changes across ethnic communities also can change the very identities that adolescents are forming. For example, structurally, linguistically, and culturally different Asian groups (Japanese, Chinese, Filipinos, Korean, Asian Indian) living in the United States came together in the 1960s to forge an Asian-American identity and to collectively combat discrimination (Chan & Hune, 1995; Espiritu, 1992). Context may be particularly relevant for multiracial or biracial youth as their ethnic/racial identity may vary with environments.

Acculturation is defined as "the adaptation of ethnic minority people to the dominant culture and its members" (Bernal & Knight, 1993, p. 3), or, more broadly, as "encompassing a wide range of behaviors, attitudes and values that change with contact between cultures" (Phinney, Romero, Nava, & Huang, 2001, p. 495). The definitions lead to two acculturation models—a linear model, assuming that individuals must either identify with their native culture or the mainstream culture (e.g., Rogler, Cortes, & Malgady, 1991), or the bidirectional model, which assumes that individuals can have distinct relations with their native and the mainstream cultures, thereby allowing for multiculturalism (Berry, Trimble, & Olmedo, 1986; Berry, 1999; Phinney et al., 2001). A key remaining question is: How do children negotiate all the contexts that might be giving them mixed messages? (For a discussion see Phelan, Davidson, & Yu, 1998.)

Consequences of Group Identification

Contemporary research has shown that greater identification with one's ethnicity is related to a host of positive outcomes, including greater self-esteem (Phinney & Chavira, 1992), ego-identity (Markstrom & Hunter, 1999), and school involvement (Taylor, Casten, Flickinger, Roberts, & Fulmore, 1994). For example, in a study of African-American eighth- and ninth-graders, Gonzales and Cauce (1995) found that ethnic pride was positively related to boys' and girls' confidence as potential dating partners and boys' grade point averages. Cross (1995), discussing blacks in the United States, views a strong ethnic identity as serving the protective function of filtering one's social worldview so as to be make it less dehumanizing. The protection comes from accepting that racism exists and affects all blacks, that negative outcomes are because of a racist system and not the self, and that one can use various strategies to deal with racism (withdrawal, assertion, avoidance, passivity). Other functions that a strong identity may serve include providing purpose, meaning, and affiliation, often expressed in celebration of accomplishments of the black community (Cross, 1995).

Greater ethnic identification can also have potentially negative consequences such as leading to greater separation from the majority group (e.g., less intergroup contact and greater conflict when contact does occur), which tends to occur in the immersion stage when adolescents seek out information about their own group (e.g., Phinney, 1990). Although self-protective, such behavior can limit children's social and academic opportunities and experiences. For this reason, researchers have explored whether school performance differences between race-majority and minority groups are in part explained by student ethnic identification. For example, in the United States, Fordham and Ogbu (1986, see Cross, 1995) considered whether school failure of race-minority adolescents is due to the development of an "oppositional identity" (rejecting dominant groups' dress, speech, attitudes). In a study of black students from low-income families, they found that in

middle and high school, the students increasingly sought to disidentify with "acting white," which included doing well in school. Alternatively, Spencer (2001) has shown that African-American youth do not necessarily associate high achievement with "acting white." Drawing on data from sixth-, seventh-, and eighth-grade African-American youth, Spencer (2001) noted that "high-achieving African American adolescents are not only failing to identify with acting white values, but more than likely have a better understanding of the irrelevance of the comparison for blacks and in what seems to be the term's lack of meaning, even for whites" (p. 29).

Why might some minority youth shy away from academics, whereas other minority groups might actively pursue it? Chan and Hune (1995) suggest that "among Asian American children and their families, the reaction to racialized behavior may be intense concentration on school achievement at the risk of their mental health and personality—a reaction that can been as adaptive from one perspective and limiting from another" (p. 226). In addition, work on interpersonal expectancies (e.g., McKown & Weinstein, 2002) and on "stereotype threat" (e.g., Steele & Aronson, 1995) provides a better understanding of why high-performing minority youth may experience school failure. For example, stereotype threat is a social-psychological threat in situations in which a stereotype of one's group applies (e.g., the threat of being judged as poor in math for girls). Ambady, Shih, Kim, and Pittinsky (2001) activated children's Asian or gender identity and then had them complete part of a standardized math test. Relative to a control condition, girls in kindergarten and middle school who were in the Asian identity activation condition showed facilitated performance, while the gender identity condition inhibited girls' performance. Thus, Asian-American girls who are disadvantaged in the math arena because of the female stereotype can draw on the Asian identity as a self-protective factor in those situations. These findings suggest that salient negative academic stereotypes about one's ethnic or racial group would diminish one's academic performance.

Future directions. Stage models have dominated work on ethnic and racial identity development. Research using these models has illustrated how most children initially show a preference for the mainstream racial group but eventually work toward a positive self-concept as members of their own groups. Although this line of research has tended to focus on nonwhite ethnic groups, as victims of the racism perpetuated by whites, some aspects of the models (e.g., immersing oneself in one's ethnicity, developing a respect for other groups) apply to whites and other mainstream groups. For instance, Helms (1993) proposed a stage model of white identity development, which included stages of discarding racism and learning to be white without racism (see also Rowe, Bennett, & Atkinson, 1994).

The stage model approach has shed light on some seemingly contradictory findings. For example, research shows that a strong ethnic identity

can lead to both outgroup prejudice and outgroup tolerance. This seeming contradiction can be explained by the identity stage children are in (e.g., immersion vs. internalization). Despite this, a current shortcoming of stage models is their inability to clearly specify the ages at which children and adolescents will be at different stages of the identity process. This will probably be addressed in future work as researchers expand their study of different racial and ethnic groups and their focus on these groups in different contexts (Gonzales & Cauce, 1995).

Another pressing issue for identity researchers is helping educators address the ethnic and racial diversity of their students. The "colorblind" practice of ignoring racial and ethnic differences seeks a laudable social outcome—fair and equal treatment (see Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee, & Browne, 2000; Schofield, 1986). Yet a colorblind approach to education is controversial because race and other characteristics do affect children's lives (e.g., Jones, 1997; West, 1992), and some efforts to assimilate immigrants and ethnic groups into the dominant culture have failed in the short term, leading to high dropout rates (e.g., Garcia & Hurtado, 1995). Multicultural education, an alternative approach, suggests "a restructuring and transformation of the total school environment so that it reflects the racial and cultural diversity that exists within U.S. society and helps children from diverse groups to experience educational equality" (Banks, 1995, p. 329, also see Hollins, 1999). Multicultural programs also are controversial because they often do not teach the rich nuances of culture, ethnicity, nationality, and race (Lee, 1999) or may exaggerate differences across groups, both of which may produce and perpetuate stereotyping among children (Bigler, 1999). Schools and communities that work collaboratively will probably be able to develop the most effective education programs (Banks, 1995; Phelan, Davidson, & Yu, 1998), for example, drawing on the different strengths of colorblind and multicultural programs.

Development of Ethnic and Racial Prejudice

In a racially and ethnically diverse world with limited social and economic resources, intergroup conflict seems inevitable. Despite a decline in the reporting of racial and ethnic prejudice over the past few decades (e.g., in the U.S., see Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000), group disparities and intergroup conflict continue to make headlines across the globe. In this section, we review traditional theories of racial and ethnic prejudice among children and then highlight contemporary theories such as the cognitive-developmental approach and the evolutionary approach (also see Aboud, 1988; Brown, 1995). Although prejudice is to some degree inevitable because of limited resources in the environment and within the person, researchers have made tremendous strides in understanding how to reduce prejudice, which we mention at the end of this section.

Traditional Theories of Prejudice among Children

An early theory of explaining prejudice among children evolved from a psychodynamic framework (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Bettleheim & Janowitz, 1950). For example, Adorno and colleagues (1950) suggested that parents' threatening and punishing responses to their children's "unconventional" behavior produced an inadequate ego, which relied on the use of defense mechanisms (such as projection of anger toward outgroups rather than toward parents) to release the aggressive and sexual impulses of children's poorly controlled "ids," resulting in the "authoritarian personality." This work was criticized on theoretical, conceptual, and methodological grounds. In the 1980s a newer version of this research showed that authoritarianism is related to prejudice toward a wide variety of groups, at least in college-age samples (see Altemeyer, 1998).

The traditional social-learning approach to prejudice (also referred to as social reflection theory, Allport, 1954) suggested that children become gradually more prejudiced with age as they try to imitate and to please their parents. Research on the link between children's attitudes and those of others in their environment, however, has not revealed consistent results. For example, Carlson and Iovini (1985) found a significant relation between the racial attitudes of white fathers and their adolescent sons but not between the racial attitudes of black fathers and sons. Branch and Newcombe (1986) found that as black children get older, their attitudes toward whites and blacks become more similar to their parents' attitudes. Aboud and Doyle (1996b) found that third-grade children's racial attitudes were not strongly related to their mothers' attitudes. Studies also have examined whether children's racial attitudes are related to their peers' attitudes. Patchen (1983) found that both black and white ninth-graders' attitudes and behaviors were not significantly related to their peers' racial attitudes. Similarly, Aboud and Doyle (1996b) found that a multiracial group of third- and fourth-graders perceived their peers to hold attitudes similar to their own; however, in actuality their peers generally did not report similar racial attitudes to their own (see also Aboud & Doyle, 1996a). These results may suggest that children often do not discuss their racial attitudes very much with their parents and peers. Parents (particularly members of race-majority groups) also may not discuss prejudice much with their children (Knight et al., 1993; Kofkin, Katz, & Downey, 1995). However, when adults and peers discuss prejudice in ways that address its cognitive underpinnings, prejudice is decreased (Aboud & Doyle, 1996a). For example, Aboud and Doyle (1996a) found that low-prejudice white third- and fourth-graders who discussed their racial attitudes with a high-prejudice peer were able to lower their peer's prejudice by pointing out instances of cross-race similarity (how members of all groups can be mean sometimes) and within-race trait variability (how whites exhibit negative and positive traits).

Contemporary Theories

Children's attitudes toward racial and ethnic groups are influenced not only by their social environment but also by their social cognitive skills. According to the cognitive-developmental approach as articulated by Aboud (1988) and Katz (1976; also see Piaget & Weil, 1951), children's racial/ethnic prejudice decreases from early to middle childhood in part because of their acquisition of particular cognitive skills (e.g., Bigler & Liben, 1993; Doyle, Beaudet, & Aboud, 1988; Katz & Zalk, 1978). As early as preschool and kindergarten, majority group children exhibit prejudice; examples include English Canadians judging French Canadians (Doyle et al., 1988), Euro-Australians judging Aboriginal Australians (Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996), and Jewish Israelis judging Arabs (for a review, see Bar-Tal, 1996). Young majority children typically assign more positive and less negative attributes to their own group than to other groups (outgroups) but show a decline in prejudice at around age 7 (Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Doyle et al., 1988; Powlishta, Serbin, Doyle, & White, 1994). Race-minority children (e.g., Native American, Beuf, 1977; African-American, Spencer, 1982) have shown a bias against their racial group in preschool, but after age 7, they tend to have more positive attitudes toward their own group (Aboud, 1988).

These age-related declines in prejudice have been shown to reflect the influence of specific cognitive skills such as classifying others on multiple dimensions (e.g., Bigler & Liben, 1992, 1993; Katz, Sohn, & Zalk, 1975), taking on differing perspectives (e.g., Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Doyle & Aboud, 1995), perceiving similarities between different groups (e.g., Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Doyle et al., 1988; Powlishta et al., 1994), and perceiving differences within the same group (e.g., Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Katz et al., 1975). For example, Doyle and Aboud (1995) found that between ages 6 and 9, white Canadian children developed more positive attitudes of blacks and more negative attributes of whites, although the number of negative attributions toward blacks and positive attributions toward whites did not change. Thus children could conceive of both groups on multiple overlapping dimensions. Another cognitive limitation of children worth noting is their limited attention to stereotype-inconsistent information (e.g., Bigler, 1999). Bigler and Liben (1993) showed that when white children were read stories, they remembered stereotype-consistent more than stereotype-inconsistent information about blacks (see also Martin & Halverson, 1981). Children who are skillful in classifying people on multiple dimensions, however, have a better memory for counterstereotypic stories.

These cognitive skills that are acquired with age yield individual differences among late adolescents, and influence prejudice levels (for a review, see Levy, 1999). For example, several individual difference constructs (e.g., need for cognition, attributional complexity) are conceptually similar to the

abilities to classify others on multiple dimensions and to reconcile differing perspectives, which most children acquire by age 9 or 10 (e.g., Bigler & Liben, 1993; Doyle & Aboud, 1995). Thus, with age, people probably draw differentially on cognitive skills relevant to prejudice.

Although given minimal attention thus far, evolutionary perspectives will probably be given increasing treatment in developmental theorizing on prejudice (e.g., Fishbein, 1996; Hirschfeld, 2001; also see chapter 5). Fishbein (1996) argues that evolutionary processes that produce prejudice began in hunter-gatherer tribes and were incorporated in human's epigenetic systems. Hypothesized evolutionary processes include: inclusive fitness, which leads children to give preferential treatment toward relatives, authority-bearing systems, which encourage children to almost blindly accept whatever they hear about outgroup members from ingroup authority figures, and intertribal hostility, which encourages protection of limited resources. Consistent with cognitive-developmental theories, Fishbein argues that identification with a group is often a precursor to prejudice.

Another evolutionary perspective draws on cognitive developmental work on children's competencies in physics, mathematics, and folk biology (e.g., Hauser & Carey, 1998). Hirschfeld (1995, 2001) argues that children's thinking about human social aggregates derives from a theorylike knowledge structure, which is governed by an endogenous preorganized acquisition device. Children's theorylike competence, or *naive sociology*, helps them decide which group affiliations to weigh more heavily than others and thus helps children reduce the cognitive demands of equally weighing all social information in their environment.

Evolutionary approaches have generally been criticized for suggesting that prejudice is natural and thus should be condoned. Yet aspects of evolutionary explanations overlap considerably with cognitive approaches that suggest that categorizing is inevitable, at least at some ages, and with sociocultural interpretations that suggest that prejudice grows out of social forces and limited resources. Evolutionary perspectives cannot be disentangled from these other approaches. For example, the finding that children and adults see race as a relevant social category for hierarchically organizing their world could be evidence for the endogenous module or evidence that children learned the relevant category from their environment. Evolutionary approaches are probably best thought of as illuminating potential distal causes of prejudice, whereas these other approaches (cognitive, social learning) focus on and test more proximal causes of prejudice.

Prejudice-Reduction Interventions

With a greater understanding of prejudice among children, there is increasing dialogue between basic and applied researchers of prejudice (see Aboud & Levy, 1999). Cooperative learning programs have become a popular, successful intervention strategy in schools (Johnson & Johnson, 2000;

Slavin & Cooper, 1999). Multicultural programs also have become extremely popular in schools, but their effectiveness has been questioned, as discussed in the previous section on racial and ethnic identity (also see Bigler, 1999). Researchers also have developed successful mediation programs to resolve interethnic conflicts in schools (Johnson & Johnson, 2000; also see Coleman & Deutsch, 1995; Deutsch, 1993). Relatively new intervention strategies in schools, such as social-cognitive retraining (e.g., Aboud & Fenwick, 1999; for a review see Aboud & Levy, 2000) and bilingual education programs (e.g., Genesee & Gandura, 1999) show promise. Media interventions such as television programs (e.g., *Sesame Street*) have been revised to more effectively reduce prejudice among viewers (Graves, 1999). Because prejudice is multifaceted, different intervention strategies are probably needed to tackle each component of prejudice.

Future directions. Over the past few decades, cognitive-developmentalists have shown that age-related cognitive abilities make young children more receptive to categorical (prejudice-increasing) information and less receptive to individuating (prejudice-reducing) information. However, researchers from other theoretical traditions have continued to show that children's levels of prejudice also reflect social and emotional factors. Because of this, contemporary research is moving toward an integrative approach, combining elements of cognitive development and social learning theories (e.g., Aboud & Amato, 2001). These new avenues can be seen in research on dyadic discussion (Aboud & Doyle, 1996a), assertive bystander training in the face of racial bullying (Aboud & Fenwick, 1999), and exclusion from social clubs on the basis of racial group membership (Killen et al., 2002). In doing so, researchers are incorporating theorizing and methodology from experimental social psychology (e.g., Levy, 1999), such as the identification of individual differences in children's lay theories relevant to prejudice (Cameron, Alvarez, Ruble, & Fuligni, 2001; Levy & Dweck, 1999) and the variables that contribute to stereotyping in adulthood (see Oskamp, 2000). In future work, developmentalists will probably draw on social psychology research on implicit and subtle forms of prejudice in college students (see Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986). There is already some evidence of implicit prejudice among children (Verna, 1982) and of children expressing weaker prejudice in nonambiguous situations, compared to ambiguous situations where their responses cannot easily be attributed to prejudice (Lawrence, 1991; Sagar & Schofield, 1980). Since implicit prejudice assesses the strength of the internal associations between attributes and a target group, children will probably develop higher levels of implicit prejudice with age because of the corresponding increase in their experiences with groups.

Party Identification

The aforementioned developmental work focuses on children's and young adolescents' attitudes about social groups, which can lay the foundation for

political awareness and action in adulthood. Now we turn to explicitly political attitudes, first to their acquisition by preadults and then to their later life histories. The paradigmatic case of the development of political attitudes among preadults has from the beginning been Americans' party identification. In large part that is because party identification turns out to be by far the strongest and most consistent prediction of Americans' voting preferences, and seems to have been so for over a century (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960; Miller & Shanks, 1996).

The early conventional wisdom was that "a man is born into his political party just as he is born into probable future membership in the church of his parents" (Hyman, 1959, p. 74). The more complex theory developed in *The American Voter* (Campbell et al., 1960) is perhaps the most influential in the study of political behavior. It is based on a simple two-question series asked of each survey respondent: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" Those giving either of the first two responses were then asked: "Would you call yourself a strong (X) or a not very strong (X)?" Those giving the third response were asked, "Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican party or to the Democratic party?" Those saying "closer to the Republican party" were classified as "Independent leaning to the Republicans," a parallel classification generated "Independent leaning to the Democrats," and those selecting neither were regarded as "pure Independents." This generated a simple seven-point scale running from strong Republican through Pure Independent to strong Democrat.

The theory described the *direction* of party identification as an attitudinal predisposition typically acquired in preadult life, often from the parental family; as usually acquired without an elaborate accompanying ideology about the relative merits of the two parties; as highly stable over the life span; and as the most powerful single factor in determining candidate evaluations and voting choices in partisan elections, and often issue preferences as well. The *strength* of party identification was thought to increase through the life cycle as the individual accumulated experience with the partisan electoral system (Converse, 1969, 1976). Party identification was originally conceptualized in terms that grew out of reference group theory, though more recently there have been efforts to conceptualize it in terms of social identity theory (Greene, 1999; Miller & Shanks, 1996, p. 127; see chapter 15). It is not clear that such a reformulation has so far led to any very different predictions or empirical findings.

The observation that *family transmission* was crucial to the development of party identification was most thoroughly tested by Jennings and Niemi (1974, 1981) in their classic "Michigan socialization study." They conducted interviews with a national sample of high school seniors and their parents in 1965, with both samples again in 1973 and 1982, and with the student cohort along with children of the former students in 1997 (Jennings, Stoker, & Bowers, 1999). They found substantial, though not per-

fect, parental transmission of party identification to their adolescent children, and lesser transmission of other political attitudes. Parent-child similarity of partisanship declined through the offsprings' early adulthood (though not thereafter), as the offsprings' own issue preferences played an increasing role in their party identifications (Beck & Jennings, 1991; Niemi & Jennings, 1991).

Plainly families vary considerably in their ability to pass their partisanship on to their offspring. Variations in parent-child relationships seem not to be central in success of transmission; e.g., politics has not been found to be a central vehicle for rebellion against parents (Jennings & Niemi, 1974; Niemi, 1974), even among student protestors (D. Sears, 1975, pp. 126–127). However, the most politicized parents and those with the most stable attitudes were consistently the most successful at socializing their offspring even through the latter's middle age (Beck & Jennings, 1991; Jennings, et al., 1999). The main reason seems to be that such parents are most successful in accurately communicating their political positions to their children (Tedin, 1974, 1980). In fact offspring usually exaggerate the true level of parent-child political similarity (Westholm, 1999). Accuracy of perception of parental positions also helps to explain differences in transmission across attitude domains: parental attitudes are communicated more clearly in some domains (e.g., hotly contested elections) than others (e.g., political efficacy). As indicated earlier, young children's racial/ethnic attitudes are not as similar to their parents' attitudes, apparently because parents (at least those in the racial majority) often do not discuss them with their children. There is also evidence that offspring sometimes influence parental attitudes, especially in domains in which offspring introduce more "modern" attitudes to families (e.g., Glass, Bengtson, & Dunham, 1986). And, more generally, parental political information has a major effect on the flow of political information to offspring (Jennings, 1996).

The centrality of family transmission was originally proposed in an era of more common intact two-parent families than is the case now, with higher rates of divorce, never-married mothers, and so on. Even so, the extension of the Michigan socialization study to the children of the original students shows quite convincingly that parent-child transmission in those families shows very much the same pattern as it did in the original families (Jennings et al., 1999). Indeed in some domains it is even higher, such as in political ideology and racial attitudes. Unstable families do take their toll, however. College students report both less political agreement between divorced parents and weaker family transmission (Hardy, Carrier, & Endersby, 2000).

The original theory implied that party identification was transmitted in piecemeal fashion as part of daily life. But if the key to successful political socialization is clear communication of stable parental attitudes, vivid *political events* should be important catalysts because they stimulate heavy information flow, and so provide occasions for such communication. Presi-

dential elections should be one such regular occasion. Consistent with the catalyst hypothesis, Sears and Valentino (1997) found that the strength of adolescents' partisan attitudes increased dramatically from before the beginning to the end of such a campaign, almost to their parents' levels. No such increase occurred in adults' partisanship, which was already at high levels; or in attitudes about objects more peripheral to the campaign; or during the less information-intense year following the campaign. Also consistent with the catalyst idea, the surge in partisanship was greatest among adolescents most involved in interpersonal political communication (Valentino & Sears, 1998).

Another example of a vivid and socializing political event was the year-long controversy over President Bill Clinton's relationship to the intern Monica Lewinsky. Parents reported that their adolescent children found the scandal quite interesting, that it catalyzed increased conversation about politics in their families, and gave parents an opportunity to express their own views to their children about Clinton and about sex, morals, and values in general (Pew Research Center, 1998). Republicans felt especially successful in passing on their own views to their children. Although about half the parents reported being "very upset" by the allegations, the children's predominant response was described as being "interested" in what would happen to the president, and they did not seem to be too disturbed by the whole affair. Overall parents felt it more likely to help than to "harm" their children's interest in politics.

The mass media are, of course, important for providing contact between children and the world of politics. Indeed, longer term interest in politics may be sparked if preadults enter the age of political awareness at times of heightened activity in the political arena (Danowski & Ruchinskas, 1983). Children's first contact with politics is usually via television, although their degree of political knowledge seems to be suppressed somewhat by heavy viewing of entertainment television. It seems better explained by their level of exposure to the print media (see the review by Chaffee and Yang, 1990).

◣ Adult Life History

The original theory of party identification, with its focus on early learning and later persistence, provided a clear and quite influential paradigm. Is it a useful model for thinking about political life histories more generally? To address this question, we return to the three ways of thinking about time noted at the outset. Four distinctive models of the political life cycle have been most common and will be discussed in turn. Two reflect the persisting effects of early experience: (1) a *persistence* model, in which the residues of preadult learning persist through life, perhaps even hardening with time; and (2) a variant on it, an *impressionable years* model, in which attitudes

are particularly susceptible to influence in late adolescence and early adulthood but tend to persist thereafter. These models are normally contrasted with one that, loosely speaking, views adults as more responsive to the events of their "times," (3) a *lifelong openness* model, in which individuals remain open to influence throughout later life. A fourth model, somewhat orthogonal to the others, picks up on the idea of distinctive political life stages: (4) a *life cycle* model, in which people are attracted to certain attitudes at specific life stages, such as radical ideas in their youth and conservatism in old age (Alwin, 1994; Jennings & Niemi, 1981; D. Sears, 1975).

Persistence over the Life Span

The persistence hypothesis is important from both the psychological and political points of view. There is the psychological question of the trajectory of important political and social attitudes through the life cycle. Is there generally a "critical period" in an individual's life for acquisition of political attitudes? What is the plasticity of those attitudes as the individual ages (see Alwin, 1993; Alwin, Cohen, & Newcomb, 1991; D. Sears, 1975, 1983, 1990)? From a political perspective, if the most important attitudes are essentially static after early life, change would occur primarily by replacing older cohorts with younger ones holding fresher attitudes rather than by conversion of mature adults to new points of view (see Alwin, 1993). So widespread persistence would mean that political change depends to a considerable degree on cohort replacement. A system in which political loyalties are essentially static through adulthood would yield a very different politics from one in which they are regularly formed anew on the merits of each circumstance.

Longitudinal Studies

The most straightforward way of assessing persistence, though the most expensive and difficult to execute well, is to measure a given attitude from a given set of respondents at multiple points in time. Psychologists tend to call such studies "longitudinal studies" (e.g., R. Sears, 1975; 1984) while political scientists and sociologists call them "panel studies" (e.g., Converse & Markus, 1979). The most extensive work has been done using two 4-year National Election Studies (NES) panel studies done in the 1950s and 1970s. Party identification was the most stable attitude measured in those studies, indeed almost perfectly stable, with some correction for measurement unreliability (Converse & Markus, 1979). Similar conclusions have emerged from other studies in the United States (Green & Palmquist, 1994; Green & Schickler, 1993; Jennings & Stoker, 1999) and in Canada, Britain, and Germany (Schickler & Green, 1997).

Two studies of more specialized populations yield evidence of stability across much longer periods of adulthood. Newcomb (1943) studied a co-

hort of women attending Bennington College during the 1930s. They generally came from affluent, politically conservative families, but many changed in a liberal direction while attending that politically progressive college. Followup studies showed extremely high long-term stability of partisanship from college graduation through adulthood: "attitudes, once formed, can be incredibly stable. . . . The stability coefficient linking a latent attitude variable over roughly 50 years of the life-span is in the .70 to .80 range" (Alwin, 1993, p. 68; also see Alwin et al., 1991). The long-term Terman gifted children study tested a considerably larger and more heterogeneous sample, selected from high-IQ children in California public elementary schools after World War I. Their party identifications were quite stable from approximately age 30 to 67, with a coefficient of .65 corrected for measurement error (Sears & Funk, 1999).

Variations across Attitude Objects

In longitudinal studies, then, party identification became the paradigmatic case for attitudinal persistence. What about other attitudes? The conventional wisdom is that racial policy attitudes are among the most stable of whites' policy attitudes, though less stable than party identification (Converse, 1964; Converse & Markus, 1979; Jennings & Stoker, 1999; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Sears, 1983). Basic political ideology has also been found to be quite stable (Alwin et al., 1991; Jennings & Stoker, 1999; Sears, 1983; Sears & Funk, 1999). For example, only 13 percent changed from "liberal" to "conservative," or vice versa, over the 37-year span of the Terman gifted children study (Sears & Funk, 1999). Moral attitudes, such as those toward abortion and marijuana, have also been found to be highly stable in some of these studies. On the other hand, attitudes in many domains intensely debated by political elites seem to show much less stability over time in the mass public (Converse, 1964; Converse & Markus, 1979; Jennings et al., 1999; Sears, 1983).

Why do some attitudes persist for so long whereas others seem to be much more unstable? To start with, their observed stability only reflects the external outcome of a series of internal collisions between the individual's predispositions and external pressures to change. Both can vary a good bit. In addition, the normal criterion for stability, a high test-retest correlation, can be somewhat misleading if the marginal frequencies have changed. The conclusion that party identification is highly stable was based on high stability coefficients during a period in which party divisions remained more or less constant (Converse, 1976). However, some older racial attitudes would look misleadingly stable by the same criterion. In that period of great social change the public as a whole became markedly more liberal; presumably, many people shifted to the left but maintained their approximate rank order (Firebaugh & Davis, 1988; Schuman et al., 1997). Rather than one model of the political life cycle fitting all, then, the trajectories of both any given individual's attitudes and the attitudes of people in the aggregate are likely to vary across attitude objects.

How can one explain such variations? One theory looks both to learning factors, such as the volume and one-sidedness of communication in the individual's microenvironment, or the opportunity to practice the attitude in conversation and behavior, and to cognitive factors, such as the constancy of meaning of the attitude object and connectedness of attitudes to other attitudes and values, as general factors that enhance attitude stability (Sears, 1983). Americans' party identifications and racial attitudes are cases of relatively high levels of information flow and thus are presumably sources of conversation and opportunities for behavioral practice. But many policy issues scarcely come to public attention at all and thus involve considerably lower levels of all these contributors to persistence.

Persistence also should be greater for attitudes toward objects that are salient in early life than toward those that only become salient later in life, even if in the same general domain. Adulthood migration between the relatively racially tolerant North and the more racially conservative South affected whites' racial attitudes selectively (Glaser & Gilens, 1997). Region of origin dominated whites' adult attitudes about the issues, such as racial intermarriage, that were most salient in the civil rights era of the 1950s and 1960s, when they were relatively young. Region of adult residence had a stronger effect on the issues more salient in their adulthood, such as busing for school integration or special aid to minorities.

Another possibility raised by Achen (1975) is that some observed attitude instability may simply be due to measurement error. Though he did not precisely specify the source of the error, he implied that it resulted especially from ambiguous survey items. As noted by Converse and Markus (1979), it is not obvious why the same question-writers systematically did so well in some domains and so badly in others, or why political elites and more educated citizens show much higher stability on the same presumably flawed items than does the full mass public. Following Achen's logic, Alwin and Krosnick (1991), using structural equation models to correct for measurement error, estimated that almost all attitudes measured in the 4-year NES panel studies were nearly perfectly stable, which seems unlikely. They concede that their models make assumptions that may be untenable.

Zaller and Feldman (1992) offer another interpretation of "measurement error": that a person might give contradictory answers to the same question in two interviews because of "ambivalence." Different "considerations" might come to mind each time, leading to unstable overall responses because they are based on different subsets of "considerations" at different times. This may not help explain differences in stability across attitude objects very much, however. For example, abortion is an issue that creates a great deal of ambivalence (Alvarez & Brehm, 1995). Attitudes about it nevertheless have among the greatest over-time attitude stability of all contemporary political issues (Converse & Markus, 1979).

Other Assessments of Persistence

One problem with longitudinal studies is they tend to be limited to one historical era, and often to one cohort, which limits their ability to distinguish levels of stability across the life course from particular historical circumstances. Another tool for assessing persistence that is not so limited to historical period and cohort is cohort analysis. This requires a series of cross-sectional surveys conducted at different times with different samples but including the same measures. If each birth cohort, as a whole, does not maintain the same distribution of opinion as it ages, high levels of attitudinal persistence at the individual level are unlikely. On the other hand, cohort analysis yields less direct evidence about individual-level stability than do longitudinal studies.

Moreover, this generality across cohorts and periods creates its own problems. Any correlations of age with political attitudes potentially reflect three different confounded effects: cohort (birth cohort), life cycle (age at measurement), and period (year of measurement). To assess these three effects, researchers can extract only two pieces of information from any given survey—respondent age and year of survey. Age and birth cohort are perfectly correlated in any given survey, and age and chronological time are perfectly correlated across a series of surveys. Therefore, assigning variance to any one of these three effects is indeterminate, in a strict sense, unless "side information" is available from other sources to rule out one of these potential sources of variance (Mason, Mason, Winsborough, & Poole, 1973). For example, in the "steady state" period of the American party system from 1952 to 1964, the aggregate distribution of party identification among whites did not change, allowing period effects to be set at zero (Cassel, 1999; Converse, 1976).

A useful application of cohort analysis has been to explain the reasons for the greatly increased support for general principles of racial equality among white Americans since World War II (see Schuman et al., 1997). One possible explanation is logically implausible from the outset, that aging by itself promoted liberalizing change: while each cohort became more liberal as it aged, at any given point age was negatively correlated with racial conservatism. That leaves two other possibilities: that individual attitudes were highly persistent, so prejudiced older cohorts were gradually replaced by more tolerant younger cohorts (a cohort effect); or that widespread liberalizing individual attitude changes occurred (a period effect). Cohort replacement seems to have been the dominant effect as older, more prejudiced cohorts were replaced with younger, less prejudiced ones. But period effects also occurred, as all cohorts showed similar linear liberalizing trends over time (Danigelis & Cutler, 1991; Firebaugh & Davis, 1988). These liberalizing trends within cohorts began to slow by the 1980s, especially on newer racial issues (Steeh & Schuman, 1991; Wilson 1996; for similar results over a broader range of attitudes, see Davis, 1992).

A third approach to persistence is more opportunistic, using natural experiments that test the resistance to change of attitudes presumably acquired early. Changes in social location that place the individual in an altered attitudinal environment might be expected to influence attitudes. For example Miller and Sears (1986) found that adults' levels of racial tolerance were more strongly associated with the level of racial tolerance in their childhood and young adulthood attitudinal environments than by that of their mature adulthood environments (also see Glaser & Gilens, 1997). Migration between congressional districts dominated by opposite parties influenced adults' voting preferences and party identification, though the changes were considerably greater among those who migrated earlier in adulthood (Brown, 1988). Some direct personal experiences in adulthood might also be expected to produce change. One common expectation is that the emergence of economic interests in adulthood will influence individuals' political attitudes. However, extensive research has found surprisingly little evidence of much effect of adults' self-interests, as if sociopolitical attitudes acquired earlier resisted such influences later in adulthood (Sears & Funk, 1991).[1]

The Impressionable Years

The "impressionable years" hypothesis is a variant of the persistence hypothesis, suggesting that adolescents' and young adults' attitudes are weaker and more open to change than they are at later stages (Sears, 1975). At least three psychological propositions lie behind this hypothesis. One is a primacy notion: youths experience political life as a "fresh encounter," in Mannheim's (1952) words, that can seldom be duplicated later. Second, attitudes that are subjected to strong information flows and, regularly practiced, should become stronger with age (Converse, 1969, 1976). Partisanship is a good example, since both election campaigns and the act of voting recur often. Third, the young may be especially open to influence because they are becoming more aware of the social and political world around them just at the life stage when they are seeking a sense of self and identity (Erikson, 1968). These three views agree that the period up to one's late twenties, roughly, should be the most volatile.

Stronger Attitudes with Age

One implication is that young adults will simply have weaker attitudes, such as being less likely to say they are "strong" partisans. Indeed cohort analyses in the United States show that each cohort expresses stronger party identifications as it ages, at least during what Converse (1976) described as the "steady state era" of roughly constant partisan divisions prior to the 1970s (also see Alwin, 1992, 1993, Claggett, 1981). Such aging effects held in the United Kingdom as well (Cassel, 1999).

A second implication is that such attitudes should become more stable

with age. Data from two 4-year NES panel studies show that all older cohorts in each study had substantially more stable party identifications than did the youngest cohort (Alwin et al., 1991; Sears, 1983). The youngest cohort in the first study also showed greatly increased stability in the second study, when it was 16 years older, showing that the greater stability is an aging rather than a period effect (Alwin, 1993). The Michigan socialization study cited earlier also showed that high school seniors showed substantially lower levels of attitude stability than did their parents. After the students reached their thirties, though, their attitudes had become as stable as their parents' attitudes, and indeed did not greatly increase in stability as they aged further (Jennings & Stoker, 1999; also see Beck & Jennings, 1991; Jennings & Markus, 1984).

A third implication is that such attitudes ought to become more resistant to influence as the individual ages. Three surveys analyzed by Visser and Krosnick (1998) similarly found increased resistance to influence after early adulthood. Another study assessed attitude change resulting from changes at different life stages in one's social environment, as indexed by demographic location (Miller & Sears, 1986). Changes in the youthful environment seem to have had considerably greater influence on levels of social tolerance than did changes in adult environments. All this represents several kinds of evidence for an "impressionable" period in the life cycle, then.

If indeed attitudes that are well practiced become stronger with age, one might expect that the elderly would show the least change of all. Surprisingly enough, there is some evidence that the relationship of age to attitude stability follows an inverted-U pattern. One early study (Sears, 1981) found that racial prejudice among whites in the 1972–76 NES panel study was least stable over time for the youngest (under 30) and oldest (over 60) age groups. Moreover, it was a period of liberalizing racial attitudes, and the oldest cohort actually changed in a liberal direction the most. These findings held up with education controlled, and apparently could not be explained by greater measurement unreliability in old age. The basic finding was corroborated in a study of the stability of party identification using both NES panels, adding corrections for measurement unreliability (Alwin, 1993; Alwin et al., 1991; also see Visser & Krosnick, 1998). Why these attitudes might become more unstable in old age is unclear, though many of the ways that people are socially embedded in the society often do change after retirement age, in terms of their work, residence, family, and other social networks. That may destabilize their political attitudes.

Political Generations

The impressionable years hypothesis focuses on the particular susceptibility to influence of individuals' attitudes in late adolescence and early adulthood. But if "the times" exert strong pressures to change, they can influence large numbers of people at that stage in common, yielding generational effects. More narrowly, Karl Mannheim (1928/1952) suggested that "generational

units," or subsets of a youth cohort, rather than full cohorts, may share powerful experiences that will mark them as distinctive for life. Either way, producing generational effects requires both that individuals have a particular psychological openness at that life stage and evocative political experiences in that historical era.

A number of political generations have been subjected to especially intensive empirical study. One was composed of the women who were politically socialized before 1920, when they were first eligible to vote in national elections. Women only gradually began to turn out to vote, initially producing a substantial gender gap in voting turnout, largest among those socialized prior to women's suffrage; that is, in the cohort born before 1906. No such gender gap held among those socialized well after suffrage; that is, those born after 1925. As the presuffrage cohorts of women were gradually replaced by postsuffrage cohorts, the gender gap in turnout declined, and by the late 1980s it had disappeared (Firebaugh & Chen, 1995). Another was the "New Deal generation" in the United States. Youthful new voters who first entered the electorate during the 1930s remained substantially more Democratic into the 1950s, both in voting behavior and in party identification, than were earlier cohorts at similar ages (Campbell et al., 1960; also see Centers, 1950; Elder, 1974; Butler & Stokes, 1969, for a parallel effect in Great Britain). They also continue to have more knowledge about the New Deal than did younger Americans, even years later (Jennings, 1996).

The young protestors in the United States and Europe in the 1960s were a quite self-conscious generational unit. Most evidence indicates that their left-liberal distinctiveness has persisted since then, especially among those who actively engaged in protest. For example, the students in the Michigan socialization study who had then been active as protestors continued to be considerably more liberal than were college-educated nonprotestors at each of the later three waves of the panel study (Jennings, 1987, 2000; also see Fendrich & Lovoy, 1988; McAdam, 1989; Marwell, Aiken, & Demerath, 1987; Whalen & Flacks, 1984). Interestingly enough, their offspring were also strikingly more liberal than the offspring of nonprotestors (Jennings, 2002). But even "engaged observers"—those who were attentive to the movements but not very active in them—showed lasting political effects years later (Stewart, Settles, & Winter, 1998).

The youth cohort that immediately followed them is another case in point. A number of issues divided both parties internally in the mid-1960s to early 1970s, such as civil rights, conflict over the Vietnam War, and the Watergate scandal. These internal rifts within the parties seem to have much reduced the strength of partisanship in the generation then entering the electorate. Since then the strength of partisan commitment among incoming youthful cohorts has turned back up, and they now more closely resemble those who entered the electorate before that dealigning period (Miller & Shanks, 1996).

But in other respects contemporary young people continue to show unusually low levels of political engagement, in political information, newspaper reading, political interest, and voting turnout. Part of this is a life cycle effect, as young people have historically been less politically engaged than mature adults. But it is partly a generational effect as well, surprisingly so, since education enhances political engagement, and recent generations have received much more education (e.g., Astin, Parrott, Korn, & Sax, 1997; Delli Carpini, 2000; Putnam, 2000; Smith, 1999). Putnam (2000) has suggested that these all reflect a decline in "social capital" in recent generations, paralleling a broad drop in voluntary socializing and organizational membership. He has implicated the rise of television as disruptive of such communal activities, though evidence for its role is necessarily somewhat indirect. The generational decline in turnout, the most extensively analyzed, has otherwise largely resisted extensive efforts at explanation (e.g., Highton & Wolfinger, 2001; Miller & Shanks, 1996).

Finally, a potentially rich line of investigation concerns possible persisting generational effects of political or social traumas. Loewenberg (1971), for example, suggests that the unusually powerful support for the Nazi regime among Germans born from 1900 to 1915 can be ascribed in part to the many traumas they had experienced in early life, including malnutrition and starvation, disease, neglect of children, the disappearance of a generation of fathers, and hyperinflation. Direct exposure to political violence in Israel and South Africa has been shown to increase the likelihood of psychopathology (Slone, Adiri, & Arian, 1998; Slone, Kaminer, & Durrheim, 2000). Even exposure to distal violence, such as the assassination of a popular leader, can have profound emotional effects in the short run (Raviv, Sadeh, Raviv, Silberstein, & Diver, 2000; Wolfenstein & Kliman, 1965), and perhaps long-term political effects as well (Sears, 2002).

Another set of generational effects is reflected in *collective memory*, defined as "memories of a shared past that are retained by members of a group, large or small, that experienced it," especially "shared memories of societal-level events" (Schuman & Scott, 1989, pp. 361–362; also see Halbwachs, 1950/1980). The impressionable years hypothesis would be that people should especially recall events and changes as important if they happened in their adolescence or early adulthood. One method of measuring collective memories asks respondents to cite "national or world changes" that have been "especially important" over the last 50 years or so (Schuman & Scott, 1989). The age cohort most likely to select World War II as especially important had been 20, on average, in 1943, and the cohort most likely to select the Vietnam War averaged age 20 in 1968. Ascribing great importance to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy peaked among those who had been in childhood and adolescence in 1963. When asked in 1990 whether the best analogy for the Gulf War crisis was a "Hitler" metaphor of a voracious dictator or a "Vietnam" metaphor of a Third World quagmire, those over 40 strongly preferred the Hitler analogy, whereas those

under 40 were split evenly between the two analogies (Schuman & Rieger, 1992). Even questions about simple pieces of information, such as what was President Roosevelt's party, can reveal marked generational differences (Jennings, 1996).

Robert Jervis (1976) has provided a particularly important application of this notion of collective memory to the question of how foreign policy decision-makers "learn from history." Political leaders who have had dramatic and important firsthand experiences in politics when they are in the "impressionable years" may later apply such experiences to issues they must deal with as mature adults. For example, Harry Truman, confronting the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, and Lyndon Johnson, facing the Vietnam War, both recalled that the buildup to World War II had taught them the danger of not facing up to aggressors at an early stage. Colin Powell and other military leaders who had been young officers in the 1960s later applied the lesson of Vietnam to, among other things, the Persian Gulf War: don't go to war halfheartedly, either stay out or go in with overwhelming force. The danger of those "lessons" learned early, as with any persisting generational effects, is of course that they are long out of date by the time the young person becomes a mature adult, as is expressed in the saying that the military is always "fighting the last war."

Lifelong Openness

The application of developmental approaches to political psychology has undergone considerable cycling in popularity. A generation ago, Greenstein (1970, p. 969) felt that "political socialization is a growth stock," and David Sears (1975, p. 94) opined that "research output has increased at a geometric rate." A reaction then set in, focused especially on two often overly enthusiastic assumptions: of a "primacy principle," that early-acquired predispositions had considerable staying power, and a "structuring principle," that they had some special political power in adulthood, because what is learned early is most important (e.g., Searing et al., 1973, 1976). Some developmentally oriented researchers then called for recognition of more openness to change through the life course than the persistence theory allowed for; for example, that "change during adulthood is normal. . . . [T]he life course should be understood as a more integrated and contingent whole" (Sapiro, 1994, p. 204), and that "learning and development are [not] completed by adulthood; rather they . . . [constitute] a lifelong process." (Sigel, 1989, p. viii). Larger external trends in political science also contributed to greater attention to openness in adulthood, with the growing influence of economic theories emphasizing the rational choices made by adults.

Documenting Change among Mature Adults

The challenges to the persistence view have often provided valuable evidence. Sometimes it too is interpreted overenthusiastically, so some cau-

tionary flags may be in order. One influential line of work argues that adults' partisanship is in fact responsive to "the times," such as economic conditions and judgments of incumbent performance (Fiorina, 1981), and candidate images, issues, or events (Allsop & Weisberg, 1988; Markus, 1983; Niemi & Jennings, 1991). In one study cited for this purpose, candidate evaluations were shown to influence adult party identification, rather than vice versa (Rapoport, 1997). However, the sample comprised only young people newly eligible to vote, not mature adults. The finding would be more consistent with the impressionable years than the openness hypothesis.

An impressive series of studies collected by Sigel (1989) examines the political effects of discontinuities within adulthood, such as entering the workplace, serving in the military, immigrating to a new country, participating in social movements, entering college, getting married, or becoming a parent. Each of these cases, as she notes, incorporates three elements that potentially can affect political attitudes: crystallization of an individual's own unique identity, assumption of new roles, and coping with the novel and unanticipated demands of adulthood. However, all these specific discontinuities also occur most often in late adolescence and early adulthood, again suggesting that these findings may fit the impressionable years hypothesis better than the openness hypothesis. And even the mostly youthful powerful personal experience of military service in Vietnam was found by the Michigan socialization study to have only "modest" effects on political attitudes (Jennings & Markus, 1977).

When mature adults encounter major discontinuities in their attitudinal environments, they sometimes do change their attitudes, as indicated earlier. But relatively few people are exposed to such discontinuities after early adulthood (Miller & Sears, 1986). For example, migration from an area dominated by one party to an area dominated by its opponents is almost three times as likely among young adults as among their elders, and has much more effect among the young (Brown, 1988). Migration between North and South has affected white adults' racial attitudes, but only about 10 percent have engaged in such migration in both directions combined (Glaser & Gilens, 1997). The microenvironments represented by individuals' social networks also tend to be politically supportive, and indeed disagreements are underrecognized (Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton, & Levine, 1995). Observed changes resulting from environmental changes are not very common, then, and the reason may be both sociological and psychological: environmental continuity is quite great, and when it breaks down change may occur, but both are more common in the "impressionable years."

Political Context as a Moderator

The political context is also critical to how these individual-level processes play out. Two prominent cases involving the normally quite stable party identification and racial attitudes make the point. The polarization of party

elites on racial issues led to a substantial shift of Southern whites to the Republican party in the 1980s (Miller & Shanks, 1996). The society-wide elite rejection of the Southern segregation system led to a shift away from Jim Crow racism after the civil rights era (Firebaugh & Davis, 1988).

The strengthening of party identification with age should partly be dependent on the stability of the party system itself. In the United States, intraparty disputes in the period around the early 1970s resulted in *reduced* net strength of partisanship in most cohorts as they aged, contrary to its usual trajectory. In the more polarized and stable party division since, partisan commitment has resumed its normal strengthening with age (Miller & Shanks, 1996). More generally, Converse (1969) found that age was associated with stronger party identifications in the mature democratic systems of the United States and United Kingdom but considerably less so in the interrupted democratic systems in Germany and Italy and in the immature electoral system of Mexico. He found that the strength of individuals' partisanship in those five countries was well predicted by a model including personal partisan experience (years eligible to vote and years voted), inherited partisan experience (communicated partisanship from parents), a forgetting effect when democracy was interrupted, and a socialization effect reflecting the delayed enfranchisement of women. Even Russia, in the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union, yields evidence of nascent partisanship that is stable across elections and with meaningful underlying attitudinal cleavages (Brader & Tucker, 2001; Miller & Klobucar, 2000). But later research suggests that the persistence model works well, or at least best, for parties that are large and/or old, consistent with the notion that people need visible and stable attitude objects if they are to learn strong attitudes about them (Converse & Pierce, 1992).

Life Cycle Effects

These questions about the persistence of early learning, as opposed to the continuing openness to new experience, by no means exhaust the possible contributions of a life-span development approach to political psychology. As noted earlier, correlations of attitudes with age can logically reflect either generational or life cycle effects, as in the old French adage that "He who is not a revolutionary at 20 has no heart; he who is a revolutionary at 40 has no head." The two can be distinguished in cohort analyses. These show that people do not seem necessarily to become more conservative with age. In the 1950s, age was positively correlated with Republicanism, when the elderly came from pre–New Deal cohorts, a period of Republican dominance (Crittenden, 1962). In a later era, when the elderly were predominantly from the "New Deal generation," they tilted toward the Democrats. These reflect generational rather than life cycle effects (e.g., Abramson, 1983; Alwin, 1992; Glenn, 1974).

Age was also positively correlated with support for Jim Crow racism

among whites after World War II (e.g., Kluegel, 1990; Schuman et al., 1997). However, as noted earlier, cohort analyses actually show waning support for Jim Crow racism within cohorts of white Americans as they aged during that period, reflecting a period rather than a life cycle effect (Danigelis & Cutler, 1991; Firebaugh & Davis, 1988; Sears, 1981). Both examples provide evidence against any universal conservatizing effect of age. Indeed, life cycle effects on attitudes have been especially difficult to pin down (Alwin, 1993, 1994).

An important further distinction is between psychological and sociological interpretations of life cycle effects. A nice behavioral example concerns the low voting turnout of young people. Some of this is generational (Putnam, 2000). But age differences in turnout are of long standing, so life stage is also implicated. A psychological interpretation is that consistent turnout, like strong partisanship, develops through experience with the political system. A common sociological interpretation is that young people are distracted from civic duties by the press of various transitions into adult roles, such as leaving school, leaving home, entering the work force, getting married, home ownership, and, often, geographic mobility. If so, turnout might increase with age merely because young people ultimately evolve past such obstacles to civic duty. Comparing these two views, Highton and Wolfinger (2001) found that successfully transitioning into such adult roles had quite mixed effects on turnout, whereas aging all by itself greatly increased it: having accomplished all six adult tasks increased voting turnout by only 6 percent, a small fraction of the 37 percent turnout gap between the young and those over age 60. The authors prefer the more psychological explanation that "pure learning" may be responsible (p. 208).

◤ The Case of Immigrants

As with many areas of political psychology, the available evidence about childhood and adult development rests heavily on the American political experience. It is only a single case, with a highly stable political system, even compared to other developed democracies such as France, Germany, the former Soviet Union, or South Africa. Examining people only in a stable political context risks overestimating the natural continuities within the individual life history. As one check, we can look at immigrants, who have changed from one political system to another.

Adult Development of National and Ethnic Identity

The persistence hypothesis would suggest that identification with an original nationality group would be stable within immigrants' life spans and would be passed on to their children, generating a strong ethnic group conscious-

ness in politics (Uhlaner, Cain, & Kiewiet, 1989; Wolfinger, 1965). On the other hand, contemporary immigrants might follow the trajectory of the European immigrants of a century ago (Alba, 1990), with their original national identity (e.g., "Mexican") being slowly replaced across generations by an American ethnic identity (e.g., "Latino"), which in turn, with intermarriage, residential and occupational integration, and upward mobility, ultimately might be replaced by identification with the new nation (e.g., "American"), a process more consistent with the impressionable years hypothesis. Another possibility, consistent with the "openness" view, is that this whole process might occur within a single generation. A mixed alternative would be a more "segmented assimilation," in which some immigrant groups follow the trajectory of upward mobility and assimilation while others remain poor and with low levels of education, rebuffed by discrimination, and rejecting core American values, instead developing a strong ethnic identity as an alienated nationality group on American soil (Falcon, de la Garza, Garcia, & Garcia, 1992; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001).

Two recent studies test these alternatives. Surveys of Latino adults in Los Angeles County asked, "How do you primarily think of yourself: just as an American, both as an American and (ethnicity), or only as an (ethnicity)?" They tend to pass through three distinct stages (Citrin & Sears, 2003, ch. 3). Noncitizen immigrants tend to identify themselves primarily as ethnics and feel a strong sense of ethnic identity. Naturalized immigrants overwhelmingly say "both," and also have a fairly strong sense of ethnic identity. Nonimmigrant Latinos are very unlikely to think of themselves primarily as ethnic, their sense of ethnic identity is weaker, and they have a stronger sense of pride in America. Very similar differences between immigrants and nonimmigrants emerged in a large study of Asian and Latino undergraduates in California.

Party Identification

Immigrants also provide a test of the boundaries of the original theory of party identification. They are likely not to be exposed to much family transmission because their nonvoting parents often have no partisan preferences. Yet immigrants, arriving with the traditional attitudes and values of their own culture, appear to gradually assimilate to the norms of the dominant society. Relatively disadvantaged contemporary Latino immigrants gradually come to identify with the Democratic party, just as had those arriving a century earlier from Europe: the most Democratic Latinos tend to be those who are lower in income and unionized (Cain et al., 1991; de la Garza, DeSipio, Garcia, Garcia, & Falcon, 1992; DeSipio & de la Garza, 1992). And current immigrants, like earlier waves of European immigrants, seem to become more Republican as they become more affluent. Whether that change is intergenerational, as the persistence hypothesis

would suggest, or intragenerational, as the lifelong openness hypothesis would suggest, is unclear; at least some Latino Republicans have a history of being ex-Democrats (Cain et al., 1991).

But immigrants may also import old loyalties and antagonisms from their native countries. For example, Republicans in the vigorously anticommunist Reagan era commanded majorities among refugees from communism from Cuba, Vietnam, Korea, and Taiwan, especially among those fleeing at the height of communist power. Democrats commanded large majorities among those from Mexico or Puerto Rico, who tend to immigrate for economic reasons (Cain et al., 1991; DeSipio & de la Garza, 1992). There is also some evidence that involvement in a previous political system tends to foster immigrants' politicization. Black (1987; Black, Niemi, & Powell, 1987) found that participation and partisanship in the Canadian political system were higher among the immigrants who had been the most interested in politics and politically active in their home countries.

Immigrants also provide an interesting test case of the hypothesis that partisanship strengthens with political experience, for which age is usually a proxy. Immigrants enter at a variety of different ages, so age does not bear a uniform relationship to the amount of political experience they have had with the new political system of the receiving nation. Rather, the strength of their partisanship should be a function of time since immigration. Indeed the longer immigrants have lived in the United States, and the more generations their families have been in the United States, the more likely they are to develop a party identification and identify as a strong partisan (Cain, et al., 1991; Wong, 2000). Their age does not matter much. Of course, time in the new nation is not the only important variable. Naturalized citizens are more likely to acquire a partisan preference, and citizenship explains some of the effects of time, as if time doesn't "count" for as much until citizenship occurs, consistent with the presumed role of practice in the development of a partisan preference.

◣ Conclusions

In our view, continuing research on the problems that originally gave rise to the field have obtained somewhat surprising levels of support for its initial suppositions. The importance of studying the early learning of morality, racial and ethnic attitudes and identity, and partisanship now seems evident. Even proponents of a revisionist view suggest that the findings all "point to much continuity in political-response patterns over the course of an individual's life," notwithstanding the new tasks and roles people later encounter, as well as "considerable change in sociopolitical attitudes and behaviors" in response to new contingencies (Sigel, 1989, p. 458), and "the weight of these studies suggests that we should not usually expect dramatic evidence of change during adulthood" (Sapiro, 1994, p. 204). This recent research nicely documents the conditions under which adult change is most likely to occur. But in our view there has been something of an overcorrection against the early claims of a broad and general persistence of political attitudes, and the center of gravity of the debate has swung a bit too far away from recognition of the substantial persistence manifested by some predispositions.

A second point we would make is that in recent years new foci of attention have arisen—such as the importance of distinguishing moral from other domains of reasoning (e.g., social-conventional), the importance of cognitive (in additional to social) factors in racial and ethnic attitudes, the increasing political importance of ethnic and national identity, the continuing importance of antagonisms against outgroups, and the increasing concern over civic education—that require developmental analyses, even if not to the exclusion of alternative approaches. These foci point to key mediators and moderators of stability and change across the life course. Moreover, long-term persistence is not merely a matter of internal psychology but also of a supportive social and political milieu.

We close with ruminations about two limitations of the literature we have discussed. One is that it has been to an excessive degree generated within North America. No doubt this reflects both where the main body of such research has been done and the limits of our own knowledge. It narrows us particularly in assessing how changing political contexts influence the individual. For example, we present no solid estimate of the extent to which the great experiments at society-molding "took" in Maoist China, the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany or Islamic Iran. Second, we have reviewed a good bit of work on how specifically political events have influenced political development. But these are presumably a subset of the ways that individuals interact with the events of the larger world. Psychologists have not generally been sufficiently attentive to those interactions (though see Stewart & Healy, 1989).

Finally, we noted at the outset that much of the work in this chapter has been motivated, at least in part, by liberal social scientists seeking reformist solutions to social problems. We should be cautious about normative implications of the research described here. On the matters taken up in this chapter, there is typically no one ideal outcome that all will agree to. The nature of politics—indeed, its primary raison d'être—is to adjudicate disputes over competing interests and preferences, not to ratify consensus over political ends. Even ethnocentrism and prejudice are often seen as justified by those who hold them, as harshly as they are condemned by their victims and their sympathizers. Stereotypes have their beneficent uses as simplifiers and organizers, as much as they harm their victims and limit the social skills and circles of their holders. The merits of assimilation and separation of contending groups can be and are legitimately debated. And, as often was said in the months after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, one man's "terrorist" is another man's "freedom fighter." If

political psychology can teach us anything, it is that we must all constantly struggle to balance the natural tendency to glorify the familiar and those most like us with the need to sympathetically take the perspective of others. Social scientists may engage that struggle in more intellectual terms than the ordinary person, but a struggle it remains.

Notes

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1. One other early approach used the individual's retrospective judgment to assess persistence: Did they recall ever changing their party identification (Campbell et al., 1960)? Such judgments were later shown to be rather unreliable, usually overestimating stability (Niemi, Katz, & Newman, 1980).

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