The Cosmopolitan Society and its
Enemies
Ulrich Beck
I
N THIS article I want to discuss three questions: (1) What is a cosmopolitan
sociology? (2) What is a cosmopolitan society? (3) Who are the
enemies of cosmopolitan societies?
What is a Cosmopolitan Sociology?
Let me start by attempting to nail a pudding to the wall, that is, defining
the key terms ‘globalization’ and ‘cosmopolitanization’. At the beginning of
the 21st century the conditio humana cannot be understood nationally or
locally but only globally. ‘Globalization’ is a non-linear, dialectic process in
which the global and the local do not exist as cultural polarities but as
combined and mutually implicating principles. These processes involve not
only interconnections across boundaries, but transform the quality of the
social and the political inside nation-state societies. This is what I define
as ‘cosmopolitanization’: cosmopolitanization means internal globalization,
globalization from within the national societies. This transforms everyday
consciousness and identities significantly. Issues of global concern are
becoming part of the everyday local experiences and the ‘moral life-worlds’
of the people. They introduce significant conflicts all over the world. To treat
these profound ontological changes simply as myth relies on a superficial
and unhistorical understanding of ‘globalization’, the misunderstandings of
neoliberal globalism. The study of globalization and globality, cosmopolitanization
and cosmopolitanism constitutes a revolution in the social
sciences (Beck, 2000a, 2002a; Cheah and Robbins, 1998; Gilroy, 1993;
Shaw, 2000; Therborn, 2000; Urry, 2000).
Of course, the new interest in cosmopolitanism has been critically
associated with those elite Western individuals who were the fullest expression
of European bourgeois capitalism and colonial empires. But we need
Ⅲ Theory, Culture & Society 2002 (SAGE, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi),
Vol. 19(1–2): 17–44
[0263-2764(200204)19:1–2;17–44;023244]
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 17
to identify, as Paul Rabinow argues, a (self-)critical cosmopolitanism, which
combines ‘an ethos of macro-independencies with an acute consciousness
. . . of the inescapabilities and particularities of places, characters,
historical trajectories and fate’ (1996: 56) The study of cosmopolitanization
must not be confused with wishful thinking primarily concerned with projecting
the cosmopolitan intentions of the scholar. There is no necessary
connection between the study of the hidden cosmopolitanization of nationstate
societies and the rise of the ‘cosmopolitan subject’, even if some
cultural theorists appear to believe there is.
To me the ‘cosmopolitanization thesis’ is a methodological concept
which helps to overcome methodological nationalism and to build a frame
of reference to analyse the new social conflicts, dynamics and structures of
Second Modernity (Beck, 2002c; Beck et al., 2002; Lash, 2002; Latour,
2002). The central defining characteristic of a cosmopolitan perspective is
the ‘dialogic imagination’. By this I mean the clash of cultures and rationalities
within one’s own life, the ‘internalized other’. The dialogic imagination
corresponds to the coexistence of rival ways of life in the individual
experience, which makes it a matter of fate to compare, reflect, criticize,
understand, combine contradictory certainties. It was Friedrich Nietzsche
who spoke in this sense of ‘the Age of Comparison’. He meant not only that
the individual was free to pick and choose among competing traditions and
heritages. Even more significant was that the various cultures of the world
were beginning to interpenetrate each other. And he foresaw this process
continuing, until ideas of every culture would be side by side, in combination,
comparison, contradiction and competition in every place and all
the time.
The national perspective is a monologic imagination, which excludes
the otherness of the other. The cosmopolitan perspective is an alternative
imagination, an imagination of alternative ways of life and rationalities,
which include the otherness of the other. It puts the negotiation of contradictory
cultural experiences into the centre of activities: in the political, the
economic, the scientific and the social.
‘Cosmopolitanism’ means – as Immanuel Kant argued 200 years ago
– being a citizen of two worlds – ‘cosmos’ and ‘polis’. There are five different
dimensions to this, distinguishing between external and internal otherness.
Externally it means:
(a) including the otherness of nature;
(b) including the otherness of other civilizations and modernities; and
(c) including the otherness of the future;
internally it means:
(d) including the otherness of the object; and
(e) overcoming the (state) mastery of (scientific, linear) rationalization.
18 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1–2)
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 18
While radical social change has always been part of modernity and the
social sciences, the transition to a methodological cosmopolitanism revolutionizes
the very coordinates, categories and conceptions of change itself.
A cosmopolitan sociology (or cosmopolitan social sciences – this is an
important difference!) has to answer the questions: how to include nature?
How to include other modernities and civilizations? How to include the
object into subjectivity and intersubjectivity? How to include the otherness
of the future? And how to overcome the state-scientific mastery of rationality
– within the framework, methods and conceptions of the social
sciences? Methodological cosmopolitanism rejects the either-or principle
and assembles the this-as-well-as-that principle – like ‘cosmopolitan
patriots’, patriots of two worlds. What the ‘cosmo-logic’ signifies is its
thinking and living in terms of inclusive oppositions (including nature into
society etc.) and rejecting the logic of exclusive oppositions, which characterizes
methodological nationalism and first modernity sociology.
In relation to the concept of ‘globality’ (Albrow, 1996; Robertson,
1992) cosmopolitanism means: rooted cosmopolitanism, having ‘roots’ and
‘wings’ at the same time. So it rejects the dominant opposition between cosmopolitans
and locals as well: there is no cosmopolitanism without localism.
Let me exemplify what ‘cosmopolitan’ means in relation to social
theory by referring to the theory of reflexive modernization. One central
operational thesis, a basic indicator of reflexive modernization, is the
pluralization of borders. This is supposed to be true for such fundamental
dualisms as the border between nature and society, subject and object, life
and death, We and the Others, war and peace. If one focuses on globalization
from within (as I do in this article) the pluralization of borders means
the pluralization of nation-state borders or the implosion of the dualism
between the national and the international: how far is there a multitude of
non-identical borders emerging, within which themes and dimensions and
with what effects (strategic opportunities of action for whom); for example:
economically, culturally, politically, legally, technologically, etc.? In terms
of methodological nationalism these borders coincide; in terms of a
methodological cosmopolitanism these borders diverge. ‘Globalization from
within’ thus stands for dissonance in drawing of borderlines – the axiom
of the incongruity of borders. In other words: borders are no longer predeterminate,
they can be chosen (and interpreted), but simultaneously also
have to be redrawn and legitimated anew. There is both an increase in
plausible ways of drawing new borders and a growing tendency to question
existing borders in all different fields (e.g. climate crisis, BSE crisis, biopolitics,
genetically modified food, terrorist threat).
When cultural, political, economic and legal borders are no longer
congruent, contradictions open up between the various principles of
exclusion. Inner globalization, understood as pluralization of borders,
produces, in other words, a legitimation crisis of the national morality of
exclusion: on which principles are the internal hierarchies of unities or
states based? And it produces questions as to the distribution of global
Beck – The Cosmopolitan Society 19
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 19
responsibilities: why do we have to recognize a special moral responsibility
towards other people just because, by accident, they have the same nationality?
Why should they be free of any moral sensibility towards other people
for the sole reason that they happened to be born on the other side of the
national fence? What loses any legitimacy is the fundamentally dubious
assumption that such responsibilities are absolute within a border, while
their absence is equally absolute outside this border.
This exclusion crisis sets off an avalanche of cosmopolitan questions:
can the reasons which a society gives for the exclusion of strangers be questioned
by members of this society and strangers alike? Who questions, who
decides, who justifies and who defines who ‘who’ is? For example, may
‘foreigners’ participate in the process of discussion, definition and decisionmaking
when it comes to the issue of civil rights? Or does this decision ultimately
lie solely with the members? May members claim a right to
homogeneity in order to exclude others? The right of ‘ethnic self-determination’?
The right of ‘religious homogeneity’, of ‘racial homogeneity’? Of
‘ethnic cleansing’? So the cosmopolitan constellation evidently created in
demands for legitimation, which are asserted both internally and externally,
opens up discussions to include groups which have previously been
excluded, redistributes the burden of proof and excludes some principles
as illegitimate, or questions their legitimacy (Beck-Gernsheim, 2000).
This calls for a ‘world citizenry’ (Kant), despite the lack of governance
in the world at large; and with time, there must be invented a ‘cosmopolitan
state’, founded upon the otherness of the other (Beck, 2002c). Without the
rule of law there is only the rule of force and ruse – not the cosmopolitan
societies we are looking for. But the rule of law is not static, especially in
today’s world of reflexive modernization. There has to be a fundamental
sense of the principles, the cosmopolitan memory and norms to be expressed
through the law – and observed even without law – so there can be shared
confidence, an ethos against which global norms are being institutionalized
(one example of a cosmopolitan memory: the transnationalization of the
Holocaust; Levy and Sznaider, 2001).
I doubt that cosmopolitan societies are any less ethical and historical
than national societies. But cosmopolitanism lacks orientation, perhaps
because it is so much bigger and includes so many different kinds of people
with conflicting customs, assorted hopes and shames, so many sheer technological
and scientific possibilities and risks, posing issues people never
faced before. There is, in any case, a greater felt need for an evident ethical
dimension in the decisions, both private and public, that intervene in all
aspects of life and add up to the texture of cosmopolitan societies.
Political decisions in a world where the distinctions that make up our
standard picture of the modern state – the border that divides domestic from
foreign policy and security – are part of this, including how to fight the war
on terrorism, how to monitor the stock market, how to audit the auditors.
All of this has to be done, but no-one is sure how to go about it. So, after
communism and neoliberalism, the next big idea is needed – and this could
20 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1–2)
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 20
be cosmopolitanism. There is a need to rethink the essential concepts and
values of cosmopolitan societies, why so many people don’t seem to consider
them as self-evident and are fighting them and why there are new dilemmas.
It is not a matter of post-modernity or non-modernity, but of a new rule of
globalized entangled modernities (Randeria, 1999) that highlight the
urgency of demands of this world risk society.
Thus a cosmopolitan sociology imposes fundamental questions of
redefinition, reinvention and reorganization. The challenges are related to
two fundamental processes: globalization and individualization. The
globalization debate took up the territorial bias; the individualization debate
has probed and criticized the collective bias of the social sciences (Beck
and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). First, of course, conceptual problems: by those
I mean, for example, the declining effectiveness of sociological classics to
make sense of the dramatically changing economy and society; second,
methodological problems: most of the social sciences are based on a
‘methodological constructivism’ which excludes the otherness of nature and
the otherness of the object (Latour, 2001, 2002), and on a ‘methodological
nationalism’. This term can be defined by the explicit or implicit assumptions
about the nation-state being the power container of social processes
and the national being the key-order for studying major social, economic
and political processes. Third, organizational problems: what transnational
structure of cooperation do the social sciences need in order to explore and
understand the emerging worlds of transnational flows, networks,
socioscapes, life forms, identities, classes and power structure? A sociology
that remains happily glued to its own society and times will not have much
to contribute.
What do cosmopolitan social sciences mean in the space of empirical
investigation, if the space of sociological imagination is not the nation-state
society? Göran Therborn (1995, 2000) distinguishes very interestingly
between the universal and the global. He argues that, to classical sociology,
space was the social space of humankind. But now we are entering into a
new space of sociological imagination, that is, into globality. Globality
means reflexive globalization, a global everyday experience and consciousness
of the global. For Therborn a ‘global sociology’ treats the globe as a
set of divergent cultures and modernities and not only as a territory of
humankind in evolution of modernity.
For him:
globality entails a turn away both from provincial gaze and from the exotic
gaze of the colonizer (and of the colonized). There is no longer any legitimate
centre point, from which to look out and to communicate with the rest of the
world. Vistas, experiences, conceptualizations from all parts of the globe will
be brought into networks of global inter-communication. Extra-European
cultural experiences and language skills will be important assets here, and
new links to comparative linguistics will be opened up. A global sociology
amounts to a fundamental turn of imagination as well as of investigation, from
Beck – The Cosmopolitan Society 21
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 21
the nation in the North Atlantic space of reference to a global social cosmos
with no naturally given privileged observation post and no absolute time.
(Therborn, 2000: 51)
So ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’ implies a new politics of comparison
in relation to the internal otherness of nature, future, other civilizations,
etc. The monologic national imagination of the social sciences
assumed that Western modernity is a universal formation and that the
modernities of the non-Western others can be understood only in relation
to the idealized Western model. The hegemonic North American notion of
modernity – as spelled out in old modernization theory and theories of
development – locates the non-West at the far end of an escalator rising
toward the West, which is at the pinnacle of modernity in terms of capitalistic
development, secularization, culture and democratic state formations.
In a cosmopolitan perspective we need to attend to how places in the nonWest
differently plan and envision the particular combinations of culture,
capital and nation-state, rather than assume that they are immature versions
of some Western prototype. So a cosmopolitan sociology is opposed to a universalizing
armchair theory.
It’s quite interesting to relate this debate on ‘divergent or entangled
modernities’ (Randeria, 1999) to the debate on ‘postcolonialism’. Loose use
of the term ‘postcolonialism’ has the bizarre effect of contributing to a
Western tradition of othering the Rest (Gilroy, 1993; Hall, 1996). It suggests
a post-war scheme whereby ‘the Third World’ was followed by ‘the developing
countries’, which are now being succeeded by ‘the postcolonial’. As
quite a few authors argue, ‘we must move beyond an analysis based on
colonial nostalgia’ (Ong, 1999: 12ff.). It appears that unitary models of the
postcolonial and of modernity are ascendant at a time when, for example,
many Asian countries are not interested in colonialism or in postcolonialism,
but are in the process of constructing alternative modernities based on
new relations with their populations, with capital and with the West. In many
corners of the globe, in a departure from the norm in post-Second World
War ‘developmental states’, intellectuals, politicians and scientists are producing
alternative visions of Asian, Chinese, Latin American modernities.
In other words, the ‘alternative’ in alternative modernities does not necessarily
suggest a critique of, or opposition to, modernity and capitalism. It
suggests the kind of entangled modernity that is constituted by different sets
of relations between the post-developmental state, its population, modernization
and global capital. This is being constructed by political and social
elites who appropriate Western knowledges and represent them as truth
claims about their own country. So the debate on entangled modernity or
modernities belongs to a post-postcolonial era.
For a cosmopolitan sociology a tiny question remains to be answered:
how to research the global? Isn’t the total global, let’s say, a bit too global?
And would a sociology of the global not necessarily transform sociology into
philosophy and metaphysics without any systematic empirical reference for
22 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1–2)
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 22
falsification? So the question has to be positioned and answered: how is an
empirical sociology of the global becoming possible?
Believe it or not, to me there is a simple answer to this question, but
this answer is blocked by common images and misunderstandings of
globalization. They are paradoxes of globalization.
The first is that globalization is about globalization. This isn’t true.
Globalization is about localization as well. You cannot even think about
globalization without referring to specific locations and places. One of the
important consequences of the globalization thesis is the recovering of the
concept of place. It is global–local dialectics which Robert Robertson has
in mind when he talks about ‘glocalization’. The implication for empirical
sociology is that glocalization happens not out there, but in here. Therefore
sociology can investigate the global locally. As Saskia Sassen’s (2000) work
shows, this has significant implications for the analysis and theorization of
cities: not the city as a bounded territorialized unit, but the city as a node
in a grid of cross-boundary processes. Further, this type of globalized city
cannot be located simply in a hierarchical scale that places it beneath the
national, regional and global. It is one of the spaces of the global, and it
engages the global directly, often by-passing the national.
This works becomes clearer if we pick up a second misunderstanding
of globalization, which sees it as an additive and not substitutive aspect of
nation-state society and sociological imagination. In the globalization discourse
you often find the assumption that globalization only changes the
relation between and beyond national states and societies (‘interconnectedness’),
but not the inner quality of the social and political itself (‘cosmopolitanization’).
But globalization includes globalization from within,
globalization internalized, or, as I prefer to say, ‘cosmopolitanization of
nation-state societies’. So, this misunderstanding can be solved: under conditions
of globalization the national is no longer the national. The national
has to be rediscovered as the internalized global.
As Saskia Sassen puts it: ‘Of particular interest here is the implied
correspondence of national territory to the national, and the associated
implication that the national and the non-national are two mutually
exclusive conditions. We are now seeing their partial unbundling.’ Sassen
argues:
that one of the features of the current face of globalization is the fact that a
process, which happens within a territory of sovereign state, does not necessarily
mean that it is a national process. Conversely, the national (such as
firms, capital, culture) may increasingly be located outside the national territory,
for instance, in a foreign country or digital spaces. This localization of
the global, or of the non-national, in national territories, and of the national
outside national territories, undermined a key duality running through many
of the methods and conceptual frameworks prevalent in social sciences, that
the national and the non-national are mutually exclusive. (Sassen, 2000:
145ff.)
Beck – The Cosmopolitan Society 23
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 23
From this can be drawn the most important implication. There is no need
to investigate the global totally globally. We can organize a new purposeful
historically sensitive empiricism on the ambivalent consequences of
globalization in cross-national and multi-local research networks. But what
kind of concepts and categories can we use for this purpose? Or do we have
to invent and coin new ones?
It was Kant who argued ‘Anschauung ohne Begriff ist blind; Begriff
ohne Anschauung ist leer’ (Observations without concepts are blind;
concepts without observations are empty). If it is true that the meaning of
the national and the local is changing through internalized globalization,
then the most important methodological implication for all social sciences
is that normal social sciences categories are becoming zombie categories,
empty terms in the Kantian meaning. Zombie categories are living dead
categories, which blind the social sciences to the rapidly changing realities
inside the nation-state containers, and outside as well.
The purpose of my distinction between a first and a second age of modernity
is not to introduce a new problematic evolutionary form of periodization
based on either-or epochal ‘stages’, when everything is reversed
at the same moment, all the old relations disappear forever and entirely new
ones come up to replace them. The main purpose of the distinction of a first
age and a second age of modernity is a twofold one: first, to position the
question of new concepts and frame of references and, second, to criticize
conventional sociology as an empty-term sociology, a zombie sociology. In
a research study at Munich University on ‘reflexive modernization’ (Beck et
al., 2002), which I am in charge of, we are conducting long-term research
on subjects like these: how does the meaning of ‘class’ change under the
conditions of individualization and globalization? How does the perception
of global risk transform the concept of ‘rationality’ in science and law? How
are the concepts of ‘employment’ and ‘labour’ being dissolved and redefined
in the global information economy? Has the concept of the state already
been converted into a super-, supra-, inter-, post-, neo-, trans-, nation-state?
Let me give you an example. Until now sociologists have written textbooks
and done research on the class structure of Britain, France, the
United States, Germany and so on. But if you look at how a class-based
sociology defines class categories, you find that it depends upon what is
going on in families, in households. Empirical definitions of class identity
are founded on categories of household, defined by either a male (head) of
the household, or, at least, the leading person of a household. But what is
a ‘household’ nowadays, economically, socially, geographically, under conditions
of living-apart-together, normal divorce, remarriage and transnational
life forms? High mobility means more and more people are living
a kind of place-polygamy. They are married to many places in different
worlds and cultures. Transnational place-polygamy, belonging in different
worlds: this is the gateway to globality in one’s own life. Class sociology not
only proposes that one knows what the category ‘household’ nowadays
means; it also proposes: that households – and classes! – are territorially
24 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1–2)
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 24
based in one and only one national container society. So we have to address
the question: what does a de-territorialized, post-national (or bi-national)
concept of household mean and what are its implications for class analysis?
In our project on ‘reflexive modernization’ (Beck et al., 2002), we are
researching, for example, the question: if there is no clear relationship
between household and family, how do we start, then? If we don’t know what
a ‘family’ is, maybe we could start with a ‘couple’. But what is a ‘couple’?
The French sociologist Jean-Claude Kaufmann (1994) has a very sophisticated
answer: a couple is not formed when two people start living together,
or when they start having sex. Something else must be added: a couple
begins when two persons buy one washing machine – not two! Why?
Because then the quarrels about ‘Dirty Laundry’ (the title of his marvellous
book) start. Who washes for whom? What counts as dirty? What as clean?
What happens in each case, if he says yes and she says no? (Of course those
are, as we all know, Western questions.)
If we want to distinguish between a methodological nationalism and a
methodological cosmopolitanism we not only have to solve the new problem
of beginning – there is also the problem of redefining the sociological frame
of reference. If we want to do this for the purpose of empirical research,
there are two concepts in the making:
Ⅵ Interconnectedness: beautifully explained and empirically rich, as
expressed in the work of David Held and his colleagues, especially their
latest book, Global Transformations (1999). But this idea of interconnectedness
somehow still presupposes the territorial unit of states and
state societies, that are becoming more and more interconnected and networked.
And, keeping in mind global inequalities, ‘interconnectedness’
is a semantic euphemism.
Ⅵ The new metaphor of the fluid that flows: neither boundaries nor relations
mark the difference between one place and another. Instead, sometimes
boundaries come and go, while relations transform themselves without
fracture. Then social space behaves like a fluid (Mol and Law, 1994: 643).
But the very suggestiveness of the powerful metaphor of the ‘fluid’ begs
the question of whether ‘networks’ and ‘flows’ as social processes can be
so independent of national, transnational and political-economic structures
that enable, channel and control the flows of people, things and
ideas. In other words: there is a lack of institutional (power)-structures,
sometimes even an anti-institutionalism involved in the powerful cultural
research and theory about ‘fluids’ and ‘mobility’ (Urry, 2000).
Ⅵ Cosmopolitanization from within (this is what I am working on): cosmopolitanization
has to be clearly distinguished from cosmopolitanism.
Cosmopolitanism (as I will discuss later) is a large, ancient, rich and
controversial set of political ideas, philosophies and ideologies. It
remains in part an ideological construct, and as such it has the abstract,
even artificial atmosphere that Heinrich Heine described as the ‘kingdom
of the air’. Cosmopolitanization, on the other hand, is a frame of reference
Beck – The Cosmopolitan Society 25
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 25
for empirical exploration for globalization from within, globalization
internalized. It is a kind of class analysis after class analysis, which takes
on board globalization. Like class analysis, as Marx proposed it, it
combines a descriptive analysis of social structure with the assumption
that this analysis gives us a key to understand the political dynamics and
conflicts of globalized social worlds.
But cosmopolitan sociology does imply more than a new transnational sensitivity
for empirical research (Therborn, 2000): Western sociology, the sociological
equivalent of NATO, has most of the money and intercontinental
firepower. What does the rest of the world have? It is not without significance
that it contains about seven-eighths of the world’s population, and
that these seven-eighths are no longer subjects of colonization and have
their own centres of higher education and research, however short of financial
resources many of them may be. Second, transnational immigration and
education are creating a quite significant stratum of educated transnationals.
They have personal knowledge, both of East-Asia and of
California, of Latin America and of Anglo-America, of South-Asia and
England, of the Arab world, Africa and France, of Turkey and Germany
and the USA, to mention only a few of the largest combinations. These
people are raising the standards of the cosmopolitan redefinition of social
sciences, which we have to work on. The basic idea is: a cosmopolitan social
theory and social science ask about the complicated accommodations,
alliances and creative contradictions between the nation-state and mobile
capital, between the hidden cosmopolitanization of nation-state societies
and national identities and institutions, between cosmopolitanism and
nationalism.
What is a Cosmopolitan Society?
As often in history, cosmopolitanization is being experienced and reflected
upon as crisis – a threefold crisis: crisis of cosmos (nature), crisis of polis
(paradigm of nature-state politics) and crisis of rationality and control. To
illustrate this, I pick up on the latter one.
We now have to recognize and act upon a new global market risk,
which is highlighted by the Asian crisis in 1998 and which demonstrates
the social and political dynamics of the economic world risk society. The
global market risk is a new form of ‘organized irresponsibility’, because it
is an institutional form so impersonal as to have no responsibilities, even
to itself. Enabled by the information revolution, global market risk allows
the near-instant flow of funds to determine who will prosper and who will
suffer. Today, you can illustrate the components of global market risk by the
experience of the Asian crisis as you could, in 1986, illustrate the basic
aspects of global technological risk with the experience of Chernobyl.
Somehow, the Asian crisis is the economic Chernobyl. So cosmopolitanization
comes into being by recognizing oneself as being involved and victimized
by global risk regimes.
26 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1–2)
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 26
Let’s look at this in a bit more detail. In the social sciences and
cultural theory globalization is often defined in terms of ‘time-space compression’,
‘de-territorialization’, ‘de-nationalization’, etc. Those concepts
mostly refer to the spatial dimension. But what do globalization and cosmopolitan
society mean in the dimension of time and (collective) memory? The
experience of a cosmopolitical crisis – as I explained before – implies:
people all over the world are reflecting on a shared collective future, which
contradicts a nation-based memory of the past.1
There is no memory of the global past. But there is an imagination of
a globally shared collective future, which characterizes the cosmopolitan
society and its experience of crisis. Of course, both the national and the
cosmopolitan imagination are past- and future-orientated. But to oversimplify
this distinction: methodological nationalism is about the future implications
of a nationally shared past, an imagined past; while methodological
cosmopolitanism is about the present implications of a globally shared
future, an imagined future. If it is true, as, for example, Koselleck argues,
that modernity as such is dominated by the future, this future regime of
modernity is being realized not in the national but in the cosmopolitan age
of modernity. To repeat myself: the definition and construction of collectivity
in cosmopolitan societies are about the definition and construction of a
globally shared collective future crisis. It is the future, not the past, which
‘integrates’ the cosmopolitan age.
But a significant difference should be noted, that between consciousness
and action. It is the same in all dimensions of the social and the
political – transnational identities and life forms, globalizing economy,
global risks, etc.: global consciousness of a shared collective future is a consciousness
which does not incorporate forms of action. Forms of action – in
the spheres of politics, science, law, etc. – are past-based. So far, there are
very few transnational forms of action designed for a shared collective
future.
From this it follows that the cosmopolitan crisis is not only about a
crisis of cosmos and nature, a crisis of polis, and a crisis of rationality and
control; it is also to a great degree about profound contradiction between a
time-based consciousness of a globally shared future without adequate
forms of institutionalized action and a past-based national memory without
a globally shared collective future (or, to be more precise, with a past-based
shared hostility towards the future).
To sum up this first part of my argument: in the dimension of space
we talk and reflect upon the de-territorialization of the social, the political
and the economic; in the dimension of time we have to reflect upon the ‘retraditionalization’
of the social, political and cultural through a globally
shared collective future. Re-traditionalization means the collective future
consciousness takes over the position of tradition and memory in the pastorientated
national imagination and paradigm: the tradition of cosmopolitan
societies is the tradition of future. It is, of course, a fragile future, a future
crisis, a future of de-futurization.
Beck – The Cosmopolitan Society 27
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 27
Just like pre-modern feudal societies and nationally based industrial
societies, so, too, do cosmopolitan societies develop their own imagination
of time and space, their own concepts of ‘class’ and ‘power’, their own notion
of democratization and justice, their own hysterias and dilemmas, and their
own questions: how to organize politics, that is, reach collectively binding
decisions. Breaking free of ‘methodological nationalism’ and exploring
‘methodological cosmopolitanism’ will probably only succeed if excursions
into social theory are combined with excursions into concealed worlds of
experience. So what does ‘cosmopolitanization’ mean? Let me begin with an
example.
The British sociologist Michael Billig talks about ‘banal nationalism’
(1995). By this he means that, almost unconsciously, we repeatedly ‘show
our colours’, renewing our national identity and demarcating it from others
through a host of everyday routines. Both in this sense – and also in contradiction
to it – we must now, I believe, talk about a banal cosmopolitanism,
in which everyday nationalism is circumvented and undermined and
we experience ourselves integrated into global processes and phenomena.
It certainly starts with pop and rave (youth cultures will be brilliant
examples), goes on with television and the Internet, but includes also very
definitely food (as John Tomlinson [1999] has shown). Who today can still
feed himself locally or nationally? The product labels may still try to make
us believe it, but from yoghurt, to meat and fruit, to say nothing of the globalized
hotchpotch of sausage meat, as consumers we are irredeemably locked
into globalized cycles of production and consumption. Food and drink of all
countries unite – that has long ago become trite reality.
Take the supermarket around the corner. Today one finds on the
shelves every possible kind of food that used to be eaten on other continents
and in other cultures, albeit as industrially mass-produced articles.
The result, nevertheless, is a banal cosmopolitan culinary eclecticism,
which is meanwhile promoted and celebrated in cook books and TV food
programmes as the new normality. So world society has taken possession of
our kitchens and is boiling and sizzling in our pans. Anyone who still wants
to raise the national flag, when it comes to food, founders on the ever more
hollow myths of national dishes, which at best are no more than islands in
the broad stream of the dominant and by now banal culinary cosmopolitan-
ism.
As I said, banal cosmopolitanism appears to be displacing banal
nationalism – involuntarily and invisibly, and throughout the world. In
Birmingham recently, there was a national demonstration against the
‘German’ company BMW because its plan to sell the ‘British’ company
Rover threatened to bring calamity to the whole region. On such an
occasion, for sure, banal nationalism briefly flares up again, but afterwards,
in the pub around the corner, tempers are cooled with so-called ‘Dutch’ or
‘German’ beer and ‘our’ football team is cheered on in competitions in which
players of every skin colour and culture play against one another.
Which is to say that the experiential frame of national societies, shut
28 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1–2)
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 28
off from one another by a unified language, identity and politics, is increasingly
nothing more than a scam. What appears as and is proclaimed as
national is, in essence, increasingly transnational or cosmopolitan. What is
at issue is the relation of our knowledge of the world and social structure.
Social structure is becoming transnational or cosmopolitan; an epistemological
shift is required in concurrence with this ontological change. Of
course, there are limits to cosmopolitanization as well. On the one hand a
new transnational space is eroding and superseding national space as the
locus of social life. On the hand this social life is, in many ways, still filtered
through nation-state institutions. This situation underscores the highly contradictory
nature of national–transnational relations as well as the indeterminacy
of the emergent cosmopolitan social structures.
For the purposes of social analysis, therefore, it is necessary to distinguish
systematically between the national manifestation on the one hand
and the cosmopolitan reality of ‘global flows’, currents of information,
symbols, money, education, risks and people, on the other. This internal,
involuntary and often unseen cosmopolitanization of the national sphere of
experience is occurring, however, as a concealed ‘side-effect’ of economic
globalization, that is, with the power and autonomy of digital capitalism. It
has to be said: it is not socialism that is establishing this beneficent disorder
in the world, but nationally unbounded capitalism. This does not mean confusing
‘world citizenship’ with the rise of a global managerial class. A clear
distinction must be drawn between ‘global capitalism’ and ‘global citizenship’.
Yet a plural world citizenship is to some extent soaring with the wind
of global capital at its back (I will come to this later).
At this point, at the latest, it is necessary to warn against a possible
cosmopolitan fallacy. The fundamental fact that the experiential space of
the individual no longer coincides with national space, but is being subtly
altered by the opening to cosmopolitanization should not deceive anyone
into believing that we are all going to become cosmopolitans. Even the most
positive development imaginable, an opening of cultural horizons and a
growing sensitivity to other unfamiliar, legitimate geographies of living and
coexistence, need not necessarily stimulate a feeling of cosmopolitan
responsibility. The question of how this might at all be possible has hardly
been properly put so far, never mind investigated. Actually cosmopolitanization
is about a dialectics of conflict: cosmopolitanization and its
enemies.
But the consequent ‘cosmopolitanization’ from the inside of societies
organized and thought in nation-state terms actually increases the probability
of national fallacy as well. This is the belief that what takes place
within the container of this or that national state can also be pinned down,
understood and explained nationally. This ‘national or territorial fallacy’
applies, not least, to a large proportion of the statistics assembled by nationstate
oriented economic and social sciences.
So, once again, what does inner ‘cosmopolitanization’ mean? Cosmopolitanization
means that the key questions of a way of life, such as
Beck – The Cosmopolitan Society 29
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 29
nourishment, production, identity, fear, memory, pleasure, fate, can no
longer be located nationally or locally, but only globally or glocally –
whether in the shape of globally shared collective futures, capital flows,
impending ecological or economic catastrophes, global foodstuff chains or
the international ‘Esperanto’ of pop music. And the key question now will
be to what extent the transnational sphere of experience, which is opening
up, will dissolve or overlap the national sphere of experience – whether the
former will swallow up the latter or vice versa. To what extent, therefore,
the transnational sphere of experience will be overlaid, filtered off and
broken down by nation-state institutions and identities – and with what
resulting explosions – or, indeed, as such, increasingly the subject of conscious
and public reflection.
If one generalizes this phenomenology of the ongoing transnationalization,
then the claim I am staking with the concept of ‘cosmopolitan
society’ becomes clear. This concept aims to describe a historically new
quality and form of societal differentiation. By which I mean, that a new
way of doing business and of working, a new kind of identity and politics
as well as a new kind of everyday space-time experience and of human
sociability, is emerging. There is no historical precedent for this, hence we
are forced to re-think the concept of ‘society’. It is impossible even to outline
this claim here. I must limit myself to a few aspects, which could make my
thesis at least intuitively comprehensible. To this end I would like to look
in turn at changes in the understanding of space-time, of identity, of the production
paradigm as well as at the resulting consequences for key sociological
concepts like class and power and, within this frame, point to certain
dilemmas of cosmopolitanism.
Space-Time
One could, of course, object: first, transnational ways of life and the dialogic
imagination express, once again, a middle-class bias; second, the notion of
mobile culture as restless nomadic movement does not apply to those who
stay at home. But both arguments can easily be rejected.
Let me remind you how Robert E. Park in the 1920s defined the
‘marginal man’: ‘[a] cultural hybrid, a man living and sharing intimately in
the cultural life and traditions of two distinct peoples’ (1928: 892). In the
struggles over belonging, the actions of migrants and minorities are major
examples of dialogic imaginative ways of life and everyday cosmopolitanism.
We normally only look at the transnationalizaton of capital and not at
the much more restricted transnationalization of cheap labour. As Saskia
Sassen (2000) has shown, there are combined strategies of relocation to the
periphery and the use of immigrant, ethnic and female labour pools in highly
segmented labour markets in the core. So, to discover a kind of transnational
anomie as a source of social action and capital might, indeed, be a paradoxical
discovery to be made by the salutary experience of migrants and
their dramatically disadvantaged situation.
Not mobility but the transformation of localities itself is the key impact
30 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1–2)
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 30
of cultural globalization. As John Tomlinson, myself and many others have
pointed out, the idea of de-territorialization is of major importance. It means:
loosening and transforming the ties of culture to place. ‘Our roots are our
antennae.’ That’s the kind of sentence which gets to the heart of the
paradigm shift in the role of location in the context of global networks. The
more television, but also the mobile phone and the Internet, become part of
the fittings of homes, the more the sociological categories of time, space,
place, proximity and distance change their meaning. Because this domestic
information technology interior potentially makes those who are absent
present, always and everywhere. Sociability is no longer dependent on geographical
proximity. It thus becomes possible – as recent studies have
already shown – for people who live isolated from their neighbours in one
place simultaneously to be tied into dense networks stretching across continents.
In other words: the sphere of experience, in which we inhabit
globally networked life-worlds, is glocal, has become a synthesis of home
and non-place, a nowhere place.
So the other side of de-territorialization (which actually does have only
a negative meaning – ‘post-ism’ and ‘de-ism’ are all over!) is cosmopolitanization:
the digital cosmopolitan architecture of the most local and
private centres of everyday life. A cosmopolitan sociology should investigate
not only presence and absence, but also ‘imagined presence’ (Urry,
2000). Dialogic imaginations presuppose, among others, imagined presence
of geographically distant others and worlds.
Identity
This has important consequences for identity: not all, but an increasing
number of people nowadays trade internationally, work internationally, love
internationally, marry internationally, do research internationally, and their
children are growing up and are being educated internationally. These
children are not only bi-lingual; they move through the non-place of television
and the Internet like fish through water. So why do we expect that
political loyalties and identities will continue to be tied exclusively to a
nation? Two consequences of crucial importance: community life will no
longer be determined solely or even primarily by location; and collective
memory is losing its unity and integrity. And then there are the tricky little
questions: how do Turkish Germans deal with the Holocaust? Or non-Jewish
Palestinian Israelis? There has been a great deal of thought about the
globalization of space and location, but much less about the globalization
of time and of memory (Levy and Sznaider, 2001).
At this point of my argument a systematic remark regarding the
relationship between transnational cultural theory and studies and the new
political economy is necessary: the very suggestiveness of transnational
socioscapes, networks and identities, to some extent, pushes aside the
political economy of time-space compression and gives the misleading
impression that everyone can take equal advantage of mobility and modern
communications, and that transnationality has been liberatory for all people.
Beck – The Cosmopolitan Society 31
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 31
Instead, a cosmopolitan sociology has to ask: what are the mechanisms of
power that enable the mobility as well as the relocation of diverse populations
within these emerging cosmopolitan social structures? How are
cultural flows and the dialogic imagination conditioned and shaped within
the new forms of production and global inequalities?
Production Paradigm
Methodological nationalism corresponds to the specific interrelationship
between production, social classes, political power and territoriality. The
‘third wave’ technology – communications, computerization, etc. – undermines
this historic territoriality: territoriality and production are no longer
bound together. The new possibilities offered to business by the Internet,
inter alia, add up to a qualitative break with a world which thought in terms
of the national/international dichotomy, but precisely not in transnational
terms. The decisive consequence is this: in the internal space of national
and local ways of doing business there is a fundamental transformation of
options and decision-making situations. Decisions – in particular those of
local and national enterprises – come under the influence of global possibilities
and competition. What is involved here is a paradigm shift from
territorial production, which was oriented towards a local or national market,
to de-territorialized forms of production, which are oriented towards several
national markets or the world market. The market has become transnational
and not (only) the companies. Consequently this globalization of trade is not
restricted to flows of goods and capital, but includes the globalization of
decision-making frames. And this shift is also taking place within businesses.
The result is that a whole statistical view of the world, based on
national economies and the international exchange between them, is
becoming meaningless or at least losing its value as information. ‘International’
trade, as recorded by economic research, is being transformed into
‘intra-firm trade’, in which nothing is bought or sold, but, rather, products
are pushed back and forth within a ‘firm’ operating transnationally. According
to estimates, between 40 and 60 percent of so-called ‘international trade’
is now ‘intra-firm non-trade’. There are as yet no precise statistics. Thus the
economists, and not only the social scientists, are counting the wrong peas
with great institutional enthusiasm.
Class and Power
This epochal break between first and second modernity also changes the
frame of meaning of key social scientific and everyday concepts such as
class and power. ‘Class’ or ‘social strata’ are still located, researched, organized
within the nation-state paradigm – and that frame remains almost
unquestioned. This is becoming ever more unreal for a number of reasons,
not least because, within all sections and sectors of nation-state institutions
and political and corporate organizations, new kinds of splits are emerging
between active globalizers, who act transnationally and nationally at the
same time, and those taking up a national position against transnationality,
32 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1–2)
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 32
who act only in the national frame. So de-territorialized ‘class struggle’ is –
at least – a two-frames-of-reference game. The globalizers are located in a
different world – frame of meaning – than their counterparts. Who and
where are the workers whom the globalizing managerial class has to refer
to and feel responsible for as ‘their’ workers? De-territorialized capital and
territorialized labour don’t have a common frame of reference to be positioned
in. In fact, which frame of reference – the national or the transnational
– has to be adopted in the conflict is becoming a central issue of
the conflict itself!
The Marxist argument, that workers have no nation, must today be
turned on its head: the activists of capital, who have made globalization
their profession, have no nation, while the workers and workers’ movements,
such as the trade unions, call on ‘their’ state for help, to protect them from
the adventures of globalization.
But this in turn means that the continued use of the concept of class
in a cosmopolitan sociology obscures the collapse of the nation-state class
ontology. Because a single nation-state frame of reference for all social
inequalities and all ‘classes’ can no longer be assumed. The question of
which categorical frame of meaning of ‘class’ conflicts is defining the reality
of classes is becoming part of this transnational ‘class’ conflict. Thus there
emerge conditions of really lived incomparability between national and nonnational,
territorialized and de-territorialized ‘classes’, which the class
concept of methodological nationalism does not address. It presupposes an
ontology of classes in which all classes position themselves and the opposed
other in a common (national) frame of reference. In cosmopolitan perspectives
there arises a space of overlapping but incompatible frames of reference
and meanings in which radicalized world-scale inequalities become
fragmented.
Let me explain this idea from below, from the perspective of the underclass.
Transnationality characterizes not only the globalization elites, but
the poor exploited immigrants as well. They are treated as ‘excluded others’
in the United States, but Haitians, Filipino or Indian immigrants are at the
same time active in sustaining ‘their’ households overseas and engaging in
political struggles against corrupt regimes. So, poor immigrants are living
the two-frames-of-reference life and game as well. They are at the same time
here and there, located in and in between different incompatible framings
of social inequalities and political conflicts. To draw a sociological implication,
for example, Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of different forms of capital
has to be re-thought within the transnational frame: how is the migrant’s
ability to convert economic capital into social capital being blocked by institutionalized
racism of the host society?
So, it is not only the global players who are learning the de-territorialized
game of power and putting it to the test, but also some ethnic minorities.
German, French, Swedish, Kurds organize simultaneous ad hoc
demonstrations in Berlin, Frankfurt, Stockholm, Paris, London. But that
raises an interesting question: to what extent can coalitions be forged
Beck – The Cosmopolitan Society 33
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 33
between the transnationals at the top and bottom of the social hierarchy,
coalitions which effectively counteract the national reflexes and resentments
of the middle of society?
But, at the same time, something else becomes evident: the power of
the nation state is by no means broken. The treatment of immigrants can be
considered something of a litmus test for how narrowly the limits of transnationality
continue to be drawn within national spaces.
Consequently the theory and sociology of inequality still have to take
the step from Newtonian mechanics to Einsteinian relativity theory. Put in
classical terms: Hegel’s master–slave dialectic was conceived territorially.
It must be re-thought in de-territorialized transnational terms. The same
holds true for the semantics of justice, solidarity, etc., including the social
philosophy of justice. What then remains of them is an open question.
Globalization is a narrative about power, not about digital space and
financial markets. As Susan Strange (1996) argues, states are now engaged
in a different competitive power game: they are competing for world market
shares and foreign capital in order to realize their ‘national’ interest. But
what really constitutes the ‘power’ of de-territorialized business? Networked
production transforms the relationship of economic power and state power
into a game of cat and mouse. The cat nature of business derives from the
fact that the latter’s investments can create or eliminate the lifelines of
national politics and society – jobs and taxes. The mouse nature of state
power derives from what once constituted the strength of the state, its
territorial bond.
However, the metaphor of the game of cat and mouse is wrong in one
central respect: this cat doesn’t want to eat the mouse at all! In other words:
the power of the state is not undermined through conquest, but de-territorially,
through the weightlessness and invisibility of withdrawal. That
turns the concept of power on its head. Not imperialism, but non-imperialism,
not invasion, but retreat of investors constitutes the core of global
economic power. The nation-state, nation-state society is threatened not by
conquest but by non-conquest. The supply-side states long for nothing more
than invasion by the investors; they fear nothing more than their retreat.
There is only one thing worse than being overrun by big multinationals: not
being overrun by multinationals.
The de-territorialization of economic power, therefore, is based precisely
on the opposite of what the territorial state’s power derives from. It
has no army, no means to exercise physical force, in fact, not even any legitimation.
Neither governments nor parliaments have to approve the withdrawal
or invasion of investors. Does that mean that global business is acting
illegitimately? By no means: premeditated non-conquest, the power of withdrawal,
neither requires approval nor can it be approved. Premeditated nonconquest
– this formula also contains the answer to the question of
tomorrow: from what does the different kind of politics of global business
derive its power? Globalized investment decisions achieve binding force in
the most effective way possible – through a policy of fait accompli. In the
34 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1–2)
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 34
end the so-called ‘competition state’ (Philip Cerny) is itself obligated to
expand transnationalization.2
Dilemmas of Cosmopolitanism
Living in an age of side-effects, we have to ask very early: what are the
unseen and unwanted consequences of the new rhetoric of ‘global community’,
‘global governance’ and ‘cosmopolitan democracy’? What are the
risks if the cosmopolitan mission succeeds?
No one can unproblematically transfer some historical concept of
cosmopolitanism, irrespective of which cultural continent it derives from,
to the present. Rather, we must subject, for example, the European
Enlightenment’s distinction between cosmopolitanism and nationalism to a
‘critique of recovery’ (Walter Benjamin) and deploy it intellectually and
politically in the completely changed political landscape of the beginning
of the 21st century. The best way of doing this, it seems to me, is to lay bare
the dilemmas of cosmopolitanism.
First, one might consider the universalist–pluralist dilemma of cosmopolitanism.
This is the crunch question: is there a single cosmopolitanism
or several cosmopolitanisms? Universalist cosmopolitanism, that dream of
‘a worldwide community of humankind’, as Immanuel Kant, but also Karl
Popper and many others, dreamed it, is open – like all other universalisms
– to the accusation of imperialism (Hacohen, 1999). There is not one
language of cosmopolitanism, but many languages, tongues, grammars. The
emerging significance of cosmopolitanism is about a plurality of antagonisms
and differences. Cosmopolitanism, indeed, is another word for disputing
about cosmopolitanisms. This is true for the old Greek philosophy, the
controversies during the 18th and 19th century in Europe, and this, I am
sure, is true for contemporary debates. But where there are many cosmopolitanisms,
perhaps none is left, because there are no generalizable characteristics
which allow it to be clearly distinguished, for example, from
multiculturalism.
My attempt at a definition may strike many as a dubious compromise,
but it could turn out to be a ruse, which allows us to enquire as to the variety
of historical cultural cosmopolitan traditions and ideas, without at the same
time losing sight of the defining characteristics. My central defining characteristic
– dialogic imagination – explores and exploits the creative contradictions
of cultures within and between the imagined communities of
nations (so I am only speaking here in the transnational dimensions of
including other civilizations and modernities, not the otherness of nature,
etc. – see above). This includes:
Ⅵ the clash of cultures within one’s own life;
Ⅵ globally shared collective futures (as opposed to past-based forms of
action);
Ⅵ a sense of global responsibility in a world risk society, in which there are
‘no others’;
Beck – The Cosmopolitan Society 35
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 35
Ⅵ a commitment to dialogue and against violence; and
Ⅵ a commitment to destroy faith in the supposedly natural artifice of
‘society’ and stimulate the self-reflexivity of divergent entangled cosmopolitan
modernities.
To sum up, I suggest three characteristics – globality, plurality and civility,
that is, the awareness of a global sphere of responsibility, the acknowledgement
of the otherness of others and non-violence – as defining features
of a ‘de-territorialized’ concept of cosmopolitanism.
The vagueness and equivocalness of this proposed definition are a
decisive advantage. The concept stands for openness to the world and for
plurality. And this to such a degree that it breaks with philosophical
pedantry: there is no substantial founding principle for cosmopolitanisms
such as a God-given order or natural law, or the common good, or reason.
The basic values of these cosmopolitanisms appeal to a higher amorality.
This denies a belief in the superiority of (one’s own) morality and provides
an encouragement no longer to damn those with other beliefs and opinions
(while not forcing anyone to love mankind).
Then there is the ethnic dilemma: all attempts to open up the ethnic
ghetto, to play down or extinguish ethnicity and racism, only appear to
reinforce them. Indeed, to feel oneself as part of a cosmopolitan community
and to declare one’s position publicly can be turned into its opposite by
others’ violent ethnic definitions of what is alien. Popper writes in his diary:
‘I do not see myself as an assimilated German Jew. That is precisely how
“the Führer” would have labelled me.’
The global–local dilemma: cosmopolitanisms throw up the diaspora
question – how will being-at-home far away, being-at-home without beingat-home,
be possible? This question has often been misunderstood in such
a way that social tension and division arise between cosmopolitans and
locals. The former are rooted in no place, the latter in one place. But as
John Tomlinson (1999) argues, the cosmopolitan cannot be opposed to the
local in terms of ideal types. Cosmopolitan forms of life and identities are
ones that are ethically and culturally simultaneously global and local. They
symbolize an ‘ethical glocalism’ or, as I call it, a rooted cosmopolitanism
(Beck, 2002b). The difference between purely local and cosmopolitan forms
of life is that cosmopolitans experience and – if necessary – defend their
place as one open to the world.
The multicultural dilemma: what distinguishes the world of ideas of
cosmopolitanism from that of ‘multiculturalism’? Multiculturalism attempts
– as Mario Vargas Llosa writes – to make permanent that miracle in which
dog, cat and mouse eat from the same plate. Multiculturalism, for all its
assertion of a world of variety and of the principle of plurality, fosters a
collective image of humanity in which the individual remains dependent on
his cultural sphere. He (or she) is the product of the language, the traditions,
the convictions, the customs and landscapes in which he came into the
world and in which he grew up, so that this ‘home-land’ is regarded as a
36 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1–2)
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 36
closed, self-sufficient and sacrosanct unity, which must be protected against
every possible threat.. Naturally against imperialism and also against those
forces, such as miscegenation, internationalization and cosmopolitanism,
undermining the national spirit. In this sense, multiculturalism is at loggerheads
with individualization. According to the multicultural premise, the
individual does not exist. He is a mere epiphenomenon of his culture.
Cosmopolitanism argues the reverse and presupposes individualization. The
idea that this process could continue to the point where, under the banner
of political democracy and of the recognition of human rights and of individual
freedom, national particularisms dissolve into a comprehensive and
varied world civilization, has perhaps become a little more tangible since
the end of the Cold War.
The constructivism–realism dilemma: the ‘cosmopolitan perspective’
is an anti-essentialist perspective. The conception of cultures as homogeneous
unities of language, origin and political identity, as maintained by
methodological nationalism, is the exact opposite of the cosmopolitan selfconception.
Characteristic of the latter are concepts like transnational,
transcultural, hybrid, diaspora, etc. In other words: the fundamental conviction
of constructivism – the idea, that collective identities are historically
invented and constructed imagined communities – is central. This
compels a rigorous anti-essentialism without a privileged link to ethnicity,
gender, class or cultural tradition. However – whether intended or not – by
simply talking about ‘Blacks’, ‘Jews’, etc. a residual essentialism or ‘as-if
essentialism’ inevitably slips in. In the current climate of prescriptive antiessentialism
this dilemma cannot be easily resolved. Paul Gilroy, James
Clifford and others, however, propose an ‘anti-anti-essentialism’, a double
denial, which should not be equated with an affirmation. They justify this
by arguing that, only under the conditions of such a methodical as-if, can
‘the changing same’ be preserved in discourse about a ‘black culture’ of
resistance or the Jewish diaspora.
International law–human rights dilemma: human rights, which are
also asserted in international law, that is, against the sovereignty of individual
states, are a kind of civil religion of modern cosmopolitanism. On
the other hand, this transnational humanism can easily turn into a military
humanism, which – as in the Kosovo War – also provides the Western
nations and Allied states with a kind of ‘cosmopolitan mission’, but also
with legitimation for military crusades under the banner of human rights.
This dilemma can ultimately only be resolved in the spirit of Kant by a
transnational legal order, which, among other things, excludes the possibility
of interventions being decided and carried out unilaterally by the
hegemonic military power and its allies.
Who are the Enemies of Cosmopolitan Societies?
While the image of the world is being revolutionized, intellectual life has
largely come to a standstill, defending its myths, conventions and conflicts.
Among these are the incantations of the end of politics. An elective affinity
Beck – The Cosmopolitan Society 37
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 37
between schools of thought which otherwise have little to do with one
another, that is, postmodernism, Luhmann’s system theory and neoliberalism,
has deleted the question of the ‘invention of the political’ for a cosmopolitan
era from the catalogue of issues to be taken seriously. To that extent,
it’s not surprising that, intellectually and politically, the enemies of cosmopolitan
societies dominate the scene. I should like to examine, at least
briefly, three hostile positions: first of all nationalism, second, globalism and
third, democratic authoritarianism.
Nationalism
Now that the totalitarian encumbrance of Communism has been overcome,
nationalism has taken shape as the remaining real danger to the culture of
political freedom at the beginning of the 21st century. It is a revived anticosmopolitan
nationalism which could give the sectarian acts of violence
and eccentricities of extremists a terrible legitimation. Although nationalism
is absolutely discredited by a history of endless suffering and bloodshed,
it has undergone a remarkable resurrection since the end of the
East–West conflict.
If the nation-state paradigm of societies is breaking up from the inside,
then that leaves a space for the renaissance and renewal of all kinds of
cultural, political and religious movements. What has to be understood,
above all, is the ethnic globalization paradox. At a time when the world is
growing closer together and becoming more cosmopolitan, in which, therefore,
the borders and barriers between nations and ethnic groups are being
lifted, ethnic identities and divisions are becoming stronger once again. In
every corner of the world ethnic groups are fighting for recognition of the
‘right to self-determination’. It must also be added that globophobia,
whatever the specific motivation, is ultimately grist to the mill of ethnic
reaction. And, although there are undoubtedly very diverse manifestations
of nationalism, of varying significance, in different parts of the world, there
are, nevertheless, common basic features, in particular that metaphysical
essentialism of the ‘nation’. These features inevitably give rise to those consequences
which made the 20th century one of modernized barbarism.
Thus, someone who affirms and elevates ‘his own’ will almost inevitably,
rejects and despises the foreign.
Beyond the revived ‘old’ nationalism there can also be observed worldwide,
but especially in Europe, something approaching a postmodern
romance in the treatment of nationalist and ethnic ideas and ideologies. This
has its origin in the identity politics espoused by various minorities in the
United States – blacks, women, gays, Hispanics, etc. After the end of
Marxism, which turned the individual into a subjective factor of the conditions
of production and of class, a new collectivism is coming into being
which attempts to reduce the individual to his existence as a member of a
minority culture. Noteworthy is the postmodernity of this identity construction:
relativism and fundamentalism – which would appear to be mutually
exclusive – are combined. It is assumed, for example, that only the members
38 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1–2)
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 38
of a minority group can know the ‘truth’ about the group, that is, know about
the oppression suffered. Only those who belong have, thanks to their origin,
privileged access to what constitutes the cultural and political identity of
this group. In this way, on the one hand, a postmodern relativism is asserted,
namely, that a specific history of oppression is the property of those who
‘belong’ by virtue of skin colour, gender, etc. On the other, this truth, inaccessible
to outsiders, is fundamental and determines the cultural and
political existence of every individual.
This paradoxical combination of postmodernity and fundamentalism
has, meanwhile, detached itself from its American origins and is being
applied throughout the world in the revival of ethnic and national identities.
It is quite possible that Britain will undergo a kind of ethnic Balkanization.
What until recently was a manifestation of folklore, that is Scottish
and Welsh National Parties, is now being given a new shine and deployed
against the internal imperialism of ‘Englishness’. This return of a postmodern
ethnicity sees itself, as far as its leading protagonists are concerned,
as being ‘beyond Right or Left’. But in this respect Adorno was right when
he said: Anyone who thinks he stands beyond Right or Left stands on the
Right.
Globalism
The end of Communism and the triumphal march of the world market have
given rise to a new myth: the myth of freedom indivisible. According to this
myth, economic freedom, that is the liberalization of markets, and political
freedom, that is forms of democratic self-determination and the cultural
acknowledgement of the otherness of others, are a species of Siamese twins.
The establishment of the world market will inevitably bring in its train, as
a matter of inherent logic, the establishment of democracy, plurality and
civility. This belief is symbolized by the ‘American dream’, which often
looks more like a nightmare to other countries and cultures. At any rate, at
the beginning of the 21st century history is on the side of freedom. Not least,
a technological and an economic belief in progress go hand in hand. More
succinctly, one might say: whoever has access to the Internet is automatically
transformed into a citizen of the world.
If one wants to spell out this argument in a somewhat more sophisticated
form, it goes as follows: in order for markets to function, now and in
the future, computers and all kinds of communications and information technologies
must reshape the economic landscape. An unintended side-effect
of this development is the erosion of state control of information and the
empowerment of citizens. This in turn forces governments, which want
economic growth and affluence, to tolerate, sooner or later, political freedoms.
This evolutionary optimism flies in the face of the facts: first of all,
another reminder of the continuing importance – indeed return – of
nationalism and of ethnic movements of self-determination. But historical
experience also speaks against it. To assess this Internet optimism, it is
helpful to bear in mind that something quite similar happened five centuries
Beck – The Cosmopolitan Society 39
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 39
ago, after Johannes Gutenberg introduced the printing press to Europe. It
is true: the invention of book printing and the beginning of the book trade
challenged the old powers of Europe. Luther’s Reformation, which shook
the authority of the Catholic Church, would not have been possible without
book printing and the book trade. But that should not make us lose sight of
the counter-effects: absolutist powers established themselves in the centuries
after Gutenberg’s invention.
There is a noteworthy difference between the ideologies of the 20th
century – socialism, Fascism, Communism – and the ideology of globalism,
which is dominant today. The former possessed an inspirational force, which
globalism lacks. This is an ideology which does not motivate and mobilize
the masses. The new neoliberal crusaders preach: ‘You must become
streamlined, downsize, flexibilize and get on the Internet.’ But that precisely
does not produce a new feeling of belonging, solidarity or identity. The
opposite is true: the free market ideology undermines democratic politics
and democratic identities.
The German conservatives once had a controversial election slogan:
‘Socialism or Freedom’. One could now turn it around for future use: the
conflict ‘Freedom or Capitalism’ (Beck and Willms, 2000) is already making
itself felt today under the surface of many political arguments. Global capitalism
threatens the culture of democratic freedom in that it radicalizes
social inequalities and revokes the principles of fundamental social justice
and security. In this sense, globalism is a powerful opponent of cosmopolitan
societies.
Thanks to his own family history, Max Weber became aware of the
challenges presented by the world market and the world economy quite
early in his career. And yet his conceptual and political strategies got him
entangled in an insoluble contradiction. While Weber clearly recognized the
multi-ethnic basis of the world economy, he believed it necessary to demand
ethnic exclusion in the German labour market. On the territory of the ethnically
distinctly unhomogeneous German Empire, the young Weber wanted
to restrict or eliminate the cheap wage competition of seasonal workers,
mainly Italians and Russian Poles. His theory of the rationality of industrial
capitalism was thus combined with an irrational policy of Germanization.
Today we are once again threatened by this kind of contradictory
combination of nationalism and (neo) liberalism. The following scenario is
far from improbable: governments come to power, which are externally
adaptable – with respect to world markets – but internally authoritarian.
Neoliberalism takes care of the winners of globalization; for the losers, fears
of foreigners are stirred up and doses of the toxin of re-ethnicization are
administered. Put unkindly: the Blair model and the Haider model as a kind
of European division of labour.
Democratic Authoritarianism
It would be a serious mistake to underestimate the degree to which the
modern state has been weakened with respect to its material room for
40 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1–2)
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 40
manoeuvre and its democratic qualities, but at the same time has been
newly empowered with respect to authoritarian possibilities of action. The
potential for achieving consensus in a democratic manner is diminishing.
However, the state’s capacity to enforce decisions – the combined operation
of force, law and information technological control internally – is being
modernized and increased. In other words, it has become possible to compensate
for the loss of democratic power by authoritarian means – while
preserving the democratic facade. That is what is meant by democratic
authoritarianism.
In fact, why not risk capitalism without democracy? Why not just
knock off the edges of the anyway outdated institutions of nation-state
democracy, that is, ‘reform’ them, so that the big problems of the future –
unemployment, pensions, environment – can at last be solved with technical
efficiency? If young people’s tendency to violence continues to increase,
then why not prioritize order and punish the perpetrators with public
beatings? There would still be room for liberals in such a world. They would
no doubt boast that they had insisted on a limit of 15 strokes and a free
choice of doctor.
The political seductiveness of this democratic authoritarianism is due
to its compatibility with modernization. Globalization transforms politics
and democracy into zombies – why keep on whining about cosmopolitan
democracy? Morality is determined by the technologically possible. Not the
other way round. This kind of realism eases the pangs of conscience. In the
wake of the gold rush mood, stimulated, for example, by developments in
human genetics, the burden of proof is reversed as if it were the most natural
thing in the world: remaining moral scruples have to justify themselves and
not the loss of moral inhibitions.
The combination of ethnic nationalism and democratic authoritarianism
adds up to a severe attack on liberty. But at the same time, in a dialectical
turn, it encourages and enforces cosmopolitical movements as well: it
makes it most important to begin a new political project with the insistence
on liberty, which redefines open societies as cosmopolitan societies. A
politics must be invented for the Global Age, which is a challenge for
political theory and, in pragmatic terms, for political organization as well.
The Communist Manifesto was published 150 years ago. Today, at the
beginning of a new millennium, it is time for a Cosmopolitan Manifesto
(Beck, 1998) The key idea for a Cosmopolitan Manifesto is: we live in an
age that is at once global, individualistic and more moral than we suppose.
Now we must unite to create an effective cosmopolitan world politics. There
is a new dialectic of global and local questions, which do not fit in to national
politics. These questions are already part of the political agenda – in the
localities and regions, in governments and public spheres both national and
international. But only in a transnational framework can they be properly
posed, debated and resolved. For this there has to be reinvention of politics,
a founding and grounding of the new political subject: that is – cosmopolitan
parties. These represent transnational interests transnationally, but also
Beck – The Cosmopolitan Society 41
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 41
work within the arenas of national politics. They thus become possible, both
pragmatically and organizationally, only as national-global movements and
cosmopolitan parties.
How can cosmopolitan parties become possible and powerful? In the
end this question can be answered only where people ask and listen to it –
in the space of political experimentation.
Notes
1. This idea I developed in a discussion with Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider
(2001) and Barbara Adam (2002) – I do thank Barbara for staying at the Munich
University and spending some time with me.
2. Of course, in relation to the concept of state, there have to be some distinctions
as well – on the one hand, between national unilateralism and ‘global unilateralism’,
for example of the American empire, and, on the other hand, between two
forms of ‘transnational states’ (Beck, 1999) or multilateralism: transnational surveillance
states and cosmopolitan states (Beck, 2002c).
References
Adam, B. (2002) ‘Reflexive Modernization Temporized’, Theory, Culture & Society
(forthcoming).
Albrow, M. (1996) The Global Age. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Beck, U. (1998) ‘Cosmopolitan Manifesto’, New Statesman 20 March.
Beck, U. (1999) What is Globalization? Cambridge: Polity Press.
Beck, U. (2000a) ‘The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of
Modernity’, British Journal of Sociology 51(1): 79–106.
Beck, U. (2000b) World Risk Society. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Beck, U. (2001a) ‘Cosmopolitan Social Science: Redefining “Power” for the Global
Age’, lecture for the New School of Social Research, April.
Beck, U. (2001b) ‘Risk and Power: The Loss of Confidence and the Fragility of
Global Markets in the Global Risk Society’, lecture for Harvard University, April.
Beck, U. (2001c) ‘Redefining Power in the Global Age’, Dissent.
Beck, U. (2002a) Macht und Gegenmmecht im globalen Zeitalter. Frankfurt/M.:
Suhrkamp (forthcoming).
Beck, U. (2002b) ‘Rooted Cosmopolitanism’, in U. Beck and N. Sznaider (eds)
Global America? The Cultural Consequences of Globalization. Frankfurt/M.:
Suhrkamp (forthcoming).
Beck, U. (2002c) ‘World Risk Society Revisited: The Terrorist Threat’, Theory,
Culture & Society (forthcoming).
Beck, U. and E. Beck-Gernsheim (2002) Individualization. London: Sage.
Beck, U. in conversation with J. Willms (2000) Freiheit oder Kapitalismus.
Gesellschaft neu denken. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
Beck, U., W. Bonß and C. Lau (2002) ‘Theory of Reflexive Modernisation’, Theory,
Culture & Society (forthcoming).
Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2000) Juden, Deutsche und andere Erinnerungslandschaften.
Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
42 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1–2)
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 42
Billig, M. (1995) Banal Nationalism. London: Sage.
Cheah, P. and B. Robbins (eds) (1998) Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond
the Nation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Dahrendorf, R. (1999) ‘Whatever Happened to Liberty?’, New Statesman 6 Sept.:
25–7.
Giddens, A. (1994) Beyond Left and Right. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Gilroy, P. (1993) The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness.
London/New York: Verso.
Habermas, J. (2000) The Postnational Constellation. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hacohen, M.H. (1999) ‘Karl Popper, Jewish Identity and Central European
Culture’, Journal of Modern History 71: 105–49.
Hall, S. (1996) ‘When Was the “Post-colonial’’?’, in J. Chambers and L. Curti (eds)
The Postcolonial Question, pp. 242–60. New York: Routledge.
Held, D., A.G. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton (1999) Global Transformations.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Kant, I. (1964) Critique of Pure Reason. London: Macmillan.
Kaufmann, J.C. (1994) Schmutzige Wäsche. Konstanz: Universitätsverlag.
Lash, S. (2002) ‘Foreword: Individualization in a Non-linear Mode’, in U. Beck and
E. Beck-Gernsheim Individualization. London: Sage.
Latour, B. (2001) Das Parlament der Dinge: Naturpolitik. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
Latour, B. (2002) ‘Is Remodernization Occurring – and, if so, How to Prove It?’,
Theory, Culture & Society (forthcoming).
Levy, D. and N. Sznaider (2001) Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter: Der Holocaust.
Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
Mol, A. and Law, J. (1994) ‘Regions, networks and fluids: anaemia and social
topology’, Social Studies of Science 24: 641–71.
Nietzsche, F. (1910) Human, All Too Human. London: Foulis.
Ong, A. (1999) Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality.
Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press.
Park, R.E. (1928) The Marginal Man. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Rabinow, P. (1996) The Anthropology of Reason, p. 56. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Randeria, S. (1999) ‘Jenseits von Soziologie und soziokultureller Anthropologie’,
Soziale Welt 50(4): 373–82.
Robertson, R. (1992) Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. London:
Sage.
Sassen, S. (2000) ‘New Frontiers Facing Urban Sociology at the Millennium’, British
Journal of Sociology 51(1): 143–60.
Shaw, M. (2000) ‘Historical Sociology and the Global Transformation’, pp. 229–41
in R. Parlan (ed.) Global Political Economy. London and New York: Routledge.
Strange, S. (1996) The Retreat of the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Therborn, G. (1995) ‘Route to/through Modernity’, pp. 724–39 in M. Featherstone,
S. Lash and R. Robertson (eds) Global Modernities. London: Sage.
Therborn, G. (2000) ‘At the Birth of Second Century Sociology: Times of Reflexivity,
Spaces, and Nodes of Knowledge’, British Journal of Sociology 51(1): 37–57.
Beck – The Cosmopolitan Society 43
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 43
Tomlinson, J. (1999) Globalisation and Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Urry, J. (2000) Sociology Beyond Societies. London and New York: Routledge.
Ulrich Beck is Professor of Sociology at the University of Munich and the
London School of Economics and Political Science.
44 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1–2)
02 Beck (jr/d) 8/5/02 1:30 pm Page 44