Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fenp20
Environmental Politics
ISSN: 0964-4016 (Print) 1743-8934 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fenp20
The discursive democratisation of global climate
governance
Hayley Stevenson & John S. Dryzek
To cite this article: Hayley Stevenson & John S. Dryzek (2012) The discursive
democratisation of global climate governance, Environmental Politics, 21:2, 189-210, DOI:
10.1080/09644016.2012.651898
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2012.651898
Published online: 09 Mar 2012.
Submit your article to this journal
Article views: 2390
View related articles
Citing articles: 54 View citing articles
The discursive democratisation of global climate governance
Hayley Stevensona
* and John S. Dryzekb
a
Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, UK; b
Centre for Deliberative Democracy
and Global Governance, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National
University, Canberra, Australia
The global governance of climate change represents one of the more
profound and, to date, intractable sets of problems confronting humanity.
Legitimacy, accountability, fairness, and representation matter as well as
effectiveness. In the absence of effective centralised authority, these
democratic norms need to be sought in a polycentric context. An approach
to democratisation is advanced that de-emphasises authoritative formal
institutions, and instead operates in the more informal realm of the
engagement and contestation of discourses in global public spheres.
Democracy here is conceptualised not in terms of elections and constitutions,
but in aspirations for inclusive, competent, and dispersed reflexive
capacity. Based on empirical analysis of discursive engagement in several
structured settings, key challenges for improving the democratic quality of
global climate governance are assessed.
Keywords: global governance; climate change; democracy; discourse
Introduction
The global governance of climate change represents one of the more profound
and, to date, intractable set of problems confronting humanity. Participants in
and observers of that governance (or lack thereof) are of course concerned with
effectiveness in solving the range of problems that climate change presents. But
questions of legitimacy, accountability, fairness, and representation also
pervade the concerns and communications of actors and observers. These
terms also provide the basic vocabulary of democracy. Now, there are those
who argue that effective response to climate change requires dispensing with
democracy so that decision-makers can get on with the serious task of
implementing the measures demanded by climate science, guided by appropriate
policy expertise (see, for example, Lovelock 2010). That might be an
*Corresponding author. Email: h.stevenson@sheffield.ac.uk
Environmental Politics
Vol. 21, No. 2, March 2012, 189–210
ISSN 0964-4016 print/ISSN 1743-8934 online
Ó 2012 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2012.651898
http://www.tandfonline.com
acceptable prescription for states that are already authoritarian. It is not going
to work within democratic states, where procedural legitimacy demands that
even those who disagree with policy measures get a chance to participate in
public deliberation. Still less can such expert-guided authoritarianism work at
the global level. The international system remains decentralised, and the most
effective central authority that does exist works only to smooth the operations
of markets (the World Trade Organization). Effective governance must
therefore seek legitimacy and accountability in a polycentric context, and if
so we ought to think about the democratic qualities of global climate
governance. We explore one particular approach to these qualities that for
pragmatic reasons de-emphasises the construction of authoritative formal
institutions, operating instead in the more informal realm of the engagement
and contestation of discourses in global public spheres.
Approaching global democracy
There are a number of different ways to think about global democracy. Almost
certainly the least productive views global electoral democracy in the image of
existing liberal democratic states, a non-starter in any foreseeable future. We
examine an approach to global democratisation that minimises the need to
establish new formal institutions, or reform existing ones. It does so by
operating in the informal realm of global public spheres and the discourses they
contain. The informal processes we stress could profitably co-exist with
reformed public authority at the global level, and elsewhere we have explored
how public sphere and public authority might be conceptualised as joined in a
global deliberative system. When it comes to climate change, this system is in
poor shape (but neither is it irredeemable). Here, though, we bracket such
questions. Our analysis can be read as providing a way to look at the prospects
for democratisation should the international polity prove resistant to more
formally empowered institutions.
Respect for the fundamentally decentralised character of international
politics should not be taken as absolute, but rather as a pragmatic response to
contemporary conditions. The appeal of such an orientation increases to the
extent that the global governance of climate fails at the peak centralised level,
as epitomised by the Kyoto Protocol and United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). If comprehensive and effective
global agreement proves elusive, it may be time to think in terms of a broader
array of governance mechanisms (joined by states, international organisations,
transnational networks linking public and private actors) – what Keohane and
Victor (2011) call a regime complex, as opposed to a regime. But then what
might coordinate such mechanisms, such that different bits of the regime
complex do not fly off in contradictory directions and a mess of ineffectual
action? Our answer is that diverse arrangements may be coordinated by shared
discourses, or engagement across different discourses. To the extent this kind of
coordination holds, the essence of democracy can be sought in competent and
190 H. Stevenson and J.S. Dryzek
dispersed influence over the engagement of discourses in transnational public
spheres, though much turns on the conditions of engagement.
Conventionally, one might enumerate the actors and interests that populate
transnational public spheres (or global civil society), and chart their relationship
to representation and accountability. But these actors and interests are
also the carriers of particular discourses, and another way of apprehending
transnational public space (consistent with contemporary thinking about
deliberative democracy) maps discourses and the conditions of their engagement
and contestation.
A discourse is about ‘representations and systems of meaning’ (Howarth
2009, p. 311). For Hajer and Versteeg (2005, p. 175) a discourse is ‘an ensemble
of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to social and
political phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an
identifiable set of practices’. Any discourse will typically contain what Hajer
(1995) calls a ‘storyline’ about how problems came to be (or came to be
overcome) and what should therefore be done (or not done).
Why focus in the first instance upon discourses rather than actors?
Ontologically, there is no obvious priority. While liberals believe it is
individuals who are the ultimate units of action and concern (even when
organised into collective actors), post-structuralists would see individuals as
mostly creations of the discourses in which they move. The most defensible
position is almost certainly somewhere between these two extremes. People are
conditioned by discourses; but especially when they engage more than one
discourse, space opens for reflection upon their relative merits. But the main
justification for emphasising discourses is the coordinating role that discourses
play, especially when formal centres of authority are weak – the normal case in
international politics. Discourses are consequential because they can coordinate
the actions of large numbers of individuals who never need communicate
with each other directly (so a discourse of market liberalism coordinates global
economic affairs). If there is such a thing as international society (as the
English School of international relations avers), then its rules are shared norms
which are the product of discourses. While the English School has generally
seen international society as composed only of states, there is no reason why its
membership cannot be extended to non-state actors.
In international relations, those emphasising the power of discourses such
as realism or market liberalism have often treated them in hegemonic terms
(Walker 1993, George 1994). Constructivist analysts too, deploying a somewhat
different vocabulary, have often traced the history of dominant
understandings of for example sovereignty (Reus-Smit 1999). However in
today’s world, contestation across discourses is just as likely as hegemony.
Perhaps the last bastion of hegemonic discourse is the market liberalism that
dominated international financial affairs until the crisis of 2008. After faltering
amid crisis, that discourse showed remarkable resilience, though following
crisis it may be best classified as what Fairclough (2006, p. 39) calls a ‘nodal
discourse’ around which other discourses cluster.
Environmental Politics 191
Any shift from hegemony to contestation can be understood as an aspect of
modernisation. Accompanying modernisation is increased awareness of
discourses other than those in which one has been socialised. Giddens calls
this ‘de-traditionalisation’ (see Beck et al. 1994), which can apply not just to
religion and other pre-modern legacies, but also to modern traditions such as
industrialism, in which the content of economic growth and technological
change were once unquestioned. If such processes are accompanied by
reflection, openness to alternative understandings, and critical questioning,
then we can speak of reflexive modernisation. If they are accompanied by
angry rejection of alternatives and retreat into the familiar by people who now
understand the nature of the threat to them, we can speak of reflexive
traditionalisation (Dryzek 2006, pp. 20–22), in (for example) religious
fundamentalism and radical nationalism. Environmental affairs really only
make sense in light of a questioning of industrialism, so here at least we need to
be on the lookout for multiplicity and contestation across discourses.
Reflexive modernisation and reflexive traditionalisation alike mean that
space opens for the configuration of discourses to be itself influenced by
reflective choices of competent agents, simply as a result of enhanced
awareness of alternative discourses. To the extent this capacity becomes
dispersed and inclusive, there is potentially good news for democracy. In
this light, introducing democracy into international politics has little to do
with the familiar liberal assemblage of competitive elections, constitutions,
and the protection of political rights. Rather, it can be conceptualised in
terms of aspirations for inclusive, competent, and dispersed reflexive
capacity. Discourses (like social structures in general) both enable and
constrain communication. The actions of individuals and other actors may
normally reinforce and help constitute but sometimes they can destabilise a
prevailing discourse. The reflective choices of competent agents then ought
to be able to affect both the content and relative weight of discourses
(Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, p. 400). This in turn is consistent with the
idea of discursive democracy, grounded in competent and dispersed
engagement of discourses in the public sphere, whose outcome can affect
collective decisions (Dryzek 2000).
Shifting attention from actors to discourses has implications for the way in
which power is located in dominant systems of knowledge that define the
natural state of the world as well as solutions to perceived problems (Barnett
and Duvall 2005, pp. 20–22). Fostering inclusive, competent, and dispersed
reflexive capacity is a mode of resistance whereby power is confronted by
democratising the production of meaning. Structural inequalities pervade the
international system, and individuals and groups have different capacities to
influence global governance. But rather than shelving democratic aspirations
until these inequalities disappear, our discourse approach allows consideration
of how the interests of marginalised groups may be served.
How, then, does the global governance of climate change look in this light?
What discourses are present, what is their relative weight, and what is the
192 H. Stevenson and J.S. Dryzek
condition of their engagement? How consequential is the interplay of
discourses in the global public sphere?
Gill (2000, p. 173) points out that ‘the terms ‘‘discourse’’ and ‘‘discourse
analysis’’ are highly contested . . . there are probably at least 57 varieties of
discourse analysis’. The kind we deploy here is broadly consistent with
Fairclough’s (2003) ‘critical discourse analysis’. It is also political discourse
analysis in that it stresses ascriptions of agency and motivation to entities and
actors, and relationships of hierarchy, cooperation, and competition embedded
in particular discourses (as well as more standard features of ontology, what is
perceived to exist, and key metaphors). Any discourses uncovered have a
history that bears scrutiny, though they can be studied through their revelation
in particular texts and verbal interchanges. The coding scheme based on these
considerations has the following elements (Dryzek 2005, pp. 17–19):
. Basic entities whose existence is recognised or constructed. This is the
ontology of a discourse. It might feature rational individuals, deities,
social classes, ecosystems, population, generations. Correspondingly,
particular discourses can deny the existence of any and all of these things.
. Assumptions about natural relationships. Relationships between entities
can involve competition, hierarchy, equality, cooperation, or conflict.
. Agents and their motives. Storylines need actors. These actors can be
some or all humans (citizens, consumers, producers) or groups (such as
corporations, social classes, social movements, or governments). Motives
might include material gain, esteem, virtue, survival. In some discourses
nature itself is an agent, whether resilient and forgiving, or fragile and
unforgiving.
. Key metaphors and other rhetorical devices. In environmental discourse,
metaphors might be mechanical (nature is like a machine), organic, or
anthropomorphic (ecosystems have a kind of collective intelligence).
Rhetoric can appeal to some version of common sense, to religious
feelings of guilt, or might involve horror stories about particular
practices, or appeal to some idyllic vision of how life could be.
Climate discourses in the global public sphere
A large and diverse range of civil society and commercial actors populates the
public sphere of global climate governance. The settings in which they interact
are equally numerous and include internet chat-rooms, blogs, print and online
media, citizen forums, and UNFCCC side events. Public space is crowded and
busy, yet a great deal of activity occurs in the form of monologues on which
others can offer a brief comment or merely register support. Petition-based
networks such as Avaaz, TckTckTck, and 350.org may raise awareness and
hold power to account, yet their potential for enabling citizens to deliberate is
less certain. Settings in which groups and individuals can elaborate on their
ideas in a genuinely interactive manner are rare. Rarer still are those that bring
Environmental Politics 193
together participants from multiple countries, North and South, in anything
like a global public sphere. To distil the constellation of climate discourses, as
well as the condition of their engagement, we report on a discourse analysis of
four organised spaces for discussion on responding to climate change. These
were the most prominent non-state summits1
held during a 12-month period
preceding the landmark 2009 Copenhagen climate summit and in its early
aftermath. This was a period in which climate change attracted unprecedented
public attention. The high level of formal UN activity provided much grist for
the public mill as people debated how the international community should
appropriately respond. Each of these settings attracted high international
participation, from the North and South, providing valuable empirical
material for discourse analysis.
1) The World Business Summit on Climate Change was held before the
UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen to enable more than 500 invited ‘global
leaders from business, policy, civil society, and science . . . [to engage] in
dialogue on the road to a low-carbon future and the recommendations for an
ambitious new climate change framework’ (Copenhagen Climate Summit 2009,
p. 3). A discourse analysis of the Business Summit programme pointed to a low
level of diversity among contributions.2
The vast majority articulated concerns
in terms that we label ‘Mainstream Sustainability’ (see Box 1).3
This discourse holds that action to address climate change can be defined
within the parameters of the existing political economy. Competition and the
profit motive are inherent in human relations, but sustainability and material
growth prove compatible. Diversity emerges within the parameters of
Mainstream Sustainability on the question of how climate change ought to
be absorbed into existing development. For some, all aspects of global climate
governance can effectively be brought under the logic of the market. Illustrative
is Goldman Sachs, contributing to a panel on carbon markets, for whom
Box 1. Mainstream Sustainability.
Basic entities whose existence is recognised or constructed:
high and low carbon societies; capitalist markets; consumers;
GDP; intellectual property
Assumptions about natural relationships:
competition; partnerships; win-win economy/conservation
Agents and their motives:
business – profit with a conscience
governments – ecologically benign economic growth
innovators – mixed motives, money and sustainability
Key metaphors and other rhetorical devices:
carbon footprint
green jobs
‘pollution preventions pays’
reassurance
194 H. Stevenson and J.S. Dryzek
‘markets are particularly efficient at allocating capital and determining the
appropriate prices for goods and services’. Governments can help stimulate
such markets with policy frameworks, but investors are also seen to have a role
in promoting markets for ‘emissions trading . . . , weather derivatives, renewable
energy credits, and other climate related commodities’ (Goldman Sachs
n.d.). For others, reducing greenhouse gas emissions presents an opportunity
for low-carbon societies in which green technologies become the motor of
economic development. Recognising that ‘pollution prevention pays’ will spur
a shift away from emissions-intensive production towards technologies such as
renewable energy, biochar, and carbon sequestration. ‘Green growth’ is
possible as enterprises can profit from reducing their ecological footprint. Such
confidence was expressed by contributors ranging from the China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (2008) to Swiss Re (n.d.) and BP (2009) to
Greenpeace (2008).
Marginally present were contentions that economic growth is compatible
with ecological sustainability and a stable climate but qualified by the
conviction that the ultimate objective of modernisation should not simply be a
decoupling of profit and pollution in the industrialised countries. Instead,
modernisation should serve human rights and needs while evening out
inequalities between industrialised and developing countries. This may require
mobilising local populations and civil society, and sits within a class of
discourse we label ‘Expansive Sustainability’ (see Box 2).4
Vantage Point Venture Partners (Garthwaite 2009), participating in a panel
on the New Green Economy, expressed this discourse in asserting the need for
developing public–private partnerships to transfer low-carbon technologies to
developing countries before they become affordable. Suntech Power (2010)
Box 2. Expansive Sustainability.
Basic entities whose existence is recognised or constructed:
decarbonising economy
humans with rights and needs
technology
polluters
Assumptions about natural relationships:
possibility of international equity
responsibility
vulnerability
competition – could be fair
partnership
Agents and their motives:
states: material motives, common but differentiated responsibilities
civil society organisations: common good
Key metaphors and other rhetorical devices:
carbon footprint
Environmental Politics 195
used a constructed image of the earth at night to reveal areas of energy
deprivation and energy-intensive prosperity. The challenge is to address both
conditions, assumed possible with publicly-subsidised renewable energy. Such
equity concerns were not salient in the vast majority of contributions.
One lone contributor raised questions about the existing economic order
itself. Reflecting a class of discourse we label ‘Limits’ (see Box 3), the viability
and/or desirability of existing neoliberal development is questioned, and norms
including economic growth, population growth, meat consumption, and
profligate material consumption criticised. The UK’s Sir Crispin Tickell,
participating in a panel on Business Action on Climate Change, articulated a
weak version of Limits. The global liberal economy is not irretrievably
unsustainable but he cautioned against ‘greenwash’ and pointed to the
importance of new measures of societal health beyond gross domestic product
(GDP) (Tickell 2009). Another dissenting voice, Youssef Nassef (2006),
stressed the importance of looking beyond high-tech innovation and
recognising local wisdom: ‘adaptation need not entail the transfer of a lot of
resources from the north to the south because we’re starting to realize that
there is a lot of knowledge at the level of indigenous communities’.
2) The Business for the Environment Summit convened in April 2009 to
discuss risks and opportunities presented by climate change (B4E 2009). Here
too discussion was overwhelmingly in terms of Mainstream Sustainability.5
Particularly salient were assumptions that business opportunities can be found
in economic and ecological crises (e.g. Cramer 2009); governments need to
provide clear and stable regulatory frameworks to encourage business
investment (e.g. Ju 2009); and consumers are primarily motivated by costsaving
so effort needs to be directed towards affordable climate-friendly
technology and products (e.g. Cramer 2009, Mattar 2009). Just one contributor
explicitly approached the issue from an equity-oriented position. Bunker Roy
(2009), founder of Barefoot College, asserted that realising sustainability will
Box 3. Limits.
Basic entities whose existence is recognised or constructed:
ecological limits
(rejects GDP)
development that is not growth
Assumptions about natural relationships:
human dependence on natural world
Agents and their motives:
self-interested states, mostly with unsustainable policy goals
potentially: states with enlightened self-interest
Key metaphors and other rhetorical devices:
ecological footprints
one planet
danger of ecological collapse
196 H. Stevenson and J.S. Dryzek
require empowering the vulnerable and marginalised, including rural illiterate
women, and de-mystifying and decentralising access to renewable power. This
contribution belongs within the Expansive Sustainability class of discourse
(Box 2).
Present but marginal were voices articulating concerns consistent with
Limits (Box 3). The Crown Prince of Jordan, repeating Robert F. Kennedy’s
famous quip that GDP ‘measures everything except that which makes life
worthwhile’, called for institutionalising new measures of wellbeing (B4E 2009,
pp. 18–19). Similarly, the conclusions of a working group on ‘Innovating New
Business Models for a Changing World’ advocated new consumption patterns;
instilling sustainability values in citizens through school, church, and
community groups; and rejection of designed redundancy as a profit strategy
(B4E 2009, p. 20).
Opportunities for challenging the dominance of Mainstream Sustainability
also came during question and answer sessions. Although most discussion did
not depart from the dominant discourse, a few questions were articulated in
terms of Expansive Sustainability (e.g. concerning per capita pollution permits/
cap-and-share) and Limits (e.g. concerning the limit to efficiency in production
and consumption). To the extent such questions induce critical reflection on the
part of those articulating more mainstream discourses, this type of exchange
could promote reflexive modernisation: but not if challenging questions are
met with re-statement of the original discourse. We observe instances of both
discursive reinforcement (e.g. per capita permits are unnecessary if new
businesses emerging in the South are smarter than those in the North) and
discursive reflection (e.g. efficiency does have its limits so communities
ultimately need to be designed to enable lower consumption).
3) Klimaforum09 was an open forum established alongside the 2009
UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen to provide space for people, organisations,
and social movements to exchange ideas and experiences. An estimated
50,000 people from 95 countries attended over two weeks (Eriksen et al. 2010, p.
3). While ostensibly open, its political platform delimited participation (though
perhaps not attendance) to those articulating certain discourses.6
Key elements
of the platform included: rejection of technological fixes; the importance of
locally based solutions; mobilisation of civil society; reducing consumption and
production; and criticism of exploitation of nature and faith in economic
growth (Eriksen et al. 2010, p. 49). The forum comprised 342 activities. A
discourse analysis of a sample of these activities reveals the overwhelming
dominance of a class of discourse we label ‘Green Radicalism’ (see Box 4).7
Green Radicalism is defined by the assumption that unconstrained material
growth cannot be reconciled with a safe climate and sustainability: a
fundamental reorientation of economic development is required. Such changes
demand redistribution of power. Concerns relating to human rights, justice,
and equity are prioritised over short-term economic values. Green Radicalism
focuses on the political and economic structural causes of climate change, and
here we observe some diversity. For some Klimaforum09 participants, the key
Environmental Politics 197
structural cause of climate change is development that privileges industrialscale
production, which ought to be replaced by small scale production. The
Pesticide Action Network (2009), for example, argues that although
agriculture is responsible for approximately one-third of global greenhouse
gas emissions, there is potential to feed the world sustainably if agriculture
is de-corporatised, de-industrialised, re-localised, and democratised. Similarly,
for Global Justice Ecology Project (2009), ‘real solutions’ to climate
change are to be found in the sustainable practices of peasant communities
and indigenous peoples whereas ‘false solutions’ (agrofuels, offsetting
schemes) will only engender greater injustice. Others diverge from the stress
on decentralisation to highlight ‘new globalism’: an effective and just
response to climate change requires transforming the unequal international
system into an equitable global community. Governance within this
community ought to be democratic and foster cooperation between
individuals, cultures, nations, social movements, and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs). Existing institutions are incapable of delivering this;
instead, citizens and civil society can drive the transition. Illustrative is the
position of UK Climate Camp, a collective of activists and communities
committed to non-state and non-capitalist climate solutions. Within this
‘culture of resistance’, democratic participation is more than occasionally
marking X in a box. An empowering transformation can be approached
through ‘[g]rassroots organising in cooperative, low-impact, sustainable
ways’ (Jasiewicz 2008, Climate Camp 2009).
Box 4. Green Radicalism.
Basic entities whose existence is recognised or constructed:
climate/ecological debt
global commons
humans with rights
nature/Mother Earth
ecological limits
Assumptions about natural relationships:
interconnectedness of human and non-human worlds
cooperation and solidarity
equality
diversity
popular sovereignty
Agents and their motives:
irresponsible governments and corporations
mainstream environmentalists pursuing ineffectual solutions
grassroots seeking broader understanding
nature as agent
Key metaphors and other rhetorical devices:
crisis
organic metaphors
passion
vision of another world
198 H. Stevenson and J.S. Dryzek
Other participants articulated a feminist variant of Green Radicalism and
identified the key challenge as arising from pervasive patriarchy. Not only are
women’s basic needs unmet by large-scale development projects, but women
are also more vulnerable to the negative impacts of mitigation and adaptation
measures. Climate justice ought not only be justice for the global South, but
also gender justice (see, for example, Ro¨ hr 2006, World March of Women
2009).
Departing from this political focus on unequal power distribution while still
emphasising underlying economic causes of climate change is the separate class
of discourse, ‘Limits’. A small minority in the sample of Klimaforum09
activities articulated their ideas in these terms (Box 3).8
Prominent Limits
voices constituted a panel entitled ‘Limits to Growth’. Tim Jackson, for
instance, has observed that ‘[t]he logic of free-market capitalism states that the
economy must grow continuously or face an unpalatable collapse . . . it is time
to stop pretending that mindlessly chasing economic growth is compatible with
sustainability’ (Jackson 2008; see also Nørga˚ rd et al. 2010, Wackernagel 2010).
Limits avers that reorganisation is possible within existing institutions and
without any redistribution of power. Change may occur voluntarily, or
through the guidance and regulation of existing authorities. Illustrative is a
panel session on meat consumption. Here vegetarian organisations identified
the introduction of an animal products tax and a withdrawal of all subsidies to
the meat industry as ‘probably the single most effective policy we can
implement NOW to save the world from a climate change catastrophe’
(VegClimate Alliance et al. 2009).
Perhaps surprisingly, given the political platform of Klimaforum09, a small
number of economically reformist (yet equity-oriented) voices made their way
into the programme. These voices reflect Expansive Sustainability (Box 2).9
Illustrative is a panel organised by the International Network for Sustainable
Energy (INFORSE) on ‘Sustainable energy for development to reduce
poverty’. This network holds that renewable energy and energy efficiency are
the ‘essential pillars of future mitigation actions by all countries’ and can
decouple emissions from economic growth, ‘still the primary goal of all world
governments’ (INFORSE 2009).
4) The People’s World Summit on Climate Change and Mother Earth Rights
was convened by the Bolivian government in Cochabamba in April 2010. The
summit was designed to allow dialogue among ‘peoples of the world, social
movements and Mother Earth’s defenders, scientists, academics, lawyers and
governments that want to work with their citizens’ (PWCCC 2010). An
estimated 35,000 attended, about three-quarters of whom were Bolivian with
others coming from 140 countries (Morales 2010). Like Klimaforum09, the
People’s Summit was ostensibly open but the call for participation was
articulated in Green Radical terms, as illustrated in the following:
Confirming that 75% of historical emissions of greenhouse gases originated in the
countries of the North that followed a path of irrational industrialization;
Environmental Politics 199
Noting that climate change is a product of the capitalist system; . . .
Confident that the peoples of the world, guided by the principles of solidarity,
justice and respect for life, will be able to save humanity and Mother Earth . . . .
The World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother
Earth has as objectives:
1) To analyze the structural and systemic causes that drive climate change and to
propose radical measures to ensure the well-being of all humanity in harmony
with nature . . .
6) To define strategies for action and mobilization to defend life from Climate
Change and to defend the Rights of Mother Earth. (PWCCC 2010)
While a range of people may be attracted to the idea of engaging in
dialogue with ‘peoples of the world, social movements and Mother Earth’s
defenders’, this representation of the problem most strongly resonates with a
discourse of Green Radicalism. The resulting ‘People’s Agreement’ is a strong
expression of this discourse, although it does assume the continued relevance of
multilateral institutions guided by the will of the people.10
The People’s
Summit was organised around 17 working groups corresponding to themes
under discussion in the United Nations (UN) negotiations, and 173 selforganised
events. Like the conference call, the working groups’ agendas were
framed in Green Radical terms. Discourse analysis of a sample of the selforganised
events does reveal a slightly broader discursive presence, though still
overwhelmingly dominated by Green Radicalism.11
As in Klimaforum09, some
diversity was observed within this discourse. For some, the main structural
cause to be overcome was globalised industrial-scale development that
marginalises small-scale producers. Illustrative is an event organised by
Plataforma Boliviana Frente al Cambio Clima´ tico on Mother Earth’s rights.
This network asserts that although people are partially responsible for climate
change, culpability mostly lies with transnational corporations and imperialism.
The solution lies in local alternative development models based on
ancestral knowledge and technologies under the guidance of communities
(Plataforma Boliviana Frente al Cambio Clima´ tico 2009). Similarly, Vı´a
Campesina (2010) with their slogan ‘We peasants can cool the planet!’
highlighted the importance of social movements resisting further corporatisation
of agriculture disguised as mitigation and adaptation. Only through smallscale
organic agriculture can ecological sustainability be ensured while also
protecting human rights. Moving beyond the local level while remaining within
Green Radicalism are contributions highlighting ‘new globalism’. The
‘Peoples’ Movement on Climate Change’ (2008), for example, sees governments
as unwilling to prioritise the interests and wellbeing of their constituents
and calls instead on grassroots movements to unite and create spaces for intercommunity
dialogue. ‘Focus on the Global South’ similarly doubted the
capacity of the UNFCCC to deliver fair and effective agreement. The most
promising scenario is for ‘movements for economic, gender and ecological
justice to constitute themselves into an effective trans-border movement able to
200 H. Stevenson and J.S. Dryzek
unmask the latest schemes of pro-corporate forces and institutions to delay or
obstruct genuine solutions to the climate crisis’ (Focus on the Global South
2010).
Departing from the politically progressive character of Green Radicalism
while maintaining its economically radical disposition were a small minority
who articulated their concerns in terms of Limits (Box 3).12
A network of
theologians called on all ‘institutions, organizations and people’ to take
responsibility and respond to the painful cries of Mother Earth. Spiritual
leaders are imbued with a capacity to raise consciousness and elicit change
within their congregations, while also encouraging governments to ‘to assume
principal responsibility in the care of the Earth’ (ISEAT 2010).
Again a small number of economically reformist voices contributed to the
Cochabamba programme. These tended to reflect Expansive Sustainability
(Box 2).13
The 350.org movement, for example, presses for a goal of 350 ppm14
symbolising ‘the recipe for a very different world, one that moves past cheap
fossil fuel to more sensible technologies, more closely-knit communities, and a
more equitable global society’ (350.org 2009). No explicit critique is made of
liberal capitalism, only the fuel that drives the neoliberal model of
development. Similarly, the Partnership for Clean Indoor Air (n.d.) shared
its efforts to improve the quality of life of disadvantaged households by
improving access to solar power, but without challenging the economic system.
Engagement of climate discourses
When it comes to climate change there is no ‘nodal’ discourse, in Fairclough’s
terms (2006, p. 39). Instead, a plurality of discourses informs different
understandings of the problem and appropriate governance measures. This
plurality is important for democratisation. But democracy in the terms we
advocate ultimately hinges on inclusive, competent, and dispersed reflexive
capacity. The question then is whether the present conditions of discursive
engagement foster such capacity. Our answer is, not quite. We found no forum
in which Mainstream Sustainability engaged Green Radicalism. What we
observe instead are discrete settings dominated by a specific discourse:
Mainstream Sustainability for the two business summits, Green Radicalism
for the Klimaforum and Cochabamba gatherings. Limits and Mainstream
Sustainability appeared at both kinds of gathering, but only as minor
themes.
The two kinds of gatherings therefore look a bit like enclaves. There is
certainly a place for enclaves in democracy, but only as a place for creating
competence prior to engagement with other discourses. Democratic theorists
including Fraser (1992), Mansbridge (1996), and Karpowitz et al. (2009) argue
that in stratified societies (like the international society) disempowered and
subordinated individuals may only be able to ‘formulate oppositional
interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs’ by retreating into
enclaves with like-minded others (Fraser 1992, p. 123). Interviews with
Environmental Politics 201
participants in the Klimaforum09 declaration drafting process support this
argument.15
Many found the process a positive and enlightening one in which
their understanding deepened through exchanging experiences and perspectives.
Others found their understanding confirmed rather than necessarily
enhanced. A recurring theme for many participants was the feeling of solidarity
that strengthened throughout the process. Most participants in the business
summits do not need any such boost to their confidence, so their enclave
character is harder to defend.
Discursive enclaves of any sort have limitations. The most obvious is that
discourses articulated only in protected settings are not exposed to critique and
challenge, and outsiders are not exposed to competing assumptions that might
stimulate their own reflexive capacity. As Mansbridge (1996, p. 58) notes, when
people communicate only in enclaves ‘they encourage one another not to hear
anyone else. They do not learn how to put what they want to say in words that
others can hear and understand’. Research into online communication suggests
a tendency towards homogeneity because users can filter the mass of
information to engage with likeminded others (though see Dahlberg 2007).
A further problem is what Sunstein (2007) calls ‘ideological amplification’
and ‘group polarisation’ (Sunstein 2003), the tendency for individuals to
reinforce their commitment to existing convictions when they are supported by
the majority. Regardless of the plurality of perspectives privately held, groups
will become more polarised in the direction of the majority of publicised
perspectives. Homogeneity displaces diversity. This means that reflexive
capacity is diminished. Sunstein (2007, pp. 275–276) offers several explanations.
One emphasises the association between repetition and persuasiveness. If
arguments are repeatedly articulated in terms of a single discourse with
relatively few arguments articulated in competing terms, the information that
informs individuals’ understanding of a problem is disproportionately
associated with a single discourse. If a change of individual perspective occurs,
then, it is likely to change in the direction of the majority.
Another explanation is that a desire to be perceived favourably by others
leads people to adjust their positions toward the publicly stated majority
position. Noell-Neumann’s (1984) ‘spiral of silence’ suggests that those who
perceive themselves in a minority will refrain from voice. One participant in the
Klimaforum09 declaration drafting process admitted to withholding his true
view rooted in an economically reformist discourse that provided scope for
cost-effective technological solutions. He believed this would not find favour
within a group of anti-technology NGOs.16
This sentiment was echoed by
another individual who participated in the online component of the declaration
drafting process, who admitted to withholding his own views on technology
while waiting for others to positively broach the subject, which did not
happen.17
A random survey of participants at the Cochabamba Summit also
found that dissent from the dominant anti-capitalist stance was present yet
such sentiments were never publicly shared in forums and workshops.18
One of
the most prominent features of the People’s Agreement from this gathering was
202 H. Stevenson and J.S. Dryzek
the ostensible consensus that capitalism is indeed the key structural cause of
climate change.
What can we say about productive engagement that would counteract such
tendencies? Engagement might take the form of contestation, of the sort that
occurred when anti-globalisation emerged to challenge dominant neoliberal
discourse around 2000, eventually inducing international organisations such as
the World Bank to change at least some practices (Stiglitz 2002). But when it
comes to climate change, contestation is not necessarily productive. Consider
the particularly combative discourse of denialism, which had no presence in the
four forums we examined, but which is prominent in the public sphere,
especially in internet forums. Organised denialism cannot provide grist for
productive contestation, for at its heart is the construction of opponents not as
adversaries to be respected, but as enemies to be defeated (to use the language of
Mouffe 2000), with no possibility for critical engagement. Hamilton (2009a,
2009b) has documented this phenomenon in Australia. So ‘[w]hile the internet is
often held up as the instrument of free speech, it is often used for the opposite
purpose, to drive people out of the public debate’ (Hamilton 2009a). Anyone
who has scrolled through the comments posted on online news articles about
climate politics or climate science will be aware that a denialist discourse
occupies space entirely disproportionate to its relative weight in society. Such
contributions are often offensive or personally insulting to the author and other
commentators. The effect is to undermine fruitful deliberations on global
climate governance.
Given the limitations of enclave deliberation, developing inclusive,
competent, and dispersed reflexive capacity depends in part on establishing
connections between spaces dominated by different discourses. We should not
expect such engagement to somehow produce a ‘super-discourse’ that would
henceforth coordinate global affairs. The range of issues that climate change
covers is so large and complex that any such hegemonic super-discourse would
almost certainly have major blind spots. It would take climate governance into a
situation more like that of global finance prior to the 2008 crash. Engagement
need not even yield what Fairclough (2006, p. 25) refers to as ‘interdiscursive
hybridity’ or ‘the combination of different discourses, and/or genres, and/or
styles in texts’. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine a head-on confrontation
between Green Radicalism and Mainstream Sustainability parallel to that
between anti-globalisation and neoliberalism after 1999, because for Green
Radicals, Mainstream Sustainability represents not the source of problems, but
rather an ineffectual response. In this light, it is possible to imagine the two
minor discourses present in all four forums we examined, Limits and Expansive
Sustainability, as forming a kind of discursive bridge by which (initially) indirect
engagement between Green Radicalism and Mainstream Sustainability is
facilitated. But to play this bridging role, these two discourses would need to
take greater prominence than they currently have. The idea here is not just to
highlight points of commonality and sites for compromise, but also to provide
possibilities for contestation and the reflection it can induce.
Environmental Politics 203
Conclusion
To the extent effective central authority in governance is lacking, what remains
are multiple locations for decision. When it comes to climate change, these
locations might exist in states, subnational governments, international
organisations, markets, transnational corporations, financial networks, even
individual consumers. What coordinates decisions and actions is often the
discourse that spans them.
In a decentralised political setting of the kind that characterises the global
governance of climate change (especially in the wake of peak global level
failures), there is a tension between two roles discourses can play. One role is
coordination of a large numbers of actors. The second is grist for contestation
in the public sphere of the sort that offers glimpses of democracy in the absence
of state-like central authority. On the face of it, coordination benefits if the
number of discourses is small: indeed, it may be most straightforward when
matters are dominated by a single discourse. Such was the case for the global
governance of economic affairs prior to 2008, dominated by neoliberalism and
associated assumptions about efficient markets. But this financial case also
illustrates a democratic failure precisely because of the hegemony of neoliberal
discourse. In addition, an absence of competing discourses meant that
deficiencies in the operation of the financial system that in retrospect were
glaring were never corrected.
The situation when it comes to climate change is very different. We have
charted a multiplicity of discourses in public space that might seem to work
against discourses playing a role in the coordination of governance. But the
real problem when it comes to impeding coordination is the degree to which
particular discourses flourish in particular enclaves.
Now, it could be argued that all that is likely in any near future is a number
of islands of transnational coordination, each stabilised by a particular
discourse or set of discourses. One such island might be constituted by business
networks. Another might be constituted by social movement activists in
alliance with post-neoliberal governments such as Bolivia. It is much easier to
demonstrate the consequentiality of a discourse (or interacting set of
discourses) within such an island than it is to demonstrate the more global
significance of that island. We can, for example, see that climate marketisation
is becoming increasingly prominent in coordinating emissions trading and
offset schemes. It is less easy to judge how consequential this development is
globally.
To the degree that global climate governance remains polycentric, it is
necessary to think long and hard about the roles played by discourses and their
potentially more effective engagement, such that we could speak with more
confidence of the global governance of climate change. Both effective
governance and democratic ideals could benefit from such broader engagement.
For example, if climate marketisation is becoming as dominant as
Paterson (2011) suggests, it would be perilous for it to proceed while ignoring
the implications of markets for social justice as highlighted by Green
204 H. Stevenson and J.S. Dryzek
Radicalism. Such perils would attenuate both the effectiveness of markets in
limiting or offsetting emissions; and the democratic legitimacy with which
outcomes were generated. Whatever the relative standing of particular
discourses in any polycentric future, both transnational democracy and
effectiveness in mitigation and adaptation stand to benefit from engagement
deeper than anything we see at present. We have made some suggestions for
improving engagement, particularly through an enhanced role for bridging
discourses that are currently somewhat marginal. But that is only a beginning.
There is plenty of scope for further work on topics as varied as the role of
rhetoric in bridging difference, institutional innovations in the public sphere
that would create different kinds of settings for engagement, the role of
performance and protest in inducing reflection, and the kinds of communication
that do and do not work.
Acknowledgements
Versions of this article were presented at the Berlin Conference on the Human
Dimension of Global Environmental Change, Berlin, 2010; the Marie Curie Training
Course on the Human Dimension of Environmental Change, Berlin, 2010; and the
Human Ecology Forum, Australian National University, 2010. For comments we thank
Tom Bauler, and the anonymous referees. This research was supported by Australian
Research Council Federation Fellowship FF00883522.
Notes
1. In one case, the World Business Summit on Climate Change, government actors
were among the participants, but panellists were overwhelmingly drawn from nonstate
sectors.
2. The sample comprised most panel discussions, interactive debates, and working
groups. Special addresses, keynote speeches, and opening and closing ceremonies
were excluded. A total of 67 documents were analysed. In most cases summaries of
specific contributions were not available; materials analysed therefore comprised
largely of work authored by each speaker or their organisation on the same or a
similar theme. Although this may not convey the precise contribution made at the
World Business Summit on Climate Change, such material does allow us to see
which discourse governs each contributor’s thinking on climate change, which in
turn would be reflected in their contributions. Each document was coded
according to the scheme outlined above.
3. Fifty-eight documents were classified in these terms.
4. Nine documents were interpreted as Expansive Sustainability.
5. This event was well documented with written summaries of speeches, panel
contributions, and working group conclusions, as well as videos of panel
discussions, including questions and answers. Most videos have now been archived
on YouTube; a complete collection is held by Hayley Stevenson. A total of 46
contributions were analysed and questions from the audience which diverged from
the dominant discourse noted. This sample comprised all special addresses, panel
discussions, and three of the six working group summaries. Forty-one contributions
were interpreted as Mainstream Sustainability.
6. In their evaluation report, the organising committee claims that ‘[a]t no time was it
required that the participants of Klimaforum09 agreed with the platform’ (Eriksen
et al. 2010, p. 8), but it did provide a basis for accepting and rejecting proposed
activities. Moreover, people wishing to participate in a pre-summit online debate
Environmental Politics 205
as part of the Klimaforum09 Declaration drafting process were indeed required to
pledge their support for the platform.
7. Three concerns informed sample selection. First, given the time-consuming nature of
discourse analysis, the entire programme of activities could not be analysed. Second,
although activities were conducted in Danish, French, Spanish, and English, we could
only use information available in languages in which one of us is proficient. Third,
material for analysis had to be available online. Material sourced for analysis included
summaries and publicity of the activity itself, and work authored by each organiser or
nominated speaker/s on the same or similar topic (see note 2). Therefore, the sample
comprised activities that took place in the first week of the forum, offer textual
information in either English or Spanish, and associated material could be located
online. Forty-nine documents associated with 42 panels were analysed. For most
panels a single document was coded because the panel had a single organising group,
or the panel had multiple but affiliated organising groups. For panels in which two or
more unaffiliated groups participated, separate documents were coded. Thirty-eight
documents were interpreted as Green Radicalism.
8. Seven of 49 documents were interpreted as Limits. Three were associated with a
single panel on ‘Limits to Growth’.
9. Three documents were interpreted as such.
10. This was a contentious point among participants of the PWCCC (see Stevenson
2011).
11. The three concerns outlined in note 7 informed the selection of a sample for analysis
in this case. Material analysed includes summaries and publicity of the event itself,
and work authored by each speaker/organiser on the same or similar topic. This
sample comprised events that (a) took place in the first two days of the conference; (b)
offer textual information in either English or Spanish; and (c) associated material
could be located online. Events organised exclusively by governmental agencies were
excluded from the analysis given our interest in discerning public climate discourses.
Forty-four documents associated with 42 events were analysed. For most events a
singledocumentwasanalysedbecausetheeventhada singleorganisinggroup,or had
multiple but affiliated organising groups. For events in which two or more
unaffiliated groups participated, separate documents were analysed. Thirty-four
events were interpreted as Green Radicalism.
12. Four events were interpreted as Limits.
13. Six activities were classified in these terms.
14. Parts per million of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
15. Interviews were carried out by Hayley Stevenson with 27 participants. Some were
conducted in person at Klimaforum09, and others were conducted by telephone in
February/March 2010.
16. Anonymous interview conducted by Hayley Stevenson, Copenhagen, December
2009.
17. Anonymous telephone interview conducted by Hayley Stevenson, Canberra,
February 2010.
18. Forty-nine participants were surveyed. Of these 41 responded to the question
pertaining to this point. Four disagreed with the statement that ‘Capitalism is one
of the principal causes of climate change’. One respondent indicated that s/he did
not know if they agreed or disagreed. Three others stressed that while it is a cause
it is not the only cause.
References
350.org, 2009. Frequently asked questions. Available from: http://www.350.org/under
standing-350#1 [Accessed 31 May 2011].
206 H. Stevenson and J.S. Dryzek
B4E (Business for Environment), 2009. Summary report. Available from: http://
www.b4esummit.com/wp-content/uploads/B4E09_Post_Event_Report2.pdf [Accessed
31 May 2011].
Barnett, M. and Duvall, R., 2005. Power in global governance. In: M. Barnett and R.
Duvall, eds. Power in global governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1–32.
Beck, U., Giddens, A., and Lash, S. 1994. Reflexive modernization: politics, tradition,
and aesthetics in the modern social order. Cambridge: Polity Press.
BP, 2009. Our position on climate change. In: BP Sustainability Reporting 2009.
Available from: http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/
global_assets/e_s_assets/e_s_assets_2009/downloads_pdfs/Energy_challenges_and_
climate_change.pdf [Accessed 31 May 2011].
China National Offshore Oil Corporation, 2008. Caring for climate. Available from:
http://www.cnooc.com.cn/newstopic.php?id¼276577 [Accessed 31 May 2011].
Climate Camp, 2009. About us. Available from: http://www.climatecamp.org.uk/about
[Accessed 31 May 2011].
Copenhagen Climate Summit, 2009. Shaping the sustainable economy. Summary report of
the World Business Summit on Climate Change Copenhagen, 24–26 May.
Cramer, A., 2009. B4E panel: the green imperative – leadership, innovation and
technology. Available from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼78sgMY4G754&
list¼PL518743CAADCD2378 [Accessed 31 May 2011].
Dahlberg, L., 2007. Rethinking the fragmentation of the cyberpublic: from consensus to
contestation. New Media & Society, 9 (5), 827–847.
Dryzek, J.S., 2000. Deliberative democracy and beyond: liberals, critics, contestations.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dryzek, J.S., 2005. The politics of the earth: environmental discourses, 2nd ed. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Dryzek, J.S., 2006. Deliberative global politics: discourse and democracy in a divided
world. Cambridge: Polity.
Eriksen, S., Samuelsen, H.H., Monabay, R., and Timpte, M., 2010. Klimaforum09:
evaluation report. Copenhagen, Denmark: Foreningen Civilsamfundets
Klimaforum.
Fairclough, N., 2003. Analysing discourse: textual analysis for social research. London:
Routledge.
Fairclough, N., 2006. Language and globalization. London: Routledge.
Finnemore, M., and Sikkink, K., 2001. Taking stock: the constructivist research
program in international relations and comparative politics. Annual Review of
Political Science, 4, 391–416.
Focus on the Global South, 2010. Focus on the Global South climate justice campaign.
Available from: http://focusweb.org/pdf/cjworkplan2010.pdf [Accessed 31 May
2011].
Fraser, N., 1992. Rethinking the public sphere: a contribution to the critique of actually
existing democracy. In: C. Calhoun, ed. Habermas and the public sphere. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 109–142.
Garthwaite, J., 2009. Alan Salzman: bringing Silicon Valley entrepreneurship to global
climate policy. Available from: http://earth2tech.com/2009/06/02/alan-salzmanbringing-silicon-valley-entrepreneurship-to-global-climate-policy/
[Accessed 31 May
2011].
George, J., 1994. Discourses of global politics: a critical (re)introduction to international
relations. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Gill, R., 2000. Discourse analysis. In: M.W. Bauer and G. Gaskell, eds. Qualitative
researching with text, image and sound: a practical handbook. London: Sage
Publications, 172–190.
Environmental Politics 207
Global Justice Ecology Project, 2009. Climate justice. Available from: http://
globaljusticeecology.org/climate_justice.php [Accessed 31 May 2011].
Goldman Sachs, n.d. Goldman Sachs environmental policy framework. Available from: http://
www2.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/environment-and-energy/enviro-policy-framework.pdf
[Accessed 31 May 2011].
Greenpeace, 2008. Remarks by Gerd Leipold. Available from author on request.
Hajer, M.A., 1995. The politics of environmental discourse: ecological modernization and
the policy process. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hajer, M.A., and Versteeg, W., 2005. A decade of discourse analysis of environmental
politics. Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning, 7 (3), 175–184.
Hamilton, C., 2009a. Bullying, lies and the rise of right-wing climate denial. Australian
Broadcast Commission, 22 February. Available from: http://www.abc.net.au/
unleashed/stories/s2826189.htm [Accessed 31 May 2011].
Hamilton, C., 2009b. Who is orchestrating the cyber-bullying? Australian Broadcast
Commission, 23 February. Available from: http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/
39128.html [Accessed 31 May 2011].
Howarth, D., 2009. Power, discourse, and policy: articulating a hegemonic approach to
critical policy studies. Critical Policy Studies, 3 (3–4), 309–335.
INFORSE, 2009. Position paper on climate change. Available from: http://www.inforse.
dk/europe/pdfs/INFORSE-Climate-Change-Paper-09.pdf [Accessed 31 May 2011].
ISEAT (The Superior Ecumenical Andean Institute of Theology), The ASETT Latin
American Theological Commission and World Council of Churches, 2010. Climate
change: toward an ecumenical declaration. Available from: http://www.kairoscana
da.org/fileadmin/fe/files/PDF/EcoJustice/GlobalSouth/WCC-Clamor.pdf [Accessed
31 May 2011].
Jackson, T., 2008. Why politicians dare not limit economic growth. Available from: http://
www.stwr.org/globalization/why-politicians-dare-not-limit-economic-growth.html
[Accessed 31 May 2011].
Jasiewicz, E., 2008. Time for a revolution. The Guardian, 21 August. Available from:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/21/climatechange.kingsnorth
climatecamp [Accessed 31 May 2011].
Ju, C.K., 2009. B4E panel: solving environmental challenges through innovation and
technology. Available from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼eGctH0Ne-Vs&
list¼PL518743CAADCD2378 [Accessed 31 May 2011].
Karpowitz, C.F., Raphael, C., and Hammond IV, A.S., 2009. Deliberative democracy
and inequality: two cheers for enclave deliberation among the disempowered.
Politics & Society, 37 (4), 576–615.
Keohane, R.O., and Victor, D.G., 2011. The regime complex for climate change.
Perspectives on Politics, 9 (1), 7–23.
Lovelock, J., 2010. Interview. The Guardian, 29 March. Available from: http://
www.guardian.co.uk/science/2010/mar/29/james-lovelock-climate-change [Accessed
31 May 2011].
Mansbridge, J., 1996. Using power/fighting power: the polity. In: S. Benhabib, ed.
Democracy and difference: contesting the boundaries of the political. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 46–66.
Mattar. H., 2009. B4E panel: changing mindset, changing behaviour: consumers
advancing the green agenda. On file with Hayley Stevenson.
Morales, E., 2010. Discurso de Evo Morales Ayma, Presidente del Estado Plurinacional
de Bolivia, al Grupo del G 77 þ China en las Naciones Unidas. 7 May. Available
from: http://cmpcc.org/2010/05/07/discurso-de-evo-al-g77-en-la-onu/ [Accessed 31
May 2011].
Mouffe, C., 2000. The democratic paradox. London: Verso.
Nassef, Y., 2006. Interview: ‘climate change is happening very fast’. Available from:
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,2237751,00.html [Accessed 31 May 2011].
208 H. Stevenson and J.S. Dryzek
Noell-Neumann, E., 1984. Spiral of silence. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Nørga˚ rd, J.S., Peet, J., and Ragnarsdo´ ttir, K.V., 2010. The history of the limits to
growth. Solutions, 2 (1), 59–63.
Partnership for Clean Indoor Air, n.d. About PCIA. Available from: http://
www.pciaonline.org/node/2 [Accessed 31 May 2011].
Paterson, M., 2011. Selling carbon: from international climate regime to global carbon
market. In: J.S. Dryzek, R.B. Norgaard, and D. Schlosberg, eds. The Oxford
handbook of climate change and society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 611–624.
Peoples’ Movement on Climate Change, 2008. What is the People’s Protocol on Climate
Change? Available from: http://peoplesclimatemovement.net/component/content/
article/12 [Accessed 31 May 2011].
Pesticide Action Network, 2009. Workshop on building community resilience to climate
change through food sovereignty and ecological agriculture: confronting corporate
agriculture in the climate crisis. Available from: http://www.panap.net/en/fs/post/
food-sovereignty/127 [Accessed 31 May 2011].
Plataforma Boliviana Frente al Cambio Clima´ tico, 2009. Declaracio´n de la Plataforma
Sobre Cambio Climatico. Available from: http://funsolon.civiblog.org/blog/_
archives/2009/3/30/4138272.html [Accessed 31 May 2011].
PWCCC (World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother
Earth), 2010. Call. 5 January. Available from: http://pwccc.wordpress.com/2010/01/
15/call/ [Accessed 31 May 2011].
Reus-Smit, C., 1999. The moral purpose of the state: culture, social identity, and
institutional rationality in international relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Ro¨ hr, U., 2006. Gender relations in international climate change negotiations.
Available from: http://www.generoyambiente.org/arcangel2/documentos/222.pdf
[Accessed 31 May 2011].
Roy, B., 2009. B4E panel: solving environmental challenges through innovation and
technology. Available from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼uVuI4A1ka6U
&list¼PL518743CAADCD2378 [Accessed 31 May 2011].
Stevenson, H., 2011, Representing ‘The Peoples’? Post-neoliberal states in the
international climate negotiations. Working paper, The Australian National
University, Australia. Available from: http://deliberativedemocracy.anu.edu.au/
Content/workingpapers/Pdf%20version/STEVENSON%20Hayley%202011-1.pdf
[Accessed 31 May 2011].
Stiglitz, J., 2002. Globalization and its discontents. New York: W. W. Norton.
Sunstein, C.R., 2003. The law of group polarization. In: J.S. Fishkin and P. Laslett,
eds. Debating deliberative democracy. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 80–
101.
Sunstein, C.R., 2007. Ideological amplification. Constellations, 14 (2), 273–279.
Suntech Power, 2010. Everywhere under the sun. Available from: http://www.makingit
magazine.net/?p¼470 [Accessed 31 May 2011].
Swiss Re, n.d. Our position and objectives. Available from: http://www.swissre.com/
rethinking/climate/our_position_and_objectives.html [Accessed 31 May 2011].
Tickell, C., 2009. Markets and the environment – are markets enough? Available from:
http://www.crispintickell.com/page131.html [Accessed 31 May 2011].
VegClimate Alliance et al., 2009. The Copenhagen Declaration on meat consumption and
climate change. Available from: http://vegclimatealliance.org/the-copenhagen-declaration/
[Accessed 31 May 2011].
Vı´a Campesina, 2010. La Agenda Campesina e Indı´gena ante la crisis clima´tica, los
transge´nicos y agrocombustibles. Available from: http://www.viacampesina.org/sp/
index.php?option¼com_content&view¼article&id¼965:la-agenda-campesina-e-in-
digena-ante-la-crisis-climatica-los-transgenicos-y-agrocombustibles&catid¼22:biodi
versidad-y-recursos-gencos&Itemid¼37 [Accessed 31 May 2011].
Environmental Politics 209
Wackernagel, M., 2010. A trust for sustainable living interview for thought leaders.
Video 1. Available from: http://www.livingrainforest.org/explore/tsl-interviews/
mathis-wackernagel-eco-footprints-and-opportunities/ [Accessed 31 May 2011].
Walker, R.B.J., 1993. Inside/outside: international relations as political theory. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
World March of Women, 2009. World March of Women. Available from: http://
www.mmf-france.fr/documents/2005Depliantmondial.pdf [Accessed 31 May 2011].
210 H. Stevenson and J.S. Dryzek