Energy transition in (Subsaharan) Africa Filip Černoch cernoch@mail.muni.cz Sub-Saharan Africa 2 Sub-Saharan Africa 3 • If you were the head of your country during the late 1970s, what policies would you follow to minimize the impact of possible another oil shock on your country‘s economy? • What options do the hydrocarbon producing countries of MENA region have to deal with the (possible) impacts of decarbonization? As you see it, which are more probable and which less? Why? Context 4 Sub-Saharan Africa 5 • Region is rich with resources (both fossil and renewables) but poor with energy accounts for 6% of global energy demand (3% of electricity), having 17% of the world´s population. 45% of that bioenergy. Over the past 30 years power generation per capita plateued. Total primary energy demand by fuel, 2018 • Solid biomass (fuelwood, straw, charcoal, dried animal and human waste) accounts for about 70% of final energy use in the region (80% with SA excluded). Trends 6 1) Growing population 7 • Rapid population growth -180 million in 1950; 1.3 bn. in 2018; (expected) 2.2 bn. in 2050, and (expected) 3.9 bn in 2095. • Urbanisation – by 2030, more than 50% of people in cities, by 2050 more than 60%. By 2040 about 580 additional million people in the cities. • Potential advantage is growing working-age population (42% below 15 years). 40% of the population below powerty line. 2) Investments and economy 8 • In 2018, around USD100 billion invested in energy sector = about 5.5% of the global total. • The economy of the region is still smaller than that of Germany (sic). Agriculture 65% of employment, mining for export. • Share of population living in powerty decreases while absolute number increases. • Significant role (FDI, trade) of the EU, growing role of China (oil-related investments in Angola, Chand and Uganda, gas investment in Mozambique, or hydro in Ethiopia and Nigeria). • Governance shortomings preventing foreign investments – low-quality institutions. 2) Investments and economy 9 2) Financing sources for power generation investment by share, type and capacity in sub-Saharan Africa, 2014 - 2018 10 2) China case – the new colonialism? 11 • Investments of USD 60 bn in 2015, around 10 000 Chinese companies operating in the region. • Export of commodities, import of electronics and industrial goods. (Tecno – 25% of the whole smartphone market). • Predatory loan practices or investments in infrastructure? • China lent at least USD95.5 billion between 2000 and 2015 – 40% for power generation and transmission, 30% for infrastructure. • Example of Djibouty – in two years from 50% to 85% GDP. Similar in Angola, Kenya… 3) Electricity access 12 • In 2013 the trend of population growth outpacing electrification reversed. 45% electrification rate. • In 2013 610 million people without elektricity, 595 in 2018. 80% of them in rural areas. • Increasing role of renewables. Decentralized systems, off-grid systems? • Still 530 million people in mainly rural areas without electricity by 2040. • Reliable supplies of electricity essential economic development. • Electricity prices very high by world standards, despite being often bellow the costs of supply (subsidies for oil). • Electrification undermining development goals of clean energy and climate action? 3) Population without access to electricity, 2018 13 3) Access to electricity 14 3) Electricity generation by fuel, 2010 - 2018 15 3) Electricity outages and GDP per capita in selected regions, 2017 16 3) Diesel generators vs. PV units 17 • Diesel generators used to back-up the (unreliable) grid – outages for 6% of the time on average, in some countries (Nigeria, Guinea, Central African Republic) much higher figures. • Nigeria the largest African importer of the generators, spending almost USD 22 bn. for fuel only (5bn above the price of electricity). 4) Clean cooking 18 • Between 2015 – 2018 increase from 15% to 17% population with access to clean cooking. 900 million without. • Clean cooking – health and environmental improvements, economic opportunities for women. • 500 000 premature deaths due to the household air pollution. • 6% of people using kerosene. Deforestation for charcoal for cities. Increase in LPG. 2) Biomass in cooking 19 • Solid biomass (fuelwood, straw, charcoal, dried animal and human waste) accounts for about 70% of final energy use in the region (80% with SA excluded). • Cooking primarily. • Environmental consequences, health effect. • Policy actions and wood scarcity may encourage usage of LPG and more efficient cookstoves, but 650 million people still cooking with biomass in 2040. 4) Clean cooking 20 4) Main fuels used by household for cooking, 2018 21 4) Population without access to clean cooking, 2018 22 5) Hydrocarbon resources 23 • The whole continent (incl. North Africa) around 450 billion barrels of technically recoverable oil (about 7% of the world). In subsaharan Africa ¾ of reserves in Nigeria and Angola. • Natural gas used sparcely – about 5% in energy mix. 100 tcm (13% of the global total) of recoverable natural gas, often flared (1/3 of the whole production). Plenty of new discoveries, prospecs of increased consumption. Nigeria, Mozambique, Tanzania. Expensive infrastructure needed. = estimated 120 bn. tons of coal (less than 1% of world reserves) in the southern part of the continents, lack of exploration and data. SA, Mozambique etc. = Uranium resources in Namibia, Niger, SA (20% of world reserves). 5) Net income from oil and gas production and government expenditure in top-ten producers in Africa 24 5) Nigeria and its oil 25 • Angola is overtaking Nigeria as the largest sub-Saharan oil producer. • In Nigeria, regulatory uncertainty, militant aktivity, oil theft (bunkering) in the Niger Delta compromise production. • Oil theft estimated at 150 kb/d plus oil spills due to sabotages (= 14% of output) – lost revenue of more than USD 5bn/y. Situation getting better in the last years. • Nigeria as a rentier state – largest economy in the region but several key human development indicators (education, life expectancy) on the regional average. • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KagZ76EXU_I 5) (Energy) resource curse? 26 • IEM outlook 2019: • Growth 3.2% in 2019, 3.6% in 2020. • Non-resource-intensive countries expected to growth nearly three times faster (at 6.0%) than oil exporters (at 2.1%) and other resource intensive countries (2.7%). • Africa’s resource producers remain among the least diversified economies in the world, and their economic prospects remain tied to the volatile movement of global commodity prices. 6) Renewable sources 27 • Development limited by financing, underdeveloped grids and infrastructure, uncertaint policy environment. • Around 4 GW of solar PV added between 2010 and 2018. • Total of 35 GW of hydro capacity across Africa. 60% of investments between 2010 and 2015 from China. • About 5.5 GW of wind total. • Bioenergy – 60% of primar energy use. 6) Renewable potential 28 7) Climate change impact 29 • More than 680 million (more than half of the population) in areas where cooling is needed. Incidences of natural diseasters, 1980s-2000s Crossroads 30 (Centralized) fossil fuels vs. (decentralized) renewables 31 • What energy pathway to take? • Centralized/traditional sources need centralized governance. • Decentralized/renewable sources provide energy, but - could economy be built on decentralized/renewable sources? • Leapfroging – example of telecommunication. Sources • World Population Review (2018): Sub Saharan Africa Population 2018. • IEA (2014): Africa Energy Outlook. • IEA (2017): Energy Access Outlook 2017: From Powerty to Prosperity. • Hafner, M.; Tagliapietra, S.; de Strasser, L.(2017): Energy In Africa: Challenges and Opportunities. • Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (2018): Electrifying Africa. • IMF (2019): Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa. Average elektricity losses in power systems, elektricity demand served by back-up generators, and share of hours of elektricity supply lost to outages, 2018 33