Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt
Realism
• Introduction: the timeless wisdom of Realism
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• One Realism, or many?
• The essential Realism
• Conclusion: Realism and the globalization of world politics
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READER'S GUIDE
Realism is the dominant theory of International Relations. Why? Because it provides the most powerful explanation for the state of war which is the regular condition of life in the international system. This is the bold claim made by realists in defence of their tradition, a claim which will be critically examined in this chapter. The second section will ask whether there is one Realism or a variety of Realisms? The argument presented below suggests that despite important differences, particularly between historical realism and structural realism, it is possible to identify a shared core which all realists subscribe to. Section three outlines these common elements: self-help, statism, and survival. In the final section, we will return to the question how far Realism is relevant for explaining or understanding our world? Although it leaves many areas of the globalization of world politics uncharted, Realism's emphasis upon material forces such as state power remains an important dimension of international relations after the cold war.
Introduction: the timeless wisdom of Realism
The story of Realism most often begins with a mythical tale of the idealist or Utopian writers of the inter-war period (1919-39). Writing in the aftermath of World War One, the 'idealists', a term that realist writers have retrospectively imposed on the inter-
war scholars, focused much of their attention on understanding the cause of war so as to find a remedy for its existence. Yet according to the realists, the inter-war scholars' approach was flawed in a number of respects. They, for example, ignored the role of
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power, overestimated the degree to which human beings were rational, mistakenly believed that nation-states shared a set of common interests, and were overly passionate in their belief in the capacity of humankind to overcome the scourge of war. The outbreak of World War Two in 1939 confirmed, for the realists at least, the inadequacies of the inter-war idealists' approach to studying international politics.
A new approach, one based on the timeless insights of Realism, rose from the ashes of the discredited idealist approach.1 Histories of the academic field of International Relations describe a Great Debate that took place in the late 1930s and early 1940s between the inter-war idealists and a new generation of realist writers, which included E. H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Frederick Schuman, George Kennan, and others, who all emphasized the ubiquity of power and the competitive nature of politics among nations. The standard account of the Great Debate is that the realists emerged victorious, and the rest of the International Relations story is, in many respects, a footnote to Realism.2 It is important to note, however, that at its Inception, there was a need for Realism to define itself against an alleged 'idealist' position. From 1939 to the present, leading theorists and policy-makers have continued to view the world through realist lenses. The prescriptions it offered were particularly well suited to the United States' rise to become the global hegemon (or leader). Realism taught American leaders to focus on interests rather than ideology, to seek peace through strength, and to recognize that great powers can coexist even if they have antithetical values and beliefs. The fact that Realism offers something of a 'manual' for maximizing the interests of the state in a hostile environment explains in part why it remains 'the central tradition in the study of world politics' (Keohane 1989a: 36). This also helps to explain why alternative perspectives (see Ch. 11) must of necessity engage with, and attempt to go beyond, Realism.
The theory of Realism that became dominant after World War Two, which we will describe as modern realism (1939-79), is often claimed to rest on an older, classical tradition of thought. The very idea of the timeless wisdom of Realism suggests that modem realism has a number of intellectual antecedents, which we will call classical realism (up to the twen-
tieth century). Indeed, many contemporary realist writers often claim to be part of an ancient tradition of thought that Includes such illustrious figures as Thucydides (c. 460-406 bc), Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78). The insights that classical realism offered on the way in which state leaders should conduct themselves in the realm of international politics are often grouped under the doctrine of raison d'etat, or reason of state. Together, writers associated with raison d'etat are seen as providing a set of maxims to leaders on how to conduct their foreign affairs so as to ensure the security of the state. Many successful leaders of the nineteenth and twentieth century have claimed to follow the timeless principles of classical realism.
According to the historian Friedrich Meinecke, 'Raison d'etat is the fundamental principle of international conduct, the State's First Law of Motion. It tells the statesman what he must do to preserve the health and strength of the State' (Meinecke 1957:1). Most importantly, the state, which is identified as the key actor in international politics, must pursue power, and it is the duty of the statesperson to calculate rationally the most appropriate steps that should be taken so as to perpetuate the life of the state in a hostile and threatening environment. For realists of all stripes, the survival of the state can never be guaranteed, because the use of force culminating in war is a legitimate instrument of statecraft. As we will see, the assumption that the state is the principal actor coupled with the view that the environment in which states inhabit is a perilous place help to define the essential core of Realism. There is, however, one issue in particular that theorists associated with raison d'etat, and classical realism more generally, were concerned with; that is, the role, if any, that morals and ethics occupy in international politics.
Realists are sceptical of the idea that universal moral principles exist and, therefore, warn state leaders against sacrificing their own self-interests in order to adhere to some tadeterrriinate notion of 'ethical' conduct. Moreover, realists argue that the need for survival requires state leaders to distance themselves from traditional morality which attaches a positive value to caution, piety, and the greater good of humankind as a whole. Machiavelli argued
that these principles were positively harmful if adhered to by state leaders. It was imperative that state leaders learned a different kind of morality which accorded not to traditional Christian virtues but to political necessity and prudence. Proponents of raison d'etat often speak of a dual moral standard: one moral standard for individual citizens living inside the state and a different standard for the state in its external relations with other states. Justification for the two moral standards stems from the fact that the condition of international politics often make it necessary for state leaders to act in a manner (for example, cheating, lying, killing) that would be entirely unacceptable for the individual. But before we reach the conclusion that Realism is completely immoral, it is important to add that proponents of raison d'itat argue that the state itself represents a moral force, for it is the existence of the state that creates the possibility for an ethical political community to exist domestically. Thus preserving the life of the state and the ethical community it envelops becomes a moral duty of the statesperson.
Although the advanced student might be able to detect some subtle differences, it is fair to say that there is a significant degree of continuity between classical and modern realism. Indeed, the three core elements that we identify with Realism—statism, survival, and self-help—are present in the work of a classical realist such as Thucydides and a modern realist such as Hans J. Morgenthau. We argue that these 'three Ss' constitute the corners of the realist triangle. While we will expand on the meaning of these 'three Ss' later in the chapter, it is important to be clear at the outset what these terms signify.
Realism identifies the group as the fundamental unit of political analysis. During earlier times, such as when Thucydides and Machiavelli were writing, the basic unit was the polis or city-state, but since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) realists consider the-'sov-ereign state as the principle actor in international politics. This is often referred to as the state-centric assumption of Realism. Statism is the term given to the idea of the state as the legitimate representative of the collective will of the people. The legitimacy of the state is what enables it to exercise authority internally as manifest, for example, in the making and enforcement of law. Yet outside the boundaries of the state, realists argue that a condition of
anarchy exists. By anarchy what is most often meant is that international politics takes place in an arena that has no overarching central authority above the individual collection of sovereign states. Thus rather than necessarily denoting complete chaos and lawlessness, the concept of anarchy is used by realists to emphasize the point that the international realm is distinguished by the lack of a central authority. As we will see, realists draw a variety of conclusions about the effect that anarchy has on shaping the basic character of international politics.
Following from this, realists draw a sharp distinction between domestic and international politics. Thus while Hans J. Morgenthau argues that 'international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power,' he goes to great lengths to demonstrate the qualitatively different result this struggle has on international politics as compared to domestic politics (Morgenthau [1948] 1955: 25). One major factor that realists argue sets international politics apart from domestic politics is that while the latter is able to constrain and channel the power-seeking ambitions of individuals in a less violent direction (for example, the pursuit of wealth), the former is much less able to do so. For realists, it is self-evident that the incidence of violence is greater at the international than the domestic level. A prominent explanation that realists provide for this difference in behaviour relates to the different organizational structure of domestic and international politics. Realists argue that the basic structure of international politics is one of anarchy in that each of the independent sovereign states consider themselves to be their own highest authority and do not recognize a higher power above them. Conversely, domestic politics is often described as a hierarchic structure in which different political actors stand in various relations of super- and subordination.
It is largely on the basis of how realists depict the international environment that they conclude that the first priority for state leaders is to ensure the survival of their state. Under anarchy, the survival of the state cannot be guaranteed. Realists correctly assume that all states wish to perpetuate their existence. Looking back at history, however, realists note that the actions of some states resulted in other states losing their existence (look at the results that Germany achieved at the beginning of World War II).
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This is partly explained in light of the power differentials of states. Intuitively, states with more power stand a better chance of surviving than states with less power. Power is crucial to the realist lexicon and traditionally has been defined narrowly in military strategic terms. It is the ability to get what you want either through the threat or use of force. Yet irrespective of how much power a state may possess, the core national Interest of all states must be survival. While states obviously have various interests, such as economic, environmental, and humanitarian, if their existence was to be jeopardized, then these other interests would not stand a chance of ever being realized. Like the pursuit of power, the promotion of the national interest is an iron law of necessity.
Self-help is the principle of action in an anarchical system where there is no global government. According to Realism, each state actor Is responsible for ensuring their own well-being and survival. Unlike domestic politics where a range of institutions and mechanisms seek to ensure the welfare of the individual citizen, these are either non-existent or extremely weak In the International realm. Realists do not believe it is prudent for a state to entrust its safety and survival on another actor or international institution such as the League of Nations or the United Nations. For as Machiavelli recognized, today's friend can quickly become tomorrow's enemy. States, in short, should not depend on others for their own security. Moreover, realists once again turn to the historical record and note the unfortunate fate of Ethiopia under the League of Nations and Kuwait under the United Nations and conclude that states should ultimately rely on themselves for security.
You may at this point be asking what options are available to states to ensure their own security. Consistent with the principle of self-help, if a state feels threatened it should seek to augment its own power capabilities by engaging, for example, in a military arms build-up. Yet this may prove to be insufficient for a number of smaller states who feel threatened by a much larger state. This brings us to one of the crucial mechanisms that realists throughout the ages have considered to be essential to preserving the liberty of states—the balance of power. Although various meanings have been attributed to the concept of
the balance of power, the most common definition holds that if the survival of a state or a number of weaker states Is threatened by a hegemonic state or coalition of stronger states, they should join forces, establish a formal alliance, and seek to preserve their own independence by checking the power of the opposing side. The mechanism of the balance of power seeks to ensure an equilibrium of power in which case no one state or coalition of states is in a position to dominate all the others. The cold war competition between the East and West, as institutionalized through the formal alliance system of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), provides a prominent example of the balance of power mechanism in action.
Before continuing to engage with realist thought in more detail, let us remind ourselves that the story of the discipline of International Relations, like all texts, is open to multiple readings. Moreover, the final chapters have yet to be written. An interesting thought experiment is to ask whether Realism will have the last word. When 'the end of the world as we know it' is upon us, and the conclusion to the 'book' of International Relations is being hastily drafted, will it be written by a realist? Many contemporary theorists would argue that the discipline's centre of gravity is already shifting away from Realism towards a new kind of Liberalism, a theory more appropriate for the post-cold war era perhaps. Other more radical voices argue that what is needed is nothing less than a transformation In our political imagination, in terms of widening our sense of community beyond the confines of the sovereign state which realists (and some Liberal thinkers) take for granted (see Ch. 29). This is especially the case in light of the arguments that some proponents of globalization are making about the state being transcended by global economic forces. Although the chapter does not have the space to do justice to these critical arguments, the 'headlines' are presented in Box 7.3 in the hope that the reader will consult them in their original form.
By way of a response to the critics, it Is worth reminding them that the death-knell of Realism has been sounded a number of times already, by the scientific approach in the 1960s and transnatlonalism in the 1970s, only to see the resurgence of a more
robust form of Realism in the late 1970s and 1980s (commonly termed 'neo-realism'). In this respect Realism shares with Conservatism (its ideological godfather) the recognition that a theory without the means to change is without the means of its own preservation. The question of Realism's resilience touches upon one of its central claims, namely, that it is the embodiment of laws of International politics which remain true across time (history) and space (geopolitics). This argument is made by a leading contemporary realist, Robert Gilpin, who cast doubt on 'whether or not twentieth-century students of international relations know anything that Thucy-dides and his fifth-century bc compatriots did not know about the behaviour of states' (1981: 227-8).
Thucydides was the historian of the Pelopon-neslan War, a conflict between two great powers in the ancient Greek world, Athens and Sparta. Thucydides' work has been admired by subsequent generations of realists for the insights he raised about many of the perennial issues of international politics. Thucydides' explanation of the underlying cause of the war—'the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta' (1.23)—is considered to be a classic example of the impact that the anarchical structure of international politics has on the behaviour of state actors. On this reading, Thucydides makes It clear that Sparta's national interest, like that of all states, was survival, and the changing distribution of power represented a direct threat to its existence. Sparta was, therefore, compelled by necessity to go to war in order to forestall being vanquished by Athens. Thucydides also makes it clear that Athens felt equally compelled to pursue power in order to preserve the empire it had acquired. The famous Athenian leader, Pericles, claimed to be acting on the basis of the most fundamental of human motivations: ambition, fear, and self-interest.
One of the significant episodes of the war between Athens and Sparta is known as the 'Melian dialogue' and represents a fascinating Illustration of a number of key realist principles. Case Study 1 (Box 7.1) reconstructs the dialogue between the Athenian leaders who arrived on the island of Melos to assert their right of conquest over the islanders, and the response this provoked.
In short, what the Athenians are asserting over the Melians is the logic of power politics. Because of
their vastly superior military force, they are able to present a fait accompli to the Melians: either submit peacefully or be exterminated. The Melians for their part try and 'buck' the logic of power politics, appealing in turn with arguments grounded in justice, God, and their allies the Spartans. As the dialogue makes clear, the Melians were forced to submit to the realist iron law that 'the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept'. Later realists would concur with Thucydides' suggestion that the logic of power politics has universal applicability. Instead of Athens and Melos, we could just as easily substitute, for example, Nazi Germany and Czechoslovakia in 1939, the Soviet Union and Hungary in 1956, or Indonesia and East Timor in 1975. In each case, the weaker state had to submit to the will of the stronger. Power trumps morality, and the threat or use of force triumphs over legal principles such as the right to independence (sovereignty). There are also alternative readings of Thucydides that highlight what happens when states act purely on the basis of self-interest without any consideration of moral and ethical principles. After all, Athens suffers epic defeat even while following the timeless tenets of Realism.
The question whether Realism does embody 'timeless truths' about politics will be returned to in the conclusion of the chapter. Could a scholar who understood the history of international conflict in the fifth century bc really apply the same conceptual tools to global politics at the end of the second millennium? In the following section we will begin to unravel Realism in order to reveal the way in which the tradition has evolved over the last twenty-five centuries. After considering the main tributaries which flow into the realist stream of thinking, the third section will attempt to disinter a 'core' of realist principles to which all realists could subscribe.
Key points
• Realism has been the dominant theory of world politics since the beginning of academic International Relations.
• Outside of the academy, Realism has a much longer history. Scepticism about the capacity of human reason to deliver moral progress resonates
Box 7.1 Case Study 1: The Melian dialogue—Realism and the preparation for war
Athenians. Then we on our side will use no fine phrases saying, for example, that we have a right to our empire because we defeated the Persians... And we ask you on your side not to imagine that you will influence us by saying that you, though a colony of Sparta, have not joined Sparta in the war, or that you have never done us any harm ... you know as well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.
melians. Then in our view (since you force us to leave justice out of account and to confine ourselves to self-interest) ... you should not destroy a principle that is to the general good of all men—namely, that in the case of all who fall into danger there should be such a thing as fair play and just dealing.
Athenians. We do not want any trouble in bringing you into our empjre, and we want you to be spared for the good both of yourselves and of ourselves.
melians. And how could It be just as good for us to be the slaves as for you to be the masters?
Athenians. You, by giving in, would save yourselves from disaster; we by not destroying you, would be able to profit from you.
melians. So you do not agree to our being neutral, friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither side?
Athenians. No... if we were on friendly terms with you, our subjects would regard that as a sign of weakness in us, whereas your hatred is evidence of our power.... So that by conquering you we shall increase not only the size but the security of our empire.
melians. But do you think there is no security for you in what we suggest? For here again, since you will not let us mention justice, but tell us to give in to your interests, we, too, must tell you what our interests are and, if yours and ours happen to coincide, we must try to persuade you of the fact. Is it not certain that you will make enemies of all states who are at present neutral, when they see what is happening here and naturally conclude that in course of time you will attack them too? ... Yet we know that in war, fortune sometimes makes the odds more level. Athenians. Hope, that comforter in dangerl melians. We trust that the gods will give us fortune as good as yours, because we are standing for what is right against what Is wrong; and as for what we lack in power, we trust that it will be made up for by our alliance with the
Spartans, who are bound, if for no other reason, then for honour's sake, and because we are their kinsman, to come to our help.
Athenians. So far as the favour of the gods is concerned, we think we have as much right to that as you have.... Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to conclude that It is a general and necessary law of nature to rule whatever one can. This is not a law that we made ourselves, nor were we the first to act upon it when it was made. We found it already in existence, and we shall leave it to exist forever among those who come after us. We are merely acting in accordance with it, and we know that you or anybody else with the same power as ours would be acting in precisely the same way. And therefore, so far as the gods are concerned, we see no good reason why we should fear to be at a disadvantage. But with regard to your views about Sparta and your confidence that she, out of a sense of honour, will come to your aid, we must say that we congratulate you on your simplicity but do not envy you your folly ... of all people we know the Spartans are most conspicuous for believing that what they like doing is honourable and what suits their interests is just.
melians. But this is the very point where we can feel most sure. Their own self-interest will make them refuse to betray their own colonists, the Melians. Athenians. You seem to forget that if one follows one's self-interest one wants to be safe, whereas the path of justice and honour Involves one in danger .... Do not be led astray by a false sense of honour.... You, if you take the right view, will be careful to avoid this. And, when you are allowed to choose between war and safety, you will not be so insensitively arrogant as to make the wrong choice. You will see that there is nothing disgraceful in giving way to the greatest city in Hellas when she is offering you such reasonable terms—alliance on a tribute-paying basis and liberty to enjoy your own property. This is the safe rule—to stand up to one's equals, to behave with deference to one's superiors, and to treat one's Inferiors with moderation.
melians. Our decision, Athenians, is just the same as it was at first. We are not prepared to give up in a short moment the liberty which out city has enjoyed from its foundation for 700 years.
Athenians. You seem to us ... to see uncertainties as realities, simply because you would like them to be so.
(This is an edited extract from Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin Classics, 1954), 360-5)
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through the work of classical political theorists such as Thucydides, Machiavelll, Hobbes, and Rousseau.
In "The Melian dialogue', one of the episodes of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides uses the words of the Athenians to highlight the realist view of a number of key concepts such as self-interest, alliances, balance of power, capabilities, and insecurity. The people of Melos respond In
idealist verse, appealing to justice, fairness, luck, the gods, and in the final instance, to common interests.
At the end of the millennium, Realism continues to attract academicians and inform policy-makers, although the passing of the cold war has seen a revival in the fortunes of Liberalism, and a variety of more critical approaches grouped under the banner of post-positivism.
One Realism, or many?
The intellectual exercise of articulating a unified theory of Realism has been criticized by writers who are both sympathetic and critical of the tradition (Doyle 1997; M. J. Smith 1986). In the words of a leading critic of Realism, 'there is no single tradition of political realism, but rather a knot of historically constituted tensions, contradictions and evasions' (Walker 1993: 106). Consistent with the argument that there is not one Realism, but many, is the attempt to delineate different types of Realism. The most simple distinction Is a form of periodization that we introduced in the preceding section: classical realism (up to the twentieth century), modern realism (1939-79), and neo-realism (1979 onwards). These different periods do not, however, overcome the problem of diversity. For example, not all classical realists agree on the causes of war, or whether the balance of power is a natural state or one that must be created.
An alternative form of classification Is thematic (a summary of the varieties of realism outlined below is contained in Table 7.1). One of the most convincing of these is R. B. J. Walker's distinction between -historical realism and structural realism (1993:108-22) which the following classification builds on.3 Machiavelll is the leading classical exponent of historical realism in that he recognized the difficulties of devising universal maxims of state conduct that could be used at all times and places to ensure the survival of the state. Machiavelll recognized the flux of political life and appreciated the point that change is a continuous process. Therefore he warned
state leaders always to hedge their bets and, rather than propounding timeless truths, Machiavelll offered what can be termed 'situation-bound knowledge' that always had to take the immediate context into consideration. E. H. Carr is the modern Machiavelll, advocating a foreign policy which recognizes the interplay of power and morality, consent and coercion, and force and appeasement. Carr concluded that the fundamental problem of international politics was how to foster peaceful change in the relations between satisfied and non-satisfied powers without the need to resort to war.
The structural realism lineage begins with Thucydides' representation of power politics as a law of human behaviour. The drive for power and the will to dominate are held to be fundamental aspects of human nature. The behaviour of the state as a self-seeking egoist is understood to be merely a reflection of the characteristics of the people that comprise the state. It is human nature that explains why international politics is necessarily power politics. This reduction of Realism to a condition of human nature is one which frequently reappears in the leading works of the realist canon, most famously in the work of the high priest of post-war Realism, Hans J. Morgenthau. It can usefully be thought of as a 'structural' theory—structural realism I—because human nature is viewed by realists as the determining structure, one which stands outside of history and cannot be transcended. Morgenthau notes, 'politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature' (Morgenthau
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[1948] 1955: 4). The important point foi Morgenthau is, first, to recognize that these laws exist and second, to devise the most appropriate policies that are consistent with the basic fact that human beings are flawed creatures. For both Thucydides and Morgenthau, the essential continuity of the power-seeking behaviour of states is rooted in the biological drives of human beings.
The more frequent use of the term 'structural' in the literature—structural realism II4—is to denote the form of realist argument which attributes the cause of conflict to the anarchic structure of the international system. This form of structural realism is most often associated with Kenneth Waltz's landmark book, Theory of International Politics (1979). According to Waltz, anarchy prevents states from entering into co-operative agreements to end the state of war. The condition of anarchy—that is, the fact that there is no 'higher power' to ensure the peace among sovereign states—is often viewed as synonymous to a state of war. By the state of war, structural realists do not intend to convey the impression that large-scale war is a daily occurrence in international politics, but rather the possibility that a particular state may resort to force indicates that the outbreak of war is always a likely scenario in an anarchical environment. Thus, the structure of the system can drive states to war even if state leaders desire peace (Butterfield 1951: 21). Structural realists insist that the type of state, for example a democracy or totalitarian state, or the personality of the leader is less important in accounting for the phenomena of war than the fact that action takes place within the context of an anarchical realm. But as a number of scholars have pointed out, contemporary realists like Waltz who have tried to construct a realist theory without relying on an assumption about human nature often 'smuggle' into their idea of a 'system' behavioural assumptions about states as competitive and egoistic entities. Moreover, in the work of contemporary structural realists, these traits appear to be prior to the interactions of states as though they existed before the game of power politics began.
The fourth and final type of realism develops out of a reading of Thomas Hobbes. Although his great work Leviathan is often cited by realists for its graphically pessimistic portrayal of human nature, Hobbes can more usefully be deployed in support of liberal
realism. His analogy between individuals in a state of nature and sovereigns in a state of war suggests a kind of permanent cold war where states are constantly living in fear of being attacked. But crucially, Hobbes believed that states are less vulnerable than individuals in the state of nature, and are therefore able to coexist with other sovereigns. As elementary rules of coexistence are formulated, such as the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, the anarchical system becomes an anarchical society, and Realism metamorphoses Into a form of liberal realism. This liberal wing of realism has appealed in particular to British international relations theorists, who have, as John Vincent put it, 'flattered Hobbes by imitating him' (1981: 96-101).5
Given the varieties of Realism that exist, it is hardly surprising that the overall coherence of Realism as a tradition of inquiry into international relations has been questioned (Forde 1992: 62). The answer to the question of 'coherence' is, of course, contingent upon how strict the criteria are for judging the continuities which underpin a particular theory. Here it is perhaps a mistake to understand traditions as a single stream of thought, handed down in a neatly wrapped package from one generation of realists to another. Instead it is preferable to think of living traditions like Realism as the embodiment of both continuities and conflicts. For this reason it is important for students to read realists in their historical and political contexts, to try and understand the world they were speaking to and the forces they were reacting against.
While recognizing the danger of imposing a 'mythology of coherence' (Skinner 1988: 39) on the various theorists and practitioners identified with Realism, there are good reasons for attempting to identify a shared core of propositions which all realists subscribe to (see section below, 'The essential Realism'). In the first instance, there is virtue in simplicity; complex ideas can be filtered, leaving a residual substance which may not conform to any one of the ingredients but is nevertheless a virtual representation of all of them. A second reason for attempting to arrive at a composite Realism is that, despite the different strands running through the tradition, there is a sense in which all realists share a common set of propositions. These will be considered In the third section of this chapter.
Table 7.1 A taxonomy of realisms
Type of Realism
Key thinkers (classical and modern)
Key texts
'Big idea'
Structural realism I (Human Nature)
Historical or practical realism
Structural realism II (International system)
Liberal realism
Thucydides (c.430-400 ec)
Morgenthau (1948) Machlavelll(1532)
Carr (1939)
Rousseau (c.1750) Waltz (1979)
Hobbes (1651) Bull (1977)
The Peloponnesian War
Politics Among Nations The Prince
The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939
The State of War
Theory of International
Politics
Leviathan
The Anarchical Society
international politics is driven by an endless struggle for power which has its roots in human nature, lustice, law, and society have either no place or are circumscribed.
Political realism recognizes that principles are subordinated to policies; the ultimate skill of the state leader is to accept, and adapt to, the changing power political configurations in world politics.
It is not human nature, but the anarchical system which fosters fear, jealousy, suspicion, and insecurity. Conflict can emerge even if the actors have benign intent towards each other.
The international anarchy can be cushioned by states who have the capability to deter other states from aggression, and who are able to construct elementary rules for their coexistence.
Key points
• There is a lack of consensus in the literature as to whether we can meaningfully speak about Realism as a single coherent theory.
• There are good reasons for delineating different types of Realism. The most important cleavage is between those who see Realism as a licence to take any course of action necessary to ensure political survival (historical realists) and those who see it as a permanent condition of conflict or the preparation for future conflicts (structural realists).
• Structural realism divides into two wings: those writers who emphasize human nature as the structure (structural realism I) and those who believe that anarchy is the structure which shapes and shoves the behaviour of states (structural realism II).
At the margins of Realism we find a form of liberal realism which rejects the pessimistic picture of historical and structural realists, believing that the state of war can be mitigated by the management of power by the leading states in the system and the development of practices such as diplomacy and customary international law.
The question whether it is legitimate to speak of a coherent tradition of political realism touches upon an important debate conducted by historians of ideas. Most classical realists did not consider themselves to be adherents of a particular tradition, for this reason Realism, like all other traditions, is something of an invention.
i Once we admit to a variety of realisms, we are in danger of exaggerating the particular characteristics of each thinker and the context within which they wrote, at a cost of gleaning a better understanding of Realism as a whole.
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The essential Realism
The previous paragraphs have argued that Realism is a theoretical broad church, embracing a variety of authors and texts. Despite the numerous denominations, we argue that all realists subscribe to the following 'three Ss': statism, survival, self-help." Each of these elements is considered In more detail in the subsections below.
Statism
For realists, the state is the main actor and sovereignty is its distinguishing trait. The meaning of the sovereign state is inextricably bound up with the use of force. In terms of its internal dimension, to illustrate this relationship between violence and the state we need to look no further than Max Weber's famous definition of the state as 'the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory'.7 Within this territorial space, sovereignty means that the state has supreme authority to make and enforce laws. This is the basis of the unwritten contract between individuals and the state. According to Hobbes, for example, we trade our liberty in return for a guarantee of security. Once security has been established, civil society can begin. But in the absence of security, there can be no art, no culture, no society. All these finer aspects of social life are secondary in importance. The first move, then, for the realist is to organize power domestically. In this respect, 'every state is fundamentally a Machstaat' or power state (Donelan 1990: 25). Only after power has been organized, can community begin.
Realist international theory appears to operate according to the assumption that, domestically, the problem of order and security is solved. The presence of a sovereign authority domestically implies that individuals need not worry about their own security, since this is provided for them in the form of a system of law, police protection, prisons, and other coercive measures. This allows members of the political community living 'Inside' the state to pursue the good life. However, on the 'outside', in the relations among independent sovereign states, insecurities,
dangers, and threats to the very existence of the state loom large. Realists largely explain this on the basis that the very condition for order and security— namely, the existence of a sovereign—is missing from the international realm. Yet it is worthwhile to evaluate critically the assumptions that are being made here. Is it really the case that you always feel secure inside your own state? Is a central authority a prerequisite for peace and order? Is the inside/ outside distinction that realists draw between peace and security on the one hand, and violence and insecurity on the other hand defensible?
Realists claim that in anarchy, states compete with other states for security, markets, influence, and so on. And the nature of the competition is often viewed in zero-sum terms; in other words, more for one actor means less for another. This competitive logic of power politics makes agreement on universal principles difficult, apart from the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other sovereign states. This international legal aspect of sovereignty functions as a 'no trespass sign' placed on the border between states. But even this principle, designed to facilitate coexistence, is suspended by realists who argue that in practice non-intervention does not apply in relations between great powers and their 'near abroad'.
Given that the first move of the state is to organize power domestically, and the second is to accumulate power internationally, it is self-evidentfy important to consider in more depth what realists mean by their ubiquitous fusion of politics with power. It is one thing to say that international politics is a struggle for power, but this merely begs the question of what realists mean by power. Morgenthau offers the following definition of power: 'man's control over the minds and actions of other men' ([1948] 1955: 26). There are two important points that realists make about the elusive concept of power. First, power is a relational concept; one does not exercise power in a vacuum, but in relation to another entity. Second, power is a relative concept; calculations need to be made not only about one's own power capabilities, but about the power that other
state actors possess. Yet the task of accurately assessing the power of states is mfinitely complex, and often is reduced to counting the number of troops, tanks, aircraft, and naval ships a country possesses in the belief that this translates in the ability to get other actors to do something they would not otherwise do. There have been, however, a number of criticisms made of classical and modern Realism's over-reliance on this one-dimensional view of power.
There are two important exceptions to this tendency. First, the more liberal wing of realism has long noted the importance of more subtle understanding of power as prestige; in other words, the ability to get what you want without either the threat or the use of force but through diplomatic influence or authority. Second, E. H. Carr grafted economic and ideological dimensions onto the traditional realist equation of power 'equals' military force. Despite these revisions, Realism has been purchased at a discount precisely because its currency, power, has remained under-theorized and inconsistently used. Simply by asserting that states seek power provides no answer to crucial questions. Why do states struggle for power? Why is the accumulation of power, as Morgenthau argued, 'always the immediate aim'? Surely power is a means to an end rather than an end in itself?
Contemporary structural realists have in recent years sought to bring more conceptual clarity to bear on the meaning of power in the realist discourse. Kenneth Waltz tries to overcome the problem by shifting the focus from power to capabilities. He suggests that capabilities can be ranked according to their strength in the following areas: 'size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence' (1979: 131). The difficulty here is that resource strength does not always lead to military victory. For example, in the 1967 Six Day War between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, the distribution of resources clearly favoured the Arab coalition and yet the supposedly weaker side annihilated its enemies' forces and seized their territory. The definition of power as capabilities is even less successful at explaining the relative economic success of Japan over China. A more sophisticated understanding of power would focus on the ability of a state to control
or influence its environment in situations that are not necessarily conflictual.
An additional weakness with the realist treatment of power concerns its exclusive focus upon state power. For realists, states are the only actors that really 'count'. Transnational corporations, international organizations, and religious denominations, like all other ideologies, rise and fall but the state is the one permanent feature in the landscape of modern global politics. Moreover, it is not clear that these non-state actors are autonomous from state power, whether this be Italy in the case of the papacy or the US in the case of corporations like Microsoft. The extent to which non-state actors bear the imprint of a statist identity is further endorsed by the fact that these actors have to make their way in an international system whose rules are made by states. There is no better example of this than the importance of American hegemonic power 'underwriting' the Bretton Woods trading system which has set the framework for international economic relations in the post-1945 period. The motivation for this was not altruism on the part of the US but the rational calculation that it had more to gain from managing the international system than to lose by refusing to exercise leadership. Moreover, realists argue that an open, free-trade economic system, such as what was established at Bretton Woods, depends on the existence of a hegemon who is willing to shoulder the financial burdens of managing the system. This realist argument, popularly known as hegemonic stability theory, maintains that international economic order is dependent on the existence of a dominant state.
Survival
The second principle which unites most realists of all persuasions is the assertion that, in international politics, the pre-eminent goal is survival. Although there is an ambiguity in the works of the realists as to whether the accumulation of power is an end in itself, one would think that there is no dissenting from the argument that the ultimate concern of states is for security. Survival is held to be a precondition for attaining all other goals, whether these involve conquest or merely independence. According
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to Waltz, 'beyond the survival motive, the alms of states may be endlessly varied' (1979: 91). Yet a recent controversy among realists has arisen over the question of whether states are in fact principally security or power maximizers. This controversy pits defensive against offensive realists, and has a number of significant implications for how we view the prospects of international security and co-operation. Defensive realists such as Waltz and Joseph Grieco (1997) argue that states have security as their principal interest and therefore only seek the requisite amount of power to ensure their own survival. According to this view, states are profoundly defensive actors and will not seek to gain greater amounts of power if that means jeopardizing their own security. Offensive realism, as put forth by John Mearshe-imer (1994/5), argues that the ultimate goal of all states is to achieve a hegemonic position in the international system. States, according to this view, always desire more power and are willing, if the opportunity arises, to alter the existing distribution of power even if such an action may Jeopardize their own security. In terms of survival, defensive realists hold that the existence of status quo powers lessens the competition for power while offensive realists argue that the competition is always keen because revisionist states and aspiring hegemons are always willing to take risks with the aim of Improving their position in the International system.
Niccolo Machiavelli tried to make a 'science' out of his reflections on the art of survival. His short and engaging book, The Prince, was written with the explicit Intention of codifying a set of maxims which will enable leaders to maintain their hold on power. Machiavelli derived these maxims from his experience as a diplomat and his studies of ancient history. For instance, he was full of admiration for the Roman empire which annexed all potential enemies through conquest and imperial domination. Ergo, the lesson that Princes or Sovereigns must be prepared to break their promises if it is in their interests, and to conquer neighbouring states before they (inevitably) attack you. There are a number of ethical and practical difficulties associated with Machiavel-li's recommendations, particularly when relating these to contemporary international politics. Indeed, it is the perceived moral bankruptcy of Realism which has provoked a number of the most
influential criticisms of the theory, summarized in Box 7.3.
In important respects, we find two related Machiavellian themes recurring in the writings of modem realists, both of which derive from the idea that the realm of international politics requires different moral and political rules than those which apply in domestic politics. The task of understanding the reál nature of international politics, and the need to protect the state at all costs (even if this may mean the sacrifice of one's own citizens) places a heavy burden on the shoulders of state leaders. In the words of Henry Kissinger, the academic realist who became Secretary of State during the Nixon Presidency, 'a nation's survival is its first and ultimate responsibility; it cannot be compromised or put to risk' (1977: 204). Their guide must be an ethic of responsibility: the careful weighing up of consequences; the realization that individual acts of an immoral kind might have to be taken for the greater good. By way of an example, think of the ways in which governments frequently suspend the legal and political rights of 'suspected terrorists' in view of the threat they pose to 'national security'. A realist would argue that letting a suspected terrorist out of prison because there is insufficient evidence for prosecution would be an Irresponsible act which might jeopardize the lives of innocent civilians. An ethic of responsibility Is frequently used as a justification for breaking the laws of war, as In the case of the United States decision to drop nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The principle difficulty with the realist formulation of an 'ethics of responsibility' is that, whilst instructing leaders to consider the consequences of their actions, it does not provide a guide to how state leaders should weigh the consequences (M. J. Smith 1986:51).
Not only does Realism provide an alternative moral code for state leaders, it suggests a wider objection to the whole enterprise of bringing ethics into international politics. Starting from the assumption that each state has its own particular values and beliefs, realists argue that the state is the supreme good and there can be no community beyond borders. Without a common culture, and common institutions, the idea of an 'international community', so frequently articulated by journalists, is seriously premature. E. H. Can turned scepticism
about moral unlversals into a 'critical weapon' which he wielded in order to reveal how the supposedly universal principles adumbrated by the Great Powers (such as the virtue of free trade or self-determination) were really 'unconscious reflexions of national policy' (Carr 1946: 87). This moral relativism has generated a substantial body of criticism, particularly from liberal theorists: if all values are relative, how can we judge the actions of state-leaders? Are there not some policies which are wrong irrespective of which states commit them, such as torture or the denial of civil rights? Whilst the intuitive answer to these questions is 'yes', the argument gets more murky when other states with non-Western cultures argue that what we call 'torture' they call a 'rite of passage' (as in the case of female genital mutilation in certain African states). Moreover, many developing states argue that civil rights undermine social cohesion by privileging the individual's rights over the collective good. A realist would therefore see the pursuit of human rights in foreign policy as the imposition of one state's moral principles on another (Morgenthau 1978: 4).
Self-help
Kenneth Waltz's path-breaking work Theory of International Politics brought to the realist tradition a deeper understanding of the international system within which states coexist. Unlike many other realists, Waltz argued that international politics was not unique because of the regularity of war and conflict, since this was as familiar in domestic politics. The key difference between domestic and international orders lies in their structure. In the domestic polity, citizens do not have to defend themselves. In the international system, there is no higher authority to prevent and counter the use of force. Security can therefore only be realized through self-help. In an anarchic structure, 'self-help is necessarily the principle of action' (Waltz 1979: 111). But in the course of providing for one's own security, the state in question will automatically be fuelling the insecurity of other states.
The term given to this spiral of insecurity is the security dilemma.8 According to Wheeler and Booth, security dilemmas exist 'when the military
preparations of one state create an unresolvat uncertainty in the mind of another as to wheth those preparations are for "defensive" purposes on (to enhance its security in an uncertain world) whether they are for offensive purposes (to chan, the status quo to its advantage)' (1992: 30). Th scenario suggests that one state's quest for security often another state's source of insecurity. States fir it very difficult to trust one another and often vie the intentions of others in a negative light. Thus tt military preparations of one state are likely to I matched by neighbouring states. The Irony is that the end of the day, states often feel no more secu; than before they undertook measures to enhan< their own security.
Is there any escape from the security dilemmj There is a divergence in the realist camp betwee structural realists who believe the security dilemm to be a perennial condition of international politic and historical realists who believe that, even in a sel help system, the dilemma can be mitigated. Th principle mechanism by which it may be mitigated: through the operation of the balance of powe Maintaining a balance of power therefore became central objective in the foreign policies of the Grea Powers; this idea of a contrived balance is well illu: trated by the British foreign office memoranduE quoted in Box 7.2.
In a self-help system, structural realists argue tha the balance of power will emerge even in the absenc of a conscious policy to maintain the balance (i.e prudent statecraft). Waltz argues that balances o power result irrespective of the intentions of any pat ticular state. In an anarchical system populated tr states who seek to perpetuate themselves, alliance will be formed that seek to check and balance thi power against threatening states. A fortuitous bal ance will be established through the interactions o states in the same way that an equilibrium is estab lished between firms and consumers in a fret economic market (according to classical libera, economic theory). Liberal realists are more likely tc emphasize the crucial role state leaders and diplo-mats play in maintaining the balance of power. In other words, the balance of power is not natural oi inevitable, it must be constructed.
All varieties of Realism are united in the view that the balance of power is not a stable condition.
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Box 7.2 British foreign policy and the balance of power
History shows that the danger threatening the independence of this or that nation has generally arisen, at least in part, out of the momentary predominance of a neighbouring State at once militarily powerful, economically efficient, and ambitious to extend its frontiers or spread its influence... The only check on the abuse of political predominance derived from such a position has always consisted in the opposition of an equally formidable rival, or a combination of several countries forming leagues of defence. The equilibrium established by such a grouping of forces is technically known as the balance of power, and it has become almost an historical truism to identify England's secular policy with the maintenance of this balance by throwing her weight now in this scale and now in that, but ever on the side opposed to the political dictatorship of the strongest single State or group at a given time.
Memorandum by Sir Eyre Crowe on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany, f fonuary 1907 (vlotti and Kauppl 1993: SO).
Whether it is the contrived balance of the Concert of Europe in the early nineteenth century, or the more fortuitous balance of the cold war, balances of power are broken—either through war or peaceful change—and new balances emerge. What the perennial collapsing of the balance of power demonstrates is that states are at best able to mitigate the worst consequences of the security dilemma but are not able to escape it. The reason for this terminal condition is the absence of trust In international relations.
Historically realists have illustrated the lack of trust among states by reference to the parable of the 'stag hunt'. In Man, the State and War, Kenneth Waltz revisits Rousseau's parable:
Assume that five men who have acquired a rudimentary ability to speak and to understand each other happen to come together at a time when all of them suffer from hunger. The hunger of each will be satisfied by the fifth part of a stag, so they 'agree' to co-operate in a project to trap one. But also the hunger of any one of them will be satisfied by a hare, so,
as a hare comes within reach, one of them grabs It. The defector obtains the means of satisfying his hunger but in doing so permits the stag to escape. His immediate interest prevails over consideration for his fellows. (1959:167-8)
Waltz argues that the metaphor of the stag hunt provides not only a justification for the establishment of government, but a basis for understanding the problem of co-ordinating the interests of the individual versus the interests of the common good, and the pay-off between short-term interests and long-term interests. In the self-help system of international politics, the logic of self-interest mitigates against the provision of collective goods such as 'security' or 'free trade'. In the case of the latter, according to the theory of comparative advantage, all states would be wealthier in a world that allowed freedom of goods and services across borders. But individual states, or groups of states like the European Union, can increase their wealth by pursuing protectionist policies providing other states do not respond in kind. Of course the logical outcome is for the remaining states to become protectionist, international trade collapses, and a world recession reduces the wealth of each state.
The contemporary liberal solution to this problem of collective action In self-help systems Is through the construction of regimes (see Ch. 14). In other words, by establishing patterns of rules, norms and procedures, such as those embodied in the World Trade Organization (WTO), states are likely to be more confident that other states will comply with the rules and that defectors will be punished. Contemporary structural realists agree with liberals that regimes can facilitate co-operation under certain circumstances, although realists believe that in a self-help system co-operation is 'harder to achieve, more difficult to maintain, and more dependent on state power' (Grieco, in Baldwin 1993: 302). One reason for this is that structural realists argue that states are more concerned about relative than absolute gains. Thus the question is not whether all will be better off through co-operation, but rather who will likely gain more than another. It is because of this concern with relative gains issues that realists argue that cooperation is difficult to achieve in a self-help system (see Ch. 9).
A more thoroughgoing challenge to the way in which realists have set up the problem of collective
action in a self-help system comes from construc-tlvsm (see Ch. 11).' Although this Is a complex argument, the key move in the critique is to argue that anarchy need not imply a self-help system. Historically, anarchy has accommodated varieties of inter-state practices. In the eighteenth century, philosophers and lawyers portrayed the European states-system as a commonwealth, a family of nations, with common laws and customs. In the twentieth century, the decentralized international system has witnessed a diverse pattern of interactions, from a literal state of war to brief periods of collective security to examples of regional integration. Only the first of these three conditions could be described in terms of self-help. As Alexander Wendt puts it; 'Self-help presupposes self-interest; it does not explain it. Anarchy is what states make of it' (1994: 388).
Key points
• Statism is the centrepiece of Realism. This Involves two claims. First, for the theorist, the state is the pre-eminent actor and all other actors in world politics are of lesser significance. Second, state 'sovereignty' signifies the existence of an independent political community, one which has juridical authority over Its territory.
• Key criticism: Statism is flawed both on empirical (challenges to state power from 'above' and 'below') and normative grounds (the inability of sovereign states to respond to collective global
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problems such as famine, environmental degradation, and human rights abuses). Survival: The primary objective of all states is survival; this is the supreme national interest to which all political leaders must adhere. All other goals such as economic prosperity are secondary (or 'low polities'). In order to preserve the security of their state, leaders must adopt an ethical code which judges actions according to the outcome rather than in terms of a judgement about whether the individual act Is right or wrong. If there are any moral universals for political realists, these can only be concretized in particular communities.
► Key criticism: Are there no limits to what actions a state can take in the name of necessity?
» Self-help: No other state can be relied upon to guarantee your survival. In international politics, the structure of the system does not permit friendship, trust, and honour; only a perennial condition of uncertainty generated by the absence of a global government. Coexistence is achieved through the maintenance of the balance of power, and limited co-operation is possible in interactions where the realist state stands to gain more than other states.
• Key criticism: Self-help is not an inevitable consequence of the absence of a world government; self-help is the game which states have chosen to play. Moreover, there are historical and contemporary examples where states have preferred collective security systems, or forms of regional integration, in preference to self-help.
Conclusion: Realism and the globalization of world politics
The chapter opened by considering the often repeated realist claim that the pattern of international politics—wars interrupted for periods characterized by the preparation for future wars—have remained constant over the preceding twenty-five centuries. Realists have consistently held that the continuities
in international relations are more important than the changes, but many find this to be problematic in the present age of globalization. In the concluding paragraphs below, we will briefly evaluate whether Realism can speak to our world, or has become, as its critics suggest, an anachronistic theory.
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Box 7.3 What the critics say
R. Ashley*. Structural realists portray the structure of the International system as though there Is only one structure (that of power) and Its existence is independent of states (rather than constructed by them). For this reason, contemporary structural realism is a static, conservative theory (7 984).
C. Beitz: The analogy between individuals In a state of nature and states in international anarchy is misplaced for four reasons. States are not the only actors; the power of states is massively unequal; states are not Independent of each other; patterns of co-operation exist (even if motivated by self-interest) despite the absence of a global government capable of enforcing rule (1979).
K. Booth : Realism cannot speak to our world. Survival for the majority of individuals in global politics is threatened not by armies of 'foreign' states but more often by their own governments, or more broadly, structures of global capitalism which produce and reproduce the daily round of 'human wrongs' such as malnutrition, death from preventable diseases, slavery, prostitution, and exploitation (1995b).
C. Brown: The strongest argument against Realism's moral scepticism is that states employ a moral language of rights and duties In their relations with each other (1992). J. Burton: Interactions of states is only one of many levels of Interaction In world society. Rather than an image of states as billiard balls impacting on each other at random, Burton argues we should think about International relations as a 'cobweb model' of interactions and linkages between multiple actors (firms, individuals, groups, etc.) (1990).
R. Cox: Realism is problem-solving theory. It accepts the prevailing order, and seeks only to isolate aspects of the system in order to understand how it works. The Idea of theory serving an emancipatory purpose—i.e. contemplating alternative world orders—is not in the structural realist's vocabulary (1986).
F. Halliday: The realist conception of the state In international politics (where states are equal, they are in control of their territory, they coincide with nations, and represent their peoples) is very unrealistic. A more adequate interpretation of the state is provided by sociology, which makes an analytical distinction between the state and society, the state and government, and the state and nation (1994).
M. Hollis and S. Smith: Realism assumes that the methods of the natural sciences can be employed to explain the social world (of which International relations Is
part). Realism can therefore be equated with a form of positivism which seeks to uncover causal laws that can both explain and predict the occurrence of events in world politics (1990).
F. Kbatochwil: Contrary to the expectations of contemporary structural realism, the end of the cold war was not brought about by any radical shift in the distribution of power in the international system, and moreover, this shift occurred without a major war (1993).
A, Linklater: We must go beyond the structural realist emphasis upon constraints, and the liberal realist predilection for order, in order to develop an emancipatory form of theory which seeks to deepen the sense of solidarity, and widen the bonds of community In global politics (1990b).
V. Spike Peterson: The realist emphasis upon national security Is contradictory for women, since It masks over 'women's systemic insecurity'. Taking feminism seriously requires a radical rethink of the way In which security is framed by a form of sovereignty which legitimizes violence against women and gendered divisions of resources and identities (1992).
j. Rosenberg: Realism is a conservative ideology. Fundamental to this conservatism Is the autonomy realists accord to the international realm. The borders and landscapes of this environment are set and policed by the twin concepts of sovereignty and anarch/ (1994: 30).
M.J. Smith: Despite the argument that values should not impact objective policy formulation. Realism too often appears as nothing more than the (traditional) values and beliefs of the author in question, leaving the suspicion that it is conservative intultionlsm masquerading as an international political theory (1986).
C. Sylvester: From Machiavelll to the early twenty-first century, the qualities 'men' have ascribed to 'women'— such as irrationality. Intuition, temptation—have been regarded as a danger to International affairs. For this reason, historical realists argue that statecraft should remain 'mancraft'(1994).
j. Vasquez: A statistical analysis of International Relations literature In the 1950s and 1960s underscores the dominance of the realist paradigm in terms of the overwhelming reliance on the core assumptions of Realism. However, although Realism dominated the field, it did not adequately explain international politics from a social science perspective. For example, of 7,044 realist hypotheses tested in the field, only 15 7 of these fail to be falsified (1998:149).
It has often been argued that the end of the cold war dealt a fatal blow for Realism. Despite its supporters' faith in the capacity of Realism to predict changes in the international system, most contemporary structural realists predicted the continuity of a stable bipolar (or two superpowers) system well into the twenty-first century (Waltz 1979: 210). It would therefore appear that the peaceful conclusion of the cold war, which represents one of the most significant changes in the contemporary international system, raises some serious problems for Realism. Critics of structural realism were right in objecting to its inability to theorize changes in the international system, and some questioned whether the reign of Realism might not be coming to an end. (Although, in fairness to Realism, none of the other paradigms of international politics managed to predict the disintegration of the cold war system with the clarity of many Central and East European intellectuals and dissidents.) Yet various realists have provided explanations to account for the end of the cold war and do not find the events that culminated in the collapse of the Soviet Union to represent a major anomaly for realism, see Case Study 2 (Box 7.4).
Moreover, the understandable idealism which greeted the end of the Soviet empire has become more muted in the last few years as the world has witnessed some of the most horrific conflicts of the twentieth century. In the former Yugoslavia we have seen war crimes committed by all of the protagonists, crimes that Europe thought had been banished by the defeat of Nazism. Whilst it would be too strong to claim that the Balkan war was a realist war (because of the multiplicity of complex causes) its origins in the fear engendered by the collapse of the Yugoslav state allied to the contagion of a form of nationalism defined by the fiction of a pure ethnic identity, bear a resemblance to an atavistic realism of blood and belonging. War in Africa, rising tensions between India and Pakistan, conflict in the Middle East, and concern about the Intentions of China continue to corifirrn the relevance of Realism. There seems little doubt that realist ideas will be drawn upon in the future by state leaders who believe the use of force is the only instrument left to insure their survival.
This Is not to suggest that Realism is only useful as
Box 7.4 Case study 2: After the cold war—Realism's eternal return?
• Leading non-realist theorists have argued that the end of the cold war represents a failure for Realism in general, and neo- or structural realism in particular. Why? First, Waltz's 1979 book Theory of International Politics aligns structural realism with positivism, and the objective of all positivist theories is to predict. Despite this clear scientific objective, most realists were unwilling to specify when and how the international system was going to change although Waltz believed it was likely to last well into the twenty-first century. This in itself suggests that Realism is a conservative theory, privileging an explanation of continuity over theorizing alternative future orders.
• While realists could claim that all branches of IR theory were caught out by the collapse of bipolarity at the end of the 1980s, there is a second and more weighty criticism of Realism and that concerns its failure to explain the end of the cold war. The most common realist reply is to argue that a state in decline will try to reverse this process by curtailing its external commitments. In other words, the Soviet Union retreated, and in this sense, was defeated. The problem here is that, when they did make general predictions, contemporary realists expected the opposite.
• Again, we find that Realism lends itself to any number of possible consequences. Realism can lend itself to an expansionist foreign policy or to appeasement; to a retreat from empire or to expanding the frontier for security reasons. The ambiguity of this point is pot very succinctly by John Vazquez (in his excellent critique of neo-realism and the end of the cold war): The great virtue of realism is that It can explain almost any foreign policy event. Its great defect is that it tends to do this after the fact, rather than before' (Vazquez, 1998: 324).
a guide to understanding the origins and settlement of wars. It will continue to serve as a critical weapon for revealing the interplay of national interests beneath the rhetoric of universalist sentiments. There is no more powerful example of this than Realism's potential to deconstruct a Marxist or a Liberal progressivist view of history which sees the gradual triumphing of European ideas and values
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Box 7.5 Key concepts in realist thought
anarchy Does not imply chaos, but the absence
of political authority, anarchic The 'ordering principle' of international
system politics, and that which defines its
structure.
balance of      Refers to an equilibrium between states;
power historical realists regard it as the product
of diplomacy (contrived balance) whereas structural realists regard the system as having a tendency towards a natural equilibrium (fortuitous balance).
capabilities Population and size of territory, resources, economic strength, military capability, and competence (Waltz 1979:131)
dual moral The idea that there are two principles or standards       standards of right and wrong: one for
the individual citizen and different one
for the state.
ethic of re- For historical realists, an ethic of spomibility responsibility Is the limits of ethics in international politics; it involves the weighing up of consequences and the realization that positive outcomes may result from amoral actions.
idealism Holds that ideas have important causal effect on events in international politics, and that ideas can change. Referred to by realists as utoplanism since it underestimates the logic of power politics and the constraints this imposes upon political action.
inter- A condition where the actions of one
dependence state impact upon other states (can be strategic interdependence or economic). Realists equate interdependence with vulnerability, hegemony The influence a great power is able to establish on other states in the system; extent of influence ranges from leadership to dominance.
hegemonic     A realist based explanation for co-stability operation that argues that a dominant theory state is required to ensure a liberal, free-trade international political economy.
Inter- A set of Interrelated parts connected to
national form a whole. Systems have defining
system principles   such   as   hierarchy (in
domestic politics and anarchy (in international politics), national Invoked by realists and state leaders to
Interest signify that which is most important to
the state—survival being at the top of the list.
power The ability to control outcomes e.g.
state A is able to get state B to act in a way which maximizes the Interests of A.
self-help In an anarchical environment, states
cannot assume other states will come to their defence even if they are allies.
sovereignty The state has supreme authority domestically and Independence internationally
state A legal territorial entity composed of a
stable population and a government; It possesses a monopoly over the legitimate use of force; its sovereignty is recognized by other states in the international system.
statlsm The ideology which supports the
organization of humankind into particular communities; the values and beliefs of that community are protected and sustained by the state.
state of war The conditions (often described by classical realists) where there is no actual conflict, but a permanent cold war that could become a 'hot' war at any time.
structure In the philosophy of the social sciences a structure is something which exists independently of the actor (e.g. social class) but Is an Important determinant in the nature of the action (e.g. revolution). For contemporary structural realists, the number of great powers in the international system constitutes the structure.
survival The first priority for state leaders,
emphasized by historical realists such as Machiavelli, Meinecke, and Weber.
throughout the world. A realist has no problem understanding aspects of the globalization of world politics—indeed structural realists could claim to have theorized more completely the nature of the international system than any other paradigm on offer. What is interesting about a realist theory of globalization is the acceptance of the militarization of the international system, and the patterns of political control and domination which extend beyond borders (such as hegemonic control or spheres of Influence), but a concomitant rejection of the idea that globalization is accompanied by a deepening sense of community. From Rousseau to Waltz, realists have argued that interdependence brought about through intimate contact with modernity is as likely to breed 'mutual vulnerability' as peace and prosperity. And while questioning the extent to which the world has become 'interdependent', realists Insist that the state is not going to be eclipsed by global forces operating either below or above the nation-state.
There are good reasons for thinking that the twenty-first century will be a realist century. The Western sense of immortality, fuelled by the Enlightenment discoveries of reason and democracy, was dealt a fatal blow by the Holocaust. Despite the
efforts of federalists to rekindle the idealist flame, Europe continues to be divided by interests and not united by a common good. Outside of Europe and North America, many of the assumptions which underpinned the post-war international order, particularly those associated with human rights, are increasingly being seen as nothing more than a Western idea backed by economic dollars and military 'divisions'. As the axis of world politics shifts to the Asia-Pacific region, this model of democratic individualism which the liberal West has tried to export to the rest of the world is being revealed as culturally contingent and economically retarded. This comes as no surprise to realists who understand that words are weapons and that internationalist ideas are the continuation of statism by other means. Here we find an alliance between Realism and many non-Western states' leaders who recognize that values are shared within particular communities and not between them, that knowledge is contingent and not grounded in universal reason, that global cultures are fragmented and contested. Rather than transforming global politics in its own image, as liberalism has sought to do in this century, the West may need to become more realist in order to survive the next,
QUESTIONS
1 How does the Melian dialogue represent key concepts such as self-interest, the balance of power, alliances, capabilities, empires and justice?
2 Do you think there is one Real/sm, or many?
3 Do you know more about international relations than an Athenian student during The Peloponnesian War?
4 Is the practice of international politics realist? How does Realism inform state practice? Through what channels or processes does it shape foreign policy?
5 Do realists confuse a description of war and conflict, for an explanation of why it occurs?
6 How can the security dilemma be escaped or mitigated?
7 Is Realism any more than the ideology of powerful, satisfied states?
8 How far do the critics of Realism overlook the extent to which the theory is grounded in an ethical defence of the state?
9 How would realists try to explain the continuing instability in the Balkans? Do you find their arguments convincing?
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REALISM 16
10 Will the West have to learn to be more realist, and not less, if Its civilization is to survive in the twenty-first century?
GUIDE TO FURTHER READING
The most comprehensive book on twentieth-century Realism is Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986). For an effective single chapter survey, particularly on structural realism, see Martin Hollls and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), chapter 5. The Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globallsm (New York: Macmillan, 1993) textbook has an extensive treatment of Realism in chapter 2, including important excerpts from the classical precursors.
The best single work on historical realism is N.Machiavelll, The Prince, ed. Q. Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). E. H. Can, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1946) Is a hugely important and thought-provoking work which brings historical Realism Into the twentieth century, see especially chapters S and 6. The bible for liberal realism is Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977). Structural realism I, with its emphasis upon laws of human nature, is exemplified in Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1978), chapter 1. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesiey, 1979) Is the exemplar for structural Realism II, see in particular, chapters 1 and 6. Alongside this work, the student should consult Robert Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). This collection of essays includes key chapters by Waltz, an interesting defence of Realism by Robert Gilpin, and powerful critiques by Richard Ashley, Robert Cox, and J. G. Ruggie. A more recent collection which takes the debate further is David A. Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberal-ism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For the more penetrating constructlvist challenge to Realism, see A. Wendt in International Organization, 46:2 (1992), 395-421; and American Political Science Review, 88:2 (1994), 384-96.
NOTES
1. Realism, reoIpoHb'lc, and rofaon d'itat are broadly interchangeable. In this chapter, Realism with an upper case 'R' will be used to signify the general tradition. When discussing particular realists, or types of realism (such as historical realism), lower case V will be used.
2. A number of critical histories of the field of International Relations have recently challenged I: the notion that the inter-war period was essentially 'idealist' in character. Both Peter Wilson (1998) and Brian C. Schmidt (1998) argue that it is simply a myth that an Idealist paradigm dominated the study of international relations during the interwar period of the field's history. ,
3. The other 'critical' distinction is made by Richard Ashley who contrasts the 'practical realism' of Machiavelli and Carr with the 'technical realism' of Gilpin and Waltz (1981:221). |
4. What we have termed 'structural realism II' is often referred to in the literature as Neo- »: Realism. Robert Keohane argues that Neo-Realism differs from earlier forms of Realism 'in «1 that it does not rest on the presumed iniquity of the human race' (1989k 40). Although ■§ Keohane is right to note the shift In causation from human nature to anarchy, he is wrong to 9B believe that this is anything other than a change from one kind of structure to another Wt (hence the use in the chapter of 'structural realism I' and 'II'). ;H
5. The extent to which British liberal realism, found in the work of Martin Wight and Hedley Bull constitues a break from Realism, is a matter of some debate in the literature. For contrasting answers, compare Booth (1995b) and Dunne (1998). This is not to suggest thai the category liberal realism does not also apply to certain American thinkers, notably Herz (1981).
6. There are a number of similar versions of this idea of a 'shared core' to Realism in the literature. Keohane distils the core into: state as actor, state as rational, state as power maximizer (Keohane 1989b: 39) and (Gilpin 1986: 304-5) are two examples among many.
7. M.J. Smith, 23. Weber is rightly regarded by Smith as the theorist who has shaped twentieth century realist thought, principally because of his fusion of politics with power.
8. It is important to note that not all conflict results from the security dilemma (since both parties have benign intent); historically, more conflicts have been caused through predatoi states.
9. Alex Wendt defines constructivism in the following terms: 'Constructivism is a structural theory of the international system which makes the following core claims (1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenousty to the system by human nature or domestic politics' (1994: 385).