The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders
and Decision-Making
Alexander L. George
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Jun., 1969), pp. 190-222.
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REVIEWS AND OTHER DISCUSSION 

The rrOfierationalCode": A .Neglected 

Afifiroach to the Study of Political 

Leaders and Decision-Making* 

ALEXANDERL. GEORGE
STANFORD UNIVERSITY
In the past two decades the field of international relations studies
has become increasingly diversified and is now marked by
sharp differences over questions of scope, method, and theory. This
heterogeneity, however, should not be allowed to obscure broad
agreement on some fundamental propositions of overriding importance.
One of these is the feeling shared by traditionalists and
scientifically-oriented investigators alike, and by many academic
scholars as well as sophisticated policymakers, that the way in
which the leaders of nation-states view each other and the nature
of world political conflict is of fundamental importance in determining
what happens in relations among states.
Reflecting the perspective of the policymaker, for example,
Louis Halle, a former State Department planner, writes that the
" This article is a slightly modified version of a publication with the same
title issued by The RAND Corporation as RM-5427 in August, 1967. The author
wishes to express appreciation for permission to reprint.
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
foreign policy of a nation addresses itself not to the external world,
as is commonly stated, but rather to "the image of the external
world" that is in the minds of those who make foreign policy. Halle
concludes his book on American foreign policy with a sober warning:
"In the degree that the image is false, actually and philosophically
false, no technicians, however proficient, can make the
policy that is based on it sound."l Essentially the same point has
emerged from the work of many scientifically-oriented scholars
who, influenced by psychological theories of cognition, have been
struck by the role that the subjective perceptions and beliefs of
leaders play in their decision-making in conflict situations.
Convergence on this fundamental point provides an opportunity,
therefore, for establishing a more fruitful dialogue among academic
scholars of various persuasions and policy-oriented researchers. To
call attention to this opportunity and to help structure some of the
central research questions, I decided a few years ago to reexamine
an older study that had pioneered in the analysis of elite belief
systems. I refer to Nathan Leites' concept of "operational code."
It must be said immediately that this term is a misnomer insofar
as it implies, incorrectly, a set of recipes or repertoires for political
action that an elite applies mechanically in its decision-making.
A closer examination of what Leites had in mind indicates
that he was referring to a set of general beliefs about fundamental
issues of history and central questions of politics as these bear,
in turn, on the problem of action. The actor's beliefs and premises
that Leites singled out have a relationship to decision-making that
is looser and more subtle than the term "operational code" implies.
They serve, as it were, as a prism that influences the actor's perceptions
and diagnoses of the flow of political events, his definitions
and estimates of particular situations. These beliefs also provide
norms, standards, and guidelines that influence the actor's
choice of strategy and tactics, his structuring and weighing of alternative
courses of action. Such a belief system influences, but does
not unilaterally determine, decision-making; it is an important,
but not the only, variable that shapes decision-making behavior.
With this caveat in mind, let me recall briefly the origins, nature,
and impact of Leites' study before proceeding to indicate how his
1 American Foreign Policy, (London: G. Allen, 1960) pp. 316, 318.
approach can be codified into a more explicit and usable research
model.
I. Backgrotcnd
It is now over fifteen years since Nathan Leites published A
Study of B o b h e v i ~ m , ~which broke important ground in the netvly
emerging behavioral approach to the study of ~oliticalelites.
During and after World War I1 many students of world politics
turned their attention to the ways in which different elites
approached problems of international conflict and cooperation.
They posed questions for research that could not be satisfactorily
answered by traditional approaches, such as systematic biographical
analysis of a ruling group according to the social origins, education,
training, and other background characteristics of its members.
Biographical profiles of this kind often suggested factors that helped
account for the emergence and forinatioil of leadership groups,
but they did not illuminate adequately the political orientations,
styles of calculation, and behavior of the ruling groups in que~tion.~
Leites' book was by no means universally acclaimed. But there
were those who welcomed it not merely for its insights into Bolshevik
mentality; some thought it introduced a new genre of elite
study that might fill some of the needs for a behavioral approach
to studies of political leadership.
Thus the eminent anthropologist, Clyde Kluckhohn, praised A
Stzcdy of Bolshevism as being "a work of gigantic stature that is
likely to faire e'cole in politics and the other behavioral sciences
for many years to ~orne."~This expectation has not materialized.
A Stt~dyof Bolshevism inspired few efforts at similar research
on other leadership groups.5
2 (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953), hereafter cited as Stud?/.
3 For a useful critique of the systematic multi-biographical study of elite
groups, see Morris Janowitz, "The Systematic Aspects of Political Biography,"
World Politics 6 (April 1954).A comprehensive critical appraisal of elite theories
and related empirical researches is provided in Dankwart A. Rustow, "The
Study of Elites," World Politics 18 (July 1966).
4 In his review article, "Politics, History, and Psychology," World Politics, 8
(October 1955),p. 117.
5 An early attempt was made by Theodore Chen to apply the "operational
code" approach to Comnlunist Chinese leaders. More recently, in December
1966, Robert North organized a conference of Chinese area specialists at
Stanford University to consider again the utility and feasibility of doing a study
INTERsATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
Among the reasons for this, I believe, is the unusually complex
nature of Leites' work, which is not one but several interrelated
studies that are subtly interwoven. While the complexity of the
work adds to its richness and intellectual appeal, it has also made
it unusually difficult for readers to grasp its structure or to describe
its research mode.6
I wish to call particular attention in this paper to that portion of
A Stzccly of Bolshevism known as the "operational code." Leites
employed this phrase to refer to the precepts or maxims of political
tactics and strategy that characterized the classical Bolshevik
approach to politics. Leites initially published this portion of his
larger treatise separately, and in abbreviated form, as The Operational
Code of the Politb~ro.~Two years later his more detailed
statement of the "operational code" appeared in the full-scale A
Study of Bolshevism (1953),but now several new dimensions were
added and interwoven with it. Hence, the "operational code"
became embedded in a much more ambitious socio-psychological
account of the historical origins and meanings of Bolshevism. The
reader was provided not only with the "operational code" but, as
Daniel Bell noted, also with a special kind of history of the changing
moral temper of an important element of the radical reformminded
Russian intelligentsia. A third component of the study, in
some ways the most ambitious, was Leites' delineation of the "Bolshevik
character" which, he suggested, constituted in some respects
a distinct type in social history in the sense that any individual is
unique though resembling others in important respects.*
of the Chinese Comlnunist operational code. Other studies pursue similar research
objectives, though not modeled on the operational code: See, for
example, Davis B. Bobrow, "The Chinese Communist Conflict System," Orbis,
9, (Winter 1966); Howard L. Boorman and Scott A. Boorman, "Strategy
and National Psychology in China," The Annals, 370 (March 1967); Tang
Tsou and Morton H. Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy
and Peking's International Behavior," American Political Science Review, 59
( March 1965).
6 A helpful effort to identify the several conlponents of A Study of Bolshevism
is provided by Daniel Bell, "Bolshevik Man, His Motivations: A
Psychoanalytic Key to Communist Behavior," Commentary, 19 (1955), pp.
179-87; much of this essay was reproduced in the same author's "Ten Theories
in Search of Reality: The Prediction of Soviet Behavior in the Social Sciences,"
World Politics, 10 (April 1958).
7 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951).
8 In this connection see, for example, Michael Walzer's study of the origins
Hence A Study of Bolshevism emerges as far more than a
list of maxims of political strategy. Rather, the "operational code"
blends and merges at many points with the discussion of "Bolshevik
character." The maxims of political strategy that comprise the
"operational code" take on the character of rules of conduct held
out for good Bolsheviks and norms of behavior that, ideally, are
internalized by the individual who thereby acquires a new and
different character structure-that of the reliable, "hard-core" Bolshevik.
In the terminology of modern ego psycho!ogy, the individual
who succeeds in internalizing this preferred character structure
thereby accomplishes an "identity transformation."
Leites dealt briefly, and necessarily speculatively, with the
origins of the "Bolshevik character." He saw it as being, in part, a
readion to those qualities of the reform-minded Russian intelligentsia
of the nineteenth century that had, in Lenin's judgment, proven
to be quite unsuitable for the task of making a successful revolu-
tion.
In dealing with the origins of the Bolshevik character and, in
particular, with its "reactive" aspects, Leites employed a method
that drew in part, but only in part, on psychoanalytic theory. This
has further complicated the task of understanding the research
model on which his complex study is based. Since the question is
germane to the task of "disentangling" the operational code portion
of the work, some clarification of the role psychoanalytic theory
played in Leites' study is necessary before proceeding.
It is true that Leites felt that the full significance of important
elements of the emergent Bolshevik character could be better
understood by regarding them as "reaction formations" (and other
ego defense mechanisms) to powerful unconscious wishes that had
helped to shape the older character structure of Russian reformminded
intellectual^.^ But, according to Leites, the Bolshevik charof
modern radical politics in the sixteenth century and his effort to construct
a general model of radical politics that encompasses Bolshevism as well as
Puritanism. The Revolution of Saints (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1965).
9 The psychoanalytic hypotheses employed by Leites were touched upon
at various points in A Stzcdy of Bolshevism and discussed more fully in his
article, "Panic and Defenses Against Panic in the Bolshevik View of Politics,"
in Psychoanolt/sis and the Social Sciences, Vol. 4, (New York: International
Universities Press, 1955), pp. 135-44.
INTERSATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
acter also represented a conscious effort by Lenin and his associates
to reverse certain traditional aspects of Russian character.
Leites therefore employed psychoanalytic theory to illuminate the
unconscious significance of Bolshevik beliefs; but he noted explicitly
that his "delineation of the preconscious and conscious content"
of Bolshevik doctrine and the operational code did not require the
reader either to accept the theory of psychoanalysis or to agree
with the particular use Leites made of it in his admittedly speculative
attempt to illuminate the possible unconscious significance
of some of these Bolshevik beliefs.1°
What emerges from this is that the set of beliefs about politics
associated with the concept, "operational code," can be investigated
without reference to psychoanalytic hypotheses. These beliefs,
implicitly or explicitly held by the political actor, can be inferred
or postulated by the investigator on the basis of the kinds of data,
observational opportunities, and methods generally available to political
scientists. In this respect, the "operational code" approach
does not differ from research efforts to identify many other beliefs,
opinions, and attitudes of political actors. Leites' use of psychoanalytic
theory, therefore, offers no impediment to "factoring out" the
operational code part of his study.
At the same time, it is one of the attractive features of the
operational code construct for behaviorally-inclined political scientists
that it can serve as a useful "bridge" or "link" to psychodynamic
interpretations of unconscious dimensions of belief systems
and their role in behavior under different conditions.ll Thus, once
an actor's approach to political calculation has been formulated by
10 Stzccly p. 22. Daniel Bell, op. cit., also called attention to the fact that
Leites regards Bolshevik character as both a conscious and unconscious reaction
to features of the earlier pre-Bolshevik character.
11 I have suggested elsewhere ("Power As A Compensatory Value for
Political Leaders," Jozcrnal of Social Issues, 24 (July 1988))that political scientists
interested in applying personality theories to the study of political leaders
need to build a number of conceptual "bridges" that reflect the problems,
theoretical interests, and available data of their discipline in order to make
more effective use of personality theories rooted in psychoanalysis. The "operational
code" construct is one such "bridge." The belief system about politics
is part of the cognitive and affective portion of the ego structure of personality;
as such it serves an adaptive function for coping with reality. But at the same
time the emergence of a belief system may be affected by developmental
problems encountered in personality formation; if so. beliefs may then also
serve ego defensive functions vis-d-vis unconscious wishes and anxieties.
the researcher, he can proceed-if he so wishes and is able to do
so-to relate some of the beliefs in question to other motivational
variables of a psychodynamic character. With the belief system
of the political actor in hand, the investigator can move more
easily than would otherwise be possible into the sphere of unconscious
motives and defenses against them that affect the strength
and operation of these beliefs in the actor's political behavior in
different circumstances, and to an assessment of the extent to which
these beliefs are subject to reality-tests of various kinds. An elite's
fundamental beliefs about politics are probably resistant to change
for various reasons, of which unconscious motivations are but one
factor.12
Another shortcoming of the Study should be mentioned. Leites
did not structure and synthesize the various beliefs, rules, and
maxims about politics associated with his concept of "operational
code." The relationship of the different elements of the Bolshevik
view of politics to each other and to the problem of making specific
choices of action remained somewhat obscure.13That is, he did not
clarify sufficiently the order, hierarchy, and interrelationships
among the various elements of the "code." I will attempt to redress
this by reinterpreting various components of the so-called code
and restructuring it into a more tightly knit set of beliefs about
fundamental issues and questions associated with the classical problem
of political action. To repeat, it is in this sense-as a set of
premises and beliefs about politics and not as a set of rules and
12 In this connection, Leites argued that the fact that beliefs comprising
the operational code appeared to be held with unusual stubbornness, exaggeration,
and intensity raised the presumption that adherence to them was
reinforced by defenses against strong unconscious wishes or fears and, hence,
that they were relatively impervious to many kinds of rational tests. (We
shall return to this point below, p. 216).
13 This point was well made recently by John Weakland in a perceptive
and balanced appraisal of A Study of Bolshezjism. Weakland notes that Leites'
work is "remarkably simple in overall organization, and for a work aiming to
present a code, it gives little attention to synthesis and systematization. . . .
We are presented with a list of themes, but these parts of the code are not
interrelated. . . . And there is even less attention given to questions of more
complex structure, such as possible relationships between themes or principles
of different levels. . . ." John H. Weakland, "Investigating the Operational
Code of the Chinese Communist Leadership," an unpublished paper written
for the Politburo Feasibility Study Conference, Stanford University, 16-18
December 1966.
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
recipes to be applied mechanically to the choice of action-that
the "operational code" construct is properly understood.
11. The "'Operational Code" and Cognitiue Limits on Rational Deci-
sion-making
A political leader's beliefs about the nature of politics and
political conflict, his views regarding the extent to which historical
developments can be shaped, and his notions of correct strategy
and tactics-whether these beliefs be referred to as "operational
code," "Weltanschauung," "cognitive map," or an "elite's political
culture"-are among the factors influencing that actor's decisions.
The "operational code" is a particularly significant portion of the
actor's entire set of beliefs about political life.14 Not all the beliefs
and attitudes that influence a political actor's behavior, then, will
be considered here. A comprehensive model of decision-making
behavior, for example, would also consider the actor's ethical and
normative beliefs.15
It is widely recognized that there are important cognitive limits
on the possibility of rational decision-making in politics as in other
sectors of life.16 In contrast to models of "pure7' rationality in statistical
decision theory and formal economics, efforts at rational
decision-making in political life are subject to constraints of the
following kind: (1) The political actor's information about situations
with which he must deal is usually incomplete; (2) his knowl-
14 For a more general discussion of olitical belief s stems, see Lucian
W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), PoliticafCulture and Pogtical Development
(Princeton, N .J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), particularly the "Introduction"
by L. Pye and "Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture" by
S. 	Verba.
1; These were considered by Leites in Stucly especially pp. 99-144.
16 In recent ears a number of social scientists have attempted to draw
upon the field o r cognitive psychology in order to elaborate better decisionmaking
models for studies of world politics. While cognitive theory is relevant
and suggestive, it does not lend itself readily to the task. Considerable adaption
and development is needed. In particular, investigators will have to
articulate the substantive beliefs and co nitive problems that are relevant in
decision-making in political settings, a n f they will also have to define more
specifically the special contexts in which these political beliefs originate,
operate in decision-making, and change. For a useful discussion and statement
of a still quite general model, see Richard A. Brody, "Cognition and Behavior:
A Model of International Relations," in 0. G. Harvey (ed.), Experience,
Structure, and Adaptability (New York: Springer, 1966).
VOLUhIE 13, NUMBER 2, JUNE 1969
edge of ends-means relatioi~shipsis generally inadequate to predict
reliably the consequences of choosing one or another course
of action; and (3) it is often difficult for him to formulate a single
criterion by means of which to choose which alternative course of
action is "best."17
Political actors have to adapt to and try to cope with these
cognitive limits or "boundaries" to rational decision-making. There
are, no doubt, a variety of ways in which different political leaders
deal with this problem in similar or different political settings. This
is, indeed, an aspect of comparative political research that has
received little systematic attention.18 Row do political leaders in
varying political cultures and institutional structures approach the
task of making calcnlations, of deciding what objectives to select,
and how to deal with uncertainty and risk-that is, more generally,
how to relate means and ends, etc. ? What styles of political calculation
and strategies are developed for this purpose by different
leaders? This has to do, of course, with the familiar problem of
the relation of knowledge to action on which many observers and
practitioners of politics have reflected. What is proposed here is
that this classical problem be conceptualized more rigorously and
studied more systematically than in the past.lQ
17 For useful discussions of these cognitive limits and some of their implications
in the arena of political decision-making, see James G. March and
Herbert A. Simon, Ovganizations (New York: Tohn Wilev. 1958); and Charles
E. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through,' " Public Administration
Quarterly, 29 (Spring 1959), pp. 79-88. Lindblom's views have been
elaborated in subsequent publications.
18 For interesting developments in this direction, however, see Albert
Hirschman's effort to identify some characteristic features of the problemsolving
and decision-making styles of Latin American reform leaders, in his
Jotcrneys Toward Progress (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963); and
the research by Wendell Bell and Jaines Mau on "images of the future" as
a key variable in social change in developing countries.
19 For insightful essays on some of these questions see, for example, David
S. McLelland, "The Role of Political Style: A Study of Dean Acheson," in
Roger Hilsman and Robert C. Good (eds.), Foreign Policy in the Sixties
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965); Peter Gourevitch, "Political
Skill: A Case Study," in John D. Montgomery and Arthur Smithies (eds.),
Public Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Prers, 1965), especially
pp. 266-68; Erwin C. Hargrove, Presidential ~ e a d e v s h i ~ :Personality and Political
Style (New York: Macmillan, 1966).
Michael Brecher, "Elite Images and Foreign PoIicy Choices: Krishna Menon's
View of the World," Pacific Affairs, 40 (Spring and Summer, 1967). Systematic
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
The issues and questions referred to in the preceding paragraph
comprise one part of the "operational code" construct. We shall
refer to the "answers" given by a political actor to these questions
as his "instrumental beliefs," that is, his beliefs about ends-means
relationships in the context of political action.
There is another set of more general issues and questions that
are part of an operational code. These are what may be called
the political actor's beliefs, since they refer to assumptions
and premises he makes regarding the fundamental nature
of politics, the nature of political conflict, the role of the individual
in history, et~.~O
It is in terms of these two sets of beliefs-the specific contents
of which will be discussed shortly-that I have redefined and
restructured the concept of "operational code." What emerges is a
research construct for empirical work on decision-making that
focuses more clearly than did A Study of Bokhevism on the interrelated
set of beliefs about the nature of political conflict and an
effective approach to calculation of political strategy and tactics.
A Study of Bolshevism emphasized the "answers" that, in Leites'
judgment, the old Bolsheviks gave to these central questions
about politics and the relation of knowledge to action. However, he
did not explicitly state all the issues and questions themselves. This
I shall attempt to do here in order to facilitate similar studies of
other leaders and other leadership groups, and thereby lead to
systematic comparative studies.
There are, of course, difficult problems in employing knowledge
of a leader's "operational code," or belief system about politics,
for purposes of explaining or predicting his behavior in specific
instances.21The investigator's knowledge of the actor's general belief
research on presidential leadership styles is currently being undertaken by
Professor James David Barber, Department of Political Science, Yale University.
20 I have borrowed here and adapted the general distinction between
"epistemological" and "instrumental" beliefs made by 0. G. Brim, D. C. Glass,
D. E. Lavin, and N. Goodman, Personality and Decision Processes: Studies
in the Social Psychology of Thinking (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1962). In attempting to apply their useful distinction to the subject matter
of the "operational code" I have found it necessary to formulate differently
the specific issues and questions related to the problem of political action.
21 Leites himself did not overlook these problems or oversimplify the
task of utilizing the operational code, with its ambiguous and inconsistent
prescriptions, for explaining or predicting Soviet behavior. See Study pp. 16-18.
system can assist, but not substitute for, analysis of specific situations
and assessment of institutional and other pressures on the
political actor's decisions. Knowledge of the actor's approach to
calculating choice of action does not provide a simple key to explanation
and prediction; but it can help the researcher and the
policy planner to "bound the alternative ways in which the subject
may perceive different types of situations and approach the
task of making a rational assessment of alternative courses of action.
Knowledge of the actor's beliefs helps the investigator to clarify
the general criteria, requirements, and norms the subject attempts
to meet in assessing opportunities that arise to make desirable gains,
in estimating the costs and risks associated with them, and in
making utility calculations.
Whether it be from the standpoint of philosophy, history, psychology,
sociology, economics, or political science, students of
human behavior have long agreed that any individual must necessarily
simplify and structure the complexity of his world in order
to cope with it. In everyday life as in the laboratory, problemsolving
often requires deliberate or unwitting simplification of a
more complex reality. This applies also to the political actor, for
he too must somehow comprehend complex situations in order to
decide how best to deal with them.22In doing so, the actor typically
engages in a "definition of the situation," i.e., a cognitive structuring
of the situation that will clarify for him the nature of the problem,
relate it to his previous experience, and make it amenable
to appropriate problem-solving activities. The political actor perceives
and simplifies reality partly through the prism of his "cognitive
map" of politics. This includes the belief system that has been
referred to in the past as the "operational code" of a political actor.
We turn now to the content of an operational code. I have
identified a number of questions about politics that, together,
hopefully cover most of the central issues connected with the
problem of knowledge and action. The "answers" a political actor
gives to these questions serve to define his fundamental orientation
towards the problem of leadership and action. Before proceeding,
we take note of the possibility that in some non-Western cultures
" This point has been emphasized particularly in the writings of Charles
E. Lindblom. See also March and Simon, op. cit., pp. 139,151.
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
the problem of knowledge and its relation to the calculation of
political action may be approached differently and, hence, the
list of fundamental questions identified here may not be entirely
applicable.
Most of the observations Leites made about the classical Bolshevik
approach to political calculation can be subsumed under
one or another of these questions. We will not take up here
whether Leites' construction of the classical Bolshevik belief system
was valid in all respects. But we shall consider later the question
of the extent to which some of the old Bolshevik beliefs have
since changed. And we shall suggest some of the ways in which
knowledge of this belief system relates to the task of explaining
or predicting Soviet behavior.
The immediate objective of this paper-to explicate in detail
the nature of the belief system associated with the concept of operational
code-does not require us to delve deeply into these
additional questions. Of more immediate concern is the adequacy
of our explication and restructuring of the code. One useful way of
assessing this is to see whether the Bolshevik beliefs described
in the Stzcdy can be subsumed under the various philosophical
and instrumental questions we have formulated. We need deal only
summarily with Leites' study for this purpose; we shall ignore
those dimensions of his multifaceted study that do not constitute
the operational code per se but comprise related questions concerning
the "Bolshevik character," the social-psychological origins of
the Bolshevik belief system, and the underlying psychodynamic
processes about which Leites speculated.
111.The Philosophical Content of an Operational Code
1. What is the "essential" nature of political life? Is the political
universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the
fundamental character of one's political opponents?23
A political actor's belief system about the nature of politics is
shaped particularly by his orientation to other political actors.
Most important of these are one's opponents. The way in which
they are perceived-the characteristics the political actor attributes
23 The summary presented here is drawn from Study, pp. 27-30 ("Politics
Is A War") and pp. 429-41 ("Who-Whom?").
to his opponents-exercises a subtle influence on many other
philosophical and instrumental beliefs in his operational code.24
In the classical Bolshevik belief system the "image of the opponent"
was perhaps the cornerstone on which much of the rest of their
approach to politics was based. The old Bolsheviks ~erceivedthe
capitalist opponent as thoroughly hostile at bottom, whatever facade
he might display, and possessed of great shrewdness and determination
to annihilate his class opponent.
Accordingly, for the old Bolsheviks the political universe was
one of acute conflict. The fundamental question of politics and history,
as formulated by the Bolsheviks, was "who [will destroy]
whom?" This conflict between Communists and their class enemies
was viewed as fundamental and irreconcilable. It was not attsibutable
to particular historical personages but sprang from the "objective"
historical conditions described by Marxist dialectics.
Consistent with these views was another Bolshevik belief regarding
the instability of any "intermediate" historical position between
being annihilated or achieving world hegemony. So long as the
Bolsheviks had not yet achieved world hegemony, the danger of
being annihilated by the enemy would remain an ever-present
one.
Other answers to the first question posed here are possible and
have been given by different elites. For example, the traditional
"idealist" conception of international affairs postulates a fundamental
harmony of interests among peoples and nations that is only
temporarily disrupted because of the wickedness or weakness of
certain individuals and the lack of adequate institutions, a view
with which "realists" have increasingly taken issue.Z5
It is important to recognize that on this issue as on other elements
of the belief system, not all members of a ruling group will
necessarily agree; moreover, beliefs can change significantly over
a period of time. Thus, in research since the publication of A Stzldy
of BoLheuisrn Nathan Leites noted various indications of an impor-
24 For this reason, it is of particular interest that in his more recent work
Leites has found indications of an amelioration in the Soviet leaders' image
of their opponent. (See below, p. 217.)
2s On this point see, for example, Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and SelfInterest
in America's Foreign Relations ( Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1953); and Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1959).
INTERNATIOSAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
tant modification in this basic Bolshevik belief which, in turn, has
potentially far-reaching implications for the Soviet style of political
behavior.
2. What are the prospects for the euentual realization of one's
fundamental political values and nspiratiorw? Can one be
optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in
what respects the one and/or the other?26
The conventional Bolshevik position was optimistic, drawing as
it did upon ideological-doctrinal premises regarding the eventual
triumph of Communism on a worldwide scale. Yet, it was an optimism
tinged with conditional pessimism, i.e., an underlying belief
that catastrophe could not be excluded and was an ever-present
danger. One had to be constantly aware of the possibility of catastrophe
and avoid contributing to its actualization by defective calculations
and inept political behavior.
3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to u ; h t
extentFZ7
The classical Bolshevik position on this issue reflected the
strong "determinist" streak in the Marxist view of history; but this
view was balanced by strong "indeterminist" conceptions. Thus,
the Bolsheviks believed that while the direction and final outcome
of the major historical development from capitalism to Communism
are predictable, nonetheless the rate of this development and its
particular paths are not. At many junctures or branch points of
historical development, therefore, more than one outcome is "objectively
possible."
This general belief has had important implications for the way
in which Bolsheviks approached the problem of "action." The passive
orientation to action that was logically and psychologically
implicit in the ''determinist" view of history was counterbalanced
by the "indeterminist" conception of the many zig-zags that historical
developments could take prior to reaching their predictable
2 V h e summary which follows draws from Study, pp. 404-16 ("The
Incessant Danger of Attack," and "The Uncertainty of Survival Before
Victory").
27 The summary presented here draws from Study, pp. 52, 77-85 ("Unpredictable
Aspects of the Future").
final outcome. From an operational standpoint the latter, "indeterminist",
component of the belief dominated in that it emphasized
the importance of intelligent, well-calculated action as a means
of expediting the historical process. As a result, the Bolshevik
answer to this question encouraged and, when reinforced by the
other beliefs already referred to, even drove its adherents towards
"voluntarism" and initiative rather than fatalism and passivity.
Elaborating on this philosophical theme, the Bolsheviks believed
that "objective conditions" from time to time create certain "opportunities"
for the Party to advance its interests at the expense of
its opponents. However, it was regarded as not predictable and
by no means certain that the Party would succeed in "utilizing
these opportunities for advance and in transforming them into
realities.
4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical
developmetzt? W h a t is one's role in "moving" and "shaping"
history in the desired directiodZ8
The classical Bolshevik answer to this question follows from
beliefs held with respect to the preceding issues. Thus, in the 301shevik
view, the Party is obliged to seize and utilize any "opportunity"
for advance, for men can determine within fairly wide limits
the cost and duration of an "inevitable" social change. The answer
to this question, therefore, emphasizes the role that dedicated,
disciplined and intelligent political actors can play in "moving
history in the desired direction.
5. 	What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and in historical
d e ~ e l o p m e n t ? ~ ~
The classical Bolshevik answer was that all politically important
events are explainable by the laws of Marxism-Leninism; therefore,
that history can be importantly shaped by "accidental" events is
rejected.
Consistent with this general belief was the Politburo's tendency,
often noted by Western observers, to perceive connections
between events where we see none; to regard unrelated details
28 See Study, pp. 85-92 ("Transforming Opportunities Into Realities").
29 See Study, pp. 67-73 ("The Denial of Accidents").
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
as symptomatic of major political trends; and to believe there is
complicated planning behind events which we know to be fortuitous.
Bolshevik thought minimized the role of chance-with all
its unsettling implications for their belief system-by distorting
the image of the opponent and perceiving him as preternaturally
calculating and powerful, which, in turn, had other unsettling impli-
cations.
Related to this was the emphatic negative the Bolsheviks gave
to the question: Can one "muddle It is not only not
possible to "muddle through," they believed, but extremely dangerous
to try to do so. Accompanying this wcs the related belief
that there is in every situation just one "correct" line or policy. All
other policies or choices of action may result in, or tend to lead to
ruin-i.e., the "catastrophe" held to be an ever-present possibility,
as noted above. In the Bolshevik belief system, moreover, political
mistakes were rarely harmless or anything less than acutely dangerous.
("Every small step has to be carefully weighed.")
As the preceding discussion has suggested, these beliefs about
the major philosophical issues concerning politics are related to each
other. This set of beliefs, in turn, is logically and psychologically
related to a set of "instrumental" beliefs that refer more specifically
to key aspects of the problem of knowledge and action. What
should be stressed before proceeding is that the answers different
political leaders or elite groups give to the basic questions implicit
in the traditional problem of knowledge and action are affected
by their philosophical beliefs about the nature of politics.
IV. The Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code
1. 	What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives
for political
The classical Bolshevik answer to the question of how best to
set one's goals in embarking upon action was influenced by two of
the general philosophical beliefs already alluded to: the mixture of
determinist and indeterminist conceptions regarding future historical
developments and the view of one's role in "moving" history
30 See Study, pp. 49, 264-68.
31 The discussion of this question draws from and freely interprets materials
in Study, pp. 32, 77-92, 47-49, 514-24.
in the right direction. Recall in this connection, too, the general
injunction implicit in the Bolshevik answer to the third and fourth
of the philosophical beliefs noted earlier, namely that the Party is
obliged to seize all "opportunities" that arise for making advances.
How, then, did the Bolsheviks orient themselves more specifically
to the critical question of determining what one should strive for,
and what the goals and objectives of action should be when an
"opportunity" to make gains arises?
The classical Bolshevik "answer" (perhaps partly at the preconscious
level) was along the following lines:
( a ) 	One should not approach the task of setting the objective
or goal of political action by trying first to calculate precisely
the probability of achieving each of the alternative
objectives that might be pursued in a given situation.
( b ) Further, one should not limit the objective one strives for
in a particular situation to that which, on the basis of such
calculations, appears to be quite likely or rather certain of
being achieved by the means at one's disposal. (Note here
the Bolshevik admonition against the tendency to allow
assessments of available means and their presumed limited
efficacy to unduly circumscribe and limit the magnitude of
the objective or goal to be pursued.)
( c ) In setting one's goals, therefore, one must counter tendencies
towards an overly conservative approach to political
action: a reluctance to push for useful gains against seemingly
difficult odds, and the related tendency to "pare
down" the goals of action to those that seem highly feasible
and liltely to be achieved.
( d ) Against this conservative approach to calculation of endsmeans
relationships to politics, the Bolsheviks argued on
behalf of a strategy of attempting to optimize or maximize
the gains that might be derived in a given situation. (Note
here the Bolshevik tendency to reject what has been called
the "satisficing" strategy that many other decision-makers
often prefer to an "optimizing" one.)32
32 On this point see, for example, March and Simon, op. cit., pp. 140-41,
169.
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
Let us consider now how some of the familiar cognitive limits
on rational decision-making are dealt with in support of the preference
for an optimizing strategy rather than a more conservative
approach. In Bolshevik thinking on this central issue, the problem
of uncertain or incomplete knowledge relevant to choice of
action is "bounded" in a special way. In behalf of the preferred
optimizing approach, the Bolshevik code argues-not unrealistically,
it may be said-in the following vein:
( a ) Political action often has to begin with incomplete knowledge
about possible outcomes; it is action itself and only
action that will increase knowledge.
( b ) What can be achieved in a particular situation cannot be
predicted in advance-it can only become known in the
process of "struggle" in which one attempts to get the most
out of a situation.
(c) In choosing the goals or 	objectives of a particular course
of action, therefore, one should limit them only by assessing
what is "objectively possible" in that situation-i.e., not
impossible to achieve by intelligent use of resources at
one's disposal.
The operative belief, restated, is that in initiating an action
the Party must be concerned only with ascertaining that the goals
it sets are "objectively possible" (in the general and somewhat
vague sense already indicated)-not that they can be achieved
with high probability. For what can be achieved cannot be predicted
in advance; it depends on the "relationship of forces" which
can be known only in the process of "struggle" carried out "to the
end." What is important, therefore, is that the limited knowledge
available to assess the likely consequences of alternative courses
of action should not lead the political actor who engages in endsmeans
calculations to make an overly conservative choice of what
to strive for.
Applying these beliefs to the problem of action, the Bolsheviks
developed a special kind of optimizing strategy. In undertaking an
initiative to advance their interests, they often set for themselves
not a single objective but a set of graduated objectives. The standard
task faced by all decision-makers-namely, that of attempting
to reconcile what is desirable with what is thought to be feasibleis
not over-determined in this optimizing strategy. Rather, action
is oriented in a specific situation to a series of objectives embracing
payoffs that are graduated (but perhaps inversely related) in
degree of utility and feasibility. The optimizing strategy calls for
striving simultaneously for a maximum payoff-even though the
probability of achieving it appears to be low-and the more modest
payoffs which appear to be less difficult and more probable. There
seems to be an implicit assumption that such a strategy not only
provides an opportunity to achieve the maximum payoff in a given
situation but, should that prove infeasible or emerge as too costly
or risky, it will enable one to settle, if necessary, for one of the
lesser of the graduated objectives that will constitute the largest
payoff that could have been squeezed out of the "opportunity" the
situation afforded. The contrast here is with "adventures" where
there are no lesser objectives, but only a maximum payoff or a
severe loss. (See below.)
Such an optimizing strategy, therefore, is consonant with the
general philosophical belief alluded to earlier: namely, that what
can be achieved in a particular situation cannot be predicted in
advance, that action must begin with incomplete knowledge and
a measure of uncertainty regarding possible outcomes, and that it
is only through "struggle" that one can find out how much a given
"opportunity" to advance will yield.33
It should not be assumed that resort to an optimizing strategy
of this kind necessarily implies neglect of risk and cost calculations.
On the other hand, adherents of this strategy may not give due
recognition to the possibility that striving for the maximum possible
payoff in a given situation may well entail special costs and risks.
Thus, if the optimizing strategy is not correctly perceived as such
by the opponent, it may well unduly arouse his sense of danger
and mobilize his potential for resistance and counteraction in a way
that pursuit of more modest objectives might avoid doing.34
33 During the course of efforts to assess Soviet intentions in placing illissiles
in Cuba, Charles Bohlen, a leading U.S. specialist on the Soviet Union, cited
one of Lenin's adages which compared national expansion to a ba~.oi.ttdrive:
If you strike steel, pull back; if you strike mush, keep going. Theodore C.
Sorenson, Kennedy (Kew York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 677.
34 For a discussion of the possibility that the Bolshevik tendency to push
ISTERSATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
We shall shortly discuss Bolshevik beliefs about calculation, control,
and acceptance of risks. Here we note that the general Bolshevik
answer to the question under discussion proclaimed the
need for important limits to this preferred optimizing strategy.
Thus, the injunction to optimize was "bounded" by the somewhat
contradictory maxim: "Avoid adventures." This maxim, or rule of
action, conveys several different imperatives:
(a) A generalized injunction not to embark on forward operations
against an opponent that are not carefully calculated
in advance to exclude complacent overestimates of
one's own strength and underestimates of his strength.
Complacent miscalculations of this kind reflect a failure to
assess properly whether the "objective conditions" permit a
responsible effort to make gains of any kind, and, if so,
what the range of objectives should be that one can safely
pursue in the given situation.
( b ) A generalized injunction against undertaking 	action that
has an uncertain chance of yielding any payoff but is
coupled, at the same time, with a large risk of severe loss
if it fails. Actions to advance one's interests should be
avoided when they cannot utilize the optimizing strategy
noted above in which graduated objectives and payoffs are
pursued. An action is "adventuristic" if it has no lesser objectives
and no possibility of lesser payoffs-i.e., one for
which the expected outcomes are limited to a maximum
payoff or a severe loss.
(c) 	A generalized injunction against permitting one's calculations
and choice of action to be dominated by prospects
of immediate or short-term gains while ignoring the possibility
of the longer-range costs and risks attached to the same
action.
We may summarize our discussion of the &st instrumental belief
in the Bolshevik code as follows: Choose an optimizing strategy
that pursues graduated objectives, but "avoid adventures."
to the limit led to an underestimation of the undesired consequences of such
conduct, see Leites, Study, pp. 33-34,36-37, 39.
The fact that not one but several graduated objectives may
serve to orient Soviet action in conflict situations is particularly
important in the sphere of world politics. The optimizing strategy
that lies behind Soviet initiatives in foreign policy from time to
time has evidently complicated the task of Western governments
in trying to assess Soviet intentions and to devise appropriate
counter-measures. On various occasions in the past, unfamiliarity
with this aspect of the Soviet operational code seems to have resulted
in unnecessary perplexity, confusion, and alarm in attempts
to assess Soviet intentions. Western observers have responded to
Soviet initiatives (such as the Berlin blockade of 1948) on the
assumption that Soviet leaders were pursuing a single objective.
Equivocal indications of what the Soviets were after were variously
interpreted in terms of what "the" Soviet intention really was, as if
the Soviets were pursuing only a single objective rather than a set
of graduated objectives. Some Western interpretations focused on
indications that the Soviets were pursuing an extremely ambitious
objective, thus heightening apprehensions regarding the aggressive
bent of Soviet policy, the "risks" Soviet leaders were willing to take,
and the "danger" of war. Other interpretations focused on indications
that the Soviets were pursuing only a quite modest, even
"defensive" objective, thus encouraging the belief that the crisis
could be quickly and easily terminated if only the Western policies
that had "provoked the Soviets were altered and concessions
made to satisfy them.35
It is not possible to discuss in detail here the consequences of
Western responses based upon misperception of the nature of
Soviet optimizing strategy. One might assume that Western responses
in such situations would be more effective if based on awareness
that the opponent is pursuing a set of graduated objectives
ranging from relatively modest to quite ambitious goals, and that
he relies heavily on feedback in deciding how far to go. But we
35 In the Cuban missile crisis U. S, policy-makers at first entertained
various theories, partly overlapping and partly divergent, as to Soviet intentions.
They seem to have settled on an interpretation that avoided attributing
to the Soviet leaders a single motive in favor of a theory that the Soviets
expected that the deployment of missiles would give them prospects for a
variety of specific gains in foreign policy. See particularly Roger Hilsman,
To move a Nation (New York: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 161-65, 201-02; and
Theodore C. Sorensen, op. cit., pp. 676-78.
IXTERhvATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
must also consider the possibility that Western responses to Soviet
initiatives have occasionally been more effective precisely because
they focused on the most ambitious gains the Soviets may have
had in mind in pursuing this kind of optimizing strategy.
2. How aye the goals of adion pursued most effectively?
The classical Bolshevik answer to this question can be summarized
in three maxims: "push to the limit," "engage in pursuit" of
an opponent who begins to retreat or make concessions, but "know
when to st0p."~6
The first part of the answer, "push to the limit," enjoins that
maximum energy be exerted to attain the objectives of action. The
"struggle" to attain them should not be curtailed prematurely;
pressure should be maintained against the opponent even though
he doesn't give signs of buckling and even though it seems to stiffen
his resistance at first.
The second part of the answer invokes the principle of "pursuit."
Once some progress, some weakening of the opponent's position
has been achieved, it is imperative not to yield to the temptation
of relaxing pressure. When an opponent begins to talk of
making some concessions or offers them, it should be recognized
that this is a sign of weakness on his part. Additional and perhaps
major gains can be made by continuing to press the opponent
under these circumstances.
Once again, however, the Bolshevik operational code set important
limits, though of a generalized character, to the preceding
two maxims. These limits are, characteristically, embodied in a
general injunction, "know when to stop," which is directed against
the psychological danger of being carried away by one's success
to the point of failing to calculate soberly and rationally the costs
and risks of continuing efforts to press forward. Once again, a general
injunction of this type lacks operational content; it does not
suggest how the maxim is to be applied meaningfully in specific
situations; but it is presumably a valuable part of the cognitive
and affective makeup of a good Bolshevik.
It has been of considerable value on occasion to Western leaders
to understand that their Soviet counterparts structure the problem
36 See Study, pp. 30-34, 505-12, 442-49, 52-53, 514-24.
of action with a set of beliefs and maxims that seem to contradict
or, rather, oppose one another. There is, as a result, what might be
called a "tension of opposites" in their cognitive structuring of the
problem of action. We saw this already in the beliefs held with
respect to the first of the instrumental issues: attempt to optimize
gains, but don't engage in "adventures." And we see it again here
with reference to the second instrumental issue: "push to the limit"
and "pursue" a retreating opponent, but "know when to
Another "tension of opposites" may be discussed at this point
that applies to situations in which a Bolshevik leader feels himself
put on the defensive by some action of the opponent. The maxims
which "bound" this problem of action and create a tension are
"resist from the start" any encroachment by the opponent, no matter
how slight it appears to be; but "don't yield to enemy provocations"
and "retreat before superior force."38
"Yielding" to an opponent is so worrisome a danger in the
classical Bolshevik code (and, presumably, so anxiety-arousing a
fantasy in the old Bolshevik psyche) that it gave rise to a strong
injunction to be ultra-sensitive to encroachments of any kind. No
matter how trivial they seem, the opponent's encroachments are
to be opposed because failure to "resist from the start" may encourage
him to step up his attack. (This is related to fears associated
with the second of the philosophical beliefs in which ideological/
doctrinal optimism regarding the final triumph of Communism is
mixed with a certain pessimism, i.e., an underlying belief that nonetheless
catastrophe and major setbacks cannot be excluded.)
3. 	How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled,
and accepted?
The Bolsheviks' answer to this question was importantly influenced
by their experience in struggling against vastly stronger,
dangerous opponents-first the Tsarist government and then, after
the revolution, the leading capitalist powers. If we recall the Bol-
37 A similar "tension of opposites" has been noted in the Chinese Communist
approach to the problem of strategy and action. See Tang Tsou and
Morton H. Halperin, op. cit., p. 89.
38 For a discussion of these maxims, see Study, pp. 55-57, 449-61, 46-47,
57-60, 475-503. See also N. Leites, Kremlin Thoughts: Yielding, Rebuffing,
Prouoking, Retreating, The RAND Corporation, RM-3618-ISA ( May 1963).
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
shevik answer to the earlier question on choosing one's objectives
in embarking in political action, the present question can be reformulated
as follows: How does one pulsue an optimizing strategy
while at the same time kmwing how to calculate and control its
l i s w
( a ) The Bolsheviks recognized that it was of	 course possible,
in principle, to "provoke" a strong opponent into a major
attack designed to crush the Bolshevik party (or, later,
the Soviet Union). Behavior that might have this effect
upon the opponent, therefore, was to be avoided. Nonetheless,
it was believed that considerable scope was left short
of this for lesser, well-calculated efforts to advance at the
stronger opponent's expense. The opponent, it was believed,
would be deterred by various constraints from lashing back
in an effort to crush the Bolsheviks. The opponent's evaluation
of his overall self-interest would keep him from translating
his basic hostility-always present-into an operational
plan for liquidating the Bolshevik party (and,
later, the Soviet Union).
( b ) It is often safe to pursue even quite major objectives at the
expense of a stronger opponent (as in the Berlin blockade
of 1948-1949 and in the Cuban missile crisis). In the Soviet
view, the risks of offensive actions of this kind can often
be controlled by limiting the means they employ on behalf
of their ambitious objectives. In the Soviet view, it is possible
to pursue quite large gains at an enemy's expense in
this fashion without triggering a strong, undesired reaction.
We digress briefly at this point to take note of an important
difference that often characterized Soviet and U.S. approaches to
the calculation and acceptance of risks during the period of the
Cold War. The question of how to keep conflicts between them
safely limited was answered somewhat differently in the "lirnitations"
theories of the two sides. The U.S. theory, strongly reinforced
by our reading of the lessons of the Korean War, has been
that a limitation on one's objectives is essential to keep limited
conflicts from expanding dangero~sly.~~This seemed to be borne out
39 See, for example, R. E. Osgood, Limited War (Chicago: University
by the consequences-i.e., Chinese Communist intervention-of
our failure to keep the U.S. objective limited in the Korean War.
After defeating the North Koreans we enlarged our war aims to
include unification of North Korea and South Korea by force of
arms, which triggered the Chinese Communist intervention.
The Soviet theory of limitations, on the other hand, holds that
it is often safe to pursue even large, far-reaching objectives in
limited conflicts without immediate danger or undue risk of their
expanding. What is critical in the Soviet view is not so much the
limitation of one's objectives but rather limitation of the means one
employs on their behalf. (Examples of this theory of limitations
are Soviet behavior in the Berlin blockade and Chinese behavior
in the Quemoy crisis of 1958. In both cases far-reaching objectives
were evidently among those being pursued, but the risks of doing
so were controlled by limiting the means employed against the
two Western outposts.)
(c) It is a Soviet belief that the fact that risks of high magnitude
are in some sense present in a conflict situation-e.g.,
the danger of war between the Soviet Union and the
United States-is less important than (1) whether that
undesired consequence is immediately at hand or at some
remove in time, and (2) whether the Soviet leaders believe
themselves able to control the intermediate events of
the sequence that could result in war. Soviet leaders have
displayed considerable confidence in their ability to control
and avoid quite unacceptable, more distant risks in this
way. Their approach to risk calculation is often more sophisticated
than that of Western leaders in that Soviet leaders
distinguish not only the magnitude of risks but also between
risks that are immediate and those which are more remote.
Hence Soviet leaders believe, and often act on the
premise, that in a struggle to make important gains one
can accept seemingly high risks so long as the undesired
event is several steps removed in a possible temporal
of Chicago Press, 1957); W. W. Kaufmann, "Limited Warfare," in Kaufmann
(ed.) Military Policy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1956); Morton H. Halperin, Limited W a r in the Nuclear Age (New
York: John Wiley, 1963).
INTERNATIONaL STUDIES QU-ARTERLY
sequence and so long as, in addition, they believe they
can control the sequence of events leading to it. In a number
of cases (the North Korean attack on South Korea,
some of the Berlin crises, the Cuban missile crisis) the
Soviets acted in ways that seemed to indicate to Western
leaders and publics that Soviet leaders were prepared to
risk and indeed were risking general war. The risk of general
war, however, was in fact several steps removed; and
Soviet leaders could well believe that they retained the
possibility of calling off the crisis or redirecting it into safer
channels, if necessary.
In other words, Soviet leaders do not settle for a single
probability estimate of unwanted risks that may develop
in the future; rather, they attempt to subject such estimates
of probability to sequential analysis. We may contrast this
style of risk calculation with the tendency of Western leaders
and publics to blur the time-component of the different
risks created by a Soviet initiative, or by their own actions,
a tendency which disposes Westerners in some situations
to magnify their estimates of the prevailing risks and to
greater conservatism in risk acceptance.
In this respect, therefore, as in others previously noted, Soviet
and U.S. approaches to risk calculation and risk-acceptance have
often differed. Soviet understanding of the ways in which undesired
risks could be calculated and controlled often constituted an
advantage. As for Westein leaders and publics, their tendency to
perceive and interpret Soviet risk-acceptance behavior erroneously
from the standpoint of their own approach to risk calculation
inclined them to make distorted judgments regarding Soviet intentions
and the riskiness and significance of Soviet cold war initiatives.
(One may note briefly that, over time, Western leaders have
perhaps come to understand better the Soviet approach to risk calculation
and risk acceptance.)
4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interest240
Once again the Bolshevik answer displays a tendency to state
the matter in terms of opposites (excluding middle positions).
40 See Study, p. 34.
Thus, the Bolshevik code says, somewhat enigmatically or tritely:
"There must be neither procrastination nor precipitate action."
The Party must be able to bide its time indefinitely, if need be.
But it is forbidden to defer an advance that is feasible now (even
though difficult) in the necessarily uncertain expectation that
advance would be easier at some later date. Action, therefore,
tends to be either required or impermissible; there is nothing in
between.
5. What is the utility and role of diferent means for advancing
one's interests?
Of a number of Bolshevik views about the utility of different
means, mention will be made here of one that has been rather
unfamiliar to Westerners and is perhaps more idiosyncratic than
other Bolshevik beliefs about means. This is the belief that in order
to deter a powerful enemy "it often pays to be rude."41 Rude and
even violent language, which may or may not be accompanied
by small damaging actions, is expected to serve this purpose by
heightening the opponent's estimates of one's strength and determination
and/or by weakening the mass support for his policies.
The tactic of rudeness was believed to be not overly risky because,
in Bolshevik thought, a "serious" powerful opponent is expected
not to allow himself to become emotionally aroused by such tactics.
V. Clzanges inthe Belief System
Even a belief system that reflects well-considered evaluations
of past political experience is subject to change under certain
conditions. Resistance to changing beliefs may be accentuated by
personality rigidities, which may be greater in some members of
a ruling group than in others; but a variety of other factors may
be operative.
Some political elites have a pronounced tendency to perceive
and to deal with present problems in the light of authoritative
diagnoses they have made of past experiences. They attach considerable
importance to making correct diagnoses of past events
which, they feel, provide usable "lessons" of history in the form of
models and precedents. The tendency to approach calculation of
4 1 See Study, pp. 34-42.
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
present policy in this manner is particularly pronounced in radically
oriented elites, such as the Marxists, who claim to have a
special understanding of history and historical development. AS a
result, a body of general beliefs develops about the nature of political
conflict and basically correct or incorrect approaches to dealing
with opponents that takes on a doctrinal character. Special
precautions may be taken to safeguard the content of such beliefs
from arbitrary, unauthorized changes. Beliefs about politics, then,
become part of the sacred political culture of the elite that is systematically
transmitted to new leaders. Change in such an elite's
belief system, then, does not follow simply from the fact that the
composition of the top leadership changes.
As noted earlier, indications are available that some changes in
important elements of the classical Bolshevik operational code took
place or became noticeable in the Khrushchev era. I believe that
the restructuring and synthesis in this paper of the major elements
of this kind of belief system facilitates inquiry into the possibility
of changes in its content and of their implications. Thus, as was
suggested earlier, the first philosophical belief in our list appears
to be of critical importance in shaping the character of the belief
system as a whole and in regulating its impact on the actor's political
behavior. Particularly close attention should be given, therefore,
to possible shifts in the political actor's image of his opponent
and, related to this, his view of the fundamental nature of
political conflict.42
Let us look briefly now at Leites' more recent research on the
Soviet elite from this standpoint. Leites studied statements by
Khrushchev and other contemporary Soviet leaders in order to
establish whether they held the same set of beliefs regarding the
nature of political conflict and the same image of the opponent
as Lenin and Stalin had earlier held. He noted various indications
that a somewhat more moderate view had emerged of the basic
"who-whom" problem that Lenin had so starkly formulated (see p.
42 This would appear to apply also to the Chinese Communist leadership.
(See the forthcoming report by Robert C. North on the SLanford University
conference which considered the feasibility of research on the Chinese politburo.)
Among those scholars who have examined the problem of evaluating
and changing beliefs about the opponent are Morton Deutsch, William Gamson,
Andr6a Modigliani, John Kautsky, Charles E. Osgood, Amitai Etzioni,
Ralph K. White, Milton Rokeach and Joseph deRivera.
VOLUME 13, NUMBER 2, JUNE 1969
202 above), and that the related fear of annihilation had softened.
The hypothesis of a change in these beliefs was stated cautiously
by Leites.
When one strikes a balance . . . it would seem that Bolshevik
fears of annihilation have declined, which presumably decreases
the urgency of total victory as an antidote against e~tinction.~~
Such change would be of considerable significance since, as Leites
noted, the aggressiveness and expansionist drive in the older variant
of Bolshevism had probably been motivated to a significant extent
by this basic view of the nature of political conflict and the
related fear of annihilati~n.~~
If this fundamental belief was attenuated over time, one would
expect that such a change would influence other components of
the belief system as well. Leites found indications that this was
the case. Examining evidence bearing on the question: "Are They
Relaxing?," Leites concluded, again cautiously: "Despite the Cuban
affair, it cannot be excluded that they are relaxing, to some limited
extent."46 Posing another question: "Are They Mellowing?" and
reviewing relevant statements by Khrushchev and other leaders.
Leites concluded:
Thus it would seem that the Bolshevik fear of ~ieldinghas, after
all, declined, and the insistence on "utilizing possibilities" weakened
. . . . contemporary Soviet leaders probably feel less constrained
to push forward into any possible accessible space
without regard for delayed and indirect consequences. They may
even have gained for themselves some slight liberty to concede
without an immediate concession in return. 46
We turn briefly now to the task of accounting for an amelioration
in elements of the older Bolshevik belief system. This task is
admittedly formidable; the following remarks are by no means
intended as an authoritative explanation. Any effort to explain such
a change should probably consider several factors and the interactions
among them. Changes in top Soviet leadership following
43 Kremlin Moods, The RAND Corporation, RhI-3535-ISA (January 1964),
p. 126.
44 Ibid., p. 91.
46 Ibid., pp. 164-66.
46 Ibid., p. 211.
INTERRTATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
Stalin's death in 1953 were undoubtedly of great importance. AS
Leites noted, Stalin had bent some of the Bolshevik beliefs of
Lenin's time in a harsher direction. Even before the accentuation
of Stalin's paranoid tendencies in his later years, idiosyncratic elements
of his personality had probably rendered his adherence to
the Bolshevik belief system relatively impervious to reality-testing.47
Khrushchev's mind was apparently less "closed in this respect than
Stalin's; he was more receptive to recognizing relevant experiences
and historical changes as being in some sense "critical tests" of
basic components of the belief system, and also more capable of
cautiously modifying some of these beliefs.
While the difference between Stalin's and Khrushchev's personalities
was perhaps critical in this respect, other factors also must
be taken into account. The growth of Soviet power may have
contributed to Khrushchev's reassessment of the "danger of annihilation."
Perhaps of greater importance was the fact that historical
experience demonstrated, more during Khrushchev's rule than in
Stalin's, that perhaps after all the United States would not engage
in an unprovoked war with the Soviet Union. U.S. leaders had not
only failed to wage preventive war while the Soviet Union was
weak in the immediate post-World War I1 period, they also seemed
prepared to allow it to approach parity with the United States.
Well might these historic developments encourage post-Stalin leaders
to alter somewhat the earlier image of the U.S. elite as an overwhelmingly
hostile, shrewd, determined opponent and to permit
themselves to feel a somem~hatgreater sense of security. 48
In accounting for changes in the Soviet belief system, therefore,
it appears necessary to give weight not only to changes in
personality variables but also to the impact of significant historical
47 The importance of Stalin's personality for his political behavior has
been emphasized particularly by Robert Tucker. See his "The Dictator and
Totalitarianism," World Politics, (July 1965), and his earlier analysis, "Stalinism
and the World Conflict," Journal of International Affairs, 8, No. 1 (1954).
48 Interestingly, Khrushchev's period also saw the emergence of a less
favorable image of the United States as an opponent. There was both less
idealization of, and less respect for the U.S. elite than in the old Bolshevik
view. The historic class enemy was now perceived as an "agin ," "declinin "
elite, one which was weaker, less intelligent. less determine3 than in tRe
past. The changed characteristics imputed to the United States leadership,
however, were seen as making it in some respects possibly more dangerous.
(See Kremlin Moods, pp. 91-126, 1-13.)
developments. In addition to those already mentioned, reference
should be made to events such as the emergence of greater independence
and conflict within the international Communist movement
after Stalin's death. It is probably the case that changes in
top leadership made it easier to reconsider older beliefs in the
light of new developments.
Changes in the belief system that manifested themselves during
Khrushchev's period are indeed of considerable significance for
world politics. But it is necessary to note that they evidently
constituted modifications of the classical Bolshevik belief system,
not its abandonment or radical transformation. There remained
substantial elements of continuity with the past in the belief system
and political culture of post-Stalin Soviet leadership. 49
VI. Conclusion
This paper has formulated and illustrated the set of beliefs
about basic issues concerning the nature of politics and political
action that have been heretofore implied by the term "operational
code." This term is a misnomer in important respects; it should
probably be replaced by some other way of referring to these
beliefs, such as "approaches to political calculation." I have tried
in this paper to codify the general issues and questions around
which such a belief system is structured in the hope that it will
encourage and facilitate systematic efforts to apply this research
approach to a variety of other ruling groups and individual political
leaders as well. The possibility emerges of a useful new dirnension
for comparative studies of different leaders and elite groups.
I have argued in this paper that knowledge of this belief system
provides one of the important inputs needed for behavioral
analyses of political decision-making and leadership styles. The
"operational code" construct does this insofar as it encompasses
that aspect of the political actor's perception and structuring of the
political world to which he relates, and within which he attempts
to operate to advance the interests with which he is identified.
49 This point was emphasized in Leites' Rrenzlin Moocls. There is, in the
writer's knowledge, no similar study of further changes in the belief system
that may have emerged in the post-Khrushchev era. However, Vernon V.
Aspaturian is studying Soviet images of the ICennedy Administration.
IP*'TERNATIOhTALSTUDIES QUARTERLY
m i s approach should be useful for studying an actor's decisionrnaldng
"style," and its application in specific situations.
As noted earlier (p. 202), this paper focuses on the political
actor's orientation towards opponents (domestic and international)
rather than towards other types of political actors. 1 believe this
focus is justified; a belief system about politics is influenced particularly
by the actor's assumptions about the nature of political conflict
and by his image of opponents.
Of course, the image of the opponent may play a less central
and a somewhat different role in the belief systems of elites who
do not attribute (as did the Bolsheviks) an irreconcilable hostility
to their political enemies. When political opponents are perceived
as limited (and perhaps temporary) adversaries, important consequences
may be expected to follow for other elements in the belief
system. Particularly in such cases is it desirable to supplement attention
to the actor's image of the opponent with observations about:
his orientation towards political friends and followers.
There remain, of course, important questions concerning data
and methods to be employed for research directed towards constructing
a political actor's belief system about politics. These problems
are not taken up in this paper; I would suggest here merely
that questions of data and methods be approached in an eclectic
and pragmatic spirit. Even provisional answers to the research
questions encompassed by the operational code are likely to be
useful. Opportunities for research of this kind vary considerably,
depending on the particular leaders or elite groups that happen
to be of interest. Different research methods may be employed
for using materials that are already available and, when opportunities
permit, for acquiring new data more systematically. Data
relevant to the operational code may be obtained from various
kinds of content analysis-both via qualitative analysis of texts
(as in Leites' study) or more rigorous quantitative analysis (as
by Professor Ole Holsti in his study of John Foster Dulles' image
of the Soviet opponent).50Similarly, when interviewing is possible,
several variants of open-ended, in depth, or structured interview
techniques might be employed. Useful data and inferences on
50 Ole Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy," in D. J.
Finlay, 0. R. Holsti, and R. R. Fagen, Enemies in Politics (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1967).
these matters are likely to be obtained also by those who have
opportunities to engage in "participant observation," whether as
researchers, political journalists, or political participants. Finally,
inferences about various aspects of an actor's operational code
are possible from case studies of his behavior in particular situat
i o n ~ . ~ ~
61 For example, Arnold Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Analysis of
Soviet Calculations and Behavior," World Politics 16 (April 1964).
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY