The Early Cold War and American Political Development: Reflections on Recent Research

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This paper is a review essay of three books representing new research into the relationship between Cold War mobilization and postwar American political development: Michael Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (Cambridge University Press, 1998); Guy Oakes, *The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture* (Oxford University Press, 1994); and Peter Trubowitz, *Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy* (University of Chicago Press, 1998).

It has been more than a decade since the Berlin Wall came down and the Cold War ended. We now have some historical perspective from which to re-examine the cultural, political, ideological, economic, and strategic-military consequences for the United States of waging and "winning" the half-century-long shadow war. Much of the new scholarship on the Cold War has been animated by new primary sources in the United States and by newly declassified Soviet and East Bloc archives. A dominant theory of international relations throughout the Cold War period—neorealism— operated on the assumption that nation-states were the primary actors in international politics. From this and other basic premises, a series of general predictions on state behavior in the international arena were developed. As far I know, most practitioners and followers of neorealism—academic scholars, political elites in most countries, pundits on the political right and left, public intellectuals of all stripes, and most everyone else—were dead wrong about how the Cold War would end.[1]

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The new scholarship on the Cold War is important because it should reveal what the experts misunderstood about this dangerous period in postwar history as they planned for World War III. Much of the new knowledge that has been developed in the last decade about the early Cold War has focused on the interpenetration of external and internal policy planning. By examining what, in retrospect, seems to have been an intrinsic consanguinity between domestic policy planning and international politics, we can better understand not only how the trajectory of the Cold War was affected, but also how domestic political development was shaped. In the case of the United States, newly declassified archives have enlivened an important if tendentious debate about the political, economic, and social effects of the anti-communist ideology of the early 1950s, spying in the United States during the 1950s, and whether the Cold War mobilization and its consequences for the United States were worth the price.

This essay is limited to a discussion of American political development (APD) during the early years of the Cold War.[2] Irrespective of the issue of whether there were spies in United States, early Cold War mobilization had long-term institutional effects on APD in two important domains: executive power and jurisprudence. The indeterminate nature of the Cold War (was it a "real" war or not?) systematically and logically led to an increase in presidential power. Law-making in an atmosphere of emergency planning (1947–1953) institutionalized the centralization of power in the executive branch of government and, perhaps more importantly, laws dealing with "national security" conflated internal and external policy: the early Cold War threat was not only about the Soviet Union, it was also about ideas.[3] The "containment" of ideas (a much more difficult task than military-strategic containment) focused the attention of the federal government on internal threats as if there were little or no difference between external security policy and domestic security policy. The result was laws with very high levels of discretionary power that helped to advance the growth of a national security bureaucracy. Much of the national security legislation of this era endorsed a narrow, constrained view of liberalism that ultimately undermined civil liberties. Cold War liberalism was reflected in the public institutions and the political culture of the time.

The ensuing analysis considers three questions: What effects did the Cold War mobilization have on U.S. political institutions? What were the cultural and sociological consequences of early Cold War mobilization, especially the constant disaster preparedness planning that it entailed? Finally, what role did regional political economies within the U.S. play in foreign policy planning? Three superb books approach these questions from slightly different angles and from different disciplines. Michael Hogan's *A Cross Of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State,*

1945–1954 offers a vibrant analysis of the institutional and bureaucratic changes wrought by the Truman Administration's mobilization plans for the Cold War. Hogan frames his book around an important question that anyone interested in APD and the early Cold War must ask: did the United States become a garrison state? Guy Oakes's *The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture* examines the cultural and social impact on the American polity of continuous war mobilization. One section of Oakes's book considers how a theory of emotion management, developed within departments of sociology and political science shortly after the end of World War II, was instrumentalized by the Eisenhower Administration in order to deploy its civilian defense programs. Oakes's book offers us a window through which we can examine one of the most important institutional developments of the postwar era: the link between the research university system and the state. Peter Trubowitz's *Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy* takes a political-economic tack and examines how regional political economy fundamentally configured American foreign policy. Trubowitz shows how sectional issues affected the way the agenda was set for external policy planning. His argument is elegant and his thesis on regional political interests explores *both* historical and cultural themes in a thoughtful fashion, making his book an example of both quantitative and qualitative political analysis. His work is a prime example of how an analysis of the sub-national regional aspects of U.S. policy planning can offer us an alternative to more traditional "top–down" approaches for understanding postwar APD.[4]

NATIONAL SECURITY, THE STATE, AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Postwar expansion of central-state authority in the United States is understandable, in part, as a result of the Allied victory in World War II. Emerging from that global conflict relatively unscathed and a superpower, the U.S. committed itself to a new activist global policy based on two foundations: the United States' long-term national interests were tightly interwoven with those of Western Europe, and Soviet power and influence had to be circumscribed. For the first time in its history the United States faced dilemmas and obstacles that European states and powers had confronted for centuries: how to mobilize over the long term and manage multiple crises that arose from real and perceived threats; how to create institutions to handle state and society relations in the context of ongoing preparedness and mobilization programs; how to produce and disseminate the legitimating ideologies that would garner domestic support for a postwar grand strategy; and how to

rationalize national security planning and administration so that both grand strategic commitments and the economic and military capability to support them were brought into line. Thus postwar national security planning in the United States was not dissimilar to the kinds of grand strategic planning and processes that had dominated Europe for centuries, especially in preeminent nations that had been victorious in war. Postwar U.S. grand strategy entailed integrated plans to mobilize a vast array of resources—human, political, ideological, military, and industrial—so that the United States could handle any number of potential strategic interactions and crises.[5]

Over a fairly short period of time (1947–1953), the mobilization of American society for Cold War institutionalized a plethora of politically insulated executive agencies and numerous state-society relationships, some of which were new but many of which were originally forged during World War II. Understood from this perspective, the war-making state of the mid-1940s was not dismantled but strengthened within two years of the end of World War II.

Hogan's *A Cross of Iron* examines the rationalization of postwar national security policy and its consequences for the American state. Hogan considers how the United States' Cold War mobilization programs created the institutional and administrative conditions for a type of garrison state. He sees these programs as prime examples of the triumph of the decentralized contract state that simultaneously protected liberal-democratic structures and efficiently prosecuted the Cold War to total victory. My own work suggests that a civic garrison *was* created as Cold War national security was rationalized and thus a more robust central-state apparatus than Hogan suggests was produced. Nevertheless, Hogan's second theme, which emphasizes a decentralized and to some degree an anti-statist Cold War mobilization process, is supported by the provocative scholarship of Aaron Friedberg.[6] *A Cross of Iron* tacks between both my view of a more robust Cold War state and Friedberg's highly decentralized Cold War state. Hogan's work offers us an astute institutional history of the development of the Cold War national security state that fills the gap between both interpretations of American political development during the early Cold War. The chapters take the reader through three phases of institutional and administrative development: an early phase of elite concerns surrounding the postwar world order, culminating in the most important state-building legislation of the era, the National Security Act of 1947 (chapters 1–3); a second phase of political-economic reorganization that was propelled by the bureaucratic architecture established by the National Security Act, the debates around Universal Military Training, the high-level deliberations with the Truman Administration about the threat of creating a garrison state, and the deep concerns surrounding the economic consequences for constant war mobilization (chapters 4–6); and

finally a third phase in which Korean War rearmament reoriented national security policy planning and led to the creation of institutions that balanced political-economic issues with the Cold War imperatives outlined in National Security Council Directive 68 (NSC–68) and the National Security Act (chapters 7–10). Hogan's framework is appealing because it illustrates how elite thinking and public policy were buffeted by both operational and intellectual controversy—not over the soundness of the primary Cold War issue of containment policy, but over the secondary issue of how to achieve this end without undermining American democratic values or driving the U.S. economy into a crisis. Hogan's work makes clear just how much concern there was on the part of Truman Administration planners regarding the long-term effects of Cold War mobilization on American society. Early Cold War mobilization was not a process of "bankers and bullets," a conspiracy of war-mongering generals and Wall Street bankers, as first-wave Cold War historical revisionism seemed to suggest. On the contrary, Hogan shows how political elites and planners of all stripes were concerned about how to achieve a balance between Cold War mobilization and the protection of democratic norms and values.

A Cross of Iron presents students of APD with a blueprint of how Cold War mobilization compelled the Truman Administration and the Congress to establish a politically insulated national security bureaucracy. Additionally, I would argue that this bureaucracy, with its extraordinarily high levels of discretionary power, led to a blurring of any distinction between internal and external enemies. National security agencies such as the CIA and the FBI often carried out their operations on the assumption that domestic and external political threats were one and the same.[7] The result was an enormous expansion of central-state power that penetrated all spheres of life in the name of national security, collapsing the public–private divide. In this institutional sense, Hogan's book can be read in a comparative context, supporting the conclusion that state-building in the United States was tied to war-making and war mobilization in much the same way that it has been in Europe.[8] By my lights, this comparative-historical reading of *A Cross of Iron* leads us to reconsider the notion of "American exceptionalism" in at least one context: political development in the twentieth century.[9] The United States looks very European in the development of its political institutions during the early Cold War: a strong central state where power is concentrated in the executive and is strengthened by a highly insulated bureaucracy with the discretionary power to carry out public policy. Hogan stops well short of calling the United States a garrison state. I would argue (and this is my only quibble with the book) that he makes a strong case for a garrisoning process during the early Cold War period that produced something much closer to a garrison state than he might want to admit. It was obviously

not a totalitarian police state, but an American civic garrison that privileged "Cold War liberalism" and its consequences in the name of national security. Most important, however, *A Cross of Iron* is an exemplar of creative, well-researched, and provocative historical and political analysis. The book is one of the best studies to date concerning the intrinsic link between war mobilization and state-building in the United States at a key moment of post-World War II political development.

MAKING THE VERY BEST OF THE WORST: DISASTER PLANNING AND THE STATE

Another challenge for domestic public policy and national security policy in the early years of the Cold War was the problematic nature of life in the "atomic age." In the "next war," policy planners such as Secretary of Defense James Forrestal claimed, atomic, biological, and chemical weapons would be used against the continental United States. By 1950, a picture of World War III was indelibly etched in the imagination of policy makers: millions dead in the pulverized and radiating ruins of major cities in the United States. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were harbingers for Chicago, New York, and Detroit if the Cold War became a "hot" war. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and other national security planners argued that U.S. citizens had to come to grips with the possibility—even probability—that the Cold War would result in the ultimate challenge to the American social order: nuclear war.

One of the important bureaucratic developments of the National Security Act was the creation of the National Security Resources Board (NSRB). Although short-lived, the NSRB dealt with the strategic–military–economic facets of Cold War mobilization, focusing on industrial planning for and during a nuclear war. It also promoted a home-front mobilization arm: the Office of Civil Defense Planning (OCDP). In December 1950, the OCDP became a stand-alone line agency of the federal government by virtue of the Civil Defense Act of 1950 and was renamed the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA). In Oakes's *The Imaginary War*, the FCDA is used as a case for examining how long-term disaster planning affected Cold War political culture generally as well as how civilian defense planning reflected the institutionalization of a set of important administrative and institutional links between public policy, propaganda, and public ethics. With respect to APD, one particular theme is most interesting: as public policy, civil defense was used by the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations both as a tool for controlling "nuclear terror" and as a way to attend to the psychological well-being of the American polity. Oakes demonstrates that FCDA planning

was systematically tied to Cold War deterrence policy and was also predicated on a general theory of emotion management and "crisis mastery." *The Imaginary War* establishes how postwar social-science research on mass behavior and the sociology of emotions shaped the way that both political elites and FCDA planners viewed the psychology of the American public. In supporting nuclear deterrence policy and training the public to manage their own emotional well-being under horrific conditions, the federal government had to cement institutional relationships both with research universities—especially sociology and political science departments—and the mass media. In the case of rational deterrence theory, there were domestic prerequisites: the American public had to be prepared to fight and win a war, and this had to be signaled in a credible fashion. In addition, containment policy by means of nuclear deterrence was based on "moral foundations." Oakes's study examines how the state dealt with both the material and emotional aspects of Cold War deterrence theory: "If the attempt to preserve peace by threatening nuclear war produced the very consequences it was intended to avert, the American people would be required to pay the price ultimately exacted by this strategy. If the price of freedom proved to be nuclear war, would Americans be willing to pay?" (p. 6). It was the FCDA's mission to make sure the answer to this question was yes.

From a political development perspective, the FCDA functioned as a mediating institution that linked the federal government with major research universities and newly developing think tanks and foundations throughout the country. It also linked the state with the print, broadcast, and film industries in much the same way a wartime information agency manages these connections.[10] In this sense, the FCDA became the Truman and Eisenhower administrations' Cold War version of the World War II Office of War Information.[11] The first three chapters of *The Imaginary War* outline the causal logic behind the Truman and Eisenhower civil defense program and the dependence of the state on social-science research derived from the alliance forged between the universities and the government. National security planners transformed both an academic theory of emotions and a general theory of marketing and advertising into a coherent public policy of civil defense and disaster planning. Oakes establishes how a dubious theory of national morale was tied to an elite conception of American democracy that was contemptuous of postwar American society. He also shows that national morale and national will were viewed by FCDA planners as malleable artifacts that were prime objects for a comprehensive public-relations campaign. Oakes illustrates one of the principal paradoxes of the early Cold War with his analysis of the mentality of key planners such as George F. Kennan and James Forrestal: the irony was that these elite figures were charged with protecting a system, liberal democracy in the American tradition, that

they believed produced a weak-willed, consumer-oriented, ignorant polity that was untrustworthy (or at least unworthy of their trust) and that they viewed with contempt.[12] In short, some of the "wise men" of the early Cold War doubted the very system they sought to protect on the basis of their own elite interpretation of American liberalism and its consequences for Cold War citizenship. Oakes's dismantling of the ubiquitous hagiography surrounding George Kennan is an extremely helpful counter-interpretation to the traditional "wise-men" theory of Cold War mobilization (pp. 25–30).

Once Oakes establishes that there was a deep-seated suspicion of the American polity's willingness to carry the burdens of Cold War mobilization—one of which was the willingness to engage in global strategic nuclear war—on the part of some national security elites, he moves into a detailed analysis of the social and cultural consequences of civil defense policy and emergency planning by establishing how nuclear terror or, in the vernacular of the time, "the problem of panic" was handled by FCDA planners. Oakes demonstrates through his careful use of primary sources how the FCDA used both propaganda and marketing techniques to undertake the reconstruction of nuclear reality. One of the consequences of this approach was to subject the American public to a methodical, wartime-like campaign of propaganda. Like Hogan, Oakes also illustrates how private and public spheres of life were conflated in the name of national security during the early Cold War years. He examines how the FCDA mediated the administrative and organizational process by which the state expanded into two key areas of society: the research university and the marketing and advertising industry. The federal government cemented these alliances by funding universities (and especially key members of the professorate, who often held jobs both as tenured faculty and for the U.S. government as consultants), research foundations and "think tanks," and quasi-private business associations such as the Advertising Council. For example, in 1952, total U.S. government funding (at least based on data that has been declassified; much remains classified) for major media networks and key social-science research foundations was $14.7 and $39.9 million, respectively (in 1998 dollars).[13] Finally, Oakes's last chapter, "Liberal Propaganda and National Security," outlines an ominous long-term institutional consequence of early Cold War disaster planning: the development of a sophisticated administrative and organizational architecture for the production and the dissemination of propaganda that rested on premises that are at odds with the principles of liberalism. The book shines in this last section, where Oakes's narrative establishes the causal logic between the chapters with both a historical and sociological sensibility, a combination increasingly rare in the social sciences and humanities. In the end, *The Imaginary War* lays bare the fundamental internal contradictions between key facets of Cold War mobilization and the

premises on which American liberal democracy rests. *The Imaginary War* is an example of careful analysis and historical research that offers students of APD an ingenious interpretation of a political culture that resulted in a permanent expansion of the state.

SECTIONALISM AND THE COLD WAR CONSENSUS

Richard Bensel claims that one of the "massive facts" in American political history is sectionalism.[14] Peter Trubowitz's *Defining the National Interest* builds on the foundational analyses of scholars of APD such as Bensel to outline his theory about how the national interest is defined, which in turn explains why particular kinds of foreign policy were initiated and others cast aside.[15] Against an assertion that there was an undifferentiated Cold War consensus and the age-old dictum that the primacy of foreign policy (i.e., state survival) always shapes state behavior even in the United States during the Cold War, Trubowitz suggests otherwise. He makes a very important critical argument: in the case of the United States, there is no single "national interest" and there never was one, overarching definable national interest that drove foreign-policy planning. This view works against "outside-in" neorealist theory, which holds that changing external security dilemmas are what define a state's national interest. As noted above, this theory of international politics framed U.S. policy throughout the Cold War but did so by devaluing internal politics and domestic structure, one of the truly extraordinary methodological errors in postwar social science. Trubowitz poses the question of what the national interest is and what exactly the politics are in defining that national interest. He answers this question with a meticulous use of descriptive statistics and political-historical narrative. The book illustrates in a clear and concise fashion exactly *how* the national interest has been redefined in different periods in APD: in the case of the Cold War, Trubowitz suggests that the Cold War consensus may not have been so consensual after all.

Defining the National Interest examines three periods in American political development—the 1890s, the 1930s, and the 1980s—with the aim of illustrating clean historical breaks in external policy development (pp. 1–30). As public policy, foreign policy planning developed out of the changing definition of national interest. The ways and means by which the national interest were defined were intimately connected to regional political economy and the distribution of power within the Congress. In short, the national interest is framed by the raw politics of sectionalism, an insight that makes Trubowitz's book an important work in the field of APD because it proposes there has been much less continuity in the development

of U.S. foreign policy than many political historians and international relations specialists have suggested. Additionally, *Defining the National Interest* critically approaches the question of American exceptionalism from a subnational political perspective, highlighting the social bases of political development and public policy as against the war and state-formation perspective (which tends to approach questions about political development from the comparative–historical–institutional point of view), or the traditional diplomatic-historical approaches: "This book offers an alternative approach to the analysis of American foreign policy ... the book identifies America's *regional* diversity as the most important source of tension and conflict over foreign policy" (p. 4). Trubowitz periodizes APD along clear-cut breaks in foreign policy development, the fault lines of which are located along cross-sectional alliances that were forged in Congress during different historical moments between 1890 and the 1980s. The section on the Cold War is enlightening because Trubowitz connects Cold War consensus development to the transformation of the *political* (as against "inside-the-beltway" elite partisanship) landscape within U.S. society regarding internationalism and isolationism: "It is therefore correct to argue that before the United States assumed the mantle of global leadership, American politics had to be transformed" (p. 165). Trubowitz situates the beginning of this consequential transformation of American politics in the 1930s (much earlier than do most political scientists and historians). In the section leading up to and including the Cold War period, *Defining the National Interest* builds on the argument that the 1930s were not as "isolationist" as many history books suggest and, more importantly, that the subsequent postwar consensus on internationalism rested on an alliance of sectional political-economic interests, not simply the elite patriotic bipartisanship that is often referred to by scholars examining the postwar period. Ultimately the "internationalist" cross-sectional political alliance rested on three pillars: the changing structure of the northern industrial base from a purely domestic orientation to one that was tied to the international political economy; the threat that Nazi Germany presented to both the northern and southern political economies; and perhaps the most important single issue of all, the "deal" that made the New Deal possible: FDR's commitment to keep civil rights issues off the national legislative agenda.[16]

From Trubowitz's perspective, we can understand U.S. foreign policy development and Cold War mobilization only if we bridge the divide between realism and *Innenpolitik* (pp. 240–45). *Defining the National Interest* offers us a way to bridge the divide by examining the critical relationship between internal and external policy formulation through a judicious application of a political-economy analysis of domestic politics. Trubowitz identifies the U.S. Congress as the principal institution that shaped foreign policy planning,

including the all-important Cold War project. This is a noteworthy addition to our understanding of the mobilization programs of the early Cold War, for the fact remains that while Cold War scholars pay attention to Congress, for the most part they focus on the expansion of the central state as a by-product of the growth of executive power. The conceptual apparatus that Trubowitz uses in his book is germane to Cold War APD because it forces those of us interested in the subject to be careful about methodology. Trubowitz's study compels us to be mindful about how we construct our case studies so as not to get lost in high-level memoranda and other kinds of communications within the executive branch at the expense of careful, systematic analysis of the U.S. Congress and the *constitutional* link between that institution and sub-national sectional politics.

CONCLUSION

American postwar political development was influenced by the formation of norms and institutions that carried out Cold War national security policy. During the early Cold War the policies that flowed from these institutions helped to create a particular type of emergency politics that affected political discourse, ideology, and culture. Elite concerns about the pending "crisis of defense" led to home-front mobilization programs that trained the public to prepare for the worst and taught citizens that it was their patriotic duty to make sure they were ready for the long Cold War struggle. For a liberal-democratic state, institutions must at the very least derive their political and legal legitimacy from a domestic political consensus achieved through democratic means. In the case of the early Cold War mobilization project, there is little indication that undemocratic political activity was institutionalized. However, there is abundant evidence that moments of illiberalism were accepted by the American public and its political leaders as the price of becoming a super-power in the international arena. In different ways and from different perspectives, the three books discussed in this essay represent the very best kind of scholarship. All three books confront the issues of public policy during the Cold War and, although they are not in agreement on all issues, they offer anyone interested in APD a dazzling cross-disciplinary analysis. In the end, one conclusion that we can draw from these works is that the institutional arrangements created during the early Cold War are still with us. Given the events of 11 September 2001, the capacity of the American state to garrison itself, for good or ill, will be put to use once again. These books show that many of the questions raised today about mobilization, civilian defense, and internal security are not new. More important, they offer us and policy planners a robust policy history

that *should* function as a referent for current decision-makers in the coming years.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

ENDNOTES

1. On international relations theory and the Cold War, see Janice Gross Stein, Thomas Risse-Kappen, et al., "Symposium: The End of the Cold War and Theories of International Relations," *International Organization* 48 (Spring 1994): 155–278; Kenneth Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (Spring 1988): 615–28; John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory," *International Security* 17 (Winter 1992/93): 5–58; Michael J. Hogan, ed., *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

2. Given the voluminous literature on the Cold War and the need for brevity, here are some recent examples. On new documentation regarding communist spying, see Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, *The Secret World of American Communism* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1995). For an alternative to the view proffered by Klehr et al., see Ellen Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes: McCarthysim in America*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1998); Jacob Weisberg, "The Rehabilitation of Joe McCarthy," *The New York Times Magazine* (November 28, 1999). An academic journal has been launched that considers the use of new primary resources that focus on the Cold War in an international context: *The Journal of Cold War Studies*. On the internet, The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), is breaking new ground in the area of Cold War studies. See http://cwihp.si.edu.

3. Public Law 253, 80th Cong., 1st Session, July 26, 1947, *U.S. Statutes At Large*, LXI, pp. 495–510. On the rationalization of national security policy and the role of the National Security Act of 1947, see Secretary of State George Marshall's comments in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1947, Vol. 1, pp. 712–15.

4. See Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Guy Oakes, *The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and Cold War Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Peter Trubowitz, *Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

5. See Aristide R. Zolberg, "International Engagement and American Democracy: A Comparative Perspective," in *International Influences on American Political Development*, ed., Ira Katznelson and Martin Shefter (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, forthcoming); and Zolberg, "Strategic interactions and the formation of modern states: France and England," in *The State in Global Perspective*, ed. Ali Kazancigil (London: Gower/Unesco, 1986), pp. 73–106. See also Martin Van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 189–332.

6. Andrew D. Grossman, *Neither Dead Nor Red: Civilian Defense and American Political Development During the Early Cold War* (New York: Routledge, 2001); Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000). On the garrison state as a concept, see Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State," *American Journal of Sociology* 56 (1941):

455–68; *National Security and Individual Freedom* (New York: MacGraw-Hill, 1950), pp. 23–49; *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York: Free Press, 1965); and *The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951).

7. On bureaucratic discretionary power and its potential to undermine liberal-democratic politics, see Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979), pp. 92–123. There is a large and growing historical literature on loyalty and political repression during the early Cold War. See, for example, the work of Athan Theoharis on the FBI, including *Seeds of Repression; Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971); and *Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Houston Plan* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978). Also see Sigmund Diamond, *Compromised Campus: The Collaboration of Universities with the Intelligence Community, 1945–1955* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). For an excellent work on the role of the CIA during this period see, Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid The Piper: The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta Books, 1999).

8. For a set of essays on historical institutionalism in comparative perspective, see Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds., *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

9. See Aristide R. Zolberg, "How Many Exceptionalisms" in *Working Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States*, ed., Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 397–456.

10. See "Report on Social Science Research in Cold War Operations," Papers of Harry S. Truman (PHST), Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), Box 1, Social Science Research Folder 2 of 2; "Information and Training for Civil Defense" National Archives (NA), National Security Resources Board (NSRB), Records Group (RG)–304, Box 19, Project East River Folder. See also "Funds Obligated for Social Science Research in Fiscal 1952," PHST, PSF, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), Box 1, Social Science Research file 2 of 2. Finally, see Roger L. Geiger, *Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities Since World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); and the essays in *Universities and Empire: Money and Politics in the Social Sciences During the Cold War*, ed. Christopher Simpson (New York: The New Press, 1998).

11. Andrew D. Grossman, "Atomic Fantasies and Make-Believe War: The American State, Social Control, and Civil Defense Planning, 1946–1952," *Political Power and Social Theory* 9 (1995): 91–120.

12. For an excellent discussion of the manifestations of this "Burkean" legacy in elite politics, see Don Herzog, *Poisoning the Minds of the Lower Orders* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 13–49; 193–201.

13. This data is taken from Grossman, *Neither Dead Nor Red*, Chapter 3. Much of the funding for social-science research related to Cold War issues was funneled through agencies such as the CIA, as well as a short-lived Orwellian agency know as the Psychological Strategy Board. This data, for the most part, remains classified.

14. Richard Franklin Bensel, *Sectionalism and American Political Development 1880–1980* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), p. 412.

15. I have reviewed Trubowitz's book in *Political Science Quarterly*. Although this section of the essay draws on my review, here I focus on the Cold War and the importance of Trubowitz's approach to understanding public policy formation. For my review of the book, see *Political Science Quarterly* 3 (Fall 1998): 519–20.

16. The issue of race, American political development, and region during this period can not be overestimated. See Daniel Kryder, *Divided Arsenal: Race and the American State During World War II* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000) and Ira Katznelson, Kim Geiger, and Daniel Kryder, "Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in Congress, 1933–1950" *Political Science Quarterly* 108 (Summer 1993): 283–306.