The Rise and Fall of Detente The Question: What caused the rise and the fall of détente? uThe Background: Détente was a period in the early 1970s when the United States and the Soviet Union emphasized negotiation over confrontation and sought to find a way to manage the competition without unnecessary confrontation. uOne Secondary Source: Vladislav Zubok that Leonid Brezhnev was crucial to the onset of détente, that he highly valued peace, that he was willing to make substantial concessions to gain peace and that he had the political skill as a mediator within the Soviet leadership to make it happen. Zubok later says that détente fell because of ideology and domestic politics, that neither side was willing to give up the “bargaining from a position of strength” necessary to make it work MY ARGUMENT uI believe a balance of power theory offers a better explanation for the rise of détente. Once both sides had an assured retaliatory capability and the fundamental sites of tension between the two sides had been rendered less critical, it was in the interests of both sides to look to other to stabilize the status quo and minimize the costs and risks of the competition. The two sides were able to solve some of the remaining issues separating the two, but the competition remained. Meanwhile, domestic interests on both sides of the cold war interested in maintaining a strategy of “peace through strength” used the remaining differences between the two powers in order to undermine détente, Review: The Soviets in1968 uThe Soviets build up nuclear weapons to have an assured retaliatory strike, and pursuing an expensive strategy to fight war in Europe uBrezhnev had been worried NATO would intervene in Czechoslovakia u Becomes more confident both in own abilities and in firmness of spheres of influence uSoviet concerns about the revolutionary policies of China that might destabilize the system uSoviet concerns about the economy, about the cost of the arms race and about the possibilities of trade with West uSoviets want recognition of East Germany and the implied recognition of equality as a great power u Review: The United States in 1968 uRichard Nixon and Henry Kissinger pride themselves on realist vision uThe US recognizes the Soviet Union has an assured retaliatory capability, and is pushing an expensive strategy to be able to fight a war in Europe uThe US accepts Soviet domination of Eastern Europe as, for the moment, irreversible, but not ready to declare this publicly because of German allies uThe US is bogged down in an unwinnable war in Vietnam uThe breakdown of the US popular consensus for containment reduces US ability to respond to crises elsewhere uUS concerned that revolutionary politics in China might destabilize the system uLINKAGE POLITICS https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FAhDQxPHvP0 u West Germany helps make it possible uWilly Brandt—former Mayor of Berlin uUnderstands a position of strength won’t bring Germans u together uHopes to do it through negotiation u Wiling to make concessions u Accepts Polish boundaries to German u Accepts that West Berlin not a part of West u Germany uThis opens the way for both Soviet Union and the US to move further China: Nixon’s Strategic Triangle uMao begins the Cultural Revolution-1966 u An attack on Chinese party and state institutions uChinese Soviet relations deteriorate u Ideological: Hyperrevolution vrs. Mature Stalinism u Debates about “illegal treaties” and territorial disputes u Huge Soviet build-up of conventional forces on the border u Skirmishes on an island in the Amur -1969 uBoth China and the Soviet Union seek assurances from the United States u Nixon-Surprise visit to China in 1972 u Nixon also asks China on help to Vietnam u u u u Vietnam under Nixon u Wants a ”Decent Interval” to assure credibility u “Vietnamization”: troops down to 39,000 by 1973 u Increases pressure: heavy bombing, invasion of Cambodia u Soviets agree to help, though not clear how much influence they had u 1973: US withdraws u 1975: North Vietnam overruns South Vietnam u u The Fruits of Detente uARMS CONTROL uNon-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 1968 (Johnson) uStrategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT I). 1972 uAnti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) 1972 uTRADE uUS increases sales of technology, grain to USSR uSYMBOLIC BENEFITS: The Basic Principles uNixon and Kissinger tell the Soviets that they have no interest in changing the Soviet system, and support Brandt in recognizing East Germany. u u u Linkage? uSoviet Union avoids conflicts that might disrupt détente u1972: US bombs Vietnam just before Nixon visit to Moscow u1973: Soviets hint to United States that Egypt will attack Israel u US capitalizes on Yom Kippur War to isolate USSR from Egypt u Détente continues anyway uHuman Rights uSoviets quietly increase number of Jews allowed to leave uSoviets send famous dissidents to the West rather than prison or u psychiatric wards u u The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, 1974 uFIRST BASKET: Security arrangements: u Renunciation of any change in boundaries by force. u This is the recognition that Soviets wanted and worked hard to attain. uSECOND BASKET: Trade arrangements uTHIRD BASKET: Human Rights u Agree to Freedom of Speech, Association, Movement u Soviets assumed they could ignore this part u But local dissidents use it: Polish Letter of 69, Charter 77, Helsinki Monitoring Group u The Competition Continues uNixon and Brandt leave office uTwo different conceptions of Détente u US: A means to moderate Soviet actions in the Third World u Expected moderation u USSR: A reflection of Soviet strength u Expected expansion, esp. in Africa uArms race continues despite agreements u Soviet military want to continue build-up u US hardliners in Congress want to continue build-up u US Domestic Politics and the Role of Human Rights uNixon and Kissinger are realists: More interested in détente than human rights u Still, they get some quiet deals improving human rights uOpponents of détente use human rights to discredit détente u Why human rights a political winner: Brings liberals, conservatives in u Conservatives: Don’t like communism, want to portray it as bad as possible u Liberals: Like human rights uJackson-Vanik Amendment: Henry Jackson looking for way to destroy detente u Limits trade with USSR unless publicly allows Jews to emigrate u Soviet Union says no uNegative response to Helsinki Third Act: Arguments that Soviets not following it Third World Struggles uUSSR and Cubans— uAngola uSomalia and Ethiopia uDifferent perceptions uUSSR—strength moves competition outside the center uUS—détente was supposed to stop such competition u The Carter Administration uIn the 1976 election, détente is a dirty word uThe Carter administration says it wants to reduce nuclear weapons uTears up a proposal for SALT II, offers a new proposal that reduces weapons, but mostly Soviet weapons, and Soviets reject it angrily uThe Carter Administration says it wants to pursue human rights uBut its record is ambivalent: very good in Latin America; poor in Iran uCarter and Afghanistan u