THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR 1917-1948 Housekeeping •The First Quiz •Reading Issues • Today’s Lecture •The Two Protagonists •The Interests of the Two Powers •An Uneasy Alliance During the War •The Immediate Post-War Situation •Failed Negotiations: Tehran, Yalta, Potsdam, London •Four Proclamations •The Marshall Plan • The Two Protagonists •Both universal ideas •Both seek to remake the international system after WWI •Both retreat after they fail •US isolationism—Communism particularly great threat •But some nongovernmental actions •Russia into besieged fortress, sees enemies •Five-Year Plans: Behind the Urals •But USSR also admired US •Very different domestic systems The Soviet Union. (Kennan gets it right here) •Ideology--Marxist-Leninism-Stalinism • Two Camps: Socialism vrs. Capitalism • Socialist Camp led by USSR • Interests of Socialism = Interests of USSR • Inexorable Conflict: Socialism will win, but must be prepared • Imperialist Contradictions: War among imperialist countries at least as likely as war between two camps •Practical Interests of USSR • Build up Soviet military strength—more industrialization • Use opportunities cautiously to gain territory: Zubok: Sphere of influence mentality • Litvinov (from Zubok): Outmoded vision • More territory = more safety • Stalin: Both sides will occupy as far as troops reach • Divide imperialists-Increase contradictions • The United States •The Roosevelt Administration •US Engagement in global politics and economics •Response to costs of isolationism in interwar period • US had become global financial center after WWI •Private banks had arranged system for European stability •US Government did not do anything to manage •When crisis hit in 1929, banks collapsed, arrangement failed, depression, protectionism •Depression also endangered democracy at home •Additional Fears • Wartime production had ended depression • Fears that end of war would decrease demand again • Returning soldiers • Isolationist sentiment still strong • US Interests •Create global economic order that would support US economy and, by extension, support US democracy •Prevent war: Four International Policemen •Stable global capitalist order •Strong Industrial Powers to trade with (Britain, Europe, Japan) •Free Trade (now the World Trade Organization) •Stable Monetary and Financial Sytem (IMF) •Presented in way that would gain domestic support •Remnants of Wilsoniamism--UN • The Uneasy Alliance: The Sources of Tension •Soviet Gains from Molotov-Ribbentrop •The Baltics, Western Poland, Bukovina, Ruthenia •The Casualties of War •USSR took brunt of European War •(But part of it Stalin’s fault) •Roosevelt had a political strategy of minimizing casualties •The Second Front: When and Where? •When: 1943 or 1944: •Reasons for 1944: War with Japan: Not enough landing crafts; Problem of Submarines •Stalin suspects otherwise •Churchill Plan for Southern Strategy—Mediterranean •Lend-Lease •Soviet Help in Japan • • • • • • • THE LEGACY OF WORLD WAR II •GENERAL INSTABILITY • Lack of any political continuity: • Nearly all continental Europe occupied or allied with Germany: new governments had to be installed • Economic desperation throughout Europe, but destruction worst in Germany, Poland, Baltics, Soviet Belorussia, Ukraine • Demographic crises: deaths , rapes, refugees (search for ethnic homogeneity) • New Leadership in US, Britain •THE BALANCE OF POWER • The United States is most powerful • Huge industrial productivity unaffected by war: 50% of World GDP • The largest naval capacity and the atomic bomb • Russia: Exhausted but formidable because of huge land army in Europe • Feeling in population, and some party members, that life should be easier • Britain exhausted, nearly bankrupt • The Post-War Settlement: Initial Issues •The Occupation of Germany, Austria •The Nature of Governments under Soviet occupation •Reparations •The Role of the United Nations •Japan •China •Turkey •Iran • • Negotiations: The Summits •Tehran, Late November 1943 •Yalta, February, 1945 •Potsdam, July, 1945 •US and Britain commit to invasion in France in May, 1944(Tehran) •Germany divided into four parts, including France (Yalta) •Recognition of Soviet annexation of Baltics (Tehran, Yalta) •Recognition of new Polish boundaries. (all three) •Recognition of Soviet-installed government in Poland, provided it is opened to members of opposition •Free elections in Soviet occupied countries. •“Orderly and Humane” Transfers/Expulsions of Germans from Poland, Czech lands(Y) •Soviet agreement to participate in UN (Yalta) •Reparations (including Soviet ability to gain reparations from Western Germany) • Questions •What are most popular attitudes towards the Yalta Conference in the Czech Republic today? • •Do you think Roosevelt should have bargained harder for more open governments in Eastern Europe? • •What are most popular attitudes regarding transfer of German population in the Czech Republic today? Has that been changing? Deteriorating Relations •Spring 1945: Soviet treatment of Poland, others raises suspicions •April, 1945: Franklin Roosevelt dies; Truman more confrontational •April 1945: US suspends Lend-Lease aid, then restores it •July, 1945: US tests Atomic Bomb •August 1945: At Potsdam, US revokes promise on Kuriles •August 1945: US, Britain refuse to recognize governments in Bulgaria, Rumania, Stalin suspects atomic diplomacy •October 1945: Moscow Conference ends with failure •December, 1945: USSR withdraws from US economic structure •Continuing frustrations about Soviet efforts in Eastern Europe, Iran, Turkey, etc. • Stalin’s Election Speech, February, 1946 •Mostly usual ideology, says USSR must have three more five-year plans •Dashes hopes of an easier life after the war •The perception in the US, however, very different •Seen in the midst of growing anxiety that cannot deal with Soviet •Said relatively little in favor of allies •Seemed to say that Soviet Union again preparing for war •Request for Kennan to offer his opinion • • • • Kennan Long Telegram: CONTAINMENT •Kennan was one of the best experts on Russia in US State Department •Had worked in Russia since 1930s, and read much more •Thought Stalin did not believe negotiation was possible •Thought Stalin always pressing for advantage •Thought Stalin understood only strength •Frustrated with Roosevelt’s efforts to persuade Stalin •Felt Roosevelt could have been tougher •By 1946, thought spheres of influence were locked in, must accept them •But must contain Soviet expansion in matters of importance • • Kennan Quotes • •Why does Soviet Union accept such an ideology? • •First, ideological language does not reflect Russian people: •“it does not represent natural outlook of Russian people. Latter are, by and large, friendly to outside world, eager for experience of it, eager to measure against it talents they are conscious of possessing, eager above all to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own labor. ... But party line is binding for outlook and conduct of people who make up apparatus of power--party, secret police and Government--and it is exclusively with these that we have to deal. •Why does leadership propagate such a line? Arises from Ancient Roots of Russian system • At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule wasrelatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to standcomparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. •. • • • • Kennan, February 22, 1946 •Why not abandon ideology? •In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethicalvalue in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moraland intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last ofthat long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced country onto ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security of their internally weak regimes. •[Marxism] provides justification for that increase of military and police power of Russian state, for that isolation ofRussian population from outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits ofRussian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. • • Containment in Action: Events of 1946 •Iran, March 1946 • Soviets do not comply with agreed withdrawal date • US and Britain react strongly in complaint, • USSR withdraws •Turkey, August, 1946 • USSR seeks to intimidate Turkey to have more say in Bosphorous • US naval exercises and USSR backs down •Germany • May, 1946: US suspends reparation payments from West to USSR • September, 1946: US says will not leave Europe, announces Bizonia Novikov Telegram, September 1946: A Response to Kennan •“For this purpose broad plans for expansion have been developed and are being implemented through diplomacy and the establishment of a system of naval and air bases stretching far beyond the boundaries of the United States, through the arms race, and through the creation of ever newer types of weapons.” • •“All of the countries of Europe and Asia are experiencing a colossal need for consumer goods, industrial and transportation equipment, etc. Such a situation provides American monopolistic capital with prospects for enormous shipments of goods and the importation of capital into these countries -- a circumstance that would permit it to infiltrate their national economies. Such a development would mean a serious strengthening of the economic position of the United States in the whole world and would be a stage on the road to world domination by the United States.” • • Novikov: •“The foreign policy of the United States is not determined at present by the circles that strive to strengthen cooperation. The ascendance to power of President Truman, a politically unstable person but with certain conservative tendencies, and the subsequent appointment of (James) Byrnes as Secretary of State meant a strengthening of the influence of U.S. foreign policy of the most reactionary circles of the Democratic party. “ •“ Obvious indications of the U.S. effort to establish world dominance are also to be found in the increase in military potential in peacetime and in the establishment of a large number of naval and air bases both in the United States and beyond its borders.” • • Questions: •What is role of ideology in creation of the cold war? • •What is role of personalities? •If Stalin had died in 1946, would things have been different? •If Roosevelt had lived until 1948, would things have been different? The Truman Doctrine, March 12, 1947 •Containment as the strategy • Do not allow Soviet expansion in areas of strategic importance • Not anti-communism, but directed against a great power • Keep firm, steady policy • Mostly economic •Turkey and Greece: • Both in economic need • Face Economic Press • Key areas in Mediterranean • Britain can no longer support: A Key Moment • Truman Doctrine •Still an isolationist group in Congress, might not be willing to give the money •Truman needs to persuade: He will “Scare the Hell out of them” •Not Soviet Union, but communism is a risk to security: • “The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States. • Truman Doctrine •A Simple View of the Ideological Struggle: • •“At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. •One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. •The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. • Truman Doctrine: The US Mission •The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world -- and we shall surelyendanger the welfare of our own nation. •… •I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to w ork out their own destinies in their own way. • • But Economic Means •“I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.” •… •The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better lifehas died. We must keep that hope alive.The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. • • What are the differences between the Truman Doctrine and the Long Telegram? •Who is the enemy? •Where should US challenge communism? •What is the motivation to engage in struggle? • •What role does domestic politics play in the cold war? • • The Marshall Plan, June 1947 •The need to strengthen European countries, particularly Germany •Offers over $20 million in aid; enables local governments freedom to • allocate •Some strings attached: must allow US corporate investment •All European countries invited, included USSR and other occupied countres •USSR goes to initial meetings, Molotov briefly interested, Czechoslovakia very interested • Stalin rejects Marshall plan, forces occupied countries to leave as well • •