CHAPTER 13 Political Executives and
Leadership
‘A ruler must learn to be other than good.’
NI C C O L Ò MA C H I AV E L L I , The Prince (1532)
P R E V I E W The executive is the irreducible core of government. Political systems can operate
without constitutions, assemblies, judiciaries and even parties, but they cannot
survive without an executive branch to formulate government policy and ensure
that it is implemented. Such is the potential power of executives that much of
political development has taken the form of attempts to check or constrain them,
either by forcing them to operate within a constitutional framework, or by making
them accountable to a popular assembly or democratic electorate. Political executives,
and particularly chief executives, are certainly the face of politics with which
the general public is most familiar. This is because the executive is the source of
political leadership. This role has been greatly enhanced by the widening responsibilities
of the state in both the domestic and international realms, and the media’s
tendency to portray politics in terms of personalities. However, the hopes and
expectations focused on executives may also prove to be their undoing. In many
political systems, leaders are finding it increasingly difficult to ‘deliver the goods’.
Debates about the nature, extent and implications of executive power are, nevertheless,
linked to the wider issue of political leadership. Widely seen as a vital ingredient
of politics, providing it with a necessary sense of purpose and direction,
leadership has been interpreted in a variety of ways, ranging from a personal gift to
a bureaucratic device. Similarly, leadership can involve a variety of styles, strategies
and approaches, affecting not only how effective it is but also the relationship
between leadership and democracy.
K E Y I S S U E S What is the executive branch of government? What does it comprise?
What are the principal functions of political executives?
How do presidential executives differ from parliamentary executives?
Where does power lie in political executives?
How should political leadership be understood and explained?
Is there a crisis of leadership in modern politics?
ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE
Who’s who in the executive?
The executive is, technically, the branch of government that is responsible for the
execution or implementation of policy. The division of government into executive,
legislative and judicial institutions has been sustained by the doctrine of the
separation of powers (see p. 313), and has been the traditional basis on which to
analyse government since the time of Montesquieu (see p. 312). From this point
of view, three distinct branches of government can be identified:
Legislatures make law; they enact legislation.
Executives implement law; they execute law.
Judiciaries interpret law; they adjudicate on the meaning of law.
In practice, however, the executive’s responsibilities tend to be substantially
broader, as well as more complex. This complexity also extends to the composition
of the executive. Members of executives have been categorized in one of two
ways. First, a distinction is often drawn between the ‘political’ executive and the
‘bureaucratic’ executive. This highlights the differences between politicians and
civil servants, and, more broadly, between politics and administration (see p.
363). Second, various levels of status and responsibility have been identified
within executives. Whereas assemblies tend to respect at least the formal equality
of their members, executive branches are typically pyramidal, organized according
to a clear leadership structure.
The distinction between political and bureaucratic, or official, posts is most
clear-cut in the case of parliamentary executives, where differences in recruitment,
responsibility, status and political orientation can be identified. In parliamentary
systems, the political executive comprises elected politicians, ministers
drawn from and accountable to the assembly: their job is to make policy, in accordance
with the political and ideological priorities of their party, and to oversee its
implementation. The official executive comprises appointed and professional civil
servants whose job it is to offer advice and administer policy,subject to the requirements
of political neutrality (see p. 345) and loyalty to their ministers.
Nevertheless, in parliamentary systems (see p. 310) such as those in Australia,
Canada, India and the UK, the political/bureaucratic distinction is blurred by the
fact that senior civil servants often make a substantial contribution to policymaking
and because use is commonly made of temporary, politically committed
advisers. The overlap is usually even greater in presidential executives. In the
USA, for example, the president is the only elected politician in the executive.
Cabinet members are, in effect, appointed officials, and all the senior and many
middle-ranking civil servants are politically partisan and temporary. In communist
executives, for example in China and the USSR of old, the distinction is
rendered virtually redundant by the all-pervasive reach of the ‘ruling’ communist
party. Chinese bureaucrats are thus ‘political’, in the sense that they are, in all
cases, ideologically committed supporters, and usually members, of the Chinese
Communist Party.
In comparison with political/bureaucratic distinctions, hierarchical divisions
within executive branches are easier to identify. In the first place, executives tend
P O L I T I C A L E X E C U T I V E S A N D L E A D E R S H I P 285
CONCEPT
Executive
In its broadest sense, the
executive is the branch of
government that is
responsible for the
implementation of laws
and policies. More
commonly, the term is
now used in a narrower
sense to describe the
smaller body of decisionmakers
who take overall
responsibility for the
direction and
coordination of
government policy. This
group of senior figures is
often called the political
executive (roughly
equivalent to ‘the
government of the day’,
or ‘the administration’),
as opposed to the official
executive, or bureaucracy
(p. 361). For ‘core’
executive (see p. 299).
Parliamentary executive:
An executive, typically
composed of a prime minister
and cabinet, that is drawn from
and accountable to the
parliament, and is formed
through parliamentary
elections.
Presidential executive: An
executive that is headed by a
separately elected president,
who enjoys political and
constitutional independence
from the parliament.
to be centralized around the leadership (see p. 300) of a single individual. As
Montesquieu put it,‘this branch of government, having need of dispatch, is better
administered by one than by many’. Two separate posts can, nevertheless, be identified,
although they may be held by the same person. On the one hand, there is
the head of state, an office of formal authority and largely symbolic importance.
On the other, there is the head of government, or the chief executive, a post that
carries policy-making and political responsibilities. Whereas executive presidents,
as in the USA, Russia and France, ‘wear two hats’, the posts in parliamentary
systems are usually separate. A prime minister serves as the chief executive, and
the post of head of state is usually held by a non-partisan figurehead.
Beneath the chief executive, a range of ministers or secretaries have responsibility
for developing or implementing policy in specific areas. There is often a
hierarchy amongst these departmental bosses, imposed either by the importance
of their policy areas (economics and foreign ministers generally hold leading
positions), or by their entitlement to sit in the cabinet or in senior committees.
As discussed further below, cabinets have responsibilities that range from the
sharing of policy-making power in a form of collective leadership to the offering
of advice and the broader coordination of executive policy. At a lower level are
the massed ranks of bureaucrats and administrators (discussed in Chapter 16)
who, at least in theory, are concerned less with policy formulation than with
policy implementation. Finally, there are enforcement agencies, such as the
police force and armed forces, and an array of quasi-governmental bodies, popularly
known as ‘quangos’ (see p. 368). These are part of the executive insofar as
they help to put government policy into effect, but they are staffed by personnel
who enjoy at least formal independence from the government itself.
Functions of political executives
At its most simple, the task of the political executive is to provide leadership. In this
sense, the executive functions as the ‘commanding heights’ of the state apparatus,
the core of the state itself. This role extends over a variety of areas, and this means
that the members of the political executive have to carry out several functions,
sometimes simultaneously. The most important of the areas are the following:
ceremonial duties
control of policy-making
popular political leadership
bureaucratic management
crisis response.
Ceremonial leadership
Heads of state, chief executives and, to a lesser extent, senior ministers or secretaries
‘stand for’ the state. In giving state authority personal form, they represent
the larger society and symbolize, accurately or otherwise, its unity. This role is
largely formal and ceremonial, and covers, for example, state occasions, foreign
visits, international conferences, and the ratification of treaties and legislation.
Non-executive presidents and constitutional monarchs are sometimes charged
with these essentially ceremonial responsibilities, allowing other executive
286 P O L I T I C S
Cabinet: A group of senior
ministers that meets formally
and regularly, and is chaired by
the chief executive; cabinets
may make policy or be
consultative.
CONCEPT
Heads of state
The head of state is the
personal embodiment of
the state’s power and
authority. As the leading
representative of the
state, the head of state
enjoys the highest status
in the land. However, he
or she is often a figure of
essentially symbolic or
formal significance, with
real power residing in the
hands of the head of
government (a post that
may or may not be held
by the same person).
Heads of state exercise a
range of ceremonial
powers and
responsibilities, such as
awarding honours,
assenting to legislation
and treaties, and
receiving visiting heads of
state. The head of state is
usually either a president
or monarch (see p. 292).
officers to get on with the day-to-day business of government. The role is, nevertheless,
of broader significance for two reasons. First, it provides a focus for unity
and political loyalty, and so helps to build legitimacy (see p. 81). Second, it allows
those at the top of the executive to portray themselves as ‘national leaders’, which
is vital to the maintenance of public support and electoral credibility.
Policy-making leadership
The key function of the political executive is to direct and control the policy
process. In short, the executive is expected to ‘govern’. This role was substantially
expanded during the twentieth century in response to the broadening responsibilities
of government. The political executive is looked to, in particular, to develop
coherent economic and social programmes that meet the needs of more complex
and politically sophisticated societies, and to control the state’s various external
relationships in an increasingly interdependent world. One important consequence
of this has been the growth of the executive’s legislative powers, and its
encroachment on the traditional responsibilities of the parliament or assembly.
Not only do political executives usually initiate legislative programmes and
help, by persuasion or direction, to make the legislative process work, but, in
many cases, they also exercise a wide range of law-making powers, using decrees,
orders and other instruments. However, it is misleading to imply that the political
executive always dominates the policy process. Much policy, for instance, is
initiated by political parties and interest groups. Moreover, by virtue of their
expertise and specialist knowledge, bureaucrats or civil servants may play a
crucial role in policy formulation; at best, leaving the political executive to establish
the overall direction of government policy.
Popular leadership
The popularity of the political executive, more than any other part of the political
system, is crucial to the character and stability of the regime as a whole. At a
policy level, it is the ability of the executive to mobilize support that ensures the
compliance and cooperation of the general public. Quite simply, without
support from the public, or from key groups in society, policy implementation
becomes difficult, perhaps impossible. More importantly, the political executive’s
popularity is linked to the legitimacy of the broader regime. The unpopularity of
a particular government or administration does not, in itself, weaken support for
the political system, but it may do so in the absence of a mechanism for removing
and replacing that government. This goes some way towards explaining the
widespread use of regular and competitive elections. Of course, this is not to say
that unpopular and immovable executives always spell systemic breakdown.
Such regimes can survive, but only by resorting to authoritarianism (see p. 277),
meaning that popular compliance is brought about through repression and
ideological manipulation.
Bureaucratic leadership
Its task of overseeing the implementation of policy means that the political executive
has major bureaucratic and administrative responsibilities. In this sense,
P O L I T I C A L E X E C U T I V E S A N D L E A D E R S H I P 287
chief executives, ministers and secretaries constitute a ‘top management’ charged
with running the machinery of government. This work is organized largely along
departmental lines, senior ministers having responsibility for particular policy
areas and for the bureaucrats engaged to administer those areas.At a higher level,
there is a need for policy coordination, which is usually accomplished through
some kind of cabinet system.
However, doubts have been expressed about the effectiveness of this
bureaucratic leadership. First, as political executives are staffed by politicians,
they often lack the competence, managerial experience and administrative
knowledge to control a sprawling bureaucratic machine effectively. Second,
particular government departments can develop their own interests, especially
when they forge alliances with powerful client groups. Third, the bureaucracy
as a whole can develop interests that are separate from those of the political
executive, encouraging it to resist the control of its notional political masters.
These issues are examined in greater detail in Chapter 16 in relation to bureaucratic
power.
Crisis leadership
A crucial advantage that the political executive has over the assembly is its ability
to take swift and decisive action. When crises break out, in either domestic or
international politics, it is invariably the executive that responds, by virtue of its
hierarchical structure and the scope it provides for personal leadership. It is
therefore common for assemblies to grant political executives near-dictatorial
powers in times of war, and for executives to seize ‘emergency powers’ when
confronted by domestic crises such as natural disasters, terrorist threats, industrial
unrest and civil disorder. Clearly, however, the power to declare ‘states of
emergency’ and to impose effective executive rule is subject to abuse. Not
uncommonly, governments have used these powers to weaken or eradicate political
opposition under the guise of constitutionalism (see p. 337).
POWER IN THE EXECUTIVE: WHO LEADS?
As already noted, the roles and responsibilities of the political executive have
been substantially enhanced by the emergence of democratic politics, growing
government intervention, and political and economic globalization (see p. 142).
During the twentieth century, political executives acquired ever-wider policymaking
and legislative responsibilities, took command of sprawling bureaucratic
machines, and increasingly became the focus of popular politics and media
attention. These developments have, in turn, profoundly affected the internal
organization of the executive branch of government, and the distribution of
power within it. By common consent, the main beneficiary of this process has
been the chief executive. Heads of government now commonly have institutional
responsibilities, a political status, and a public profile that sets them clearly apart
from their cabinet or ministerial colleagues. Nevertheless, this image of growing
centralization and the rise of personal power conflicts sharply with evidence of
leadership failure, and the growing incapacity of chief executives to carry out
what people have elected them to do (see p. 305). The complex dynamics of exec-
288 P O L I T I C S
utive power can be examined more closely by looking at the roles of presidents,
prime ministers and cabinets.
In each of these three cases, however, three dimensions of power must be
borne in mind:
the formal dimension of power: the constitutional roles and responsibilities
of executive officers and the institutional frameworks in which they operate
the informal dimension of power: the role of personality, political skills and
experience, and the impact of factors such as parties and the media
the external dimension of power: the political, economic and diplomatic
context of government, and the broader pressures that bear on the executive
branch.
Presidents
A president is a formal head of state, a title that is held in other states by a
monarch or emperor.An important distinction, however, must be made between
constitutional presidents and executive presidents. Constitutional or nonexecutive
presidents, found in India, Israel and Germany, for example, are a
feature of parliamentary systems and have responsibilities confined largely to
ceremonial duties. In these circumstances, the president is a mere figurehead, and
executive power is wielded by a prime minister and/or a cabinet. This section is
concerned with executive presidents, who combine the formal responsibilities of
a head of state with the political power of a chief executive. Presidencies of this
kind constitute the basis of what is called ‘presidential government’ (see Figure
13.1), as opposed to parliamentary government (see Figure 14.1).
Presidential executives may be either limited or unlimited. Limited presidential
executives operate within constraints imposed by a constitution, political
democracy, party competition and some form of separation of powers.
Above all, the powers of the president are counterbalanced by those
of a popularly accountable assembly. The best-known example of limited
presidentialism is found in the USA, but semi-presidential systems like those
in France and Finland also conform to this model. In unlimited presidential
executives, on the other hand, the president is invested with near-unchecked
powers, meaning that these regimes are, effectively, dictatorships (see p. 281).
They are commonly found in one-party states that rest heavily on the support
of the military. Unlimited executives can be found, for example, in Sudan,
Belarus and Kazakhstan.
US-style presidential government has spawned imitations throughout the
world, mainly in Latin America and, more recently, in postcommunist states
such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Russia – although, apart from
Russia, most postcommunist presidencies operate within what are effectively
parliamentary systems. In investing executive power in a presidency, the architects
of the US constitution were aware that they were, in effect, creating an ‘elective
kingship’. Wishing to avoid the abuse of power they believed had occurred
under the British Crown, they established an intricate separation of powers
between the legislative, executive and judicial branches. This was more accurately
described by Richard Neustadt (1990) as ‘separated institutions sharing
powers’. Thus, although the president was designated head of state, chief execuP
O L I T I C A L E X E C U T I V E S A N D L E A D E R S H I P 289
CONCEPT
Presidential
government
A presidential system of
government is
characterized by a
constitutional and
political separation of
powers between the
legislative and executive
branches of government.
The principal features of
a presidential system are:
(1) the executive and the
legislature are separately
elected; (2) there is a
formal separation of the
personnel between the
legislative and the
executive branches; (3)
the executive cannot be
removed by the
legislature (except,
possibly, through
impeachment; (4) the
president or executive
cannot ‘dissolve’ the
legislature; and (5)
executive authority is
concentrated in the
hands of the president.
Presidentialism:
Personalized leadership that is
disengaged from parties or
other government bodies, in
the manner of an executive
president.
Semi-presidential system:
A system of government in
which a separately elected
president presides over a
government drawn from, and
accountable to, the assembly.
tive, commander-in-chief of the armed forces and chief diplomat, and was
granted wide-ranging powers of patronage and the right to veto legislation,
Congress was invested with strong counterbalancing powers. In particular,
Congress could declare war and override presidential vetoes, and the Senate was
empowered to approve appointments and ratify treaties. Indeed, until the early
twentieth century the presidency remained a generally secondary institution;
such policy leadership as was required was provided by Congress.
The status of the US presidency was then transformed by two key developments.
First, a national economy developed that required the government to
abandon its traditional laissez-faire policies and adopt a more interventionist
approach to economic and social life. Second, the USA was forced to drop its
policy of isolationism and accept a world role, assuming after World War II a
superpower status, in a bipolar, and subsequently unipolar, world system. Since
President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal in the 1930s, US presidents have played
the role of chief legislator, and since 1945 have worn the mantle of the leader of
the ‘free world’. Alarmed by the ease with which President Johnson and President
Nixon escalated the Vietnam War without war being formally declared by
Congress, Arthur Schlesinger (1974) went so far as to proclaim the emergence of
an ‘imperial presidency’.
Presidential power is, nevertheless, often fragile and insubstantial. Neustadt’s
classic text Presidential Power (1990) remains correct: the chief power of the US
president is the ‘power to persuade’; that is, the ability to bargain, encourage and
even cajole, but not dictate. The ability of US presidents to get their way depends
on four crucial relationships, specifically those with:
Congress
the federal bureaucracy
the Supreme Court
the media.
The president’s relationship with Congress is undoubtedly the most crucial. The
success of particular presidents, for instance, is often quantified in terms of their
‘success rate’ with Congress; that is, the proportion of their legislative
290 P O L I T I C S
Presidency Assembly
Checks and
balances
Electorate
Figure 13.1 Presidential system of government (limited presidentialism)
Patronage: The practice of
making appointments to office,
or, more widely, the granting of
favours.
Imperial presidency: A
presidency that has broken free
from its constitutional bounds
and threatens to dominate the
other two branches of
government.
programme that survives congressional scrutiny. Following the Vietnam War
and the Watergate scandal, however, presidents have had to confront more
assertive Congresses, intent on reclaiming some of their lost powers. An early
example of this was the passage of the War Powers Act 1974, which meant that
congressional support was required for the dispatching of US troops abroad.
More significantly, the USA’s relatively weak party system deprives the president
of the major lever of legislative control available to parliamentary executives: an
appeal to party unity. This means, as President Jimmy Carter discovered in the
1970s, that presidents can be rebuffed by Congress even when both houses are
dominated by their own party.
Presidents may be weaker still when they are confronted by a Congress that
is controlled by the opposition party. This was the problem that President
Clinton experienced after the election of a Republican Congress in 1994. Barack
Obama’s influence over Congress was also severely restricted when the
Democrats lost 63 seats in, and control of, the House of Representatives in the
2010 mid-term elections. The difficulty confronting the president is that, regardless
of party affiliation, both Representatives and Senators are concerned primarily
with the ‘folks back home’. Indeed, the interest that this forces them to take in
domestic affairs has encouraged commentators to speak of the‘two presidencies’.
These are the ‘domestic’ presidency, which is typically characterized by policy
failure and gridlock, and from which most presidents retreat; and the ‘foreign’
presidency, to which they gravitate in the hope of demonstrating their leadership
credentials. Even President Clinton, elected to office on a promise to focus ‘like a
laser beam’ on the economy, could not avoid, in Rose’s (1987) words, ‘going
international’. This trend was further strengthened by the so-called ‘war on
terror’ (see p. 401) following the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and
Washington. The ultimate control that Congress exercises over the president
resides in the power of impeachment, although this has only been used twice
(Andrew Johnson in 1868, and Bill Clinton in 1998), and on both occasions the
president was aquitted at a trial by the Senate.
In theory, the federal bureaucracy exists to serve the president but, in practice,
it often acts as an embarrassing constraint. Although presidents make, directly or
indirectly, about 4,000 appointments at senior and middle-ranking levels in their
administrations, this is a minimal proportion of the total number of professional
bureaucrats in the US, who number over 2 million. Moreover, it is widely argued
that these bureaucrats frequently respond to interests at odds with the priorities
of the administration. As Secretary of the Navy under Woodrow Wilson, F. D.
Roosevelt described influencing the Navy Department as like punching a feather
mattress: ‘you punch and punch but it remains the same’. In his famous
comment on his successor, General Eisenhower, President Truman referred to a
similar problem:
He’ll sit here and he’ll say ‘Do this! Do that!’ and nothing will happen. Poor
Ike – it won’t be a bit like the Army.
Similar difficulties exist in relation to the Supreme Court. Since the 1950s, the
Court has played a significant role in US political life, forcing presidents to shape
the political agenda, in part, by exercising influence over it. Although presidents
appoint justices to the Supreme Court, these appointments may be rejected by
P O L I T I C A L E X E C U T I V E S A N D L E A D E R S H I P 291
Impeachment: A formal
process for the removal of a
public official in the event of
personal or professional
wrongdoing.
292 P O L I T I C S
the Senate (as discovered by Nixon twice and Reagan once), and, once they have
been appointed, judges cannot be controlled because of their security of tenure.
Much of the New Deal programme in the 1930s was blocked by the Supreme
Court, until F. D. Roosevelt was able to shift its ideological balance through the
‘court revolution’ of 1937. Eisenhower, in turn, appointed Earl Warren as Chief
Justice, only later discovering his taste for judicial activism and his liberal interpretation
of the constitution.
The final key relationship is that between the US president and the media.
The media are vital to presidents who need to appeal directly to the US public
‘over the heads of Congress’. In this respect, presidents such as Ronald Reagan, a
former actor and journalist, have been remarkably successful in ‘managing’
media coverage and ensuring favourable comment. Nevertheless, presidents who
live by the media may also die by them. The media are often portrayed as the
USA’s fourth branch of government, which prizes both its political independence
and its reputation for seeking truth. The exposure of the Watergate scandal by
The Washington Post eventually led to the resignation of President Nixon in 1974,
and relentless coverage of the Whitewater affair seriously weakened the Clinton
administration in the early 1990s.
The potential within presidential systems for institutional conflict was realized
in early postcommunist Russia as the Russian parliament came increasingly
under the control of hardliners intent on resisting President Yeltsin’s ‘shock
therapy’ reform package. Ultimately, Yeltsin’s presidency survived only because
of the support of the military in crushing the parliament’s rebellion in October
Focus on . . .
The monarchy debate
A monarchy is a system of rule dominated by one
person (it literally means ‘rule by one person’). In
general usage, however, it is the institution through
which the post of head of state is filled through inheritance
or dynastic succession. In absolute monarchies,
the monarch claims, if seldom exercises, a monopoly of
political power (examples being Saudi Arabia, Swaziland
and the Vatican City). In constitutional monarchies, the
monarch fulfils an essentially ceremonial function
largely devoid of political significance (for example, in
Spain, the Netherlands and the UK).
The advantages of a constitutional monarchy are as
follows:
It provides a solution to the need for a non-partisan
head of state who is ‘above’ party politics.
The monarch embodies traditional authority, and so
serves as a symbol of patriotic loyalty and national
unity.
The monarch constitutes a repository of experience
and wisdom, especially in relation to constitutional
matters, available to elected governments.
The disadvantages of a constitutional monarchy include
the following:
It violates democratic principles, in that political
authority is not based on popular consent and is in
no way publicly accountable.
The monarch symbolizes (and possibly supports)
conservative values such as hierarchy, deference and
respect for inherited wealth and social position.
The monarchy binds nations to outmoded ways and
symbols of the past, thus impeding progress.
1993, which led to the imposition of presidential rule. The possibility of the
emergence in Russia of an unlimited presidential executive was, however, offset
by Yeltsin’s need to balance the volatile and conflicting pressures within the
Russian political system. Russia’s tradition of strong executive leadership was
nevertheless reasserted after 1999 by President Putin. Putin established a hegemonic
presidency based on what he called a‘dictatorship of law’. This system was
amended during 2008–12, when Putin served as prime minister under President
Medvedev, due to a constitutional restriction on residents serving for three
successive terms in office.
A different form of presidential government is found in semi-presidential
systems, such as those in France, Austria, Finland and Portugal. These are hybrid
systems. They comprise, as in presidential systems, a separately elected president
invested with a range of executive powers and, as in parliamentary systems, a
government, usually featuring a prime minister and a cabinet, drawn from and
accountable to the assembly. In Finland and Austria, for example, such systems
operate largely through a division of executive responsibilities, allowing the president
to concentrate on foreign affairs and broader constitutional issues, while
the prime minister and cabinet take charge of domestic policy.
However, the system constructed in the Fifth French Republic, and
completed with the introduction of a separately elected president in 1962, is
significantly more complex. On the one hand, in addition to carrying out the
roles that the US president plays as head of state, chief executive and dispenser
of appointments, French presidents enjoy a fixed five-year term in office, and can
also bring the legislature to heel by using their power to dissolve the National
Assembly. On the other hand, they are seriously constrained by the need for their
governments to maintain parliamentary and public support. Thus, presidents
such as de Gaulle (1958–69), Pompidou (1969–74) and Giscard d’Estaing (1974–
81) derived their strength largely from the control that Gaullist forces exercised
in the National Assembly. However, the right to call a general election does not
necessarily guarantee party control of the National Assembly, as the Socialist
President Mitterrand discovered in 1986, and again in 1993, when he was forced
into cohabitation with Gaullist governments. Similarly, despite the fact that he
possessed the formal powers of an elected monarch, de Gaulle’s presidency
ended in resignation in 1969 after the student riots of May 1968 and a financial
crisis. The fragility of presidential power was also demonstrated by the pressures
on President Chirac, particularly during the period of Jospin’s Socialist-led
government (1997–2002).
Prime ministers
Most of the political executives in the modern world can be classified as
parliamentary executives. The structure and form of executive power found in
parliamentary systems differs significantly from that in presidential ones.
Parliamentary executives have three essential features. First, since executive power
is derived from the assembly and closely linked to party politics, a separate head
of state, in the form of a constitutional monarch or non-executive president, is
required to fulfil ceremonial duties and act as a focus of patriotic loyalty. Second,
the political executive is drawn from the assembly, which means that the separation
of the personnel between the legislature and executive found in presidential
P O L I T I C A L E X E C U T I V E S A N D L E A D E R S H I P 293
Cohabitation: An
arrangement in a semipresidential
system in which
the president works with a
government and assembly
controlled by a rival party or
parties.
systems does not occur in parliamentary systems. Third, the executive is directly
responsible to the assembly, or at least to its lower chamber, in the sense that it
survives in government only as long as it retains the confidence of the assembly.
The external dynamics of executive power in parliamentary systems thus
contrast sharply with those found in presidential ones. In short, parliamentary
executives are forced to govern in and through assemblies, while presidential
executives tend to rely on a personal mandate and an independent set of constitutional
powers. This undoubtedly also affects the internal dynamics of power.
In particular, it creates a greater pressure in parliamentary executives for collective
decision-making and collaboration, often reflected in the higher status of the
cabinet in these systems. However, many commentators have argued that the
growth of prime-ministerial power has effectively turned prime ministers into
quasi-presidents.
Prime ministers (sometimes seen as chancellors, as in Germany; ministerpresidents,
as in the Netherlands; or referred to by a local title, such as the Irish
Taoiseach) are heads of government whose power is derived from their leadership
of the majority party, or coalition (see p. 239) of parties, in the assembly.
The range of formal powers with which the office of prime minister is invested
are typically modest in comparison with those of executive presidents. The most
important of these is the control of patronage – the ability to hire and fire,
promote and demote, ministers. In the Netherlands and Australia, for example,
even this power is exercised by the assembly or the majority party. As the job of
prime minister can have only a loose constitutional description, it is no exaggeration
to say that the post is what its holder chooses to make of it or, more accurately,
is able to make of it.
In practice, this boils down to two key sets of prime-ministerial relationships.
The first set is with the cabinet, individual ministers and government departments;
the second is with his or her party and, through it, the assembly and the
public. The support of the cabinet is particularly crucial to prime ministers who
are designated primus inter pares (first among equals), such as those in the UK,
India and Australia. This status forces prime ministers to operate through a
system of collective cabinet government (see p. 298). Their power is therefore a
reflection of the degree to which, by patronage, cabinet management and the
control of the machinery of government, they can ensure that ministers serve
under them. In contrast, German chancellors are personally empowered by
Article 65 of the Basic Law (1949) to decide the general lines of government
policy. However, the same article also constrains their power by stipulating that
ministers enjoy autonomy in relation to their departments.
There is no doubt that the key to prime-ministerial power and influence lies
in his or her position as party leader. Indeed, the modern premiership is largely
a product of the emergence of disciplined political parties. Not only is the post
of prime minister allocated on the basis of party leadership, it also provides its
holder with a means of controlling the assembly and a base from which the
image of a national leader can be constructed. The degree of party unity, the
parliamentary strength of the prime minister’s party (in particular, whether it
rules alone or as a member of a coalition), and the authority vested in the assembly
(or, at least, its first chamber), are therefore important determinants of
prime-ministerial power. For instance, factional rivalry within, and then the
decline of, the LDP ensured that the tenure of Japanese prime ministers was
294 P O L I T I C S
short (17 prime ministers came and went between 1974 and 2011) and cabinets
were frequently reconstructed. Similarly, Italy’s fragmented party system usually
forces prime ministers to play the role of a broker within what tend to be fragile
coalition governments. German chancellors, for their part, are restricted by the
independence of the Länder, the power of the second chamber (the Bundesrat),
and the authority of the Constitutional Court, as well as by the autonomy of the
Bundesbank.
There is, nevertheless, agreement that, despite their differing constitutional
and political positions, prime-ministerial power has grown in recent years. This
results in part from the tendency (of the broadcast media, in particular) to focus
on personalities, meaning that prime ministers become a kind of ‘brand image’
of their parties. The growth of international summitry and foreign visits also
provides prime ministers with opportunities to cultivate an image of statesmanship,
and gives them scope to portray themselves as national leaders. In some
cases, this has led to the allegation that prime ministers have effectively emancipated
themselves from cabinet constraints and established a form of primeministerial
government. For instance, in India an imperial style of premiership
developed under Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv that reached its peak during
the state of emergency, 1975–77. This was possible because of the secure majorities
that the Congress Party enjoyed in parliament, the ruthless control exerted
over the apparatus of central government, and the sway that the Gandhi dynasty
continued to exert over important sections of the Indian public.
Allegations of prime-ministerial government have often been made in the
UK. The unusual level of power wielded by prime ministers stems from various
sources, including the following:
the level and range of their patronage
their control of the cabinet system, especially their ability to set up and staff
cabinet committees
their ability to dominate the assembly as leaders of the largest party, especially
when that party has majority control of the lower chamber
their position as head of the civil service, and the control this gives them
over the bureaucratic machine
their direct access to the media, which enables them to make personalized
appeals to the voters.
Prime ministers stand at the apex of the administrative and political arms of
government, meaning that the cabinet has been turned into a US-style advisory
body that no longer exercises policy-making responsibility. The primeministerial
government thesis appeared to have become a reality in the UK
during the 1980s, as Margaret Thatcher effectively recast the nature and authority
of the office. In many respects, Tony Blair’s premiership after 1997 built on
these foundations. What distinguished Thatcher’s premiership was the fact that
she saw herself as a ‘conviction prime minister’, her role being to provide ideological
leadership and policy coherence, orientated around ideas that came to be
called Thatcherism. Similarly, Blair strongly associated his leadership of the
Labour Party with the advance of the ‘modernizing’ project; this saw the party
rebranded as‘new’ Labour and‘third way’ ideological priorities displace old-style
socialist ones. For Michael Foley (2000), this development exposed the degree to
P O L I T I C A L E X E C U T I V E S A N D L E A D E R S H I P 295
Thatcherism: The freemarket/strong-state
ideological
stance adopted by Margaret
Thatcher; the UK version of the
New Right political project.
296 P O L I T I C S
which an ‘authentically British presidency’ had come into existence, highlighting
a wider trend in parliamentary systems towards presidentialism.
Although prime ministers who command cohesive parliamentary majorities
can wield power that would be the envy of many a president, they are also subject
to important constraints. By no means, for instance, do prime ministers have a
free hand in terms of hiring and firing. The need to maintain party unity by
ensuring that the various factions and ideological wings of the party are represented
in the cabinet, and the pressure in countries such as Canada to maintain
regional and linguistic representation, act as important checks on primeministerial
power. The advent of coalition government, as under David Cameron
in the UK since 2010, also constrains the prime minister’s powers of patronage.
Ultimately, prime ministers are only as powerful as their cabinets, parties and
broader political circumstances allow them to be. This can be seen in India,
where, following the excesses of the emergency in the 1970s, prime ministers such
as Desai, Singh and Rao, leading coalition or minority governments, reduced the
size of the prime minister’s staff, were willing to respect the autonomy of government
departments, and interfered less in the affairs of state governments.
It is also interesting that the power wielded by Margaret Thatcher in the UK
may have been less a consequence of her indomitable character and ideological
resolution than a reflection of the unusually favourable circumstances that
confronted her. Chief amongst these were the weak and divided nature of the
Labour opposition, the 1982 Falklands War victory, the revival of the world
economy in the mid-1980s, and, partly as a result of these, the ability of the
Conservatives to win three successive elections under her leadership. However,
the fragility of prime-ministerial power was underlined by her removal as leader
in 1990.
Focus on . . .
Prime-ministerial government: a virtue or a vice?
Prime-ministerial government has two key features.
First, the office of prime minister is the central link
between the legislative and executive branches of
government, its holder being drawn from and accountable
to the assembly, and also serving as chief executive
and head of the bureaucracy. Second,
prime-ministerial government reflects the centralization
of executive power in the hands of the prime
minister and the effective subordination of both the
cabinet and departmental ministers. In this, it parallels
presidentialism.
Prime-ministerial government has been criticized for
the following reasons:
It strengthens centralization by weakening the
constraints formerly exerted by the cabinet and
government departments.
It narrows policy debate and weakens scrutiny by
excluding criticisms and alternative viewpoints.
However, it can be defended on the following grounds:
It reflects the personal mandate that prime ministers
acquire in general elections.
It gives government policy clearer direction by
checking the centrifugal pressures embodied in
departmentalism (see p. 371) and the ‘nudge and
fudge’ of collective decision-making.
P O L I T I C A L E X E C U T I V E S A N D L E A D E R S H I P 297
Events: In March 2003, the Iraq War
started with an invasion launched by
the USA and the UK. The UK’s involvement
in this war was a remarkable
example of prime-ministerial power. It
showed the then-prime minister, Tony
Blair, at his most determined, zealous,
even messianic. Blair persisted with his
determination to ‘stand by the USA’,
despite mass anti-war demonstrations
on the streets of London and other
major UK cities, and despite suffering
the largest backbench revolt against
any government in over a century.
What is more, this was a war of choice
for Blair. Many in Washington had
expected the UK to back away from
military action once the Security
Council of the United Nations had
failed to pass a resolution specifically
authorizing the war, and they had planned accordingly. The
UK’s involvement in the Iraq War was therefore a personal
decision on the part of Blair: he did it because he thought
it was the right thing to do. But he also did it because he
could do it: his position as prime minister allowed him to
do it.
Significance: For many, the decision to go to war was a
clear reflection of the fact that the UK no longer had a
prime minister, but a president. Personal leadership had
replaced collective leadership – the prime minister was in
charge, not the cabinet or Parliament. In a trend dating
back to Harold Wilson in the 1960s and Margaret Thatcher
in the 1980s, Blair had been able to emancipate himself
from the constraints that typically apply to a parliamentary
executive. With two landslide election victories
behind him (in 1997 and 2001), Blair had little to fear
from a cabinet that was, in the main, unwilling to challenge
his authority, or from a Parliament in which Labour’s
majority was so large that it effectively immunized him
from backbench pressure. Although the UK does not have
a separately elected executive, a combination of the
media’s portrayal of politics in terms of personality and
image, rather than ideas and policies, and the tendency of
parties to use their leaders as their ‘brand image’, has led
to the growth of personalized election campaigns in which
the victorious leader comes to claim a personal mandate
on the basis of their electoral success. This has led to the
growth of ‘spatial leadership’; that is, the tendency of
leaders to distance themselves from their parties and
governments either by presenting themselves as
‘outsiders’, or by developing a personal ideological stance.
However, significant though these trends may be, it is
difficult to argue that they have rebalanced the structural
dynamics of the UK’s parliamentary executive. Although
Blair’s decision in 2003 was, in itself, a remarkable
example of prime-ministerial power, it cast a dark shadow
over the rest of his premiership, ultimately leading to the
end of his political career. After 2003, Blair’s poll ratings
plummeted, and Labour’s majority in the 2005 general
election was slashed from 166 to just 65. A mood of
restiveness and unease took hold on Labour’s backbenches
and was expressed in increasingly frequent backbench
revolts. Tensions also grew within the cabinet, especially
as Gordon Brown and his allies became more open about
pursuing their political ambitions. Shortly before the 2005
election, Blair became the first prime minister to, in effect,
pre-announce his own resignation. He did this by promising
that, if he were re-elected for a third term in office, he
would not seek a fourth term. This promise was duly
carried out when he resigned in June 2007. Presidential
tendencies may have allowed Blair to make the fateful
2003 decision in the first place, but the fact that UK prime
ministers are always forced to operate within a cabinet
and parliamentary system meant that he was unable to
escape the consequences of that decision.
POLITICS IN ACTION . . .
The UK prime minister: a president in all but name?
298 P O L I T I C S
The relative weakness of John Major’s premiership, particularly in the
1992–97 period, stemmed less from his personal inadequacies and more from
the greater difficulties his government had to face. Chief amongst these was a
combination of the Conservatives’ diminished parliamentary majority and the
party’s deepening rift over Europe. In contrast, Tony Blair benefited not only
from his large majorities and the electoral decline of the Conservative Party, but
also from the fact that, after 18 years in opposition, the Labour Party was initially
more responsive to demands for strong leadership and unity. Gordon Brown’s
premiership, 2007–10, was blighted by both his personal limitations as a political
communicator and by the severe recession that was triggered by the 2007–09
global financial crisis, which effectively destroyed Brown’s and Labour’s reputation
for economic competence.
Cabinets
Virtually all political executives feature a cabinet of some sort. In France, the
cabinet is known as the ‘Council of Ministers’ and, in China, it is called the
‘Politburo’. A cabinet is a committee of senior ministers who represent the
various government departments or ministries. This term is not to be confused
with ‘cabinet’, as used in France and the EU to denote small groups of policy
advisers who support individual ministers. The widespread use of cabinets
reflects the political and administrative need for collective procedures within the
political executive. In the first place, cabinets enable government to present a
collective face to assemblies and the public. Without a cabinet, government
Focus on . . .
Cabinet government: advantages and disadvantages
Cabinet government is characterized by two central
features. First, the cabinet constitutes the principal link
between the legislative and executive branches of
government; its members are drawn from and accountable
to the parliament, but also serve as the political
heads of the various government departments. Second,
the cabinet is the senior executive organ, and policymaking
responsibility is shared within it, the prime
minister being ‘first’ in name only. This system is
usually underpinned by collective responsibility – all
the cabinet ministers are required to ‘sing the same
song’ and support official government policy.
The virtues of cabinet government are the following:
It encourages full and frank policy debate within
the democracy of cabinet meetings, subjecting
proposals to effective scrutiny.
It guarantees the unity and cohesion of government,
since the cabinet makes decisions collectively
and collectively stands by them.
However, cabinet government has been criticized for
the following reasons:
It acts as a cloak for prime-ministerial power
because it forces dissenting ministers to support
agreed government policy in public.
It means that government policy becomes
incoherent and inconsistent, as decisions are
based on compromises between competing
ministers and departmental interests.
could appear to be a personal tool wielded by a single individual. Second, cabinets
are an administrative device designed to ensure the effective coordination of
government policy. In short, in the absence of a cabinet, government would
consist of rival bureaucratic empires each bent on self-aggrandisement, rather as
occurred in the Hitler state in Nazi Germany.
The precise role and political importance of cabinets vary from system to
system and state to state. In presidential systems such as the USA’s, the cabinet
exists to serve the president by acting as a policy adviser, rather than a policymaker.
Indeed, in the second half of the twentieth century, executive growth in
the USA occurred largely at a non-cabinet level, in the form of the construction
of the Executive Office of the President (discussed in Chapter 16). In contrast,
the cabinet, in theory at least, is the apex of the executive in states that respect
the principle of cabinet government, such as the UK, most of the
Commonwealth and several European countries (including Italy, Sweden and
Norway).
It is, nevertheless, difficult in practice to find examples of collective executives
that operate through a cabinet or equivalent body. In theory, a form of collective
leadership operates in China, reflecting the Marxist–Leninist belief that the
Communist Party (CCP), rather than a single leader, is the leading and guiding
force in Chinese society. In practice, the leadership system in China has been
dominated by a paramount individual. In the cases of Mao Zedong, during
1949–76, and Deng Xiaoping, during 1978–97, they wielded such supreme
power that they retained their position until they died. More recent Chinese
leaders have combined their position with the posts of general secretary of the
CCP and president of the People’s Republic of China. In Germany, and
commonly throughout continental Europe, a tradition of departmental specialization
discourages ministers from seeing themselves as ‘team players’, and so
counters any tendency towards cabinet government. Even in the UK system,
supposedly the archetypal example of cabinet government, it is difficult to see
the cabinet as a decision-making body, let alone as a democratic forum.
Not only has the rise of prime-ministerial power subverted the collective
nature of UK government, but the growth in the range and complexity of
government policy has also ensured that most decisions are effectively made
elsewhere, and thus reach the cabinet in a prepackaged form. This highlights the
important contribution that government departments make to policy formulation,
as well as the impact of cabinet committees and, indeed, subcommittees. In
the UK and elsewhere, the full cabinet is merely the hub of a cabinet system,
comprising committees of subject specialists able to examine policy proposals in
greater detail and depth than is possible in the cabinet itself. This system weakens
the cabinet both because it strengthens the levers of control that are available to
the prime minister, who sets up and staffs committees, and because full cabinets
usually lack the time and expertise to challenge proposals that emanate from
committees. The complex relationships that result from this have been explained
by some commentators in terms of the idea of a ‘core executive’ (Rhodes and
Dunleavy, 1995).
On the other hand, it would be a mistake to dismiss cabinets as merely‘dignified’
institutions. Many prime ministers, for example, have paid a high price for
ignoring the collective element within modern government. German chancellors
are generally considered to be even stronger than UK prime ministers because
P O L I T I C A L E X E C U T I V E S A N D L E A D E R S H I P 299
CONCEPT
Core executive
The core executive is a
network of institutions
and people who play key
roles in the overall
direction and
coordination of
government policy. It
usually encompasses the
prime minister, senior
policy advisers, leading
cabinet members, cabinet
committees, and staff in
strategically important
government
departments. The core
executive model gets
away from the simplistic
‘prime minister versus
cabinet’ debate, by
acknowledging that these
bodies operate within an
institutional context. It
also acknowledges the
extent to which policy
influence is exerted
through the building up
of alliances and coalitions
of support.
they can be removed only by a vote of ‘constructive no confidence’. This means
that the Bundestag can remove a government only by approving an alternative
one, not merely by withdrawing support from the existing one (as occurs in the
UK). Nevertheless, Chancellor Schmidt was forced to resign in 1982 when the
small Free Democratic Party withdrew from his Social-Democrat-led coalition
cabinet to join forces with the Christian Democrats, led by Helmut Kohl.
Coalitions certainly add to the difficulties of cabinet management, as Italian
prime ministers have regularly discovered, but a single-party cabinet can also
cause problems for chief executives.
Although cabinets generally remain loyal to prime ministers for fear that
divisions in a party’s senior leadership spell the likelihood of election defeat,
prime ministers are sometimes removed as a result of pressure from within the
cabinet, or from senior party figures. Margaret Thatcher interpreted her fall in
1990 in precisely these terms. Thatcher claimed to have been ousted by a cabinet
coup through the withdrawal of ministerial support once she had failed to secure
re-election as party leader on the first ballot (Thatcher, 1993). Kevin Rudd’s
removal as Australian prime minister in 2010 reinforced the lesson that parliamentary
leaders cannot long survive without the support of senior party figures.
Faced with the declining popularity of his government and growing dissatisfaction
with his own leadership, Rudd stood down as prime minister and Labor
Party leader in favour of his deputy, Julia Gillard, becoming the first Australian
prime minister to be removed from office by his own party during his first term
in office.
THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP
In some respects, the subject of political leadership appears to be outdated. The
division of society into leaders and followers is rooted in a predemocratic culture
of deference and respect in which leaders ‘knew best’ and the public needed to
be led, mobilized or guided. Democratic politics may not have removed the need
for leaders, but it has certainly placed powerful constraints on leadership;
notably, by making leaders publicly accountable and establishing an institutional
mechanism through which they can be called to account and removed. In other
respects, however, the politics of leadership has become increasingly significant,
helping to contribute to the establishment of a separate discipline of political
psychology, whose major concerns include a study of the psychological make-up
and motivations of political leaders (Kressel, 1993).
This growing focus on leadership has occurred for a number of reasons. For
instance, to some extent, democracy itself has enhanced the importance of
personality by forcing political leaders, in effect, to ‘project themselves’ in the
hope of gaining electoral support. This tendency has undoubtedly been
strengthened by modern means of mass communication (especially television),
which tend to emphasize personalities, rather than policies, and provide leaders
with powerful weapons with which to manipulate their public images.
Furthermore, as society becomes more complex and fragmented, people may
increasingly look to the personal vision of individual leaders to give coherence
and meaning to the world in which they live. Ironically, then, leadership may
never have been so important, but also so difficult to deliver.
300 P O L I T I C S
CONCEPT
Leadership
Leadership can be
understood either as a
pattern of behaviour, or
as a personal quality. As a
pattern of behaviour,
leadership is the
influence exerted by an
individual or group over a
larger body to organize or
direct its efforts towards
the achievement of
desired goals. As a
personal attribute,
leadership refers to the
character traits that
enable the leader to exert
influence over others;
leadership is thus
effectively equated with
charisma (see p. 83). In
both respects, however,
leadership requires
‘followership’. For a claim
to leadership to be
upheld, others, the
followers, must recognise
and act on that claim.
P O L I T I C A L E X E C U T I V E S A N D L E A D E R S H I P 301
Theories of leadership
The question of political leadership is surrounded by controversy. To what extent
is leadership compatible with freedom and democracy? Does personalized leadership
inspire and motivate, or does it subdue and repress (see p. 305)? Are
strong leaders to be admired or feared? At the heart of these disagreements lie
differing views about the nature of political leadership. What does the phenomenon
of leadership comprise? Where does leadership come from? Four contrasting
theories of leadership can be identified. Leadership can be understood as:
a natural gift
a sociological phenomenon
an organizational necessity
a political skill.
A natural gift
The traditional view of leadership sees it as a rare but natural gift.As Aristotle (see
p. 6) put it, ‘men are marked out from the moment of birth to rule or be ruled’.
From this perspective, leadership is strictly an individual quality, manifest in the
personalities of what were traditionally thought of as ‘men of destiny’. The most
extreme version of this theory is found in the fascist ‘leader principle’ (Führerprinzip).
This is based on the idea of a single, supreme leader (always male), who
alone is capable of leading the masses to their destiny. Such an idea was, in part,
derived from Friedrich Nietzsche’s notion of the Übermensch (the ‘overman’ or
‘superman’), who rises above the ‘herd instinct’ of conventional morality and so
achieves self-mastery. In a more modest form, this theory of leadership is embodied
in the idea of charisma, generally understood to mean the power of personality.
The classic examples of charismatic leaders are usually seen as forceful
personalities (such as Hitler, Castro, Nasser and Thatcher), although the more
modest, but no less effective,‘fireside chats’of F. D. Roosevelt and the practised televisual
skills of almost all modern leaders also exemplify charismatic qualities.
However, unfortunately, leaders who exhibit genuine moral authority are rare.
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900)
German philosopher.A professor of Greek at Basel by the age of 25, Nietzsche became
increasingly interested in the ideas of Schopenhauer (1788–1860) and the music of
Wagner (1813–83). Growing illness and insanity after 1889 brought him under the
control of his sister Elizabeth, who edited and distorted his writings. Nietzsche’s
complex and ambitious work stressed the importance of will, especially the ‘will to
power’, and it anticipated modern existentialism in emphasizing that people create
their own worlds and make their own values. He attacked conventional values based
on God, truth and morality, and sought to replace these with new values and a new
ideal of the human person. His best known writings include Thus Spake Zarathustra
(1883/84), Beyond Good and Evil (1886) and On the Genealogy of Morals (1887).
Modern political psychology adopts a similar view of leadership, in that it
analyses it in terms of human personality. One of the earliest attempts to do this
was the collaboration in the late 1920s between the Austrian psychologist
Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) and US diplomat William C. Bullitt on a controversial
study of President Woodrow Wilson (Freud and Bullitt, 1967). Harold
Lasswell’s ground-breaking Psychopathology and Politics (1930) suggested that
leaders are motivated largely by private, almost pathological, conflicts, which are
then rationalized in terms of actions taken in the public interest. A widely
discussed modern analysis of political leadership has been advanced by James
Barber (1988). Focusing on what he called ‘presidential character’, Barber categorized
US presidents according to two key variables: first, whether they were
‘active’ or ‘passive’ in terms of the energy they put into their jobs; and, second,
whether they were ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ in terms of how they felt about political
office. He therefore identified four character types:
active-positive
active-negative
passive-positive
passive-negative.
Examples of active-positive presidents would include Kennedy, Clinton and
Obama. Active-negative presidents would include Harding and Reagan. Nixon is
an example of a passive-positive president, while Coolidge and Eisenhower were
passive-negative. Nevertheless, the limitations of Barber’s analysis are demonstrated
by the way that George W. Bush was transformed from a passive-positive
president into a much more assertive and active one by the terrorist attacks on
the USA on 11 September 2001.
A sociological phenomenon
An alternative view of leadership sees it as a sociological, rather than psychological,
phenomenon. From this perspective, in other words, leaders are ‘created’
by particular socio-historical forces. They do not so much impose their will on
the world as act as a vehicle through which historical forces are exerted. This is
certainly the approach adopted by Marxists, who believe that historical development
is structured largely by economic factors, reflected in a process of class
struggle. The personalities of individual leaders are, thus, less important than the
broader class interests they articulate. Marx, nevertheless, acknowledged that
Bonapartism was an exception. This was a phenomenon based on Louis
Bonaparte’s coup d’état in France in 1851, through which a personal dictatorship
was established in conditions in which the bourgeoisie had lost power, but the
proletariat was not sufficiently developed to seize it. Even in this case, however,
Marx insisted that the Bonapartist dictatorship reflected the interests of the
numerically strongest class in France, the smallholding peasantry. Similarly, in
analysing Stalinism in the USSR, Trotsky (see p. 369) emphasized the degree to
which Stalin’s power was rooted in the dominance of the state bureaucracy
(Trotsky, 1937). Sociological factors have also provided the basis for the very
different idea that political leadership is largely a product of collective behaviour.
In his seminal The Crowd ([1895] 1960), Gustav Le Bon analysed the dynamics
302 P O L I T I C S
Bonapartism: A style of
government that fuses personal
leadership with conservative
nationalism; for Marxists, it
reflects the relative autonomy
of the state.
CONCEPT
Cult of
personality
A cult of personality (or
cult of leadership) is a
propaganda device
through which a political
leader is portrayed as a
heroic or God-like figure.
By treating the leader as
the source of all political
wisdom and an unfailing
judge of the national
interest, the cult implies
that any form of criticism
or opposition amounts to
treachery or lunacy. Cults
of personality have
typically been developed
in totalitarian regimes
(first by Stalin) through
the exploitation of the
possibilities of modern
means of mass
communication, and the
use of state repression to
cultivate a form of
ritualized idolatrization.
of crowd psychology, arguing that leaders are impelled by the collective behaviour
of the masses, not the other way round.
An organizational necessity
The third theory of leadership sees it in largely technical terms as a rational, or
bureaucratic, device. In this view, leadership is essentially an organizational
necessity that arises from the need for coherence, unity and direction within any
complex institution. Leadership therefore goes hand-in-hand with bureaucracy
(see p. 361). Modern large-scale organizations require specialization, which, in
turn, gives rise to a hierarchy of offices and responsibilities. This bureaucratic
leadership conforms to what Weber (see p. 82) called legal-rational authority, in
that it is essentially impersonal and based on formal, usually written, rules. The
rise of constitutional government has undoubtedly invested political leadership
with a strongly bureaucratic character by ensuring that power is vested in a political
office, rather than the individual office-holder. This, nevertheless, conflicts
with democratic pressures that force political leaders to cultivate charisma and
emphasize personal qualities in order to win and retain power.
A political skill
The final theory of leadership portrays it very much as an artefact; that is, as a
political skill that can be learned and practised. Political leadership, in this sense,
is akin to the art of manipulation, a perhaps inevitable feature of democratic
politics in an age of mass communications. This can be seen most graphically in
the cults of personality that have been constructed to support the dictatorial
leaderships of figures such as Mao Zedong (see p. 304), Colonel Gaddafi and
Saddam Hussein. Indeed, many of the classic examples of charismatic leadership
can, in practice, be seen as forms of manufactured leadership. Stalin, for
example, bolstered his own popularity by building up an elaborate cult of Lenin
in the 1920s; he erected statues, renamed streets and towns, and placed Lenin’s
embalmed body in a mausoleum in Red Square. During the 1930s, having carefully
linked himself to Lenin’s heritage, Stalin transferred this cult to himself.
Similarly, Hitler’s performances at the Nuremburg rallies were carefully stagemanaged
by Albert Speer. His every word and gesture were carefully rehearsed
and choreographed; the whole event was designed to build up emotional tension
that would be released by Hitler’s appearance.
Modern democratic politicians have no less strong a need to project themselves
and their personal vision, though the skills appropriate to the television
age tend to be refined and sophisticated compared with those suitable for mass
rallies and public demonstrations. The heightened optimism that greeted Barack
Obama’s first election victory in 2008 and his inauguration the following year,
and his unusually successful early period in office (especially over the issue of
health care reform), were often linked to his capacity to deploy two important
leadership skills. First, an astute and highly fluent public speaker, Obama
was able to convey professionalism and gravitas whilst also, as appropriate,
using humour and self-deprecation. Second, he demonstrated strong emotional
intelligence, the capacity that, according to Greenstein (2009), is the key to
establishing a successful leadership style. Emotional intelligence reflects the
P O L I T I C A L E X E C U T I V E S A N D L E A D E R S H I P 303
Emotional intelligence:
The ability to handle oneself
and to build successful
relationships, based on an
understanding of one’s own
and others’ feelings.
304 P O L I T I C S
ability to draw on four key competences or skills: self-awareness (the ability to
read one’s own emotions), self-management (the ability to control one’s
emotions and marshall positive emotions), empathy (the ability to sense, understand
and react to others’ emotions) and relationship management (the ability
to use these skills in combination to have the greatest impact in any situation)
(Goleman, 2005). In Obama’s case, these skills were used in an attempt to
balance a commitment to bipartisanship against support for an underlying
vision of the federal government as an agent of social justice that harked back to
Franklin Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ and Lyndon Johnson’s ‘Great Society’. However,
a possible drawback of such ‘soft’ leadership skills (in many ways, these are akin
to ‘soft’ power (see p. 428)) is that they may so increase levels of hope and expectation
that eventual disillusionment with the leader becomes inevitable.
Styles of leadership
A style of leadership refers to the strategies and behavioural patterns through
which a leader seeks to achieve his or her goals. Quite simply, leaders are not all
alike: leadership can be exercised in a number of different ways. The factors that
shape the adoption of a particular leadership strategy or style are, of course,
numerous. Amongst the most obvious are the personality and goals of the leader,
the institutional framework within which he or she operates, the political mechanisms
by which power is won and retained, the means of mass communication
available, and the nature of the broader political culture. Three distinctive styles
of leadership have been identified (Burns, 1978):
laissez-faire leadership
transactional leadership
transformational leadership.
The chief feature of laissez-faire leadership is the reluctance of the leader to
interfere in matters outside his or her personal responsibility. Such leaders have
a ‘hands off’ approach to cabinet and departmental management. An example
of such leadership could be found in the Reagan White House, and the relatively
Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976)
Chinese Marxist theorist and leader of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–76. Mao
was the son of a peasant farmer in Hunan. He initially worked as a librarian and
teacher. In 1921, he helped to found the Chinese Communist Party and, in 1935,
became its leader. As a political theorist, Mao adapted Marxism–Leninism to the
needs of an overwhelmingly agricultural and still traditional society. His legacy is
often associated with the Cultural Revolution (1966–70), a radical egalitarian movement
that denounced elitism and ‘capitalist roaders’ (these inclined to bow to pressure
from bourgeois forces), and that resulted in widespread social disruption,
repression and death. Maoism is usually understood as an anti-bureaucratic form of
Marxism that places its faith in the radical zeal of the masses.
P O L I T I C A L E X E C U T I V E S A N D L E A D E R S H I P 305
Questions about leadership become particularly controversial when leaders draw less on their office and its formal powers
and more on their own personal qualities and characteristics. When leadership becomes more an individual rather than
an institutional phenomenon, does it become sinister or threatening? Or is personalized leadership more meaningful,
even inspiring, than ‘bureaucratic’ forms of leadership?
YES NO
Debating . . .
Should personalized leadership always be feared?
Recipe for authoritarianism. The fact that, as democracy
has advanced, political leadership has increasingly been
‘depersonalized’ (by being subject to constitutional and
institutional constraints) is no coincidence. When a
leader’s authority derives more from his or her personality
than his or her office, government power is apt to be
abused. This reflects the longstanding concern that as
charisma (charm, or the power of personality) is not
based on formal rules or procedures, potentially, it has no
limit. In line with Lord Acton’s warning that ‘absolute
power corrupts absolutely’, leaders may also become
more greedy, selfish and insensitive to the views of others
to the extent that they feel they can manipulate them.
Infantilizing society. Personalized leadership may not
only affect leaders but also followers, the public at large.
Charismatic leadership has a near-mystical character,
operating as it does through the belief that leaders
possess special, even god-like qualities. As the relationship
between leader and followers has a quasi-religious
dimension, it generates uncritical loyalty, amounting
perhaps to devotion. Personalized leaders are obeyed not
because of what they say or do, but because of who they
are. The rise of personalized leadership therefore infantilizes
society, instilling a political passivity and unwillingness
to engage in questioning, argument and debate
that is incompatible with a healthy democracy.
Doomed to fail. Leaders who come to power largely as a
result of personal gifts or qualities tend to be poor
leaders whose political careers typically end in failure.
Personalized leaders ‘shine’ in the theatre of politics,
where their oratorical (and, often, televisual) skills are
most in evidence, but their administrative and policymaking
skills may be much less developed. Moreover,
their capacity to engender optimism and enthusiasm may
mean that they build up hope and expectation to a level
that cannot be fulfilled, thereby making disappointment
inevitable. Finally, when leaders believe they can
persuade anyone of anything, they become susceptible to
hubris and self-delusion.
Charisma and democracy. The idea that charismatic
leadership is irreconcilable with democracy is a gross
over-statement. While no one would deny that charisma
continues to be significant in the democratic age, its
political character has changed fundamentally. Rather
than being aloof, domineering and bombastic, modern
charismatic leaders cultivate ‘soft’ qualities, hoping to be
liked rather than feared and trying to resemble ordinary
citizens rather than overlords. What is more, however
attractive a leader’s personality and however fluent and
persuasive a communicator he or she may be, no modern
leader has the capacity to use their personal skills to
escape from the electoral and constitutional constraints
of a democratic system.
Leadership with a human face. Leadership works only if
it is personal. Leaders must move us: they must ignite
our passions and inspire the best in us, and, in the
process, help us recognize the potential of our society.
They do this not simply because of the office that they
hold, but because they are living, breathing human
beings, who are capable of articulating a narrative that is
meaningful precisely because it derives from the leader’s
life, values and sense of vision. Perhaps the foremost
attribute of leadership in contemporary circumstances is
the ability to formulate and, most importantly, communicate
a message that resonates with large sections of the
electorate.
Being above politics. Personalized leaders are able to
distance themselves from the political and institutional
context that may otherwise define them. This is most
evident in relation to party politics and the danger that,
being a party leader, a president or prime minister may
use their position primarily to advance the interests of
their party and its associated groups. Whereas party
leadership entails partisanship, so leading to a one-sided
approach to politics, personalized leadership opens up
the possibility of bipartisanship, as the leader is able to
rise above party divisions and appeal to a wider body of
people and groups.
slight interest that Reagan took in the day-to-day workings of his administration.
George W. Bush, similarly, was strongly inclined to delegate responsibilities
to key advisers, but the so-called ‘war on terror’, launched in 2001, forced
him to adopt a more forthright leadership style. A laissez-faire style is not irreconcilable
with ideological leadership, but it certainly requires that ideological
goals constitute only a broadly-stated strategic vision. The strengths of this
approach to leadership are that, because subordinates are given greater responsibility,
it can foster harmony and teamwork, and it can allow leaders to concentrate
on political and electoral matters by relieving them of their managerial
burdens. On the other hand, it can also lead to the weak coordination of
government policy, with ministers and officials being allowed too much scope
to pursue their own interests and initiatives. The Iran–Contra affair, for
example, demonstrated how little President Reagan knew about the activities of
the Central Intelligence Agency officers and White House officials for whom he
was supposedly responsible.
In contrast, transactional leadership is a more ‘hands-on’ style of leadership.
Transactional leaders adopt a positive role in relation to policy-making and
government management, but are motivated by essentially pragmatic goals and
considerations. Prominent amongst these are likely to be the maintenance of
party unity and government cohesion, and the strengthening of public support
and electoral credibility. Such leaders act as brokers who are concerned to
uphold the collegiate face of government by negotiating compromises and
balancing rival individuals, factions and interests against one another. In the
USA, Lyndon Johnson and George Bush Sr could be seen as transactional
leaders, as could Harold Wilson and John Major in the UK. This is, above all, a
managerial, even technocratic, style of leadership, its advantage being that it is
fiercely practical and allows scope for tactical flexibility. Its central drawback,
however, is that such leaders may be seen as opportunistic wheeler-dealers who
are devoid of firm principles or deep convictions. This was illustrated by George
Bush’s damaging admission during the 1992 US presidential election that he did
not understand what he called ‘the vision thing’.
In the third style of leadership, transformational leadership, the leader is not
so much a coordinator or manager as an inspirer or visionary. Not only are such
leaders motivated by strong ideological convictions, but they also have the
personal resolution and political will to put them into practice. Instead of
seeking compromise and consensus, transformational leaders attempt to mobilize
support from within government, their parties and the general public for the
realization of their personal vision. Howard Gardner (1996) suggested that a
leader is ‘an individual who creates a story’. The effectiveness of such a leader
hinges on the degree to which the leader in question‘embodies’ the story, and the
extent to which the story resonates with the broader public.
General de Gaulle, for instance, recast the nature of political leadership in
France as much by presenting himself as a ‘father figure’ and ‘national leader’ as
by establishing a presidential system in the form of the Fifth Republic. A very
similar style was adopted in the UK by Margaret Thatcher, whose avowed aim
when coming into office was to run a ‘conviction government’. The continued
use of terms such as ‘Gaullism’ and ‘Thatcherism’ bears witness to the enduring
impact of these leaders’ ideological visions. Tony Blair in the UK also adopted a
transformational stance by recasting the Labour Party as ‘new’ Labour, in the
306 P O L I T I C S
process ensuring that his government pursued ‘third way’ rather than old-style
socialist priorities. Not uncommonly, transformational leadership is linked to
populism, reflecting the desire of such leaders to demonstrate that they are articulating
the concerns and interests of ‘the people’. Although the strength of transformational
leadership is that it provides a basis for pushing through radical
programmes of social, economic or political reform, it may also encourage a
drift towards authoritarianism and lead to ideological rigidity. It is thus possible
to see Thatcher herself as one of the casualties of Thatcherism, in that in 1990
she paid the price for her domineering leadership style and her unwillingness to
change policy priorities, even when these had become electorally unpopular.
Regardless of the leadership style they adopt, there are reasons to believe that
modern political leaders face greater challenges than their predecessors did. This
is important, because attitudes towards leaders, and the perceived effectiveness of
leadership, do much to influence people’s general view of the political process.
The first difficulty that leaders face is that modern societies have perhaps become
so complex and enmeshed with global influences that politicians find it almost
impossible to get things done. Leaders are therefore doomed to disappoint, to fail
to live up to expectations. Indeed, virtually all political careers end in failure
perhaps because would-be leaders can only rise by building greater expectations
than they have the capacity to fulfil.
Second, leaders suffer because old ideological and moral certainties are
breaking down, and this makes it more difficult to construct compelling narratives
that have wide popular resonance. Third, modern societies are becoming
more diverse and fragmented. Political leaders are therefore finding it increasingly
difficult to construct a political appeal based on a common culture and a
set of shared values. Fourth, and finally, a cultural gap has perhaps developed
between the political and the non-political worlds. Political leaders are increasingly
career politicians whose lifestyles, sensibilities and even language are
remote from the concerns of private citizens. Far from being seen as providing
inspiration and articulating popular hopes and aspirations, modern leaders tend
to be viewed as self-serving and out of touch. To the extent that this is true,
people become alienated from conventional politics, and perhaps look elsewhere
for a source of political leadership.
P O L I T I C A L E X E C U T I V E S A N D L E A D E R S H I P 307
CONCEPT
Populism
Populism (from the Latin
populus, meaning ‘the
people’) has been used to
describe both distinctive
political movements and
a particular tradition of
political thought.
Movements or parties
described as populist
have been characterized
by their claim to support
the common people in
the face of ‘corrupt’
economic or political
elites. As a political
tradition, populism
reflects the belief that
the instincts and wishes
of the people provide the
principal legitimate guide
to political action.
Populist politicians
therefore make a direct
appeal to the people, and
claim to give expression
to their deepest hopes
and fears.
Questions for discussion
In what circumstances may heads of state play a
significant political role?
Is the only power that a chief executive possesses
the power to persuade?
Are presidents or prime ministers more powerful?
Is collective cabinet government a principle worth
preserving?
Are leaders ‘born’ or ‘made’?
Is the task of leadership becoming easier or more
difficult?
Should strong leaders be admired or feared?
Are cults of personality a feature of all political
systems, not just dictatorial ones?
Do we get the political leaders we deserve?
SUMMARY
The executive branch of government is responsible for the execution or implementation of policy. The political
executive comprises a core of senior figures and is roughly equivalent to ‘the government of the day’ or
‘the administration’. The bureaucratic executive consists of public officials or civil servants. However, the
political/bureaucratic distinction is often blurred by the complexities of the policy-making process.
Political executives act as the ‘commanding heights’ of the state apparatus and carry out a number of leadership
roles. These include representing the state on ceremonial occasions, offering policy-making leadership in
relation to strategic priorities, mobilizing popular support for the government or administration, overseeing
the bureaucratic machine, and taking the initiative in the event of domestic or international crises.
Presidential executives concentrate executive power in the hands of a president who combines the roles of
head of state and head of government, but confronts an assembly that enjoys constitutional and political
independence. Prime ministers in parliamentary systems operate through two key sets of relationships: the
first is with their cabinets, ministers and departments; the second is with their parties and the assembly from
which their power stems.
The power of chief executives has been enhanced by the tendency of the media and electoral politics to
focus on personality and image, by the opportunities to display statesmanship provided by international
affairs and summitry, and by the need for political and ideological leadership within an increasingly large and
complex executive branch. Their power is, nevertheless, checked by the importance of government and party
unity, the need to maintain support in the assembly, and the difficulty of controlling the sprawling bureaucratic
machine.
Political leadership has been understood in various ways. It has been interpreted as a personal gift based on
individual qualities such as charisma, as a sociological phenomenon in which leaders express particular sociohistorical
forces, as an organizational necessity rooted in the need for coherence and unity of direction, and
as a political skill that can be learned by leaders intent on manipulating their colleagues and the masses.
Leaders have adopted very different strategies to achieve their goals. Laissez-faire leadership attempts to
foster harmony and teamwork by broadening the responsibilities of subordinates. Transactional leadership
allows leaders to act as brokers, and balance rival factions and interests against each other. Transformational
leadership places a heavy emphasis on the mobilization of support through the leader’s capacity to inspire
and to advance a personal vision.
308 P O L I T I C S
Further reading
Elgie, R., S. Moestrup and Yu-Shan Wu (eds), SemiPresidentialism
and Democracy (2011).A wide-ranging
collection of essays that examine the workings and
implications of semi-presidential systems.
Gardner, H., Leading Minds (1996). A fascinating exploration
of the nature of leadership, and the skills and
strategies deployed by leaders.
Helms, L., Presidents, Prime Ministers and Chancellors:
Executive Leadership in Western Democracies (2004).
A useful discussion of executive leadership that
compares the USA, the UK and Germany.
Poguntke, T. and P. Webb., The Presidentialization of
Politics (2007). A major examination of the ‘presidential
logic of governance’, that also considers
cross-national differences.