CHAPTER 3 Politics and the State
‘The purpose of the State is always the same: to limit the
individual, to tame him, to subordinate him, to subjugate him.’
MA X ST I R N E R , The Ego and His Own (1845)
P R E V I E W The shadow of the state falls on almost every human activity. From education to
economic management, from social welfare to sanitation, and from domestic order
to external defence, the state shapes and controls; where it does not shape or
control it regulates, supervises, authorizes or proscribes. Even those aspects of life
usually thought of as personal or private (marriage, divorce, abortion, religious
worship and so on) are ultimately subject to the authority of the state. It is not
surprising, therefore, that politics is often understood as the study of the state, the
analysis of its institutional organizations, the evaluation of its impact on society
and so on. Ideological debate and party politics, certainly, tend to revolve around
the issue of the proper function or role of the state: what should be done by the
state and what should be left to private individuals and associations? The nature of
state power has thus become one of the central concerns of political analysis. This
chapter examines the feature that are usually associated with the state, from both
a domestic and an international perspective. It considers the issue of the nature of
state power, and, in the process, touches on some of the deepest and most abiding
divisions in political theory. This leads to a discussion of the contrasting roles and
responsibilities of the state and the different forms that states have assumed.
Finally, it looks whether, in the light of globalization and other developments, the
state is losing its central importance in politics.
K E Y I S S U E S What is the state, and why does it play such a crucial role in politics?
How has state power been analysed and explained?
Is the state a force for good or a force for evil?
What roles have been assigned to the state? How have responsibilities
been apportioned between the state and civil society?
To what extent does politics now operate outside or beyond the state?
DEFINING THE STATE
The term ‘state’ has been used to refer to a bewildering range of things: a collection
of institutions, a territorial unit, a philosophical idea, an instrument of coercion
or oppression, and so on. This confusion stems, in part, from the fact that
the state has been understood in four quite different ways; from an idealist
perspective, a functionalist perspective, an organizational perspective and an
international perspective. The idealist approach to the state is most clearly
reflected in the writings of G. W. F. Hegel (see p. 59). Hegel identified three
‘moments’ of social existence: the family, civil society and the state. Within the
family, he argued, a ‘particular altruism’ operates that encourages people to set
aside their own interests for the good of their children or elderly relatives. In
contrast, civil society was seen as a sphere of ‘universal egoism’ in which individuals
place their own interests before those of others. Hegel conceived of the state
as an ethical community underpinned by mutual sympathy – ‘universal altruism’.
The drawback of idealism, however, is that it fosters an uncritical reverence
for the state and, by defining the state in ethical terms, fails to distinguish clearly
between institutions that are part of the state and those that are outside the state.
Functionalist approaches to the state focus on the role or purpose of state
institutions. The central function of the state is invariably seen as the maintenance
of social order (see p. 400), the state being defined as that set of institutions
that uphold order and deliver social stability. Such an approach has, for
example, been adopted by neo-Marxists (see p. 64), who have been inclined to
see the state as a mechanism through which class conflict is ameliorated to
ensure the long-term survival of the capitalist system. The weakness of the functionalist
view of the state, however, is that it tends to associate any institution
that maintains order (such as the family, mass media, trade unions and the
church) with the state itself. This is why, unless there is a statement to the
contrary, an organizational approach to the definition of the state is adopted
throughout this book
The organizational view defines the state as the apparatus of government in
its broadest sense; that is, as that set of institutions that are recognizably ‘public’,
in that they are responsible for the collective organization of social existence and
are funded at the public’s expense. The virtue of this definition is that it distinguishes
clearly between the state and civil society (see p. 6). The state comprises
the various institutions of government: the bureaucracy (see p. 361), the military,
the police, the courts, the social security system and so on; it can be identified
with the entire ‘body politic’. The organizational approach allows us to talk
about ‘rolling forward’ or ‘rolling back’ the state, in the sense of expanding or
contracting the responsibilities of the state, and enlarging or diminishing its
institutional machinery.
In this light, it is possible to identify five key features of the state:
The state is sovereign. It exercises absolute and unrestricted power, in that it
stands above all other associations and groups in society. Thomas Hobbes
(see p. 61) conveyed the idea of sovereignty (see p. 58) by portraying the
state as a ‘leviathan’, a gigantic monster, usually represented as a sea creature.
State institutions are recognizably ‘public’, in contrast to the ‘private’
institutions of civil society. Public bodies are responsible for making and
P O L I T I C S A N D T H E S T A T E 57
CONCEPT
The state
The state is a political
association that
establishes sovereign
jurisdiction within
defined territorial
borders, and exercises
authority through a set
of permanent
institutions. These
institutions are those
that are recognizably
‘public’, in that they are
responsible for the
collective organization of
communal life, and are
funded at the public’s
expense. The state thus
embraces the various
institutions of
government, but it also
extends to the courts,
nationalized industries,
social security system,
and so forth; it can be
identified with the entire
‘body politic’.
Idealism: A view of politics
that emphasizes the
importance of morality and
ideals; philosophical idealism
implies that ideas are more
‘real’ than the material world.
Civil society: A private
sphere of autonomous groups
and associations, independent
from state or public authority
(see p. 6).
enforcing collective decisions, while private bodies, such as families, private
businesses and trade unions, exist to satisfy individual interests.
The state is an exercise in legitimation. The decisions of the state are usually
(although not necessarily) accepted as binding on the members of society
because, it is claimed, they are made in the public interest, or for common
good; the state supposedly reflects the permanent interests of society.
The state is an instrument of domination. State authority is backed up by
coercion; the state must have the capacity to ensure that its laws are obeyed
and that transgressors are punished. For Max Weber (see p. 82), the state
was defined by its monopoly of the means of ‘legitimate violence’.
The state is a territorial association. The jurisdiction of the state is
geographically defined, and it encompasses all those who live within the
state’s borders, whether they are citizens or non-citizens. On the international
stage, the state is therefore regarded (at least, in theory) as an
autonomous entity.
The international approach to the state views it primarily as an actor on the
world stage; indeed, as the basic ‘unit’ of international politics. This highlights
the dualistic structure of the state; the fact that it has two faces, one looking
outwards and the other looking inwards. Whereas the previous definitions are
concerned with the state’s inward-looking face, its relations with the individuals
and groups that live within its borders, and its ability to maintain domestic
order, the international view deals with the state’s outward-looking face, its relations
with other states and, therefore, its ability to provide protection against
external attack. The classic definition of the state in international law is found in
the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of the State (1933).
According to Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention, the state has four features:
a defined territory
a permanent population
an effective government
the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
This approach to the state brings it very close to the notion of a‘country’. The
main difference between how the state is understood by political philosophers
and sociologists, and how it is understood by IR scholars is that while the former
treat civil society as separate from the state, the latter treat civil society as part of
the state, in that it encompasses not only an effective government, but also a
permanent population. For some, the international approach views the state
essentially as a legal person, in which case statehood depends on formal recognition
by other states or international bodies. In this view, the United Nations
(UN) is widely accepted as the body that, by granting full membership, determines
when a new state has come into existence. Nevertheless, while, from this
perspective, states may be legally equal, they are in political terms very different.
Although their rights and responsibilities as laid out in international law may be
identical, their political weight in world affairs varies dramatically. Some states
are classified as‘great powers’, or even‘superpowers’ (see p. 422), whereas others
are ‘middle’ or ‘small’ powers and, in cases such as the small highland countries
of the Caribbean and the Pacific, they may be regarded as ‘micro-states’.
58 P O L I T I C S
Great power: A state
deemed to rank amongst the
most powerful in a hierarchical
state system, reflecting its
influence over minor states.
CONCEPT
Sovereignty
Sovereignty, in its
simplest sense, is the
principle of absolute and
unlimited power.
However, sovereignty can
be understood in
different ways. Legal
sovereignty refers to
supreme legal authority,
defined in terms of the
‘right’ to command
compliance, while
political sovereignty
refers to absolute
political power, defined in
terms of the ‘ability’ to
command compliance.
Internal sovereignty is
the notion of supreme
power/authority within
the state (e.g.
parliamentary
sovereignty: see p. 336).
External sovereignty
relates to a state’s place
in the international order
and its capacity to act as
an independent and
autonomous entity.
P O L I T I C S A N D T H E S T A T E 59
Regardless of the different ways in which the state has been understood, there
is general agreement about when and where it emerged. The state is a historical
institution: it emerged in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe as a system
of centralized rule that succeeded in subordinating all other institutions and
groups, including (and especially) the Church, bringing an end to the competing
and overlapping authority systems that had characterized Medieval Europe. By
establishing the principle of territorial sovereignty, the Peace of Westphalia
(1648), concluded at the end of the Thirty Years’ War, is often taken to have
formalized the modern notion of statehood, by establishing the state as the principal
actor in domestic and international affairs. There is less agreement,
however, about why the state came into existence. According to Charles Tilly
(1990), for instance, the central factor that explains the development of the
modern state was its ability to fight wars. In this view, the transformation in the
scale and nature of military encounters that was brought about from the
sixteenth century onwards (through, for instance, the introduction of gun
powder, the use of organized infantry and artillery, and the advent of standing
armies) not only greatly increased the coercive power that rulers could wield, but
also forced states to extend their control over their populations by developing
more extensive systems of taxation and administration. As Tilly (1975) thus put
it, ‘War made the state, and the state made war’. Marxists, in contrast, have
explained the emergence of the state largely in economic terms, the state’s origins
being traced back to the transition from feudalism to capitalism, with the state
essentially being a tool used by the emerging bourgeois class (Engels, [1884]
1972). Michael Mann (1993), for his part, offered an account of the emergence
of the state that stresses the state’s capacity to combine ideological, economic,
military and political forms of power (sometimes called the ‘IEMP model’).
The state nevertheless continued to evolve in the light of changing circumstances.
Having developed into the nation-state during the nineteenth century,
and then going through a process of gradual democratization, the state acquired
wider economic and social responsibilities during the twentieth century, and
especially in the post-1945 period, only for these, in many cases, to be ‘rolled
back’ from the 1980s and 1990s. The European state model, furthermore, spread
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831)
German philosopher. Hegel was the founder of modern idealism and developed the
notion that consciousness and material objects are, in fact, unified. In Phenomenology
of Spirit (1807), he sought to develop a rational system that would substitute for
traditional Christianity by interpreting the entire process of human history, and
indeed the universe itself, in terms of the progress of absolute Mind towards selfrealization.
In his view, history is, in essence, a march of the human spirit towards a
determinate endpoint. His major political work, Philosophy of Right (1821), portrays
the state as an ethical ideal and the highest expression of human freedom. Hegel’s
work had a considerable impact on Marx and other so-called ‘young Hegelians’. It also
shaped the ideas of liberals such as T. H. Green (1836–82), and influenced fascist
thought.
Nation-state: A sovereign
political association within
which citizenship and
nationality overlap; one nation
within a single state (see
p. 124).
to other lands and other continents. This occurred as the process of decolonization
accelerated in the decades following World War II, independence implying
the achievement of sovereign statehood. One result of this process was a rapid
growth in UN membership. From its original 51 member states in 1945, the UN
grew to 127 members by 1970, and reached 193 members by 2011 (with the
recognition of South Sudan). The state has therefore become the universal form
of political organization around the world. However, in order to assess the significance
of the state, and explore its vital relationship to politics, two key issues
have to be addressed. These deal with the nature of state power and with the roles
and responsibilities the state has assumed and should assume.
DEBATING THE STATE
Rival theories of the state
What is the nature of state power, and whose interests does the state represent?
From this perspective, the state is an ‘essentially contested’ concept. There are
various rival theories of the state, each of which offers a different account of its
origins, development and impact on society. Indeed, controversy about the
nature of state power has increasingly dominated modern political analysis and
goes to the heart of ideological and theoretical disagreements in the discipline.
These relate to questions about whether, for example, the state is autonomous
and independent of society, or whether it is essentially a product of society, a
reflection of the broader distribution of power or resources. Moreover, does the
state serve the common or collective good, or is it biased in favour of privileged
groups or a dominant class? Similarly, is the state a positive or constructive force,
with responsibilities that should be enlarged, or is it a negative or destructive
entity that must be constrained or, perhaps, smashed altogether? Four contrasting
theories of the state can be identified as follows:
the pluralist state
the capitalist state
the leviathan state
the patriarchal state.
The pluralist state
The pluralist theory of the state has a very clear liberal lineage. It stems from the
belief that the state acts as an ‘umpire’ or ‘referee’ in society. This view has also
dominated mainstream political analysis, accounting for a tendency, at least within
Anglo-American thought, to discount the state and state organizations and focus
instead on‘government’. Indeed, it is not uncommon in this tradition for‘the state’
to be dismissed as an abstraction, with institutions such as the courts, the civil
service and the military being seen as independent actors in their own right, rather
than as elements of a broader state machine. Nevertheless, this approach is possible
only because it is based on underlying, and often unacknowledged, assumptions
about state neutrality. The state can be ignored only because it is seen as an impartial
arbiter or referee that can be bent to the will of the government of the day.
60 P O L I T I C S
Pluralism: A belief in, or
commitment to diversity or
multiplicity; or the belief that
power in modern societies is
widely and evenly distributed
(see p. 100).
The origins of this view of the state can be traced back to the social-contract
theories (see p. 62) of thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke (see p.
31). The principal concern of such thinkers was to examine the grounds of political
obligation, the grounds on which the individual is obliged to obey and
respect the state. They argued that the state had arisen out of a voluntary agreement,
or social contract, made by individuals who recognized that only the
establishment of a sovereign power could safeguard them from the insecurity,
disorder and brutality of the state of nature. Without a state, individuals abuse,
exploit and enslave one another; with a state, order and civilized existence are
guaranteed and liberty is protected. As Locke put it, ‘where there is no law there
is no freedom’.
In liberal theory, the state is thus seen as a neutral arbiter amongst the
competing groups and individuals in society; it is an ‘umpire’ or ‘referee’ that is
capable of protecting each citizen from the encroachments of fellow citizens. The
neutrality of the state reflects the fact that the state acts in the interests of all citizens,
and therefore represents the common good or public interest. In Hobbes’
view, stability and order could be secured only through the establishment of an
absolute and unlimited state, with power that could be neither challenged, nor
questioned. In other words, he held that citizens are confronted by a stark choice
between absolutism (see p. 268) and anarchy. Locke, on the other hand, developed
a more typically liberal defence of the limited state. In his view, the purpose
of the state is very specific: it is restricted to the defence of a set of ‘natural’ or
God-given individual rights; namely, ‘life, liberty and property’. This establishes
a clear distinction between the responsibilities of the state (essentially, the maintenance
of domestic order and the protection of property) and the responsibilities
of individual citizens (usually seen as the realm of civil society). Moreover,
since the state may threaten natural rights as easily as it may uphold them, citizens
must enjoy some form of protection against the state, which Locke believed
could be delivered only through the mechanisms of constitutional and representative
government.
These ideas were developed in the twentieth century into the pluralist theory
of the state. As a theory of society, pluralism asserts that, within liberal democracies,
power is widely and evenly dispersed. As a theory of the state, pluralism
holds that the state is neutral, insofar as it is susceptible to the influence of
P O L I T I C S A N D T H E S T A T E 61
Divine right: The doctrine
that earthly rulers are chosen
by God and thus wield
unchallengeable authority; a
defence for monarchical
absolutism.
Political obligation: The
duty of the citizen towards the
state; the basis of the state’s
right to rule.
State of nature: A society
devoid of political authority
and of formal (legal) checks on
the individual; usually
employed as a theoretical
device.
Anarchy: Literally, ‘without
rule’; anarchy is often used
pejoratively to suggest
instability, or even chaos.
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679)
English political philosopher. Hobbes was the son of a minor clergyman who subsequently
abandoned his family. He became tutor to the exiled Prince of Wales Charles
Stewart, and lived under the patronage of the Cavendish family. Writing at a time of
uncertainty and civil strife, precipitated by the English Revolution, Hobbes developed
the first comprehensive theory of nature and human behaviour since Aristotle (see
p. 6). His classic work, Leviathan (1651), discussed the grounds of political obligation
and undoubtedly reflected the impact of the CivilWar. It provided a defence for absolutist
government but, by appealing to reasoned argument in the form of the social
contract, also disappointed advocates of divine right.
62 P O L I T I C S
various groups and interests, and all social classes. The state is not biased in
favour of any particular interest or group, and it does not have an interest of its
own that is separate from those of society. As Schwarzmantel (1994) put it, the
state is ‘the servant of society and not its master’. The state can thus be portrayed
as a ‘pincushion’ that passively absorbs pressures and forces exerted upon it. Two
key assumptions underlie this view. The first is that the state is effectively subordinate
to government. Non-elected state bodies (the civil service, the judiciary,
the police, the military and so on) are strictly impartial and are subject to the
authority of their political masters. The state apparatus is therefore thought to
conform to the principles of public service and political accountability. The
second assumption is that the democratic process is meaningful and effective. In
other words, party competition and interest-group activity ensure that the
government of the day remains sensitive and responsive to public opinion.
Ultimately, therefore, the state is only a weather vane that is blown in whichever
direction the public-at-large dictates.
Modern pluralists, however, have often adopted a more critical view of the
state, termed the neopluralist (see p. 63) theory of the state. Theorists such as
Robert Dahl (see p. 250), Charles Lindblom and J. K. Galbraith (see p. 155) have
come to accept that modern industrialized states are both more complex and less
responsive to popular pressures than classical pluralism suggested. Neopluralists,
for instance, have acknowledged that business enjoys a ‘privileged position’ in
relation to government that other groups clearly cannot rival. In Politics and
Markets (1980), Lindblom pointed out that, as the major investor and largest
employer in society, business is bound to exercise considerable sway over any
government, whatever its ideological leanings or manifesto commitments.
Moreover, neopluralists have accepted that the state can, and does, forge its own
sectional interests. In this way, a state elite, composed of senior civil servants,
Focus on . . .
Social-contract theory
A social contract is a voluntary agreement made
amongst individuals through which an organized
society, or state, is brought into existence. Used as a
theoretical device by thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke
and Rousseau (see p. 97), the social contract has been
revived by modern theorists such as John Rawls (see p.
45). The social contract is seldom regarded as a historical
act. Rather, it is used as a means of demonstrating
the value of government and the grounds of political
obligation; social-contract theorists wish individuals to
act as if they had concluded the contract themselves. In
its classic form, social-contract theory has three
elements:
The image of a hypothetical stateless society (a
‘state of nature’) is established. Unconstrained
freedom means that life is ‘solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish and short’ (Hobbes).
Individuals therefore seek to escape from the state
of nature by entering into a social contract, recognizing
that only a sovereign power can secure order
and stability.
The social contract obliges citizens to respect and
obey the state, ultimately in gratitude for the
stability and security that only a system of political
rule can deliver.
judges, police chiefs, military leaders and so on, may be seen to pursue either the
bureaucratic interests of their sector of the state, or the interests of client groups.
Indeed, if the state is regarded as a political actor in its own right, it can be
viewed as a powerful (perhaps the most powerful) interest group in society. This
line of argument encouraged Eric Nordlinger (1981) to develop a state-centred
model of liberal democracy, based on ‘the autonomy of the democratic state’.
The capitalist state
The Marxist notion of a capitalist state offers a clear alternative to the pluralist
image of the state as a neutral arbiter or umpire. Marxists have typically argued
that the state cannot be understood separately from the economic structure of
society. This view has usually been understood in terms of the classic formulation
that the state is nothing but an instrument of class oppression: the state
emerges out of, and in a sense reflects, the class system. Nevertheless, a rich
debate has taken place within Marxist theory in recent years that has moved the
Marxist theory of the state a long way from this classic formulation. In many
ways, the scope to revise Marxist attitudes towards the state stems from ambiguities
that can be found in Marx’s (see p. 41) own writings.
Marx did not develop a systematic or coherent theory of the state. In a
general sense, he believed that the state is part of a ‘superstructure’ that is determined
or conditioned by the economic ‘base’, which can be seen as the real foundation
of social life. However, the precise relationship between the base and the
superstructure, and in this case that between the state and the capitalist mode of
production, is unclear. Two theories of the state can be identified in Marx’s writings.
The first is expressed in his often-quoted dictum from The Communist
Manifesto ([1848] 1967): ‘The executive of the modern state is but a committee
for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’. From this perspective,
the state is clearly dependent on society and entirely dependent on its
economically dominant class, which in capitalism is the bourgeoisie. Lenin (see
p. 99) thus described the state starkly as ‘an instrument for the oppression of the
exploited class’.
A second, more complex and subtle, theory of the state can nevertheless be
found in Marx’s analysis of the revolutionary events in France between 1848 and
1851, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte ([1852] 1963). Marx suggested
that the state could enjoy what has come to be seen as ‘relative autonomy’ from
the class system, the Napoleonic state being capable of imposing its will upon
society, acting as an ‘appalling parasitic body’. If the state did articulate the interests
of any class, it was not those of the bourgeoisie, but those of the most populous
class in French society, the smallholding peasantry. Although Marx did not
develop this view in detail, it is clear that, from this perspective, the autonomy of
the state is only relative, in that the state appears to mediate between conflicting
classes, and so maintains the class system itself in existence.
Both these theories differ markedly from the liberal and, later, pluralist
models of state power. In particular, they emphasize that the state cannot be
understood except in a context of unequal class power, and that the state arises
out of, and reflects, capitalist society, by acting either as an instrument of oppression
wielded by the dominant class, or, more subtly, as a mechanism through
which class antagonisms are ameliorated. Nevertheless, Marx’s attitude towards
P O L I T I C S A N D T H E S T A T E 63
CONCEPT
Neopluralism
Neopluralism is a style of
social theorizing that
remains faithful to
pluralist values while
recognizing the need to
revise or update classical
pluralism in the light of,
for example, elite, Marxist
and New Right theories.
Although neopluralism
embraces a broad range
of perspectives and
positions, certain central
themes can be identified.
First, it takes account of
modernizing trends, such
as the emergence of
postindustrial society.
Second, while capitalism
is preferred to socialism,
free-market economic
doctrines are usually
regarded as obsolete.
Third, western
democracies are seen as
‘deformed polyarchies’, in
which major corporations
exert disproportionate
influence.
Bourgeoisie: A Marxist term,
denoting the ruling class of a
capitalist society, the owners of
productive wealth.
the state was not entirely negative. He argued that the state could be used
constructively during the transition from capitalism to communism in the form
of the ‘revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat’. The overthrow of capitalism
would see the destruction of the bourgeois state and the creation of an alternative,
proletarian one.
In describing the state as a proletarian ‘dictatorship’, Marx utilized the first
theory of the state, seeing the state as an instrument through which the economically
dominant class (by then, the proletariat) could repress and subdue other
classes. All states, from this perspective, are class dictatorships. The ‘dictatorship
of the proletariat’ was seen as a means of safeguarding the gains of the revolution
by preventing counter-revolution mounted by the dispossessed bourgeoisie.
Nevertheless, Marx did not see the state as a necessary or enduring social formation.
He predicted that, as class antagonisms faded, the state would ‘wither away’,
meaning that a fully communist society would also be stateless. Since the state
emerged out of the class system, once the class system had been abolished, the
state, quite simply, loses its reason for existence.
Marx’s ambivalent heritage has provided modern Marxists, or neo-Marxists,
with considerable scope to further the analysis of state power. This was also
encouraged by the writings of Antonio Gramsci (see p. 175), who emphasized
the degree to which the domination of the ruling class is achieved by ideological
manipulation, rather than just open coercion. In this view, bourgeois domination
is maintained largely through ‘hegemony’ (see p. 174): that is, intellectual
leadership or cultural control, with the state playing an important role in the
process.
Since the 1960s, Marxist theorizing about the state has been dominated by
rival instrumentalist and structuralist views of the state. In The State in Capitalist
Society ([1969] 2009), Miliband portrayed the state as an agent or instrument of
the ruling class, stressing the extent to which the state elite is disproportionately
drawn from the ranks of the privileged and propertied. The bias of the state in
favour of capitalism is therefore derived from the overlap of social backgrounds
between, on the one hand, civil servants and other public officials, and, on the
other, bankers, business leaders and captains of industry. Nicos Poulantzas, in
Political Power and Social Classes (1968), dismissed this sociological approach,
and emphasized instead the degree to which the structure of economic and social
power exerts a constraint on state autonomy. This view suggests that the state
cannot but act to perpetuate the social system in which it operates. In the case of
the capitalist state, its role is to serve the long-term interests of capitalism, even
though these actions may be resisted by sections of the capitalist class itself. NeoMarxists
have increasingly seen the state as the terrain on which the struggle
amongst interests, groups and classes is conducted. Rather than being an ‘instrument’
wielded by a dominant group or ruling class, the state is thus a dynamic
entity that reflects the balance of power within society at any given time, and the
ongoing struggle for hegemony.
The leviathan state
The image of the state as a ‘leviathan’ (in effect, a self-serving monster intent on
expansion and aggrandizement) is one associated in modern politics with the
New Right. Such a view is rooted in early or classical liberalism and, in particular,
64 P O L I T I C S
Proletariat: A Marxist term,
denoting a class that subsists
through the sale of its labour
power; strictly speaking, the
proletariat is not equivalent to
the working class.
CONCEPT
Neo-Marxism
Neo-Marxism
(sometimes termed
‘modern’ or ‘western’
Marxism) refers to
attempts to revise or
recast the classical ideas
of Marx while remaining
faithful to certain Marxist
principles or aspects of
Marxist methodology.
Neo-Marxists typically
refuse to accept that
Marxism enjoys a
monopoly of the truth,
and have thus looked to
Hegelian philosophy,
anarchism, liberalism,
feminism, and even
rational-choice theory.
Although still concerned
about social injustice,
neo-Marxists reject the
primacy of economics
over other factors and,
with it, the notion that
history has a predictable
character.
a commitment to a radical form of individualism (see p. 158). The New Right,
or at least its neoliberal wing, is distinguished by a strong antipathy towards state
intervention in economic and social life, born out of the belief that the state is a
parasitic growth that threatens both individual liberty and economic security. In
this view, the state, instead of being, as pluralists suggest, an impartial umpire or
arbiter, is an overbearing‘nanny’, desperate to interfere or meddle in every aspect
of human existence. The central feature of this view is that the state pursues
interests that are separate from those of society (setting it apart from Marxism),
and that those interests demand an unrelenting growth in the role or responsibilities
of the state itself. New Right thinkers therefore argue that the twentiethcentury
tendency towards state intervention reflected not popular pressure for
economic and social security, or the need to stabilize capitalism by ameliorating
class tensions but, rather, the internal dynamics of the state.
New Right theorists explain the expansionist dynamics of state power by
reference to both demand-side and supply-side pressures. Demand-side pressures
are those that emanate from society itself, usually through the mechanism
of electoral democracy. As discussed in Chapter 4 in connection with democracy,
the New Right argue that electoral competition encourages politicians to‘outbid’
one another by making promises of increased spending and more generous
government programmes, regardless of the long-term damage that such policies
inflict on the economy in the form of increased taxes, higher inflation and the
‘crowding out’ of investment. Supply-side pressures, on the other hand, are those
that are internal to the state. These can therefore be explained in terms of the
institutions and personnel of the state apparatus. In its most influential form,
this argument is known as the ‘government oversupply thesis’.
The oversupply thesis has usually been associated with public-choice theorists
(see p. 252), who examine how public decisions are made on the assumption
that the individuals involved act in a rationally self-interested fashion.
Niskanen (1971), for example, argued that, as budgetary control in legislatures
such as the US Congress is typically weak, the task of budget-making is shaped
largely by the interests of government agencies and senior bureaucrats. Insofar as
this implies that government is dominated by the state (the state elite being able
to shape the thinking of elected politicians), there are parallels between the
public-choice model and the Marxist view discussed above. Where these two
views diverge, however, is in relation to the interests that the state apparatus
serves. While Marxists argue that the state reflects broader class and other social
interests, the New Right portrays the state as an independent or autonomous
entity that pursues its own interests. In this view, bureaucratic self-interest
invariably supports‘big’ government and state intervention, because this leads to
an enlargement of the bureaucracy itself, which helps to ensure job security,
improve pay, open up promotion prospects and enhance the status of public
officials. This image of self-seeking bureaucrats is plainly at odds with the pluralist
notion of a state machine imbued with an ethic of public service and firmly
subject to political control.
The patriarchal state
Modern thinking about the state must, finally, take account of the implications
of feminist theory. However, this is not to say that there is a systematic feminist
P O L I T I C S A N D T H E S T A T E 65
CONCEPT
Patriarchy
Patriarchy literally means
‘rule by the father’, the
domination of the
husband–father within
the family, and the
subordination of his wife
and his children.
However, the term is
usually used in the more
general sense of ‘rule by
men’, drawing attention
to the totality of
oppression and
exploitation to which
women are subject.
Patriarchy thus implies
that the system of male
power in society at large
both reflects and stems
from the dominance of
the father in the family.
Patriarchy is a key
concept in radical
feminist analysis, in that
it emphasizes that gender
inequality is systematic,
institutionalized and
pervasive.
theory of the state. As emphasized in Chapter 2, feminist theory encompasses a
range of traditions and perspectives, and has thus generated a range of very
different attitudes towards state power. Moreover, feminists have usually not
regarded the nature of state power as a central political issue, preferring instead
to concentrate on the deeper structure of male power centred on institutions
such as the family and the economic system. Some feminists, indeed, may question
conventional definitions of the state, arguing, for instance, that the idea that
the state exercises a monopoly of legitimate violence is compromised by the
routine use of violence and intimidation in family and domestic life.
Nevertheless, sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly, feminists have
helped to enrich the state debate by developing novel and challenging perspectives
on state power.
Liberal feminists, who believe that sexual or gender (see p. 163) equality can
be brought about through incremental reform, have tended to accept an essentially
pluralist view of the state. They recognize that, if women are denied legal
and political equality, and especially the right to vote, the state is biased in favour
of men. However, their faith in the state’s basic neutrality is reflected in the belief
that any such bias can, and will, be overcome by a process of reform. In this
sense, liberal feminists believe that all groups (including women) have potentially
equal access to state power, and that this can be used impartially to
promote justice and the common good. Liberal feminists have therefore usually
viewed the state in positive terms, seeing state intervention as a means of redressing
gender inequality and enhancing the role of women. This can be seen in
campaigns for equal-pay legislation, the legalization of abortion, the provision
of child-care facilities, the extension of welfare benefits, and so on.
Nevertheless, a more critical and negative view of the state has been developed
by radical feminists, who argue that state power reflects a deeper structure
of oppression in the form of patriarchy. There are a number of similarities
between Marxist and radical feminist views of state power. Both groups, for
example, deny that the state is an autonomous entity bent on the pursuit of its
own interests. Instead, the state is understood, and its biases are explained, by
reference to a ‘deep structure’ of power in society at large. Whereas Marxists
place the state in an economic context, radical feminists place it in a context of
gender inequality, and insist that it is essentially an institution of male power. In
common with Marxism, distinctive instrumentalist and structuralistversions of
this feminist position have been developed. The instrumentalist argument views
the state as little more than an agent or ‘tool’ used by men to defend their own
interests and uphold the structures of patriarchy. This line of argument draws on
the core feminist belief that patriarchy is rooted in the division of society into
distinct ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres of life, men dominating the former while
women are confined to the later. Quite simply, in this view, the state is run by
men, and for men.
Whereas instrumentalist arguments focus on the personnel of the state, and
particularly the state elite, structuralist arguments tend to emphasize the degree
to which state institutions are embedded in a wider patriarchal system. Modern
radical feminists have paid particular attention to the emergence of the welfare
state, seeing it as the expression of a new kind of patriarchal power. Welfare may
uphold patriarchy by bringing about a transition from private dependence (in
which women as ‘home makers’ are dependent on men as ‘breadwinners’) to a
66 P O L I T I C S
system of public dependence in which women are increasingly controlled by the
institutions of the extended state. For instance, women have become increasingly
dependent on the state as clients or customers of state services (such as childcare
institutions, nursery education and social work) and as employees, particularly
in the so-called ‘caring’ professions (such as nursing, social work and
education).
The role of the state
Contrasting interpretations of state power have clear implications for the desirable
role or responsibilities of the state. What should states do? What functions
or responsibilities should the state fulfil, and which ones should be left in the
hands of private individuals? In many respects, these are the questions around
which electoral politics and party competition revolve. With the exception of
anarchists, who dismiss the state as fundamentally evil and unnecessary, all political
thinkers have regarded the state as, in some sense, worthwhile. Even revolutionary
socialists, inspired by the Leninist slogan ‘smash the state’, have accepted
the need for a temporary proletarian state to preside over the transition from
capitalism to communism, in the form of the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’.
Nevertheless, there is profound disagreement about the exact role the state
should play, and therefore about the proper balance between the state and civil
society. Among the different state forms that have developed are the following:
minimal states
developmental states
social-democratic states
collectivized states
totalitarian states
religious states
Minimal states
The minimal state is the ideal of classical liberals, whose aim is to ensure that
individuals enjoy the widest possible realm of freedom. This view is rooted in
social-contract theory, but it nevertheless advances an essentially ‘negative’ view
of the state. From this perspective, the value of the state is that it has the capacity
to constrain human behaviour and thus to prevent individuals encroaching on
the rights and liberties of others. The state is merely a protective body, its core
function being to provide a framework of peace and social order within which
citizens can conduct their lives as they think best. In Locke’s famous simile, the
state acts as a nightwatchman, whose services are called upon only when orderly
existence is threatened. This nevertheless leaves the ‘minimal’ or ‘nightwatchman’
state with three core functions. First and foremost, the state exists to maintain
domestic order. Second, it ensures that contracts or voluntary agreements
made between private citizens are enforced, and third it provides protection
against external attack. The institutional apparatus of a minimal state is thus
limited to a police force, a court system and a military of some kind. Economic,
social, cultural, moral and other responsibilities belong to the individual, and are
therefore firmly part of civil society.
P O L I T I C S A N D T H E S T A T E 67
Rights: Legal or moral
entitlements to act or be
treated in a particular way; civil
rights differ from human rights.
68 P O L I T I C S
The cause of the minimal state has been taken up in modern political debate
by the New Right. Drawing on early liberal ideas, and particularly on free-market
or classical economic theories, the New Right has proclaimed the need to ‘roll
back the frontiers of the state’. In the writings of Robert Nozick, this amounts to
a restatement of Lockean liberalism based on a defence of individual rights,
especially property rights. In the case of free-market economists such as
Friedrich von Hayek (see p. 37) and Milton Friedman (see p. 138), state intervention
is seen as a ‘dead hand’ that reduces competition, efficiency and productivity.
From the New Right perspective, the state’s economic role should be
confined to two functions: the maintenance of a stable means of exchange or
‘sound money’ (low or zero inflation), and the promotion of competition
through controls on monopoly power, price fixing and so on.
Developmental states
The best historical examples of minimal states were those in countries such as
the UK and the USA during the period of early industrialization in the nineteenth
century. As a general rule, however, the later a country industrializes, the
more extensive will be its state’s economic role. In Japan and Germany, for
instance, the state assumed a more active ‘developmental’ role from the outset. A
developmental state is one that intervenes in economic life with the specific
purpose of promoting industrial growth and economic development. This does
not amount to an attempt to replace the market with a ‘socialist’ system of planning
and control but, rather, to an attempt to construct a partnership between
the state and major economic interests, often underpinned by conservative and
nationalist priorities.
The classic example of a developmental state is Japan. During the Meiji Period
(1868–1912), the Japanese state forged a close relationship with the zaibutsu, the
great family-run business empires that dominated the Japanese economy up until
World War II. Since 1945, the developmental role of the Japanese state has been
assumed by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI),
which, together with the Bank of Japan, helps to shape private investment decisions
and steer the Japanese economy towards international competitiveness (see
Robert Nozick (1938–2002)
US academic and political philosopher. Nozick’s major work, Anarchy, State and
Utopia (1974), had a profound influence on New Right theories and beliefs. He developed
a form of libertarianism that was close to Locke’s and clearly influenced by nineteenth-century
US individualists such as Spooner (1808–87) and Tucker
(1854–1939). He argued that property rights should be strictly upheld, provided that
wealth has been justly acquired in the first place, or has been justly transferred from
one person to another. This position means support for minimal government and
minimal taxation, and undermines the case for welfare and redistribution. Nozick’s
rights-based theory of justice was developed in response to the ideas of John Rawls
(see p. 45). In later life, Nozick modified his extreme libertarianism.
p. 372). A similar model of developmental intervention has existed in France,
where governments of both left and right have tended to recognize the need for
economic planning, and the state bureaucracy has seen itself as the custodian of
the national interest. In countries such as Austria and, to some extent, Germany,
economic development has been achieved through the construction of a‘partnership
state’, in which an emphasis is placed on the maintenance of a close relationship
between the state and major economic interests, notably big business and
organized labour. More recently, economic globalization (see p. 142) has fostered
the emergence of ‘competition states’, examples of which are found amongst the
tiger economies of East Asia. Competition states are distinguished by their recognition
of the need to strengthen education and training as the principal guaranteeing
economic success in a context of intensifying transnational competition.
Social-democratic states
Whereas developmental states practise interventionism in order to stimulate
economic progress, social-democratic states intervene with a view to bringing
about broader social restructuring, usually in accordance with principles such as
fairness, equality (see p. 454) and social justice. In countries such as Austria and
Sweden, state intervention has been guided by both developmental and socialdemocratic
priorities. Nevertheless, developmentalism and social democracy do
not always go hand-in-hand. As Marquand (1988) pointed out, although the UK
state was significantly extended in the period immediately after World War II
along social-democratic lines, it failed to evolve into a developmental state. The
key to understanding the social-democratic state is that there is a shift from a
‘negative’ view of the state, which sees it as little more than a necessary evil, to a
‘positive’ view of the state, in which it is seen as a means of enlarging liberty and
promoting justice. The social-democratic state is thus the ideal of both modern
liberals and democratic socialists.
Rather than merely laying down the conditions of orderly existence, the
social-democratic state is an active participant; in particular, helping to rectify the
imbalances and injustices of a market economy. It therefore tends to focus less
upon the generation of wealth and more upon what is seen as the equitable or just
distribution of wealth. In practice, this boils down to an attempt to eradicate
poverty and reduce social inequality. The twin features of a socialdemocratic
state are therefore Keynesianism and social welfare. The aim of
Keynesian economic policies is to ‘manage’ or ‘regulate’ capitalism with a view to
promoting growth and maintaining full employment. Although this may entail
an element of planning, the classic Keynesian strategy involves ‘demand management’
through adjustments in fiscal policy; that is, in the levels of public spending
and taxation. The adoption of welfare policies has led to the emergence of socalled
‘welfare states’, whose responsibilities have extended to the promotion of
social well-being amongst their citizens. In this sense, the social-democratic state
is an ‘enabling state’, dedicated to the principle of individual empowerment.
Collectivized states
While developmental and social-democratic states intervene in economic life
with a view to guiding or supporting a largely private economy, collectivized
P O L I T I C S A N D T H E S T A T E 69
Competition state: A state
which pursues strategies to
ensure long-term
competitiveness in a globalized
economy.
Tiger economies: Fastgrowing
and export-orientated
economies modelled on Japan:
for example, South Korea,
Taiwan and Singapore.
Social justice: A morally
justifiable distribution of
material rewards; social justice
is often seen to imply a bias in
favour of equality.
Welfare state: A state that
takes primary responsibility for
the social welfare of its citizens,
discharged through a range of
social security, health,
education and other services
(albeit different in different
societies).
70 P O L I T I C S
Political and ideological debate so often revolves around the issue of the state and, in particular, the proper balance
between the state and civil society. At one extreme, anarchists claim that states and, for that matter, all systems of rule are
illegitimate. Other views range from a grudging acceptance of the state as a necessary evil to a positive endorsement of
the state as a force for good. Does the state have a positive or negative impact on our lives? Should it be celebrated or
feared?
YES NO
Debating . . .
Is the state a force for good?
Key to civilized existence. The most basic argument in
favour of the state is that it is a vital guarantee of order
and social stability. A state is absolutely necessary because
only a sovereign body that enjoys a monopoly of the
means of coercion is able to prevent (regrettable, but
inevitable) conflict and competition from spilling over
into barbarism and chaos. Life in the absence of a state
would be, as Hobbes famously put it, ‘solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish and short’. This is a lesson that is underlined
by the sad misfortunes suffered by so-called ‘failed’
states (see p. 76), where civil war and warlordism take
hold in the absence of a credible system of law and order.
Foundation of public life. The state differs from other
bodies and institutions in that it is the only one that
represents the common or collective interests, rather than
the selfish or particular ones. The state speaks for the
whole of society, not just its parts. As such, the state
makes possible a ‘public’ realm of existence, which allows
people to be involved in something larger than themselves,
discharging responsibilities towards fellow citizens
and, where appropriate, participating in making collective
decisions. In a tradition that dates back to Aristotle
and Hegel, the state can therefore be seen to be morally
superior to civil society.
Agent of social justice. The state is a key agent of
modernization and delivers a range of economic and
social benefits. Even supporters of free-market economics
acknowledge this in accepting that the economy can only
function in a context of civic order that can only be
established by the state. Beyond this, the state can
counter the inherent instability of a market economy by
intervening to ensure sustainable growth and full
employment, and it can protect people from poverty and
other forms of social disadvantage by delivering publiclyfunded
welfare services that no amount of private
philanthropy can rival in terms of reach and quality.
Cause of disorder. As anarchists argue, the state is the
cause of the problem of order, not its solution. The state
breeds conflict and unrest because, by robbing people of
their moral autonomy and forcing them to obey rules
they have not made themselves, it ‘infantalizes’ them and
blocks their moral development. This leaves them under
the sway of base instincts and allows selfishness, greed
and aggression to spread. As moral development flourishes
in conditions of freedom and equality, reducing the
authority of the state or, preferably, removing it altogether,
will allow order to arise ‘from below’, naturally
and spontaneously.
Enemy of freedom. The state is, at best, a necessary evil.
Even when its benefits in terms of upholding order are
accepted, the state should be confined to a strictly
minimal role. This is because, as state authority is sovereign,
compulsory and coercive, the ‘public’ sphere is, by
its nature, a realm of oppression. While anarchists therefore
argue that all states are illegitimate, others suggest
that this only applies when the state goes beyond its
essential role of laying down the conditions for orderly
existence. Freedom is enlarged to the extent that the
‘public’ sphere contracts, civil society being morally
superior to the state.
Recipe for poverty. The economy works best when it is
left alone by the state. Market economies are selfregulating
mechanisms; they tend towards long-term
equilibrium, as the forces of demand and supply come
into line with one another. The state, in contrast, is a
brute machine: however well-meaning state intervention
in economic and social life may be, it inevitably upsets
the natural balance of the market and so imperils growth
and prosperity. This was a lesson most graphically illustrated
by the fate of orthodox communist systems, but it
has also been underlined by the poor economic performance
of over-regulated capitalist systems.
states bring the entirety of economic life under state control. The best examples
of such states were in orthodox communist countries such as the USSR and
throughout Eastern Europe. These sought to abolish private enterprise altogether,
and set up centrally planned economies administered by a network of
economic ministries and planning committees. So-called ‘command economies’
were therefore established that were organized through a system of ‘directive’
planning that was ultimately controlled by the highest organs of the communist
party. The justification for state collectivization stems from a fundamental
socialist preference for common ownership over private property. However, the
use of the state to attain this goal suggests a more positive attitude to state power
than that outlined in the classical writings of Marx and Engels (1820–95).
Marx and Engels by no means ruled out nationalization; Engels, in particular,
recognized that, during the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’, state control would
be extended to include factories, the banks, transportation and so on.
Nevertheless, they envisaged that the proletarian state would be strictly temporary,
and that it would ‘wither away’ as class antagonisms abated. In contrast, the
collectivized state in the USSR became permanent, and increasingly powerful
and bureaucratic. Under Stalin, socialism was effectively equated with statism,
the advance of socialism being reflected in the widening responsibilities and
powers of the state apparatus. Indeed, after Khrushchev announced in 1962 that
the dictatorship of the proletariat had ended, the state was formally identified
with the interests of ‘the whole Soviet peoples’.
Totalitarian states
The most extreme and extensive form of interventionism is found in totalitarian
states. The essence of totalitarianism is the construction of an all-embracing
state, the influence of which penetrates every aspect of human existence. The
state brings not only the economy, but also education, culture, religion, family
life and so on under direct state control. The best examples of totalitarian states
are Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s USSR, although modern regimes such as
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq arguably have similar characteristics. The central pillars
of such regimes are a comprehensive process of surveillance and terroristic
policing, and a pervasive system of ideological manipulation and control. In this
sense, totalitarian states effectively extinguish civil society and abolish the
‘private’ sphere of life altogether. This is a goal that only fascists, who wish to
dissolve individual identity within the social whole, are prepared openly to
endorse. It is sometimes argued that Mussolini’s notion of a totalitarian state was
derived from Hegel’s belief in the state as an ‘ethical community’ reflecting the
altruism and mutual sympathy of its members. From this perspective, the
advance of human civilization can clearly be linked to the aggrandisement of the
state and the widening of its responsibilities.
Religious states
On the face of it, a religious state is a contradiction in terms. The modern state
emerged largely through the triumph of civil authority over religious authority,
religion increasingly being confined to the private sphere, through a separation
between church and state. The advance of state sovereignty thus usually went
P O L I T I C S A N D T H E S T A T E 71
Collectivization: The
abolition of private property in
favour of a system of common
or public ownership.
Totalitarianism: An allencompassing
system of
political rule, involving
pervasive ideological
manipulation and open
brutality (see p. 269).
CONCEPT
Statism
Statism (or, in French,
étatisme) is the belief
that state intervention is
the most appropriate
means of resolving
political problems, or
bringing about economic
and social development.
This view is underpinned
by a deep, and perhaps
unquestioning, faith in
the state as a mechanism
through which collective
action can be organized
and common goals can
be achieved. The state is
thus seen as an ethical
ideal (Hegel), or as
serving the ‘general will’
or public interest. Statism
is most clearly reflected
in government policies
that regulate and control
economic life, possibly
extending to Soviet-style
state collectivization.
hand in hand with the forward march of secularization. In the USA, the secular
nature of the state was enshrined in the First Amendment of the constitution,
which guarantees that freedom of worship shall not be abridged, while in France
the separation of church and state has been maintained through a strict emphasis
on the principle of laïcité. In countries such as Norway, Denmark and the
UK,‘established’ or state religions have developed, although the privileges these
religions enjoy stop well short of theocratic rule, and their political influence has
generally been restricted by a high level of social secularization.
Nevertheless, the period since the 1980s has witnessed the rise of the religious
state, driven by the tendency within religious fundamentalism (see p. 53) to
reject the public/private divide and to view religion as the basis of politics. Far
from regarding political realm as inherently corrupt, fundamentalist movements
have typically looked to seize control of the state and to use it as an instrument
of moral and spiritual regeneration. This was evident, for instance, in the process
of ‘Islamization’ introduced in Pakistan under General Zia-ul-Haq after 1978,
the establishment of an ‘Islamic state’ in Iran as a result of the 1979 revolution,
and, despite its formal commitment to secularism, the close links between the Sri
Lankan state and Sinhala Buddhism, particularly during the years of violent
struggle against Tamil separatism. Although, strictly speaking, religious states are
founded on the basis of religious principles, and, in the Iranian model, contain
explicitly theocratic features, in other cases religiously-orientated governments
operate in a context of constitutional secularism. This applies in the case of the
AKP in Turkey (see p. 280) and, since 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
ECLIPSE OF THE STATE?
Since the late 1980s, debate about the state has been overshadowed by assertions
about it ‘retreat’ or ‘decline’. The once-mighty leviathan – widely seen to be coextensive
with politics itself – had seemingly been humbled, state authority
having been undermined by the growing importance of, amongst other things,
the global economy, the market, major corporations, non-state actors and international
organisations. The clamour for ‘state-centric’ approaches to domestic
and international politics to be rethought, or abandoned altogether, therefore
grew. However, a simple choice between ‘state-centrism’ and ‘retreat-ism’ is, at
best, misleading. For instance, although states and markets are commonly
portrayed as rival forces, they also interlock and complement one another. Apart
from anything else, markets cannot function without a system of property rights
that only the state can establish and protect. Moreover, although states may have
lost authority in certain respects; in others, they may have become stronger.
Decline and fall of the state
Globalization and state transformation
The rise of globalization has stimulated a major debate about the power and
significance of the state in a globalized world. Three contrasting positions can be
identified. In the first place, some theorists have boldly proclaimed the emergence
of ‘post-sovereign governance’ (Scholte, 2005), suggesting that the rise of
72 P O L I T I C S
Laïcité: (French) The
principle of the absence of
religious involvement in
government affairs, and of
government involvement in
religious affairs.
State religion: A religious
body that is officially endorsed
by the state, giving it special
privileges, but (usually) not
formal political authority.
globalization is inevitably marked by the decline of the state as a meaningful
actor. Power shifts away from the state and towards global marketplaces and
transnational corporations (TNCs) (see p. 149) in particular. In the most
extreme version of this argument, advanced by so-called ‘hyperglobalists’, the
state is seen to be so ‘hollowed out’ as to have become, in effect, redundant.
Others, nevertheless, deny that globalization has altered the core feature of world
politics, which is that, as in earlier eras, sovereign states are the primary determinants
of what happens within their borders, and remain the principal actors on
the world stage. In this view, globalization and the state are not separate or, still
less, opposing forces; rather, and to a surprising degree, globalization has been
created by states and thus exists to serve their interests. Between these two views,
however, there is a third position, which acknowledges that globalization has
brought about qualitative changes in the role and significance of the state, and in
the nature of sovereignty, but emphasizes that these have transformed the state,
rather than simply reduced or increased its power.
Developments such as the rise of international migration and the spread of
cultural globalization have tended to make state borders increasingly ‘permeable’.
However, most of the discussion about the changing nature and power of
the state has concerned the impact of economic globalization (discussed in more
detail in Chapter 6). The central feature of economic globalization is the rise of
‘supraterritoriality’, the process through which economic activity increasingly
takes place within a ‘borderless world’ (Ohmae, 1989). This is particularly clear
in relation to financial markets that have become genuinely globalized, in that
capital flows around the world seemingly instantaneously; meaning, for
example, that no state can be insulated from the impact of financial crises in
other parts of the world. If borders have become permeable and old geographical
certainties have been shaken, state sovereignty, at least in its traditional sense,
cannot survive. This is the sense in which governance (see p. 74) in the twentyfirst
century has assumed a genuinely postsovereign character. It is difficult, in
particular, to see how economic sovereignty can be reconciled with a globalized
economy. Sovereign control over economic life was only possible in a world of
discrete national economies; to the extent that these have been, or are being,
incorporated into a single globalized economy, economic sovereignty becomes
meaningless. However, the rhetoric of a‘borderless’ global economy can be taken
too far. For example, there has been, if anything, a growing recognition that
market-based economies can only operate successfully within a context of legal
and social order that only the state can guarantee (Fukuyama, 2005).
Increased global competition has also generated pressure to develop more
efficient and responsive means of developing public policy and delivering public
services. For many, this reflected a shift from government to ‘governance’. As
societies became more complex and fluid, new methods of governing have had
to be devised that relied less on hierarchical state institutions and more on
networks and the market, thus blurring the distinction between the state and
society. The‘governance turn’ in politics has been characterized by what has been
called the ‘reinvention’ of government, reflected, in particular, in a move away
from direct service provision by the state to the adoption of an ‘enabling’ or
‘regulating’ role. Such developments have led, some argue, to the transformation
of the state itself, reflecting the rise of what has variously been called the ‘competition’
state, the ‘market’ state or the ‘postmodern’ state. Philip Bobbitt (2002)
P O L I T I C S A N D T H E S T A T E 73
Supraterritoriality: The
reconfiguration of geography
that has occurred through the
declining importance of state
borders, geographical distance
and territorial location.
Economic sovereignty: The
absolute authority of the state
over national economic life,
involving independent control
of fiscal and monetary policies,
and control over trade and
capital flows.
went as far as to argue that the transition from the nation-state to what he
termed the ‘market state’ heralded a profound shift in world politics, in that it
marked the end of the‘long war’ between liberalism, fascism and communism to
define the constitutional form of the nation-state. The core feature of the market
state is a shift away from ‘top-down’ economic management, based on the existence
of discrete national economies, to an acceptance of the market as the only
reliable principle of economic organization. Instead of trying to ‘tame’ capitalism,
market states ‘go with the flow’. Whereas states were previously judged on
their effectiveness in promoting growth and prosperity, alleviating poverty and
narrowing social inequality, market states base their legitimacy on their capacity
to maximize the opportunities available to citizens, and their ability to ensure
effective and unimpeded market competition. The speed with which this has
happened varies in different parts of the world, as states embrace the marketstate
model with greater or less enthusiasm, and try to adapt it to their political
cultures and economic needs.
Non-state actors and international bodies
A further manifestation of the decline of the state is evident in the rise of nonstate
or transnational actors and the growing importance of international organizations.
This reflects the fact that, increasingly, major aspects of politics no
longer take place merely in or through the state but, rather, outside or beyond
the state. Amongst non-state actors, TNCs are often regarded as the most significant,
their number having risen from 7,000 in 1970 to 38,000 in 2009. TNCs
often dwarf states in terms of their economic size. Based on the (rather crude)
comparison between corporate sales and countries’ GDP, 51 of the world’s 100
largest economies are corporations; only 49 of them are countries. General
Motors is broadly equivalent, in this sense, to Denmark; Wal-Mart is roughly the
same size as Poland; and Exxon Mobil has the same economic weight as South
Africa. However, economic size does not necessarily translate into political
power or influence. States, after all, can do things that TNCs can only dream
about, such as make laws and raise armies. Non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) (see p. 248) have also steadily grown in number and influence, particularly
since the 1990s. Estimates of the total number of international NGOs
usually exceed 30,000, with over 1,000 groups enjoying formal consultative
status by the UN. Their expertise, moral authority and high public profiles
enable NGOs such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International and Care International
to exert a level of influence within international organizations that may at times
rival, or even surpass, that of national governments. NGOs are therefore the key
agents of what is increasingly called ‘global civil society’ (see p. 106). Other nonstate
actors range from the women’s movement and the anti-capitalist movement
to terrorist networks, such as al-Qaeda, guerrilla armies and transnational
criminal organizations. As such groups have a ‘trans-border’ character, they are
often able to operate in ways that elude the jurisdiction of any state.
The growth of politics beyond the state has also been apparent in the trend
towards political globalization. However, its impact has been complex and, in
some ways, contradictory. On the one hand, international bodies such as the UN,
the European Union (EU) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have
undermined the capacity of states to operate as self-governing political units. As
74 P O L I T I C S
Market state: A state that
aims to enlarge citizens’ rights
and opportuities, rather than
assume control over economic
and social life.
Political globalization: The
growing importance of
international bodies and
organizations, and of
transnation political forces
generally.
CONCEPT
Governance
Governance is a broader
term than government
(see p. 266).Although
lacking a settled or agreed
definition, it refers, in its
widest sense, to the
various ways through
which social life is
coordinated. Government
can therefore be seen as
one of the institutions
involved in governance; it
is possible to have
‘governance without
government’ (Rhodes,
1996).The wider use of
the term reflects a
blurring of the state/
society distinction,
resulting from changes
such as the development
of new forms of public
management and the
growth of public–private
partnerships. (See
multilevel governance
p. 380).
the range and importance of decisions that are made at intergovernmental or
supranational level has increased, states have been forced to exert influence in
and through regional or global bodies, or to operate within frameworks established
by them. In the case of the EU, a growing range of decisions (for example,
on monetary policy, agriculture and fisheries policy, defence and foreign affairs)
are made by EU institutions, rather than member states. This has led to the
phenomenon of multilevel governance, as discussed in Chapter 17. The WTO,
for its part, acts as the judge and jury of global trade disputes and serves as a
forum for negotiating trade deals between and amongst its members. On the
other hand, political globalization opens up opportunities for the state as well as
diminishes them. This occurs through the ‘pooling’ of sovereignty. For example,
the EU Council of Ministers, the most powerful policy-making body in the EU,
is very much a creature of its member states and provides a forum that allows
national politicians to make decisions on a supranational level. By ‘pooling’
sovereignty, member states of the EU arguably gain access to a larger and more
meaningful form of sovereignty. The ‘pooled’ sovereignty of the EU may be
greater than the combined national sovereignties of its various member states.
Failed states and state-building
In the developing world, debate about the decline of the state has sometimes
been displaced by concern about weak, failing or collapsed states. Cooper (2004)
portrayed what he called the ‘pre-modern’ world as a world of postcolonial
chaos, in which such state structures as exist are unable to establish (in Weber’s
words) a legitimate monopoly of the use of force, thus leading to endemic
warlordism, widespread criminality and social dislocation. Such conditions do
not apply consistently across the developing world, however. In cases such as
India, South Korea and Taiwan, developing world states have been highly
successful in pursuing strategies of economic modernization and social development.
Others, nevertheless, have been distinguished by their weakness, sometimes
being portrayed as ‘quasi-states’ or ‘failed states’ (see p. 76). Most of the
weakest states in the world are concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, classic examples
being Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. These states fail the most basic test of state power: they are unable to
maintain domestic order and personal security, meaning that civil strife and
even civil war become almost routine.
The failure of such states stems primarily from the experience of colonialism
(see p. 122), which, when it ended (mainly in the post-1945 period), bequeathed
formal political independence to societies that lacked an appropriate level of
political, economic, social and educational development to function effectively
as separate entities. As the borders of such states typically represented the extent
of colonial ambition, rather than the existence of a culturally cohesive population,
postcolonial states also often encompass deep ethnic, religious and tribal
divisions. Although some explain the increase in state failure since the 1990s
primarily in terms of domestic factors (such as a disposition towards authoritarian
rule, backward institutions and parochial value systems which block the
transition from pre-industrial, agrarian societies to modern industrial ones),
external factors have also played a major role. This has applied not least through
the tendency of globalization to re-orientate developing world economies
P O L I T I C S A N D T H E S T A T E 75
Warlordism: A condition in
which locally-based militarized
bands vie for power in the
absence of a sovereign state.
around the dictates of global markets, rather than domestic needs, and to widen
inequality.
State failure is not just a domestic problem, however. Failed states often have a
wider impact through, for example, precipitating refugee crises, providing a refuge
for drug dealers, arms smugglers and terrorist organizations, generating regional
instability, and, sometimes, provoking external intervention to provide humanitarian
relief and/or to keep the peace. In this light, there has been a growing
emphasis on state-building, typically associated with the larger process of peacebuilding
and attempts to address deep-rooted, structural causes of violence in
post-conflict situations. The provision of humanitarian relief and the task of
conflict resolution become almost insuperably difficult in the absence of a functioning
system of law and order. The wider acceptance of humanitarian intervention
(see p. 424) since the early 1990s has meant that ordered rule is often
provided, initially at least, by external powers. However this does not constitute a
long-term solution. As examples such as Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate,
externally-imposed order is only sustainable for a limited period of time,
both because the economic and human cost to the intervening powers may be
unsustainable in the long run, and because, sooner or later, the presence of foreign
troops and police provokes resentment and hostility. Foreign intervention has
therefore come, over time, to focus increasingly on the construction of effective
indigenous leadership and building legitimate national institutions, such as an
army, a police force, a judiciary, a central bank, a tax collection agency and functioning
education, transport, energy and healthcare systems. As examples such as
Liberia demonstrate, state-building is often a profoundly difficult task (see p. 77).
Return of the state?
Discussion about the state in the early twenty-first century has been dominated
by talk of retreat, decline, or even collapse. The reality is more complex, however.
For instance, although globalization may make state borders more‘porous’, globalization
has not been imposed on unwilling states; rather, it is a process that has
been devised by states in pursuit of what they identify as their national interests.
Similarly, international organizations typically act as forums through which
states can act in concert over matters of mutual interest, rather than as bodies
intent on usurping state power. Moreover, a number of developments in recent
years have helped to strengthen the state and underline its essential importance.
What explains the return of the state? In the first place, the state’s unique capacity
to maintain domestic order and protect its citizens from external attack has
been strongly underlined by new security challenges that have emerged in the
twenty-first century; notably, those linked to transnational terrorism (as
discussed in Chapter 18). This underlines what Bobbitt (2002) viewed as a basic
truth:‘The State exists to master violence’; it is therefore essentially a‘warmaking
institution’. The decline in military expenditure that occurred at the end of the
Cold War, the so-called ‘peace dividend’, started to be reversed in the late 1990s,
with global military expenditure rising steeply after the September 11 terrorist
attacks and the launch of the ‘war on terror’. Furthermore, counter-terrorism
strategies have often meant that states have imposed tighter border controls and
assumed wider powers of surveillance, control and sometimes detention, even
becoming ‘national security states’.
76 P O L I T I C S
CONCEPT
Failed state
A failed state is a state
that is unable to perform
its key role of ensuring
domestic order by
monopolizing the use of
force within its territory.
Examples of failed states
in recent years include
Cambodia, Haiti, Rwanda,
Liberia and Somalia.
Failed states are no
longer able to operate as
viable political units, in
that they lack a credible
system of law and order.
They are no longer able
to operate as viable
economic units, in that
they are incapable of
providing for their
citizens and have no
functioning
infrastructure. Although
relatively few states
collapse altogether, a
much larger number
barely function and are
dangerously close to
collapse.
State-building: The
construction of a functioning
state through the
establishment of legitimate
institutions for the formulation
and implementation of policy
across key areas of government.
P O L I T I C S A N D T H E S T A T E 77
Events: During the 1990s, Liberia was often cited as
a classic example of a failed state. Its ethnic and religious
mixes, widespread poverty, endemic corruption,
collapse of institutions and infrastructure, and
tendency towards warlordism and violence imperilled
the security and welfare of its citizens and affected
other states, notably neighbouring Sierra Leone.
Liberia, Africa’s oldest republic, had collapsed into
civil war in the late 1980s when Charles Taylor’s
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) rebels
overran much of the countryside, seizing the capital,
Monrovia, in 1990. Around 250,000 people were
killed and many thousands more fled the country as
fighting intensified between rebel splinter groups, the
Liberian army and West African peacekeepers. The 14year
civil war ended in 2003 when, under mounting international
pressure and hemmed in by rebels, Taylor stepped
down and went into exile in Nigeria (he was later found
guilty of war crimes by an international tribunal in The
Hague, linked to atrocities carried out in Sierra Leone). A
transitional government steered the country towards elections
in 2005, which brought the Harvard-educated economist
Elaine Johnson-Sirleaf to power, becoming Africa’s
first female head of state. Sirleaf was re-elected in an
uncontested run-off presidential election in November
2011.
Significance: Successful state-building has to overcome
at least three challenges. First, new institutions and structures
have to be constructed in a context of often deep
political and ethnic tension, economic and social dislocation,
and endemic poverty. In Liberia, the process of reconstructing
the economic and social infrastructure was
accelerated once Sirleaf and her Unity Party (UP) assumed
power in 2005. Central Monrovia was transformed with
improved roads and shining new buildings; investment in
education and health saw the building of hundreds of new
schools and health facilities, some of them free and
affordable; and, alongside the elected presidency and
legislature, progress was made in establishing an independent
judiciary, and a disciplined police and military.
Other important institutions have included Liberia’s Truth
and Reconciliation Commission, modelled on the experience
of South Africa, and the National Election
Commission (NEC), which presided over its first elections
in 2011. Nevertheless, many development goals have yet
to be achieved, despite considerable sums of money
having been provided by international donors. For
example, most people in Monrovia still do not have electricity
or running water, and unemployment remains
extremely high, with young people being most affected.
Second, the indigenous leadership and new institutions
need to enjoy a significant measure of legitimacy. This is
why state-building is invariably linked to the promotion of
‘good governance’, with the eradication of corruption
being a key goal. Before contesting the presidency, Sirleaf
had resigned her post as head of the Governance Reform
Commission, criticizing the transitional government’s
inability to fight corruption. However, her opponents claim
that her administration is guilty of some of the crimes it
associates with previous governments. In 2009, the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission implicated Sirleaf in the
civil war and recommended that she be banned from
public office for 30 years. The 2011 elections were also
highly divisive. Sirleaf’s main opponent, Winston Tubman,
boycotted the run-off election, claiming that the NEC was
biased in favour of the president and had manipulated
vote-counting in her favour.
Third, successful state-building often requires external
support, although this may become more of a hindrance
than a help. State-building ‘from above’, associated with
military intervention, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, clearly
has its drawbacks, not least because indigenous leaders
and new institutions are in danger of being seen to serve
external interests rather than domestic ones. In the case
of Liberia, the support of the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) and the presence of a
15,000-strong UN peacekeeping force certainly aided
economic development and helped to keep civil strife
under control. Nevertheless, Liberia’s peace may be fragile,
and this may be tested either when the UN peacekeeping
forces withdraw, or when President Sirleaf leaves office.
POLITICS IN ACTION . . .
Liberia: a failed state rebuilt?
Second, although the days of command-and-control economic management
may be over, the state has sometimes reasserted itself as an agent of modernization.
Competition states have done this by improving education and training in
order to boost productivity and provide support for key export industries. States
such as China and Russia each modernized their economies by making significant
concessions to the market, but an important element of state control has
been retained or re-imposed (these developments are examined in more detail in
Chapter 6 in relation to ‘state capitalism’). On a wider level, the state’s vital role
in economic affairs was underlined by the 2007–09 global financial crisis.
Although the G20 may have provided states with a forum to develop a coordinated
global response, the massive packages of fiscal and other interventions that
were agreed were, and could only have been, implemented by states. Indeed, one
of the lessons of the 2007–09 crash, and of subsequent financial and fiscal crises,
may be that the idea that the global economy works best when left alone by the
state (acting alone, or through international organizations) has been exposed as
a myth.
78 P O L I T I C S
SUMMARY
The state is a political association that exercises sovereign jurisdiction within defined territorial borders. As a
system of centralized rule that emerged in Europe between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, and
succeeded in subordinating all other institutions and groups, the state came to dominate political life in all
its forms. The spread of the European model of the state to other lands and continents has seen the state
become the universal form of political organization around the world
There are a number of rival theories of the state. Pluralists hold that the state is a neutral body that arbitrates
between the competing interests of society. Marxists argue that the state maintains the class system
by either oppressing subordinate classes or ameliorating class conflict. The New Right portrays the state as a
self-serving monster that is intent on expansion and aggrandizement. Radical feminists point to patriarchal
biases within the state that support a system of male power.
Those who support the state see it either as a means of defending the individual from the encroachments of
fellow citizens, or as a mechanism through which collective action can be organized. Critics, however, tend to
suggest that the state reflects either the interests of dominant social groups, or interests that are separate
from, and antithetical to, society.
States have fulfilled very different roles. Minimal states merely lay down the conditions for orderly existence.
Developmental states attempt to promote growth and economic development. Social-democratic states aim
to rectify the imbalances and injustices of a market economy. Collectivized states exert control over the
entirety of economic life. Totalitarian states bring about all-encompassing politicization and, in effect, extinguish
civil society. Religious states are used as instruments of moral and spiritual renewal.
Modern debate about the state is dominated by talk of retreat, decline and even collapse. The decline of the
state is often explained in terms of the impact of globalization, the rise of non-state actors and the growing
importance of international organizations. Most dramatically, some postcolonial states have collapsed, or
barely function as states, having a negligible capacity to maintain order. However, the retreat of the state
may have been exaggerated and, in relation to security and economic development in particular, the state
may be reviving in importance.
P O L I T I C S A N D T H E S T A T E 79
Questions for discussion
How should the state be defined?
Would life in a stateless society really be ‘nasty,
brutish and short’?
Why has politics traditionally been associated with
the affairs of the state?
Can the state be viewed as a neutral body in relation
to competing social interests?
Does the nature and background of the state elite
inevitably breed bias?
What is the proper relationship between the state
and civil society?
Does globalization mean that the state has
become irrelevant?
Have nation-states been transformed into market
states?
To what extent can state capacity be ‘re-built’?
Further reading
Hay, C., M. Lister and D. Marsh, The State: Theories and
Issues (2006). An accessible, comprehensive and
contemporary introduction to the theoretical
perspectives on the state and to key issues and
controversies.
Jessop, B., State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in Their
Place (1990). A demanding but worthwhile collection
of essays through which Jessop develops his
own approach to state theory.
Pierre, J. and B. Guy Peters, Governance, Politics and
the State (2000). A useful discussion of the
phenomenon of governance, and of its implications
for the role and nature of the state.
Sørensen, G., The Transformation of the State: Beyond
the Myth of Retreat (2004). A systematic analysis of
the contemporary state that assesses the nature
and extent of its transformation in a global era.