CHAPTER 9 Representation, Elections
and Voting
‘If voting changed anything they’d abolish it.’
Anarchist slogan
P R E V I E W Elections are often thought of as the heart of the political process. Perhaps no
questions in politics are as crucial as ‘Do we elect the politicians who rule over us?’,
and ‘Under what rules are these elections held?’ Elections are seen as nothing less
than democracy in practice. They are a means through which the people can
control their government, ultimately by ‘kicking the rascals out’. Central to this
notion is the principle of representation. Put simply, representation portrays politicians
as servants of the people, and invests them with a responsibility to act for or
on behalf of those who elect them. When democracy, in the classical sense of direct
and continuous popular participation, is regarded as hopelessly impractical, representation
may be the closest we can come to achieving government by the people.
There is, nevertheless, considerable disagreement about what representation means
and how it can be achieved in practice. Although it is widely accepted that elections
play a pivotal role in the process of representative democracy, electoral systems are
many and various and debate has long raged over which system is the ‘best’. Not
only do different systems have different strengths or advantages, but there is no
consensus over the criteria that should be used for assessing them. Finally, elections
need voters, but there is little agreement about why voters vote as they do, and
especially about the extent to which their behaviour is rationally-based, as opposed
to being influenced by underlying psychological, social or ideological forces.
K E Y I S S U E S What is representation? How can one person ‘represent’ another?
How can representation be achieved in practice?
What do elections do? What are their functions?
How do electoral systems differ? What are their strengths and weak-
nesses?
What do election results mean?
Why do people vote as they do? How can voting behaviour be
explained?
REPRESENTATION
The issue of representation has generated deep and recurrent political controversy.
Even the absolute monarchs of old were expected to rule by seeking the
advice of the ‘estates of the realm’ (the major landed interests, the clergy, and so
on). In this sense, the English Civil War of the seventeenth century, fought
between King and Parliament, broke out as a result of an attempt to deny representation
to key groups and interests. Similarly, debate about the spread of
democracy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries centred largely on the
question of who should be represented. Should representation be restricted to
those who have the competence, education and, perhaps, leisure to act wisely
and think seriously about politics (variously seen as men, the propertied, or
particular racial or ethnic groups), or should representation be extended to all
adult citizens?
Such questions have now largely been resolved through the widespread
acceptance of the principle of political equality (see p. 90), at least in the formal
sense of universal suffrage and ‘one person, one vote’. Plural voting, for example,
was abolished in the UK in 1949, women were enfranchised in one canton in
Switzerland in 1971, and racial criteria for voting were swept away in South
Africa in 1994. However, this approach to representation is simplistic, in that it
equates representation with elections and voting, politicians being seen as‘representatives’
merely because they have been elected. This ignores more difficult
questions about how one person can be said to represent another, and what it is
that he or she represents. Is it the views of the represented, their best interests,
the groups from which they come, or what?
Theories of representation
There is no single, agreed theory of representation. Rather, there are a number of
competing theories, each of which is based on particular ideological and political
assumptions. For example, does representative government imply that government
‘knows better’ than the people, that government has somehow ‘been
instructed’ by the people what to do and how to behave; or that the government
‘looks like’ the people, in that it broadly reflects their characteristics or features?
Such questions are not of academic interest alone. Particular models of representation
dictate very different behaviour on the part of representatives. For
instance, should elected politicians be bound by policies and positions outlined
during an election and endorsed by the voters, or is it their job to lead public
opinion and thereby help to define the public interest? Moreover, it is not
uncommon for more than one principle of representation to operate within the
same political system, suggesting, perhaps, that no single model is sufficient in
itself to secure representative government.
Four principal models of representation have been advanced:
trusteeship
delegation
the mandate
resemblance.
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N , E L E C T I O N S A N D V O T I N G 197
CONCEPT
Representation
Representation is,
broadly, a relationship
through which an
individual or group
stands for, or acts on
behalf of, a larger body of
people. Representation
differs from democracy in
that, while the former
acknowledges a
distinction between
government and the
governed, the latter, at
least in its classical form,
aspires to abolish this
distinction and establish
popular self-government.
Representative
democracy (see p. 92)
may nevertheless
constitute a limited and
indirect form of
democratic rule, provided
that the representation
links government and the
governed in such a way
that the people’s views
are articulated, or their
interests secured.
Trustee model
A trustee is a person who acts on behalf of others, using his or her superior
knowledge, better education or greater experience. The classic expression of
representation as trusteeship is found in Edmund Burke’s (see p. 36) speech to
the electors of Bristol in 1774:
You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him he is not
member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament . . . Your representative
owes you, not his industry only, but his judgement; and he betrays, instead of
serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion (Burke, 1975).
For Burke, the essence of representation was to serve one’s constituents by the
exercise of ‘mature judgement’ and ‘enlightened conscience’. In short, representation
is a moral duty: those with the good fortune to possess education and
understanding should act in the interests of those who are less fortunate. This
view had strongly elitist implications, since it stresses that, once elected, representatives
should think for themselves and exercise independent judgement on
the grounds that the mass of people do not know their own best interests. A
similar view was advanced by John Stuart Mill in the form of the liberal theory of
representation. This was based on the assumption that, although all individuals
have a right to be represented, not all political opinions are of equal value. Mill
therefore proposed a system of plural voting in which four or five votes would be
allocated to holders of learned diplomas or degrees, two or three to skilled or
managerial workers, and a single vote to ordinary workers. He also argued that
rational voters would support politicians who could act wisely on their behalf,
rather than those who merely reflected the voters’ own views. Trustee representation
thus portrays professional politicians as representatives, insofar as they are
members of an educated elite. It is based on the belief that knowledge and understanding
are unequally distributed in society, in the sense that not all citizens
know what is best for them.
This Burkean notion of representation has also attracted severe criticism,
however. For instance, it appears to have clearly antidemocratic implications. If
198 P O L I T I C S
John Stuart Mill (1806–73)
UK philosopher, economist and politician. Mill was subject to an intense and austere
regime of education by his father, the utilitarian theorist James Mill (1773–1836).This
resulted in a mental collapse at the age of 20, after which he developed a more
human philosophy influenced by Coleridge and the German Idealists. His major writings,
including On Liberty (1859), Considerations on Representative Government
(1861) and The Subjection of Women (1869), had a powerful influence on the development
of liberal thought. In many ways, Mill’s work straddles the divide between
classical and modern liberalism. His distrust of state intervention was firmly rooted
in nineteenth-century principles, but his emphasis on the quality of individual life
(reflected in a commitment to ‘individuality’) looked forward to later developments.
Trustee: A person who is
vested with formal (and usually
legal) responsibilities for
another’s property or affairs.
politicians should think for themselves because the public is ignorant, poorly
educated or deluded, then surely it is a mistake to allow the public to elect their
representatives in the first place. Second, the link between representation and
education is questionable. Whereas education may certainly be of value in aiding
the understanding of intricate political and economic problems, it is far less clear
that it helps politicians to make correct moral judgements about the interests of
others. There is little evidence, for example, to support Burke’s and Mill’s belief
that education breeds altruism and gives people a broader sense of social
responsibility. Finally, there is the fear traditionally expressed by radical democrats
such as Thomas Paine that, if politicians are allowed to exercise their own
judgement, they will simply use that latitude to pursue their own selfish interests.
In this way, representation could simply become a substitute for democracy. In
his pamphlet Common Sense ([1776] 1987), Paine came close to the rival ideal
of delegate representation in insisting that ‘the elected should never form to
themselves an interest separate from the electors’.
Delegate model
A delegate is a person who acts as a conduit conveying the views of others, while
having little or no capacity to exercise his or her own judgement or preferences.
Examples include sales representatives and ambassadors, neither of whom are,
strictly speaking, authorized to think for themselves. Similarly, a trade-union
official who attends a conference with instructions on how to vote and what to
say is acting as a delegate, not as a Burkean representative. Those who favour this
model of representation as delegation usually support mechanisms that ensure
that politicians are bound as closely as possible to the views of the represented.
These include what Paine referred to as ‘frequent interchange’ between representatives
and their constituents in the form of regular elections and short terms in
office. In addition, radical democrats have advocated the use of initiatives and
the right of recall as means of giving the public more control over politicians.
Although delegation stops short of direct democracy, its supporters nevertheless
usually favour the use of referendums (see p. 201) to supplement the representative
process.
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N , E L E C T I O N S A N D V O T I N G 199
Thomas Paine (1737–1809)
UK-born writer and revolutionary. Paine was brought up in a Quaker family and spent
his early years as an undistinguished artisan. He went to America in 1774 and fought
for the colonists in the War of Independence. He returned to England in 1789, but,
after being indicted for treason, fled to France as a supporter of the republican cause,
where he narrowly escaped the guillotine during the Terror. Paine’s radicalism fused a
commitment to political liberty with a deep faith in popular sovereignty, providing
inspiration for both liberal republicanism and socialist egalitarianism. He was an
important figure in revolutionary politics in the USA, the UK and France. His most
important writings include Common Sense ([1776] 1987), The Rights of Man
(1791/92) and The Age of Reason (1794).
Altruism: A concern for the
welfare of others, based on
either enlightened self-interest,
or a recognition of a common
humanity.
Delegate: A person who is
chosen to act for another on
the basis of clear guidance and
instruction; delegates do not
think for themselves.
Initiative: A type of
referendum through which the
public is able to raise legislative
proposals.
Recall: A process whereby
the electorate can call
unsatisfactory public officials to
account and ultimately remove
them.
The virtue of what has been called ‘delegated representation’ is that it
provides broader opportunities for popular participation and serves to check the
self-serving inclinations of professional politicians. It thus comes as close as is
possible in representative government to realizing the ideal of popular sovereignty.
Its disadvantages are, nevertheless, also clear. In the first place, in ensuring
that representatives are bound to the interests of their constituents, it tends
to breed narrowness and foster conflict. This is precisely what Burke feared
would occur if members of the legislature acted as ambassadors who took
instructions from their constituents, rather than as representatives of the nation.
As he put it,‘Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest,
that of the whole’. A second drawback is that, because professional politicians
are not trusted to exercise their own judgement, delegation limits the scope for
leadership (see p. 300) and statesmanship. Politicians are forced to reflect the
views of their constituents or even pander to them, and are thus not able to
mobilize the people by providing vision and inspiration.
Mandate model
Both the trustee model and the delegate model were developed before the emergence
of modern political parties, and therefore view representatives as essentially
independent actors. However, individual candidates are now rarely elected
mainly on the basis of their personal qualities and talents; more commonly, they
are seen, to a greater or lesser extent, as foot soldiers for a party, and are
supported because of its public image or programme of policies. New theories of
representation have therefore emerged. The most influential of these is the socalled
‘doctrine of the mandate’. This is based on the idea that, in winning an
election, a party gains a popular mandate that authorizes it to carry out whatever
policies or programmes it outlined during the election campaign. As it is the
party, rather than individual politicians, that is the agent of representation, the
mandate model provides a clear justification for party unity and party discipline.
In effect, politicians serve their constituents not by thinking for themselves or
acting as a channel to convey their views, but by remaining loyal to their party and
its policies.
The strength of the mandate doctrine is that it takes account of the
undoubted practical importance of party labels and party policies. Moreover, it
provides a means of imposing some kind of meaning on election results, as well
as a way of keeping politicians to their word. Nevertheless, the doctrine has also
stimulated fierce criticism. First, it is based on a highly questionable model of
voting behaviour, insofar as it suggests that voters select parties on the grounds
of policies and issues. Voters are not always the rational and well-informed creatures
that this model suggests. They can be influenced by a range of ‘irrational’
factors, such as the personalities of leaders, the images of parties, habitual allegiances
and social conditioning.
Second, even if voters are influenced by policies, it is likely that they will be
attracted by certain manifesto commitments, but be less interested in, or
perhaps opposed to, others. A vote for a party cannot therefore be taken to be an
endorsement of its entire manifesto or, indeed, of any single election promise.
Third, the doctrine imposes a straitjacket. It limits government policies to those
positions and proposals that the party took up during the election, and leaves no
200 P O L I T I C S
Popular sovereignty: The
principle that there is no higher
authority than the will of the
people (the basis of the
classical concept of
democracy).
Manifesto: A document
outlining (in more or less
detail) the policies or
programme a party proposes to
pursue if elected to power.
CONCEPT
Mandate
A mandate is an
instruction or command
from a higher body that
demands compliance. The
idea of a policy mandate
arises from the claim on
behalf of a winning party
in an election that its
manifesto promises have
been endorsed, giving it
authority to translate
these into a programme
of government. The
doctrine of the mandate
thus implies that the
party in power can only
act within the mandate it
has received. The more
flexible notion of a
governing mandate, or,
for an individual leader, a
personal mandate, has
sometimes been
advanced, but it is
difficult to see how this
in any way restricts
politicians once they are
in power.
scope to adjust policies in the light of changing circumstances. What guidance
do mandates offer in the event of, say, international or economic crises? Finally
(as discussed in the next main section of this chapter), the doctrine of the
mandate can be applied only in the case of majoritarian electoral systems, and its
use even there may appear absurd if the winning party fails to gain 50 per cent
of the popular vote.
Resemblance model
The final theory of representation is based less on the manner in which representatives
are selected than on whether they typify or resemble the group they
claim to represent. This notion is embodied in the idea of a ‘representative crosssection’,
as used by market researchers and opinion pollsters. By this standard, a
representative government would constitute a microcosm of the larger society,
containing members drawn from all groups and sections in society (in terms of
social class, gender, age and so on), and in numbers that are proportional to the
size of the groups in society at large. The idea of descriptive representation, or
as it has been called ‘microcosmic representation’, has traditionally been
endorsed by socialist, feminist and other radical thinkers. They argue that the
‘under-representation’ of groups such as the working class, women and racial
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N , E L E C T I O N S A N D V O T I N G 201
Focus on . . .
Referendums: for or against?
A referendum is a vote in which the electorate can
express a view on a particular issue of public policy. It
differs from an election in that the latter is essentially
a means of filling a public office and does not provide a
direct or reliable method of influencing the content of
policy. The referendum is therefore a device of direct
democracy (see p. 92). It is typically used not to replace
representative institutions, but to supplement them.
Referendums may be either advisory or binding; they
may also raise issues for discussion (initiatives), or be
used to decide policy questions (propositions or
plebiscites).
Amongst the advantages of referendums are the
following:
They check the power of elected governments,
ensuring that they stay in line with public opinion.
They promote political participation, thus helping
to create a more educated and better-informed
electorate.
They strengthen legitimacy by providing the public
with a way of expressing their views about specific
issues.
They provide a means either of settling major
constitutional questions, or of gauging public
opinion on issues not raised in elections because
major parties agree on them.
The disadvantages of referendums include the following:
They leave political decisions in the hands of those
who have the least education and experience, and
are most susceptible to media and other influences.
They provide, at best, only a snapshot of public
opinion at one point in time.
They allow politicians to manipulate the political
agenda and absolve themselves of responsibility for
making difficult decisions.
They tend to simplify and distort political issues,
reducing them to questions that have a yes/no
answer.
Microcosm: Literally, a little
world; a miniature version of a
larger body, but exact in its
features and proportions.
Descriptive representation:
A model of representation that
takes account of politicians’
social and other characteristics,
usually based on the idea that
they should be a ‘representative
sample’ of the larger society.
202 P O L I T I C S
minorities at senior levels in key institutions ensures that their interests are
marginalized, or ignored altogether.
The resemblance model suggests that only people who come from a particular
group, and have shared the experiences of that group, can fully identify with
its interests. This is the difference between ‘putting oneself in the shoes of
another’ and having direct and personal experience of what other people go
through. A ‘new man’ or a ‘pro-feminist’ male may, for instance, sympathize with
women’s interests and support the principle of gender equality, but will never
take women’s problems as seriously as women do themselves, because they are
not his problems. On the other hand, the idea that representatives should resemble
the represented undoubtedly causes a number of difficulties.
One of these is that this model portrays representation in exclusive or narrow
terms, believing that only a woman can represent women, only a black person
can represent other black people, only a member of the working class can represent
the working classes and so on. If all representatives simply advanced the
interests of the groups from which they come, the result would be social division
and conflict, with no one being able to defend the common good or advance a
broader public interest. Moreover, a government that is a microcosm of society
would reflect that society’s weaknesses as well as its strengths. What would be the
advantage, for example, of government resembling society if the majority of the
population are apathetic, ill-informed and poorly educated? Finally, the microcosmic
ideal can be achieved only by imposing powerful constraints on electoral
choice and individual freedom. In the name of representation, political parties
may be forced to select quotas of female and minority candidates, constituencies
may be set aside for candidates from particular backgrounds, or, more dramatically,
the electorate might have to be classified on the basis of class, gender, race
and so on, and only be allowed to vote for candidates from their own group.
ELECTIONS
Although controversy continues to rage about the nature of representation, there
is one point of universal agreement: the representative process is intrinsically
linked to elections and voting. Elections may not, in themselves, be a sufficient
Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950)
Moravian-born US economist and sociologist. Following an early academic career and
a brief spell as Minister of Finance in post-First-World-War Austria, Schumpeter
became professor of economics at Harvard University in 1932. His economic thought,
developed in Theory of Economic Development (1912) and Business Cycles (1939),
centred on the long-term dynamics of the capitalist system and in particular the
role of ‘risk-loving’ entrepreneurs. In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942),
Schumpeter drew on economic, sociological and political theories to advance the
famous contention that western capitalism was, impelled by its very success, evolving
into a form of socialism.
condition for political representation but, in modern circumstances, there is
little doubt that they are a necessary condition. Indeed, some thinkers have gone
further and portrayed elections as the very heart of democracy. This was the view
developed by Joseph Schumpeter (see p. 202) in Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy (1942), which portrayed democracy as an‘institutional arrangement’,
as a means of filling public office by a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.
As he put it, ‘democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of
accepting or refusing the men [sic] who are to rule them’. In interpreting democracy
as nothing more than a political method, Schumpeter, in effect, identified it
with elections, and specifically with competitive elections. While few modern
democratic theorists are prepared to reduce democracy simply to competitive
elections, most nevertheless follow Schumpeter in understanding democratic
government in terms of the rules and mechanisms that guide the conduct of
elections. This focuses attention on the very different forms that elections can
take.
First, which offices or posts are subject to the elective principle? Although elections
are widely used to fill those public offices whose holders have policy-making
responsibilities (the legislature and executive, in particular), key political institutions
are sometimes treated as exceptions. This applies, for instance, to the
second chambers of legislature in states such as the UK and Canada, and where
constitutional monarchs still serve as heads of state. Second, who is entitled to
vote, how widely is the franchise drawn? As pointed out, restrictions on the right
to vote based on factors such as property ownership, education, gender and racial
origin have been abandoned in most countries. Nevertheless, there may be informal
restrictions, as in the practice in most US states of leaving electoral registration
entirely in the hands of the citizen, with the result that non-registration and
non-voting are widespread. On the other hand, in Australia, Belgium and Italy,
for instance, voting is compulsory (see p. 204).
Third, how are votes cast? Although public voting was the norm in the USSR
until 1989, and it is still widely practised in small organizations in the form of a
show of hands, modern political elections are generally held on the basis of a
secret ballot (sometimes called an ‘Australian ballot’, as it was first used in South
Australia in 1856). The secret ballot is usually seen as the guarantee of a‘fair’ election,
in that it keeps the dangers of corruption and intimidation at bay.Nevertheless,
electoral fairness cannot simply be reduced to the issue of how people vote. It is
also affected by the voters’ access to reliable and balanced information, the range
of choice they are offered, the circumstances under which campaigning is carried
out, and, finally, how scrupulously the vote is counted.
Fourth, are elections competitive or non-competitive? This is usually seen as
the most crucial of distinctions, as, until the 1990s, only about half of the countries
that used elections offered their electorates a genuine choice of both candidates
and parties. Single-candidate elections, for example, were the rule in
orthodox communist states. This meant that public office was effectively filled
through a nomination process dominated by the communist party. Electoral
competition is a highly complex and often controversial issue. It concerns not
merely the right of people to stand for election and the ability of political parties
to nominate candidates and campaign legally, but also broader factors that affect
party performance, such as their sources of funding and their access to the
media. From this point of view, the nature of the party system may be as crucial
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N , E L E C T I O N S A N D V O T I N G 203
204 P O L I T I C S
In 2005, some 33 countries operated a system of compulsory voting for some or all elected bodies, although only in a
minority of cases was this enforced through the threat of punishment (usually by a small fine, or community service).
However, while some argue that compulsory voting strengthens democracy, even seeing it as a civic duty, others point out
that ‘non-voting’ is a basic civil right, whose infringement may make a mockery of the democratic process.
YES NO
Increased participation. The almost certain consequence
of introducing compulsory voting would be that turnout
rates will increase. Voter turnout in Australia has thus
been consistently around 94–96 per cent since the introduction
of nationwide compulsory voting in 1924, having
previously been as low as 47 per cent. Compulsory voting
would, at a stroke, resolve the ‘participation crises’ that
afflict so many mature democracies, in the process
counteracting longer-term trends against voting in
modern, individualized and consumerist societies.
Greater legitimacy. Governments formed on the basis of
compulsory voting would be much more likely to rest on
a popular majority (a majority of those eligible to vote),
not just an electoral majority (a majority of those who
actually vote). Declining turnout in the UK’s noncompulsory
system meant that, in 2005, the Labour Party
was able to gain a comfortable parliamentary majority
with the support of just 22 per cent of the electorate.
Compulsory voting would therefore strengthen democratic
legitimacy and ensure that governments do not
neglect sections of society that are less active politically.
Civic duty. Citizenship is based on reciprocal rights and
responsibilities. The right to vote therefore involves a
duty to exercise that right, and legal compulsion simply
ensures that that duty is fulfilled (treating it like paying
taxes, jury service and (possibly) military conscription).
Moreover, enforcing the responsibility to vote has educational
benefits, in that it will stimulate political activism
and create a better informed citizenry.
Countering social disadvantage. Voluntary voting effectively
disadvantages the most vulnerable elements in
society, the poor and less-educated – those who are, as
research consistently shows, least likely to vote. Noncompulsion
therefore means that the interests of the
educated, articulate and better-off prevail over those of
other groups. Genuine political equality requires not only
that all can vote, but that all do vote. Only then can political
equality serve the interests of social equality.
Abuse of freedom. Compulsion, even in the name of
democracy, remains compulsion: a violation of individual
freedom. The right not to vote may, in some senses,
be as important as the right to choose for whom to vote.
Non-voting may thus be a conscientious act, a product of
rational and considered reflection, an attempt to draw
attention to, amongst other things, the lack of choice
among mainstream political parties or, perhaps, to
express a principled rejection of the political system
itself.
Cosmetic democracy. Compulsory voting addresses the
symptoms of the problem but not the cause. Making
voting compulsory would undoubtedly increase the electoral
turnout, but it would not address the deeper problems
that account for a growing decline in civic
engagement. Higher turnout levels brought about
through compulsion may therefore simply mask deeper
problems, making it less likely, rather than more likely,
that issues such as the decline in trust in politicians, and
a lack of effective responsiveness and accountability, will
be properly addressed.
Worthless votes. Generally, those who do not vote have
the least interest in and understanding of politics.
Forcing would-be non-voters to vote would therefore
simply increase the number of random and unthinking
votes that are cast. This may particularly be the case
when some voters, because they only turn up through a
fear of punishment, may feel resentful and aggrieved.
This is an especially worrying prospect as such ‘worthless’
votes may, ultimately, determine the outcome of an
election.
Distorted political focus. A final problem with compulsory
voting is that it may distort the strategies adopted by
political parties. Instead of focusing on the interests of
the mass of the electorate, parties may be encouraged to
frame policies designed to attract more volatile ‘marginal’
voters (that is, would-be non-voters), thereby leading to a
decline in coherence and an increase in polarization.
Debating . . .
Should voting be compulsory?
to the maintenance of genuine competition as are rules about who can stand and
who can vote. Finally, how is the election conducted? As will be discussed later,
there is a bewildering variety of electoral systems, each of which has its own particular
political and constitutional implications.
Functions of elections
Because of the different kinds of elections, and the variety of electoral systems,
generalization about the roles or functions of elections is always difficult.
Nevertheless, the advance of democratization (see p. 272) in the 1980s and
1990s, stimulated in part by the collapse of communism, has usually been associated
with the adoption of liberal-democratic electoral systems, characterized by
universal suffrage, the secret ballot and electoral competition. The significance of
such systems is, however, more difficult to determine. As Harrop and Miller
(1987) explained, there are two contrasting views of the function of competitive
elections.
The conventional view is that elections are a mechanism through which
politicians can be called to account and forced to introduce policies that
somehow reflect public opinion. This emphasizes the bottom-up functions of
elections: political recruitment, representation, making government, influencing
policy and so on. On the other hand, a radical view of elections, developed by
theorists such as Ginsberg (1982), portrays them as a means through which
governments and political elites can exercise control over their populations,
making them more quiescent, malleable and, ultimately, governable. This view
emphasizes top-down functions: building legitimacy, shaping public opinion
and strengthening elites. In reality, however, elections have no single character;
they are neither simply mechanisms of public accountability, nor a means of
ensuring political control. Like all channels of political communication, elections
are a‘two-way street’ that provides the government and the people, the elite
and the masses, with the opportunity to influence one another. The central functions
of elections include the following:
Recruiting politicians: In democratic states, elections are the principal
source of political recruitment, taking account also of the processes through
which parties nominate candidates. Politicians thus tend to possess talents
and skills that are related to electioneering, such as charisma (see p. 83),
oratorical skills and good looks, not necessarily those that suit them to
carrying out constituency duties, serving on committees, running government
departments and so on. Elections are typically not used to fill posts
that require specialist knowledge or experience, such as those in the civil
service or judiciary.
Making governments: Elections make governments directly only in states
such as the USA, France and Venezuela, in which the political executive is
directly elected. In the more common parliamentary systems, elections
influence the formation of governments, most strongly when the electoral
system tends to give a single party a clear parliamentary majority. The use
of proportional representation (see p. 207) may mean that governments are
formed through post-election deals, and that governments can be made and
unmade without the need for an election.
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N , E L E C T I O N S A N D V O T I N G 205
Providing representation: When they are fair and competitive, elections
are a means through which demands are channelled from the public to the
government. Short of the use of initiatives and the recall, however, the electorate
has no effective means of ensuring that mandates are carried out,
apart from its capacity to inflict punishment at the next election. Moreover,
nowhere do elected governments constitute a microcosm of the larger
society.
Influencing policy: Elections certainly deter governments from pursuing
radical and deeply unpopular policies; however, only in exceptional cases,
when a single issue dominates the election campaign, can they be said to
influence policy directly. It can also be argued that the range of policy
options outlined in elections is typically so narrow that the result can be of
only marginal policy significance. Others suggest that government policy is,
in any case, shaped more by practical dictates, such as the state of the
economy, than it is by electoral considerations.
Educating voters: The process of campaigning provides the electorate with
an abundance of information, about parties, candidates, policies, the
current government’s record, the political system and so on. However, this
leads to education only if the information that is provided, and the way it is
provided, engages public interest and stimulates debate, as opposed to
apathy and alienation. As candidates and parties seek to persuade, rather
than to educate, they also have a strong incentive to provide incomplete and
distorted information.
Building legitimacy: One reason why even authoritarian regimes bother to
hold elections, even if they are non-competitive, is that elections help to
foster legitimacy (see p. 81) by providing justification for a system of rule.
This happens because the ritual involved in campaigning somehow confers
on an election a ceremonial status and importance. Most importantly, by
encouraging citizens to participate in politics, even in the limited form of
voting, elections mobilize active consent.
Strengthening elites: Elections can also be a vehicle through which elites
can manipulate and control the masses. This possibility encouraged
Proudhon (see p. 381) to warn that ‘universal suffrage is counter-revolution’.
Political discontent and opposition can be neutralized by elections
that channel them in a constitutional direction, and allow governments to
come and go while the regime itself survives. Elections are particularly
effective in this respect because, at the same time, they give citizens the
impression that they are exercising power over the government.
Electoral systems: debates and controversies
An electoral system is a set of rules that governs the conduct of elections. Not
only do these rules vary across the world; they are also, in many countries, the
subject of fierce political debate and argument. These rules vary in a number of
ways:
Voters may be asked to choose between candidates or between parties.
Voters may either select a single candidate, or vote preferentially, ranking
the candidates they wish to support in order.
206 P O L I T I C S
The electorate may or may not be grouped into electoral units or
constituencies.
Constituencies may return a single member or a number of members.
The level of support needed to elect a candidate varies from a plurality to
an overall or ‘absolute’ majority, or a quota of some kind.
For general purposes, however, the systems available can be divided into two
broad categories on the basis of how they convert votes into seats. On the one
hand, there are majoritarian systems, in which larger parties typically win a
higher proportion of seats than the proportion of votes they gain in the election.
This increases the chances of a single party gaining a parliamentary majority and
being able to govern on its own. In the UK, for example, single-party government
prevailed between 1945 and 2010 despite the fact that no party achieved an
electoral majority during this period. On the other hand, there are proportional
systems, which guarantee an equal (or, at least, more equal) relationship between
the seats won by a party and the votes gained in the election. In a pure system of
proportional representation (PR), a party that gains 45 per cent of the votes
would win exactly 45 per cent of the seats. PR systems therefore make singleparty
majority rule less likely, and are commonly associated with multiparty
systems and coalition government. The electoral systems described in the following
Focus boxes range from the most majoritarian type of system to the purest
type of proportional system.
Although in some countries the electoral system provokes little debate or
interest, in others it is an issue of pressing political and constitutional significance.
France, for instance, has changed its electoral system so many times that
any statement about it runs the risk of being out of date. The second ballot (see
p. 209) was abandoned for parliamentary elections in 1985, when France
switched to a regional-list system (see p. 213), but it was reintroduced for the
1993 election. In the UK, although the majoritarian single-member plurality
(SMP) system (see p. 208) continues to be used for general elections, since 1999
a number of more proportional systems have been introduced for elections to
the devolved bodies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the Greater
London Authority and the European Parliament. The confusing thing about the
electoral reform debate is that the shifts that have occurred reflect no consistent
pattern. In 1993, while New Zealand adopted proportional representation in
place of the SMP system (see p. 214), Italy moved in the opposite direction,
replacing the party list with the less proportional additional member system (see
p. 211), before, in 2005, returning to the list system.
Electoral systems attract attention, in part, because they have a crucial impact
on party performance and, particularly, on their prospects of winning (or, at least,
sharing) power. It would be foolish, then, to deny that attitudes towards the electoral
system are shaped largely by party advantage. President Mitterrand’s twists
and turns in France in the 1980s and 1990s were dictated mainly by his desire to
strengthen Socialist representation in the National Assembly. Similarly, the UK
Labour Party’s interest in electoral reform since the 1980s has waxed and waned
according to whether it appeared that the party could win under SMP rules. The
party’s conversion to PR for devolved bodies and its commitment in 1997 to
holding a referendum on electoral reform for the House of Commons were, in
part, a consequence of spending 18 years in opposition. It is notable that Labour’s
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N , E L E C T I O N S A N D V O T I N G 207
Plurality: The largest
number out of a collection of
numbers, not necessarily an
absolute majority (50 per cent
or more of all the numbers
combined).
CONCEPT
Proportional
representation
Proportional
representation is the
principle that parties
should be represented in
an assembly or
parliament in direct
proportion to their
overall electoral strength,
their percentage of seats
equalling their
percentage of votes. The
term is generally used to
refer not to a single
method of election but
to a variety of electoral
mechanisms, those able
to secure proportional
outcomes, or at least a
high and reliable degree
of proportionality. The
best known PR systems
are the party-list system,
the single-transferablevote
system and the
additional member
system.
208 P O L I T I C S
landslide victories in 1997 and 2001 coincided with declining interest in the party
in changing Westminster elections. However, other less cynical and more substantial
considerations need to be taken into account. The problem, though, is that
there is no such thing as a ‘best electoral system’.
The electoral reform debate is, at heart, a debate about the desirable nature
of government and the principles that underpin ‘good’ government. Is representative
government, for instance, more important than effective government? Is a
bias in favour of compromise and consensus preferable to one that favours
conviction and principle? These are normative questions that do not permit
objective answers. Moreover, in view of the complex role they play, elections can
be judged according to a diverse range of criteria, which not uncommonly
contradict one another. Electoral systems therefore merit only a qualified
Focus on . . .
Electoral systems: single-member plurality (SMP) system
(‘first past the post’)
Used: The UK (House of Commons), the USA, Canada
and India, for example. Type: Majoritarian.
Features:
The country is divided into single-member
constituencies, usually of equal size.
Voters select a single candidate, usually marking his
or her name with a cross on the ballot paper.
The winning candidate needs only to achieve a
plurality of votes (the ‘first past the post’ rule).
Advantages:
The system establishes a clear link between representatives
and constituents, ensuring that
constituency duties are carried out.
It offers the electorate a clear choice of potential
parties of government.
It allows governments to be formed that have a
clear mandate from the electorate, albeit often on
the basis of plurality support amongst the elec-
torate.
It keeps extremism at bay by making it more difficult
for small radical parties to gain seats and credi-
bility.
It makes for strong and effective government in
that a single party usually has majority control of
the assembly.
It produces stable government, in that single-party
governments rarely collapse as a result of disunity
and internal friction.
Disadvantages:
The system ‘wastes’ many (perhaps most) votes,
those cast for losing candidates and those cast for
winning ones over the plurality mark.
It distorts electoral preferences by ‘under-representing’
small parties and ones with geographically evenly
distributed support (the ‘third-party effect’).
It offers only limited choice because of its duopolistic
(two-major-parties) tendencies.
It undermines the legitimacy of government, in that
governments often enjoy only minority support,
producing a system of plurality rule.
It creates instability because a change in government
can lead to a radical shift of policies and
direction.
It leads to unaccountable government in that the
legislature is usually subordinate to the executive,
because the majority of its members are supporters
of the governing party.
It discourages the selection of a socially broad
spread of candidates in favour of those who are
attractive to a large body of voters.
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N , E L E C T I O N S A N D V O T I N G 209
endorsement, reflecting a balance of advantages over disadvantages and their
strength relative to other systems. These criteria fall into two general categories:
those related to the quality of representation, and those linked to the effectiveness
of government.
Majoritarian systems are usually thought to be at their weakest when they are
evaluated in terms of their representative functions. To a greater or lesser extent,
each majoritarian system distorts popular preferences, in the sense that party
representation is not commensurate with electoral strength. This is most glaringly
apparent in their ‘unfairness’ to small parties and parties with evenly
distributed geographical support, and their ‘over-fairness’ in relation to large
parties and those with geographically concentrated support. For example, in 2010
in the UK, the Conservative Party gained 47 per cent of the parliamentary seats
with 36 per cent of the vote, the Labour Party won 40 per cent of the seats with
29 per cent of the vote, and the Liberal Democrats gained merely 9 per cent representation
with 23 per cent of the vote. Such biases are impossible to justify in
representative terms, especially since the unfortunate ‘third’ parties are often
centrist parties, and not the extremist parties of popular image.
Two-party systems and single-party government are thus‘manufactured’by the
majoritarian bias of the electoral system, and do not reflect the distribution of
popular preferences. Moreover, the fact that parties can come to power with barely
two-fifths of the popular vote (in 2005 in the UK, for example, the Labour Party
gained a House of Commons majority with 35.3 per cent of the vote) strains the
legitimacy of the entire political system, and creates circumstances in which radical,
Focus on . . .
Electoral systems: second ballot system
Used: Traditionally in France, but it is used for presidential
elections in countries such as Austria, Chile and
Russia. Type: Majoritarian.
Features:
There are single-candidate constituencies and
single-choice voting, as in the single-member
plurality (SMP) system.
To win on the first ballot, a candidate needs an
overall majority of the votes cast.
If no candidate gains a first-ballot majority, a
second, run-off ballot is held between the leading
two candidates.
Advantages:
The system broadens electoral choice: voters can
vote with their hearts for their preferred candidate
in the first ballot, and with their heads for the leastbad
candidate in the second.
As candidates can win only with majority support,
they are encouraged to make their appeal as broad
as possible.
Strong and stable government is possible, as with
SMP systems.
Disadvantages:
As the system is little more proportional than the
SMP system, it distorts preferences and is unfair to
‘third’ parties.
Run-off candidates are encouraged to abandon their
principles in search of short-term popularity, or as a
result of deals with defeated candidates.
The holding of a second ballot may strain the electorate’s
patience and interest in politics.
210 P O L I T I C S
ideologically-driven parties can remain in power for prolonged periods under little
pressure to broaden their appeal. The Conservatives in the UK were thus able to
implement a programme of market-orientated reforms in the 1980s and 1990s
while never gaining more than 43 per cent of support in general elections. When
the majority of voters oppose the party in power, it is difficult to claim that that
party has a popular mandate for anything.
Looked at in this light, proportional electoral systems seem to be manifestly
more representative. Nevertheless, it may be naive simply to equate electoral fairness
with proportionality. For instance, much of the criticism of PR systems
stems from the fact that they make coalition government (see p. 239) much more
likely. Although it can be argued that, unlike single-party governments, coalitions
enjoy the support of at least 50 per cent of the electors, their policies are typically
thrashed out in post-election deals, and thus are not endorsed by any set of electors.
An additional danger is that parties within a coalition government may not
exert influence in line with their electoral strength. The classic example of this is
when small centre parties (such as the Free Democrats in Germany) can dictate
to larger parties (for example, the CDU or the SPD in Germany) by threatening
to switch their support to another party. Then, in effect, ‘the tail wags the dog’.
The defence of majoritarian systems is more commonly based on government
functions, and specifically on the capacity of such systems to deliver stable
Focus on . . .
Electoral systems: alternative vote (AV) system;
supplementary vote (SV)
Used: Australia (House of Representatives (AV)), and
the UK (London mayor (SV)). Type: Majoritarian.
Features:
There are single-member constituencies.
There is preferential voting. In AV, voters rank the
candidates in order of preference: 1 for their first
preference, 2 for their second preference and so
on. In SV, there is only a single ‘supplementary’
vote.
Winning candidates must gain 50 per cent of all the
votes cast.
Votes are counted according to the first preferences.
If no candidate reaches 50 per cent, the
bottom candidate is eliminated and his or her votes
are redistributed according to the second (or subsequent)
preferences. This continues until one candidate
has a majority. In SV, all candidates drop out
except the top two.
Advantages:
Fewer votes are ‘wasted’ than in the SMP system.
Unlike the second-ballot system, the outcome
cannot be influenced by deals made between candi-
dates.
Although winning candidates must secure at least
50 per cent support, single-party majority government
is not ruled out.
Disadvantages:
The system is not much more proportional than the
SMP system, and so is still biased in favour of large
parties.
The outcome may be determined by the preferences
of those who support small, possibly extremist,
parties.
Winning candidates may enjoy little first-preference
support, and have only the virtue of being the least
unpopular candidate available.
Proportionality: The degree
to which the allocation of seats
amongst parties reflects the
distribution of the popular vote.
and effective rule. In other words, a lack of proportionality may simply be the
price that is paid for strong government. In these systems, the bias in favour of
single-party rule means that the electorate can usually choose between two
parties, each of which has the capacity to deliver on its election promises by
translating its manifesto commitments into a programme of government.
Supported by a cohesive majority in the assembly, such governments are usually
able to survive for a full term in office. In contrast, coalition governments are
weak and unstable, in the sense that they are endlessly engaged in a process of
reconciling opposing views, and are always liable to collapse as a result of internal
splits and divisions. The classic example here is post-1945 Italy which, up to
2012, had had no fewer than 63 governments.
Supporters of PR argue, on the other hand, that having a strong government, in
the sense of a government that is able to push through policies, is by no means an
unqualified virtue, tending as it does to restrict scrutiny and parliamentary
accountability.Instead,they suggest that‘strong’government should be understood
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N , E L E C T I O N S A N D V O T I N G 211
Focus on . . .
Electoral systems: mixed-member proportional (MMP) system;
additional member system (AMS)
Used: Germany, Italy, New Zealand and the UK
(Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly).
Type: Proportional.
Features:
A proportion of seats (50 per cent in Germany, but
more in Italy, Scotland and Wales, for instance) are
filled by the SMP system using single-member
constituencies.
The remaining seats are filled using the party-list
system (see p. 213).
Electors cast two votes: one for a candidate in the
constituency election, and the other for a party.
Advantages:
The hybrid nature of this system balances the need
for constituency representation against the need for
electoral fairness. The party-list process ensures
that the whole assembly is proportionally represen-
tative.
Although the system is broadly proportional in
terms of its outcome, it keeps alive the possibility
of single-party government.
It allows electors to choose a constituency representative
from one party and yet support another
party to form a government.
It takes account of the fact that representing
constituents and holding ministerial office are very
different jobs that require very different talents and
experience.
Disadvantages:
The retention of single-member constituencies
prevents the achievement of high levels of propor-
tionality.
The system creates two classes of representative,
one burdened by insecurity and constituency
duties, the other having higher status and the
prospect of holding ministerial office.
Constituency representation suffers because of the
size of constituencies (generally, twice as large as in
SMP systems).
Parties become more centralized and powerful
under this system, as they decide not only who has
the security of being on the list and who has to
fight constituencies, but also where on the list
candidates are placed.
212 P O L I T I C S
in terms of popular support, and the willingness of citizens to obey and respect the
government. Broadly-based coalitions may possess these qualities in greater abundance
than do single-party governments. By the same token, ‘stable’ government
could mean a consistent development of government policies over a number of
governments, rather than a government with the ability to survive for a single electoral
term. This is more likely to be achieved by coalition governments (in which
one or more parties may remain in power over a number of governments, albeit reshuffled)
than by single-party governments, in which more sweeping changes in
personnel and priorities are unavoidable when power changes hands.
The electoral reform debate, however, constantly risks overestimating the
importance of electoral systems. In practice, elections are only one amongst a
variety of factors that shape the political process, and may not be the most
crucial. Indeed, the impact of particular electoral systems is conditioned largely
by other circumstances; namely, the political culture, the nature of the party
system, and the economic and social context within which politics is conducted.
Generalizations about the nature of coalition government are always highly
Focus on . . .
Electoral systems: single-transferable-vote (STV)
system
Used: The Republic of Ireland and the UK (Northern
Ireland Assembly). Type: Proportional.
Features:
There are multimember constituencies, each of
which usually returns between three and eight
members.
Parties may put forward as many candidates as
there are seats to fill.
Electors vote preferentially, as in the alternative
vote system.
Candidates are elected, if they achieve a quota. This
is the minimum number of votes needed to elect
the stipulated number of candidates, calculated
according to the Droop formula:
total number of votes cast
quota 5 ————————————— + 1
(number of seats to be filled + 1)
For example, if 100,000 votes are cast in a
constituency that elects four members, the quota is
100,000/(4 + 1) + 1 = 20,001.
The votes are counted according to first preferences.
If not all the seats are filled, the bottom
candidate is eliminated. His or her votes are redistributed
according to second preferences and so on,
until all the seats have been filled.
Advantages:
The system is capable of achieving highly proportional
outcomes.
Competition amongst candidates from the same
party means that they can be judged on their
records and on where they stand on issues that cut
across party lines.
The availability of several members means that
constituents can choose to whom to take their
grievances.
Disadvantages:
The degree of proportionality achieved varies,
largely on the basis of the party system.
Strong and stable single-party government is
unlikely.
Intra-party competition may be divisive, and may
allow members to evade their constituency respon-
sibilities.
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N , E L E C T I O N S A N D V O T I N G 213
suspect, for instance. Whereas coalitions in Italy have typically been weak and
short-lived, in Germany they have usually produced stable and effective government.
Similarly, although majoritarian systems can produce significant shifts in
policy as one government follows another, broad policy consensuses are also not
uncommon. In the 1950s and 1960s, despite an alternation in power between the
Conservative and the Labour parties, UK government policy displayed a remarkable
consistency of policy direction, rooted in a cross-party commitment to
Keynesian social democracy. Furthermore, it is far from clear what damage electoral
systems can cause. Despite Italy’s famed political instability, often blamed
on its now-abandoned party-list electoral system, in the post-World War II
period the north of the country at least experienced steady economic growth,
making Italy, by the 1990s, the third most prosperous state in the EU.
What do elections mean?
The importance of elections cannot be doubted. At the very least, they provide
the public with its clearest formal opportunity to influence the political process,
and also help, directly or indirectly, to determine who will hold government
Focus on . . .
Electoral systems: party-list system
Used: Israel, and in countries throughout Europe,
including Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland, and
the European Parliament. Type: Proportional.
Features:
Either the entire country is treated as a single
constituency, or, in the case of regional party lists,
there are a number of large multimember
constituencies.
Parties compile lists of candidates to place before
the electorate, in descending order of preference.
Electors vote for parties, not for candidates.
Parties are allocated seats in direct proportion to
the votes they gain in the election. They fill these
seats from their party list.
A ‘threshold’ may be imposed (5 per cent in
Germany) to exclude small, possibly extremist,
parties from representation.
Advantages:
This is the only potentially pure system of proportional
representation, and is therefore fair to all
parties.
The system promotes unity by encouraging electors
to identify with their nation or region, rather than
with a constituency.
The system makes it easier for women and minority
candidates to be elected, provided, of course, they
feature on the party list.
The representation of a large number of small
parties ensures that there is an emphasis upon
negotiation, bargaining and consensus.
Disadvantages:
The existence of many small parties can lead to
weak and unstable government.
The link between representatives and constituencies
is entirely broken.
Unpopular candidates who are well-placed on a
party list cannot be removed from office.
Parties become heavily centralized, because leaders
draw up party lists, and junior members have an
incentive to be loyal in the hope of moving up the
list.
214 P O L I T I C S
POLITICS IN ACTION . . .
Electoral reform in New Zealand: politics renewed?
Events: In a non-binding referendum in New
Zealand in 1992, 85 per cent of electors
voted to change the established singlemember
plurality (SMP) electoral system,
(popularly known as ‘first past the post’) with
71 per cent of voters backing the mixedmember
proportional (MMP) system as their
preferred alternative. In a binding second
referendum the following year, MMP
gained the support of 54 per cent in a
straight contest against SMP. The first
election using MMP was held in 1996, and it
has been used in each of the subsequent
elections. The issue of electoral reform had
gained growing prominence in New
Zealand after two successive elections
(in 1978 and 1981) had been won by the
‘wrong’ party (the National Party won
parliamentary majorities even though the Labour Party
gained more votes). Other factors included growing
discontent with the electoral system amongst Labour
supporters, due to the National Party being in power
for all but six years during 1949–84, and the belief
that proportional representation would boost Maori
representation.
Significance: Has electoral reform in New Zealand been a
success? As ever with electoral reform, the debate turns
on how ‘success’ is defined. Supporters of electoral reform
have argued that MMP in New Zealand has brought about
greater responsiveness and accountability. The clearest
evidence of this has been a significant widening of the
representation of parties, both in the House of
Representatives and in government. The Labour-National
two-party system has undoubtedly been broken, giving
way to a multiparty system. The average number of
parties represented in the House under MMP has
increased from 2.4 during the period 1946–93 to 7. Most
tellingly, since reform, neither National nor Labour has
been able to govern alone on the basis of a parliamentary
majority. The succession of coalition governments that has
resulted from reform has shifted the focus of New
Zealand politics away from simple rivalry between
National and Labour towards a more complex process of
consensus-building, as both major parties look to forge
alliances with smaller parties. After the 2011 election, for
instance, National formed a coalition government through
an agreement with ACT, United Future and the Maori
Party. Moreover, since 1996, New Zealand governments
have been minority governments for all but two years, a
situation that allows parties outside of government, such
as the Green Party, to exert a measure of policy influence.
However, criticisms of MMP continue to be voiced in New
Zealand, not least by the National Party, which remains
committed to a return to SMP. Critics claim that the twovote
system causes voter confusion and leads to the
‘contamination effect’, whereby views about constituency
candidates affect the distribution of party-list votes. It is
also far from clear that the introduction of MMP has had a
beneficial impact on voter turnout, the second election
under MMP, in 1999, having recorded the lowest turnout
of any twentieth-century New Zealand election. Two,
deeper concerns about MMP continue to be voiced,
however. First, MMP has been portrayed as the enemy of
strong government, in that, being divided, coalition
governments are often unable to deliver decisive leadership.
Second, misgivings have been expressed about the
power of so-called ‘pivotal parties’, small parties whose
policy influence greatly exceeds their electoral strength
because they are able to do deals with both major parties.
Concerns such as these encouraged National to call a
further electoral reform referendum which coincided with
the 2011 general election and offered voters a straight
choice between MMP and a return to SMP. However, the
resulting 58 per cent in favour of keeping MMP (a 4 per
cent increase on the vote in 1993) indicated broad satisfaction
with the new system and suggests that it is
unlikely to be abandoned in the near future.
power. From this perspective, elections are about results – in other words, who
wins and who loses. This view is encouraged by media coverage, which, with the
aid of opinion polls, increasingly turns elections into horseraces. Nevertheless,
politicians are not backward in claiming that elections have a broader and more
profound meaning. Elections are, in this sense, seen as nothing less than a visible
manifestation of the public interest; in short, ‘the public has spoken’. Political
commentators also express their opinions, proclaiming, for instance, that elections
reflect a ‘shift in the popular mood’. The problem, however, is that all such
claims and interpretations have a strongly arbitrary character; any attempt to
invest an election with ‘meaning’ is fraught with dangers. The people may have
spoken, but it is frustratingly difficult to know what they have said.
Many of these problems stem from the difficult notion of the ‘public interest’.
If such a thing as a ‘public’ interest exists, it surely reflects the common or collective
interests of all citizens. This is precisely what Rousseau (see p. 97) implied in
the idea of the ‘general will’, which he understood to mean the will of all citizens,
provided each of them acts selflessly. The difficulty with this view is obvious.
Quite simply, individuals do not, in practice, act selflessly in accordance with a
general or collective will; there is no such thing as an indivisible public interest.
All generalizations about ‘the public’ or ‘the electorate’ must therefore be treated
with grave suspicion. There is no electorate as such, only a collection of electors
who each possess particular interests, sympathies, allegiances and so on. At best,
election results reflect the preferences of a majority, or perhaps a plurality, of
voters. However, even then there are perhaps insuperable problems in deciding
what these votes ‘mean’.
The difficulty in interpreting election results lies in the perhaps impossible
task of knowing why voters vote as they do. As is made clear in the next section,
generations of political scientists have grappled with the question of electoral
behaviour, but have failed to develop a universally accepted theory of voting.
Voting, on the surface a very simple act, is shaped by a complex of factors,
conscious and unconscious, rational and irrational, selfish and selfless. All theories
are therefore partial and must be qualified by a range of other considerations.
This can be seen in relation to the so-called ‘economic theory of democracy’,
advanced by Anthony Downs (1957). This theory suggests that the act of voting
reflects an expression of self-interest on the part of voters, who select parties in
much the same way as consumers select goods or services for purchase. On this
basis, the winning party in an election can reasonably claim that its policies most
closely correspond to the interests of the largest group of voters.
On the other hand, it can be argued that, rather than ‘buying’ policies, voters
are typically poorly-informed about political issues and are influenced by a
range of ‘irrational’ factors such as habit, social conditioning, the image of the
parties and the personalities of their leaders. Moreover, the ability of parties to
attract votes may have less to do with the ‘goods’ they put up for purchase than
with the way those goods are ‘sold’ through advertising, political campaigning,
propaganda and so on. To the extent that this is true, election results may reflect
not so much the interests of the mass of voters, as the resources and finances
available to the competing parties.
A further – and, some would argue, more intractable – problem is that no elective
mechanism may be able reliably to give expression to the multifarious preferences
of voters. This is a problem that the US economist Kenneth Arrow described
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N , E L E C T I O N S A N D V O T I N G 215
CONCEPT
Public interest
The public interest
consists of the general or
collective interests of a
community; that is, that
which is good for society
as a whole. Two
contrasting notions of
the public interest can be
identified. Strong versions
distinguish clearly
between the interests of
the public as a collective
body and the selfish or
personal interests of each
individual. In the view of
Rousseau and many
socialists, the interests of
the public are ‘higher’
than, or morally superior
to, those of the
individual. Weak versions
recognize only private
interests, and therefore
see the public interest as
nothing more than the
sum of private interests.
in terms of his‘impossibility theorem’. In Social Choice and Individual Values (1951)
Arrow drew attention to the problem of ‘transitivity’ that occurs when voters are
allowed to express a range of preferences for candidates or policy options, rather
than merely cast a single vote. The drawback of casting but a single vote is not only
that it is a crude all-or-nothing device, but also that no single candidate or option
may gain majority support.For instance,candidate A may gain 40 per cent of the vote,
candidate B 34 per cent, and candidate C 26 per cent. The situation could, nevertheless,
become more confused if second preferences were taken into account.
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the second preferences of all
candidate A’s supporters go to candidate C, the second preferences of candidate
B favour candidate A, and the second preferences of candidate C go to candidate
B. This creates a situation in which each candidate can claim to be preferred by
a majority of voters. The first and second preferences for candidate A add up to
74 per cent (40 per cent plus B’s 34 per cent). Candidate B can claim 60 per cent
support (34 per cent plus C’s 26 per cent), and candidate C can claim 66 per cent
support (26 per cent plus A’s 40 per cent). This problem of ‘cyclical majorities’
draws attention to the fact that it may not be possible to establish a reliable link
between individual preferences and collective choices. In other words, election
results cannot speak for themselves, and politicians and political commentators
who claim to find meaning in them are, to some extent, acting arbitrarily.
Nevertheless, the latitude that this allows politicians is not unlimited, because
they know that they will be called to account at the next election. In this light,
perhaps the most significant function of elections is to set limits to arbitrary
government by ensuring that politicians who claim to speak for the public must
ultimately be judged by the public.
VOTING BEHAVIOUR
The growth of academic interest in voting behaviour coincided with the rise of
behavioural political science. As the most widespread and quantifiable form of
political behaviour, voting quickly became the focus for new techniques of
sample surveying and statistical analysis. The American Voter (Campbell et al.,
1960), the product of painstaking research by the University of Michigan,
became the leading work in the field and stimulated a wealth of similar studies,
such as Butler and Stokes’ Political Change in Britain (1969). At the high point of
the behavioural revolution, it was thought that voting held the key to disclosing
all the mysteries of the political system, perhaps allowing for laws of mass political
psychology to be developed. Even though these lofty hopes have not been
fulfilled, psephology (the scientific study of voting behaviour) still commands a
central position in political analysis. This is because voting provides one of the
richest sources of information about the interaction between individuals, society
and politics. By investigating the mysteries of voting behaviour, we are thus able
to learn important lessons about the nature of the political system, and gain
insight into the process of social and political change.
Voting behaviour is clearly shaped by short-term and long-term influences.
Short-term influences are specific to a particular election and do not allow conclusions
to be drawn about voting patterns in general. The chief short-term influence
is the state of the economy, which reflects the fact that there is usually a link
216 P O L I T I C S
between a government’s popularity and economic variables such as unemployment,
inflation and disposable income. Optimism about one’s own material
circumstances (the so-called ‘feel-good’ factor) appears to be particularly crucial
here. Indeed, it is often alleged that governments attempt to create pre-election
booms in the hope of improving their chances of gaining re-election. The
chances that political and business cycles can be brought into conjunction are
clearly strengthened by flexible-term elections that allow the government to
choose when to ‘go to the country’.
Another short-term influence on voting is the personality and public standing
of party leaders. This is particularly important, because media exposure portrays
leaders as the brand image of their party. This means that a party may try to rekindle
popular support by replacing a leader who is perceived to be an electoral liability.
Another factor is the style and effectiveness of the parties’ electoral
campaigning. The length of the campaign can vary from about three weeks for
flexible-term elections to up to two years in the case of fixed-term elections, such
as those for the US president. Opinion polls are usually thought to be significant
in this respect, either giving a candidate’s or party’s campaign momentum, or
instilling disillusionment, or even complacency, amongst voters.
A final short-term influence, the mass media (see p. 179), may also be of
long-term significance if biased or partisan coverage reflects structural, and
therefore continuing, factors such as press ownership. However, the pattern of
media coverage may change from election to election. For instance, under Tony
Blair’s leadership, the UK Labour Party made concerted attempts to court the
Murdoch press in particular, helping to explain the party’s longest period in
power, between 1997 and 2010. All such considerations, nevertheless, operate
within a context of psychological, sociological, economic and ideological influences
on voting. These are best examined in relation to rival models of voting.
The most significant of these are the following:
the party-identification model
the sociological model
the rational-choice model
the dominant-ideology model.
Theories of voting
Party-identification model
The earliest theory of voting behaviour, the party-identification model, is based
on the sense of psychological attachment that people have to parties. Electors are
seen as people who identify with a party, in the sense of being long-term
supporters who regard the party as ‘their’ party. Voting is therefore a manifestation
of partisanship, not a product of calculation influenced by factors such as
policies, personalities, campaigning and media coverage. This model places
heavy stress on early political socialization (see p. 178), seeing the family as the
principal means through which political loyalties are forged. These are then, in
most cases, reinforced by group membership and later social experiences.
In this model, attitudes towards policies and leaders, as well as perceptions
about group and personal interests, tend to be developed on the basis of party
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N , E L E C T I O N S A N D V O T I N G 217
CONCEPT
Partisan
dealignment
Partisan dealignment is a
decline in the extent to
which people align
themselves with a party
by identifying with it.
This implies that the
‘normal’ support of
parties falls, and a
growing number of
electors become ‘floating’
or ‘swing’ voters. As party
loyalties weaken,
electoral behaviour
becomes more volatile,
leading to greater
uncertainty and, perhaps,
the rise of new parties, or
the decline of old ones.
The principal reasons for
partisan dealignment are
the expansion of
education, increased
social mobility, and
growing reliance on
television as a source of
political information.
identification. Events are thus interpreted to fit with pre-existing loyalties and
attachments. This partisan alignment tends to create stability and continuity,
especially in terms of habitual patterns of voting behaviour, often sustained over
a lifetime. From this point of view, it should be possible to calculate the ‘normal’
vote of a party by reference to partisanship levels. Deviations from this ‘normal’
level presumably reflect the impact of short-term factors. One of the weaknesses
of this model is the growing evidence from a number of countries of partisan
dealignment (see p. 217). This indicates a general fall in party identification and
a decline in habitual voting patterns. In the USA, partisan dealignment is
reflected in a decline in the number of registered Democrats and Republicans,
and a rise in the number of Independents (up from 6 per cent in 1952 to 36 per
cent in 2009). In the UK, it is demonstrated by a decline in the strength of allegiance
to the Conservative Party and the Labour Party,‘very strong’ identification
with either party having fallen from 43 per cent in 1966 to 9 per cent in 2005.
Sociological model
The sociological model links voting behaviour to group membership, suggesting
that electors tend to adopt a voting pattern that reflects the economic and social
position of the group to which they belong. Rather than developing a psychological
attachment to a party on the basis of family influence, this model highlights
the importance of a social alignment, reflecting the various divisions and tensions
within society. The most significant of these divisions are class, gender, ethnicity,
religion and region. Although the impact of socialization is not irrelevant to this
model, social-base explanations allow for rationality insofar as group interests
may help to shape party allegiances. For many analysts, the sociological model is
best understood as an ‘interest plus socialization’ approach to voting (Denver,
2012). This has perhaps been clearest in relation to social class (see p. 153).
Not uncommonly, party systems have been seen to reflect the class system, with
the middle classes providing the electoral base for right-wing parties, and the
working classes providing the electoral base for left-wing parties. The Labour–
Conservative two-party system in the UK was traditionally understood in
precisely this light. Peter Pulzer (1967) was able to declare, famously, ‘class is the
basis of British party politics; all else is embellishment and detail’. The sociological
model, however, has been attacked on the grounds that, in focusing on social
groups, it ignores the individual and the role of personal self-interest. Moreover,
there is growing empirical evidence that the link between sociological factors
and party support has weakened in modern societies. In particular, attention has
been paid to the phenomenon of class dealignment. Evidence of class dealignment
can be found in most western societies. For example, absolute class voting
(the proportion of voters who support their ‘natural’ class party) fell in the UK
from 66 per cent in 1966 to 47 per cent in 1983. In 1997, the Labour Party, for
the first time, received more votes from non-manual workers than from manual
workers.
Rational-choice model
Rational-choice models of voting shift attention onto the individual, and away
from socialization and the behaviour of social groups. In this view, voting is seen
218 P O L I T I C S
CONCEPT
Class
dealignment
Class dealignment is the
weakening of the
relationship between
social class and party
support. Social class may
nevertheless remain a
significant (even the
most significant) factor
influencing electoral
choice. The impact of
dealignment has been to
undermine traditional
class-based parties
(notably, working class
parties of the left), often
bringing about a
realignment of the party
system. Explanations of
class dealignment usually
focus on changes in the
social structure that have
weakened the solidaristic
character of class
identity, such as post-
industrialism.
as a rational act, in the sense that individual electors are believed to decide their
party preference on the basis of personal self-interest. Rather than being habitual,
a manifestation of broader attachments and allegiances, voting is seen as
essentially instrumental; that is, as a means to an end. Rational-choice models
differ in that some, following the example of V. O. Key (1966), see voting as a
retrospective comment on the party in power and how its performance has
influenced citizen’s choice. Others, such as Himmelveit et al., (1985), portray
voters as active, in the sense that they behave like consumers expressing a choice
amongst the available policy options.
The latter view stresses the importance of what is called ‘issue voting’, and
suggests that parties can significantly influence their electoral performance by
revising and reshaping their policies. It is generally accepted that this has been
one of the consequences of partisan and class dealignment. This has also been
encouraged by the pluralism and individualism that postmodernism (see p. 18)
has fostered. The weakness of rational-choice theories is that they abstract the
individual voter from his or her social and cultural context. In other words, to
some extent, the ability to evaluate issues and calculate self-interest (the essence
of instrumental voting) is structured by broader party attachments and group
loyalties.
Dominant-ideology model
Radical theories of voting tend to highlight the degree to which individual choices
are shaped by a process of ideological manipulation and control. In some
respects, such theories resemble the sociological model, in that voting is seen to
reflect a person’s position in a social hierarchy. Where these theories differ from
the sociological model, however, is in emphasizing that how groups and individuals
interpret their position depends on how it has been presented to them
through education, by the government and, above all, by the mass media. (The
influence of the media on political debate and party competition is examined in
greater detail in Chapter 8.)
In contrast to the earlier view that the media merely reinforce pre-existing
preferences, this suggests that the media are able to distort the flow of political
communications, both by setting the agenda for debate and by structuring preferences
and sympathies. The consequence of this is that, if voters’ attitudes
conform to the tenets of a dominant ideology, parties will not be able to afford
to develop policies that fall outside that ideology. In this way, far from challenging
the existing distribution of power and resources in society, the electoral
process tends to uphold it. The weakness of the dominant-ideology model is
that, by overstating the process of social conditioning, it takes individual calculation
and personal autonomy out of the picture altogether.
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N , E L E C T I O N S A N D V O T I N G 219
Issue voting: Voting
behaviour that is shaped by
party policies and (usually) a
calculation of personal self-
interest.
Questions for discussion
Is representation merely a substitute for democ-
racy?
What conditions best promote representative
government?
Are elections more significant in calling politicians
to account, or in ensuring the survival of a
regime?
Is there inevitably a trade-off between electoral
fairness and strong and stable government?
Should electoral systems seek to deliver propor-
tionality?
Is there a ‘best’ electoral system?
How successful are elections in defining the
public interest?
To what extent is voting behaviour a rational
and issue-based activity?
SUMMARY
Representation is a relationship in which an individual or group stands for, or acts on behalf of, a larger body
of people. This may be achieved through the exercise of wisdom by an educated elite, through guidance or
instructions given to a delegate, through the winning of a popular mandate, or through representatives being
drawn from the groups they represent.
In modern politics, representation is invariably linked with elections. Elections may not be a sufficient condition
for political representation, but are certainly a necessary condition. For elections to serve representative
purposes, however, they must be competitive, free and fair, and conducted on the basis of universal adult
suffrage.
Elections have a variety of functions. On the one hand, they have ‘bottom-up’ functions, such as political
recruitment, representation, making government and influencing policy. On the other hand, radical theorists
emphasize their ‘top-down’ functions, which include that they build legitimacy, shape public opinion and help
to strengthen elites.
Electoral systems are often classified as either majoritarian systems or proportional systems. In majoritarian
systems, large parties typically win a higher proportion of seats than votes, thereby increasing the chances of
single-party government. In proportional systems, there is an equal (or at least, more equal) relationship
between the percentages of seats and votes won, increasing the likelihood of coalition government.
Majoritarian systems are usually defended on the grounds that they offer the electorate a clear choice of
potential governments, invest winning parties with a policy mandate, and help to promote strong and stable
government. In contrast, proportional systems are defended on the grounds that they usually give government
a broader electoral base, promote consensus and cooperation amongst a number of parties, and establish
a healthy balance between the executive and the assembly.
The meaning of elections is closely linked to the factors that shape voting behaviour. Amongst the various
theories of voting are models that highlight the importance of party identification and habitual attachments,
those that emphasize the importance of group membership and social alignment, those that are based on
rational choice and calculations of self-interest, and those that suggest that individual choices are shaped by
ideological manipulation and control.
220 P O L I T I C S
Further reading
Birch, A. H., The Concepts and Theories of Democracy
(3rd edn) (2007). A clear and thorough discussion of
the concept of representation and the theory of
representative democracy.
Farrell, D., Electoral Systems:A Comparative Introduction
(2nd edn) (2011).A clear introduction to the six principal
types of election system currently used.
Gallagher, M. and P. Mitchell (eds), The Politics of
Electoral Systems (2008). An analysis of the operation
of electoral systems in 22 states that highlights
the complex relationship between electoral systems
and the larger political process.
LeDuc, L., R. Niemi and P. Norris (eds), Comparing
Democracies 3: Elections and Voting in the 21st
Century (2010). A wide-ranging collection of essays
that examine the nature and health of electoral
democracy and the significance of electoral systems.