Poland: Winding Road from the Communist to the Post-Solidarity Elite
Author(s): Jacek Wasilewski and Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński
Source: Theory and Society, Vol. 24, No. 5, Special Issue on Circulation vs. Reproduction of
Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe (Oct., 1995), pp. 669-
696
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/657847
Accessed: 19-09-2019 11:06 UTC
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Poland: Winding road from the Communist to the
post-Solidarity elite
JACEK WASILEWSKI and EDMUND WNUK-LIPINSKI
Jagiellonian University; Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw
In a historically short period of a half century, Polish society has ex
enced two radical changes of social order and two equally radical
of power elites. The first shift took place in the mid-forties, the se
at the turn of the eighties and the nineties.
The aftermath of the Second World War brought about not only
political elite, but also entirely new conditions and rules of soci
political life. On the basis of the theory of elites, the best expla
of this radical shift or power would probably be the circulation of e
hypothesis. The question remains whether the second radical sh
power can also be explained in terms of the circulation of elites
terms of the reproduction of elites. There are many studies dealing
the emergence of new elites in the postcommunist Poland,1 but n
them addresses this hypothesis directly.
In this article we are exploring the issue of circulation vs. reprod
in the context of the formation of current elites. To understand th
cess in the postcommunist and post-Solidarity Poland, it is neces
know the historical context of Polish development in the last d
(section 1), rules of Communist elite recruitment (section 2), a
composition of the current elites (section 3). We examine the ci
tion vs. reproduction hypothesis in the next section. Looking for
ments supporting one of these two models of change of the power e
we keep in mind the conversion of capital thesis. The conv
of capital understood in Bourdieu's terms,2 intrigues many stud
the postcommunist transformation. Its most popular interpret
frequently debated in academic circles and on the political
assumes that the "negotiated revolution" in Eastern Europe was
of trade off.3 To secure the non-violent shift of power, the Commu
nomenklatura has been allowed to convert their political capital
Theory and Society 24: 669-696, 1995.
? 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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670
ancient regime into economic capital in the new regime. Our study
enables some insight into this process. The chapter is concluded by a
summary section on the formation of the postcommunist and postSolidarity
elite.
Two transformations and the emergence of the new elites: Historical
context
To understand the formation of elites in present-day Poland, one has to
consider the historical context of Polish post-war political life. The
Second World War itself - prior to the Communist takeover - brought
about tremendous changes in the structure and attitudes of Polish
society. Three social classes virtually disappeared. The bourgeoisie and
big landowners fled the country in two waves: in 1939 because of the
Nazis, and in 1944-45 because of the Bolsheviks. The petty bourgeoisie
- consisting of the vast majority of Polish Jews - was exterminated by
the Nazis. The intelligentsia was decimated by both the Nazis and
Soviets. A substantial part of this class emigrated, spreading all over the
world. Due to the Yalta agreement, the territory of the country was
moved nearly two hundred miles westward, resulting in migrations
unprecedented in Polish history: in 1945-47 about four million people
were relocated.4 The outcome of all these processes was disastrous:
local communities disappeared, social control weakened, the intergenerational
transmission of values was distorted, millions of uprooted
people wandered across the country. On top of this, the Red Army was
stationed on Polish soil, and among the Polish people there was a widespread
disillusionment with the pre-war political elites' performance.
All these factors strongly contributed to the Communist takeover of
Poland.
Imposition of the Stalinist system in Poland,s like in other East European
countries, was based on five types of actions taken by victorious
communists:
(1) Establishment of political monopoly of the party legitimated by
the principles of Marxism-Leninism;
(2) Setting up of the mechanism of political approval for the incumbents
of all strategic positions in politics, economy, media,
culture, and intellectual life (the mechanism later known as the
"nomenklatura system");
(3) Nationalization of economy, centralization of resources and
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671
their allocation through the mechanism of central planning
(redistributive economy);
(4) Terror and police repression against opponents of the new
system;
(5) Mass and centrally orchestrated propaganda brainwashing the
society to gain control over people's minds and souls.
By the end of the 1940s centralization of public life was completed,
and it took the Communists two more years to subordinate nearly all
institutions to their will. The last independent organization was the
Catholic Church. Nonetheless, the Church was forced to pay tribute
to the regime, declaring loyalty to the Communist powerholders.
The means employed by Communists to attain power were effective:
the political system was under total control of the party, society appeared
to be pacified, and social peace was secured. In return, the
new authorities guaranteed full employment, some social benefits, and
upward-mobility opportunities for the representatives of the lower
classes.
This situation lasted seven years: from the late 1940s until the end of
1955. In the mid-fifties the intra-system dissent started to gain some
importance. Party reformers, young Marxists (among them Leszek
Kolakowski, Jacek Kurori, and Karol Modzelewski), and some intellectuals
and academics, fascinated with democratic socialism ("socialism
with a human face"), tried to modify the system without changing its
identity. They failed. Nonetheless, they contributed to the later development
of democratic opposition in Poland, having a decisive impact
on the left of-the-center orientation of the dissident movement of the
sixties and seventies.
In October 1956, after the bloody (June 1956) riots in Poznafi,6
Wladyslaw Gomulka - the domestic Communist leader expelled in
1948 - regained power. Stalinism in Poland was over. The semi-sovereignty,
semi-democracy, and semi-pluralism of the mid-forties were reintroduced.
Soviet advisers had to leave the country. The power of
the political police was severely limited. Industrial democracy had been
introduced (workers' councils), and the Church regained its relative
autonomy. Collectivization of agriculture was halted, quasi-oppositional
political groupings were tolerated, censorship became much
more lenient, and some academic freedoms were re-installed. All
these improvements, however, did not threaten the core of the system.
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672
They were, undoubtedly, distinct deviations from the dominant pattern
of Soviet-style Communism, but the identity of the Communist system
remained intact. Strategic spheres of public life were, as before, under
control of the party. Moreover, Gomulka's thaw was quite short: from
1957 onward the regime was gradually retreating from all democratic
reforms introduced in 1956.
Despite the half-hearted reforms, "the Polish road to socialism," as
Gomulka's reforms were called, managed to get social support, mostly
due to two factors: removing the humiliating signs of Soviet domination,
and halting the terror. It is necessary to stress, however, that
reformed or not the system never depended on the support of the
majority of people, simply because democratic procedures had never
been a part of its logic.
The students' revolt of March '68, supported by most of the intellectuals
and a good part of the intelligentsia, became a starting point for
anti-systemic political identity for many future members of the Solidarity-based
counter-elite. March '68 did not generate any institutionalized
alternative political force. Nevertheless, it was an important
experience for both the power-holders and the society. For the powerholders
it provided proof that Gomulka was unable to cope with the
country's problems, and resulted in strengthening the intra-party opposition
against him. For the society as a whole, March '68 revealed the
regime's readiness to use violent means to secure its power. The party
initiated post-March '68 campaigns of anti-semitism and anti-intellectualism
that politically awakened a large part of the intelligentsia,
setting up a point of reference for their political views and preferences.
What March '68 meant for students, intellectuals, and a large part of
the intelligentsia, the December '70 bloody riots in Gdarisk, Gdynia,
Szczecin, and other Baltic Coast cites meant for Polish blue-collar
workers. Indeed, December '70 changed the consciousness of the
Polish working class, constructing a foundation on which ten years later
an organization was built that shook the world's Communist system,
and eventually contributed decisively to its final collapse. Although the
Communists succeeded again in outmaneuvering the workers
(replacing Gomulka with Edward Gierek, and promising a kind of
Kadar's "goulash socialism"), many future Solidarity leaders, Lech
Walesa included, originated from these riots.
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673
March '68 and December '70 - two protests against distortions of Communism,
brutally suppressed by the regime - had important long-run
consequences. On the one hand, the regime showed its limited tolerance
toward intellectual or working-class dissent, on the other, people
learned their lesson, adopting a "wait-and-watch" strategy. This is why
Gierek's policy of cooptation of the intelligentsia, technocrats, and
skilled workers into the system had limited societal response. At that
time both the intelligentsia and working class split: some joined Gierek
(and the honeymoon lasted until the mid-seventies), others rejected the
idea of cooptation. The December '70 riots kindled the working-class
dissent that was unique in the entire Soviet Bloc and that later (in the
eighties) made the working class one of the sources of the counter-elite.
In 1976, Poland was again the scene of workers' riots, this time on the
outskirts of Warsaw and in Radom. Drawing conclusions from the previous
attempts, in which the striking workers and supporting dissidents
were organized on an ad hoc basis, the leaders of the democratic opposition,
ignoring the Communists' legal practices (but sticking to the
Constitution), established the first permanent and formally structured
oppositional institution. The Committee for Workers' Defence,7 known
by its acronym "KOR," was organized by Warsaw intellectuals. Its
establishment was publicly announced, all members kept a high profile,
openly expressing their views. They pretended they lived in a
democratic ("normal") country. The new evolutionism8 concept was
put into practice. The ethos - later known as the Solidarity ethos - of
non-violence, dignity, human rights, freedom, equality, and pluralism
started its way into millions of Polish minds.
Soon after KOR, many committees, parties, and alternative groupings
were set up, such as the Free Trade Unions in Gdafisk and Silesia, SKS
(Students' Solidarity Committees) and NZS (Independent Students'
Association) in three major Polish academic centers, Mloda Polska
(Young Poland) - a Gdafisk movement of young conservatives, KPN
(Confederation of Independent Poland) - the first openly anticommunist
political party, PPN (Polish Alliance for Independence) - a
political group of anticommunist intellectuals, ROPCiO (Movement
for Defense of Human and Civil Rights), Helsinki Committee. These
and many other independent civic initiatives expressing divergent
political persuasions and often grouping both workers and intellectuals
were mushrooming.9 To complete the picture of the emerging embryos
of the future counter-elite, one has to mention the role of the Catholic
Intelligentsia Clubs, operating under the protective umbrella of the
Catholic Church in all major Polish cities.
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674
All the above-mentioned organizations created a pool for the political
counter-elite that appeared on the public scene in the second half of
the 1970s. Their activity soon culminated in the emergence of Solidarity.
The birth of Solidarity, and the sixteen months (September 1980December
1981) of legal existence of the nearly ten-million-strong
movement, was a phenomenon whose impact on the erosion of the
Soviet bloc may hardly be overestimated. In the Communist world it
was the first secular, legal, mass, and nation-wide institution existing
outside the control of the Communist party. It had a fully developed
formal structure, covering the whole country: from the remotest village
to Gdaiisk (not Warsaw, the center of the regime, but Gdafisk!) and
from the forgotten rural workshop to the giants of "socialist industrialization."
Institutionalization of the mass anticommunist dissent became
a fact. Ten-million members of Solidarity elected a hundred-thousand
previously unknown leaders, representatives, and activists. With the
members of other civic and political initiatives independent of the
Communist state, they created - in the period of merely sixteen months
- an entire alternative political class. Thousands of people developed
their skills of self-organization, experienced a free institutional environment,
and acquired managerial, political, and administrative ex-
perience.10
One-third of the party members joined Solidarity. Most of them actively
undermined the position of the party's apparatchiks, joining the intraparty
democratic movement (the so-called Movement of Horizontal
Alliances). After the imposition of Martial Law, most of them left the
party. As a result, in 1981-82 the party lost more than one-third of its
members,11 and the recruitment of new people into party ranks virtually
halted.
This extraordinary period greatly affected the development and institutionalization
of the Polish counter-elite. The opposition survived the
imposition of Martial Law and reappeared as an organized political
force in 1988, forcing the regime to take a seat at the Round Table in
early 1989. On the other side of the political divide, in the second half
of the Eighties the liberal wing within the party was gaining the upper
hand, eventually convincing the party's hardliners that negotiating with
Solidarity was the only way to remain in power.
The changes initiated in 1988-89 were a combination of several overlapping
processes. Breaking the barrier of Communist domination
sped up political and economic dynamics. New political parties and
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675
new civil-society institutions were mushrooming, and local communities
revived. Societal activism, though not as spontaneous and widespread
as in 1980-81, became an integral part of the extrication from
Communism. This activism, combined with an enormous organizational
effort to re-build the formal structure for the alternative society
smashed by Martial Law, resulted in the victorious elections of 4 June
1989. The next day, the leading Polish actress announced on TV:
"Communism in Poland is over." And she was right!
The Round Table Accord between the Communist political elite and
the Solidarity counter-elite set up a blueprint for the evolutionary
character of the transformation. The outcome of the elections sped up
this process, and sped up the replacement of the old elite by a new one.
The Polish political scene entered a period of alteration and instability.
Three parallel processes contributed to that:
1. Disintegration of Solidarity as a united anticommunist movement
and the birth of many Solidarity-based political parties opposing
each other.
2. Institutionalization of new political groupings of anticommunist
and non-Solidarity persuasion.
3. Disintegration of the old communist party (Polish United Workers'
Party), followed soon by its re-integration in a new organizational
form and under a new (social-democratic) ideology.
In both radical systemic changes - in 1944-48 and 1989 the relations
between the state and the Church were significant for the whole sphere
of public life.12 The Communists' strategy was to separate the Church
from public life, to break its unity through state-controlled lay Catholics'
organizations, and to instrumentalize the Church institutions for
their particular political purposes. The Catholic Church has survived as
an independent organization, despite the hostile institutional environment.
Apart from its ministration duty, it fulfilled other vital social
functions. Being an alternative for the state-controlled intergroup links,
it counteracted social atomization. It was clearly visible during the first
visit of the Pope to the homeland (1979), when the monopoly of the
state for public communication was broken, encouraging hitherto
isolated and dispearsed political groups to communicate among themselves,
and often to join independent civic activities.
After the imposition of Martial Law the Church institutions became a
natural shelter and a kind of asylum for various activities of the civil
society, mostly in cultural and educational spheres, but also in political
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676
and even economic ones. During Marshall Law the Church had an
incontestable authority in the society.
The situation has changed since 1989: the tension between the Church
and civil society has been growing. The Church umbrella is not needed
anymore, since the negotiated revolution of 1989 emancipated the
society and lifted all restrictions on autonomy of social forces. On the
other hand, in the initial stage of the current transformation the Catholic
Church considerably extended its influence, partly because the previous
limitations ceased to exist, and partly because some segments of
the new political elite stimulated the growth of the political role of the
Church. Public-opinion polls show that before the collapse of Communism
the majority of Polish society had a favorable opinion of the
political role of the Church, while recently the majority declare critical
views.13 As a result, one may notice a significant drop in the authority
of the Church over the last years.
Changing patterns of elite recruitment under Communism
By the early 1950s, the circulation of elites had been completed. All
the prewar and non-communist war-time politicians were ousted. The
same happened to other leaders of society: former economic managers
were replaced by working-class cadres; civil servants by the "new
intelligentsia" hastily trained in special programs; and lawyers by lower
party activists armed with "revolutionary instinct."
At that time recruitment of the new elite was virtually limited to the
party channels. Legitimation of the new elite was based not on social
support (in those times the social base of Communism in Polish society
was extremely limited) but on the "historical mission of the working
class and its vanguard - the Communist Party." Two patterns of elite
recruitment prevailed: Communism-combatant in the immediate postwar
years and Communist-combatant-proletarian during the late 1940s
and early 1950s.14
According to the Communist-combatant pattern, the primary criteria
of selection were faithfulness to the Communist principles confirmed
by membership in the Communist party, activity in the political organizations
operating during the WWII in the Soviet Union and subsequently
in Poland, or recommendation from active service in the
Polish Armed Forces formed in the Soviet Union.
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677
The Communist-combatant-proletarian pattern, on the one hand, made
the criteria of the first pattern more stringent; on the other hand, it
broadened the pool of eligibles to include people of the right class
origin and class membership.
With Gomulka's return to power the personnel policy changed. The
Stalinist wing of the party was cut, but quite soon the same happened
with the reformist ("revisionists") wing. The former reappeared on the
national scene under the nationalist banner in the mid-sixties, inspiring
the March '68 anti-semitic and anti-intellectual campaigns. The latter
either left the party or were deprived of political importance by being
"exiled" to provincial party committees or ambassadorships. Nevertheless,
the new formula of elite recruitment was introduced, stressing
the importance of occupational skills and abandoning the class origin
criteria. The party-specialist pattern15 was an attempt to reconcile
political and qualificational requirements. To satisfy the first provision,
a candidate was expected to be a party member, to satisfy the second
one - a diploma holder. Under Gomulka, however, the political
requirements still distinctly predominated over qualifications. Under
Gierek this relationship was more balanced. Several factors contributed
to that. Probably the decisive one was the combined effect of the
initial success of Gierek's economic policy, demographic trends, and
the wide opening of the educational system (which at the elementary
and vocational level took place in the late forties, and on the secondary,
and to some extent on tertiary levels, in the mid-fifties). In the seventies,
just after Gierek's elevation to the leadership, the post-war babyboom
generation, much better educated than the previous one, entered
the labor market. For this generation, Gierek's technocratic vision of
"developed socialism" had some attraction, and the political tribute
they had to pay did not seem particularly high.16 But also under
Gierek, political requirements dominated over skills, particularly in
times of economic slump, which in Poland always meant times of political
destabilization. Moreover, occupational credentials were often
treated as a pure formality; it was the degree or diploma that counted,
not the merit of a candidate.
The fourth pattern of elite recruitment, that of the loyal expert, the
party proclaimed during the Solidarity period (1980-81). The regime
could no longer ignore popular demands for meritocratic selection of
the elite. According to the loyal expert pattern, political involvement
and political preferences were not to be a matter of the appointment
procedure as long as the appointees declared their loyalty to the ConThis
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678
stitution.17 After the short period under military rules for recruitment in
the first stage of the Martial Law (1982), the pattern of loyal expert had
been repeatedly reaffirmed by Jaruzelski's government, and in the
second half of the eighties was regarded as one of the most important
instruments of the economic reform and national reconciliation. Contrary
to the three previous patterns of elite recruitment however, the
loyal expert pattern has never been fully translated into practice.18
Essentially it remained an empty formula.
Despite the astounding stability of the party-specialist pattern of elite
recruitment in Poland, we do not advocate a thesis that throughout the
post-Stalinist period the very same rules governed the selection of the
nomenklatura's elite. The four patterns of elite recruitment reflect the
fluctuaction in rules of cadre policy. The intensity of their implementation
varied dramatically: the loyal expert pattern was not really put into
practice, whereas the Communist-combatant was rigorously obeyed.
Throughout the post-war period there were exceptions in the employment
of these patterns. For instance, strict rules were rarely adopted to
the tiny group of incumbents of the top positions. Politbureau members,
Central Committee secretaries, the highest governmental officers
were nominated on an individual basis, according to their personal
status within the ruling circles at a given moment.
In the 1980s alone, the party twice underwent essential internal transformation.
The first time during the Solidarity and Martial Law
period,19 the second time after 1986, when the policy of imposition of
pro-market economic reforms a la Kadar failed. Because of these
transformations many representatives of the old cadre disappeared
from political life, and the dominating influence on party policy fell
into the hands of party liberals, who understood the necessity of
market reforms and democratization of public life. Many of them were
recruited from outside the party/government ranks, possibly according
to the loyal-expert pattern.20 In other words, the nomenklatura of 1988
had very little in common with the narrow-minded Gomulka's nomenklatura
formed before the war and in the period of struggle for peoples'
power; neither did it have much in common with the technocratic but
doctrinarian Gierek's nomenklatura.
The process of circulation of communist elites was strongly dependent
on the stability of the political situation at a given moment, and on the
firmness of a leader's rule. During periods of stability, circulation was
virtually non-existent. During times of economic or social - thus politiThis
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679
cal - turbulence, it was extremely intense. The latter case characterized
Poland ever since the late 1970s. Therefore, incumbents in the 1988
top nomenklatura positions might not properly reflect features typical
for nomenklatura throughout the period of Communist rule. One has
to keep this in mind to avoid misinterpretations.
Social composition of elites
For further analysis we have distinguished six types of elites: three categories
within the old elite and three within the new one. The Communist
nomenklatura of 1988, which originally consisted of eight strata of
incumbents in party-controlled top positions,21 is divided into:
1. The old political elite - party functionaries, legislators, state and
governmental administrators, top regional administrators, leaders
of mass organizations, and top representatives of the foreign
service. Altogether, 502 members of the old political elite were
interviewed.
2. The old economic elite - directors and deputy directors of the
largest enterprises: 263 respondents.
3. The old cultural elite - decision-makers in media, science, education,
and culture: 123 respondents.
The new elite is divided into three analogous groups:
4. The new political elite of 1993 consists of incumbents of high
positions in government and regional administration, and deputies
to Parliament: 282 respondents.
5. The new economic elite of 1993 is a heterogenous category, consisting
of three segments of the postcommunist economy: directors
and deputy directors of large state-owned enterprises, presidents
and vice-presidents of large cooperatives (considered currently
a non-state sector), and owners, chief executive officers,
and their deputies in the private sector. The last category includes
firms of various ownership status: individually owned,
limited liability companies, stock companies, joint ventures, etc.
Altogether, 588 members of the new economic elite were interviewed,
among them 228 directors and deputy directors in the
state sector.
6. The new cultural elite of 1993 is composed of people hold
positions similar to the cultural section of the nomenklatura
leaders of media, academic, and cultural organizations. This is
the smallest of all six groups: 90 people were interviewed.
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680
The social composition of the old and new Polish elites shows some
striking differences, and some striking similarities (see Tables 1, 2, and
3). Among the members of the new elites, women are represented
more often (sometimes three times more often) than among the 1988
nomenklatura. It would be difficult to say, however, that the change in
the gender structure of elites is impressive: after the collapse of Communism
women are still severely underrepresented among the top position
holders. The nomenklatura - as one could expect - is considerably
older than other groups. This is not because they held top positions five
years earlier than members of other elites: the age structure of this
group has been adjusted to 1988, the year when they held top positions
in the country. The youngest, according to the expectations, are the
new political and economic elites. Nearly two-third of them are below
fifty. Indeed, the generational aspect of the transformation is very clear.
Data describing social background (Table 2) show three important
characteristics of Polish elites. The first one is a very high percentage up
to 20-23 percent - of those who were brought up in single-parent
families (mostly without a father). Undoubtfully this is an effect of the
war. This very fact is an important factor determining the cultural and
social capital of respondents, and - possibly - shaping the structure of
their personalities. The second one is the relatively low status of origin
of Polish elites. Nearly two-thirds of both the old and the new elites
come from peasantry, working class, and non-manual families. The differences
in background variables among various categories of Polish elites
are the third important feature. It is not true, as many might expect, that
the new elites are distinct in this respect from the old ones. Considering
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of the old (1988) and new (1993) elites in Poland
Variables All elites Political elites Economic elites Cultural elites
Old New Old New Old New Old New
Gender
Man 93.0 88.5 90.8 87.9 95.8 89.1 95.9 86.7
Women 7.0 11.5 9.2 12.1 4.2 10.9 4.1 13.3
Age in year of incumbency
Under 40 10.5 18.0 13.0 21.3 6.8 17.2 8.1 13.3
40-49 33.7 44.1 33.5 43.6 39.9 45.6 21.1 35.6
50-59 40.4 25.8 37.7 22.0 42.2 29.1 47.2 16.7
60-69 14.1 11.3 14.8 12.1 11.0 7.8 17.9 31.1
70 or above 1.4 0.8 1.0 1.1 - 0.3 5.7 3.3
Number of respondents 888 960 502 282 263 588 123 90
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681
Table 2. Social background of the old (1988) and new (1993) elites in Poland
Variables All elites Political elites Economic elites Cultural elites
Old New Old New Old New Old New
Father's occupation
Party/mass organizations
elite 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4
State/regional administration
elite 0.8 1.1
Economic elite (top
managers) 2.7 3.4
Cultural elite (cultural
decision-makers) 0.1 0.2
Low managers 6.3 8.8
Professional with
subordinates 2.5 5.0
Professional without
subordinates 2.8 4.3
Non-manual 15.4 19.7
Skilled manual 23.9 25.4
Unskilled manual 2.3 0.4
Peasant, agricultural
laborers 20.9 15.9
Brought-up without
father 17.9 12.8
Father not in labor force 4.3 1.8
- 0.2
1.0 1.1 0.8 1.2 - 1.1
3.2 5.3 2.7 2.9 0.8 1.1
0.2 - - 0.2 - 1.1
4.8 11.3 7.2 7.3 10.6 10.0
2.2 7.4 0.8 2.2 7.3 15.6
2.6 5.0
13.7 20.9
23.9 16.0
2.0 1.8
1.1 2.7
16.7 20.1
29.3 31.6
3.0 1.4
7.3 12.2
19.5 13.3
12.2 14.4
1.6 -
24.3 14.9 19.8 17.9 9.8 6.7
17.9 13.8 15.2 11.2 23.6 20.0
4.0 2.1 3.4 1.2 7.3 4.4
Father's education
Primary
Secondary
Tertiary
No father or no data
on education
53.0 47.8
19.7 22.9
9.1 16.3
58.0 38.3
16.7 21.3
7.6 26.9
55.2 56.0
22.0 24.1
6.5 8.3
28.5 24.4
26.8 20.0
21.1 34.5
18.2 13.0 17.7 13.5 16.3 11.6 23.6 21.1
Father's Communist Party membership
Never member 80.5 77.9
Ever member 19.5 22.1
Number of respondents 888 960
77.3 80.1 84.8 77.4 84.6 74.4
22.7 19.9 15.2 22.6 15.4 25.6
502 282 263 588 123 90
both fathers' education and occupatio
the cultural elites and the new political
status families than do members of bot
Communist-party membership stron
old elites. To say that the highest p
(nearly 80 percent) was found among
would not be trivial to observe, how
members of the new economic elite
proportion of party members amon
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682
Table 3. Social characteristics of the old (1988) and new (1993) elites in Poland
Variables All elites Political elites Economic elites Cultural elites
Old New Old New Old New Old New
Respondent highest educati
Primary
Secondary
Tertiary
Respondent occupation in i
Party/mass organizations
elite
State/regional administration
elite
Economic elite (top
managers)
Cultural elite (cultural
decision-makers)
Low managers
Professional with sub-
ordinates
Professional without sub-
ordinates
Non-manual
Skilled manual
Unskilled manual
Peasant, agricultural
laborers
Not in labor force
4.3 0.4 7.0 -
8.3 10.0 13.3 6.7
87.4 89.6 79.7 93.3
1988
14.1 0.9 24.3 2.8
22.9 4.7 39.8 13.8
30.7 32.2 4.4 6.0
0.8 0.7 0.8
1.9 12.9 1.6 1.1
97.3 86.4 97.6 98.9
0.8 - 0.8 1.1
1.1 0.7
92.4 49.3
- 2.2
5.7 2.2
11.9 3.0 1.8 1.1 1.1 0.7 76.4 24.2
6.2 26.0 7.6 13.5 2.3 32.8 8.9 21.1
3.4 11.8 5.4 19.9
3.2 11.5 4.8 25.9
1.0 4.0 1.8 5.0
2.9 0.9 5.0 0.7
- 0.1 - 0.4
0.4 6.0
- 3.2
- 4.1
0.4 1.2
1.6 24.4
3.3 20.0
1.2 1.5 2.2 4.3 - 0.3 - -
2.6 3.4 3.0 6.7 1.5 1.7 3.3 4.4
Respondent Communist Party membership
Never 18.9 53.3 18.9 69.5
Former member 4.1 10.2 2.4 7.8
Member in 1988 77.0 36.5 78.7 22.7
12.2 43.0 33.3 70.0
6.5 11.7 5.7 7.8
81.4 45.2 61.0 22.2
Respondent occupation in i
Party/mass organizations
elite
State/regional
administration elite
Economic elite (top
managers)
Cultural elite (cultural
decision-makers)
Low managers
Professional with sub-
ordinates
Professional without
subordinates
Non-manual
Skilled manual
Unskilled manual
Peasant, agricultural
laborers
Not in labor force
Number of respondents
2.4 0.4 4.2 1.1
4.7 22.0 7.4 74.1
24.1 58.6 13.3 3.2
7.0 8.5 2.6 0.4
13.2 5.4 15.1 8.5
5.2 1.4 5.2 3.5
7.1 0.8 9.2 2.5
6.2 0.3 9.2 0.7
2.1 - 3.6 -
0.1 - 0.2 -
1.1 0.5 2.0 1.8
26.8 2.0 28.1 4.3
888 960 502 282
0.2 - -
1.5 - 0.8 2.2
53.6 93.6 4.9 4.4
0.8 0.5 38.2 86.7
13.3 4.6 4.9 -
1.9 0.5 12.2 -
1.5 4.6 10.6 1.1
3.4 0.5 - -
0.4 - - -
23.6 0.5 28.5 4.4
263 588 123 90
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683
elites is much lower than among all other categories, but still exceeds
20 percent.
One should not be surprised that one-fifth of the members of the old
elite never belonged to the party. This is how the nomenklatura
mechanism worked: it assumed party control over personnel policy, not
necessarily appointment of party members only. Communist regimes in
the post-Stalinist epoch insisted they were meritocratic. Promotion of
competent non-party members was an important vehicle of legitimacy.
Even non-competent non-party members' promotion may have given
the impression of meritocratic selection.
It is worth mentioning that since the seventies membership of the Communist
Party was not based heavily on ideological grounds in Poland.
In most cases it resulted from careerist or opportunist attitudes. To
illustrate this thesis, let us point out that over 60 percent of the 1988
nomenklatura declared themselves Catholic. This fact is an indicator of
a profound split between the private and public domain in Communist
Poland, which is described in Polish sociological literature as "social
dimorphism."22 To be a Catholic in private life and a Communist in
public was probably the most common - although far from only - case
of social dimorphism.
An introductory analysis of the composition of Polish elites offers
several hints concerning circulation vs. reproduction hypotheses. It
must be stressed that our data do not support the view that a distinctive
line separates the old elite from the new one. Instead, several
similarities suggest that, as far as recruitment basis and patterns of
social attainment are concerned, the old political elite and both economic
elites have a lot in common. That would imply a tendency
toward a reproductive pattern of personnel change, at least regarding
the new economic elite. On the other hand, the distinctiveness of the
new political and cultural elites - in terms of social background, education,
party membership - suggests the circulation pattern. Moreover, it
has to be remembered that some of our samples are quite heterogenous.
The old political elite, for example, consists of party apparatchiks,
deputies to Parliament, and high-ranked civil servants; the new
economic elite includes both representatives of the state-industry
managerial class and the new private entrepreneurs. This heterogeneity
might be a key to grasping the logic of the processes of elite transformation
at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s.
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684
Circulation or reproduction of elites?
Operationalization of the hypotheses
The circulation of elites hypothesis, like the one concerning their
reproduction, may be operationalized in many ways. In their introduction
to this issue, Ivan and Szonja Szel6nyi made a number of conceptual
distinctions concerning reproduction and circulation of elites,
which we use here. In this section we focus our attention on reproduction,
assuming for brevity that circulation is its opposite. It is a significant
limitation, resulting from the fact that the data analysis is still in
its initial phase. Our central hypothesis is that there was more circulation
than reproduction in Polish elites.
The concept of reproduction-circulation of elites has two aspects:
intergenerational and intragenerational. In the case of Eastern Europe,
the intergenerational aspect might be understood in two ways: 1. A
reproduction of the nomenklatura elite takes place when the members
of the new elite are so-called "cadre-kids": offspring of the higher
officials of the party/state apparatus; and 2. A reproduction of the precommunist
elite takes place when the members of the new elite appear
to be children or grandchildren of the pre-war elite (aristocracy, grand
bourgeoisie, high-ranked bureaucracy).
The most obvious case of intragenerational reproduction occurs when
the incumbents of new positions prove to be the old elite themselves.
This type of reproduction has two faces: simple reproduction, when
incumbents of command positions under Communism succeeded in
maintaining the same positions after the collapse of the old regime, and
reproduction by conversion, when incumbents of command positions
under Communism succeeded in maintaining their elite status, but currently
belong to another fraction of the elite than they did before.
Speaking in operational categories, simple reproduction occurs if the
incumbents of the 1993 command positions in 1988 held positions in
the same stratum of the elite, and reproduction by conversion occurs if
the incumbents of the 1993 command position in 1988 held command
positions in some other stratum of the elite.
Considering the characteristics of the East European transformation, it
is worthwhile to distinguish the third aspect of intragenerational reproduction.
Let's call it vertical reproduction. We deal with vertical reproduction
whenever the new elite consists of people who under CommuThis
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685
nism did not belong to the nomenklatura elite, but were on the trajectory
to achieve such positions and had the assets at their disposal
necessary to reach this goal. The one step forward - to become elite
members - they then made under the new system. In Poland, and
probably in other countries of Eastern Europe as well, political debates
frequently refer to this model of reproduction of elites, sometimes
describing the transformation itself as a "revolution of the deputies."
According to this view, those deputies are the main beneficiaries of the
transition: they are the persons who were not high enough to be executed
by the revolutions but high enough to take over the positions and
privileges of the beheaded. Speaking in operational categories, vertical
reproduction occurs when the members of the new elites are recruited
from among those who in 1988 were sub-elite: those who held medium-rank
managerial posts and were members of the Communist party.
In Eastern Europe, and certainly in Poland, two competing value
judgments dominate discussion on the personnel aspects of transformation.
One advocates some continuity; another calls for radical
change. The arguments for continuity are based on practical principles
stressing that the requirements of competent bureaucracy and smooth
transition make it necessary to maintain a part of the old apparatus.
The arguments for radical change are based on revolutionary principles,
stressing the necessity of the total substitution of the old bureaucracy,
which is seen as a potential saboteur of transition. One may ask
which of these two models was applied in Poland.
The circulation-reproduction hypothesis is tested here in "inflow," and
not "outflow," categories. This means that the analysis focuses on the
new elite (not on the nomenklatura) and we investigate from what classes
of the Communist society the new elite's members "flowed in."
Obviously, an opposite approach (to study outflow from the old elite to
the postcommunist destination) is equally valid and interesting. We will
use it later in exploring the conversion of nomenklatura power.
Intergenerational elite reproduction
We examined some aspects of intergenerational reproduction above
when we discussed the composition of elites. The data on fathers' occupation
presented there show that there is no high intensity of intergenerational
reproduction. Apparently, most of the present-day elites
are not children of party officials, pre-war aristocracy, or bourgeoisie.
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686
Still, such a situation was not expected. We had been inclined to expect
that two groups would be overrepresented among the new elites: on the
one hand, people with high inherited cultural capital (measured by
fathers' education) and, the other hand, children of the Communist
privileged class, defined in a broader way than the top nomenklatura
alone, to include also party members who held managerial positions
(Communist sub-elite). The latter case - if data support it - might be
called intergenerational vertical reproduction.
Table 4 includes figures showing the proportion of respondents coming
from nomenklatura families, from other politically privileged families
(father as member of the Communist sub-elite), and from culturally
privileged families (father with university education). Considering the
heterogeneity of the new economic elite, we divided it into groups
according to the sector of economy. In accord with our expectations,
the intergenerational reproduction of elites is not high, although it is
clearly visible. However, the character of this reproduction is slightly
different from what we predicted.
Taking all three new elites together, we found fewer people coming
from culturally privileged families than we anticipated. This result is
mostly due to the low proportion of parents with tertiary education
among the members of the new economic elite. It may be interpreted in
two ways. On the one hand, it may be a consequence of the broad
scope of the intragenerational reproduction: it is probable that a large
part of the new economic elite originated from the Communist managerial
class, which as a whole was recruited from the lower classes. We
Table 4. Intergenerational reproduction of elites: Percentages of the 1993 elite members
coming from politically and culturally privileged families
Social background Political Cultural Economic elite Total
elite elite
Total State Coop. Private
Father member of
the old elite 6.8 3.3 4.5 3.1 3.4 6.6 5.0
Father member of
the old sub-elite
(party manager) 11.3 13.3 11.7 12.2 10.2 12.3 11.8
Father with tertiary
education 26.4 34.4 8.3 8.3 6.1 9.9 16.2
Number of cases 282 90 588 228 148 212 960
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687
test this interpretation later, while discussing intragenerational reproduction
of elites. On the other hand, it may be the result of general
regularities governing the processes of social mobility in Poland.
People coming from lower classes, more often than children of the
intelligentsia and professionals, choose engineering and managerial
careers. They prefer "practical" occupations (and not "abstract" ones,
like humanities, social sciences, or the arts), and pay more attention to
material benefits connected with their vocation. Also among the new
political elite we found fewer people than expected from universityeducated
families. We believe that this can be attributed to the fact that
among its members are representatives of the workers currently in
Solidarity.
Taking all three new elites together, we found more people coming
from the Communist political class (both from top nomenklatura and
sub-elite families) than we anticipated. To our surprise, among the new
political elite and among new private entrepreneurs (the two elite that
were to serve as a symbol of democracy and the free market) the proportions
of persons coming from the Communist political class are
even a bit higher than among the other segments of the new elite. We
believe that different mechanisms are responsible for this similarity.
Regarding private entrepreneurs, we think it is mostly the result of
intergenerational conversion of political capital into economic capital.
Regarding the new political elite, this phenomenon may be partly
explained by the leftwing social environment that a good part of Polish
democratic opposition originated from. In this case "cadre kids" were
"rebellious kids," who ideologically contested their Communist fathers.
This rebellion led them to dissident organizations, and finally, after collapse
of the old regime into the ranks of the new political elite.
Intragenerational elite reproduction
The essence of the circulation-reproduction hypothesis, and of heated
political controversies over it, is not intergenerational, but intragenerational
reproduction of elites. To what extent does the present
ruling elite originate from the old elite? The data on simple reproduction,
reproduction by conversion, and vertical reproduction are presented
in Table 5. The first thing to note is that the overall scope of
reproduction of the elites is relatively broad: 40 percent of the members
of the present elites held elitist positions under Communism. And
if we include those who were then a step below (in the sub-elite), the
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688
Table 5. Intragenerational reproduction of elites: Percentages of the new elite members
belonging in 1988 to the old elite (simple reproduction and reproduction by conversion)
and to the old sub-elite (vertical reproduction)
Position in 1988 Position in 1993 Total
Political Cultural Economic elite
elite elite
Total State Coop. Private
Political elite 16.6 3.3 0.7 - 0.7 1.4 5.6
Economic elite 6.0 2.2 49.3 46.9 61.5 43.4 32.1
Cultural elite 1.1 24.4 0.7 - 1.4 0.9 3.0
Total, old elites 23.7 29.9 50.9 46.9 63.6 45.7 40.7
Sub-elite 2.5 6.7 6.3 7.4 4.1 6.6 5.2
Number of
respondents 282 90 588 228 148 212 960
rate of reproduction will rise to forty-five.
significant differences among the three g
elite. Among the economic elite, reprodu
(57 percent while including sub-elite grou
political elite, it is 24 percent (26 perce
reproduction), and in the cultural elite,
percent (36 percent).
Another very important feature is the narr
conversion, and the broad scope of simple
duction is most clearly visible among the
The high rate of simple reproduction ma
that in the selection of the new elite fro
role was played by meritocratic factors.
who were real experts in their fields succeed
under the new system. Those who were
however, exclude an alternative interpre
who had higher social capital and were m
opportunistic.
The easiest to interpret in circulation-rep
nomic elite. Only in this case may we say
duced Communist economic elite. And it
sector of the postcommunist economy
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689
state-owned, cooperative, or private one. In all cases, the proportion of
nomenklatura is very high, and in the cooperatives it is enormous. The
last case does not surprise us, because for many years cooperatives in
Poland were known as a "haven" for party-coterie arrangements and as
shelter for discredited apparatchiks.
The most interesting among the three sectors is the private one, which
was to be the outpost of the market economy. It is apparently governed
by the old economic elite to the same extent as the state-controlled
sector: every second owner or top manager in the private sector used to
be a director of a socialist enterprise. What does this fact mean for the
conversion of power thesis? We think it is a strong argument for it. We
defined "conversion" as the transfer from one segment of communist
elite to other segments of the postcommunist elite. Transfer from the
post of a nomenklatura director to the position of owner, major shareholder,
or chief executive officer of a private firm is doubtless a form of
conversion of political capital into economic capital. We do not mean
to suggest that the nomenklatura directors did not possess proper
managerial qualifications, and that political capital was their only asset.
Just the contrary: we believe that they possessed above-average managerial
skills and, precisely because of that, acquired command positions
in business. Simultaneously however, we believe that despite these
qualifications they would not have achieved success in business if it
were not for their political assets, which guaranteed them easy access
to information, decisionmakers, powerful networks, low-interest loans,
etc.
Obviously, a classic case of conversion of power takes place when
"pure" political power converts into "pure" economic capital: from
apparatchik to billionaire. In the present sample such a classic conversion
does not occur: none of the members of the private economic
elite was a high-ranked full-time officer of the party apparatus in 1988,
and very few were top government officials. This does not mean, however,
that apparatchiks did not get into business. We should not jump to
conclusions until we have focused on the outflow from the nomenklatura
sample, investigating what positions the former officers of the
Communist administration acquired in 1993. The nomenklatura origin
of most members of the new economic elite explains the previously
observed similarity between the old and the new economic elites. They
are similar simply because they used to belong to the same class of
Communist managers. Intragenerational reproduction of the cultural
and political elites is much lower than that of the economic elite. Here
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690
- particularly regarding the political elite - we should speak of circulation
rather than of reproduction: the proportion of newcomers is much
higher than that of "old cadres." Thus, the revolutionary principle of
exchange of political personnel was not employed in Poland. Rather,
we are closer to the pragmatic principle of continuity of power: 75 percent
new people and 25 percent old ones. Yet, we must stress that to
claim responsibly that the pragmatic model of cadre exchange was
adopted, we would have to be sure that it was meritocratic criteria that
led to the nomenklatura's retaining elite positions.
Data presented in Table 5 show the significant prevalence of simple
reproduction over vertical reproduction. This requires some comment.
Is "revolution of the deputies" a slogan with no foundations? We do not
think so. In our opinion it includes a part of the truth. It does not
clearly show in our analysis because, while operationalizing the concept
of nomenklatura in Poland, we included within this group
deputy directors of the largest enterprises and firms directly controlled
by Central Committee of the Communist Party. In consequence, the
old economic elite, and to a lesser extent the old cultural elite, include
positions that in other countries were included into the "general
managers" category. This overestimates simple reproduction and
reproduction by conversion, and underestimates vertical reproduction.
It also overstates the general intensity of reproduction of elites in
Poland, since it is certain that some deputy directors were not party
members in 1988, so, if the definition of nomenklatura were more
rigorous, they would be included neither into the nomenklatura nor
into the sub-elite. This must be remembered while making inter-country
comparisons.
The data analysis does provide an unequivocal answer to the question,
circulation or reproduction? In postcommunist Poland, elites are
formed both ways. Thus, the answer is circulation and reproduction. It
should be given in this order, for per saldo circulation prevails over
reproduction. It is the new economic elite that is responsible for the
comparatively high rate of elite reproduction in Poland. First, this is
because most of its members originate from the nomenklatura.
Secondly, it is because the new economic elite are more numerous than
the two others combined, so that it most strongly determines the
picture of the whole. Confirming our expectations, the highest circulation
occurs among the new political elite. Thus, the core of the new
power elite consists of new people. Reproduction of the old political
elite is a limited phenomenon. This cannot be said about conversion of
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691
the old political capital into market assets. This issue, however, has to
be dealt with elsewhere.
Conclusions: The postcommunist and post-Solidarity elite
In the final phase of our fieldwork, in September 1993, the early parliamentary
election took place in Poland. It resulted in the victory of the
postcommunist party (37 percent of the seats in the Diet) and the
peasant party of satellite descent (29 percent). The left wing Solidarityrooted
Labor Union was also successful (9 percent ), while the postSolidarity
Christian and rightwing parties were severely defeated: none
of them gained a single seat in Parliament. From among Solidarityrooted
parties it was only the centrist Democratic Union (led by Mazowiecki
and Kuroii) that managed to preserve its status (16 percent of
the seats). The result of the election was the formation of a postcommunist
and peasant coalition cabinet, supported by a decisive majority
in both the Diet and the Senate, and having a good chance to remain in
power for the next four years.
The results of the September election induced many commentators
and analysts, as well as a large part of the Polish and foreign public, to
formulate conclusions like "Communism has returned to Poland."
Regarding the interesting problems of elites, conclusions of this type
assume the form: "In four years - 1989-1993 - the exchange of elites
in Poland described a full circle: from Communists to Communists."
We do not agree with these conclusions, which oversimplify the Polish
situation. We argue against these overhasty conclusion in the final
section of this article. The fundamental premise of our reasoning is the
conviction that in present-day Poland there is neither Communism nor
Solidarity. Poland today is both postcommunist and post-Solidarity.
Sociological surveys present social reality at a given time. In our case it
was in 1993 that we carried out the interviews - and 1988, the last year
of Communism in Poland and the last year to which many items of our
questionnaire referred. Social and political elites, however, do not follow
the timetable of sociological inquires. In the years preceding 1988,
and particularly during 1989-90, Poland experienced major changes
in elite recruitment. After the Round Table and the June 1989 election,
the Party fell like a house of cards. A new party, Social-Democracy of
the Republic of Poland, was formed on its ruins in January 1990. Most
of the old leaders did not join the new party, passing the leadership into
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692
the hands of the younger generation. The new leaders were mostly
people politically shaped in the 1980s and directly engaged in the
Round Table negotiations. By 1993 there was no Solidarity. Both the
remnants of Solidarity 1980-81 and the recreated Solidarity that was
victorious in 1989 disintegrated in 1990-91, and only the trade union
remained under this name.
Although blue-collar workers constituted the core of Solidarity, and
the movement would not have come into being without the strikes
initiated by the working class, it would still be an oversimplification to
call Solidarity a workers' movement. Intellectuals took an active role in
laying the foundations of Solidarity and in significant ways influenced
its shape, but it was not the intellectuals' movement either.23 And
though the demands for higher earnings and better working conditions
formed an essential part of its program, Solidarity was not a movement
of economically handicapped employees. Solidarity was an organization
integrated around those values that the ancien regime did not want
to - or could not - live up to. It was a mass movement of the Poles who
were separated from the authorities by an impassable distance. Although
the living standard of Poles was far below the Western standards,
the real distance between the people and the ruling class was not
economic. It was primarily a political distance: those who were active in
Solidarity could not otherwise influence public life. It was also a cultural
distance: the values, the Weltanschauung, the moral standards, the
faith, and even the language of those who joined Solidarity were
depreciated and devalued.24
Solidarity was a formidable oppositional institution. It had organizational
structure and successfully mobilized society through reference
to humanistic, patriotic, and religious symbols. Solidarity's leaders had
political experience, and the movement adopted an effective nonviolence
ethos. Solidarity was, however, entirely unprepared to govern
in a democratic polity. Its emphasis on communitarian values was useful
in an authoritarian state; but under democracy the vision of "society
vs. state" turned destructive. Solidarity could not find the ways to act
when the country was no longer "theirs," but ours. Before June 1989
political struggles were fought along one line: between regime and
opposition. After June 1989, politics became multidimensional. It is no
longer tantamount to morality: the politics of anti-politics belongs to
the past.25 Politics no longer unites the whole nation and appeals to
universal human values; it comes "down to the Earth"; it asks only - in
Lasswell's terms - who gets what, when, and how.26
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693
Solidarity was not able to adjust to the new situation. The dichotomy
"we vs. them" was a moral dichotomy, which had its origin in the
opposition of good and evil. With the decline of the Communist regime,
there were no more enemies to integrate society. Paradoxically, the
formation of the Solidarity cabinet accelerated its disintegration.
Solidarity was to serve as social and political base of the government,
and simultaneously as "an umbrella" protecting the market reforms. It
was the agency that set the priorities of the cabinet and was supposed
to control, through its Parliamentary representation, the execution of
government policies. At the same time, Solidarity was a mass Trade
Union that was to protect the interests of wage-workers and represent
them in conflicts with state-controlled employers.
Solidarity - like a character from an ancient tragedy - created the
situation that led to its unavoidable annihilation. Subverting Communism,
promoting democracy, pluralism, and the market economy, it
fundamentally changed social reality, the perception of this reality, and
even the language in which this reality was described. And all these
changes questioned its identity, and negated the very justification of its
existence: solidarity. It appeared that the transformation meant the shift
from the world of community and moral rights to the conflict world
of diverse economic and political interests. The blue-collar workers of
the largest socialist enterprises and the powerless intelligentsia constituted
the social base of Solidarity. It was soon apparent that precisely
these two groups were those most endangered by reforms initiated by
Solidarity. Revolution started to devour its children.
Solidarity's antagonists were better prepared for the new, marketdriven,
competitive world. When Solidarity was in decay, the postcommunist
Left took the comfortable place of that opposition. It reconstituted
itself and portrayed itself as a representative of economic
interests of those groups bearing the highest costs of the shock therapy.
It did not, however, propagate the restitution of the old system. The
postcommunists were well aware that people in Poland might miss
social protection provided by the old regime, but would not accept the
return of the ancient regime. The postcommunist elite has no personal
stake in the restoration of the old socio-economic system either: they
are successful in the pluralist political system and market economy.
The dichotomy "we vs. them" was the key to understanding the Polish
developments throughout the eighties. It ceased to be the key to understanding
in the nineties. This can be seen in terms of the social characThis
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694
teristics of the elites we surveyed. We can tell whether they used to be
Communists, unionists, members of Communist satellite organizations,
or nationalistic anticommunists. Yet, this no longer matters. A postcommunist
and post-Solidarity elite is in the making. The individual
political biography has no real impact on what position someone achieves:
it has more to do with the social interests one articulates. The classical
political division between "Left and Right" reemerges, and the
political genealogy loses its importance.
A postcommunist and post-Solidarity elite has formed since 1990. The
results of the September 1993 election are only the most spectacular
manifestation of this process. A new "thick line" is drawn. It is no longer
important whether one was a party member or a Solidarity member,
whether one supported Martial Law or fought against it. What
matters is the attitude toward social-safety nets, privatization and reprivatization,
state protectionism, subsidizing of agriculture, inflow of
foreign capital, the political role of the Church, etc. Polish elites of
1993 reflect more and more clearly these divisions, and less and less
clearly the divisions that dominated Polish public life throughout the
1980s.
Notes
1. See W. Wesotowski, "The role of political elites in transition from Communism to
democracy: The case of Poland," Sisyphus - Social Studies 8 (1992): 77-100; J.
Wasilewski, "Dilemmas and controversies concerning leadership recruitment in
Eastern Europe," in P. Lewis, editor, Democracy and Civil Society in Eastern Europe
(London: Macmillan, 1992); J. Wasilewski and W. Wesotowski, editors, Poczatki
parlamentarnej elity: Poslowie kontraktowego Sejmu (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo
IFiS PAN, 1992).
2. P. Bourdieu, Distinctions: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1984); P. Bourdieu, "The forms of capital," in J. G.
Richardson, editor, Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1986).
3. L. Bruszt, "1989: The negotiated revolution in Hungary," in G. Szoboszlai, editor,
Democracy and Political Transformation: Theories and East-Central European Realities
(Budapest: Hungarian Political Science Association, 1991). See also E. Hankiss,
East European Alternatives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
4. M. Latuch, Demografia spo/eczno-ekonomiczna (Warszawa: Paristwowe
Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1980).
5. See T. Hammond, editor, The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1975). George Sanford describes the Communist takeover of
Poland in this way: "In the Polish case the communist takeover was a mixture
between the outright imposition of a 'baggage train' government, as in Romania,
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695
and the genuine parliamentary methods of Czechoslovakia." (G. Sanford, Polish
Communism in Crisis, London: Croom Helm, 1983). This might be an accurate
description, taking into account that some democratic procedures were adopted
indeed: the 1946 referendum, and the 1947 multi-party general elections. Since the
referendum's results were falsified by the Communists (see A. Paczkowski, Referendum
z 30 czerwca 1946 r.: Przebieg i wyniki, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo ISP PAN,
1993), we may assume that the same happened with the Communist-controlled
1947 general election. Therefore, we claim that the Polish case is much closer to
the Romanian than to Czechoslovakia's model.
6. About Polish crises see J. Karpinski, Countdown: The Polish Upheavals of 56, 68,
70, 76, 80 (New York: Karz-Cohl, 1982).
7. J. J. Lipski, KOR: A History of the Workers' Defense Committee in Poland, 1976-
1981 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
8. A. Michnik, "A new evolutionism," in Letters from Prison and Other Essays (Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1987).
9. M. H. Bernhard, The Origins of Democratization in Poland: Workers, Intellectuals,
and Oppositional Politics, 1976-1980 (New York: Columbia University Press,
1993).
10. On Solidarity in 1980-81 see, for instance, T. Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution:
Solidarity (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983); A. Touraine et al., Solidarity:
The Analysis of a Social Movement, Poland 1980-81 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983); J. Holzer, Solidarnosc 1980-81. Geneza i Historia (Paris:
Institute Litteraire, 1984).
11. A. Suiek, "Polish United Workers' Party: From mobilization to non representation,"
Soviet Studies 42 (1990): 499-512.
12. B. Szajkowski, Next to God ... Poland: Politics and Religion in Contemporary
Poland (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).
13. Data from a survey carried out in October 1994 by the Center for Public Opinion
Studies, as reported in Gazeta Wyborcza, No. 1722, 9 February 1995.
14. J. Wasilewski, "The patterns of bureaucratic elite recruitment in Poland in the
1970s and 1980s," Soviet Studies 42 (1990): 743-757.
15. Wasilewski, "The patterns of bureaucratic elite recruitment in Poland in the 1970s
and 1980s."
16. Actually, not only for this generation. Gierek succeeded - no doubts about that - i
convincing part of the intellectuals and the intelligentsia (particularly the technica
intelligentsia) and a part of the skilled industrial workers as well, that it was possi
ble to combine socialism with democracy and material well-being. His openness to
the West and long-run projects (as in the "second industrialization" of Poland)
sounded persuasive for many. His cooptation policy ended eventually in failure not
because nobody followed him, but because most of Gierek's initial followers retreated
when they realized that the prosperity of 1972-75 was over, the neo-Stalinist
methods of governing were returning, and a mass corruption - new phenomenon
among Polish Communist rulers - degenerated the power apparatus.
17. This included, among many remnants of the Stalinist constitution of 1952, th
chapter about the leading role of the Communist party and fraternal cooperation
with the Soviet Union.
18. For empirical evidence, see Wasilewski, "The patterns of bureaucratic elite recruitment
in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s."
19. Let us illustrate these changes by pointing out that in 1983 only 4 percent of the incumbents
in high party offices in southern Poland were nominated during Gierek's
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696
term. The others took office either during the "sixteen months of Solidarity" (47%),
or at the time of Martial Law (49%). Equally radical changes took place in other
regions. See: J. Wasilewski, "Social processes of regional power elite recruitment,"
Sisyphus - Sociological Studies 5 (1989): 205-224.
20. The most recent sociological data (prior to the present project) describing the patterns
of Communist elite recruitment refer to 1986. Until then, the loyal expert
model apparently was not employed. It seems, however, that in the last few years of
Communist rule in Poland some incumbents in top positions in the party and
government were recruited according to this pattern. The preliminary stage of the
analysis does not allow us to verify this surmise.
21. These eight strata of the old elite were as follows: 1. Central Committee level party
apparatus; 2. Lower party apparatus (secretaries at the voivodship level); 3. Legislators,
chief state and governmental officials; 4. Top state administrators at the
voivodship level; 5. Mass organizations' leaders of the central level; 6. Economic
elite: directors and deputy directors of the largest enterprises; 7. Cultural elite:
incumbents of high posts in cultural, academic, and mass-media institutions; 8.
Higher echelons of the foreign service (ambassadors, deputy-chiefs of missions,
representatives at international organizations).
22. E. Wnuk-Lipinski, "Social dimorphism," in I. Bialecki, J. Koralewicz, M. Watson,
editors, Society in Transition (London: Berg Publishers, 1987).
23. There is a big controversy among scholars about the role workers and intellectuals
played in origin of Solidarity and shaping its policy. See R. Laba, Worker Roots of
Solidarity: A Political Sociology of Poland's Working Class Democratization (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1991); L. Goodwyn, Breaking the Barrier: The
Rise of Solidarity in Poland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); M. Bernhard,
"Reinterpreting Solidarity," Studies in Comparative Communism 24 (1991): 313-
330; J. Kubik, "Who done it: Workers, intellectuals, or someone else? Controversy
over Solidarity's origins and social composition," Theory and Society 23 (1994):
441-466.
24. Kubik, "Who done it: Workers, intellectuals, or someone else? Controve
Solidarity's origins and social composition."
25. See G. Konrad, Antipolitics (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 19
Havel, "Politics and conscience," in Open Letters by Vaclav Havel (New Yor
tage Books: 1992); D. Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Antipolitics: Opposi
Reform in Poland Since 1968 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1
Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1991).
26. H. D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: McGr
1936).
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