93
CHAPTER 4
The Return of Nationalist Ethos: The Loss
of Liberal Democracy in Poland?
Ursula van Beek
In October 2015, for the first time since Poland transitioned to
democracy in 1989, a single political party gained an absolute majority
in the Polish parliament. The Law and Justice Party (Prawo i
Sprawiedliwosc: PiS) cut its political teeth first as a member of the
ruling coalition (2005–2007) and later as the largest opposition party in
parliament (2007–2015). Although well known for its strong populist
and Eurosceptic orientations, during both the presidential and the parliamentary
elections the party toned down its strong pro-Catholic
Church stance and temporarily suspended its customary preoccupation
with Poland’s perceived neighbouring enemies and with bringing former
communist functionaries to book. Instead, PiS focused on the economy,
social issues and education in a dynamic Western-styled electioneering
campaign wooing voters in their own neighbourhoods and workplaces
with promises of a better life for all.
© The Author(s) 2019
U. van Beek (ed.), Democracy under Threat,
Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89453-9_4
U. van Beek (*) 
Transformation Research Unit (TRU), Department of Political Science,
Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, South Africa
e-mail: uvb@sun.ac.za
94  U. van BEEK
Yet the party’s Manifesto (Program PiS) leaves no room for doubt
where PiS stands politically. The document is couched entirely in nationalist
rhetoric and is replete with references to history and tradition. The
Manifesto considers the Catholic Church and the mass media as key
players in the essential task of sustaining a national identity that is reflective
of true Polish values. The nativist ethos also comes through clearly in
references to Poland’s foreign relations, especially in the context of the
European Union.
Not surprisingly, following the installation of the incumbent regime
European press reactions were uniformly negative, ranging from mildly
cautious to highly alarmist, with the latter foreseeing the emergence
of a paternalist-nationalist state crafted on the populist Hungarian
model (Hassel 2015). Some of the international academic assessments
expressed similar concerns, referring to the new government as illiberal
(Freudenstein and Niclewicz 2016) and suggesting that Poland might be
seeing the final days of its democracy (Kelemen and Orenstein 2016).
To come to grips with the dramatic political change, this chapter
first explores the historical reasons for Poland’s drifting away from liberal
democracy. The analysis is guided by the assumption that examining
the historical trajectory offers insights without which it is difficult, if
not impossible, to understand why the agenda of the governing populist
party resonates so well with so many citizens. The chapter also addresses
the question of how the concept of liberalism is understood in Poland,
and to what extent this understanding has a bearing on the shift in political
preferences. The developments that have set Poland on a collision
course with the European Union are discussed with reference to the controversy
surrounding the Constitutional Tribunal, and the attempts by
the executive to usurp power over the country’s judiciary as a whole.
The conceptual departure point for the discussion has been inspired
by the 2016 study of the phenomenon of rising support for populist parties
in developed Western societies by Inglehart and Norris (2016). The
chapter examines the rise of populism in Poland in reference to this study.
The Rise of Populism in Western Europe
Much has been written on the subject of contemporary populism
and the underlying dynamic that propels populist parties into having
greater political influence or gaining political power (Mair 2002; Norris
2005; Albertazzi and McDonnel 2007; Gherghina Sergiu et al. 2013;
4  THE RETURN OF NATIONALIST ETHOS: THE LOSS OF LIBERAL …  95
Niznik 2016). Three common features seem to capture the essence of
populism: an anti-establishment posture, authoritarianism, and nativism
(Mudde 2007). Chief among them is the innate antagonism between
the people and the political elite, leading to popular perceptions that the
existing political establishment is corrupt and no longer represents the
people. This anti-establishment sentiment is underpinned by a preference
for a strong leader who is thought to better represent the will of ordinary
people, and by a retreat into xenophobic nationalism.
Against this background, Inglehart and Norris (2016), focusing their
attention on voter behaviour, empirically examine two theories about the
demand side of public opinion that seek to explain mass support for populism.
The first set of views refers to the profound effect the transformation
from an industrial to post-industrial society and economy has had
in the West. The process witnessed the collapse of manufacturing industries,
the rise of technological innovation and the knowledge society, and
unprecedented global flows of people, goods, and capital. The decline of
industries has eroded organized labour to a large extent and caused the
welfare safety net to shrink, producing much greater income and wealth
inequality. The resultant rise in economic insecurity and feelings of social
deprivation among people who do not benefit from the changes are said
to fuel popular resentment of the political classes.
Inglehart and Norris’s second and related thesis cites a cultural backlash
as the other main reason for the surge in votes for populist parties. This
argument builds on the theory of value change that had emerged in step
with the rise to formerly unknown levels of existential security experienced
by the citizens of Western societies in the post-war period. Solid empirical
evidence documents these developments beginning in the early 1970s
when the post-war generation became politically relevant; having made
itself first heard in the students protests of the late 1960s. The intergenerational
shift, or the “silent revolution,” which facilitated the move
from traditional values to more progressive norms of cosmopolitanism,
multiculturalism, individual liberty and support for left-libertarian parties,
triggered a backlash among older generations and the less educated.
For the purposes of their analyses, Inglehart and Norris introduce the
classic economic Left-Right cleavage in party competition, which they
see as being currently intersected by the cultural cleavage dividing populism
and cosmopolitan liberalism. Figure 4.1 offers a visual representation
of the crosscutting relationship between the populist-cosmopolitan
continuum and Left-Right orientations.1
96  U. van BEEK
In their empirical investigation, Inglehart and Norris first identified
the ideological location of 268 political parties in thirty-one European
countries utilizing data from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey. They
then used the pooled European Social Survey 1–6 (2002–2014) to
examine the cross-national evidence at the individual level. This approach
allowed them to assess the effect of the economic insecurity and cultural
values theses, respectively, on voting behaviour for populist parties.
The investigation led Inglehart and Norris to two main findings of
comparative relevance to the following discussion:
1. The measures that were used only partially confirmed the claim
that populist support is due to the resentment of economic
inequality and social deprivation.
2. All of the values scales that were used proved dependable predictors
of voting behaviour in support of populist parties.
Fig. 4.1  Economic and cultural orientations (Source Adapted from Inglehart
and Norris 2016)
4  THE RETURN OF NATIONALIST ETHOS: THE LOSS OF LIBERAL …  97
The overall conclusion the authors reached was that cultural values associated
with specific social and demographic factors provided the most
persistent and accurate explanation for voting in support of populist
parties. Inglehart and Norris noted that the appeal of traditional values
associated with support for populist parties was strongest among older
generations, ethnic minorities, men, religious believers, and people with
limited education. The authors expect that over time the generation gap
will fade away as older cohorts with traditional attitudes are gradually
replaced by their children and grandchildren who adhere to more progressive
values.2
The Rise of Populism in Poland
The Ruling Party: A Programmatic Profile
Figure 4.1 offers a useful conceptual framework within which to profile
PiS. On the strength of its own declarations alone, the party can be
firmly placed at the populist end of the vertical continuum. The retrograde
nationalist vision contained in its Manifesto is one of a Poland
where the “teaching of the Catholic Church, Polish tradition and Polish
patriotism have powerfully merged with each other to build the political
identity of the nation” (Program PiS 2014: 10). The Church is at the
centre. It is seen not only as having played a specific nation-building and
civilizational role that is historically different than in other nations, but
also as the protector of Polish identity. The Manifesto points out that
during the 123 years Poland was effaced from the map of Europe by its
neighbours, and again under communism, the Catholic Church provided
a sanctuary for the preservation of “Polishness” and substituted for the
non-existing sovereign state.
Placing Poland in the European context, the Manifesto ostensibly supports
the ideals that have given rise to the notion of a unified Europe by
stressing the civilizational richness of the continent that is derived from
the diversity of its peoples. But, contrary to the logical progression from
such an assertion to the idea of cultivating multiculturalism, the document
goes on to argue that the only way in which to assure a strong
and prosperous Europe is to preserve this diversity as a lasting feature
of the cultural space. “Unification, or radical impoverishment of diversity,
and the replacement of cultural heritage by primitive civilizational
98  U. van BEEK
experiments translate into weakening the continent.” (Program 2014: 12).
In a strongly worded passage, PiS rejects political correctness imposed
not only by “cultural aggression” but also by administrative and legal
means. “We do not accept the uncontrolled erosion of the sovereignty of
the European fatherlands. We will defend our freedom decisively and will
erect the strongest possible legal barriers to thwart such practices against
Poland. This is our ‘Euro-realism’” (Program 2014: 13).
Figure 4.1 is also helpful in situating PiS on the Left-Right axis.
The largely leftward position PiS occupies on that continuum confirms
the contention that the traditional association of populist parties
with the Right in Western Europe fails to capture some key features of
contemporary populist parties elsewhere. Its Manifesto makes it clear
that PiS, while pro-market in some respects, leans heavily towards
economic redistribution and the welfare state. Before sketching the
envisaged socio-economic “repair” programme under the heading
“Project for Poland,” 27 pages (Program 2014: 17–44) of the document
are taken up by a highly contemptuous denunciation of the previous
administration, which is being accused of having failed the nation
on every level, from political to social, to economic, and to cultural.
The “Tusk system”,3 as the Manifesto terms it, is described as having
misrepresented democracy with regard to both its essence and the procedures
and mechanisms that characterize it. As such the “Tusk system”
has worked to block the possibility of achieving positive economic and
social changes in Poland.
The welfare system promised by PiS is structured around the “Polish
family.” The Manifesto commits the party to supporting the family
and its security, and unveils policies aimed at assuring secure family
life and encouraging families to have more children. Stressing as fundamental
and necessary for secure family life to have a job and roof over
one’s head, the party undertakes to help create conditions conducive to
achieving these goals. The document further promises an easy access to
health services and education, as well as to state support for the aged
and infirm members of the family. The specific benefits include, among
others, a monthly subsidy of 500 zloty (± US$ 125) for the second and
each subsequent child4; social grants for poor families; the raising of taxation
threshold for low-income families; care for chronic illness suffers;
free preschool; free meals in primary school; free medicine for pensioners
over 75 years (Program 2014: 107–122).
4  THE RETURN OF NATIONALIST ETHOS: THE LOSS OF LIBERAL …  99
The Electorate: A Social and Demographic Profile
In stark contrast to the findings on voting support for populist parties
in Western Europe presented by Inglehart and Norris, support for PiS
cannot be associated with the same key social demographic factors. As
results of the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2015 indicate
(Polish Electoral Commisison: PKW 2015), voting patterns in Poland do
not fit the model of old conservatives versus young liberals, nor the well
educated versus the less well educated. In addition, more women voted
for PiS than men in a ratio of 49 to 51% (Survey Report 2015: 2); while
support across rural and urban areas was evenly spread (Survey Report
2015: 6).
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the election results, respectively, by age
group and by the level of education of voters. The tables comprise results
for only three of the seven parties that contested the election because
Table 4.1  Voting results by age group
Table constructed on data published by the Polish Electoral Commission on October 26, 2015. http://
parlament2015.pkw.gov.pl/349_wyniki_sejm/0/0/19
Age group Political parties (%)
PiS PO Zjednoczona Lewica
18–29 26.6 14.4 3.4
30–39 30.6 23.8 5.6
40–49 38.7 25.8 6.4
49–50 47.1 23.0 7.3
60 and above 48.7 28.1 9.3
Table 4.2  Voting results by education level
Table constructed on data published by the Polish Electoral Commission on October 26, 2015.
http://parlament2015.pkw.gov.pl/349_wyniki_sejm/0/0/19
Level of education Political parties (%)
PiS PO Zjednoczona Lewica
Primary 55.9 15.4 3.6
Vocational 53.0 19.3 5.3
Secondary 39.2 23.0 7.00
Higher 30.4 26.7 8.5
100  U. van BEEK
of the relevance of those parties to the current discussion.5 The parties
include PiS, the liberal Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska: PO), and
the United Left (Zjednoczona Lewica).
Looking at the results in Table 4.1, support for PiS among the 18–29
cohort might suggest that the youngest voters were the least inclined
to vote populist. However, many of their votes went to two other parties:
Kukitz’15, a right-wing anti-system party headed by a rock singer
and the radically populist KORWiN headed by a controversial maverick.
Thus, in total, 37.4% of that age cohort voted Right. When one adds
to this result the low support for the United Left party, the picture that
emerges is one of young voters leaning alarmingly strongly towards the
Right end of the political spectrum (Election Results 2015).
Table 4.2 shows that the higher the voters’ education, the less they
support PiS. Nevertheless, the percentage of voters with higher education
who cast their vote for PiS was still substantial and, significantly,
it was 3.7 percentage points higher than votes cast for the liberal PO
party.6 As Table 4.2 also illustrates, voters with higher levels of education
show higher support for the Left. In fact, if the decisive vote was up to
Fig. 4.2  Support for political parties and religiosity of supporters (Source
Graph constructed using data from Report on Survey November 22, 2015.
http://www.newsweek.pl/polska/jak-religijnosc-wplywa-na-wybory-,ar-
tykuly,374493,1.html)
4  THE RETURN OF NATIONALIST ETHOS: THE LOSS OF LIBERAL …  101
that cohort alone, the United Left party would have reached the mandatory
5% threshold for parliamentary representation.
The one variable applicable to Poland listed by Inglehart and Norris
as a predictor of voting preferences for populist parties in the West is
religiosity, in the Polish case measured by the frequency of mass attendance.7
As the Fig. 4.2 indicates, 74% of those attending mass several
times a week or once a week voted for PiS.
The significant support for the populist PiS over its liberal rival is a
concern that cannot but raise the most important question: Why would
Poland—the first country to break out of the Soviet Bloc and clear the
road towards political freedom for others in the region—turn its back on
liberal democracy?
An Interpretation
The title of this chapter refers to the “loss” of liberal democracy in
Poland. The question that must necessarily precede any attempt to
explain such a loss is to ask what exactly has been lost. To that end, one
must come to grips with what liberalism means in Poland and how it has
been understood in the context of freedom.
Polish commentators offer a useful start to such discussion by pointing
out that the successful establishment and functioning of liberal
democracy in Poland occurred under, what they term, the Western stimulus.
The idea of liberal democracy, in other words, was a foreign import
not a home-grown philosophy, and as such it carries no native tradition
(Wnuk-Lipinski 1996; Szacki 2002). What is more, while transition to
democracy in Poland was driven by the slogan of “catching up with the
West,” for many Poles today the current troubled state of the West raises
the question of whether catching up still makes sense and, if so, what
does this actually entail. The raison d’etre, therefore, has been undermined,
with negative consequences for Poland’s liberal elite. But, of
course, the roots of the problem reach much deeper and, as it is usually
the case, can be found in history.
At least three historical factors can be distinguished in the search
for a possible explanation for Poland’s populist turn. The first has
been a historical trajectory inauspicious to the entrenchment of liberalism.
At the time when the American Revolution inspired the drafting
of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen adopted
in 1789, Poland embarked on her long struggle for independence.
102  U. van BEEK
The struggle was not guided by the idea of the inviolable right to
liberty of the individual, but that of the plurality. The relatively brief
period of the regained independent statehood from 1918 to 1939 by
a country sandwiched between communist Russia and the increasingly
fascist Germany did little to sow the liberal seed. The subsequent attack
by both these neighbours on Poland in September 1939 and the ensuing
extermination policy against the Poles, and against the elite in particular,
were once again mainly about survival as a nation. The forced
post-war incorporation of Poland into the Soviet Bloc rekindled the
desire to achieve freedom from foreign domination, but was yet again
fuelled chiefly by the idea of national freedom. And throughout these
turbulent two centuries, the Catholic Church—the very epitome of
conservatism—was seen as the only refuge where one could feel truly
Polish.
By contrast, Western liberal democracies might be internally differentiated
but they are all contained within a common and well-defined
value system. This normative delineation is based on the core belief in a
specific place of the free individual in the collective. In the Western cultural
sphere, this standing is defined by the rights and responsibilities of
the individual rooted in the emancipating ideas of the Enlightenment
and the French Revolution. In other cultural spheres, the status of the
individual in the context of the collective is decided by different cultural
norms that have formed under different historical processes (Baszkiewicz
1998). This suggests that the transfer of democratic institutions and procedures
and their implantation into a culturally alien ground might be
a far easier task than the transplanting of liberal values necessary for a
healthy growth of democracy.
In Poland, and elsewhere in the region, the final stages of communism
witnessed what could be taken for the arrival of such a receptive normative
climate in the upsurge of a civic culture driven by unrealized
freedom aspirations and widely felt deprivations in the status of a citizen.
This impression was particularly strong during the period of the domino
effect starting with the emergence of the “Solidarity” Trade Union
movement in Poland and the later Polish Round Table talks, moving
on to the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia, and the reform negotiations
between the communist elite and the opposition in Hungary.
This impression was misleading, however, because it was derived from
the actions and opinions of the anti-communist elite who challenged the
oppressive regime and whose discourse was conducted in the language of
4  THE RETURN OF NATIONALIST ETHOS: THE LOSS OF LIBERAL …  103
a democratic culture. The same could not be said for the respective societies
at large, but even so, in the early stages of transformation the elite
enjoyed authentic mass support, which created conditions conducive to
the building of liberal democracy on the ruins of communism (WnukLipinski
2004).
The second factor that might explain Poland’s populist turn relates to
the length of uninterrupted democratic persistence in a given setting. As
Robert Dahl (1997) noted, democratic consolidation requires a strong
democratic culture characterized by sufficient emotional and pragmatic
attachment to democratic procedures. For this to happen, time is
needed. Many authors agree that the longer the period of uninterrupted
democratic habituation lasts, the greater the chances for the entrenchment
of a liberal civic culture and its acceptance as a natural social environment
(Muller and Seligson 1994; Barry 1978; Schmitter and Karl
1991). Time has not been on Poland’s side.
The third explanatory variable refers to the nature of the autocratic
regime from which a country transits to democracy (Geddes 1999;
Teorell 2010). Each type has a specific identity that creates a specific set
of problems after transition. At the most general level, the communist
type affected those it ruled by the Marxist idea of materialist determinism
in which the human being was seen as subject to predetermined
historical processes, which tended to instil passivity, risk-aversion, and
reliance on the state. But the hypocritical nature and the internal contradictions
of the communist system bestowed a much more tangible
and damaging legacy. The theoretically attractive, but in reality duplicitous
version of the “common good” as experienced under communism,
has left many questioning this very principle on which good governance
rests. The concepts of law and power were similarly corrupted. The former
was equalled with the will of the ruling elite; while holding power
was seen more as a goal in itself and, especially, as a means of access to
benefits.
The arrival of democracy in 1989 did not dispel the systemic confusion.
A survey conducted three years hence revealed that only 9% of
respondents thought democracy replaced communism for good; 27%
assumed that even though the communist regime had collapsed it was
difficult to say if that was a permanent state of affairs or not, and, significantly,
18% saw the Catholic Church as the new “leading force,” while
16% perceived “Solidarity” as a new dictatorship, and 15% thought the
communists were still in power (Roszkowski 1995).
104  U. van BEEK
The difficult task of crafting a new democracy under such a taxing historical
bequest soon began emerging, both at the elite and at the societal
levels, and in between the elite and the society. The first cracks appeared
with the disintegration of the nationwide “Solidarity” movement as
it inevitably splintered into different ideological groupings and parties.
The disintegration facilitated the entrance onto the political scene of
many new actors and the comeback of some of the old communist ones,
albeit reorganized under different guises. While this dynamic could be
regarded as a natural progression towards the emergence of democratic
multiparty politics, the political polarization that had emerged in Poland
led to extraordinarily deep cleavages as the various parties clashed over
all issues, including such core ones as market economy, privatization, and
de-communisation. Equally troubling has been the carry-over authoritarian
tendency of keeping closed the channels of communication between
the elected representatives and their constituencies (Roszkowski 1995;
Grabowska 1995; Wasilewski 1995).
At the same time, the arrival of capitalism brought social divisions and
inequalities unknown under communism. This was despite the successful
“shock therapy” that transformed the stale-planned economy into
a thriving market economy, attracting foreign investment, promoting
impressive economic growth, and creating a new middle class and financial
upper classes. But rather than first building a strong and transparent
state and putting in place appropriate regulation to assure an equitable
development of the society as a whole, the neoliberal elite reduced the
role of the state. Consequently, the considerable successes did not translate
into the creation of a social welfare state of the Western European
kind and the fulfilment of hopes for a just and participatory social order
that most Poles associated with liberal democracy. Instead, economic
exclusions appeared, especially of senior citizens and the young, with an
unemployment rate among the latter at 21.1% in 2015, leading to the
emigration of over 2.3 million young Poles to Western European countries,
and indirectly contributing to Brexit (Karolewski and Benedikter
2016). And as promises for improvement were not met, frustrations
developed eroding the legitimacy of the liberal regime.
As a consequence and rather ironically, liberalism, or more precisely
the miscomprehension of the concept in Poland, has become the most
divisive fault line splitting the nation. Instead of blurring political differences
and allowing independent groups to coexist amicably and cooperate
with each other on the basis of trust and tolerance, a new ideological
4  THE RETURN OF NATIONALIST ETHOS: THE LOSS OF LIBERAL …  105
monopoly emerged. In time, many citizens whose expectations were not
fulfilled started to equate liberalism with all evil, perceiving it as divisive;
anti-Catholic, hence anti-Polish; culpable of perpetuating neoliberal
exploitation globally; and devoid of moral values. At the same time, liberal
elite came to be seen as cold and rational technocrats obsessed with
the market and disinterested in the welfare of ordinary people.
Polish cosmopolitan elite bear much responsibility for such popular
misconceptions of liberal democracy. Preoccupied as they were with
“catching up” with the West, they did not promote the political aspects
of liberalism, nor did they impart to the society the emancipatory essence
of liberal values, an omission that is sometimes attributed to their reluctance
to openly promote such values for fear of evoking the animus of
the Catholic Church (Szacki 2002). Instead, the liberal leadership collapsed
the political and normative spheres into the economic one, creating
the overwhelming impression that liberalism was essentially about
everybody becoming rich, or at least better off.
Writing over two decades ago, Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski, one of
Poland’s leading sociologists and political commentators at the time
(Wnuk-Lipinski 1996) warned against the absence of political thought.
He also bemoaned the lack of a vision that would mobilize genuine support
among the majority of the people and offer them, even if only partially,
a sense of a new political identity. In his view, the articulation of a
target goal was of critical importance for the democratic political process
because it provided the average citizen with a reference point for the formulation
of his or hers own political preferences: “If there is no vision,
there is nothing to identify with, and there is nothing to support” (1996:
271), with the result that values morph into interests.
Unfortunately, Wnuk-Lipinski’s prophetic words fell on deaf ears.
The detached liberal elite failed to appeal to peoples’ minds and hearts.
By so doing, they had opened up a space for their critics from both the
Left and the Right to enter with their tools of trade ready and honed to
play on human emotions. Neither those on the Left nor those on the
Right are afraid to stir up passions or paint the black and white picture
of “us” the good ones versus “them” the bad ones, and both sides speak
of emancipation—not of the human spirit, though, but from under the
“dictatorship” of global capital or the EU. However, while the Left in
Poland remains stuck in the passé Marxist terminology of class struggle
and Western capitalist exploitation and as such attracts little public
attention in the post-communist society, the messages of the Right fit
106  U. van BEEK
perfectly into the troubled Zeitgeist with all its current anxieties (Tokarski
2016). And PiS has become adept at unscrupulously manipulating
societal apprehensions by invoking the familiar calming symbols of the
Church and the Polish nation under its moral guidance in an alien world.
PiS: Policies and Reactions
A veteran Polish sociologist coined the phrase “anti-communist bolshevism”
to describe PiS and its policies (Staniszkis 2016). In her view,
which reflects that of the majority of Polish academic commentators,
the party displays an archaic concept of governance based on the conviction
that ruling equates with instilling fear, and is about status, symbolism,
and imposition of the government’s will on the populace without
encountering resistance; an attitude not unlike that of the erstwhile communist
regime.
PiS is a radically conservative party. If political liberalism is understood
as a system, which sets limits on government’s interference with
the private lives, worldviews, and habits of the citizens, the Polish ruling
party’s policies represent the exact opposite. The policies are aimed
at forcing the whole of the society to transform—for its own good—
under the party’s “Good Change” slogan. Echoing the position of the
Catholic Church, PiS is anti-abortion and anti-in vitro fertilization, and
it stands for disciplinarian paternalism from the level of the government
to that of the family, seeing the family, not the individual, as at the most
essential component of the society. The party is also highly insensitive
to feminist issues, censures homosexuality, and uses incendiary language
about immigrants. In short, PiS stands against most of the values that are
seen as progressive in Western democracies. And in trying to impose the
“good change,” PiS is not averse to breaking the law and using underhanded
tactics, including taking decisions in parliament late at night or
early in the morning, with short notices given to opposition parties.
The “Good Change” slogan extends to Poland’s foreign policy, especially
within the European Union. On the face of it, Poland under PiS
remains entrenched in EU structures and the party continues to pursue
some of the main policy objectives of its liberal predecessors, but
beneath that façade there is a fundamental paradigm shift. Whereas all
of the country’s previous post-communist administrations regarded
Europe as a chance for Poland to find security within the structures of
NATO and enjoy prosperity and peace as a member state of the EU,
4  THE RETURN OF NATIONALIST ETHOS: THE LOSS OF LIBERAL …  107
PiS regards Europe not as a chance, but as a risk—if not a danger—for
Poland. This reassessment is based not only on highly negative perceptions
of the EU and pessimism about its future, but also on the way in
which the ruling party defines the Polish nation; a definition that considers
it to be a cultural and historical entity, not a political community
of citizens. In line with this logic, and as already stated in its Manifesto,
PiS continues to insist that the EU will survive only if it foregoes integration
in favour of a union of sovereign national states (Stefan Batory
Foundation 2016). Integration has been also questioned by PiS on the
grounds of faulty representation. The Polish Foreign Minister, Jan
Waszczykowski, speaking in parliament remarked that proponents of
closer integration want economic governance to be coordinated by the
political union and yet “today there is no fair and democratic way of electing
legitimate authorities of such a union” (Speech January 29, 2016).
More belligerently, PiS asserts that it will not tolerate any outside
interference into Poland’s sovereign affairs, even if the country’s existing
laws should be perceived to have been broken. This attitude ignores
the fact that on accession to the EU Poland accepted the Copenhagen
Criteria, which require the joining state to preserve the institutions of
democratic governance and human rights, and respect the obligations
and intents of the EU (Laboratorium Wiez 2016).
PiS’s aggressive stance has been contributing to Poland’s diplomatic
isolation and the country’s distancing from mainstream European politics.
The collision course with the EU was set over PiS’s introduction of
new media laws and, above all, those governing the Polish Constitutional
Tribunal. In response, on January 13, 2016, the European Commission
launched a formal investigation into PiS’s alleged disempowerment of
the checks and balances principle protecting the independence of democratic
institutions. This was the first such action taken by the EU against
one of its full member states (Karolewski and Benedikter 2016).
The controversy surrounding the Constitutional Tribunal, both outside
and inside the country, is so vast and complex that a broad outline
only can be presented here. According to the European Commission, PiS
is undermining the separation of powers principle by attempting to tip
the balance in favour of the executive by using its majority in the legislative
body against the judiciary. Is this the case? Unequivocally “yes.”
Already as Prime Minister (2006–2007), Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the then
and current leader of PiS, presented a project aimed at curbing the
powers of the Constitutional Tribunal, thus making clear his party’s
108  U. van BEEK
preference for a majoritarian model of democracy, rather than a liberal
one based on the rule of law and separation of powers. Gaining power as
a majority party placed PiS in a position to implement such designs.
Consequently, the Constitutional Tribunal debacle has emerged with
the topic becoming a political battlefield for the government, parliamentary
opposition, civil society organizations, and almost the entire legal
profession in the country. In the broadest terms, PiS believes that its
electoral victory in 2015 made it clear Poles wanted the new government
to deliver a wholesale change, which in the party’s view should start not
with amending the constitution, but with changing the institution that
guards it, that is, the Constitutional Tribunal. The opposition maintains
that if any changes were needed, the constitution should be amended
and this should be done according to the procedures defined in that very
founding document (Kultura Liberalna 2016: 2).
In the opinion of some members of the legal profession, the root
of the problem can be found in the provision contained in the 1997
Constitution, which leaves both the organizational and the procedural
aspects of the Constitutional Tribunal in the hands of the Legislative
(article 197 of the constitution). As they explain, the proviso is the result
of an incomplete transformation from the communist political system in
which the Sejm (parliament) was the highest organ of state power, to one
based on the principle of separation of powers. Among the many negative
implications emanating from the proviso, the most concerning is the
method of choosing judges for the Constitutional Tribunal; the judges
are selected by a parliamentary majority, and not by means of a compromise
reached between the legislative majority and the minority.
Since a majoritarian practice has been in operation under the liberal
government, PiS is able to claim that it merely continues an already
established procedure. Some of the jurists stress that the European
Commission failed to notice this irregularity when the liberal government
was in power and only started to perceive it as a threat to the rule
of law in Poland once the populist PiS took over. On those grounds they
consider the intervention by the European Commission as hypocritical,
arguing that if each EU member state is supposed to be treated equally,
the same member state must also be treated equally in terms of consecutive
parliaments, even if the respective assemblies are constituted by a
majority of two different political parties (Debata akademicka 2016).
But a Report prepared for the Helsinki Foundation for Human Right
(Report 2015–2016) makes it clear that PiS has gone well beyond simply
4  THE RETURN OF NATIONALIST ETHOS: THE LOSS OF LIBERAL …  109
perpetuating a bad precedence. The authors of the Report do refer to
the contested selection of new judges, tracing its origins back to a temporary
regulation of June 2015 enacted by the previous government that
made possible for the then ruling liberal majority to nominate five new
judges to the Constitutional Tribunal. However, this problem has been
exacerbated by the regulatory amendments implemented by PiS since
November 2015. These amendments effectively undermine the functioning
of the Constitutional Tribunal as the executive has usurped for itself
the right to verify the decisions taken by the Tribunal, refuse to accept
them and/or carry them out.
In reaction to the amendments, there emerged a strong lobby defending
the Constitutional Tribunal. Among the lobbyist are the courts—
led by the High Court and the Supreme Administrative Court—various
legal structures, law associations, law departments at universities, and
the general public—with thousands of citizens participating in marches
and demonstrations and presenting petitions to the government (Raport
2016). The most vocal and visible among the latter is the Committee
for the Defence Democracy (KOD) founded in response to the constitutional
crisis (Komitet Obrony Demokracji 2016).
In April 2016, the Centre for Research on Public Opinion conducted
a survey to gauge public perceptions of the crisis surrounding
the Constitutional Tribunal (CBOS 2016: 62). The results revealed
that nearly half of the respondents declared they stood on the side of
the Constitutional Tribunal and factions opposed to PiS; over a quarter
expressed support for PiS on this issue, as shown in Fig. 4.3.
Supporting one or the other side in the debate was strongly correlated
with the respondents’ self-identification. Of those supporting the
position of the ruling party and its government, 59% placed themselves
politically on the Right, and 69% were very religious, attending mass a
few times a week. The majority of respondents supporting the Tribunal
placed themselves on the Left (73%) or in the centre (62%) of the political
spectrum and were mostly non-practicing Catholics (64%) or attending
mass only on occasion (60%) (CBOP 62:4/2016).
To establish the impact of the opposing “narratives” meant to sway
the public one way or the other, respondents were asked if they agreed
or disagreed with the following 10 statements, giving them five choices:
“Strongly agree,” “Partially agree,” “Partially disagree,” “Strongly disagree,”
and “Hard to tell”.
110  U. van BEEK
	 1. PiS attempts to disable the Constitutional Tribunal so it can rule
unrestricted.
	 2. PiS only wishes to improve governance.
	 3. The Constitutional Tribunal wants to paralyse governance of the
country and puts itself above the law.
	 4. The Constitutional Tribunal is doing its duty and safeguards
democracy and the rule of law in Poland.
	 5. The opposition is using the Constitutional Tribunal to attempt to
overthrow a legally elected government.
	 6. The opposition cares for democracy and the rule of law in Poland.
	 7. The EU, its politician, and its institutions care about democracy
and the rule of law in Poland.
	 8. The EU, its politician, and its institutions have been from the start
unfriendly towards PiS and support the opposition.
	 9. The European Commission cares for democracy and the rule of
law in Poland.
	10. The European Commission has little understanding of Poland and
what is happening in that country.
Fig. 4.3  Support for opposing narratives (Source Figure constructed using
data from CBOS Survey Report (62:4) 2016. http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.
POL/2016/K_062_16.PDF)
4  THE RETURN OF NATIONALIST ETHOS: THE LOSS OF LIBERAL …  111
Two indicators were constructed on the basis of the responses. The first
showed the effect of PiS’s “narrative”; the second one the anti-PiS “narrative”.
The first indicator was constructed by counting the “Strongly
agree” and “Partially agree” responses with regard to the following
statements:
•	 PiS wishes only to improve governance.
•	The Constitutional Tribunal wants to paralyse governance of the
country and place itself above the law.
•	 The opposition using the Constitutional Tribunal attempts to overthrow
a legally elected government.
•	The European Commission has little understanding of Poland and
what is happening in that country.
The second indicator was constructed by counting the “Strongly agree”
and “Partially agree” responses with regard to the following statements:
•	PiS attempts to disable the Constitutional Tribunal so it can rule
unrestricted.
•	The Constitutional Tribunal is doing its duty and safeguards
democracy and the rule of law in Poland.
•	 The opposition cares for democracy and the rule of law in Poland.
•	 The EU, its politician, and its institutions care about democracy and
the rule of law in Poland.
•	 The European Commission cares for democracy and the rule of law
in Poland.
Figure 4.4 illustrates reactions to the PiS narrative by the number of
statements with which the respondents have agreed. Thirty-one per cent
of respondents did not agree with any one of the five statements; eleven
per cent of the respondents agreed with all five statements.
Positive reactions were noted for less than two statements (Average:
1.86).
Figure 4.5 shows reaction to the anti-PiS narrative, once again by the
number of statements with which the respondents have agreed. Twentysix
per cent of respondents did not agree with any one of the five statements;
twenty per cent agreed with all five statements. Positive reactions
were noted for more than two statements (Average: 2.31). The results
112  U. van BEEK
Fig. 4.4  Impact of PiS narrative by reaction to statements (Source Figure constructed
using data from CBOS Survey Report (62:11) 2016. http://www.cbos.
pl/SPISKOM.POL/2016/K_062_16.PDF)
Fig. 4.5  Impact of anti-PiS narrative by reaction to statements (Source Figure
constructed using data from CBOS Survey Report (62:12) 2016. http://www.
cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2016/K_062_16.PDF)
4  THE RETURN OF NATIONALIST ETHOS: THE LOSS OF LIBERAL …  113
show that in April 2016 just under half of the respondents (45%) stood
on the side of the Constitutional Tribunal, against a little more than a
quarter (29%) of those who backed PiS on this issue, with neither of the
respective “narratives” being fully accepted, but with slightly more credibility
given to anti-PiS interpretations.
More than a year later, in July 2017, with the powers of the
Constitutional Tribunal having been seriously curtailed in the interim by
the ruling party, a survey revealed that 45% of respondents were critical
of the Tribunal. The assessments were closely correlated with party political
preferences: 47% of PiS supporters approved of the Tribunal, against
74% of polled supporters of the liberal PO party who held critical opinions
about it (CBOS 2016).
Having successfully hollowed out the Constitutional Tribunal by
assuring the constitutionality of laws PiS tries to push through the parliament
would not be questioned, the party set its sights next on disempowering
the National Judicial Council and the Supreme Court. When
the proposed amendment laws regarding these two institutions were first
mooted in early 2017, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in an
unprecedented statement of February 2, 2017, accused the government
of having used a fait accompli to undermine the constitutional foundations
of the state, and of trying to dismantle the remnants of the independence
of the judiciary in the country. She called on all judges to resist
those attempts by appealing to their honour and civic duty (Chief Justice
2017).
In the opinion of the Supreme Court judges, the proposed laws
would divest the National Judicial Council of its main function, which
is to guard the independence of the courts and the autonomy of the
judges. Invoking Article 187 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court
pointed out that the proposed amendment would violate the constitution
by shifting the control of the nomination of judges from the judiciary
to the politicians. Article 31b of the proposed legislation would in
effect make the nomination of each new judge subject to parliamentary
majority. On February 2, 2017, the proposed law was thus summarily
dismissed as unacceptable by the Supreme Court (Supreme Court statement
2017).
Despite the strong objections by the judiciary and widespread public
protests, a  bill was rushed through parliament in July 2017 that
would pave the way for government control of the Supreme Court.8 It
is worthwhile noting that during the relevant parliamentary debate a PiS
114  U. van BEEK
MP explained that the law was meant to “correct” the judiciary system
in Poland by enabling the much delayed process of de-communisation to
take place, which the ruling party accused the judiciary of having failed
to conduct (Parliamentary Debate 2017).
In a surprise move, Poland’s President, Andrzej Duda, vetoed the
proposed judicial reforms. The former member of PiS, who earlier
rejected a meeting on the crisis with the President of the European
Council, Donald Tusk, stated he did not feel the law would strengthen
a sense of justice. But he added a new law was necessary and that with
the help of experts he would prepare relevant amendments within two
months on both the Supreme Court and the National Judicial Council.
Thus, at the time of writing, the final outcome remains uncertain
(Presidential Veto 2017).
President Duda’s veto and especially continuing public disaffection
suggest the ruling party might find it harder to impose its will than it
assumes. A case in point has been public resistance to the earlier attempt
by PiS to push through at speed an expensive reform of the educational
system. The proposed reform was not tabled for public debate or comments,
and no explanation was given as to why PiS deemed it necessary
to return to the educational system that had existed in communist
Poland. A series of mass protests by teachers and teachers associations
rolled across the country in October 2016 (Kultura 2016/41).
The demonstrations by teachers were but part of a series of protests
against the top-down “reforming” tendency of PiS that has become its
hallmark. But the game changer appears to have been the massive display
of opposition to the proposed amendment to the abortion law. Since
1993 Poland has had one of the most stringent legislations in Europe,
with abortion available only in cases of rape, incest, serious foetal defects,
or threat-of-life to the mother. The 1993 law was a compromise between
the communist era of unrestricted abortions and the pro-life proponents
of a total ban, strongly supported by the Church. PiS decided to walk
away from the compromise, proposing an amendment to the law that
would make all abortions illegal, regardless of circumstances.
Anger at the proposal brought out thousands onto the streets. The
“Black Protest,” so named after the mostly black-clad female marchers,
was the first significant political setback for PiS (Kulisz 2016). The
unprecedented withdrawal of the proposal by PiS in the face of the mass
protest was the immediate consequence, but there were other, more futureprojecting
implications. First, the protest of October 3, 2016 was the
4  THE RETURN OF NATIONALIST ETHOS: THE LOSS OF LIBERAL …  115
outcome of an unmatched in speed and breadth public mobilization not
only of women but also of men, with many of the participants having been
previously politically disengaged. Second, even some of the newspapers
known for their Right-leaning sympathy expressed disapproval, with one
editor declaring that for him the “good change” was over (Dziennik.pl.
2016). Third, by withdrawing the proposal PiS let down its own Catholicconservative
electorate inviting criticism under the suspicion that either
the party was never actually committed to the proposal and merely was
using it in a political game, or that it withdrew from its earlier position out
of weakness so as not to deepen further the public wrath that it found it
could not control (Kultura Liberalna 2016: 40).
The temporary dip in approval ratings for PiS quickly recovered
to former levels, but the party’s arrogance might have been somewhat
tempered by the realization that it is not invincible and cannot rule as it
pleases. Meanwhile, citizens had a chance to remind themselves of the
power they wield to decide their own affairs.
Concluding Reflections
In Poland, the living memory of a deeply troubled history and the teaching
of the Catholic Church are inseparably enmeshed and jointly define
the psyche of the nation. The cultivation of liberalism in such ground,
like that of an exotic plant, requires special care. As the above analyses
documented, such care was not taken. Having defined liberalism mainly
in economic terms, Polish liberal elite implemented their ambitious economic
programme with great success and managed to change the country
into the poster child of post-communist transition. And for a time
high expectations of a better life for all, buttressed by robust economic
growth, stimulated constituencies to favour liberal economic and political
reforms. Yet while the liberal neo-capitalist model was highly successful
in producing a new middle class and financial upper classes as
well as attracting foreign investment, the lower strata of the population
began to feel gradually disenfranchised as high hopes were replaced by
a socio-economic decline, aggravated by what was perceived as a disconnect
between the elite and the citizens. And as liberalism—such as it was
understood in Poland—lost its lustre, the traditional mindset came to the
fore opening the door for another political option to enter.
Comparing support for populism in Poland with support for populist
parties in Western Europe, as examined by Inglehart and Norris, two
116  U. van BEEK
conclusions can be drawn. First, on the basis of election results, which
revealed strong populist tendencies among the young cohort, the optimistic
expectation that when the older generation dies there will be
return to more progressive values, is not pertinent to Poland. Second,
the finding that the economic factor plays a lesser role in populist support
than the cultural factor is equally inapplicable. Instead, in Poland,
the two factors work together, reinforcing each other. PiS assures this
by combining leftist redistributive measures, approximating Western
European social market economies, with a rightist populist agenda that
coincides with the conservative Catholic values of large sections of the
electorate. Whereas the economic measures have been exerting a positive
socio-economic influence, the extreme brand of populism PiS represents
is dragging the country backwards. The blurring of the Church-state
line; the re-emergence of deep suspicion of neighbours, Germany and
Russia in particular; xenophobia; and intolerance all have raised their
ugly heads under the current regime, alienating Poland from the
European Union and its values.
Does this mean that Poland is witnessing its final days of democracy, as
some fear? The ultimate outcome of the government’s interference with
the judical system and its efforts to undermine the separation of powers
principle are not possible to predict. However, there is room for guarded
confidence in the robust civic engagement of many among the majority
of citizens who do not support PiS and who are ready to stand up in
defence of their democratic institutionsand civil liberties. Still, to return
to power and retain it, liberal elite will have to reinvent themselves. In the
cultural sphere, unlike their Western counterparts, they do not have the
rich repository of emancipatory values to fall back upon, so they will have
to become creative and start from scratch. In a country as overwhelmingly
Christian as Poland, Christianity could prove a useful catalyst to
help make the connection between liberal values and the legacy of the
Christian tenets of equality of status and individual liberty on which liberal
democracy rests. In the economic sphere, liberal elite—and not just
in Poland—will have to learn how to put the people first.
Notes
1. The authors note that the traditional association in Western Europe of
populism with the Right fails to capture certain core features of today’s
populist parties in other parts of the world.
4  THE RETURN OF NATIONALIST ETHOS: THE LOSS OF LIBERAL …  117
2. Unfortunately, the study does not offer a speculative explanation as to why
the “older cohorts”, the very sixties’ generation who drove the “silent revolution,”
should now turn their backs on the progressive norms they had
fought to achieve.
3. The term refers to Donald Tusk, President of the European Council since
December 1, 2014, who was the Prime Minister of Poland and co-founded
the liberal Civic Platform party, which PiS defeated in the October 2015
election.
4. This core campaign promise (called 500+) has been implemented; the others
have been either implemented partially or not at all.
5. With a voter turnout of 50.92% the seven parties, which gained parliamentary
representation included: Peace and Justice (PiS) 37.58% of
votes; Platforma Obywatelska (PO) 24.09%; Together 3.62%; KORWiN
4.76%; Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 5.13%; United Left (ZL) 7.55%;
Kukiz’15 8.81%. http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/wybory-parlamentarne-
2015-pkw-podala-ostateczne-wyniki/zqe59j.
6. More telling still has been the relative drop in support for PO when compared
with the 2011 election in which 48% of the electorate with higher
education voted for the liberal party against only 22% of voters who cast
their ballot for PiS.
7. The remaining group Inglehart and Norris associated with support for
populist parties were ethnic majorities. It is not possible to apply this category
to Poland, which in the wake of the Holocaust and the post-World
War II mass expulsions of minorities left the geographically shifted country
with one of the most mono-ethnic societies in the world.
8. Commenting on the manner in which the bill was passed by the parliament,
the former judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, Prof M Safian,
stated that if the bill was passed when the Tribunal was still functional, it
would have been invalidated on the grounds it violated due process of law
(Woszczyk 2017).
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